diff --git "a/test.json" "b/test.json"
new file mode 100644--- /dev/null
+++ "b/test.json"
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"appno":{"28470":["62303\/13"],"28507":["20159\/16"],"28527":["12987\/15"],"28546":["10851\/09"],"28548":["1574\/06"],"28591":["54436\/14"],"28592":["12646\/15"],"28596":["30474\/14"],"28598":["32275\/15"],"28639":["52783\/08"],"28670":["1870\/05"],"28671":["47351\/06"],"28680":["11981\/15"],"28790":["25794\/13","28151\/13"],"28835":["42119\/12"],"28866":["5794\/13"],"28858":["63129\/15","901\/16","480\/16","2200\/16","6990\/16","478\/16","891\/16","9712\/16","63138\/15"],"28853":["40192\/06"],"28893":["2961\/09"],"28895":["41738\/10"],"28910":["36384\/16"],"28924":["16483\/12"],"28935":["16363\/07"],"28936":["19356\/07"],"28948":["48917\/15"],"29007":["58216\/12"],"29010":["4772\/06"],"29047":["42332\/14"],"29108":["17605\/15"],"29107":["11220\/14"],"29147":["32779\/15"],"29164":["41237\/14"],"29165":["68059\/13"],"29176":["27122\/10"],"29184":["51714\/13"],"29189":["22495\/08"],"29211":["64724\/10"],"29212":["47287\/15"],"29218":["686\/12"],"29233":["46248\/07"],"29275":["24587\/13"],"29271":["63945\/09"],"29307":["32546\/08"],"29345":["34015\/07"],"29357":["35192\/14","10825\/09","12412\/14"],"29358":["14769\/09"],"29361":["31632\/10"],"29402":["21980\/04"],"29429":["49645\/09"],"29483":["51252\/09"],"29595":["77248\/12"],"29619":["21987\/05"],"29682":["18052\/11"],"29768":["61928\/13"],"29860":["68883\/13"],"29843":["23022\/13"],"29865":["72760\/12","60429\/12"],"29867":["36043\/13"],"29907":["21759\/15"],"29982":["4705\/13","2539\/13"],"29997":["45855\/12"],"30002":["55625\/15","40014\/16","31189\/15","38250\/16","49973\/15","54813\/15"],"30029":["58182\/14"],"30059":["72126\/14"],"30060":["30059\/15"],"30100":["39708\/07"],"30130":["55089\/13"],"30175":["34999\/16"],"30174":["8138\/16"],"30181":["34455\/10","63839\/09","45044\/06","18796\/08","49158\/09","36295\/10"],"30230":["19796\/14"],"30381":["65263\/09"],"30385":["54227\/14"],"30478":["50236\/06"],"30490":["3625\/15"],"30561":["60890\/08"],"30673":["14416\/06"],"30676":["52550\/08"],"30699":["67981\/16"],"30705":["1167\/15"],"30741":["48852\/17"],"30735":["1089\/09"],"30753":["46454\/11"],"30754":["33234\/12"],"30757":["24459\/12"],"30938":["35061\/04"],"30959":["47580\/13"],"30966":["50157\/06"],"30967":["2674\/07"],"31153":["33586\/15"],"31175":["49869\/06","44822\/06"],"31226":["20421\/17","37702\/17","23188\/17","61689\/16"],"31276":["18877\/12"],"31273":["3289\/10"],"31335":["57269\/14"],"31337":["11467\/15"],"31352":["20102\/13"],"31382":["35523\/06"],"31387":["55912\/09"],"31512":["43852\/12"],"31515":["48724\/15"],"31517":["1128\/16"],"31538":["22457\/16"],"31547":["76379\/17","59609\/17","74677\/17"],"31546":["12018\/16"],"31599":["18052\/11"],"31645":["44436\/09"],"31657":["35432\/07"]},"docid":{"28470":"001-165758","28507":"001-167323","28527":"001-166744","28546":"001-167781","28548":"001-166745","28591":"001-166944","28592":"001-166945","28596":"001-168401","28598":"001-168406","28639":"001-167100","28670":"001-167118","28671":"001-167119","28680":"001-167806","28790":"001-168780","28835":"001-168862","28866":"001-170524","28858":"001-170044","28853":"001-169199","28893":"001-169476","28895":"001-169662","28910":"001-170646","28924":"001-170054","28935":"001-169649","28936":"001-169650","28948":"001-170031","29007":"001-170388","29010":"001-170360","29047":"001-170468","29108":"001-171099","29107":"001-171098","29147":"001-172496","29164":"001-171994","29165":"001-171778","29176":"001-171775","29184":"001-172809","29189":"001-172066","29211":"001-172934","29212":"001-172091","29218":"001-172103","29233":"001-172318","29275":"001-173509","29271":"001-173361","29307":"001-172651","29345":"001-173088","29357":"001-173251","29358":"001-173252","29361":"001-173255","29402":"001-172963","29429":"001-173619","29483":"001-174063","29595":"001-174644","29619":"001-174953","29682":"001-175846","29768":"001-176965","29860":"001-178410","29843":"001-177226","29865":"001-177351","29867":"001-177353","29907":"001-178026","29982":"001-177917","29997":"001-178178","30002":"001-178363","30029":"001-178361","30059":"001-178962","30060":"001-178921","30100":"001-178943","30130":"001-179193","30175":"001-179232","30174":"001-179231","30181":"001-177931","30230":"001-179571","30381":"001-181314","30385":"001-180719","30478":"001-181197","30490":"001-181277","30561":"001-182556","30673":"001-182845","30676":"001-182850","30699":"001-183841","30705":"001-182869","30741":"001-184372","30735":"001-183205","30753":"001-183687","30754":"001-183685","30757":"001-183338","30938":"001-184489","30959":"001-184479","30966":"001-184655","30967":"001-184657","31153":"001-187469","31175":"001-186723","31226":"001-187193","31276":"001-188125","31273":"001-187508","31335":"001-187737","31337":"001-187739","31352":"001-188726","31382":"001-187919","31387":"001-187924","31512":"001-189159","31515":"001-189166","31517":"001-189168","31538":"001-189351","31547":"001-189418","31546":"001-189417","31599":"001-189902","31645":"001-190025","31657":"001-189960"},"originatingbody":{"28470":23,"28507":26,"28527":6,"28546":27,"28548":29,"28591":6,"28592":6,"28596":6,"28598":25,"28639":6,"28670":23,"28671":29,"28680":4,"28790":7,"28835":23,"28866":23,"28858":5,"28853":6,"28893":6,"28895":8,"28910":27,"28924":8,"28935":6,"28936":6,"28948":27,"29007":7,"29010":29,"29047":6,"29108":28,"29107":28,"29147":6,"29164":4,"29165":6,"29176":27,"29184":5,"29189":6,"29211":6,"29212":7,"29218":7,"29233":6,"29275":28,"29271":7,"29307":6,"29345":23,"29357":6,"29358":6,"29361":6,"29402":8,"29429":7,"29483":27,"29595":23,"29619":23,"29682":5,"29768":25,"29860":7,"29843":7,"29865":23,"29867":23,"29907":4,"29982":4,"29997":7,"30002":27,"30029":6,"30059":23,"30060":23,"30100":6,"30130":7,"30175":23,"30174":23,"30181":6,"30230":6,"30381":27,"30385":4,"30478":27,"30490":28,"30561":27,"30673":6,"30676":6,"30699":27,"30705":4,"30741":29,"30735":5,"30753":4,"30754":4,"30757":6,"30938":6,"30959":25,"30966":5,"30967":6,"31153":23,"31175":6,"31226":27,"31276":25,"31273":7,"31335":6,"31337":27,"31352":27,"31382":7,"31387":28,"31512":27,"31515":6,"31517":6,"31538":23,"31547":27,"31546":27,"31599":8,"31645":28,"31657":23},"ECHRRanking":{"28470":1301,"28507":981,"28527":1281,"28546":981,"28548":1081,"28591":1281,"28592":1281,"28596":1181,"28598":981,"28639":1281,"28670":1291,"28671":1081,"28680":1291,"28790":1281,"28835":1281,"28866":1181,"28858":1181,"28853":1281,"28893":1281,"28895":1511,"28910":981,"28924":1511,"28935":1281,"28936":1281,"28948":1081,"29007":1311,"29010":1081,"29047":1281,"29108":1081,"29107":1081,"29147":1181,"29164":1291,"29165":1291,"29176":1081,"29184":1181,"29189":1281,"29211":1181,"29212":1291,"29218":1281,"29233":1281,"29275":981,"29271":1181,"29307":1281,"29345":1291,"29357":1291,"29358":1281,"29361":1281,"29402":1511,"29429":1291,"29483":1081,"29595":1281,"29619":1281,"29682":1291,"29768":1081,"29860":1181,"29843":1291,"29865":1291,"29867":1281,"29907":1281,"29982":1281,"29997":1281,"30002":1081,"30029":1281,"30059":1291,"30060":1291,"30100":1281,"30130":1281,"30175":1291,"30174":1291,"30181":1281,"30230":1281,"30381":981,"30385":1291,"30478":1081,"30490":1081,"30561":981,"30673":1281,"30676":1281,"30699":981,"30705":1281,"30741":981,"30735":1291,"30753":1291,"30754":1291,"30757":1281,"30938":1281,"30959":1081,"30966":1281,"30967":1281,"31153":1181,"31175":1281,"31226":1081,"31276":981,"31273":1291,"31335":1281,"31337":1081,"31352":981,"31382":1291,"31387":1081,"31512":1081,"31515":1291,"31517":1291,"31538":1291,"31547":1081,"31546":1081,"31599":1511,"31645":1081,"31657":1281},"representedby":{"28470":"HAAS F.","28507":"DANISH REFUGEE COUNCIL","28527":"PETRYAKOV S.","28546":"N\/A","28548":"MARKOV E. V.","28591":"KHRUNOVA I.","28592":"PETRYAKOV S.","28596":"MOTZ S.","28598":"SMALLENBURG A.","28639":"GLUKHOV A. V.","28670":"KUSNER N. ; TARAKHKALO O.","28671":"TARAKHKALO M.","28680":"TZEFERAKOU M.","28790":"CAMILLERI M. ; CAMILLERI K.","28835":"KARIMLI N.","28866":"KRUGER C. ; RODE O.","28858":"\u015eENSES E. ; VESEK V. ; G\u00dcZEL M. ; TURHALLI BALSAK C.  ; T\u00dcRKDO\u011eAN \u00d6. ; \u00c7\u0130FT\u00c7\u0130 M.","28853":"N\/A","28893":"ISAKAYEV G.","28895":"KERN J. ; VERBROUCK C.","28910":"HELLBORG M.","28924":"MASERA L.M. ; ZIRULIA S.","28935":"ABAZADZE T. ; LEACH P.","28936":"LEGASHVILI N.","28948":"DAVIDYAN E. ; TRENINA D.","29007":"Weiss A.","29010":"N\/A","29047":"VASILYEV I.","29108":"CIUREA A.E.","29107":"N\/A","29147":"SOKOLOVA I.","29164":"MENICHETTI S.","29165":"SHADRINA E. ; SADOVSKAYA O.","29176":"N\/A","29184":"MLINARIC R. ; VILAJTOVIC K.","29189":"STICHTING RUSSIAN JUSTICE INITIATIVE ; \u201cSRJI\/ASTREYA\u201d","29211":"VAN HAREN F.L.M.","29212":"POHARNOK B.","29218":"SLUPSKA-UCZKIEWICZ B.","29233":"RYZHOV A.I. ; SADOVSKAYA O.A. ; KALYAPIN I.A.","29275":"HATNEANU D.O. ; GRECU S.","29271":"ERRC","29307":"BOGRYAKOV E.V. ; ARSLAMBEKOV T.S. ; GLADKIKH A.G.","29345":"MARKOV E.","29357":"GLADKIKH A.G.; VANSLOVA E.M. ; SADOVSKAYA O.A. ; KALYAPIN I.A.","29358":"ALEKSANDROVICH M. E. ","29361":"","29402":"MARGARITOVA-VUCHKOVA S.","29429":"MEDVES E.","29483":"KUZMINYKH K. ","29595":"ILIEVA M.","29619":"N\/A","29682":"HISSEL V. ; VERSIE B.","29768":"","29860":"CAMILLERI M. ; CAMILLERI K.","29843":"POPESCU N.T.","29865":"AVERINSKA J.","29867":"INTLERS M.","29907":"MASCIA A.","29982":"GINESI A. ; FILIPPI S. ; CALIENDO M. ; MARCHESI A.","29997":"BALTAY L.","30002":"YERMOLAYEVA N. ; VASILYEV I. ; TRENINA D. ; DAVIDYAN E. ; ZHARINOV K. ; DENISOV A. ; RYLEYEVA E.","30029":"VASILYEV I.G.","30059":"BLUM H.","30060":"BOUZROU Y.","30100":"MARKOV E. ","30130":"POPA I.","30175":"DIETRICH O.","30174":"POVLAKIC K.","30181":"KUZNETSOV M.V. ; RYZHOV A.I. ; SADOVSKAYA O.A. ; KALYAPIN I.A. ; GLUKHOV A.V. ; FEDOROV D.V. ; CHIKOV P.V.","30230":"CVEJIC A.","30381":"PREOBRAZHENSKAYA O.","30385":"MENICHETTI S. ; CARRANO C.","30478":"KUPTSOV I.","30490":"KARSAI D.","30561":"BOYCHENYUK A. V.","30673":"MOSENKOV D.V.","30676":"ZHULANOV Z.","30699":"MASSARA R.","30705":"TSITSELIKIS K. ; SPATHIS A.","30741":"STORRVIK O.","30735":"BRICEAC A. ; C\u00c2RNA\u021a T.","30753":"DUFFY H. ; MICKUM IV G.B. ; MARGULIES J.","30754":"GOLDSTON J.A. ; SKILBECK R. ; SINGH A. ; HOLLANDER N. ; HATNEANU D.O.","30757":"LOUCAIDES L.","30938":"MOSKALENKO K. ; PREOBRAZHENSKAYA O.","30959":"N\/A","30966":"BIVOL A.","30967":"MOSKALENKO K. ; MARALYAN A.","31153":"MIHAYLOVA D. ; KASHUMOV A.","31175":"SADCHIKOVA O.V.","31226":"TRENINA D. ; DAVIDYAN E. ; ZHARINOV K. ; VASILYEV I.","31276":"N\/A","31273":"EUROPEAN ROMA RIGHTS CENTRE","31335":"KONAKOV A.P. ; TSAREV A.B.","31337":"MEMORIAL HUMAN RIGHTS CENTRE ; EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY CENTRE","31352":"DEN HARTOGH C.","31382":"ISAYEVA V. ; TSELOVALNICHENKO N. ","31387":"VERPETA V.O.","31512":"KOZYUKOV P.","31515":"PREOBRAZHENSKAYA O.","31517":"CRNOGORAC N.","31538":"MAUCERI F.","31547":"TRENINA D. ; DAVIVYAN E. ; ZHARINOV K.","31546":"TRENINA D. ; DAVIDYAN E.","31599":"HISSEL V. ; VERSIE B.","31645":"BELYAYEVA O.","31657":"MAMMADOV R."},"typedescription":{"28470":15,"28507":8,"28527":15,"28546":8,"28548":15,"28591":15,"28592":15,"28596":8,"28598":8,"28639":15,"28670":15,"28671":15,"28680":15,"28790":15,"28835":15,"28866":8,"28858":9,"28853":15,"28893":15,"28895":15,"28910":8,"28924":15,"28935":15,"28936":15,"28948":15,"29007":15,"29010":15,"29047":15,"29108":15,"29107":15,"29147":8,"29164":15,"29165":15,"29176":15,"29184":8,"29189":15,"29211":8,"29212":15,"29218":15,"29233":15,"29275":8,"29271":8,"29307":15,"29345":15,"29357":15,"29358":15,"29361":15,"29402":15,"29429":15,"29483":15,"29595":15,"29619":15,"29682":15,"29768":15,"29860":8,"29843":15,"29865":15,"29867":15,"29907":15,"29982":15,"29997":15,"30002":15,"30029":15,"30059":15,"30060":15,"30100":15,"30130":15,"30175":15,"30174":15,"30181":15,"30230":15,"30381":8,"30385":15,"30478":15,"30490":15,"30561":8,"30673":15,"30676":15,"30699":8,"30705":15,"30741":8,"30735":15,"30753":15,"30754":15,"30757":15,"30938":15,"30959":15,"30966":15,"30967":15,"31153":8,"31175":15,"31226":15,"31276":8,"31273":15,"31335":15,"31337":15,"31352":8,"31382":15,"31387":15,"31512":15,"31515":15,"31517":15,"31538":15,"31547":15,"31546":15,"31599":15,"31645":15,"31657":15},"resolutionnumber":{"28470":"","28507":"","28527":"","28546":"","28548":"","28591":"","28592":"","28596":"","28598":"","28639":"","28670":"","28671":"","28680":"","28790":"","28835":"","28866":"","28858":"","28853":"","28893":"","28895":"","28910":"","28924":"","28935":"","28936":"","28948":"","29007":"","29010":"","29047":"","29108":"","29107":"","29147":"","29164":"","29165":"","29176":"","29184":"","29189":"","29211":"","29212":"","29218":"","29233":"","29275":"","29271":"","29307":"","29345":"","29357":"","29358":"","29361":"","29402":"","29429":"","29483":"","29595":"","29619":"","29682":"","29768":"","29860":"","29843":"","29865":"","29867":"","29907":"","29982":"","29997":"","30002":"","30029":"","30059":"","30060":"","30100":"","30130":"","30175":"","30174":"","30181":"","30230":"","30381":"","30385":"","30478":"","30490":"","30561":"","30673":"","30676":"","30699":"","30705":"","30741":"","30735":"","30753":"","30754":"","30757":"","30938":"","30959":"","30966":"","30967":"","31153":"","31175":"","31226":"","31276":"","31273":"","31335":"","31337":"","31352":"","31382":"","31387":"","31512":"","31515":"","31517":"","31538":"","31547":"","31546":"","31599":"","31645":"","31657":""},"nonviolation":{"28470":"","28507":"","28527":"","28546":"","28548":"3;34","28591":"","28592":"","28596":"","28598":"","28639":"","28670":"","28671":"34","28680":"","28790":"","28835":"","28866":"","28858":"","28853":"","28893":"","28895":"","28910":"","28924":"3;13;13+P4-4;P4-4","28935":"","28936":"P4-4","28948":"","29007":"3;4;4-1","29010":"3;6;6+6-1;6-1;6-3-c","29047":"34","29108":"","29107":"","29147":"","29164":"","29165":"","29176":"","29184":"","29189":"","29211":"","29212":"3","29218":"5;5-3","29233":"3;13;13+3","29275":"","29271":"","29307":"","29345":"6;6+6-3-c;6-1;6-3-c","29357":"","29358":"","29361":"","29402":"6;6+6-3-c;6-1;6-3-c","29429":"","29483":"","29595":"3","29619":"6;6+6-3-c;6-1;6-3-c;34","29682":"5;5-1;5-1-e","29768":"","29860":"","29843":"","29865":"","29867":"","29907":"","29982":"","29997":"3;14;14+3","30002":"","30029":"5;5-1","30059":"2;2-1;3","30060":"2;2-1","30100":"","30130":"","30175":"2;3","30174":"","30181":"","30230":"","30381":"","30385":"","30478":"","30490":"3","30561":"","30673":"","30676":"","30699":"","30705":"","30741":"","30735":"3;13;13+3","30753":"","30754":"","30757":"","30938":"","30959":"","30966":"3;5;5-1;5-3;5-4;13;13+3","30967":"","31153":"","31175":"","31226":"","31276":"","31273":"","31335":"","31337":"","31352":"","31382":"3","31387":"","31512":"","31515":"","31517":"","31538":"3;8;8-1","31547":"","31546":"","31599":"3;5;5-1;5-1-e","31645":"","31657":""},"organisations":{"28470":"European Committee for the Prevention of Torture;Committee of Ministers;ECHR","28507":"ECHR","28527":"Committee of Ministers;ECHR","28546":"ECHR","28548":"European Committee for the Prevention of Torture;ECHR","28591":"Committee of Ministers;ECHR","28592":"Committee of Ministers;ECHR","28596":"ECHR","28598":"ECHR","28639":"ECHR","28670":"Committee of Ministers;ECHR","28671":"ECHR","28680":"ECHR","28790":"Commissioner for Human Rights;Court of Justice of the European Union;European Committee for the Prevention of Torture;European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights;Human Rights Watch;Inter-American Commission on Human Rights;International Court of Justice;PACE;United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights;United Nations Human Rights Committee;Committee of Ministers;ECHR","28835":"ECHR","28866":"ECHR","28858":"Commissioner for Human Rights;Venice Commission;ECHR","28853":"ECHR","28893":"ECHR","28895":"Court of Justice of the European Union;European Committee of Social Rights;ECHR","28910":"ECHR","28924":"Court of Justice of the European Union;European Committee for the Prevention of Torture;Inter-American Commission on Human Rights;International Court of Justice;International Criminal Court;Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees;PACE;United Nations Human Rights Committee;Committee of Ministers;ECHR","28935":"European Committee for the Prevention of Torture;International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia;ECHR","28936":"ECHR","28948":"Human Rights Watch;ECHR","29007":"Commissioner for Human Rights;Inter-American Commission on Human Rights;International Court of Justice;International Criminal Court;International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda;International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia;PACE;United Nations Human Rights Committee;Committee of Ministers;ECHR","29010":"ECHR","29047":"Human Rights Watch;Committee of Ministers;ECHR","29108":"ECHR","29107":"ECHR","29147":"ECHR","29164":"International Labour Organization;Committee of Ministers;ECHR","29165":"PACE;Committee of Ministers;ECHR","29176":"ECHR","29184":"ECHR","29189":"European Committee for the Prevention of Torture;ECHR","29211":"Commissioner for Human Rights;Court of Justice of the European Union;ECHR","29212":"Commissioner for Human Rights;Court of Justice of the European Union;European Committee for the Prevention of Torture;Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees;ECHR","29218":"ECHR","29233":"ECHR","29275":"ECHR","29271":"Commissioner for Human Rights;European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights;PACE;Committee of Ministers;ECHR","29307":"ECHR","29345":"ECHR","29357":"ECHR","29358":"ECHR","29361":"ECHR","29402":"European Committee for the Prevention of Torture;Committee of Ministers;ECHR","29429":"European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights;ECHR","29483":"ECHR","29595":"European Committee for the Prevention of Torture;ECHR","29619":"ECHR","29682":"ECHR","29768":"ECHR","29860":"ECHR","29843":"European Committee of Social Rights;PACE;Committee of Ministers;ECHR","29865":"ECHR","29867":"European Committee for the Prevention of Torture;ECHR","29907":"ECHR","29982":"PACE;ECHR","29997":"ECHR","30002":"Human Rights Watch;ECHR","30029":"Human Rights Watch;ECHR","30059":"ECHR","30060":"ECHR","30100":"ECHR","30130":"ECHR","30175":"ECHR","30174":"ECHR","30181":"ECHR","30230":"European Committee for the Prevention of Torture;United Nations Human Rights Committee;ECHR","30381":"ECHR","30385":"ECHR","30478":"ECHR","30490":"ECHR","30561":"ECHR","30673":"ECHR","30676":"ECHR","30699":"ECHR","30705":"European Committee for the Prevention of Torture;PACE;ECHR","30741":"Committee of Ministers;ECHR","30735":"ECHR","30753":"Commissioner for Human Rights;Eurocontrol;European Committee for the Prevention of Torture;Human Rights Watch;Inter-American Commission on Human Rights;International Court of Justice;PACE;UN Committee against Torture;Venice Commission;Committee of Ministers;ECHR","30754":"Commissioner for Human Rights;Eurocontrol;Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina;Human Rights Watch;International Court of Justice;International Criminal Court;PACE;UN Committee against Torture;Venice Commission;Committee of Ministers;ECHR","30757":"ECHR","30938":"European Committee for the Prevention of Torture;ECHR","30959":"ECHR","30966":"European Committee for the Prevention of Torture;ECHR","30967":"ECHR","31153":"ECHR","31175":"ECHR","31226":"ECHR","31276":"ECHR","31273":"European Commission against Racism and Intolerance;Advisory Committee;ECHR;FCNM","31335":"ECHR","31337":"ECHR","31352":"Commissioner for Human Rights;Human Rights Watch;United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights;ECHR","31382":"ECHR","31387":"ECHR","31512":"ECHR","31515":"ECHR","31517":"European Committee for the Prevention of Torture;ECHR","31538":"ECHR","31547":"ECHR","31546":"Human Rights Watch;Committee of Ministers;ECHR","31599":"European Committee for the Prevention of Torture;Committee of Ministers;ECHR","31645":"European Committee for the Prevention of Torture;ECHR","31657":"ECHR"},"documentcollectionid":{"28470":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"28507":["CASELAW","DECISIONS","ADMISSIBILITYCOM","ENG"],"28527":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"28546":["CASELAW","DECISIONS","ADMISSIBILITYCOM","ENG"],"28548":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","COMMITTEE","ENG"],"28591":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"28592":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"28596":["CASELAW","DECISIONS","ADMISSIBILITY","ENG"],"28598":["CASELAW","DECISIONS","ADMISSIBILITYCOM","ENG"],"28639":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"28670":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"28671":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","COMMITTEE","ENG"],"28680":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"28790":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"28835":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"28866":["CASELAW","DECISIONS","ADMISSIBILITY","ENG"],"28858":["CASELAW","DECISIONS","ADMISSIBILITY","ENG"],"28853":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"28893":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"28895":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","GRANDCHAMBER","ENG"],"28910":["CASELAW","DECISIONS","ADMISSIBILITYCOM","ENG"],"28924":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","GRANDCHAMBER","ENG"],"28935":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"28936":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"28948":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","COMMITTEE","ENG"],"29007":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"29010":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","COMMITTEE","ENG"],"29047":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"29108":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","COMMITTEE","ENG"],"29107":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","COMMITTEE","ENG"],"29147":["CASELAW","DECISIONS","ADMISSIBILITY","ENG"],"29164":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"29165":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"29176":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","COMMITTEE","ENG"],"29184":["CASELAW","DECISIONS","ADMISSIBILITY","ENG"],"29189":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"29211":["CASELAW","DECISIONS","ADMISSIBILITY","ENG"],"29212":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"29218":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"29233":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"29275":["CASELAW","DECISIONS","ADMISSIBILITYCOM","ENG"],"29271":["CASELAW","DECISIONS","ADMISSIBILITY","ENG"],"29307":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"29345":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"29357":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"29358":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"29361":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"29402":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","GRANDCHAMBER","ENG"],"29429":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"29483":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","COMMITTEE","ENG"],"29595":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"29619":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"29682":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"29768":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","COMMITTEE","ENG"],"29860":["CASELAW","DECISIONS","ADMISSIBILITY","ENG"],"29843":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"29865":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"29867":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"29907":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"29982":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"29997":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"30002":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","COMMITTEE","ENG"],"30029":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"30059":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"30060":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"30100":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"30130":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"30175":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"30174":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"30181":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"30230":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"30381":["CASELAW","DECISIONS","ADMISSIBILITYCOM","ENG"],"30385":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"30478":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","COMMITTEE","ENG"],"30490":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","COMMITTEE","ENG"],"30561":["CASELAW","DECISIONS","ADMISSIBILITYCOM","ENG"],"30673":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"30676":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"30699":["CASELAW","DECISIONS","ADMISSIBILITYCOM","ENG"],"30705":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"30741":["CASELAW","DECISIONS","ADMISSIBILITYCOM","ENG"],"30735":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"30753":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"30754":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"30757":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"30938":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"30959":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","COMMITTEE","ENG"],"30966":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"30967":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"31153":["CASELAW","DECISIONS","ADMISSIBILITY","ENG"],"31175":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"31226":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","COMMITTEE","ENG"],"31276":["CASELAW","DECISIONS","ADMISSIBILITYCOM","ENG"],"31273":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"31335":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"31337":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","COMMITTEE","ENG"],"31352":["CASELAW","DECISIONS","ADMISSIBILITYCOM","ENG"],"31382":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"31387":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","COMMITTEE","ENG"],"31512":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","COMMITTEE","ENG"],"31515":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"31517":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"31538":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"],"31547":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","COMMITTEE","ENG"],"31546":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","COMMITTEE","ENG"],"31599":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","GRANDCHAMBER","ENG"],"31645":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","COMMITTEE","ENG"],"31657":["CASELAW","JUDGMENTS","CHAMBER","ENG"]},"judges":{"28470":["Andr\u00e9 Potocki","Angelika Nu\u00dfberger","Carlo Ranzoni","Erik M\u00f8se","Ganna Yudkivska","Khanlar Hajiyev","M\u0101rti\u0146\u0161 Mits"],"28507":["Jon Fridrik Kj\u00f8lbro","Paul Lemmens","Ksenija Turkovi\u0107"],"28527":["Alena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1","Dmitry Dedov","Georgios A. Serghides","Helen Keller","Johannes Silvis","Luis L\u00f3pez Guerra","Pere Pastor Vilanova"],"28546":["Branko Lubarda","Georgios A. Serghides","Pere Pastor Vilanova"],"28548":["Carlo Ranzoni","Khanlar Hajiyev"],"28591":["Alena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1","Branko Lubarda","Dmitry Dedov","Georgios A. Serghides","Helena J\u00e4derblom","Luis L\u00f3pez Guerra","Pere Pastor Vilanova"],"28592":["Alena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1","Branko Lubarda","Dmitry Dedov","Helen Keller","Helena J\u00e4derblom","Luis L\u00f3pez Guerra","Pere Pastor Vilanova"],"28596":["Alena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1","Branko Lubarda","Dmitry Dedov","Helen Keller","Helena J\u00e4derblom","Luis L\u00f3pez Guerra","Pere Pastor Vilanova"],"28598":["Kristina Pardalos","Pauliine Koskelo","Tim Eicke"],"28639":["Alena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1","Branko Lubarda","Dmitry Dedov","Georgios A. Serghides","Helena J\u00e4derblom","Luis L\u00f3pez Guerra","Pere Pastor Vilanova"],"28670":["Andr\u00e9 Potocki","Angelika Nu\u00dfberger","Carlo Ranzoni","Ganna Yudkivska","Khanlar Hajiyev","Yonko Grozev"],"28671":["Carlo Ranzoni","Khanlar Hajiyev"],"28680":["Ale\u0161 Pejchal","Armen Harutyunyan","Kristina Pardalos","Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos","Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska","Robert Spano"],"28790":["Andr\u00e1s Saj\u00f3","Iulia Motoc","Krzysztof Wojtyczek","Marko Bo\u0161njak","Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque","Vincent A. De Gaetano","Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer"],"28835":["Andr\u00e9 Potocki","Angelika Nu\u00dfberger","Erik M\u00f8se","Khanlar Hajiyev","M\u0101rti\u0146\u0161 Mits","S\u00edofra O\u2019Leary"],"28866":["Andr\u00e9 Potocki","Angelika Nu\u00dfberger","Erik M\u00f8se","Khanlar Hajiyev","M\u0101rti\u0146\u0161 Mits","S\u00edofra O\u2019Leary","Yonko Grozev"],"28858":["Jon Fridrik Kj\u00f8lbro","Julia Laffranque","Paul Lemmens","Georges Ravarani","Ksenija Turkovi\u0107"],"28853":["Alena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1","Branko Lubarda","Dmitry Dedov","Georgios A. Serghides","Helen Keller","Luis L\u00f3pez Guerra","Pere Pastor Vilanova"],"28893":["Alena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1","Branko Lubarda","Dmitry Dedov","Georgios A. Serghides","Helena J\u00e4derblom","Luis L\u00f3pez Guerra","Pere Pastor Vilanova"],"28895":["Ale\u0161 Pejchal","Andr\u00e9 Potocki","Angelika Nu\u00dfberger","Ann Power-Forde","Dean Spielmann","Dmitry Dedov","Egidijus K\u016bris","Ganna Yudkivska","Guido Raimondi","Helena J\u00e4derblom","Johannes Silvis","Jon Fridrik Kj\u00f8lbro","Julia Laffranque","Khanlar Hajiyev","Kristina Pardalos","Luis L\u00f3pez Guerra","Mark Villiger","Neboj\u0161a Vu\u010dini\u0107","Paul Lemmens","Robert Spano","Ksenija Turkovi\u0107"],"28910":["Branko Lubarda","Dmitry Dedov","Helena J\u00e4derblom"],"28924":["Alena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1","Andr\u00e1s Saj\u00f3","Angelika Nu\u00dfberger","Dmitry Dedov","Erik M\u00f8se","Georgios A. Serghides","Guido Raimondi","Helen Keller","Khanlar Hajiyev","Kristina Pardalos","Krzysztof Wojtyczek","Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos","Luis L\u00f3pez Guerra","M\u0101rti\u0146\u0161 Mits","Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska","Neboj\u0161a Vu\u010dini\u0107","Paul Lemmens","Robert Spano","St\u00e9phanie Mourou-Vikstr\u00f6m","Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer","Georges Ravarani","Pere Pastor Vilanova"],"28935":["Branko Lubarda","Dmitry Dedov","Georgios A. Serghides","Helen Keller","Helena J\u00e4derblom","Luis L\u00f3pez Guerra","Pere Pastor Vilanova"],"28936":["Branko Lubarda","Dmitry Dedov","Georgios A. Serghides","Helen Keller","Helena J\u00e4derblom","Luis L\u00f3pez Guerra","Pere Pastor Vilanova"],"28948":["Branko Lubarda","Dmitry Dedov","Helena J\u00e4derblom"],"29007":["Andr\u00e1s Saj\u00f3","Krzysztof Wojtyczek","Marko Bo\u0161njak","Nona Tsotsoria","Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque","Vincent A. De Gaetano","Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer"],"29010":["Andr\u00e9 Potocki","Ganna Yudkivska","S\u00edofra O\u2019Leary"],"29047":["Alena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1","Dmitry Dedov","Georgios A. Serghides","Helen Keller","Helena J\u00e4derblom","Luis L\u00f3pez Guerra","Pere Pastor Vilanova"],"29108":["Iulia Motoc","Marko Bo\u0161njak","Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque"],"29107":["Iulia Motoc","Marko Bo\u0161njak","Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque"],"29147":["Alena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1","Branko Lubarda","Dmitry Dedov","Georgios A. Serghides","Helena J\u00e4derblom","Luis L\u00f3pez Guerra","Pere Pastor Vilanova"],"29164":["Armen Harutyunyan","Guido Raimondi","Kristina Pardalos","Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos","Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska","Robert Spano"],"29165":["Alena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1","Branko Lubarda","Dmitry Dedov","Helen Keller","Helena J\u00e4derblom","Luis L\u00f3pez Guerra","Pere Pastor Vilanova"],"29176":["Alena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1","Branko Lubarda","Dmitry Dedov"],"29184":["Julia Laffranque","Paul Lemmens","St\u00e9phanie Mourou-Vikstr\u00f6m","Georges Ravarani","Ksenija Turkovi\u0107"],"29189":["Branko Lubarda","Dmitry Dedov","Georgios A. Serghides","Helen Keller","Helena J\u00e4derblom","Luis L\u00f3pez Guerra","Pere Pastor Vilanova"],"29211":["Alena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1","Branko Lubarda","Dmitry Dedov","Georgios A. Serghides","Helen Keller","Helena J\u00e4derblom","Luis L\u00f3pez Guerra"],"29212":["Andr\u00e1s Saj\u00f3","Ganna Yudkivska","Krzysztof Wojtyczek","Marko Bo\u0161njak","Nona Tsotsoria","Vincent A. De Gaetano","Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer"],"29218":["Andr\u00e1s Saj\u00f3","Egidijus K\u016bris","Ganna Yudkivska","Krzysztof Wojtyczek","Marko Bo\u0161njak","Vincent A. De Gaetano","Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer"],"29233":["Alena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1","Dmitry Dedov","Georgios A. Serghides","Helen Keller","Helena J\u00e4derblom","Luis L\u00f3pez Guerra","Pere Pastor Vilanova"],"29275":["Iulia Motoc","Marko Bo\u0161njak","Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque"],"29271":["Egidijus K\u016bris","Ganna Yudkivska","Iulia Motoc","Krzysztof Wojtyczek","Nona Tsotsoria","Vincent A. De Gaetano","Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer"],"29307":["Branko Lubarda","Dmitry Dedov","Georgios A. Serghides","Helen Keller","Helena J\u00e4derblom","Luis L\u00f3pez Guerra","Pere Pastor Vilanova"],"29345":["Andr\u00e9 Potocki","Angelika Nu\u00dfberger","Carlo Ranzoni","Erik M\u00f8se","Ganna Yudkivska","M\u0101rti\u0146\u0161 Mits","Yonko Grozev"],"29357":["Branko Lubarda","Dmitry Dedov","Georgios A. Serghides","Helen Keller","Helena J\u00e4derblom","Luis L\u00f3pez Guerra","Pere Pastor Vilanova"],"29358":["Branko Lubarda","Dmitry Dedov","Georgios A. Serghides","Helen Keller","Helena J\u00e4derblom","Luis L\u00f3pez Guerra","Pere Pastor Vilanova"],"29361":["Branko Lubarda","Dmitry Dedov","Georgios A. Serghides","Helen Keller","Helena J\u00e4derblom","Luis L\u00f3pez Guerra","Pere Pastor Vilanova"],"29402":["Alena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1","Andr\u00e1s Saj\u00f3","Andr\u00e9 Potocki","Angelika Nu\u00dfberger","Dmitry Dedov","George Nicolaou","Georgios A. Serghides","Guido Raimondi","Helena J\u00e4derblom","Jon Fridrik Kj\u00f8lbro","Krzysztof Wojtyczek","Ledi Bianku","Luis L\u00f3pez Guerra","Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska","Neboj\u0161a Vu\u010dini\u0107","P\u00e4ivi Hirvel\u00e4","Paul Lemmens","Paul Mahoney","Robert Spano","Yonko Grozev","Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer","Ksenija Turkovi\u0107","Pere Pastor Vilanova"],"29429":["Carlo Ranzoni","Egidijus K\u016bris","Ganna Yudkivska","Iulia Motoc","Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque","Vincent A. De Gaetano"],"29483":["Branko Lubarda","Georgios A. Serghides","Pere Pastor Vilanova"],"29595":["Andr\u00e9 Potocki","Angelika Nu\u00dfberger","Erik M\u00f8se","M\u0101rti\u0146\u0161 Mits","Pavlina Panova","S\u00edofra O\u2019Leary","Yonko Grozev"],"29619":["Angelika Nu\u00dfberger","Carlo Ranzoni","Erik M\u00f8se","Ganna Yudkivska","S\u00edofra O\u2019Leary","Yonko Grozev"],"29682":["Jon Fridrik Kj\u00f8lbro","Ledi Bianku","Neboj\u0161a Vu\u010dini\u0107","Paul Lemmens","Robert Spano"],"29768":["Ale\u0161 Pejchal","Krzysztof Wojtyczek"],"29860":["Carlo Ranzoni","Egidijus K\u016bris","Ganna Yudkivska","Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque","Vincent A. De Gaetano","Georges Ravarani"],"29843":["Carlo Ranzoni","Ganna Yudkivska","Iulia Motoc","Marko Bo\u0161njak","Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque","Vincent A. De Gaetano"],"29865":["Andr\u00e9 Potocki","Angelika Nu\u00dfberger","Erik M\u00f8se","M\u0101rti\u0146\u0161 Mits","Nona Tsotsoria","S\u00edofra O\u2019Leary","Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer"],"29867":["Andr\u00e9 Potocki","Angelika Nu\u00dfberger","M\u0101rti\u0146\u0161 Mits","Nona Tsotsoria","Yonko Grozev","Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer"],"29907":["Armen Harutyunyan","Guido Raimondi","Kristina Pardalos","Krzysztof Wojtyczek","Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos","Ksenija Turkovi\u0107"],"29982":["Armen Harutyunyan","Guido Raimondi","Kristina Pardalos","Krzysztof Wojtyczek","Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos","Ksenija Turkovi\u0107"],"29997":["Ganna Yudkivska","Iulia Motoc","Marko Bo\u0161njak","Vincent A. De Gaetano","Georges Ravarani"],"30002":["Dmitry Dedov","Luis L\u00f3pez Guerra"],"30029":["Alena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1","Dmitry Dedov","Georgios A. Serghides","Helen Keller","Helena J\u00e4derblom","Luis L\u00f3pez Guerra"],"30059":["Andr\u00e9 Potocki","Angelika Nu\u00dfberger","Erik M\u00f8se","M\u0101rti\u0146\u0161 Mits","Nona Tsotsoria","S\u00edofra O\u2019Leary","Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer"],"30060":["Andr\u00e9 Potocki","Angelika Nu\u00dfberger","Erik M\u00f8se","M\u0101rti\u0146\u0161 Mits","Nona Tsotsoria","S\u00edofra O\u2019Leary","Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer"],"30100":["Branko Lubarda","Dmitry Dedov","Georgios A. Serghides","Helen Keller","Helena J\u00e4derblom","Pere Pastor Vilanova"],"30130":["Carlo Ranzoni","Ganna Yudkivska","Iulia Motoc","Vincent A. De Gaetano","Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer"],"30175":["Andr\u00e9 Potocki","Angelika Nu\u00dfberger","Erik M\u00f8se","M\u0101rti\u0146\u0161 Mits","S\u00edofra O\u2019Leary","Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer"],"30174":["Andr\u00e9 Potocki","Angelika Nu\u00dfberger","M\u0101rti\u0146\u0161 Mits","Nona Tsotsoria","Yonko Grozev","Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer"],"30181":["Branko Lubarda","Dmitry Dedov","Georgios A. Serghides","Helen Keller","Helena J\u00e4derblom","Luis L\u00f3pez Guerra"],"30230":["Alena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1","Branko Lubarda","Dmitry Dedov","Helena J\u00e4derblom","Luis L\u00f3pez Guerra","Pere Pastor Vilanova"],"30381":["Branko Lubarda","Georgios A. Serghides","Pere Pastor Vilanova"],"30385":["Ale\u0161 Pejchal","Guido Raimondi","Krzysztof Wojtyczek","Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos","Pauliine Koskelo","Ksenija Turkovi\u0107"],"30478":["Dmitry Dedov","Luis L\u00f3pez Guerra"],"30490":["Carlo Ranzoni"],"30561":["Helen Keller","Pere Pastor Vilanova","Mar\u00eda El\u00f3segui"],"30673":["Alena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1","Branko Lubarda","Dmitry Dedov","Helen Keller","Helena J\u00e4derblom","Pere Pastor Vilanova","Mar\u00eda El\u00f3segui"],"30676":["Alena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1","Dmitry Dedov","Georgios A. Serghides","Helen Keller","Helena J\u00e4derblom","Mar\u00eda El\u00f3segui"],"30699":["Helen Keller","Pere Pastor Vilanova","Mar\u00eda El\u00f3segui"],"30705":["Ale\u0161 Pejchal","Armen Harutyunyan","Kristina Pardalos","Krzysztof Wojtyczek","Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos","Tim Eicke"],"30741":["Erik M\u00f8se","Yonko Grozev","Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer"],"30735":["Dmitry Dedov","Ledi Bianku","Neboj\u0161a Vu\u010dini\u0107","Paul Lemmens","Robert Spano"],"30753":["Ale\u0161 Pejchal","Egidijus K\u016bris","Kristina Pardalos","Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos","Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska","Paul Mahoney","Robert Spano"],"30754":["Ale\u0161 Pejchal","Florin Streteanu","Iulia Motoc","Kristina Pardalos","Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos","Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska","Paul Mahoney","Robert Spano"],"30757":["Alena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1","Branko Lubarda","Georgios A. Serghides","Helen Keller","Helena J\u00e4derblom","Pere Pastor Vilanova"],"30938":["Alena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1","Dmitry Dedov","Georgios A. Serghides","Helena J\u00e4derblom","Pere Pastor Vilanova","Mar\u00eda El\u00f3segui"],"30959":["Ale\u0161 Pejchal","Krzysztof Wojtyczek"],"30966":["Dmitry Dedov","Jon Fridrik Kj\u00f8lbro","Neboj\u0161a Vu\u010dini\u0107","Paul Lemmens","Robert Spano"],"30967":["Alena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1","Branko Lubarda","Dmitry Dedov","Helen Keller","Helena J\u00e4derblom","Pere Pastor Vilanova","Mar\u00eda El\u00f3segui"],"31153":["Angelika Nu\u00dfberger","M\u0101rti\u0146\u0161 Mits","S\u00edofra O\u2019Leary","Yonko Grozev","Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer"],"31175":["Branko Lubarda","Dmitry Dedov","Georgios A. Serghides","Helen Keller","Vincent A. De Gaetano","Mar\u00eda El\u00f3segui"],"31226":["Alena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1","Dmitry Dedov"],"31276":["Krzysztof Wojtyczek","Pauliine Koskelo","Ksenija Turkovi\u0107"],"31273":["Egidijus K\u016bris","Ganna Yudkivska","Marko Bo\u0161njak","Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque"],"31335":["Branko Lubarda","Dmitry Dedov","Georgios A. Serghides","Helen Keller","Vincent A. De Gaetano","Pere Pastor Vilanova"],"31337":["Helen Keller","Pere Pastor Vilanova","Mar\u00eda El\u00f3segui"],"31352":["Alena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1","Dmitry Dedov"],"31382":["Carlo Ranzoni","Egidijus K\u016bris","Ganna Yudkivska","Marko Bo\u0161njak","Paulo Pinto De Albuquerque","Georges Ravarani"],"31387":["Carlo Ranzoni"],"31512":["Helen Keller","Pere Pastor Vilanova","Mar\u00eda El\u00f3segui"],"31515":["Alena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1","Dmitry Dedov","Georgios A. Serghides","Vincent A. De Gaetano","Pere Pastor Vilanova","Mar\u00eda El\u00f3segui"],"31517":["Alena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1","Branko Lubarda","Georgios A. Serghides","Helen Keller","Vincent A. De Gaetano","Pere Pastor Vilanova"],"31538":["Andr\u00e9 Potocki","Angelika Nu\u00dfberger","M\u0101rti\u0146\u0161 Mits","S\u00edofra O\u2019Leary","Yonko Grozev","Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer"],"31547":["Alena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1","Dmitry Dedov"],"31546":["Alena Pol\u00e1\u010dkov\u00e1","Dmitry Dedov"],"31599":["Angelika Nu\u00dfberger","Branko Lubarda","Carlo Ranzoni","Dmitry Dedov","Ganna Yudkivska","Georgios A. Serghides","Guido Raimondi","Helen Keller","Helena J\u00e4derblom","Jon Fridrik Kj\u00f8lbro","Kristina Pardalos","Ledi Bianku","Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos","Marko Bo\u0161njak","Neboj\u0161a Vu\u010dini\u0107","Paul Lemmens","Robert Spano","Vincent A. De Gaetano","Ksenija Turkovi\u0107","Tim Eicke"],"31645":["Marko Bo\u0161njak","Georges Ravarani"],"31657":["Andr\u00e9 Potocki","Angelika Nu\u00dfberger","M\u0101rti\u0146\u0161 Mits","Yonko Grozev","Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer"]},"courts":{"28470":"Constitutional Court;Federal Constitutional Court","28507":"","28527":"","28546":"","28548":"Supreme Court","28591":"","28592":"","28596":"Administrative Court","28598":"Administrative Court;H\u00f6gsta f\u00f6rvaltningsdomstolen;Korkein hallinto-oikeus;Supreme Administrative Court","28639":"Supreme Court","28670":"Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court;Supreme Court","28671":"Supreme Court","28680":"Court of Cassation","28790":"","28835":"","28866":"Administrative Court;Constitutional Court;Senate of the Supreme Court;Supreme Court","28858":"Constitutional Court","28853":"","28893":"","28895":"Administrative Court;Constitutional Court","28910":"","28924":"Administrative Court","28935":"","28936":"","28948":"Supreme Court","29007":"Supreme Court","29010":"Supreme Court","29047":"Supreme Court","29108":"","29107":"","29147":"","29164":"","29165":"Supreme Court","29176":"","29184":"Constitutional Court;Supreme Court","29189":"Supreme Court","29211":"Raad van State","29212":"","29218":"","29233":"","29275":"Constitutional Court","29271":"","29307":"","29345":"Supreme Court","29357":"Supreme Court","29358":"Supreme Court","29361":"","29402":"Administrative Court;Court of Cassation;Supreme Administrative Court;Supreme Court of Cassation;Supreme Court","29429":"","29483":"","29595":"Administrative Court;Supreme Administrative Court","29619":"Supreme Court","29682":"Court of Cassation","29768":"","29860":"","29843":"Court of Cassation;High Court of Cassation and Justice;Supreme Court","29865":"","29867":"Supreme Court","29907":"","29982":"Court of Cassation","29997":"","30002":"Supreme Court","30029":"Supreme Court","30059":"Administrative Court;Constitutional Court","30060":"Court of Cassation","30100":"","30130":"Constitutional Court;Court of Cassation;High Court of Cassation and Justice","30175":"Supreme Court","30174":"Administrative Court;Supreme Administrative Court","30181":"Supreme Court","30230":"Constitutional Court","30381":"","30385":"","30478":"","30490":"","30561":"","30673":"Supreme Court","30676":"","30699":"Administrative Court","30705":"","30741":"Supreme Court","30735":"Supreme Court of Justice;Supreme Court","30753":"Constitutional Court;Court of Cassation;Federal Court;Supreme Court","30754":"Court of Cassation;Federal Court;Supreme Court","30757":"Supreme Court","30938":"Supreme Court","30959":"","30966":"","30967":"Supreme Court","31153":"Administrative Court;Supreme Administrative Court","31175":"Supreme Court","31226":"Supreme Court","31276":"","31273":"Administrative Court","31335":"","31337":"Supreme Court","31352":"Raad van State","31382":"Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court;Supreme Court","31387":"Supreme Court","31512":"Supreme Court","31515":"Supreme Court","31517":"Constitutional Court","31538":"Court of Cassation;Supreme Court of Cassation;Supreme Court","31547":"Supreme Court","31546":"","31599":"Constitutional Court;Court of Cassation;Federal Constitutional Court","31645":"Administrative Court","31657":"Supreme Court"},"conclusion":{"28470":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Positive obligations) (Substantive aspect);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","28507":"Inadmissible","28527":"Violation of Article 34 - Individual applications;Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment;Positive obligations) (Substantive aspect)","28546":"Inadmissible","28548":"No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Length of pre-trial detention;Reasonableness of pre-trial detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Review of lawfulness of detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-5 - Compensation);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Degrading treatment);Violation of Article 13+6-1 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Reasonable time);No violation of Article 34 - Individual applications","28591":"Violation of Article 34 - Individual applications (Article 34 - Hinder the exercise of the right of petition);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect)","28592":"Violation of Article 34 - Individual applications (Article 34 - Hinder the exercise of the right of petition);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect)","28596":"Partly struck out of the list;Partly inadmissible","28598":"Inadmissible","28639":"Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect)","28670":"Preliminary objections joined to merits and dismissed (Article 35-1 - Exhaustion of domestic remedies);Remainder inadmissible (Article 35-3-a - Manifestly ill-founded);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation;Positive obligations);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations;Article 8-1 - Respect for home;Respect for private life);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","28671":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing);No violation of Article 34 - Individual applications (Article 34 - Hinder the exercise of the right of petition)","28680":"Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations;Article 8-1 - Respect for private life);Violation of Article 13+8 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 8-1 - Respect for private life;Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life;Positive obligations);Violation of Article 3+13 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Extradition) (Article 13 - Effective remedy;Right to an effective remedy) (Conditional) (Turkey);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","28790":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Review of lawfulness of detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention)","28835":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect)","28866":"Inadmissible","28858":"Partly inadmissible","28853":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect)","28893":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention)","28895":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Expulsion) (Conditional) (Georgia);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Expulsion;Article 8-1 - Respect for family life) (Conditional) (Georgia);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - finding of violation sufficient (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","28910":"Inadmissible","28924":"Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention;Article 5-1-f - Expulsion);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-2 - Information on reasons for arrest;Prompt information);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Review of lawfulness of detention);No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 - Prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens-{general} (Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 - Prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment;Prohibition of torture);No violation of Article 13+P4-4 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 - Prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens-{general};Prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","28935":"Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Life) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2 - Positive obligations) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Degrading treatment)","28936":"Violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 - Freedom of movement-{general} (Article 2 para. 2 of Protocol No. 4 - Freedom to leave a country);Violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 - Prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens-{general} (Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 - Prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens);No violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 - Prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens-{general} (Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 - Prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment;Positive obligations) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment;Positive obligations)","28948":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Expulsion) (Conditional) (Uzbekistan)","29007":"Remainder inadmissible;No violation of Article 4 - Prohibition of slavery and forced labour (Article 4 - Positive obligations;Article 4-1 - Trafficking in human beings);No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect)","29010":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 6+6-1 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6-3-c - Defence through legal assistance) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing)","29047":"Violation of Article 38 - Examination of the case-{general} (Article 38 - Obligation to furnish all necessary facilities);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Extradition;Positive obligations) (Substantive aspect) (Uzbekistan);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);No violation of Article 34 - Individual applications (Article 34 - Hinder the exercise of the right of application)","29108":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect)","29107":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect)","29147":"Inadmissible","29164":"Preliminary objections joined to merits and dismissed (Article 35-1 - Exhaustion of domestic remedies);Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2 - Positive obligations;Article 2-1 - Life) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation;Positive obligations) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 14+2 - Prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 - Discrimination) (Article 2 - Right to life;Article 2-1 - Life);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","29165":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","29176":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect)","29184":"Inadmissible","29189":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Torture) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing)","29211":"Inadmissible","29212":"Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention;Article 5-1-f - Expulsion;Prevent unauthorised entry into country);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Review of lawfulness of detention);No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Inhuman treatment;Prohibition of torture);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Expulsion) (Serbia);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","29218":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Length of pre-trial detention)","29233":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Torture) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);No violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Torture)","29275":"Inadmissible","29271":"Inadmissible","29307":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect)","29345":"Remainder inadmissible (Article 35-3-a - Manifestly ill-founded);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Length of pre-trial detention);No violation of Article 6+6-3-c - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Article 6-3-c - Defence through legal assistance;Legal assistance of own choosing);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","29357":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Torture) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","29358":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect)","29361":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect)","29402":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Procedural aspect);No violation of Article 6+6-3-c - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Article 6-3-c - Defence through legal assistance);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","29429":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation;Positive obligations) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 14+3 - Prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 - Discrimination) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Positive obligations);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","29483":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment)","29595":"No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect)","29619":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 5+5-4 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention) (Article 5-4 - Review of lawfulness of detention;Article 5 - Right to liberty and security);No violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing;Article 6-3-c - Defence through legal assistance);No violation of Article 6+6-3-c - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Criminal proceedings;Article 6-3-c - Defence through legal assistance);No violation of Article 34 - Individual applications (Article 34 - Hinder the exercise of the right of application)","29682":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention;Article 5-1-e - Persons of unsound mind);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","29768":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect)","29860":"Struck out of the list","29843":"Preliminary objection joined to merits and dismissed (Article 35-1 - Exhaustion of domestic remedies);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Civil proceedings;Article 6-1 - Access to court;Fair hearing);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","29865":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","29867":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect)","29907":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect)","29982":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Torture) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect)","29997":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);No violation of Article 14+3 - Prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 - Discrimination) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Degrading treatment);Violation of Article 14+3 - Prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 - Discrimination) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Effective investigation)","30002":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Expulsion) (Conditional) (Uzbekistan);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention)","30029":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Expulsion) (Conditional) (Tajikistan);No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Speediness of review)","30059":"No violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect)","30060":"No violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2 - Positive obligations;Article 2-1 - Life);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","30100":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing)","30130":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect)","30175":"No violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2 - Extradition) (Conditional) (Kosovo);No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Extradition) (Conditional) (Kosovo)","30174":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","30181":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention)","30230":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect)","30381":"Inadmissible","30385":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment;Positive obligations);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations;Article 8-1 - Respect for private life);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","30478":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect)","30490":"No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect)","30561":"Inadmissible","30673":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Torture) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing)","30676":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect)","30699":"Inadmissible","30705":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Degrading treatment)","30741":"Inadmissible","30735":"Inadmissible (Art. 35) Admissibility criteria;(Art. 35-1) Six-month period (Russia);Preliminary objection joined to merits and dismissed (Art. 34) Individual applications;(Art. 34) Victim (the Republic of Moldova);Remainder inadmissible (Art. 35) Admissibility criteria;(Art. 35-3-a) Manifestly ill-founded (the Republic of Moldova);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect) (the Republic of Moldova);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment;Prohibition of torture) (the Republic of Moldova);No violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment;Prohibition of torture) (the Republic of Moldova);No violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Effective investigation;Positive obligations) (the Republic of Moldova);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction) (the Republic of Moldova)","30753":"Preliminary objection dismissed (Art. 34) Individual applications;(Art. 34) Victim;Preliminary objections joined to merits and dismissed (Art. 35) Admissibility criteria;(Art. 35-1) Exhaustion of domestic remedies;(Art. 35-1) Six-month period;Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for family life;Respect for private life);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Inhuman treatment;Prohibition of torture);Respondent State to take individual measures (Article 46-1 - Parties to case;Article 46-2 - Individual measures);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","30754":"Preliminary objections joined to merits and dismissed (Art. 35) Admissibility criteria;(Art. 35-1) Exhaustion of domestic remedies;(Art. 35-1) Six-month period;Remainder inadmissible (Art. 35) Admissibility criteria;(Art. 35-3-a) Manifestly ill-founded;Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for family life;Respect for private life);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Inhuman treatment);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing;Impartial tribunal;Independent tribunal;Tribunal established by law);Violation of Article 2+P6-1 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Death penalty) (Article 1 of Protocol No. 6 - Abolition of the death penalty-{general});Violation of Article 3+P6-1 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Inhuman punishment;Inhuman treatment) (Article 1 of Protocol No. 6 - Abolition of the death penalty-{general});Respondent State to take individual measures (Article 46-1 - Parties to case;Article 46-2 - Individual measures);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","30757":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect)","30938":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Torture) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8-1 - Respect for family life)","30959":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect)","30966":"No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect) (the Republic of Moldova);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect) (Russia);No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect) (the Republic of Moldova);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect) (Russia);No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention) (the Republic of Moldova);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention) (Russia);No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Reasonableness of pre-trial detention;Article 5-4 - Review of lawfulness of detention) (the Republic of Moldova);No violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Degrading treatment) (the Republic of Moldova);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Degrading treatment) (Russia)","30967":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing)","31153":"Inadmissible","31175":"Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing)","31226":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Extradition) (Conditional) (Tajikistan);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Extradition) (Conditional) (Uzbekistan);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1-f - Extradition)","31276":"Partly struck out of the list;Partly inadmissible","31273":"Struck out of the list (Art. 37) Striking out applications-{general};(Art. 37-1) Striking out applications;Remainder inadmissible (Art. 35) Admissibility criteria;(Art. 35-3-a) Manifestly ill-founded;(Art. 35-3-a) Ratione materiae;Violation of Article 14+3 - Prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 - Discrimination) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Degrading treatment);Violation of Article 14+3 - Prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 - Discrimination) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Effective investigation);Violation of Article 14+8-1 - Prohibition of discrimination (Article 14 - Discrimination) (Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life;Article 8-1 - Respect for family life;Respect for home;Respect for private life);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","31335":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect)","31337":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation;Positive obligations) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations;Article 8-1 - Respect for private life)","31352":"Inadmissible","31382":"Struck out of the list (Art. 37) Striking out applications-{general};(Art. 37-1) Striking out applications;(Art. 37-1-c) Continued examination not justified;No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect)","31387":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 6+6-3-c - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing) (Article 6 - Right to a fair trial;Article 6-3-c - Defence through legal assistance)","31512":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 6 - Right to a fair trial (Article 6 - Criminal proceedings;Article 6-1 - Fair hearing)","31515":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","31517":"Preliminary objection joined to merits and dismissed (Art. 35) Admissibility criteria;(Art. 35-1) Exhaustion of domestic remedies;Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Positive obligations) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Positive obligations) (Procedural aspect);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","31538":"No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation;Positive obligations) (Procedural aspect);No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment;Positive obligations) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 - Positive obligations;Article 8-1 - Respect for private life)","31547":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Expulsion) (Conditional) (Uzbekistan);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-4 - Review of lawfulness of detention)","31546":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Expulsion) (Conditional) (Uzbekistan);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention)","31599":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);No violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention;Article 5-1-e - Persons of unsound mind);No violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention;Article 5-1-e - Persons of unsound mind);Pecuniary damage - claim dismissed (Article 41 - Pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction);Non-pecuniary damage - award (Article 41 - Non-pecuniary damage;Just satisfaction)","31645":"Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading punishment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 13+3 - Right to an effective remedy (Article 13 - Effective remedy) (Article 3 - Prohibition of torture;Degrading treatment)","31657":"Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-1 - Lawful arrest or detention);Violation of Article 5 - Right to liberty and security (Article 5-3 - Reasonableness of pre-trial detention);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Degrading treatment;Inhuman treatment) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 3 - Prohibition of torture (Article 3 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect);Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Life) (Substantive aspect);Violation of Article 2 - Right to life (Article 2-1 - Effective investigation) (Procedural aspect)"},"externalsources":{"28470":"CPT standards;Committee of Ministers\u2019 Recommendation Rec(2006)2 on the European Prison Rules;Committee of Ministers\u2019 Recommendation no. R (98) 7 concerning the ethical and organisational aspects of health care in prison","28507":"","28527":"","28546":"","28548":"","28591":"","28592":"","28596":"","28598":"","28639":"","28670":"","28671":"","28680":"","28790":"","28835":"","28866":"","28858":"","28853":"","28893":"","28895":"","28910":"","28924":"Directive 2008\/115\/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 (the \u201cReturn Directive\u201d) \u201con common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals\u201d;Bilateral agreement of 5 April 2011 between Italy and Tunisia;Council of Europe\u2019s Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) report \u201con the large-scale arrival of irregular migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees on Europe\u2019s southern shores\u201d, published on 30 September 2011;\u201cDraft articles on the expulsion of aliens\u201d adopted by the International Law Commission at its sixty-sixth session (2014), and of which the United Nations General Assembly took note by its Resolution A\/RES\/69\/119 of 10 December 2014\n\n","28935":"","28936":"","28948":"","29007":"The Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings;The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (\u201cthe Palermo Protocol\u201d)\n","29010":"","29047":"","29108":"","29107":"","29147":"","29164":"","29165":"","29176":"","29184":"","29189":"","29211":"","29212":"\u201cHungary as a country of asylum. Observations on restrictive legal measures and subsequent practice implemented between July 2015 and March 2016\u201d report by the UNHCR (published in May 2016);\u201cCrossing Boundaries: The new asylum procedure at the border and restrictions to accessing protection in Hungary\u201d report by the European Council for Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) (prepared on 1 October 2015);\u201cCase Law Fact Sheet: Prevention of Dublin Transfers to Hungary\u201d report by the European Council for Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) (prepared in January 2016);Report to the Hungarian Government on its visit to Hungary from 21 to 27 October 2015 by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT)\n","29218":"","29233":"","29275":"","29271":"","29307":"","29345":"","29357":"Article 1 of the United Nations Convention against Torture","29358":"","29361":"","29402":"Reports of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (CPT) following its visits to Bulgaria in 1999 (Burgas Investigation Detention Facility), 2002 (Burgas prison), 2006, 2008, 2014 and 2015 (Sofia Prison);Statement from European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) on 26 March 2015 on Bulgaria","29429":"Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), adopted in 1979 by the United Nations General Assembly and ratified by Romania on 7 January 1982;Comments made in respect of Romania by the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (\u201cthe CEDAW Committee\u201d) in its its thirty-fifth session (15 May - 2 June 2006)\n","29483":"","29595":"","29619":"","29682":"","29768":"","29860":"","29843":"","29865":"Report of the Latvian Ombudsman (Ties\u012bbsargs) dedicated to human-rights issues in Latvia for the year 2013","29867":"","29907":"","29982":"","29997":"","30002":"","30029":"","30059":"","30060":"","30100":"","30130":"","30175":"Report to the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) on its visit to Kosovo from 8 to 15 June 2010 (CPT\/Inf (2011) 26), 6 October 2011) of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT);Report to UNMIK on its visit to Kosovo from 15 to 22 April 2015 (CPT\/Inf (2016) 23, 8 September 2016) of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT);Kosovo country report (May 2015) of the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees;Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 of the Department of State of the United States of America;Kosovo 2016 Report (9 November 2016) of the European Commission;Blood feuds and availability of state protection\u201d (KOS104577.E, 10 October 2013) of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada : report \u201cKosovo;Report \u201cKosovo: blood feuds\u201d (1 July 2016) of the Swiss Refugee Council","30174":"Article 22 \u00a7 1 of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (1577 UNTS 3)","30181":"","30230":"","30381":"","30385":"","30478":"","30490":"","30561":"","30673":"","30676":"","30699":"","30705":"","30741":"","30735":"","30753":"2007 International Committee of the Red Cross Report;Statement of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on detention of Taliban and Al-Qaeda prisoners at the US Base in Guant\u00e1namo Bay, Cuba, 16 January 2002;Amnesty International, Memorandum to the US Government on the rights of people in US custody in Afghanistan and Guant\u00e1namo Bay, April 2002;Human Rights Watch, \u201cUnited States, Presumption of Guilt: Human Rights Abuses of Post-September 11 Detainees\u201d, Vol. 14, No. 4 (G), August 2002;International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, \u201cAnti terrorism Measures, Security and Human Rights: Developments in Europe, Central Asia and North America in the Aftermath of September 11\u201d, Report, April 2003;Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolution no. 1340 (2003) on rights of persons held in the custody of the United States in Afghanistan or Guant\u00e1namo Bay (PACE Resolution), 26 June 2003;Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe\u2019s inquiry \u2013 the Marty Inquiry (2006, 2007 and 2011 Marty Reports)\n;US Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility Report: \u201cInvestigation into the Office of Legal Counsel\u2019s Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Agency\u2019s Use of \u2018Enhanced Interrogation Techniques\u2019 on Suspected Terrorists\u201d (2009 DOJ Report);Resolution on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners (2006\/22009INI);Statement of the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture (IRCT) of February 2003;UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 29\/2006, Mr Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi and 25 other persons v. United States of America, UN Doc. A\/HRC\/4\/40\/Add.1 at 103 (2006);Human Rights Watch, \u201cUnited States: Reports of Torture of Al Qaeda Suspects\u201d, 26 December 2002;Amnesty International Report 2003 \u2013 United States of America, 28 May 2003;Amnesty International, \u201cUnlawful detention of six men from Bosnia-Herzegovina in Guant\u00e1namo Bay\u201d, 29 May 2003;Amnesty International, \u201cUnited States of America, The threat of a bad example: Undermining international standards as \u2018war on terror\u2019 detentions continue\u201d, 18 August 2003;Amnesty International, \u201cIncommunicado detention\/Fear of ill treatment\u201d, 20 August 2003;International Committee of the Red Cross, United States: ICRC President urges progress on detention-related issues, news release 04\/03, 16 January 2004;Human Rights Watch - Statement on US Secret Detention Facilities of 6 November 2005;Human Rights Watch \u2013 List of Ghost Prisoners Possibly in CIA Custody of 30 November 2005;2010 UN Joint Study (A\/HRC\/1342) of the Human Rights Council of United Nations Organisation released the \u201cJoint Study on Global Practices in Relation to Secret Detention in the Context of Countering Terrorism of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism\u201d of 19 February 2010;The Fava Inquiry \u2013 of the Temporary Committee on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners (\u201cTDIP\u201d) set up by the European Parliament on 18 January 2006;US authorities\u2019 report prepared by John Helgerson, the CIA Inspector General, in 2004 (2004 CIA Report);CIA background paper on the CIA\u2019s combined interrogation techniques (2004 CIA Background Paper) of 30 December 2004;2014 US Senate Committee Report","30754":"2007 International Committee of the Red Cross Report;Statement of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on detention of Taliban and Al-Qaeda prisoners at the US Base in Guant\u00e1namo Bay, Cuba, 16 January 2002;Amnesty International, Memorandum to the US Government on the rights of people in US custody in Afghanistan and Guant\u00e1namo Bay, April 2002;Human Rights Watch, \u201cUnited States, Presumption of Guilt: Human Rights Abuses of Post-September 11 Detainees\u201d, Vol. 14, No. 4 (G), August 2002;International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, \u201cAnti terrorism Measures, Security and Human Rights: Developments in Europe, Central Asia and North America in the Aftermath of September 11\u201d, Report, April 2003;Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolution no. 1340 (2003) on rights of persons held in the custody of the United States in Afghanistan or Guant\u00e1namo Bay (PACE Resolution), 26 June 2003\n;Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe\u2019s inquiry \u2013 the Marty Inquiry (2006, 2007 and 2011 Marty Reports);US Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility Report: \u201cInvestigation into the Office of Legal Counsel\u2019s Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Agency\u2019s Use of \u2018Enhanced Interrogation Techniques\u2019 on Suspected Terrorists\u201d (2009 DOJ Report);Resolution on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners (2006\/22009INI);Articles 26 and 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969);Statement of the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture (IRCT) of February 2003;UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 29\/2006, Mr Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi and 25 other persons v. United States of America, UN Doc. A\/HRC\/4\/40\/Add.1 at 103 (2006);Human Rights Watch, \u201cUnited States: Reports of Torture of Al Qaeda Suspects\u201d, 26 December 2002;Amnesty International Report 2003 \u2013 United States of America, 28 May 2003;Amnesty International, \u201cUnlawful detention of six men from Bosnia-Herzegovina in Guant\u00e1namo Bay\u201d, 29 May 2003;Amnesty International, \u201cUnited States of America, The threat of a bad example: Undermining international standards as \u2018war on terror\u2019 detentions continue\u201d, 18 August 2003;Amnesty International, \u201cIncommunicado detention\/Fear of ill treatment\u201d, 20 August 2003;International Committee of the Red Cross, United States: ICRC President urges progress on detention-related issues, news release 04\/03, 16 January 2004;Human Rights Watch - Statement on US Secret Detention Facilities of 6 November 2005;Human Rights Watch \u2013 List of Ghost Prisoners Possibly in CIA Custody of 30 November 2005;2010 UN Joint Study (A\/HRC\/1342) of the Human Rights Council of United Nations Organisation released the \u201cJoint Study on Global Practices in Relation to Secret Detention in the Context of Countering Terrorism of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism\u201d of 19 February 2010;The Fava Inquiry \u2013 of the Temporary Committee on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners (TDIP) set up by the European Parliament on 18 January 2006;US authorities\u2019 Report prepared by John Helgerson, the CIA Inspector General, in 2004 (2004 CIA Report);European Parliament resolution on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners (2006\/22009INI) of 14 February 2007;CIA background paper on the CIA\u2019s combined interrogation techniques (2004 CIA Background Paper) of 30 December 2004;Preamble to Protocol No. 13 to the European convention of human rights;2014 US Senate Committee Report","30757":"","30938":"","30959":"","30966":"","30967":"","31153":"","31175":"","31226":"","31276":"","31273":"","31335":"","31337":"","31352":"","31382":"","31387":"","31512":"","31515":"","31517":"CPT report on Serbia and Montenegro (CPT\/Inf (2006) 18)","31538":"","31547":"","31546":"","31599":"The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 13 December 2006;Articles 12 and 17, as well as the explanatory memorandum of the Recommendation REC (2004) 10 of the Committee of Ministers to member states concerning the protection of the human rights and dignity of persons with mental disorders;Report by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) of 8 March 2018 on the visit to Belgium from 27 March to 6 April 2017","31645":"","31657":""},"doctypebranch":{"28470":"CHAMBER","28507":"ADMISSIBILITYCOM","28527":"CHAMBER","28546":"ADMISSIBILITYCOM","28548":"COMMITTEE","28591":"CHAMBER","28592":"CHAMBER","28596":"ADMISSIBILITY","28598":"ADMISSIBILITYCOM","28639":"CHAMBER","28670":"CHAMBER","28671":"COMMITTEE","28680":"CHAMBER","28790":"CHAMBER","28835":"CHAMBER","28866":"ADMISSIBILITY","28858":"ADMISSIBILITY","28853":"CHAMBER","28893":"CHAMBER","28895":"GRANDCHAMBER","28910":"ADMISSIBILITYCOM","28924":"GRANDCHAMBER","28935":"CHAMBER","28936":"CHAMBER","28948":"COMMITTEE","29007":"CHAMBER","29010":"COMMITTEE","29047":"CHAMBER","29108":"COMMITTEE","29107":"COMMITTEE","29147":"ADMISSIBILITY","29164":"CHAMBER","29165":"CHAMBER","29176":"COMMITTEE","29184":"ADMISSIBILITY","29189":"CHAMBER","29211":"ADMISSIBILITY","29212":"CHAMBER","29218":"CHAMBER","29233":"CHAMBER","29275":"ADMISSIBILITYCOM","29271":"ADMISSIBILITY","29307":"CHAMBER","29345":"CHAMBER","29357":"CHAMBER","29358":"CHAMBER","29361":"CHAMBER","29402":"GRANDCHAMBER","29429":"CHAMBER","29483":"COMMITTEE","29595":"CHAMBER","29619":"CHAMBER","29682":"CHAMBER","29768":"COMMITTEE","29860":"ADMISSIBILITY","29843":"CHAMBER","29865":"CHAMBER","29867":"CHAMBER","29907":"CHAMBER","29982":"CHAMBER","29997":"CHAMBER","30002":"COMMITTEE","30029":"CHAMBER","30059":"CHAMBER","30060":"CHAMBER","30100":"CHAMBER","30130":"CHAMBER","30175":"CHAMBER","30174":"CHAMBER","30181":"CHAMBER","30230":"CHAMBER","30381":"ADMISSIBILITYCOM","30385":"CHAMBER","30478":"COMMITTEE","30490":"COMMITTEE","30561":"ADMISSIBILITYCOM","30673":"CHAMBER","30676":"CHAMBER","30699":"ADMISSIBILITYCOM","30705":"CHAMBER","30741":"ADMISSIBILITYCOM","30735":"CHAMBER","30753":"CHAMBER","30754":"CHAMBER","30757":"CHAMBER","30938":"CHAMBER","30959":"COMMITTEE","30966":"CHAMBER","30967":"CHAMBER","31153":"ADMISSIBILITY","31175":"CHAMBER","31226":"COMMITTEE","31276":"ADMISSIBILITYCOM","31273":"CHAMBER","31335":"CHAMBER","31337":"COMMITTEE","31352":"ADMISSIBILITYCOM","31382":"CHAMBER","31387":"COMMITTEE","31512":"COMMITTEE","31515":"CHAMBER","31517":"CHAMBER","31538":"CHAMBER","31547":"COMMITTEE","31546":"COMMITTEE","31599":"GRANDCHAMBER","31645":"COMMITTEE","31657":"CHAMBER"},"respondent":{"28470":"DEU","28507":"DNK","28527":"RUS","28546":"RUS","28548":"UKR","28591":"RUS","28592":"RUS","28596":"ITA;CHE","28598":"FIN","28639":"RUS","28670":"UKR","28671":"UKR","28680":"GRC","28790":"MLT","28835":"AZE","28866":"LVA","28858":"TUR","28853":"RUS","28893":"RUS","28895":"BEL","28910":"SWE","28924":"ITA","28935":"RUS","28936":"RUS","28948":"RUS","29007":"AUT","29010":"UKR","29047":"RUS","29108":"ROU","29107":"ROU","29147":"RUS","29164":"ITA","29165":"RUS","29176":"RUS","29184":"HRV","29189":"RUS","29211":"NLD","29212":"HUN","29218":"POL","29233":"RUS","29275":"ROU","29271":"ROU","29307":"RUS","29345":"UKR","29357":"RUS","29358":"RUS","29361":"RUS","29402":"BGR","29429":"ROU","29483":"RUS","29595":"BGR","29619":"UKR","29682":"BEL","29768":"POL","29860":"MLT","29843":"ROU","29865":"LVA","29867":"LVA","29907":"ITA","29982":"ITA","29997":"HUN","30002":"RUS","30029":"RUS","30059":"AUT","30060":"FRA","30100":"RUS","30130":"ROU","30175":"AUT","30174":"BGR","30181":"RUS","30230":"SRB","30381":"RUS","30385":"ITA","30478":"RUS","30490":"HUN","30561":"RUS","30673":"RUS","30676":"RUS","30699":"CHE","30705":"GRC","30741":"NOR","30735":"MDA;RUS","30753":"LTU","30754":"ROU","30757":"CYP","30938":"RUS","30959":"POL","30966":"MDA;RUS","30967":"RUS","31153":"BGR","31175":"RUS","31226":"RUS","31276":"POL","31273":"UKR","31335":"RUS","31337":"RUS","31352":"NLD","31382":"UKR","31387":"UKR","31512":"RUS","31515":"RUS","31517":"SRB","31538":"BGR","31547":"RUS","31546":"RUS","31599":"BEL","31645":"UKR","31657":"AZE"},"importance":{"28470":2,"28507":4,"28527":4,"28546":4,"28548":4,"28591":4,"28592":4,"28596":4,"28598":4,"28639":4,"28670":3,"28671":4,"28680":3,"28790":4,"28835":4,"28866":4,"28858":4,"28853":4,"28893":4,"28895":1,"28910":4,"28924":1,"28935":4,"28936":4,"28948":4,"29007":1,"29010":4,"29047":4,"29108":4,"29107":4,"29147":4,"29164":3,"29165":3,"29176":4,"29184":4,"29189":4,"29211":4,"29212":3,"29218":4,"29233":4,"29275":4,"29271":4,"29307":4,"29345":3,"29357":3,"29358":4,"29361":4,"29402":1,"29429":3,"29483":4,"29595":4,"29619":4,"29682":3,"29768":4,"29860":4,"29843":3,"29865":3,"29867":4,"29907":4,"29982":4,"29997":4,"30002":4,"30029":4,"30059":3,"30060":3,"30100":4,"30130":4,"30175":3,"30174":3,"30181":4,"30230":4,"30381":4,"30385":3,"30478":4,"30490":4,"30561":4,"30673":4,"30676":4,"30699":4,"30705":4,"30741":4,"30735":3,"30753":3,"30754":3,"30757":4,"30938":4,"30959":4,"30966":4,"30967":4,"31153":4,"31175":4,"31226":4,"31276":4,"31273":3,"31335":4,"31337":4,"31352":4,"31382":3,"31387":4,"31512":4,"31515":3,"31517":3,"31538":3,"31547":4,"31546":4,"31599":1,"31645":4,"31657":4},"rulesofcourt":{"28470":"","28507":"","28527":"","28546":"","28548":"","28591":"","28592":"","28596":"","28598":"","28639":"","28670":"","28671":"","28680":"","28790":"","28835":"","28866":"","28858":"","28853":"","28893":"","28895":"","28910":"","28924":"27","28935":"","28936":"","28948":"","29007":"","29010":"","29047":"","29108":"","29107":"","29147":"","29164":"","29165":"","29176":"","29184":"","29189":"","29211":"","29212":"","29218":"","29233":"","29275":"","29271":"","29307":"","29345":"","29357":"17","29358":"","29361":"","29402":"","29429":"49","29483":"","29595":"","29619":"","29682":"","29768":"","29860":"","29843":"","29865":"","29867":"","29907":"","29982":"","29997":"","30002":"","30029":"","30059":"","30060":"","30100":"","30130":"","30175":"13;78","30174":"","30181":"","30230":"","30381":"","30385":"","30478":"","30490":"","30561":"","30673":"","30676":"","30699":"","30705":"","30741":"","30735":"","30753":"","30754":"","30757":"","30938":"","30959":"","30966":"","30967":"","31153":"","31175":"","31226":"","31276":"","31273":"","31335":"","31337":"","31352":"","31382":"","31387":"","31512":"","31515":"","31517":"","31538":"","31547":"","31546":"","31599":"","31645":"","31657":""},"ecli":{"28470":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:0901JUD006230313","28507":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:0913DEC002015916","28527":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:0920JUD001298715","28546":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:0920DEC001085109","28548":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:0922JUD000157406","28591":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:1004JUD005443614","28592":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:1004JUD001264615","28596":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:1004DEC003047414","28598":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:1004DEC003227515","28639":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:1011JUD005278308","28670":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:1013JUD000187005","28671":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:1013JUD004735106","28680":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:1013JUD001198115","28790":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:1122JUD002579413","28835":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:1124JUD004211912","28866":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:1206DEC000579413","28858":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:1206DEC006312915","28853":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:1206JUD004019206","28893":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:1213JUD000296109","28895":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:1213JUD004173810","28910":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:1213DEC003638416","28924":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:1215JUD001648312","28935":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:1220JUD001636307","28936":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:1220JUD001935607","28948":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0110JUD004891715","29007":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0117JUD005821612","29010":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0119JUD000477206","29047":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0126JUD004233214","29108":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0214JUD001760515","29107":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0214JUD001122014","29147":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0228DEC003277915","29164":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0302JUD004123714","29165":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0307JUD006805913","29176":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0307JUD002712210","29184":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0307DEC005171413","29189":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0314JUD002249508","29211":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0314DEC006472410","29212":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0314JUD004728715","29218":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0321JUD000068612","29233":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0328JUD004624807","29275":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0404DEC002458713","29271":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0404DEC006394509","29307":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0411JUD003254608","29345":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0427JUD003401507","29357":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0502JUD001082509","29358":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0502JUD001476909","29361":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0502JUD003163210","29402":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0512JUD002198004","29429":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0523JUD004964509","29483":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0606JUD005125209","29595":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0629JUD007724812","29619":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0706JUD002198705","29682":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0718JUD001805211","29768":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:0907JUD006192813","29860":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:1003DEC006888313","29843":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:1003JUD002302213","29865":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:1005JUD006042912","29867":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:1005JUD003604313","29907":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:1012JUD002175915","29982":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:1026JUD000253913","29997":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:1031JUD004585512","30002":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:1107JUD003118915","30029":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:1107JUD005818214","30059":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:1116JUD007212614","30060":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:1116JUD003005915","30100":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:1128JUD003970807","30130":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:1128JUD005508913","30175":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:1207JUD003499916","30174":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:1207JUD000813816","30181":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:1212JUD004504406","30230":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2017:1219JUD001979614","30381":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:0130DEC006526309","30385":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:0201JUD005422714","30478":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:0227JUD005023606","30490":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:0227JUD000362515","30561":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:0327DEC006089008","30673":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:0515JUD001441606","30676":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:0515JUD005255008","30699":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:0515DEC006798116","30705":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:0517JUD000116715","30741":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:0529DEC004885217","30735":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:0529JUD000108909","30753":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:0531JUD004645411","30754":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:0531JUD003323412","30757":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:0605JUD002445912","30938":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:0710JUD003506104","30959":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:0712JUD004758013","30966":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:0717JUD005015706","30967":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:0717JUD000267407","31153":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:1002DEC003358615","31175":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:1009JUD004986906","31226":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:1023JUD006168916","31276":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:1106DEC001887712","31273":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:1106JUD000328910","31335":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:1120JUD005726914","31337":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:1120JUD001146715","31352":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:1120DEC002010213","31382":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:1204JUD003552306","31387":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2018:1204JUD005591209","31512":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2019:0115JUD004385212","31515":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2019:0115JUD004872415","31517":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2019:0115JUD000112816","31538":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2019:0117JUD002245716","31547":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2019:0122JUD005960917","31546":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2019:0122JUD001201816","31599":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2019:0131JUD001805211","31645":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2019:0219JUD004443609","31657":"ECLI:CE:ECHR:2019:0221JUD003543207"},"isplaceholder":{"28470":"False","28507":"False","28527":"False","28546":"False","28548":"False","28591":"False","28592":"False","28596":"False","28598":"False","28639":"False","28670":"False","28671":"False","28680":"False","28790":"False","28835":"False","28866":"False","28858":"False","28853":"False","28893":"False","28895":"False","28910":"False","28924":"False","28935":"False","28936":"False","28948":"False","29007":"False","29010":"False","29047":"False","29108":"False","29107":"False","29147":"False","29164":"False","29165":"False","29176":"False","29184":"False","29189":"False","29211":"False","29212":"False","29218":"False","29233":"False","29275":"False","29271":"False","29307":"False","29345":"False","29357":"False","29358":"False","29361":"False","29402":"False","29429":"False","29483":"False","29595":"False","29619":"False","29682":"False","29768":"False","29860":"False","29843":"False","29865":"False","29867":"False","29907":"False","29982":"False","29997":"False","30002":"False","30029":"False","30059":"False","30060":"False","30100":"False","30130":"False","30175":"False","30174":"False","30181":"False","30230":"False","30381":"False","30385":"False","30478":"False","30490":"False","30561":"False","30673":"False","30676":"False","30699":"False","30705":"False","30741":"False","30735":"False","30753":"False","30754":"False","30757":"False","30938":"False","30959":"False","30966":"False","30967":"False","31153":"False","31175":"False","31226":"False","31276":"False","31273":"False","31335":"False","31337":"False","31352":"False","31382":"False","31387":"False","31512":"False","31515":"False","31517":"False","31538":"False","31547":"False","31546":"False","31599":"False","31645":"False","31657":"False"},"violation":{"28470":"3","28507":"","28527":"3;34","28546":"","28548":"3;5;5-1;5-3;5-4;5-5;6;6-1;13;13+3;13+6-1","28591":"3;34","28592":"3;34","28596":"","28598":"","28639":"3;5;5-1","28670":"3;8;8-1","28671":"3;6;6-1","28680":"3;3+13;8;8-1;13;13+8","28790":"3;5;5-1;5-4","28835":"3","28866":"","28858":"","28853":"3","28893":"3;5;5-1","28895":"3;8;8-1","28910":"","28924":"3;5;5-1;5-1-f;5-2;5-4;13;13+3","28935":"2;2-1;3;13;13+3","28936":"3;13;13+3;P4-2;P4-2-2;P4-4","28948":"3","29007":"","29010":"3","29047":"3;38","29108":"3","29107":"3","29147":"","29164":"2;2-1;3;14;14+2","29165":"3","29176":"3","29184":"","29189":"3;6;6-1","29211":"","29212":"3;5;5-1;5-1-f;5-4;13;13+3","29218":"3","29233":"3","29275":"","29271":"","29307":"3","29345":"3;5;5-1;5-3","29357":"3","29358":"3","29361":"3","29402":"3","29429":"3;14;14+3","29483":"3;13;13+3","29595":"","29619":"3;5;5+5-4;5-1;5-4","29682":"3","29768":"3","29860":"","29843":"3;6;6-1","29865":"3","29867":"3","29907":"3","29982":"3","29997":"3;14;14+3","30002":"3;5;5-1","30029":"3;5;5-4","30059":"","30060":"3","30100":"3;5;5-1;6;6-1","30130":"3","30175":"","30174":"3","30181":"3;5;5-1","30230":"3","30381":"","30385":"3;8;8-1","30478":"3","30490":"3","30561":"","30673":"3;6;6-1","30676":"3","30699":"","30705":"3;13;13+3","30741":"","30735":"3;13;13+3","30753":"3;5;5-1;8;8-1;13;13+3","30754":"2;2+P6-1;2-1;3;3+P6-1;5;5-1;6;6-1;8;8-1;13;13+3;P6-1","30757":"3","30938":"3;6;6-1;8;8-1","30959":"3","30966":"3;5;5-1;13;13+3","30967":"3;6;6-1","31153":"","31175":"3;5;5-1;6;6-1","31226":"3;5;5-1-f","31276":"","31273":"3;8;8-1;14;14+3;14+8-1","31335":"3","31337":"3;8;8-1","31352":"","31382":"","31387":"3;6;6+6-3-c;6-1;6-3-c","31512":"3;6;6-1","31515":"3","31517":"3","31538":"","31547":"3;5;5-1;5-4","31546":"3;5;5-1","31599":"3;5;5-1;5-1-e","31645":"3;13;13+3","31657":"2;2-1;3;5;5-1;5-3"},"judgementdate":{"28470":1472688000000,"28507":0,"28527":1474329600000,"28546":0,"28548":1474502400000,"28591":1475539200000,"28592":1475539200000,"28596":0,"28598":0,"28639":1476144000000,"28670":1476316800000,"28671":1476316800000,"28680":1476316800000,"28790":1479772800000,"28835":1479945600000,"28866":0,"28858":0,"28853":1480982400000,"28893":1481587200000,"28895":1481587200000,"28910":0,"28924":1481760000000,"28935":1482192000000,"28936":1482192000000,"28948":1484006400000,"29007":1484611200000,"29010":1484784000000,"29047":1485388800000,"29108":1487030400000,"29107":1487030400000,"29147":0,"29164":1488412800000,"29165":1488844800000,"29176":1488844800000,"29184":0,"29189":1489449600000,"29211":0,"29212":1489449600000,"29218":1490054400000,"29233":1490659200000,"29275":0,"29271":0,"29307":1491868800000,"29345":1493251200000,"29357":1493683200000,"29358":1493683200000,"29361":1493683200000,"29402":1494547200000,"29429":1495497600000,"29483":1496707200000,"29595":1498694400000,"29619":1499299200000,"29682":1500336000000,"29768":1504742400000,"29860":0,"29843":1506988800000,"29865":1507161600000,"29867":1507161600000,"29907":1507766400000,"29982":1508976000000,"29997":1509408000000,"30002":1510012800000,"30029":1510012800000,"30059":1510790400000,"30060":1510790400000,"30100":1511827200000,"30130":1511827200000,"30175":1512604800000,"30174":1512604800000,"30181":1513036800000,"30230":1513641600000,"30381":0,"30385":1517443200000,"30478":1519689600000,"30490":1519689600000,"30561":0,"30673":1526342400000,"30676":1526342400000,"30699":0,"30705":1526515200000,"30741":0,"30735":1527552000000,"30753":1527724800000,"30754":1527724800000,"30757":1528156800000,"30938":1531180800000,"30959":1531353600000,"30966":1531785600000,"30967":1531785600000,"31153":0,"31175":1539043200000,"31226":1540252800000,"31276":0,"31273":1541462400000,"31335":1542672000000,"31337":1542672000000,"31352":0,"31382":1543881600000,"31387":1543881600000,"31512":1547510400000,"31515":1547510400000,"31517":1547510400000,"31538":1547683200000,"31547":1548115200000,"31546":1548115200000,"31599":1548892800000,"31645":1550534400000,"31657":1550707200000},"dmdocnumber":{"28470":"","28507":"","28527":"","28546":"","28548":"","28591":"","28592":"","28596":"","28598":"","28639":"","28670":"","28671":"","28680":"","28790":"","28835":"","28866":"","28858":"","28853":"","28893":"","28895":"","28910":"","28924":"","28935":"","28936":"","28948":"","29007":"","29010":"","29047":"","29108":"","29107":"","29147":"","29164":"","29165":"","29176":"","29184":"","29189":"","29211":"","29212":"","29218":"","29233":"","29275":"","29271":"","29307":"","29345":"","29357":"","29358":"","29361":"","29402":"","29429":"","29483":"","29595":"","29619":"","29682":"","29768":"","29860":"","29843":"","29865":"","29867":"","29907":"","29982":"","29997":"","30002":"","30029":"","30059":"","30060":"","30100":"","30130":"","30175":"","30174":"","30181":"","30230":"","30381":"","30385":"","30478":"","30490":"","30561":"","30673":"","30676":"","30699":"","30705":"","30741":"","30735":"","30753":"","30754":"","30757":"","30938":"","30959":"","30966":"","30967":"","31153":"","31175":"","31226":"","31276":"","31273":"","31335":"","31337":"","31352":"","31382":"","31387":"","31512":"","31515":"","31517":"","31538":"","31547":"","31546":"","31599":"","31645":"","31657":""},"sclappnos":{"28470":"47152\/06;66583\/11;4672\/02;27229\/95;59696\/00;30210\/96;50390\/99;9870\/07;3456\/05;40512\/13;20877\/04;30628\/02;1033\/07","28507":"","28527":"","28546":"","28548":"","28591":"","28592":"","28596":"","28598":"","28639":"","28670":"61382\/09;38435\/13;28261\/06;11160\/07;41526\/10;2660\/03;38833\/03;30856\/03;10161\/13;19009\/04;75788\/01;29525\/10;38478\/05;5786\/08;48995\/99;27310\/09;33234\/07","28671":"","28680":"51431\/99;43611\/11;56030\/07;59166\/12;12738\/12;71398\/12;30696\/09;17056\/06;2237\/08","28790":"","28835":"","28866":"","28858":"","28853":"","28893":"","28895":"39350\/13;6289\/73;17299\/12;23380\/09;30240\/96;34724\/10;39630\/09;43611\/11;27765\/09;47531\/99;40016\/98;72597\/10;75203\/12;30696\/09;33071\/96;46827\/99;46951\/99;1638\/03;10511\/10;26565\/05;2346\/02;60367\/10;37201\/06;8319\/07;11449\/07;65692\/12;140\/10;35226\/11;13163\/87;10486\/10","28910":"","28924":"3455\/05;12186\/08;53709\/11;39766\/09;30471\/08;21987\/93;64812\/01;19776\/92;42525\/07;60800\/08;205\/02;45917\/99;53608\/11;67253\/01;28358\/95;72967\/01;18670\/03;47152\/06;23380\/09;52100\/08;41533\/08;33441\/10;33468\/10;33476\/10;22018\/10;22414\/93;36378\/02;51564\/99;7472\/14;16387\/03;15916\/09;8805\/79;2832\/66;22689\/07;42750\/09;43125\/98;3811\/02;40907\/98;2344\/02;11701\/85;33225\/08;39630\/09;78456\/11;12244\/86;55894\/00;22978\/05;25464\/05;13255\/07;45302\/05;19218\/91;7367\/76;58387\/11;10533\/83;27765\/09;50272\/99;5310\/71;15707\/10;54810\/00;34578\/97;62393\/00;47095\/99;15297\/09;37213\/02;53254\/99;41035\/98;6847\/02;43707\/07;30210\/96;32863\/05;26772\/95;29896\/13;9019\/80;41872\/10;30696\/09;74762\/01;3394\/03;294\/08;10865\/09;45886\/07;32431\/08;62936\/00;11364\/03;67263\/01;13178\/03;7334\/13;72754\/11;24952\/94;42023\/98;31195\/96;66460\/01;21722\/11;39806\/05;28524\/95;39472\/07;39474\/07;33394\/96;2237\/08;8687\/08;59450\/00;29787\/03;29810\/03;18896\/91;59584\/00;8300\/06;53541\/07;13229\/03;21986\/93;25803\/94;16643\/09;44009\/05;36760\/06;24838\/94;22635\/03;45223\/05;32541\/08;43441\/08;47146\/11;8256\/07;29217\/12;12850\/87;43517\/09;46882\/09;55400\/09;57875\/09;61535\/09;35315\/10;37818\/10;44256\/06;5856\/72;24888\/94;42987\/98;11509\/85;2974\/05;16880\/08;78146\/01;9787\/82;6301\/73;26629\/95;29392\/95","28935":"","28936":"","28948":"","29007":"58842\/09;4239\/08;25321\/94;27207\/95;33677\/10;52340\/10;44898\/10;40020\/03;28634\/06;72663\/01;25965\/04;73316\/01;60125\/11","29010":"","29047":"","29108":"","29107":"","29147":"","29164":"55164\/08;25599\/94;4149\/04;41029\/04;71127\/01;74448\/12;46598\/06;54241\/08;46846\/08;41526\/10;33218\/96;43994\/05;46477\/99;3564\/11;34056\/02;2660\/03;63034\/11;27229\/95;22492\/93;7510\/04;23413\/94;10161\/13;43982\/06;39272\/98;646\/10;22535\/93;28634\/06;50385\/99;37703\/97;74839\/10;43577\/98;43579\/98;33401\/02;23452\/94;2346\/02;52391\/99;38478\/05;14038\/88;26608\/11;33234\/07;16064\/90;16065\/90;16066\/90;16068\/90;16069\/90;16070\/90;16071\/90;16072\/90;16073\/90","29165":"22867\/05;10060\/07;46423\/06;27026\/10;26692\/05;7511\/76;7743\/76;13134\/87;32704\/04;24669\/02;7710\/02;19986\/06;5310\/71;40998\/98;42606\/05;3933\/04;54522\/00;26772\/95;46956\/09;64752\/09;77617\/01;13754\/02;54825\/00;42837\/04;34150\/04;53984\/00;57519\/09;51083\/09;75863\/11;35016\/03;21986\/93;64398\/01;38033\/02;24888\/94;34687\/02;45046\/05;22458\/04","29176":"","29184":"","29189":"","29211":"","29212":"55352\/12;19776\/92;73049\/01;10309\/03;39692\/09;40713\/09;41008\/09;72967\/01;29226\/03;43395\/09;43611\/11;7367\/76;45508\/99;39187\/98;27765\/09;12738\/10;16483\/12;58923\/14;30210\/96;10816\/10;30696\/09;10290\/13;46827\/99;46951\/99;3394\/03;20420\/02;11364\/03;42502\/06;10511\/10;25904\/07;55669\/00;31890\/11;41827\/07;29787\/03;29810\/03;59552\/08;37201\/06;45355\/99;45357\/99;36760\/06;47679\/99;61603\/00;2853\/09;3989\/07;38353\/07;46410\/99;26083\/94","29218":"","29233":"","29275":"","29271":"","29307":"","29345":"71503\/01;23380\/09;4378\/02;22600\/93;25703\/11;39630\/09;22978\/05;70337\/01;20999\/05;50541\/08;50571\/08;50573\/08;40351\/09;5826\/03;20136\/11;1574\/13;23893\/03;41651\/10;40107\/02;5911\/05;72250\/01;31305\/09;10865\/09;45886\/07;32431\/08;4268\/04;42371\/02;7215\/10;2775\/07;36391\/02;56581\/00;5856\/72;24888\/94;44558\/98;50901\/99;2293\/03;14612\/02;74820\/10;71\/11;76\/11;83\/11;332\/11","29357":"2281\/06;23380\/09;38887\/09;22978\/05;31316\/09;52783\/08;46956\/09;52796\/08;57519\/09;4722\/09","29358":"","29361":"","29402":"39660\/02;36408\/97;56679\/00;1466\/07;7377\/03;6903\/75;25703\/11;8130\/78;22978\/05;11855\/85;15018\/11;61199\/12;34720\/97;50541\/08;50571\/08;50573\/08;40351\/09;13972\/88;5310\/71;18731\/91;25702\/94;26828\/06;31333\/06;10511\/10;49017\/99;25444\/94;7025\/04;21272\/03;36391\/02;56581\/00;46295\/99;36760\/06;4570\/05","29429":"61382\/09;41526\/10;43994\/05;14967\/89;10161\/13;646\/10;28440\/07;33401\/02;38773\/05;5786\/08;33234\/07","29483":"","29595":"","29619":"","29682":"25357\/94;8225\/78;47687\/13;43418\/09;8595\/06;43653\/09;22978\/05;43733\/09;22831\/08;22283\/10;43717\/09;10511\/10;43663\/09;43368\/08;13229\/03;50658\/09;36813\/97;36760\/06;53448\/10;7\/08;43517\/09;73548\/13;6301\/73;14793\/08","29768":"","29860":"","29843":"1401\/08;22251\/08;26692\/05;47848\/08;77938\/11;65158\/09;21472\/03;10161\/13;12060\/12;21722\/11;49669\/07;3524\/14;68842\/13;5786\/08;24125\/06;29392\/95","29865":"42525\/07;60800\/08;40907\/98;4672\/02;74568\/12;38494\/05;4473\/02;34138\/04;1179\/10;23893\/06;45744\/08;53281\/08;14516\/10;26544\/10;44939\/11;45517\/04;30779\/05;7334\/13;35589\/08;17599\/05;17885\/04;50756\/13;20184\/06;10775\/09;28973\/11","29867":"","29907":"","29982":"","29997":"","30002":"","30029":"","30059":"32446\/96;55721\/07;38361\/97;50275\/08;16281\/10;47848\/08;18407\/10;40907\/98;13071\/87;23458\/02;24746\/94;47708\/08;27229\/95;38447\/09;1108\/02;23413\/94;26772\/95;29675\/02;52750\/99;37703\/97;28883\/95;25498\/94;43577\/98;43579\/98;27900\/04;33343\/96;28524\/95;44973\/04;52391\/99;25803\/94;71463\/01;36760\/06;23763\/94;29474\/09;50901\/99;64301\/01;41488\/98","30060":"23380\/09;47848\/08;20579\/12;23458\/02;27229\/95;38447\/09;18984\/91;23452\/94;9375\/02;41773\/98;25803\/94;32541\/08;43441\/08;39922\/03;37795\/13;24888\/94","30100":"","30130":"","30175":"24027\/07;22414\/93;43611\/11;32621\/06;24573\/94;9146\/07;32650\/07;59166\/12;38885\/02;46221\/99;56662\/09;37201\/06;1948\/04;14038\/88;10226\/13;13163\/87","30174":"11593\/12;53709\/11;24587\/12;39350\/13;56796\/13;25794\/13;28151\/13;28761\/11;14344\/13;42525\/07;60800\/08;65540\/16;22368\/17;48737\/99;17674\/02;39081\/02;2134\/12;2161\/12;46113\/99;31206\/05;18152\/11;7604\/76;23458\/02;67810\/10;15018\/11;61199\/12;71825\/11;7511\/13;5310\/71;55508\/07;29520\/09;62393\/00;15297\/09;16483\/12;56660\/12;15318\/89;30696\/09;10290\/13;14902\/10;8317\/78;798\/05;70586\/11;52160\/13;52165\/13;41442\/07;43577\/98;43579\/98;36925\/10;39472\/07;39474\/07;63638\/14;76491\/14;68264\/14;33201\/11;8687\/08;43835\/11;40167\/06;39221\/98;41963\/98;8207\/06;29217\/12;32940\/08","30181":"","30230":"","30381":"","30385":"55164\/08;25599\/94;19776\/92;71127\/01;23380\/09;26692\/05;28114\/95;41526\/10;33218\/96;8130\/78;39630\/09;22978\/05;13255\/07;2660\/03;38478\/05;48470\/99;16483\/12;39272\/98;646\/10;22457\/08;50029\/99;10865\/09;45886\/07;32431\/08;33401\/02;23452\/94;2346\/02;36813\/97;25803\/94;32541\/08;43441\/08;24888\/94;47848\/08;29392\/95","30478":"","30490":"","30561":"","30673":"","30676":"","30699":"","30705":"","30741":"","30735":"33592\/96;43370\/04;6884\/11;24163\/11;30649\/05;23459\/94;47203\/06;48787\/99;44898\/10;23205\/08;50012\/08;7101\/06;72508\/13;11138\/10;7334\/13;38055\/06;25393\/10;51216\/06;17963\/08;10249\/03;36813\/97;11353\/06","30753":"25599\/94;27065\/05;21987\/93;28761\/11;35763\/97;61498\/08;55721\/07;38361\/97;5878\/08;2944\/06;71503\/01;24760\/94;33810\/07;18817\/08;24027\/07;52207\/99;23502\/06;23657\/94;6884\/11;22414\/93;29226\/03;25781\/94;30873\/96;39630\/09;22978\/05;48205\/99;13255\/07;27765\/09;7511\/13;48787\/99;22277\/93;7615\/02;5310\/71;54810\/00;44898\/10;5432\/07;22729\/93;50222\/99;30210\/96;24276\/94;26772\/95;15318\/89;22535\/93;46827\/99;46951\/99;43577\/98;43579\/98;44883\/09;46221\/99;8139\/09;18580\/91;37201\/06;21986\/93;40167\/06;71386\/10;25803\/94;36378\/02;14038\/88;16064\/90;29392\/95","30754":"27065\/05;21987\/93;28761\/11;61498\/08;55721\/07;38361\/97;5878\/08;2944\/06;8300\/07;50184\/07;332\/08;42509\/10;71503\/01;24760\/94;33810\/07;18817\/08;24027\/07;11949\/08;36742\/08;66911\/09;67354\/09;52207\/99;23502\/06;23657\/94;6884\/11;22414\/93;29226\/03;25781\/94;39630\/09;48205\/99;48207\/99;48209\/99;13255\/07;27765\/09;7511\/13;48787\/99;7615\/02;22678\/93;5310\/71;54810\/00;44898\/10;41015\/04;5432\/07;22729\/93;24276\/94;15318\/89;22535\/93;46827\/99;46951\/99;77617\/01;10865\/09;43577\/98;43579\/98;44883\/09;46221\/99;8139\/09;2346\/02;18580\/91;37201\/06;21986\/93;40167\/06;71386\/10;56581\/00;25803\/94;14038\/88;46661\/99;16064\/90;16065\/90;16066\/90;16068\/90;16069\/90;16070\/90;16071\/90;16072\/90;16073\/90","30757":"","30938":"","30959":"","30966":"","30967":"","31153":"","31175":"","31226":"","31276":"","31273":"39630\/09;3564\/11;387\/03;35802\/05;22978\/05;63409\/11;42697\/05;73235\/12;30575\/08;30587\/13;17170\/04;10851\/13;5355\/15;44913\/15;50853\/15;12060\/12;33071\/96;10865\/09;41138\/98;64320\/01;24014\/05;43577\/98;43579\/98;18907\/02;35810\/09;23452\/94;28326\/09;18967\/02;9310\/81;64602\/12;60041\/13;26608\/11;2476\/02;68059\/13;6318\/03;29381\/09;32684\/09;41488\/98;15829\/05;18618\/06;12350\/04;8978\/80","31335":"","31337":"","31352":"","31382":"25599\/94;4149\/04;41029\/04;11562\/05;32967\/96;47848\/08;59548\/00;61679\/00;26984\/05;18369\/07;27229\/95;23786\/02;76805\/11;56080\/13;52013\/08;24014\/05;37246\/06;16605\/09;35810\/09;33834\/03;3524\/14;10249\/03;5786\/08;26307\/95;29474\/09;33234\/07;4299\/03;3431\/03","31387":"","31512":"","31515":"32704\/04;77248\/12;5821\/10;65523\/12;24573\/94;23893\/06;3933\/04;46956\/09;23692\/09;10865\/09;77092\/01;10825\/09;33343\/96;14416\/06;25001\/07;29392\/95","31517":"25599\/94;22107\/03;62798\/09;33097\/96;57834\/00;23380\/09;3321\/67;3322\/67;3323\/67;3344\/67;41124\/02;22978\/05;34056\/02;23893\/06;19796\/14;26772\/95;39272\/98;75450\/12;30696\/09;56185\/07;43393\/98;71156\/01;77617\/01;22684\/05;10511\/10;35810\/09;44973\/04;22893\/05;36813\/97;25803\/94;46248\/07;21980\/04;47137\/07;24888\/94;44698\/06;41461\/02;17153\/11","31538":"25599\/94;61030\/08;23380\/09;16098\/05;41526\/10;67810\/10;29032\/04;39272\/98;22457\/08;67208\/01;29263\/12;18727\/06;54227\/14;8978\/80;29392\/95","31547":"","31546":"","31599":"58271\/10;25357\/94;8225\/78;61272\/09;23279\/14;47152\/06;9106\/80;23380\/09;49902\/99;43687\/09;43418\/09;32010\/07;27428\/07;10448\/83;10662\/06;32705\/06;22978\/05;43494\/09;43733\/09;7345\/12;44084\/10;17167\/11;39446\/06;33849\/08;10533\/83;2778\/02;50272\/99;10211\/12;27505\/14;43977\/13;27229\/95;53157\/11;30210\/96;22831\/08;43653\/09;53448\/10;11537\/11;23692\/09;58749\/00;72508\/13;43717\/09;48865\/99;10511\/10;42023\/98;4646\/08;37555\/97;36035\/04;43663\/09;34151\/04;43368\/08;28785\/11;36435\/07;33834\/03;3300\/10;13229\/03;50658\/09;36813\/97;25803\/94;28300\/06;36760\/06;7\/08;330\/09;73548\/13;55594\/13;6301\/73","31645":"","31657":""},"separateopinion":{"28470":"FALSE","28507":"","28527":"FALSE","28546":"","28548":"FALSE","28591":"FALSE","28592":"FALSE","28596":"","28598":"","28639":"FALSE","28670":"FALSE","28671":"FALSE","28680":"FALSE","28790":"TRUE","28835":"FALSE","28866":"","28858":"","28853":"FALSE","28893":"FALSE","28895":"TRUE","28910":"","28924":"TRUE","28935":"FALSE","28936":"TRUE","28948":"FALSE","29007":"TRUE","29010":"FALSE","29047":"FALSE","29108":"FALSE","29107":"FALSE","29147":"","29164":"TRUE","29165":"FALSE","29176":"FALSE","29184":"","29189":"FALSE","29211":"","29212":"FALSE","29218":"FALSE","29233":"FALSE","29275":"","29271":"","29307":"FALSE","29345":"FALSE","29357":"FALSE","29358":"FALSE","29361":"FALSE","29402":"TRUE","29429":"FALSE","29483":"FALSE","29595":"FALSE","29619":"TRUE","29682":"TRUE","29768":"FALSE","29860":"","29843":"TRUE","29865":"FALSE","29867":"FALSE","29907":"FALSE","29982":"FALSE","29997":"FALSE","30002":"FALSE","30029":"FALSE","30059":"FALSE","30060":"FALSE","30100":"FALSE","30130":"FALSE","30175":"FALSE","30174":"FALSE","30181":"FALSE","30230":"FALSE","30381":"","30385":"TRUE","30478":"FALSE","30490":"FALSE","30561":"","30673":"FALSE","30676":"FALSE","30699":"","30705":"FALSE","30741":"","30735":"FALSE","30753":"FALSE","30754":"FALSE","30757":"FALSE","30938":"FALSE","30959":"FALSE","30966":"TRUE","30967":"TRUE","31153":"","31175":"FALSE","31226":"FALSE","31276":"","31273":"FALSE","31335":"FALSE","31337":"FALSE","31352":"","31382":"TRUE","31387":"FALSE","31512":"FALSE","31515":"FALSE","31517":"TRUE","31538":"FALSE","31547":"FALSE","31546":"FALSE","31599":"TRUE","31645":"FALSE","31657":"FALSE"},"doctype":{"28470":"HEJUD","28507":"HEDEC","28527":"HEJUD","28546":"HEDEC","28548":"HEJUD","28591":"HEJUD","28592":"HEJUD","28596":"HEDEC","28598":"HEDEC","28639":"HEJUD","28670":"HEJUD","28671":"HEJUD","28680":"HEJUD","28790":"HEJUD","28835":"HEJUD","28866":"HEDEC","28858":"HEDEC","28853":"HEJUD","28893":"HEJUD","28895":"HEJUD","28910":"HEDEC","28924":"HEJUD","28935":"HEJUD","28936":"HEJUD","28948":"HEJUD","29007":"HEJUD","29010":"HEJUD","29047":"HEJUD","29108":"HEJUD","29107":"HEJUD","29147":"HEDEC","29164":"HEJUD","29165":"HEJUD","29176":"HEJUD","29184":"HEDEC","29189":"HEJUD","29211":"HEDEC","29212":"HEJUD","29218":"HEJUD","29233":"HEJUD","29275":"HEDEC","29271":"HEDEC","29307":"HEJUD","29345":"HEJUD","29357":"HEJUD","29358":"HEJUD","29361":"HEJUD","29402":"HEJUD","29429":"HEJUD","29483":"HEJUD","29595":"HEJUD","29619":"HEJUD","29682":"HEJUD","29768":"HEJUD","29860":"HEDEC","29843":"HEJUD","29865":"HEJUD","29867":"HEJUD","29907":"HEJUD","29982":"HEJUD","29997":"HEJUD","30002":"HEJUD","30029":"HEJUD","30059":"HEJUD","30060":"HEJUD","30100":"HEJUD","30130":"HEJUD","30175":"HEJUD","30174":"HEJUD","30181":"HEJUD","30230":"HEJUD","30381":"HEDEC","30385":"HEJUD","30478":"HEJUD","30490":"HEJUD","30561":"HEDEC","30673":"HEJUD","30676":"HEJUD","30699":"HEDEC","30705":"HEJUD","30741":"HEDEC","30735":"HEJUD","30753":"HEJUD","30754":"HEJUD","30757":"HEJUD","30938":"HEJUD","30959":"HEJUD","30966":"HEJUD","30967":"HEJUD","31153":"HEDEC","31175":"HEJUD","31226":"HEJUD","31276":"HEDEC","31273":"HEJUD","31335":"HEJUD","31337":"HEJUD","31352":"HEDEC","31382":"HEJUD","31387":"HEJUD","31512":"HEJUD","31515":"HEJUD","31517":"HEJUD","31538":"HEJUD","31547":"HEJUD","31546":"HEJUD","31599":"HEJUD","31645":"HEJUD","31657":"HEJUD"},"languageisocode":{"28470":"ENG","28507":"ENG","28527":"ENG","28546":"ENG","28548":"ENG","28591":"ENG","28592":"ENG","28596":"ENG","28598":"ENG","28639":"ENG","28670":"ENG","28671":"ENG","28680":"ENG","28790":"ENG","28835":"ENG","28866":"ENG","28858":"ENG","28853":"ENG","28893":"ENG","28895":"ENG","28910":"ENG","28924":"ENG","28935":"ENG","28936":"ENG","28948":"ENG","29007":"ENG","29010":"ENG","29047":"ENG","29108":"ENG","29107":"ENG","29147":"ENG","29164":"ENG","29165":"ENG","29176":"ENG","29184":"ENG","29189":"ENG","29211":"ENG","29212":"ENG","29218":"ENG","29233":"ENG","29275":"ENG","29271":"ENG","29307":"ENG","29345":"ENG","29357":"ENG","29358":"ENG","29361":"ENG","29402":"ENG","29429":"ENG","29483":"ENG","29595":"ENG","29619":"ENG","29682":"ENG","29768":"ENG","29860":"ENG","29843":"ENG","29865":"ENG","29867":"ENG","29907":"ENG","29982":"ENG","29997":"ENG","30002":"ENG","30029":"ENG","30059":"ENG","30060":"ENG","30100":"ENG","30130":"ENG","30175":"ENG","30174":"ENG","30181":"ENG","30230":"ENG","30381":"ENG","30385":"ENG","30478":"ENG","30490":"ENG","30561":"ENG","30673":"ENG","30676":"ENG","30699":"ENG","30705":"ENG","30741":"ENG","30735":"ENG","30753":"ENG","30754":"ENG","30757":"ENG","30938":"ENG","30959":"ENG","30966":"ENG","30967":"ENG","31153":"ENG","31175":"ENG","31226":"ENG","31276":"ENG","31273":"ENG","31335":"ENG","31337":"ENG","31352":"ENG","31382":"ENG","31387":"ENG","31512":"ENG","31515":"ENG","31517":"ENG","31538":"ENG","31547":"ENG","31546":"ENG","31599":"ENG","31645":"ENG","31657":"ENG"},"introductiondate":{"28470":"","28507":"13\/04\/2016 00:00:00","28527":"","28546":"17\/09\/2008 00:00:00","28548":"","28591":"","28592":"","28596":"22\/04\/2014 00:00:00","28598":"02\/07\/2015 00:00:00","28639":"","28670":"","28671":"","28680":"","28790":"","28835":"","28866":"18\/01\/2013 00:00:00","28858":"31\/12\/2015 00:00:00","28853":"","28893":"","28895":"","28910":"27\/06\/2016 00:00:00","28924":"","28935":"","28936":"","28948":"","29007":"","29010":"","29047":"","29108":"","29107":"","29147":"06\/07\/2015 00:00:00","29164":"","29165":"","29176":"","29184":"01\/08\/2013 00:00:00","29189":"","29211":"08\/11\/2010 00:00:00","29212":"","29218":"","29233":"","29275":"08\/04\/2013 00:00:00","29271":"09\/11\/2009 00:00:00","29307":"","29345":"","29357":"","29358":"","29361":"","29402":"","29429":"","29483":"","29595":"","29619":"","29682":"","29768":"","29860":"01\/11\/2013 00:00:00","29843":"","29865":"","29867":"","29907":"","29982":"","29997":"","30002":"","30029":"","30059":"","30060":"","30100":"","30130":"","30175":"","30174":"","30181":"","30230":"","30381":"30\/10\/2009 00:00:00","30385":"","30478":"","30490":"","30561":"14\/11\/2008 00:00:00","30673":"","30676":"","30699":"24\/11\/2016 00:00:00","30705":"","30741":"11\/07\/2017 00:00:00","30735":"","30753":"","30754":"","30757":"","30938":"","30959":"","30966":"","30967":"","31153":"10\/07\/2015 00:00:00","31175":"","31226":"","31276":"14\/03\/2012 00:00:00","31273":"","31335":"","31337":"","31352":"20\/03\/2013 00:00:00","31382":"","31387":"","31512":"","31515":"","31517":"","31538":"","31547":"","31546":"","31599":"","31645":"","31657":""},"reportdate":{"28470":"","28507":"","28527":"","28546":"","28548":"","28591":"","28592":"","28596":"","28598":"","28639":"","28670":"","28671":"","28680":"","28790":"","28835":"","28866":"","28858":"","28853":"","28893":"","28895":"","28910":"","28924":"","28935":"","28936":"","28948":"","29007":"","29010":"","29047":"","29108":"","29107":"","29147":"","29164":"","29165":"","29176":"","29184":"","29189":"","29211":"","29212":"","29218":"","29233":"","29275":"","29271":"","29307":"","29345":"","29357":"","29358":"","29361":"","29402":"","29429":"","29483":"","29595":"","29619":"","29682":"","29768":"","29860":"","29843":"","29865":"","29867":"","29907":"","29982":"","29997":"","30002":"","30029":"","30059":"","30060":"","30100":"","30130":"","30175":"","30174":"","30181":"","30230":"","30381":"","30385":"","30478":"","30490":"","30561":"","30673":"","30676":"","30699":"","30705":"","30741":"","30735":"","30753":"","30754":"","30757":"","30938":"","30959":"","30966":"","30967":"","31153":"","31175":"","31226":"","31276":"","31273":"","31335":"","31337":"","31352":"","31382":"","31387":"","31512":"","31515":"","31517":"","31538":"","31547":"","31546":"","31599":"","31645":"","31657":""},"issue":{"28470":"Federal Medical Association\u2019s Guidelines for the Substitution Treatment of Opiate Addicts of 19 February 2010, adopted in accordance with section 5 \u00a7 11 of the Prescription of Narcotic Substances Regulation ; Section 13 of the Narcotic Substances Act ; Section 5 \u00a7 2 of the Prescription of Narcotic Substances Regulation ; Paragraph 8 of the Federal Medical Association\u2019s Guidelines for the Substitution Treatment of Opiate Addicts","28507":"","28527":"","28546":"","28548":"","28591":"","28592":"","28596":"","28598":"","28639":"","28670":"Articles 125 and 126 of the Criminal Code ; Article 365 of the Civil Code","28671":"","28680":"","28790":"","28835":"","28866":"","28858":"","28853":"","28893":"","28895":"","28910":"","28924":"Article 10 \u00a7 4 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998 providing \u201cConsolidated text of provisions concerning immigration regulations and rules on the status of aliens\u201d ; Article 13 of the Italian Constitution\n","28935":"","28936":"","28948":"","29007":"Articles 193 \u00a7 2, 197, 210 and 363a of the Code of Criminal Procedure ; Article 104a of the Criminal Code\n","29010":"","29047":"","29108":"","29107":"","29147":"","29164":"","29165":"","29176":"","29184":"","29189":"","29211":"","29212":"Articles 31 \u00a7 8 (b), 33, 38 \u00a7 1 and 43 of Directive 2013\/32\/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast) ; Article 8 \u00a7 1 of Directive 2013\/33\/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast) ; Sections 2, 2(k), 31\/A , 66 (2) d,  71\/A (1), (2) and (7) of Act no. LXXX of 2007 on Asylum (\u201cthe Asylum Act\u201d) ; Government Decree no. 191\/2015. (VII.21.) on the definition of safe countries of origin and safe third countries\n","29218":"","29233":"","29275":"","29271":"","29307":"","29345":"","29357":"The Operational-Search Activities Act (Law no. 144-FZ of 12 August 1995) ; Article 144 Code of Criminal Procedure","29358":"","29361":"","29402":"2009 Execution of Punishments and Pre-Trial Detention Act and its implementing regulations ","29429":"Articles 91 (Administrative sanctions), 180 (Bodily harm) and 193 (Threats) of the Criminal Code ; Articles 2, 16 and 26 of Law no. 217\/2003 on preventing and combating domestic violence entered into force on 29 May 2003\n","29483":"","29595":"","29619":"","29682":"","29768":"","29860":"","29843":"Law at Issue Article 17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure","29865":"","29867":"","29907":"","29982":"","29997":"","30002":"","30029":"","30059":"","30060":"","30100":"","30130":"","30175":"","30174":"","30181":"","30230":"","30381":"","30385":"","30478":"","30490":"","30561":"","30673":"","30676":"","30699":"","30705":"","30741":"","30735":"","30753":"","30754":"","30757":"","30938":"","30959":"","30966":"","30967":"","31153":"","31175":"","31226":"","31276":"","31273":"Articles 67, 161, 365 and 367 of the Criminal Code","31335":"","31337":"","31352":"","31382":"Criminal Code ; Articles 147 and 171 of the Labour Code ; Decree no. 421","31387":"","31512":"","31515":"Section XVII of the Instruction on the performance of duties by special convoy departments of the penal service, approved jointly by the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior on 24 May 2006 and amended by their joint order no. 236dsp\/900dsp of 22 October 2008","31517":"","31538":"","31547":"","31546":"","31599":"Law of 5 May 2014 on compulsory confinement (in force since 1 October 2016), repealing the Social Protection Act of 9 April 1930","31645":"","31657":""},"applicability":{"28470":"","28507":"","28527":"","28546":"","28548":"","28591":"","28592":"","28596":"","28598":"","28639":"","28670":"","28671":"","28680":"","28790":"","28835":"","28866":"","28858":"","28853":"","28893":"","28895":"","28910":"","28924":"23","28935":"","28936":"","28948":"","29007":"","29010":"","29047":"","29108":"","29107":"","29147":"","29164":"","29165":"","29176":"","29184":"","29189":"","29211":"","29212":"26","29218":"","29233":"","29275":"","29271":"","29307":"","29345":"","29357":"","29358":"","29361":"","29402":"","29429":"","29483":"","29595":"","29619":"","29682":"","29768":"","29860":"","29843":"","29865":"","29867":"","29907":"","29982":"","29997":"","30002":"","30029":"","30059":"","30060":"","30100":"","30130":"","30175":"","30174":"","30181":"","30230":"","30381":"","30385":"20;55","30478":"","30490":"","30561":"","30673":"","30676":"","30699":"","30705":"","30741":"","30735":"","30753":"","30754":"","30757":"","30938":"","30959":"","30966":"","30967":"","31153":"","31175":"","31226":"","31276":"","31273":"","31335":"","31337":"","31352":"","31382":"","31387":"","31512":"","31515":"","31517":"","31538":"20;55","31547":"","31546":"","31599":"","31645":"","31657":""},"languagenumber":{"28470":1,"28507":1,"28527":1,"28546":1,"28548":1,"28591":1,"28592":1,"28596":1,"28598":1,"28639":1,"28670":1,"28671":1,"28680":1,"28790":1,"28835":1,"28866":1,"28858":1,"28853":1,"28893":1,"28895":1,"28910":1,"28924":1,"28935":1,"28936":1,"28948":1,"29007":1,"29010":1,"29047":1,"29108":1,"29107":1,"29147":1,"29164":1,"29165":1,"29176":1,"29184":1,"29189":1,"29211":1,"29212":1,"29218":1,"29233":1,"29275":1,"29271":1,"29307":1,"29345":1,"29357":1,"29358":1,"29361":1,"29402":1,"29429":1,"29483":1,"29595":1,"29619":1,"29682":1,"29768":1,"29860":1,"29843":1,"29865":1,"29867":1,"29907":1,"29982":1,"29997":1,"30002":1,"30029":1,"30059":1,"30060":1,"30100":1,"30130":1,"30175":1,"30174":1,"30181":1,"30230":1,"30381":1,"30385":1,"30478":1,"30490":1,"30561":1,"30673":1,"30676":1,"30699":1,"30705":1,"30741":1,"30735":1,"30753":1,"30754":1,"30757":1,"30938":1,"30959":1,"30966":1,"30967":1,"31153":1,"31175":1,"31226":1,"31276":1,"31273":1,"31335":1,"31337":1,"31352":1,"31382":1,"31387":1,"31512":1,"31515":1,"31517":1,"31538":1,"31547":1,"31546":1,"31599":1,"31645":1,"31657":1},"casename":{"28470":"CASE OF WENNER v. GERMANY","28507":"F.M. AND OTHERS v. DENMARK","28527":"CASE OF KONDRULIN v. RUSSIA","28546":"IVANOV v. RUSSIA","28548":"CASE OF SAVCHENKO v. UKRAINE","28591":"CASE OF KLIMOV v. RUSSIA","28592":"CASE OF MAYLENSKIY v. RUSSIA","28596":"ALI AND OTHERS v. SWITZERLAND AND ITALY","28598":"M.A.-M. AND OTHERS v. FINLAND","28639":"CASE OF LEONID PETROV v. RUSSIA","28670":"CASE OF IRINA SMIRNOVA v. UKRAINE","28671":"CASE OF TYMCHENKO v. UKRAINE","28680":"CASE OF B.A.C. v. GREECE [Extracts]","28790":"CASE OF ABDULLAHI ELMI AND AWEYS ABUBAKAR v. MALTA","28835":"CASE OF MUSTAFA HAJILI v. AZERBAIJAN","28866":"S.N. AND T.D. v. LATVIA","28858":"EL\u00c7\u0130 AND OTHERS v. TURKEY","28853":"CASE OF MIKHAIL NIKOLAYEV v. RUSSIA","28893":"CASE OF DUMIKYAN v. RUSSIA","28895":"CASE OF PAPOSHVILI v. BELGIUM","28910":"A.J. AND F.B. v. SWEDEN","28924":"CASE OF KHLAIFIA AND OTHERS v. ITALY","28935":"CASE OF DZIDZAVA v. RUSSIA","28936":"CASE OF SHIOSHVILI AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA","28948":"CASE OF I.U. v. RUSSIA","29007":"CASE OF J. AND OTHERS v. AUSTRIA","29010":"CASE OF KOMAROV v. UKRAINE","29047":"CASE OF KHAMIDKARIYEV v. RUSSIA","29108":"CASE OF PENDIUC v. ROMANIA","29107":"CASE OF MIH\u0102ILESCU v. ROMANIA","29147":"M.S.S. v. RUSSIA","29164":"CASE OF TALPIS v. ITALY","29165":"CASE OF V.K. v. RUSSIA","29176":"CASE OF VINOGRADOV v. RUSSIA","29184":"\u0110UROVI\u0106 v. CROATIA","29189":"CASE OF MUKAYEV v. RUSSIA","29211":"OJEI v. THE NETHERLANDS","29212":"CASE OF ILIAS AND AHMED v. HUNGARY","29218":"CASE OF BUJAK v. POLAND","29233":"CASE OF SHESTOPALOV v. RUSSIA","29275":"URZIC\u0102 v. ROMANIA","29271":"CAZACLIU AND OTHERS v. ROMANIA","29307":"CASE OF MORGUNOV v. RUSSIA","29345":"CASE OF ZHERDEV v. UKRAINE","29357":"CASE OF OLISOV AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA","29358":"CASE OF SITNIKOV v. RUSSIA","29361":"CASE OF KONDAKOV v. RUSSIA","29402":"CASE OF SIMEONOVI v. BULGARIA","29429":"CASE OF B\u0102L\u0218AN v. ROMANIA","29483":"CASE OF BARSUKOV v. RUSSIA","29595":"CASE OF DIMCHO DIMOV v. BULGARIA (No. 2)","29619":"CASE OF SADKOV v. UKRAINE","29682":"CASE OF ROOMAN v. BELGIUM","29768":"CASE OF BUDNIK v. POLAND","29860":"MAHAMUD AHMED v. MALTA","29843":"CASE OF D.M.D. v. ROMANIA","29865":"CASE OF \u0100BELE v. LATVIA","29867":"CASE OF OSTROVE\u0145ECS v. LATVIA","29907":"CASE OF TIZIANA PENNINO v. ITALY","29982":"CASE OF CIRINO AND RENNE v. ITALY","29997":"CASE OF M.F. v. HUNGARY","30002":"CASE OF T.M. AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA","30029":"CASE OF K.I. v. RUSSIA","30059":"CASE OF CEESAY v. AUSTRIA","30060":"CASE OF BOUKROUROU AND OTHERS v. FRANCE","30100":"CASE OF ALEKSANDR KONOVALOV v. RUSSIA","30130":"CASE OF DORNEANU v. ROMANIA","30175":"CASE OF D.L. v. AUSTRIA","30174":"CASE OF S.F. AND OTHERS v. BULGARIA","30181":"CASE OF KSENZ AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA","30230":"CASE OF KRSMANOVI\u0106 v. SERBIA","30381":"DMITRIYEV v. RUSSIA","30385":"CASE OF V.C. v. ITALY","30478":"CASE OF SHATOKHIN v. RUSSIA","30490":"CASE OF TERGE v. HUNGARY","30561":"ISMOGULOV v. RUSSIA","30673":"CASE OF SERGEY IVANOV v. RUSSIA","30676":"CASE OF PANKOV v. RUSSIA","30699":"H AND OTHERS v. SWITZERLAND","30705":"CASE OF ZABELOS AND OTHERS v. GREECE","30741":"HANSEN v. NORWAY","30735":"CASE OF POCASOVSCHI AND MIHAILA v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA AND RUSSIA","30753":"CASE OF ABU ZUBAYDAH v. LITHUANIA","30754":"CASE OF AL NASHIRI v. ROMANIA","30757":"CASE OF KHANI KABBARA v. CYPRUS","30938":"CASE OF ABDULKADYROV AND DAKHTAYEV v. RUSSIA","30959":"CASE OF OLEKSA v. POLAND","30966":"CASE OF MANG\u00ceR AND OTHERS v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA AND RUSSIA","30967":"CASE OF SERGEY RYABOV v. RUSSIA","31153":"AYDAROV AND OTHERS v. BULGARIA","31175":"CASE OF GOLUBYATNIKOV AND ZHUCHKOV v. RUSSIA","31226":"CASE OF A.N. AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA","31276":"OR\u0141OWSKI v. POLAND","31273":"CASE OF BURLYA AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE","31335":"CASE OF SAMESOV v. RUSSIA","31337":"CASE OF S.N. v. RUSSIA","31352":"A.S. v. THE NETHERLANDS","31382":"CASE OF ISAYEVA v. UKRAINE","31387":"CASE OF DUDKA v. UKRAINE","31512":"CASE OF BELYAYEV v. RUSSIA","31515":"CASE OF ILGIZ KHALIKOV v. RUSSIA","31517":"CASE OF GJINI v. SERBIA","31538":"CASE OF X AND OTHERS v. BULGARIA","31547":"CASE OF B.U. AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA","31546":"CASE OF U.A. v. RUSSIA","31599":"CASE OF ROOMAN v. BELGIUM","31645":"CASE OF BEKETOV v. UKRAINE","31657":"CASE OF MAMMADOV AND OTHERS v. AZERBAIJAN"},"article":{"28470":["3","41"],"28507":["3","35"],"28527":["3","34"],"28546":["3","35"],"28548":["3","5","5-1","5-3","5-4","5-5","6","6-1","13","13+3","13+6-1","34"],"28591":["3","34"],"28592":["3","34"],"28596":["3","8","8-1","8-2","13","13+3","13+8","35","37","37-1"],"28598":["3","13","35"],"28639":["3","5","5-1"],"28670":["3","8","8-1","35","35-1","35-3-a","41"],"28671":["3","6","6-1","34"],"28680":["3","3+13","8","8-1","13","13+8","41"],"28790":["3","5","5-1","5-4"],"28835":["3"],"28866":["2","3","5","6","6+13","8","8-1","8-2","10","13","34","35","P7-1","P7-1-1"],"28858":["2","3","5","5-1","8","9","13","15","17","18","34","35","P1-1","P4-2"],"28853":["3"],"28893":["3","5","5-1"],"28895":["3","8","8-1","41"],"28910":["2","2-1","2-2","3","5","6","9","35"],"28924":["3","5","5-1","5-1-f","5-2","5-4","13","13+3","13+P4-4","41","P4-4"],"28935":["2","2-1","3","13","13+3"],"28936":["3","13","13+3","P4-2","P4-2-2","P4-2-3","P4-4"],"28948":["3"],"29007":["3","4","4-1","35","35-1"],"29010":["3","6","6+6-1","6-1","6-3-c"],"29047":["3","34","38"],"29108":["3"],"29107":["3"],"29147":["3","13","35"],"29164":["2","2-1","3","14","14+2","35","35-1","41"],"29165":["3","41"],"29176":["3"],"29184":["3","35"],"29189":["3","6","6-1"],"29211":["3","35"],"29212":["3","5","5-1","5-1-f","5-4","13","13+3","35","41"],"29218":["3","5","5-3"],"29233":["3","13","13+3"],"29275":["3","35"],"29271":["3","6","6-1","8","8-1","8-2","13","14","14+3","14+6","14+8","14+P1-2","34","35","37","37-1","P1-2","P12-1"],"29307":["3"],"29345":["3","5","5-1","5-3","6","6+6-3-c","6-1","6-3-c","35","35-3-a","41"],"29357":["3","13","35","41"],"29358":["3"],"29361":["3"],"29402":["3","6","6+6-3-c","6-1","6-3-c","41","46","46-2"],"29429":["3","14","14+3","41"],"29483":["3","13","13+3"],"29595":["3"],"29619":["3","5","5+5-4","5-1","5-4","6","6+6-3-c","6-1","6-3-c","34"],"29682":["3","5","5-1","5-1-e","34","41"],"29768":["3"],"29860":["3","5","5-1","5-2","5-4","37","37-1"],"29843":["3","6","6-1","35","35-1","41"],"29865":["3","35","35-1","41"],"29867":["3"],"29907":["3"],"29982":["3"],"29997":["3","14","14+3"],"30002":["3","5","5-1"],"30029":["3","5","5-1","5-4"],"30059":["2","2-1","3"],"30060":["2","2-1","2-2","3","41"],"30100":["3","5","5-1","6","6-1"],"30130":["3"],"30175":["2","3"],"30174":["3","41"],"30181":["3","5","5-1"],"30230":["3"],"30381":["3","5","6","8","13","35"],"30385":["3","8","8-1","41"],"30478":["3"],"30490":["3"],"30561":["3","35"],"30673":["3","6","6-1"],"30676":["3"],"30699":["3","35"],"30705":["3","13","13+3"],"30741":["3","8","8-1","8-2","35"],"30735":["1","3","13","13+3","34","35","35-1","35-3-a","41"],"30753":["1","3","5","5-1","8","8-1","8-2","13","13+3","34","35","35-1","41","46","46-1","46-2"],"30754":["1","2","2+P6-1","2-1","3","3+P6-1","5","5-1","6","6-1","8","8-1","8-2","13","13+3","35","35-1","35-3-a","41","46","46-1","46-2","P6-1"],"30757":["3"],"30938":["3","6","6-1","8","8-1"],"30959":["3"],"30966":["3","5","5-1","5-3","5-4","13","13+3"],"30967":["3","6","6-1"],"31153":["3","6","8","8-1","8-2","13","14","14+8","34","35","P1-1"],"31175":["3","5","5-1","6","6-1"],"31226":["3","5","5-1-f"],"31276":["3","8","35","37","37-1"],"31273":["3","8","8-1","14","14+3","14+8-1","35","35-3-a","37","37-1","41"],"31335":["3"],"31337":["3","8","8-1"],"31352":["3","13","35"],"31382":["3","6","6-1","37","37-1","37-1-c"],"31387":["3","6","6+6-3-c","6-1","6-3-c"],"31512":["3","6","6-1"],"31515":["3","41"],"31517":["3","35","35-1","41"],"31538":["3","8","8-1"],"31547":["3","5","5-1","5-4"],"31546":["3","5","5-1"],"31599":["3","5","5-1","5-1-e","34","41"],"31645":["3","13","13+3"],"31657":["2","2-1","3","5","5-1","5-3"]},"referencedate":{"28470":0,"28507":0,"28527":0,"28546":0,"28548":0,"28591":0,"28592":0,"28596":0,"28598":0,"28639":0,"28670":0,"28671":0,"28680":0,"28790":0,"28835":0,"28866":0,"28858":0,"28853":0,"28893":0,"28895":0,"28910":0,"28924":0,"28935":0,"28936":0,"28948":0,"29007":0,"29010":0,"29047":0,"29108":0,"29107":0,"29147":0,"29164":0,"29165":0,"29176":0,"29184":0,"29189":0,"29211":0,"29212":0,"29218":0,"29233":0,"29275":0,"29271":0,"29307":0,"29345":0,"29357":0,"29358":0,"29361":0,"29402":0,"29429":0,"29483":0,"29595":0,"29619":0,"29682":0,"29768":0,"29860":0,"29843":0,"29865":0,"29867":0,"29907":0,"29982":0,"29997":0,"30002":0,"30029":0,"30059":0,"30060":0,"30100":0,"30130":0,"30175":0,"30174":0,"30181":0,"30230":0,"30381":0,"30385":0,"30478":0,"30490":0,"30561":0,"30673":0,"30676":0,"30699":0,"30705":0,"30741":0,"30735":0,"30753":0,"30754":0,"30757":0,"30938":0,"30959":0,"30966":0,"30967":0,"31153":0,"31175":0,"31226":0,"31276":0,"31273":0,"31335":0,"31337":0,"31352":0,"31382":0,"31387":0,"31512":0,"31515":0,"31517":0,"31538":0,"31547":0,"31546":0,"31599":0,"31645":0,"31657":0},"scl_array":{"28470":["Blokhin v. Russia [GC], no. 47152\/06, ECHR 2016","Budanov v. Russia, no. 66583\/11, \u00a7 73, 9 January 2014","Farbtuhs v. Latvia, no. 4672\/02, \u00a7 51, 2 December 2004","Keenan v. the United Kingdom, no. 27229\/95, \u00a7\u00a7 115-116, ECHR 2001 III","Khudobin v. Russia, no.  59696\/00, \u00a7\u00a7  95-96, ECHR 2006 XII (extracts)","Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7 94, ECHR 2000 XI","McGlinchey and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 50390\/99, \u00a7 46, ECHR 2003 V","Poghosyan v. Georgia, no. 9870\/07, \u00a7 59, 24 February 2009","Sarban v. Moldova, no. 3456\/05, \u00a7 90, 4 October 2005","Sergey Antonov v. Ukraine, no. 40512\/13, 22 October 2015","Testa v. Croatia, no. 20877\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 51-52, 12 July 2007","Ukhan v. Ukraine, no. 30628\/02, \u00a7 76, 18 December 2008","Xiros v. Greece, no. 1033\/07, 9 September 2010"],"28507":[""],"28527":[""],"28546":[""],"28548":[""],"28591":[""],"28592":[""],"28596":[""],"28598":[""],"28639":[""],"28670":["B. v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 61382\/09, \u00a7 74, 16 July 2013","B.V. and Others v. Croatia (dec.), no. 38435\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 149-158, 15 December 2015","\u0106osi\u0107 v. Croatia, no. 28261\/06, \u00a7 21-23, 15 January 2009","D.F. v. Latvia, no. 11160\/07, \u00a7 83, 29 October 2013","\u0110or\u0111evi\u0107 v. Croatia, no. 41526\/10, ECHR 2012","Hajduov\u00e1 v. Slovakia, \u00a7 46, 30 November 2010","Kirpichenko v. Ukraine, no. 38833\/03, \u00a7 63, 2 April 2015","Kryvitska and Kryvitskyy v. Ukraine, no. 30856\/03, \u00a7 44, 2 December 2010","M. and M. v. Croatia, no. 10161\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 141-143, ECHR 2015 (extracts)","McCann v. the United Kingdom, no. 19009\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 49-50 and 55, ECHR 2008","Piryanik v. Ukraine, no. 75788\/01, \u00a7 20, 19 April 2005","Remetin v. Croatia, no. 29525\/10, \u00a7 90, 11 December 2012","Sandra Jankovi\u0107 v. Croatia, no. 38478\/05, \u00a7 45, 5 March 2009","S\u00f6derman v. Sweden [GC], no. 5786\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 83-85, ECHR 2013","Surugiu v. Romania, no. 48995\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 60-67, 20 April 2004","Udovi\u010di\u0107 v. Croatia, no. 27310\/09, \u00a7 136, 24 April 2014","Valiulien\u0117 v. Lithuania, no. 33234\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 68-75, 26 March 2013"],"28671":[""],"28680":["Aristimu\u00f1o Mendizabal v. France, no 51431\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 65-66, 17 January 2006","F.G. v. Sweden [GC], no 43611\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 115 and 158, ECHR 2016","Fern\u00e1ndez Mart\u00ednez v. Spain, [GC], no 56030\/07, \u00a7 114, ECHR 2014 (extracts)","J.K. and Others v. Sweden [GC], no 59166\/12, 23 August 2016","Jeunesse v. the Netherlands [GC], no 12738\/12, \u00a7 103, 3 October 2014","M.E. v. Sweden [GC], no 71398\/12, 8 April 2015","M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, [GC] no 30696\/09, \u00a7 262, 21 January 2011","Micallef v. Malta [GC], no 17056\/06, \u00a7 55, ECHR 2009","R.U. v. Greece, no 2237\/08, 7 June 2011"],"28790":[""],"28835":[""],"28866":[""],"28858":[""],"28853":[""],"28893":[""],"28895":["A.S. v. Switzerland, no. 39350\/13, 30 June 2015","Airey v. Ireland, 9 October 1979, \u00a7 26, Series A no. 32","Aswat v. the United Kingdom, no. 17299\/12, \u00a7 49, 16 April 2013","Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380\/09, \u00a7 86, ECHR 2015","D. v. the United Kingdom, 2 May 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997 III","E.O. v. Italy (dec.), no. 34724\/10, 10 May 2012","El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630\/09, ECHR 2012","F.G. v. Sweden [GC], no. 43611\/11, ECHR 2016","Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765\/09, ECHR 2012","Karagoz v. France (dec.), no. 47531\/99, 15 November 2001","Karner v. Austria, no. 40016\/98, ECHR 2003 IX","Khachatryan v. Belgium (dec.), no. 72597\/10, 7 April 2015","Kochieva and Others v. Sweden (dec.), no. 75203\/12, 30 April 2013","M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696\/09, ECHR 2011","Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 33071\/96, ECHR 2000\u2011XII","Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827\/99 and 46951\/99, \u00a7 121, ECHR 2005-I","Maslov v. Austria [GC], no. 1638\/03, \u00a7 93, ECHR 2008","Murray v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 10511\/10, \u00a7 79, ECHR 2016","N. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 26565\/05, ECHR 2008","Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346\/02, \u00a7 52, ECHR 2002 III","S.H.H. v. the United Kingdom, no. 60367\/10, 29 January 2013","Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201\/06, ECHR 2008","Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, nos. 8319\/07 and 11449\/07, \u00a7 214, 28 June 2011","Tarakhel v. Switzerland ([GC], no. 29217\/12, ECHR 2014 (extracts)","Tatar v. Switzerland, no. 65692\/12, 14 April 2015","Trabelsi v. Belgium, no. 140\/10, \u00a7 130, ECHR 2014 (extracts)","V.S. and Others v. France (dec.), no. 35226\/11, 25 November 2014","Vilvarajah and Others v. the United Kingdom, 30 October 1991, Series A no. 215","Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v. Belgium, no. 10486\/10, 20 December 2011"],"28910":[""],"28924":["A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no 3455\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 162-163, ECHR 2009","A.A. v. Greece, no 12186\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 57-65, 22 July 2010","A.F. v. Greece, no 53709\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 71-80, 13 June 2013","Aarabi v. Greece, no 39766\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 42-51, 2 April 2015","Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, no 30471\/08, 22 September 2009","Aksoy v. Turkey, 18 December 1996, \u00a7 61, Reports 1996 VI","Alver v. Estonia, no 64812\/01, \u00a7 50, 8 November 2005","Amuur v. France, 25 June 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-III","Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525\/07 and 60800\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 142-145, 10 January 2012","Andrei Frolov v. Russia, no 205\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 47-49, 29 March 2007","Andric v. Sweden (dec.), no 45917\/99, 23 February 1999","B.M. v. Greece, no 53608\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 67-70, 19 December 2013","Babushkin v. Russia, no 67253\/01, \u00a7 44, 18 October 2007","Baranowski v. Poland, no 28358\/95, ECHR 2000-III","Belevitskiy v. Russia, no 72967\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 73-79, 1 March 2007","Berisha and Haljiti v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), no 18670\/03, 16 June 2005","Blokhin v. Russia [GC], no 47152\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 164-172, ECHR 2016","Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no 23380\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 81-90, ECHR 2015","Brega v. Moldova, no 52100\/08, 20 April 2010","Bubullima v. Greece, no 41533\/08, \u00a7 27, 28 October 2010","C.D. and Others v. Greece, nos. 33441\/10, 33468\/10 and 33476\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 49-54, 19 December 2013","C\u0103\u015funeanu v. Romania, no 22018\/10, \u00a7 60-62, 16 April 2013","Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, Reports 1996-V","Chama\u00efev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, no 36378\/02, ECHR 2005-III","\u010conka v. Belgium, no 51564\/99, ECHR 2002-I","D.L. v. Bulgaria, no 7472\/14, \u00a7\u00a7 6 and 69-71, 19 May 2016","Davydov v. Estonia (dec.), no 16387\/03, 31 May 2005","Dbouba v. Turkey, no 15916\/09, \u00a7 54, 13 July 2010","De Jong, Baljet and Van den Brink v. the Netherlands, 22 May 1984, \u00a7 60, Series A no 77","De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, 18 June 1971, \u00a7\u00a7 67-70, Series A no 12","De Souza Ribeiro v. France [GC], no. 22689\/07, ECHR 2012","Del R\u00edo Prada v. Spain [GC], no 42750\/09, \u00a7 125, ECHR 2013","Delbec v. France, no 43125\/98, \u00a7 33, 18 June 2002","Denisenko and Bogdanchikov v. Russia, no 3811\/02, \u00a7 83, 12 February 2009","Dougoz v. Greece, n\u00ba 40907\/98, \u00a7 46, ECHR 2001-II","Dritsas v. Italy (dec.), no 2344\/02, 1 February 2011","E. v. Norway, 29 August 1990, Series A no 181-A","Efremidze v. Greece, no 33225\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 36-42, 21 June 2011","El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no 39630\/09, \u00a7 195, ECHR 2012","F.H. v. Greece, no. 78456\/11, 31 July 2014","Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. the United Kingdom, 30 August 1990, \u00a7 40, Series A no 182","Fuchser v. Switzerland, no 55894\/00, \u00a7 43, 13 July 2006","G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no 22978\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 87-92, ECHR 2010","Gavrilovici v. Moldova, no 25464\/05, 15 December 2009","Georgia v. Russia (I) [GC], no 13255\/07, ECHR 2014 (extracts)","Ghulami v. France (dec.), no 45302\/05, 7 April 2009","Giulia Manzoni v. Italy, 1 July 1997, \u00a7 25, Reports 1997-IV","Guzzardi v. Italy, 6 November 1980, \u00a7\u00a7 92-93, Series A no 39","Ha.A. v. Greece, no 58387\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 26-31, 21 April 2016","Herczegfalvy v. Austria, 24 September 1992, \u00a7 63, Series A no 244","Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no 27765\/09, ECHR 2012","Hutchison Reid v. the United Kingdom, no 50272\/99, \u00a7 79, ECHR 2003-IV","Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, Series A no 25","Istv\u00e1n G\u00e1bor Kov\u00e1cs v. Hungary, no 15707\/10, \u00a7 26, 17 January 2012","Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no 54810\/00, \u00a7 67, ECHR 2006-IX","Je\u010dius v. Lithuania, no 34578\/97, \u00a7 56, ECHR 2000-IX","Kadikis v. Latvia, no 62393\/00, \u00a7 55, 4 May 2006","Kalashnikov v. Russia, no 47095\/99, \u00a7 102, ECHR 2002-VI","Kanagaratnam and Others v. Belgium, no 15297\/09, \u00a7 80, 13 December 2011","Kantyrev v. Russia, no 37213\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 50-51, 21 June 2007","Karalevi\u010dius v. Lithuania, no 53254\/99, \u00a7 39, 7 April 2005","Kehayov v. Bulgaria, no 41035\/98, \u00a7 64, 18 January 2005","Khudoyorov v. Russia, no 6847\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 106-107, ECHR 2005-X (extracts)","Koktysh v. Ukraine, no 43707\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 22 and 91-95, 10 December 2009","Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no 30210\/96, ECHR 2000-XI","L.M. v. Slovenia, no 32863\/05, 12 June 2014","Labita v. Italy [GC], no 26772\/95, \u00a7 170, ECHR 2000-IV","Lavrentiadis v. Greece, no 29896\/13, \u00a7 45, 22 September 2015","Luberti v. Italy, 23 February 1984, \u00a7\u00a7 33-37, Series A no 75","M.A. v. Cyprus, no 41872\/10, ECHR 2013","M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no 30696\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 217-234, ECHR 2011","Mahdid and Haddar v. Austria (dec.), no 74762\/01, 8 December 2005","Medvedyev and Others v. France [GC], no 3394\/03, \u00a7 73, ECHR 2010","Mete and Others v. Turkey, no 294\/08, \u00a7 112, 4 October 2012","Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], nos. 10865\/09, 45886\/07 and 32431\/08, \u00a7 315, ECHR 2014 (extracts)","Moisseiev v. Russia, no 62936\/00, \u00a7\u00a7 124-127, 9 October 2008","Mooren v. Germany [GC], no 11364\/03, \u00a7 76, 9 July 2009","Mouisel v. France, no 67263\/01, \u00a7 37, ECHR 2002-IX","Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, no 13178\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 53-54, ECHR 2006-XI","Mursi\u010d v. Croatia [GC], no 7334\/13, 20 October 2016","Musaev v. Turkey, no 72754\/11, \u00a7 40, 21 October 2014","N.C. v. Italy [GC], no 24952\/94, \u00a7 44, ECHR 2002-X","Naumenko v. Ukraine, no 42023\/98, \u00a7 108, 10 February 2004","Nikolova v. Bulgaria [GC], no 31195\/96, \u00a7 69, ECHR 1999-II","Novoselov v. Russia, no 66460\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 32 and 40-43, 2 June 2005","Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, no 21722\/11, \u00a7 219, ECHR 2013","Paladi v. Moldova [GC], no 39806\/05, \u00a7 74, 10 March 2009","Peers v. Greece, no 28524\/95, \u00a7\u00a7 68 and 74, ECHR 2001 III","Popov v. France, nos. 39472\/07 and 39474\/07, 19 January 2012","Price v. the United Kingdom, no 33394\/96, \u00a7 24, ECHR 2001-VII","R.U. v. Greece, no 2237\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 62-64, 7 June 2011","Rahimi v. Greece, no 8687\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 60-62, 5 April 2011","Ramirez Sanchez v. France [GC], no 59450\/00, \u00a7 117, ECHR 2006-IX","Riad and Idiab v. Belgium, nos. 29787\/03 and 29810\/03, \u00a7 100, 24 January 2008","Ribitsch v. Austria, 4 December 1995, \u00a7 34, Series A no 336","Rivas v. France, no 59584\/00, \u00a7 38, 1 April 2004","Ruiz Rivera v. Switzerland, no 8300\/06, \u00a7 47, 18 February 2014","S.D. v. Greece, no 53541\/07, 11 June 2009","Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], no 13229\/03, \u00a7 43, ECHR 2008","Salman v. Turkey [GC], no 21986\/93, \u00a7\u00a7 99-100, ECHR 2000-VII","Selmouni v. France [GC], no 25803\/94, ECHR 1999-V","Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, no 16643\/09, \u00a7 188, 21 October 2014","Shtukaturov v. Russia, no 44009\/05, \u00a7 123, ECHR 2008","Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no 36760\/06, ECHR 2012","Steel and Others v. the United Kingdom, 23 September 1998, \u00a7 54, Reports 1998-VII","Sulejmanovic v. Italy, no 22635\/03, \u00a7 43, 16 July 2009","Sultani v. France, no 45223\/05, ECHR 2007 IV","Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], nos. 32541\/08 and 43441\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 113-114, ECHR 2014 (extracts)","T. and A. v. Turkey, no 47146\/11, 21 October 2014","Tabesh v. Greece, no 8256\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 38-44, 26 November 2009","Tarakhel v. Switzerland [GC], no 29217\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 93-122, ECHR 2014","Tomasi v. France, 27 August 1992, \u00a7 110, Series A no 241-A","Torreggiani and Others v. Italy, nos. 43517\/09, 46882\/09, 55400\/09, 57875\/09, 61535\/09, 35315\/10 and 37818\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 68-69, 8 January 2013","Turan \u00c7ak\u0131r v. Belgium, no 44256\/06, \u00a7 54, 10 March 2009","Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, 25 April 1978, \u00a7 32, Series A no 26","V. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no 24888\/94, \u00a7 71, ECHR 1999 IX","Vachev v. Bulgaria, no 42987\/98, \u00a7 71, ECHR 2004-VIII","Van der Leer v. the Netherlands, 21 February 1990, \u00a7\u00a7 27-28, Series A no 170-A","Vasyukov v. Russia, no 2974\/05, \u00a7 59, 5 April 2011","Velinov v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no 16880\/08, \u00a7 49, 19 September 2013","Vlasov v. Russia, no 78146\/01, \u00a7 84, 12 June 2008","Weeks v. the United Kingdom, 2 March 1987, \u00a7 61, Series A no 114","Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, 24 October 1979, \u00a7 39, Series A no 33","Witold Litwa v. Poland, no 26629\/95, \u00a7 60, ECHR 2000-III","Z. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no 29392\/95, \u00a7 73, ECHR 2001-V"],"28935":[""],"28936":[""],"28948":[""],"29007":["ATV Privatfernseh-GmbH v. Austria (dec.), no. 58842\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 32-37, 6 October 2015","C.N. v. the United Kingdom, no. 4239\/08, \u00a7 65, 13 November 2012","Denizci and Others v. Cyprus, nos. 25316-25321\/94 and 27207\/95, \u00a7 369, ECHR 2001 V","F\u00fcrst-Pfeifer v. Austria, nos. 33677\/10 and 52340\/10, \u00a7 31, 17 May 2016","Jeronovi\u010ds v. Latvia [GC], no. 44898\/10, \u00a7 107, 5 July 2016","M. and Others v. Italy and Bulgaria, no. 40020\/03, \u00a7 151, 31 July 2012","Maiorano and Others v. Italy, no. 28634\/06, \u00a7 105, 15 December 2009","Nikolay Dimitrov v. Bulgaria, no. 72663\/01, \u00a7 69, 27 September 2007","Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, no. 25965\/04, ECHR 2010 (extracts)","Siliadin v. France, no. 73316\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 89 and 112, ECHR 2005 VII","V.M. and Others v. Belgium [GC], no. 60125\/11, \u00a7 36, 17 November 2016"],"29010":[""],"29047":[""],"29108":[""],"29107":[""],"29147":[""],"29164":["A. v. Croatia, no 55164\/08, \u00a7 60, 14 October 2010","A. v. the United Kingdom, 23 September 1998, \u00a7 22, Reports 1998 VI","Aksu v. Turkey [GC], nos. 4149\/04 and 41029\/04, \u00a7 43, ECHR 2012","Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria, no 71127\/01, \u00a7 65, 12 June 2008","Bevacqua and S., pr\u00e9cit\u00e9, \u00a7 79","Bljakaj and Others v. Croatia, no 74448\/12, \u00a7 124, 18 September 2014","Bljakaj, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9 \u00a7 121","Branko Toma\u0161i\u0107 and Others v. Croatia, no 46598\/06, \u00a7 50, 15 January 2009","Camekan v. Turkey, n  54241\/08, \u00a7 38, 28 January 2014","Choreftakis and Choreftaki v. Greece, no 46846\/08, \u00a7 50, 17 January 2012","\u0110or\u0111evi\u0107 v. Croatia, no 41526\/10, ECHR 2012","E. and Others v. the United Kingdom, no 33218\/96, \u00a7 99 26 November 2002","E.M. v. Romania, no 43994\/05, \u00a7 51, 30 October 2012","Edwards v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no 46477\/99, 7 June 2001","Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, no 3564\/11, 28 May 2013","Gongadze v. Ukraine, no 34056\/02, \u00a7 165, ECHR 2005 XI","Hajduov\u00e1 v. Slovakia, no 2660\/03, \u00a7 47, 30 November 2010","Halime K\u0131l\u0131\u00e7 v. Turkey, no 63034\/11, \u00a7 99, 28 June 2016","Keenan v. the United Kingdom, no 27229\/95, \u00a7\u00a7 89-90, ECHR 2001 III","K\u0131l\u0131\u00e7 v. Turkey, no 22492\/93, \u00a7 62, ECHR 2000 III","Kontrov\u00e1 v. Slovakia, no 7510\/04, \u00a7 49, 31 May 2007","L.C.B. v. the United Kingdom, 9 June 1998, \u00a7 36, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 III","M. and M. v. Croatia, no 10161\/13, \u00a7 136, ECHR 2015 (extracts)","M.B. v. Romania, no 43982\/06, \u00a7 64, 3 November 2011","M.C. v. Bulgaria, no 39272\/98, \u00a7 151, ECHR 2003 XII","M.G. v. Turkey, no 646\/10, 22 March 2016","Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, no 22535\/93, \u00a7 85, ECHR 2000 III","Maiorano and Others v. Italy, no 28634\/06, \u00a7 111, 15 December 2009","Makaratzis v. Greece [GC], n  50385\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 49-55, ECHR 2004 XI","Mastromatteo v. Italy [GC], no 37703\/97, \u00a7 69, ECHR 2002 VIII","Mudric v. the Republic of Moldova, no 74839\/10, \u00a7 63, 16 July 2013","Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577\/98 and 43579\/98, \u00a7\u00a7 110 and 112-113, ECHR 2005-VII","Opuz v. Turkey, no. 33401\/02, ECHR 2009","Osman c the United Kingdom, 28 October 1998, \u00a7\u00a7 115-122, Reports 1998 VIII","Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, no 46477\/99, \u00a7 86, ECHR 2002 II","Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no 2346\/02, \u00a7 49, ECHR 2002 III","Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], no 52391\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 324-325, ECHR 2007 II","Sandra Jankovi\u0107 v. Croatia, no 38478\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 45-46, 5 March 2009","Soering v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A no 161, p. 34, \u00a7 88","T.M. and C.M. v. the Republic of Moldova, no 26608\/11, 28 January 2014","Valiulien\u0117 v. Lithuania, no 33234\/07, \u00a7 87, 26 March 2013","Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 16064\/90, 16065\/90, 16066\/90, 16068\/90, 16069\/90, 16070\/90, 16071\/90, 16072\/90 and 16073\/90, \u00a7156-158, ECHR 2009"],"29165":["Ablyazov v. Russia, no. 22867\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 57 and 59, 30 October 2012","Bataliny v. Russia, no. 10060\/07, \u00a7 103, 23 July 2015","Beganovi\u0107 v. Croatia, no. 46423\/06, \u00a7 85, 25 June 2009","Buntov v. Russia, no. 27026\/10, \u00a7 125, 5 June 2012","C.A.S. and C.S. v. Romania, no. 26692\/05, \u00a7 70, 20 March 2012","Campbell v. the United Kingdom, no. 7511\/76, Commission decision of 15 December 1977","Cosans on behalf of Cosans v. the United Kingdom, no. 7743\/76, Commission decision of 15 December 1977","Costello Roberts v. the United Kingdom, 25 March 1993, Series A no. 247 C","Denis Vasilyev v. Russia, no. 32704\/04, 17 December 2009","Gerasimova v. Russia, no. 24669\/02, \u00a7 17, 13 October 2005","Gerasimova v. Russia (dec.) no. 24669\/02, 16 September 2004","Grzelak v. Poland, no. 7710\/02, 15 June 2010","Ilbeyi Kemalo\u011flu and Meriye Kemalo\u011flu v. Turkey, no. 19986\/06, 10 April 2012","Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7 161, Series A no. 25","Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines v. Turkey, no. 40998\/98, \u00a7 79, ECHR 2007 V","\u0130zci v. Turkey, no. 42606\/05, \u00a7 72, 23 July 2013","Kopylov v. Russia, no. 3933\/04, \u00a7 119, 29 July 2010","Kotov v. Russia [GC], no. 54522\/00, \u00a7\u00a7 92 et seq., 3 April 2012","Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 120, ECHR 2000 IV","Lyapin v. Russia, no. 46956\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 133-40, 24 July 2014","Manzhos v. Russia, no. 64752\/09, \u00a7 40, 24 May 2016","Mikheyev v. Russia, no. 77617\/01, 26 January 2006","Molie v. Romania (dec.), no. 13754\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 29 and 39-41, 1 September 2009","Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine, no. 54825\/00, ECHR 2005 II (extracts)","Nikiforov v. Russia, no. 42837\/04, \u00a7 54, 1 July 2010","Pogulyayev v. Russia, no. 34150\/04, \u00a7 19, 3 April 2008","Radio France and Others v. France (dec.), no. 53984\/00, \u00a7 26, ECHR 2003 X (extracts)","Razzakov v. Russia, no. 57519\/09, \u00a7 61, 5 February 2015","Reilly v. Ireland (dec.), no. 51083\/09, \u00a7 53, 23 September 2014","S.M. v. Russia, no. 75863\/11, \u00a7 68, 22 October 2015","Saliyev v. Russia, no. 35016\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 64-68, 21 October 2010","Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986\/93, \u00a7 100, ECHR 2000 VII","Samoylov v. Russia, no. 64398\/01, \u00a7 39, 2 October 2008","Stork v. Germany, no. 38033\/02, \u00a7 103, 13 July 2006","V. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24888\/94, \u00a7 71, ECHR 1999 IX","Yavorivskaya v. Russia, no. 34687\/02, \u00a7 25, 21 July 2005","Yaz\u0131c\u0131 and Others v. Turkey (no. 2), no. 45046\/05, \u00a7 27, 23 April 2013","Zakharin and Others v. Russia, no. 22458\/04, \u00a7 68, 12 November 2015"],"29176":[""],"29184":[""],"29189":[""],"29211":[""],"29212":["Aden Ahmed v. Malta, no. 55352\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 97-99, 23 July 2013","Amuur v. France, 25 June 1996, \u00a7 43, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 III","Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal [GC], no. 73049\/01, \u00a7 86, ECHR 2007 I","Arat v. Turkey, no. 10309\/03, \u00a7 46, 10 November 2009","Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 39692\/09, 40713\/09 and 41008\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 57-58, ECHR 2012","Belevitskiy v. Russia, no. 72967\/01, \u00a7 91, 1 March 2007","Creang\u0103 v. Romania [GC], no. 29226\/03, \u00a7 91, 23 February 2012","De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], no. 43395\/09, \u00a7 80, 23 February 2017","F.G. v. Sweden [GC], no. 43611\/11, ECHR 2016","Guzzardi v. Italy, 6 November 1980, \u00a7 95, Series A no. 39","H.L. v. the United Kingdom, no. 45508\/99, \u00a7 91, ECHR 2004 IX","H.M. v. Switzerland, no. 39187\/98, \u00a7 45, ECHR 2002 II","Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765\/09, ECHR 2012","Jeunesse v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 12738\/10, \u00a7 110, 3 October 2014","Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 16483\/12, 15 December 2016","Kholmurodov v. Russia, no. 58923\/14, \u00a7 84, 1 March 2016","Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7 157, ECHR 2000 XI","Lokpo and Tour\u00e9 v. Hungary, no. 10816\/10, \u00a7 22, 20 September 2011","M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696\/09, \u00a7 223, ECHR 2011","Mahamed Jama v. Malta, no. 10290\/13, \u00a7 100, 26 November 2015","Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827\/99 and 46951\/99, \u00a7 69, ECHR 2005 I","Medvedyev and Others v. France [GC], no. 3394\/03, \u00a7 79, ECHR 2010","Mogo\u015f v. Romania (dec.), no. 20420\/02, 6 May 2004","Mooren v. Germany [GC], no 11364\/03, \u00a7 79, 9 July 2009","Muminov v. Russia, no. 42502\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 91-92, 11 December 2008","Murray v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 10511\/10, \u00a7 83, ECHR 2016","N.A. v. the United Kingdom, no. 25904\/07, \u00a7 119, 17 July 2008","Nakhmanovich v. Russia, no. 55669\/00, \u00a7 70, 2 March 2006","Nizomkhon Dzhurayev v. Russia, no. 31890\/11, \u00a7 113, 3 October 2013","R.C. v. Sweden, no. 41827\/07, \u00a7 52, 9 March 2010","Riad and Idiab v. Belgium, nos. 29787\/03 and 29810\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 68-71, 24 January 2008","Rohlena v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 59552\/08, \u00a7 51, ECHR 2015","Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201\/06, ECHR 2008","Shamsa v. Poland, nos. 45355\/99 and 45357\/99, \u00a7 47, 27 November 2003","Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 36760\/06, ECHR 2012","Sta\u0161aitis v. Lithuania, no. 47679\/99, \u00a7 67, 21 March 2002","Storck v. Germany, no. 61603\/00, \u00a7 73, ECHR 2005\u2011V","Takush v. Greece, no. 2853\/09, \u00a7 40, 17 January 2012","Ullens de Schooten and Rezabek v. Belgium, nos. 3989\/07 and 38353\/07, \u00a7 54, 20 September 2011","\u00dcner v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 46410\/99, \u00a7 54, ECHR 2006 XII","Waite and Kennedy v. Germany [GC], no. 26083\/94, \u00a7 54, ECHR 1999 I"],"29218":[""],"29233":[""],"29275":[""],"29271":[""],"29307":[""],"29345":["Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], no. 71503\/01, \u00a7 160, ECHR 2004 II","Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 81-90 and 100-101, ECHR 2015","Bykov v. Russia [GC], no. 4378\/02, \u00a7 89, 10 March 2009","Daud v. Portugal, 21 April 1998, \u00a7 38, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 II","Dvorski v. Croatia, [GC], no. 25703\/11, ECHR 2015","El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 182-85, ECHR 2012","G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, ECHR 2010","G\u00fcve\u00e7 v. Turkey, no. 70337\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 91 and 98, ECHR 2009 (extracts)","Hellig v. Germany, no. 20999\/05, \u00a7 57, 7 July 2011","Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 50541\/08, 50571\/08, 50573\/08 and 40351\/09, \u00a7 249, 13 September 2016","Idalov v. Russia [GC], no. 5826\/03, 22 May 2012","Ilievska v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 20136\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 61-62, 7 May 2015","Jaeger v. Estonia, no. 1574\/13, \u00a7 42, 31 July 201","Kaverzin v. Ukraine, no. 23893\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 172-80, 15 May 2012","Khamroev and Others v. Ukraine, no. 41651\/10, \u00a7 106, 15 September 2016","Kharchenko v. Ukraine, no. 40107\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 98 and 101, 10 February 2011","Kleutin v. Ukraine, no. 5911\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 105 and 106, 23 June 2016","Lopata v. Russia, no. 72250\/01, \u00a7 137, 13 July 2010","Lyalyakin v. Russia, no. 31305\/09, 12 March 2015","Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], nos. 10865\/09, 45886\/07 and 32431\/08, ECHR 2014 (extracts)","Panovits v. Cyprus, no. 4268\/04, \u00a7 67, 11 December 2008","Pavlenko v. Russia, no. 42371\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 106, 107, 109 and 113, 1 April 2010","Prade v. Germany, no. 7215\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 33 and 34, 3 March 2016","Rudnichenko v. Ukraine, no. 2775\/07, \u00a7 130, 11 July 2013","Salduz v. Turkey [GC], no. 36391\/02, 27 November 2008","Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no. 56581\/00, \u00a7 86, ECHR 2006 II","Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, 25 April 1978, \u00a7 32, Series A no. 26","V. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24888\/94, \u00a7 71, ECHR 1999 IX","Vala\u0161inas v. Lithuania, no. 44558\/98, ECHR 2001 VIII","Van der Ven v. the Netherlands, no. 50901\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 61 and 62, ECHR 2003 II","Wieser v. Austria, no. 2293\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 12 and 40, 22 February 2007","Wiktorko v. Poland, no. 14612\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 54-55, 31 March 2009","Yaroshovets and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 74820\/10, 71\/11, 76\/11, 83\/11, and 332\/11, \u00a7 117, 3 December 2015"],"29357":["Aleksandr Andreyev v. Russia, no. 2281\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 48-51, 23 February 2016","Bouyid v. Belgium ([GC], no. 23380\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 81-88, ECHR 2015","Fartushin v. Russia, no. 38887\/09, 8 October 2015","G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 89-90, ECHR 2010","Gorshchuk v. Russia, no. 31316\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 35 38, 6 October 2015","Leonid Petrov v. Russia, no. 52783\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 52 55 and 58-60, 11 October 2016","Lyapin v. Russia, no. 46956\/09, 24 July 2014","Ovakimyan v. Russia, no. 52796\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 54-58, 21 February 2017","Razzakov v. Russia, no. 57519\/09, 5 February 2015","Turbylev v. Russia, no. 4722\/09, 6 October 2015"],"29358":[""],"29361":[""],"29402":["Aleksandr Zaichenko v. Russia, no. 39660\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 41-43, 18 February 2010","Averill v. the United Kingdom, no. 36408\/97, ECHR 2000 VI","Azinas v. Cyprus [GC], no. 56679\/00, \u00a7 32, ECHR 2004 III","Brusco v. France, no. 1466\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 47-50, 14 October 2010","Dayanan v. Turkey, no. 7377\/03, 13 October 2009","Deweer v. Belgium, 27 February 1980, \u00a7\u00a7 42-46, Series A no. 35","Dvorski v. Croatia [GC], no. 25703\/11, ECHR 2015","Eckle v. Germany, 15 July 1982, \u00a7 73, Series A no. 51","G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, \u00a7 180, ECHR 2010","H\u00e5kansson and Sturesson v. Sweden, 21 February 1990, \u00a7 66, Series A no. 171-A","Harakchiev and Tolumov v. Bulgaria, nos. 15018\/11 and 61199\/12, \u00a7 280, ECHR 2014 (extracts).","Heaney and McGuinness v. Ireland, no. 34720\/97, \u00a7 42, ECHR 2000 XII","Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 50541\/08, 50571\/08, 50573\/08 and 40351\/09, ECHR 2016","Imbrioscia v. Switzerland, 24 November 1993, \u00a7 36, Series A no. 275","Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7 161 in fine, Series A no. 25","John Murray v. the United Kingdom, no. 18731\/91, 8 February 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 I","K. and T. v. Finland [GC], no. 25702\/94, \u00a7\u00a7 140 and 141, ECHR 2001 VII","Kuri\u0107 and Others v. Slovenia [GC], no. 26828\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 235 and 236, ECHR 2012 (extracts)","McFarlane v. Ireland [GC], no. 31333\/06, \u00a7 143, 10 September 2010","Murray v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 10511\/10, \u00a7 86, ECHR 2016","Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Denmark [GC], no. 49017\/99, \u00a7 44, ECHR 2004 XI","P\u00e9lissier and Sassi v. France [GC], no. 25444\/94, \u00a7 66, ECHR 1999 II","Pishchalnikov v. Russia, no. 7025\/04, 24 September 2009","Sakhnovskiy v. Russia [GC], no. 21272\/03, \u00a7 90, 2 November 2010","Salduz v. Turkey [GC], no. 36391\/02, ECHR 2008","Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no. 56581\/00, \u00a7 86, ECHR 2006 II","Stafford v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 46295\/99, \u00a763, ECHR 2002-IV","Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 36760\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 254-55, ECHR 2012","Yankov and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 4570\/05, \u00a7 23, 23 September 2010"],"29429":["B. v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 61382\/09, \u00a7 47, 16 July 2013","\u0110or\u0111evi\u0107 v. Croatia, no. 41526\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 138 and 139, ECHR 2012","E.M. v. Romania, no. 43994\/05, \u00a7 51, 30 October 2012","Guerra and Others v. Italy [GC], 19 February 1998, \u00a7 44, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-I","M. and M. v. Croatia, no. 10161\/13, \u00a7 136, 3 September 2015","M.G. v. Turkey, no. 646\/10, \u00a7 62, 22 March 2016","Milena Felicia Dumitrescu v. Romania, no. 28440\/07, \u00a7 54, 24 March 2015","Opuz v. Turkey, no. 33401\/02, 9 June 2009","Savitskyy v. Ukraine, no. 38773\/05, \u00a7 117, 26 July 2012","S\u00f6derman v. Sweden, no. 5786\/08, \u00a7 102, 12 November 2013","Valiulien\u0117 v. Lithuania, no. 33234\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 68-71, 26 March 2013"],"29483":[""],"29595":[""],"29619":[""],"29682":["Aerts v. Belgium, 30 July 1998, \u00a7 46, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 V","Ashingdane v. the United Kingdom, 28 May 1985, Series A no 93","Bamouhammad v. Belgium, no 47687\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 115-123, 17 November 2015","Claes v. Belgium, no 43418\/09, 10 January 2013","De Donder and De Clippel v. Belgium, no 8595\/06, \u00a7 100, 6 December 2011","Dufoort v. Belgium, no 43653\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 76, 77 and 79, 10 January 2013","G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no 22978\/05, \u00a7 115, ECHR 2010","Gelaude v. Belgium, no 43733\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 26-30, 9 January 2014","L.B. v. Belgium, no 22831\/08, 2 October 2012","Lankester v. Belgium, no 22283\/10, 9 January 2014","Moreels v. Belgium, no 43717\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 29-33, 9 January 2014","Murray v. the Netherlands [GC], no 10511\/10, ECHR 2016","Oukili v. Belgium, no 43663\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 29-33, 9 January 2014","Papillo v. Switzerland, no 43368\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 41-43, 27 January 2015","Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], no 13229\/03, \u00a7 69, ECHR 2008","Saadouni v. Belgium, no 50658\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 37-41, 9 January 2014","Scordino v. Italy (no 1) [GC], no 36813\/97, \u00a7\u00a7 179-180, ECHR 2006 V","Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no 36760\/06, \u00a7 147, ECHR 2012","Swennen v. Belgium, no 53448\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 69 72, 10 January 2013","T\u0103nase v. Moldova [GC], no 7\/08, \u00a7 105, ECHR 2010","Torreggiani and Others v. Italy, nos. 43517\/09 and 6 others, \u00a7 50, 8 January 2013","W.D. v. Belgium, no 73548\/13, 6 September 2016","Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, 24 October 1979, \u00a7 51, Series A no 33","Y.Y. v. Turkey, no 14793\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 52-55, ECHR 2015 (extracts)"],"29768":[""],"29860":[""],"29843":["An\u0111elkovi\u0107 v. Serbia, no. 1401\/08, 9 April 2013","Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], no. 22251\/08, ECHR 2015","C.A.S. and C.S. v. Romania, no. 26692\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 68-70 and 82, 20 March 2012","Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848\/08, \u00a7 156, ECHR 2014","Dimitrov and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 77938\/11, \u00a7 171, 1 July 2014","Dr\u0103gan v. Romania, no. 65158\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 99-102, 2 February 2016","Lamarche v. Romania, no. 21472\/03, \u00a7 34, 16 September 2008","M. and M. v. Croatia, no. 10161\/13, \u00a7 136, ECHR 2015 (extracts)","M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, no. 12060\/12, 12 April 2016","Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, no. 21722\/11, \u00a7 219, ECHR 2013","P.M. v. Bulgaria, no. 49669\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 65-66, 24 January 2012","Sarbyanova-Pashaliyska and Pashaliyska v. Bulgaria, no. 3524\/14, \u00a7 41, 12 January 2017","Serban Marinescu v. Romania, no. 68842\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 78-80, 15 December 2015","S\u00f6derman v. Sweden [GC], no. 5786\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 80 and 81, ECHR 2013","W. v. Slovenia, no. 24125\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 66-70, 23 January 2014","Z and Others v. the United Kingdom, [GC], no. 29392\/95, \u00a7 73, ECHR 2001-V"],"29865":["Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525\/07 and 60800\/08, \u00a7 142, 10 January 2012","Dougoz v. Greece, no. 40907\/98, \u00a7 46, ECHR 2001 II","Farbtuhs v. Latvia, no. 4672\/02, 2 December 2004","Frumkin v. Russia, no. 74568\/12, \u00a7 180, 5 January 2016","Ignats v. Latvia (dec.), no. 38494\/05, 24 September 2013","Iliev and Others v. Bulgaria, nos. 4473\/02 and 34138\/04, \u00a7 55, 10 February 2011","I\u013cjins v. Latvia (dec.), no. 1179\/10, 5 November 2013","J.L. v. Latvia, no. 23893\/06, \u00a7 75, 17 April 2012","Jasinskis v. Latvia, no. 45744\/08, \u00a7 59, 21 December 2010","Jegorovs v. Latvia (dec.), no. 53281\/08, 1 July 2014","Ko\u010degarovs and Others v. Latvia (dec.), nos. 14516\/10, 26544\/10 and 44939\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 110-123, 18 November 2014","Krivo\u0161ejs v. Latvia, no. 45517\/04, \u00a7 61, 17 January 2012","Meln\u012btis v. Latvia, no. 30779\/05, \u00a7 47, 28 February 2012","Mur\u0161i\u0107 v. Croatia [GC], no. 7334\/13, 20 October 2016","Nagmetov v. Russia [GC], no. 35589\/08, 30 March 2017","Norbert Sikorski v. Poland, no. 17599\/05, \u00a7 108, 22 October 2009","Orchowski v. Poland, no. 17885\/04, \u00a7 109, 22 October 2009","Seagal v. Cyprus, no. 50756\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 165-67, 26 April 2016","S\u00fcrer v. Turkey, no. 20184\/06, \u00a7 49, 31 May 2016","Svetlana Vasilyeva v. Russia, no. 10775\/09, \u00a7 43, 5 April 2016","Z.H. v. Hungary, no. 28973\/11, \u00a7 29, 8 November 2012"],"29867":[""],"29907":[""],"29982":[""],"29997":[""],"30002":[""],"30029":[""],"30059":["Abd\u00fclsamet Yaman v. Turkey, no. 32446\/96, \u00a7 43, 2 November 2004","Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 55721\/07, \u00a7 167, ECHR 2011","Anguelova v. Bulgaria, no. 38361\/97, \u00a7 138, ECHR 2002 IV","Ataykaya v. Turkey, no. 50275\/08, \u00a7 47, 22 July 2014","Aydan v. Turkey, no. 16281\/10, \u00a7 69, 12 March 2013","Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848\/08, ECHR 2014","Dobriyeva and Others v. Russia, no. 18407\/10, \u00a7 72, 19 December 2013","Dougoz v. Greece, no. 40907\/98, \u00a7 46, ECHR 2001-II","Edwards v. the United Kingdom, 16 December 1992, Series A no 247-B","Giuliani and Gaggio, [GC], no. 23458\/02, ECHR 2011","Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom, no. 24746\/94, \u00a7 109, ECHR 2001 III","Jaloud v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 47708\/08, \u00a7 186, ECHR 2014","Keenan v. the United Kingdom, no. 27229\/95, \u00a7 111, ECHR 2001 III","Ketreb v. France, no. 38447\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 71-72, 19 July 2012","Kolevi v. Bulgaria, no. 1108\/02, \u00a7 201, 5 November 2009","L.C.B. v. the United Kingdom, 9 June 1998, \u00a7 36, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 III","Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000 IV","Leyla Alp and Others v. Turkey, no. 29675\/02, \u00a7 76, 10 December 2013","Lors\u00e9 and Others v. the Netherlands, no. 52750\/99, \u00a7 63, 4 February 2003","Mastromatteo v. Italy [GC], no. 37703\/97, \u00a7 89, ECHR 2002 VIII","McKerr v. the United Kingdom, no. 28883\/95, \u00a7 129, ECHR 2001 III","Messina v. Italy (no. 2) (dec.), no. 25498\/94, ECHR 1999 V","Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577\/98 and 43579\/98, ECHR 2005 VII","Palushi v. Austria, no. 27900\/04, 22 December 2009","Pantea v. Romania, no. 33343\/96, \u00a7 189, ECHR 2003 VI (extracts)","Peers v. Greece, no. 28524\/95, \u00a7 75, ECHR 2001 III","Premininy v. Russia, no. 44973\/04, \u00a7 83, 10 February 2011","Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 52391\/99, ECHR 2007 II","Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803\/94, \u00a7 87, ECHR 1999 V","\u0160ilih v. Slovenia [GC], no. 71463\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 153 154, 9 April 2009","Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 36760\/06, \u00a7 202, ECHR 2012","Tanr\u0131kulu v. Turkey [GC], no. 23763\/94, \u00a7\u00a7 101-110, ECHR 1999-IV","Tautkus v. Lithuania, no. 29474\/09, \u00a7 52, 27 November 2012","Van der Ven v. the Netherlands, no. 50901\/99, \u00a7 51, ECHR 2003 II","Velcea and Maz\u0103re v. Romania, no. 64301\/01, \u00a7 113, 1 December 2009","Velikova v. Bulgaria, no. 41488\/98, \u00a7 80, ECHR 2000 VI"],"30060":["Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no 23380\/09, \u00a7 86, ECHR 2015","Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v. Romania [GC], no 47848\/08, \u00a7 131, ECHR 2014","Ghedir and Others v. France, no 20579\/12, 16 July 2015","Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], no 23458\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 174 and 177, ECHR 2011 (extracts)","Keenan v. the United Kingdom, no 27229\/95, ECHR 2001 III","Ketreb v. France, no 38447\/09, 19 July 2012","McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, 27 September 1995, Series A no 324","Osman v. the United Kingdom, 28 October 1998, \u00a7 116, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 VIII","Saoud v. France, no 9375\/02, 9 October 2007","Scavuzzo-Hager and Others v. Switzerland, no 41773\/98, 7 February 2006","Selmouni v. France [GC], no 25803\/94, \u00a7 95, ECHR 1999 V","Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], nos. 32541\/08 and 43441\/08, \u00a7 114, ECHR 2014 (extracts)","Ta\u00efs v. France, no 39922\/03, \u00a7 82, 1 June 2006","Tekin and Arslan v. Belgium, no 37795\/13, \u00a7 101, 5 September 2017","V. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no 24888\/94, \u00a7 71, ECHR 1999 IX"],"30100":[""],"30130":[""],"30175":["Ahmad and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 24027\/07 and 4 others, \u00a7 168, 10 April 2012","Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-V","F.G. v. Sweden [GC], no. 43611\/11, ECHR 2016","F.H. v. Sweden, no. 32621\/06, 20 January 2009","H.L.R. v. France, 29 April 1997, \u00a7 40, Reports 1997 III","Harkins and Edwards v. the United Kingdom, nos. 9146\/07 and 32650\/07, \u00a7 120, 17 January 2012","J.K. and Others v. Sweden [GC], no. 59166\/12, \u00a7 80, ECHR 2016","N. v. Finland, no. 38885\/02, \u00a7 167, 26 July 2005","\u00d6calan v. Turkey [GC], no. 46221\/99, ECHR 2005 IV","Oshlakov v. Russia, no. 56662\/09, \u00a7 90, 3 April 2014","Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201\/06, ECHR 2008","Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, no. 1948\/04, \u00a7 136, 11 January 2007","Soering v. United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, Series A no. 161","Tershiyev v. Azerbaijan, no. 10226\/13, \u00a7 55, 31 July 2014","Vilvarajah and Others v. the United Kingdom, 30 October 1991, \u00a7\u00a7 107 and 108, Series A no. 215"],"30174":["A.B. and Others v. France, no. 11593\/12, 12 July 2016","A.F. v. Greece, no. 53709\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 53-54, 13 June 2013","A.M. and Others v. France, no. 24587\/12, 12 July 2016","A.S. v. Switzerland, no. 39350\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 15-38, 30 June 2015","Abdi Mahamud v. Malta, no. 56796\/13, \u00a7 52, 3 May 2016","Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v. Malta, nos. 25794\/13 and 28151\/13, \u00a7 103, 22 November 2016","Al Nashiri v. Poland, no. 28761\/11, \u00a7 23, 24 July 2014","Alimov v. Turkey, no. 14344\/13, \u00a7 76, 6 September 2016","Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525\/07 and 60800\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 122-23, 10 January 2012","Atanasov and Apostolov v. Bulgaria (dec.), nos. 65540\/16 and 22368\/17, \u00a7\u00a7 44-68, 27 June 2017","Choban v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 48737\/99, 23 June 2005","Davydov and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 17674\/02 and 39081\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 172 and 175, 1 July 2010","de los Santos and de la Cruz v. Greece, nos. 2134\/12 and 2161\/12, 26 June 2014","Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (dec.) [GC], nos. 46113\/99 and 7 others, \u00a7 101, ECHR 2010","Djalti v. Bulgaria, no. 31206\/05, 12 March 2013","Erkenov v. Turkey, no. 18152\/11, \u00a7 38, 6 September 2016","Foti and Others v. Italy, nos. 7604\/76 and 3 others, Commission decision of 11 May 1978, Decisions and Reports (DR) c14, p. 140, at p. 143","Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], no. 23458\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 9, 139 and 185, ECHR 2011 (extracts)","Gross v. Switzerland [GC], no. 67810\/10, \u00a7 28, ECHR 2014","Harakchiev and Tolumov v. Bulgaria, nos. 15018\/11 and 61199\/12, \u00a7 211, ECHR 2014 (extracts)","Housein v. Greece, no. 71825\/11, 24 October 2013","Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, no. 7511\/13, \u00a7 21, 24 July 2014","Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7 210, Series A no. 25","Janowiec and Others v. Russia [GC], nos. 55508\/07 and 29520\/09, \u00a7 208, ECHR 2013","Kadi\u0137is v. Latvia (no. 2), no. 62393\/00, \u00a7 55, 4 May 2006","Kanagaratnam v. Belgium, no. 15297\/09, 13 December 2011","Khlaifia and Others v. Italy, [GC], no. 16483\/12, ECHR 2016 (extracts)","Korneykova and Korneykov v. Ukraine, no. 56660\/12, \u00a7 141, 24 March 2016","Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 23 March 1995, \u00a7 45, Series A no. 310","M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696\/09, ECHR 2011","Mahamed Jama v. Malta, no. 10290\/13, \u00a7 63, 26 November 2015","Mahmundi and Others v. Greece, no. 14902\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 60 and 64, 31 July 2012","McFeeley and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 8317\/78, Commission decision of 15 May 1980 DR 20, p. 44, at p. 70","Miro\u013cubovs and Others v. Latvia, no. 798\/05, \u00a7 62, 15 September 2009","Mohamad v. Greece, no. 70586\/11, \u00a7 50, 11 December 2014","Moxamed Ismaaciil and Abdirahman Warsame v. Malta, nos. 52160\/13 and 52165\/13, \u00a7 48, 12 January 2016","Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v. Belgium, no. 41442\/07, 19 January 2010","Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577\/98 and 43579\/98, \u00a7 147, ECHR 2005-VII","Neshkov and Others v. Bulgaria, nos. 36925\/10 and 5 others, 27 January 2015","Popov v. France, nos. 39472\/07 and 39474\/07, 19 January 2012","Posevini v. Bulgaria, no. 63638\/14, \u00a7 55, 19 January 2017","R.C. and V.C. v. France, no. 76491\/14, 12 July 2016","R.K. and Others v. France, no. 68264\/14, 12 July 2016","R.M. and Others v. France, no. 33201\/11, 12 July 2016","Rahimi v. Greece, no. 8687\/08, 5 April 2011","S.A.S. v. France [GC], no. 43835\/11, 1 July 2014","Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], no. 40167\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 11, 56, 61, 70 and 133, ECHR 2015","Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy [GC], nos. 39221\/98 and 41963\/98, \u00a7\u00a7 10, 91 and 176, ECHR 2000-VIII","Stepuleac v. Moldova, no. 8207\/06, \u00a7 55, 6 November 2007","Tarakhel v. Switzerland [GC], no. 29217\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 53-122, ECHR 2014 (extracts)","Tehrani and Others v. Turkey, nos. 32940\/08 and 2 others, \u00a7 89, 13 April 2010"],"30181":[""],"30230":[""],"30381":[""],"30385":["A v. Croatia, no 55164\/08, \u00a7 60, 14 October 2010","A. v. the United Kingdom, 23 September 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 VI","Amuur v. France, 25 June 1996, \u00a7 36, Reports 1996-III","Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria, no 71127\/01, 12 June 2008","Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no 23380\/09, ECHR 2015","C.A.S. and C.S. v. Romania, no 26692\/05, \u00a7 82, 20 March 2012","Dalban v. Romania [GC], no 28114\/95, \u00a7 44, ECHR 1999-VI","\u0110or\u0111evi\u0107 v. Croatia, no 41526\/10, ECHR 2012","E. and Others v. the United Kingdom, no 33218\/96, 26 November 2002","Eckle v. Germany, 15 July 1982, \u00a7\u00a7 69 and seq., Series A no 51","El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no 39630\/09, \u00a7 195, ECHR 2012","G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no 22978\/05, ECHR 2010","Georgia v. Russia (I) [GC], no 13255\/07, \u00a7 192, ECHR 2014 (extracts)","Hajduov\u00e1 v. Slovakia, no 2660\/03, \u00a7 47, 30 November 2010","Jankovi\u0107 v. Croatia, no 38478\/05, 5 March 2009","Jensen v. Denmark (dec.), no 48470\/99, ECHR 2001 X","Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], no 16483\/12, \u00a7 160, ECHR 2016","M.C. v. Bulgaria, no 39272\/98, ECHR 2003 XII","M.G. v. Turkey, no 646\/10, \u00a7 80, 22 March 2016","M.P. and Others v. Bulgaria, no 22457\/08, 15 November 2011","Mikheyeva v. Latvia (dec.), no 50029\/99, 12 September 2002","Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], nos. 10865\/09, 45886\/07 and 32431\/08, \u00a7 315, ECHR 2014 (extracts)","Opuz v. Turkey, no 33401\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 150-151, ECHR 2009","Osman v. the United Kingdom, 28 October 1998, Reports 1998-VIII","Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no 2346\/02, \u00a7 65, ECHR 2002 III","Sandra Jankovi\u0107 v. Croatia, no 38478\/05, \u00a7 45, 5 March 2009","Scordino v. Italy (no 1) [GC], no 36813\/97, \u00a7 181, ECHR 2006-V","Selmouni v. France [GC], no 25803\/94, \u00a7 95, ECHR 1999-V","Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], nos. 32541\/08 and 43441\/08, \u00a7 113, ECHR 2014 (extracts)","V. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no 24888\/94, \u00a7 71, ECHR 1999 IX","Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v. Romania [GC], no 47848\/08, \u00a7 156, ECHR 2014","Z and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no 29392\/95, ECHR 2001-V"],"30478":[""],"30490":[""],"30561":[""],"30673":[""],"30676":[""],"30699":[""],"30705":[""],"30741":[""],"30735":["Baumann v. France, no. 33592\/96, \u00a7 47, ECHR 2001 V","Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], nos. 43370\/04 and 2 others, \u00a7\u00a7 103-10, ECHR 2012 (extracts)","Cestaro v. Italy, no. 6884\/11, \u00a7 146, 7 April 2015","Cristioglo v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 24163\/11, \u00a7 31, 26 April 2016","Holomiov v. Moldova, no. 30649\/05, \u00a7 107, 7 November 2006","Holzinger v. Austria (no. 1), no. 23459\/94, \u00a7 21, ECHR 2001 I","I.D. v. Moldova, no. 47203\/06, \u00a7 50, 30 November 2010","Ila\u015fcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 311-33, ECHR 2004 VII","Jeronovi\u010ds v. Latvia [GC], no. 44898\/10, \u00a7 74, ECHR 2016","Karoussiotis v. Portugal, no. 23205\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 57 and 87-92, ECHR 2011","M.S. v. Belgium, no. 50012\/08, \u00a7 124, 31 January 2012","Malai v. Moldova, no. 7101\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 45-46, 13 November 2008","Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], no. 72508\/13, \u00a7 370, ECHR 2017 (extracts)","Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 11138\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 97-100, ECHR 2016","Mur\u0161i\u0107 v. Croatia [GC], no. 7334\/13, \u00a7 96, ECHR 2016","Oprea v. Moldova, no. 38055\/06, \u00a7 33, 21 December 2010","Rafaa v. France, no. 25393\/10, \u00a7 33, 30 May 2013","Rotaru v. Moldova, no. 51216\/06, \u00a7 47, 15 February 2011","Savca v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 17963\/08, \u00a7 58, 15 March 2016","Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) [GC], no. 10249\/03, \u00a7 135, 17 September 2009","Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813\/97, \u00a7\u00a7 181 and 202, ECHR 2006 V","Shishanov v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 11353\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 124-143, 15 September 2015"],"30753":["A. v. the United Kingdom, 23 September 1998, \u00a7 22, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 VI","Abuyeva and Others v. Russia, no. 27065\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 240-241, 2 December 2010","Aksoy v. Turkey, 18 December 1996, Reports 1996-VI","Al Nashiri v. Poland, no. 28761\/11, 24 July 2014","Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 35763\/97, \u00a7\u00a7 26-31, ECHR 2001 XI","Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom, no. 61498\/08, ECHR 2010","Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 55721\/07, ECHR 2011","Anguelova v. Bulgaria, no. 38361\/97, \u00a7\u00a7 161-162, ECHR 2002 IV","Armani Da Silva v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 5878\/08, \u00a7 233, ECHR 2016","Aslakhanova and Others v. Russia, nos. 2944\/06 and 4 others, 18 December 2012","Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], no. 71503\/01, ECHR 2004-II","Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, Reports 1998 VIII","Association \u201c21 December 1989\u201d and Others v. Romania, nos. 33810\/07 and 18817\/08, 24 May 2011","Babar Ahmad and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 24027\/07 and 4 others, \u00a7 168, 10 April 2012","Bankovi\u0107 and Others v. Belgium and Others (dec.) [GC], no. 52207\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 59-61, ECHR 2001-XII","Benzer and Others v. Turkey, no. 23502\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 218-219, 12 November 2013","\u00c7ak\u0131c\u0131 v. Turkey [GC], no. 23657\/94, \u00a7 85, ECHR 1999-IV","Cestaro v. Italy, no. 6884\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 205-208, 7 April 2015","Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, Reports 1996-V","Creang\u0103 v. Romania [GC], no. 29226\/03, \u00a7 88, 23 February 2012","Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], no. 25781\/94, ECHR 2001 I","Egmez v. Cyprus, no. 30873\/96, \u00a7 78, ECHR 2000-XII","El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630\/09, ECHR 2012","G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, \u00a7 91, ECHR 2010","Gentilhomme, Schaff-Benhadji and Zerouki v. France, nos. 48205\/99 and 2 others, \u00a7 20, 14 May 2002","Georgia v. Russia (I) [GC], no. 13255\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 93-94, ECHR 2014 (extracts)","Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765\/09, \u00a7 209, ECHR 2012","Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, no. 7511\/13, 24 July 2014","Ila\u015fcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787\/99, ECHR 2004-VII","\u0130lhan v. Turkey [GC], no. 22277\/93, \u00a7 85, ECHR 2000 VII","Imakayeva v. Russia, no. 7615\/02, ECHR 2006 XIII (extracts)","Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25","Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no. 54810\/00, \u00a7\u00a7 16-18, ECHR 2006 IX","Jeronovi\u010ds v. Latvia [GC], no. 44898\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 107 and 118, 5 July 2016","Kadirova and Others v. Russia, no. 5432\/07, \u00a7 94, 27 March 2012","Kaya v. Turkey, 19 February 1998, \u00a7 106, Reports 1998 I","Krastanov v. Bulgaria, no. 50222\/99, \u00a7 53, 30 September 2004","Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7 92, ECHR 2000 XI","Kurt v. Turkey, 25 May 1998, \u00a7\u00a7 123-124, Reports 1998 III","Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, ECHR 2000 IV","Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 23 March 1995, \u00a7\u00a7 47 and 56, Series A no. 310","Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, no. 22535\/93, ECHR 2000 III","Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827\/99 and 46951\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 67 and 90, ECHR 2005 I","Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577\/98 and 43579\/98, \u00a7 147, ECHR 2005 VII","Nasr and Ghali v. Italy, no. 44883\/09, 23 February 2016","\u00d6calan v. Turkey [GC], no. 46221\/99, \u00a7 179, ECHR 2005 IV","Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom, no. 8139\/09, ECHR 2012 (extracts)","Quinn v. France, 22 March 1995, \u00a7 42, Series A no. 311","Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201\/06, \u00a7 125, ECHR 2008","Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986\/93, \u00a7 100, ECHR 2000-VII","Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], no. 40167\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 149-150, ECHR 2015","Savriddin Dzhurayev v. Russia, no. 71386\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 138, 252-254 and 256, ECHR 2013 (extracts)","Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803\/94, ECHR 1999 V","Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, no. 36378\/02, \u00a7 375, ECHR 2005 III","Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, Series A no. 161","Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 16064\/90 and 8 others, \u00a7 184, ECHR 2009","Z and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29392\/95, \u00a7 73, ECHR 2001 V"],"30754":["Abuyeva and Others v. Russia, no. 27065\/05, 2 December 2010","Aksoy v. Turkey, 18 December 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI","Al Nashiri v. Poland, no. 28761\/11, 24 July 2014","Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom, no. 61498\/08, ECHR 2010","Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 55721\/07, \u00a7 167, ECHR 2011","Anguelova v. Bulgaria, no. 38361\/97, \u00a7\u00a7 161-162, ECHR 2002","Armani Da Silva v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 5878\/08, \u00a7 233, ECHR 2016","Aslakhanova and Others v. Russia, nos. 2944\/06, 8300\/07, 50184\/07, 332\/08 and 42509\/10, \u00a7 96, 18 December 2012","Aslakhanova and Others v. Russia, nos. 2944\/06 and 4 others, 18 December 2012","Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], no. 71503\/01, ECHR 2004-II","Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, Reports 1998 VIII","Association \u201c21 December 1989\u201d and Others v. Romania, nos. 33810\/07 and 18817\/08, \u00a7 202, 24 May 2011","Babar Ahmad and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 24027\/07, 11949\/08, 36742\/08, 66911\/09 and 67354\/09, \u00a7 168, 10 April 2012","Bankovi\u0107 and Others v. Belgium and Others (dec.) [GC], no. 52207\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 59-61, ECHR 2001-XII","Benzer and Others v. Turkey, no. 23502\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 218 219, 12 November 2013","\u00c7ak\u0131c\u0131 v. Turkey [GC], no. 23657\/94, \u00a7 85, ECHR 1999-IV","Cestaro v. Italy, no. 6884\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 205-208, 7 April 201","Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-V","Creang\u0103 v. Romania [GC], no. 29226\/03, \u00a7 88, 23 February 2012","Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], no. 25781\/94, ECHR 2001 IV","El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630\/09, ECHR 2012","Gentilhomme and Others v. France, nos. 48205\/99, 48207\/99 and 48209\/99, \u00a7 20, 14 May 2002","Georgia v. Russia (I) [GC], no. 13255\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 93-94, ECHR 2014 (extracts)","Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765\/09, \u00a7 209, ECHR 2012","Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, no. 7511\/13, 24 July 2014","Ila\u015fcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 300-304, ECHR 2004 VII","Imakayeva v. Russia, no. 7615\/02, ECHR 2006 XIII (extracts)","Incal v. Turkey, 9 June 1998, \u00a7\u00a7 68 et seq. Reports 1998 IV","Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7 161, Series A no. 25","Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no. 54810\/00, \u00a7\u00a7 16-18, ECHR 2006 IX","Jeronovi\u010ds v. Latvia [GC], no. 44898\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 107 and 118, 5 July 2016","Kaboulov v. Ukraine, no. 41015\/04, 19 November 2009","Kadirova and Others v. Russia, no. 5432\/07, \u00a7 94, 27 March 2012","Kaya v. Turkey, 19 February 1998, \u00a7 106, Reports 1998 I","Kurt v Turkey, 25 May 1998, \u00a7\u00a7 123-124, Reports 1998 III","Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 23 March 1995, \u00a7\u00a7 47 and 56 Series A no. 310","Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, no. 22535\/93, ECHR 2000-III","Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827\/99 and 46951\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 67 and 90, ECHR 2005 I","Mikheyev v. Russia, no. 77617\/01, judgment of 26 January 2006","Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], nos. 10865\/09 and 2 others, ECHR 2014 (extracts)","Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577\/98 and 43579\/98, \u00a7 147, ECHR 2005 VII","Nasr and Ghali v. Italy, no. 44883\/09, 23 February 2016","\u00d6calan v. Turkey [GC], no. 46221\/99, ECHR 2005-IV","Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom, no. 8139\/09, ECHR 2012 (extracts)","Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 61 and 65, ECHR 2002-III","Quinn v. France, 22 March 1995, \u00a7 42, Series A no. 311","Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201\/06, \u00a7 125, ECHR 2008","Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986\/93, \u00a7 100, ECHR 2000-VII","Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], no. 40167\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 149-150, ECHR 2015","Savriddin Dzhurayev v. Russia, no. 71386\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 138, 252-254 and 256, ECHR 2013 (extracts)","Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no. 56581\/00, \u00a7 84, ECHR 2006 II","Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803\/94, ECHR 1999 V","Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, Series A no. 161, \u00a7 91","S\u00f6ylemez v. Turkey, no. 46661\/99, \u00a7 122, 21 September 2006","Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 16064\/90, 16065\/90, 16066\/90, 16068\/90, 16069\/90, 16070\/90, 16071\/90, 16072\/90 and 16073\/90, \u00a7 184, ECHR 2009"],"30757":[""],"30938":[""],"30959":[""],"30966":[""],"30967":[""],"31153":[""],"31175":[""],"31226":[""],"31276":[""],"31273":["Azzolina and Others v. Italy (nos. 28923\/09 and 67599\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 134 and 137, 26 October 2017","Betayev and Betayeva v. Russia, no. 37315\/03, \u00a7 89, 29 May 2008","Bouyid v. Belgium ([GC], no. 23380\/09, ECHR 2015","Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848\/08, \u00a7 97, ECHR 2014","Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], no. 25781\/94, \u00a7 81, ECHR 2001 IV","D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 57325\/00, \u00a7\u00a7 120-22, ECHR 2007 IV","East African Asians v. United Kingdom (Commission\u2019s report of 14 December 1973, Decisions and Reports 78-A, p. 62, \u00a7 207)","El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 183 and 184, ECHR 2012","Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 3564\/11, \u00a7 54, 28 May 2013","Fedorchenko and Lozenko v. Ukraine, no. 387\/03, 20 September 2012","Frande\u015f v. Romania (dec.), no. 35802\/05, \u00a7 21, 17 May 2011","G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, ECHR 2010","Grigoryan and Sergeyeva v. Ukraine, no. 63409\/11, \u00a7 45, 28 March 2017","Hristovi v. Bulgaria, no. 42697\/05, \u00a7 80, 11 October 2011","Identoba and Others v. Georgia, no. 73235\/12, 12 May 2015","Ivko v. Russia, no. 30575\/08, \u00a7 66, 15 December 2015","Karaahmed v. Bulgaria, no. 30587\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 74-77, 24 February 2015","Kerimova and Others v. Russia, nos. 17170\/04 and 5 others, \u00a7\u00a7 292-93, 3 May 2011","Kir\u00e1ly and D\u00f6m\u00f6t\u00f6r v. Hungary, no. 10851\/13, 17 January 2017","Lisnyy and Others v. Ukraine and Russia ((dec.), nos.  5355\/15, 44913\/15 and 50853\/15, \u00a7\u00a7 28-32, 5 July 2016","M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, no. 12060\/12, 12 April 2016","Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no.  33071\/96, ECHR 2000 XII","Mocanu and Others v. Romania, [GC], nos. 10865\/09 and 2 others, ECHR 2014 (extracts)","Moldovan and Others v. Romania (no. 2), nos. 41138\/98 and 64320\/01, ECHR 2005 VII","Mustafa Tun\u00e7 and Fecire Tun\u00e7 v. Turkey [GC], no. 24014\/05, \u00a7 222, 14 April 2015","Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577\/98 and 43579\/98, \u00a7 160, ECHR 2005 VII","Narin v. Turkey, no. 18907\/02, \u00a7 46, 15 December 2009","O\u2019Keeffe v. Ireland [GC], no. 35810\/09, \u00a7 144, ECHR 2014 (extracts)","Osman v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 October 1998, \u00a7 128 Reports 1998-VIII","P.F. and E.F. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 28326\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 40-47, 23 November 2010","Pisarkiewicz v. Poland, no. 18967\/02, \u00a7 29, 22 January 2008","Powell and Rayner v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1990, \u00a7 41, Series A no. 172","R.B. v. Hungary, no. 64602\/12, 12 April 2016","Singh and Others v. Greece, no. 60041\/13, \u00a7 26, 19 January 2017","T.M. and C.M. v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26608\/11, \u00a7 38, 28 January 2014","Th\u00e9venon v. France (dec.), no. 2476\/02, ECHR 2006 III","V.K. v. Russia, no. 68059\/13, \u00a7 174, 7 March 2017","Valeriy Fuklev v. Ukraine, no. 6318\/03, \u00a7 98, 16 January 2014","Vallianatos and Others v. Greece [GC], nos. 29381\/09 and 32684\/09, \u00a7 47, ECHR 2013 (extracts)","Velikova v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 41488\/98, ECHR 1999 V (extracts)","Vogrin\u010di\u010d and Others v. Slovenia (dec.), nos. 15829\/05 and 18618\/06, 28 June 2011","Wainwright v. the United Kingdom, no. 12350\/04, \u00a7 43, ECHR 2006 X","X and Y v. the Netherlands, judgment of 26 March 1985, \u00a7 23, Series A no. 91"],"31335":[""],"31337":[""],"31352":[""],"31382":["A. v. the United Kingdom, 23 September 1998, \u00a7 22, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 VI","Aksu v. Turkey [GC], nos. 4149\/04 and 41029\/04, \u00a7 43, ECHR 2012","Byrzykowski v. Poland, no. 11562\/05, \u00a7 105, 27 June 2006","Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], no. 32967\/96, ECHR 2002 I","Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848\/08, \u00a7 131, ECHR 2014","Dodov v. Bulgaria, no. 59548\/00, 17 January 2008","Dulskiy v. Ukraine, no. 61679\/00, 1 June 2006","Gorgiev v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 26984\/05, \u00a7 69, 19 April 2012","Josipovi\u0107 v. Serbia (dec.), no. 18369\/07, 4 March 2008","Keenan v. the United Kingdom, no. 27229\/95, \u00a7 111, ECHR 2001 III","Krasnoshapka v. Ukraine, no. 23786\/02, 30 November 2006","Kraulaidis v. Lithuania, no. 76805\/11, \u00a7 57, 8 November 2016","Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal [GC], no. 56080\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 215-216, ECHR 2017","Mosendz v. Ukraine, no. 52013\/08, \u00a7 92, 17 January 2013","Mustafa Tun\u00e7 and Fecire Tun\u00e7 v. Turkey [GC], no. 24014\/05, \u00a7 225, 14 April 2015","Muta v. Ukraine, no. 37246\/06, \u00a7 59, 31 July 2012","N.D. v. Slovenia, no. 16605\/09, \u00a7 57, 15 January 2015","O\u2019Keeffe v. Ireland [GC], no. 35810\/09, \u00a7 172, ECHR 2014 (extracts)","Rivi\u00e8re v. France, no. 33834\/03, \u00a7 63, 11 July 2006","Sarbyanova Pashaliyska and Pashaliyska v. Bulgaria, no. 3524\/14, \u00a7 37, 12 January 2017","Scoppola v. Italy (No. 2) [GC], no. 10249\/03, \u00a7 54, 17 September 2009","S\u00f6derman v. Sweden [GC], no. 5786\/08, \u00a7 57, ECHR 2013","Tahsin Acar v. Turkey (preliminary objections) [GC], no. 26307\/95, \u00a7\u00a7 75 77, ECHR 2003-VI","Tautkus v. Lithuania, no. 29474\/09, \u00a7 62, 27 November 2012","Valiulien\u0117 v. Lithuania, no. 33234\/07, \u00a7 74, 26 March 2013","Yuri Illarionovitch Shchokin v. Ukraine, no. 4299\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 35-37, 3 October 2013","Yuryeva and Yuryev v. Ukraine, no. 3431\/03, 31 July 2012"],"31387":[""],"31512":[""],"31515":["Denis Vasilyev v. Russia, no. 32704\/04, \u00a7 100, 17 December 2009","Dimcho Dimov v. Bulgaria (no. 2), no. 77248\/12, \u00a7 60, 29 June 2017","Gerasimenko and Others v. Russia, nos. 5821\/10 and 65523\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 82-84, 1 December 2016","H.L.R. v. France, 29 April 1997, \u00a7 40, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997 III","J.L. v. Latvia, no. 23893\/06, \u00a7 64, 17 April 2012","Kopylov v. Russia, no. 3933\/04, \u00a7 133, 29 July 2010","Lyapin v. Russia, no. 46956\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 134-140, 24 July 2014","M.C. v. Poland, no. 23692\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 87-89, 3 March 2015","Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], nos. 10865\/09 and 2 others, \u00a7 322, ECHR 2014 (extracts)","Necdet Bulut v. Turkey, no. 77092\/01, \u00a7 24, 20 November 2007","Olisov and Others v. Russia, nos. 10825\/09 and 2 others, \u00a7\u00a7 81-82, 2 May 2017","Pantea v. Romania, no. 33343\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 189-190, ECHR 2003-VI (extracts)","Sergey Ivanov v. Russia, no. 14416\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 81-83, 15 May 2018","Stasi v. France, no. 25001\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 78-79, 20 October 2011","Z and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29392\/95, \u00a7 73, ECHR 2001 V"],"31517":["A. v. the United Kingdom, 23 September 1998, \u00a7 22, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 VI","Antropov v. Russia, no. 22107\/03, 29 January 2009","Artur Ivanov v. Russia, no. 62798\/09, \u00a7 19, 5 June 2018","Bat\u0131 and Others v. Turkey, nos. 33097\/96 and 57834\/00, \u00a7 133, ECHR 2004 IV (extracts)","Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 81 and 92, ECHR 2015","Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v. Greece (the \u201cGreek case\u201d), nos. 3321\/67, 3322\/67, 3323\/67 and 3344\/67, \u00a7 30, Commission's report of 5 November 1969, Yearbook 12, p. 186","Filip v. Romania, no. 41124\/02, \u00a7 47, 14 December 2006","G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 93 and 142, ECHR 2010","Gongadze v. Ukraine, no. 34056\/02, \u00a7 175, ECHR 2005 XI","J.L. v. Latvia, no. 23893\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 11-13 and 73-75, 17 April 2012","Krsmanovi\u0107 v. Serbia, no. 19796\/14, \u00a7 74, 19 December 2017","Labita v Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000\u2011IV","M.C. v. Bulgaria, no. 39272\/98, \u00a7\u00a7 149-151, ECHR 2003 XII","M.S. v. Croatia (no. 2), no. 75450\/12, 19 February 2015","M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696\/09, \u00a7 220, ECHR 2011","Ma\u0111er v. Croatia, no. 56185\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 88-89, 21 June 2011","Matko v. Slovenia, no. 43393\/98, \u00a7 100, 2 November 2006","Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses and Others v. Georgia, no. 71156\/01, \u00a7 97, 3 May 2007","Mikheyev v. Russia, no. 77617\/01, \u00a7 88, 26 January 2006","Muradova v. Azerbaijan, no. 22684\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 122-126, 2 April 2009","Murray v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 10511\/10, \u00a7 83, ECHR 2016","O\u2019Keeffe v. Ireland [GC], no. 35810\/09, \u00a7 144, ECHR 2014 (extracts)","Premininy v. Russia, no. 44973\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 71-73, 10 February 2011","Rodi\u0107 and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 22893\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 66-67, 27 May 2008","Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813\/97, \u00a7\u00a7 202-216, ECHR 2006 V","Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803\/94, ECHR 1999 V","Shestopalov v. Russia, no. 46248\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 56-63, 28 March 2017","Simeonovi v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 21980\/04, \u00a7 124, 12 May 2017","Tahirova v. Azerbaijan, no. 47137\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 50 and 54, 3 October 2013","V. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24888\/94, \u00a7 71, ECHR 1999 IX","Vin\u010di\u0107 and Others v. Serbia, nos. 44698\/06 and 30 others, \u00a7 51, 1 December 2009","Vladimir Romanov v. Russia, no. 41461\/02, \u00a7 59, 24 July 2008","Vu\u010dkovi\u0107 and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], nos. 17153\/11 and 29 others, \u00a7\u00a7 35 and 82, 25 March 2014"],"31538":["A. v. the United Kingdom, 23 September 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 VI","B.V. v. Belgium, no 61030\/08, 2 May 2017","Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no 23380\/09, ECHR 2015","Di Salvo v. Italy (dec.), no 16098\/05, 11 January 2007","\u0110or\u0111evi\u0107 v. Croatia, no 41526\/10, \u00a7 139, ECHR 2012","Gross v. Switzerland [GC], no 67810\/10, \u00a7 28, ECHR 2014","M. and C. v. Romania, no 29032\/04, \u00a7 113, 27 September 2011","M.C. v. Bulgaria, no 39272\/98, \u00a7 149, ECHR 2003 XII","M.P. and Others v. Bulgaria, no 22457\/08, 15 November 2011","\u0158eh\u00e1k v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no 67208\/01, 18 May 2004","S.Z. v. Bulgaria, no 29263\/12, 3 March 2015","Szula v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no 18727\/06, 4 January 2007","V.C. v. Italy, no 54227\/14, 1 February 2018","X and Y v. the Netherlands, 26 March 1985, \u00a7 20, Series A no 91","Z and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no 29392\/95, ECHR 2001 V"],"31547":[""],"31546":[""],"31599":["A.S. v. Turkey, no 58271\/10, \u00a7 66, 13 September 2016","Aerts v. Belgium, 30 July 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-V","Ashingdane v. the United Kingdom, no 8225\/78, report of the Commission of 12 May 1983","B. v. Germany, no 61272\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 82-84, 19 April 2012","Bergmann v. Germany, no 23279\/14, \u00a7\u00a7 124-128, 7 January 2016","Blokhin v. Russia [GC], no 47152\/06, \u00a7 137, 23 March 2016","Bouamar v. Belgium, 29 February 1988, \u00a7 50, Series A no 129","Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no 23380\/09, \u00a7 81, ECHR 2015","Brand v. the Netherlands, no 49902\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 62-66, 11 May 2004","Caryn v. Belgium, no 43687\/09, \u00a7 52, 9 January 2014","Claes v. Belgium, no 43418\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 93 101, 10 January 2013","Cocaign v. France, no 32010\/07, 3 November 2011","De Schepper v. Belgium, no 27428\/07, \u00a7 48, 13 October 2009","Dhoest v. Belgium, no 10448\/83, report of the Commission of 14 May 1987, Decisions and Reports (DR)","Enache v. Romania, no 10662\/06, \u00a7 49, 1 April 2014","Frank v. Germany (dec.), no 32705\/06, 28 September 2010","G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no 22978\/05, \u00a7 115, ECHR 2010","Garib v. the Netherlands [GC], no 43494\/09, \u00a7 100, 6 November 2017","Gelaude v. Belgium, no 43733\/09, 9 January 2014","Glien v. Germany, no 7345\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 93-96, 28 November 2013","G\u00fclay \u00c7etin v. Turkey, no 44084\/10, 5 March 2013","H.W. v. Germany, no 17167\/11, \u00a7 112, 19 September 2013","Had\u017eic and Suljic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, nos. 39446\/06 and 33849\/08, \u00a7 41, 7 June 2011","Herczegfalvy v. Austria, 24 September 1992, \u00a7 82, Series A no 244","H\u00fcseyin Yildirim v. Turkey, no 2778\/02, \u00a7 73, 3 May 2007","Hutchison Reid v. the United Kingdom, no 50272\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 49-55, ECHR 2003-IV","Ilnseher v. Germany [GC], nos. 10211\/12 and 27505\/14, \u00a7\u00a7 139 and 141, 4 December 2018","Kadusic v. Switzerland, no 43977\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 56 and 59, 9 January 2018","Keenan v. the United Kingdom, no 27229\/95, \u00a7\u00a7 115-116, ECHR 2001 III","Klinkenbu\u00df v. Germany, no 53157\/11, \u00a7 47, 25 February 2016","Kudla v. Poland [GC], no 30210\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 82 100, ECHR 2000 XI","L.B. v. Belgium, no 22831\/08, 2 October 2012","Dufoort v. Belgium, no 43653\/09, 10 January 2013","Swennen v. Belgium, no 53448\/10, 10 January 2013","Lorenz v. Austria, no 11537\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 58-64, 20 July 2017","M.C. v. Poland, no 23692\/09, \u00a7 88, 3 March 2015","Matencio v. France, no 58749\/00, \u00a7\u00a7 76-77, 15 January 2004","Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], no 72508\/13, 28 November 2017","Moreels v. Belgium, no 43717\/09, 9 January 2014","Morsink v. the Netherlands, no 48865\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 66-69, 11 May 2004","Murray v. the Netherlands [GC], no 10511\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 105-106, 26 April 2016","Naumenko v. Ukraine, no 42023\/98, \u00a7 112, 10 February 2004","O.H. v. Germany, no 4646\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 88 91, 24 November 2011","O\u2019Hara v. the United Kingdom, no 37555\/97, \u00a7 34, ECHR 2001-X","Osterm\u00fcnchner v. Germany, no 36035\/04, 22 March 2012","Oukili v. Belgium, no 43663\/09, 9 January 2014","Pankiewicz v. Poland, no 34151\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 42 45, 12 February 2008","Papillo v. Switzerland, no 43368\/08, \u00a7 48, 27 January 2015","Plaisier v. Belgium, no 28785\/11, 9 January 2014","Raffray Taddei v. France, no 36435\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 58 59, 21 December 2010","Rivi\u00e8re v. France, no 33834\/03, 11 July 2006","S. v. Germany, no 3300\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 97-99, 28 June 2012","Saadi c the United Kingdom [GC], no 13229\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 67 and 69, ECHR 2008","Saadouni v. Belgium, no 50658\/09, 9 January 2014","Scordino v. Italy (no 1) [GC], no 36813\/97, \u00a7\u00a7 179-180, ECHR 2006 V","Selmouni v. France [GC], no 25803\/94, \u00a7 99, ECHR 1999 V","Slawomir Musial v. Poland, no 28300\/06, 20 January 2009","Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no 36760\/06, ECHR 2012","Tanase v. Moldova [GC], no 7\/08, \u00a7 105, ECHR 2010","Van Meroye v. Belgium, no 330\/09, 9 January 2014","W.D. v. Belgium, no 73548\/13, 6 September 2016","W.P. v. Germany, no 55594\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 65-66, 6 October 2016","Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, no 6301\/73, report of the Commission of 15 December 1977, (DR), \u00a7 84","Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, 24 October 1979, \u00a7 39, Series A no 33"],"31645":[""],"31657":[""]},"fact":{"28470":["5.The applicant was born in 1955. At the time of lodging his application, he was detained in Kaisheim Prison. He was released subsequently.","A.The applicant\u2019s medical condition and treatment received in detention","6.The applicant has been continuously addicted to heroin since 1973, when he was aged 17. He has also been suffering from hepatitis C since 1975 and has been HIV-positive since 1988. He has been considered 100% disabled and has been receiving an employment disability pension since 2001. He has tried to overcome his addiction to heroin with various types of treatment (including five courses of in-house drug rehabilitation therapy), all of which failed. From 1991 to 2008 the applicant\u2019s heroin addiction was treated with medically prescribed and supervised drug substitution therapy. Since 2005, the applicant had reduced the dosage of his drug substitution medication (Polamidon) and consumed heroin in addition to that medication.","7.In 2008 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of drug trafficking and taken in detention on remand in Kaisheim Prison, where his drug substitution treatment was interrupted against his will. On 3 June 2009 the Augsburg Regional Court convicted the applicant of drug trafficking, sentenced him to three years and six months\u2019 imprisonment and, having regard to a previous conviction, to another two years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. It further ordered the applicant\u2019s placement in a drug detoxification facility, to be executed after a period of six months\u2019 detention in prison. The applicant was still not provided with substitution treatment for his heroin addiction. On 10 December 2009 he was transferred to a drug rehabilitation centre in G\u00fcnzburg, Bavaria, where he underwent abstinence\u2011based treatment for his addiction, without additional substitution treatment.","8.On 19 April 2010 the Memmingen Regional Court declared the applicant\u2019s detention in the detoxification facility terminated and ordered his retransfer to prison. In a decision dated 25 June 2010 the Munich Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. Having regard, in particular, to the views expressed by the applicant\u2019s treating doctors, the court considered that it could no longer be expected with sufficient probability that the applicant could be cured from his drug addiction or could be prevented for a considerable time from relapsing into drug abuse. He had secretly consumed methadone at the clinic and lacked motivation to lead a drug-free life.","9.The applicant was transferred back to Kaisheim Prison on 30 April 2010. The prison doctors gave him various painkillers for chronic pain resulting from his polyneuropathy, on a daily basis. During his detention, the pain in his feet, neck and spine became such that, at least during certain periods, he spent most of his time in bed.","10.The applicant was examined by an external doctor for internal medicine, H., on the prison authorities\u2019 request in October 2010. H. did not consider any changes in the treatment of the applicant\u2019s HIV and hepatitis C infections necessary. Having regard to the applicant\u2019s chronic pain linked to his long-term drug consumption and polyneuropathy, he suggested that the prison medical service reconsider the possibility of drug substitution treatment. He subsequently confirmed that the applicant should be examined by a doctor specialised in drug addiction therapy to that end.","11.The applicant also obtained, on his request, an opinion drawn up by an external doctor specialised in drug addiction treatment (B.) dated 27 July 2011, on the basis of the written findings of doctor H. and the Kaisheim Prison doctor\u2019s and authorities\u2019 findings and statements, but without having been able to examine the applicant in person. B. considered that from a medical point of view, drug substitution treatment had to be provided to the applicant. Heexplained that in accordance with the Federal Medical Association\u2019s Guidelines for the Substitution Treatment of Opiate Addicts (Richtlinien der Bundes\u00e4rztekammer zur Durchf\u00fchrung der substitutionsgest\u00fctzten Behandlung Opiatabh\u00e4ngiger) of 19 February 2010 (see paragraph 30 below), drug substitution therapy was internationally recognised as being the best possible therapy for long-standing opioid addicts. Detoxification caused the person concerned serious physical strain and extreme mental stress and should only be attempted in cases of a very short opioid dependence. Drug substitution therapy prevented a deterioration of the patient\u2019s state of health and a high risk to life, which arose particularly after forced abstinence in detention. It further prevented the spreading of infectious diseases such as HIV and hepatitis C. It had to be clarified whether, in the applicant\u2019s case, further treatment for the hepatitisC from which he suffered was necessary.","B.The proceedings at issue","1.The decision of the prison authorities","12.By submissions dated 6 June 2011, which he supplemented subsequently, the applicant made a request to the Kaisheim prison authorities for treatment with Diamorphin, Polamidon or another heroin substitute for his heroin addiction. Alternatively, he requested that the question of whether such substitution treatment was necessary be examined by a drug addiction specialist.","13.The applicant claimed that drug substitution treatment was the only adequate treatment for his medical condition. Under the relevant Guidelines of the Federal Medical Association for the Substitution Treatment of Opiate Addicts, drug substitution treatment, which he had received prior to his detention, was the required standard treatment for his condition and had to be continued during his detention.","14.The applicant claimed that, as confirmed by doctor H., the serious chronic neurological pain from which he was suffering could be considerably alleviated by drug substitution treatment, as had been the case during his previous substitution treatment. Having been addicted to heroin for almost forty years, he stood hardly any chance of leading a totally drug\u2011free life on release from prison. His rehabilitation could therefore better be furthered by providing him drug substitution treatment. While undergoing such treatment previously, he had been able to lead a relatively normal life and to complete training as a software engineer.","15.Furthermore, referring to doctor B.\u2019s opinion, the applicant claimed that he was in need of Interferon therapy in order to treat his hepatitis C infection. In view of his poor physical and mental health, it was impossible to carry out such treatment without simultaneous drug substitution therapy. Substitution also helped to protect other prisoners from infection when using the same needles as he did for the consumption of drugs and diminished the trafficking and uncontrolled consumption of illegal drugs in prison. He also considered that the prison doctors did not have specialist knowledge in drug addiction treatment and asked to be examined by an external specialist.","16.After the prison authorities\u2019 first decision dismissing the applicant\u2019s application was quashed by the Augsburg Regional Court on 4 October 2011 for lack of sufficient reasoning, the prison authorities, on 16 January 2012, again dismissed the applicant\u2019s request.","17.The prison authorities argued that substitution treatment was neither necessary from a medical point of view nor a suitable measure for the applicant\u2019s rehabilitation. With regard to the medical necessity of drug substitution therapy, the prison authorities, relying on prison doctor S.\u2019s statement, considered that drug substitution therapy was not a necessary treatment for the purposes of section 60 of the Bavarian Execution of Sentences Act (see paragraph 27 below). They found that the applicant, who was severely addicted to drugs, had not received drug substitution treatment prior to his current detention in Kaisheim Prison. He had been placed in a drug rehabilitation centre for five months before his transfer to Kaisheim Prison, where he had been treated by medical experts with considerable knowledge of drug addiction treatment. The applicant had neither been given substitution treatment in the clinic, nor had the doctors recommended substitution treatment in prison. After three years in detention, he no longer suffered from physical withdrawal symptoms. Moreover, his condition with regard to his HIV and hepatitis C infections was stable and did not require any therapy for which substitution treatment was a necessary precondition. As suggested by the prison doctor, the applicant should use the opportunity to wean himself off opioids, such as heroin and its substitutes, while in prison, as it was very difficult to obtain drugs there.","18.With regard to the applicant\u2019s social rehabilitation and treatment (sections 2 and 3 of the Bavarian Execution of Sentences Act, see paragraph27 below), the prison authorities added that the main reason for which addicts underwent drug substitution therapy was to prevent them from becoming impoverished and from becoming involved in drug-related criminality. In prison, these risks were not present. Furthermore, the applicant had already shown that substitution therapy while he was at liberty had not prevented him from consuming other drugs or committing crimes, which had been caused by his antisocial nature. Moreover, the applicant had also consumed drugs while in detention. Therefore, providing him substitution treatment could lead to a risk to life and limb.","2.The proceedings before the Augsburg Regional Court","19.On 26 January 2012 the applicant, relying on the reasons he had submitted to the prison authorities, appealed against the decision of the prison authorities to the Augsburg Regional Court. He further submitted that the authorities of Kaisheim Prison, where no substitution treatment had ever been provided, had omitted to examine the medical necessity of drug substitution therapy under the relevant criteria laid down, in particular, in the Federal Medical Association\u2019s Guidelines for the Substitution Treatment of Opiate Addicts, which were clearly met in his case. He further argued that under the applicable administrative rules for substitution treatment in prison in the Land of Baden-W\u00fcrttemberg, he would be provided with drug substitution therapy, which is carried out in the prisons of the majority of the German L\u00e4nder.","20.On 28 March 2012 the Augsburg Regional Court, endorsing the reasons given by the prison authorities, dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It added that it was not necessary to obtain the opinion of a drug addiction expert. The prison doctors of Kaisheim Prison had sufficient training to decide on the medical necessity of drug substitution therapy, irrespective of the fact that drug substitution therapies might never have been used in that prison. The administrative rules for substitution treatment in prison applicable in the Land of Baden-W\u00fcrttemberg were irrelevant, given that Kaisheim Prison was situated in the Land of Bavaria.","3.The proceedings before the Munich Court of Appeal","21.On 4 May 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Munich Court of Appeal. He submitted that the Regional Court\u2019s failure to investigate sufficiently whether drug substitution treatment was necessary, under the applicable Federal Medical Association\u2019s Guidelines and with the help of an independent doctor specialised in drug addiction treatment, had breached section 60 of the Bavarian Execution of Sentences Act and Article 3 of the Convention. Refusing him the alleviation of his intense neurological pain with an existing and medically necessary treatment constituted inhuman treatment.","22.On 9 August 2012 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as ill\u2011founded. In the court\u2019s view, the applicant had failed to show why drug substitution therapy was the one specific medical treatment he needed. He had further failed to prove that the prison doctors of Kaisheim Prison were not qualified to decide about the medical necessity of heroin substitution. The applicant\u2019s objection against the Court of Appeal\u2019s decision was rejected.","4.The proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court","23.On 10 September 2012 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. He complained that his right to respect for his physical integrity under the Basic Law had been breached because he was denied drug substitution therapy, the only suitable therapy to treat his chronic pain, which would make Interferon therapy possible and allow him to reduce his craving for heroin and lead a \u201cnormal\u201d everyday prison life without isolation. He further complained that his right to be heard under the Basic Law had been violated as the domestic courts had not taken into consideration the medical opinions he had submitted to show that a substitution treatment was necessary and had failed to consult an independent specialised expert.","24.On 10 April 2013 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint without giving reasons (file no. 2 BvR 2263\/12).","C.Subsequent developments","25.On 17 November 2014 the Kaisheim prison authorities rejected the applicant\u2019s fresh request to be provided with substitution treatment in preparation for his release. The applicant\u2019s counsel was advised to ensure that the applicant was taken to a drug rehabilitation clinic immediately on his release in order to prevent him from taking an overdose of heroine as soon as he was at liberty.","26.On 3 December 2014 the applicant was released. When examined by a doctor on 5 December 2014 he tested positive for methadone and cocaine. The doctor confirmed that the applicant would receive drug substitution treatment from 8 December 2014 onwards.","32.The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) of the Council of Europe issues the CPT standards, in which the \u201csubstantive\u201d sections of the CPT\u2019s yearly General Reports are summarised. In its CPT standards as established at the time of the applicant\u2019s detention (CPT\/Inf\/E(2002)1 \u2011 Rev.2010), which have not been amended since then in respect of the issues relevant here (see CPT\/Inf\/E(2002) 1 \u2011Rev.2015), the CPT made the following relevant findings and recommendations:","\u201cHealth care services in prisons","Extract from the 3rd General Report [CPT\/Inf (93) 12], published in 1993","31.... the CPT wishes to make clear the importance which it attaches to the general principle - already recognised in most, if not all, of the countries visited by the Committee to date - that prisoners are entitled to the same level of medical care as persons living in the community at large. This principle is inherent in the fundamental rights of the individual. ...","Equivalence of care","i) general medicine","38.A prison health care service should be able to provide medical treatment and nursing care, as well as appropriate diets, physiotherapy, rehabilitation or any other necessary special facility, in conditions comparable to those enjoyed by patients in the outside community. Provision in terms of medical, nursing and technical staff, as well as premises, installations and equipment, should be geared accordingly.\u201d","33.Recommendation Rec(2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the European Prison Rules, adopted on 11 January 2006 at the 952nd meeting of the Ministers\u2019 Deputies (\u201cthe European Prison Rules\u201d), provides a framework of guiding principles for the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty. The relevant extracts in Part III of the appendix to the Recommendation, on \u201cHealth\u201d, provide:","\u201cOrganisation of prison health care","... 40.3Prisoners shall have access to the health services available in the country without discrimination on the grounds of their legal situation.","40.4Medical services in prison shall seek to detect and treat physical or mental illnesses or defects from which prisoners may suffer.","40.5All necessary medical, surgical and psychiatric services including those available in the community shall be provided to the prisoner for that purpose.\u201d","34.Recommendation no. R(98)7 of the Committee of Ministers to member States concerning the ethical and organisational aspects of health care in prison, adopted on 8 April 1998 at the 627th meeting of the Ministers\u2019 Deputies, provides, in its Appendix, in so far as relevant:","\u201c7.The prison administration should make arrangements for ensuring contacts and co-operation with local public and private health institutions. Since it is not easy to provide appropriate treatment in prison for certain inmates addicted to drugs, alcohol or medication, external consultants belonging to the system providing specialist assistance to addicts in the general community should be called on for counselling and even care purposes. ...","Equivalence of care","10.Health policy in custody should be integrated into, and compatible with, national health policy. A prison health care service should be able to provide medical, psychiatric and dental treatment and to implement programmes of hygiene and preventive medicine in conditions comparable to those enjoyed by the general public. Prison doctors should be able to call upon specialists. If a second opinion is required, it is the duty of the service to arrange it. ...","45.The treatment of the withdrawal symptoms of abuse of drugs, alcohol or medication in prison should be conducted along the same lines as in the community.\u201d","35.According to the Policy paper on preventing risks and reducing harm linked to the use of psychoactive substances adopted in November 2013 by the Permanent Correspondents of the Co-operation Group to Combat Drug Abuse and Illicit trafficking in Drugs (Pompidou Group) of the Council of Europe (P-PG (2013) 20), there is a growing recognition that drug dependence must be understood and treated as a chronic, preventable, treatable and recoverable disease. At the same time national differences in political acceptance, interpretation and variance in the type of feasible measures, as well as access to them and their availability, persist. Despite these differences, there is a general prevailing consensus that abstinence and recovery-oriented policies need to be supplemented by measures that can demonstrably reduce the harms and risks of psychoactive substance use (ibid., \u00a7 10).","36.According to the data collected by Harm Reduction International (HRI), a non-governmental organisation, in 2012 opioid substitution therapy programmes were operational in the community in 41 of the Council of Europe Member States. No such programmes existed in Andorra, Monaco, the Russian Federation and Turkey (in the latter country, they were introduced by 2015); no statistical data was available in respect of Liechtenstein and San Marino. In 2012, opioid substitution programmes were available also in prison in 30 of the Council of Europe Member States whereas no such treatment was available in prison in 15 of the Council of Europe Member States (Andorra, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Iceland, Lithuania, Monaco, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, Turkey and Ukraine); no statistical data was available in respect of Liechtenstein and San Marino. By 2015, opioid substitution programmes had been made available also in prison in Bulgaria, Estonia, Turkey and Ukraine.","37.The HRI data for 2012 correspond to those published by the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), a European Union decentralized agency, in their 2012 study entitled \u201cPrisons and drug abuse in Europe: the problem and responses\u201d, which contains data in respect of all (then) European Union Member States, Croatia, Turkey and Norway."],"28507":["A. The circumstances of the case","1. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.","2. The applicants are Iranian nationals, a mother and her two daughters. They were born in 1976, 2001 and 2007 respectively. They are currently living in Denmark. They are represented by the Danish Refugee Council ( Dansk Flygtningehj\u00e6lp ).","3. The applicants entered Italy in the beginning of June 2014.","4. On 20 June 2014 they entered Denmark.","5. On 7 July 2014 the Immigration Service ( Udl\u00e6ndingestyrelsen ) found that the applicant should be returned to Italy under the Dublin Regulation. The Italian authorities accepted this on 1 October 2014.","6. On 15 July 2014 the Refugee Appeals Board decided to suspend transfer until judgment was delivered in Tarakhel v. Switzerland ([GC], no. 29217\/12, ECHR 2014 (extracts)). The judgment was delivered on 4 November 2014.","7. In the light thereof, on 7 January 2015 the present case was referred back to the Immigration Service for a review.","8. On 27 March 2015 the Italian authorities provided a general guarantee stating that all families with minors transferred to Italy under the Dublin III Regulation would be kept together and accommodated in a facility where the reception conditions were appropriate for the family and the age of the children.","9. On 14 April 2015 the Immigration Service found that the applicants could be returned to Italy under the Dublin Regulation.","10. On appeal, on 8 July 2015 the decision was upheld by the Refugee Appeals Board ( Flygtningen\u00e6vnet ), on the condition that the Immigration Service could obtain an individual guarantee meeting the criteria set out in the Tarakhel judgment, prior to the transfer of the applicants.","11. In the meantime, on 8 June 2015 the Dublin Unit of the Italian Ministry of the Interior sent a letter to the Dublin Units of the other member States of the European Union, setting out the new policy of the Italian authorities on transfers to Italy of families with small children. The new policy was considered necessary in view of the fact that reception facilities, specifically reserved for such families, frequently remained unoccupied as a result of families having left for an unknown destination prior to transfer, or having obtained a court order barring their transfer. In order to safeguard appropriate facilities where families may stay together, the Italian authorities earmarked a total of 161 places, distributed over twenty-nine projects under the System for Protection of Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR). The Italian authorities confirmed that this number would be extended should the need arise. The circular letter read as follows:","\u201cRE: DUBLIN REGULATION Nr. 604\/2013. Guarantees for vulnerable cases: family groups with minors. Further to the previous circular letters of 2 February 2015 and in relation to the current European case-law concerning the guarantees in case of transfers of family groups with minors in compliance with the Dublin Regulation, you will find herewith enclosed the list of the SPRAR projects, which can provide reception to the international protection applicants. Specifically, in the framework of the SPRAR \u2013 Protection System for International Protection Applicants and Refugees \u2013 provided for by the Act nr. 189\/2002 and consisting of the network of the local bodies, as it can also be seen from the www.sprar.it website, specific places have been reserved for family groups in the framework of the implementation of local reception projects. These projects of \u201cintegrated reception\u201d are financed by means of public resources on the basis of calls for tender with specific requirements, on a continuous basis, and they are implemented by the Municipalities with the support of the voluntary sector; they also provide for information, guidance, assistance and orientation measures, by creating individual and family paths of socioeconomic integration (autonomy and social inclusion paths) as well as specific paths for minors. These projects also ensure family unity, Italian language courses and job training. Any checks of the abovementioned requirements lie with the competent Authorities for the transfer to Italy of family groups, by means either of their delegates, or of their liaison officers or of Easo personnel with this specific task. We are therefore of the opinion that, despite the objective difficulties which Italy is facing on the grounds of the high number of migrants and international protection applicants who reach Europe through the Italian coasts, the guarantee requests by Member States concerning the reception standards specifically ensured to family groups with minors can be regarded as fulfilled, also in consideration of the principle of mutual trust, underlying the legislation which regulates the relations among member States.\u201d","12. On 24 June 2015, Italian authorities stated at a meeting of the [Dublin] Contact Committee in Brussels that the circular letter of 8 June 2015 from Italy had replaced the previous letter of 27 March 2015 according to which the member States had been requested to ask Italy for an individual guarantee at least 15 days before a removal was to take place. Italy also said at the meeting that individual guarantees would no longer be issued, but that it was the perception of Italy that the SPRAR centres that had been identified and would be used in future to accommodate families with minor children satisfied the requirements set out in the Tarakhel judgment.","13. It appears from The SPRAR System, a joint report of 13 July 2015 by the Ministries of Immigration of the Netherlands, Germany and Switzerland following a fact-finding mission to two SPRAR projects, that all SPRAR projects are to provide beneficiaries with personalised programmes to help them (re)acquire autonomy, and to take part and integrate effectively in Italian society, in terms of finding employment and housing, access to local services, social life and education. It further appears that a number of minimum services are guaranteed to beneficiaries of SPRAR projects, including provision by the managing entity of food, clothes, bed linen and sanitary products and pocket money. Moreover, the managing entity must facilitate access to and the use of public services and health care, and ensure the inclusion of children in the local school system and access to education for adults, as well as Italian language classes, without interruption for the whole year, for a minimum of 10 hours per week. The managing entity must also facilitate the recognition of the beneficiaries \u2019 degrees and professional qualifications and encourage university enrolment. Moreover, the managing entity must provide information on Italian labour legislation and support the integration of beneficiaries into the labour market. As regards the housing market, it is incumbent on the managing entity to provide information about Italian housing legislation and to facilitate access to the public and private housing market by supporting and mediating between beneficiaries and potential landlords. The managing entity must also facilitate access to protected housing if the specific personal situation of the beneficiary so requires. Finally, the managing entity must promote dialogue between beneficiaries and the local community and procedures and provide support relating to family reunification and Italian and European asylum law.","14. On 6 October 2015 the Immigration Service decided, that reception conditions for the applicant and her two children in Italy would be suitable. It emphasised, inter alia, that the Italian authorities had launched a number of initiatives to improve reception and accommodation conditions for families with minor children, and at a meeting in Brussels on 24 June 2015, the Italian authorities informed the other member States that the capacity of centres deemed suitable for the accommodation of families with minor children would be adapted according to need. The Italian authorities had also said that the circular letter of 8 June 2015 replaced the previous Italian letter of 27 March 2015. It appeared from the circular letter of 8 June 2015 that families with minor children would be offered accommodation in conditions appropriate for families and minors in order to guarantee the unity of the family and that offers of language courses and job training would also made. The Danish Immigration Service further referred to The SPRAR System, published on 13 June 2015.","15. On appeal, on 3 February 2016, the Refugee Appeals Board upheld the decision by the Immigration Service, setting out, inter alia:","\u201c ... the Refugee Appeals Board makes the following statement:","... The members of the Refugee Appeals Board agree that the formal rules of the Dublin Regulation governing the return of the applicant and her children to Italy have been satisfied.","The issue to be determined by the Refugee Appeals Board is whether such circumstances exist that the applicant and her children cannot be returned to Italy anyway and that the application must be examined in Denmark, see Articles 3(2) and 17 of the Dublin Regulation. The issue at stake is therefore whether the applicant and her children must be assumed to be subject to circumstances on their return to Italy which are so burdensome that the circumstances would be contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.","The majority of the members of the Refugee Appeals Board find that the applicant, as a single mother with two children, must be deemed to belong to a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable group in need of special protection.","Based on the circular letter of 8 June 2015 from Italy and Italy \u2019 s subsequent assurances on the adaptation of its reception capacity at the meeting of the Contact Committee on 24 June 2015, the majority of the members of the Refugee Appeals Board find that Italy must be considered to satisfy the requirements to take charge of the applicant and her children. The majority also refer to the unanimous decisions made by the European Court of Human Rights in J.A. and Others v. the Netherlands (decision of 3 November 2015) and A.T.H. v. the Netherlands (decision of 17 November 2015) finding inadmissible applications from other asylum-seekers with minor children who had complained that they would be subjected to treatment proscribed by Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights if returned to Italy under the rules of the Dublin Regulation.","It is observed that the circular letter of 8 June 2015 was not included in the basis of the previous decision by the Refugee Appeals Board.","The majority of the members of the Refugee Appeals Board further find that the applicant had not demonstrated that her future prospects, if transferred to Italy together with her two children, whether taken from a material, physical or psychological perspective, would be contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It is observed in this respect that the applicant is in good health, according to her own statement to the Danish Immigration Service at the asylum screening interview. It cannot lead to a different conclusion that the Danish Refugee Council has submitted that the applicants are in need of special support due to their mentally vulnerable situation; that the eldest daughter sees a psychologist; that they have obtained a network through the school and the church; which they do not have in Italy; and that accordingly they will lose their daily security. Accordingly, the majority of the members of the Refugee Appeals Board find no basis on which it could be assumed that the applicant would not be able to benefit from the resources available in Italy to a female asylum-seeker with two minor children or that, in case of health-related or other difficulties, the Italian authorities would not respond in an appropriate manner. The majority find that the consideration of the applicant \u2019 s children cannot independently justify that the family should not be transferred to Italy. It is observed in this respect that the applicant \u2019 s application for asylum has to be processed according to the regular asylum procedure, no matter which country is responsible for examining the application for asylum lodged by the applicant and her children, and within the processing time that can be expected for the procedure.","Furthermore, the majority of the members of the Refugee Appeals Board find that the length of the processing time cannot justify the processing of the application in Denmark. The majority emphasise in this respect that the applicant was informed already on 2 October 2014 that she was to be transferred back to Italy and that the subsequent processing time is attributable solely to the applicant \u2019 s complaint and the need to clarify the consequences of the Tarakhel judgment. The consequences must now be deemed clarified by Italy \u2019 s letter of 8 June 2015 and the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights of 3 and 17 November 2015. The circumstance that the Danish Immigration Service has decided to process other applications in Denmark cannot lead to a different decision.","Against that background and based on a review of the case, the Refugee Appeals Board informs you that the Board finds no basis for reversing the decision made by the Danish Immigration Service, see section 48a(1), first sentence, cf. section 29a(1), of the Danish Aliens Act ( udl\u00e6ndingeloven ), see the Dublin Regulation.","The Refugee Appeals Board observes that the Board presumes that the Danish National Police will ensure, prior to the removal of the applicant and her children to Italy and that the Italian authorities are notified of the relevant information on the applicant \u2019 s needs.\u201d","16. Another circular letter dated 15 February 2016 was sent by the Dublin Unit of the Italian Ministry of the Interior to the Dublin Units of the other member States of the European Union, in which the Italian Dublin Unit provided an updated list of \u201cthe SPRAR projects where asylum-seeker family groups with children will be accommodated, in full respect of their fundamental rights and specific vulnerabilities\u201d.","B. Relevant domestic law and practice","17. The relevant European, Italian and Netherlands law, instruments, principles and practice in respect of asylum proceedings, reception of asylum-seekers and transfers of asylum-seekers under the Dublin Regulation have recently been summarised in Tarakhel v. Switzerland ([GC], no. 29217\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 28-48, ECHR 2014 (extracts)); Hussein Diirshi v. the Netherlands and Italy and 3 other applications (( dec. ), nos. 2314\/10, 18324\/10, 47851\/10 and 51377\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 98-117, 10 September 2013); Halimi v. Austria and Italy (( dec. ), no. 53852\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 21-25 and \u00a7\u00a7 29 \u2011 36, 18 June 2013); Abubeker v. Austria and Italy ( dec. ), no. 73874\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 31-34 and \u00a7\u00a7 37-41, 18 June 2013); Daybetgova and Magomedova v. Austria (( dec. ), no. 6198\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 25 29 and \u00a7\u00a7 32-39, 4 June 2013); and Mohammed Hussein v. the Netherlands and Italy (( dec. ), no. 27725\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 25-28 and 33-50, 2 April 2013).","18. Pursuant to section 56, subsection 8, of the Aliens Act, decisions by the Refugee Appeal Board are final, which means that there is no avenue for appeal against the Board \u2019 s decisions.","19. Aliens may, however, by virtue of Article 63 of the Danish Constitution ( Grundloven ) bring an appeal before the ordinary courts, which have authority to adjudge on any matter concerning the limits to the competence of a public authority.","Article 63 of the Constitution reads as follows:","\u201c1. The courts of justice shall be empowered to decide any question relating to the scope of the executives \u2019 authority; though any person wishing to question such authority shall not, by taking the case to the courts of justice, avoid temporary compliance with orders given by the executive authority.","The courts will normally confine the review to the question of deciding on the legality of the administrative decision, including shortcomings of the basis for the decision and illegal assessments, but will generally refrain from adjudging on the administrative discretion exercised.\u201d","Review by the courts pursuant to section 63 of the Constitution is a common legal remedy. Consequently, in cases where an alien claims that a refusal to grant a residence permit or a deportation order would be in violation of the Convention, the courts examine intensively whether the Administration \u2019 s decision is in accordance with Denmark \u2019 s obligations under the Convention, including Article 8 (see, for example, Priya v. Denmark ( dec. ), no 13594\/03, 6 July 2006, and Saeed v. Denmark ( dec. ), no. 53\/12, 24 June 2014 ). The courts cannot grant an alien a residence permit but they can annul the decision of the Administration and thus send the case back to the Administration for a renewed examination, for instance if the courts find that the refusal to grant a residence permit constitutes a violation of the alien \u2019 s right to respect for family life according to Article 8 of the Convention. An application pursuant to section 63 of the Constitution has no automatic suspensive effect. However, an application pursuant to section 63 of the Constitution may be granted suspensive effect if very particular circumstances ( ganske s\u00e6rlige omst\u00e6ndigheder ) exist."],"28527":["6.The applicant was born in 1953 and lived in Magnitogorsk, in the Chelyabinsk Region until his arrest.","A.Arrest and conviction","7.On 28 June 2011 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having committed a criminal offence. He remained in custody throughout the investigation and trial.","8.On 29 March 2012 the Pravoberezhniy District Court of Magnitogorsk sentenced him to thirteen years and ten months\u2019 imprisonment. The sentence was upheld on appeal by the Chelyabinsk Regional Court on 16August2012.","B.The applicant\u2019s health and his medical treatment in detention","9.In 2012, following a complaint by the applicant of pain in his lower abdomen, he was diagnosed with an enlargedprostategland and underwent surgery in relation to that condition.","10.In April 2013 the applicant was transferred to the prison tuberculosis hospital in Chelyabinsk for testing of his urogenital system. Two operations were performed in the hospital, but various problematic symptoms relating to his urinary system persisted.","11.In February 2014 a biopsy of prostate tissue revealed the presence of cancer cells. The applicant was diagnosed with terminal prostate cancer which had spread to his liver and inguinal lymph nodes. His condition was aggravated by a wasting syndrome and paraneoplastic syndrome.","12.According to the applicant, he did not have access to the required medication in the hospital, and therefore his condition worsened.","13.On 30 October 2014 a medical panel confirmed his diagnosis, adding a list of secondary illnesses to it. The doctors concluded that the applicant\u2019s medical condition made him eligible for early release.","14.On 26January 2015 the Metallurgicheskiy District Court of Chelyabinsk \u201cthe District Court\u201d examined the applicant\u2019s request for early release on health grounds. In the proceedings the applicant was represented by MrA.Lepekhin, a lawyer from Agora.","15.At the hearing the doctor who was treating the applicant testified that his condition had significantly deteriorated since the beginning of 2014. He received painkillers in hospital, but effective medical treatment was unavailable, owing to a lack of the required medication.","16.The acting head of the hospital stated that the applicant could only receive adequate medical treatment in another hospital.","17.The prosecutor opposed the applicant\u2019s being released, citing his failure to reform while in detention. He also stated that the release was not necessary, as the applicant could receive the required medical treatment within the prison system.","18.The court rejected the applicant\u2019s request for release. It found that he had failed to improve himself, that is to say, the aim of reforming him as a prisoner had not been achieved. His medical condition did not preclude further detention, as the requisite medical treatment was available within the prison system. To receive it, the applicant only needed a transfer to a different hospital.","19.On 7 April 2015 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court upheld the above decision on appeal, having fully endorsed the reasoning of the lower court. It also noted that, in addition to pain relief and therapy to relieve symptoms, the applicant could have chemotherapy, should the prison hospital receive the required medication.","C.Rule 39 request","20.In the meantime, on 26 March 2015 the applicant sought interim measures from this Court underRule 39 to ensure adequate medical treatment or his release from detention.","21.On 27 March 2015 the Court decided to applyRule 39, indicating to the Government thatit was desirable in the interests of the proper conduct of the proceedings that the applicant should be immediately examined by medical experts who were independent of the prison system, with a view to determining: (1)whether the treatment he was receiving in the prison hospital was adequate with regard to his condition; (2) whether his state of health was compatible with detention in prison hospital conditions; and (3)whether his condition required his placement in a specialist, possibly civilian, hospital. Furthermore, the Government were also to ensure his transfer to a specialist hospital, should the medical experts conclude that he required it.","22.On 9April 2015 the Government responded to the Court\u2019s letter of 27March 2015, asserting that the scope and quality of the applicant\u2019s medical treatment in the prison hospital corresponded to his needs. They alleged that, owing to the gravity of the applicant\u2019s condition, only treatment of his symptoms was recommended, and such treatment was being provided in full. They submitted the following documents: a typed copy of the applicant\u2019s medical file; certificates from detention facilities summarising the applicant\u2019s treatment and describing his state of health; a report by a medical panel of 30 October 2014 confirming his eligibility for early release; a copy of the District Court\u2019s decision of 26 January 2015; a statement by the acting head of the hospital in which he noted that the District Court had misinterpreted his testimony given on 26 January 2015, as he had never discussed the possibility of the applicant being treated in another hospital; and a statement by the head of the prison hospital in which he confirmed that the cancer treatment was only possible in a special oncological centre, and that he had never argued that it was accessible within the prison system.","23.On 28May 2015 the applicant\u2019s lawyer submitted that the Government had not made arrangements for the independent medical examination indicated by the Court to be carried out. However, two independent doctors summoned by the applicant\u2019s lawyer had assessed the quality of his medical treatment in detention and the compatibility of further detention in the prison hospital with his state of health. In an expert report dated 23 May 2015 the doctors had concluded that the treatment the applicant was receiving in the prison hospital was inadequate. The belated diagnosis of prostate cancer and the failure to provide active treatment, such as glandular therapy, radiation therapy or surgery were mentioned among other major shortcomings on the part of the medical authorities. The doctors had also noted that the applicant could not be provided with adequate medical treatment in the prison hospital, because it had no licence for inpatient treatment of cancer patients and urological diseases. Accordingly, the experts had concluded that his detention in that facility did not correspond to his medical needs, and threatened his life.","D.Developments following the application of Rule 39","24.Over the following months the applicant\u2019s health continued to deteriorate, and the wasting syndrome progressed.","25.On 24 August 2015 the medical panel prepared a new report, again recommending the applicant\u2019s early release on health grounds. A court hearing on the matter was scheduled for 11 September 2015. Four days before that date the applicant died of cancer.","26.At the request of the applicant\u2019s lawyer, MrA.Lepekhin, the Investigative Committee carried out a preliminary inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the applicant\u2019s death, which ended with a decision of 15 October 2015 not to open a criminal case."],"28546":["The applicant, Mr Vladimir Ilyich Ivanov, is a Russian national, who was born in 1956.","The Russian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, the Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.","Mr Ivanov was the defendant in criminal proceedings. He was detained in the IZ-47\/1 remand prison in St Petersburg. On 17 September 2008 an application form was introduced on his behalf and signed by Ms Maria Zhiglaeva. No authority form was enclosed."],"28548":["5.The applicant was born in 1973 and is currently serving a prison sentence in Sokyryany Prison no. 67.","A.The applicant\u2019s arrest on 18 September 2001, his alleged ill\u2011treatment by the police and the investigation into the matter","6.In September 2001 the applicant and an acquaintance, F., decided to carry out a carjacking. On the night of 17-18September 2001 they stopped a taxi for that purpose. F. shot the driver in the head and the two then took him to a forest, where F. and the applicant fired several more shots into the victim and abandoned the body. According to the applicant, he believed that the driver was already dead when he shot at him. When driving the car later on, the applicant and F. encountered the traffic police who ordered them to stop. They did not obey the order and attempted to flee. The applicant threw a grenade at the police, but it went wide. Eventually F., who was driving, lost control of the car, which caused it to stop. The applicant opened fire and seriously wounded one of the police officers.","7.In order to overcome the applicant\u2019s resistance, the police officers hit him on the head several times with the handle of a gun. He lost consciousness and was handcuffed. His apprehension took place at about 3a.m. on 18September 2001.","8.While the parties were not in dispute as regards the facts summarised above, their account of subsequent events differed.","9.According to the Government, no further coercive measures were used against the applicant.","10.According to the applicant, he was seriously ill-treated after his arrest and his account of subsequent events is as follows. In his application form he submitted that once the police had seen him regain consciousness, at about 5 a.m., they had taken him to the Suvorivskyy district police station where they had beaten him. In his observations in reply to those of the Government, the applicant added that he had also been beaten in the two hours between his apprehension and transportation to the police station. The applicant also alleged that upon his arrival at the police station the officers had thrown him to the floor and had started kicking and punching him and hitting him with rubber truncheons. They had allegedly sought to take revenge on him for wounding their colleague and to make him confess to the criminal offences under investigation. The applicant\u2019s beating had allegedly continued until 7 or 8 a.m.","11.At an unspecified time on the morning of 18 September 2001 a forensic medical expert examined the applicant. As noted in the report of the examination, the applicant was 195 cm tall and was of strong constitution. The following injuries were detected: four painful swellings (two of which were coupled with sores) of up to 4 cm in diameter on the back part of the head and on both temples, two oval bruises on the forehead of 8 x 5 cm and 5 x 4 cm, bruises on both eyelids, a slightly swollen bridge of the nose, bruises on the sides of the nose extending to the eyelids, and linear sores on both wrists. The expert found that the applicant could have sustained the injuries in question in the course of his arrest. The applicant stated to the expert that he had not been beaten in police custody.","12.According to the applicant, his medical examination was limited to the visible parts of his body not covered by clothes, and the expert failed to document the many bruises that covered the rest of his body. The applicant also alleged that the police officers had talked to the doctor in private before the examination. Furthermore, they had allegedly threatened the applicant that if he complained they would kill him.","13.As further submitted by the applicant, on 29September 2001 the police tried to transfer him from the Kherson Temporary Detention Facility (\u201cthe ITT\u201d, part of the police system) to the Kherson Pre-Trial Detention Centre (\u201cthe SIZO\u201d), but the SIZO\u2019s administration refused to admit him because of his many injuries.","14.On 5 October 2001 the applicant was transferred to the SIZO, where a doctor examined him. No injuries were documented. The applicant submitted to the Court, without providing any further details, that the report of the examination had been wrongly dated as 8 October 2001 (instead of 5October) and that it had been false.","15.The applicant stated that throughout his detention in the ITT, from 18September to 5 October 2001, he had been subjected to torture such as the administration of electric shocks, being suspended from a horizontal metal bar while his hands were handcuffed behind his back, suffocation with a gas mask and plastic bag, and having his fingers crushed in doors. The applicant also alleged that police officers had jumped on his chest from a desk while he lay on the floor.","16.With his observations to the Court of 16July 2014 the applicant submitted a handwritten copy of a complaint to the Kherson regional prosecutor\u2019s office (\u201cthe Kherson prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d) dated 5 October 2001 (with a handwritten confirmation by two inmates that the applicant had handed the complaint to the guard on duty for dispatching). He complained about his \u201ccontinual beating, torture and humiliation\u201d following his arrest on 18September and during his detention in the ITT. He further submitted that the medical examination of 18September 2001 had been incomplete and that the Kherson SIZO had disregarded his requests for a medical examination and the documentation of various injuries, which he did not specify.","17.According to another, similar handwritten note submitted to the Court on 16July 2014, the applicant had on 7October 2001 complained to the governor of the Kherson SIZO that the guards had torn up his complaints to the prosecution authorities on 5 and 6October 2001. He also complained that although he had been taken to the SIZO on 5 October 2001 with injuries all over his body, the SIZO official on duty had rejected his request for a medical examination.","18.According to the applicant, on 9 October 2001 he sent another complaint to the Kherson prosecutor\u2019s office.","19.On 18 February 2002 a forensic medical report was issued in respect of the applicant\u2019s injuries following his arrest. Having studied the case file, the forensic expert stated that the applicant had had a hemorrhage in the soft tissues of his head, sores and bruises on his face and scalp, and sores on his wrists. The injuries in question could have been inflicted on 18September 2001 in the circumstances the applicant had described during his questioning as an accused (that is resulting from being hit on the head with the handle of a gun). The expert classified the injuries as minor. There is no further information in the case file about the report or where it was used.","20.The applicant raised his complaint of ill-treatment during his trial at the Kherson Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Kherson Court\u201d, see, in particular, paragraphs 40 and 41 below). As a result, on 21 May 2003 a trial court judge requested that the Kherson prosecutor\u2019s office carry out an investigation into the matter.","21.On 30 May 2003 the Kherson prosecutor\u2019s office refused to open a criminal case against the police officers for lack of corpus delicti in their actions. The prosecutor relied on the statements of the police officers, who denied ill-treating the applicant and his co-defendants, as well as on documents from the SIZO administration, which stated that no injuries had been found on the defendants during their medical examinations and that they had not raised any complaints. According to the applicant, he had only been able to familiarise himself with the prosecutor\u2019s decision after almost a year, on 2March 2004.","22.As the applicant and his co-defendants maintained their complaints during the trial, in June 2003 the judge once again requested that the prosecution authorities investigate the matter.","23.On 7 November 2003 the Kherson prosecutor\u2019s office again refused to open a criminal case against the police officers, using the same reasoning as before.","24.The applicant challenged that decision before the courts.","25.On 30July 2004 a judge at the Kherson Komsomolskyy District Court (\u201cthe Komsomolskyy Court\u201d), following a hearing which included the prosecutor but not the applicant or his lawyer, dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint as unfounded.","26.On 7 September 2004 the Kherson Court quashed that decision as being formalistic and lacking reasoning. It remitted the case to the same court for fresh examination by a different judge.","27.On 10 September 2004 the Komsomolskyy Court once again dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint. This time the applicant\u2019s lawyer was present at the hearing. The judge heard the parties and studied the case file. He noted that the prosecutor had rightly dismissed the applicant\u2019s allegation of ill-treatment after questioning all those involved and studying the relevant reports on the medical examinations.","28.On 19 October 2004 the Kherson Court, siting as a panel of three judges, upheld that decision and its reasoning.","29.On 3 December 2004 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant\u2019s request for leave to appeal against the above decisions on points of law on the ground that the criminal proceedings against him were still pending.","B.Criminal proceedings against the applicant and his detention","30.On 18 September 2001, at about 3 a.m., the applicant was arrested by the traffic police. At 10 a.m. the police drew up a report about his arrest. He was placed in the Kherson ITT.","31.On the same date criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant on suspicion of aggravated robbery and murder, illegal arms handling and an attempt on the life of law-enforcement officials. By that time there were already other criminal proceedings pending against him.","32.On an unspecified date further charges were brought against the applicant and several other people. Overall, the criminal proceedings in question involved twelve suspects and concerned twelve episodes of criminal activity, including numerous counts of theft, robbery and murder, committed between 1998 and 2001.","33.On 22September 2001 the Komsomolskyy Court ordered the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention for an initial period of two months. The court referred to the seriousness of the charges against the applicant and noted that he might abscond or hinder the investigation if at liberty. That decision could be challenged on appeal within three days of its pronouncement. Thehearing took place in the presence of the prosecutor, but in the absence of the applicant and his lawyer. According to a handwritten note with the judge\u2019s signature, the applicant was told of the decision on the day it was pronounced. The applicant, however, said that he became aware of it after a considerable delay, which prevented him from lodging an appeal.","34.On 24 September 2001 the investigator in charge of the case issued a decision to extend the term of the applicant\u2019s detention in the ITT to ten days (instead of the legally allowed maximum of three days, after which the applicant had to be transferred to the local SIZO \u2013 see paragraph77 below). That decision was explained by the need to carry out witness confrontations, crime reconstructions and other investigative measures with the applicant\u2019s participation.","35.On 12 November 2001 the Komsomolskyy Court extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention to four months on the ground that he was suspected of grave criminal offences and there were no reasons to change the preventive measure. The applicant\u2019s lawyer, who was present at the hearing, did not object. The applicant could appeal against that decision within three days, but did not do so.","36.On 10 January 2002 the Kherson Court, following a hearing which included the prosecutor, but not the applicant or his lawyer, extended the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention to six months (until 18March 2002) on the same grounds as before. That decision was not amenable to appeal. According to the applicant, he only became aware of it after a long delay.","37.On 1 March 2002 the pre-trial investigation was completed and the applicant and his lawyer received access to the case file.","38.On 18 March 2002 the applicant complained to both the prosecution authorities and the courts that the period of his pre-trial detention had expired on that date and had not been extended. Accordingly, he requested to be released without delay. It appears that there was no follow-up to his complaints.","39.On 14 June 2002 the applicant and his co-accused were indicted.","40.On 5 August 2002 the Kherson Court held a preparatory hearing, during which it decided to keep the applicant in detention. The case file does not contain a copy of that decision.","41.On 7 December 2004 the Kherson Court found the applicant guilty of the charges and sentenced him to life imprisonment.","42.On 11 May 2006 the Supreme Court quashed that judgment and remitted the case to the same trial court for fresh examination. It held, in particular, that the applicant\u2019s defence rights had been violated on account of his removal from the hearing, in breach of procedural rules. The Supreme Court also ruled to keep the applicant in detention as a preventive measure, without further reasoning.","43.On 20 April 2007 the Kherson Court delivered a new judgment convicting the applicant of various criminal offences and sentenced him to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment.","44.On 8 April 2008 the Supreme Court quashed that judgment in the part concerning the applicant on the grounds that the trial court had modified the charges against him without respecting the applicable procedural rules. Accordingly, the case was remitted for fresh consideration again. The ruling of the Supreme Court made no mention of any preventive measure in respect of the applicant pending the delivery of a new judgment.","45.On 29 December 2009 the Kherson Court again found the applicant guilty on a long list charges and sentenced him to life imprisonment.","46.On 20 September 2011 the Supreme Court quashed that judgment too and remitted the case to the trial court for fresh examination.","47.On 6 October 2011 the Kherson Court transferred the case to the Bilozerka Town Court (\u201cthe Bilozerka Court\u201d) following jurisdiction\u2011related amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure.","48.In July, August and September 2012 the applicant applied to the trial court for release on an undertaking not to abscond. He submitted that he had already been detained for over eleven years and that his continued detention was unjustified. He referred, in particular, to the poor conditions of his detention and his deteriorating health. The applicant also noted that he had already settled the victims\u2019 civil claims.","49.On 19 July, 6 August and 27 September 2012 the Bilozerka Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s applications for release on the grounds that he had failed to show that he would not abscond or hinder the implementation of various procedural decisions if he was released.","50.On 6 August 2012 the Bilozerka Court discontinued the criminal proceedings against the applicant on a number of charges as they had become time\u2011barred.","51.On 8 October 2012 the same court found the applicant guilty of armed robbery, aggravated murder and an attempt on the life of a law\u2011enforcement official and sentenced him to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment.","52.In the absence of any appeals, on 28 October 2012 the judgment became final.","C.Alleged beating of the applicant by a guard in the Kyiv SIZO on 16August 2005","53.During the daily outdoor walk on 16 August 2005 in the Kyiv SIZO one of the guards allegedly hit the applicant with a rubber truncheon in the stomach and on the hip. The applicant did not submit any further details about that incident.","54.On 12 September 2005 the applicant was transferred to the Kherson SIZO. According to the authorities, he was examined on the same day by doctors, who did not detect any injuries. The applicant submitted that no such examination had taken place.","55.On 20 September 2005 the applicant\u2019s lawyer wrote to the governor of the Kherson SIZO that the applicant had complained of having been beaten by a guard in the Kyiv SIZO. The lawyer therefore requested a medical examination of his client.","56.On 4October 2005 a commission of three doctors examined the applicant. According to the applicant, that was his first examination in the Kherson SIZO. The doctors documented a 3.5-cm-long brown pigmented linear mark on the side of the applicant\u2019s left hip and a round mark of slightly pigmented skin with irregular edges in the paraumbilical area of the left part of his stomach.","57.On 6 October 2005 the SIZO administration informed the applicant\u2019s lawyer of the above report.","58.On 26 October 2005 three doctors examined the applicant again. Their findings were the same as on 4 October 2005. On a later, unspecified date the SIZO governor wrote about the findings to the applicant\u2019s lawyer.","59.The applicant complained to various authorities that he had been beaten on 16 August 2005 and that his injuries had never been properly documented. His complaints were forwarded to the Kyiv city prosecutor\u2019s office (\u201cthe Kyiv prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d).","60.Extracts from the applicant\u2019s medical records in detention, which were provided to the Court by the Government, contain a copy of a report on a medical examination of the applicant in the Kherson SIZO of 13February 2006. It mentioned, in particular, that the applicant had pigmented skin marks. Their description was identical to that given in the reports of 4 and 26 October 2005 (see paragraphs 56 and 58 above).","61.On 22 March 2006 the Kyiv prosecutor\u2019s office wrote to the applicant that his complaints were without basis.","62.It is not known whether the applicant took that complaint further.","63.On 5 February 2014 the administration of the Kyiv SIZO informed the Government\u2019s Agent that all the records for 2005 had been destroyed after the expiry of a five-year limit for their storage.","D.Conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention from 5October 2005 to 24December 2012","64.During various unspecified periods from 5October 2005 until his transfer to Sokyryany Prison on 24 December 2012, the applicant was detained in SIZOs in Kherson, Odessa and Kyiv.","65.According to the applicant, he was held in overcrowded, unheated and damp cells, with no ventilation and poor lighting. There were allegedly no laundry facilities for detainees, and the cells were infested with insects. The applicant also contended that his cell mates had smoked all the time and that he had been exposed to passive smoking. He submitted numerous statements by his cellmates confirming the accuracy of the above description of their conditions of detention. The applicant also submitted several colour photographs of his cells in the Kherson and Kyiv SIZOs showing, in particular, tight metal grids on the windows, an extremely small space between the various items of furniture in the cell, poor sanitary facilities, and a lavatory which could be seen from the door.","66.According to the Government, the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention were acceptable. They noted that the parts of the Kherson SIZO where he had been detained in 2005 had been demolished since that time because they had been dilapidated and not subject to capital repairs. The Government therefore submitted that they could not provide any more details about the conditions of detention there.","67.During his transportation between the SIZOs and to court hearings, the applicant was allegedly handcuffed at all times (sometimes for up to thirty-two hours), not given sufficient food and water, deprived of sleep and unable to use the toilet when needed.","68.The applicant complained about the conditions of his transportation to the prosecution authorities and sought to bring criminal charges against the escorting officers concerned.","69.On 29 June 2006 the Kyiv Garrison Military Prosecutor\u2019s Office refused to open criminal proceedings against the escorting officers owing to a lack of corpus delicti in their actions. The applicant unsuccessfully challenged that decision before the courts at three levels of jurisdiction.","70.According to the Government, the conditions of the applicant\u2019s transportation were not in breach of his rights.","71.The applicant also alleged that during his detention his health had seriously deteriorated. In particular, he had contracted tuberculosis and had had unspecified heart problems, for which he had not obtained adequate medical treatment. His requests for medical assistance had allegedly been refused by the authorities.","72.The Government provided the Court with detailed information in chronological order about the applicant\u2019s health and the medical care provided to him in detention. His health-related concerns included the residual effects of tuberculosis (contracted in 2003), micro-cardiosclerosis, and some digestive disorders. As can be seen from the applicant\u2019s medical file, he had regular medical examinations and received treatment for his health problems.","E.The applicant\u2019s access to documents in the criminal file in the context of his application to the Court","73.In January 2007 the Court asked the applicant to submit copies of his cassation appeals against the judgment of 7 December 2004, showing the dates he had lodged them with the courts dealing with the criminal case against him.","74.On 11 March and 25 April 2007 the applicant asked the trial court to provide him with copies of all his cassation appeals and those of his co\u2011defendants.","75.On 7 May 2007 the trial court judge dealing with the criminal case in question wrote to the applicant that there were no grounds to grant his request as he had already received all the copies he had asked for, which was confirmed by acknowledgments of receipt with his signature in the case file. Furthermore, the judge noted that the applicant had also been given the possibility to familiarise himself with the case file.","78.On 23 November 2011 the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (\u201cthe CPT\u201d) published the Report [CPT\/Inf (2011) 29] to the Ukrainian Government on a visit to Ukraine from 9 to 21 September 2009, which had included a visit to the Kyiv SIZO. The relevant extracts from the Report read as follows (original emphasis):","\u201c74. At the time of the 2009 visit, the total number of prisoners in Ukraine stood at 145,000 (including 36,000 on remand), compared to some 178,000 at the time of the 2005 visit. Thus, the positive trend towards a reduction of the prison population already noted in the report on the 2005 visit continues. That said, overcrowding persists in remand establishments, the ones in Kyiv, Kherson, ...Odessa ... being cited as the most problematic. The delegation observed for itself that the overcrowding was particularly acute in the Kyiv SIZO, where there was some 1 m\u00b2 of space per prisoner in certain cells, with inmates sharing beds or sleeping on the floor ...","3. Prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment","87. The 2009 visit provided an opportunity to review the situation of prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment. ... [The] Kyiv [SIZO was] accommodating ... 41lifers at various stages of appeal processes.","88. [Material conditions] were ... acceptable in the lifers\u2019 cells of the ... Kyiv [SIZO]; that said, the occupancy levels in the cells were too high (e.g. three inmates in cells measuring some 10 m\u00b2).","...","100. The SIZO in Kyiv occupies a complex of buildings in one of the central areas of Kyiv. Some of the detention buildings had been constructed some 140 years previously. ...","With an official capacity of 2,950 places, on 8 September 2009 the establishment was holding 3,440 inmates, including 217 women and 69 juveniles. The vast majority of the inmate population was on remand. The establishment was also holding 297 inmates awaiting the outcome of their appeal (including 41 life-sentenced prisoners), 93 prisoners in transit and 100 sentenced inmates assigned to work in the prison\u2019s general services and maintenance. ...","101.The vast majority of the cells holding male prisoners were seriously overcrowded (for example, 52 prisoners in a cell measuring some 50 m\u00b2 and containing 40 beds; 32 prisoners in a cell measuring 33 m\u00b2 and containing 20 beds). In some cells, the number of prisoners exceeded the number of beds available, and inmates took turns to sleep on the available beds or slept on the floor. The cells were packed with double bunk-beds, leaving very little space for any other furniture. In some cells, there were TV sets which belonged to the occupants.","Because of the human mass, ventilation was almost non-existent and the cells were very hot and stuffy. The level of hygiene was also highly unsatisfactory: in some cells the delegation saw cockroaches, and prisoners also referred to the presence of mice and rats. The in-cell sanitary installations (a partitioned toilet and sink) were generally in a decrepit state and were clearly not sufficient for the numbers of inmates held in the larger cells.","The negative consequences of the deplorable material conditions described above were compounded by the fact that some prisoners had spent lengthy periods of time at the SIZO ... In the CPT\u2019s view, the combination of negative factors to which a large number of prisoners were subjected at the Kyiv SIZO (overcrowding, appalling material conditions and levels of hygiene, and practically non-existent activity programmes) could easily be described as inhuman and degrading treatment. ...\u201d","79.The CPT\u2019s later report, which was published on 14November 2012 and which concerned its visit to Ukraine from 29November to 6December 2011, also contained the following relevant extracts regarding the conditions of detention in the Kyiv SIZO (original emphasis):","\u201c43. The delegation gained a generally positive impression of the material conditions in the units for juveniles at the [SIZO] in Kyiv ....","However, conditions of detention were quite simply appalling in many of the other detention units of the ... [SIZO]. Numerous cells were in a poor state of repair and had only very limited access to natural light. In addition, the CPT is concerned about the severe overcrowding observed in a number of detention units of [the establishment]. At the time of the visit, the Kyiv SIZO was accommodating 3,761prisoners (official capacity: 2,850 places) ...","The Committee acknowledges the efforts made by the Ukrainian authorities to reduce overcrowding in the [SIZO] visited. ...\u201d","80.The relevant extracts from some earlier CPT reports (following visits to Ukraine in 1998, 2000 and 2002) concerning the conditions of transportation of detainees in Ukraine are quoted, in particular, in the Court\u2019s judgment in the case of Andrey Yakovenko v. Ukraine (no.63727\/11, \u00a7\u00a771-73, 13March 2014)."],"28591":["7.The applicant was born in 1967 and lived before his arrest in the town of Yoshkar-Ola in the Mariy El Republic.","A.The applicant\u2019s state of health","8.In 2010 the applicant was convicted of murder, possessing firearms and aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment.","9.In April 2012 he was diagnosed with cancer of the left kidney. According to a medical certificate, on 25July 2012 he underwent ablation in the prison hospital. A month later he was discharged and transferred to a correctional colony, despite complaining of deteriorating health.","10.On 18December 2012 a pulmonary fluorography revealed that the applicant had \u201csuspected nidal shadows (in the middle zones) on the right and left sides\u201d. An MRI performed a month later confirmed that he had metastases in the lungs.","11.On 6March 2013 a medical panel diagnosed him with \u201cstage3 cancer\u201d of the left kidney (stage 4 is the final in the development of cancer).","12.On 28March 2013 the applicant was examined by another medical panel. The diagnosis included stage 4 cancer of the left kidney and multiple metastases in the lungs, as well as various secondary illnesses of the cardiovascular and digestive systems. The panel concluded that the applicant was eligible for early release as he suffered from a condition included in the list of serious illnesses precluding the serving of sentences in correctional institutions, as provided for by Decree no. 54 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 6February 2004.","13.A month later the Ingondinskiy District Court ordered the applicant\u2019s release, finding that his condition was \u201cserious enough\u201d to warrant his discharge. The decision was quashed upon an appeal by a prosecutor and the matter was sent back to the District Court for re\u2011examination.","14.On 24July 2013 the District Court rejected a request by the applicant for release, citing the panel\u2019s report of 6March 2013 and, in particular, the fact that he had been diagnosed with stage 3 cancer, which was not included in the list of illnesses. At the same time, the District Court dismissed the findings made by another medical panel on 28March2013, considering that examination to have been \u201cunlawfully conducted\u201d. It also noted that the \u201capplicant\u2019s behaviour did not show his determination to get on the road to recovery\u201d.","15.On 21November 2013 the District Court dismissed another request for early release by the applicant. Accepting that he suffered from stage 4 cancer, the court nevertheless held as follows:","\u201c... [the applicant] is a particular danger to society, his improvement level is negligible, and according to the [colony] administration he has not got on the road to recovery. [The applicant] regularly receives symptomatic treatment and, in view of the specifics of his disease, does not need another kind of treatment.\u201d","The decision of 21 November 2013 was appealed against and became final on 14 May 2014.","16.The applicant\u2019s lawyer sought the opinion of an independent expert from the Blokhin Cancer Research Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences. On 22April 2014 three of its specialists prepared a reply, stressing that appropriate treatment could prolong the life expectancy of those suffering from stage 4 cancer for up to thirty months and that there were grounds to believe that the applicant needed specific antitumour treatment.","17.In May and June 2014 Ms Artemyeva unsuccessfully applied to have the applicant transferred from the correctional colony, where no anti-cancer treatment was available, to the prison hospital.","18.On 2July 2014 a new medical panel diagnosed him with stage 3 kidney cancer with growing multiple lung metastases and metastases in the mediastinal lymph nodes. The panel\u2019s findings also referred to the results of a computer tomography, which had revealed tuberculomas in the left lung.","19.In August 2014 the applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged a complaint against the administration of the correctional colony, alleging that they had failed to provide her client with adequate medical care. She requested that the court authorise the applicant\u2019s transfer to the prison hospital.","20.On 1October 2014 the District Court dismissed the complaint, but granted the transfer request. Relying on statements by a representative of the applicant\u2019s correctional colony and Ms Artemyeva, the court found that the applicant was not receiving anti-cancer treatment in the colony as such treatment had to be prescribed by an oncologist. The colony medical unit did not employ this type of specialist.","21.On 20October 2014 an independent forensic expert studied the applicant\u2019s medical file at the request of his lawyer, and concluded that since the end of 2012 his condition had called for tumour immunotherapy. The expert also noted that since August 2012 his treatment had been merely symptomatic and that his drug regimen was limited to painkillers.","B.Rule 39 request and subsequent developments","22.At the end ofJuly 2014 the applicant asked the Court to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and to indicate to the Russian authorities that he should be provided with the necessary medical care or released from prison on health grounds.","23.On 5August 2014 the Government were requested under Rule54 \u00a72 (a) of the Rules of Court to submit information about the applicant\u2019s health, the quality of the medical assistance he was receiving and the conditions of his detention.","24.On 15 September 2014 the Government responded, providing the Court with the applicant\u2019s entire medical file. In addition, in merely a few lines, they stressed that:","(a) the applicant was undergoing treatment in the prison hospital;","(b) his health was satisfactory and \u201cnothing was life-threatening\u201d;","(c) the medical care was afforded to him \u201cin full\u201d, was \u201cappropriate\u201d to his condition and complied both with the requirements of Russian law and the guarantees of Article 3 of the Convention; and","(d) his illnesses were not included in the list of illnesses precluding the serving of sentences in correctional institutions.","25.The applicant responded in November 2014, maintaining his claims of absent or sporadic medical assistance. He again relied on the conclusions of the forensic medical expert made on 20 October 2014.","26.Following receipt of the Government\u2019s submissions and the applicant\u2019s comments on them, on 12November 2014 the Acting President of the Section decided to indicate to the Government, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that the applicant should be immediately examined by medical experts independent from the penal system, including by an oncologist, with a view to determining (a) whether the treatment he was receiving in detention was adequate to his condition; (b) whether his current state of health was compatible with detention in a correctional colony or prison hospital; and (c) whether his current condition required his admittance to a specialist hospital or release. The Government were also asked to ensure his immediate transfer to a specialist hospital if the medical experts concluded that such admittance was required.","27.The Court wrote to the Government on 13 November 2014. On 4December 2014 the Government responded, submitting various documents.","(i)A typed copy of the applicant\u2019s medical history drawn up between September and November 2014, which contained a detailed schedule showing his daily intake of drugs. It appears from that document that he received basic analgesic and hypotensive drugs and cough medicine, and that an oncologist had prescribed him \u201clifelong\u201d immunotherapy with a drug called \u201creodoron\u201d. However, the drug intake schedule did not contain any mention of the drug \u201creodoron\u201d.","(ii)Certificates issued by the acting head of the medical unit in the applicant\u2019s correctional colony, listing the diagnosis and giving a short description of general medical procedures. According to the certificates, on 20 November 2014 the applicant\u2019s condition was \u201csatisfactory\u201d and his illnesses \u201cdid not present any danger\u201d to his life. The certificates also indicated that there were no signs of progressive lung failure or \u201ccancer intoxication\u201d (paraneoplastic syndromes, such as fever). The acting head of the unit nevertheless noted that any illness, including those suffered by the applicant, could be life-threatening.","(iii)A certificate dated 24 November 2011 issued by the head of the applicant\u2019s correctional colony setting out his criminal record and convictions and indicating that since 23August 2014 he had been detained in the correctional colony as there were no grounds to keep him in the prison hospital.","28.In a one-page document the Government also answered the three questions which on 12 November 2014 the Court had asked to be addressed to independent medical experts. In particular, they stressed that upon the applicant\u2019s arrival at each correctional institution he had undergone clinical tests and had been examined by medical specialists. He had thus been placed under regular medical supervision in relation to his illnesses. The Government argued that his condition was satisfactory and that there was no threat to his life as he was afforded medical care appropriate to his condition and in the required amount. They concluded that his condition did not call for admittance to a specialist hospital or release.","29.The applicant commented on the Government\u2019s information, insisting that the medical assistance afforded to him was inadequate and that his life was in imminent danger unless antitumor and radiation treatment were administered to him. He relied on the results of a medical examination on 18December 2014, which had revealed new and growing metastases in the right adrenal gland, the left brain hemisphere and the right cerebellar hemisphere.","30.The applicant also submitted an alternative expert report commissioned by his lawyer. On 17 January 2015 two forensic medical experts from St. Petersburg State Medical University prepared a report responding to the three questions put by the Court in its decision of 12November 2014. Assessing the quality of the applicant\u2019s medical assistance, the experts noted that since August 2012 the applicant had only received symptomatic treatment with anaesthetics for his kidney cancer. No other cancer-related treatment had been given until December 2014. The experts drew up a list of various established and widely applied medical procedures, including immunotherapy, extensive chemotherapy and radiotherapy, which should have been provided to a patient such as the applicant to improve his condition and extend his life. The experts stressed that even after the growing metastasis in the applicant\u2019s brain was discovered in December 2014 the prison doctors had not considered the possibility of radiotherapy. The experts noted that the drug \u201creodoron\u201d mentioned in his medical record did not exist. They further criticised other aspects of his medical assistance, including the frequency and direction of important medical examinations. The experts concluded that the applicant\u2019s life expectancy was critically low. He had no more than a few months to live, particularly in view of the fact that he was not being afforded the necessary treatment.","C.Developments after communication of the case","31.Following communication of the case to the parties, on 29 June2015 the Government informed the Court that the applicant had died on 8April 2015. They submitted a copy of the death certificate and asked the Court, in the absence of any person wishing to pursue the application on his behalf, to strike the case out of the list of cases pursuant to Article 37 \u00a7 1 (c) of the Convention.","32.The Government included the applicant\u2019s medical record drawn up between December 2014 and April 2015 in a letter to the Court dated 24September 2015. They also enclosed a number of certificates prepared by the acting heads of the correctional colony and colony medical unit. The acting head of the colony laid down the details of the applicant\u2019s criminal record, indicated that he had not made any complaints to the colony administration between 21November 2014 and 8 April 2015 and that a request he had made for early release had been dismissed by the Ingodinskiy District Court on 16 March 2015. In separate certificates the acting head of the medical unit recorded the progress of the applicant\u2019s illness, placing particular emphasis on the rapid deterioration of his health in 2014 when new and growing metastases had been discovered in his lungs, lymph nodes, adrenal gland and brain, and the development of cancer intoxication, accompanied by serious bilateral polysegmental pneumonia, brain oedema and terminal kidney failure. The applicant\u2019s condition had been considered particularly serious between 18December 2014 and 1 February 2015, and then between 24 March and 8April 2015. The assessment had been changed to moderately serious for the period 1 February to 23 March 2015, although no changes in the long list of conditions had been recorded.","33.In the letter of 18 August 2015 the applicant\u2019s lawyer informed the Court that Ms Artemyeva, the applicant\u2019s sister and heir, wished to continue the proceedings before the Court on the applicant\u2019s behalf. The lawyer enclosed a birth certificate as proof of the applicant and Ms Artemyeva\u2019s relationship and copies of letters sent by various Russian authorities to MsArtemyeva in response to complaints alleging that they had failed to properly treat the applicant."],"28592":["6.The applicant was born in 1983 and lived in Verkhnyaya Pyshma, Sverdlovsk Region.","A.Arrest and conviction","7.On 27 May 2012 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of murder. He remained in detention throughout the investigation and trial.","8.On 18 January 2014 the Verkhnyaya Pyshma Town Court convicted the applicant of the charges and sentenced him to ten years\u2019 imprisonment.","B.The applicant\u2019s medical condition","9.The applicant was seriously ill at the time of the arrest. He suffered from advanced HIV, long-term tuberculosis at the stage of lung tissue destruction and chronic hepatitis C.","10.In June 2012 the applicant was admitted to the tuberculosis unit of the medical wing of remand prison no. IZ-66\/1 in Yekaterinburg for treatment. On his admission to prison he had informed the doctor that he had been receiving tuberculosis treatment for several years, but that it had not been successful. A drug regimen based on a combination of five anti\u2011tuberculosis drugs was prescribed for him. In the second half of 2012 a highly active antiretroviral therapy was ordered by a medical panel for his HIV.","11.A chest X-ray carried out on 26 September 2012 revealed the formation of lung cavities, showing the further progress of the disease.","12.On 23 January 2013 drug susceptibility testing was performed. It showed that the applicant\u2019s tuberculosis was resistant to all the drugs he had received since June 2012, when his treatment had begun. No alteration in his treatment took place until 18 April 2013, when the applicant was admitted to Prison Hospital no.6 in StDonato in Sverdlovsk Region. Given the development of the applicant\u2019s drug resistance, a medical panel at the hospital ordered different antibiotics to be used.","13.The applicant\u2019s condition improved slightly and on 10 February 2014 he was discharged from the hospital to a medical wing. However, in the following months he started experiencing back pain. In July 2014 a tuberculous infection of the vertebrae was diagnosed and the applicant was readmitted to the prison hospital.","14.On 26 September 2014 a medical panel found him eligible for early release on health grounds. His application for release was examined by the Leninskiy District Court of Nizhniy Tagil on 27November 2014. At the hearing the applicant\u2019s doctor testified that he was suffering from serious diseases, that he could not care for himself and that the prospects of his recovery were poor. On the same day the District Court dismissed the application, citing the applicant\u2019s history of previous convictions which, in the court\u2019s opinion, demonstrated that he \u201chad failed to take the path of improvement\u201d. The decision was upheld on appeal by the Sverdlovsk Regional Court on 24February 2015.","C.Rule 39 request","15.On 12 March 2015 the applicant asked the Court to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and to indicate to the Government that he should be provided with adequate medical care and immediately released. The applicant stated that he was not receiving the necessarymedical care and treatment in detention, despite suffering from a life-threatening and rapidly progressing illness.The deterioration of his condition required an urgent medical intervention, which was unavailable in the prison hospital.","16.On 23 March 2015 the President of the Section, acting upon the applicant\u2019 s request, decided to apply Rules 39 and 41 of the Rules of Court, indicating to the Government that the applicant should be immediately examined by medical experts which were independent from the prison system. They were to determine (1) whether he was receiving adequate treatment in the prison hospital for his condition; (2) whether his state of health was compatible with detention in the conditions of a prison hospital; and (3) whether his condition required his admission to a specialist, possibly civilian, hospital. Furthermore, the Government were to ensure his transfer to a specialist hospital if the medical experts concluded that admission to such a hospital was necessary.","17.On 7April 2015 the Government responded to the Court\u2019s letter of 24March2015. It submitted documents related to the applicant\u2019s conviction; certificates issued by the head of the detention facility where the applicant had been previously detained, describing the state of his health and giving a list of medical procedures he had undergone; documents showing that the detention facility was authorised to provide medical services to inmates; extracts from the applicant\u2019s medical history; certificates issued by the head of the prison hospital describing the state of the applicant\u2019s health, the quality of the medical treatment and the conditions of his detention; handwritten statements by three of the prison hospital\u2019s staff stating that they had provided the applicant with the necessary care; the report of the special medical panel of 26September2014; and copies of the decisions of 27November2014 and 24February2015 on his applications for early release.","18.The Government also asserted that the scope and quality of the treatment provided to the applicant in the prison hospital was appropriate for his state of health. However, they admitted that there had been a serious deterioration in the applicant\u2019s condition in 2014. Lastly, they submitted that an examination of the applicant by a medical panel to check his entitlement to early release had been scheduled for 9April2015.","19.On 22May2015 the applicant\u2019s representative reported that the independent medical examination had not been carried out by the Government. However, two independent doctors acting at the request of the applicant\u2019s lawyer had assessed the quality of the applicant\u2019s medical treatment in detention and whether his further detention in the prison hospital was appropriate for someone as ill as him. In their report, dated 20May2015, the doctors concluded that the medical care provided by the detention authorities had been inadequate, particularly in view of the continued use of ineffective drugs. They also stated that the applicant required spinal surgery owing to the tuberculous infection of the vertebrae and that it was vital he be transferred from the prison hospital to a specialist medical facility.","D.Developments following the application of Rule 39","20.On 22May 2015 the Leninskiy District Court of Nizhniy Tagil dismissed the applicant\u2019s second application for release on health grounds, referring to his failure to improve his character.","21.On 21 August 2015 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court set aside that decision. The court held that the applicant should be released immediately, owing to the state of his health and the absence of disciplinary violations.","22.After his release the applicant was admitted to a civilian hospital in Verkhnyaya Pyshma, where he died on 3 October 2015."],"28596":["1. The applicants are Jihana Ali (the \u201cfirst applicant\u201d), born in 1984; her brother, Netschirwan Ali (the \u201csecond applicant\u201d), born in 1992 and sister, Saida Ali (the \u201cthird applicant\u201d), born in 1993; and the first applicant \u2019 s daughter, Nesrin Ali (the \u201cfourth applicant\u201d), born in 2003. They are all Syrian nationals of Kurdish descent and were represented by Mrs S. Motz, a lawyer practicing in Zurich.","2. The Swiss Government were represented by their Agent, Mr F. Sch\u00fcrmann, of the Federal Office of Justice. The Italian Government were represented by their Agent, Ms E. Spatafora and their co-Agent, Ms P. Accardo.","A. The circumstances of the case","3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.","4. The applicants arrived in Italy on 15 August 2013 where they were registered as asylum seekers. On 27 August 2013 they entered Switzerland and formally applied for asylum there. On 23, 25 and 30 September 2013, at the request of the Swiss Federal Office for Migration (the \u201cFOM\u201d), the Italian authorities accepted to take responsibility for the determination of the applicants \u2019 asylum situation pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) no. 343\/2003 of 18 February 2003 (\u201cthe Dublin Regulation\u201d). Accordingly, on 30 September 2013, the FOM refused to consider the applicants \u2019 asylum application on the merits.","On 21 October 2013, the Swiss Federal Administrative Court dismissed the applicants \u2019 appeal against the FOM \u2019 s decision considering inter alia that the applicant had failed to establish that Italy was in breach of its international obligations with respect to the treatment of asylum seekers, in particular the Council Directive 2003\/9\/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers in the Member States.","In the meantime, the third applicant, who claimed to be religiously married with a man holding a temporary humanitarian residence permit ( vorl\u00e4ufige Aufnahme ) became pregnant. Her request to the FOM for reconsideration of the removal decision and interim relief was rejected on the ground that a humanitarian temporary permit did not constitute a stable right of residence and therefore she could not rely on Article 8 of the Convention.","5. According to the applicants, several of their relatives reside in Switzerland (brother, uncle, cousins, brother in law).","B. Events after the lodging of the application","6. The application was lodged with the Court on 17 April 2014. On 23 April 2014 the Court issued an interim measure within the meaning of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court indicating to the Swiss Government that it was desirable, in the interests of the parties and of the proper conduct of the proceedings before the Court, not to expel the applicants to Italy for the duration of the proceedings before the Court.","7. On 2 September 2014 the third applicant married.","8. On 13 February 2015 the Swiss Government informed the Court that the third applicant had married and given birth to a child. Since her husband had in the meantime been admitted to Switzerland as a refugee, on 11 February 2015 the Secretariat of State for Migration (the \u201cSEM\u201d), which had in the meantime replaced the FOM, had decided not to remove her to Italy and to proceed with the examination of her asylum application in Switzerland. The Government therefore requested the Court to strike the application out of the list of cases pursuant to Article 37 \u00a7 1 of the Convention with respect to the third applicant.","9. On 9 March 2015 the third applicant was granted refugee status in Switzerland.","10. On 23 March 2015 the Swiss Government informed the Court that the Italian authorities had requested all their counterparts participating in the \u201cDublin\u201d system to inform them at least 15 days in advance of any transfer to Italy of a family with minor children so that they could be in a position to provide the guarantees required by the Court in its judgment in the case of Tarakhel v. Switzerland ([GC], no. 29217\/12, \u00a7 122, 4 November 2014).","On the same day the Italian Government confirmed that in order to book housing places for \u201cDublin\u201d transferees they needed to be given notice of a confirmed date for any transfer reasonably in advance.","11. On 30 March 2015, in reply to the Swiss Government \u2019 s request to strike the application out in respect of the third applicant, the applicants \u2019 representative considered that the Court should nevertheless award Swiss Francs (CHF) 1,390.83 (approximately EURO (EUR) 1,280), for costs and expenses incurred by the third applicant as a result of the Swiss authorities \u2019 refusal to recognise her right to maintain family life in Switzerland. The Swiss Government opposed this claim.","12. On 6 June 2015, the Court decided to lift the application of the interim measure.","13. On 22 June 2015 the first and fourth applicants requested that the SEM re-examine their asylum application in Switzerland. After their request was rejected by the SEM, they appealed to the Federal Administrative Court.","In an interim decision of 3 September 2015 the Federal Administrative Court considered that the Italian authorities had given sufficient guarantees and, on 15 October 2015, rejected the first and fourth applicants \u2019 appeal.","14. On 11 November 2015, the first and fourth applicants, whose transfer to Italy was scheduled for 17 November 2015, lodged a fresh Rule 39 request considering that the Swiss authorities had not received sufficient guarantees from their Italian counterparts.","15. In their comments submitted on 16 November 2015, the Swiss Government referred to a leading judgment delivered by the Federal Administrative Court on 12 March 2015 (E-6629\/2014) pursuant to which transfers to Italy of families with minor children could not take place in the absence of guarantees that the family would be taken charge of in a manner adapted to the age of the children and that the family would be kept together.","They also submitted copies of official guarantees provided by the Italian Government. In a circular letter of 2 February 2015, specifically referring to the Tarakhel judgment, the Italian Ministry of the Interior guaranteed their Dublin counterparts that \u201call families with minor children (...) [ would ] be kept together and accommodated in a facility which the reception conditions [ were ] adapted to the family and to the age of the children\u201d. In a second letter of 15 April 2015, the Italian Ministry of the Interior informed the European Commission that housing facilities within the SPRAR ( Sistema di protezione per richiedenti asilo e rifugiati ) had been reserved for families transferred to Italy in the context of a Dublin procedure. The list of available facilities was circulated among States participating in the Dublin system by a circular letter from the same ministry of 8 June 2015. This letter stated that each family with minor children would be assigned to a specific local reception ensuring family unity and social integration.","Moreover, the Swiss Government indicated that in a judgment of 27 July 2015 (D-4394\/2015), the Federal Administrative Court had considered that the list of SPRAR facilities provided by the Italian authorities constituted per se a sufficient guarantee with regard to the Tarakhel requirements.","16. On 16 November 2015, having noted the parties \u2019 submissions, the Court decided to reject the applicants \u2019 fresh Rule 39 request.","17. On 8 December 2015, the Swiss Government informed the Court that the transfer of the first and fourth applicants to Italy had been scheduled for 17 November 2015 but did not take place because the first applicant refused to leave and the fourth applicant had disappeared. The second applicant had also disappeared.","The Government therefore considered that these applicants did not intend to maintain their application and requested that the application be struck out in their respect pursuant to Article 37 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.","18. On 20 January 2016, the applicants \u2019 representative informed the Court that the second and fourth applicants had left the asylum centre because they were afraid of being removed to Italy. However, they had maintained contact with their family and wished that the Court continue the examination of their application.","19. On 18 February 2016, the applicants \u2019 representative informed the Court that the fourth applicant had returned to the asylum centre where she was living with her mother.","20. On 24 March 2016, the Swiss Government informed the Court that a tentative transfer of the first and fourth applicants to Italy, scheduled for 16 March 2016, had had to be cancelled due to the violent resistance of the first applicant who, on that occasion, had injured a police officer with a razor blade.","21. On 11 May 2016, the Swiss Government informed the Court that the first and fourth applicants had been transferred to Italy on 5 May 2016.","C. Relevant domestic law with regard to the Dublin Regulation","22. The relevant domestic law is set out in the Tarakhel judgment (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 22-23 and 26-27).","23. The relevant instruments and principles of European Union law are set out in the same judgment (\u00a7\u00a7 28-36).","24. In particular, the Dublin Regulation is applicable to Switzerland under the terms of the association agreement of 26 October 2004 between the Swiss Confederation and the European Community regarding criteria and mechanisms for establishing the State responsible for examining a request for asylum lodged in a Member State or in Switzerland (OJ L 53 of 27 February 2008). The Dublin Regulation has since been replaced by Regulation (EU) No 604\/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 (the \u201cDublin III Regulation\u201d), which is designed to make the Dublin system more effective and to strengthen the legal safeguards for persons subject to the Dublin procedure.","25. The Dublin III Regulation entered into force on 1 January 2014 and was passed into law by the Swiss Federal Council on 7 March 2014.","D. The Italian context","26. A detailed description of the asylum procedure and the legal framework and organisation of the reception system for asylum seekers in Italy is also set out in the Tarakhel judgment ( \u00a7\u00a7 36-50)."],"28598":["1. The applicants, Mr M.A.-M. (\u201cthe first applicant\u201d), his wife (\u201cthe second applicant\u201d) and two minor children, are Iraqi nationals who were born in 1986, 1996 and 2015 respectively (\u201cthe applicants\u201d). They were represented before the Court by Ms Anna Smallenburg, a lawyer practising in Helsinki.","2. The Finnish Government were represented by their Agent, Mr Arto Kosonen of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.","A. The circumstances of the case","3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.","4. The couple arrived in Finland from Iraq via Italy on 16 February 2015 and sought asylum on the same day. The second applicant was already pregnant at the time. On 23 March 2015 the Finnish Immigration Service ( Maahanmuuttovirasto, Migrationsverket ) contacted the Italian authorities and asked them to receive the applicants. The Italian authorities agreed to receive the first applicant on 28 April 2015 and did not oppose receiving the second applicant by the end of the time-limit of two months, expiring on 23 May 2015. On 27 May 2015 the Italian authorities were further informed that, if the second applicant gave birth before the removal, the Finnish Government would request guarantees from the Italian Government that the family would be kept together and that the family would be placed in appropriate accommodation. The couple \u2019 s twins were born prematurely in Finland on 25 May 2015 but this information was submitted to the Finnish Immigration Service only on 3 June 2015.","5. On the same date, the Immigration Service rejected the applicants \u2019 asylum application and decided to order their removal back to Italy. This decision did not take into account the new information submitted about the birth of the twins. In its reasoning, the Immigration Service stated that the second applicant was in good medical condition and that she could be removed despite her pregnancy. According to the post \u2011 Tarakhel practice which had been agreed upon between the Finnish and Italian authorities, individual guarantees would be requested by the Finnish authorities 15 days before the planned removal. The applicants \u2019 removal would therefore comply with the Tarakhel judgment. This decision was served on the applicants on 16 June 2015.","6. By letter dated 18 June 2015 the applicants appealed to the Administrative Court ( hallinto-oikeus, f\u00f6rvaltningsdomstolen), requesting also a stay on removal.","7. On 25 June 2015 the Administrative Court decided not to grant a stay on removal.","8. On 29 October 2015 the Administrative Court rejected the applicants \u2019 appeal. It found that the Italian authorities had agreed to receive the first applicant on 28 April 2015 and had not opposed receiving his wife by 23 May 2015. The Finnish and Italian Governments had agreed on arrangements according to which families with children were to be kept together and placed in appropriate accommodation. Before the removal, the Finnish authorities would inform the Italian authorities of the special needs of the family, including their need for medical assistance. The court found that the medical condition of the twins was not such as they could not receive appropriate treatment in Italy. On these grounds, and on those already expressed by the Immigration Service, the court held that the applicants would not be subject to a risk of treatment in violation of Article 3 of the Convention.","9. By letter dated 27 November 2015 the applicants appealed further to the Supreme Administrative Court ( korkein hallinto-oikeus, h\u00f6gsta f\u00f6rvaltningsdomstolen), requesting again a stay on removal.","10. On 18 May 2016 the Supreme Administrative Court refused the applicants leave to appeal.","B. Procedure under Rule 39","11. The application was lodged with the Court on 2 July 2015. On the same day, the duty judge of the Court decided to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court for the duration of the proceedings before the Court and to put factual questions to the Finnish Government under Rule 54 \u00a7 2 (a), which concerned, inter alia, the guarantees obtained from the Italian authorities in relation to the applicants \u2019 scheduled transfer to Italy.","12. The Finnish Government submitted their reply on 10 July 2015. In their letter, the respondent Government noted that the Italian authorities had informed the Finnish authorities of the guarantees for vulnerable cases, including families with children, by their letter of 8 June 2015. In this circular letter, the Italian Dublin Unit set out the new policy of the Italian authorities on transfers to Italy of families with small children and provided a list of accommodation available to such families.","13. Furthermore, the Finnish Government noted that the Immigration Service would transfer the medical information detailing the special needs of the applicants to the competent authorities in Italy and, accordingly, those needs would be taken care of in such a manner that the applicants would receive any necessary medical care in Italy without interruption. They noted that the Finnish authorities had made sufficient efforts to obtain individual and specific guarantees from the Italian authorities, and that there was no reason to suspect that the applicants would be separated from each other or subjected to any treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention upon their arrival in Italy. The examination of the applicants \u2019 application by the Court was premature as no final decision had yet been made by the relevant domestic courts. Accordingly, the Government considered that the applicants \u2019 application should be declared inadmissible by virtue of Article 35 \u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.","14. On 3 August 2015 the applicants were sent a copy of the Government \u2019 s letter for information.","15. On 12 October 2015 the applicants commented on the information submitted by the Government. They argued that a mere agreement between Finland and Italy to keep families with children together and to arrange accommodation for them could not be regarded as sufficient. They claimed that Italy was not capable of giving such individual guarantees as demanded by the Tarakhel judgment. The applicants \u2019 situation would be unclear if Italy could give no individual guarantees by the time of the possible removal. The applicants wished the Court to continue the examination of their case.","16. On 3 November 2015 the Government reiterated their previous observations and considered that, even after the delivery of the Administrative Court \u2019 s decision of 29 October 2015, the applicants had still not exhausted all effective domestic remedies since it was still open for them to request leave to appeal from the Supreme Administrative Court.","17. On 19 February 2016 the applicants commented on the Government \u2019 s letter of 3 November 2015, indicating that they had sought leave to appeal from the Supreme Administrative Court. They continued to claim that they had not yet been informed about any individual and specific guarantees concerning their possible removal to Italy. They also submitted the latest medical certificates for the twin babies."],"28639":["5.The applicant was born in 1978 and lived in Cheboksary before his conviction. He is currently serving a sentence in Novocheboksarsk.","A.The applicant\u2019s arrest and subsequent events","6.In April 2006 a criminal case was opened into the theft of money belonging to the applicant\u2019s cousin, Ms G.","7.On 8 September 2006 G. was found dead in her flat with several gunshot wounds. On 9 September 2006 a criminal case was opened into her murder.","8.On 14 September 2006 the applicant, who was suspected of the theft and whose whereabouts were unknown, was placed on a police wanted list.","9.At around 10 p.m. on 6 October 2006 the applicant was arrested on the street. He was handcuffed and taken to the police station of the Moskovskiy district police department of Cheboksary (\u041c\u043e\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0420\u041e\u0412\u0414 \u0433.\u0427\u0435\u0431\u043e\u043a\u0441\u0430\u0440\u044b \u2013 \u201cthe district police\u201d).According to Ms P. and two other female witnesses, the applicant had no injuries before his arrest.","10.The applicant was escorted to the police station at around 11p.m. He was taken in handcuffs to room no. 217 on the first floor (\u201csecond floor\u201d in Russian) and interviewed by operative police officers Ch. and F. about the theft and murder. He gave a partial confession, stating that he had stolen less money from the victim, but denied murder.","11.The parties provided different accounts of the events at the police station.","12.According to the applicant, police officers Ch. and F., who were drunk at the time, demanded that he confess to the theft and murder. They allegedly beat him up, delivering blows to his head, ears, body and legs, and threatened him with rape. At about 3 a.m. they shackled a 40 kg weight to his hands, which he was made to hold while they continued to physically assault him. At about 4a.m. they made him stand on the windowsill of an open window and threatened to throw him out and make it look as if he had attempted to flee or commit suicide if he did not confess to the murder. After refusing to do so, one of the police officers allegedly pushed him out of the window.","13.According to the Government, in the course of the police interview the applicant, who was drunk when he was taken to the police station, suddenly climbed on a table and jumped out of the window. This course of events was reported by police officers Ch. and F. to their superior on 7October 2006. They stated that they had taken the applicant for an interview in room no. 217 in handcuffs as he had been drunk, had had a strong smell of alcohol coming from his mouth, had behaved aggressively and inadequately and had used obscene and threatening language towards them.","14.Shortly before 6 a.m. on 7 October 2006 the applicant was given first aid by the ambulance service, which diagnosed him with a closed head injury, concussion and bruises of the soft tissue on the face and on both feet. According to the paramedic and his assistant, they found the applicant lying on the tarmac conscious; he was handcuffed without any weight shackled to him.","15.At 6.15a.m.the applicant was taken to the Cheboksary Town Emergency Hospital handcuffed on a stretcher, accompanied by police officers Ch. and F. After surgery his right foot was in plaster and his left foot had a weight fixed to it. The applicant was shackled to the bed by one of his hands and guarded by a police officer.","16.From 11.20 to 11.55 a.m. on 7 October 2006 an investigator from the district police questioned the applicant in hospital as a suspect in the theft case, in the presence of a lawyer. He reiterated his confession (see paragraph 10 above). From 7 to 8.30 p.m. that evening an investigator from the Moskovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office questioned him as a witness in the murder case.","17.According to Ms P. and the applicant\u2019s mother, who visited the applicant in the hospital, the applicant\u2019s eyes were both bruised (which is also evident on photographs of the applicant in hospital), his left ear was swollen, his teeth were loose and he could hardly talk. According to his mother, his left ear was unresponsive and he could not hear, his head and chin were badly bruised, and he had bruises and cuts on his wrists. The applicant told his mother that he had been beaten up and threatened with rape by two police officers, who had shackled a 40 kg weight to him and threatened to throw him out of a window if he did not confess to the crimes. He could not remember what had happened next.","18.At 1.10 p.m. on 10 October 2006 an investigator from the district police drew up a record of the applicant\u2019s arrest at 1p.m. that day as a suspect in the theft case. On 11October2006 the Moskovskiy District Court of Cheboksary (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) dismissed the investigator\u2019s request to have the applicant remanded in custody on the grounds that he had been hospitalised and could not participate in the hearing himself.","19.At 2.15 p.m. on 13October 2006 an investigator from the Moskovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office drew up a record of the applicant\u2019s arrest at 2.10p.m. that day on suspicion of the murder. On the same day the District Court extended his arrest until 16October 2006.","20.On 16October 2006 the criminal cases concerning the theft and murder were joined and the applicant was charged with both crimes. The District Court remanded him in custody.","21.On the same day the applicant, who had been undergoing continuous inpatient treatment in hospital since 7 October 2016, was transferred to the Cheboksary pre\u2011trial detention facility.","22.By an order of 21 October 2006 the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Chuvashiya held police officers Ch. and F. liable in disciplinary proceedings for failing to properly guard the applicant and leaving him without permanent surveillance on 7October 2006. They were issued with a severe warning. The order stated that in the course of the applicant\u2019s interview the police officers, who had failed to carry out their duties in accordance with the service regulations and to take into account the applicant\u2019s personality, had opened a window thereby creating conditions for the applicant to jump out of it.","23.On 22 November 2006 the applicant confessed to the murder of G. in the course of his questioning as an accused, in the presence of his lawyer.","24.On 8 February 2007 the District Court convicted him of theft, murder and possession of a firearm, and sentenced him to fourteen years\u2019 imprisonment. The period of his arrest and remand in custody from 10 to 12October 2006 and from 13 October 2006 onwards was counted towards his sentence. The judgment entered into force on 5April 2007.","B.The applicant\u2019s medical records","25.The following injuries were recorded during the applicant\u2019s initial examination at the Cheboksary Town Emergency Hospital on 7October 2006: a soft tissue injury to the head, scratches on the face and knees, swelling and bruises on the left hip, a fractured left foot and a dislocated right foot. He was diagnosed with a closed head injury, concussion, bruises and scratches on the head soft tissue and left hip and knee joints, and fractures to both feet.","26.On 8 October 2006, during his inpatient treatment in hospital, the applicant, who had complained that one of his teeth was loose and painful, was examined by a dentist and diagnosed with a \u201ccontusion of tooth 41\u201d (lower tooth on the right side).On 11 October 2006 an otolaryngologist examined him in connection with the impaired hearing in his left ear and diagnosed him with otitis.","27.From 22 October to 12November 2006 the applicant received inpatient treatment in the medical facility of Chuvashiya correctional colony no. 4 (IK-4).","28.It appears from a report by a panel of forensic psychiatrists dated 24November 2006 that the applicant suffered from a personality disorder which did not require medical treatment or exclude his criminal responsibility. The experts did not assess the applicant\u2019s fall from the window of the police station.","29.On 11 December 2006 an investigator of the Moskovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office ordered a forensic medical examination of the applicant. The investigator stated that at about 5 a.m. on 7 October 2006 the applicant had fallen from office no. 217 on the first floor of the police station and received injuries to both feet. The investigator asked whether on 7October 2006 the applicant had had any injuries other than those to both of his feet, and if so, how and when they had been received, whether they could have been received as a result of a fall onto tarmac from the first floor, where they were located and how serious they had been.","30.Following an examination of the applicant\u2019s hospital records, a forensic medical expert concluded on 14December2006 that the information concerning the applicant\u2019s initial examination in hospital on 7October 2006 was undetailed. Information on the exact location, number and morphological characteristics of the injuries was missing, and was insufficient to determine the time and order they had been inflicted to distinguish them and determine which could have been as a result of the applicant being punched and kicked and which could have been as a result of his fall from the first floor. It was stated in the expert\u2019s report that the applicant had not attended the examination, after asking in writing to carry it out in his absence.","C.Pre-investigation inquiry into the applicant\u2019s allegations of police ill-treatment and unlawful deprivation of liberty","1.Refusal to open a criminal case","31.On 11 October 2006 the applicant\u2019s mother lodged a complaint with the Chuvashiya prosecutor\u2019s office concerning her son\u2019s alleged ill\u2011treatment and unlawful deprivation of liberty from 6 to 10 October 2006.","32.On 8November 2006 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Moskovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office concerning his alleged ill\u2011treatment by the police officers, requesting that criminal proceedings be opened against them.","33.The Moskovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office and subsequently the Cheboksary inter-district investigation department of the investigative committee at the Chuvashiya prosecutor\u2019s office refused to open a criminal case into the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment and unlawful deprivation of liberty twenty-four times, pursuant to Article 24\u00a71(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cCCrP\u201d), because none of the elements of the offences provided for in Articles 127, 285, 286, 299 and301 of the Criminal Code (unlawful deprivation of liberty, abuse of powers, criminal prosecution of persons known to be innocent and unlawful arrest and detention respectively) were present in respect of the actions of the police officers. They concluded that the applicant\u2019s allegations could not be confirmed by a pre-investigation inquiry.","34.The pre-investigation inquiry was resumed twenty-three times as the decisions refusing to open a criminal investigation were set aside by higher authorities within the prosecutor\u2019s office and subsequently the investigative committee as unsubstantiated, unlawful or based on an incomplete inquiry.","(i)A refusal on 21 October 2006 was overruled on 5 December 2006 on the grounds, inter alia, that nothing had been done to establish whether there had been a 40 kg weight in office no. 217. Moreover, police officers Ch. and F. had carried out non-investigative actions involving the applicant, a suspect in the criminal case, from 11 p.m. to 5.42 a.m. on the night of 6October 2006, and no assessment of the lawfulness of those actions had been carried out.","(ii)A refusal on 12 December 2006 was overruled on 13December 2006. It was noted that office no. 217 had been inspected and no weights had been found.","(iii)Twenty further decisions refusing to open a criminal case taken between 18 December 2006 and 9 October 2008 were overruled. In particular, a refusal on 22 May 2008 was overruled on 5 June 2008 on the grounds that instructions by the deputy head of the investigative committee of Chuvashiya given on 22November 2007 had still not been fulfilled. A refusal on 16 June 2008 was overruled on 16 June 2008 on the grounds that deficiencies identified by the deputy head of the prosecutor\u2019s office of Chuvashiya on 5December 2006, the Moskovskiy District Court of Cheboksary on 6March 2007 and the Supreme Court of Chuvashiya on 12April 2007 had still not been corrected.","(iv)A refusal on 27 October 2008 was overruled on 28 October 2008 on the grounds that the investigative committee of Chuvashiya acknowledged that investigator S. had been found liable in disciplinary proceedings for stalling the inquiry and issuing unlawful and unsubstantiated decisions based on an incomplete inquiry.","(v)A refusal on 2 December 2008 was upheld by the courts as a result of a review under Article 125 of the CCrP (see paragraph 40 below).","35.In the most recent refusal issued on 2December 2008 investigator A. from the Cheboksary investigative committee found that the applicant, who had been wanted in the theft case, had been arrested and taken to the police station and remained there on suspicion of committing it. His being held in room no. 217 for five hours had been necessary for carrying out operational\u2011search measures. Police officers Ch. and F. had handcuffed him lawfully in order to guard him and prevent him from escaping or harming himself or others. His hospitalisation had made it impossible for him to be arrested as a suspect on 7October 2006. He had been handcuffed in hospital to prevent him from attempting to escape again.","36.The investigator also found that the applicant had jumped out of the window himself in order to flee, without any coercion by the police officers. His allegations that he had been subjected to physical violence had not been confirmed. The investigator stated that injuries other than those to both feet had been found on the applicant at the time of his admission, as set out in the forensic medical expert\u2019s report of 14 December 2006. However, the lack of any detailed description of those injuries in the applicant\u2019s medical records had made it impossible to establish when and how they had been received, in particular whether they had been received as a result of him falling from the first floor or being beaten up.","37.The investigator\u2019s decision of 2 December 2008 referred, inter alia, to statements by police officers Ch. and F. They said that after the applicant\u2019s arrest on 6 October 2006 they had interviewed him in room no.217 about the theft and the murder of G. of which he had been suspected. The applicant had given a partial confession to the theft but had denied murder. He had been convicted of a criminal offence in the past and had tried to escape from a police station by jumping out of a toilet window. The incident had prompted the police to install iron bars on it. In September 2006, after the murder of G., the applicant had been hospitalised for a drug overdose, but had not been arrested because after the hospital had alerted the police he had managed to escape. During the interview on 6October 2008 the applicant, who had been drunk and had smelled of alcohol, had behaved provokingly and insulted them with obscene words. They had therefore handcuffed him (placing his hands in front) to avoid any attempts to escape or commit suicide. At about 5 a.m., as F. had been leaving the room, the applicant had jumped on a table adjacent to an open window and jumped out. Ch. claimed that he had been putting documents into a safe at the time, while F. said that Ch. had been sitting at the table and the applicant had been sitting on a chair near the table immediately before jumping out of the window. Access to the window had been blocked by the table. It had been possible to reach and open it while sitting at the table. They had taken the applicant to hospital and guarded him there to prevent him attempting to flee again.","38.The decision of 2 December 2008 also referred to the applicant\u2019s statements that immediately before his arrest he had been drinking, and to statements by the investigator from the district police and a police officer who had guarded the applicant at the hospital on 9October 2006 that the applicant had allegedly stated off the record that he had jumped out of the window himself trying to flee, without any influence by the police officers. It also relied on statements by duty police officer T. that in the early morning of 7 October 2006 he had seen on a monitor (no video recordings had been made) that somebody had fallen out of the window of the police station. He had been the first to go near the applicant lying on his back with his hands handcuffed to his front. Nothing had been attached to his hands. In his earlier statements set out in the refusal to open a criminal case of 21October 2006, T. explained that at around 5 to 6 a.m. on 7 October 2006 he had seen on a monitor that somebody was lying near the entrance of the police station. Police officers and ambulance staff approached him. T. had not gone near him himself and had neither seen him nor whether there had been any objects near him.","2.Judicial review of the investigating authority\u2019s decisions","39.Refusals of 17February 2007 and 25April 2007, as well as the refusal of 2December 2008, were reviewed by the domestic courts in accordance with Article125 of the CCrP. The applicant\u2019s complaints concerning the two 2007 refusals were allowed. In decisions of 6March and 13 September 2007 the District Court found that they were unlawful and lacked reasoning. The decision of 6 March was upheld on appeal on 12April 2007 by the Supreme Court of Chuvashiya, which noted that it was necessary to assess the lawfulness of the handcuffing and guarding of the applicant in hospital before his detention in the criminal proceedings. The decision of 13September 2007 also found the Moskovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s failure to enforce the District Court\u2019s previous decision of 6March 2007 unlawful.","40.On 3 November 2009 the District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the most recent refusal to open a criminal case, finding that the investigating authorities had carried out all the measures necessary for establishing the relevant facts fully, objectively and thoroughly, and had taken a reasoned decision on the basis of a full and comprehensive inquiry in accordance with the law. On 10 December 2009 the Supreme Court of Chuvashiya upheld that decision on appeal, noting that in disagreeing with the District Court\u2019s findings, the applicant\u2019s representative had misinterpreted the relevant domestic law."],"28670":["6.The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Donetsk.","A.History of the applicant\u2019s conflict with the co-owners of her flat","7.In the end of November2001 the applicant was visited by two unfamiliar men, V.S. and A.N., who offered to buy half of the flat she lived in for 700 United States dollars (USD). It was a one-bedroom flat, measuring 43.3square meters, recently privatised and acquired in equal shares by the applicant and her adult son, Y. The applicant refused to sell her half of the flat. According to her, the price offered was extraordinarily below the market value. In any event, she had no reason to sell the flat, which had been her long-established home for several decades. In response, V.S. and A.N. warned the applicant that she would regret her decision, because Y., (who was married and lived elsewhere), had offered the other half of the flat as a gift to V.S. If the applicant refused to sell her half for the price, which was offered to her, or to exchange it for a smaller flat on the outskirts of the city, V.S. would move into the flat and create intolerable living conditions for her.","8.Subsequently the applicant learned that on 18December 2001 Y. had signed a notarised gift deed in which he transferred his title to half of the flat (which was not as divided into allocated parts of the whole) to V.S.","9.From November 2002 A.N., V.S. and their acquaintances started regularly visiting the applicant\u2019s flat, demanding that she sell. According to the applicant, on numerous occasions they broke the locks, insulted and harassed her and caused damage to her property. Subsequently a part and then the entire of V.S.\u2019s share in the flat was formally acquired by A.N. as a gift, whose value amounted to 5,602 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) according to the gift certificates. However, irrespective of this transfer, A.N. and V.S. continued to act in concordance in demanding the applicant move out and sell her share.","10.For instance, on 23November 2002 A.N. and V.S. broke the locks on the entrance door when the applicant was away, entered the flat and, upon the applicant\u2019s arrival, reiterated their demands that she sell her share. As the applicant protested against their presence in the flat and their overall conduct, a conflict emerged, in the course of which A.N. hit the applicant in the chest inflicting a bruise and causing soft tissue swelling.","11.On 26November 2002 A.N., V.S. and several strangers broke into the applicant\u2019s flat again. As they were irritated by the barking of the applicant\u2019s dog, V.S. started kicking her and chased her out. Subsequently the applicant found her dog\u2019s dead body in a garbage container.","12.Also on an unspecified date in November 2002 V.S. arrived in the flat after 11p.m. (when the applicant was already asleep) and opened the balcony door, holding it open for some four hours notwithstanding the freezing temperature outside. In response to the applicant\u2019s subsequent reprimands, he explained that he wished for her to catch a cold as she had been disagreeable.","13.On 15December 2002, when the applicant\u2019s daughter was visiting the applicant, V.S. arrived in the flat again. A conflict emerged, in the course of which V.S. hit the applicant on the head and stomach, inflicting concussion and blunt trauma of the abdominal wall. He also hit the applicant\u2019s daughter on the head and other parts of the body, inflicting cerebral concussion and bruising of legs and arms. As a result of the conflict, the applicant and her daughter had to seek medical assistance for their injuries and the applicant received inpatient hospital treatment.","14.Subsequently V.S. and A.N. started installing in the flat from two to six strangers without the applicant\u2019s consent. These tenants, mostly young males, behaved in a discourteous way. In particular, they organised loud parties; frivolously used, damaged and stole the applicant\u2019s belongings; created insanitary conditions; carelessly used electricity, gas and appliances, frequently left the entrance door open, and ignored requests to contribute towards the maintenance charges on the flat.","15.On numerous occasions the applicant attempted to drive the tenants away or to call them to order. Her efforts resulted in conflicts, in the course of which she was harassed and intimidated. Her attempts to replace the locks on the entrance doors to prevent unauthorised entry into the flat resulted in them being broken and in the tenants, who frequently changed, moving in again, in spite of her discontent. As she was unable to withstand such living conditions and was afraid for her life and limb, the applicant effectively moved out, contending herself with odd living arrangements. However, she paid short visits to the flat regularly, to supervise the situation.","16.In the beginning of June 2003 V.S. drove his car onto the footpath, where the applicant was standing waiting for a bus, scaring and nearly hitting her.","17.On 11July 2003 at about 9.20a.m. V.S. again arrived in the flat, when the applicant was in it, and demanded that she surrender her share. A conflict emerged, in the course of which V.S. punched the applicant in the stomach, causing her physical pain.","18.On three further occasions (30July 2004, 5 August and 1December 2005) the applicant was severely beaten by V.S., twice accompanied by his acquaintance A.L. The applicant suffered physical pain and bruising. On 30July 2005, in addition to that, she also sustained a second concussion, which necessitated inpatient treatment.","19.On various dates the applicant learned that A.N. and V.S. had also acquired ownership of shares in numerous other flats in Donetsk and that they had behaved similarly with the co-owners of these flats, inducing them to sell their shares on unfavourable terms.","B.The applicant\u2019s action for rescission of the gift deed (first set of civil proceedings)","20.On 16 October 2003 the Voroshylivsky district prosecutor instituted civil proceedings on the applicant\u2019s behalf, seeking rescission of the gift deed between Y. and V.S. and the eviction of the latter on the grounds that the gift deed had been executed without the applicant\u2019s consent.","21.On 12 November 2003 the Voroshylivsky District Court of Donetsk (hereafter \u201cthe Voroshylivsky Court\u201d) allowed this claim, having found, in particular, that Article113 of the Civil Code of Ukraine of 1963 did not authorise the transfer of title to a part of shared property, which had not been divided into allocated parts and that it also obliged co-owners of a shared property to seek the consent of their counterparts before carrying out transactions in it.","22.On 5February 2004 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal (hereinafter \u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) quashed this judgment following an appeal by the applicants\u2019 opponent and dismissed the prosecutor\u2019s claim, having found that, unlike in the case of selling part of a shared property, giving it as a gift to a third party did not require the co-owners\u2019 consent.","23.On 10 August 2004 the Supreme Court of Ukraine dismissed the applicant\u2019s and the prosecutor\u2019s requests for leave to appeal in cassation against the Regional Court\u2019s judgment. The judgment became final.","C.The applicant\u2019s action with a view to dispossessing V.S. and A.N. and rescinding their right of occupancy of the flat (second set of civil proceedings)","24.On 5October 2004 the applicant instituted civil proceedings seeking the dispossession of V.S. (joined by A.N., when he acquired part of V.S.\u2019s share and replaced by him, when he acquired the entire share), of his share in the flat, regard being had to his unlawful conduct towards her, the impossibility of joint use of the flat, and his refusal to pay his share of the maintenance costs. She further sought a judicial rescission of their right to occupy the flat and compensation for the costs she had borne on the flat with their shares. The defendants lodged a counterclaim, alleging, in particular, that the applicant had been interfering with their personal life and belongings, provoking conflicts, harassing them and creating intolerable living conditions, which made it impossible for them to fulfil their desire to settle in the flat. They sought damages from the applicant for this conduct and demanded that the flat be divided into allocated parts.","25.On 21 June 2005 the District Court allowed the applicant\u2019s claim in part and dismissed her opponents\u2019 counterclaim. In particular, referring to Article365 of the new Civil Code of Ukraine of 2003, it ordered the dispossession of A.N. (by then the owner of half the flat) of his share against payment by the applicant of compensation in the amount of UAH5,602. The court noted, in particular, that there was extensive evidence that the defendants had allowed numerous strangers to live in the flat; that the applicant had been harassed; and that the flat\u2019s appliances and the applicant\u2019s belongings had been misused and damaged. It further concluded that, regard being had to the flat\u2019s size and layout, it was not possible for the co-owners to use it jointly in a harmonious manner or to have it reasonably divided into two independent halves for each of them to use separately. At the same time, A.N.\u2019s dispossession in return for fair compensation would not put him at a substantial disadvantage, since he had another registered residence and predominantly used the disputed flat for subletting to other persons. The court next found that, since A.N. had received the flat as a gift, fair compensation would be the payment of the indicative price (UAH 5,602) declared by the parties as that share\u2019s value in the latest gift deeds. Finally, the court found that A.N. and V.S. had no longer any right to occupy the flat and ordered partial reimbursement of the maintenance costs incurred by the applicant on the flat.","26.On 20 October 2005 the Regional Court, having reviewed the case on appeal by the applicant\u2019s opponents, upheld the judgment with respect to the reimbursement of the costs borne on the flat by the applicant and the revocation of V.S.\u2019s right to occupy it, as he no longer owned any share in the flat. It then quashed the ruling to dispossess A.N., having noted that, according to the expert assessment, the market value of the disputed flat had been appraised at UAH 147,756, which meant that value of half the flat had been UAH 73,878. The court further stated that the applicant\u2019s claim for dispossession of A.N. and revocation of his right of occupancy had not been based on any legal provision. The relevant part of the judgment read as follows:","\u201cNeither the provisions of the Housing Code of Ukraine nor those of the Civil Code of Ukraine of 2003, which the applicant cites as the basis for her claims, nor the Property Law of Ukraine, envisage dispossession of the owner of his or her property and his or her eviction from a flat owned by him or her on the grounds cited by the applicant.\u201d","27.The applicant appealed in cassation. She noted, in particular, that A.N. and V.S. had acquired shares in a number of Donetsk flats and had deliberately created intolerable living conditions for their co-owners in order to obtain the flats in their entirety on terms grossly unfavourable to the other co-owners. She further alleged that, having no other residence and being a victim of constant harassment, she had abandoned the flat and had been requesting refuge from various acquaintances.","28.On 2December 2005 the district prosecutor also lodged a cassation appeal on the applicant\u2019s behalf, in which he corroborated her submissions that the defendants had been harassing her, had been using the flat in bad faith and had forced the applicant, a senior lady, to leave the dwelling she had occupied for many years. He also alleged that the sum proposed by the applicant in compensation for the defendants\u2019 share in the flat had been fair, as it had been equal to the flat\u2019s value indicated in the gift deeds on the basis of which A.N. had received the disputed share.","29.On 11 January 2006 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant\u2019s request for leave to appeal.","30.On 22 January 2006 it likewise rejected the prosecutor\u2019s request for leave to appeal and the Regional Court\u2019s judgment became final.","D.The applicant\u2019s complaints to the law-enforcement authorities and criminal proceedings against A.N., V.S. and A.L.","31.On numerous occasions between 2002 and 2007 the applicant complained to the Voroshylivsky district police in Donetsk (\u201cthe district police\u201d) about various instances of verbal and physical harassment, damage to and taking of her property and attempts by V.S. and A.N. to extort her share in the flat.","32.On various dates police officers arrived in the applicant\u2019s flat in response to her calls for help. They examined the situation, questioned the applicant and her opponents, and subsequently refused to institute criminal proceedings (in particular, 22 January, 7 February and 24 December 2002; 22and 24 January, 22 February, 5 and 22 March, 15 July, 30 August, 18September, 12, 16 and 24 October, 4, 15 and 19 November and 5December 2003; 1 June, 3 and 9 August and 15 November 2004, 20January, 23 July, 6 August, 19 November, 13 and 28 December 2005; and 4 and 31 March and 16 and 27 July 2006). In their refusals, the police noted that the prosecution of A.N., V.S. and their acquaintances was unwarranted since the relevant facts disclosed the existence of a chronic domestic conflict between lawful occupants of a flat, who attempted to engage the police in resolving their private disagreements. The hostilities took place inside the household and did not breach the public peace. Both parties had accused each other of provoking conflict and it was not evident, which party had in fact assaulted the other and which had acted out of self\u2011defence. In any event, during these conflicts the applicant had sustained no serious damage to her health and had not presented any evidence that her belongings had in fact been taken or damaged by the accused individuals. It was not possible to exclude that she had falsified the disappearance of her belongings in order to compromise the unwanted tenants. The police further recommended that the applicant resolve the dispute concerning the use of the flat in civil proceedings and assured her that \u201cpre-emptive conversations\u201d had been had with the purported offenders to foster respectful conduct on their part. On several occasions the police had issued official warnings to them, advising them of the impermissibility of antisocial behaviour.","33.On 30 January 2003 the prosecutor\u2019s office quashed a decision not to institute criminal proceedings in connection with the injuries caused to the applicant on 15December2002. On several occasions the applicant enquired about the status of these proceedings and received no reply. In 2006 the applicant was informed that the investigation had been suspended.","34.On 19October2005 the head of the district police instructed his officers to place the applicant\u2019s flat on the police register for frequent visits with a view to preventing any offences and infringements of applicable law. He noted, in particular, that the investigations had confirmed the applicant\u2019s allegations concerning A.N.\u2019s and V.S.\u2019s disruptive conduct. In particular, it had been established that they had been allowing numerous tenants to live in the co-owned flat, who had brought it into a decrepit and insanitary state. The persons who had been occupying the flat had also taken the applicant\u2019s personal belongings without her authorisation and had used her furniture, equipment and appliances in a careless manner, as a result of which these objects were deteriorating. Moreover, these persons had interfered with the applicant\u2019s ability to access the flat by changing the locks and thus effectively precluding her from living there. He also acknowledged that numerous pre-emptive conversations and warnings given by the police had not brought about any improvements.","35.On several other occasions (in particular, 28 February 2006, 4September 2006, 19 February 2007 and 6 March 2007) the Ministry of the Interior in Donetsk acknowledged, in response to the applicant\u2019s further complaints, that her allegations concerning A.N.\u2019s and his associates\u2019 interference with her home had some basis. They further assured the applicant that her address had been placed on the police register for frequent visits.","36.On 18 July 2006 the applicant lodged a private criminal complaint against V.S., A.N. and A.L. with the Voroshylivsky Court. Relying on Articles 125 and 126 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, she alleged that the defendants had systematically beaten and verbally harassed her. In this respect the applicant referred to the incidents of 23 November and 15December 2002, 30 July 2004 and 5 August 2005 (see paragraphs 10, 13 and 18 above). She also submitted that, in her view, these incidents had to be approached not as isolated instances of ill-treatment, but as episodes of systematic and premeditated criminal conduct by an organised criminal association functioning with a view to extorting flats from Donetsk residents. She submitted that the same individuals had engaged in similar conduct vis\u2011\u00e0-vis a number of other co-owners of properties in the city. Accordingly, she requested the District Court\u2019s assistance in transmitting her complaints to the public law-enforcement authorities with a view to instituting criminal proceedings concerning extortion and coercion.","37.On various dates five other residents of Donetsk joined the proceedings, alleging that the same defendants had acquired shares in their flats and had been pressurising and terrorising them with a view to extorting the remaining shares.","38.On 19 December 2006 Judge M. of the Voroshylivsky Court decided that the applicant\u2019s and other complainants\u2019 allegations disclosed an appearance that serious crimes, warranting institution of public criminal proceedings, had been committed. Accordingly, the judge instituted criminal proceedings on suspicion of fraud, extortion, coercion, circumvention of the law and several other crimes, and transferred the case to the Donetsk regional prosecutor for investigation.","39.On 24 January 2007 the prosecutor\u2019s office appealed against this decision, alleging that applicable law did not authorise judges to institute public criminal proceedings in the above circumstances.","40.On 27 March 2007 the Regional Court upheld the prosecutor\u2019s office\u2019s appeal and returned the case to the Voroshylivsky Court to be examined by another judge with respect to the complaints which could be addressed in private prosecution proceedings.","41.Subsequently (23 August 2007) Judge P. of the Voroshylivsky Court returned the applicant\u2019s and other complainants\u2019 submissions without examination. She found that the injured parties had failed to comply with the rules on territorial jurisdiction and with other unspecified procedural requirements.","42.On 26 July 2007 the regional police instituted criminal proceedings in respect of a complaint about extortion lodged by a certain A.C., who had allegedly been forced to abandon her flat on account of the intolerable living conditions created by the co-owners of her flat.","43.On 15 August 2007 the police joined the applicant\u2019s complaints concerning extortion to the aforementioned criminal proceedings.","44.On the same date A.N., V.S. and A.L. were arrested and placed in custody.","45.On various further dates complaints by eleven other individuals relating to the same persons\u2019 misconduct were joined to the proceedings.","46.On 29 December 2007 deputy head of the regional prosecutor\u2019s office signed the bill of indictment in respect of A.N., V.S. and A.L. charging them, in particular, under Article189\u00a74 of the Criminal Code, with extorting property in an organised group and transferring the case to the Kyivskiy District Court of Donetsk (hereafter \u201cthe Kyivskiy Court\u201d) for trial.","47.On various dates in 2008 the defendants were released from custody pending trial.","48.On 24 May 2011 the Kyivskiy Court acquitted all the defendants of the charges under Article189 of the Criminal Code. It noted, in particular, as follows:","\u201c... The court comes to a conclusion that the basis of the present criminal proceedings is the existence of a private-law dispute between the defendants and the injured parties concerning the use of shared property, which the injured parties demand to resolve by way of criminal proceedings in view of their extremely antagonistic relationship with the defendants.\u201d","49.On 27 February 2012 the Regional Court quashed this verdict on appeal by the prosecution and the injured parties and remitted the case for retrial.","50.On 17 April 2012 the defendants were rearrested and placed in custody.","51.On 12 October 2012 the Kyivskiy Court found that all the defendants were guilty of extortion under Article 189\u00a74 and sentenced them to eleven, ten and eight years\u2019 imprisonment respectively. It also ordered the confiscation of all their personal property. The court found, in particular, that the case-file contained sufficient evidence that the episodes of the applicant\u2019s harassment (listed in paragraphs 10, 12-13 and 16\u201118 above) had indeed taken place. It also awarded the applicant UAH35,273.47 in pecuniary and UAH30,000 in non-pecuniary damage to be paid jointly and separately by the defendants.","52.On 6 March 2013, following an appeal by the defendants, the Regional Court upheld this verdict on appeal concerning all points, except one episode unrelated to the applicant\u2019s case.","53.On 18 September 2014 the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court rejected the cassation appeals lodged by A.N. and V.S.","58.In its Recommendation Rec(2002)5 of 30 April 2002 on the protection of women against violence, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe stated, inter alia, that member States should introduce, develop and\/or improve where necessary national policies against violence based on maximum safety and protection of victims, support and assistance, adjustment of the criminal and civil law, raising of public awareness, training for professionals confronted with violence against women and prevention.","59.The Recommendation also stated that member States should ensure that all victims of violence are able to institute proceedings, make provisions to ensure that criminal proceedings can be initiated by the public prosecutor, encourage prosecutors to regard violence against women as an aggravating or decisive factor in deciding whether or not to prosecute in the public interest, and ensure where necessary that measures are taken to protect victims effectively against threats and possible acts of revenge."],"28671":["5.The applicant was born in 1977 and is currently serving a life sentence in Ladyzhynska prison no. 39.","A.Criminal proceedings against the applicant and his alleged ill\u2011treatment by the police","6.In the evening on 17 August 2005 the applicant arrived from Sumy, where he lived, to Kyiv. Shortly thereafter, at 21.20 p.m., while still being at the railway station, he was arrested on suspicion of two counts of murder and robbery committed earlier that month in Sumy. Some items belonging to the victims were found in his luggage.","7.The applicant stated in his application that no coercive measures had been applied to him during or after his arrest on 17 August 2005. He also noted that immediately after his arrest he had been brought to the local police station, where the officer on duty had examined him and had drawn up a report about his injuries in the presence of two attested witnesses. The report stated that the applicant had abrasions on his back and stomach.","8.The applicant spent the night at the police station, without any investigative measures undertaken.","9.On 18 August 2005 three police officers, who had arrived from Sumy, transported the applicant to that city (340km from Kyiv) in their vehicle.","10.The applicant\u2019s account of the subsequent events is as follows. He was handcuffed and had one of his ankles shackled in a tight manner. When he protested, one of the officers hit him several times in the stomach. The police stopped their car in a forest, made him go out and subjected him to cruel ill-treatment with a view to extracting his confession to the investigated criminal offences. Theapplicant maintained that he had only witnessed the offences in question, whereas those were his acquaintances, A. and Se., who had committed them. The police officers severely beat him all over his body. Subsequently they undressed him, stuffed his mouth with earth and grass, and raped him with a wooden stick. The applicant urinated involuntarily. He conceded to all their requirements. After a pause, during which the officers drank alcohol, while the applicant stayed in the car with the driver, they made him \u201crehearse\u201d his confessions. They insisted that he should plead guilty without mentioning the involvement of anybody else.","11.The police car arrived at the Kovpakivskyy police station in Sumy at about 6 p.m. on 18 August 2005.","12.According to the case-file materials, on 18 August 2005, at 6.20p.m., the applicant\u2019s arrest was reported and his rights of a criminal suspect were explained to him.","13.On the same day, at 7 p.m., a forensic medical expert (a woman), acting at the investigator\u2019s instruction, examined the applicant, who was naked. She finalised the examination report on 16 September 2005, in which she documented the following injuries: abruise measuring 2 x 1 cm in the applicant\u2019s left temple, another bruise of about the same size on the right part of his head, a6x0.2cm bruise and abrasion under his right eye, a horizontal linear abrasion on the right part of his torso measuring 3 x0.6cm, a bruise of 2 x 1 cm and a vertical linear abrasion measuring 18x 3 cm on his left thigh. Furthermore, there were linear abrasions up to 1cm wide around both wrists of the applicant. The applicant explained the origin of his injuries as follows: upon his arrival to Kyiv some unknown persons had beaten him up at about 9 p.m. at the railway station. The expert stated that the injuries in question had been inflicted \u201cby blunt hard objects\u201d and that the applicant could have sustained them at the time he indicated. Lastly, the injuries were evaluated as insignificant.","14.The applicant submitted that the expert had not reported all his injuries and that he had not dared to complain to her of his ill-treatment, firstly, because of the presence of the officers in question during his examination and, secondly, because he had been ashamed in front of a woman.","15.As indicated by the applicant in his application form and confirmed by the case-file materials, from 7.20 to 10.50p.m. on 18August 2005 he was questioned in respect of and confessed to one count of murder (of MsCh.), in the presence of a lawyer, Mr M., appointed for him by the investigator. More specifically, he submitted that Ms Ch. had been his acquaintance, he had met her by chance near a forest, they had had a conflict and he had killed her with a knife that had fallen out of her picnic bag. The applicant also stated that he had taken the victim\u2019s jewelleries and mobile phone and had sold them.","16.Furthermore, according to the applicant\u2019s account submitted in his application form, his questioning had started before and continued during his medical examination, in the presence of many police officers including those who had ill-treated him. He also alleged that he had not had the possibility to talk in private to the lawyer, who, in any event, had not shown any interest in the case and had remained passive.","17.In his reply to the Government\u2019s observations on the admissibility and merits of the application, the applicant submitted a different version of the events: that his first questioning had actually taken place on 19August 2005 and that its report had wrongly been dated 18August 2005.","18.The applicant was placed in the Sumy Temporary Detention Facility (\u201cthe Sumy ITT\u201d, a part of the police infrastructure), in which he was detained until his transfer to the Sumy Pre-Trial Detention Centre (\u201cthe Sumy SIZO\u201d) on 7 October 2005.","19.On an unspecified date the administration of the Sumy ITT issued an information note about the meetings the applicant had with police officers. It appears that two of the officers, who had convoyed him from Kyiv to Sumy and whom he accused of his ill-treatment, visited him in the ITT on seven occasions during the period from 18 August to 7 October 2005.","20.On 19 August 2005, during the crime reconstruction, the applicant reiterated his confession to MsCh.\u2019s murder and the theft of her belongings.","21.On the same date the applicant was questioned, in the presence of his lawyer Mr M., in respect of another count of murder, of Ms S. (some household appliances from her flat and her husband\u2019s military identity card had been found in the applicant\u2019s luggage following his arrest on 17August 2005 \u2013 see paragraph 6 above).","22.On 27 and 30 August 2005 the applicant reiterated his confessions. During his questioning on the last-mentioned date he, however, modified his account of the events as regards the murder of Ms Ch. He submitted that he had in fact used his own butterfly-type knife, which he had bought at a market in July that year.","23.On 1 September 2005 a reconstruction of the criminal offences was carried out, during which the applicant maintained his confessions, in the presence of his lawyer.","24.According to the applicant, on 28 September 2005 his lawyer and the investigator had an informal conversation with him. They requested him to tell them the truth regarding his role in the criminal offences under the investigation. By that time the applicant had written seven \u201cpleas of guilt\u201d, but, as his interlocutors had supposedly stated, none of them appeared convincing. The applicant complained of his ill-treatment and submitted that he was remaining under the constant pressure on the part of the police officers concerned. The investigator promised him to take measures to protect him.","25.During his questioning on 30 September 2005 the applicant retracted his earlier confessions as obtained under duress. He stated that he had only been a witness of the crimes and that the murders had been committed by other persons, A. and Se., who had later forced him to sell the property belonging to the victims. The applicant indicated those persons\u2019 first names and physical description.","26.Two police officers implicated in the alleged ill-treatment of the applicant visited him in the SIZO (where he had been transferred from the ITT on 7 October 2005) on 18, 22 and 30 November 2005. They allegedly continued putting pressure on him, to which the investigator failed to react.","27.On 31 January 2006 the investigator in charge of the applicant\u2019s criminal case was replaced.","28.On an unspecified date in January 2006 Mr M. allegedly admitted in his conversation with the applicant\u2019s mother that he was under pressure and was not therefore in a position to duly defend her son\u2019s rights.","29.On 6 February 2006 the applicant started to be represented by Ms S., a lawyer contracted by his mother, instead of the appointed lawyer Mr M.","30.On 13 February 2006 the formal charges of two counts of murder for profit and aggravated robbery were brought against the applicant. During his questioning on that date the applicant stated once again that his initial confessions had been the result of his ill-treatment by the police officers who had ensured his transfer from Kyiv to Sumy on 18 August 2005 (see paragraphs 9 and 10 above).","31.On 15 February 2006 an investigator of the Sumy Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant\u2019s complaint of ill-treatment by the police officers for the lack of corpus delicti in their actions. It was noted in the decision that the applicant had raised that complaint for the first time during his questioning on 13February 2006. The officers concerned denied the veracity of his allegations. One of them submitted that the applicant had voluntarily decided to confess to the criminal offences in question during his transfer from Kyiv to Sumy. Although the applicant had some injuries, he had himself explained that he had sustained them during a conflict with unidentified persons prior to his arrest.","32.On 21 March 2006 the above decision was sent to the applicant with a note that he could challenge it before a court within seven days of the date of its receipt. The applicant did not, however, appeal against that decision. According to him, he intended to raise the complaint of his ill-treatment during his trial as his lawyer had advised him.","33.On 12 May 2006 the Sumy Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Sumy Court\u201d) sitting as a court of first instance found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to life-term imprisonment with confiscation of all his property. The court relied on the applicant\u2019s confessions made during the pre-trial investigation as eventually modified by him (see paragraph22 above). It noted certain factual inconsistencies in his statements, but considered them insignificant. The court also took into account the forensic and material evidence in the case. Namely, it could not be ruled out that the blood discovered under Ms Ch.\u2019s fingernails could have originated from the applicant. Nor could it be excluded that the applicant had smoked the cigarettes found at the crime scene in Ms S.\u2019s flat. Furthermore, certain items belonging to the victims had been discovered on him or sold by him to other persons, which he did not contest.","34.The applicant had requested the court to summon a number of witnesses, who might have seen him in a local bar together with A. and Se. or who might have been able to identify those persons. The court called numerous witnesses indicated by the applicant, but not all of them. Those heard by the court could not identify the persons described by the applicant.","35.The trial court examined and dismissed as unfounded the applicant\u2019s allegation of his ill-treatment by the police. It noted that although some injuries had been detected on him following his arrest, he had himself explained their origin as resulting from his beating by unknown persons. Furthermore, he had stated in writing that he had no complaints against the police. Lastly, the court noted that the applicant had complained for the first time about his ill-treatment only on 13 February 2006. It relied on the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 15 February 2006 not to initiate criminal proceedings against the police, which the applicant could but had not challenged.","36.On the same date the Sumy Court also issued a separate ruling criticising the applicant\u2019s delayed transfer from the Sumy ITT to the SIZO (see paragraph 18 above). It noted that instead of the legally established maximum of three days the applicant had been detained in the ITT for three weeks.","37.Both the applicant and the lawyer acting on his behalf appealed against the conviction, arguing principally that the applicant\u2019s guilt had not been proven (there had been no sufficient material evidence and the statements of the applicant and of the witnesses had been inconsistent) and that the conviction was based on the applicant\u2019s statements obtained under duress. They also argued that the court had not allowed the applicant\u2019s requests to summon a witness who had been acquainted with the supposed murderers and that the statements of several witnesses who had allegedly seen those persons had not been attached sufficient weight.","38.On 17 August 2006 the Supreme Court partly changed the reasoning of the verdict, having upheld, on the whole, the findings of the first-instance court and the applicant\u2019s sentence. The Supreme Court noted that the applicant\u2019s complaints of ill-treatment were unsubstantiated and that they had been rejected by the prosecutor\u2019s decision against which the applicant had failed to lodge an appeal. The Supreme Court also noted that the applicant\u2019s allegation about other persons\u2019 responsibility for the crimes had been duly examined at the pre-trial stage and during the trial and that it was unsubstantiated.","39.On 9 April 2007 the applicant was transferred from the SIZO to Ladyzhynska prison no. 39 to serve his sentence.","B.Other relevant facts","40.On 31 January 2007 the Registry of the Court acknowledged receipt of the completed application form from the applicant. By the same letter it requested him to specify whether he had appealed against the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 15February 2006 and to provide a copy of his cassation appeal, as well as any other documents in substantiation of his complaints under Article 6 \u00a7 3 (c) and (d) of the Convention.","41.On 31 May 2007 the applicant informed the Court that he had not challenged the decision in question. He also sent a copy of the cassation appeals against his conviction lodged by him personally and by his lawyer.","42.On 6 July 2007 the Registry wrote to the applicant that his case was ready for examination by the Court and that he would be informed about the subsequent procedures in due time.","43.The applicant submitted numerous supplements to his application. He provided, in particular, extensive details as regards the conditions of his detention in the pre-trial detention facilities in Sumy (the ITT and the SIZO). Subsequently the Court declared those complaints inadmissible (see paragraph 4 above). As regards the applicant\u2019s conditions of detention in Ladyzhynska prison no. 39, the submissions before the Court are confined to the following two letters from the applicant\u2019s mother.","44.On 24 November 2009 the Registry received a letter from the applicant\u2019s mother (who represented him at the time) of an unspecified date, in which she submitted that her son was in a desperate situation in prison being subjected to constant beatings and humiliations. She noted that he had been \u201cplaced in a cell without light for seven days\u201d and that he \u201chad been wearing a winter hat whereas the temperature was about 30\u00baC\u201d.","45.On 10 October 2011 another letter from the applicant\u2019s mother was received, in which she submitted that the conditions of his detention in the prison amounted to his \u201cconstant torture\u201d. In substantiation, she enclosed an incomplete photocopy of the applicant\u2019s letter to her dated 9August 2011. The applicant had complained to his mother about poor conditions in the prison, about his harassment by the guards and about having had to share his cell with an inmate, with whom he had a conflict. He had also written that he had cut his left wrist as a protest and that no adequate medical care had been provided to him in that regard."],"28680":["5.The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Athens.","6.While studying in Turkey (1994-1999) the applicant had become a pro-communist and pro\u2011Kurdish political activist. In 1997 he opened a literary caf\u00e9, which was frequented by individuals favourable to such a political stance. In 2000 the Turkish police arrested the applicant, and he was prosecuted for infringing State constitutional order (Article 146 of the Turkish Criminal Code). The applicant was also held in the \u201cwhite (isolation)cells\u201d in Kandra Prison. He went on hunger strike for 171 days, causing him to develop Wernicke-Korsakoff syndrome, a pathology which can cause irreversible damage to health and prove fatal. Given the threat to the applicant\u2019s life, the Turkish authorities decided to release him.","7.In 2002 the applicant fled to Greece, where he submitted an asylum application on 15 January 2002. On 18 February 2002 the General Secretary of the Ministry of Public Order, adjudicating at first instance, rejected that application, giving summary reasons.","8.On 21 March 2002 the applicant appealed to the Ministry of Public Order against that decision. On 29 January 2003, having been summoned to attend the Advisory Board on Asylum, he presented the latter with a number of documents showing that he had suffered torture in Turkey on account of his political opinions, including a medical report drawn up by the Greek Medical Centre for the Rehabilitation of Torture Victims and an Amnesty International document. On the same day the Advisory Board on Asylum issued a favourable opinion in respect of the applicant.","9.Further to that favourable opinion, under Article 3\u00a75 of Presidential Decree No. 61\/1999 (on the procedure for the examination of asylum applications), the Minister for Public Order should have taken a decision within twenty-four hours on whether or not to grant the applicant international protection. However, by the date on which the application was referred to the Court, the Minister had not taken any decision and therefore had neither ratified nor rejected the Board\u2019s opinion.","10.Between 2003 and 2015 the applicant lived in Athens and attended the police station every six months in order to renew his asylum-seeker\u2019s card. Under domestic law that card did not constitute a residence permit and therefore did not secure all the attendant rights: it only allowed the asylum-seeker not to be expelled and to reside in the national territory with \u201ctolerated status\u201d while his application was being examined. More specifically, under domestic law the asylum-seeker was not entitled to engage in an occupation, undertake vocational training, marry, obtain a driving licence, hold a bank account or apply for family reunion.","11.In 2003, while he was living in Athens, the applicant was joined by his wife from Turkey. However, her presence in Greece only became lawful in 2008, when she obtained a short-term work permit. In 2010 the couple had a son. In 2011 the applicant\u2019s wife returned to Istanbul with the child owing to health problems. The couple divorced in 2012.","12.Meanwhile, on 5 August 2005, the Turkish Interpol Office had issued an extradition request in respect of the applicant. That request had been based on accusations similar to those used in 2000 which had been assessed by the Greek authorities during the examination of his asylum application.","13.On 12 March 2013 the applicant was arrested in Patras. On 26 March 2013 the indictment division of Patras Court of Appeal examined the extradition request and unanimously decided to reject it. The division based its decision on the risk run by the applicant of suffering ill-treatment on account of his political opinions, should he be extradited. It further noted that the nature of the offences for which extradition had been requested had only been described vaguely and abstractly in the request submitted by the Turkish authorities.","...","14.On 27March 2013 the public prosecutor appealed to the Court of Cassation against the decision of the indictment division of Patras Court of Appeal.","15.On 26 April 2013 the Court of Cassation upheld the impugned decision.","16. The applicant had meanwhile been actively seeking to secure a final decision. He had written to the Ombudsman of the Republic on 21 March and 25 June 2012, and to the Minister for Public Order on 19November 2013, 16 June 2014 and 27 February 2015.","17.Furthermore, it emerged from correspondence among a number of different authorities (between police authorities and between the police and other authorities) on 23February 2007, 16 October 2012, 14November 2012 and 28January 2015, that the applicant\u2019s asylum application was still pending before the Minister for Public Order.","..."],"28790":["5.The applicants were born in 1996 and 1995 respectively. At the time of the introduction of the application the two applicants were detained in Safi Barracks Detention Centre, Safi, Malta.","A.Background to the case","1.Mr Burhaan Abdullahi Elmi (the first applicant)","6.Mr Burhaan Abdullahi Elmi entered Malta in an irregular manner by boat on 16 August 2012. Upon arrival, he was registered by the immigration police and given an identification number (12U-029). During the registration process the immigration authorities asked the applicant to provide his personal details, including name, nationality, and age. He informed them that he was born in 1996 and therefore was sixteen years old. The Government claimed that he was seventeen years old. Although no interpreter was present the applicant was helped by some other irregular immigrants who had arrived with him and who could speak English.","7.He was then presented with two documents in English, one containing a Return Decision and the other a Removal Order. The Return Decision stated that he was a prohibited immigrant by virtue of Article5 of the Immigration Act (Chapter 217 of the Laws of Malta) because he was in Malta \u201cwithout means of subsistence and liable to become a charge on public funds\u201d. The Return Decision also informed the first applicant that his stay was being terminated and of the possibility to apply for a period of voluntary departure. The Removal Order was based on the consideration that the applicant\u2019s request for a period of voluntary departure had been rejected. It informed him that he would remain in custody until removal was affected and that an entry ban would be issued against him. The two documents further informed him of the right to appeal against the Decision and Order before the Immigration Appeals Board (\u201cthe IAB\u201d) within three working days.","8.The first applicant claimed that the contents of the decision in English were not explained to him, and that he could not understand the language. According to the Government, in practice the immigration police inform the migrants verbally in English about their right to appeal, and the migrants translate for each other.","9.He was further provided with an information leaflet entitled \u201cYour entitlements, responsibilities and obligations while in detention\u201d in Arabic, a language he did not understand. According to the Government the first applicant did not request a booklet in another language.","10.In accordance with Article 14 (2) of the Immigration Act (see Relevant domestic law), the first applicant was detained. He was originally detained in Warehouse 2 at Safi Barracks, and in 2013 was moved to BlockB.","2.Mr Cabdulaahi Aweys Abubakar (the second applicant)","11.Mr Cabdulaahi Aweys Abubakar entered Malta in an irregular manner by boat on 31 August 2012. Upon arrival, he was registered by the immigration police and given an identification number (12W-062). During the registration process the immigration authorities asked the second applicant to provide his personal details, including name, nationality, and age. He informed them that he was born in 1995 and therefore was seventeen years old.","12.He was then presented with two documents in English, one containing a Return Decision and the other a Removal Order. The Return Decision stated that he was a prohibited immigrant by virtue of Article5 of the Immigration Act (Chapter 217 of the Laws of Malta) because he was in Malta \u201cwithout means of subsistence and liable to become a charge on public funds\u201d and \u201cwithout leave granted by the principal Immigration Officer\u201d. The Return Decision also informed the second applicant that his stay was being terminated and of the possibility to apply for a period of voluntary departure. The Removal Order was based on the consideration that the applicant\u2019s request for a period of voluntary departure had been rejected. It informed him that he would remain in custody until removal was affected and that an entry ban would be issued against him. The two documents further informed him of the right to appeal against the Decision and Order before the Immigration Appeals Board (\u201cthe IAB\u201d) within three working days.","13.The second applicant claimed that the contents of the decision in English were not explained to him, and that he could not understand the language. According to the Government, in practice the immigration police inform the migrants verbally in English about their right to appeal, and the migrants translate for each other.","14.He was further provided with an information leaflet entitled \u201cYour entitlements, responsibilities and obligations while in detention\u201d in Arabic, a language he did not understand. According to the Government the second applicant did not request a booklet in another language.","15.In accordance with Article 14 (2) of the Immigration Act (see Relevant domestic law), the second applicant was detained. He was originally detained in Warehouse 2 at Safi Barracks and in January 2013 was moved to Block B.","B.Asylum proceedings","1.Mr Burhaan Abdullahi Elmi","16.A few days following Mr Burhaan Abdullahi Elmi\u2019s arrival he was called for an information session provided by the Staff of the Office of the Refugee Commissioner. He was assisted in submitting the Preliminary Questionnaire (PQ), thereby registering his wish to apply for asylum under Article 8 of the Refugees Act, Chapter 420 of the Laws of Malta (see Relevant domestic law, below). He stated on the form that he was sixteen years old.","2.Mr Cabdulaahi Aweys Abubakar","17.A few days following Mr Cabdulaahi Aweys Abubakar\u2019s arrival he was called for an information session provided by the Staff of the Office of the Refugee Commissioner. He was assisted in submitting the PQ, thereby registering his wish to apply for asylum. He stated on the form that he was born in 1995 and was seventeen years old.","C.The AWAS Age-Assessment Procedure","1.Mr Burhaan Abdullahi Elmi","18.In Mr Burhaan Abdullahi Elmi\u2019s case, on 31 August 2012 he was referred to AWAS for age assessment. Within a few weeks of his arrival, three people from AWAS interviewed him. After the interview they informed him that as they could not confirm his minor age through the interview they would send him for a further age verification (FAV) test \u2011 this would be an X-ray of the bones of the wrist. He was taken for the FAV test shortly after his interview. The first applicant claimed that, some weeks later, in or around October 2012, he was informed verbally by AWAS staff that he was found to be a minor and that he would be released shortly.","19.Until the date of the lodging of the application, that is eight months after his arrival in Malta, Mr Burhaan Abdullahi Elmi had not received a written decision informing him of the outcome of the age\u2011assessment procedure, and was still in detention.","2.Mr Cabdulaahi Aweys Abubakar","20.In Mr Cabdulaahi Aweys Abubakar\u2019s case, on 18September2012 he was referred to AWAS for age assessment. He was interviewed by three people from AWAS in the third week of September 2012. After the interview they informed him that as they could not confirm his minor age through the interview they would send him for a FAV test. He was taken for the FAV test on 8 February 2013, five months after his interview with AWAS. The second applicant claimed that, some weeks later, in March2013, he was informed verbally by AWAS staff that he was found to be a minor and that he would be released shortly.","21.Until the date of the lodging of the application, that is almost eight months after his arrival in Malta, Mr Cabdulaahi Aweys Abubakar had not received a written decision informing him of the outcome of the age\u2011assessment procedure, and was still in detention.","22.In the meantime both Mr Cabdulaahi Aweys Abubakar and members of the Jesuit Refugee Service who visited him in detention contacted AWAS on a number of occasions to inquire about the case, but no reply was forthcoming.","D.Conditions of detention","1.Mr Burhaan Abdullahi Elmi","23.Mr Burhaan Abdullahi Elmi claims to have been held in very difficult conditions of detention with adult men of various nationalities. In Warehouse 2 and Block B, of Safi Detention Centre, physical conditions were basic and he often lacked the most basic necessities, including clothing, particularly shoes, which were only replaced every four months. Recreational activity was limited, and the yard was taken over by adult males, making it difficult for a young person like him to play with them. Educational activities were virtually non-existent. There was a lack of information, difficulties communicating with the outside world, and obstacles in obtaining the most basic services. Moreover, the centre was overcrowded and lacked protection from abuse and victimisation. Fights often broke out between men of different origins, nationalities or tribes, and he also referred to an episode where he had been beaten up by a fellow detainee. Noting there was no privacy or security, Mr Burhaan AbdullahiElmi stressed that he felt very insecure in detention, and that his food was often stolen by detainees as was his blanket. He explained that Warehouse 2 was worse than Block B, it was like a big hall of people, hundreds of people, and he had a bunk bed in this big warehouse. He considered that the conditions in Warehouse 2 were very similar to those in Warehouse 1, which had been documented in a number of reports, including two CPT reports of 2007 and 2011. The first applicant also stated that he had difficulty communicating with a doctor in the absence of an interpreter and that he suffered from dizziness and eye problems.","2.Mr Cabdulaahi Aweys Abubakar","24.Mr Cabdulaahi Aweys Abubakar\u2019s narration about the conditions of detention in Warehouse 2 and Block B are similar to those referred to by the first applicant. Mr Cabdulaahi Aweys Abubakar also noted that in the first two weeks of his detention he had had stomach pains, but no doctor was available, nor was an ambulance called. He alleged that he had headaches and rashes on his scalp; however, the detention authorities would not provide him with the shampoo prescribed by the doctor. He noted that in October 2012 the detention authorities had not taken him to a hospital appointment; it had had to be rescheduled to March 2013. On that date, the doctor prescribed medication, however, up to the date of the introduction of the application (17 April 2013) this had not been forthcoming. He also referred to an incident in which he had been beaten up by a fellow detainee who had allegedly also previously attacked another detainee with a knife. He noted that when he arrived in detention he was given two bed sheets, a blanket, a T-shirt, and two pairs of underwear, but no shoes, not even flip\u2011flops. The second applicant further explained that they were fed chicken every day and that he was unable to keep in touch with his relatives, as the five-euro phone card distributed to them every two months only allowed four minutes of talk time to Somalia.","E.Latest developments","1.Mr Burhaan Abdullahi Elmi","25.The Government informed the Court that following the lodging of the application with the Court, on 19 April 2013 Mr Burhaan Abdullahi Elmi was released from detention under a care order and placed in an open centre for unaccompanied minors. He subsequently left Malta before the termination of his asylum proceedings; indeed the last day of registration at the open centre was 2 August 2013. In the absence of any further contact with the Office of the Refugee Commissioner, on 31 August 2013 the applicant\u2019s asylum claim was implicitly \u201cwithdrawn as discontinued\u201d.","26.It appears that the first applicant absconded and went to Germany and was held by the German authorities, who in turn requested the Maltese authorities to take him back in terms of the Dublin Regulation. Following the acceptance of that request on 7May 2014 the Maltese authorities were informed by the German authorities that return was suspended pending proceedings in Germany.","27.In a signed declaration sent to the Court by his legal representatives the first applicant admitted to being in Schonbach, Germany, as he was waiting there for the outcome of the judicial proceedings as to whether he would be sent back to Malta in terms of the Dublin II Regulation to have his asylum claim determined.","2.Mr Cabdulaahi Aweys Abubakar","28.The Government informed the Court that following the lodging of the application with the Court, on 24 April 2013 Mr Cabdulaahi AweysAbubakar was released from detention under a care order and placed in an open centre for unaccompanied minors. He was granted subsidiary protection on 14 September 2013.","40.Under European Union law, in particular Article 24 of The Reception Conditions Directive provides guidance on the type of accommodation to be provided to unaccompanied minors, which must be with adult relatives, with a foster family, in reception centres with special provisions for minors, or in other suitable accommodation. Detention of unaccompanied minors is not fully prohibited but is only allowed in exceptional circumstances and never in prison accommodation (Article11 (3) of the Recast Directive). The directive considers that a \u2018minor\u2019 means a third-country national or stateless person below the age of 18 years; it also notes that applicants aged sixteen and over, but under the age of eighteen and therefore still minors, may be placed in accommodation centres for adult asylum seekers, but only if it is in the best interests of the child[1].","41.In so far as relevant the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, of 20 November 1989, ratified by Malta in 1990, reads as follows:","Article 1","\u201cFor the purposes of the present Convention, a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.\u201d","Article 2","\u201c1. States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child\u2019s or his or her parent\u2019s or legal guardian\u2019s race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status.","2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is protected against all forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child\u2019s parents, legal guardians, or family members.\u201d","Article 3","\u201c1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.","2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures.","3. States Parties shall ensure that the institutions, services and facilities responsible for the care or protection of children shall conform with the standards established by competent authorities, particularly in the areas of safety, health, in the number and suitability of their staff, as well as competent supervision.\u201d","Article 37","\u201cStates Parties shall ensure that:","(a) No child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for offences committed by persons below eighteen years of age;","(b) No child shall be deprived of his or her liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily. The arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity with the law and shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time;","(c) Every child deprived of liberty shall be treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, and in a manner which takes into account the needs of persons of his or her age. In particular, every child deprived of liberty shall be separated from adults unless it is considered in the child\u2019s best interest not to do so and shall have the right to maintain contact with his or her family through correspondence and visits, save in exceptional circumstances;","(d) Every child deprived of his or her liberty shall have the right to prompt access to legal and other appropriate assistance, as well as the right to challenge the legality of the deprivation of his or her liberty before a court or other competent, independent and impartial authority, and to a prompt decision on any such action.\u201d","42.In Recommendation Rec(2003)5 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, to member States, on measures of detention of asylum seekers, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 16 April 2003 at the 837th meeting of the Ministers\u2019 Deputies, the Committee of Ministers recommended, in particular in respect of minors, that:","\u201c20. As a rule, minors should not be detained unless as a measure of last resort and for the shortest possible time.","21. Minors should not be separated from their parents against their will, nor from other adults responsible for them whether by law or custom.","22. If minors are detained, they must not be held under prison-like conditions. Every effort must be made to release them from detention as quickly as possible and place them in other accommodation. If this proves impossible, special arrangements must be made which are suitable for children and their families.","23. For unaccompanied minor asylum seekers, alternative and non-custodial care arrangements, such as residential homes or foster placements, should be arranged and, where provided for by national legislation, legal guardians should be appointed, within the shortest possible time.\u201d","43.In Recommendation 1985 (2011) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, of 7 October 2011, entitled \u201cUndocumented migrant children in an irregular situation: a real cause for concern\u201d, the Parliamentary assembly considered that undocumented migrant children are triply vulnerable: as migrants, as persons in an undocumented situation and as children. They recommended that member States refrain from detaining undocumented migrant children, and protect their liberty by abiding by the following principles:","\u201c9.4.1. a child should, in principle, never be detained. Where there is any consideration to detain a child, the best interest of the child should always come first;","9.4.2. in exceptional cases where detention is necessary, it should be provided for by law, with all relevant legal protection and effective judicial review remedies, and only after alternatives to detention have been considered;","9.4.3. if detained, the period must be for the shortest possible period of time and the facilities must be suited to the age of the child; relevant activities and educational support must also be available;","9.4.4. if detention does take place, it must be in separate facilities from those for adults, or in facilities meant to accommodate children with their parents or other family members, and the child should not be separated from a parent, except in exceptional circumstances;","9.4.5. unaccompanied children should, however, never be detained;","9.4.6. no child should be deprived of his or her liberty solely because of his or her migration status, and never as a punitive measure;","9.4.7. where a doubt exists as to the age of the child, the benefit of the doubt should be given to that child;\u201d","44.Prior to the above recommendation, in Resolution 1707 (2010) 28January 2010, the Parliamentary Assembly, called on member states of the Council of Europe in which asylum seekers and irregular migrants are detained to comply fully with their obligations under international human rights and refugee law, and encouraged them to abide by a number of guiding principles, inter alia, that vulnerable people should not, as a rule, be placed in detention and specifically that unaccompanied minors should never be detained.","45.TheReport by Thomas Hammarberg, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe following his visit to Malta from 23 to 25March 2011, 9 June 2011, paragraphs 19-20, reads as follows;","\u201c19. At the end of their detention, migrants, including refugees, beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, asylum seekers and persons whose asylum claims have been rejected, are accommodated in open centres around Malta. Conditions prevailing in these centres vary greatly, with adequate arrangements reported in the smaller centres that cater for some vulnerable groups, such as families with children or unaccompanied minors, and far more difficult conditions in the bigger centres. As mentioned above, when the Commissioner\u2019s visit took place the number of irregular arrivals had been very low for over 18 months and the 2011 arrivals from Libya had not yet started. As a result, the vast majority of migrants had moved out of the detention centres and were living in open centres, with the respective populations numbering at 49 and 2 231 respectively. The Commissioner visited the detention centre in Safi, and three open centres - the Hal-Far tent village, the Hangar Open Centre in Hal-Far and Marsa.","20. At the time of the visit the material conditions in the Safi detention centre, where all 49 of the migrant detainees were kept, appeared to be considerably better than those in open centres. Although a number of issues remained to be addressed, including those regarding the detainees\u2019 access to a diversified diet and water other than from the tap, the premises visited, including the dormitories, toilets and showers had been recently refurbished. The only female detainee of the centre was accommodated in a separate facility. The Commissioner wishes to note however, that in accordance with the mandatory detention policy referred to above, most of the persons (approximately 1 100) who have arrived from Libya since his visit have been placed in detention centres. This is naturally bound to have a significant impact on the adequacy of the conditions in these centres.\u201d","46.The Report to the Maltese Government on the visit to Malta carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 19 to 26May 2008, 17February 2011), in so far as relevant reads as follows:","\u201c52. In accordance with Maltese policy on administrative detention of foreigners under aliens\u2019 legislation, all foreigners arriving illegally in Malta are still detained for prolonged periods, in the case of asylum seekers until such time as their request for refugee status is determined (normally 12 months) and for irregular immigrants for up to a maximum of 18 months. In practice, however, some may spend even longer periods in detention. The only declared exceptions to this general rule concern persons deemed to be vulnerable because of their age and\/or physical condition, unaccompanied minors and pregnant women ...","53. The situation found in the detention centres visited by the delegation had not substantially improved since the CPT\u2019s previous visit in 2005. Indeed, many of the problems identified in the report on that visit still remain unresolved. In several parts of the detention centres, the combined effects of prolonged periods of detention in poor, if not very poor, material conditions, with a total absence of purposeful activities, not to mention other factors, could well be considered to amount to inhuman and degrading treatment.","...","60. At Safi Barracks Detention Centre, which at the time of the visit accommodated a total of 507 immigration detainees, living conditions for detainees had slightly improved in comparison to the situation observed by the CPT in 2005.","At Warehouse No. 1, living conditions were less cramped than when last visited by the CPT, and the toilet facilities were new and clean. That said, the Committee has strong reservations as regards the use of converted warehouses to accommodate detainees. This should only be seen as a temporary - and short term - solution.","B Block has been refurbished since the CPT\u2019s last visit. The sanitary facilities have been renovated and a large exercise area is at the disposal of the immigration detainees. However, conditions were still difficult in certain rooms, where immigration detainees were sleeping on mattresses on the floor.","Surprisingly, poor conditions of detention were observed in the new C Block. Living conditions were cramped, access to natural light was insufficient and ventilation very poor. Further, access to running water was limited, as well as access to hot water, the latter being unavailable for prolonged periods.","In addition, the internal regulation in force at Safi Barracks provided for the compulsory closing of the doors in B and C Blocks every afternoon at 5 p.m., thereby preventing access to the outdoor yard. This exacerbated significantly the already far from ideal living conditions in these blocks.\u201d","47.The Report to the Maltese Government on the visit to Malta carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 26 to 30September 2011, published on 4 July 2013, in so far as relevant in connection with Safi barracks, reads as follows:","\u201c44. At the time of the visit, Safi Detention Centre was accommodating a total of 506 male adult detainees (236 in Warehouse No. 1, 113 in Warehouse No. 2 and 124 in Block B).","In keeping with the Government\u2019s Detention Policy, no unaccompanied minors were held in either of the two detention centres visited. Upon issuance of a care order by the Minister of Social Policy, unaccompanied minors were always transferred to a juvenile institution. Single women were always accommodated separately from male detainees.","...","48. As was the case in 2008, a number of detainees complained about disrespectful behaviour and racist remarks by detention officers (in particular in the Warehouses at Safi Detention Centre). The CPT reiterates its recommendation that the Maltese authorities remind all members of staff working in detention centres for foreigners that such behaviour is not acceptable and will be punished accordingly.","...","55. At both [Lyster and] Safi Detention Centres, material conditions have improved since the 2008 visit. ... At Safi Barracks, additional renovation work had been carried out in Block B. It is noteworthy that all foreign nationals received personal hygiene products on a regular basis and were also supplied with clothes and footwear.","However, material conditions of detention were still appalling in the two Warehouses at Safi Barracks. In particular, at Warehouse No. 1, foreign nationals were being held in extremely crowded conditions and the sanitary facilities consisting of seven mobile toilets (without a flush) and seven mobile shower booths, located in the outdoor exercise yard, were in a deplorable state. In fact, the Warehouses are not suitable for accommodating persons for prolonged periods, but should only be used in the event of an emergency.","The CPT recommends that the Maltese authorities take the necessary measures to ensure that all immigration detainees currently being held in the two Warehouses at Safi Barracks are transferred as soon as possible to Ta\u2019 Kandja Detention Centre and that both Warehouses are in future only used for short\u2011term detention in emergency situations.","...","57. At Safi Detention Centre, conditions of detention in the two warehouses were further exacerbated by the total lack of any organised activities. The situation was slightly better, but far from satisfactory in Block B, where detainees could play football in the exercise yard (surrounded by high walls), which was accessible from 8.30 a.m. to 7 p.m.","The CPT calls upon the Maltese authorities to introduce a regime providing purposeful activities to foreign nationals held at Safi [and Ta\u2019 Kandja Detention] Centres.","...","58. Medical and nursing services in detention centres for foreigners were provided by two separate privately-run companies. There was a pool of doctors ensuring the presence of one doctor from Mondays to Fridays (including public holidays), for five hours per day at Safi [and four hours per day at Lyster Barracks]. Further, a nurse was present in each detention centre from Mondays to Fridays from 8 a.m. to 3 p.m. In addition, at Safi Barracks, a nurse from the local health-care service came to the establishment to administer medication requiring supervision in the evenings and at weekends.","The CPT must stress that, given the size of the inmate populations, the current arrangements for the provision of health care were clearly insufficient to ensure that detainees\u2019 health problems were dealt with in a timely and effective manner. The delegation was overwhelmed by complaints from detainees about delays in seeing a doctor (up to several days) and, subsequently, in receiving prescribed medicines (up to one week). In practice, only a limited number of requests (usually five) per detention block were forwarded by detention officers to the nurse on duty on a first-come first\u2011served basis. This was described by many detainees as source of constant tension among themselves. ...","In the two Warehouses at Safi Barracks, the delegation observed that a significant number of detainees were lying in bed all day in total apathy. Given that nurses never entered the detention areas, the likelihood was great that detainees in need of urgent psychological support remained undetected for a long time. Regrettably, both centres were still not being visited by a psychologist and a psychiatrist.","Another major shortcoming was the lack of systematic medical screening of detainees upon admission to a detention centre. The delegation was informed by health-care staff that, on arrival at the port, all foreign nationals had undergone a chest X-ray, but no further screening was performed at the detention centres. In this regard, the CPT wishes to recall that systematic medical screening is not only an essential means of protecting detainees and staff alike (in particular, with regard to transmissible diseases) but also an important safeguard against ill-treatment. ...","60. As regards contact with the outside world, the CPT welcomes the fact that, in both detention centres visited, foreign nationals could receive telephone calls from the outside. They were also were provided with telephone cards free of charge on a regular basis, although these were limited to a total of 5\u20ac every two months.\u201d","In their report the CPT noted that, at Safi Detention Centre, attempts were made by the management to provide misleading information and to hide from the delegation a significant number of complaints which had been lodged by foreign nationals.","48.In a report by the International Commission of Jurists (\u201cICJ\u201d) entitled \u201cNot here to stay\u201d, Report of the International Commission of Jurists on its visit to Malta on 26\u201130 September 2011, May 2012, which assessed migration and asylum practice in Malta (at the time of the Libyan crisis), the ICJ expressed concern that the Safi Barracks detention centres, including B-Block, were located on two military bases \u2013 a situation at odds with international law and standards. The ICJ report concluded that the accumulation of poor conditions of detention, brought the situation in the Safi Barracks detention centre beyond the threshold of degrading treatment, in violation of Malta\u2019s international human rights obligations under Article3 of the Convention.","49. They considered that a lesser, though still worrisome, situation of overcrowding existed in B-Block of the Safi Barracks at the time of the ICJ visit. While this centre was provided with open cells, these were overcrowded with bunk beds, and the only privacy was that which had been tentatively achieved through hanging blankets from the top of the bunks. In their view in B-Block, the kitchen and the bathroom appeared rather dirty.","50.They noted, inter alia, that in the Warehouse the number of toilets and showers appeared to the delegation to be insufficient in comparison to the number of people detained. The migrants detained in Warehouse One had no facilities for cooking, mainly due to the structure of the detention centre, which did not allow for a kitchen, big enough for all detainees, to be installed.","51.Other relevant extracts from their report read as follows:","\u201cThere is a lack of leisure facilities in the detention centres visited. In Warehouse One, the only entertainment was provided by a single television in the main common room and by the recreation-yard. In B-Block, there was also a recreation\u2011yard, although of rather limited dimensions, and the detainees expressly complained of the lack of means of recreation, claiming that they had only one ball at their disposal. No books seemed to be present in the detention facilities.\u201d ...","\u201cThe detainees in Warehouse One also complained about the clothing provided to them. According to them, clothes were given to them through charity and some of them were wearing very worn out t-shirts.\u201d ...","\u201c [the ICJ] considers that in Safi Barracks, the accumulation of poor conditions of detention, including sanitary conditions, together with the apparent existence of cases of psychological instability, with the lack of leisure facilities, the overcrowded conditions and the mandatory length of 18 months of detention brought, at the time of the visit, the situation in the detention centre beyond the threshold of degrading treatment, and therefore in violation of Article 3 ECHR, Articles 1 and 4 EU Charter, Article 7ICCPR and Article 16 CAT.\u201d","52.Bridging Borders, a JRS Malta report on the implementation of a project to provide shelter and psychosocial support to vulnerable asylum seekers between June 2011 and June 2012, highlights the fact that not all medication prescribed by medical personnel in detention is provided free by the Government health service. In fact the said report notes that during the lifetime of the project the organisation purchased medication for 130 detainees.","53.Care in Captivity, a more recent JRS Malta report on the provision of care for detained asylum seekers experiencing mental health problems (research period December 2013 to June 2014), documented several obstacles to quality health care including: lack of availability of interpreters; lack of attendance for follow-up appointments following discharge to detention (in seven out of seventy-four cases); and failure to dispense prescribed psychotropic medication in some cases. It held that:","\u201cIn this regard, the current system where, after discharge from the ASU ward, the responsibility for continuity of care, in terms of attendance of hospital appointments and dispensation of medication, falls under detention health care providers and custodial staff appears not to be operating effectively.\u201d","54.In so far as relevant, extracts from a report by Human Rights Watch in 2012 called \u201cBoat-ride to Detention\u201d, reads as follows:","\u201cChildren lack adequate information about the age determination process (including whether documents are accepted and whether there is an appeal). Some migrants who request an age determination procedure are seemingly ignored: interviewees reported telling authorities they were minors but never receiving age determination. Other children never request an age determination because they lack information on the procedure.\u201d","\u201cThe government should do more to provide children with reliable information about the age determination procedure. Children receive no guidance on the content of the procedure, whether documents will be useful, or whether they can appeal. Malta has taken considerable steps in providing information to migrants about the process for asylum, including by conducting information sessions to every incoming migrant. It could easily do the same for the age determination process.\u201d","55.A 2014 report issued by Aditus, a local NGO entitled \u201cUnaccompanied Minor Asylum-Seekers in Malta: a technical Report on Ages Assessment and Guardianship Procedures\u201d, reads as follows:","\u201cThe procedural information provided to persons undergoing age assessment is extremely limited which further excludes the applicant from active participation in the process.\u201d","\u201cUnder the old procedure [2012] persons were not adequately informed of the possibility of appeal... persons were also typically not informed of the reasons for a negative decision\u201d","\u201cMost experts agree that age assessment is not a determination of chronological age but rather an educated guess. There are risks that due to the inaccuracy of age assessment techniques, persons claiming to be minors may have their age mis\u2011assessed\u201d","56.The relevant extracts of General Comment no.6 (2005) of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, entitled \u201cTreatment of unaccompanied and separated children outside their country of origin\u201d read as follows:","\u201c61. In application of article 37 of the Convention and the principle of the best interests of the child, unaccompanied or separated children should not, as a general rule, be detained. Detention cannot be justified solely on the basis of the child being unaccompanied or separated, or on their migratory or residence status, or lack thereof. Where detention is exceptionally justified for other reasons, it shall be conducted in accordance with article 37(b) of the Convention that requires detention to conform to the law of the relevant country and only to be used as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time. In consequence, all efforts, including acceleration of relevant processes, should be made to allow for the immediate release of unaccompanied or separated children from detention and their placement in other form of appropriate accommodation....","63. In the exceptional case of detention, conditions of detention must be governed by the best interests of the child and pay full respect to article 37(a) and (c) of the Convention and other international obligations. Special arrangements must be made for living quarters that are suitable for children and that separate them from adults, unless it is considered in the child\u2019s best interests not to do so. Indeed, the underlying approach to such a program should be \u201ccare\u201d and not \u201cdetention\u201d. Facilities should not be located in isolated areas where culturally-appropriate community resources and access to legal aid are unavailable. Children should have the opportunity to make regular contact and receive visits from friends, relatives, religious, social and legal counsel and their guardian. They should also be provided with the opportunity to receive all basic necessities as well as appropriate medical treatment and psychological counselling where necessary. During their period in detention, children have the right to education which ought, ideally, to take place outside the detention premises in order to facilitate the continuance of their education upon release. They also have the right to recreation and play as provided for in article 31 of the Convention. In order to effectively secure the rights provided by article 37(d) of the Convention, unaccompanied or separated children deprived of their liberty shall be provided with prompt and free access to legal and other appropriate assistance, including the assignment of a legal representative.\u201d","57.In their report \u201c20 years of combatting torture\u201d 19th General Report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) 1 August 2008 - 31 July 2009, the CPT remarked as follows:","\u201c97. The CPT considers that every effort should be made to avoid resorting to the deprivation of liberty of an irregular migrant who is a minor. Following the principle of the \u201cbest interests of the child\u201d, as formulated in Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, detention of children, including unaccompanied and separated children, is rarely justified and, in the Committee\u2019s view, can certainly not be motivated solely by the absence of residence status.","When, exceptionally, a child is detained, the deprivation of liberty should be for the shortest possible period of time; all efforts should be made to allow the immediate release of unaccompanied or separated children from a detention facility and their placement in more appropriate care. Further, owing to the vulnerable nature of a child, additional safeguards should apply whenever a child is detained, particularly in those cases where the children are separated from their parents or other carers, or are unaccompanied, without parents, carers or relatives.","98. As soon as possible after the presence of a child becomes known to the authorities, a professionally qualified person should conduct an initial interview, in a language the child understands. An assessment should be made of the child\u2019s particular vulnerabilities, including from the standpoints of age, health, psychosocial factors and other protection needs, including those deriving from violence, trafficking or trauma. Unaccompanied or separated children deprived of their liberty should be provided with prompt and free access to legal and other appropriate assistance, including the assignment of a guardian or legal representative. Review mechanisms should also be introduced to monitor the ongoing quality of the guardianship.20 years of combating torture: CPT General Report 2008-20","99. Steps should be taken to ensure a regular presence of, and individual contact with, a social worker and a psychologist in establishments holding children in detention. Mixed-gender staffing is another safeguard against ill-treatment; the presence of both male and female staff can have a beneficial effect in terms of the custodial ethos and foster a degree of normality in a place of detention. Children deprived of their liberty should also be offered a range of constructive activities (with particular emphasis on enabling a child to continue his or her education).\u201d"],"28835":["5.The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Baku.","6.He was a journalist and at the relevant time was working as editor\u2011in\u2011chief of the Demokrat newspaper. He was also a member of the Musavat Party.","A.The applicant\u2019s arrest and alleged ill-treatment by the police","1.The applicant\u2019s version of events","7.On 2 April 2011 a number of opposition parties held a demonstration at Fountains Square in Baku. The applicant went to the place where the demonstration would be held, intending to participate in it.","8.On arriving at Fountains Square at around 2.15 p.m. on 2 April 2011, the applicant was arrested by a group of police officers and taken to the Nasimi District Police Office (\u201cthe NDPO\u201d).","9.After his arrival at the police office, the applicant was placed in the exercise yard of the NDPO temporary detention centre with other arrested persons. A few minutes later the deputy head of the NDPO, S.N., arrived at the detention centre with two men, one of whom was wearing a police uniform while the other was in plain clothes. The applicant introduced himself as a journalist and asked S.N. the reasons for his arrest. The two men accompanying S.N. then held the applicant\u2019s arms while S.N. punched and kicked him in different parts of his body. After having physically assaulted the applicant, S.N. and the other two men left the detention centre.","10.At around 11 p.m. on 2 April 2011 the applicant was given a formal warning, under Article 298 of the Code of Administrative Offences, for participating in an unauthorised demonstration and was released from detention.","2.The Government\u2019s version of events","11.The Government maintained that the applicant had not been subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment in police custody.","12.The Government also submitted an administrative offence record drawn up at 4.30 p.m. on 2 April 2011, according to which the applicant had been warned, under Article 298 of the Code of Administrative Offences, for violation of the rule regulating the organisation and holding of gatherings. The applicant had signed the record and made a comment confirming his participation in the demonstration.","B.Remedies used by the applicant","13.On 4 April 2011 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Nasimi district prosecutor\u2019s office, claiming that on 2 April 2011 he had been ill-treated by S.N. in police custody.","14.On 6 April 2011 the investigator in charge of the case questioned the applicant, who reiterated his allegation of ill-treatment. In particular, he stated that on 2 April 2011, while he had been detained in the exercise yard of the temporary detention centre of the NDPO with other arrested persons, he had been beaten by S.N. and two other men, one of whom had been wearing a police uniform while the other had been in plain clothes. When he had asked S.N. the reasons for his arrest, the two men accompanying S.N. had held his arms and S.N. had physically assaulted him by punching and kicking him in different parts of his body.","15.On 6 April 2011 the applicant was examined by a forensic expert. It appears from forensic report no. 01\/MES dated 9 April 2011 that the expert noticed a bruise (qan\u00e7\u0131r) measuring 4.5 by 2.5 cm on the outer side of the applicant\u2019s right calf (bald\u0131r). He concluded that the injury had been caused by a hard blunt object and that the time at which it had been inflicted corresponded to 2 April 2011.","16.On 12 and 14 April 2011 the investigator questioned T.Y. and N.S. as witnesses in connection with the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment complaint. The two witnesses, who had also been arrested on 2 April 2011 and detained in the temporary detention centre of the NDPO, confirmed that on 2 April 2011 the applicant had been beaten by S.N. in the exercise yard of the NDPO temporary detention centre. In this connection, T.Y. stated that, when S.N. and two other men had arrived at the temporary detention centre, S.N. had begun insulting the applicant. S.N. had also kicked him in the stomach. As the applicant had objected to it, S.N. and the two men accompanying him began to beat the applicant. N.S. also stated that S.N. and the two men accompanying him had begun insulting the arrested persons immediately after their arrival at the temporary detention centre. As the applicant had objected to their attitude, they had beaten him severely.","17.On 15 April 2011 the investigator questioned S.N., who refuted the applicant\u2019s allegations. S.N. claimed that he had not used force against the applicant and that, in any event, he had not been on the premises of the NDPO between 1 and 7 p.m. on 2 April 2011 when the applicant had been taken there.","18.On 18 April 2011 the investigator separately questioned two police officers, M.V. and R.M., who had been on guard duty at the NDPO on 2April 2011. The wording of their statements was identical. They each stated that none of the persons arrested on 2 April 2011 had been placed in the exercise yard of the temporary detention centre and that none of them had been beaten. They also stated that S.N. had not been present when the arrested persons had been taken to the police office.","19.On 20 and 22 April 2011 the investigator separately questioned two police officers, I.M., who had participated in the applicant\u2019s arrest on 2April 2011, and I.S., who was the neighbourhood police officer for the area where the applicant was arrested. Their statements were identical. They each claimed that the applicant had not been placed in the exercise area of the temporary detention centre and had not been beaten in police custody. They also claimed that S.N. had not been present at that time at the police office. Moreover, I.M. stated that when he had taken the applicant to the police office he had not been aware of any injury on the applicant\u2019s body. However, such an injury might have been inflicted during the unlawful demonstration.","20.On 25 April 2011 the deputy prosecutor of the Nasimi district prosecutor\u2019s office issued a decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings in connection with the applicant\u2019s complaint of ill-treatment. In his decision, after having summarised the conclusions of the forensic report and the statements given by the applicant, T.Y. and N.S., as well as S.N. and the other four police officers questioned during the inquiry, the prosecutor concluded in one sentence that the available evidence did not disclose any appearance of a criminal act. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:","\u201cAs no appearance of a criminal act was disclosed in the material collected during the inquiry at the request of Hajili Mustafa Mustafa oglu, who claimed that on 2 April 2011 he had sustained injury as a result of a beating by the deputy head of the NDPO, S.N., the institution of criminal proceedings should be refused.\u201d","21.On 5 January 2012 the applicant lodged a complaint against that decision with the Nasimi District Court, arguing that the prosecutor\u2019s decision was unsubstantiated. In particular, he claimed that the prosecutor had not taken into consideration the conclusions of the forensic report and the statements from T.Y. and N.S. The applicant also complained that the prosecutor had failed to give any explanation as to the circumstances in which the injury had been caused.","22.It appears from the transcript of the court hearing of 16 January 2012 that in the proceedings before the Nasimi District Court the applicant\u2019s lawyer asked the court to hear T.Y. and N.S., who had testified during the inquiry in support of the applicant\u2019s complaint of ill-treatment. He also asked the court to order the examination of video recordings from the NDPO\u2019s security cameras. In reply to the lawyer\u2019s requests, the investigator in charge of the case stated at the hearing that the NDPO\u2019s security cameras were only for surveillance purposes and did not record. The court granted the lawyer\u2019s request concerning the examination of the video recordings from the security cameras.","23.On 24 January 2012 the Nasimi District Court dismissed the complaint, finding that the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 25 April 2011 had been lawful and properly substantiated. The court held that, although the expert had noticed a bruise on the applicant\u2019s body, it had not been established that the injury had been inflicted by S.N. As regards the video recordings, the court noted that they were no longer available. The NDPO had replied to its request relating to the examination of the video recordings that the security cameras in question had not contained a memory card and, therefore, the video recordings had been automatically deleted one month later. The judgment made no mention of the witness statements made in favour of the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment claim.","24.On 27 January 2012 the applicant appealed against the decision, reiterating his previous complaints. In particular, he complained that the prosecutor had failed to give any explanation of how the injury noticed by the forensic expert had been caused. He also requested the appellate court to hear T.Y. and N.S., claiming that the first-instance court had ignored their witness statements without any reason. The applicant further complained about the conflicting explanations given by the investigator and the Nasimi District Court as to the impossibility of obtaining video recordings from the NDPO\u2019s security cameras. Whereas the investigator had explained that those cameras were simply for surveillance purposes and did not record, the first-instance court had indicated in its decision that the impossibility was due to the absence of memory cards in the security cameras, which led to automatic deletion of the video recordings one month later.","25.On 6 February 2012 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the Nasimi District Court\u2019s decision of 24 January 2012. The appellate court\u2019s decision made no mention of the applicant\u2019s particular complaints."],"28866":["1. The applicants, Mr S.N. (\u201cthe first applicant\u201d) and Mr T.D. (\u201cthe second applicant\u201d), are two Russian nationals, who were born in 1977 and 1972 respectively and live in Moscow. The President of the Section decided that their names should not be disclosed (Rule 47 \u00a7 4 of the Rules of the Court). The Chamber also decided not to notify the Government of the Russian Federation of the present application on the grounds that Article 36 \u00a7 1 of the Convention did not apply in the circumstances of the present case (see I v. Sweden, no. 61204\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 40-46, 5 September 2013).","2. The applicants were represented before the Court by Ms C. Kruger and Mr O. Rode, lawyers practising in Strasbourg and Riga respectively. The Latvian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Mrs K. L\u012bce.","3. The applicants complained, in particular, that their expulsion to the Russian Federation had put them at risk of being subjected to torture or inhuman treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, and that they did not have effective remedies in that regard. They also complained under Article 8 of the Convention about interference with their family life and absence of procedural safeguards in that regard.","4. On 6 February 2014 the above-mentioned complaints were communicated to the Government.","A. The circumstances of the case","5. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.","6. The applicants were born in what is now the Chechen Republic in the Russian Federation. The first applicant moved to Latvia in 1997 and has lived there ever since, on the basis of regularly renewed residence permits. In 2002 he was granted a permanent residence permit, which was renewed in 2007 and 2012. The second applicant moved to Latvia in 2002 and has lived there subsequently, on the basis of regularly renewed residence permits.","1. Inclusion in the list of aliens prohibited from entering in Latvia","7. On 26 July 2012 the Latvian Minister of Interior adopted decisions to include the applicants in the list of aliens prohibited from entering and remaining in Latvia and the Schengen Area (hereinafter \u201cthe blacklist\u201d) for an indeterminate period of time. These decisions were taken on the basis of a report by the Constitution Protection Bureau, one of the Latvian intelligence services ( Satversmes aizsardz\u012bbas birojs \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe SAB\u201d), submitted on 9 July and amended on 20 July 2012. The SAB had informed the Minister of Interior that both applicants had been engaging in criminal activity and planning to commit a serious crime, and hence posed a threat to national security and public order and safety. The part relating to national security grounds was identical in both decisions and stated:","\u201cThe SAB indicated that the information obtained attests to [the applicant \u2019 s] criminal activity in a leading role within an organised criminal group. Similarly, it is apparent from the information provided by the SAB that [the applicant] is planning to commit a serious or especially serious crime which may have irreversible consequences on national security. As a consequence [the applicant] in his activity [is] a threat to public order and national security.\u201d","8. The applicants were not made aware of the SAB \u2019 s report.","9. The decision concerning the first applicant pointed to the fact that he was married to a Russian national. It was therefore concluded that he would not encounter any obstacles in meeting his spouse outside Latvia.","10. In the decision concerning the second applicant it was noted that he was married to a Latvian national. His former wife (a Russian national) and their minor child were also residing in Latvia. The decision went on to state that an interference with the second applicant \u2019 s right to respect for his private and family life was justified, taking into account, among other things, that during the nine years he had resided in Latvia \u201che had not learned the [State language], which [had] clearly obstructed his integration into society\u201d. It was also pointed out that he had moved to Latvia when he was over eighteen, which meant that his ties to his native country had not disappeared. With regard to him having an opportunity to meet his young son, the decision stated that he had already agreed in 2002, while still residing in Russia, that the child would reside with his mother in Latvia. It was therefore concluded that he \u201cwould not be entirely deprived of opportunities to meet [his] son\u201d in Russia. The interference with his family life with his spouse, a Latvian national, was held to be \u201ccommensurate with the interests of the society\u201d.","11. Both decisions mentioned that under section 61(8) of the Immigration Law, an appeal could be lodged with the Prosecutor General \u2019 s Office. The decisions became effective on the day they were signed, 26 July 2012, and were sent to the applicants \u2019 declared addresses in Riga. On 3 August 2012 they were expelled from Latvia (see paragraph 23 below).","12. On 3 August 2012 the applicants, through their legal representative, applied to the Administrative Cases Division of the Senate of the Supreme Court to challenge the Minister of Interior \u2019 s decision to put their names on the blacklist. On 7 and 9 August 2012 the Senate refused to accept the applicants \u2019 complaints for lack of jurisdiction, indicating that such reviews fell within the competence of the Prosecutor General if the decision had been adopted \u201c on the basis of information obtained as a result of intelligence or counterintelligence \u201d. The decisions also referred to the Constitutional Court \u2019 s judgment of 6 December 2004 (see paragraph 53 below) which said that the prosecutor \u2019 s review as such did not infringe the right of access to court. The Senate \u2019 s decision was final.","13. On 20 August 2012 the applicants \u2019 legal representative appealed to the Prosecutor General asking, inter alia, that the decision to put them on the blacklist be revoked and that he be given access to the SAB \u2019 s report of 9 and 20 July 2012, which had formed the basis of the Minister of Interior \u2019 s decision. On five occasions the appeals were amended to include, inter alia, the allegations that in 1998 the applicants had collaborated with the Latvian State security services in a hostage liberation operation in the Chechen Republic. Later the appeal was amended to include the second applicant \u2019 s allegation that subsequently he had refused to cooperate with a SAB officer in relation to certain activities of the leaders of the Chechen community in Latvia, and therefore the expulsion had been instigated in revenge for that.","14. In a reply of 24 September 2012 the Prosecutor General dismissed the request for access to the requested documents. He noted that the possibility to familiarise oneself with information containing State secrets, if necessary with the assistance of specially authorised representatives, as provided in section 65 \u00b3 of the Immigration Law (see paragraph 51 below), applied only to administrative court proceedings. The Prosecutor General in his reply also stated:","\u201c ... By envisaging in section 61(8) of the Immigration Law that an appeal against a decision the Minister of Interior adopted on the basis of information obtained in the course of intelligence or counterintelligence activities carried out by a State security institution could be lodged with the Prosecutor General [but] not a court, the legislator wished especially to protect information obtained in the course of intelligence or counterintelligence activities; [granting] access to such information to persons not possessing special permission ... could seriously infringe the work of the State security institutions ... thus seriously impairing national security.\u201d","15. In a final decision of 23 November 2012 the Prosecutor General reformulated the Minister of Interior \u2019 s decision of 26 July 2012 (see paragraph 7 above). The part relating to national security grounds was identical in his decisions relating to both applicants and stated:","\u201cHaving familiarised myself with the results of the review carried out by the Prosecutor [General \u2019 s Office] and the information provided in the conclusions and supporting documents, [I] find that the SAB, as a competent State institution, had grounds to consider that [the applicant] had a role in an organised criminal group and [was] one of its leaders, [had] committed or [was] planning to commit a serious or especially serious crime, and [that his] presence in Latvia was a threat to public order and national security as confirmed by the information [obtained by the SAB in the course of counterintelligence activities], which I have verified and examined.","Nevertheless, when adopting a decision to include [someone] in the list of aliens prohibited from entering the Republic of Latvia, the Minister must assess whether the behaviour of the foreigner and the nature and scope of information held by the competent institution is sufficient to establish any of the ... conditions set out in section 61(1) of the Immigration law.","Having examined the information held by the SAB, [I] consider that [the information] is not sufficient to establish the conditions set out in section 61(1)(1) and (3), [namely] that [the applicant is] acting in an anti-governmental or criminal organisation or [has] a role in such an organisation, and has carried out or is planning to commit a serious or particularly serious crime.","At the same time, the nature and scope of the SAB information obtained in the course of counterintelligence activities clearly attest to [the fact] that [the applicant \u2019 s] activity is a threat to Latvian national security and public order and safety, as well as a threat to the national security of the States in the Schengen [Area]. The condition set out in section 61(1)(2) has therefore been established, which serves as a basis for the adopted decision to include [the applicant] in the list of aliens prohibited from entering the Republic of Latvia.\u201d","16. The Prosecutor General also dismissed the applicants \u2019 fear that they could be exposed to ill-treatment in Russia due to their alleged involvement in the hostage liberation in 1998, as that involvement remained unconfirmed. In particular, the witnesses questioned had provided controversial submissions, which did not correspond to the testimony of other witnesses, including the statements obtained from the hostages liberated during the operation. In examining the allegations about the risk of ill-treatment after expulsion, the information the Prosecutor General \u2019 s Office had obtained from the Border Guard Service and the applicants \u2019 relatives confirmed that on numerous occasions between January 2010 and July 2012 the applicants had entered the Russian Federation, including the Chechen Republic.","17. In relation to the complaint of unlawful activity by a SAB officer, the Prosecutor General noted that the meeting between the SAB officer and the second applicant had been recorded in accordance with the law, and that the second applicant \u2019 s allegations were ill-founded.","2. Proceedings for review of the decision of the Minister of Interior","18. Subsequently, in the light of the Prosecutor General \u2019 s decision to reformulate the basis on which the applicants \u2019 names had been put on the blacklist, on 22 August 2013 their legal representative wrote to the Minister of Interior and director of the SAB asking for a review of the decisions to include them in the list.","19. On 25 September 2013 the applicants \u2019 representative received a response from the director of the SAB, stating that his request of 22 August 2013 did not refer to any new circumstances which could serve as a basis for amending or revoking their report to the Minister of Interior in July 2012 (see paragraph 7 above). On 10 October 2013 the Minister of Interior gave a similar reply to the applicants \u2019 representative.","20. In a letter sent to the Court on 21 October 2013 the applicants \u2019 representative brought to the Court \u2019 s attention the following:","\u201c ... [I]n April 2013 the applicants were informed that in an unofficial conversation with a certain high-ranking police officer, [a staff member of the SAB] had stipulated that he would \u201ctake care\u201d of any potential complaints the applicants might submit to the Court, and certain politicians would make sure the complaints were not successful. ... The applicants considered this information irrelevant before the above \u2011 mentioned official information [the Government \u2019 s letter] was received.\u201d","They further drew the Court \u2019 s attention to two questions, the first being how the SAB became aware of their application to the Court, and the second how the application influenced the decisions of the SAB and Minister of Interior.","3. Other proceedings following the decision of the Minister of Interior of 26 July 2012 to include the applicants in the blacklist","(a) Detention and expulsion","21. The authorities apprehended the first and second applicants on 31 July and 2 August 2012 respectively. They were both placed in a State Police temporary detention facility. The first applicant met one of his lawyers on the day of his detention, and the other one the following day. The second applicant met his lawyer on the day of his detention.","22. On 2 August 2012 the acting chief of the Riga branch of the State Border Guard Service adopted decisions to expel the applicants from Latvia and to deport them to the Russian Federation. The reason was that the applicants constituted a threat to national security, public order or safety under section 51 paragraph 2 part 4 of the Immigration Law (see paragraph 47 below). The decisions indicated that it was possible to lodge an appeal without suspensive effect to the chief of the Border Guard Service. On the same day both applicants were made aware of the respective decisions. They both appealed (see paragraph 26 below).","23. On the morning of 3 August 2012 the applicants were taken to the Russian border and expelled from Latvia.","24. That afternoon one of the legal representatives sent a fax to, inter alia, the Border Guard Service, asking the applicants not to be expelled to the Russian Federation \u201cbecause they are possibly agents of the Security Police and their expulsion to the receiving State puts them under threat and they could be subjected to torture\u201d.","25. According to the applicants \u2019 initial submissions to the Court, \u201cfive days after their expulsion to the Russian Federation\u201d they were summoned by Chechen police and were questioned about their role in the hostage liberation operation in 1998 before being beaten up. The case file contains an identical certificate for each applicant issued by a Chechen hospital, confirming that on 10 August 2012 both applicants had been found to have concussion, a brain injury and multiple bruises and scratches. The applicants alleged that as a result of what had happened they had had to flee the Chechen Republic and were now hiding in the Russian Federation.","26. The applicants \u2019 representative submitted appeals against the expulsion orders of 2 August 2012 (see paragraph 22 above), complaining, inter alia, of the authorities \u2019 failure to strike a fair balance between the right to respect for their family life and the alleged threat to national security, as required under Article 8 of the Convention. The chief of the Border Guard Service dismissed the first and second applicant \u2019 s complaints on 23 and 27 August 2012 respectively.","27. In their appeal to the Administrative District Court of 7 September 2012 the applicants also said that before adopting the impugned decision the Border Guard Service had not heard them, meaning they had not been able to provide information on the possible threat they would face at the hands of the security services after their expulsion to the Russian Federation.","28. On 7 May 2014 the Administrative District Court, in two judgments, upheld the impugned decisions in relation to both applicants. The Administrative District Court established that prior to expulsion the applicants had not approached the Latvian authorities with allegations concerning the risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 if expelled to the Russian Federation. It also noted that on 2 August 2012 both applicants were informed that the expulsion would be carried out the following day, on 3 August 2012. On the same day one of the applicants submitted a request to the chief of the Border Guard Service asking to be given several impounded goods in custody, but no other requests were made. Both applicants met their lawyers after being detained.","29. The court referred to its well-established case-law and noted that the decisions to put the applicants \u2019 names on the blacklist on national security grounds had been reviewed and upheld by the Prosecutor General, so neither the Border Guard Service nor the administrative court were competent to review the Minister of Interior \u2019 s decision.","30. By addressing the complaint that in adopting the impugned expulsion decision of 2 August 2012 the applicants were not heard, the court noted that even if it constituted a minor procedural shortcoming, the lack of hearing of the applicants and witnesses could not have an effect on the outcome of the case. In particular, the court noted that the review of the Minister of Interior \u2019 s decision fell outside the scope of the present administrative proceedings. Any information the applicants might have submitted in relation to the adoption of the above decision could not have any effect on the content of the contested decision of 2 August 2012 to expel the applicants. Moreover, the applicants were not prevented, with the assistance of their legal representatives, from communicating to the Border Guard Service any information regarding the alleged interference the impugned decision would have on their family life.","31. The judgments also stated that there were no obstacles for the applicants to enjoy their family life in the Russian Federation. Nor were there any special circumstances to the effect that the family members could not join them outside Latvia. The wife of the first applicant was a Russian national and she would not have any restrictions to travel to the Russian Federation, whereas the second applicant would not encounter any obstacles in meeting outside Latvia his child whose mother was a Russian national.","32. On 3 September 2015 (in relation to the first applicant) and on 5 February 2015 (in relation to the second applicant) the Administrative Cases Division of the Senate of the Supreme Court refused to initiate cassation proceedings. The Senate stated, in particular, that the contested expulsion orders were a final stage in the proceedings initiated by the decisions of the Minister of Interior. The Senate further noted that it had been made aware of the decisions of the Minister of Interior and the letters of SAB on which the decision was based, and of the decisions of the Prosecutor General. Review of the above decisions fell outside the scope of the present proceedings, but these decisions attested to the lawful basis and legitimate aim of the applicants \u2019 expulsion.","33. On the question of the proportionality of the interference with the applicants \u2019 family lives, the Senate upheld the lower court \u2019 s findings and noted that the applicants had not advanced any arguments indicating any restrictions to enjoy their family life outside Latvia. In relation to the second applicant, the Senate noted that in 2002, while still residing in Russia, he had agreed that the child would reside with the applicant \u2019 s former wife, a Russian national, in Latvia. The Senate also stated that both applicants had entered the Republic of Latvia as adults and throughout their stay in Latvia they had not learned Latvian, which showed that their ties with the expelling State were not strong.","(b) Withdrawal of the residence permit","34. On 1 August 2012 the acting director of the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs decided to withdraw the first applicant \u2019 s residence permit and refused to grant the second applicant a temporary residence permit because of their inclusion in the blacklist.","35. The applicants \u2019 legal representative lodged appeals against the above-mentioned decisions on 22 and 28 August 2012 respectively. Two levels of administrative courts dismissed the complaints.","36. On 14 August 2015, the Administrative Cases Division of the Senate of the Supreme Court refused to initiate cassation proceedings in relation to the second applicant. The Senate noted, in particular, that the authorities had concluded that the applicant posed a threat to national security, and that depriving him of residence permit served a legitimate aim. The Senate also did not see any reasons why the applicant could not meet his minor child outside the territory of Latvia, especially in the circumstances where already in 2002, while still residing in Russia, the applicant had agreed that the child would reside with his mother in Latvia.","37. The cassation complaint submitted by the first applicant is pending examination before the Senate.","38. On 15 September 2014 the Ombudsman of the Republic of Latvia issued an opinion following the applicants \u2019 complaint concerning their expulsion proceedings. The Ombudsman did not find any violation of Articles 3 or 8 of the Convention. In relation to the review procedure, the opinion stated:","\u201c A decision to include someone in the list of foreigners prohibited from entering the Republic of Latvia is adopted by the Senate of the Supreme Court in the form of oral proceedings by a special panel of judges to whom special access to [State] secrets is granted, as well as interpreters, recordkeepers and other court officials to whom such access is also granted. No prima facie legitimate purpose can currently be established for dividing the appellate procedure into the competence of two other institutions, the Supreme Court and Prosecutor General; no further analysis shall follow, however, as the assessment of this issue is not the subject of this case.\u201d","39. The final conclusions, as far as relevant, stated:","\u201cFirstly, a breach of Article 13 of the [Convention] and [Article 1 \u00a7 1 (a)] of Protocol No. 7 to the [Convention] has been committed in respect of the expelled S.N. and T.D. Once a State holds that not only the Supreme Court but also the Prosecutor General has the right to review a decision to include someone in the list of foreigners prohibited from entering the State, observation of the adversarial principle has to be ensured in the latter process, similar to the process guaranteed in Supreme Court [review cases]. If an alien seeks to contest the decision, defence counsel must be provided who has access to classified information, [State] secrets, and the right to familiarise [himself] with the evidence on which the expulsion of foreigners is based, so that a complaint may be filed for the protection of the interests of the expelled foreigner.\u201d","B. Relevant domestic law and practice","1. Constitution","40. The relevant Articles of the Latvian Constitution ( Satversme ) provide:","Article 92","\u201cEveryone has the right to defend his or her rights and lawful interests in a fair court. Everyone shall be presumed innocent until his or her guilt has been established in accordance with the law. Everyone whose rights are violated without justification has the right to commensurate compensation. Everyone has the right to the assistance of counsel.\u201d","Article 96","\u201cEveryone has the right to inviolability of his or her private life, home and correspondence.\u201d","Article 116","\u201cThe rights of persons set out [in Article 96] ... of the Constitution may be subject to restrictions in the circumstances provided for by law in order to protect the rights of other people, the democratic structure of the State and public safety, welfare and morals. On the basis of the conditions set forth in this Article, restrictions may also be imposed on the expression of religious beliefs.\u201d","2. The Constitutional Court Law, as in force at the material time","(a) Relevant provisions","41. Section 18 paragraph 1 part 4 of the Constitutional Court Law provides that an application to the Constitutional Court regarding the initiation of constitutional proceedings must, among other criteria, contain legal reasoning ( juridiskais pamatojums ). Pursuant to section 19 \u00b2, in addition to the above-mentioned requirements, an individual constitutional complaint must include justification as to how the applicant \u2019 s fundamental rights as defined in the Constitution have been infringed upon, and show that all available remedies have been used.","42. Section 20 sets out the grounds on which the panel examining the constitutional complaint may refuse to initiate a case. When examining a constitutional complaint (application) the panel may also refuse to initiate a case where the legal reasoning included in the complaint is evidently insufficient to satisfy the claim (section 20(6)).","(b) Interpretation of the \u201clegal reasoning\u201d requirement","43. In a decision of 14 March 2014 ( application no. 29\/2014) on the question of institution of constitutional proceedings, the panel of the Constitutional Court stated that the legal reasoning of a complaint is an analysis of the content of a legal provision, an explanation as to how the impugned provision interferes with the applicant \u2019 s fundamental rights, an assessment of the lawfulness of the procedure according to which the impugned provision has been adopted, and an assessment of the legal aim and proportionality of the interference.","44. On 7 May 2014 ( application no. 61\/2014) on the question of institution of constitutional proceedings, the panel of the Constitutional Court stated that in support of an allegation that the impugned provision does not comply with the provisions of the Constitution, the applicant must indicate in the legal reasoning (1) whether the contested provision contains any restriction of rights, (2) whether this restriction is prescribed by law and has a legitimate aim and (3) whether the restriction is proportionate to the aim pursued.","3. Immigration law (wording in force at the material time)","45. Under section 46(5) of the Immigration Law, once a decision to include an alien in a blacklist has been adopted by the Minister of Interior and if the person is on Latvian territory, the chief of the Border Guard Service or someone authorised by him must adopt a decision to expel ( l\u0113mums par piespiedu izraid\u012b\u0161anu ) the person concerned within eight days, to be counted from the date it was established that he or she was on Latvian territory.","46. Section 50(1) provides that an alien has the right to appeal against an expulsion decision within seven days. Under section 50(3), an appeal against a decision taken pursuant to section 46 does not have suspensive effect.","47. Section 51 of the Immigration Law lists the circumstances in which the State Border Guard Service may detain an alien. Paragraph 2 part 4 at the material time, provided that an alien could be detained on grounds of information that a person poses threats to national security, public order or safety.","48. Under section 61(1)(1) the Minister of Interior may decide to include someone who is not a Latvian citizen or a \u201cnon-citizen\u201d in a blacklist if, among other things, \u201ccompetent State institutions have reason to believe\u201d (\u201c kompetent\u0101m valsts iest\u0101d\u0113m ir pamats uzskat\u012bt \u201d) that he or she (i) is a member of an anti-governmental or criminal organisation or has a role in such an organisation, (ii) is a threat to national security or public order and safety, or (iii) may hinder the pre-trial investigation or work of the law enforcement authorities in investigating the crimes upon arriving in Latvia (section 61(1)(2)), or (iv) has carried out or is planning to carry out a serious or particularly serious crime (section 61(1)(3)).","49. In relation to the review, section 61 at the material time provided as follows:","(6) A alien in respect of whom a decision has been taken in accordance with [61(1)] has the right, within one month of becoming acquainted with the decision, to appeal to the Administrative Cases Division of the Senate of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Latvia. Submission of an application to the court may not suspend implementation of the decision referred to [in section 61(1)]. The applicant does not have the right to request the court to suspend the operation of such a decision.","...","(8) If the decision referred to in section 61(1) has been taken on the basis of information acquired by State security institutions as a result of intelligence or counterintelligence operations, it may be appealed to the Prosecutor General \u2019 s Office, whose decision shall be final.\u201d","50. Section 61(6) came into effect on 1 July 2005 and it was introduced after the Constitutional Court had declared unconstitutional a provision providing that decisions adopted by the Minister of Interior were not amenable to review (see paragraph 53 below). Section 61(8) about the Prosecutor General \u2019 s Office review came into effect on 10 February 2006.","51. In May 2006 section 65 3 (3) came into force, which provides that if the applicant \u2019 s representative does not have a special permit for access to State secrets, the court must appoint as the applicant \u2019 s representative for that part of the proceedings an advocate practising in Latvia who has been issued such a permit. If the applicant does not consent to such representation, the court must examine the information associated with official secrets without involving the applicant or his or her representative.","52. Section 63(7) provides that in cases where the period of an entry ban exceeds three years, the institution which has adopted the decision to include an alien in the blacklist shall review it every three years from the date it was taken.","4. Relevant Constitutional Court case-law","53. The relevant parts of the Constitutional Court \u2019 s judgment of 6 December 2004 (case no. 2004-14-01) on the compliance of section 61(6) of the Immigration Law with Article 92 of the Constitution read:","\u201c10. In conformity with section 61 of the Immigration Law, the opinion of the competent State authorities (in this particular case, the opinion of the State security institution) lies at the basis of the Minister \u2019 s [of the Interior] decision. Someone who challenges his or her inclusion in the [blacklist] does not agree, as a matter of course, with the facts expressed in the decision, which are often connected with issues of State security. When reviewing such claims, the use of confidential material may be unavoidable. Even though in cases connected with national security the possibility of legal examination is limited, this does not mean that the national authorities can be free from effective judicial control in all cases, whenever they choose to assert that national security and terrorism are involved ( see ECHR Judgment in case \u201cChahal v. the United Kingdom \u201d \u00a7 131 ).","...","If the violation of a person \u2019 s rights is the result of the decision of a competent institution (State security institution), on the basis of which the Minister of Interior has adopted the decision, one can agree with the opinion voiced in the letter by the Ministry of the Interior that the person has the possibility of protecting his rights by lodging a complaint to the prosecutor under the procedure set out in Article 6 of the State Security Institutions Law. As regards an assessment of the activity of the State security institution in this case, the State has secured a protection remedy for the individual, which is as effective as possible in circumstances where the issue is connected with State security and, possibly, the use of confidential information. The Constitutional Court in its judgments has already pointed out that \u201cin Latvia the Prosecutor [General \u2019 s Office] may be regarded as an effective and available means of protection, because the status and role of the prosecutor in supervising the law secures an independent and impartial review of cases in compliance with Article 13 of the Convention\u201d ( see the Constitutional Court October 11, 2004 Judgment in case no. 2004-06-01; April 23, 2003 Judgment in case no.2002-20-0103 )","Thus, as regards the assessment of the competent (State security) institution, the State has secured effective protection under Article 13 of the Convention.","...","15. ... The fact that the Minister of Interior \u2019 s decision might be connected with interests of State security does not prevent the State from establishing a procedure under which the judicial institutions in certain cases, and under a definite procedure, may acquaint themselves with the material connected with State security. The institution concerned may even decide to present the required amount of documents separately if [they] do not include State secrets. Article 6 of the Convention, if read together with Article 5, also provides such a solution by, among other things, a special positive duty upon States, in accordance with which they have to create institutional infrastructures necessary for the implementation of a fair court, and enact legal norms which guarantee that the procedure is fair and impartial.","...","The impugned provision thus does not ensure realisation of a person \u2019 s right to a fair court as guaranteed by Article 92 of the Satversme \u201d.","54. On 7 October 2010 the Constitutional Court (case no. 2010-01-01 ) noted that international human rights norms and the practice of their application serve as a means of interpretation at constitutional law level to determine the contents and scope of fundamental rights and the principle of the law-governed State, as far as it does not lead to a decrease or limitation of the fundamental rights included in the Constitution.","55. On 6 November 2014 the Constitutional Court (case no. 2013-20-03) held that the contested provision of the domestic law did not comply with the Constitution and was repealed with effect from 1 May 2015. As regards the individual applicant, in order for him to have the possibility to require repeated assessment of the proportionality of the measure adopted against him, the contested legal provision was repealed with effect as of the date of its adoption."],"28858":["1. A list of the applicants, all of whom are Turkish nationals, is set out in Appendix A.","A. Background to the events giving rise to the applications","2. Since August 2015 a number of curfews have been imposed in certain towns and cities in south-east Turkey by the local governors, including the towns of Cizre and Sur where the applicants live. The stated aim of the curfews was to clear the trenches dug up and the explosives planted by members of a number of outlawed organisations, as well as to protect the civilians from violence. Some of those curfews were lifted and then re-imposed on various dates. In imposing the curfews the governors relied on section 11 (c) of the Provincial Administration Law (see \u201cRelevant domestic law\u201d below).","3. On 14 December 2015 a curfew was imposed in the town of Cizre, prohibiting people from leaving their homes at any time of the day. The 24 \u2011 hour curfew in Cizre continued until it was modified on 2 March 2016, whereby people were allowed to leave their homes between the hours of 5 a.m. and 7.30 p.m. Another modification of the modalities of the curfew made on 28 March 2016 allowed people to leave their homes between 4.30 a.m. and 9.30 p.m. and a final modification made on 5 June 2016 limited the curfew hours to between 11 p.m. and 2.30 a.m.","4. On 11 December 2015 a 24-hour curfew was imposed in six of the fifteen neighbourhoods in the town of Sur. On 13 and 16 March and 22 May 2016 the curfew was lifted from some parts of those neighbourhoods.","5. The applicants allege that a large number of people have been killed in areas under curfew and that a large number of houses have been bombed and destroyed by fire opened from military vehicles such as tanks. In support of their allegations the applicants submitted to the Court video recordings and photographs, showing tanks and armed military vehicles driving on the streets and on the outskirts of towns and helicopters flying overhead; houses and blocks of flats being pounded by heavy artillery and the extensive damage caused to the insides and outsides of a number of buildings; smoke billowing from a large number of buildings; injured people - including children and elderly - being carried on makeshift stretchers.","6. According to a report published by the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey on 22 March 2016, the number of civilians killed between August 2015 and 18 March 2016 in areas under curfew \u2010 including Cizre and Sur \u2010 was at least 310. Of those 310 deceased persons, 72 were children, 62 were women and 29 were aged 60 and older. A further 79 persons killed in the area during that same period were not yet identified. It was estimated that 76 of those persons lost their lives because they had not been able to have access to medical facilities.","7. It was stated in the report pertaining to an Urgent Action launched by Amnesty International on 11 January 2016 that \u201c[i] n all areas under curfew many residents are facing severe electricity and water shortages and they cannot leave their homes to access basic food supplies. Residents requiring medical care have also been unable to safely leave their neighbourhoods to access such care. Ambulances in some cases have been unable to enter areas under curfew due to the security situation or because they were denied access by the security services.\u201d","8. According to the Mardin Chamber of Pharmacies which oversees the pharmacies in a number of towns and cities including Cizre, after 14 December 2015 only five of the nineteen pharmacies in Cizre managed to stay open and even then only for three hours a day. As a result, substantially fewer people were able to obtain their prescription medicines and no baby food was sold. Furthermore, since the beginning of the curfew all family health clinics in Cizre have been closed.","B. The circumstances of the cases","9. The facts of the cases, as submitted by the applicants and as they appear from the documents submitted by them, may be summarised as follows.","1. \u00d6mer El\u00e7i v. Turkey, no. 63129\/15","10. The applicant and his family live in the Nur Neighbourhood of Cizre.","11. A curfew had been imposed on Cizre between 4 and 12 September 2015 and according to a report prepared by Mr Tahir El\u00e7i, the president of the Diyarbak\u0131r Bar Association at the time, during that period fifteen civilians were killed by firearms and six other civilians lost their lives because they were not taken to hospital. A further nine civilians were injured by firearms.","12. On 9 September 2015 the applicant introduced an individual application before the Constitutional Court concerning that curfew and requested an interim measure. In that application the applicant alleged, inter alia, that as a result of the curfew his rights guaranteed in Articles 2, 3, 5 and 8 of the Convention had been violated and asked for the curfew to be lifted.","13. The applicant \u2019 s request was rejected by the Constitutional Court on 11 September 2015. The Constitutional Court considered that the applicant had failed to show that his life would be endangered if he complied with the rules of the curfew and that there was no serious danger necessitating the granting of an interim measure (see also paragraph 48 below in \u201cRelevant Domestic Law and Practice\u201d).","14. After the introduction of the round-the-clock curfew in Cizre on 14 December 2015, the applicant and his family members became unable to leave their home and they were cut off from the outside world. They had to live in harsh winter conditions without water or electricity and without access to health and other public services. Because of the lack of a supply of food, the applicant and his family members were able to have only one meal per day.","15. The applicant \u2019 s house is in an area where the military operations were more intense. After the imposition of the curfew, military tanks surrounded the applicant \u2019 s neighbourhood and shelled the buildings in it, endangering the lives of those living in the neighbourhood. On one such occasion a tank shell landed in the garden of the applicant \u2019 s house, smashing the windows of the house. The house belonging to the applicant \u2019 s brother, which neighboured the applicant \u2019 s house, was burned down by the security forces. The applicant submitted photographs of his house and garden showing the remains of a tank shell lying in the garden and bullet holes in the walls and windows. He also submitted photographs of his brother \u2019 s house which show a burned house and extensive damage inside it.","16. Fearing that their house might get bombed, the applicant, his family members and around forty of their neighbours left their homes on 8 January 2016 and moved to another neighbourhood of Cizre where the clashes were less severe. They returned to their homes on 26 February 2016.","17. On 13 January 2016 the applicant \u2019 s legal representatives sent a letter to the governor of \u015e\u0131rnak and asked for permission to be allowed to see the applicant with a view to obtaining information and documents from him in order to prepare the application form to be submitted to the Court and to obtaining the applicant \u2019 s signature on the application form. On 15 January 2016 the governor informed the applicant \u2019 s legal representatives that armed clashes in Cizre were continuing and his office was under an obligation to protect all civilians from violence. They could not, therefore, allow the legal representatives to visit the applicant in Cizre but if the applicant wanted to contact the police and was prepared to go to a secure location to be specified by the authorities, then the security forces could take him from there to a location outside of Cizre where the legal representatives could meet him. The governor also informed the legal representatives that personnel from his office had telephoned the applicant and that the applicant had told them that he had not asked for a meeting with his lawyers but that he would nevertheless meet with the lawyers if they so wished.","18. Fearing for the applicant \u2019 s safety, the lawyers decided not to meet with the applicant. After the curfew in Cizre was lifted during daytime hours, the applicant \u2019 s legal representatives went to Cizre and met with the applicant who signed the application form and provided them with an update about his circumstances.","2. Vesek v. Turkey, no. 63138\/15","19. After the curfew was imposed in the applicant \u2019 s home town of Cizre on 14 December 2015, the applicant and his family members became unable to leave their home. The applicant was living in a house together with his wife, their two children and the latter \u2019 s families. When the security forces started shelling the houses in the applicant \u2019 s neighbourhood with heavy artillery, the applicant and his family members left their house on 5 January 2016 and moved to a relatively safer neighbourhood of Cizre where they started living with eleven other persons. While moving to that address the applicant noticed that almost all the houses in his neighbourhood had been shelled with artillery. After the applicant had left his house he was unable to obtain any information about the fate of his house. In the opinion of the applicant, given that his entire neighbourhood has been completely evacuated because of the intensive artillery shelling, it was likely that his house was also destroyed.","3. Ero\u011flu v. Turkey, no. 478\/16","20. Following the imposition of the round-the-clock curfew in the town of Sur on 11 December 2015, the two applicants \u2013 husband and wife \u2013 and their children became unable to leave their home situated in a part of the town covered by the curfew and where there were armed clashes. Their children were unable to go to school or even outside to play with other children. A large number of buildings in their town were demolished during the armed clashes. In support of their allegations the applicants submitted to the Court a number of photographs showing extensive explosives \u2019 damage to the outsides and insides of a number of houses.","21. The applicants were unable to work and their living standards therefore deteriorated considerably. When on occasions the first applicant Kas\u0131m Ero\u011flu was able to leave the family home in order to buy food and other supplies, he had to persuade the security forces to allow him to return to the house. When he was unable to persuade them, he had to stay with his relatives in other parts of Diyarbak\u0131r which were not under curfew. The applicants and their children suffered psychological problems because of hearing frequent explosions, living in constant fear and witnessing their town being destroyed.","4. G\u00f6rg\u00f6z v. Turkey, no. 480\/16","22. Following the imposition of the curfew in their home town of Sur on 11 December 2015, the applicants \u2013 mother and daughter \u2013 became unable to leave their home which is in a part of the town covered by the curfew and where there were armed clashes. The second applicant was unable to go to school. A large number of buildings in their town were demolished during the armed clashes. In support of their allegations the applicants submitted to the Court a number of photographs showing extensive explosives \u2019 damage to the outsides and insides of a number of houses.","23. The applicants were unable to work and their living standards therefore deteriorated considerably. They suffered psychological problems because of hearing frequent explosions, living in constant fear and witnessing their town being destroyed.","5. Sultan and S\u00fcleyman D\u00fczg\u00fcn v. Turkey, no. 891\/16","24. Following the imposition of the curfew in Sur on 11 December 2015, the two applicants \u2013 husband and wife \u2013 became unable to leave their home situated in a part of the town covered by the curfew and where there were armed clashes. Most of the time they did not have electricity, water or heating. Their children were unable to go to school or even outside to play with their friends. A large number of buildings in the applicants \u2019 town were demolished during the armed clashes. In support of their allegations the applicants submitted to the Court a number of photographs showing extensive explosives \u2019 damage to the outsides and insides of a number of houses.","25. The applicants were unable to work and their living standards therefore deteriorated considerably. They suffered psychological problems because of hearing frequent explosions, living in constant fear and witnessing their town being destroyed.","6. Bedri and Halime D\u00fczg\u00fcn v. Turkey, no. 901\/16","26. Following the imposition of the curfew in Sur on 11 December 2015, the applicants \u2013 husband and wife \u2013 became unable to leave their home which is in a part of the town covered by the curfew and where there were armed clashes. Their children were unable to go to school or outside to play with their friends. A large number of buildings in the applicants \u2019 town were demolished during the armed clashes. In support of their allegations the applicants submitted to the Court a number of photographs showing extensive explosives \u2019 damage to the outsides and insides of a number of houses.","27. The applicants were unable to work and their living standards therefore deteriorated considerably. They suffered psychological problems because of hearing frequent explosions, living in constant fear and witnessing their town being destroyed.","7. \u00c7a\u011flak v. Turkey, no. 2200\/16","28. The applicant and her family live in the town of Sur. Following the imposition of the round-the-clock curfew on 11 December 2015, they became unable to leave their home and they were cut off from the outside world. They had to live in harsh winter conditions without water, food, electricity and medication, and without access to health care, education, communication facilities or other public services. Severe armed clashes took place in the vicinity of the applicant \u2019 s home which endangered her and her family members \u2019 lives.","29. A large number of buildings in the applicant \u2019 s town were demolished and a number of people were killed and injured during the armed clashes. In support of her allegations the applicant submitted to the Court a number of photographs and a video footage recording, showing extensive explosives \u2019 damage to the outsides and insides of a number of houses.","8. Da\u011fl\u0131 and Others v. Turkey, 6990\/16","30. The 22 applicants are members of four families who live in Cizre. Following the imposition of the round-the-clock curfew in Cizre on 14 December 2015, they became unable to leave their homes which were located in areas where there were heavy clashes.","31. Shortly after the imposition of the curfew, the Da\u011fl\u0131 family sent their 11-year-old son Kadir to another town so that his life would not be endangered in Cizre. Although the Da\u011fl\u0131 family home was not shelled, a neighbouring house was riddled with bullets. As a result of such incidents the applicants lived in constant fear for their lives. Although the applicants were told that some shops would be open, they did not dare to leave their home for fear of being shot at on the street. They also did not want to leave their homes because if they did so they would be subjected to numerous searches and insults by the security forces and ordered to pay a fine of 219 Turkish liras (approximately 65 Euros) for breaching the curfew. The applicant Mr Mehmet Senan Da\u011fl\u0131 owned a small shop situated beneath the family home but he was unable to open it for business. The Da\u011fl\u0131 family were practically imprisoned in their own house where there were frequent power cuts. Their son, the applicant Muhammed Da\u011fl\u0131, was unable to go to school.","32. The Zeren family live in two neighbouring flats in Cizre. When the curfew was imposed, obtaining food became a life-threatening event for them even though there was a small shop in their block of flats which was open until midday but whose food stocks were not replenished. The Zeren family and their young children lived in fear for their lives because of artillery shelling in nearby neighbourhoods. The applicant Narin Zeren is a pharmacist but she was unable to open her pharmacy after the imposition of the curfew. Four of the applicants from the Zeren family are students but they were unable to go to school.","33. The K\u0131rm\u0131z\u0131g\u00fcl family lived in their family home until the middle of January 2016. When an artillery shell hit a neighbouring house and the shrapnel from that explosion spread to their house, they abandoned the family home and moved to a relative \u2019 s house in another part of Cizre. However, the houses in that neighbourhood were also hit by bullets and they lived in constant fear. In both houses the members of the K\u0131rm\u0131z\u0131g\u00fcl family suffered extreme difficulties such as a lack of food, drinking water, electricity, heating and access to health facilities. The applicant Emin K\u0131rm\u0131z\u0131g\u00fcl has heart problems and became unable to go to work after the imposition of the curfew. Six of the applicants from the K\u0131rm\u0131z\u0131g\u00fcl family are students but they were unable to go to school.","34. The De\u011fer family lived in their family home in Cizre. On 15 December 2015 - that is the day after the curfew was imposed - there was a power and water cut. The water they had stocked in their house beforehand lasted until the beginning of January 2016 and afterwards they had to abandon their home and move into the house of a friend in another part of Cizre. They were unable to take with them their belongings and had to leave their cow and car behind. Four of the applicants from the De\u011fer family are students but they were unable to go to school. Artillery shelling continued in their new neighbourhood as well, killing one child, injuring two children and demolishing a mosque. The applicants lived in constant fear for their lives.","35. On 29 January 2016 the 22 applicants and four other relatives applied to the Constitutional Court and asked for an interim measure for, inter alia, the curfew to be lifted. They argued that their lives were at risk, that they were unable to obtain the necessary food and other household goods and that their children were unable to go to school.","36. On 3 February 2016 the Constitutional Court rejected their request. While examining the applicants \u2019 request the Constitutional Court apparently contacted the governor of Cizre and obtained information about the applicants \u2019 situation. The governor apparently informed the Constitutional Court that the applicants had not contacted the authorities to ask for help. The lawyer representing the applicants informed the Constitutional Court that the reason why the applicants had not asked for help was because they did not trust the authorities. The Constitutional Court also considered that members of the De\u011fer family were in a part of Cizre unaffected by the curfew.","37. In the light of the foregoing the Constitutional Court rejected the request for the interim measure and considered that it was open to the applicants to contact the local authorities and ask for help. In its decision the Constitutional Court also reiterated the reasoning it had adopted in a previous and comparable case (see paragraph 13 above and paragraph 48 below).","9. Kaya v. Turkey, no. 9712\/16","38. After the introduction of the round-the-clock curfew in Sur on 11 December 2015, the applicant became unable to leave her home and she was cut off from the outside world. She had to live in harsh winter conditions without water, food, heating or electricity and without access to health care and other public services.","39. Her house was in the midst of heavy clashes and as a result of those clashes the applicant suffered a number of injuries. Her psychological well-being deteriorated as a result of the trauma she suffered because of her fears for her life.","40. After having lived in such circumstances for almost three months, the applicant was evacuated from her house on 2 March 2016 and taken into police custody on suspicion of membership of an outlawed organisation. After having been detained there for four days, a judge ordered her release.","C. The proceedings before the Court","41. On 29 December 2015 Mr \u00d6mer El\u00e7i, that is the applicant in application no. 63129\/16, requested the Court, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, to indicate to the Turkish Government to lift the curfew imposed in Cizre and to ensure that the operations in Cizre by the security forces were either halted or were conducted in compliance with the applicable international standards.","42. On 31 December 2015 the Court requested the Government to submit the following information:","\u201c1. What is the legal basis for the curfews?","2. Given the curfew, is the applicant able to have realistic and adequate access to health services and obtain his elementary needs such as food, water, electricity, etc.? In that connection, would his life be endangered if he were to leave his house for any emergencies or for procuring basic goods such as food and medicines?","3. In view of the number of civilian casualties reported in the areas affected by the curfew, including, in particular, the area in which the applicant lives, what measures have been and are being taken to safeguard the right to life of the residents living in those areas?\u201d","43. On 8 January 2016 the Government submitted their reply to the above questions.","44. Between 31 December 2015 and 18 February 2016 the applicants in the remaining eight applications also requested similar interim measures from the Court under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.","45. The applicants \u2019 requests for interim measures were declined by the Court between 12 January and 19 February 2016. The Court decided to give priority treatment to the applications in accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court and, given the apparent gravity of the situation in the region, it also informed the Government that it relied on the Government to take all reasonable steps in order to ensure that applicants in a vulnerable situation with regard to their physical integrity would be enabled to have access to necessary care if they so requested.","D. Relevant domestic law and practice","46. Article 13 of the Turkish Constitution provides as follows:","\u201cFundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted only by law and in conformity with the reasons mentioned in the relevant articles of the Constitution without infringing upon their essence. These restrictions shall not be contrary to the letter and spirit of the Constitution and the requirements of the democratic order of the society and the secular republic and the principle of proportionality.\u201d","47. Section 11 of the Provincial Administration Law (Law No 5442, 10 June 1949), in so far as relevant, provides as follows:","\u201cA) Governors are the superiors of all regular or private armed forces located within their provinces. They [governors] take the necessary steps in order to prevent a crime from taking place and to maintain the public order and safety. To that end they may employ all regular and private armed forces of the State; managers and employees of such entities are obliged to swiftly comply with the governors \u2019 orders\u201d.","...","C) Governors have the duty to maintain and to protect the peace and safety, personal integrities, well-being of the public, enjoyment of possessions, and preventative law-enforcement within their provinces.\u201d","48. The Constitutional Court adopted a number of decisions in relation to the requests it received for interim measures for, inter alia, the curfews to be lifted. In its first such decision, which concerned the request made by the applicant \u00d6mer El\u00e7i (see paragraph 13 above), the Constitutional Court stated the following in response to the applicant \u2019 s allegations that the curfews lacked a legal basis:","\u201c Pursuant to section 11 \u00a7 C of Law No. 5442, the Governor of \u015e\u0131rnak declared a curfew in the town of Cizre where the applicants claim they are living. The Governor \u2019 s reasoning for taking that decision was to apprehend members of the terrorist organisation and to protect the lives and property of members of the public during terrorist incidents. The declaration of the curfew by the Governor for the above-mentioned reasons, in order to maintain public order and to protect the lives and property of the public, cannot be said to be devoid of basis.\u201d","49. In its subsequent decisions the Constitutional Court rejected the requests for interim measures and reiterated its conclusion set out in the preceding paragraph.","E. Relevant international materials","50. On 2 December 2016 the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights published his Memorandum on the \u201cHuman Rights Implications of Anti-Terrorism Operations in South-Eastern Turkey\u201d (CommDH(2016)39). The Memorandum \u2019 s conclusions and recommendations are as follows:","\u201c5. Conclusions and recommendations","118. The Commissioner is fully aware of the extent of the terrorist threat faced by Turkey and recognises the right and duty of the Turkish state to fight against terrorism in all its forms. The Commissioner also understands the circumstances in South-Eastern Turkey, where an armed, separatist organisation, recognised as terrorist by the EU, NATO and many countries, has systematically used violence and terror in a decades-long conflict which has claimed tens of thousands of lives. Nothing in this memorandum should be considered as justifying the actions of the PKK or any other terrorist activity in South-Eastern Turkey.","119. At the same time, the response of the Turkish state, in accordance with its international obligations, must adhere to the principles of rule of law and human rights standards, which require any interference with basic human rights to be defined in law, necessary in a democratic society and strictly proportionate to the aim pursued. In this respect, Turkey has a very long record of extremely grave human rights violations recognised as such by the European Court of Human Rights, with the most severe forms of violation having occurred in South-Eastern Turkey in the 1990s. Following a period of relative peace during the so-called \u201csolution process\u201d, the Commissioner deeply regrets the resumption of hostilities and their rapid escalation in South-Eastern Turkey.","120. For the purposes of this memorandum, the Commissioner examined the response of the Turkish authorities to the situation in the South-East since the summer of 2015, which mainly took the form of declaration of curfews accompanied by police and\/or military operations. In the light of this examination as set out in the body of this memorandum and in view of the applicable international and European standards, as well as of the tremendous restrictions on the enjoyment of core human rights that they imposed, the Commissioner considers these measures to have been neither legal, in the sense of being sufficiently foreseeable and defined in law, nor roportionate to the legitimate aim pursued by Turkey.","121. In the opinion of the Commissioner, therefore, the response the Turkish authorities developed since August 2015, characterised by the declaration of open-ended, 24-hour curfews, have caused a number of very serious human rights violations simply by virtue of having been imposed on the affected local populations. The Commissioner urges the Turkish authorities in the strongest possible terms to put an immediate end to this practice. Any future measures deployed in the region must show much higher regard to the human rights of the local civilian population when balancing them against the imperative of the fight against terrorism.","122. As regards numerous allegations of human rights violations committed by security forces, the Commissioner finds them to be extremely serious and consistent. He considers many of these allegations to be credible, given their sources and considering past patterns of human rights violations committed by Turkish security forces during anti-terrorism operations in the South-East, as well as the Turkish authorities \u2019 efforts to reinforce the immunity of security forces from prosecution during this period. At any rate, given the fact that these allegations concern violations in areas cut off from the world during operations which were under the complete control of the authorities, it is for the Turkish authorities to prove convincingly that they are unfounded.","123. The Commissioner observes that the Turkish authorities not only have not shown any willingness to tackle the long-standing problem of impunity and to implement the recurrent recommendations of the Commissioner \u2019 s Office on this issue, but that the patterns which have led to serious human rights violations in the past remained in operation during the period in question. All evidence indicates that the authorities did neither treat with the requisite seriousness the allegations of human rights violations, nor conduct ex officio criminal investigations into lives lost during the operations in a way that would be liable to shed light on the events. The priority seems to have rather been to reassure and shield from prosecution the security forces, who have only been subjected to disciplinary sanctions for particularly egregious forms of misconduct with the exception of very few criminal cases where members of security forces were treated as suspects, while at the same time vilifying human rights NGOs and lawyers bringing these allegations. In the Commissioner \u2019 s opinion, this situation falls woefully short of Turkey \u2019 s international obligations.","124. For investigations into these allegations to be considered effective, they should have been immediate, diligent and thorough. Unfortunately, given the elapsed time since some of the operations, the fact that evidence might have been actively destroyed with heavy machinery in the affected zones, as well as the general attitude of prosecutors, it seems very improbable that any future investigation will fully satisfy the criteria for effectiveness. Turkish authorities will therefore have to contend with the fact that Turkey will be presumed to have committed many serious human rights violations, including violations of the right to life, during the period in question.","125. This situation brings home the urgency for a mentality shift in Turkey when it comes to the accountability of state agents. The Commissioner considers that impunity has been a nefarious influence throughout Turkey \u2019 s recent history, legitimising and fostering behaviour fundamentally at odds with human rights, and undermining all efforts to protect and promote them. It is true that the authorities took swift action to punish state agents suspected of involvement in the coup attempt of 15 July 2016, but the Commissioner regrets that one of the first measures taken in this connection was to give administrative, legal and criminal immunity to other state agents enforcing emergency decrees. In the opinion of the Commissioner, a crucial test for human rights in Turkey is whether the same diligence can be shown when the actions are not directed against the state but the human rights of its individual citizens.","126. The Commissioner once more urges Turkey in the strongest possible terms to finally tackle the numerous root causes of impunity in Turkey (see paragraph 83 above) and implement the recommendations he repeatedly made to Turkey for combatting it.","127. In the light of his examination set out in this memorandum, the Commissioner considers that numerous human rights of a very large population in South-Eastern Turkey have been violated in the context of the anti-terrorism operations conducted since August 2015. The priority for Turkey must therefore be to abandon the approach which has led to this situation, followed by the demonstration of a clear will to remedy its effects.","128. This requires, firstly, public recognition by the authorities of the mistakes and human rights violations committed. This must be accompanied by serious efforts to compensate moral and material damages suffered by the people concerned, be it because of the failure of the Turkish state to protect them from terrorism or the direct effect of the anti-terrorist operations themselves. The Commissioner gained the impression that the Turkish authorities do not grasp the scale of the efforts needed in this connection and the existing framework for compensation appears clearly insufficient in many respects. Regarding the approach to expropriate the local population in certain cities affected by the operations, the Commissioner thinks that such a measure would represent a double punishment for the persons affected and cannot be considered a form of redress.","129. The Commissioner wishes to stress his willingness to pursue his constructive dialogue with the Turkish authorities and to offer his assistance and support to their efforts to improve the protection and promotion of human rights in Turkey.\u201d","51. On 13 June 2016 European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) published its opinion on \u201cThe Legal Framework Governing Curfews\u201d, which had been adopted at its 107 th Plenary Session (Venice, 10-11 June 2016). The report \u2019 s conclusions are as follows:","\u201cV. Conclusions","93. The Venice Commission has taken note with concern of the developments occurring since summer 2015 in South-East Turkey, where there have been particularly violent confrontations and major losses of human lives, including a large number of civilian losses, along with considerable material damage.","94. The Commission also recognises the scale and complexity of the challenges facing the Turkish authorities given the seriousness and the number of terrorist attacks which have been carried out recently in the country. Their efforts and their commitment to combating terrorism are legitimate.","95. The Commission would like to point out, however, that although it is a state \u2019 s duty to muster all its resources to combat the terrorist threat and protect its citizens from such attacks, it is also crucial in a democratic society to strike the right balance between security needs and the exercise of rights and freedoms, showing due regard for the requirements of the rule of law.","96. Despite the seriousness of the situation they were facing, the Turkish authorities chose not to declare a state of emergency to engage in the security operations they considered necessary in the areas concerned, whereas these operations and the related measures (such as curfew) inevitably entail restrictions to rights and freedoms, which sometimes have extremely serious consequences.","97. The Venice Commission has taken note of the authorities \u2019 choice, which they justify through their desire to protect rights and freedoms in all circumstances including in a context in which, as they themselves state, all the prerequisites to declare a state of emergency were met.","98. The Commission therefore notes that the curfews imposed since August 2015 have not been based on the constitutional and legislative framework which specifically governs the use of exceptional measures in Turkey, including curfew. To comply with this framework, any curfew measure should be associated with emergency rule, as provided for in Articles 119 to 122 of the Constitution. This would also be in keeping with the approach of the Commission, which has stressed in its work that de facto emergency powers should be avoided and it is better to declare them officially along with their accompanying lists of obligations and guarantees including the obligation to inform international organisations of any derogations from fundamental rights and the reasons for these, thus subjecting their application to the supervision of these organisations or to parliamentary debate and approval.","99. In the Venice Commission \u2019 s opinion, the Provincial Administration Law, on which decisions imposing curfews were based, and the decisions themselves do not meet the requirements of legality enshrined in the Constitution and resulting from Turkey \u2019 s international obligations in the area of fundamental rights, in particular under the ECHR and relevant case-law.","100. To remedy this situation, the Venice Commission invites the Turkish authorities to implement the following recommendations in particular:","- to no longer use the provisions of the Provincial Administration Law as a legal basis for declaring curfews and to ensure that the adoption of all emergency measures including curfews is carried out in compliance with the constitutional and legislative framework for exceptional measures in force in Turkey, showing due regard for the relevant international standards and complying with national rules and international obligations with regard to the protection of fundamental rights;","- to review the legal framework on states of emergency to ensure that all exceptional decisions and measures such as curfew taken by the authorities when a state of emergency is formally declared are subject to an effective review of legality including, in particular, consideration of their necessity and proportionality;","- to introduce all the necessary amendments to the State of Emergency Law so that there is a clear description in the law of the material, procedural and temporal arrangements for the implementation of curfews, particularly the conditions and safeguards to which they must be subject (including parliamentary and judicial supervision).","101. The Venice Commission remains at the disposal of the Turkish authorities for any assistance they may require.\u201d"],"28853":["THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE","5.The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in the village of Krasnyy Yar in the Staropoltavskiy district of Volgograd Region.","A.Alleged ill-treatment by police officers","6.On 5 August 2002 a quarrel broke out between the applicant and T. on one side and the applicant\u2019s brothers V. and P. and P.\u2019s wife, E., on the other. V. and E. called the police.","7.At about 8 p.m. police officers D., S., Sh. and Z. arrived and took statements from E., who complained that at about 6p.m. the applicant and T. had burst into her home. The applicant had used obscene language towards her, threatening to \u201ckill everyone\u201d and attempting to hit her and her seven year\u2011old daughter. The police also took statements from A. who explained that she had been with E. when the applicant and T. had come over, asked about V. and then entered V.\u2019s home. She had then heard shouting, and E.\u2019s daughter had run in to tell her mother that there was a quarrel taking place in V.\u2019s courtyard. E. had attempted to enter the courtyard but T. had not let her in. The applicant had come out of V.\u2019s courtyard, using obscene language towards E. and threatening her with violence. The applicant and T. had followed E. into her house, continuing to insult and threaten her in the presence of her young daughter. This had continued until E.\u2019s husband, P., had arrived home and the applicant and T. had then left.","8.The police officers took the applicant to the Staropoltavskiy district police station. They arrived at about 11 p.m.","9.According to the applicant, he was thrown into the boot of the police car and driven for about 80kilometres. During the journey the police officers stopped the car and assaulted him. He was allegedly again assaulted at the police station. In particular, he was allegedly punched many times in the head and chest.","10.At an unspecified time that day police officer Sh. drew up a report charging the applicant with petty hooliganism, an offence under Article20.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences. It was stated in the report that at 6p.m. on 5 August 2002 the applicant had started a brawl with E., using abusive language and attempting to hit her.","11.At the police station the applicant was placed in a cell for administrative offenders overnight. Another detainee, K., was also being held in the cell.","12.At about 9 a.m. on 6 August 2002 the applicant was brought before a judge of the Staropoltavskiy District Court, who found that at 6p.m. on 5August 2002 the applicant had started a brawl with E. while drunk and had used obscene language towards her. The applicant was sentenced to two days\u2019 administrative detention for petty hooliganism.","13.After the hearing the applicant was placed in the Staropoltavskiy district police temporary detention facility. At his request and in view of his condition, an ambulance was called.","B.The applicant\u2019s injuries","14.Before taking him to hospital, an ambulance paramedic, N., diagnosed the applicant with a traumatic rupture of the left eardrum, bruising to the left of the ribcage, two fractured left ribs, a stomach injury and bruising to the left hip.","15.On the same day he was examined by an otolaryngologist from the Staropoltavskiy District Polyclinic. He complained of ringing in the left ear and stated that he had been assaulted by police officers. The otolaryngologist concluded that in addition to chronic otitis, the applicant had signs of traumatic otitis of the left ear.","16.On his admission to the Staropoltavskaya Central District Hospital the applicant stated that on 5August 2002 he had been assaulted by his brother and then by police officers. He complained of pain in the left of the ribcage, around the eighth and ninth ribs. He had an abrasion measuring 7by1.2 centimetres on the left of the chest. His final diagnosis was a fractured eleventh left rib confirmed by X-ray images, soft tissue bruising, abrasions on the left of the chest and traumatic otitis of the left ear.","17.On 8 August 2002 he was discharged and sent for outpatient treatment by an otolaryngologist, a physician assessment and monitoring by a surgeon.","18.The applicant received outpatient treatment at home. He was sent for a neurosurgical examination at the Volgograd Regional Polyclinic, where X-ray images showed that he had sustained fractures to the top and bottom of the left of the skull. He was urgently admitted to the Volgograd Regional Hospital. On admission the applicant complained that he had been suffering from recurrent headaches, ringing in the ears and dizziness, and hearing loss in the left ear. He explained that on 5August 2002 he had been assaulted by police officers.","19.The applicant\u2019s hospital treatment lasted from 24October to 11November 2002. He was diagnosed with a closed head injury, mild bruising on the brain, a fractured left temporal bone (confirmed by X\u2011ray images), otitis of both ears, loss of hearing in the right ear and first degree mixed hearing loss in the left ear.","C.Investigation into the applicant\u2019s complaint","1.Institution of criminal proceedings","20.On 8 August 2002 the applicant lodged a complaint with the chief of the Staropoltavskiy district police regarding his alleged ill\u2011treatment by police officers. He stated that during the incident before his arrest V. had hit him on the left hip with a spade handle, and he had punched him back in the face.","21.On 10 August 2002 T. submitted a statement to the same chief of police describing the circumstances of the incident before the police arrived. He confirmed the applicant\u2019s version of events.","22.On 20 August 2002 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the prosecutor\u2019s office.","23.On 4 September 2002, following a pre-investigation inquiry, the Staropoltavskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office instituted criminal proceedings, finding that there was sufficient indication that the elements of a crime under Article 286 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Criminal Code (abuse of powers) were present in respect of the officers\u2019 actions.","24.On 7 September 2002 the applicant was given victim status.","25.On the same day P. was questioned as a witness in relation to the quarrel on 5August 2002. He stated that he had punched T. but had not touched the applicant, and that the applicant had been \u201cabsolutely healthy\u201d and had had no bruises or any other injuries.","26.V. stated that on 5 August 2002 the applicant and T. had entered his house, and that the applicant had punched him in the eye. He had managed to trap the applicant underneath him, and T. had pulled him off the applicant by the legs.","27.N., the paramedic who had provided the applicant with first aid on 6August 2002 at the police station, gave the following statements as a witness: the applicant had complained of headaches, loss of hearing in the left ear, pain in the chest, stomach and left hip and shortness of breath. He had had hearing loss and fresh coagulated blood around his left ear, a sharp pain around his left ribs and pain in the stomach.","2.Forensic medical report of 17 December 2002","28.On 23 October 2002 the prosecutor\u2019s office ordered a forensic medical opinion to establish the origin of the applicant\u2019s injuries, stating that at about 2 p.m. on 5August 2002 the applicant had been hit in the right hip by V. with a spade handle, and that the applicant had alleged to have been punched multiple times by police officers on his way to the Staropoltavskiy district police station, where he had allegedly been taken in the boot of a police car.","29.M., an expert from the Volgograd regional forensic medical bureau and A., a radiologist from the Volgograd Regional Hospital examined the applicant\u2019s medical records, X-ray images of his skull and temporal bones taken on 24and 28October 2002 and X-ray images of his ribcage taken on 23October 2002. In their report, dated 17 December 2002, they established that the applicant had a closed head injury in the form of mild bruising on the brain and a fractured left temporal bone, further complicated by traumatic otitis of the left ear. Those injuries had been caused by hard blunt objects and amounted to \u201csevere damage to health\u201d. The applicant also had a blunt injury to his ribcage with a fractured eighth left rib and an abrasion on the left of the chest, caused by hard blunt objects, which amounted to \u201cmedium damage to health\u201d. The experts did not exclude the possibility that the injuries had been caused at the time and in the circumstances as alleged by the applicant.","3.Termination of the criminal proceedings against police officers D. and Z.","30.On 4 January 2003 the applicant did not identify Z. during an identification parade, saying that he had not seen whether it had been D. and Z. who had assaulted him on the road, but that they certainly had not assaulted him at the police station. On 15 January 2003 the criminal proceedings concerning the two officers were terminated under Article24\u00a71 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cCCrP\u201d) because none of the elements of a crime were present in respect of their actions.","4.Forensic medical report of 13 February 2003","31.On 21 January 2003 the prosecutor\u2019s office ordered an additional forensic medical opinion.","32.On 13 February 2003 S., an expert from the Volgograd regional forensic medical bureau, examined the criminal case documents submitted to him by the prosecutor\u2019s office. These included statements by P., V., the paramedic N. and police officers Sh. and S. (see paragraphs 25-27 above and paragraph 33 below), the applicant\u2019s medical records and X-ray images of his ribs, temporal bones and skull dated 23, 24 and 28October 2002. S.concluded that on 5 August 2002 the applicant had received the following injuries: a fractured left temporal bone with a rupture of the left eardrum, a displaced fracture of the eighth left rib and a fractured sixth left rib, and an abrasion on the left of the chest. On 24October 2002 the applicant had been diagnosed with mild bruising on the brain. The expert concluded that all the injuries could have been inflicted in the manner alleged by the applicant, given their nature, number and location, the mechanism of their formation, the means of their infliction, notably by punching and kicking, the positions of the victim and attackers in relation to each other, and the direction of the blows.","5.Decision of 4 March 2003 terminating the criminal proceedings against police officers S. and Sh., annulled on 15 April 2003","33.On 15January 2003, during his examination as a suspect, police officer Sh. stated that he had not noticed any injuries on the applicant during his arrest on 5 August 2002, journey to the police station or at the police station. Nor had the applicant complained that anybody had injured him. Police officer S., who was also examined as a suspect that day, stated that he had seen abrasions on the applicant\u2019s face immediately after his arrest.","34.On 4 March 2003 the Staropoltavskiy district deputy prosecutor terminated the criminal proceedings against police officers S.and Sh. The decision stated that before his arrest on 5August 2002 the applicant, who had been drunk, had committed an act of petty hooliganism against V. The applicant and V. had then physically assaulted each other. The decision also included statements by the applicant saying that V. had hit him in the left hip with a spade handle and that he had punched him back in the face, that he had travelled to the police station in the boot of a police car after being thrown in by police officers, that during the journey the officers had stopped the car and beaten him up, punching him in the head and chest, after seeing that he had dented the boot lid, and that they had assaulted him again at the police station. The decision relied on the statements of D., S., Sh., Z. and other police officers who had denied the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill\u2011treatment.","35.On 15 April 2003 the Staropoltavskiy district prosecutor annulled the decision of 4 March 2003 as the possibility of the applicant\u2019s injuries being inflicted during the fight with V. had not been properly explored.","6.Decision of 16 May 2003 terminating the criminal proceedings against police officers S. and Sh., annulled on 9 February 2004","36.On 16 May 2003 the Staropoltavskiy district deputy prosecutor issued a new decision terminating the proceedings, containing essentially the same wording as the previous decision. It was annulled on 9 February 2004 by the Volgograd regional deputy prosecutor as the exact circumstances of the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment had not yet been determined.","7.Decision of 9 March 2004 terminating the criminal proceedings against police officers S. and Sh., annulled on 4 February 2005","37.On 9 March 2004 an investigator of the Staropoltavskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office terminated the criminal proceedings against police officers S. and Sh. on the same grounds as previously.","38.According to a letter of 27 August 2004, the Volgograd regional prosecutor\u2019s office requested the Staropoltavskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office to examine complaints by the applicant concerning the improper handling of the investigation and report on the results. According to a letter from the Volgograd regional prosecutor\u2019s office dated 24 December 2004, a similar request was made in relation to a complaint by him concerning the termination of the proceedings. The Staropoltavskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office was requested to submit its report before 13 January 2005.","39.According to letters addressed to the applicant from the Volgograd regional prosecutor\u2019s office and an investigator of the Staropoltavskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office, dated 3February 2005 and 10February 2005 respectively, the decision of 9March 2004 was set aside on 4February 2005 and the investigation was reopened.","8.Decision of 10 March 2005 terminating the criminal proceedings against police officers S. and Sh., annulled on 9 September 2005","40.According to a letter from the Volgograd regional prosecutor\u2019s office dated 3November 2005, a new decision terminating the proceedings was issued on 10March 2005 and annulled on 9 September 2005. According to a letter dated 17 May 2005, the Volgograd regional prosecutor\u2019s office had in the meantime requested the district prosecutor\u2019s office to inform the applicant of the results of the investigation and report back before 4 June 2005.","41.On 24 October 2005 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office informed the applicant that his complaint concerning the termination of the proceedings had been forwarded to the Volgograd regional prosecutor\u2019s office for examination.","42.On 19 June 2006 it requested the Staropoltavskiy district prosecutor to examine the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the investigation in the case and report back before 30 June 2006.","9.Reopening of the investigation in 2011","43.On 17 November 2011 the Court invited the Government to submit information concerning the investigation in the applicant\u2019s case.","44.On 21 December 2011 the Volgograd regional prosecutor\u2019s office set aside the decision of 9 March 2004 terminating the criminal proceedings as the possibility of the applicant receiving the injuries in the fight with V. had not been examined. An additional investigation was ordered.","45.The Volgograd regional prosecutor\u2019s office carried out an internal investigation in connection with some irregularities found in the case file. It stated in its report of 31 January 2012 that the decisions of 4February and 9September 2005 (see paragraphs 39-40 above) were nowhere to be found and that according to new information received from the Staropoltavskiy district prosecutor and his deputy, the decision of 9 March 2004 had not been annulled. The prosecutor\u2019s office therefore concluded that the decisions of 4February 2005 and 9September 2005 had never been taken. The report also noted other irregularities, such as the failure of the prosecutor\u2019s office to send copies of the decisions taken in the case to their supervisory authorities or the information centre of the Ministry of the Interior, such as the decision of 9 February 2004.","10.New forensic medical report of 29 March 2012","46.On 1 March 2012 the Pallasovskiy inter-district investigation division of the Volgograd regional investigative committee ordered a new forensic medical examination of the applicant in order to determine what, if any, injuries the applicant had had after the events of 5August 2002, and whether he could have received them as a result of falling over or striking himself against something.","47.Zh., an expert from the Staropoltavskiy district unit of the Volgograd regional forensic medical bureau, examined the applicant but found no injuries on him. As the applicant\u2019s medical records and X-ray images from 2002 had been lost, the expert based his opinion on information contained in previous expert reports, notably a report dated 18September 2002 containing information about his treatment at the Central District Hospital (see paragraph 16 above) and an expert\u2019s suggestion that an opinion should be sought from a more experienced expert, and reports dated 17December 2002 (see paragraph 29 above) and 13 February 2003 (see paragraph32 above).","48.In his report of 29 March 2012 Zh. concluded that the only injuries he could confirm were the abrasion on the chest and bruising to the eighth and ninth ribs. They could have been received on 5August 2002 as a result of the applicant falling over and striking himself against protruding hard blunt objects \u2013 it was unlikely that they had been inflicted by punching and kicking.As regards the other injuries, noted in the expert reports of 17December 2002 and 13 February 2003, Zh. considered that they could not be taken into account in the assessment of damage to the applicant\u2019s health because no information about the relevant clinical manifestations or reliable X-ray imaging supporting them could be found in the previous expert reports.","11.Forensic medical report of 19 April 2012","49.On 9 April 2012 the investigative committee ordered a new expert opinion, using the same questions as previously (see paragraph 46 above) because the conclusions made by Zh. in his report of 29March 2012 completely contradicted the conclusions made by the experts in 2002 and 2003.","50.A report of 19 April 2012, prepared by a panel of five experts from the Volgograd regional forensic medical bureau, confirmed the abrasion on the left of the chest which, according to them, could have been caused on 5August 2002 by a hard blunt object with a limited surface area, as a result of hitting or being hit by it.","51.The experts noted that no traumatic injuries to the skull or healed rib fractures had been found on the applicant\u2019s X\u2011ray images made on 16March 2012 and 9 April 2012 respectively.","52.As the X-ray images of the ribcage, skull and temporal bones of 23,24 and 28October 2002 had been lost, the experts found it impossible to draw any conclusions as to the fractured left temporal bone, bruising on the brain or fractured eighths and eleventh ribs diagnosed previously.","53.The experts considered that the medical records described in the previous expert reports contained no objective confirmation as to the diagnosis of traumatic otitis of the left ear, such as injuries or bleeding in that area, and concluded that the ringing and impaired hearing of which the applicant had complained had been explained by his chronic otitis.","12.Decision of 30 April 2012 terminating the criminal proceedings against police officers S. and Sh., annulled on an unspecified date","54.On 30 April 2012 the investigative committee terminated the proceedings in accordance with Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the CCrP, because none of the elements of a crime were present in respect of the actions of police officers S. and Sh.. The decision was based, inter alia, on the following new statements received during the additional investigation in 2012.","55.On 30 January 2012 E. stated that on 5 August 2002 she had seen the applicant assaulting V. but had not seen V. assaulting the applicant. After the quarrel between the two men the applicant had followed her to her house, where V. had retreated. The applicant had threatened and verbally abused her, and she had had no choice but to call the police.","56.On 30 January 2012 P. stated that the applicant had had no injuries before his arrest on 5 August 2002. He had been behaving aggressively, shouting threats at E. and V.","57.On 30 January and 7 February 2012 respectively, the applicant\u2019s wife and T. stated that the applicant had had no injuries before his arrest.","58.On 19 March 2012 V. stated that the applicant and T. had burst into his house and attacked him. He had pushed the applicant, who had fallen onto his left side. He had then jumped on him and punched him in the head.","59.Police officers D., S., Sh. and Z. stated that on arriving in the village of Krasnyy Yar they had learned that the applicant and T. had assaulted V., and that the applicant had also threatened to kill E. and had hit her. They had arrested the applicant and T. and had then gone to E.\u2019s house and taken statements. They had then set off to the police station. Once outside Krasnyy Yar, they had released T. because there had been too many people in the car, the engine had been overheating. T. had been behaving calmly, unlike the applicant. No violence had been used against the applicant, who had been in the passenger compartment of the car and not the boot as alleged. When arrested, the applicant had had traces of blood on his face and T\u2011shirt and coagulated blood in his left ear. His untidy appearance and dirty face had given the impression that he had been fighting with somebody. He had been moaning and holding the left of his chest, and had clearly been in pain.","60.K., the detainee who had shared the same cell as the applicant on the night of 5 August 2002, stated that the applicant had had coagulated blood in his left ear and a swollen lip. He had been complaining of chest pain and coughing painfully. It also transpires from statements by K. and police officer G. that on their way to court on the morning of 6August 2002 the applicant had been walking slowly. At one point he had crouched down, holding his right hand to the left of his body and saying that his ribs were aching. He had also been coughing painfully. On their way back to the police station the applicant had crouched down and complained of feeling unwell. There had been sweat on his forehead. He had been unable to lift his hands above chest height because of the pain. An ambulance had been called.","61.N., the paramedic who had examined the applicant at the police station, stated that he had complained of headaches, loss of hearing on the left side, chest pain, difficulty breathing and pain in the left hip. He had stated that his brother had hit him on the hip with a spade handle. When asked about the origin of the other injuries, he had not said anything. One of the police officers, who had been present during the examination, had shouted that the applicant had also been hit in the ear with a spade handle.","62.According to an examination report of the police car which had been used to take the applicant to the police station on 5August 2002, the right side of the boot lid, the part closest to the petrol tank, had been dented. The decision stated that the location of the dents was different from where the applicant had said he had dented the lid, that the police officers had been unable to provide any explanation as to the dents, and that it was now impossible to examine the car as it had been written off.","63.Relying on the results of the 2012 forensic medical examination, the decision stated that the only injuries confirmed were the abrasion on the chest and bruising to the ribs, and that the applicant could have received them in the fight with V. as had been confirmed by V. in 2012.","64.It appears that on an unspecified date the decision of 30 April 2012 was annulled and the investigation was reopened.","13.Forensic psychology report of 29 May 2012","65.In his report of 29 May 2012, ordered by the investigating authority on 7 March 2012, a forensic psychologist found that the applicant had a tendency to use fantasy and invention in order to fill gaps in his memory, and that during his examination by the expert he had displayed signs of giving already prepared statements, hiding information or giving false information about the conflict situation between him and T. on one side and his brothers and E. on the other.","66.The report referred to witness statements given in the case about the events of 5August 2002. In particular, on 6 February 2012 V. had stated that the applicant and T. had burst into his house. The applicant had punched him in the face and T. had grabbed him by the legs. The applicant had then, while sitting on him, punched him repeatedly in the face and chest. V. had stated that he had not even struck the applicant once. During his additional examination on 19March 2012 V. had stated that in the course of the fight with the applicant and T. he had managed to slip out, finding himself on top of the applicant and punching him in the head. During the reconstruction of events V. had stated that after bursting into his house the applicant and T. had knocked him down, T. had held him by the legs and the applicant, while sitting on him, had punched him five or six times in the face and chest. He had punched the applicant in the head. He had then managed to slip out and trap the applicant underneath him. Sitting on the applicant, he had tried to punch him but T. had pulled him off by the legs.","14.Decision of 3 June 2012 terminating the criminal proceedings against police officers S. and Sh.","67.On 3 June 2012 the proceedings against police officers S. and Sh. were terminated in accordance with Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the CCrP because none of the elements of a crime had been present in respect of their actions. In addition to the evidence set out in the previous decision, the decision of 3June 2012 relied on statements by E.\u2019s daughter that after the incident between the applicant and V. the applicant had attacked her, throwing her to the ground and kicking her about six times. He had then tried to hit her mother, E. The decision also referred to the conclusions made by the expert psychologist (see paragraph 65 above).","68.It was concluded, as in the previous decision, that the applicant\u2019s allegations of police ill\u2011treatment had not been based on real facts and that the only injuries confirmed in 2012, namely the abrasion on the chest and bruising to the ribs, could have been received by the applicant in the fight with V., as had been confirmed by V. in 2012."],"28893":["5.The applicant was born in 1970 in Armenia. Until his arrest in 2008 he lived in Kurgan, Russia. On 20 September 2012 the Sverdlovsk Region office of the FederalMigrationService ordered his deportation to Armenia. It seems that the deportation order was executed on 11 October 2012.","A.Circumstances leading to the applicant\u2019s arrest","6.On 3 August 2008 the applicant, while under the influence of alcohol, took a car without the owner\u2019s consent and crashed into a tree. As a result of this accident he sustained multiple injuries, including a thighbone fracture, a dislocated hip and facial wounds.","7.The applicant was taken by ambulance to Kurgan Town Hospital where he was admitted to an intensive care unit. He was connected to a medical ventilator and subjected to emergencyanti-shock treatment. The doctors sutured his wounds. A metal pin for skeletal traction was inserted through the heel bone of his broken leg and the applicant was placed in a special metal frame with weights attached to his injured leg.","8.Several days later his condition improved and he was transferred to a trauma department, where he remained bedridden in a skeletal traction frame. Osteosynthesis surgery was to be performed in due course.","9.On 6 August 2008 the police opened a criminal case into car theft.","10.It appears that during the investigation the authorities learned that the applicant was wanted by the authorities of the Republic of Belarus for a murder allegedly committed in 2003 in Minsk.","11.A police investigator asked the attending doctor whether the applicant could be discharged from hospital and transferred to a detention facility.","12.On an unspecified date the doctor informed the investigator that the applicant was in need of inpatient treatment on account of multiple injuries, including facial injuries, a dislocated hip and a thighbone fracture. Citing the seriousness of his condition the doctor noted that the applicant could not be transported to a court or police station. The doctor stated that police detention centres and remand prisons in Kurgan were unable to ensure the appropriate medical care to the applicant.","13.On 8 August 2008 the investigator reported the content of the above letter to his superior.","14.Four days later, upon a request from an investigator, a medical expert commenced an examination of the applicant to assess the seriousness of his injuries. Without informing the hospital administration and without having received the results of the expert examination, the police arrested the applicant and took him to remand prison no.IZ-45\/1 in Kurgan. It does not seem that any special arrangements for the applicant\u2019s transport were made.","15.It was noted in the expert report completed on 3 September 2008 that the applicant\u2019s injuries were of \u201cmedium\u201d seriousness.","B.Detention and conviction","1.Detention pending extradition","16.On 13 August 2008 the Kurgan Town Court, at the request of the Kurgan prosecutor and in the absence of the applicant, ordered his detention pending the receipt of an extradition request from the Belarusian authorities. That ruling was based on Article 466 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Russia (\u201cthe CCrP\u201d) and Article 61 of the Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters (\u201ctheMinskConvention\u201d).","17.On 21 August 2008 the Kurgan Regional Court quashed the order of 13 August 2008 in view of the applicant\u2019s absence from the hearing before the Town Court. The Regional Court remitted the issue for fresh consideration.","18.A week later, this time after hearing evidence from the applicant, the Town Court, on the basis of the same legal provisions, ordered his detention until receipt of the extradition request from the Republic of Belarus.","19.On 4 September 2008 the Regional Court upheld the applicant\u2019s detention on appeal.","20.According to the applicant, only on 14 October 2008 did the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office inform the competent Belarusian authorities of the applicant\u2019s arrest.","21.The General Prosecutor of the Republic of Belarus requested the applicant\u2019s extradition.","22.On 25 August 2009 the Russian Prosecutor General\u2019s Office ordered the applicant\u2019s extradition to stand trial in Belarus.","23.According to the applicant, in March 2010 he was extradited to the Republic of Belarus.","24.On 23 March 2010 the Belarusian authorities closed the criminal case due to the absence of corpus delicti in the applicant\u2019s actions. He was then returned to Russia.","2.Detention pending investigation into the car accident","25.In the meantime, on 29 August 2008, in the context of the criminal investigation into car theft, the Kurgan Town Court ordered the applicant not to leave Kurgan.","26.On 23 September 2008 the Town Court changed the measure of restraint to detention pending investigation. The decision was based on the seriousness of the charges, the fact that the applicant had been on the run and had no permanent residence in Russia. The Regional Court upheld that detention order on appeal.","27.On 22 November 2008 the Town Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 5 December 2008, citing the seriousness of the charges and the lack of a permanent residence in Russia.","28.On 4 December 2008 and 4 January 2009 the Town Court again extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 5 and 30 January 2009, respectively. In addition to the previously employed arguments, the detention orders were held to be justified by the necessity to complete the investigation. The latest detention order was upheld on appeal by the Regional Court on 15January2009.","3.Conviction","29.On 27 March 2009 the Kurgan Town Court convicted the applicant of car theft and sentenced him to four years\u2019 imprisonment in a correctional colony.","30.On 26 May 2009 the Regional Court upheld the conviction and sentence, but amended the type of the detention facility where the applicant was to serve his sentence to a settlement colony.","C.Medical treatment and the conditions of detention","31.It is clear from entries made by civilian doctors in the applicant\u2019s medical history on 12August 2008, the day of his arrest, that he was in satisfactory health; his body temperature, which had fluctuated for several days, was 37.7\u02daC; the pain syndrome was decreasing; his stitches were dry; and no signs of inflammation were present. The metal pin remained in his leg. In the discharge summary drafted on account of the applicant\u2019s arrest, \u201ccontinued medical treatment\u201d and crutches were prescribed. The attending doctor explicitly noted that the patient had been taken from the hospital without the consent of the chief doctor.","32.On admission to the remand prison the applicant was examined by a feldsher (medical assistant), who recorded the visible bodily injuries. No medical tests were performed and no treatment was prescribed. The applicant was not provided with any mobility aid devices, such as a wheelchair, crutches or a walking stick.","33.It was not disputed by the parties that the next day the applicant had been placed in a cell designed to accommodate a maximum of four inmates. The cell measured 15.4 sq. m. On 13 August and between 15 and 19August2008 the applicant had to share that cell with seven other inmates, with each inmate thus having no more than 1.9 sq. m of floor space. Several inmates, including the applicant, had no places to sleep.","34.According to the applicant, in the remand prison he experienced a leg pain, nausea and loss of consciousness.","35.Medical entries show that the applicant was seen by a prison doctor for the first time on 18 August 2008, in response to his complaints of pain, nausea and vertigo. After a visual examination, the doctor ordered the transfer of the applicant to Regional Anti-Tuberculosis Prison Hospital no.OF-73\/1 in Kurgan (\u201cthe prison hospital\u201d) \u201cfor treatment and skeletal traction\u201d. The transfer was performed the next day.","36.In the prison hospital several medical tests were performed. Owing to technical problems the applicant could not undergo an X-ray examination of his legs ordered by a doctor. He was seen by a surgeon and a neurologist.","37.The surgeon, having considered the time that had passed from the termination of the skeletal traction, removed the metal pin from the applicant\u2019s leg. A walking stick was prescribed.","38.The neurologist diagnosed the applicant with vegetative-vascular dystonia and prescribed a month-long drug regimen.","39.The applicant was discharged from hospital on 27 August 2008 in a \u201csatisfactory condition\u201d.","40.The medical documents in the Court\u2019s possession cover the period up to 21 May 2009. They show that at that time the applicant was seen by the prison doctor on account of his chronic peptic and liver conditions. It does not appear that he underwent any medical examination or treatment related to the leg condition.","41.As to the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention during that period, the Government submitted that the applicant had been transferred between several cells of the remand prison, some of which were overcrowded. In particular, between 30September and 8 October 2008, between 26 January and 19 March, 24March and 10 April, 11 April and 2 June 2009 the applicant was afforded less than 2.7 sq. m of floor space, and occasionally less than 2 sq. m. According to the applicant, the cells were poorly ventilated, had non-partitioned toilets and were infested with bugs, mice and lice.","42.On 2 June 2009, the applicant was sent to serve his sentence in a settlement colony. He was released on 22 September 2012, after having served his sentence in full.","43.According to him, he continued to walk with a limp after the release, because the broken leg had knitted in a wrong position."],"28895":["10.The applicant was born in 1958. He lived in Brussels and died there on 7 June 2016.","11.He arrived in Belgium via Italy on 25 November 1998, accompanied by his wife and a six-year-old child. The applicant claimed to be the father of the child, an assertion which the Government contested. The couple subsequently had a child together in August 1999 and another in July 2006.","A.Criminal proceedings","12.On 29 December 1998 the applicant was arrested and taken into custody on charges of theft. On 14 April 1999 he received a sentence of seven months\u2019 imprisonment, which was suspended except for the period of pre\u2011trial detention.","13.In 1999 and 2000 the applicant and his wife were arrested on several occasions in connection with theft offences.","14.On 28 April 2000 the applicant\u2019s wife was sentenced to four months\u2019 imprisonment for theft.","15.On 18 December 2001 the applicant was convicted of a number of offences including robbery with violence and threats, and received a sentence of fourteen months\u2019 imprisonment, which was suspended except for the period of pre-trial detention.","16.On 9 November 2005 the applicant was sentenced by the Ghent Court of Appeal to three years\u2019 imprisonment for involvement in a criminal organisation with a view to securing pecuniary advantage using intimidation, deception or corruption.","17.Having already spent time in pre-trial detention, he was subsequently detained in Forest Prison and then in Merksplas Prison, where he continued to serve his sentence.","B.Asylum proceedings","18.On 26 November 1998, the day after their arrival, the applicant and his wife lodged an asylum application.","19.As the applicant\u2019s wife stated that she had travelled through Germany, a request to take back the applicant and his family was sent to the German authorities under the Dublin Convention of 15 June 1990 determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities (\u201cthe Dublin Convention\u201d).","20.After the German authorities had refused the request, it transpired that the applicant and his family were in possession of a Schengen visa issued by the Italian authorities. A request to take charge of them was therefore sent to the Italian authorities and was accepted on 4 June 1999.","21.On 22 September 1999 the applicant lodged a further asylum application, using a false identity. It was immediately rejected after his fingerprints had been checked.","22.On 23 October 2000 the Aliens Office informed the applicant\u2019s lawyer that the proceedings concerning the asylum application of 26November 1998 had been concluded on 11 June 1999 with the refusal of the application.","C.Requests for leave to remain on exceptional grounds","1.First request for regularisation on exceptional grounds","23.On 20 March 2000 the applicant lodged a first request for regularisation for a period of more than three months, on the basis of section9(3) (since 1 June 2007, section 9bis) of the Aliens (Entry, Residence, Settlement and Expulsion) Act of 15 December 1980 (\u201cthe Aliens Act\u201d). In support of his request the applicant stated that he and his wife had a daughter born in Georgia before their arrival in Belgium and another daughter born in Belgium in 1999.","24.On 30 March 2004 the Aliens Office declared the request devoid of purpose as the applicant had left the country and been intercepted in Germany. It found that the request was in any case unfounded in view of the fact that the applicant\u2019s medical treatment for tuberculosis had ended (seeparagraph 49 below). The Aliens Office also referred to the applicant\u2019s lack of integration in Belgium and the numerous breaches of public order he had committed.","2.Second request for regularisation on exceptional grounds","25.On 28 April 2004 the applicant lodged a second request for regularisation of his residence status on the basis of section 9(3) of the Aliens Act. He cited as exceptional circumstances the duration of his residence in Belgium and his integration into Belgian society, the risks that a return to Georgia would entail for his children\u2019s schooling, the fact that he had been the victim of persecution and his state of health.","26.The Aliens Office declared the request inadmissible on 5 April 2007 on the ground that the evidence adduced did not amount to exceptional circumstances for the purposes of section 9(3) of the Act such as to warrant the lodging of the request in Belgium rather than with the competent diplomatic mission or consulate, as was the rule. The Aliens Office noted that the applicant had been allowed to remain in the country for the sole purpose of the asylum proceedings, which had been concluded by a final decision. It also cited as reasons the lack of any need for medical supervision, the applicant\u2019s precarious and unlawful residence status, the absence of a risk of persecution in Georgia and the possibility for the children to continue their schooling in that country.","27.In a judgment of 29 February 2008 the Aliens Appeals Board rejected an application by the applicant to set aside the Aliens Office\u2019s decision. It noted in particular that, since the decision complained of had not been accompanied as such by a removal measure, it could not give rise to a risk of violation of Article 3 of the Convention.","3.Third request for regularisation on exceptional grounds","28.On 10 September 2007, relying on the same grounds as those invoked under section 9ter of the Aliens Act (see paragraph 54 below) and on his family situation, the applicant lodged a request for regularisation on exceptional grounds under section 9bis of the Aliens Act.","29.On 7 July 2010 the Aliens Office refused the request for regularisation, taking the view that the protection of the State\u2019s best interests took precedence over the applicant\u2019s social and family interests and that by committing serious punishable acts the applicant himself had placed his family\u2019s unity in jeopardy. That decision was served on the applicant on 11July 2010.","30.On 26 July 2010 the applicant lodged a request with the Aliens Appeals Board under the ordinary procedure for a stay of execution of the decision of 7 July 2010 rejecting his request for regularisation of his status, together with an application to have that decision set aside. In so far as necessary, the application also related to the order to leave the country issued on the same date (see paragraph 78 below). The applicant alleged a violation of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention and argued that his serious health problems amounted to exceptional humanitarian circumstances as defined by the Court in D. v. the United Kingdom (2 May 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997\u2011III), that he would not have access to treatment in Georgia and that the discontinuation of treatment would lead to his premature death. He further alleged an infringement of Article 8 of the Convention and of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, on the ground that if he were returned to Georgia he would be separated from his family permanently.","31.The request and application were refused by the Aliens Appeals Board in a judgment of 16 March 2015 on the ground that the applicant had not attended the hearing or been represented.","4.Regularisation of the residence status of the applicant\u2019s family","32.On 5 November 2009 the applicant\u2019s wife lodged a request for regularisation on exceptional grounds under section 9bis of the Aliens Act, relying on her family situation and the duration of her residence in Belgium.","33.On 29 July 2010 she and her three children were granted indefinite leave to remain.","D.The applicant\u2019s state of health","1.Chronic lymphocytic leukaemia","34.In 2006, while the applicant was in prison (see paragraph 17 above), he was diagnosed with chronic lymphocytic leukaemia in Binet stage B, with a very high level of CD38 expression. No treatment was commenced.","35.As his health had deteriorated, the applicant was admitted to the Bruges prison hospital complex from 14 August to 23 October 2007 in order to receive a course of chemotherapy.","36.A report prepared on 11 February 2008 by Antwerp University Hospital, where the applicant was being treated, stated that his condition was life-threatening and that, on the basis of the averages observed in 2007, his life expectancy was between three and five years. The report stated that, following treatment, his white blood cell count had fallen significantly.","37.From 8 to 14 May 2010 the applicant was confined to hospital in Turnhout with respiratory problems. The medical report concerning his stay recommended that the applicant be treated as an outpatient by a lung specialist and a haematologist. This treatment did not materialise on his return to Merksplas Prison, where he was being held.","38.On 22 July 2010 a doctor from Antwerp University Hospital visited the applicant in the Merksplas closed facility for illegal aliens (see paragraph 79 below), to which he had been transferred in the meantime, in order to carry out a full medical check-up. The doctor\u2019s report noted that the applicant\u2019s leukaemia, which was progressing rapidly towards Binet stageC, had not been monitored sufficiently and that a different course of chemotherapy was required.","39.In August 2011 the applicant\u2019s condition worsened and the doctors observed that his leukaemia had progressed to Binet stage C, with anaemia and widespread enlargement of the lymph nodes (life expectancy of twenty\u2011four months). It was decided to switch to a different course of chemotherapy.","40.On 12 September 2012 a doctor from the haematology department of St Pierre University Hospital in Brussels, where the applicant was being treated following his release (see paragraph 82 below), drew up a certificate which stated as follows:","\u201c...","D.Possible complications if treatment is discontinued. Failure to treat the liver and lung disease could result in organ damage and consequent disorders (respiratory insufficiency, cirrhosis and\/or liver cancer). Without treatment, the [chronic lymphocytic leukaemia] could lead to the patient\u2019s death as a result of the disease itself or the effects of serious infections.","A return to Georgia would expose the patient to inhuman and degrading treatment.","E.Progression and prognosis. Chronic lymphocytic leukaemia (CLL): good if treated, but the risk of relapse is real, so that close monitoring is required even during remission. ...\u201d","41.After a relapse diagnosed in 2013, the doctors in St Pierre University Hospital observed in March 2014 that the applicant\u2019s leukaemia had developed into lymphocytic lymphoma, and his chemotherapy was adjusted accordingly. A positron\u2011emission tomography (PET) scan performed on 22September 2014 showed a lack of response to the chemotherapy, a progression of the disease in the lymph nodes and the liver, and a pulmonary infection.","42.The applicant\u2019s treatment was handed over to the Institut Bordet in Brussels, a hospital devoted exclusively to the treatment of cancer patients.","43.In December 2014 the applicant began to receive a new course of treatment as part of a study. He was given Ibrutinib, designed in particular to improve his overall condition, which had been compromised by complications arising out of the treatment (fungaemia, pulmonary infections, septicaemia and cholecystitis, resulting in his being admitted to hospital on several occasions). The treatment was prescribed in order to improve the applicant\u2019s overall condition in preparation for a donor stem cell transplant.","44.A medical certificate issued on 25 May 2015 by the specialist treating the applicant, Dr L., head of the experimental haematology laboratory at the Institut Bordet, stated that the patient\u2019s viral load was stable. The doctor stressed that discontinuing treatment would result in the patient\u2019s death. Because of the patient\u2019s immunosuppression and the aggressive nature of the leukaemia, treatment in a specialised haematology unit was necessary, as was a donor stem cell transplant, which offered the only remaining prospect of a cure provided that it was performed during the two-year \u201cwindow of response\u201d to Ibrutinib.","45.The applicant stated that the stem cell transplant, originally scheduled to take place in April 2015, had not been performed to date because he did not have a residence permit in Belgium as required by the Organ Removal and Transplant Act of 13 June 1986.","46.On 14 July 2015 a new medical report was prepared by Dr L. which read as follows:","\u201cThe patient\u2019s CLL [chronic lymphocytic leukaemia]","...","The patient has been suffering from CLL for nine years (diagnosed in 2006), and by 2011 had already reached stage C and Rai IV [stage IV according to the Rai criteria]. He had already had three lines of treatment prior to Ibrutinib, which he is currently taking, and was refractory to the third line of treatment (R-CVP chemotherapy).","It is clear from the medical literature that if Ibrutinib is discontinued in such a situation, the average life expectancy is three months. ...","The literature also shows that only 7% of patients being treated with Ibrutinib achieve complete remission. Mr Paposhvili is currently in partial remission and is thus wholly dependent on the treatment. This is a new targeted therapy to which he would have no access in his country of origin. With continuous treatment the patient\u2019s prognosis is more favourable, with an 87% survival rate after three years. ...","CLL and especially treatment with Ibrutinib can give rise to serious complications which fully justify regular supervision in a specialised setting. This is particularly true since the patient is in a weak state and has a serious medical history (tuberculosis and stroke) and significant comorbidities (active chronic hepatitis and COPD [chronic obstructive pulmonary disease]). ...","In the case of a young person \u2013 Mr Paposhvili is only 57 \u2013 the current guidelines advocate using Ibrutinib in order to obtain the best possible response, followed by a donor peripheral blood stem cell transplant. A HLA [human leukocyte antigen] matched donor has been identified for the patient.","Although risky, a donor transplant offers the only prospect of a cure for the patient; he would be unable to have such a transplant in his country of origin.","...","Conclusions","The [Aliens Office\u2019s medical adviser] concludes ... [that] the condition of the patient\u2019s vital organs is not directly life-threatening. That all depends on what is meant by \u2018directly\u2019. The patient is suffering from a cancer that is potentially fatal in the short term (median survival time nineteen months) ... and most likely within six months without appropriate treatment.","Moreover, if the treatment is not tailored to the patient\u2019s overall immunosuppression, there is a serious risk of death caused by infection, especially in a Gold stage II COPD patient with a history of tuberculosis. ...\u201d","47.On 1 August 2015 treatment with Ibrutinib became eligible for reimbursement in Belgium.","48.Because of the side-effects of this treatment, which might compromise the donor transplant, the dose of Ibrutinib was reduced from three doses to one dose per day.","2.Other illnesses","49.In 2000 the applicant was diagnosed with active pulmonary tuberculosis. He was treated for that condition under the emergency medical assistance and social welfare assistance schemes.","50.During 2008 the applicant\u2019s tuberculosis was found to have become active again.","51.As a result of that disease the applicant developed chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, for which he received treatment.","52.In addition, the applicant suffered from hepatitis C, which was also diagnosed in 2006 and was probably linked to a history of drug abuse. It was accompanied by liver fibrosis. According to a medical report dated 24April 2015 his hepatitis, which had been treated effectively in 2012 and 2013, had become stable.","53.A magnetic resonance imaging scan carried out in March 2015 showed that the applicant had suffered a stroke, resulting in permanent paralysis of the left arm. The effects of the stroke were managed with an anti-epilepsy drug.","E.Requests for regularisation on medical grounds","1.First request for regularisation on medical grounds","54.On 10 September 2007, relying on Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention and alleging, in particular, that he would be unable to obtain treatment for his leukaemia (see paragraph 34 above) if he were sent back to Georgia, the applicant lodged a first request for regularisation on medical grounds on the basis of section 9ter of the Aliens Act.","55.On 26 September 2007 the Aliens Office refused the request on the ground that, under section 9ter(4) of the Act, the applicant was excluded from its scope on account of the serious crimes which had given rise in the meantime to a ministerial deportation order issued on 16 August 2007 (see paragraph 73 below).","56.On 17 December 2007 the applicant lodged a request for a stay of execution of that decision under the ordinary procedure, together with an application to set aside. He alleged in particular that the Aliens Office had relied exclusively on the ministerial deportation order in excluding him from the scope of section 9ter of the Aliens Act, without investigating his state of health or the risk he ran of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, and without weighing up the interests at stake as required by Article 8 of the Convention.","57.In a judgment of 20 August 2008 the Aliens Appeals Board dismissed the applicant\u2019s claims in the following terms:","\u201cIt is clear from the wording of [section 9ter] that there is nothing to prevent the administrative authority, when dealing with a request for leave to remain on the basis of the above-mentioned section 9ter, from ruling immediately on the exclusion of the person concerned from the scope of the said section 9ter without first being required to take a decision on the medical evidence submitted to it, if it considers at the outset that there are substantial grounds for believing that the person concerned has committed any of the acts referred to in section 55\/4, cited above. Indeed, the examination of that evidence is superfluous in such a situation since the person responsible for taking the decision has in any event already decided that the individual is excluded from the scope [of section 9ter].","...","As regards the alleged violation of Article 3 of the Convention, it should be observed that the decision complained of in the present application is not accompanied by any removal measure, with the result that the alleged risk of discontinuation of treatment in the event of the applicant\u2019s return to Georgia is hypothetical.\u201d","58.The Aliens Appeals Board also dismissed the complaint under Article 8 of the Convention in view of the fact that the impugned decision had not been accompanied by any removal measure.","2.Second request for regularisation on medical grounds","59.In the meantime, on 3 April 2008, the applicant had lodged a second request for regularisation on medical grounds on the basis of section 9ter of the Aliens Act. In addition to his various health problems he referred to the fact that he had been continuously resident in Belgium for eleven years and had lasting social ties in that country, and to his family situation. He also argued that if he was sent back he would be left to fend for himself while ill in a country in which he no longer had any family ties and where the medical facilities were unsuitable and expensive.","60.The request was refused by the Aliens Office on 4 June 2008 for the same reason it had cited previously (see paragraph 55 above).","61.On 16 July 2008 the applicant lodged an application with the Aliens Appeals Board to have that decision set aside.","62.In a judgment of 21 May 2015 the Aliens Appeals Board rejected the application to set aside. It held that, where the above-mentioned exclusion clause was applied, the Aliens Office was not required to rule on the medical and other evidence contained in the request for regularisation. According to the Aliens Appeals Board, such examination was superfluous by virtue of the exclusion clause alone. The Board pointed out that its task was to review the lawfulness of the measure. This review did not permit it to substitute its own assessment of the facts that were deemed to have been established and were not apparent from the administrative file; rather, its task was confined to ensuring that the formal requirement to provide reasons had been complied with and that the reasoning was not based on a manifest error of assessment. As to the complaints alleging a violation of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, the Aliens Appeals Board stated that the assessment of the medical situation of an alien facing removal whose request for regularisation had been rejected should be carried out, as applicable, at the time of enforcement of the removal measure.","63.On 22 June 2015 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against that judgment with the Conseil d\u2019\u00c9tat. One of the grounds of appeal was based on Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. The applicant submitted that the Aliens Appeals Board could not have been unaware that several orders to leave the country had already been issued against him prior to the decision not to examine his request for leave to remain, and that his expulsion had been suspended only as a result of the interim measure applied by the Court (see paragraph 87 below). The applicant further argued that the Aliens Appeals Board had breached the provisions of the Convention by postponing until the date of enforcement of the removal measure the examination of the medical situation of an alien suffering from a serious illness who had requested leave to remain on medical grounds, without studying the specific risks.","64.In an order of 9 July 2015 the appeal on points of law was declared inadmissible. The Conseil d\u2019\u00c9tat held that, contrary to the applicant\u2019s assertion, the grounds for setting aside advanced before the Aliens Appeals Board had simply stressed, in a theoretical and general manner, that section9ter of the Act encompassed the application in domestic law of the obligation under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention prohibiting the removal of a seriously ill person if such a measure was liable to result in death or inhuman and degrading treatment; no specific explanation had been given, however, as to how the applicant himself risked facing that situation. The Conseil d\u2019\u00c9tat also observed that the applicant had not argued before the Aliens Appeals Board that orders to leave the country had been issued against him, or that a removal measure could be revived; he was therefore unable to rely on those arguments in his appeal on points of law. In any event, the Conseil d\u2019\u00c9tat held that the Aliens Appeals Board had in no way erred in finding that the examination of the medical situation of an alien facing removal whose request for leave to remain had been rejected should be carried out, as applicable, at the time of enforcement of the measure.","3.Review of the applicant\u2019s situation in connection with the proceedings before the Court","65.The applicant was requested to report to the Aliens Office\u2019s medical service on 24 September 2012 for a medical check-up and to enable the Belgian authorities to reply to the Court\u2019s questions.","66.The report prepared by the medical adviser on that occasion listed the consultations held and the treatment that had been administered to the applicant. It stated that his leukaemia had stabilised after several cycles of chemotherapy and was being monitored closely, and that the applicant was under medical supervision for his lung disease.","67.Referring to the Court\u2019s judgment in the case of N. v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 26565\/05, ECHR 2008), the report concluded as follows:","\u201cOn the basis of this medical file it cannot ... be concluded that the threshold of severity required by Article 3 of the Convention, as interpreted by the Court, has been reached ...","It appears from the medical file that the diseases to which the medical certificates refer ... do not disclose a direct threat to the patient\u2019s life. The conditions from which the applicant suffers are serious and potentially fatal but are currently under control.","None of the patient\u2019s vital organs is in a condition that is directly life-threatening. His hepatitis C is not currently causing any cirrhosis. The pulmonary disease is being controlled by treatment consisting solely of an inhaled corticosteroid. The patient\u2019s haematological disorder is currently stable. The lymph nodes are no longer swollen and the patient\u2019s haemolytic anaemia is resolved. Chemotherapy has been discontinued for the time being.","... Neither monitoring of the patient\u2019s vital parameters nor ongoing medical supervision is necessary in order to ensure the patient\u2019s survival.","The disease cannot be considered at present to be in the terminal stages. ... The patient is close to Binet stage A at present. His chronic obstructive pulmonary disease is also currently under control.\u201d","68.A medical report drawn up on 23 June 2015 by the medical adviser to the Aliens Office provided a detailed review of the applicant\u2019s clinical history and current state of health and the treatment being administered. It concluded as follows:","\u201cOn the basis of [the] medical file it cannot therefore be concluded that the threshold of severity set by Article 3 of the Convention, which requires a risk to life on account of the applicant\u2019s critical condition or the very advanced stage of his or her illness, has been reached (N. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.26565\/05, ECHR 2008, and D.v.the United Kingdom, 2May 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997\u2011III).","The diseases referred to in the most recent update to the medical file ([Dr L.], 25May 2015) ... do not disclose:","\u2013 a direct threat to the life of the patient. The illnesses from which the applicant suffers are serious and potentially fatal but are currently under control. ...","\u2013 that the condition of the patient\u2019s vital organs is directly life-threatening. ...","\u2013 a critical state of health. Neither monitoring of the patient\u2019s vital parameters nor ongoing medical supervision is necessary in order to ensure the patient\u2019s survival. The disease cannot be said to be in the terminal stages at present ...\u201d","F.Removal proceedings and the Court\u2019s intervention","1.Order to leave the country under the Dublin Convention","69.On 10 June 1999, on the grounds that the Belgian authorities did not have responsibility under the Dublin Convention for examining the asylum application, the Aliens Office issued an order for the applicant and his wife to leave the country with a view to their transfer to Italy. However, their departure was postponed because the applicant\u2019s wife was pregnant.","70.After the birth, the family was granted leave to remain until 14October 1999 because the new-born baby was in hospital. Their leave to remain was subsequently extended until 15 March 2000 on the ground that the child needed regular supervision by a paediatric gastroenterologist.","71.The time-limit for enforcement of the order for the family to leave the country was extended several times during the first half of 2000 because of the need to treat the applicant\u2019s tuberculosis (see paragraph 49 above) and the six-month course of anti-tubercular treatment required by the whole family.","72.On 23 October 2000 the Aliens Office informed the applicant\u2019s lawyer that the time-limit had been extended until such time as the applicant and his child were fully recovered.","2.Ministerial deportation order","73.On 16 August 2007, while the applicant was serving a prison sentence (see paragraph 17 above), the Minister of the Interior, in a deportation order issued under section 20 of the Aliens Act, directed the applicant to leave the country and barred him from re-entering Belgium for ten years. The order referred to the applicant\u2019s extensive criminal record, allied to the fact that \u201cthe pecuniary nature of the offences demonstrate[d] the serious and ongoing risk of further breaches of public order\u201d.","74.The order became enforceable on the date of the applicant\u2019s release but was not in fact enforced because the applicant was undergoing medical treatment at the time.","75.The applicant, who was in hospital, did not contact his lawyer in order to lodge an application to have the ministerial order set aside. However, on 15 November 2007 the lawyer lodged an application on his own initiative. In a judgment of 27 February 2008 the Aliens Appeals Board rejected the application as being out of time.","76.In the meantime, as the applicant was about to finish serving the prison sentence imposed in 2005, he was transferred on 14 August 2007 to Bruges Prison with a view to implementation of the ministerial deportation order. He remained there until 27 March 2010, when he was transferred to Merksplas Prison.","77.During his time in Bruges Prison the applicant was visited on an almost daily basis by his wife and\/or his children. The authorities of Merksplas Prison, to which he was subsequently transferred and where he remained until 11 July 2010, informed the applicant that they did not have a record of the number of visits he had received.","3.Orders to leave the country following refusal of the regularisation request","78.In parallel with its decision of 7 July 2010 refusing the applicant\u2019s request for regularisation on exceptional grounds (see paragraph 29 above), the Aliens Office on 7 July 2010 issued an order for him to leave the country, together with an order for his detention. These orders, made on the basis of section 7(1)(1) of the Aliens Act, were served on the applicant on 11 July 2010.","79.Also on 7 July 2010 it was decided that the applicant should be transferred on 13 July to the Merksplas closed facility for illegal aliens with a view to his removal to Georgia.","80.On 16 July 2010 the Georgian embassy in Brussels issued a travel document valid until 16 August 2010.","81.On the same day the applicant lodged a request for a stay of execution under the ordinary procedure, together with an application to set aside, directed specifically against the above-mentioned order to leave the country of 7 July 2010.","82.On 30 July 2010, two days after the indication by the Court of an interim measure (see paragraph 87 below), an order was made for the applicant\u2019s release and he was given until 30 August 2010 to leave the country voluntarily.","83.In a letter dated 30 August 2010 counsel for the applicant applied for an extension of the time-limit for enforcement of the order to leave the country. The time-limit was initially extended until 13 November 2010 and was subsequently extended several times until 19 February 2011.","84.On 18 February 2012 the Aliens Office issued an order to leave the country \u201cwith immediate effect\u201d pursuant to the ministerial deportation order of 16 August 2007.","85.The above-mentioned request and application were rejected by the Aliens Appeals Board in a judgment of 29 May 2015 on the ground that the applicant had not attended the hearing or been represented.","4.Indication of an interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court","86.In the meantime, on 23 July 2010, the applicant applied to the Court for interim measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Relying on Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the Convention, he alleged that if he were removed to Georgia he would no longer have access to the health care he required and that, in view of his very short life expectancy, he would die even sooner, far away from his family.","87.On 28 July 2010 the Court indicated to the Belgian Government that it was desirable, in the interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings before the Court, to suspend enforcement of the order for the applicant to leave the country issued on 7 July 2010 \u201cpending the outcome of the proceedings before the Aliens Appeals Board\u201d.","G.Other events","88.The applicant was arrested on several occasions between 2012 and 2015 for shoplifting.","89.In addition, in July 2013 the Aliens Office was contacted by the Luxembourg police and customs cooperation centre, which reported that the applicant was in detention in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.","90.In May 2014 a warrant was issued for the applicant\u2019s arrest for theft. The applicant was detained in Bruges Prison and released a few days later.","91.Two notarised deeds of sale dated 24 March and 5 August 2015 record the transfer by the applicant, represented by E.B., to a certain Aleksandre Paposhvili, of a plot of building land for a sum of 30,000 euros (EUR) and a plot of farmland for a sum of EUR 5,000. Both plots are located in the village of Kalauri in the Gurjaani region of Georgia.","123.Basing its findings, inter alia, on the information referred to in the Chamber judgment (paragraphs 90-92), the European Committee of Social Rights assessed the conformity of the Georgian health-care system with Article 11 \u00a7 1 of the European Social Charter (Right to protection of health, Removal of the causes of ill-health) and adopted the following conclusions (Conclusions 2015, Georgia, Article 11 \u00a7 1):","\u201c...","The Committee takes note of the information submitted by Georgia in response to the conclusion that it had not been established that there was a public health system providing universal coverage (Conclusions 2013, Georgia).","The Committee recalls that the health care system must be accessible to everyone. The right of access to care requires inter alia that the cost of health care should be borne, at least in part, by the community as a whole (Conclusions I (1969), Statement of Interpretation on Article 11) and the cost of health care must not represent an excessively heavy burden for the individual. Out-of-pocket payments should not be the main source of funding of the health system (Conclusions 2013, Georgia).","The report states that on 28 February 2013 a Universal Health Care Programme was launched for persons without medical insurance. The first phase of the programme ensured citizens with a basic medical package, including primary health care and emergency hospitalisation. Since 1 July 2013 the programme has been expanded to include more services of primary health care and emergency hospitalisation, emergency outpatient care, planned surgeries, treatment of oncological diseases and child delivery. According to recent data (April 2014), all citizens of Georgia are now provided with basic healthcare, approximately 3.4 million people in the framework of the Universal Health Care Programme, 560,000 people are beneficiaries of the State Health Insurance Programme and about 546,000 people have a private or corporate insurance.","The Committee notes that the Government has declared health care as a priority field, resulting in funding for state health care programmes almost doubling: from 365million GEL in 2012 (\u20ac 139 million) to 634 million GEL in 2013 (\u20ac 241 million). State spending as a share of GDP has increased from 1.7% to 2.7% and as a share of the state budget from 5% to 9%.","However, the Government acknowledges that despite improvements the cost of medication remains high amounting to 35% of state expenditure on health care. The report does not provide information on out-of-pocket payments as a share of total spending on health care, but according to WHO data it was still between 60% and 70% in 2011 (compared to about 16% on average for EU-27). Very limited coverage of medication costs is now provided under the Universal Health Care Programme, for example for emergency care, chemotherapy and radiotherapy, but the general lack of coverage of medication costs is a major point of dissatisfaction among beneficiaries of the programme according to a recent evaluation (Universal Healthcare (UHC) Program Evaluation by the USAID Health System Strengthening Project, April 2014). The Committee notes the examples provided by the Government of coverage of certain medication costs under the State Health Insurance Programme.","The report states that as a result of deregulation measures the pharmaceutical market has become free and competitive, however no evidence is provided to show that the price of medication has become generally more accessible, especially for vulnerable groups and those with chronic conditions.","While the Committee considers that the Universal Health Care Programme is a positive step forward and that the role of out-of-pocket payments as a source of funding of the health system may have been reduced somewhat, it still considers that the high proportion of out-of-pocket payments for health care, and in particular the high medication costs, represent too high a burden for the individual effectively being an obstacle to universal access to health care. The situation is therefore not in conformity with the Charter.","Conclusion","The Committee concludes that the situation in Georgia is not in conformity with Article 11\u00a71 of the Charter on the ground that out-of-pocket payments in general and medication costs in particular represent too high a burden for the individual effectively being an obstacle to universal access to health care.\u201d"],"28910":["1. The applicants, a married couple, are Afghan nationals who were born in 1985 and 1992 respectively. The President granted the applicants \u2019 request for their identity not to be disclosed to the public (Rule 47 \u00a7 4). They were represented before the Court by Ms M. Hellborg, a lawyer practising in Goteborg.","A. The circumstances of the case","2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.","3. The applicants applied for asylum on 3 May 2012 and were interviewed twice by the Migration Agency ( Migrationsverket ). They submitted that they were Hazaras from the Ghazni province of Afghanistan.","4. At the asylum interviews the first applicant stated the following. He had left Afghanistan for Greece for the first time in 2002 and applied for asylum there in 2004. In 2010 he had voluntarily returned to Afghanistan since his application had been refused by the Greek authorities and the threat in Afghanistan had no longer been present. After having first stayed in Kabul, he had later moved to a smaller town. The mullah there had found his views on other religions too liberal, and he had been seen as an apostate. He had become isolated and could not work. He had met the second applicant and had fallen in love with her, but her family had not accepted him. Sometime later the mullah had given the first applicant a job as a caretaker at the mosque. One day the fireplace had caught fire and parts of the mosque had burned down. He had been suspected of having set the mosque on fire intentionally and had been arrested. Allegedly, the mullah had stated that he had the authority to sentence the first applicant to death by stoning. The applicants had fled Afghanistan together in 2010. The first applicant alleged that he had become interested in Christianity in 2002 during his stay in Greece, where he had handed out Christian magazines to people on the street and had gone to church twice a week and taken part in other church activities. He had not been allowed to be baptised because the priest there found his knowledge of Christianity to be insufficient. In June 2012 he had been baptised in Sweden at the Pentecostal church. He had come to appreciate Christianity \u2019 s respect for women, honesty and tolerance of other faiths. He did not think that other Afghans in his circle or the Afghan authorities were aware of his conversion, but the authorities would eventually come to know of it because he would not hide his conversion if returned to Afghanistan. This would put his life at risk. He had also taken another man \u2019 s wife to be his, for which he risked harsh punishment. Finally, the applicants alleged that they were not able to relocate internally in Afghanistan.","5. The second applicant stated at the interviews that she had been kidnapped, assaulted and raped by a man whom she had later been forced to marry. She had run away and divorced her husband and had married the first applicant. Consequently, she would risk being killed if returned to Afghanistan. She had not, however, converted to Christianity.","6. On 12 May 2013 the Migration Agency rejected the applicants \u2019 asylum applications and ordered their deportation to Afghanistan. It noted that they had failed to substantiate that the first applicant had returned to Afghanistan in 2010, that the marriage certificate that they had submitted only in copy contained a birth date and a family name which differed from the information given in their asylum applications, that they had given numerous diverging explanations as to how their friends in Greece had sent the certificate to them, and that no documents certifying the second applicant \u2019 s divorce from her first husband had been submitted. In any event, even if their claims concerning the first applicant \u2019 s return to Afghanistan and the later divorce and marriage were to be accepted, the Agency found that the applicants \u2019 stories were, in central parts, vague, contradictory and peculiar. It noted that the first applicant had been given work as a janitor in the mosque despite his being seen as an apostate. Furthermore, the information on the possible death sentence was deemed vague and remarkable, as the first applicant had not seen the actual order; the mullah had just waved a piece of paper which allegedly gave him the authority to sentence the first applicant. It was also unclear which authority had issued the document.","7. Concerning the first applicant \u2019 s conversion, the Migration Agency first noted that he had not mentioned in the first asylum interview that he had previously tried to convert in Greece and planned to convert in Sweden. Moreover, although, in the view of the Agency, a genuine conversion must be seen as an important step in a person \u2019 s life, the applicant \u2019 s statements on why he had converted and what Christianity meant to him were vague and of a rather general nature. Despite his alleged ten-year interest in Christianity, he had no knowledge of the main Christian holidays and the disposition of the Bible and had also been unable to give an account of what he considered to be the Christian message. In general, he had not been able to relate any deeper knowledge of the Bible or of Christianity. He had explained that this was due to his not yet having had the opportunity to study the religion. The Migration Agency found that the first applicant had not converted out of a genuine religious conviction and that he had not made it probable that he intended to live as a convert upon return Afghanistan. Furthermore, there was no indication that his baptism or other religious activities had come to the attention of the Afghan authorities.","8. With respect to the second applicant, the Migration Agency noted that she had herself stated that she was a Muslim and had not converted to Christianity. She had changed her story on her alleged kidnapping, and her submissions regarding her ex-husband \u2019 s background and position were also considered vague. Furthermore, her statements on when she had met the first applicant were deemed vague and lacking in detail and contradicted the first applicant \u2019 s submissions. Having regard to these credibility issues, the Agency concluded that she had not shown that she would be at risk for having remarried.","9. In sum, the Migration Agency found that the individual reasons put forward by the applicants did not warrant granting asylum.","10. As regards the general situation in Afghanistan, the Agency referred to a legal statement by the head of the Agency \u2019 s legal department, issued in 2010, according to which there were internal armed conflicts in a number of provinces in Afghanistan, inter alia, Ghazni, and aggravated tensions in a number of others, but that there were internal flight alternatives for families with a male leader. Because of the internal armed conflict in the applicants \u2019 home province of Ghazni, the Agency examined the possibility of an internal flight alternative. It noted that, according to the available country information, men could settle in a different location in Afghanistan even without the support of a network. Women and families could travel with their men, but might face harassment and ill-treatment if they travelled on their own. Sporadic acts of violence occurred in Kabul, primarily targeting public authorities and officials, but the majority of the city \u2019 s population had moved from other parts of Afghanistan without the support of an existing social network and all ethnic minorities were represented in the province. Thus, the general situation in Kabul did not in itself warrant granting asylum. Taking into account that the applicants were young, healthy and able to work, the Agency concluded that Kabul was a relevant and reasonable alternative within Afghanistan.","11. The applicants appealed against the decision and in essence made the same submissions as before the Migration Agency. They added that the original marriage certificate had been sent by post but had never arrived. Moreover, the mullah had hired the first applicant in order to bring him back to Islam and to be able to control him. The first applicant \u2019 s conversion essentially consisted of his having adopted Christian values. He had not been able to study the religion in detail due to his illiteracy. In Afghanistan he had run into trouble merely by questioning the values of Islam. He had not been able to read the document that the mullah had waved in front of him because he was illiterate, but he had recognised the seal of the district office. They did not know the position of the second applicant \u2019 s ex-husband because Talibans did not have positions as in Sweden. They knew that he was powerful and influential, however, because he had driven expensive cars and money was power in Afghanistan. He had worked for the district office. The second applicant claimed not to have changed her story; rather, she had been misunderstood, either by the interpreter or the Migration Agency \u2019 s administrator. By leaving her husband, the second applicant had breached Muslim values. Her ex-husband had connections and could kill her, even in Kabul.","12. On 27 September 2013 the applicants \u2019 appeal was rejected by the Migration Court ( Migrationsdomstolen ). The court, which held an oral hearing, shared the reasoning of the Migration Agency regarding the general situation in Afghanistan and the applicants \u2019 personal grounds for seeking asylum. It found that the first applicant had not explained why he had returned to his home village and agreed to be employed by the mullah, despite the perceived serious threat from the mullah. It deemed the first applicant \u2019 s account of the alleged death sentence to be vague and speculative. Consequently, the court considered that he had not made it probable that he would be in need of asylum because of his non-Muslim behaviour or the fire in the mosque. Furthermore, it noted that no original documents had been submitted concerning the second applicant \u2019 s alleged divorce, or the applicants \u2019 marriage certificate. Also, the second applicant had given conflicting accounts of the divorce proceedings. The court concluded that the applicants had not made probable the alleged events causing their flight and marriage. Moreover, their accounts of the second applicant \u2019 s ex-husband and how they had got in touch and fled after the fire in the mosque were deemed vague and lacking in detail. In sum, the court concluded that the applicants had not shown that they were in need of international protection because of the incidents that had allegedly occurred in Afghanistan or their submissions concerning their marriage.","13. Regarding the applicants \u2019 sur place activities, the court first noted that religious conversion for Muslims was criminalised under Sharia law and punishable by death. It further noted that the first applicant \u2019 s conversion was not an expression or a continuation of views that he held before leaving Afghanistan in 2002. However, it considered that he had proved that he had formally converted by being baptised. To assess whether or not his conversion was genuine, the court turned to an examination of his credibility. The court held that a religious conversion constituted a major change in a person \u2019 s life and that, in the light of what is known of the Afghan attitude on the matter, abandoning Islam in favour of Christianity must be considered a very far-reaching step in the life of an Afghan. The court therefore shared the Migration Agency \u2019 s conclusion that it was remarkable that the first applicant had failed to mention during the first asylum interview that he had tried to convert in Greece and that he had planned to convert in Sweden. Moreover, the court noted that the first applicant had not been able to describe what, in the Christian faith, had convinced him to convert. It found it conspicuous that, despite his ten-year interest in Christianity, he had not demonstrated any profound knowledge of the Bible, Christian holidays or other aspects of the religion. Furthermore, the first applicant had only started attending church services on a more regular basis around the time when the Migration Agency had refused his asylum application. In the light of the above, the court concluded that he had not made it plausible that he had converted out of a genuine religious conviction or that he intended to live as a convert in Afghanistan and consequently risk persecution. It found that there was nothing to indicate that the baptism or other activities within the parish had, or could, come to the attention of the Afghan authorities. In consequence, the second applicant was deemed not to have substantiated a risk of treatment warranting international protection due to having married a convert.","14. Turning to the general situation in Afghanistan and the issue of an internal flight alternative, the court noted that there was an internal armed conflict in the applicants \u2019 home province. With respect to Kabul, the humanitarian situation was serious and there were aggravated tensions in the province. Having regard to the fact that the applicants belonged to a vulnerable minority without a social network, the court concluded that Kabul was not a reasonable alternative. However, it held that there were other sufficiently safe provinces, such as Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif, to which the applicants could reasonably relocate.","15. On 9 January 2014 the Migration Court of Appeal ( Migrations\u00f6verdomstolen ) refused leave to appeal.","16. Subsequently, the applicants alleged that there were impediments to their deportation and requested the Migration Agency to grant them a new assessment of their case. They submitted in essence the following. In October 2013 the second applicant had converted to Christianity and had been baptised in the same church as the first applicant. She had converted because she had seen that conversion had had a positive impact on the first applicant. She had attended the first applicant \u2019 s baptism and had started reading the Bible. Her commitment had dawned late and her understanding of the Christian message had taken time. Given the known danger of being an apostate in Afghanistan, their return there would put their lives at immediate risk. Their faith was so strong that they would refuse to follow the religious traditions of their home country. They submitted their baptism certificates and a written statement by a pastor of their parish attesting to their religious activities.","17. On 8 April 2014 the Migration Agency dismissed the petition to stop the deportation. It noted that the first applicant \u2019 s conversion had already been assessed in the earlier decision, which had acquired legal force. Regarding the second applicant, it noted that it transpired from the oral hearing before the Migration Court that she had denied having converted to Christianity. She had claimed to have been a Muslim but, as she had not adhered to the Muslim dress code, she had been criticised by Afghan women. Also, she had been seen as non-Muslim due to her marriage to a non-Muslim man. In view of the above, and considering that the information on the second applicant \u2019 s formal conversion was to be viewed as an addition to or modification of circumstances which had already been examined in the earlier decision, the Migration Agency concluded that there were no reasons to stop the deportation or to grant the applicants a new assessment of their case.","18. Upon appeal by the applicants, on 13 May 2014 the Migration Court upheld the impugned decision, sharing the reasoning of the Migration Agency regarding the first applicant. Concerning the second applicant, the court found that the issue of her conversion to Christianity, her baptism and the consequences thereof were new circumstances which had not been assessed in previous proceedings. However, the court noted that she had not been interested in Christianity while living in Afghanistan. Furthermore, although she had denied being a Christian up until the Migration Court \u2019 s judgment in September 2013, she had been baptised soon after, in October 2013. Also, she had now presented a written statement by a pastor according to which she had attended church as early as in June 2013. The court found these events contradictory and concluded that the second applicant \u2019 s submissions about her Christian faith were highly questionable and did not constitute an impediment to her deportation.","19. Subsequently, the applicants again alleged that there were impediments to their deportation and requested the Migration Agency to grant them a new assessment of their case. They submitted that their long and deep involvement with Christianity showed that they had lived as established Christians. They had been known for their Christian activities and had pursued missionary work. Their conversion was known in Afghan society, in Sweden and in Afghanistan. They had had an Afghan Muslim guest in August 2014. He had disapproved of their religious conversion and had threatened them. They had later learned that he had been sent back to Afghanistan in October 2014. He had subsequently called them and threatened them with execution for being apostates. He had said that he had told the authorities about the applicants \u2019 religious conversion.","20. On 27 November 2015 the Migration Agency dismissed the petition to stop the deportation. It noted that the applicants \u2019 conversion had already been assessed in the earlier decisions which had acquired legal force and which had concluded that their conversion was not based on a genuine religious conviction. The Agency further found that the general situation in Afghanistan had not changed since its previous decisions in such a way that it constituted an impediment to the applicants \u2019 deportation. Regarding the alleged threats from an Afghan guest, the Agency noted that the allegations had not been corroborated or substantiated in any way.","21. The applicants appealed. In addition to what they had previously stated, they argued that the fact that they now had a child, a daughter born in December 2014, warranted granting asylum.","22. On 4 February 2016 the Migration Court rejected the appeal, sharing the reasoning of the Migration Agency. It noted that the applicants had submitted additional written statements from friends, according to which the applicants had received threats from fellow countrymen because of their religious conversion. The court found that, even if the events described in the written statements had actually occurred and their countrymen had learned about the applicants \u2019 conversion, those circumstances alone did not warrant granting asylum. The same conclusion was reached with respect to the applicants \u2019 child.","23. On 30 March 2016 the Migration Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal.","24. The applicants submitted an asylum application on behalf of their daughter. Noting that she had no health issues and that her deportation together with her parents would not violate Article 8 of the Convention, the Migration Agency rejected the application on 27 November 2015, referring to the reasons given in the decisions concerning the applicants. The decision was upheld by the Migration Court on 4 February 2016. On 30 March 2016 the Migration Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal.","25. The present application was lodged with the Court on 20 June 2016. On 20 September 2016 the duty judge decided to indicate to the Government of Sweden that it was desirable in the interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings before the Court not to deport the applicants to Afghanistan for the duration of the proceedings before it (Rule 39 of the Rules of Court).","B. International materials","26. Information relating to the situation of the Hazaras can be found in, inter alia, A.M. v. the Netherlands, no. 29094\/09, 5 July 2016, and M.H.A. v. the Netherlands (dec.) 61402\/15, 5 July 2016, and relating to sur place activities of asylum seekers in T.M. and Y.A. v. the Netherlands (dec.) 209\/16, 5 July 2016."],"28924":["10.The applicants were born in 1983, 1987 and 1988 respectively. MrKhlaifia (\u201cthe first applicant\u201d) lives in Om Laarass (Tunisia); MrTabal and Mr Sfar (\u201cthe second and third applicants\u201d) live in ElMahdia (Tunisia).","A.The applicants\u2019 arrival on the Italian coast and their removal to Tunisia","11.On 16 September 2011 in the case of the first applicant, then the next day, 17 September, in the case of the second and third applicants, the applicants left Tunisia with others on board rudimentary vessels heading for the Italian coast. After several hours at sea, their vessels were intercepted by the Italian coastguard, which escorted them to a port on the island of Lampedusa. The applicants arrived on the island on 17 and 18September 2011 respectively.","12.The applicants were transferred to an Early Reception and Aid Centre (Centro di Soccorso e Prima Accoglienza \u2013 \u201cCSPA\u201d) on the island of Lampedusa at Contrada Imbriacola where, after giving them first aid, the authorities proceeded with their identification. According to the Government, on this occasion individual \u201cinformation sheets\u201d were filled in for each of the migrants concerned (see paragraph 224 below); this is disputed by the applicants (see paragraph 222 below).","13.They were accommodated in a part of the centre reserved for adult Tunisians. According to the applicants, they were held in an overcrowded and dirty area and were obliged to sleep on the floor because of the shortage of available beds and the poor quality of the mattresses. They had to eat their meals outside, sitting on the ground. The centre was kept permanently under police surveillance, making any contact with the outside world impossible.","14.The applicants remained in the CSPA until 20September, when a violent revolt broke out among the migrants. The premises were gutted by fire and the applicants were taken to a sports complex on Lampedusa for the night. At dawn on 21September they managed, together with other migrants, to evade the police surveillance and walk to the village of Lampedusa. From there, with about 1,800 other migrants, they started a demonstration through the streets of the island. After being stopped by the police, the applicants were taken first back to the reception centre and then to Lampedusa airport.","15.On the morning of 22 September 2011 the applicants were flown to Palermo. After disembarking they were transferred to ships that were moored in the harbour there. The first applicant was placed on the Vincent, with some 190 other people, while the second and third applicants were put on board the Audace, with about 150 others.","16.The applicants described the conditions as follows. All the migrants on each vessel were confined to the restaurant areas, access to the cabins being prohibited. They slept on the floor and had to wait several hours to use the toilets. They could go outside onto the decks twice a day for only a few minutes at a time. They were allegedly insulted and ill-treated by the police, who kept them under permanent surveillance, and they claimed not to have received any information from the authorities.","17.The applicants remained on the ships for a few days. On 27September 2011 the second and third applicants were taken to Palermo airport pending their removal to Tunisia; the first applicant followed suit on 29 September.","18.Before boarding the planes, the migrants were received by the Tunisian Consul. In their submission, the Consul merely recorded their identities in accordance with the agreement between Italy and Tunisia of April 2011 (see paragraphs 36-40 below).","19.In their application the applicants asserted that at no time during their stay in Italy had they been issued with any document.","Annexed to their observations, the Government, however, produced three refusal-of-entry orders dated 27 and 29 September 2011 that had been issued in respect of the applicants. Those orders, which were virtually identical and drafted in Italian with a translation into Arabic, read as follows:","\u201cThe Chief of Police (questore) for the Province of Agrigento","Having regard to the documents in the file, showing that","(1)on \u201817 [18] September 2011\u2019 members of the police force found in the province of \u2018Agrigento\u2019, near the border of: \u2018island of Lampedusa\u2019, Mr [surname and forename] born ... on [date] ... \u2018Tunisian\u2019 national ... not fully identified, \u2018undocumented\u2019 (sedicente);","(2)the alien entered the territory of the country by evading the border controls;","(3)the identification (rintraccio) of the alien took place on\/immediately after his arrival on national territory, and precisely at: \u2018island of Lampedusa\u2019;","WHEREAS none of the situations [provided for in] Article 10 \u00a7 4 of Legislative Decree no.286 of 1998 is present;","CONSIDERING that it is appropriate to proceed in accordance with Article 10 \u00a7 2 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998;","ORDERS","that the above-mentioned person be","REFUSED LEAVE TO ENTER AND RETURNED","\u2013An appeal may be lodged against the present order within a period of sixty days from the date of its service, with the Justice of the Peace of Agrigento.","\u2013The lodging of an appeal will not, in any event, suspend the enforcement (efficacia) of the present order.","\u2013The director of the Migration Office will proceed, for the enforcement of the present order, with its notification, together with a summary translation into a language spoken by the alien or into English, French or Spanish; and with its transmission to the diplomatic or consular delegation of the State of origin, as provided for by Article 2 \u00a7 7 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998; and with its registration under Article 10 \u00a7 6 of the said Legislative Decree.","To be escorted to the border at: \u2018Rome Fiumicino\u2019","[Issued at] Agrigento [on] 27[29]\/09\/2011 on behalf of the Chief of Police","[Signature]\u201d","20.These orders were each accompanied by a record of notification bearing the same date, also drafted in Italian with an Arabic translation. In the space reserved for the applicants\u2019 signatures, both records contain the handwritten indication \u201c[the person] refused to sign or to receive a copy\u201d (si rifiuta di firmare e ricevere copia).","21.On their arrival at Tunis airport, the applicants were released.","B.Decision of the Palermo preliminary investigations judge","22.A number of anti-racism associations filed a complaint about the treatment to which the migrants had been subjected, after 20September 2011, on board the ships Audace, Vincent and Fantasy.","23.Criminal proceedings for abuse of power and unlawful arrest (Articles 323 and 606 of the Criminal Code) were opened against a person or persons unknown. On 3 April 2012 the public prosecutor sought to have the charges dropped.","24.In a decision of 1 June 2012 the Palermo preliminary investigations judge (giudice per le indagini preliminari) granted the public prosecutor\u2019s request.","25.In his reasoning the judge emphasised that the purpose of placing the migrants in the CSPA was to accommodate them, to assist them and to cater for their hygiene-related needs for as long as was strictly necessary, before sending them to an Identification and Removal Centre (Centro di Identificazione ed Espulsione \u2013 \u201cCIE\u201d) or taking any measures in their favour. At the CSPA the migrants could, according to him, obtain legal assistance and information about asylum application procedures.","The judge shared the public prosecutor\u2019s view that the interpretation of the conditions concerning the grounds for and duration of the confinement of migrants in a CSPA was sometimes vague. He also agreed with the public prosecutor that a range of factors were to be taken into consideration, leading to the conclusion that the facts of the case could not be characterised as a criminal offence.","The judge noted that the Agrigento police authority (questura) had merely registered the presence of the migrants at the CSPA without taking any decisions ordering their confinement.","26.According to the judge, the unstable balance on the island of Lampedusa had been upset on 20September 2011, when a group of Tunisians had carried out an arson attack, seriously damaging the CSPA at Contrada Imbriacola and rendering it incapable of fulfilling its purpose of accommodating and assisting migrants. The authorities had then organised transfer by air and sea to evacuate migrants from Lampedusa. The following day, clashes had taken place in the island\u2019s port between the local population and a group of foreigners who had threatened to explode gas canisters. The judge explained that there had thus been a situation which was likely to degenerate, and which was covered by the notion of \u201cstate of necessity\u201d (stato di necessit\u00e0) as provided for in Article 54 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 34 below). It was thus an imperative to arrange for the immediate transfer of some of the migrants by using, among other means, the ships.","As to the fact that, in the emergency situation, no formal decision had been taken to place the migrants on board the ships, the judge found that this could not be regarded as an unlawful arrest and that the conditions for the migrants\u2019 transfer to CIEs were not satisfied. Firstly, the CIEs were overcrowded, and secondly, the agreements with the Tunisian authorities suggested that their return was supposed to be prompt. The fact that a refusal-of-entry measure (respingimento) had been ordered in respect of the migrants, without judicial scrutiny, a few days after their arrival, was not unlawful in the judge\u2019s view. The calculation of a \u201creasonable time\u201d for the adoption of that measure and for the migrants\u2019 stay in the CSPA had to take account of logistical difficulties (state of the sea, distance between Lampedusa and Sicily) and of the number of migrants concerned. In those circumstances, the judge concluded that there had been no infringement of the law.","Moreover, the judge was of the view that no malicious intent could be attributed to the authorities, whose conduct had been prompted first and foremost by the public interest. The migrants had not sustained any unfair harm (danno ingiusto).","27.In so far as the complainants had alleged that the way in which the migrants had been treated had been detrimental to their health, the judge noted that the investigations had found that nobody on the ships had applied for asylum. Those who, at the Lampedusa CSPA, had expressed an intention to do so, together with any vulnerable individuals, had been transferred to the centres of Trapani, Caltanissetta and Foggia. Unaccompanied minors had been placed in temporary accommodation and no pregnant women had been transferred to the ships. The migrants on board had been able to receive medical assistance, hot water, electricity, meals and hot drinks. Moreover, as recorded in a press agency note of 25September 2011, T.R., a member of parliament (MP) had boarded the ships in the port of Palermo, and had observed that the migrants were in good health, that they were receiving assistance and were sleeping in cabins containing bed linen or reclining seats (poltrone reclinabili). Some of the Tunisians had been taken to hospital, while others had been treated on board by medical staff. Accompanied by the deputy chief of police (vice questore) and by police officers, the MP in question had talked with some of the migrants. He had thus been able to observe that they had access to prayer rooms, that the food was satisfactory (pasta, chicken, vegetables, fruit and water) and that the Civil Protection Authority (Protezione civile) had provided them with clothing. Some of the migrants had complained of a lack of razors, but the MP had observed that this could be explained by a measure taken to prevent self-harm.","28.The judge noted that, even though the migrants had not been in custody or under arrest, a photograph published in a newspaper had shown one of them with his hands bound by black ribbons and in the company of a police officer. He had been part of a small group of individuals who, fearing immediate removal, had engaged in acts of self-harm and had caused damage to buses. In the judge\u2019s view, the restraint in question had been necessary to guarantee the physical well-being of the persons concerned and to avoid aggressive acts against police officers who were neither armed nor equipped with any means of coercion. In any event, the conduct of the police officers had been justified by a \u201cstate of necessity\u201d, within the meaning of Article 54 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 34 below).","29.In the light of the foregoing, the preliminary investigations judge concluded that the case file contained no evidence of the physical and mental elements of the offences provided for in Articles 323 and 606 of the Criminal Code.","C.Decisions of the Agrigento Justice of the Peace","30.Two other migrants in respect of whom a refusal-of-entry order had been issued challenged those orders before the Agrigento Justice of the Peace.","31.In two decisions (decreti) of 4 July and 30 October 2011, respectively, the Justice of the Peace annulled those orders.","In his reasoning the judge observed that the complainants had been found on Italian territory on 6May and 18September 2011 respectively and that the orders at issue had been adopted only on 16 May and 24September 2011. While acknowledging that Article 10 of Legislative Decree no.286 of 1998 (see paragraph 33 below) did not indicate any time-frame for the adoption of such orders, the judge took the view that a measure which by its very nature restricted the freedom of the person concerned had to be taken within a reasonably short time after the identification (fermo) of the unlawful migrant. To find otherwise amounted to allowing de facto detention of the migrant in the absence of any reasoned decision of the authority, which would contravene the Constitution.","36.On 5 April 2011 the Italian Government entered into an agreement with Tunisia on measures to control the flow of irregular migrants from that country.","37.The text of the agreement had not been made public. However, appended in an annex to their request for referral to the Grand Chamber, the Government produced extracts from the minutes of a meeting held in Tunis on 4 and 5 April 2011 between the Ministries of the Interior of Tunisia and Italy. According to a press release dated 6April 2011 on the website of the Italian Ministry of the Interior[1], Tunisia undertook to strengthen its border controls with the aim of avoiding fresh departures of irregular migrants, using logistical resources made available to it by the Italian authorities.","38.In addition, Tunisia undertook to accept the immediate return of Tunisians who had unlawfully reached the Italian shore after the date of the agreement. Tunisian nationals could be returned by means of simplified procedures, involving the mere identification of the person concerned by the Tunisian consular authorities.","39.According to the indications given by the Government in their written observations of 25 April 2016 before the Grand Chamber, there had been an initial agreement with Tunisia in 1998; it had been announced on the Interior Ministry\u2019s website, added to the treaty archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and published in Official Gazette no. 11 of 15 January 2000.","40.The Government produced a note verbale concerning the bilateral agreement that Italy concluded with Tunisia in 1998, appending it in an annex to their request for referral to the Grand Chamber. The document in question, emanating from the Italian Government and dated 6 August 1998, and which does not seem to be the text applied in the applicants\u2019 case (see paragraph103 below), contains provisions on bilateral cooperation for the prevention and repression of illegal immigration, the readmission of the two countries\u2019 nationals, the return of nationals of third countries outside the Arab Maghreb Union to their countries of last departure, and the taking-back of migrants after readmission in error.","The text of the note verbale shows that the Italian Government agreed to support Tunisia\u2019s efforts to combat illegal immigration by providing technical and operational material assistance and by making a financial contribution. Each Party undertook, at the request of the other Party and without further formality, to readmit into its territory any person who did not meet the conditions of entry or residence applicable in the requesting State, in so far as it had been established that the person concerned was a national of the requested State. The text refers to the documents required for the identification of those concerned and provides (part II, point 5) that if the consular authority of the requested State considers it necessary to hear the person concerned, a representative of the authority of that State may go to the court office, or to the reception centre or medical facility where the migrant is legally residing, in order to interview him or her.","The note verbale also describes the procedure for issuing a laissez\u2011passer and for the removal of migrants, while indicating the Italian Government\u2019s undertaking \u201cnot to resort to mass or special removals\u201d of the persons concerned.","41.In the European Union (EU) context, the return of irregular migrants is governed by Directive 2008\/115\/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 (the \u201cReturn Directive\u201d) \u201con common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals\u201d. The Directive contains the following provisions in particular:","Article 1Subject matter","\u201cThis Directive sets out common standards and procedures to be applied in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, in accordance with fundamental rights as general principles of Community law as well as international law, including refugee protection and human rights obligations.\u201d","Article 2Scope","\u201c1.This Directive applies to third-country nationals staying illegally on the territory of a Member State.","2.Member States may decide not to apply this Directive to third-country nationals who:","(a)are subject to a refusal of entry in accordance with Article 13 of the Schengen Borders Code, or who are apprehended or intercepted by the competent authorities in connection with the irregular crossing by land, sea or air of the external border of a Member State and who have not subsequently obtained an authorisation or a right to stay in that Member State;","(b)are subject to return as a criminal law sanction or as a consequence of a criminal law sanction, according to national law, or who are the subject of extradition procedures.","...\u201d","Article 8Removal","\u201c1.Member States shall take all necessary measures to enforce the return decision if no period for voluntary departure has been granted in accordance with Article 7(4) or if the obligation to return has not been complied with within the period for voluntary departure granted in accordance with Article 7.","2.If a Member State has granted a period for voluntary departure in accordance with Article 7, the return decision may be enforced only after the period has expired, unless a risk as referred to in Article 7(4) arises during that period.","3.Member States may adopt a separate administrative or judicial decision or act ordering the removal.","4.Where Member States use \u2014 as a last resort \u2014 coercive measures to carry out the removal of a third-country national who resists removal, such measures shall be proportionate and shall not exceed reasonable force. They shall be implemented as provided for in national legislation in accordance with fundamental rights and with due respect for the dignity and physical integrity of the third-country national concerned.","5.In carrying out removals by air, Member States shall take into account the Common Guidelines on security provisions for joint removals by air annexed to Decision 2004\/573\/EC.","6.Member States shall provide for an effective forced-return monitoring system.\u201d","Article 12Form","\u201c1.Return decisions and, if issued, entry-ban decisions and decisions on removal shall be issued in writing and give reasons in fact and in law as well as information about available legal remedies.","The information on reasons in fact may be limited where national law allows for the right to information to be restricted, in particular in order to safeguard national security, defence, public security and for the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences.","2.Member States shall provide, upon request, a written or oral translation of the main elements of decisions related to return, as referred to in paragraph 1, including information on the available legal remedies in a language the third-country national understands or may reasonably be presumed to understand.","3.Member States may decide not to apply paragraph 2 to third country nationals who have illegally entered the territory of a Member State and who have not subsequently obtained an authorisation or a right to stay in that Member State.","In such cases decisions related to return, as referred to in paragraph 1, shall be given by means of a standard form as set out under national legislation.","Member States shall make available generalised information sheets explaining the main elements of the standard form in at least five of those languages which are most frequently used or understood by illegal migrants entering the Member State concerned.\u201d","Article 13Remedies","\u201c1.The third-country national concerned shall be afforded an effective remedy to appeal against or seek review of decisions related to return, as referred to in Article12(1), before a competent judicial or administrative authority or a competent body composed of members who are impartial and who enjoy safeguards of independence.","2.The authority or body mentioned in paragraph 1 shall have the power to review decisions related to return, as referred to in Article 12(1), including the possibility of temporarily suspending their enforcement, unless a temporary suspension is already applicable under national legislation.","3.The third-country national concerned shall have the possibility to obtain legal advice, representation and, where necessary, linguistic assistance.","4.Member States shall ensure that the necessary legal assistance and\/or representation is granted on request free of charge in accordance with relevant national legislation or rules regarding legal aid, and may provide that such free legal assistance and\/or representation is subject to conditions as set out in Article 15(3) to (6) of Directive 2005\/85\/EC.\u201d","Article 15Detention","\u201c1.Unless other sufficient but less coercive measures can be applied effectively in a specific case, Member States may only keep in detention a third-country national who is the subject of return procedures in order to prepare the return and\/or carry out the removal process, in particular when:","(a)there is a risk of absconding or","(b)the third-country national concerned avoids or hampers the preparation of return or the removal process.","Any detention shall be for as short a period as possible and only maintained as long as removal arrangements are in progress and executed with due diligence.","2.Detention shall be ordered by administrative or judicial authorities.","Detention shall be ordered in writing with reasons being given in fact and in law.","When detention has been ordered by administrative authorities, Member States shall:","(a)either provide for a speedy judicial review of the lawfulness of detention to be decided on as speedily as possible from the beginning of detention;","(b)or grant the third-country national concerned the right to take proceedings by means of which the lawfulness of detention shall be subject to a speedy judicial review to be decided on as speedily as possible after the launch of the relevant proceedings. In such a case Member States shall immediately inform the third-country national concerned about the possibility of taking such proceedings.","The third-country national concerned shall be released immediately if the detention is not lawful.","3.In every case, detention shall be reviewed at reasonable intervals of time either on application by the third-country national concerned or ex officio. In the case of prolonged detention periods, reviews shall be subject to the supervision of a judicial authority.","4.When it appears that a reasonable prospect of removal no longer exists for legal or other considerations or the conditions laid down in paragraph 1 no longer exist, detention ceases to be justified and the person concerned shall be released immediately.","5.Detention shall be maintained for as long a period as the conditions laid down in paragraph1 are fulfilled and it is necessary to ensure successful removal. Each Member State shall set a limited period of detention, which may not exceed six months.","6.Member States may not extend the period referred to in paragraph 5 except for a limited period not exceeding a further twelve months in accordance with national law in cases where regardless of all their reasonable efforts the removal operation is likely to last longer owing to:","(a)a lack of cooperation by the third-country national concerned, or","(b)delays in obtaining the necessary documentation from third countries.\u201d","Article 16Conditions of detention","\u201c1.Detention shall take place as a rule in specialised detention facilities. Where a Member State cannot provide accommodation in a specialised detention facility and is obliged to resort to prison accommodation, the third-country nationals in detention shall be kept separated from ordinary prisoners.","2.Third-country nationals in detention shall be allowed \u2014 on request \u2014 to establish in due time contact with legal representatives, family members and competent consular authorities.","3.Particular attention shall be paid to the situation of vulnerable persons. Emergency health care and essential treatment of illness shall be provided.","4.Relevant and competent national, international and non-governmental organisations and bodies shall have the possibility to visit detention facilities, as referred to in paragraph 1, to the extent that they are being used for detaining third-country nationals in accordance with this Chapter. Such visits may be subject to authorisation.","5.Third-country nationals kept in detention shall be systematically provided with information which explains the rules applied in the facility and sets out their rights and obligations. Such information shall include information on their entitlement under national law to contact the organisations and bodies referred to in paragraph 4.\u201d","Article 18Emergency situations","\u201c1.In situations where an exceptionally large number of third-country nationals to be returned places an unforeseen heavy burden on the capacity of the detention facilities of a Member State or on its administrative or judicial staff, such a Member State may, as long as the exceptional situation persists, decide to allow for periods for judicial review longer than those provided for under the third subparagraph of Article15(2) and to take urgent measures in respect of the conditions of detention derogating from those set out in Articles 16(1) and 17(2).","2.When resorting to such exceptional measures, the Member State concerned shall inform the Commission. It shall also inform the Commission as soon as the reasons for applying these exceptional measures have ceased to exist.","3.Nothing in this Article shall be interpreted as allowing Member States to derogate from their general obligation to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of their obligations under this Directive.\u201d","42.When interpreting the Return Directive, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held that an alien was entitled, before a decision to return him or her was adopted, to express his or her view on the legality of his or her stay (see, in particular, Khaled Boudjlida v. Pr\u00e9fet des Pyr\u00e9n\u00e9es\u2011Atlantiques, case C-249\/13, judgment of 11 December 2014, \u00a7\u00a728-35).","43.It can be seen from the CJEU\u2019s case-law that, in spite of the lack of express provision for the right to be heard in the Return Directive, that right applies as a fundamental principle of EU law (see, in particular, Articles 41, 47 and 48 of the EU\u2019s Charter of Fundamental Rights; also the judgments M.G. and N.R v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, C-383\/13 PPU, 10 September 2013, \u00a7 32, and Sophie Mukarubega v. Pr\u00e9fet de police et Pr\u00e9fet de la Seine-Saint-Denis, C-166\/13, judgment of 5November 2014, \u00a7\u00a7 42-45).","The CJEU clarified that the right to be heard: (a) guaranteed to every person the opportunity to make known his or her views effectively during an administrative procedure and before the adoption of any decision liable to affect his or her interests adversely (Khaled Boudjlida, cited above, \u00a7 36, and Sophie Mukarubega, cited above, \u00a7 46); and (b) enabled the competent authority effectively to take into account all relevant information, to pay due attention to the observations submitted by the person concerned, and thus to give a detailed statement of reasons for its decision (Khaled Boudjlida, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 37-38).","In the Khaled Boudjlida judgment (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 55, 64-65 and 67), the CJEU added: (a) that the alien need not necessarily be heard in respect of all the information on which the authority intends to rely to justify its return decision, but must simply have an opportunity to present any arguments against his removal; (b) that the right to be heard in a return procedure does not entitle the person to free legal assistance; and (c) that the duration of the interview is not decisive in ascertaining whether the person concerned has actually been heard (in the case at issue it had lasted about thirty minutes).","44.In the CJEU\u2019s view, a decision taken following an administrative procedure in which the right to be heard has been infringed will result in annulment only if, had it not been for such an irregularity, the outcome of the procedure might have been different (see M.G. and N.R, cited above, \u00a7\u00a738 and 44, concerning decisions to extend detention pending removal; in \u00a7\u00a7 41-43 of that judgment it is stated that the Directive\u2019s effectiveness would otherwise be undermined and the objective of removal called into question).","45.Lastly, the CJEU has held that the right to be heard can be subjected to restrictions, provided they correspond to objectives of general interest and do not involve, with regard to the objective pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference which infringes upon the very substance of the right guaranteed (see M.G. and N.R., cited above, \u00a7 33, and Sophie Mukarubega, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 53 and 82, where it is stated that the person concerned does not have to be heard by the national authorities twice, both on his or her application to stay and on a return decision, but only on one of those questions)."],"28935":["A.Background to the case","10.During the period from the end of September 2006 to the end of January 2007 identity checks of Georgian nationals residing in Russia were carried out in the streets, markets and other workplaces and at their homes. Many were subsequently arrested and taken to police stations. After a period of custody in police stations, they were grouped together and taken by bus to a court, which summarily imposed administrative penalties on them and gave decisions ordering their administrative expulsion from Russian territory. Subsequently, after sometimes undergoing a medical visit and a blood test, they were taken to detention centres for foreigners where they were detained for varying periods of time, taken by bus to airports in Moscow, and expelled to Georgia by aeroplane. (for further details as to the background of the case see Georgia v.Russia (I) [GC], no.13255\/07, \u00a745, ECHR 2014).","B.Circumstances of the present case","11.The applicant was born in 1959 in Senaki (Georgia) and married to Mr Tengiz Togonidze, a Georgian national born in 1958. Together they had lived in St Petersburg since 2004. In April 2006 Mr Togonidze had started suffering from coughing fits, shortness of breath and thickening of the aorta walls.","12.In May 2006 the applicant returned to Georgia because her visa had expired. Mr Togonidze, whose visa had expired on 9 February 2005 and whose registration was no longer valid either, stayed in St Petersburg.","1.The arrest and the conditions of detention and transportation of MrTogonidze","13.At about 8.50 p.m. on 3 October 2006 Mr Togonidze was arrested by police officers in St Petersburg and placed in detention.","14.At about 3.30 p.m. on 4 October 2006 the Nevskiy District Court of StPetersburg ordered Mr Togonidze to be expelled from the Russian Federation and detained at the St Petersburg special detention centre for aliens pending his administrative expulsion on the ground that he had infringed the residence rules governing foreign nationals, namely Article18.8 of the Code of Administrative Offences. The court also fined the applicant in the amount of RUB 1,500.","15.Mr Togonidze was subsequently brought to the reception centre for foreigners of the Main Internal Affairs Directorate for St Petersburg and Leningrad Region. Upon his arrival he was examined by a medical officer, who found that Mr Togonidze did not show any health problems preventing him from being placed in the reception centre. Mr Togonidze informed the medical staff that he suffered from asthma attacks and was subsequently placed together with another Georgian detainee who suffered from asthma in a cell measuring between 35 and 40 m2 with 25 to 30 other Georgian nationals.","16.The sanitary conditions of the cell were very poor, as the toilets were only separated from the rest of the cell by a partition measuring 1.1 m at one side, and there was a lack of fresh air. In addition, while Mr Togonidze was provided with possibilities to take walks, he was not permitted outdoor activities.","17.On 13 October 2006 Mr Togonidze was suffering from nausea and a headache and asked for medical assistance. Subsequently a medical officer checked his blood pressure and temperature, which was slightly raised. He was given paracetamol. A re-examination the same day showed that his temperature was back to normal.","18.On 14 October 2006 Mr Pataridze, Consul of Georgia in the Russian Federation at the material time, visited the detention centre. When he saw Mr Togonidze, who was having difficulties breathing and whose face had turned black, he had requested that Mr Togonidze be immediately transferred to a hospital but that request was not complied with.","19.On 16 October 2006 Mr Togonidze, together with 24 other Georgian nationals, was placed in a bus to Domodedovo Airport in Moscow with a view to his expulsion by aeroplane to Georgia. Prior to entering the bus the detainees and their belongings were searched. In addition the detainees were accompanied by 20 officers of the special police force of the Main Internal Affairs Directorate (OMON) on the bus and two further police cars escorted the bus on the way to the airport.","20.The conditions of transport in the bus were very difficult, with no air conditioning, and although the journey lasted between eight and nine hours, the officers who had been accompanying the detainees had not allowed them to open the windows. On the way to the airport the bus stopped five times to let people, allegedly for a bribe, use the toilet and purchase food. Exiting the bus was closely monitored by the accompanying police officers.","21.On 17 October 2006 between 7 and 8 a.m. the bus arrived at the airport and around 8.30 a.m. MrTogonidze, whose health had deteriorated during the bus ride, was allowed to leave the bus upon the request of MrPataridze, who was awaiting the Georgian nationals at the airport.","22.Mr Pataridze indicated that when MrTogonidze had got off the bus he had seen that he was very ill and was \u201csuffocating like a fish out of water\u201d and begging to be allowed to breathe fresh air.","23.On the way to the terminal MrTogonidze collapsed after walking a few steps and died. A called ambulance was unable to resuscitate him and he was declared dead at 10.20 a.m.","2.The investigation carried out by the Russian authorities following MrTogonidze\u2019s death","24.On 18 October 2006 the Bureau of Forensic Medical Examination of the Moscow Health Department conducted an autopsy of MrTogonidze\u2019s corpse and indicated that his death was caused by tuberculosis. In addition blood and urine samples were taken and sent for forensic chemical examination.","25.On 19 October 2006 the Moscow Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office decided not to initiate criminal proceedings, as the competent prosecutor found that MrTogonidze had died of a natural cause.","26.During the forensic chemical examination of the taken blood and urine samples methadone was detected in both samples. In regard to the urine sample a high-performance liquid chromatography (HLPC) was applied, which established 0,11 mg% methadone and 0,69 mg% methadone metabolite in Mr Togonidze\u2019s urine. A closer inspection of MrTogonidze\u2019s blood was not conducted and the exact level of methadone in his blood was not established. Based on these findings the Bureau of Forensic Medical Examination of the Moscow Health Department finally concluded that MrTogonidze had died of methadone poisoning.","27.On 8 November 2006 the decision not to initiate criminal proceedings of 19 October 2006 was quashed and the case file was forwarded for additional examination.","28.On 9 November 2006 the Moscow Regional Prosecutor\u2019s Office decided again not to initiate criminal proceedings. This time finding that, owing to detecting methadone in the urine and blood of Mr Togonidze (see paragraph 26 above) and finding three injection marks on his corpse, there was evidence for repeated use of narcotics for a long period of time. Therefore the prosecutor concluded that Mr Togonidze took the methadone voluntarily and that his death was caused by negligent poisoning with methadone.","29.On 14 December 2006 the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Russian Federation proposed that the decision of 9 November 2006 would be quashed and further investigations would be conducted. It held that thus far the deterioration of Mr Togonidze\u2019s health during the bus ride had not sufficiently been examined and that relevant officials had not been interviewed.","30.On 15 December 2006 the Federal Migration Service challenged the allegation that Mr Togonidze had died of methadone poisoning, saying that he had died of tuberculosis.","31.On 20 December 2006 a criminal investigation was initiated against an unknown person for selling methadone to Mr Togonidze at an unknown date and unknown location.","32.On 30 July 2007 the decision to dismiss criminal proceedings was quashed and the case was forwarded for additional examination. In particular it was held that the dismissal was premature and that it should be established whether any narcotics were found on Mr Togonidze, the amount of methadone taken by him, whether such a dose could be lethal, why MrTogonidze\u2019s health deteriorated during the bus ride and whether he received adequate health care during his detention and transfer to the airport.","33.On 8 August 2007 the criminal proceedings were dismissed and on 9August 2007 the dismissal was quashed again, as the instructions of 30July 2007 had not been fulfilled.","34.On 14 August 2007 the criminal proceedings were dismissed again and the dismissal was quashed on 11 December 2007.","35.On 20 December 2007 criminal proceedings were finally dismissed. A subsequent request to quash the dismissal was denied on 14 February 2008 and confirmed on 1 September 2010.","3.Medical Report submitted by the applicant","36.Based on the documents provided by the Government, and in particular on the autopsy report and the report of the forensic chemical examination, the applicant submitted her own medical report regarding her husband\u2019s death. The report was compiled by a forensic pathologist, DrJohn Clark \u2013 a former lecturer at different universities in the United Kingdom and chief pathologist for the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) \u2013 supported by a forensic toxicologist, DrHilary Hamnett.","37.The experts pointed out that the Russian authorities gave the cause of death as methadone intoxication based on the fact that methadone was detected in the blood and urine of Mr Togonidze and that he had three injection marks on his body. They also emphasised that the authorities concluded from these facts that Mr Togonidze had repeatedly used narcotics for a long period of time. As regards the needle punctures they pointed out that the injection mark at the bend of the left elbow stemmed most probably from the resuscitation attempts at the airport, in which intravenous drugs were given, and that the other two marks, on the lower third of the left shoulder, appear as a very unusual site for self-injection of drugs. They further indicated that methadone is usually taken in liquid form and only very uncommonly by injection. In addition, according to their opinion, the last few hours of Mr Togonidze\u2019s life did not coincide with the \u2018normal\u2019 death of a person dying from methadone intoxication. Being a sedative, people dying from methadone intoxication typically do so after a period of unconsciousness. Mr Togonidze, however, did not show any signs of drowsiness and was able to talk to the Georgian consul and walk a few steps before suddenly collapsing. Lastly they pointed out that the conclusion of repeated drug use was not confirmed by an analysis of a hair sample or finding any supporting evidence, such as needles, ampoules or syringes, on Mr Togonidze\u2019s corpse or in his cell.","38.As regards the forensic chemical examination the experts indicated that the applied analyses appear not to have been carried out according to international recommendations and that the level of methadone was only measured in the urine and not in the blood. In their opinion it is unacceptable to conclude intoxication on urine levels alone, as drugs accumulate in the bladder over time and only blood levels can give an indication of a likely intoxication or incapacitation.","39.In sum the forensic pathologist concluded that there was no scientific justification for giving methadone intoxication as the cause of death. He himself would have given the cause of death as suppurative bronchopneumonia due to chronic obstructive airways disease. He further indicated that, given Mr Togonidze\u2019s chronic lung disease, he was more likely to develop a chest infection and to progress his pneumonia in a crowded, airless space. The deterioration of his health, however, would have been noticeable, as he would have been unwell and showed signs such as wheezing and coughing. A timely hospitalisation and antibiotic treatment would have been the correct course of action."],"28936":["9.The first applicant, Ms Lia Shioshvili, was born in 1977 and lives in Gurjaani (Georgia). She is the mother of the second, third, fourth and fifth applicant, all Georgian nationals and born respectively in 1995, 1997, 2000 and 2004.","A.The background to the case","10.During the period from the end of September 2006 to the end of January 2007 identity checks of Georgian nationals residing in Russia were carried out in the streets, markets and other workplaces as well as at their homes. Many were subsequently arrested and taken to police stations. After a period of custody in police stations, they were grouped together and taken by bus to a court, which summarily imposed administrative penalties on them and gave decisions ordering their administrative expulsion from Russian territory. Subsequently, some were taken to detention centres for foreigners where they were detained for varying periods of time, and then taken by bus to various airports in Moscow, and expelled to Georgia by aeroplane. Some of the Georgian nationals against whom expulsion orders were issued left the territory of the Russian Federation by their own means (for further details as to the background of the case see Georgia v.Russia(I), cited above, \u00a7 45).","B.The circumstances of the present case","1.The applicants\u2019 arrival in Russia and their expulsion","11.On 29 May 1998 the first applicant, her husband and her two children arrived in the Russian Federation for the first time. At that time there was no visa requirement for Georgian citizens in place. In the subsequent years the first applicant, her husband and the children had been back and forth several times between the Russian Federation and Georgia.","12.In 2003 the first applicant and her children again entered the territory of the Russian Federation with a visa valid for one month. They settled together with their husband\/father in the village of Karinskoye, in the Odintsovski district of Moscow city.","13.In September 2004 the first applicant gave birth to her fourth child, the fifth applicant. The first applicant did not apply for a birth certificate for the fifth applicant at that time, since she was unlawfully residing in Russia.","14.At the beginning of October 2006, the applicants moved to the city of Ruza in order to avoid expulsion.","15.On 18 October 2006 a police officer visited the applicants\u2019 family home in Ruza and requested the first applicant to produce her identity papers. Owing to the absence of visa documents the officer asked all applicants to follow him to the local police station, where an administrative offence report was drawn up. The applicants left the police station after approximately 30 minutes. The police officer informed the first applicant that a court hearing concerning her case would take place soon. He further advised her to apply for a birth certificate for the fifth applicant.","16.On 25 October 2006 the Georgian Consulate in Moscow issued a temporary birth certificate for the fifth applicant, valid until 14 November 2006.","17.On 7 November 2006 a hearing before the Ruzskiy District Court of the Moscow Region took place, following which an expulsion decision was issued. The court only ordered the expulsion of the first applicant, even though mentioning in its decision that she was mother to four children. The hearing lasted about ten minutes and despite the first applicant\u2019s limited knowledge of the Russian language, she was not assisted by an interpreter.","2.The applicants\u2019 forced stay in Derbent (Dagestan)","18.On 20 November 2006, after having received the expulsion decision of 7 November 2006 all five applicants left Moscow. Due to suspended air, rail, road, sea and postal communications between the Russian Federation and Georgia, the applicants took the train from Moscow to Baku (Azerbaijan). The first applicant was eight months pregnant at the material time and her four minor children were eleven, nine, six and two years old.","a)The applicants\u2019 version of the subsequent events","19.According to the applicants their train was stopped by Russian migration officers on 22 November 2006 at approximately 10.30 pm near the Russian\/Azerbaijani border and all Georgian nationals were asked to get off the train with their belongings. The officers collected the applicants\u2019 identity and travel documents and confiscated 400 USD from the first applicant, which allegedly had not been declared. The officers informed all the Georgians including the applicants, that there were various irregularities in their documents and that they could not continue their journey, whereas all non\u2011Georgians could resume their journey on the train.","20.The five applicants were then requested to walk with the other Georgian nationals to a bus, which went to Derbent. Two migration officers escorted the group but would not inform them of the authorities\u2019 intention nor where the group was being taken. Due to the cold weather and her advanced pregnancy the walk and the bus ride were particular difficult for the first applicant. In particular, since she had to carry a suitcase and her youngest child. Her oral complaints to the officers about these circumstances were of no avail.","21.Once the group arrived in Derbent, the migration officers asked the group to accompany them to the migration service office. The first applicant was unable to continue walking and waited outside for two hours with her children. She was worried for the health of her minor children and for the unborn child.","22.On 23 November 2006, at about 3 am, the group was taken to Derbent train station for the night. They had to pay 500 rubles to the police officers, who guarded them, to be allowed to go to the toilet. No water or food was provided.","23.At daybreak, the police officers asked the group to go to the migration service office again, where they spent the whole day waiting outside at a temperature of 5o C.","24.In the evening the first applicant\u2019s health deteriorated, her children were crying and coughing and no shelter, water or food was offered by the authorities. Finally, the group of Georgians rented an unheated, four-room basement flat in Derbent, for which the first applicant had to pay 200rubles per day for her and the children. Three women and six children from the group of Georgians, including the applicants, settled in one room, which had four beds. The remaining three rooms were occupied by more than 20Georgian men.","25.According to the applicants the migration officers regularly visited the flat, but the first applicant\u2019s complaints about her worsening health were to no avail.","26.On 29 November 2006 the first applicant tried to cross the Russian\/Azerbaijani border with her three eldest children, the second, third and fourth applicant. The fifth applicant stayed with the other Georgians, as her birth certificate had expired on 14 November 2006. However, they were stopped by the customs officers who indicated that the court\u2019s expulsion decision only concerned the first applicant and not her children. They were subsequently sent back to Derbent.","27.The first applicant\u2019s health worsened, she suffered from a cold and had a fever, became depressed and had repeated asthma attacks.","28.On 3 and 4 December 2006, after having gone back and forth to the migration service office, and with the help of an employee from the consulate service of the Georgian Embassy in Moscow, the first applicant finally obtained transit visa for her children and all other necessary documents, so that all five applicants could leave for Georgia.","29.Several national broadcasting television companies reported on the Georgians\u2019 situation in Derbent on a daily basis between 1 and 7December 2006.","b)The Government\u2019s version of the subsequent events","30.According to the Government the border control services, which conducted immigration controls in the trains going to the Republic of Azerbaijan, did not bring any Georgian nationals to the migration services on 22 or 23 November 2006. However, on 23 November 2006 the name of the fifth applicant was registered by the Line Division of the Interior at Derbent station in the register of passengers put off trains. She was, however, registered as a Russian national. The other four applicants were not registered in the aforementioned register.","31.The Government further explained that according to the normal procedure persons, who are put off international trains, are invited to the Police Line Division to include their personal data in the register. These persons, however, are neither coerced to do so, nor accompanied on their route to the station, nor passed over to the migration service department.","32.Further investigations by the Russian authorities revealed, according to the Government, that the first applicant temporarily resided in a house in Derbent with the consent of the house owners. According to the testimony of the house owners the first applicant lived there free of charge, was not accompanied by children and no police officer or other official visited the first applicant in the house.","3.The applicants\u2019 return to Georgia","33.On 5 December 2006 a group of 30 Georgians, including the applicants, travelled to the Russian\/Azerbaijani border in two buses that they had hired. At the border the customs officers checked the documents for several hours, while the applicants had to wait standing outside.","34.With another bus the group travelled through the city of Baku to the Azerbaijani\/Georgian border. The last 5 kilometres to the border the applicants had to walk, as the bus driver had asked them to get off the bus: The first applicant and her youngest child, the fifth applicant, were able to take a taxi to the border, but the three other applicants had to continue walking; the temperature was below 3o C.","35.After having arrived in Georgia, the first applicant\u2019s health was particularly bad. She suffered from a severe cough and fever, her right leg had grown numb and her general condition was extremely weak. Owing to her financial situation and the lack of health insurance the applicant did not visit a hospital right away. On 11 December 2006 a pregnancy examination showed that the pregnancy was progressing and that the fetus was well.","36.On 12 December 2006, the first applicant\u2019s health worsened, she had an asthma attack and severe abdominal pain.","37.On 14 December 2006, the first applicant was taken to hospital where she gave birth to a stillborn child the next day.","38.According to the death certificate issued by the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs on 15 December 2006, the child died as a result of \u201cintranatal hipoqsy\u201d caused by a viral infection. The birth history no364\/12, issued on the same date, stated that \u201cthe stress experienced by the pregnant mother during the expulsion could be considered a reason for the child\u2019s death\u201d.","39.During the following months, the first applicant suffered from severe depression and panic attacks. Furthermore, the fourth applicant developed a very bad cough and caught pneumonia. The fifth applicant, the first applicant\u2019s youngest child, was deeply affected psychologically by the expulsion: she was constantly crying and afraid of other people and diagnosed with \u201cbehavioral disorder\u201d.","4.The first applicant\u2019s complaint to the Prosecutor","40.On 23 July 2008, the first applicant lodged a complaint with the General Prosecutor\u2019s office of the Russian Federation. She directly mentioned violations of Articles 3 and 14 of the Convention and requested a thorough investigation and the punishment of those responsible.","41.On 9 October 2008, the first applicant\u2019s representative received an answer, informing him that the complaint had been forwarded to the Prosecutor of Derbent and that he would be notified about further procedural actions taken in this respect.","42.However, he received no further information from the Russian authorities."],"28948":["7.The applicant was born in 1988 in Margilan, Uzbekistan. He arrived in Russia on 2 October 2014.","8.On 5 September 2014 the applicant was charged in absentia with participation in the extremist religious movement Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami and activities threatening the constitutional order. On the same day the authorities ordered his pre-trial detention and issued an international search and arrest warrant bearing his name.","9.On 24 December 2014 the applicant was arrested in Moscow. On26December 2014 the Cheremushkinskiy District Court of Moscow ordered and subsequently prolonged his detention.","10.On 22 January 2015 the applicant was further charged with organising a local branch of Hizb ut-Tahri al Islami in one of the regions of Uzbekistan.","A.Extradition proceedings","11.On 23 January 2015 the Uzbek prosecution authorities requested the applicant\u2019s extradition on the above charges. The request included assurances regarding the proper treatment of the applicant, which were formulated in standard terms.","12.On 21 May 2015 the applicant\u2019s extradition in respect of certain charges was authorised by the Deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation.","13.The applicant challenged this decision in the courts, arguing that he belonged to a vulnerable group and therefore faced a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 at the hands of the Uzbek authorities.","14.On 13 October 2015 his appeals were dismissed by a final decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. Without reference to any relevant evidentiary material, the Supreme Court considered that the applicant\u2019s claims were hypothetical and lacked specific indications regarding the level of risk, and observed that the situation in a requesting state might change over time. It also found that the assurances of the Uzbek authorities were satisfactory.","B.Refugee status proceedings","15.On 5 June 2015 the applicant lodged a request for refugee status, referring to persecution in Uzbekistan on religious grounds.","16.On 9 November 2015 his request was refused by a final administrative decision of the migration authorities. The applicant challenged this decision in the courts, referring inter alia to the risk of ill\u2011treatment.","17.On 18 May 2016 his appeals were dismissed by a decision of Moscow City Court.","C.Other relevant proceedings","18.On 25 December 2015 the Meshchanskiy District Court of Moscow ordered the applicant\u2019s expulsion for violating the migration rules. The applicant\u2019s appeal, which referred to the risk of ill-treatment, amongst other factors, was dismissed by the Moscow City Court on 24 February 2016.","19.On 16 February 2016 the applicant applied for temporary asylum. No information concerning the outcome of these proceedings was supplied by the parties.","21.The relevant reports by the UN agencies and international NGOs on the situation in Uzbekistan up until 2015 were cited in the case of Kholmurodov v. Russia (no. 58923\/14, \u00a7\u00a7 46-50, 1 March 2016)."],"29007":["5.The first and second applicants were born in 1984 and 1982 respectively and live in Vienna. The third applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Switzerland.","6.The following summary of the background of the case and the events in Austria is based on the submissions by the applicants. The account of the investigation in Austria is based on the submissions by both parties.","A.Background of the case","7.The applicants are all nationals of the Philippines. The first and third applicants were recruited in 2006 and 2009 respectively by an employment agency in Manila to work as maids or au pairs in Dubai (United Arab Emirates). The second applicant travelled to Dubai in December 2008 for the same purpose, at the suggestion of the first applicant, not via an agency. All of the applicants had their passports taken away by their employers. During the course of their work in Dubai, they allege that they were subjected to ill-treatment and exploitation by their employers, who also failed to pay them their agreed wages and forced them to work extremely long hours, under the threat of further ill-treatment.","1.The first applicant","8. In late 2006 the first applicant contacted an agency in Manila in order to find a job abroad. She is a single mother with one daughter who was eight months old at the time. She signed a contract in which she agreed to work for a family in Dubai for two years, from December 2006 until December 2008. The contract also stipulated that she would be paid 700United Arab Emirates dirhams (AED \u2013 approximately 150 euros (EUR) at that time) per month to work for eight hours each working day. Upon her arrival in Dubai the first applicant was taken to her employers, who were two sisters or sisters-in-law sharing one large residence with their families. One of them took possession of her passport.","9.For most of the initial two-year contract the first applicant was not subjected to physical abuse or direct threats of harm by her employers, and she was paid regularly. However, she had to work from 5 a.m. to midnight throughout the initial two-year period. Her duties included looking after her employers\u2019 children, preparing meals, cleaning the house, doing the laundry and numerous other jobs around the house and garden. During the first nine months she was required to perform this work seven days per week without a single day off, and was not allowed to leave the house unsupervised. She was not allowed to have her own telephone and was only allowed to call her family in the Philippines once a month, the costs of these calls being deducted from her wages. Further, the first applicant was forbidden from speaking to any of the other workers from the Philippines in their native language. She was constantly hungry, as she was generally only given the family\u2019s leftover food. Only when she accompanied the family to the supermarket approximately once a month was she allowed to buy some basic food for herself.","10.After approximately nine months, the first applicant faced the first punishments by her employers. She was forced to sleep on the floor when they found out that she had been talking to another employee from the Philippines in their native language. When she became ill after sleeping on the cold floor, her employers prevented her from buying medicine or contacting a doctor; instead, she had to continue working the same hours.","11.Towards the end of her two-year contract, the first applicant\u2019s employers informed her that they wished her to stay, and offered her better pay, more days off and a telephone of her own, as well as permission to visit her family, provided that she recruited someone to take over her job while she was away. The first applicant finally agreed to extend her contract and returned to the Philippines for three months. Owing to the incentives and the prospect of improved working conditions, she asked the second applicant to take over her role in Dubai during the time she was away.","12.While the first applicant was in the Philippines, she received threats from her employers that if she did not return to Dubai to work, she would be banned from ever going back there, and the second applicant would be subjected to ill-treatment. The first applicant therefore returned to Dubai in April 2009.","13.After she returned to Dubai, she was taught how to drive. After she failed her first driving test, she was forced to pay for further lessons and tests out of her own salary, with four further driving tests costing AED 700 each, a month\u2019s salary. While she was driving, one of her employers hit her on the shoulder on a number of occasions to force her to speed up. The employer also started to slap or hit her regularly for no or little reason. She also repeatedly threatened to let her husband hit the first applicant if she did not follow her orders or made any mistakes.","14.The first applicant accompanied her employers on trips to Europe, Australia, Singapore and Oman, where she spent significant amounts of time locked up in hotel rooms or under the close supervision of her employers. She only had to visit one embassy in person to obtain entry documents, and that was in relation to a trip to London, at which time she was ordered by her employers to lie about her work conditions. When they arrived in London, the first applicant was not allowed at any time to leave the apartment in which they were staying.","2.The second applicant","15.The second applicant was married with three young children in the Philippines. Her husband had no regular work. Because she expected better pay in Dubai, she agreed to work for the same employers as the first applicant. The employers in Dubai arranged a visiting visa for her, under false pretences. As a result of this arrangement, the second applicant did not approach the employment agency in the Philippines and did not have a written contract with her employers. Her understanding was that she would get AED 700 per month, which would be paid directly to her family in the Philippines.","16.In December 2008 the second applicant started to work in Dubai. After the first applicant returned to the Philippines for three months in January2009 (see paragraph 11 above), the employers significantly changed their conduct towards the second applicant. They threatened not to pay her family if she made any mistakes. They refused to let her leave Dubai, including by refusing to return her passport and ordering her to repay them her travel costs and related expenses. They also told her that she would be put in prison if she ran away or went to the authorities in Dubai for help. They physically and emotionally abused her, and there was one incident when one of her employers struck her across the shoulder using significant force. She was also forced to work from around 5 or 6a.m. until midnight or 1 a.m. the following day.","17.Between April 2009 and June 2010 the violent and threatening behaviour of the employers increased. The second applicant was punched by one of her employers on one occasion, and in another incident the employer aimed a hard slap at her face, but instead struck her across the shoulder.","3.The third applicant","18.The third applicant\u2019s family were desperate for money to pay for crucial medical treatment for her brother. Therefore, in 2009 she contacted an employment agency in the Philippines and was offered work as a maid in Dubai. She was informed that she would be earning between AED 800 and 1,000 (approximately EUR 160 to 200 at that time) per month, roughly twice her salary in the Philippines. Upon her arrival in Dubai in 2009 she had to hand over her passport and mobile phone to someone supposedly working for the employment agency. She was told that these items would be returned to her when she finished her work in Dubai.","19.The third applicant was working for a family member of the first and second applicants\u2019 employers. The applicants got to know each other, as the two families met every Friday. They secretly shared their experiences on these occasions.","20.The third applicant was also bound by working hours going from 6a.m. to midnight. Her employer forced her to clean her car in the sun and in unbearable heat, and she was prohibited from going to the toilet without letting her employer know. She was only allowed to call her family in the Philippines once a month, and only in the presence of her employer. She did not receive any remuneration at all for the first three months of her employment. Afterwards, she only received approximately AED 750 per month, less than what had been agreed. On one occasion she was slapped by her employer, and on a different occasion she witnessed another employee being hit over the head.","21.When the third applicant told her employer that she wished to return to the Philippines, she was told that she would have to pay the cost of the flight and the agency fees, which her employer knew she could not afford at that point. Her employer also made it clear that, in any event, her passport would not be returned to her until she had completed at least nine months of work in Dubai. Subsequently, the third applicant was too scared to ask to leave Dubai again, owing to her fear that her employer would take her earnings from her or refuse to return her passport for an even longer period.","B.Events in Austria","22.On 2 July 2010 the applicants\u2019 employers took them along on a short holiday trip to Austria. The applicants all stayed at the same hotel in the city centre of Vienna. The applicants slept in their own, separate apartment together with the female children. The male children slept in the same apartment as their parents. As in Dubai, the applicants had to take care of all of the employers\u2019 children and perform numerous other domestic duties. They were still required to work from approximately 5 or 6 a.m. until midnight or even later. The third applicant was regularly shouted at by her employer, for example if she failed to get all the children ready early every morning. In addition, their employers woke the first applicant up at around 2a.m. and forced her to cook food for them. Furthermore, the first applicant was forced to carry the employers\u2019 twenty suitcases into the hotel by herself. While the applicants were in Austria, their passports remained with their employers. In the hotel in Vienna in which the applicants were staying, they became acquainted with N., an employee at the hotel who could speak Tagalog, the first applicant\u2019s mother tongue.","23.When the applicants accompanied their employers to a zoo one or two days after their arrival in Austria, one of the children went missing for some time. One of the employers started screaming at the first and third applicants in a manner which the applicants had not experienced before. The first applicant found the level of verbal abuse extreme, and this was a particularly distressing and humiliating experience for her. The employer threatened to beat the third applicant, and said that \u201csomething bad\u201d would happen to her if the child was not found safe and well. By this stage, the third applicant had formed the impression that this employer, of whom she lived in a constant state of fear, was a dangerous person who might try to hurt her very badly. She had the feeling that the violence towards her was likely to escalate at any time. Therefore, she believed that something bad was going to happen to her if she remained with the family. Similarly, the first applicant believed that they could not live with their conditions of work any longer, and did not want to risk waiting to see what happened if they travelled with their employers from Vienna to London, as they were scheduled to do. The applicants therefore decided to speak to N., the Tagalog-speaking employee at the hotel, to see whether she could help them.","24.The night following the incident \u2013 that is, two or three days after their arrival in Austria \u2013 the applicants left the hotel with the help of N., who had organised a car to pick them up in a side street near the hotel and take them to a \u201csafe place\u201d. The applicants subsequently found support within the local Filipino community in Vienna.","C.Proceedings in Austria","1.Criminal proceedings against the applicants\u2019 employers","25.In April or May 2011, approximately nine months after they had left their employers, the applicants contacted a local NGO called \u201cLEF\u00d6\u201d for assistance in reporting their ill-treatment, abuse and exploitation to the police. LEF\u00d6 is actively involved in the fight against trafficking in human beings in Austria. It is financed though government funds, in particular for the provision of assistance to victims of trafficking. In July 2011 the applicants decided to turn to the Austrian police and filed a criminal complaint (Strafanzeige) against their employers. They explained that they had been the victims of human trafficking. On 11 and 21 July and 17August 2011, accompanied by representatives of LEF\u00d6, they were interviewed at length by officers from the Office to Combat Human Trafficking (B\u00fcro f\u00fcr Bek\u00e4mpfung des Menschenhandels) at the Federal Office of Criminal Investigations (Bundeskriminalamt). In their report, the officers concluded that the offences had been committed abroad.","26.The applicants were informed that their employers had also made allegations about their conduct, alleging, inter alia, that they had stolen money and a mobile phone from them when they had fled the hotel. Those allegations were subsequently formally recognised by the Austrian authorities as false. The applicants all expressed their willingness to actively cooperate with the authorities and to engage in criminal proceedings against their employers.","27.On 4 November 2011 the Vienna public prosecutor\u2019s office (Staatsanwaltschaft Wien) discontinued the proceedings under Article 104a of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe CC\u201d) relating to human trafficking (see paragraph 35 below), pursuant to Article 190 \u00a7 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe CCP\u201d \u2013 see paragraph 36 below). On 14 November 2011 the public prosecutor gave a short written decision with reasons for the discontinuation of the proceedings. In the public prosecutor\u2019s view, the offence had been committed abroad by non-nationals, and did not engage Austrian interests within the meaning of Article 64 \u00a7 1 (4) of the CC.","28.On 30 November 2011 the applicants lodged an application to continue the investigation (Fortsetzungsantrag) with the Vienna Regional Criminal Court (Straflandesgericht Wien). They submitted that Austrian interests had indeed been engaged, and that their employers had continued to exploit and abuse them in Austria. In their view, the elements of the crime punishable under Article 104a \u00a7 1 (2) of the CC had been present.","29.The Vienna public prosecutor\u2019s office then submitted a statement to the Vienna Regional Criminal Court, specifying its reasons for discontinuing the investigation. There had been no indication in the case file that any of the criminal actions exhaustively listed in Article 104a of the CC had occurred in Austria, particularly since the offence had already been completed in Dubai (zumal das Delikt bereits in Dubai vollendet wurde), and the accused were not Austrian citizens. Furthermore, from the applicants\u2019 statements (looking after children, washing laundry, cooking food), it did not appear that they had been exploited in Austria, especially since they had managed to leave their employers only two to three days after their arrival in Vienna.","30.On 16 March 2012 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court dismissed the applicants\u2019 application. The relevant parts of the decision read (translation from German):","\u201cThe decision to discontinue [criminal proceedings] requires \u2013 by implication \u2013 that the facts of a case are sufficiently clear, or a lack of indication that investigations would be promising.","There is no reason for further prosecution if, on the basis of the ... results of the investigation, a conviction is no more likely than an acquittal ...","According to Article 64 \u00a7 1 (4) of the CC, if Austrian interests have been harmed by the offence or the perpetrator cannot be extradited, Austrian criminal laws apply independently of the criminal laws of the place where the crime was committed, for example in relation to the offence of kidnapping for ransom under Article 104a of the CC. Owing to the fact that the applicants spent approximately three days in Vienna, the conditions regarding the fulfilment of the elements of the crime under Article 104a \u00a7 1 (2) of the CC have not been met, since the relevant acts relating to the exploitation of labour must be committed over a longer period of time; therefore, the commission of the offence in Austria is ruled out.","The jurisdiction of the Austrian criminal-law enforcement authorities cannot be deduced from Article 64 \u00a7 1 (4) of the CC either.","Austrian interests are engaged if either the victim or the perpetrator is an Austrian citizen, or if the criminal acts have a concrete connection to Austria, or if an obligation arises under international law in relation to the prosecution of certain offences. Austrian interests are, in any event, engaged if a criminal offence under Articles 102, 103, 104 or 217 of the CC is committed against an Austrian citizen, or if Austrian funds or Austrian securities (Wertpapiere) are the subject of offences under Article 232, or Article 237 in conjunction with Article 232, of the CC.","The applicants\u2019 argument that the elements of the crime under Article 104a of the CC had also been fulfilled in Austria therefore fails, and the plea that the alleged criminal actions against them by their employers in Dubai ... would lead to an obligation on the part of Austria under international law is likewise not convincing. In relation to the present case, [this latter argument] also cannot be inferred from the quoted [Supreme Court] judgment no. 11 Os 161\/81, which affirmed that Austrian interests had been damaged as a result of the import into Austria of a large amount of narcotics for transport...\u201d","This decision was served on the applicants\u2019 counsel on 23 March 2012.","2.Civil proceedings against the applicants\u2019 employers","31.In January 2013 two of the three applicants lodged a civil claim against their employers with the Vienna Labour and Social Court (Arbeits\u2011und Sozialgericht) in order to claim their wages. However, they alleged that because of the high risk of having to pay the costs of the proceedings because the employers did not reside in Austria, they withdrew the action.","3.Proceedings concerning the applicants\u2019 residence permits","32. The NGO LEF\u00d6 not only assisted the applicants in filing a criminal complaint against their employers, but also supported them in applying for a special residence permit in Austria for victims of human trafficking, under the former section 69a of the Residence Act (Niederlassungs- und Aufenthaltsgesetz \u2013 see paragraph 46 below).","33.All three applicants were granted a residence permit for special protection purposes in January 2012, valid for one year initially. Subsequently, because of their progressing integration, they were granted other types of residence permits with longer periods of validity.","34.The applicants were officially registered in the Central Register (Melderegister) from the point when LEF\u00d6 started supporting them. A personal data disclosure ban was enacted on the Central Register for their protection, so that their whereabouts would not be traceable by the general public."],"29010":["5.The applicant, a former police officer, was born in 1962 and lives in Zaporizhzhya. He is also acting on behalf of his son, V., who was born in 1991.","A.Criminal proceedings against the applicant","6.On 13 September 2003 four people, including the applicant, were apprehended by officers of the Zaporizhzhya office of the Security Service of Ukraine (\u0421\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0431\u0430 \u0411\u0435\u0437\u043f\u0435\u043a\u0438 \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0457\u043d\u0438 \u2013 \u201cthe SBU\u201d) in Novokateshchino village while attempting to transport opiate drugs with a view to selling them on. They were taken to the SBU\u2019s premises for questioning. After being informed of his privilege against self-incrimination, the applicant made a written statement to the effect that he had appeared at the crime scene by chance, at the request of a friend with whom he and his son had been looking for a place to fish.","7.Later the same day criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant and two other people on suspicion of illegal production, storage and sale of drugs.","8.On 14 September 2003 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant and the two others on suspicion of membership of an organised crime group.","9.On the same date the applicant was arrested. Having been informed of his procedural rights as a suspect, he refused to give evidence without a lawyer present.","10.On 15 September 2003 the applicant\u2019s wife hired a lawyer, G., to represent the applicant.","11.On 16 September 2003 the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention was ordered by a court.","12.On 19 September 2003 the applicant requested that G. be admitted to the proceedings as his lawyer.","13.On the same date, in the presence of his lawyer, the applicant denied his involvement in the crime.","14.On 23 September 2003, in the presence of his lawyer, the applicant was charged with drug-related crimes and questioned. He did not want to be informed of his rights and stated that he would not give any evidence during the pre-trial investigation.","15.On 2 October 2003 the applicant was questioned in the presence of his lawyer. He provided some biographical details as well as information on his family status, state of health and place of residence.","16.On 18 November 2003 the applicant was again questioned in the presence of his lawyer.","17.On 15 December 2003 all the criminal proceedings against the applicant were joined.","18.On 18 December 2003 the applicant was questioned in the presence of his lawyer. He did not confess to the crimes.","19.On 22 and 23 December 2003 confrontations between the applicant and his co-accused were conducted with his lawyer present.","20.On 24 December 2003 amended charges were brought against the applicant in his lawyer\u2019s presence. The applicant pleaded not guilty.","21.On 6 February 2004 the applicant\u2019s wife was admitted to the proceedings as the applicant\u2019s lay representative.","22.On 10 February 2004, upon his written consent, the applicant was questioned without a lawyer.","23.On 9 March 2004 the criminal case against the applicant and his co\u2011accused was sent to the Leninsky District Court of Zaporizhzhya (\u201cthe District Court\u201d). During the trial the applicant pleaded not guilty. He maintained that the case had been fabricated by his enemies and that all the evidence had been falsified and was inadmissible. In fact, he, a retired police officer, had been arrested in the company of drug addicts with whom he had been in contact as an advisor to the local police. They might have been producing drugs for their own use. He further claimed that his case should benefit from being examined in camera by a judge who had security clearance, to protect State secrets concerning the functioning of his network of informants.","24.In May 2004 F., a lawyer hired by the applicant\u2019s wife, was admitted to the proceedings to represent the applicant.","25.On 25 October 2005, after having heard the case in public hearings, the District Court convicted the applicant and his co-defendants of drug\u2011related offences. The applicant was sentenced to eight-and-a-half years\u2019 imprisonment and the confiscation of his personal property was ordered.","26.The applicant, represented by his lawyer and his wife, appealed. He repeated his arguments advanced at trial and complained that he had been unable to defend himself properly during the trial as he had been reticent in order to safeguard confidential information concerning the network of informants. He also complained of various procedural breaches in the collection of evidence. He alleged, with no further details, that he had had no access to a lawyer from the first questioning and, even after his lawyer had been allowed access, the authorities had tried to carry out a number of investigative steps without the lawyer present.","27.On 26 April 2006 the Zaporizhya Regional Court of Appeal allowed the defence\u2019s request to have the proceedings held in camera to prevent public disclosure of information concerning the network of informants and required all the defence lawyers and representatives to undergo security clearance to continue taking part in the proceedings. The applicant\u2019s wife did not receive security clearance in time for the appeal hearing and did not attend it.","28.On 22 June 2006 the Court of Appeal upheld the trial court\u2019s judgment.","29.On 18 December 2007, following a prior appeal by the applicant, the Supreme Court of Ukraine quashed this decision and remitted the case for fresh consideration. It noted, in particular, that the applicant\u2019s right to defence had been breached since the applicant\u2019s wife had been unable to take part in the appeal hearing. It further found that the Court of Appeal had addressed the parties\u2019 arguments in a summary way only, while it should have given detailed explanations in response to those arguments.","30.On 22 December 2008 the Court of Appeal reviewed the case in the presence of the applicant\u2019s wife. It upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction, reduced his sentence to eight years\u2019 imprisonment and ordered the confiscation of his personal property. The conviction was mainly based on the records of the crime-scene inspection and the testimonies of the applicant\u2019s co-defendants, which the trial court found to be corroborated by witness statements, and other evidence in the case.","31.On 2 July 2009 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant\u2019s request for leave to appeal on points of law.","B.Events related to the applicant\u2019s son","32.The applicant\u2019s twelve-year-old son was with him when he was apprehended on 13 September 2003. He was taken with him to the SBU and remained in the same room with the applicant for most of the time. No other family members were informed of the boy\u2019s whereabouts.","33.On the morning of 14 September 2014, after the applicant had been formally arrested, his son was returned to his mother.","34.On 3 January 2004 the applicant\u2019s wife lodged a criminal complaint with the Zaporizhzhya regional prosecutor\u2019s office (\u201cthe prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d) in which she alleged, inter alia, that her son had been unlawfully detained at the SBU\u2019s premises between 13 and 14 September 2003.","35.On 9 February 2004, having questioned the applicant and the SBU officers, the prosecutor refused to institute criminal proceedings as it had been established that no pressure had been applied to the applicant\u2019s son and that he had been able to move freely and had not been deprived of his liberty. It was further noted that the applicant had not complained of the SBU staff\u2019s attitude towards his son.","36.On 20 April 2004 the applicant\u2019s son challenged the above decision before the Prosecutor General.","37.In April 2004 the applicant and his wife lodged another complaint concerning the alleged unlawful detention of their son with the prosecutor\u2019s office.","38.On 7 May 2004 the prosecutor\u2019s office, having questioned the applicant, his wife and son, as well as the SBU officers and some witnesses, refused to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the above complaint, having found no corpus delicti in the officers\u2019 actions. It was established during the relevant investigation that the applicant\u2019s son had been taken to the SBU\u2019s premises at the applicant\u2019s request and had not been arrested or detained and had been returned to his relatives as soon as the decision to arrest the applicant had been taken; and that the applicant had raised no complaints during his son\u2019s stay at the SBU. It was also noted in the relevant resolution that the applicant\u2019s wife had refused to provide her son\u2019s medical file to prove her allegations concerning the worsening of his state of health and that there had been a contradiction in the applicant\u2019s statements and between his and his son\u2019s account of events. The prosecutor thus concluded that the allegations of unlawful deprivation of liberty or of other violations of the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s rights appeared to be ill-founded. He noted that no intention on the part of the officers to interfere with the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s personal security, specifically his freedom of movement, had been established. Likewise, there had been no evidence that the applicant\u2019s son had been subject to any form of pressure or ill-treatment.","39.On 11 May 2004 the applicant\u2019s wife and son instituted civil proceedings against the SBU before the Zhovtnevy District Court of Zaporizhzhya claiming damages for the unlawful detention of her son. Following a request of the applicant\u2019s wife of 15 October 2004, her civil claim was joined to the criminal proceedings against the applicant.","40.On 23 July 2004 the deputy prosecutor of Zaporizhzhya Region quashed the resolution of 7 May 2004 as being premature, given that no evidence regarding the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s state of health had been obtained.","41.On 31 July 2004, having questioned the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s doctors who had observed him in the course of his care previously, the prosecutor again refused to institute criminal proceedings for the same reasons as before. It was noted, inter alia, that none of the doctors had observed any worsening of the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s state of health and that no worsening of his health had been evident from his medical file either.","42.On 14 October 2004 the prosecutor\u2019s office instituted disciplinary proceedings against two officers of the SBU for their negligence towards the applicant\u2019s son. It noted, inter alia, that the applicant\u2019s son had not been formally arrested (\u0437\u0430\u0442\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0439) but had been kept at the SBU\u2019s premises for no reason and no measures had been taken to return him to his relatives. The prosecutor further observed that the applicant\u2019s son had not been subject to any form of ill-treatment. He also stressed the fact that the applicant\u2019s arrest report had been drafted only the next day after the applicant\u2019s initial arrest, in breach of the requirements of the domestic law. This resolution had been sent to the SBU for relevant measures to be taken.","43.On 27 October 2004 the SBU informed the prosecutor\u2019s office that the respective officers could no longer be disciplined as the one-year statutory time-limit had expired. It was also observed in that letter that no violations of domestic law by the SBU officers had been established by a number of investigations into the events complained of and that the applicant\u2019s son had stayed with the applicant at the SBU\u2019s premises from 13to 14 September 2003 at the applicant\u2019s own request.","44.On 5 November 2004 the applicant\u2019s wife complained to the Prosecutor General about the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 31 July 2004.","45.On 25 October 2005, when convicting the applicant, the District Court delivered a separate ruling, in which it listed the procedural violations committed by the investigating authorities in the criminal proceedings against the applicant. The fact that the applicant\u2019s son had remained in the SBU\u2019s premises for about twenty-four hours after the applicant\u2019s initial arrest, without his relatives having been informed of his whereabouts and with no medical assistance provided in view of the stress he had been under, was listed among the violations referred to by the court. The Chief of the SBU in Zaporizhzhya was invited by the court to take appropriate measures in view of the above mentioned violations.","46.On 25 January 2006 the applicant appealed to the Ordzhonikidzevsky District Court of Zaporizhzhya against the prosecutor\u2019s refusal of 31 July 2004 to institute criminal proceedings against the SBU officers.","47.On 3 April 2006 the applicant\u2019s complaint was left without consideration on the merits. The court noted in this connection that the relevant investigation files had been joined to the criminal case against the applicant and that therefore the prosecutor\u2019s decision was not subject to appeal outside of those criminal proceedings.","48.During the proceedings in his criminal case before the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court the applicant and his wife repeatedly requested, referring to the separate ruling of 25 October 2005 by the District Court (see paragraph 45 above), that measures be taken to bring the respective officers to trial for the unlawful detention of their son. The case file does not suggest that in their appeals the applicant or his wife claimed damages in this connection.","49.On 22 December 2008, in its judgment upholding the applicant\u2019s conviction, the Court of Appeal observed that the complaint related to the unlawful detention of the applicant\u2019s son had been considered by the prosecutor\u2019s office and no corpus delicti under criminal law had been found on the part of the SBU officers. The court made no separate ruling in this connection. The Supreme Court did not address this issue in its decision of 2 July 2009.","II.Conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in Zaporizhzhya Pre-Trial Detention Centre no. 10 (\u201cthe SIZO\u201d).","50.The applicant was detained in the SIZO from 17 September 2003 to 14 July 2006 and from 18 March 2008 to 24 February 2009.","A.The applicant\u2019s account","51.According to the applicant, the conditions of his detention were grossly inadequate. The cells were overcrowded. In particular, a cell measuring 3.8square metres with one bed could be occupied by eight to ten persons. As a result, detainees had to take turns to sleep. A bucket, which served as a toilet, was located in plain sight one metre away from the eating area. It had no cover and was emptied only once a day. The ventilation was very poor. The cell smelled of excrement, was filled with cigarette smoke and was damp, in particular as the detainees washed and dried their laundry there. It was also infested with cockroaches, lice and bedbugs. The shower, which had lukewarm water, was available only once every ten days. Access to natural daylight was severely limited because of a dense grill on the window. The electric lighting was so dim that it was impossible to read or write without damage to the eyes. The food was meagre and insufficient to meet the detainees\u2019 nutritional needs. Outside walks were available only on a scarce and irregular basis. Detainees sick with contagious diseases, such as tuberculosis, venereal diseases, pediculosis and scabies, were held in the same cells as healthy detainees and not provided with medical assistance. As a result, the applicant also contracted scabies and other skin diseases.","B.The Government\u2019s account","52.According to the information provided by the Government, the applicant had been held in the following cells while in the SIZO:","cell no. 18 \u2013 21.87 sq. m ( intended for eight detainees );","cell no. 65 \u2013 10.99 sq. m (intended for four detainees);","cell no. 70 \u2013 20.4 sq. m (intended for four detainees);","cell no. 36 \u2013 12.05 sq. m (intended for four detainees).","53.The conditions in those cells had been adequate and the space per detainee had not been less than 2.5 sq. m, as provided for by the relevant domestic legislation. All the cells had been equipped with a toilet and a ventilation system. Running water and mains drainage had been available. They noted, referring to the relevant documents, that there had never been a cell measuring 3.8 sq. m in the SIZO.","54.The Government further stated, referring to the relevant domestic regulations, that detainees had been provided with appropriate food and linen and had had weekly access to shower facilities and one-hour daily walks. They contested the statement that the applicant had shared a cell with smokers and those suffering from infectious diseases, pointing to the applicant\u2019s failure to provide the respective evidence and called attention to the fact that there had been a special isolation wing in the SIZO for detainees suffering from such diseases.","55.On 10 March 2006, following the applicant\u2019s complaints concerning the improper conditions of his detention in the SIZO, the prosecutor\u2019s office carried out an inspection visit there and found the applicant\u2019s complaint to be partially substantiated. It found, inter alia, that some cells \u2013 not the ones in which the applicant had been detained \u2013 and utility rooms had been in poor sanitary condition and had been infested by cockroaches; and that the cell space for persons infected with tuberculosis had not been in compliance with the relevant domestic standards. The SIZO governor was instructed to remedy the situation. No evidence in support of the applicant\u2019s allegations of improper nutrition and poor lighting had been found.","III.Medical care provided to the applicant in pre\u2011trial detention","A.The applicant\u2019s medical treatment in the SIZO","56.On 15 May 2001, following retirement from the police service, the applicant underwent a medical examination and was diagnosed with osteochondrosis, chronic gastritis in remission, chronic hepatitis, chronic pancreatitis, trichromatic anomalies, uric acid diathesis and adiposity of the first degree. According to the applicant, he was advised to undergo inpatient treatment twice a year and to appear before a special panel to decide on whether he had to be assigned disability status in view of his illnesses. He submitted that the relevant medical examination had been scheduled for the end of September 2003 but had not been carried out as he had been arrested.","57.Upon his arrival at the SIZO the applicant underwent a medical examination during which he raised no complaints about his state of health. His medical file contained a certificate, issued on 14 September 2003 by an emergency hospital, stating that he was suffering from ischaemic heart disease, cardiosclerosis, angiosclerosis of the coronary vessels, symptomatic hypertension, and chronic bronchitis. In view of the available information on the applicant\u2019s illnesses, he was put on the list for regular medical check-ups and was prescribed medical treatment.","58.On 20 and 23 September, 1 October, 17 November and 24 December 2003, 11 November 2004 and 4 July and 1 December 2005 the applicant complained to the SIZO medical unit of headaches and, on some occasions, of heart pain and dizziness. He was diagnosed with first- or second-degree hypertension and received antihypertensive medication. His blood pressure was subsequently regularly monitored and, when necessary, antihypertensive treatment was provided.","59.On 20 November 2003, 24 and 30 May and 4 July 2004 and 5 July 2005 the applicant complained to the SIZO medical unit of skin eruptions and itching. He was diagnosed with dermatitis and was provided with the necessary medical treatment.","60.On 9 October 2003 the applicant was examined by a panel composed of the head of the SIZO medical unit, a general practitioner and a physiotherapist. He was diagnosed with hypertension and prescribed the relevant treatment.","61.In October 2003 the applicant was registered for follow-up care (\u0434\u0438\u0441\u043f\u0430\u043d\u0441\u0435\u0440\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0456\u043a) in respect of his hypertension. He underwent urine and blood tests which revealed no pathology.","62.On 1 March 2004 the applicant underwent a medical check-up. He was diagnosed with second-degree hypertension and nephropathy and was prescribed the relevant medical treatment. It was also recommended that the applicant consult an ophthalmologist and a neuropathologist.","63.On 15 March 2004 the applicant was examined by a neuropathologist from a regional psychiatric hospital located in prison no. 20 and by an ophthalmologist from a civil hospital. The medication prescribed following the examination was administered to the applicant by the SIZO.","64.On 30 March 2003, 27 August 2004, 24 February, 23 August and 14December 2005 the applicant underwent X-ray examinations of his lungs and heart, which revealed no problems.","65.On 23 April 2004, following a request from the applicant\u2019s lawyer, the applicant was examined by the chief neurosurgeon of the Zaporizhzhya Regional Hospital. The prescribed medication was provided to the applicant by the SIZO medical unit.","66.On 14 and 23 June 2004 the applicant was examined by a neuropathologist. He was diagnosed with second-degree hypertension and nephropathy and was prescribed vascular and antihypertensive medication.","67.On 29 October 2004 the applicant underwent a medical check-up. He complained of recurrent headaches and dizziness and was diagnosed with second-degree hypertension and nephropathy. Antihypertensive medications were prescribed.","68.On 7 November 2005 the applicant was examined by a dermatologist. He was diagnosed with neurogenic dermatitis and prescribed the relevant medication. He was also advised to consult a psychiatrist.","69.On 28 November 2005 the applicant underwent a medical check-up. He complained of headaches and dizziness. His second-degree hypertension was confirmed following the examination and the relevant treatment was prescribed.","70.On 2 January 2006 the applicant was examined by a dermatologist and was diagnosed with dermatitis. He was advised to continue the treatment prescribed previously.","71.On 24 January 2006 the applicant was examined by a panel of SIZO physicians comprised of a psychiatrist, a dermatologist and a general practitioner. He was diagnosed with hypertension, chronic gastritis, chronic pancreatitis in remission, chronic hepatitis in remission, heartburn and a hypertensive neurocirculatory dystonia. The relevant medical treatment was prescribed.","72.On 10 February 2006 the applicant underwent a medical check-up and was diagnosed with arterial hypertension and hypertensive encephalopathy. The relevant treatment was prescribed. The applicant was further advised to consult a neuropathologist and an ophthalmologist.","73.On 15 February 2006 the applicant was examined by a medical panel comprised of SIZO and civil-institution physicians (an ophthalmologist, a general practitioner and a neuropathologist). He was diagnosed with symptomatic arterial hypertension and an uncomplicated cerebral crisis. It was concluded that the applicant\u2019s state of health did not necessitate inpatient medical treatment.","74.On 1 November 2006, when serving his prison term in prison no. 45, the applicant was examined by a group of disability experts and recognised as falling into the third (mildest) category of disability for a one-year period. Outpatient treatment for the illnesses he had been suffering from was recommended.","B.Complaints related to the applicant\u2019s health in detention","75.From 15 December 2003 the applicant\u2019s wife lodged a number of complaints with the SBU, prosecutors, courts and other State authorities alleging, inter alia, that the applicant had been unlawfully arrested and detained; that his health was in a critical condition; and that no relevant medical treatment could have been provided to him within the SIZO. She therefore requested that the preventive measure in respect of the applicant be changed and that he be immediately released from detention.","76.On 22 December 2003 and 9 January 2004, after a number of enquiries, the SBU informed the applicant\u2019s wife that the applicant\u2019s state of health was compatible with detention and that the SIZO had all the necessary facilities to provide the applicant with qualified medical assistance.","77.On 3 February 2004 the applicant\u2019s wife complained about the above conclusions before the Prosecutor General.","78.On 2 June 2004, in reply to the applicant\u2019s lawyer\u2019s query about the medical assistance provided to the applicant, the SIZO informed the lawyer that his state of health was compatible with detention and that he was under the regular supervision of the SIZO medical staff. They further submitted that it was at the court\u2019s discretion to allow medical examination of the applicant by medical specialists from civil institutions.","79.On 15 August 2004 the applicant\u2019s wife asked the prosecutor\u2019s office to provide truthful information about the applicant\u2019s state of health and stated that adequate medical assistance could not be provided to the applicant in the SIZO in view of the absence of the relevant medical specialists at the detention facility. In the light of this, she asked that the applicant undergo a medical examination in a civil medical institution.","80.On 24 November 2004 the prosecutor, having conducted an investigation into the matter and having studied the applicant\u2019s medical file, replied to the applicant\u2019s wife that her complaint appeared to be unfounded and that adequate medical assistance was being provided to the applicant in the SIZO.","81.On 4 July 2005 the applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged an application with the District Court requesting that a medical examination of the applicant by neurologists from civil hospitals be ordered.","82.On 7 September 2005, following enquiries made by the court upon the lawyer\u2019s request, the SIZO provided the court with a certificate, according to which the applicant was under the permanent supervision of the SIZO medical unit and did not necessitate medical examination by specialists other than those practising in the SIZO. It was further noted that his state of health was compatible with detention as none of his diagnoses were on the list of the illnesses, provided for by law, for which early release was possible. The applicant challenged this conclusion before the Office of the Prosecutor General alleging, inter alia, that the certificate had been forged and issued unlawfully by an unauthorised and unqualified medical officer. To verify the applicant\u2019s complaint, the Zaporizhzhya regional prosecutor\u2019s office conducted enquiries and ordered, inter alia, that the applicant be examined by different medical specialists.","83.On 24 January 2006, in compliance with the prosecutor\u2019s order, the applicant was medically examined by a panel of SIZO physicians (see paragraph 71 above). It was established in the course of that examination that the applicant had been under the close supervision of the SIZO medical unit and, when the need had arisen, of outside doctors; that twice a year, owing to his diseases, he had undergone a medical checkup; that all his complaints had been adequately addressed; and that his state of health had been compatible with detention. It was further established in the course of the prosecutor\u2019s enquiries that the medical certificate of 7September 2005 had been issued by an authorised person and had contained objective information and had correctly referred to the applicant\u2019s state of health.","84.On 2 and 23 February 2006, on the basis of the above conclusions, the prosecutor\u2019s office informed the applicant that no violations on the part of SIZO medical staff had been established.","85.On 13 February 2006 the applicant again complained to the Prosecutor General regarding the allegedly forged certificate of 7 September 2005.","86.On 3 March 2006, following further enquiries into the applicant\u2019s complaint and another medical examination of the applicant (see paragraph 73 above), the prosecutor\u2019s office informed him that his allegations appeared to be groundless."],"29047":["7.The applicant was born in 1978. He is currently serving a prison sentence in Uzbekistan.","8.The information provided by the applicant\u2019s representative and the Government concerning the circumstances of the case is limited and conflicting. The elements at the Court\u2019s disposal are described below.","A.Information submitted by the applicant\u2019s representative","9.The following account of events is based on a series of written submissions to the Court by the applicant\u2019s representative.","1.Background information","10.The applicant, while living in Uzbekistan, was a friend of a former boyfriend of Ms Gulnara Karimova, one of President Islam Karimov\u2019s daughters. At some point MsKarimova turned against her former boyfriend\u2019s friends. Fleeing political persecution, on 26December 2010 the applicant moved to Russia. He resided in Moscow with his partner, Ms I., and their child.","11.In 2011 the Uzbek authorities charged the applicant in absentia with crimes related to religious extremism on account of his alleged involvement in the establishment in 2009 of a jihadist organisation, issued an arrest warrant and put his name on an international wanted list.","12.On 10 July 2013 the applicant was arrested in Moscow on the basis of the Uzbek warrant.","13.On 12 July 2013 the Golovinskiy District Court of Moscow authorised the applicant\u2019s detention pending extradition.","14.On 9 August 2013 the Golovinskiy inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office of Moscow ordered the applicant\u2019s release on the grounds that the Uzbek authorities had not lodged a formal extradition request and that the crimes he had been charged with did not constitute criminal offences under Russian law. It was also noted that the applicant could not have established the jihadist organisation in 2009 as the organisation in question had been banned by the Supreme Court of Russia in 2003. The applicant was then released.","15.Following his release, the applicant continued to live in Moscow. At some point he applied for refugee status, referring to a risk of ill\u2011treatment in Uzbekistan.","16.On 8 November 2013 the Moscow Department of the Federal Migration Service (\u201cthe Moscow FMS\u201d) dismissed the allegations of a risk of ill-treatment in Uzbekistan as unfounded and rejected the applicant\u2019s application for refugee status. He challenged that decision in court.","17.On 12 May 2014 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow approved the applicant\u2019s application, quashed the Moscow FMS\u2019s rejection and ordered it to grant the applicant refugee status.","18.The applicant\u2019s passport remained in the Moscow FMS\u2019s file concerning his application for refugee status.","19.Given that no appeal against the judgment of 12 May 2014 was lodged within the required time, the judgment entered into force.","2.The applicant\u2019s disappearance","20.On the evening of 9 June 2014, while the applicant and his family were visiting a friend, Mr T., the applicant\u2019s child fell ill. The applicant and MsI. decided to take him to hospital and the applicant called a taxi. A silver Lada Priora arrived. Mr T. wanted to accompany the applicant and MsI., but the Lada\u2019s driver told him that the car had been ordered for two adult passengers only. The applicant, Ms I. and the child got into the taxi.","21.On their way, at about 7.20 p.m., Ms I. decided to stop at a pharmacy in the centre of Moscow. She took the child out of the taxi and the applicant waited in the car. When Ms I. left the pharmacy she saw that the taxi had driven away. A woman told Ms I. that she had seen two men getting in a parked car, which had then driven off.","22.Ms I. tried calling the applicant but his mobile telephone was turned off. She then alerted Mr T.","23.The applicant\u2019s representative was notified of the applicant\u2019s disappearance shortly after. On the same date, that is, on 9 June 2014, he contacted the Federal Security Service (\u201cthe FSB\u201d) and the border control agency, asking them to prevent the applicant\u2019s involuntary removal from Russian territory. According to the applicant\u2019s representative, he suspected the involvement of two FSB officers, \u201cTimur\u201d and \u201cZakhar\u201d, who had shown an interest in the applicant in 2011. Nevertheless, he did not mention those people in his letters to the FSB and the border control agency.","3.The applicant\u2019s reappearance in Uzbekistan","24.On 18 June 2014 the investigation department of the Uzbek Ministry of the Interior informed the applicant\u2019s father that the applicant had been arrested and placed in custody on 17 June 2014. On 25 June 2015 the applicant\u2019s representative forwarded a copy of the notification to the Court.","25.The criminal case against the applicant was brought to trial before the Tashkent City Court. He was appointed a legal aid lawyer.","4.Information collected by the applicant\u2019s representative in Tashkent","26.At the end of October 2014 the applicant\u2019s representative, MrVasilyev, travelled to Tashkent. He discovered that the applicant had been kept incommunicado in a remand prison in Tashkent. Mr Vasilyev was repeatedly denied access to the applicant.","(a)Information communicated orally to Mr Vasilyev by the applicant","27.Mr Vasilyev attended three hearings at the Tashkent City Court on 31 October, and 3 and 4November 2014. On 31 October and 3November 2014 the trial judge allowed MrVasilyev to talk to the applicant. During the conversations the applicant sat in a cage in the courtroom surrounded by guards. The applicant\u2019s representative summarised the applicant\u2019s description of the events of 9 June 2014, given orally on 31 October and 3November 2014, as follows.","28.At 7 p.m. on 9 June 2014 the applicant had been abducted by two FSB officers. They had put a sack over the applicant\u2019s head during the abduction. They had then taken the applicant to an unidentified house, tied him up and taken the sack off his head. The applicant had recognised the two men as \u201cTimur\u201d and \u201cZakhar\u201d, the FSB officers whom he had met previously in November 2011. The two men had beaten the applicant and kept him inside the house until the following day.","29.On 10 June 2014 the two FSB officers had taken the applicant to a runway at one of Moscow\u2019s airports without passing through any border or passport controls as the applicant\u2019s passport had remained with the Moscow FMS. The FSB officers had handed the applicant over to Uzbek officials near the steps of a Tashkent-bound airplane.","30.Once in Uzbekistan, the applicant had been placed under arrest by the Main Investigation Department of the Ministry of the Interior of Uzbekistan on suspicion of crimes related to religious extremism. He had been kept in detention for two months and had been subjected to torture and other ill\u2011treatment by Uzbek law-enforcement officers with a view to securing a self-incriminating statement. The applicant had been tied head downwards to a bar attached to the wall and had been beaten repeatedly. The officers had broken two of the applicant\u2019s ribs and knocked out seven of his teeth.","(b)Information provided by Ms I.","31.On 4 November 2014 the applicant\u2019s representative interviewed MsI.","32.Ms I. stated that on 3 May 2011 an FSB officer named \u201cZakhar\u201d and some police officers had come to their Moscow flat to search for the applicant, but had not found him.","33.In November 2011 \u201cZakhar\u201d and another FSB officer, \u201cTimur\u201d, had interviewed Ms I. about the applicant and his religious views and practices.","34.Following the applicant\u2019s abduction, on 10 June 2014 Ms I. had called \u201cTimur\u201d on his mobile phone, enquiring about her partner. \u201cTimur\u201d had replied that he was no longer working for \u201cthat office\u201d (the FSB). Ms I. had also tried calling \u201cZakhar\u201d but had received no response.","35.On 13 June 2014 Ms I. had flown to Tashkent with her son and mother. Upon arrival she had been detained at the airport for seven hours and then released.","36.Ms I. had been questioned by the investigator in charge of the applicant\u2019s case at the Ministry of the Interior of Uzbekistan, Mr K., but had been denied access to the applicant. When she had seen the applicant in the courtroom, he had made signs to her that he had been beaten.","(c)Information provided by the applicant\u2019s mother","37.On 4 November 2014 Mr Vasilyev interviewed the applicant\u2019s mother, Ms Kh.","38.Ms Kh. stated that her younger son had been convicted of crimes related to religious extremism in December 2010, which had influenced the applicant\u2019s decision to leave Uzbekistan. She had had occasional contact with the applicant during his time in Moscow.","39.On 15 June 2014 Ms I. had arrived in Uzbekistan and informed MsKh. of the applicant\u2019s abduction.","40.On 25 June 2014 officers of the Ministry of the Interior of Uzbekistan had come to Ms Kh.\u2019s home and searched it.","41.On 27 June 2014 the applicant\u2019s mother had visited the investigator,K., who had said that the applicant had voluntarily returned to Tashkent on 8June 2014 and had gone to the police with a statement of surrender.","42.Some people had informed Ms Kh. that her son had been severely beaten while in detention. She had not had access to the applicant, but when she had seen him in the courtroom, he had looked very poorly.","5.The applicant\u2019s conviction","43.On 18 November 2014 the Tashkent City Court found the applicant guilty of crimes under Articles 216 (\u201cthe illegal establishment of public associations or religious organisations\u201d) and 244\u00b2 (\u201cthe establishment of, management of, participation in religious extremist, separatist, fundamentalist or other proscribed organisations\u201d) of Uzbekistan\u2019s Criminal Code and sentenced him to eight years\u2019 imprisonment.","44.The lawyer appointed for the applicant refused to lodge an appeal against the judgment.","45.On 26 November 2014 Mr Vasilyev lodged an appeal with the Appeal Chamber of the Tashkent City Court on the applicant\u2019s behalf. It appears that later the applicant withdrew the statement of appeal.","46.The applicant remains imprisoned in Uzbekistan.","6.Appeal proceedings relating to the applicant\u2019s refugee status application","47.On 29 July 2014 the Moscow FMS lodged an appeal against the judgment of 12 May 2014. The statement accompanying the appeal did not contain any request to restore the time-limit for lodging it.","48.The Moscow City Court admitted the appeal on an unspecified date. The reasons for admitting it after the time-limit had run out are unknown.","49.On 19 October 2014 the UNHCR Representation in the Russian Federation (\u201cthe UNHCR\u201d) submitted a memorandum on the applicant\u2019s case to the Moscow City Court for consideration. It was noted that torture was a widespread method of coercion used by the Uzbek authorities to obtain self\u2011incriminating statements from those suspected of involvement in \u201creligious extremism\u201d. The statement read, in particular:","\u201cAs follows from the document of the Call for Urgent Action published by Amnesty International on 6 November 2014, after the forced return to Uzbekistan, MrKhamidkariyev was subjected to torture and other kinds of proscribed treatment and punishment for two months with a view to obtaining a confession to made-up charges \u2013 he was tied head down to a bar attached to a wall and beaten, as a result of which he had seven teeth knocked out and two ribs broken.\u201d","50.On 2 December 2014 the Moscow City Court examined the appeal lodged by the Moscow FMS against the judgment of 12 May 2014, quashed the judgment and upheld the Moscow FMS\u2019s decision of 8 November 2013 owing to the fact that the applicant had not provided \u201cconvincing and irrefutable evidence of the existence of well-founded fears of becoming a victim of persecution in Uzbekistan\u201d. The reasons for examining a belated appeal on the merits were not given in the text of the judgment.","B.Information submitted by the Government","51.In the course of the proceedings before the Court, the Government sent four sets of correspondence, the contents of which are described below.","1.Letter of 1 July 2014","52.By a letter of 1 July 2014 in reply to the Court\u2019s request for information of 10 June 2014, made at the same time as the indication of the interim measures (see paragraph 4 above), the Government informed the Court that \u201cthe relevant State bodies have been informed about the disappearance of the applicant and the indication by the Court of the interim measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court\u201d.","53.They further noted that the applicant had not been \u201capprehended by the officers of any Russian law-enforcement bodies on 9 June 2014 in Moscow\u201d and that \u201chis current whereabouts [are] unknown\u201d.","54.The Government also stated that on 10 June 2014 the Basmannyy district department of the interior (\u201cthe Basmannyy police\u201d) had received a complaint about the applicant\u2019s kidnapping from Mr T. and that on 19 June 2014 a case file with the preliminary inquiry conducted on the basis of that complaint had been forwarded to the Basmannyy district investigative unit of the Moscow investigative department of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Prosecutor\u2019s Office (\u201cthe investigative authority\u201d) \u201cfor further enquiry and the possible initiation of a criminal case\u201d.","55.Lastly, they noted that the applicant\u2019s representative\u2019s letter of 25June 2014 (see paragraph 24 above) had been forwarded to the investigative authority for consideration.","56. No documents were enclosed with the letter of 1 July 2014.","2.Observations on the admissibility and merits of the application of 24October 2014","57.On 24 October 2014 the Government submitted their observations on the admissibility and merits of the application, the contents of which can be summarised as follows.","58.On 9 September 2014[1] the investigative authority opened an investigation into the applicant\u2019s kidnapping as criminal case no. 815447 under Article 126 \u00a7 2 (a) of the Russian Criminal Code (\u201caggravated kidnapping\u201d).","59.In the course of the investigation CCTV pictures from cameras located in the vicinity of the scene of the incident were examined. They showed that on 9 June 2014 at about 7 p.m. the applicant had been kidnapped by unidentified people and taken away by car.","60.The Government claimed that the Court\u2019s demand to submit lists of passengers checked in on Uzbekistan-bound flights between 9 and 12 June 2014 (see paragraph 5 above) could not be complied with as the lists in question contained personal data about third parties and could not be submitted to the Court without their prior consent.","61.The Government further submitted that there was no information about the arrest of the applicant on 9 June 2014 by law\u2011enforcement agencies or his detention in remand prisons in Moscow or the Moscow Region, and that no information regarding the applicant crossing the State border had been received at that time.","62.The notification by the Uzbek authorities to the applicant\u2019s father of 18 June 2014 concerning the applicant\u2019s arrest and detention in Uzbekistan had been added to the criminal investigation file.","63.The Government concluded that there was no evidence to prove any direct or indirect involvement of the Russian authorities in the applicant\u2019s alleged kidnapping and transfer to Uzbekistan.","64.The Russian authorities had not been made aware and could not have known of any risk that the applicant might be kidnapped.","65.The Government were not in a position to provide information on the criminal proceedings against the applicant in Uzbekistan as those proceedings fell outside their jurisdiction. However, they had sent a request for mutual legal assistance to the Uzbek authorities in order to establish the applicant\u2019s whereabouts.","66.In conclusion, the Government submitted that there had not been any administrative practice of the involuntary removal of persons in respect of whom Rule 39 had been applied to their countries of nationality. Inquiries and investigations were opened into instances of the disappearance of such people. The Russian Prosecutor\u2019s Office oversaw the compliance with Russian law of any decisions taken in the course of such inquiries and investigations. A large group of State agencies had held a co-ordination meeting on 10 September 2014 on the further enforcement of measures to ensure the security of asylum seekers.","67.No documents were enclosed with the Government\u2019s observations of 24 October 2014.","3.Further observations of 26 February 2015","68.On 26 February 2015 the Government, in reply to the applicant\u2019s observations on the admissibility and merits of the application, submitted that they reaffirmed the position stated in their observations of 24 October 2014 and commented on the applicant\u2019s just satisfaction claims.","69.No documents were enclosed with the Government\u2019s correspondence of 26February 2015.","4.Letter of 15 May 2015","(a)Cover letter","70.Following the Court\u2019s additional question to the Government regarding the respondent State\u2019s compliance with Article 38 of the Convention (see paragraph 6 above), the Government submitted a letter which read as follows:","\u201cWith reference to your letter of 24 April 2015 in respect of the above application, please find enclosed copies of the criminal investigation documents disclosed by the investigative authorities after a repeated request.","The Government kindly ask the Court to join the documents to the case-file.\u201d","71.No answer to the Court\u2019s question under Article 38 of the Convention was given.","(b)Documents enclosed","72.Forty-three pages of various documents issued by the Russian and Uzbek authorities were enclosed with the Government\u2019s cover letter.","(i)Documents issued by the Russian authorities","(\u03b1)Summary of events in chronological order","73.The contents of the documents issued by the Russian authorities and which were enclosed with the Government\u2019s letter of 15 May 2015 can be summarised as follows.","74.On 10 June 2014 Mr T. reported the applicant\u2019s kidnapping to the Basmannyy police and made a statement. Mr T. stated, in particular, that a woman on the street near the pharmacy had seen two men getting into the parked silver Lada Priora.","75.On 10 June 2014 Ms I. made a statement to the Basmannyy police that at 7p.m. on 9 June 2014 she, her partner and child had taken a taxi, a silver Lada Priora. She had got out of the car to go into a pharmacy, but by the time she had come out the taxi had disappeared.","76.On 30 June 2014 the Basmannyy police reported to the investigative authority that they had failed to identify the applicant\u2019s whereabouts and that there had been no \u201cpositive information\u201d concerning any aeroplane or railway tickets issued in the applicant\u2019s name or about the applicant being placed in remand prisons. Furthermore, it was noted that the Moscow department of the FSB and the data centre of the Russian Ministry of the Interior had not sent any reply to the police\u2019s enquiries. The Basmannyy police also reported that the whereabouts of Mr T. and Ms I. were unknown and that it had been impossible to identify the taxi driver who had taken the applicant to the scene of the kidnapping.","77.On 9 July 2014 the investigative authority decided to open a criminal investigation into the applicant\u2019s kidnapping. The decision described the events as follows:","\u201cOn 9 June 2014 at about 7 p.m. persons who have not been identified by the investigation, acting jointly and by common accord, approached a car which has not been identified by the investigation parked near house no. 7\/2 at Bolshoy Kharitonyevskiy Lane in Moscow, in which Mr Khamidkariyev was travelling, and, having got in the said car against the will of the victim, kidnapped Mr Khamidkariyev, fleeing the scene of the crime in the said car to an unknown destination.\u201d","78.On 11 September 2014 the investigative authority requested the transport police to inform them whether any aeroplane or railway tickets had been issued in the applicant\u2019s name between 1 June and 1 August 2014.","79.On 9 October 2014 the investigative authority granted the applicant victim status in case no. 815447.","80.On 15January 2015 an investigator with the investigative authority decided to suspend the investigation of case no. 815447. The decision stated that the applicant\u2019s whereabouts had been established as he had been detained in a remand prison in Tashkent, the scene of the incident had been inspected, seven witnesses had been questioned, various requests had been sent to the Russian authorities and a request for mutual legal assistance had been sent to Uzbekistan, but no reply had been received.","81.On 29 April 2015 the investigator\u2019s superior at the investigative authority overruled the decision of 25 April 2015 to suspend the case and returned it to the investigator on the grounds that the suspension decision had been taken prematurely. It was noted that the following measures had to be taken to ensure a proper investigation: a response to the request for mutual legal assistance from the Uzbek authorities had still to be received, as had replies to \u201cpreviously sent requests\u201d. \u201cOther requisite investigative and procedural measures\u201d also still had to be performed.","82.On 29 April 2015 an investigator at the investigative authority decided to resume case no. 815447 following the order from his superior. It is clear from the text of the decision that between 9October 2014 and 29April 2015 the investigation had been suspended and resumed four times on the basis of decisions by a more senior officer at the investigative authority or by a prosecutor.","(\u03b2)Other documents","83.The materials provided by the Government included the following documents:","- an undated sheet of paper with no letterhead entitled \u201cFederal Search for an Individual\u201d containing the applicant\u2019s personal information and information on a criminal case pending against him in Uzbekistan, from which it transpires that the applicant was put on a Russian federal wanted list. The sheet contains a handwritten note \u201cDatabase \u2018Region\u2019 of the Russian Ministry of the Interior (has not been arrested)\u201d.","- an undated document entitled \u201cRequest for legal assistance\u201d addressed to \u201cthe competent State bodies of Uzbekistan\u201d and signed by an investigator at the investigative authority, including a list of questions to ask the applicant, MsI. and the officers in charge of the applicant\u2019s arrest. The questions concerned, in particular, the circumstances of the applicant\u2019s arrival in Uzbekistan, including how he crossed the border and the reasons for his detention in Tashkent.","(ii)Documents issued by the Uzbek authorities","84.The contents of the documents issued by the Uzbek authorities which were enclosed with the Government\u2019s letter of 15 May 2015 can be summarised as follows.","85.According to an arrest record drawn up in Russian by the Uzbek police the applicant was placed under arrest at 10.40 a.m. on 14 June 2014 as a suspect in a crime under Article 244\u00b2 \u00a7 1 of the Uzbek Criminal Code. The place of arrest was not indicated in the record. The grounds for the arrest were stated as \u201cother information leading to a suspicion that a person has committed a crime, and if the person has attempted to flee or has no abode or his or her identity has not been established\u201d. The purpose of the arrest was stated as \u201cthere are enough grounds to suspect the person of having committed a crime\u201d. A note observed that \u201cthe arrested person has been placed in a temporary detention unit of the Ministry of the Interior of Uzbekistan\u201d.","86.According to a document in Russian entitled \u201cRecord of providing an arrested person with the right to make a telephone call\u201d of 14 June 2014, the applicant made use of that right to call his mother between 10.45 and 10.49 a.m. on 14 June 2014 to inform her of his arrest.","87.The record of the search of the applicant in Russian showed that 300Russian roubles and one metallic ring were seized from the applicant when he was searched after being arrested.","88.On 18 June 2014 the Main Investigation Department of the Ministry of the Interior of Uzbekistan informed the applicant\u2019s father that his son, who had been wanted and \u201cdeclared guilty in absentia\u201d, had been arrested on 17 June 2014, placed in custody and had been participating in investigative measures.","89.According to a Russian translation of a document in Uzbek of 10February 2015 an investigator, K., at the Ministry of the Interior of Uzbekistan asked the State Customs Committee of Uzbekistan to provide information on \u201cthe facts of crossing the State border of Uzbekistan\u201d by the applicant between 1 June and 1 July 2014. A Russian translation of the reply in Uzbek by the State Customs Committee of Uzbekistan of 12February 2015 stated that there was no information in the customs\u2019 database on the applicant crossing the Uzbek border between 1 June and 1July 2014. It was noted that the database was compiled on the basis of written statements by those crossing borders and could thus contain errors owing to differences in people\u2019s handwriting.","90.According to the record of an interview held on 11 February 2015 K. questioned the applicant as a victim in an unspecified criminal case. The interview was in Russian. In the course of the interview the applicant stated that he had not been arrested by the Russian authorities and that he had voluntarily left Moscow to go to Uzbekistan to visit his ailing mother. He stated that he had had no documents on him. Once in Uzbekistan, the applicant had taken a taxi to his mother\u2019s, but the taxi had broken down and stopped. After getting out of the car, the applicant had been asked by police officers who had happened to be passing for an identification document. Since he had had no such document, he had been taken to a police station for identification and then arrested. The applicant\u2019s answer to a question about his whereabouts between 9 and 15 June 2014 was as follows:","\u201cOn 9 June 2014 I was at home, in the evening I took the child to hospital, then at about 9 p.m. I returned and stayed at home. Then on 10 June 2014 I was at home and at about 11 p.m. went to the railway station, and at 12 midnight left for Uzbekistan by bus. I was on the road for about seventy-two hours or a little longer, and on 14 June 2014 I arrived at the border between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, then, using roundabout ways, I crossed the border and at about 7 a.m. was on Uzbek territory, where I was arrested by officers of law-enforcement agencies.\u201d","91.On 12 February 2015 the investigator K. questioned Ms I. as a witness. The interview was in Russian. Ms I. stated that the applicant had voluntarily and secretly left for Uzbekistan by bus on 10 June 2014 and that she had flown to Tashkent on 13 June 2014.","92.On 12 February 2015 K. questioned one of the police officers who had arrested the applicant, Mr Kh., as a witness. The interview was in Russian. The answer to the question about the circumstances of the applicant\u2019s arrest reads as follows:","\u201cOn 14 June 2014 at about 7.30 a.m. in the Yakkasarayskiy district of Tashkent MrKhamidkariyev was stopped with a view to checking his identity documents, however, given that he had no documents on him, the latter was taken to the Yakkasarayskiy district department of the interior of Tashkent, where it was established that Mr Khamidkariyev was wanted, accordingly, Mr Khamidkariyev was taken to the initiator of the search for him in the temporary detention facility of the Ministry of the Interior of Uzbekistan, where the requisite documents were filled in.\u201d","93.On an unspecified date K. drew up a report on the actions performed under the request for mutual legal assistance. According to the report, the investigator had questioned Ms I., Mr Kh. and the applicant, had received copies of documents pertaining to the applicant\u2019s arrest, requested information concerning the border crossing and had identified two men allegedly connected with the applicant who as of November 2014 had been fighting on the side of ISIS in Syria.","94.The Government also submitted two documents in Uzbek of 14 June 2014 \u2013 a copy of the first page of Ms I.\u2019s passport, and an extract from the Criminal Code of Uzbekistan with the text of Article 244\u00b2 \u00a7 1 in Russian. The Article reads as follows: \u201cthe establishment, management, or participation in religious extremist, separatist, fundamentalist or other proscribed organisations shall be punishable by five to fifteen years of imprisonment\u201d.","95.For the relevant reports on Uzbekistan by UN bodies and international non-governmental human rights organisations up to 2014, see Egamberdiyev v. Russia (no. 34742\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 31-34, 26 June 2014).","96.The relevant parts of the Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Uzbekistan (CCPR\/C\/UZB\/CO\/4) adopted by the UN Human Rights Committee on 20 July 2015, read as follows:","\u201cState of emergency and counter-terrorism","11. The Committee, while noting that a draft State of Emergency Act has been prepared, remains concerned (CCPR\/C\/UZB\/CO\/3, para. 9) that existing regulations on states of emergency do not comply with article 4 of the Covenant. It also remains concerned (CCPR\/C\/UZB\/CO\/3, para. 15) about: (a) the overly-broad definition of terrorism and terrorist activities that is reportedly widely used to charge and prosecute members or suspected members of banned Islamic movements; (b) legal safeguards for persons suspected of, or charged with, a terrorist or related crime and allegations of incommunicado detention, torture and long prison sentences in inhuman and degrading conditions in respect of such persons (arts. 4, 7, 9, 10, 14, 18 and 19) ...","Deaths in custody","12. The Committee is concerned about reports of deaths in custody and denial of adequate medical care. It is also concerned about the lack of effective and independent investigations into such cases (arts. 2 and 6) ...","Torture","13. The Committee remains concerned that the definition of torture contained in the criminal legislation, including article 235 of the Criminal Code, does not meet the requirements of article 7 of the Covenant, as it is limited to illegal acts committed with the purpose of coercing testimony and therefore in practice is restricted to acts of torture committed only by a person carrying out an initial inquiry or pretrial investigation, a procurator or other employee of a law-enforcement agency, and results in impunity for other persons, including detainees and prisoners. The Committee is also concerned that the State party continues to grant amnesties to persons who have been convicted of torture or ill-treatment under article 235 of the Criminal Code (arts. 2 and 7) ...","14. The Committee remains concerned about reports that torture continues to be routinely used throughout the criminal justice system; that, despite the existing legal prohibition, forced confessions are in practice used as evidence in court, and that judges fail to order investigations into allegations of forced confessions even when signs of torture are visible; that persons complaining of torture are subjected to reprisals and family members are often intimidated and threatened to ensure that complaints are retracted; and that the rate of prosecution is very low and impunity is prevalent (arts. 2, 7 and 14) ...","Liberty and security of person","15. The Committee remains concerned that the State party retains the 72-hour period of detention of persons suspected of having committed an offence before bringing them before a judge, and therefore welcomes the State party\u2019s statement that the length of custody may be reduced to 48 hours in the future. It is also concerned about deficiencies in the application of the legislation governing judicial control of detention (habeas corpus) in practice, particularly allegations of: (a) forging the time or date of detention to circumvent the legal period of detention: (b) habeas corpus hearings in the absence of the detainee, especially in politically-related cases; (c) violations of the right of detainees to a lawyer, including to a lawyer of their choice, and deficient legal representation provided by State-appointed defence lawyers (arts. 9 and 14).\u201d","97.The Uzbekistan chapter of the World Report 2015 by Human Rights Watch reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:","\u201cImprisonment and Harassment of Critics","The Uzbek government has imprisoned thousands of people on politically motivated charges to enforce its repressive rule, targeting human rights and opposition activists, journalists, religious believers, artists, and other perceived critics.","...","Criminal Justice and Torture","In November 2013, the United Nations Committee against Torture stated that torture is \u201csystematic,\u201d \u201cunpunished,\u201d and \u201cencouraged\u201d by law enforcement officers in Uzbekistan\u2019s police stations, prisons, and detention facilities run by the SNB. Methods include beating with batons and plastic bottles, hanging by wrists and ankles, rape, and sexual humiliation.","Although authorities introduced habeas corpus in 2008, there has been no perceptible reduction in the use of torture in pretrial custody or enhanced due process for detainees. Authorities routinely deny detainees and prisoners access to counsel, and the state-controlled bar association has disbarred lawyers that take on politically sensitive cases.\u201d","98.The chapter on Uzbekistan of Amnesty International\u2019s report for 2014\/15, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:","\u201cTorture and other ill-treatment","Police and officers of the National Security Service (SNB)continued to routinely use torture and other ill-treatment to coerce suspects and detainees, including women and men charged with criminal offences such as theft, fraud or murder, into confessing to a crime or incriminating others. Detainees charged with anti-state and terrorism-related offences were particularly vulnerable to torture. Detainees were often tortured by people wearing masks.","Police and SNB officers regularly used convicted prisoners to commit torture and other ill-treatment on detainees in pre-trial detention. Under the Criminal Code, prisoners, unlike officials, could not be held responsible for torture but only for lesser crimes. A former detainee described witnessing officers and prisoners torture men and women in interrogation rooms in an SNB pre-trial detention centre, as well as in bathrooms and showers, punishment cells and purpose-built torture rooms with padded rubber walls and sound-proofing. He described SNB officers handcuffing detainees to radiators and breaking their bones with baseball bats.","Courts continued to rely heavily on confessions obtained under torture to hand down convictions.Judges routinely ignored or dismissed as unfounded defendants\u2019 allegations of torture or other ill-treatment, even when presented with credible evidence.","Two men, who were sentenced in 2014 to 10 years in prison each for alleged membership of a banned Islamist party, claimed in court that security forces had tortured them to sign false confessions by burning their hands and feet against a stove. One defendant toldthe judge that security forces had pulled out his fingernails and toenails. The judge failed to inquire further into the torture allegations, and admitted the confessions as evidence.","...","Counter-terror and security","The authorities became increasingly suspicious oflabour migrants returning from abroad who may have had access to information on Islam which is censored or banned in Uzbekistan, resulting in an increased number of arrests and prosecutions for \u201cextremism\u201d. The authorities claimed that migrant workers were targeted in Russia for recruitment by the IMU, IS or other groups characterized as extremist.","In November, security forces detained dozens oflabour migrants who had returned from Russia and Turkey, in raids in the capital Tashkent and several regions of the country, amid disputed claims that they were members of the banned Islamist party Hizb ut-Tahrir and had links to IS members in Syria. Human rights defenders reported that security forces used torture to extract confessions from them.\u201d","99.In April 2015, Amnesty International published a report entitled \u201cSecrets and Lies: Forced Confessions under Torture in Uzbekistan\u201d, which reads, in particular, as follows:","\u201cTorture is endemic in Uzbekistan\u2019s criminal justice system. Security forces use torture against men and women charged with criminal offences, such as theft and murder, as well as against individuals who have fallen out of favour with the authorities, including former officials, police officers and entrepreneurs. Increasingly, however, over the last 15 years, those particularly vulnerable to torture and other ill\u2011treatment have been men and women charged with or convicted of \u201canti-state\u201d and terrorism-related offences. In particular, these are Muslims worshipping in mosques outside state control or under independent imams, and members or suspected members of political opposition parties and banned Islamic movements or Islamist groups and parties, all of whom the authorities consider a threat to national and regional security.\u201d"],"29108":["5.The applicant was born in 1981 and lives in Pite\u015fti.","A.Background to the case","6.On 4 September 2014 a gynaecologist prescribed the medicine Utrogestan to the applicant, to be taken twice a day for three months.","7.According to the applicant\u2019s own statement before the Court, the medication was prescribed to help maintain her pregnancy and prevent a miscarriage.","8.According to the medicine\u2019s patient information leaflet, it was recommended for the treatment of medical conditions causing an insufficient secretion of the hormone progesterone and could be used for several conditions, including inter alia, aiding a pregnancy. Its potential side effects included drowsiness and dizziness, usually as a result of an overdose. Stopping the treatment did not have any potential effects.","9.On 29 October 2014 M.N., a prosecutor attached to the National Anticorruption Department (Direc\u021bia Na\u021bional\u0103 Anticorup\u021bie \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe DNA\u201d), summoned the applicant to be interviewed as a witness on 31October 2014 in criminal proceedings opened by the authorities into alleged acts of corruption involving her father and others. Her father was the mayor of Pite\u0219ti and a member of a major political party which formed the Romanian Government at the time.","10.According to the applicant\u2019s own statement before the Court, on the morning of 31 October 2014 she started feeling unwell and asked her chosen legal representative to inform M.N. that she might not be able to testify that day because of her health. Her lawyer called M.N. and informed him of the situation. The lawyer also reassured the prosecutor that he would accompany the applicant to the DNA\u2019s offices for the interview once her medical condition improved. Subsequently, the applicant\u2019s lawyer informed her that the prosecutor had refused to allow a lawyer to be present during her interview and he advised her to attend alone.","11.On the same date a general practitioner issued a medical note and referred the applicant urgently to hospital. The note stated that she was suffering from an inflammation of her uterus.","12.On the same date the gynaecology department of the Panait S\u00e2rbu Clinical Hospital in Bucharest took an ultrasound of the applicant\u2019s uterus. The ultrasound image produced by the applicant as evidence before the Court did not provide, contain or was accompanied by any explanation or medical report detailing her condition.","13.According to the applicant\u2019s own statement before the Court, the examination at the Panait S\u00e2rbu Clinical Hospital confirmed that she was pregnant and was experiencing some complications as a result of stress and her medication\u2019s side effects. However, the scan could not confirm whether the foetus had stopped developing or not. She was advised to continue the prescribed treatment and rest.","14.On the same date M.N. authorised two police officers to enforce a warrant to appear (mandat de aducere) issued in the applicant\u2019s name. It stated that she had unjustifiably ignored the summons of 29October 2014 and that her presence was required at the DNA\u2019s offices in order to be interviewed as a witness.","15.According to the applicant\u2019s own statement before the Court, on her return from the hospital two police officers presented her with the warrant to appear and took her to the DNA\u2019s offices even though she had informed them of her medical condition and had shown them her medical documents. During the interview she informed M.N. that she was feeling ill and presented him with the medical documents. Even though he was aware that she was pregnant, the prosecutor continued to interview her aggressively, using interview techniques aimed at intimidating her. Her interview was also recorded but in the absence of any procedural rules on the matter she was unable to ask for the recording. When she asked the prosecutor to mention in her statement that she was being interviewed while under treatment, in poor health and after a trip to the hospital, she was told that she would not be allowed to leave the premises for the rest of the evening. She became scared, gave in and fully complied with the investigating authorities\u2019 demands.","16.On 31 October 2014, after the applicant\u2019s interview, prosecutor M.N. prepared a report which stated that according to the statement made by her, she had been late for the interview because she had been feeling unwell on account of health problems (av\u00e2nd probleme de s\u0103n\u0103tate). The report noted that the applicant had supported her statement by submitting a general practitioner\u2019s referral to hospital (see paragraph 11 above) and the results of the ultrasound taken by the Panait S\u00e2rbu Clinical Hospital (see paragraph12 above). The applicant signed the report without objection.","17.According to the applicant\u2019s own statement before the Court, she also gave the prosecuting authorities a prescription for her medication and the medication\u2019s patient information leaflet.","18.On 19 January 2015 the applicant underwent a routine pregnancy check-up at a private clinic in Bucharest. According to the medical report prepared that day, she was thirteen weeks pregnant.","B.Time spent by the applicant at the DNA on 6 November 2014","19.At 4 a.m. on 6 November 2014 M.N. authorised the police to enforce a warrant to appear (mandat de aducere) issued in the applicant\u2019s name in order to interview her in the criminal proceedings opened by the authorities into alleged acts of corruption.","20.At 11.30 a.m. two police officers went to the applicant\u2019s home and presented her with the warrant to appear. According to a report produced by the officers, the applicant did not object to the warrant and followed them to the DNA\u2019s offices. The applicant signed the report.","21.According to the applicant\u2019s own statement before the Court, several police officers came to her home and took her to the DNA\u2019s offices. On her arrival, even though M.N. was aware of her pregnancy, he left her waiting for eight hours in the corridor. During that time she was forced to stand and had no access to food or water. She started feeling very unwell because of her treatment and its side effects. After eight hours a statement was taken from her in the presence of her chosen legal representatives.","22.From 12.50 to 1.10 p.m. M.N. informed the applicant in the presence of her two chosen legal representatives that she was suspected of complicity in bribe taking and money laundering in criminal proceedings opened by the authorities into alleged acts of corruption. From 1.15 to 2.45 p.m. she was interviewed as a suspect in their presence. Her statement was recorded.","23.At 6 p.m. M.N. charged (a pus \u020bn mi\u015fcare ac\u021biunea penal\u0103) the applicant with complicity in bribe taking and money laundering. Between 6.05 and 6.10 p.m. he informed her of the charges against her in the presence of her two chosen legal representatives. From 6.15 to 6.20p.m. she was interviewed in their presence about the circumstances of the case as a person charged with an offence. Her statement was recorded.","24.The applicant and her chosen legal representatives signed, without raising any written objections, all the documents produced by the DNA in respect of her case on 6November 2014, including her statements.","C.Conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention and alleged lack of medical care","25.At 7.07 p.m. on 6 November 2014 M.N. decided to place the applicant in police custody for twenty-four hours and ordered that she be taken to the Bucharest Police Detention Centre (Centrul de Re\u021binere \u015fi Arestare Preventiv\u0103 din cadrul Direc\u021biei Generale de Poli\u021bie a Municipiului Bucure\u015fti).","26.At 7.12 p.m. M.N. informed the applicant of her impending detention in the presence of one of her chosen legal representatives.","27.According to the applicant\u2019s own statement before the Court, she arrived at the detention centre at around 7.30 p.m. with only a bottle of water and a small box of vitamins and minerals. The detention centre authorities took the vitamins from her immediately.","28.On the same date the applicant signed a statement for the detention centre medical service. According to the statement, she informed them that she had been monitored for endometrial hyperplasia, that she agreed with the information recorded by the medical staff and that the information in respect of her health was complete and accurate.","29.At 7.55 p.m. the medical service produced a report concerning the applicant\u2019s health. The report noted, inter alia, that according to the statement made by her, she had been suffering from endometrial hyperplasia. Furthermore, she did not have her own Utrogestan. In addition, she stated that she would bring her medical documents in case she was detained pending trial and that she was a non-smoker.","30.According to the applicant\u2019s own statement before the Court, she informed the detention centre medical service of her pregnancy and treatment and asked them to give her the medication and vitamins that evening and the following morning as recommended. However, during her detention she was not provided with the treatment needed for her pregnancy and therefore she could have suffered a miscarriage. Furthermore, according to her, the detention centre authorities did not provide her with any food or water until the next morning. The food she received was unsavoury, and she was warned by her cellmates not to eat it. Moreover, she was detained in a cell measuring 5 square metres with three smokers, even though she had informed the authorities that she was a non-smoker and that smoke was harmful to someone in her condition. The cell had four bunk beds and was cold. She was forced to sleep in a bed that had a mattress but no bed linen or duvet. The cell had a sink and a squat toilet. The toilet was separated from the rest of the cell by a curtain and was covered with a plastic device to prevent rats from entering the cell. A shower was fitted above the toilet which was also used for flushing it. No warm water was available and the cold water from the sink was contaminated and could not be used for drinking. Furthermore, she was allowed only thirty minutes of outdoor exercise at the same time as her other three cellmates, in a yard measuring 6or7square metres. It had walls three metres high and was covered by a metal grill. The other three cellmates smoked constantly in the yard, so it was filled with cigarette smoke because fresh air could not enter as a result of the very high walls.","D.Other relevant information","31.At around 7.07 p.m. on 7 November 2014 the Bucharest County Court dismissed the DNA\u2019s request to detain the applicant pending trial for thirty days and ordered her release, on condition that she did not leave the country. In examining her personal situation, the court noted, interalia, that she was a former national television presenter and a film producer.","32.On 25 February 2015 a gynaecologist prescribed the applicant Utrogestan, to be taken twice a day until the thirty-second week of pregnancy.","33.On 17 December 2015 the DNA informed the Government, interalia, that on 6November 2014 similar procedural measures to those taken in respect of the applicant had been taken around the same time against eleven other suspects who were being investigated in the same set of criminal proceedings. Moreover, during the proceedings the applicant had been assisted by her chosen legal representatives and, like all the other suspects, she had been offered water or had been able to purchase food and water. Furthermore, water dispensers and disposable cups had been available in every corridor and office of the building. Everyone inside the building, including those under investigation, had access to its canteen. Lastly, all the defendants and their chosen legal representatives had the option of sitting down during the proceedings.","34.On 28 January 2016 the detention centre coordination department informed the Government that the applicant had arrived at 8.20p.m. on 6November 2014. According to the rules in force at the time, detainees were served dinner from 5.30 to 6 p.m. There were no written rules setting out the procedure which needed to be followed for detainees arriving later than 6 p.m. and the applicant had not asked for a meal. In addition, detention centres did not have a clear procedure in respect of detainees statements on whether they were a smoker or non-smoker. As long as detainees were asked about that at the time of their incarceration and opted for smoker or non-smoker status, they would be detained as far as possible according to their preferences.","35.According to the detention centre coordination department, none of the available documents proved that the applicant had stated that she was a non\u2011smoker at the time of her incarceration. Consequently, she had been assigned randomly to a cell for smokers. In addition, she had had access to running cold water which could have been used for drinking, and her cell had been heated at all times.","36.The applicant submitted excerpts from several newspaper and online articles concerning her detention and the time she spent at the DNA\u2019s offices on 6 November 2014. According to three of these she was interviewed at the DNA\u2019s offices for eight or more hours."],"29107":["4.The applicant was born in 1971 and is currently serving a prison sentence in Vaslui Prison.","5.In 2012 the applicant was convicted of human trafficking and sentenced to ten years\u2019 imprisonment.","6.He was detained in several detention facilities. However, in the present application he only complained about the conditions of his detention in Ia\u015fi Prison and about the fact that he had not been assigned a personal care assistant in Rahova and Ia\u015fi Prisons between 2April2013 and 30January 2014.","A.The applicant\u2019s conditions of detention in Ia\u0219i Prison","7.The applicant was detained in Ia\u015fi Prison on several occasions, for a period of almost ten months: between 2 and 16 August 2013, 3September 2013 and 11 March 2014, 14 March and 6 June 2014, as well as from 27June and 4 July 2014.","1.The applicant\u2019s account","8.The applicant alleged that he had been kept in conditions of poor hygiene in overcrowded cells. He had shared a cell of twenty\u2011nine square metres with seventeen other detainees. Moreover, he submitted that he had shared his cell with smokers despite the fact that he was a non\u2011smoker. The food had also been of very poor quality.","2.The Government\u2019s account","9.According to the information provided by the National Prison Administration and forwarded to the Court by the Government, the applicant was held in the following cells:","- cells E 4.3, E 6.2. and E6.7., all measuring 33.33 sq.m, containing twenty\u2011six beds (that is, 1.2 sq. m per bed), occupied by twenty to twenty\u2011six detainees;","- cell E 7.5., measuring 17.48 sq. m, containing three beds (that is, 5.8sq.m per bed), occupied by one to three detainees;","- and cell E 8.10, measuring 17.48 sq. m, containing eight beds (that is, 2.1sq.m per bed) and occupied by four to eight detainees.","10.The Government did not provide any information concerning either the exact number of detainees who had occupied the cells or the time spent by the applicant in each of the above-mentioned cells.","11.The detainees were provided with cleaning materials and personal hygiene products and they were responsible for cleaning the cells. Specialist contractors carried out work to eradicate rodents and insects whenever it was considered necessary. The detainees were entitled to two showers per week.","12.The applicant received a special diet for his medical condition (see paragraph13 below).","B.Assistance for the applicant in Ia\u015fi and Rahova Prisons","13.On 29 October 2013 a medical commission issued a certificate attesting that the applicant had been classified as a person with a permanent, severe physical disability on account of his visual impairment. The medical commission granted the applicant the right to a personal care assistant.","1.The applicant\u2019s account","14.The applicant alleged that no special arrangements had been made for him as a person with severe visual impairment in Ia\u015fi and Rahova Prisons between 2April 2013 and 30 January 2014.","15.Moreover, he contended that he had not been assigned a personal care assistant and had been permanently subjected to humiliating and degrading remarks from his cellmates, the same people to whom he had to appeal for assistance. As he had had no personal assistant he had not been able to benefit from daily walks and had been dependent on the other inmates to be moved around the prison.","16.He had only received assistance from inmates in the facility in exchange for cigarettes and money. The inmates had refused to help him unless they were paid. The administration had not taken any steps to rectify the situation.","17.The applicant submitted copies of several requests he had lodged with the prison authorities on 21 May, 21 November and 23December 2013 and on 20 February 2014 respectively, by which he had asked to be assigned a personal assistant. In each of his requests he had indicated the name of the co-detainee he had preferred to be assigned to him. All these requests were dismissed on the ground that the co-detainees indicated by the applicant could not assist him because they had been subject to disciplinary sanctions.","2.The Government\u2019s account","18.The Government submitted that the administration of both prisons had made diligent efforts to comply with the standards imposed by the Court. Moreover, in 2013 the authorities in Ia\u015fi Prison had refurbished cell E4.3 (see paragraph 9 above) to accommodate the needs of detainees with disabilities, including those of the applicant.","19.The Government contended that the medical certificate on his disability had been issued only on 29 October 2013 (see paragraph13 above) because the applicant had failed to submit the documents requested by the special commission for disabled persons. They further argued that even before the medical certificate had been issued, the prison authorities had on 9 August 2013 allowed a request lodged by the applicant on 7August 2013 to be assigned a personal care assistant. They had assigned him an inmate, M.D., who had been sharing the applicant\u2019s cell. He had assisted the applicant until 16August 2013, when the latter had been admitted to the medical unit of Dej Prison. In the medical unit the applicant had been assisted by a co-detainee with whom he had shared the room. The Government did not provide any information about the co-detainee in question.","20.After the applicant had returned to Ia\u015fi Prison he had lodged a request to be assigned a personal care assistant. On 22 April 2014 the prison authorities had assigned him an inmate, whom the applicant had refused.","C.The applicant\u2019s domestic complaints","21.The applicant lodged several complaints on the basis of Lawno.275\/2006 on the execution of sentences with the post-sentencing judge.","22.In 2013 the applicant lodged three complaints concerning an infringement by the administration of the Rahova Prison of his right to have a personal care assistant. He stated that he had not been assigned a person to assist him although he was suffering from a severe visual impairment.","23.The complaints were joined and examined together by the post\u2011sentencing judge on 14 June 2013. The judge noted that the prison doctor\u2019s opinion was that the applicant was not entitled to a personal assistant. It further noted that on 9 May 2013 the prison authorities had appointed a commission of specialists, which had examined the applicant. The commission had found that owing to his visual impairment the applicant encountered difficulties in eating, maintaining his hygiene and in alerting prison staff or other co-detainees in case of need. It had therefore recommended a set of steps to be taken, which included closely monitoring the applicant. Subsequently, a detainee, C.F., sharing the applicant\u2019s cell, had been assigned to support him in his daily activities. The post-sentencing judge dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaints on the grounds that the steps taken by the prison authorities had been sufficient.","24.In his application to the Court, the applicant contended that assigning him C.F. had been useless because the latter had refused to provide him with any help. The applicant produced a handwritten statement by C.F., dated 20 June 2013, in which the latter had stated that he had not helped the applicant because the prison authorities had refused to consider his activity as a personal care assistant as work that should be remunerated."],"29147":["1. The applicant, M.S.S., is an Uzbek national. He was represented before the Court by Ms I. Sokolova, a lawyer practising in Ivanovo.","2. The Russian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights.","A. The circumstances of the case","3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.","1. Background information and extradition proceedings","4. The applicant arrived in Russia in June 2012.","5. On 16 August 2012 he was charged in absentia in Uzbekistan with the unlawful organisation of an extremist religious group. On 24 August 2012 the Yakkasaray District Court in Tashkent ordered his arrest.","6. Between 2012 and 2014 the applicant stayed in Russia lawfully on the basis of his registration as a migrant and a renewable work permit. During that period he did not apply for refugee status or for temporary asylum or for a temporary residence permit.","7. In 2014 the applicant \u2019 s family (wife and three children) arrived from Uzbekistan to join him.","8. On 30 June 2014 the applicant was arrested in Russia on the basis of an international search warrant. On the same day the Ministry of the Interior of Uzbekistan informed the Russian authorities that it was intended to seek the applicant \u2019 s extradition and requested his detention pending such extradition.","9. On 2 July 2014 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Ivanovo remanded the applicant in custody pending extradition. On 7 July 2014 the applicant was released on the orders of the Oktyabrskiy District Prosecutor, since under current Russian legislation his criminal prosecution had become time \u2011 barred, thus rendering extradition impossible.","10. It remains unclear whether the Uzbekistani authorities have submitted an official request for the applicant \u2019 s extradition.","2. Refugee status proceedings","11. On 8 July 2014 the applicant applied for refugee status in Russia. On 14 October 2014 the Ivanovo Regional Department of the Federal Migration Service (the \u201cIvanovo Regional FMS\u201d) refused to grant his request, stating that the applicant \u2019 s allegation that he would run the risk of ill-treatment in Uzbekistan had not been \u201cobjectively confirmed\u201d.","12. On 15 October 2014 the applicant was informed by the Ivanovo Regional FMS that \u201ca person having exhausted all the instances of appeal ... and refusing voluntary departure from Russia within three days of the date of receipt of the [final] decision will be administratively expelled or deported\u201d.","13. On 14 November 2014 the applicant appealed to the Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation (the \u201cFMS of Russia\u201d) against the refusal to grant refugee status. On 23 December 2014 the appeal was rejected.","14. On 16 March 2015 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Ivanovo upheld the refusal to grant refugee status.","15. The applicant lodged an appeal, but asked the court to grant him deferral of payment of the court fee (150 Russian roubles (RUB), or approximately 3 euros (EUR)). The court deferred payment until 6 May 2015 and adjourned examination of the appeal. The applicant contested this decision, asking for an extension of the deferral period. His request was dismissed and the appeal was left unexamined, since the court fees remained unpaid.","16. The judgment of 16 March 2015 became final on 27 May 2015.","3. Temporary asylum proceedings","17. On 15 October 2014 the applicant applied for temporary asylum in Russia, referring to the risk of ill-treatment in Uzbekistan. On 15 January 2015 the Ivanovo Regional FMS refused his request.","18. On 5 February 2015 the applicant unsuccessfully lodged an appeal with the FMS of Russia against the refusal.","19. On 20 April 2015 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Ivanovo upheld the refusal to grant temporary asylum.","20. The applicant again lodged an appeal, but asked the court to grant him deferral of the payment of the court fee (RUB 150, or approximately EUR 3). The court deferred payment until 29 May 2015 and adjourned examination of the appeal. The applicant contested this decision, asking for an extension of the deferral period. His request was dismissed and the appeal was left unexamined, since the court fees remained unpaid.","21. The judgment of 20 April 2015 became final on 22 June 2015.","4. Request for application of interim measures","22. On 6 July 2015 the applicant requested that the Court apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court to prevent his removal to Uzbekistan. He claimed that he could be deported to Uzbekistan at any moment since the refusals to grant refugee status and temporary asylum had become final, and an appeal against a deportation decision did not have a suspensive effect.","23. On 7 July 2015 the Court granted the applicant \u2019 s request and indicated to the Government that the applicant should not be deported or expelled to Uzbekistan for the duration of the proceedings before the Court.","5. Further developments","24. In order to regularise his status in Russia, on 24 August 2015 the applicant applied to the Ivanovo Regional FMS for migration registration, a work permit and a temporary residence permit.","25. In a letter of 25 September 2015 the Ivanovo Regional FMS informed the applicant that he was not entitled to apply for a work permit and a temporary residence permit because his stay in Russia was illegal. It also confirmed that the applicant would not be removed from Russia as long as the interim measures indicated by the Court continued to apply.","26. At the same time, the Ivanovo Regional FMS informed the applicant that he could be put on the migration register for 90 days in order to legalise his stay in Russia and informed him how to go about registration.","27. The applicant has not informed the Court whether he has followed the migration registration procedure.","28. No decision on the applicant \u2019 s expulsion or deportation has been taken so far by the Russian authorities.","B. Relevant domestic law and practice","29. A summary of the relevant domestic law, as well as information concerning the human rights situation in Uzbekistan, was provided in the case of Akram Karimov v. Russia (no. 62892\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 69-111, 28 May 2014)."],"29164":["6.The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Remanzaccio.","7.The applicant married A.T., a Moldovan national, and two children were born of the marriage: a daughter in 1992 and a son in 1998.","8.The applicant alleged that after their marriage her husband had started beating her. However, in 2011 the applicant followed her husband to Italy in order to provide her children with the opportunity of a more serene future.","1.The first assault committed by A.T. against the applicant and her daughter","9.The applicant submitted that her husband, who was an alcoholic, had already been physically abusing her for a long time when, on 2 June 2012, she requested the intervention of the police after she and her daughter had been assaulted by A.T.","10.When the police arrived, A.T. had left the family home. He was found in the street in a state of intoxication, with scratches on the left side of his face. The police drew up a report of the incident. The report stated that the applicant had been beaten and bitten in the face and the left leg and that she had a number of bruises. The report also stated that the applicant\u2019s daughter had herself been hit after intervening to protect her mother and presented a neck injury caused by a fingernail and injuries to both arms. The applicant and her daughter were informed of their rights and expressed their intention to go to the hospital accident and emergency unit.","11.The applicant alleged that she had not, however, been informed of the possibility of lodging a complaint or contacting a shelter for battered women. She also submitted that she went to the accident and emergency unit in order to have her injuries recorded, but that after waiting for three hours she had decided to return home.","12.The Government, referring to the police report, submitted that there was no evidence that the applicant had gone to the accident and emergency unit.","2.The second assault committed by A.T. against the applicant","a)The applicant\u2019s version","13.The applicant submitted that after the assault on 2 June 2012 she had taken refuge in the cellar of her flat and started sleeping there.","14.She recounted the following events as follows. On 19 August 2012, after receiving a threatening telephone call from her husband, and fearing an attack by him, she decided to leave the house. When she returned home, she found that the cellar door had been broken. She tried telephoning a friend to ask if she could stay the night with her, but no one answered her call. She then decided to go back to the cellar. A.T. attacked her there with a knife and forced her to follow him in order to have sexual relations with his friends. Hoping that she would be able to seek help once outside, she resigned herself to following him. She asked a police patrol in the street for help.","15.The police merely checked her and A.T.\u2019s identity papers, and despite the applicant\u2019s assertions that she had been threatened and beaten by her husband, they invited her to go home without offering her help and told A.T. to keep away from her. A.T. was fined for unauthorised possession of a lethal weapon.","16.Shortly after she had returned home, the applicant called the emergency services and was taken to hospital. The doctors noted, among other things, that she suffered from cranial trauma, a head injury, multiple abrasions to her body and a bruise on her chest. It was deemed that her injuries would heal up within a week.","b)The Government\u2019s version","17.The Government indicated that, according to the incident report drawn up by the police, they had arrived at Leopardi Street shortly after midnight. The applicant informed them that she had been hit in the face. A.T. had given the police officers a knife. The applicant told the police that she wanted to go to hospital to have her injuries recorded. She had gone there and A.T. had returned home. The knife had been seized and the applicant fined for unauthorised possession of a lethal weapon.","3.The applicant\u2019s complaint","18.At the hospital the applicant spoke to a social worker and said that she refused to return home to her husband. She was then given shelter by an association for the protection of female victims of violence, IOTUNOIVOI (\u201cthe association\u201d).","19.The president of the women\u2019s shelter, accompanied by police officers, went to the cellar where the applicant had been living in order to fetch her clothes and personal effects.","20.From 20 August onwards A.T. began harassing the applicant by telephoning her and sending her insulting messages.","21.On 5 September 2012 the applicant lodged a complaint against her husband for bodily harm, ill-treatment and threats of violence, urging the authorities to take prompt action to protect her and her children and to prevent A.T. from approaching them. She stated that she had taken refuge in a women\u2019s shelter and that A.T. was harassing her by telephone.","22.A.T. was placed under judicial investigation on charges of ill-treating family members, inflicting grievous bodily harm and making threats. The police sent the criminal complaint to the prosecution on 9October 2012.","23.On 15 October 2012 the prosecution, having regard to the applicant\u2019s requests for protection measures, ordered urgent investigative measures, in particular requesting the police to find potential witnesses, including the applicant\u2019s daughter.","24.The applicant was given shelter by the association for three months.","25.In a letter of 27 August 2012 the head of Udine social services informed the association that there were no resources available to take charge of the applicant or to find alternative accommodation for her.","26.The Government gave a different interpretation of that letter, saying that, as the applicant had not first been referred to the Udine social services, which cared for victims of violence in the context of another project, called \u201cZero tolerance\u201d, the latter could not pay the association\u2019s expenses. In their submission, female victims of violence could contact social services requesting assistance, which the applicant had not done.","27.On 4 December 2012 the applicant left the shelter to look for work.","28.She said that she had first slept in the street before being accommodated by a friend, and had subsequently found a job as an assistant nurse for elderly people and was then able to rent a flat. According to the applicant, A.T. had continued exerting psychological pressure on her to withdraw her complaint.","29.On 18 March 2013 the prosecution, finding that no investigative measure had been carried out, again asked the police to investigate the applicant\u2019s allegations rapidly.","30.On 4 April 2013, seven months after she had lodged her complaint, the applicant was questioned for the first time by the police. She altered her statements, mitigating the seriousness of her original allegations. Regarding the episode of June 2012 she stated that A.T. had unsuccessfully attempted to hit her and her daughter. With regard to the incident that had occurred in August 2012, she said that A.T. had hit her but had not threatened her with a knife. A.T. had, however, pretended to turn the knife on himself.","The applicant also stated that at the time she had not spoken very good Italian and had not been able to express herself properly. She also stated that A.T. had not forced her to have sex with other people and that she had returned to live at the family home. She said that when she had been living at the shelter provided by the association, she had not spoken to her husband on the telephone because she had been told not to. She stated that, barring her husband\u2019s alcoholism, the situation at home was calm. She concluded by saying that her husband was a good father and a good husband and that there had been no further episodes of violence.","31.The applicant submitted that she had altered her original statements because of the psychological pressure exerted on her by her husband.","32.On 30 May 2013 the Udine public prosecutor\u2019s office, after noting, firstly, that the applicant, who had been interviewed in April, had mitigated her allegations against her husband saying that he had not threatened her with a knife and that she had been misunderstood by an employee from the shelter where she had taken refuge and, secondly, that no other violent episode had occurred, asked the investigating judge to close the complaint lodged against A.T. for ill-treatment of family members. Regarding the offence of grievous bodily harm, the prosecuting authorities indicated that they intended to continue the investigations.","33.In a decision of 1 August 2013 the investigating judge discontinued the part of the complaint concerning the allegations of ill-treatment of family members and threats. He considered that the course of the events was unclear and that, with regard to the alleged ill-treatment, the offence had not been made out because, since the applicant had complained only about the incident of August 2012, the criterion of repeated episodes of violence was not satisfied.","34.With regard to the complaint of threats aggravated by the use of a weapon, the investigating judge noted that the applicant\u2019s statements were contradictory and that in the report drawn up by the hospital there was no reference to knife injuries.","35.With regard to the offence of causing bodily harm, the proceedings were continued before the magistrate. A.T. was committed for trial on 28October 2013. The first hearing was held on 13 February 2014 and A.T. was ordered to pay a fine of 2,000euros (EUR) on 1 October 2015.","4.The third assault by A.T., against the applicant and her son and the murder by A.T. of his son","36.It can be seen from the case file that on 18 November 2013 A.T. received notice of his committal for trial before the magistrate\u2019s court on 19May 2014 for inflicting bodily harm on the applicant in August 2012.","37.In the night of 25 November 2013 the applicant sought the intervention of the police in connection with a dispute with her husband.","38.The police made the following findings in their report: on their arrival they saw that the bedroom door had been broken down and that the floor was strewn with bottles of alcohol. The applicant had stated that her husband was under the influence of alcohol and that she had decided to call for help because she thought he needed a doctor. She told them that she had lodged a complaint against her husband in the past, but that she had subsequently changed her allegations. The applicant\u2019s son had stated that his father had not been violent towards him. Neither the applicant nor her son had shown any traces of violence.","39.A.T. was taken to hospital in a state of intoxication. In the night he left the hospital and went to an amusement arcade.","40.While he was walking along the street he was arrested by the police for an identity check at 2.25 a.m.","41.The police report shows that A.T. was in a state of intoxication and had difficulty keeping his balance and that the police had let him go after stopping and fining him.","42.At 5 a.m. A.T. entered the family flat armed with a 12 cm kitchen knife with the intention of assaulting the applicant. The applicant\u2019s son attempted to stop him and was stabbed three times. He died of his wounds. The applicant tried to escape but A.T. succeeded in catching up with her in the street, where he stabbed her several times in the chest.","5.Criminal proceedings instituted against A.T. for grievous bodily harm","43.On 1 October 2015 A.T. was convicted by the magistrate\u2019s court of inflicting grievous bodily harm on the applicant, on account of the injuries he had inflicted on her during the incident in August 2012, and sentenced to a fine of EUR 2,000.","6.Criminal proceedings instituted against A.T. for the murder of his son, the attempted murder of the applicant and ill-treatment of the applicant","44.On an unspecified date in November 2013 the investigation into acts of ill-treatment was reopened.","45.A.T. asked to be tried in accordance with the summary procedure (giudizio abbreviato).","46.On 8 January 2015 A.T. was sentenced to life imprisonment by the Udine preliminary hearings judge for the murder of his son and the attempted murder of his wife and for the offences of ill-treatment of his wife and daughter and unauthorised possession of a prohibited weapon. He was also ordered to pay the applicant, who had applied to join the proceedings as a civil party, EUR 400,000 in damages.","47.With regard to the ill-treatment, the preliminary hearings judge, after hearing witnesses and the applicant\u2019s daughter, considered that the applicant and her children had been living in a climate of violence. He found that A.T. had been habitually violent and held that, apart from the daily harassment suffered by the applicant, there had been four violent episodes. He added that A.T., at his trial, had confessed to experiencing feelings of hatred towards his wife. According to the preliminary hearings judge, the events of 25November2013 were the consequence of an attempt by the applicant to get away from A.T.","48.On 22 May 2015 A.T. appealed against the judgment.","It can be seen from the file that in a judgment of 26 February 2016 the judgment was upheld by the Court of Appeal. However, neither of the parties annexed the judgment to their observations."],"29165":["5.The applicant was born in 2001 and lives in St Petersburg.","A.The applicant\u2019s ill-treatment at a public nursery school and his parents\u2019 complaints to various local authorities","6.In August 2004 the applicant started attending public pre-school educational institution no. 42 (\u201cthe nursery school\u201d). His teachers were MsK., Ms P. and an assistant teacher, MsCh.","7.In the spring of 2005 the applicant\u2019s parents noticed a change in his behaviour. In particular, he became nervous and unwilling to go to nursery school. During the summer holidays of that year the applicant\u2019s physiological state significantly ameliorated and his mood returned to normal. However, as soon as he resumed nursery school in September 2005 he again became nervous and frightened of the dark and noises. He resisted going to school and refused to discuss school with his parents or sisters.","8.On 7 November 2005, when picking him up from the nursery school, the applicant\u2019s mother noticed that his eyes were twitching and that he had a bruise on his left temple. The applicant complained that his neck and eyes were aching. The teacher, Ms P., told the applicant\u2019s mother that the children had been given eye drops containing an antibiotic. According to her, one of the children in the class had an eye infection and it was necessary to take preventive measures against its spreading among the children.","9.On 8 November 2005 the applicant was examined by an ophthalmologist, who noted a bruise on his temple. She found no symptoms of any eye infection or disease. She recommended a consultation with a neurologist in order to verify whether the eye tics could have neurological causes.","10.On the same day the applicant started to display mouth tics.","11.On 14 November 2005 the applicant\u2019s mother lodged a complaint with the local department of the Federal Authority for Consumer Protection and the Supervision of Public Well-being. She complained that the teachers at nursery school no. 42 had administered eye treatment to her son without her consent and had used physical force against him. Her son had developed nervous tics as a result.","12.On 15 November 2005 the applicant was examined by a neurologist and was diagnosed with hyperkinesia (a state of excessive restlessness which is manifested in a wide variety of disorders that affect the ability to control motor movement and which is mainly psychological in nature).","13.On 16 November 2005 the applicant\u2019s mother complained to the local department of education about the incident of 7 November 2005 and asked that the applicant be transferred to another nursery school.","14.By a letter of 23 November 2005 the local department of the Federal Authority for Consumer Protection and the Supervision of Public Well\u2011being informed the applicant\u2019s mother that the director of nursery school no.42 had been disciplined for breaching sanitary standards.","15.By a letter of 29 November 2005 the local department of education replied to the applicant\u2019s mother, stating that the facts described in her complaint had been confirmed in part and that the director of the nursery school, teachers MsK. and Ms P. and medical nurse Ms Pt. had been disciplined. It had been decided to transfer the applicant to another public nursery school.","16.When the applicant learnt that he would not have to return to nursery school no. 42, he was happy and told his parents that he had been mistreated by MsK. and Ms P. In particular, he had been punished for a failure to sleep during the afternoon sleeping hours. Sometimes he had been made to lie on a folding bed in the toilets. The lights in the toilets had been switched off and the teachers had told him that he would be eaten by rats. The applicant had felt very frightened as he had once seen a rat in the toilets. On other occasions he had been forced to stand in the entrance hall, barefoot and wearing only his underpants, for the entire duration of the sleeping hours. He had been very cold. The applicant had also on occasions been hit on the back with a fist. On one occasion the teachers had taped his mouth shut with sellotape. After he had started to suffocate, he had tried to remove the sellotape. The teachers had then taped his hands behind his back. Some other children had also been subjected to similar punishments. They had been threatened that if they complained to their parents about the teachers they would be punished.","17.The applicant also told his parents in detail about what had happened on 7 November 2005. He had been given eye drops twice. In the morning Ms K. had bent his head back with such force that his neck had ached. In the afternoon, she had sat on the applicant\u2019s legs and tried to force his eyes open with her hands. Frightened, the applicant had resisted. Ms K. had then slapped his face.","18.On 23 November 2005 the applicant\u2019s father was questioned by the police in connection with a complaint lodged by Ms K. and Ms Pt. that he had assaulted them. The applicant\u2019s father stated to the police that his conflict with Ms K. and Ms Pt. had arisen because his four-year-old son had been mistreated by the staff of the nursery school. He denied assaulting them. The criminal proceedings against the applicant\u2019s father were discontinued after one of the nursery school staff members stated in writing that MsPt. had attempted to convince her and other staff members to falsely accuse the applicant\u2019s father of assaulting Ms K. and Ms Pt.","19.On 21 December 2005 the local department of education informed the applicant\u2019s mother that the director of nursery school no. 42 had been dismissed.","20.By a letter of 13 March 2006 the local department of education informed the applicant\u2019s father that an internal inquiry had established that teachers Ms K. and Ms P. had made some of the children sleep outside the sleeping quarters. That fact, although denied by Ms K. and Ms P., had been confirmed by assistant teacher Ms Ch. and by the grandmother of one of the children. Ms K. and Ms P. had been disciplined.","21.By a letter of 17 July 2006 the Vice-Governor of St Petersburg informed the applicant\u2019s mother that medical nurse Ms Pt. had been disciplined.","B.Civil proceedings","22.On 21 February 2006 the applicant\u2019s mother sued nursery school no.42 for compensation for the damage sustained by the applicant to his health.","23.On 30 June 2006 the Kirovskiy District Court of St Petersburg approved a friendly settlement agreement between the applicant\u2019s mother and nursery school no. 42. Under that agreement, the nursery school was to pay the applicant\u2019s mother 5,000 Russian roubles (RUB) (approximately 150euros (EUR)) in compensation for medical expenses.","C.Criminal investigation into the allegations of ill-treatment","1.Pre-investigation inquiry","24.On 29 September 2006 the applicant\u2019s mother complained to the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office about her son\u2019s ill-treatment by the staff of nursery school no. 42. She described the incident of 7 November 2005, complained that during the sleeping hours her son had been occasionally locked in the toilets with the lights off, and submitted that as a result of such treatment he had developed nervous tics. She also submitted that she had not received an adequate response to her complaints to the local department of education and the local department of the Federal Authority for Consumer Protection and the Supervision of Public Well-being.","25.By letter of 27 October 2006 the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office informed the applicant\u2019s mother that an inquiry had been opened into her allegations of ill-treatment. It also noted that the local department of education had failed in its obligation under section 9 of the Minors Act to inform the district prosecutor\u2019s office of the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment (see paragraph134 below).","26.On 2 November 2006 the investigator questioned several of the parents of the children who had attended nursery school no. 42 with the applicant. Some of them stated that their children had never complained about being mistreated by teachers Ms P. or Ms K. Others stated that their children had told them about being locked in the entrance hall or in the toilets, where they had on occasion seen rats. They also confirmed that on 7November 2005 eye drops had been given to the children without the parents\u2019 consent.","27.Assistant teacher Ms Ch. stated to the investigator that on 7November 2005 two children had shown symptoms of eye infection. Teacher Ms K. had consulted medical nurse Ms Pt., who had decided to give eye drops to all children in order to prevent the spread of the infection. The parents\u2019 consent had not been obtained. The drops had been given by the teacher herself rather than by the medical nurse. Ms K. had used physical force against those children who had resisted. Many of them had been frightened and had cried. Immediately after that the applicant\u2019s eyes had started twitching. Ms Ch. also stated that both Ms K. and Ms P. had many times made certain children, including the applicant, sleep on folding beds in the toilets or in the entrance hall. Ms K. and Ms P. had often shouted at the children and had punished them by sending them to the toilets. She had once seen a child tied with string to his chair.","28.The investigator also questioned Ms K., who denied mistreating the applicant or other children. She stated that on 7November 2005 the children had been given eye drops by the medical nurse. The children had submitted to the treatment without any resistance or stress. No physical force had been used against the applicant or other children. The applicant had already had nervous tics before 7November 2005.","29.On an unspecified date at the beginning of November 2006 the applicant was questioned by the investigator. The applicant\u2019s mother and a psychologist were present during the questioning. The applicant described the incident of 7 November 2005. He also stated that he and some other children had often been made to sleep on a folding bed in the entrance hall or in the toilets with the lights turned off or left standing in the entrance hall with few clothes on. They had been frightened and cold.","30.On 8 November 2006 the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office refused to open a criminal investigation against the teachers of nursery school no. 42, finding no evidence of a criminal offence. The applicant\u2019s parents were not given a copy of that decision.","31.On 12 January 2007 the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office cancelled its decision of 8 November 2006 and resumed the pre\u2011investigation inquiry.","32.The investigator then questioned Ms P. and medical nurse MsPt., who gave the same testimony as Ms K.","33.During the following year the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office issued two more decisions (on 22 January and 6 July 2007 respectively) refusing to open a criminal investigation against the teachers of nursery school no. 42 on the ground that there was no evidence of a criminal offence having been committed.","34.The applicant\u2019s mother challenged those decisions before the Kirovskiy District Court. However, before the District Court could examine her complaints against the decisions, the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office annulled them (on 20 June and 24 December 2007 respectively) and resumed the pre-investigation inquiry. No investigative measures were performed during this one-year period.","35.On 27 September 2007 the applicant\u2019s medical documents were examined by a child psychiatrist at the request of the applicant\u2019s mother. The psychiatrist found that before November 2005 the applicant had not suffered from any neurological or psychiatric disorders. He had, however, on occasions suffered allergic reactions. The psychiatrist further noted that in 2005 the applicant had been subjected to a prolonged, psychologically traumatic experience at the nursery school. Against the background of that prolonged, traumatic experience, the incident of 7 November 2005 involving the use of violence had served as a trigger for his present neurological disorder. An allergic reaction to the eye drops could have also contributed to the development of the disorder. The psychiatrist concluded that there had been a causal link between the traumatic experience suffered by the applicant in the nursery school from September 2005 to November 2005 and his persistent neurological disorder.","36.On 24 December 2007 the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office noted that the pre-investigation inquiry was incomplete and that it was necessary to question the children who had attended the nursery school with the applicant and their parents, to obtain an expert opinion on the contra\u2011indications and side-effects of the eye drops given to the children, and to question other teachers at the nursery school.","37.On 17 January 2008 the case was transferred to the Kirovskiy district police department for further pre-investigation inquiry.","38.In February 2008 the investigator questioned the parents of some of the children who had attended the nursery school with the applicant. They stated that they did not have any complaints against teachers Ms P. and MsK. None of them gave the investigator permission to question their children.","39.The investigator also questioned one of the teachers at nursery school no.42. The teacher stated that she could not give any useful information.","40.On 29 February 2008 the Kirovskiy district police department refused to open a criminal investigation against Ms P. and Ms K., having found no evidence of a criminal offence. The applicant\u2019s parents were informed about that decision on 4 May 2008 and received a copy of it on an unspecified later date.","41.On 23 May 2008, after being criticised by the St Petersburg prosecutor\u2019s office for delays in the conduct of the pre-investigation inquiry and for its ineffectiveness, the Kirovskiy district police department cancelled the decision of 29February 2008 and resumed the pre\u2011investigation inquiry.","42.On 11 June 2008, in reply to a complaint by the applicant\u2019s mother, the St Petersburg prosecutor\u2019s office again criticised the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office for delays in the conduct of the pre-investigation inquiry and for its ineffectiveness.","43.On 26 June 2008 the Kirovskiy district police department informed the staff of nursery school no. 42 that criminal proceedings into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment would not be opened because the prosecution had become time-barred.","44.On 30 June 2008 the Kirovskiy district police department refused to open a criminal investigation into the allegations of ill-treatment, finding no evidence of a criminal offence. On 4 July 2008 the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office quashed that decision and ordered a further inquiry.","45.On 11 July 2008 the Kirovskiy district police department refused to open a criminal investigation against Ms K. It found that, although there was evidence that Ms K.\u2019s actions amounted to cruel treatment of minors, an offence under Article 156 of the Criminal Code, the criminal proceedings had become time-barred.","46.On 29 July 2008 the St Petersburg prosecutor\u2019s office quashed the decision of 11 July 2008, finding that the inquiry had been incomplete. It noted that it was necessary to question the children who had attended the nursery school with the applicant and with their parents; to establish the seriousness of the damage sustained by the applicant to his health; to obtain and analyse the documents regulating the actions of the staff of public nursery schools; and to investigate Ms P.\u2019s actions.","47.On 9 August 2008 the investigator questioned the father of a child who had attended the nursery school with the applicant. He stated that his son had never complained of being ill-treated by the nursery school teachers.","48.On 11 August and then again on 11 September 2008 the Kirovskiy district police department refused to open a criminal investigation against MsK. on the ground that there was no evidence of a criminal offence having been committed. Those decisions were cancelled on unspecified dates.","49.In reply to new complaints lodged by the applicant\u2019s mother, on 21November 2008 the St Petersburg prosecutor\u2019s office again criticised the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office for the delays in the conduct of the pre-investigation inquiry and for its ineffectiveness.","50.On 1 December 2008 the investigator questioned the mother of another child who had attended the nursery school with the applicant. She stated that her daughter had never been mistreated by the staff of the nursery school.","2.Investigation","51.On 19 January 2009 the Kirovskiy district police department opened a criminal investigation against Ms K. and Ms P.","52.On 4 March 2009 the applicant was granted the procedural status of victim. The applicant\u2019s mother was recognised as his representative.","(a)Evidence collected during the investigation","53.In the course of the criminal investigation, which lasted at least until December 2014, the police department collected the following evidence.","(i)Statements by the applicant","54.On 4 March 2009 the applicant was questioned by the investigator in the presence of his counsel, his mother and a teacher. The applicant stated that MsK. and Ms P. had often punished him and some other children. In particular, on many occasions they had made him sleep in the toilets and had threatened that he would be eaten by rats. Ms K. had once taped his mouth and hands with sellotape. She had also slapped him on the face when he had refused to open his eyes to receive eye drops. On another occasion Ms K. had splashed paint over his friend\u2019s face because she had not liked his drawings. The applicant also stated that MsK. and Ms P. had forbidden him from telling his parents about those punishments.","55.On 24 March 2009 the applicant was taken by the investigator to nursery school no.42, where he repeated his previous statements. In particular, he showed the investigator the spot in the toilets where his folding bed had been placed and the place in the entrance hall where he and other children had been forced to stand wearing only their underwear and T\u2011shirts and keeping their arms up and apart during the entire duration of the sleeping hours. He further showed the investigator where and how he had been bound with sellotape and where and how he had been given eye drops. He also showed the investigator a closet in which he had been locked in the dark. Lastly, he told the investigator that if he did not sleep during the sleeping hours Ms K. and Ms P. would hold his head against the bed until it started to ache. The applicant\u2019s lawyer, the applicant\u2019s mother, a psychologist and a teacher were present during the questioning.","56.On 9 June 2009 the applicant was questioned again. He repeated his previous statements. He also added that Ms K. had hit him on the back.","(ii)Statements by the suspects","57.Ms P. was questioned by the investigator on 6 February and 21May 2009, 23August 2011 and 13 March 2014. She initially cited her right to remain silent and refused to testify. She then denied ill-treating the applicant or other children. She stated that the applicant had had nervous tics since September 2005. During the last round of questioning she asked that the criminal proceedings be discontinued as time-barred.","58.Ms K. was questioned on 5 February and 22 June 2009 and 13March 2014. She also initially refused to testify. Shethen denied ill\u2011treating the applicant or other children. She stated that the applicant had had nervous tics since the summer of 2005 and that assistant teacher Ms Ch. had given false testimony against her in revenge for critical remarks she had made in respect of MsCh.\u2019s unsatisfactory work. During the last round of questioning she again refused to testify and asked that the criminal proceedings be discontinued as time-barred.","(iii)Witness statements","59.On 10 April 2009 medical nurse Ms Pt. was questioned. She stated that she had been the one who had administered eye drops to the children on 7November 2005 because one of them had had an eye infection. When she had learned from the applicant\u2019s mother that the applicant had eye tics, she had talked to Ms K. and Ms P., who had affirmed that the applicant had had nervous tics before 7 November 2005. She had never seen Ms K. and MsP. mistreating the children. However, when questioned on 24October 2011 and 24 July 2012 Ms Pt. stated that she had lied during the previous rounds of questioning about having given the eye drops to the children on 7November 2005. In fact the eye drops had been given by Ms K. without her (that is to say MsPt.\u2019s) permission. She had lied about that fact because she had had felt sorry for Ms K. and had not wanted her to be punished.","60.On 19 June 2009 and 21 October 2010 assistant teacher Ms Ch. was questioned. She stated that on 7 November 2005 Ms K. had given eye drops to the children on the advice of the medical nurse. Ms K. had used physical force against those children who had resisted. Many of them had been frightened and had cried. Immediately after that the applicant\u2019s eyes had started twitching. Ms Ch. also stated that on many occasions she had seen Ms K. and Ms P. make the applicant and some other children sleep on folding beds in the toilets or in the entrance hall. Ms K. and Ms P. had often shouted at the children and had punished them by locking them up in the toilets. She had once seen a child tied with string to his chair. She added that she had never talked to the applicant\u2019s parents except at the nursery school.","61.On 30 June 2009, 24 and 30 August 2011, and 12 and 13 March 2014 the investigator held confrontations between MsCh. and MsP., between Ms Ch. and Ms K., and between MsPt. and MsCh. They all reiterated their previous statements.","62.In April and May 2009, October and November 2011 and July 2012 the investigator questioned six teachers from nursery school no. 42. They stated that they had never seen Ms K. or Ms P. mistreating the children. Some of them also stated that the applicant had already had nervous tics before the incident of 7November 2005. One of them stated that assistant teacher MsCh. had sometimes taken the applicant home in the evenings because she lived in the same block of flats as the applicant. MsCh. had often shouted at the children in the nursery school and the children had been afraid of her.","63.On 21 September 2009 the investigator questioned the former director of nursery school no. 42. She stated that Ms K. and Ms P. had been competent and affectionate teachers who had been appreciated by the children and their parents. She had never received any complaints about them.","64.On 12 December 2011 and 16 July 2012 the investigator questioned the then director of nursery school no. 42, who had taken up that position in December 2005. She gave positive references for Ms P. and Ms K. She stated that she had never seen them mistreating the children or received any complaints from the parents in respect of her.","65.In April, May and September 2009, September and November 2011, and July 2012 the investigator questioned the parents of several children who had attended the nursery school with the applicant. Most of them stated that their children had never complained of having been mistreated by MsK. or MsP. One of them stated that her son had on occasions been punished by the teachers; in particular he had been made to sleep outside the sleeping quarters, in the changing room. Her son had also told her that he had seen a rat in the toilets. She had, moreover, seen some children carrying heavy folding beds from one place to another upon the instruction of the teachers. Lastly, she stated that her son had told her on 7 November 2005 that Ms K. had used force against the applicant (who had resisted and cried) when administering eye drops to him. Another parent stated that Ms K. had locked her son up in the toilets on two occasions and had once made him sleep outside the sleeping quarters, near the toilets. Another parent stated that her daughter had told her about the applicant and another boy being made to sleep separately from the others. She however did not know the details.","66.Between 16 November and 2 December 2011 the investigator questioned four of the children who had attended the nursery school with the applicant. They all stated that Ms K. and Ms P. had been kind to them and had never mistreated them or other children.","67.The applicant\u2019s mother was questioned on 10 March and 9 April 2009 and on 14 October 2010. She described the applicant\u2019s change in behaviour and mood after he had started to attend nursery school. She described the incident of 7 November 2005 and her son\u2019s subsequent development of nervous tics. She also related a conversation she had had with her son during which he had for the first time told her about being mistreated by Ms K. and Ms P. She also stated that her son continued to suffer from nervous tics and to undergo treatment for them. Lastly, she told the investigator that although Ms Ch.\u2019s sister was her neighbour she did not have any friendly relationship with her.","68.On 24 November 2011 and 28 February 2014 the applicant\u2019s father was questioned. He made similar submissions as the applicant\u2019s mother.","69.On 7 December 2011 and 28 February 2014 the investigator held confrontations between the applicant\u2019s mother and one of those teachers at the nursery school who had already been questioned in November 2011. They both reiterated their previous submissions.","70.On 13 December 2011 and 12 March 2014 the investigator held confrontations between Ms Ch. and one of the teachers of the nursery school. MsCh. confirmed her previous submissions, while the teacher stated that Ms P. and MsK. had never mistreated the children, that Ms Ch. had shouted at the children, that Ms. Ch. had sometimes babysat the applicant and that the applicant had had nervous tics before November 2005.","71.On 17 March 2014 the investigator questioned the applicant\u2019s neighbour who lived on the same landing, who stated that the applicant\u2019s tics had started in November 2005. She also stated that the applicant\u2019s parents were on good terms with Ms Ch.\u2019s sister but that she had not noticed any kind of relationship between the applicant\u2019s parents and MsCh. herself.","72.On 12 March 2014 the applicant\u2019s mother produced material from the civil case file and asked that it be included in the criminal case file. In particular, she asked for the inclusion of the written statement by one of the staff members of nursery school no. 42 (see paragraph 18 above) that medical nurse Ms Pt. had attempted to convince her and other staff members to give false testimony against the applicant\u2019s family. On 17March 2014 the investigator refused the requests, finding that the documents from the civil case file were irrelevant to the criminal case.","(iv)Expert opinions","73.On 10 April 2009 a panel of psychiatrists and psychologists examined the applicant and issued an expert opinion. They found that the applicant continued to suffer from nervous tics. Given that such tics could have had both organic and neurological causes, it was impossible to establish a causal link between the events of November 2005 and the applicant\u2019s current neurological disorder. Given the applicant\u2019s age at the material time and the time that had passed since the events in question, the applicant could not accurately recall those events. He was therefore psychologically incapable of testifying within the framework of the criminal proceedings.","74.On 9 October 2009 a panel of medical experts examined the applicant\u2019s medical records and issued an expert opinion. They noted that his nervous tics could have had both organic and neurological causes. It was therefore impossible to establish a causal link between the events of September-November 2005 and the applicant\u2019s current neurologic disorder.","75.On 14 January 2011 a panel of experts in psychiatry and psychology examined the applicant and analysed his medical records. When interviewed by the experts, the applicant stated that he wanted to forget about what had happened to him in the nursery school but he was constantly being reminded of those events because of the investigation. He affirmed that his tics were aggravated each time that he remembered, or had to discuss, the treatment to which he had been subjected in the nursery school. The experts confirmed that the aggravation of the tics was indeed related to the applicant\u2019s memories of the nursery school. The experts found that before November 2005 the applicant had not suffered from any psychiatric disorder. There had been a causal link between his nervous disorder and the prolonged, psychologically traumatic experience to which he had been subjected in the nursery school from September to November 2005. Many years later he still continued to suffer from nervous tics. He had therefore suffered damage of medium severity to his health. The experts further noted that the applicant did not suffer from any memory or intellectual disorder and that his intellectual development corresponded to his age; he was therefore capable of understanding and relating the relevant events accurately. However, his ability to remember the events had decreased with time. If in 2006 he had been still capable of remembering the events in question accurately, with the passage of time his memory of the events had become unrealistic and distorted. His statements \u2013 both in 2009 and at that current moment \u2013 could not therefore be relied upon in the criminal proceedings. Moreover, given that each discussion of the relevant events revived his memories of the traumatic experience and prevented him from moving on, his further participation in investigative measures was inadvisable.","76.On 6 April and 2 November 2011 the investigator questioned a psychiatric expert chosen by the applicant\u2019s mother. The expert stated that she disagreed in part with the expert opinion of 14January 2011. In her opinion, the applicant had suffered severe damage (rather than damage of medium severity) to his health.","77.On 25 and 26 October and 23 December 2011 and 28 February 2014 the investigator questioned some of the experts who had participated in the expert examinations mentioned above. They confirmed the findings contained in the respective expert opinions.","(v)Other medical evidence","78.On 11 March 2009 the psychologist treating the applicant stated to the investigator that the applicant had been suffering from a neurological disorder since November 2005. His health had improved as a result of the treatment.","79.On 17 July 2009 the applicant\u2019s mother submitted to the investigator a copy of a medical certificate showing that the applicant did not have any anomalies in the brain. She argued that the certificate proved that the applicant\u2019s neurological disorder was psychological rather than organic in nature.","80.On 11 November 2009 the investigator questioned a child psychiatrist who, after examining the applicant\u2019s medical records, stated that there was a causal link between the traumatic experience suffered by the applicant in the nursery school from September until November 2005 and his persistent neurological disorder.","81.On 22 April 2010 a psychiatrist and a psychologist analysed the applicant\u2019s medical records at the applicant\u2019s mother\u2019s request. They found that in the absence of any anomalies in the applicant\u2019s brain, his neurological disorder could not be organic in nature. It was highly probable that they had been caused by psychological trauma. Given that the nervous tics had appeared for the first time in November 2005, there was a causal link between the ill-treatment in the nursery school to which the applicant had been subjected from September until November 2005 and his nervous tics. Finally, the experts noted that the applicant was of normal intellectual development and did not suffer from any memory or intellectual disorders. His statements to the investigator had been detailed and consistent. There were therefore no reasons to consider that the applicant could not remember the relevant events accurately and was psychologically incapable of testifying within the framework of the criminal proceedings.","(b)The course of the investigation","82.The investigation was suspended from 2 until 16September, from 23until 30 September, from 9 until 12 October, from 15October until 5November and from 6 until 11 November 2009; from 15September until 11 October, and from 22 October until 28 November 2010; from 15December 2010 until 11 January 2011, from 15 January until 28 March, from 28 until 29 July, from 16June until 4August, and from 5 until 6September 2011; and from 30 December 2011 until 9July 2012. The decisions to suspend the investigation were taken by the investigator on the basis of medical certificates showing that Ms K. was on maternity leave and could not therefore participate in investigative measures. All those decisions were annulled by the investigators\u2019 superior as unlawful.","83.On 17 July 2009 the Kirovskiy district police department discontinued the criminal proceedings against Ms K. and Ms. P., finding that their actions in the period from September to November 2005 amounted to battery or other violent acts causing physical pain and cruel treatment of minors, offences under Article 116 \u00a7 1 and 156 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code. The prosecution of those offences was time-barred. There was insufficient evidence of premeditated infliction of damage of medium severity to health, an offence under Article 112 of the Criminal Code. Moreover, according to the experts, the applicant could not remember the relevant events accurately and was psychologically incapable of testifying within the framework of the criminal proceedings.","84.On 27 July 2009 the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office quashed the decision of 17 July 2009, finding that the investigation was incomplete, and ordered further investigative measures.","85.On 29 August 2009 the applicant\u2019s mother complained to the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office that, despite her having lodged numerous requests, she had still not been given copies of the decisions of 17and 27 July 2009.","86.On 11 November 2009 the Kirovskiy district police department discontinued the criminal proceedings against Ms K. and Ms. P. for the same reasons as those set out in the decision of 17 July 2009.","87.On 25 June 2010 the Kirovskiy District Court found that the decision of 11 November 2009 had been unlawful because the findings contained in that decision had been contradictory. It held, in particular, that in order to resolve those contradictions it was necessary to perform a new psychiatric examination of the applicant.","88.On 19 July 2010 the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office quashed the decision of 11 November 2009 and ordered further investigative measures.","89.By a letter of 26 August 2010 the St Petersburg prosecutor\u2019s office criticised the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office for the delays and the ineffectiveness of the investigation. On the same day the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office gave instructions to the Kirovskiy district police department as regards further investigative measures to be performed.","90.On 5 December 2011 Ms K. asked the investigator to discontinue the proceedings. She was suspected of inflicting damage to health of medium severity, an offence under Article 112 of the Criminal Code. The statutory limitation period for that offence was six years. The proceedings had therefore become time-barred. On the same day the prosecutor refused MsK.\u2019s request, finding that the previous expert examinations had yielded contradictory results. It was therefore necessary for a new expert examination to be performed in order to establish the severity of the damage sustained to the health of the applicant. The investigation could not therefore be discontinued.","91.On 15 December 2011 Ms P. also asked the investigator to discontinue investigations as time-barred. On the same day the prosecutor refused the request for the same reasons as those for which Ms K.\u2019s similar request had been refused.","92.On 8 February 2012 the Kirovskiy District Court examined MsK.\u2019s complaint against the decision of 5 December 2011 and dismissed it. It found that it was necessary for an additional expert examination to be performed in order to establish the severity of the damage sustained by the applicant to his health. If experts were to find that the applicant had sustained severe damage to his health, the limitation period would be ten years and the proceedings would not have become time-barred.","93.On 13 July 2012 Ms K. again asked the investigator to discontinue the investigation because the proceedings had become time-barred. On the same day the investigator refused the request for the same reasons as those above.","94.On 7 August 2012 the investigator found that after 16 June 2011 the investigation had been extended in breach of the procedure and time-limits provided by law. The investigative measures carried out between 16 June 2011 and 9 July 2012 had therefore been unlawful and all evidence collected during that period was inadmissible.","95.On 10 August 2012 the Kirovskiy district police department discontinued the criminal proceedings against Ms K. and Ms P., finding that there was insufficient evidence of a criminal offence under Article 112 of the Criminal Code. It noted that only four witnesses had confirmed that ill\u2011treatment had occurred: the applicant, the applicant\u2019s mother, Ms Ch. and Ms Pt. (in her statements of 24 July 2012). The experts had found that, because of his young age at the material time, the applicant\u2019s description of the events was unreliable and his further participation in investigative measures was inadvisable. There were therefore doubts about the credibility of his statements. The applicant\u2019s mother\u2019s statements were equally unreliable because she had learned about the events from the applicant. MsPt.\u2019s statements of 24 July 2012 contradicted her previous statements and statements by other witnesses. They could not therefore be considered reliable either. The expert opinions establishing a causal link between the alleged ill-treatment and the applicant\u2019s neurological disorder could not serve as evidence of ill-treatment because it was not within the experts\u2019 remit to establish whether or not ill-treatment had occurred. The expert opinions had been made on the assumption that such ill-treatment had indeed taken place. Ms Ch.\u2019s statements therefore constituted the only evidence of such ill-treatment. The investigator considered that those statements were insufficient to prove that ill-treatment had indeed taken place. The investigator further noted that all evidence collected between 16June 2011 and 9 July 2012 had been declared inadmissible. Given that that evidence did not contain any proof of ill-treatment, it was not necessary to collect it again.","96.The applicant\u2019s parents learned about that decision on 24 August 2012 and received a copy of it on 27 August 2012.","97.On 9 October 2012 the applicant\u2019s mother challenged the Kirovskiy district police department\u2019s decision of 10August 2012 to discontinue the criminal proceedings before the Kirovskiy District Court against Ms K. and Ms P. On 23 October 2012 the applicant\u2019s mother also challenged that decision before the StPetersburg prosecutor\u2019s office.","98.On 23 November 2012 the St Petersburg prosecutor\u2019s office found that the decision of 10August 2012 had been lawful.","99.On 2 August 2013 the Kirovskiy District Court rejected the complaint lodged by the applicant\u2019s mother on 9 October 2012. It found that the investigation had been thorough and effective. The breaches of procedure committed during the investigation \u2013 such as the failure to promptly notify the applicant\u2019s mother about certain procedural decisions taken by the investigator or the investigator\u2019s failure to comply with the prosecutor\u2019s instructions \u2013 were insufficiently serious as to warrant the quashing of the decision of 10August 2012.","100.On 24 December 2013 the St Petersburg City Court quashed the decision of 2 August 2013 on appeal and found that the decision of 10August 2012 to discontinue the investigation had been unlawful. It found that the investigation had been ineffective. In particular, given that all evidence collected between 16 June 2011 and 9 July 2012 had been declared inadmissible, it was necessary to undertake anew the investigative measures carried out during that period and to carry out further investigative measures. The court also noted that although, according to the experts, the statements that the applicant had given after 2006 were unreliable, the statements that he had given before then could be taken into account in the assessment of evidence. The City Court also criticised the District Court for the delays in the examination of the complaint lodged by the applicant\u2019s mother on 9October 2012 and the resulting excessive length of the judicial proceedings.","101.On 5 March 2014 the applicant\u2019s mother applied to the investigator, asking that MsP. and Ms K. be charged with the premeditated infliction of severe damage to health. The investigator refused her request, finding that there was no evidence of the premeditated infliction of severe damage to health.","102.On 18 March 2014 the Kirovskiy district police department discontinued the criminal proceedings against Ms P. and Ms K., finding that their actions did not amount to a criminal offence under Article 112 of the Criminal Code.","103.On 20 March 2014 the applicant\u2019s mother challenged that decision before the St Petersburg prosecutor\u2019s office, submitting that the investigation had been incomplete. On 18 April 2014 the St Petersburg prosecutor\u2019s office found that the decision of 18 March 2014 to discontinue the criminal proceedings had been lawful.","104.On 23 May 2014 the Kirovskiy District Court held that the decision of 18 March 2014 had been unlawful, finding that the investigator\u2019s assessment of evidence had been selective and that he had disregarded some facts and evidence (such as a bruise on the applicant\u2019s face), some witness statements, and expert opinions. It also found that the investigation had been excessively long.","105.On 9 June 2014 the Kirovskiy district police department annulled the decision of 18 March 2014 and resumed the investigation. After two written requests for a copy of that decision, the applicant eventually received it on 30 June 2014.","106.On 19 July 2014 the Kirovskiy district police department discontinued the criminal proceedings against Ms P. and Ms K. The investigator found that although they had indeed given eye drops to the applicant, thereby causing damage of medium severity to his health, there was no evidence of intent to cause such damage. The infliction of damage to health had not therefore been intentional or premeditated. The police department further added that although the applicant had indeed had a bruise on his face, it was not possible to establish how he had received that bruise. The applicant\u2019s testimony was unreliable due to his young age and mental development at the time of his giving it, while the allegations of ill\u2011treatment made by the applicant\u2019s mother and by Ms Ch. had been countered by the statements of all other witnesses \u2013 namely the staff of the nursery school and the parents of other children \u2013 that Ms P. and Ms K. had never mistreated the applicant or other children. The investigator concluded that the evidence collected was contradictory and that it was not possible to resolve that contradiction. Any further investigative measures would be useless. Given that suspects should benefit from any doubt, it could not be found that Ms P.\u2019s and Ms K.\u2019s actions amounted to a criminal offence under Article 112 of the Criminal Code.","107.On 29 August 2014 the St Petersburg prosecutor\u2019s office annulled the decision of 19 July 2014, finding that the investigation had been ineffective and incomplete. In particular, the criminal proceedings had been unlawfully discontinued even though it had been established that Ms P. and Ms K. had mistreated the applicant and had caused damage to his health.","108.On 12 September 2014 the Kirovskiy district police department discontinued the criminal proceedings against Ms P. and Ms K. for the same reasons as those given in the decision of 19 July 2014.","109.On 15 October 2014 the St Petersburg prosecutor\u2019s office annulled the decision of 12 September 2014, finding that the investigator had not complied with the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 29 August 2014.","110.On 10 November 2014 the Kirovskiy district police department discontinued the criminal proceedings against Ms P. and Ms K., repeating verbatim the decision of 12 September 2014.","111.On 4 December 2014 the Kirovskiy district police department again refused to open criminal proceedings against Ms P. and Ms K. under Article156 of the Criminal Code (cruel treatment of minors), finding that the prosecution had become time-barred.","(c)The applicant\u2019s complaints about the ineffectiveness of the investigation","112.The applicant\u2019s mother several times asked the investigator to declare the expert opinions of 10 April 2009 and 9October 2009 inadmissible as evidence. She argued in particular that the panel of experts of 10 April 2009 had not included an expert in child psychiatry. The investigator refused the requests made by the applicant\u2019s mother, finding that the expert opinions of 10 April 2009 and 9October 2009 had been obtained in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and had contained clear findings.","113.The applicant\u2019s mother lodged numerous complaints about the alleged ineffectiveness of the investigation with the Kirovskiy district police department, the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office, the St Petersburg prosecutor\u2019s office, the Prosecutor General and the Kirovskiy and Krasnogvardeyskiy District Courts of St Petersburg. She complained that the investigation had been flawed by delays, in particular on account of the numerous unlawful suspensions of the investigation, and that she had often been denied access to the case file. She also complained that, although sufficient evidence of ill-treatment had been gathered, Ms P. and Ms K. had still not been charged with a criminal offence. She further argued that the applicant had sustained severe damage to his health (rather than damage of medium severity) as a result of the ill-treatment he had suffered. She also challenged the investigator\u2019s refusals to declare the expert opinions of 10April 2009 and 9October 2009 inadmissible as evidence.","114.By letters of 16 and 18 November 2011 the St Petersburg prosecutor\u2019s office informed the applicant\u2019s mother that the investigator and the officials of the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office responsible for supervising the case had been disciplined for the delays during the investigation and its ineffectiveness.","115.On 2 December 2011 the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office noted that the investigation had been conducted with serious delays and shortcomings. In particular, the investigator had not performed all requisite investigative measures, such as an additional medical examination of the applicant.","116.On 12 January 2012 the Kirovskiy District Court found that it had no authority to assess whether the evidence was sufficient for charges to be brought. It was for the investigator to assess the collected evidence and to decide whether charges were to be brought.","117.On 3 February 2012 the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office found that the investigator\u2019s refusals (see paragraph 112 above) to declare the expert opinions of 10 April and 9October 2009 inadmissible as evidence had been lawful.","118.On 7 February 2012 the Kirovskiy District Court found that the rights of the applicant\u2019s mother had indeed been breached by the failure to provide her with copies of the numerous decisions to suspend the investigation. However, given that all of those decisions had been annulled, it was not necessary to examine the applicant\u2019s complaint relating to those decisions. Moreover, given that the decisions had been annulled by the investigator\u2019s superiors, the court concluded that those superiors had exercised effective supervision over the course of the investigation. On 18April 2012 the St Petersburg City Court quashed that decision on appeal for procedural defects.","119.On 13 August 2012 the Kirovskiy District Court found that the investigator had still not organised an additional expert examination of the applicant, even though he had been instructed to do so in August 2010 and again in August 2011. It also found that the applicant\u2019s mother had been unlawfully denied access to some documents in the case file.On 16 October 2012 the St Petersburg City Court quashed that decision on appeal for procedural defects.","120.On 24 August 2012 the Krasnogvardeyskiy District Court of StPetersburg found that the complaints lodged by the applicant\u2019s mother about the delays and the ineffectiveness of the investigation were well\u2011founded. However, given that on 10 August 2012 the investigation had been discontinued for lack of evidence of a criminal offence, they had to be dismissed. On 15 November 2012 the St Petersburg City Court quashed that decision on appeal. It found that some of the complaints lodged by the applicant\u2019s mother had not been examined, that the decision had been based on certain documents that had not been examined during the hearing and that the court, even though it had found some of the complaints to be well\u2011founded, had nevertheless dismissed them.","121.On 14 February 2013 the Kirovskiy District Court found that the investigator\u2019s decisions issued between 15September 2010 and 6 October 2011 to suspend the investigation had been unlawful. The rights of the applicant\u2019s mother had, moreover, been breached by the investigator\u2019s failure to inform her about the suspensions of the investigation. Her complaint that the investigator had intentionally delayed the investigation with the aim of rendering the proceedings time-barred was, however, unsubstantiated. The investigation had been discontinued for lack of evidence of a criminal offence rather than on the ground that the proceedings had become time-barred.","122.On 24 April 2013 the Kirovskiy District Court found that the applicant\u2019s mother had been unlawfully denied access to certain documents in the case file. It however rejected the remainder of her complaints relating to the alleged ineffectiveness of the investigation. In particular, the court established that the investigator had not complied with the prosecutor\u2019s instructions as to additional investigative measures to be performed. However, the prosecutor had later confirmed the investigator\u2019s decision to discontinue the investigation, thereby agreeing that it was no longer necessary to comply with his previous instructions and to undertake the investigative measures in question. The investigator\u2019s actions had therefore been lawful. On 6 August 2013 the St Petersburg City Court upheld that decision on appeal, finding it lawful, well-reasoned and justified.","123.On 17 March 2014 the Kirovskiy district police department replied to the applicant\u2019s mother that all necessary investigative measures had been performed and that all relevant facts had been established. It was therefore not necessary to carry out any further investigative measures. On the same day the Kirovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office also replied to the applicant\u2019s mother that the investigation had been thorough and complete and that there was no need for any further investigative measures.","D.The applicant\u2019s medical documents","124.The applicant is regularly examined by a neurologist. After the initial diagnosis of hyperkinesia on 15 November 2005 (see paragraph 12 above), he was examined by a neurologist on 2 February, 24 April and 10October 2006 and 26 January, 25 April, and 18 and 22 May 2007. He complained of nervous tics, sleeping difficulties, nervousness and fears. The neurologist noted that the symptoms had been caused by a prolonged, psychologically traumatic experience at the nursery school in 2005. The applicant was prescribed treatment.","125.From September 2007 until June 2008 the applicant followed a course of treatment for nervous tics.","126.On 22 October 2008 the applicant\u2019s medical documents were examined by a child psychiatrist, who found that the applicant continued to suffer from a neurological disorder of medium severity.","127.From March until June 2009 the applicant underwent a new course of treatment for nervous tics. He underwent a further course of treatment between January and April 2010.","128.Further medical certificates stated that in 2014 the applicant was still suffering from a neurological disorder and was following treatment for it.","152.PACE Recommendation 1934 (2010) on child abuse in institutions ensuring full protection of the victims provides as follows:","\u201c4. With regard to the cases of child abuse which have recently been uncovered and continue to be uncovered, and the existing standards referring to sexual, physical and emotional abuse of children, the Assembly recommends that the Committee of Ministers ask member states to:","4.1. ensure legislative protection, notably by:","4.1.1. adopting legislation to explicitly prohibit all forms of violence against children: physical and mental violence, injury or abuse (including sexual abuse), neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including in childcare institutions, public and private educational institutions, correctional facilities and leisure associations, and thus criminalising any intentional abuse of a child made by a person in a recognised position of trust, authority or influence over the child;","4.1.2. providing for ex officio prosecution in cases of child abuse in any context; ...","4.1.4. ensuring that prescription periods for child abuse offences under civil and criminal law are coherent and appropriate in view of the gravity of the offences and, in any case, do not begin before the victim reaches the age of majority; ...","4.1.8. defining as illegal and excluding certain practices with regard to the punishment of minors in institutions which are contrary to their dignity and rights ...\u201d","153.PACE Resolution 1803 (2011) on Education against violence at school provides as follows:","\u201c17.1.1.penal and\/or disciplinary standards should clearly prohibit all acts committed at school which can be qualified as \u201cviolent\u201d, including physical or degrading punishment of pupils, violence against pupils by school staff, violence by third persons against pupils on school premises and violent behaviour by pupils against other pupils, school staff or school property ...","17.1.3.all acts of violence should be investigated and recorded and, where an act is of a sufficiently serious nature, it should be reported to the competent law\u2011enforcement or disciplinary authorities; in this context, appropriate complaints mechanisms should be set up for pupils in education settings\u201d.","154.Recommendation CM\/Rec (2009)10 of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers on integrated national strategies for the protection of children from violence reads as follows:","\u201cThe state has an explicit obligation to secure children\u2019s right to protection from all forms of violence, however mild. Appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures should be taken to prohibit all violence against children at all times and in all settings and to render protection to all children within the state\u2019s jurisdiction. Legal defences and authorisations for any form of violence, including for the purposes of correction, discipline or punishment, within or outside families, should be repealed. Prohibition should imperatively cover:","... g. all forms of violence in school;","h.all corporal punishment and all other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of children, both physical and psychological ...\u201d."],"29176":["6.The applicant was born in 1960 and until his conviction lived in the town of Slantsy in the Leningrad Region.","A.The applicant\u2019s medical background and his conviction","7.In 1991 the applicant sustained a penetrating head injury, which involved the crushing of brain tissue. This trauma caused paralysis of the entire right side of his body, light speech impairment and post-traumatic epilepsy. To reduce the frequency of epileptic seizures the applicant was obliged to take Benzonal.","8.The following year the applicant was examined by a social security medical assessment board (\u0431\u044e\u0440\u043e \u043c\u0435\u0434\u0438\u043a\u043e-\u0441\u043e\u0446\u0438\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0442\u0438\u0437\u044b) and certified as having the highest-degree disability on the grounds that he had lost the ability to work, to walk without assistance or to look after himself. Those findings were confirmed by the board during routine re-examinations in 1994, 1996, 1998 and 2000, when the applicant was granted life-long disability status.","9.In 2005 the applicant committed a homicide. On 16 April 2007 the Slantsy Town Court found him guilty of murder and sentenced him to seven years\u2019 imprisonment in a highly secure correctional colony. On 15 August 2007 the Leningrad Region Court upheld the sentence on appeal.","B.The applicant\u2019s medical treatment and conditions of his detention","10.On 16 April 2007 the applicant was taken to a police ward in the town of Slantsy.","11.Two days later he was transferred to remand prison no. IZ-47\/6 in StPetersburg. On admission to that facility the resident prison doctor conducted a general medical check-up of the applicant and noted his disability. The applicant was allowed to take Benzonal supplied by his wife in order to minimise his suffering from epileptic seizures.","12.In the remand prison the applicant was detained in a normal cell block where he allegedly faced great difficulties in his daily routine owing to the lack of special arrangements, in particular when using the squat toilet and shared dormitory shower, which lacked handrails and non-slip flooring.","13.On 26 September 2007, when the sentence became final, he was transferred to correctional colony no. 7 in the Leningrad Region, where he was also placed in a cell designed for healthy inmates and, allegedly, continued to experience the inconveniences arising from his disability.","14.Having no licence to treat inmates with as strong a medication as Benzonal, the colony\u2019s medical authorities offered the applicant two substitute drugs with similar anticonvulsive effect, but the latter refused, alleging their low efficiency and possible side effects.","15.On 3 March 2008, at his own request, the applicant was sent to Gaaza prison hospital in St Petersburg (\u201cthe prison hospital\u201d) for an in\u2011depth medical examination and treatment. In the hospital he was subjected to various medical tests which showed that his health was stable. On 1 April 2008 the applicant was discharged from the hospital. In the discharge summary the supervising doctor mentioned that the patient was able to look after himself and to walk without assistance.","16.On 10 October 2008 the deputy head of the correctional colony ordered the applicant\u2019s transfer to a special unit for disabled prisoners. According to the Government\u2019s description, this unit had \u201cenhanced housing conditions\u201d and \u201cless strict security regime\u201d. It accommodated only disabled inmates, who were detained in a prison wing located close to the medical unit.","17.The applicant submitted that even after his transfer to the special unit he had not been provided with nursing assistance. Being unable to dress himself or perform hygiene procedures without assistance, he had asked his inmates for help in exchanging valuable prison products such as tea, coffee, sweets and cigarettes.","18.On 1 July 2009 the special medical board, at the request of the penal authorities, issued an advisory report confirming the gravity of the applicant\u2019s disability.","19.On 4 August 2009 the applicant was examined by a medical board composed of the prison hospital management and a neurosurgeon. The doctors noted that the applicant\u2019s health had remained stable, that he was able to look after himself, and that nursing assistance was not required for him. However, due to the gravity of the applicant\u2019s brain condition it was decided to check whether his illness fell within the established list of illnesses warranting early release.","20.Three days later a special medical board confirmed that the applicant\u2019s condition justified his early release.","21.It appears that the applicant remained in the prison hospital until 8September 2009.","22.In the meantime the detention authorities applied for his early release on medical grounds.","23.On 28 August 2009 the Smolninskiy District Court of St Petersburg dismissed their application, citing the gravity of the applicant\u2019s offence, the fact that he had developed paralysis and epilepsy prior to his arrest and that in detention his condition had remained stable. The decision was upheld on appeal by the St Petersburg City Court on 17 November 2009.","24.Between 1 February and 18 March 2010, at his own request, the applicant was admitted to the prison hospital for treatment, and on 16March2010 he was re-examined by a medical board, which confirmed his right to early release on medical grounds.","25.On 10 April 2010 the applicant was transferred to correctional colony no. 4 in the Leningrad Region. He was accommodated in a special unit for disabled prisoners. It appears that the conditions of his detention were similar to those in correctional colony no. 7. The applicant continued to receive Benzonal from his wife and refused to take any substitutes.","26.On 10 June 2010 the Tosnenskiy Town Court dismissed the application for early release on medical grounds, referring to the gravity of the applicant\u2019s offence, the fact that his health status had already been taken into account by the court which sentenced him, and, lastly, to the fact that the applicant\u2019s medical condition had not worsened in detention."],"29184":["1. The applicant, Mr Slobodan \u0110urovi\u0107, is a Montenegrin national who was born in 1954 and is currently serving a prison sentence in Zagreb Prison. He was represented before the Court by Mr R. Mlinari\u0107 and Mr K. Vilajtovic, lawyers practising in Zagreb.","2. The Croatian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Ms \u0160. Sta\u017enik.","3. On 12 February 2015 the Government of Montenegro were informed of the case and invited to exercise their right to intervene if they wished to do so. On 27 July 2015 the Government of Montenegro informed the Court that they did not wish to exercise their right to intervene in the present case.","The circumstances of the case","4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.","1. Background to the case","5. On 23 October 2008 I.P., a well-known Croatian journalist, and his business associate N.F. were killed by the explosion of an improvised device placed under I.P. \u2019 s car, which was parked in front of his publishing company. The explosion also caused injuries to two employees of the publishing company and considerable material damage to the surrounding buildings and nearby parked cars.","6. The police immediately started enquiries into the above events and soon learned that a certain R.M., L.M. and A.M. were implicated and that an unknown person was supposedly aiding them in fleeing the country. It was therefore decided to arrest these individuals. The Police Chief ( Glavni Ravnatelj Policije ) issued an oral order that the arrests be carried out by an anti-terrorist team of the Special Police Force ( Specijalna policija, Antiteroristi\u010dka jedinica Lu\u010dko \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe ATJ\u201d).","7. On 23 October 2009 the State Attorney \u2019 s Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime ( Ured za suzbijanje korupcije i organiziranog kriminaliteta \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe State Attorney \u2019 s Organised Crime Office\u201d) indicted several individuals, including the applicant, before the Zagreb County Court ( \u017dupanijski sud u Zagrebu ) on charges of conspiracy to kill I.P. and of carrying out the plan.","8. On 3 November 2010 the Zagreb County Court ( \u017dupanijski sud u Zagrebu ) found the applicant guilty on the charge of incitement to conspiracy to commit aggravated murder and sentenced him to ten years \u2019 imprisonment. On 15 January 2013 the Supreme Court ( Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske ) upheld the applicant \u2019 s conviction, increasing his sentence to twenty-three years \u2019 imprisonment.","2. The applicant \u2019 s alleged ill-treatment by the police","9. On 29 October 2008, at 5.35 p.m., the ATJ arrested the applicant together with R.M. and L.M. at the Spa\u010dva petrol station off the motorway near the town of \u017dupanja.","10. According to the Government the three individuals concerned resisted arrest and force had to be used against them. Two members of the ATJ sustained injuries. The applicant also sustained injuries while a standard restraint technique was applied against him during the arrest.","11. According to the applicant, even though he was not resisting arrest, he was severely beaten by several police officers all over his head and body.","12. After being arrested the applicant was brought to the premises of the Criminal Police in Zagreb. There he received medical assistance at 5.20 a.m. on 30 October 2008 from an emergency medical team.","13. On 31 October 2008 the applicant was questioned by an investigating judge of the Zagreb County Court in the presence of two defence lawyers. He did not make any complaints about the conduct of the police.","14. On 1 November 2008, upon his admission to detention, the applicant was examined by a prison doctor who found that he had haematomas around both eyes and an abrasion on his face.","15. According to the applicant, in the further course of the proceedings he complained to the Zagreb County Court, the investigating judge, the State Attorney \u2019 s Office, the police and other authorities of the violence used against him during his arrest. However, he did not submit any documents supporting those allegations.","16. The documents submitted by the parties show that in a letter of 27 July 2011, addressed to the Office of the President of the Republic ( Ured Predsjednika Republike Hrvatske ) the applicant complained, inter alia, of alleged ill-treatment by the police during his arrest.","17. No investigation was ever opened in connection with the applicant \u2019 s allegations of ill-treatment.","18. On 21 September 2012 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the State before the Zagreb Municipal Civil Court ( Op\u0107inski gra\u0111anski sud u Zagrebu ), claiming damages for his alleged ill-treatment by the police. It appears that these proceedings are still pending before the first-instance court.","19. In a constitutional complaint of 7 March 2013, lodged against the Supreme Court \u2019 s judgment of 15 January 2013 given in the criminal proceedings against him, the applicant alleged that the police officers had used force against him during his arrest and had caused him numerous bodily injuries. On 25 February 2015 the Constitutional Court found that these allegations, in so far as they were admissible and susceptible to be addressed within the Constitutional Court \u2019 s proceedings, did not reveal any violation of the applicant \u2019 s human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution."],"29189":["5.The applicant was born in 1977 (in some of the documents submitted his year of birth was also stated as 1979). He used to live in Grozny, Chechnya, but is currently serving a life prison sentence at an unspecified location.","6.The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.","A.The applicant\u2019s arrest and alleged ill-treatment","1.The applicant\u2019s arrest","7.On 14 April 2001 the interim prosecutor of Grozny opened criminal case no. 11133 against the applicant. On 14 September 2001 the applicant was charged, in absentia, with aggravated murder. On 31 December 2001 he left Chechnya under a false identity and in January 2002 he arrived in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan.","8.On 13 January 2006 the applicant was arrested in Semipalatinsk. On 17January 2006 the local authorities established his true identity and the Semipalatinsk town prosecutor\u2019s office extended the applicant\u2019s detention with a view to extraditing him. On an unspecified date in January or February 2006 the Russian authorities officially requested the applicant\u2019s extradition to Russia. On 23February 2006 the applicant was taken to Astana airport and handed over to Russian law-enforcement officers.","2.Ill-treatment of the applicant while in detention on remand","(a)The applicant\u2019s ill-treatment in Moscow","9.On 23 February 2006 the applicant was taken by Russian police officers from Astana to Moscow. Upon his arrival at Domodedovo airport in Moscow, he was filmed by a journalist of the RTR (Russian Public Television) company and a report about his extradition was televised on the same date in the nationwide news programme, Vesti. On the footage, the applicant showed no signs of ill-treatment. His relatives learned about his arrest and extradition from the news report.","10.On the same date, 23 February 2006, the applicant was taken to remand prison IZ-77\/4 in Moscow. Upon arrival he was examined by a doctor, who found no evidence of ill-treatment.","11.On the same date, the applicant was handed over from prison IZ\u201177\/4 to Chechen investigators and police officers for transfer to Grozny, Chechnya.","12.According to the applicant, he was placed in a vehicle with two Chechen police officers, Mr Kh. Mag. and Mr L.-A. Mud., who repeatedly punched and kicked him on the way to the airport.","13.At the airport the officers were joined by an investigator from Chechnya, Mr P. The applicant bore signs of ill-treatment: his face was swollen, he was covered in blood and he could not eat or drink.","(b)The applicant\u2019s ill-treatment on the journey from Vladikavkaz to Grozny","14.Upon arrival at the airport in Vladikavkaz, Republic of North Ossetia\u2011Alania, the applicant was taken in a Gazel minibus to Grozny.","15.According to the applicant, the commander of the Police Special Task Unit (\u041e\u0442\u0434\u0435\u043b \u043c\u0438\u043b\u0438\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u043e\u0441\u043e\u0431\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043d\u0430\u0437\u043d\u0430\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f (\u041e\u041c\u041e\u041d)) (\u201cthe OMON\u201d) police group ordered him to lie on the floor of the minibus, and the police officers kicked him and beat him with their rifle butts.","(c)The applicant\u2019s ill-treatment in the ORB-2","16.Late in the evening of 23 February 2006 the applicant arrived at the police station known as Operational Search Bureau no. 2 (hereinafter \u201cthe ORB\u20112\u201d) in Grozny, where he was detained until 6 March 2006.","17.According to the Government\u2019s submission to the Court, upon his arrival at the ORB-2 in the evening of 23 February 2006 the applicant underwent a medical examination, which established that he had haematomas around his right eye and an abrasion on his back. According to the Government, the applicant explained to the doctor that he had obtained those injuries in Kazakhstan.","18.According to the applicant\u2019s submission to the Court, on the same evening, 23 February 2006, he was taken to a large room on the ground floor of the ORB-2 premises, where he was subjected to beatings by five police officers, namely the head of the ORB\u20112\u2019s operational search division; MrIb., the operational search officer; MrAs. Vak., the head of the department specialising in the investigation of aggravated robberies; and two other police officers from the station.","19.The officers questioned the applicant about, among other things, the murder of a prosecutor perpetrated in 2001. They punched and kicked him, demanding that he confess to killing that prosecutor and give statements against certain persons whom he knew personally. The applicant refused. The officers then tortured the applicant with electric shocks and beat him about the head with plastic bottles filled with water. Every time he lost consciousness, the officers poured water on him and continued the interrogation and torture.","20.According to the applicant, throughout the night of 23-24 February 2006 and during the day on 24February 2006 he was tortured and pressured to admit his involvement in a number of serious crimes. The applicant refused to do so.","21.On 25 February 2006 the applicant was told that his aunt, MsKh.Tas., had arrived with a food package for him. The officers detained her, questioned her about the applicant and threatened her. One of the officers then told the applicant that if he wanted nothing to happen to his aunt, he would have to sign confessions. The applicant signed the documents without familiarising himself with their contents.","22.According to the applicant\u2019s submission, between 26 and 28February 2006 he was regularly ill\u2011treated at night; he was bludgeoned, tortured with electric shocks, and a gas mask was put over his head to induce suffocation. He was forced to memorise statements concerning his forced confession to the commission of the crimes in question along with details of those crimes and of crimes in which he had allegedly participated.","23.According to the applicant, on 6 March 2006 he was transferred to remand prison no.20\/1 (\u201cSIZO20\/1\u201d) in Grozny. Between March and December 2006 he was sometimes returned to the ORB-2 premises for questioning and was subjected to further beatings, electrocutions and other forms of ill-treatment. The officers threatened to kill him if he complained to anyone of the ill\u2011treatment. He again had to memorise the details regarding the crimes allegedly perpetrated by him; the police officers instructed him regarding places, methods and other details concerning the crimes he was accused of perpetrating. From the middle of March the police officers primarily used electric shocks to torture him in order to avoid leaving bruises and haematomas on his body. In the applicant\u2019s submission, the police officer who was most active in torturing him and pressurising him to confess was Mr As. Vak. from the ORB-2.","24.On 30 April and 2 May, and again on 5 and 6 September 2006, the applicant was interviewed in SIZO 20\/1 by an official from, apparently, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture. The applicant described to that official the torture to which he had been subjected on the SIZO 20\/1 premises.","25.On the night of 24 to 25 May 2006, after the applicant\u2019s complaints of ill-treatment (see paragraphs 31-32 below), he was subjected to severe beatings: a plastic bag was put over his head and he was hit in the head with metal keys and kicked. The officers threatened to kill the applicant if he continued to complain of being ill-treated.","26.On 1 June 2006 the applicant underwent a medical examination in SIZO20\/1, which established the following:","\u201c... on his left upper shoulder there are circular purple bruises, both internal and external, measuring 2-3 cm. On his right hip there is a large circular purple haematoma measuring 6 cm and an abrasion measuring 3 cm ...\u201d","27.On 20 October 2007 and again on 29 October 2007 the administrative authorities at remand prison IZ-77\/4 in Moscow replied to a request for information by the applicant\u2019s representatives stating that at the time of his arrival at their remand prison on 23 February 2006 the applicant had not borne any traces of ill-treatment.","28.In support of his allegations, the applicant furnished the Court with statements by witnesses who had also been detained in the ORB-2 at the material time. Those witnesses were: Mr Sh. El. (a statement dated 12September 2009); Mr U. Cha. (an undated statement); Mr R. Le. (astatement dated 13 September 2007); and MrM. Ga. (a statement dated 12September 2007). The applicant also submitted two official statements by the administrative authorities of remand prison IZ-77\/4 in Moscow, dated 20 and 29 October 2007 respectively.","(d)Investigation into the alleged ill-treatment","(i)The applicant\u2019s complaint to the supervising prosecutors","29.On 1 March 2006 the applicant was examined by a medical expert at the Chechen Republic Bureau of Forensic Expert Evaluations. According to the applicant, out of fear for his life he had to tell the expert that he had sustained the haematomas as a result of several falls on 23 February 2006 while he had been in Kazakhstan. The expert\u2019s conclusions of 9March 2006 were as follows:","\u201c... [the applicant] stated that he had not been subjected to beatings. His facial trauma was a result of several falls that occurred during his arrest by the local police officers in Kazakhstan. He does not complain about the state of his health. Observations: under the right eye and on the right eyelid there is a crimson and green bruise, yellow along the eye, of about 3 cm by 1.5cm. Other injuries or traces of trauma were not identified ...","Conclusions: the bruise on Mr A. Mukayev\u2019s right eye is the result of this part of his head [coming into contact] with a blunt object; possible date of occurrence \u2013 23February 2006, in the circumstances described by him. The injury does not [fall under the category of] harm ...\u201d","30.On 6 March 2006 the applicant was transferred to SIZO 20\/1 in Grozny, where he was examined by a doctor who made the following notes in his medical record:","\u201c... complaints of headaches; healing haematoma on the upper-right shoulder; fresh scar on the back of the knee measuring 2 cm; haemorrhage in the right eye; abrasion on the back of the head ... handcuff marks on both wrists ...\u201d","31.On 11 May 2006 the applicant complained to the Chechnya prosecutor\u2019s office of having been ill-treated in Moscow and in the ORB\u20112, stating that the police officers had tortured him to make him confess to crimes he had not committed.","32.On 15 May 2006 the applicant complained of the ill-treatment to the Prosecutor General\u2019s office.","33.On 25 May 2006 an investigator from the Chechnya prosecutor\u2019s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers. The applicant was not provided with a copy of that decision.","34.On 6 September the Chechnya deputy prosecutor overruled the decision of 25 May 2006 and returned the case to the investigators for further inquiries. The four police officers allegedly implicated in the ill\u2011treatment were questioned and gave statements to the effect that they had not ill-treated the applicant. On 15September 2006, upon completion of the inquiry, the investigator, V.A., refused to open a criminal case against the officers. His report contained the following remarks:","\u201c... according to the record of the initial medical examination carried out by the IVS [temporary detention centre] of the ORB-2, the examinations conducted on 7March, 17March, 29 March, 10April, 24 May, 13 June and 11 July 2006 did not reveal any bodily injuries ...","Thus, no evidence was obtained as a result of the inquiry ... the allegations of A.Mukayev ... were not confirmed\u201d.","The applicant was not provided with a copy of this decision.","35.On 10 October 2006 the decision of 15 September 2006 not to open a criminal case against the officers was overruled by the supervisory prosecutor and the complaint was returned to the investigators for further inquiries. On 20 October 2006 the investigator, Mr I.Kh. of the Chechnya prosecutor\u2019s office, questioned the officers who had brought the applicant from Moscow to Grozny and the investigator in charge of the criminal case against the applicant. Mr I.Kh. refused to investigate the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment, stating, inter alia:","\u201c... according to the record of the initial medical examination carried out by the IVS of the ORB-2, the examinations conducted on 7 March, 17 March, 29 March, 10April, 24 May, 13 June and 11 July 2006 did not reveal any bodily injuries ...","According to the documents received from SIZO 20\/1 dated 14 March 2006 and 5June 2006 concerning bodily injuries allegedly sustained by A. Mukayev, the Leninskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office refused to institute criminal proceedings.","For instance, when questioned about his bodily injuries \u2013 such as the haematoma covering one-third of the right shoulder, a bruise under his right eye, scratches on the back of his head and handcuff marks on both wrists, all of which were found when he was transferred to SIZ0 20\/1 on 1 June 2006 \u2013 A. Mukayev explained that these injuries had been sustained by him on the way to SIZO 20\/1 and on the way back to the IVS. He stated that the guards had not used physical force against him...","When questioned about the origins of the injuries, including the haemorrhage of the upper-right arm and the haematoma on his left hip found on [the applicant] when he was brought to SIZO 20\/1 on 1 June 2006, A. Mukayev explained that he had been taken for interrogation. By the exit [to the facility] he had been beaten on the buttocks and shoulder, but he did not know who had hit him. The escort guards had behaved normally towards him ...\u201d","The applicant was not provided with a copy of this decision.","36.On 23 November 2007 the investigator\u2019s refusal of 20 October 2006 was overruled by the supervisory prosecutor and the case was forwarded to the Leninskiy District Investigative Committee for further inquiries. On 9December 2007 the investigator of the Leninskiy District Investigative Committee refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers on the ground of lack of corpus delicti. The applicant was not provided with a copy of that decision.","37.On 27 December 2007 the applicant\u2019s lawyers appealed to the supervisory prosecutor against the investigators\u2019 decisions in respect of the applicant\u2019s complaint of ill\u2011treatment and requested that the prosecutor recognise as unlawful the following:","\u201c(a) the delays in the verification of A. Mukayev\u2019s complaints concerning the unlawful actions of the law-enforcement officers against him;","(b) the investigator\u2019s refusal to question important witnesses who could have confirmed the use of violence against A. Mukayev;","(c) the investigator\u2019s refusal to question A. Mukayev.\u201d","38.On 17 January 2008 the investigator\u2019s refusal of 9 December 2007 to initiate a criminal investigation was overruled by the supervisory prosecutor, and the applicant\u2019s complaints of ill-treatment were sent back to the investigators for further inquiries. The applicant was informed of that decision on 24January 2008.","(ii)The applicant\u2019s judicial appeals against the prosecutor\u2019s refusals to investigate allegations of ill-treatment","39.On an unspecified date in June 2007 the applicant\u2019s lawyer complained to the Zavodskoy District Court of Grozny (\u201cthe Zavodskoy District Court\u201d), stating, among other things:","\u201c... During the inquiry into the complaints of A. Mukayev, a forensic medical examination was conducted on 9 March 2006 ...","However, this examination was incomplete, as on 6 March 2006 when A.Mukayev had been taken to SIZO 1 (remand prison no. 1) in Grozny, the following injuries had been noted [in the medical record]:","- headaches;","- a healing haematoma on the right shoulder;","- a scar on the back of the knee measuring 2 cm;","- a haemorrhage in the right eye;","- an abrasion on the back of the head;","- handcuff marks on both wrists.","All of the above objectively confirms that physical force was used against A.Mukayev ... In addition, [the policemen] used threats and intimidation to force A.Mukayev to state that he had not been subjected to beatings and that his facial trauma had been caused on 23 February 2006 during the arrest by law-enforcement officers in Kazakhstan.","The use of torture against A. Mukayev is confirmed by his allegedly voluntary confession to having committed serious crimes ...","Before his arrest, A. Mukayev was a healthy man. However, after his arrest he started to have health problems ... In spite of consistent allegations [of torture] in the complaint lodged by A. Mukayev, the investigator refused to open a criminal case ...","On the basis of the above, it is requested that the court:","Order the Chechnya prosecutor\u2019s office to furnish [the applicant with] the materials gathered by the inquiry which resulted in the refusal to institute criminal proceedings on the basis of the complaints of A. Mukayev, as he was neither provided with a copy of this decision nor familiarised with the contents of the file;","Recognise as unlawful the failure of the prosecutor\u2019s office to investigate substantiated allegations of torture; and","Order the Chechnya prosecutor\u2019s office to conduct a thorough, objective and effective investigation into the applicant\u2019s torture, and to prosecute the culprits ...\u201d","40.On 26 September 2007 the applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged an additional complaint with the Zavodskoy District Court.","41.On 3 October 2007 the Zavodskoy District Court upheld the complaint in full and recognised as unlawful the refusal to institute criminal proceedings. The decision, which was not appealed against and became final, stated, among other things, the following:","\u201cOn 1 March 2006 a forensic medical expert ... examined A. Mukayev. ... [A]ccording to his report, he found \u2018... under the right eye and on the right eyelid ... a crimson and green bruise, yellow along the eye, about 3 cm by 1.5 cm ...\u2019","It follows that, between his extradition to Russia on 23 February 2006 and 1March 2006, A. Mukayev was subjected to physical violence.","On 6 March 2006, when he arrived at SIZO 20\/1 in Grozny, Mukayev was examined by a doctor, who made the following notes in Mukayev\u2019s medical record: \u2018... complaints of headaches; healing haematoma in the upper right shoulder; fresh scar on the back of the knee measuring 2 cm; haemorrhage in the right eye; abrasion on the back of the head ... handcuff marks on both wrists ...\u2019","Consequently, assuming that the examination conducted on 1 March 2006 was full and thorough, A. Mukayev was subjected to further physical violence between 1and6March 2006. This is confirmed by the documents.","On 10 April 2006 the following note was made in Mukayev\u2019s medical record: \u2018[N]umbness of the right side [the next part of the sentence is illegible]. [B]eaten [according to A. Mukayev] in the head during the journey from Moscow ...\u2019","On 10 May 2006 in SIZO 20\/1 the following note was made in Mukayev\u2019s medical record: \u2018[C]omplaints of numbness in the right side of his face; lacrimation of the right eye; sharp pains in the right side of the face, the ear and the gums.\u2019","On 1 June 2006 in SIZO 20\/1, the following note was made in Mukayev\u2019s medical record: \u2018[O]n the upper left shoulder there are round purple bruises, both internal and external, measuring 2-3 cm. On the right hip \u2013 a large round purple haematoma measuring 6 cm and a straight, 3\u2011cm\u2011long abrasion ...\u2019","It follows that Mukayev was subjected to torture between 10 May and 1June 2006. This is confirmed by the documents.","The inmates who were detained in the IVS of the ORB-2 at the same time as A.Mukayev also confirm the use of violence against him. ... [A]ll these [three] persons confirmed that they were prepared to give statements to the prosecutors if necessary.","A.Mukayev\u2019s lawyer, who had a short meeting with him in March 2006 in theORB\u20112, also confirms that physical violence was used against A.Mukayev.","The use of torture against A. Mukayev is substantiated by the following evidence:","his complaints;","the forensic expert examination report no. 186 of 1 March 2006;","a copy of A. Mukayev\u2019s medical record;","the witness statement of Mr Sh. El.;","the witness statement of Mr M.Ga.;","the witness statement of Mr R. Le.;","complaint lodged by [the applicant\u2019s] lawyer, Mr B. El.","The absence of any signs of ill-treatment on A. Mukayev\u2019s face on 23February 2006 when he arrived at SIZO 77\/4 in Moscow can be confirmed by the following:","the witness statements of A. Mukayev\u2019s relatives, who had seen the television programme of 23 February 2006;","the video footage of the television programmes supplied by the television companies;","a reply from SIZO-77\/4, if requested ...","The court, having examined the evidence ..., finds the complaint substantiated and upholds it. When refusing to institute criminal proceedings, the investigators failed to examine and take into account Mukayev\u2019s bodily injuries, the origins of which are an important factor in resolving the issue. Therefore, the ruling of 15 September 2006 not to open a criminal investigation was taken without fully examining the evidence or the complaints of Mukayev and his lawyer.","The court finds that further verification of all the arguments advanced by Mukayev concerning the use of violence against him is required ...\u201d","42.On an unspecified date between December 2007 and February 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Zavodskoy District Court against the decision of 9 December 2007 by the investigator of the Leninskiy District Investigative Committee not to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers (see paragraph 38 above).","43.On 19 March 2008 the Zavodskoy District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal, stating that the impugned refusal to institute criminal proceedings of 9 December 2007 had just been overruled on the same date (that is to say 19 March 2008) by the head of the Leninskiy District Investigative Committee.","44.On 29 March 2008 the investigator of the Leninskiy District Investigative Committee again ruled against instituting criminal proceedings against the police officers. The applicant again lodged an appeal against that decision with the Leninskiy District Court of Grozny (\u201cthe Leninskiy District Court\u201d).","45.On 26 June 2008 the Leninskiy District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal as unsubstantiated, stating that:","\u201c... the facts of the alleged violations of the criminal procedure regulations [by the impugned police officers] were not confirmed by the numerous inquiries. A.Mukayev was found guilty as charged ...\u201d","46.The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision with the Chechnya Supreme Court. On 6 August 2008 the latter upheld the decision of the Leninskiy District Court, stating that:","\u201c... in [citing] the overruling of the decision in refusing to open a criminal investigation within the framework of a criminal case which has been resolved by a sentence, [the applicant\u2019s representative] is in fact proposing that the court examine and evaluate evidence that has already been examined and evaluated by the Chechnya Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. Those courts have already delivered decisions which are now binding; such a situation is not provided for by the current legislation ...\u201d","47.The documents submitted to the Court show that the applicant had raised, consistently and in detail, complaints of ill-treatment during the proceedings before the Chechnya Supreme Court and in an appeal against his sentence that he lodged with the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (see below).","48. According to the Government, between May 2006 and March 2008 the domestic authorities on six occasions carried out a preliminary inquiry into the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment complaint before each time refusing to open a criminal case. The inquiries carried out showed that the applicant\u2019s allegations \u201cwere not confirmed by objective data\u201d.","B.Criminal proceedings against the applicant","1.The applicant\u2019s legal counsel","49.According to the applicant, between 23 and 26 February 2006, while he was being questioned and tortured, he had had no access to a lawyer. The investigator had not explained to him his right to legal counsel, nor that anything he said during questioning might be used as evidence in the criminal proceedings against him.","50.On 26 February 2006 the investigator appointed Mr G. Ber. as the applicant\u2019s lawyer. Rather than requesting a lawyer from the Bar Association, as prescribed by law, the investigator appointed MrG.Ber. directly. The applicant agreed to that lawyer\u2019s services on 2 March 2006 only on the insistence of the investigator in charge of the criminal case against him, and only after he had already been questioned and charged with a number of crimes.","51.On 28 February 2006 the applicant\u2019s relatives retained MrB.El. as his lawyer, but the investigators did not allow him access to the applicant. Meanwhile, G. Ber. acted as the applicant\u2019s lawyer. According to the applicant, G. Ber. had been present during the applicant\u2019s questioning; the lawyer had known that the applicant was being subjected to ill-treatment, but had failed to raise the issue before the authorities. The lawyer had signed the procedural document post facto, as requested by the investigators.","52.The applicant furnished the Court with a letter from the head of the Chechnya Bar Association of 14 December 2007, which read as follows:","\u201c... the investigator [in charge of the criminal case against the applicant] did not request the Nisam Bar Association to assign lawyer G. Ber. as legal counsel for A.Mukayev.","... under the law, a lawyer must obtain the approval of the head of the Bar Association for him to represent a client in criminal proceedings. However, MrG.Ber. failed to do that; ... his retainer agreement to represent A. Mukayev was filled out by Mr G. Ber. unlawfully.","On the basis of the complaints received by the Bar Association against the lawyer G.Ber., including those from A. Mukayev, on 30 November 2007 G. Ber. was disbarred...\u201d","53.The applicant\u2019s lawyer, Mr B.El., was allowed to meet with the applicant for the first time in the middle of March 2006.","54.The applicant unsuccessfully raised a complaint regarding the flaws in the legal aid before the trial court and on appeal. His complaints were dismissed as unsubstantiated.","2.Trial and appellate proceedings","55.During the trial the applicant was represented by his lawyer, MrB.El. The applicant retracted his confession and claimed that he had made self\u2011incriminating statements under torture. He complained to the trial judge that during his arrest and detention at the ORB-2, he had been repeatedly tortured and threatened, and had finally been forced to confess. He pleaded not guilty in respect of the murders and admitted his guilt only in respect of the unlawful acquisition of a gun and of being in possession of false identity documents.","56.On 22 May 2007 the Chechnya Supreme Court found the applicant guilty of, among other things, the murder of twelve people, and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Its ruling was based on the applicant\u2019s confession, statements made by witnesses and victims to the investigator and the court, and ballistic expert reports concluding that one of the victims had been shot with the gun found on the applicant.","57.In respect of the applicant\u2019s allegations of torture, the trial court stated that there were","\u201c... no grounds for distrusting the statement given by the operational search officer MrAs.Vak. or for casting doubt on the results of the inquiries conducted by the prosecutor\u2019s office [into the applicant\u2019s allegation]\u201d.","58.On 30 October 2007 the sentence was upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. In respect of the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment, the court stated that","\u201c... the fact that unlawful methods of investigation were used against the applicant was not confirmed\u201d.","60.The public statement of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) concerning the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation of 13 March 2007, reads in particular as follows:","\u201cb.The ORB-2","...","19.The CPT has for years now been drawing the attention of the Russian authorities to the serious human rights violations being committed by staff of the ORB-2 facility in Grozny and those violations were highlighted in the Committee\u2019s second public statement concerning the Chechen Republic issued on 10 July 2003. The Committee was led to believe, in the course of talks held in January 2005 with Dmitri KOZAK, Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Southern Federal District, that a \u201cthorough\u201d enquiry was being carried out by the Ministry of the Interior and the Prosecutor\u2019s Office into the treatment of detained persons by staff of the ORB-2. However, it subsequently became clear that no such enquiry had ever been undertaken.","To date, the steps taken in response to the CPT\u2019s concerns about the ORB-2 have consisted only of: i) the transformation of the detention facility at the ORB-2 premises into an IVS under the authority of the Command of the Allied Group of Forces, and ii) the \u201cprocessing in due time and manner\u201d of complaints lodged with the Prosecutor\u2019s Office. From the information gathered during the two ad hoc visits in 2006, it is clear that those measures have not been sufficient to put a stop to human rights violations by the ORB-2 staff.","20.Formally speaking, the IVS which has been established on the premises of theORB\u20112 may be separate from the ORB-2, and the official reporting line of the IVS staff may differ from that of the ORB-2 staff. However, in reality there is not a watertight division between the two entities.","The information gathered during the 2006 visits puts beyond any reasonable doubt that persons held in the IVS are frequently removed from the facility at night and handed over to the ORB-2 staff, and that those persons are then at great risk of ill\u2011treatment. This conclusion is based in part on individual interviews with numerous persons with experience of custody in the IVS on the premises of the ORB-2, and on medical evidence gathered in relation to certain of those persons and others. It is also based on other information gathered on site at the IVS, which clearly suggests that the management of the ORB-2 continues to exercise an important influence over the day\u2011to-day running of the detention facility. That this is the case is scarcely surprising given the very close proximity of the IVS and its staff to the ORB-2 facility, and the senior level of the ORB-2 staff concerned as compared to that of the staff working on site in the IVS. One member of the IVS staff acknowledged this and indicated that a request from the Head of the ORB-2 for the removal of a detainee at night would be complied with.","It should be added that the information gathered by the CPT\u2019s delegation also indicates that persons detained by the ORB-staff may be kept on that agency\u2019s own premises (and ill-treated) for some time before they are placed in the IVS for the first time.","21.t the end of the April\/May 2006 visit, the CPT\u2019s delegation made an immediate observation under Article 8, paragraph 5, of the Convention, formally requesting the Russian authorities to inform the Committee by 2 June 2006 of the measures taken to put an end to ill-treatment at the ORB-2. In their response, the Russian authorities refer to the findings of the preliminary inquiries carried out by the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Leninskiy district of Grozny as regards complaints against the ORB-2 staff.","19 such preliminary inquiries (on complaints from 22 persons) had been carried out in respect of 2005, and 13 (on complaints from 16 persons) in respect of the first quarter of 2006. The decision in all of the inquiries had been refusal to initiate a criminal case. Commenting on the complaints, the Russian authorities highlighted the \u201cstriking similarities\u201d of the descriptions, the sometimes \u201cclich\u00e9d style of writing\u201d and the failure to provide any \u201cobjective facts\u201d in support of the complaints. The overall conclusion reached was that \u201cpersons under investigation have opted for the method of writing out complaints as a peculiar means of procedural defence\u201d.","22.In the course of the September 2006 visit, the CPT\u2019s delegation was able to examine in detail the files on all the above-mentioned inquiries. It was found that in fact the prosecution service had not taken appropriate action on the complaints and other information received.","The complaints did display certain similarities as regards the alleged ill-treatment and the circumstances in which it was inflicted. However, such consistency tends to strengthen rather than weaken their credibility, all the more so given that in most of the files the same operative officers were concerned. At the same time, the complaints displayed individual features and specific elements that reinforced their plausibility; they could not be fairly described as \u201cclich\u00e9d\u201d. It should also be noted that 8 of the 32inquiries were prompted not by complaints but instead by reports on admittance with physical injuries issued by SIZO No. 1; the authorities\u2019 argument that one was dealing with \"a peculiar means of procedural defence\" clearly has no relevance to such cases.","More significantly, it was discovered that the major element of most of the inquiries consisted merely of explanations from the operative officers involved, combined in some cases with explanations from the investigator and the IVS\u2019s feldsher. In 11 of the inquiries, the alleged victims had not been questioned at all, and in the other inquiries this crucial element had clearly consisted of a cursory and formalistic examination. The inquiries also displayed other glaring deficiencies, such as the absence of forensic examinations or undue delays in seeking such examinations, a failure to take into account medical documentation from the SIZO, and the failure to question third parties who could shed light on the veracity of the complaint (such as other persons detained at the relevant time).","To sum up, the minimum requirements of an effective inquiry had not been met in the great majority of the 32 inquiries in question. [...]","25.At the end of the September 2006 visit, the CPT\u2019s delegation indicated that the continuing failure to take effective measures to put an end to ill-treatment at the ORB\u20112 inevitably raised an issue under Article 10, paragraph 2, of the Convention. The delegation urged the Russian authorities to improve the situation as regards the treatment of detained persons by staff of the ORB-2, both in Grozny and in the inter\u2011district divisions of the agency. To date, no information has been provided to the CPT on the measures taken by the Russian authorities in response to the delegation\u2019s remarks.\u201d","61.The public statement of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) concerning their visit to the North Caucasus in the Russian Federation of 24 January 2013, reads in particular as follows:","\u201c22.For more than a decade, the CPT has been calling upon the Russian authorities to stop the ill-treatment of detained persons by staff of ORB-2 in Grozny. [...]","Unfortunately, this message was not heeded. During the 2011 visit, the CPT\u2019s delegation received several credible allegations of the severe ill-treatment, both physical and psychological, of remand prisoners who had been transferred from SIZO No. 1 in Grozny to the IVS at ORB-2, in order to undergo investigative activities. The official position, according to which persons held in this IVS are only questioned in the specific room designated for that purpose located within the IVS\u2019s premises, is pure fiction.","The time is long overdue for the Russian authorities to implement the recommendations made by the CPT in the report on its visits to the North Caucasian region in 2006, in relation to ORB-2. Above all, the IVS facility currently situated on the premises of ORB-2 in Grozny must be relocated elsewhere.","23.As already mentioned above, the delegation received \u2013 mainly in the Republic of Dagestan and in the Chechen Republic \u2013 a number of allegations of unrecorded detentions and detentions in unlawful locations, in particular with respect to persons suspected of offences under Sections 205, 208, 209 and 222 of the Criminal Code.\u201d"],"29211":["1. The applicant, Mr Justice Ojei, is a Nigerian national, who was born in 1994 and lives in Amsterdam. He was represented before the Court by Mr F.L.M. van Haren, a lawyer practising in Amsterdam.","A. The circumstances of the case","2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.","3. The applicant lodged an application for asylum at Schiphol (Amsterdam) Airport on 30 March 2010.","4. On 31 March 2010 he was interviewed about his identity, nationality and travel itinerary ( eerste gehoor ). Confronted with the fact, apparent from the Eurodac database, that he had lodged a previous asylum request in Malta, he admitted that he had done so, claiming to be an adult. He stated that he had spent eighteen months detained in a Maltese reception centre where he had been badly treated. He had been refused asylum in Malta. He had travelled by boat from Malta to Italy and overland from Italy to the Netherlands.","5. A Dublin Claim interview ( gehoor Dublinclaim ) was held on 1 April 2010. The applicant stated that he had left Malta because he had been refused asylum. He alleged that he had been detained underground in a prison.","6. On the same day the applicant, through his counsel, submitted a document containing corrections and additions ( correcties en aanvullingen ) to the report of the Dublin Claim interview and \u201cweighty advice\u201d ( zwaarwegend advies ). He stated, inter alia, that if forced to return to Malta he would be locked up for a year in an underground prison known as \u201cPaola\u201d.","7. On 6 July 2010 the Minister of Justice rejected the applicant \u2019 s asylum request on the ground, in so far as relevant to the case before the Court, that under Article 16 of Council Regulation (EC) No 343\/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national (\u201cthe Dublin Regulation\u201d) the State responsible for examining his application for asylum was Malta and Malta had agreed to take him back. The applicant had failed to make out a convincing case that he was at risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention; moreover, he could be expected to make use of the domestic remedies offered by Malta if need be.","8. The applicant appealed to the Regional Court ( rechtbank ) of The Hague on the same day. As relevant to the case before the Court, he alleged that sending him back to Malta would expose him to conditions of detention violating Article 3 of the Convention. He submitted documents in support of this allegation. At the same time he requested a provisional measure in the form of a stay of deportation.","9. On 3 November 2010 the Regional Court of The Hague (sitting in Haarlem) dismissed both the request for a provisional measure and the appeal, finding that the applicant had failed to make out his case that Malta would fail to meet her Conventional obligations towards him.","10. Having in the meantime been informed that his transfer to Malta was scheduled for 10 November 2010, on 4 November 2010 the applicant requested the President of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division ( Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak ) of the Council of State ( Raad van State ) to order a provisional measure in the form of a stay of deportation. On 6 November 2010 the applicant lodged a further appeal ( hoger beroep ) with the Administrative Jurisdiction Division.","11. On 8 November 2010 the President of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division dismissed the applicant \u2019 s request for a provisional measure.","12. On 9 November 2010 the applicant was found to be in a psychiatric state of such seriousness that he was not fit to travel. His flight to Malta was cancelled and he was transferred to an institution for psychiatric treatment.","13. On 31 October 2011 the Administrative Jurisdiction Division dismissed the applicant \u2019 s further appeal on summary reasoning.","14. On 8 November 2010 the Court received from the applicant a request for a stay of expulsion to be indicated to the Netherlands Government. On 9 November 2010 President of the Chamber to which the case had been allocated decided, in the interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings before the Court, to indicate to the Government, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that the applicant should not be expelled to Malta for the duration of the proceedings before the Court.","15. The applicant has submitted a medical statement dated 15 September 2016 from which it appears that he continues to receive psychiatric treatment.","B. Relevant domestic and European law and practice","16. The relevant European, Maltese and Netherlands law, instruments, principles and practice in respect of asylum proceedings, reception of asylum-seekers and transfers of asylum-seekers under the Dublin Regulation are set out in Tarakhel v. Switzerland [GC], no. 29217\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 28-48, ECHR 2014 (extracts); Hussein Diirshi v. the Netherlands and Italy and 3 other applications (( dec. ), nos. 2314\/10, 18324\/10, 47851\/10 and 51377\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 98 \u2011 117, 10 September 2013); Mohammed Hussein v. the Netherlands and Italy (( dec. ), no. 27725\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 25-28 and 33-50, 2 April 2013); Suso Musa v. Malta, no. 42337\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 23-32, 23 July 2013; and Aden Ahmed v. Malta, no. 55352\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 31-39, 23 July 2013.","C. Factual information submitted by the Maltese Government and the applicant \u2019 s response","17. By letter of 15 February 2012, the Agent of the Maltese Government submitted replies to questions of the Judge Rapporteur (Rule 44 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Rules of Court). As relevant to the case now before the Court, these included the following:","\u201c 1. When did the applicant arrive in Malta and on what basis did he request protection (asylum, subsidiary protection or other) there? In what manner has this request been dealt with in practice; what was the outcome of the procedure and was the applicant provided with shelter, subsistence and medical care during this time?","The applicant entered Malta in an irregular manner on the 3 rd September 2008. Upon arrival, the applicant was served with a removal order and was put in the detention centre. Whilst in detention, the applicant was housed in a sheltered compound with adequate bedding and was provided on a daily basis with breakfast, lunch and dinner. The applicant was also given clothing and supplies to cater for his personal hygiene. Furthermore, the detention centres are equipped with the services of a medical practitioner and the services of a nurse and these services are available on a daily basis in order to assist and cater for the medical needs of persons in detention.","The applicant requested international protection at the Office of the Refugee Commissioner on the 24 th September 2008. The applicant requested asylum on the basis that he claimed that he was next in kin to become the king in his village but this was not accepted by his uncle who had poisoned his father and brother and had, therefore, instilled fear for personal safety in the applicant. In the applicant \u2019 s preliminary questionnaire which was conducted on the 24 th September 2008, the applicant declared that he was born on the 20 th March 1985. On the basis of this information, the applicant was presumably 22 years old upon arrival. The applicant did not mention that he suffered from any particular medical condition.","On the 5 th June 2009, the applicant sat for his asylum determination interview and he again confirmed his date of birth. The applicant added that apart from the problem that he had with his uncle in his country of origin, that is, Nigeria, there were no further problems in his country.","On the 20 th June 2009, the Refugee Commissioner rejected the applicant \u2019 s asylum application.","On the 16 th July 2009, the applicant appealed from the decision by filing an application before the Refugee Appeals Board. The appeal is still pending given that the applicant absconded from Malta in the meantime.","Furthermore, the applicant was released from detention on the 3 rd September 2009 and was moved to an open centre which is run by the Agency for the Welfare of Asylum Seekers. The applicant had free medical care when he was accommodated in the open centre given that his asylum application is still pending in the appeals board. The applicant remained in the open centre until the 26 th February 2010 and left the open centre without leaving any contact details.","2. What, if any, concrete, practical and effective steps are taken by the Maltese authorities to ensure that aliens returned to Malta under the terms of the Dublin II Regulation, considering also that the applicant is a minor with a medical condition, are provided with shelter, subsistence and medical care upon arrival in Malta?","The Government wishes to emphasize that the applicant always declared that he was not a minor upon his arrival: in fact the date of birth given to the local authorities makes it clear that the applicant was 22 years old upon arrival in Malta. Moreover, the applicant never complained that he suffered from any medical condition.","When aliens are returned to Malta, they are not being taken into police custody unless it results that an offence was committed by them in Malta.","Moreover, given that the applicant \u2019 s appeal is still pending, he is still considered to be an asylum seeker, and the applicant will be housed if he so wishes in the open centres where he will have access to free medical care pending the determination of his appeal. Moreover, if it is established that the applicant is a minor, the Agency for the Welfare of Asylum Seekers provides its services to unaccompanied minor asylum seekers under a \u2018 care order \u2019 issued in terms of the Children and Young Persons (Care Orders) Act.\u201d","18. The applicant replied on 13 March 2012, stating that living conditions in the open centres were very bad and unsuited to persons in his condition.","19. Appended to the applicant \u2019 s reply were:","(a) a report by the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, Mr Thomas Hammarberg, following his visit to Malta from 23 to 25 March 2011 ( CommDH (2011)17, 9 June 2011). On the subject of open centres, this report stated the following:","\u201c21. Material conditions in the open centres visited by the Commissioner were clearly sub-standard, with the Hal-Far tent village offering totally inadequate conditions of accommodation even for short periods of time. The village, which at the time of the visit hosted approximately 600 migrants, mainly from Africa, consists of tents, some of which had been damaged due to bad weather conditions, and containers, as well as offices, a classroom, sanitary facilities, a mosque, and a restaurant. Each tent is shared between approximately 20-25 men who sleep in bunk beds. The tents were clearly overcrowded and offered no privacy. Residents have complained to the Commissioner about bad sanitary conditions, including having to share the same space with persons who are sick, and about the very cold temperatures in the facilities in the winter and hot temperatures during the summer. The presence of rats was also reported by migrants. The tent village has a building with toilets, showers and basins for laundry. However, hot water is reportedly not always available. A female migrant stated that she avoided using the toilets at night as she felt unsafe covering the considerable distance between them and the container where she was accommodated. Reportedly the tent village was served by one social worker and one nurse. For medical services migrants were referred to centres outside of the tent village.","22. At walking distance from the tent village another complex, the Hangar Open Centre in Hal-Far, which includes a few dozen containers and a dilapidated hangar, accommodated approximately 500 migrants, mainly from Africa. At the time of the visit, the Commissioner noted that certain women and families with children were accommodated in containers separately from the male migrants. In the centre there was a recent building that included toilets and showers. The hangar was closed and not in use. However, the Commissioner was informed that following the new arrivals from Libya since his visit, the hangar has been re-opened and that tents have been placed inside of it to accommodate migrants. Material conditions in the hangar are reported to be seriously sub-standard, with lack of adequate bedding, dirty floors, toilets (which are shared by men, women and children), and kitchen, insufficient lighting, and the presence of rats. These conditions are all the more worrying as the Commissioner understands that a number of family units with young children are accommodated there, as mentioned below.","23. Conditions were somewhat better at the open centre in Marsa with approximately 600 male residents mostly from Somalia and Sudan. Unlike the tent village and hangar complex in Hal-Far, which are run directly by the Agency for the Welfare of Asylum Seekers (AWAS) the running of the centre in Marsa is subcontracted by the authorities to a non-governmental organisation (the Foundation for Shelter and Support to Migrants). The Commissioner notes that extensive refurbishment work, which would allow for better conditions and a more functional distribution of space, were underway during his visit. At the time of the visit however, serious overcrowding was still very obvious. Toilets visited by the Commissioner, although they had been cleaned, appeared to be run down, while the whole area of the open centre in Marsa, situated near a port, was covered by a smell which appeared to be caused by stagnating water in a neighbouring canal.\u201d","(b) two reports by Schweizerische Fl\u00fcchtlingshilfe, a Swiss NGO engaged in providing assistance to asylum-seekers and refugees, the first dated 6 September 2010, the second dated November 2011. Both describe the open centres as squalid and overcrowded and basic facilities, including for vulnerable groups, as insufficient.","(c) two letters from a child and juvenile psychiatrist who was treating the applicant, dated 23 February and 1 March 2012, describing the applicant as psychotic and potentially suicidal and expressing concern that conditions for the applicant \u2019 s reception in Malta should be appropriate to his mental state.","D. Maltese Government policy","20. On 30 December 2015 the Maltese Minister for Home Affairs and National Security published a paper entitled \u201cStrategy for the reception of asylum seekers and irregular migrants\u201d. The following is taken from this document:","\u201cMalta \u2019 s ratio of asylum seekers in proportion to population has consistently been among the highest, and very often the highest, among all EU Member States. In fact, Malta received a total of 20.2 asylum applications per 1,000 inhabitants between 2009 and 2013, compared to an EU average of 2.9. It is also to be stated that the Maltese Office of the Refugee Commissioner does not only receive international protection applications from irregular migrants; for during 2014 up to 824 asylum applications were also received from migrants who applied directly at the Office of the Refugee Commissioner. All this goes a long way to show that even though asylum applications may be generally constant, the number is at the same time elevated when compared to the country \u2019 s geo-physical and social circumstances and realities. Matters are further complicated by the fact that a majority of those who seek international protection in Malta are actually found to be deserving of such protection. This means that these people do not only require immediate reception arrangements, but also long-term solutions.","In view of the abovementioned circumstances, conditions in reception centres have been rendered difficult during certain periods; however over the last few years several initiatives were carried out in order to improve the living conditions of irregular migrants and asylum seekers residing in such centres, including by means of EU funding mechanisms. Similar to previous years, apposite European funding mechanisms and national funds will be utilised for the provision of adequate food supplies, bedding, clothing and medical support among other initiatives. Investment will also continue being made in reception facilities, where the required refurbishment initiatives in open and closed centres will be undertaken. Furthermore, Malta \u2019 s Open Reception capacity will be enhanced by means of a new Reception Facility, with the utilisation of EU funds, in order to better address current and future needs.","The present document seeks to build upon the existing reception system, introducing improvements at several stages with a view to ensuring compliance with new EU obligations, as well as to improve the system from the perspective of national security on the one hand and humanitarian and human rights considerations on the other.\u201d ( page 3)","and","\u201cAsylum seekers and beneficiaries of international protection released from the Initial Reception Facility or from Detention shall, if no alternative accommodation arrangements are available to them, be offered accommodation at Open Centres managed by the Agency for the Welfare of Asylum Seekers, or an entity or NGO working in partnership with the Agency. Such accommodation shall also be offered, on the same terms and conditions, to asylum seekers who would have reached Malta regularly, wherever Malta is the State responsible for determining their asylum application, and to beneficiaries of international protection granted protection by the Maltese authorities who would have been resettled or relocated into Malta.","...","Persons accommodated at Open Centres shall be provided with accommodation free of charge and, so long as they are not employed, with an allowance intended to cover daily expenses, such as meals and transport.","Migrants considered vulnerable, with the exception of unaccompanied minors, shall also be accommodated at Open Centres as per above. However, such persons shall be offered additional support, be it psychological, medical or otherwise as required.\u201d ( page 19)","E. Relevant international material","21. The United Nations Human Rights Council \u2019 s Working Group on Arbitrary Detention visited Malta between 23 and 25 June 2015. Its report of this visit was published by the Human Rights Council on 23 June 2016 (UN document A\/HRC\/33\/50\/Add.1). The following is taken from this report (page 10, advance unedited version):","\u201c37. The Working Group also visited Hal Far Open Centre for immigrants, outside Valetta, run by the Ministry for Social Affairs. The centre has a capacity for 800 persons. 260 were persons present during the Working Group \u2019 s visit. In the open centres, migrants enjoy freedom of movement but are requested though they are requested [sic] to undergo daily movement registration and provide details of their whereabouts.","38. The Working Group received information that 889 persons were living in three open centres including Hal Far, which consisted of prefabricated container housing units that had replaced scores of tents. Most of them were asylum-seekers awaiting decisions on their applications. Some migrants whose applications for asylum had already been rejected were also hosted there. Residents were suffering uncomfortable living conditions given inadequate ventilation and high temperatures in the summer months, in addition to the overcrowded condition in each unit. Residents were referred to the centre by immigration authorities.","39. The Working Group was informed that although the open centres were locked and guarded by security officers, residents were allowed to enter and exit the premises freely. Residents were allowed to stay for a maximum period of one year. Their beds would be restored after three weeks of absence so that it could be assigned to another migrant in need. It was brought to the attention of the Working Group that some residents arrived at the centre in April 2014, which means that they had been held there for more than 12 months. The Working Group was informed that during their stay at the open centre, residents were offered accommodation; free food, and were provided with a transportation allowance to enable them to travel to the city centre. In addition, the Working Group was informed that the centre would provide English language courses, computer training and cultural orientation.\u201d","F. Paola prison","22. There is a prison in Paola. Its official name is Corradino Correctional Facility. Conditions of detention in this institution were the object of Story and Others v. Malta, nos. 56854\/13, 57005\/13 and 57043\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 104-129, 29 October 2015."],"29212":["9.The applicants were born on 1January 1983 and 3 June 1980 respectively. Having left their home country, Bangladesh, they travelled through Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey, and entered the territory of the European Union in Greece. From there, they transited through the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to Serbia. Mr Ilias spent some 20 hours on Serbian territory; whereas Mr Ahmed two days. At last, on 15September2015 they arrived in the R\u00f6szke transit zone situated on the border between Hungary and Serbia. On the same day, they submitted applications for asylum.","10.From that moment on, the applicants stayed inside the transit zone, which they could not leave in the direction of Hungary. They alleged that the transit zone was, in their view, unsuitable for a stay longer than a day, especially in the face of their severe psychological condition. They were effectively locked in a confined area of some 110 square metres, part of the transit zone, surrounded by fence and guarded by officers; and were not allowed to leave it for Hungary. They claimed that they had no access to legal, social or medical assistance while in the zone. Moreover, there was no access to television or the Internet, landline telephone or any recreational facilities. They submitted that they stayed in a room of some 9 square metres containing beds for five.","11.The Government submitted that the containers measured 15 square metres. There were five beds in each container and an electric heater. The number of asylum-seekers never exceeded thirty in the material period. Hot and cold running water and electricity were supplied. Three pork-free meals were available daily to the applicants in a dining-container. Medical care was available for two hours daily by doctors of the Hungarian Defence Force.","12.According to the Report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (\u201cCPT\u201d) (see paragraphs 36 below), asylum seekers in the R\u00f6szke zone were accommodated in rooms of some 13 square metres in ground surface that were equipped with two to five beds fitted with clean mattresses, pillows and bedding. The accommodation containers had good access to natural light and artificial lighting, as well as to electric heating. Further, there was a narrow designated area in front of the containers to which foreign nationals had unrestricted access during the day. The sanitary facilities were satisfactory. The CPT delegation had a good impression of the health-care facilities and the general health care that was provided to foreign nationals in the establishment.","13.The applicants, both illiterate, were interviewed at once by the Citizenship and Immigration Authority (\u201cthe asylum authority\u201d). By mistake, the first applicant was interviewed with the assistance of an interpreter in Dari, which he does not speak. Both applicants\u2019 mother tongue was Urdu. According to the record of the meeting, the asylum authority gave the first applicant an information leaflet on asylum proceedings, which was also in Dari. The interview lasted two hours. An Urdu interpreter was present for the second applicant\u2019s interview, which lasted 22 minutes.","14.According to the notes taken during the interviews Hungary was the first country where both applicants had applied for asylum.","15.By a decision delivered on the very same day of 15 September 2015, the asylum authority rejected the applicants\u2019 asylum applications, finding them inadmissible on the grounds that Serbia was to be considered a \u201csafe third country\u201d according to Government Decree no. 191\/2015. (VII.21.) on safe countries of origin and safe third countries (\u201cthe Government Decree\u201d, see paragraph 33 below). The asylum authority ordered the applicants\u2019 expulsion from Hungary.","16.The applicants challenged the decision before the Szeged Administrative and Labour Court. On 20 September 2015 the applicants, through representatives of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (\u201cUNHCR\u201d) who had access to the transit zone, authorised two lawyers acting on behalf of the Hungarian Helsinki Committee to represent them in the judicial review procedure. However, the authorities did not allow the lawyers to enter the transit zone to consult with their clients until the evening of 21 September 2015, that is, after the court hearing.","17.On 21 September 2015 the court held a hearing regarding both applicants with the assistance of an Urdu interpreter. Both applicants stated that they had received a document from the Serbian authorities written in Serbian, which they could not understand, and that they had been ordered to leave Serbian territory. At the hearing, the second applicant submitted that he had applied for asylum in Serbia, but his application had not been examined.","18.The court annulled the asylum authority\u2019s decisions and remitted the case to it for fresh consideration. It relied on section 3(2) of the Government Decree and argued that the asylum authority should have analysed the actual situation in Serbia regarding asylum proceedings more thoroughly. It should also have informed the applicants of its conclusions on that point and afforded them three days to rebut the presumption of Serbia being a \u201csafe third country\u201d with the assistance of legal counsel.","19.On 23 September 2015, at the request of their lawyers, a psychiatrist commissioned by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee visited the applicants in the transit zone and interviewed them with the assistance of an interpreter attending by telephone. Her opinion stated that the first applicant (Mr Ilias) had left Bangladesh in 2010 partly because of a flood and partly because two political parties had been trying to recruit him. When he refused, he was attacked and suffered injuries. The psychiatrist observed that he was well oriented, able to focus and recall memories, but showed signs of anxiety, fear and despair. He was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (\u201cPTSD\u201d[1]).","20.With regard to the second applicant (Mr Ahmed), the medical report stated that he had fled his country five years before. He had previously worked abroad, during which time his whole family had died in a flood. He had then left Bangladesh and migrated through several countries in order to restart his life. He was found to be well oriented with no memory loss but with signs of depression, anxiety and despair. He was diagnosed with PTSD and as having an episode of depression.","21.Neither of the reports contained any indication of urgent medical or psychological treatment. However, the psychiatrist was of the opinion that the applicants\u2019 mental state was liable to deteriorate due to the confinement.","22.According to the documents in the case file, on 23 September 2015 the asylum authority informed the applicants\u2019 legal representatives by telephone that a hearing would be held two days later. However, the applicants submitted that no such precise information had been given to their representatives.","23.Since their legal representatives were not present at the hearing, the applicants decided not to make any statement. With the assistance of an Urdu interpreter, the asylum authority informed the applicants that they had three days to rebut the presumption of Serbia being a safe third country.","24.On 28 September 2015 the applicants\u2019 legal representatives made submissions to the asylum authority and requested that a new hearing be held, which they would attend.","25.On 30 September 2015 the asylum authority again rejected the applications for asylum. It found that the reports prepared by the psychiatrist had not provided enough grounds to grant the applicants the status of \u201cpersons deserving special treatment\u201d since they had not revealed any special need that could not be met in the transit zone. As to the status of Serbia being classed as a \u201csafe third country\u201d, the asylum authority noted that the applicants had not referred to any pressing individual circumstances substantiating the assertion that Serbia was not a safe third country in their case, thus they had not managed to rebut the presumption. As a consequence, the applicants\u2019 expulsion from Hungary was ordered.","26.The applicants sought judicial review by the Szeged Administrative and Labour Court. On 5 October 2015 the court upheld the asylum authority\u2019s decision. It observed in particular that, in the resumed proceedings, the asylum authority had examined, in accordance with the guidance of the court, whether Serbia could be regarded generally as a safe third country for refugees and had found on the basis of the relevant law and the country information obtained that it was so. It had considered the report of the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights published in 2015, the reports of August 2012 and June 2015 issued by the UNHCR concerning Serbia together with other documents submitted by the applicants. It had established on the basis of those documents that Serbia satisfied the requirements of section 2 (i) of the Asylum Act. The court was satisfied that the asylum authority had established the facts properly and observed the procedural rules, and because the reasons for its decision were clearly stated and were reasonable.","27.The court further emphasised that the applicants\u2019 statements given at the hearings were contradictory and incoherent. The first applicant had given various reasons for leaving his country and made confusing statements on whether he had received any documents from the Serbian authorities. The document he had finally produced was not in his name, and therefore it could not be taken into account as evidence. Never in the course of the administrative proceedings had he referred to the conduct of human traffickers before his hearing by the court. The second applicant\u2019s statements were incoherent on the issue of the duration of his stay in Serbia and the submission of a request for asylum. The applicants had not relied on any specific fact that could have led the authority to consider Serbia non-safe in their respect. They had contested the safety of Serbia only in general which was not sufficient to rebut the presumption.","28.Lastly, the court was satisfied that the authority\u2019s procedure had been in compliance with the law.","29.The final decision was served on the applicants on 8 October 2015. It was written in Hungarian but explained to them in Urdu. Escorted to the Serbian border by officers, the applicants subsequently left the transit zone for Serbia without physical coercion being applied.","30.On 22 October 2015 the transcript of the court hearing held on 5October 2015 was sent to the applicants\u2019 lawyer. On 10 December 2015 the lawyer received the Urdu translation of the court\u2019s decision taken at the hearing. On 9 March 2016 the applicants\u2019 petitions for review were dismissed on procedural grounds, since the K\u00faria held that it had no jurisdiction to review such cases.","34.The Directive 2013\/32\/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast) contains the following passages:"," \u201c(38) Many applications for international protection are made at the border or in a transit zone of a Member State prior to a decision on the entry of the applicant. Member States should be able to provide for admissibility and\/or substantive examination procedures which would make it possible for such applications to be decided upon at those locations in well-defined circumstances.","(39) In determining whether a situation of uncertainty prevails in the country of origin of an applicant, Member States should ensure that they obtain precise and up-to-date information from relevant sources such as EASO, UNHCR, the Council of Europe and other relevant international organisations. Member States should ensure that any postponement of conclusion of the procedure fully complies with their obligations under Directive 2011\/95\/EU and Article 41 of the Charter, without prejudice to the efficiency and fairness of the procedures under this Directive.","...","(43) Member States should examine all applications on the substance, i.e. assess whether the applicant in question qualifies for international protection in accordance with Directive 2011\/95\/EU, except where this Directive provides otherwise, in particular where it can reasonably be assumed that another country would do the examination or provide sufficient protection. In particular, Member States should not be obliged to assess the substance of an application for international protection where a first country of asylum has granted the applicant refugee status or otherwise sufficient protection and the applicant will be readmitted to that country.","(44) Member States should not be obliged to assess the substance of an application for international protection where the applicant, due to a sufficient connection to a third country as defined by national law, can reasonably be expected to seek protection in that third country, and there are grounds for considering that the applicant will be admitted or readmitted to that country. Member States should only proceed on that basis where that particular applicant would be safe in the third country concerned. In order to avoid secondary movements of applicants, common principles should be established for the consideration or designation by Member States of third countries as safe.","(45) Furthermore, with respect to certain European third countries, which observe particularly high human rights and refugee protection standards, Member States should be allowed to not carry out, or not to carry out full examination of, applications for international protection regarding applicants who enter their territory from such European third countries.","(46) Where Member States apply safe country concepts on a case-by-case basis or designate countries as safe by adopting lists to that effect, they should take into account, inter alia, the guidelines and operating manuals and the information on countries of origin and activities, including EASO Country of Origin Information report methodology, referred to in Regulation (EU) No 439\/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 establishing a European Asylum Support Office (6), as well as relevant UNHCR guidelines.","(47) In order to facilitate the regular exchange of information about the national application of the concepts of safe country of origin, safe third country and European safe third country as well as a regular review by the Commission of the use of those concepts by Member States, and to prepare for a potential further harmonisation in the future, Member States should notify or periodically inform the Commission about the third countries to which the concepts are applied. The Commission should regularly inform the European Parliament on the result of its reviews.","(48) In order to ensure the correct application of the safe country concepts based on up-to-date information, Member States should conduct regular reviews of the situation in those countries based on a range of sources of information, including in particular information from other Member States, EASO, UNHCR, the Council of Europe and other relevant international organisations. When Member States become aware of a significant change in the human rights situation in a country designated by them as safe, they should ensure that a review of that situation is conducted as soon as possible and, where necessary, review the designation of that country as safe. ...\u201d","Article 31","Examination procedure","\u201c...","8. Member States may provide that an examination procedure in accordance with the basic principles and guarantees of Chapter II be accelerated and\/or conducted at the border or in transit zones in accordance with Article 43 if:","...","(b) the applicant is from a safe country of origin within the meaning of this Directive ...\u201d","Article 33","Inadmissible applications","\u201c1. In addition to cases in which an application is not examined in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 604\/2013, Member States are not required to examine whether the applicant qualifies for international protection in accordance with Directive 2011\/95\/EU where an application is considered inadmissible pursuant to this Article.","2. Member States may consider an application for international protection as inadmissible only if:","(a) another Member State has granted international protection;","(b) a country which is not a Member State is considered as a first country of asylum for the applicant, pursuant to Article 35;","(c) a country which is not a Member State is considered as a safe third country for the applicant, pursuant to Article 38;","(d) the application is a subsequent application, where no new elements or findings relating to the examination of whether the applicant qualifies as a beneficiary of international protection by virtue of Directive 2011\/95\/EU have arisen or have been presented by the applicant; or","(e) a dependant of the applicant lodges an application, after he or she has in accordance with Article 7(2) consented to have his or her case be part of an application lodged on his or her behalf, and there are no facts relating to the dependant\u2019s situation which justify a separate application.\u201d","Article 35","The concept of first country of asylum","\u201cA country can be considered to be a first country of asylum for a particular applicant if:","(a) he or she has been recognised in that country as a refugee and he or she can still avail himself\/herself of that protection; or","(b) he or she otherwise enjoys sufficient protection in that country, including benefiting from the principle of non-refoulement,","provided that he or she will be readmitted to that country.","In applying the concept of first country of asylum to the particular circumstances of an applicant, Member States may take into account Article 38(1). The applicant shall be allowed to challenge the application of the first country of asylum concept to his or her particular circumstances.\u201d","Article 36","The concept of safe country of origin","\u201c1. A third country designated as a safe country of origin in accordance with this Directive may, after an individual examination of the application, be considered as a safe country of origin for a particular applicant only if:","(a) he or she has the nationality of that country; or","(b) he or she is a stateless person and was formerly habitually resident in that country, and he or she has not submitted any serious grounds for considering the country not to be a safe country of origin in his or her particular circumstances and in terms of his or her qualification as a beneficiary of international protection in accordance with Directive 2011\/95\/EU.","2. Member States shall lay down in national legislation further rules and modalities for the application of the safe country of origin concept.\u201d","Article 38","The concept of safe third country","\u201c1. Member States may apply the safe third country concept only where the competent authorities are satisfied that a person seeking international protection will be treated in accordance with the following principles in the third country concerned:","(a) life and liberty are not threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion;","(b) there is no risk of serious harm as defined in Directive 2011\/95\/EU;","(c) the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with the Geneva Convention is respected;","(d) the prohibition of removal, in violation of the right to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as laid down in international law, is respected; and","(e) the possibility exists to request refugee status and, if found to be a refugee, to receive protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention.","2. The application of the safe third country concept shall be subject to rules laid down in national law, including:","(a) rules requiring a connection between the applicant and the third country concerned on the basis of which it would be reasonable for that person to go to that country;","(b) rules on the methodology by which the competent authorities satisfy themselves that the safe third country concept may be applied to a particular country or to a particular applicant. Such methodology shall include case-by-case consideration of the safety of the country for a particular applicant and\/or national designation of countries considered to be generally safe;","(c) rules in accordance with international law, allowing an individual examination of whether the third country concerned is safe for a particular applicant which, as a minimum, shall permit the applicant to challenge the application of the safe third country concept on the grounds that the third country is not safe in his or her particular circumstances. The applicant shall also be allowed to challenge the existence of a connection between him or her and the third country in accordance with point (a).","3. When implementing a decision solely based on this Article, Member States shall:","(a) inform the applicant accordingly; and","(b) provide him or her with a document informing the authorities of the third country, in the language of that country, that the application has not been examined in substance.","4. Where the third country does not permit the applicant to enter its territory, Member States shall ensure that access to a procedure is given in accordance with the basic principles and guarantees described in Chapter II...\u201d","Article 39","The concept of European safe third country","\u201c1. Member States may provide that no, or no full, examination of the application for international protection and of the safety of the applicant in his or her particular circumstances as described in Chapter II shall take place in cases where a competent authority has established, on the basis of the facts, that the applicant is seeking to enter or has entered illegally into its territory from a safe third country according to paragraph 2.","2. A third country can only be considered as a safe third country for the purposes of paragraph 1 where:","(a) it has ratified and observes the provisions of the Geneva Convention without any geographical limitations;","(b) it has in place an asylum procedure prescribed by law; and","(c) it has ratified the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and observes its provisions, including the standards relating to effective remedies.","3. The applicant shall be allowed to challenge the application of the concept of European safe third country on the grounds that the third country concerned is not safe in his or her particular circumstances.","4. The Member States concerned shall lay down in national law the modalities for implementing the provisions of paragraph 1 and the consequences of decisions pursuant to those provisions in accordance with the principle of non-refoulement, including providing for exceptions from the application of this Article for humanitarian or political reasons or for reasons of public international law.","5. When implementing a decision solely based on this Article, the Member States concerned shall:","(a) inform the applicant accordingly; and","(b) provide him or her with a document informing the authorities of the third country, in the language of that country, that the application has not been examined in substance.","6. Where the safe third country does not readmit the applicant, Member States shall ensure that access to a procedure is given in accordance with the basic principles and guarantees described in Chapter II.","7. Member States shall inform the Commission periodically of the countries to which this concept is applied in accordance with this Article...\u201d","Article 43","Border procedures","\u201c1. Member States may provide for procedures, in accordance with the basic principles and guarantees of Chapter II, in order to decide at the border or transit zones of the Member State on:","(a) the admissibility of an application, pursuant to Article 33, made at such locations; and\/or","(b) the substance of an application in a procedure pursuant to Article 31(8).","2. Member States shall ensure that a decision in the framework of the procedures provided for in paragraph 1 is taken within a reasonable time. When a decision has not been taken within four weeks, the applicant shall be granted entry to the territory of the Member State in order for his or her application to be processed in accordance with the other provisions of this Directive.","3. In the event of arrivals involving a large number of third-country nationals or stateless persons lodging applications for international protection at the border or in a transit zone, which makes it impossible in practice to apply there the provisions of paragraph 1, those procedures may also be applied where and for as long as these third-country nationals or stateless persons are accommodated normally at locations in proximity to the border or transit zone.\u201d","35.The Directive 2013\/33\/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast) provides as follows:","Article 8","Detention","\u201c1. Member States shall not hold a person in detention for the sole reason that he or she is an applicant in accordance with Directive 2013\/32\/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection.","2. When it proves necessary and on the basis of an individual assessment of each case, Member States may detain an applicant, if other less coercive alternative measures cannot be applied effectively.","3. An applicant may be detained only:","(a) in order to determine or verify his or her identity or nationality;","(b) in order to determine those elements on which the application for international protection is based which could not be obtained in the absence of detention, in particular when there is a risk of absconding of the applicant;","(c) in order to decide, in the context of a procedure, on the applicant\u2019s right to enter the territory;","(d) when he or she is detained subject to a return procedure under Directive 2008\/115\/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, in order to prepare the return and\/or carry out the removal process, and the Member State concerned can substantiate on the basis of objective criteria, including that he or she already had the opportunity to access the asylum procedure, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that he or she is making the application for international protection merely in order to delay or frustrate the enforcement of the return decision;","(e) when protection of national security or public order so requires;","(f) in accordance with Article 28 of Regulation (EU) No 604\/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person.","The grounds for detention shall be laid down in national law.","4. Member States shall ensure that the rules concerning alternatives to detention, such as regular reporting to the authorities, the deposit of a financial guarantee, or an obligation to stay at an assigned place, are laid down in national law.\u201d","36.The Report to the Hungarian Government on the visit to Hungary carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (\u201cCPT\u201d) from 21 to 27October 2015 contains the following passages:","\u201cThe CPT notes the efforts made to provide information and legal assistance to foreign nationals in immigration and asylum detention. However, a lack of information on their legal situation, on the future steps in their respective proceedings and the length of their detention was perceived by foreign nationals as a major problem in most of the establishments visited ...","As regards the safeguards to protect foreign nationals against refoulement, the CPT expresses doubts, in view of the relevant legislative framework and its practical operation, whether border asylum procedures are in practice accompanied by appropriate safeguards, whether they provide a real opportunity for foreign nationals to present their case and whether they involve an individual assessment of the risk of ill-treatment in the case of removal.","...","\u201cThe two transit zones visited by the delegation at R\u00f6szke and Tompa were located on Hungarian territory ... Different containers served as offices, waiting rooms, a dining room and sanitary facilities (with toilets, wash basins, showers and hot-water boilers), and approximately ten of them were used for the accommodation of foreign nationals. (In footnote: The sanitary facilities were in a good state and call for no particular comment.)","...","All accommodation containers measured some 13 m\u00b2 and were equipped with two to five beds fitted with clean mattresses, pillows and bedding. They were clean and had good access to natural light and artificial lighting, as well as to electric heating. Further, in both transit zones visited, there was a narrow designated area in front of the containers which was fenced off from the rest of the compound of the transit zone and to which foreign nationals had unrestricted access during the day.","As far as the delegation could ascertain, foreign nationals had usually only been held in the transit zones for short periods (up to 13 hours) and hardly ever overnight. That said, if foreign nationals were to be held in a transit zone for longer periods, the maximum capacity of the accommodation containers should be reduced and they should be equipped with some basic furniture.","...","On the whole, the delegation gained a generally favourable impression of the health-care facilities and the general health care provided to foreign nationals in all the establishments visited.","...","Further, some detained foreign nationals met by the delegation were unaware of their right of access to a lawyer, let alone one appointed ex officio. A few foreign nationals claimed that they had been told by police officers that such a right did not exist in Hungary. Moreover, the majority of those foreign nationals who did have an ex officio lawyer appointed complained that they did not have an opportunity to consult the lawyer before being questioned by the police or before a court hearing and that the lawyer remained totally passive throughout the police questioning or court hearing. In this context, it is also noteworthy that several foreign nationals stated that they were not sure whether they had a lawyer appointed as somebody unknown to them was simply present during the official proceedings without talking to them and without saying anything in their interest.","...","However, the majority of foreign nationals interviewed by the delegation claimed that they had not been informed of their rights upon their apprehension by the police (let alone in a language they could understand) and that all the documents they had received since their entry into the country were in Hungarian.","...","... many foreign nationals (including unaccompanied juveniles) complained about the quality of interpretation services and in particular that they were made to sign documents in Hungarian, the contents of which were not translated to them and which they consequently did not understand.","...","... the CPT has serious doubts whether border asylum procedures are in practice accompanied by appropriate safeguards, whether they provide a real opportunity for foreign nationals to present their case and involve an individual assessment of the risk of ill-treatment in case of removal and thus provide an effective protection against refoulement, bearing also in mind that, according to UNHCR, Serbia cannot be considered a safe country of asylum due to the shortcomings in its asylum system, notably its inability to cope with the increasing numbers of asylum applications...\u201d","37.In a report entitled \u201cHungary as a country of asylum. Observations on restrictive legal measures and subsequent practice implemented between July 2015 and March 2016\u201d, published in May 2016, the UNHCR made the following observations:","\u201c19. Additionally, as noted above in Paragraph 15, the Act on the State Border refers to asylum-seekers being \u201ctemporarily accommodated\u201d in the transit zone. The Hungarian authorities claim that such individuals are not \u201cdetained\u201d since they are free to leave the transit zone at any time in the direction from which they came. However, as outlined above in Paragraph 16, they are not allowed to enter Hungary. In UNHCR\u2019s view, this severely restricts the freedom of movement and can be qualified as detention. As such, it should be governed inter alia by the safeguards on detention in the EU\u2019s recast Reception Conditions Directive (RCD). ...","71. In any event, UNHCR maintains the position taken in its observations on the Serbian asylum system in August 2012 that asylum-seekers should not be returned to Serbia.141 While the number of asylum-seekers passing through that country has since greatly increased, leaving its asylum system with even less capacity to respond in accordance with international standards than before, many of UNHCR\u2019s findings and conclusions of August 2012 remain valid. For example, between 1 January and 31August 2015, the Misdemeanour Court in Kanji\u017ea penalized 3,150 third country nationals readmitted to Serbia from Hungary for illegal stay or illegal border crossing, and sentenced most of them to a monetary fine. Such individuals are denied the right to (re) apply for asylum in Serbia.\u201d","38.A report entitled \u201cCrossing Boundaries: The new asylum procedure at the border and restrictions to accessing protection in Hungary\u201d by the European Council for Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) prepared on 1October2015 contains the following passages:","\u201c... transfers to Hungary are liable to expose applicants to a real risk of chain deportation to Serbia, which may trigger a practice of indirect refoulement sanctioned by human rights law. On that very basis, a number of Dublin transfers to Hungary have been suspended by German and Austrian courts.","In view of the (retroactive) automatic applicability of the \u2018safe third country\u2019 concept in respect of persons entering through Serbia and the risk of refoulement stemming from their return to Hungary, ECRE calls on Member States to refrain from transferring applicants for international protection to Hungary under the Dublin Regulation.\u201d","39.The ECRE\u2019s \u201cCase Law Fact Sheet: Prevention of Dublin Transfers to Hungary\u201d prepared in January 2016 contains the following passages:"," \u201cAn overwhelming amount of recent case law has cited the August and September legislative amendments to the Hungarian Asylum Act when preventing transfers to the country. Moreover, the Hungarian legislative revisions have impacted upon policy changes elsewhere, as evidenced by the Danish Refugee Appeals Board decision in October 2015 to suspend all Dublin transfers to Hungary ...","The entry into force in August and September 2015 of legislation creating a legal basis for the construction of a fence on the border between Hungary and Serbia in conjunction with further legislative amendments criminalising irregular entry and damage to the fence has resulted in an extremely hostile environment towards those seeking asylum, violating the right to asylum, the right to effective access to procedures and the non-criminalisation of refugees ...","It is the imposition of an admissibility procedure at the transit zones, and in particular the inadmissibility ground relating to the Safe Third Country concept, which has been at the forefront of most jurisprudence. Government Decree 191\/2015 designates countries such as Serbia as safe, leading Hungarian authorities to declare all applications of asylum seekers coming through Serbia as inadmissible. Given the location of the transit zones at the Hungarian-Serbian border over 99% of asylum applications, without an in-merit consideration of the protection claims, have been rejected on this basis by the Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN). Moreover, the clear EU procedural violations that this process gives rise to have been documented by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee as well as ECRE. From the latest statistics this process is still in full swing with the Commissioner for Human Rights submitting that between mid-September and the end of November 2015, 311 out of the 372 inadmissible decisions taken at both the border and in accelerated procedures were found as such on the safe third country concept ground. With a clear lack of an effective remedy against such a decision available and an immediate accompanying entry ban for 1 or 2 years, various actors as well as the judiciary have argued that Hungary is in breach of its non-refoulement obligations.\u201d","40.A report entitled \u201cSerbia As a Country of Asylum; Observations on the Situation of Asylum-Seekers and Beneficiaries of International Protection in Serbia\u201d prepared in August 2012 by the UNHCR contains the following passages:","\u201c4. UNHCR concludes that there are areas for improvement in Serbia\u2019s asylum system, noting that it presently lacks the resources and performance necessary to provide sufficient protection against refoulement, as it does not provide asylum-seekers an adequate opportunity to have their claims considered in a fair and efficient procedure. Furthermore, given the state of Serbia\u2019s asylum system, Serbia should not be considered a safe third country, and in this respect, UNHCR urges States not to return asylum-seekers to Serbia on this basis.","...","76. However, UNHCR received reports in November 2011 and again in February 2012 that migrants transferred from Hungary to Serbia were being put in buses and taken directly to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. ... There have been other reports that the Serbian police have rounded up irregular migrants in Serbia and were similarly sent back to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.","...","79. ... The current system is manifestly not capable of processing the increasing numbers of asylum- seekers in a manner consistent with international and EU norms. These shortcomings, viewed in combination with the fact that there has not been a single recognition of refugee status since April 2008, strongly suggest that the asylum system as a whole is not adequately recognizing those in need of international protection.\u201d","41.A report entitled \u201cCountry Report: Serbia\u201d, up-to-date as of 31December 2016, prepared by AIDA, Asylum Information Database, published by ECRE stated that the \u201cadoption of the new Asylum Act, initially foreseen for 2016, has been postponed\u201d.","42.A report entitled \u201cThe former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia As a Country of Asylum\u201d prepared in August 2015 by the UNHCR contains the following passage:","\u201c5. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has a national asylum law, the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection. This was substantially amended in 2012, with the amended version having come into force in 2013. UNHCR participated in the drafting process, in an effort to ensure that the legislation is in line with international standards. The law currently incorporates many key provisions of the 1951 Convention. Furthermore, the provisions on subsidiary protection in the law are in conformity with relevant EU standards. The law also provides for certain rights up to the standard of nationals for those who benefit from international protection, as well as free legal aid during all stages of the asylum procedure. Nevertheless, some key provisions are still not in line with international standards. In response to a sharp increase in irregular migration, the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection was recently further amended to change the previously restrictive regulations for applying for asylum in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which exposed asylum-seekers to a risk of arbitrary detention and push-backs at the border. The new amendments, which were adopted on 18 June 2015, introduce a procedure for registration of the intention to submit an asylum application at the border, protect asylum-seekers from the risk of refoulement and allow them to enter and be in the country legally for a short timeframe of 72 hours, before formally registering their asylum application.","...","46. Despite these positive developments, UNHCR considers that significant weaknesses persist in the asylum system in practice. At the time of writing, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has not been able to ensure that asylum-seekers have access to a fair and efficient asylum procedure. ... Inadequate asylum procedures result in low recognition rates, even for the minority of asylum-seekers who stay in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to wait for the outcome of their asylum claim.\u201d","43.The European Commission\u2019s Recommendation of 8.12.2016 addressed to the Member States on the resumption of transfers to Greece under Regulation (EU) No. 604\/2013 contains the following passages:","\u201c(1) The transfer of applicants for international protection to Greece under Regulation (EU) No. 604\/2013 (hereafter \u2018the Dublin Regulation\u2019) has been suspended by Member States since 2011, following two judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)1, which identified systemic deficiencies in the Greek asylum system, resulting in a violation of the fundamental rights of applicants for international protection transferred from other Member States to Greece under Regulation (EC) No.343\/2003. ...","(8) In its previous Recommendations, the Commission has noted the improvements that Greece has made to its legislative framework to ensure that the new legal provisions of the recast Asylum Procedures Directive 2013\/32\/EU and some of the recast Reception Conditions Directive 2013\/33\/EU have been transposed into the national legislation. A new law (Law 4375\/2016) was adopted by the Greek Parliament on 3 April 201614. On 22 June 2016, the Parliament approved an amendment to Law 4375\/2016 which, inter alia, modified the composition of the Appeals Committees and the right of asylum seekers to an oral hearing before them. On 31 August 2016, the Greek Parliament also adopted a law regarding school-aged refugee children residing in Greece. ...","(33) The Commission acknowledges the important progress made by Greece, assisted by the Commission, EASO, Member States and international and non-governmental organisations, to improve the functioning of the Greek asylum system since the M.S.S. judgement in 2011. However, Greece is still facing a challenging situation in dealing with a large number of new asylum applicants, notably arising from the implementation of the pre-registration exercise, the continuing irregular arrivals of migrants, albeit at lower levels than before March 2016, and from its responsibilities under the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement. ...","(34) However, significant progress has been attained by Greece in putting in place the essential institutional and legal structures for a properly functioning asylum system and, there is a good prospect for a fully functioning asylum system being in place in the near future, once all the remaining shortcomings have been remedied, in particular as regards reception conditions and the treatment of vulnerable persons, including unaccompanied minors. It is, therefore, appropriate to recommend that transfers should resume gradually and on the basis of individual assurances, taking account of the capacities for reception and treatment of applications in conformity with relevant EU legislation, and taking account of the currently inadequate treatment of certain categories of persons, in particular vulnerable applicants, including unaccompanied minors. The resumption should, moreover, not be applied retroactively but concern asylum applicants for whom Greece is responsible starting from a specific date in order to avoid that an unsustainable burden is placed on Greece. It should be recommended that this date is set at 15 March 2017.\u201d"],"29218":["5.The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Sarbice Pierwsze.","A.Background to the case","6.On 1 January 1999 the applicant was a victim of a car accident in which he suffered several bodily injuries. He was treated in Hamburg until 27February 1999.","7.In the year 1999 the applicant was suspected of having committed several thefts of leased movable goods of considerable value, in particular cars, during the period he spent running a company.","8.In June 1999 the applicant moved to New Zealand and the proceedings against him were stayed.","9.On 29 March 2004 the Minister of Justice requested that the applicant be extradited to Poland.","10.Following an extradition hearing in New Zealand, in 2010 the applicant was transported to Poland.","B.The applicant\u2019s arrest and detention","11.On 9March 2010 the applicant was arrested.","12.On 13March 2010 the Kielce District Court (S\u0105d Rejonowy) decided to detain him on remand for a period of three months, until 9 June 2010. The court referred to the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences with which he was charged and in respect of which he would face, if found guilty, deprivation of liberty for a term exceeding eight years. It further noted that there was a reasonable fear that the applicant might obstruct the proceedings or go into hiding until the charges against him became time-barred. The court pointed out that the applicant had not remained at his place of residence, had refused to accept a summons from the prosecutor and, although he was aware that an investigation was being carried out in respect of him, he had moved to New Zealand in 1999 with a view to waiting until the charges that had been brought against him became time-barred; consequently, the proceedings against him had had to be stayed for ten years.","As regards the applicant\u2019s state of health the court found that \u201cthe problems cited by the applicant do not require any medical treatment\u201d.","13.On 7 June 2010 the applicant\u2019s detention was extended until 7September 2010. The court again referred to the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences with which he was charged and on the severity of the penalty to which he would be liable if found guilty. It further noted that there was a reasonable fear that the applicant might obstruct the proceedings or go into hiding. In this respect the court referred to the fact that the applicant had moved to New Zealand on a previous occasion and had had to be located by means of an international search.","14.The applicant appealed, referring, among other things, to his state of health. He submitted that he was suffering from serious neurological and orthopaedic problems which, if not treated properly, would pose a serious danger to his health.","15.On 29 July 2010 the Cracow Court of Appeal (S\u0105d Apelacyjny) upheld the challenged decision, confirming the Regional Court\u2019s view that the detention had been justified by the severe penalty and the possibility that the applicant might obstruct the proceedings. As regards the applicant\u2019s state of health the court referred to two medical experts\u2019 opinions dated 15April and 14June 2010 respectively, according to which the applicant could be treated in the detention facilities and was able to participate in the trial.","16.On 25 August 2010 the relevant bill of indictment was submitted to the Kielce Regional Court (S\u0105d Okr\u0119gowy).","17.On 2 September 2010 the Kielce Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention for a further five months, until 4 February 2011. The court justified its decision by citing the high probability that the applicant had committed the offences with which he had been charged. It also found that there was a risk that the applicant might go into hiding or obstruct the proceedings; it did not, however, give any grounds for its findings. Lastly, the court stated that there were \u201cno grounds for releasing the applicant from detention ... in particular, [there were none of the grounds listed] in Article259 of the Code of Criminal Proceedings\u201d.","18.On 19 October 2010 the first hearing took place. Further hearings were scheduled for 2 and 30 December 2010, 25 January, 17 February, 17March, 5 and 28 April, 17 May, 16 June, 14 July, 4 August, 6, 27 and 29September, 6 and 27 October, 10 and 24 November, and 8 December 2011.","19.On 25 January 2011 the Kielce Regional Court again extended the applicant\u2019s detention for further five months. Apart from the grounds previously relied on, the court noted that the applicant had requested that several new witnesses be heard and considered that he might influence their testimony if released. The court considered that the applicant\u2019s declarations that he would appear before the court upon each and every summons did not correspond with his previous behaviour. It noted that on 19 October 2010 the applicant had resisted being taken to the court. According to the Government\u2019s submissions he had refused to be taken to the court without a wheelchair which had been provided by his wife. Lastly, the court determined, relying on the opinion of an expert neurologist and orthopaedist, that the applicant could be treated in detention.","20.The applicant appealed. He referred, among other things, to his state of health, the fact that he had to use a wheelchair, that he was waiting for a spine operation and that he could not undergo physiotherapy under conditions of detention.","21.On 22 February 2011 the Cracow Court of Appeal upheld the challenged decision relying, as previously, on the fact that in the past the applicant had gone into hiding. The court also found that the applicant had again obstructed the proceedings in that he had refused to be transported to the court hearing without a wheelchair. The Court of Appeal did not uphold the Regional Court\u2019s finding that the applicant might tamper with evidence; this, however, did not influence the court\u2019s overall assessment of the circumstances of the case. As regards the applicant\u2019s state of health, the court referred to a medical opinion issued on 28 October 2010 by an expert neurologist and orthopaedist according to which the applicant could participate in the court hearings and could be transported to court without a wheelchair.","22.On 21 June 2011 the Kielce Regional Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 21 December 2011. The court noted that the results of the applicant\u2019s recent treatment in the \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Prison hospital ward had been satisfactory and that according to the experts in neurology and orthopaedics (see paragraph 21 above) he could be treated in prison facilities. The applicant appealed.","23.On 13July 2011 the Cracow Court of Appeal examined the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the challenged decision. As regards the applicant\u2019s state of health, the court, relying on a physician expert opinion of May 2011, considered that there were no obstacles to his further detention and his treatment in the prison facilities. The court noted that if the applicant\u2019s further detention threatened his health he could be released at any time ex officio.","24.Meanwhile, on 28 June 2011, the applicant underwent a medical examination ordered by the Kielce Regional Court. The applicant arrived for the examination in a wheelchair, from which he could not get up. The Government contested this submission. The doctor found that the applicant suffered from chronic pain of the thoracic and lumbar vertebral column on the basis of multilevel disc osteoarthritis and that he had suffered a spinal injury and left hip injury in 1999 and 2005 respectively. The doctor also ordered a further examination of the applicant, which took place on 16August 2011. On 16 October 2011 a fresh opinion was delivered, the relevant part of which reads as follows:","\u201cThere are obstacles to [an extension of the] stay of the applicant in the Kielce Detention Centre because he cannot receive neurological treatment there ... the results of the electromyography examination (EMG) show a gradually worsening] dysfunction of the peripheral nerves ... which qualifies the applicant for neurological surgery that can only be executed in a neurological ward. After the operation and rehabilitation treatment, depending on his neurological state, the patient will be able to continue his detention in the Kielce detention centre\u201d.","The doctor further stated that an objective assessment of the neurological state of the applicant was not possible due to his lack of cooperation.","25.On 27 October 2011 the applicant\u2019s lawyer requested that the Kielce Regional Court lift the preventive measure applied to the applicant and to release him from detention. The lawyer referred to the applicant\u2019s state of health. He referred, among other things, to the fact that the Kielce Regional Court had to order breaks in hearings because the applicant had to rest \u201cin a horizontal position\u201d. He also requested that the court order a further examination of the applicant by a specialist in neurology.","26.On 8 November 2011 the Kielce Regional Court refused the applicant\u2019s lawyer\u2019s requests. The court held that it had already ordered a medical opinion on 2 November 2011 and that that opinion would be delivered soon. The court furthermore found that the circumstances justifying the applicant\u2019s detention had not ceased to exist and that they had already been listed in the court\u2019s decision of 21 June 2011. The court did not find it necessary to repeat them.","27.On 14 November 2011 a fresh opinion was delivered by a specialist in neurology. The doctor found that:","\u201c1. The applicant\u2019s further stay in detention and refusal of medical (neurological) treatment may constitute a serious danger to his health or even life.","2. The post-operation rehabilitation should take place in a good rehabilitation ward ...it may also take place in detention, however I do not know in which detention centre such a ward exists.\u201d","28.On 14 November 2011 the applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged an appeal against the court\u2019s decision of 8 November 2011. He requested the court, in the event that the appeal was not granted, to change the preventive measure applied to the applicant and to impose bail on him of a \u201creasonable amount\u201d.","29.On 22 November 2011 the Kielce Regional Court, sitting as a panel of three judges, upheld the challenged decision. The court held that the Kielce Regional Court, which made a decision in first instance in composition of single judge, had been aware of the applicant\u2019s state of health and that this matter had been taken into account each time his detention had been extended. Apparently, the court had not yet become aware of the medical expert opinion of 14November 2011.","30.On 8 December 2011 the Kielce Regional Court, acting ex officio, released the applicant and imposed another preventive measure on him, namely that of police supervision. The court found that the grounds originally relied on to impose and extend the applicant\u2019s detention, in particular the risk that he might go into hiding, still existed. However, given the applicant\u2019s state of health, his release was necessary. The court referred to a medical opinion which was completed and issued on 14November 2011 (see above). It was determined that the only neurological ward in which the applicant could be treated in detention was at the Gdansk Remand Centre. The applicant, however, refused to agree to be operated on there. He undertook at the same time that if he were to be released, he would undergo such an operation once he was at liberty. He also indicated the address where he could be reached and where he would collect his correspondence.","31.On 8 December 2011 the applicant was released from detention.","32.According to the last information available to the Court, the criminal proceedings against him are still pending.","33.Between 12 and 20 January 2016 he was hospitalised again in a hospital in Katowice.","C.The applicant\u2019s treatment in the prison facilities","34.According to the applicant\u2019s submissions, at the time of his deportation to Poland from New Zealand the whole documentation pertaining to his case \u2013 including his medical file and information about medications that he was taking \u2013 had been handed over to the Polish authorities.","35.As stated by the Government and not contested by the applicant, the applicant had undergone a preliminary examination on 11 March 2010 and at that time he had not informed the doctor of any illness. He stated that he felt well. He had informed the prison authorities of his previously incurred injuries only after he had been detained at the Kielce Remand Centre. As stated by the Government and not contested by the applicant, the applicant had an easy access to the shower.","36.On 23 March 2010 the applicant was examined by the neurologist for the first time. He was advised to continue his pharmacological treatment (he had his own medications) and to use a hard mattress.","37.On 26 April 2010 the applicant was examined by a physician. He complained of problems with walking and was therefore prescribed crutches. The applicant submitted that he had been prescribed crutches after he had collapsed on the floor in cell no. 114 at the Kielce Remand Centre.","38.On 1 June 2010 the applicant underwent a further neurological examination. The relevant note made by the doctor read:","\u201cHe claims that he does not have the proper mattress (prescribed on 23 March 2010). Declares [that he has] pain in his left leg ... during the examination [he did] not follow simple orders but afterwards stood up without any problems (sprawnie) on his own. He walks with the aid of crutches\u201d","39.On 17 June 2010 the applicant collapsed while being questioned at the police station. He was then taken to hospital.","40.On 28 June 2010 the physician considered it necessary to conduct a CAT scan of the applicant\u2019s spine. The examination took place on 30June 2010.","41.On 30 July 2010 the applicant consulted a neurosurgeon who, after seeing the results of the CAT scan, found no grounds for the applicant to undergo a spine operation. He advised pharmacological treatment and physiotherapy.","42.On 25 August 2010 the applicant requested a wheelchair. According to the Government the director of the facility\u2019s health centre found no grounds for granting his request.","43.According to the applicant\u2019s submissions on 31 August 2010 he again collapsed on the floor in the corridor of block X of the Kielce Remand Centre. Only then was he prescribed a wheelchair. However, since the chair which he received in the detention centre was, according to his submission, in such a state that its use constituted a danger for persons using it, the applicant requested his wife to provide him with another wheelchair; this she did, on 8 October 2010, with the approval of the prison authorities. The Government submitted that the approval was granted for \u201csocial reasons\u201d although there were no medical grounds for so doing. However, the applicant submitted copies of two medical certificates dated 31August2010, together with a note made by a psychiatrist, which read:","\u201cThe patient collapsed in the corridor (lost consciousness?) ... Patient in generally good condition.","- Wheelchair.","- Neurological examination\u201d","The applicant submitted another note made by a neurologist, which read:","\u201cToday [he] lost consciousness. He complains of pain in his left hip joint.\u201d","44.The applicant submitted a copy of the record of the questioning of a certain S.L. for the purpose of civil proceedings for compensation which the applicant had instituted against the State Treasury. S.L., who had been placed in the same cell as the applicant between July and December 2010, testified, in so far as relevant, as follows:","\u201cOur cell was on the [first] floor; one had to climb a long flight of stairs. The applicant used a wheelchair. I and J. (another cell inmate) would carry the applicant up these stairs. When J. was not there one of guards would come and help us out.\u201d","45.On 19 October 2010 the applicant resisted being taken to the court hearing without a wheelchair.","46.On the same day a doctor examined the applicant at the request of the Kielce Regional Court. The relevant parts of the medical certificate issued after the examination read as follows:","\u201cToday he claims that his left leg is weak [and that] he has pain in his lumbar spine. ... While undressing, he easily lifts his legs without manifesting pain. When he stands up he drags his left leg and claims that he cannot stand on that leg because it is weak.","In the detention he occasionally (okresowo) uses a wheelchair; however, during none of the neurological or neurosurgeon consultations was it determined that the applicant needed to use a wheelchair.","In connection with the pain reported by the applicant and the results of his medical examinations, the specialist opinion of an expert neurosurgeon or neurologist is necessary in order to determine whether the applicant may be transported to court without a wheelchair. Aggravation possible.\u201d","47.On 18 February 2011 the applicant complained about the pain in his spine and he was transported to \u0141\u00f3d\u017a prison no. 2, where he underwent treatment in the prison hospital. He remained there until 21 April 2011.","48.During his stay in the prison hospital he remained in a cell which had been adapted for detainees using wheelchairs. According to the Government\u2019s submissions not contested by the applicant he had the assistance of professional \u201ccarriers\u201d when he wanted to go to the exercise yard (the Government did not explain what exactly should be understood under that notion, in particular whether the \u201ccarriers\u201d referred to above were the prison guards or other prison staff). He attended various forms of kinesiotherapy, including exercises to strengthen the muscles of his legs, and various other forms of treatment. He also consulted a dermatologist, orthopaedist, neurologist and ophthalmologist.","49.After his release from the prison hospital the applicant was advised to continue performing the exercises he had been taught. From 21April 2011 until his release on 8December 2011 he was again detained in the Kielce Remand Centre.","50.As emerges from the decision of 10January 2012 about the degree of the applicant\u2019s disability, he was moderately disabled and able to work in special conditions. He did not need constant assistance of another person."],"29233":["THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE","6.The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Nizhniy Novgorod.","A.The applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment at the Sovetskiy district police station in Nizhniy Novgorod","7.At about 10.30 a.m. on 24 May 2004 two police officers from the Sovetskiy district police visited the applicant and invited him to answer some questions. With the permission of his mother, the applicant, a minor at the time, accompanied them to the Sovetskiy district police station in Nizhniy Novgorod.","8.The applicant\u2019s interview took place in room no. 306. He was asked questions concerning the rape of a girl he knew, but stated that he had nothing to do with the crime.","9.According to the applicant, some police officers tied him up and put him on the floor. About forty minutes later they untied him and requested that he confess to the rape. He refused. Four or five police officers punched and kicked him in the head and body, throttled him with a baton, put a plastic bag over his head and blocked off his access to air, sat and jumped on him having covered him with a blanket, grabbed him by the ears and forced him to do the splits.","10.Fearing that the ill-treatment would continue, the applicant signed a self-incriminating statement at the request of the police officers. He was then taken to see S., an investigator at the prosecutor\u2019s office. After being questioned by S. he was released. He remained at the police station for approximately ten hours. No documents concerning his detention were issued.","11.On 25 and 26 May 2004 the applicant underwent various medical examinations, including by a forensic medical expert. Additional opinions by forensic medical experts were given later. According to the applicant\u2019s medical records, he sustained the following injuries: a closed head injury, concussion, abrasions on and behind the ears and on the arms and knees, bruising on the right shoulder and ribcage and bruises on the buttocks. He was unable to attend school until 15 June 2004, having been issued a sick note on 26May 2004 for concussion.","12.The rape victim gave a statement saying that the applicant was not the person who had raped her. No criminal proceedings were brought against him.","B.The authorities\u2019 investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment","13.On 26 May 2004 the applicant\u2019s mother lodged a complaint with the Sovetskiy district police, alleging that the police officers had subjected her son to ill-treatment in order to make him confess to a crime which he had never committed, and requesting that they be prosecuted.On 28May 2004 her complaint was transferred to the Sovetskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office.","14.In accordance with Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cCCrP\u201d), six refusals to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers were issued on the grounds that the constituent elements of a crime were missing. They were each set aside because a comprehensive inquiry had not been carried out. On 20 February 2006 the Nizhniy Novgorod regional prosecutor\u2019s office instituted criminal proceedings under Article 286 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Criminal Code (abuse of authority with the use of violence).","15.On 28 February 2006 the applicant was granted victim status.","16.Police officers A. and G. gave statements saying that on 24 May 2004 they had invited the applicant to accompany them to the police station. He had remained in room no.306 until evening and they had been present in the room, as had police officer F., who had taken statements from him. They denied any ill-treatment of the applicant.","17.On 11 May 2006 the applicant failed to identify A. and G. during an identification parade.","18.On 14 July 2006 he identified operative police officer F. from a photograph as one of the men who had ill-treated him. On the same day the investigation was suspended on the grounds that the perpetrator had not been identified.","19.On 27 July 2006 the investigation was resumed and the applicant identified F. during an identification parade. During his examination as a suspect F. confirmed that on 24May 2004 he had taken statements from the applicant in room no. 306, but denied using any violence.","20.On 24 August 2006 a face-to-face confrontation was carried out between the applicant and F. The applicant stated that F. had taken part in his ill\u2011treatment and had taken the confession from him. He was unable to recall any specific acts of violence by him.","21.On 25 August 2006 the criminal proceedings against F. were discontinued under Article 27 (1) \u00a7 1 of the CCrP on the grounds that he had not been involved in the crime.","22.On 10 January 2007 an on-site examination of room no.306 was carried out.","23.On 26 January 2007 a confrontation was held between the applicant and police officers A. and G., who again both denied using any violence towards the applicant. The applicant stated that A. had taken part in his ill\u2011treatment, but he was unable to recall any specific acts of violence by him. He explained that he had not previously identified A. because he had poor eyesight. On the same day the investigating authority refused to bring criminal proceedings against A. on the grounds that the constituent elements of a crime were missing. The applicant stated that G. had not assaulted him, but had interviewed him and had been present during his ill-treatment.","24.On 26 January 2007 photographs of several other police officers were shown to the applicant. He did not identify the culprits.","25.On the same day the criminal proceedings were suspended on the grounds that the perpetrators had not been identified. The investigation was subsequently resumed and on 19April 2007 was suspended again on the same grounds.","C.Compensation proceedings","26.In 2008 the applicant brought a civil claim against the Russian Ministry of Finance, seeking 500,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in damages in connection with his torture by the police. He stated that the circumstances of the case gave reason to believe that the amount claimed was lower than compensation to which he would be entitled under Article 41 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, however he considered it preferable to settle the case at the domestic court.","27.On 17 November 2008 the Sovetskiy District Court of Nizhniy Novgorod (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) acknowledged a violation of the applicant\u2019s right not to be subjected to treatment proscribed under Article 3 of the Convention, allowed the applicant\u2019s civil claim in part and awarded him RUB50,000 (about 1,450 euros (EUR)).","28.It referred to Convention case\u2011law under Article 3 concerning the State\u2019s obligation to carry out an effective investigation, notably the case of Mikheyev v. Russia (no.77617\/01, 26 January 2006). It noted that the criminal proceedings had been initiated after six refusals to do so and that it had been acknowledged that the applicant had been the victim of a crime.","29.The District Court gave credence to the applicant\u2019s mother\u2019s version of events, which it found to be consistent with other evidence in the case, in particular statements by her that the applicant had had no injuries when he had left home with the police officers and that his health had appeared to have been damaged when he had returned from the police station. Noting that the respondent authorities and the Sovetskiy district police, acting as a third party in the proceedings, had submitted no evidence capable of proving that the applicant could have received the injuries (see paragraph11 above) in other circumstances, the District Court established that they had been sustained during his detention at the police station.","30.The District Court noted that the applicant had been a minor at the time and that, according to his submissions at the hearing, various acts of violence, to which the police officers of the Sovetskiy district police had, in the exercise of their duties, subjected him (see paragraph 9 above), had caused him mental and physical suffering. According to the applicant, he had suffered severe pain as a result of the police officers\u2019 violent actions, which had included being punched, kicked, throttled with a baton, being unable to breath, being sat on and jumped on, being forced to do the splits and so on. He had been dizzy, nauseous and sick. Over the next few days he had been weak and dizzy and had felt heaviness in the back of his head. When the police officers had tried to throttle him he had feared for his life. There had been no one to ask for help. The fact that he had suffered harm at the hands of the police, who were supposed to be there to protect people, had been especially traumatic. He had been scared, subdued and depressed. His honour and dignity had been damaged. In his eyes, by forcing him to sign the confession the police officers had humiliated him.","31.Having examined the evidence in its entirety, in particular the medical evidence of the applicant\u2019s injuries, the District Court found that the applicant\u2019s mental and physical suffering had been caused by the unlawful actions of the police officers of the Sovetskiy district police department, in particular by the inhuman and degrading treatment and by inflicting bodily harm. Therefore, his rights under Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights had been violated.","32.Relying on the Russian Constitution, in particular the provisions concerning the right to compensation for damage sustained as a result of the unlawful actions of State organs (Article 53), the District Court held that the State was responsible for the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment regardless of the fact that the guilt of specific individuals had so far not been established.","33.The parties appealed against the judgment. The applicant contested the amount of compensation, considering it to be disproportionate to the suffering he had endured.","34.On 3 March 2009 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the judgment. However, it emphasised the fact that, being a minor at the time, to be held at the police station for approximately ten hours was a long time, and that the authorities had been unable to provide any legitimate reasons for his detention."],"29275":["1. The applicant, Mr Florin Urzic\u0103, is a Romanian national, who was born in 1969 and is detained in Jilava Prison.","2. He had been granted legal aid and was represented before the Court by Ms D. O. Hatneanu and Mr S. Grecu, lawyers practising in Bucharest.","3. The Romanian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Ms C. Brumar, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.","A. The circumstances of the case","4. On 29 February 2012 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of theft and brought to Bucharest police station. He alleged that he had been beaten by police officers during his arrest and at the premises of the police station to force a confession to a few thefts.","5. On the same day, the applicant was taken to the prosecutor \u2019 s office attached to the Bucharest District Court to be questioned. As he complained of strong pain in the cervical area and his upper jaw, an ambulance took him to Bucharest Emergency Hospital.","6. According to the medical certificate produced upon his discharge from hospital on 1 March 2012, the applicant had facial injuries with severe black eyes and an injury on his right leg. He was also diagnosed with a cervical spine injury and it was recommended that he use a cervical collar for fourteen days.","7. The applicant brought criminal proceedings against the police officers involved in his arrest and questioning, complaining of ill-treatment.","8. On 11 March 2014 the prosecutor \u2019 s office attached to the Bucharest Court of Appeal decided to open a criminal investigation concerning the offences of abusive behaviour and torture.","9. On 21 March 2014 the prosecutor \u2019 s office decided not to institute criminal proceedings, finding that the violence to which the applicant had been subjected had not been committed by the defendants.","10. The applicant challenged that decision before the chief prosecutor. By a decision of 14 April 2014 the chief prosecutor partly allowed the complaint. It changed the legal basis for the discontinuation of the investigation from Article 16 \u00a7 1 (c) into Article 16 \u00a7 1 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCP\u201d). Thus, instead of dismissing the complaint on the grounds that the ill-treatment had been committed by other persons, it found that the police officers had caused the injuries but without intention. It noted that according to the evidence in the file the applicant \u2019 s injuries mentioned in the medical documents had been caused because he had resisted arrest when caught red-handed.","11. The applicant was notified of the decision on the same day. In a letter accompanying the decision, it was mentioned that his complaint had been allowed and that he could challenge the decision before a more senior prosecutor under Article 399 of the CCP within twenty days. However, the applicant did not lodge an appeal against the chief prosecutor \u2019 s decision.","B. Relevant domestic law","12. On 1 February 2014 a new CCP entered into force.","13. Article 16 \u00a7 1 of the CCP provides that criminal proceedings cannot be instituted and, if instituted, cannot be continued if, inter alia, the act committed is not proscribed by criminal law or was not committed with the mens rea required by law (sub-paragraph (b)) and\/or if there is no evidence that the defendant committed the offence (sub-paragraph (c)).","14. The prosecutor \u2019 s decisions can be challenged by the victim first before the chief prosecutor under Article 399 of the CCP and then, if the former dismisses the complaint, before the judge of the pre-trial chamber (Articles 340-42 of the CCP). Under Article 340 of the CCP an applicant can lodge an appeal against the decision of the chief prosecutor within twenty days of the date on which the decision was communicated to him.","15. The Constitutional Court held in its decision no. 599 of 21 October 2014 published in the Official Gazette no. 866 of 5 December 2014 that Article 341 \u00a7 5 of the CCP was unconstitutional. It considered that the procedure by which the pre-trial chamber judge decided on a complaint against decisions of non-prosecution or dismissal of charges \u201cwithout the participation of the individual bringing the complaint, the prosecutor and the defendant\u201d infringed the right to a fair trial in terms of the adversarial and oral arguments principles.","16. Pursuant to Article 147 \u00a7 4 of the Romanian Constitution republished on 31 October 2003, \u201c[d ]ecisions of the Constitutional Court shall be published in the Official Gazette of Romania. As of their publication, decisions shall be generally binding and effective only for the future\u201d. Pursuant to Article 147 \u00a7 1 of the Constitution, the provisions of the laws, ordinances and regulations in force found to be unconstitutional cease to have legal force within forty-five days of the publication of the decision of the Constitutional Court if, in the meantime, the Parliament or the Government, as the case may be, cannot bring the said provisions into line with the provisions of the Constitution."],"29271":["1. The applicants, whose names and dates of birth are listed in the annex to this decision (\u201cthe applicants\u201d), are seventy-six Romanian nationals of Roma ethnic origin who live or used to live in Tulcea. They were represented before the Court by the European Roma Rights Centre (\u201cERRC\u201d), a non-governmental organisation based in Budapest.","2. The Romanian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Ms C. Brumar, from the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.","A. The circumstances of the case","3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.","1. Background to the case","4. The applicants are or used to be residents of the town of Tulcea. They are of Roma ethnic origin.","5. Before July 1999 many of the applicants had lived in an informal Roma slum located in central Tulcea. In July 1999 their homes were destroyed by an accidental fire and they were rendered homeless. Afterwards they were forced to live outdoors in unsafe conditions and did not receive any assistance from the authorities.","6. In December 1999 the applicants moved, with the local authorities \u2019 permission, into an unoccupied building in Tulcea that had belonged to a State-owned factory.","7. For years the applicants and other people continued to live in that building even though the living conditions were poor and overcrowded. Despite not having a lawful right to occupy the building, the applicants \u2019 presence there was tolerated and they paid charges for water and electricity.","8. According to the applicants, they asked the local authorities on numerous occasions to assist them with regularising their status but their requests remained unsuccessful.","9. The applicants were temporarily evicted from the building for the first time in 2005 following a court order. After the eviction order was overturned, they returned to the building and continued to live there.","10. On an unspecified date the building was sold by its former owner to a private investor, namely the company E.V. Prior to selling the building, the former owner had allegedly attempted to donate the building to the local authorities, but his offer was refused by them.","2. The applicants \u2019 relocation","11. On 29 July 2004 Tulcea Local Council adopted a decision concerning the allocation of social housing in Tulcea that made higher education a decisive criterion for examining potential applications. The decision concerned social housing located in the city.","12. On 30 September 2004 Tulcea Local Council again adopted a decision concerning the allocation of social housing in Tulcea that made higher education a decisive criterion for examining potential applications. This decision concerned social housing located on a particular street.","13. On 25 January 2006 the company E.V. brought eviction proceedings against some of the occupants of the building, namely the third, ninth, tenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, twenty-first, twenty-third, twenty-fifth, twenty-ninth, forty, forty-first, forty-seventh, sixty-second, sixty-seventh, seventy-first and seventy-second applicants. The remaining the applicants were not parties to the eviction proceedings.","14. By a judgment of 27 March 2006 the Tulcea District Court allowed the company \u2019 s action for eviction. It held that the company was the lawful owner of the building and had a right to enjoy its use. The occupants had no lawful right to occupy the building and therefore had to vacate it. The judgment was upheld by the Tulcea County Court on 17 August 2006 and by the final judgment of the Constan\u021ba Court of Appeal on 19 January 2007.","15. On an unspecified date the applicants who were parties to the eviction proceedings contested the eviction order issued against them on the basis of the judgment of 27 March 2006.","16. By a judgment of 24 October 2006 the Tulcea District Court dismissed the proceedings seeking to contest the eviction order on the grounds that the said order was lawful. There is no evidence in the file that any of the applicants appealed against the judgment.","17. In October 2006 the occupants of the building, including all the applicants, were evicted. Among the applicants there were children, elderly and less able people.","18. The only shelter option offered to the applicants by the local authorities was a former army barracks building that had been disused since the 1970s located four kilometres outside Tulcea and known as \u201cPichet\u201d. The aforementioned building was in an advanced state of disrepair and had been transferred to the local authorities in May 2006 in order to be converted into social housing. The area around the building was heavily industrialised and there were no other residential buildings in the same location. A large number of the applicants moved into the building, while the remaining applicants had to live on the street for two months. In December 2006 those of the applicants who remained homeless after the eviction accepted the local authorities \u2019 offer, as a temporary solution, to move into mobile homes that were placed on a former rubbish dump.","3. The applicants \u2019 living conditions at \u201cPichet\u201d and at the rubbish dump","19. According to the applicants, when they moved to \u201cPichet\u201d they found that the building was not connected to electricity, mains water or sewage facilities. The building had no doors or windows, no heating, a broken roof and damp and damaged walls. It was also infested by rats. The toilet facilities were communal and out of order and rubbish collection was rare. The available water supply had a visible heavy sediment and caused recurring stomach problems. Trucks unloaded bauxite and gravel directly behind the building. The trucks made a lot of noise and raised large quantities of dust which caused breathing difficulties. The noise caused by the nearby shipyard also affected the applicants \u2019 psychological well-being.","20. According to the applicants, they lived in overcrowded conditions because each family was assigned only one room and therefore up to seven people had to share it. Some of them had to abandon their jobs or found it increasingly difficult to find employment and the children were no longer able to attend school or kindergarten because of the travelling distance into Tulcea and the infrequent and unreliable public transport. Some of the children were too small to return home from school on foot unaccompanied by an adult. Others had been harassed or abused by drivers or other individuals when they returned home from school after dark.","21. According to the applicants, the mobile homes that were placed on the former rubbish dump were not meant to serve as long-term habitation, especially during extreme weather conditions. They deteriorated quickly and had to be repaired repeatedly by the authorities. Although they were connected to electricity, they were not connected to running water or sewage facilities. They had no heating system, were poorly ventilated and damp, and were very cold in the winter and very warm in the summer.","22. The rubbish dump had been closed down in 2006 and the land had not been properly decontaminated before the mobile homes were placed on it.","4. Press statements made by public officials","23. In press statements published in the local newspapers Obiectiv and Tulcea Express on 14 May 2005, 26 October 2006 and on an unspecified date during their eviction in 2006, the mayor of Tulcea stated in respect of the applicants \u2019 situation that: \u201c... morally there could be a duty, but as mayor I have a duty towards law-abiding citizens, a duty towards the citizens who respect the community, a duty towards families with children who are gainfully employed. Some of them are living there without any papers to prove that they are citizens of Tulcea\u201d. Also: \u201c...Some citizens accused me of racism and some of positive discrimination. I did not set out to become the king of the gypsies in this town, because this is not why I have been elected. I have done a lot to meet the problems of this social category, but now it \u2019 s enough...\u201d. And: \u201cWe are doing everything possible to provide them with some comfort at \u201cPichet\u201d, where sixteen families have been relocated. For the rest other options were found. We have no houses available. Where would they like me to find a living space for them, at kilometre zero? Perhaps close to the market? Those who are not from Tulcea can go back to where they came from\u201d.","24. In a press statement published on 17 October 2006 in the local newspaper Obiectiv the Tulcea Prefect stated that \u201cWe are looking at an option with mobile homes, but I would like to say that many of the Roma faced with these problems have created them themselves. Many of them sold their homes and afterwards asked the Mayor \u2019 s Office for new ones. Of course, the Roma are confronted with many problems, but they are not frequent visitors of the jobs markets. Be that as it may, many non-Roma are in a similar situation to that of the Roma population and have no homes, but they do not knock at the Prefect Office \u2019 s door; they try to rent, to work and so on. I think that your organisation should also be more involved this way and educate them to work\u201d.","5. Court proceedings","(a) Injunction proceedings","25. On 12 March 2007 the sixth, fifteenth, seventeenth, twenty-first, forty-first, forty-seventh, fifty-fourth, sixty-first, sixty-seventh, seventy-first and seventy-second applicants, all of whom were living in the \u201cPichet\u201d building, brought proceedings against Tulcea Local Council to obtain an injunction ordering the local authorities to carry out the urgent maintenance work needed on their building.","26. By a final judgment of 1 October 2008 the Constan\u0163a Court of Appeal allowed the action brought by the applicants. It held that Tulcea Local Council had signed lease contracts for the building with the applicants. Therefore, as a lessor, according to the relevant domestic legislation and the provisions of the lease contracts, it had an obligation to provide adequate living conditions, and to repair the building and keep it safe for the entire duration of the contract. However, according to the available testimonies at the time, the housing conditions had been unfit for habitation and the building had been in a poor state when the applicants moved into it. In March 2007 the building had still not been connected to the town \u2019 s electricity grid and the sewage system was never fully functional. The building materials brought on site by Tulcea Local Council after the applicants moved there did not constitute fulfilment by the lessor of its obligations to repair the building because the quantity of materials was too small to ensure the complete repair of the building.","27. The argument that the building \u2019 s problems were caused by some of the tenants themselves was not supported by any proof. In addition, the argument that the applicants failed to pay rent for long periods of time was irrelevant for the case, since the lessor could not use that argument to justify a breach of his contractual duty to maintain the building. Consequently, the court ordered Tulcea Local Council to repair the building and maintain it and the communal areas at an acceptable standard for the entire duration of the lease contract.","(b) General tort law proceedings","28. On 24 August 2007 sixty-eight of the applicants living both at \u201cPichet\u201d and in the mobile homes \u2013 all except the third, eleventh, twelfth, twenty-fourth, forty-sixth, forty-seventh, forty \u2011 eighth, and forty-ninth applicants \u2013 and other people brought a general tort law action on the basis of Articles 998-999 of the Romanian Civil Code against Tulcea Local Council and the Tulcea mayor \u2019 s office seeking 245,000 Romanian lei (RON) (3,500 for each individual) (approximately 75,400 euros (EUR) (780 for each individual)) by way of compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of having their access to education restricted, the inadequacy of the living conditions in the social housing, and the interference with their health and social personality as a result of the inaction of the local authorities.","29. By a judgment of 20 October 2010 the Tulcea District Court dismissed the sixty-eight applicants \u2019 action. It held that the applicants had not suffered any damage and therefore at least one of the conditions required for a general tort law action had not been met. The local authorities had taken steps to provide the applicants with suitable living conditions, even though they had failed to pay their outstanding taxes. Although the applicants had not paid their rent, the local authorities had not used the contract clause allowing them to terminate the lease contracts after the applicants \u2019 failure to pay rent for three successive months. The means to help the disadvantaged were provided for by law. The responsibilities of Tulcea Local Council and the Tulcea mayor \u2019 s office did not include the duty to secure the necessary conditions in social housing belonging to persons of Roma ethnicity or their health.","30. The applicants appealed against the judgment. They did not submit reasons for their appeal but argued that the objectivity of the social investigation reports produced during the proceedings was doubtful because they were carried out by Tulcea Local Council employees. In addition, the social investigation reports had not reflected their living conditions as they had avoided providing details about the available utilities, furniture and living conditions by using the expression \u201cequipped with the bare necessities\u201d.","31. By a judgment of 14 December 2012 Tulcea County Court dismissed the applicants \u2019 appeal and upheld the judgment of the first \u2011 instance court. It noted that the applicants had failed to provide reasons supporting their appeal and had submitted only objections in respect of the social investigation reports. It held that according to the relevant domestic legislation the local authorities had to assign social housing to various categories of people in an order of priority set out by law. Consequently, homeless Roma could be assigned social housing only if the order of priority set out by law had been observed and if they met the monthly income criterion provided for by law. Therefore, the local authorities could not be forced to satisfy the social housing needs of all the applicants as long as such housing had to be assigned on a priority basis to other categories of people expressly provided for by law. The applicants \u2019 needs could be met afterwards, if and when social housing became available.","32. The court further held that, even though the applicants had failed to pay their dues towards the State budget, some of them had nonetheless been provided with social housing. Consequently, the local authorities had already taken steps to ensure they had suitable living conditions.","33. As far as the applicants \u2019 living conditions were concerned, the court noted that there was no evidence that the social housing was not connected to electricity or heating facilities, and this could also have been a consequence of the applicants \u2019 failure to pay their monthly invoices. Moreover, the responsibilities of the local authorities did not include the duty to ensure adequate conditions in social housing belonging to persons of Roma ethnicity.","34. In respect of the applicants \u2019 health, the court held that it was not proven that the alleged failure of the local authorities to fulfil their duties had caused the applicants \u2019 state of health to deteriorate.","35. Finally, the court also noted that it had not been proven that the local authorities \u2019 action \u2013 namely providing only some of the applicants with social housing based on availability \u2013 had restricted their access to education.","36. The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment. They argued that according to the relevant domestic legislation the local authorities were responsible for assigning social housing for renting to disadvantaged persons, a category to which the applicants belonged. The authorities had a statutory responsibility to ensure decent living conditions for Tulcea \u2019 s citizens but they had failed to fulfil their duty by housing the applicants indefinitely in accommodation which was not connected to basic utilities. The absence of decent accommodation for Tulcea \u2019 s Roma was one cause of the applicants \u2019 abandonment of school attendance and of their exclusion from the employment market. In these circumstances, the failure of the local authorities to fulfil their statutory obligations rendered them responsible for the non-pecuniary damage suffered by the applicants, estimated at RON 3,500 (approximately EUR 780) for each individual.","37. By a final judgment of 26 March 2014 the Constan\u021ba Court of Appeal allowed the applicants \u2019 appeal on points of law in part, quashed the second instance court \u2019 s judgment, annulled the action lodged by the seventeenth applicant on account of her death and awarded each of the remaining applicants RON 2,000 (approximately EUR 450) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. It noted that the parties had submitted the final judgment of 1 October 2008 to it and that the seventeenth applicant had died on 28 February 2013 and that no relatives had accepted her inheritance. Moreover, it stressed that the object of the applicants \u2019 action was strictly limited to the non-pecuniary damage claim of RON 3,500 for each individual in the light of having their access to education restricted, being provided with social housing offering inadequate living conditions, and the interference with their health and social personality resulting from the inaction of the local authorities. The applicants had not asked the court to examine the conditions in which their eviction in October 2006 had taken place. The aforementioned issue had been the object of another set of proceedings which were terminated by the final judgment of 18 May 2009.","38. The court held that the local authorities \u2019 failure to fulfil all their statutory duties and ensure adequate living conditions for the applicants in the housing rented to them after their eviction in October 2006 amounted to a breach of their right to private and family life and home guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. It noted that, contrary to the applicants \u2019 submissions, the local authorities \u2019 decision to assign and rent homes to the applicants at \u201cPichet\u201d had not been aimed at segregating the Roma families. Because winter was approaching when the applicants were evicted, the local authorities had actually been trying to urgently secure shelter for seventeen of the evicted families and their small children. According to Tulcea Local Council, the lack of social housing was endemic nationwide and particularly in Tulcea, where only ten social cases were solved yearly out of the two thousand five hundred pending requests for social housing.","39. As regards the \u201cPichet\u201d building, the court held that, according to the available evidence, the building was functional and had offered adequate conditions for housing on the date when it was leased to the applicants. In particular, the building was connected to electricity, was fitted with stoves for heating, and running water was available from a tap located in the courtyard. In addition, on the date the applicants took over the building the local authorities provided the applicants \u2019 representative, namely the ninth applicant, with some building materials in order to be able to carry out some maintenance work that was needed. However, according to the relevant domestic legislation it was not sufficient for a lessor to provide those who signed a lease contract with a functional building. The lessor had to provide during the entire period of the lease contract a building which was safe to use and which had functioning utililities. In the instant case, during the term of the lease contract the communal water, electric and sewage facilities were damaged.","40. Although the tenants reported the problems to the authorities, they had remained inactive and had failed to carry out repairs and the building had become unfit for habitation and a health hazard for the tenants. Although the Constan\u021ba Court of Appeal established on 1 October 2008 that the local authorities had failed to repair and maintain the building for the entire duration of the lease contract, and had ordered them to do so, the authorities had not demonstrated that they had complied with that judgment. Moreover, according to the available evidence, the building had become even more dilapidated and unfit for habitation. The fact that the building \u2019 s problems were caused by some of the tenants themselves could not exonerate the authorities or explain their inaction. The relevant domestic legislation provided for sanctions against tenants who damage a building, namely the cancellation of their lease contract. However, the local authorities had failed to take any punitive measures against those tenants. At the same time they had also failed to repair the building, thus creating an unsuitable living environment even for those tenants who had maintained their homes and had not damaged the building.","41. In respect of the mobile homes located on the former rubbish dump, the court held that they had represented an effective temporary solution for the applicants \u2019 problems. However, given that the applicants have had to continue living there, the homes in question and their location amounted to a breach of the applicants \u2019 right to enjoy their home in a healthy environment as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. The mobile homes assigned to seven families were placed on a former rubbish dump, without any preliminary operation to decontaminate the soil or have the level of soil pollution measured by a specialist agency. The local authorities were responsible for taking measures to locate the mobile homes in an area of the city that would be appropriate for the applicants \u2019 needs and would safeguard their right to a healthy environment. However, they had failed to fulfil their positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention and to inform the applicants that the land in question had been used as a rubbish dump prior to 2006 and that their health and quality of life might be adversely affected by pollution. The failure of the local authorities to fulfil their duties and their passivity after 2006 also amounted to a breach of the applicants \u2019 right to a home as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention.","42. Consequently, given the applicants \u2019 living conditions, namely the overcrowded and unhealthy environment, and its effect on the applicants \u2019 state of health throughout the long period of time they had to live under those conditions, combined with the general attitude of the authorities, the civil liability of the authorities could be engaged since the nature of the applicants \u2019 living conditions had a negative impact on human dignity and the applicants \u2019 right to private life and to a home.","43. In respect of the applicants \u2019 claims that the local authorities had interfered with and restricted the applicants \u2019 children \u2019 s right to education by renting them social housing located on the city \u2019 s outskirts, the court held that the local authorities were responsible for the applicants \u2019 children \u2019 s inability to attend school regularly and liable for the damage thereby caused.","44. It noted that, according to the available evidence, the applicants \u2019 children \u2019 s schools were located between three and three and a half kilometres from their homes. The absence of frequent public transport on those routes made travelling to school difficult and encouraged the abandonment of school attendance, particularly during adverse weather conditions. From 2006 to October 2008 there was no public transport connecting the \u201cPichet\u201d building to the city centre and the form of transport referred to was introduced only after that date. In this context it pointed out that according to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (\u201cthe Court\u201d), in cases where a general measure has a disproportionately prejudicial effect on a particular group of people, that measure could be deemed to be discriminatory even though it had not targeted that group of people. Consequently, even though the authorities \u2019 cancellation of public transport in the area did not directly target the Roma and pursued a legitimate aim \u2013 namely to make public transport financially efficient \u2013 its effect did not strike a fair balance between the public interest and that of the applicants. By relying on the principles set out in the Court \u2019 s case-law concerning non-discrimination against people of Roma ethnicity and their right to education, the court concluded that the local authorities had indirectly breached the applicants \u2019 children \u2019 s right to education by failing to discharge their duty of organising adequate public transport in the city.","45. In respect of the applicants \u2019 claims that their health was affected, the court noted that they enjoyed free medical assistance without any discrimination or bias. However, it considered that, based on the available testimonial evidence, the authorities \u2019 passivity in respect of the applicants \u2019 inadequate living conditions, the lack of hygiene in the rented housing and the polluted environment had affected the applicants \u2019 health.","46. Finally, in determining the non-pecuniary compensation to which the applicants were entitled (see paragraph 37 above), the court took into account the applicants \u2019 individual situations, the fact that some of the applicants had failed to fulfill all their contractual obligations, that they had refused to comply with their lawful duty to participate in routine cleaning of the premises, and that some of their actions had contributed to the deterioration of their homes.","(c) Anti-discrimination proceedings","47. On 3 October 2007 the Romanian Helsinki Committee lodged civil claims in anti-discrimination proceedings against Tulcea Local Council, relying on Article 27 \u00a7 1 of Government Ordinance No. 137\/2000 on combating and punishing all forms of discrimination. The action did not name any of the applicants or any of the victims of the measures taken by the authorities. The Romanian Helsinki Committee asked the court to acknowledge that the relocation of Roma families in a building deemed unfit for human habitation outside the town and in mobile homes on a former rubbish dump breached the domestic legislation on anti \u2011 discrimination, as did the criterion set by the local authorities requiring a certain level of education for awarding social housing. In addition, the Romanian Helsinki Committee asked the court to order Tulcea Local Council to pay RON 350,000 (approximately EUR 103,860) to the victims of the discrimination, and to restore the previous situation, or to remedy the situation caused by the discrimination.","48. The Committee argued, amongst other things, that part of the evidence used to prove that the Tulcea local authorities \u2019 decision-making process had been influenced by their preconceptions about Roma was the racist language used by them in the press to describe the applicants on account of their ethnicity (see paragraphs 23 and 24 above). Moreover, the local authorities had moved the families in question to remote locations, into a polluted area and on a former rubbish dump, had segregated them, had created physical obstacles for them which prevented them from accessing regular public services, had restricted their children \u2019 s rights to education and had refused to fulfil their contractual and legal obligations. Furthermore, without any reasonable justification, Tulcea Local Council had added the criterion of higher education as a decisive condition for accessing social housing, even though the relevant domestic legislation did not impose this criterion as a requirement and it had been statistically proven that people of Roma ethnicity are less well educated than those of other ethnicities.","49. By a judgment of 20 May 2008 the Tulcea District Court dismissed the action brought by the Romanian Helsinki Committee. It noted that following its request, the National Council for Combating Discrimination had submitted its opinion on the case. The court held that the actions of the local authorities had been motivated not by racial discrimination but by the lack of social housing affecting both the Roma and the non-Roma population. Moreover, the allegedly offensive statements made by representatives of the local authorities were not discriminatory, because the domestic anti-discrimination legislation could not restrict freedom of speech, or the freedom to hold an opinion, or to impart information. According to press articles submitted by the Romanian Helsinki Committee, the representatives of the local authorities had stated the reason for the Roma families \u2019 move to the impugned locations, namely the lack of any other social housing, not their ethnicity.","50. Furthermore, the criteria set by the local authorities for allocating social housing (see paragraphs 11 and 12 above) could not be considered discriminatory because in the court \u2019 s opinion it would be unconceivable that any one social group would have a better claim to social housing than another social group simply because the latter \u2019 s members were not educated, or that the interpretation of the legal provisions would generate positive discrimination. The local authorities were free to set certain criteria for awarding social housing and they could not be held responsible for the fact that Roma are less educated than the rest of the population. The local authorities had a duty to safeguard the rights and well-being of all the members of the community and the relocation of the Roma families to the area they favoured would have created a situation of conflict in that area that the authorities were duty-bound to avoid. The court furthermore considered that the Romanian Helsinki Committee \u2019 s claims for compensation, or to remedy the problems caused by the discrimination, were unfounded because the authorities had not committed acts of discrimination and the question of whether or not the housing assigned to the families in question was fit for habitation was not an issue of discrimination and could be remedied through a general law action. At the same time, restoring the previous situation would have contravened a final court judgment which was res judicata and ordered their eviction.","51. The Romanian Helsinki Committee appealed against the judgment and asked the appeal court to quash the first-instance court \u2019 s judgment and to allow its action the way it was formulated. It argued, inter alia, that the first-instance court had misapplied the relevant anti-discrimination legal provisions and had failed to reverse the burden of proof as required by law, even though they had proven by statistical data that the relocated families had been discriminated against. In addition, it claimed that the court had failed to examine evidence held on file such as the discriminatory statements made by the local authorities, had founded its judgment on inexistent evidence, had relied on the principle of free speech as an argument for dismissing the claims \u2013 even though free speech does not excuse discriminatory statements \u2013 had ignored the fact that of the people who had claimed social housing, it was only those with Roma ethnicity who had been assigned housing in the impugned locations, had relied on the argument that there was no social housing available in Tulcea without seeking evidence to substantiate this, and had not examined the question of whether the victims \u2019 relocation and living conditions were discriminatory. The court had also failed to understand the argument concerning the higher education criterion, given that the organisation had contested not its actual existence, but rather the importance assigned to it for the purposes of awarding social housing. The local authorities had not shown any objective justification for assigning great importance to that condition.","52. By a judgment of 15 October 2008 the Tulcea County Court dismissed the appeal. It held that the relocation of the Roma families had not been motivated by racial discrimination as the decision for relocation had been taken on the basis of regulations provided for by law. Nor had the domestic authorities treated the Roma families differently from other families in a similar situation. In addition, the local authorities \u2019 public statements had not been discriminatory and, as they did not play a decisive role in assigning housing to Roma families, were irrelevant. The Roma families had been provided with housing on the basis of clearly established criteria set out in decisions that had not been contested. The available evidence had not demonstrated fulfilment of the cumulative conditions required for an act to amount to discrimination within the meaning of the relevant domestic legislation.","53. The Romanian Helsinki Committee appealed on points of law against the judgment and asked the appeal court to quash the second \u2011 instance court \u2019 s judgment and to allow its action the way it was formulated. It argued that the second-instance court had failed to provide reasons for its decision and to fully examine the claims concerning the relocation to polluted areas, and had omitted altogether to examine the arguments about the higher education criterion. The lower court, meanwhile, had failed to explain the basis for its statement that Roma families had not been treated differently from other families in a similar situation. Moreover, the court had shifted the burden of proof in respect of the discrimination claim to the plaintiff, whereas it was for the authorities to show that there had been no discrimination. The court \u2019 s argument that the Roma families had been provided with houses on the basis of clearly established criteria set out in decisions was irrelevant as it did not mean that the criteria in question were not discriminatory. In addition, the appellate court \u2019 s reasoning simply ignored the racist and discriminatory nature of the public officials \u2019 statements, even though the same public officials were the ones who had ordered the relocation of the Roma families outside the city and on a former rubbish dump.","54. By a final judgment of 18 May 2009 (available on 3 July 2009) the Constan\u0163a Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on points of law. It held that if the interest in taking part in the proceedings lay in the purpose for which the non-governmental organisation was founded \u2212 namely, the protection of the rights of the persons in respect of whom the existence of the alleged discrimination was invoked \u2212 in the instant case the available evidence, including the succession of events as narrated by the media, did not confirm the existence of different treatment in a similar situation. The minutes of Tulcea Local Council \u2019 s meeting of 25 January 2007 and the press articles provided evidence of the efforts of the local authorities to remedy the problems caused by the eviction.","55. The local authorities had repeatedly attempted to delay the eviction pending the preparation of other housing solutions, and had succeeded in doing so. It was uncontested that after the eviction housing solutions had been found for all the families either at \u201cPichet\u201d or in mobile homes. It had also been proved that the local authorities had constantly tried to remedy the particular housing problems of individual families by granting them social housing and by overruling the opposition of some of the members of the community to certain families \u2019 being granted priority treatment. In this context the court noted the statements made by the mayor and by another representative of the local authorities in respect of the Amarioarei and Stanga families \u2019 situation after their eviction. The Romanian Helsinki Committee \u2019 s arguments that the relocation of most of the families to \u201cPichet\u201d amounted to segregation was therefore contradicted, since that had been the only housing option identified at the time of the eviction and there was no proof that alternative options had existed.","56. Also, the local authorities had tried to remedy the victims \u2019 social problems, even though it was not denied that some of them had owned homes which they had sold after moving into the unoccupied building in Tulcea, which had previously belonged to a State-owned factory. In addition, the area where the \u201cPichet\u201d building was located was connected to the town by public transport even though the bus service was infrequent. Travelling into the city was therefore possible, whereas by contrast it was a well-known fact that there were inhabited areas of the country which were not served by any transport connection at all, not even for children attending school. Furthermore, according to press reports about the investigation carried out by the Tulcea Environmental Agency, the area where the \u201cPichet\u201d building was located did not constitute a health hazard for humans. What is more, after some of the families moved to \u201cPichet\u201d, their homes had been connected to electricity.","57. As regards the mobile homes located on the former rubbish dump, the court considered that the lower courts had correctly dismissed the discrimination argument. In this connection it noted that \u2013 according to the press reports \u2013 the homes in question had initially been set up on a concrete platform at a separate location but were later moved at the request of the Roma families \u2019 representatives in order to have access to water and sewage facilities. Subsequently, they were connected to the town \u2019 s electric grid.","58. Moreover, the Romanian Helsinki Committee had failed to prove the alleged stereotypical and offensive statements made by local officials about the Roma community, and the authorities \u2019 action argued against the existence of a discriminatory stance based on ethnicity. Furthermore, leaving aside the fact that the Romanian Helsinki Committee had assumed without proof that members of the Roma community were less well educated, the education criterion set by the local authorities for allocating social housing had concerned social housing located on a particular street and it had not been proved that it was a rule applied in a \u2018 blanket \u2019 manner when allocating all social housing in the city, or that it was relevant on the date of the eviction, or that it was a real obstacle for the members of the Roma community to enforce their rights as long as it was established that there were no other options available for shelter at the time. Also, the criterion had been imposed by a Tulcea Local Council decision dating back to 2004 (see paragraphs 11 and 12 above) that had not been challenged by the victims before the domestic courts. In addition, the relevant domestic legislation allowed local authorities to determine the criteria for awarding social housing.","6. The correspondence between the local authorities","59. On 27 July 2005 Tulcea Local Council informed the Tulcea prefect \u2019 s office that they could not agree to the relocation of some of the applicants on a certain street in the town since the local inhabitants objected to their return there because of past conflicts.","60. On 2 November 2006 the Tulcea Public Transport Company under the direction of Tulcea Local Council informed the Tulcea prefect \u2019 s office, among other things, that they intended to provide transport services in the area of the \u201cPichet\u201d building from 3 November 2006.","61. On 2 April 2008 the Tulcea Public Transport Company under the direction of Tulcea Local Council informed the Tulcea prefect \u2019 s office that the buses serving the \u201cPichet\u201d area had been discontinued since 15 October 2007 because nobody was using them. Two buses continued to serve the nearby industrial zone and their number could be increased on condition that the people living in the \u201cPichet\u201d area bought monthly transport passes in advance.","62. On 15 April, 9 May, 24 July, and 1, 9 and 24 September 2008 the Tulcea prefect \u2019 s office informed the mayor of Tulcea that following individual complaints lodged by the applicants and non-governmental organisations and from inspections carried out at the \u201cPichet\u201d building and in the mobile homes located on the rubbish dump by representatives of the Tulcea County Agency for Roma, the Tulcea Public Health Agency and the Tulcea Agency for Emergency Situations, it was apparent that the applicants \u2019 homes were poorly maintained and infested by rodents, that the sewage system was either non-existent or not working, the sanitary facilities were not working, there was no access to water, the domestic refuse had not been collected for a long time and was being stored in a pit in front of the building, and maintenance work was urgently required. Consequently, it asked the mayor \u2019 s office to remedy the situation.","63. On 22 April 2008 the Tulcea schools inspectorate informed the Tulcea prefect \u2019 s office that they did not have the legal framework or the requisite funding to exempt children living in the \u201cPichet\u201d area who wanted to attend school from paying for transport passes. They further submitted that pupils generally benefited from the statutory discount of 50% for transport passes.","64. On 24 April 2008 the Tulcea schools inspectorate asked the Tulcea mayor \u2019 s office and the schools attended by the children living in \u201cPichet\u201d to get in contact each other and to examine the possibility of the aforementioned children being exempted from paying for public transport.","65. On 5 May 2008 and 22 October 2010 two of the schools that had enrolled some of the children living at \u201cPichet\u201d sent to the local public transport company under the direction of the mayor \u2019 s office a list of names of the aforementioned children together with information stating when their classes started and ended.","66. On 3 June and 4 July 2008, respectively, the Tulcea prefect \u2019 s office and Tulcea Local Council informed each other and an applicant that a source of water had been installed in the vicinity of the mobile homes located on the rubbish dump and that some of the sanitary facilities of the \u201cPichet\u201d building had been repaired, but they continued to break down as a result of improper use.","67. On 24 September 2008 the Tulcea prefect \u2019 s office informed the Tulcea Public Transport Company under the direction of Tulcea Local Council that according to information received from the inhabitants in the area, all the buses connecting the \u201cPichet\u201d building and the nearby industrialised area with the town had been cancelled, with the result that many of the children living there could not travel to school any more and therefore abandonment of school attendance was increasing. It also asked Tulcea Local Council to reinstate the bus routes serving the area in question.","7. Other relevant information","(a) The applicants sharing the same homes","68. Between 15 September and 5 December 2006 the applicants signed lease contracts with Tulcea Local Council for rooms in the \u201cPichet\u201d building or for mobile homes located on the former rubbish dump. According to the aforementioned contracts the twenty-third applicant was living together with the fiftieth, fifty-first and fifty-second applicants in a mobile home located on the rubbish dump. The fifteenth applicant was living together with the thirteenth, fourteenth, forty-third and forty-fourth applicants at \u201cPichet\u201d. The twenty-fourth applicant was living together with the eleventh and the sixty \u2011 ninth applicants in a mobile home located on the rubbish dump. The sixty-third applicant was living together with the twenty-eighth, twenty \u2011 ninth, sixty-fourth and sixty-sixth applicants at \u201cPichet\u201d. The forty \u2011 first applicant was living together with the thirty-seventh, forty-second and seventy-sixth applicants at \u201cPichet\u201d. The forty-seventh applicant was living together with the forty-sixth, forty-eighth and forty-ninth applicants at \u201cPichet\u201d. The fifty-fourth applicant was living together with the thirty \u2011 eighth, thirty-ninth, fortieth, fifty-third and fifty-fifth applicants at \u201cPichet\u201d. The sixty-first applicant was living together with the twenty-sixth, fifty-eighth, sixty-second, sixty-fifth and seventy-fifth applicants at \u201cPichet\u201d. The sixteenth applicant was living together with the twenty \u2011 seventh, fifty \u2011 sixth and fifty-seventh applicants in a mobile home located on the rubbish dump. The third applicant was living together with the second and twelfth applicants in a mobile home located on the rubbish dump. The thirty-fifth applicant was living together with the thirty-third, thirty-fourth and thirty-sixth applicants in a mobile home located on the rubbish dump. The twenty-fifth applicant was living alone in a mobile home located on the rubbish dump. The seventeenth applicant was living together with the tenth applicant at \u201cPichet\u201d. The seventy-first applicant was living together with the eighteenth, nineteenth, twentieth, seventieth and seventy-second applicants at \u201cPichet\u201d. The twenty-first applicant was living together with the twenty \u2011 second, thirtieth, thirty-first, thirty-second, seventy-third and seventy-fourth applicants at \u201cPichet\u201d. The forty-fifth applicant was living together with the fifty-ninth and the sixtieth applicants at \u201cPichet\u201d. The sixth applicant was living together with the fourth, fifth, seventh and ninth applicants at \u201cPichet\u201d.","(b) Social investigation reports and other information","69. According to social investigation reports produced by Tulcea Local Council on 28 January 2009, the twenty-second applicant was living at \u201cPichet\u201d together with the twenty-first applicant and six months earlier the eighth applicant had moved in with the ninth applicant at \u201cPichet\u201d from a different address in the city. The seventy-fourth applicant had moved to a different town and the forty-second applicant had moved to a different address in the city. Meanwhile, the fifty-fourth applicant had broken up with the fortieth applicant in December 2007 and had not been in touch since then.","70. On 19 May 2010, on their application form, the applicants informed the Court that they had mounted legal challenges against their evictions of 2005 and 2006. They also stated that, whilst important by way of background, those legal challenges did not form the focus of the application.","71. On 16 September 2011 the sixty-fifth applicant signed a lease contract with Tulcea Local Council for a home located at a different address in the city, neither at \u201cPichet\u201d nor at the former rubbish dump.","72. In December 2012 the Tulcea mayor \u2019 s office informed the Government that, according to the social investigation reports produced in October 2008 by the Tulcea Social Protection and Assistance Agency, the applicants \u2019 relatives and neighbours had informed the social investigators that the seventy-first applicant had moved to Spain a month earlier together with her children, the thirty-sixth applicant was living with her mother at a different address in the city, and the forty-sixth, forty-eighth and seventy \u2011 fifth applicants were living at a different address in the city.","73. On the same date the Tulcea mayor \u2019 s office informed the Government that, according to the social investigation reports produced in February 2009 by the Tulcea Social Protection and Assistance Agency, the twenty-seventh and fifty-seventh applicants were living in mobile homes located on the former rubbish dump. Also, according to statements from the applicants \u2019 relatives and neighbours, the fifty-sixth applicant had moved to another city in January 2009 in order to live with her partner; the thirty-sixth applicant was living with her mother at a different address in the city; the twenty-second applicant was living elsewhere with his mother; the seventy \u2011 first applicant had moved to Spain together with her children, namely the eighteenth, nineteenth, twentieth, seventieth and seventy-second applicants; the seventy-fifth, the forty-sixth and forty-eighth applicants were living at a different address in the city; the sixty-seventh and sixty-eighth applicants were living at \u201cPichet\u201d; and the fifty-second applicant was living in another town.","74. On the same date the Tulcea mayor \u2019 s office informed the Government that, according to the social investigation reports produced in December 2012 by the Tulcea Social Protection and Assistance Agency, the nineteenth, twentieth, twenty-seventh, fifty-sixth, fifty-seventh, sixty-seventh, sixty-eighth, seventieth, seventy-first and seventy-second applicants were no longer living at \u201cPichet\u201d or in the mobile homes located on the former rubbish dumps. Also, according to statements from the applicants \u2019 relatives and neighbours, the twenty-second applicant had moved and was renting an apartment at a different address in the city; the seventy-fifth applicant had been held in detention since 2010; the forty-second applicant had returned to \u201cPichet\u201d in June 2012, having previously lived at a different address in the city where she had moved sometime after December 2006; the fortieth applicant was in detention; the forty-sixth and forty-eighth applicants were living at a different address in the city; the thirty-sixth applicant was living elsewhere with her mother; and the fourteenth applicant was living at a different address in the city together with her partner \u2019 s parents.","75. According to the social investigation report produced by Tulcea Local Council on 13 December 2012 the fifty-third applicant was living with her grandmother at a different address in the city, the seventy-fourth applicant was living together with the twenty-first applicant, and the sixty \u2011 fifth applicant was living together with his partner at \u201cPichet\u201d. The eighth applicant was living together with the eighteenth applicant and the fifty-second applicant was living together with the fiftieth applicant at \u201cPichet\u201d.","76. On 20 December 2012 the Tulcea County Agency for Payments and Social Inspection informed the Government that fifty-four applicants \u2013 excluding the sixth, eleventh, thirteenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, twentieth, twenty-second, twenty-fourth, twenty-ninth, thirty-fifth, thirty-seventh, thirty-eighth, forty-fifth, forty-sixth, forty-eighth, fifty-second, sixty-fifth, sixty-seventh, sixty-eighth, sixty-ninth, seventy-fourth and seventy-fifth applicants \u2013 had been receiving or continued to receive various forms of benefits and social allowances.","77. On the same date the Tulcea schools inspectorate informed the Government that of the applicants who lived at \u201cPichet\u201d, twenty-one were and\/or had been enrolled as school students before and\/or after their eviction in October 2006, namely the fourth, fifth, seventh, thirteenth, fourteenth, nineteenth, twenty-sixth, twenty-eighth, thirtieth, thirty-first, thirty-eighth, thirty-ninth, forty-fourth, forty-sixth, fifty-third, fifty-fifth, fifty-ninth, sixty \u2011 sixth, seventieth, seventy-second and seventy-third applicants. According to the aforementioned school inspectorate some of the twenty \u2011 one children had been temporarily or permanently withdrawn from school by their parents or next of kin before, immediately after or some years after their eviction in October 2006 because their parents or relatives were not interested in their children obtaining an education.","78. On the same date the Tulcea schools inspectorate informed the Government that the schools closest to \u201cPichet\u201d and the mobile homes on the rubbish dump were located one kilometre and 200 metres respectively from the two sites.","(c) Information provided by the Tulcea Environmental Protection Agency and the Romanian Ministry of Internal Affairs","79. On 12 December 2012 the Tulcea Environmental Protection Agency informed the Government that none of the applicants had complained to it about the issues raised before the Court. Moreover, the Agency had not carried out an environmental impact evaluation regarding the pollution in the areas mentioned in their application before the Court because the mobile homes were positioned in a location in a residential neighbourhood within the city boundary with access to running water, electricity, household waste collection facilities and a school. The area in question had never been designated as a rubbish dump. The city \u2019 s rubbish dump for household waste was located 5 kilometres outside the city. The \u201cPichet\u201d building was also located within the city boundary, within the confines of the industrial port zone on the banks of the River Danube with access to running water, electricity and household waste collection facilities. The Agency had an automated air quality monitoring station positioned in a location 1,500 metres from \u201cPichet\u201d. The results produced by this station showed that the level of pollution from sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, carbon monoxide, suspended particles and volatile organic compounds had remained below dangerous levels throughout 2011 and none of the other automated stations for monitoring air quality within the city had reported dangerous levels of pollution that year either. Furthermore, the goods which were handled by the port authorities were not dangerous and an environmental impact evaluation with regard to the pollution in the area of the industrial port was therefore not necessary. Lastly, the Agency was unaware whether the applicants had been informed by the authorities about the environmental conditions in the area at the time of their eviction because the eviction had been carried out by the Tulcea mayor \u2019 s office. The Agency did not have a strategy for avoiding potential risks to the applicants \u2019 health because such a strategy would fall within the spheres of competence of the Tulcea mayor \u2019 s office and the Tulcea Public Health Agency.","80. On 6 February 2013 the Romanian Ministry of Internal Affairs informed the Government that the nineteenth and the sixty-seventh applicants had been registered at other addresses since June 2011.","(d) Statements submitted by the applicants before the Court","81. On 28 March 2013 the fifteenth applicant submitted a statement before the Court, co-signed by his partner and children, to the effect that he and his partner, the forty-third applicant, were still living together with the fourteenth, the forty-fourth and thirteenth applicants at the same address and that their living conditions had not improved. Moreover, the authorities had refused to renew their lease contract because they had fallen behind with the rent and electricity payments. He also submitted that the sixty-seventh and the sixty-eighth applicants had moved to a different address. At the same time the seventy-second applicant had been working in Spain but she had continued to make regular return visits to her home here.","82. On the same date the twenty-fourth, twenty-ninth, forty-first, forty \u2011 second, fifty-fourth and sixty-third applicants submitted statements to the Court to the effect that they had been faced with poor living conditions after their re-location. The twenty-ninth, forty-first and fifty-fourth applicants stated that after their lease contracts had expired the authorities had refused to renew them because they had also fallen behind with paying rent and other charges. The twenty-ninth applicant confirmed the fifteenth applicant \u2019 s statement about the sixty-eighth applicant. The fifty-fourth applicant also confirmed the fifteenth applicant \u2019 s statements concerning the sixty-seventh and sixty-eighth applicants, as well as those regarding the family of the seventy-second applicant. She added that the nineteenth and the twentieth applicants were in a similar situation to that of the seventy \u2011 second applicant \u2019 s family.","83. On 29 March 2013 the sixty-first and seventy-sixth applicants submitted statements before the Court confirming the poor living conditions they had been faced with after their re-location. On the same date the forty \u2011 seventh applicant stated that her grand-daughter and son, the forty \u2011 sixth and forty \u2011 ninth applicants respectively, were living with her. She reiterated that their living conditions were inadequate and had not improved. On the same date the fiftieth applicant confirmed that his living conditions were still poor and stated that his son, the fifty-second applicant, was still living there with him.","B. Relevant domestic law and international material","84. The relevant provisions of Law no. 114\/1996 on housing read as follows:","Article 24","\u201cA lease contract may be terminated prematurely in the following circumstances:","(...)","b) at the owner \u2019 s request if:","- the tenant has not paid the rent for at least 3 consecutive months;","- the tenant has significantly damaged the residence, the building, the facilities and any other property attached to them ...;","- the tenant \u2019 s behaviour makes cohabitation impossible or prevents the normal use of the residence;","- the tenant has breached the tenancy agreement;","c) at the request of the owners \u2019 association if the tenant has not paid his share of the collective charges for 3 months...\u201d","Article 27","\u201cIf a leaseholder leaves the residence permanently, or if he or she dies, or if a non-resident leaseholder ... ceases to use the residence for more than 2 years continuously, the lease shall remain valid as the case may be:","a) to the benefit of the spouse, if he or she has lived together with the leaseholder;","b) to the benefit of the descendants and the ascendants, if they have lived together with him or her:","c) to the benefit of other individuals who shared the same domicile with the leaseholder for at least 1 year and were recorded in the lease contract;","(...)","In the absence of individuals who could benefit from the lease according to paragraph 1, the lease contract shall be terminated within 30 days of the date on which the leaseholder vacated the residence or died, or when the 2-year period of continuous non-use has expired.\u201d","Article 28","\u201cThe owner shall fulfil the following duties:","a) to hand over the residence to the tenant in a condition suitable for use;","b) to take steps to repair and maintain the building for safe use during the entire duration of the lease;","c) to maintain in good condition the building \u2019 s structural strength and the external parts of the building (roof, building front, pavement, surrounding area), yards and gardens as well as the building \u2019 s internal communal area (the stairwell, lift, hallways, corridor, underground, external stairs);","d) to maintain in good condition the building \u2019 s common facilities (elevator; hydrophore; water, sewage, central and water heating facilities; central heaters; ... waste collection facilities...).","Article 29","\u201cThe tenant shall fulfil the following duties:","a) to carry out the maintenance, repair and replacement work of the building \u2019 s elements and facilities used exclusively by him;","b) to replace or repair damaged elements and facilities of the building used improperly and which are in common use, regardless if they are outside or inside the building...;","c) to clean and disinfect the residence and the parts of the building in common use during the entire duration of the lease;","d) to return the residence to the owner in a condition suitable for use once the lease ended...\u201d","Article 30","\u201cIf the owner fails to fulfil his duties to repair and maintain the leased residence, the tenant may carry out the works at the owner \u2019 s expense, by deducting the expenses from the rent.","The tenant may carry out these works if the problem in question affects normal use of the property and if the owner has not taken steps to carry out such works within 30 days of the tenant \u2019 s written notification of the problem.\u201d","Article 43","\u201cSocial housing shall be allocated by local councils on the basis of conditions which they revise annually under the law in force at the time. The following categories of persons may benefit from social housing according to an order of priority decided by the local councils: newlyweds under 35, formerly institutionalised young people over 18, disabled persons ... and other categories of entitled individuals and families.\u201d","Article 48","\u201cThere is no right to social housing for persons or families who:","(...)","a) have sold a residence after 1 January 1990;","(...)","d) have already leased another social housing residence from the State \u2019 s immovable property fund.\u201d","85. The relevant provisions of the former Romanian Civil Code read as follows:","Article 998","\u201cAny act committed by a person that causes damage to another shall render the person through whose fault the damage was caused liable to make reparation for it.\u201d","Article 999","\u201cEveryone shall be liable for damage he has caused not only through his own actions but also through failure to act or negligence.\u201d","Article 1075","\u201cAny injunction to act or not to act is changed to damages if unenforced by the debtor\u201d","Article 1077","\u201cIf an injunction to act remains unenforced, the creditor may also ask to be authorised to enforce it at the debtor \u2019 s expense.\u201d","Article 1420","\u201cThe lessor must by nature of the contract and without the need for a special provision:","1. hand over the leased property to the tenant...","2. maintain it a condition that makes it usable for the purpose for which it was leased....\u201d","Article 1421","\u201c(...)","During the lease all the repairs that may be necessary must be made, except for small repairs (...) which are the responsibility of the tenant by virtue of his use thereof.\u201d","86. The relevant provisions of Government Ordinance No. 137\/2000 on combating all forms of discrimination read as follows:","Article 27","\u201c1. An individual who considers himself or herself discriminated against may lodge an application before a court for damages and restoration of the previous situation or cancellation of the situation caused by the discrimination, according to general law. The application shall be exempt from stamp duty and shall not be affected by an application before the National Council for Combating Discrimination.","(...)","4. The interested party shall present the facts that may be presumed to amount to direct or indirect dicrimination and the defendant must prove that the principle of equal treatment has not been breached. Any evidence may be adduced before the court ... including audio and video recording or statistical data...\u201d","Article 28","\u201c1. Non-governmental organisations which have as an objective the protection of human rights or which have a legitimate interest in combating dicrimination shall have locus standi if the discrimination happens within their area of activity and affects a community or a group of people.","2. The organisations mentioned in paragraph 1 shall also have locus standi in circumstances where the discrimination affects a natural person, at his or her request.\u201d","87. Excerpts from the relevant international documents concerning the living conditions and education rights of Roma people, including recommendations, resolutions, reports, observations, memoranda and other relevant texts by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, are given in the case of Winterstein and Others v. France (no. 27013\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 90-102, 17 October 2013).","88. Excerpts from the relevant international treaties concerning the right to education, inluding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, the Convention Against Discrimination in Education 1960, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1966 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, are given in the case of Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia ([GC], nos. 43370\/04, 8252\/05 and 18454\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 77-81, ECHR 2012 (extracts))."],"29307":["THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE","5.The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Orenburg.","6.In June and July 2006 the investigation division of the Leninskiy district police department of Orenburg instituted criminal proceedings into robberies committed by an organised group.","7.On 30 August 2006 the applicant was arrested by the Department for Combating Organised Crime of Orenburg regional police (\u201cthe UBOP\u201d) on suspicion of having committed the robberies.","8.On 31 August 2006 he was questioned as an accused in the presence of his lawyer and denied being involved in the crimes.","9.On 1 September 2006 the Leninskiy District Court of Orenburg extended the term of the applicant\u2019s arrest, and on 4 September 2006 ordered that he be detained on remand and placed in pre-trial detention facility IZ-65\/1 (\u201cthe SIZO\u201d).","10.At an unspecified time on 18 September 2006 the applicant was taken from the SIZO to the UBOP building without his lawyer being present. There are no records of any investigative actions having been carried out that day with his participation.","11.According to the applicant, once he arrived at the UBOP offices five or six police officers, including L. and G., beat him in order to force him to confess to the robberies and subjected him to ill-treatment as follows. They shackled his hands and legs and tied his arms with a belt. They pushed him to the ground and almost suffocated him by putting a plastic bag and a gas mask over his head that cut off his air. They later took him to the basement of the building, which was equipped as a gym. They hung him on the parallel bars and hit him on the kidneys and extremities with a baseball bat. The applicant fainted several times so they burned him with cigarettes to make him come around.","12.At 9 p.m. the applicant was taken back to the SIZO. A routine examination by the medical assistant on duty, in the presence of a duty officer, revealed the following injuries: (i)a haematoma measuring 1 cm by 1cm on the left frontal bone of the skull; (ii) hyperaemia (redness) measuring 1.5 by 3 cm on the right side of the forehead; (iii) a red and blue haematoma measuring 2 cm by 3 cm on the right shin; (iv) hyperaemia measuring 1 cm by 1 cm on both buttocks; and (v)hyperaemia measuring 2.5by 4 cm on the right side of the lumbar region (medical report no.249 of 18September 2006, \u0430\u043a\u0442 \u043c\u0435\u0434\u0438\u0446\u0438\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043e\u0441\u0432\u0438\u0434\u0435\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044c\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f).","13.According to the additional medical records on the applicant from the SIZO for the period from 19 to 23 September 2006, he complained of headache, nausea, dizziness, vomiting and pain on the left side of his body when breathing. He had twitching eyelids and hand tremors. He was diagnosed with neurocirculatory dystonia of a hypertensive type and received treatment.","14.On 20 September 2006 the applicant went for questioning and his lawyer, Ms S., noticed that he had injuries on his forehead which he had not had before, that he looked unwell and had difficulty moving. The next day she asked for a forensic medical examination.","15.On 23 September 2006, K., an investigator at the investigation division of the Orenburg regional police department in charge of the applicant\u2019s criminal case, ordered a forensic medical expert opinion on the applicant on the basis of medical records after considering the lawyer\u2019s request, the report on the examination of the applicant at the SIZO on 18September 2006, and a report by Officer L. of the UBOP which stated that the applicant had caused the injuries to himself. K. wanted to know whether the applicant had any injuries and, if so, when and how they had been inflicted, whether they could have been inflicted as a result of a fall or as a result of harming himself, as described by Officer L., and whether the injuries were compatible with him being detained and participating in investigative actions in his case.","16.According to L.\u2019s report, the applicant had been brought to the UBOP on 18 September 2006 as part of actions taken under the investigation, and had been taken to L.\u2019s office for an interview. The applicant had jumped up from his chair and \u201chit his forehead and face on the corner of the chair with some force while shouting that he had to be taken back to the SIZO; he became hysterical, fell on the wooden floor, which had a linoleum covering, and started rolling around on the floor, hitting himself against wooden chairs and tables\u201d.","17.On 25 September 2006 the Promyshlennyy district prosecutor\u2019s office received a communication from the SIZO concerning the applicant\u2019s injuries. According to the applicant\u2019s statements to the prosecutor\u2019s office, the UBOP officers had subjected him to ill\u2011treatment on 18 September 2006 in order to force him to confess to the crimes. He remembered the name of one of them, L.On 27 September 2006 the applicant lodged a formal complaint with the district prosecutor\u2019s office, requesting the prosecution of the police officers.","18.On 6 October 2006, following a pre-investigation inquiry, S., an investigator at the Promyshlennyy district prosecutor\u2019s office of Orenburg, found that the applicant\u2019s allegations had not been confirmed. Relying on Article 24 \u00a7 1 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he refused to institute criminal proceedings on the grounds that no crime had been committed. The investigator relied on L.\u2019s denial of ill-treating the applicant.","19.On the same day the Promyshlennyy district deputy prosecutor annulled the investigator\u2019s decision as unlawful and ordered an additional inquiry.","20.On 25 October 2006 two forensic medical experts found after examining the applicant\u2019s medical records that he had haematomas on the left frontal bone and right shin, which had been caused either by hard, blunt objects, or as a result of hitting such objects, one to three days before his examination on 18September 2006. They could have been caused by the applicant simply falling down or as a result of self-inflicted injuries, as described in L.\u2019s report. The hyperaemia on the forehead, buttocks and lumbar region was not considered as an injury and its gravity could not be assessed because it was an immediate and reversible reaction to some \u201cirritant effect\u201d, including \u201cmechanical impact\u201d.","21.On 27October 2006 S. again refused to open a criminal case, citing the same grounds. In addition to L.\u2019s evidence, the investigator relied on similar statements by Officer G., who had also been present at the time the applicant had allegedly injured himself, and on the forensic medical experts\u2019 report of 25 October 2006.","22.The applicant appealed against the decision of 27 October 2006, arguing, inter alia, that the inquiry had not been thorough and that the State\u2019s responsibility had been engaged under Article 3 of the Convention because he had received injuries during his detention that had been confirmed by medical evidence. The applicant referred to the Court\u2019s case\u2011law, stating that the burden of proof in such a situation was on the State and that it had to provide evidence which could cast doubt on the applicant\u2019s allegations. The applicant argued that relying on the police officers\u2019 statements was clearly insufficient.","23.On 19 September 2007 a judge at the Promyshlennyy District Court of Orenburg dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint. The court held that the inquiry had been thorough and comprehensive, it had not found any facts to confirm the applicant\u2019s ill\u2011treatment, the medical experts\u2019 conclusions had been consistent with the police officers\u2019 statements and the refusal to institute criminal proceedings had been lawful and well-founded. On 25October 2007 the Orenburg Regional Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant and fully endorsed the District Court\u2019s findings.","24.On 6 March 2008 the Orenburg Regional Court convicted the applicant on several counts of robbery and sentenced him to twelve years and four months\u2019 imprisonment. It stated that the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment were unfounded, relying on the findings of the pre\u2011investigation inquiry and the statements by L. and the other police officers and investigators denying any wrongdoing on their part.","25.On 24 November 2008 a deputy head of the investigation department of the Orenburg town prosecutor\u2019s office dismissed an appeal by the applicant against the investigator\u2019s decision of 27 October 2006, considering that the inquiry had been thorough and objective."],"29345":["5.The applicant was born on 12 May 1988 and at the time of his most recent communication with the Court was detained in Toretsk (previously Dzerzhynsk).","6.Early on the morning of 16 February 2005 Mrs D., a night security guard at a shop in Toretsk, was found dead and partially undressed at her place of work, with injuries on her head and genitals. It was established that a grinder tool had also gone missing. The prosecutor\u2019s office instituted criminal proceedings on the same day and over the following days proceeded to interview a number of witnesses.","A.The events of 20 and 21 February 2005","7.At about 10 a.m. on 20 February 2005 two police officers arrived at the applicant\u2019s home and asked him, at the time sixteen years of age, and his father to go to the police station with them.","8.Once at the police station, the applicant was separated from his father and questioned as to whether he had any information about the grinder which had disappeared from the shop.According to the applicant, then the police had started urging him to plead guilty to the murder and theft. According to him, as he repeatedly denied those allegations, three officers allegedly beat him on various parts of his body and threatened him that he would be raped in prison.","9.At an unspecified time the same day the applicant\u2019s father and grandfather, who lived in the same house as the applicant, made statements to the police about the presence of the grinder in their house. The father stated that the applicant had apparently brought the grinder home around the time of the murder and had originally told him that a stranger had been offering the grinder for sale. On learning that the police were searching for a grinder, the applicant had told him the story he had told the police (see paragraphs 8 above and 13 below). However, in the applicant\u2019s story as retold by the father, the grinder was found in a different street. On hearing this, the father had hidden the grinder. The grandfather\u2019s account of events was similar to the father\u2019s. On the same day the police also obtained a statement of Mr S., the applicant\u2019s friend, about the time they had spent together on the night of the murder and the circumstances under which they had parted.","10.From 12.30 p.m. to 1.20 p.m. the police went to the place where the applicant\u2019s father had hidden the grinder. The father pointed to where the grinder was and the police seized it.","11.At about 3p.m. the applicant signed a document explaining his rights as a suspect, including the right to remain silent and to consult a lawyer before his first questioning. When signing the document, the applicant added that he did not object to L. representing him. The applicant alleged that he had mistakenly understood that L. had been asked to appear on his behalf by his parents. In fact, L. had been asked to represent the applicant by the investigator.","12.Subsequently the Qualifications Commission of the Bar of Ukraine, at the time the highest authority in charge of the advocates\u2019 qualifications and discipline, examined the applicant\u2019s parents\u2019 complaint concerning the procedure used in the appointment of L. The Commission established that there was no evidence that L. had been appointed through a bar association, as required by law, in particular there was no order of the bar association or agreement with the client appointing L. It also established that there was no evidence that the investigator had issued a formal decision appointing L. as the applicant\u2019s lawyer, as he had been required to do by law.","13.At 3.20 p.m. the applicant was questioned in the presence of L. He stated that on the night of the murder he had been walking home after a night out with friends. He had observed a stranger running down the street with a grinder and had started running after him. Once the man had dropped the grinder, the applicant had picked it up and run away. When he had brought the grinder home he had said to his father that someone had been offering to sell a grinder. When he had learned the next day that a night security guard had been killed and that grinders had been stolen, he had revealed the truth to his father, who had then hidden the grinder.","14.At 3:55 p.m. the applicant was examined by a forensic medical expert, who concluded that he had several light injuries that had been inflicted two to seven days before the examination.","15.At 4 p.m. the investigator K. drew up an arrest report, whereby the applicant was arrested on suspicion of D.\u2019s murder. According to the report, the applicant was being arrested on the grounds that \u201ceyewitnesses indicate the person who committed the crime\u201d. According to the Government, the applicant\u2019s parents were informed of the applicant\u2019s arrest at that time. According to the applicant, no such notification was made.","16.At the same time most of the applicant\u2019s clothes were seized for a forensic examination.","17.The applicant\u2019s father was taken to the family home to accompany the police during a search.","18.At about 6.20 p.m. the police completed the search of the applicant\u2019s home, seizing some clothes. According to the applicant it was only then that the police officers who had conducted the search brought replacement clothes from the applicant\u2019s home to the police station.","19.According to the applicant, he was left handcuffed at the police station, wearing just his underwear, for the entire period from the seizure of his clothes until the end of the search and return of the police officers who conducted it, feeling very cold and vulnerable. During that time police officers continued urging the applicant to confess to the murder and beat him with plastic water bottles.","20.On the evening of 20 February 2005 the applicant was placed in a cell in the police\u2019s temporary detention facility with two adult detainees, K., born in 1975, and O., born in 1956, who were at the time registered as suffering from drug addiction. O. had also been suffering from tuberculosis and had had a prior conviction (see paragraphs 62 and 63 below). It is unclear whether the applicant knew of the above background of his co\u2011detainees at the time he had been held with them.","According to the applicant, the two other detainees were secret police informants. They advised the applicant that as he was a minor and if he chose to cooperate the investigative authorities would prosecute him on less serious charges and he would not receive a real prison sentence.","K. was diagnosed with tuberculosis in November 2005. O. and K. died in January and December 2006 respectively, the former allegedly of an overdose and the latter of a disease.","21.The applicant continued to be detained in the cell with O. and K. until a court detention order arrived on 23 February 2005 and he was transferred to the remand prison (see paragraph 26 below).","22.According to the applicant, on the morning of 21 February 2005 two police officers took him out of his cell without registering it. They threatened to make sure he got a long prison sentence, to charge him with rape, which would lead to him being raped and harassed in prison by other inmates, and to create \u201cproblems\u201d for his family, unless he confessed. Unable to withstand such pressure, the applicant agreed to copy by hand a statement prepared for him by the police officers, acknowledging his guilt for murder in \u201cself-defence\u201d.","According to the authorities, on the morning of 21 February 2005 the applicant asked to see the officer in charge of the police detention facility.","23.The applicant then made a handwritten statement of surrender to Officer G., the head of the police detention facility. In his statement, the applicant noted that early on 16February 2005, while in a state of alcoholic intoxication, he had decided to burgle the shop. Having suddenly run into the victim, who had tried to attack him with a grinder, he had defended himself and had hit her with a brick. When she had become unconscious, the applicant, scared of what had happened, had carried her to a couch and had undressed her to make it look as though there had been a rape. Then he had picked up the grinder and taken it home.","24.Later on the same day the applicant repeated the above confessions in a formal questioning session in the presence of his lawyer, L.","25.On the same day the applicant, unaccompanied by L., was taken to an identification parade, where Y., a shop assistant who had been working on a night shift at a kiosk close to the scene of the crime on the night of the murder, picked the applicant out of a four-person line-up as the person she had seen by her kiosk shortly before D. had been killed. In the course of one of the subsequent trials Y. stated that she had not identified the applicant with total certainty but had merely thought that there was a resemblance between him and the person she had seen that night.","B.Subsequent investigation and the first trial","26.On 22 February 2005 the applicant was charged with murder without aggravating circumstances and theft. Accordingly, his procedural status changed from that of \u201csuspect\u201d to \u201caccused\u201d. Questioned on the same day in the presence of L. the applicant repeated his previous confession.","27.On 23 February 2005 the Toretsk Court remanded the applicant in custody pending the completion of the investigation. That decision was not appealed against and became final.","28.On the same day the applicant\u2019s cellmates, K. and O., were released.","29.On 25 February 2005 the applicant was transferred from the police detention facility to the remand prison in Bakhmut (at the time Artemivsk).","30.On 31 March 2005 the applicant was questioned in the presence of B., a lawyer engaged by his parents. He stated that he confirmed his prior statements about the murder. In the course of the subsequent investigation he was again questioned in the presence of the same lawyer and made detailed statements that repeated his confession.","31.On 6 April 2005 a commission of psychologists and psychiatrists produced a report at the request of the investigator concerning the applicant\u2019s mental state at the time of the crime and at the time of his examination by the experts. The experts concluded, in particular, that the applicant, according to his own account, had committed the killing in self-defence, without premeditation and through an unexpected confluence of circumstances. As a result, he had suffered a serious shock and confusion. At the remand prison he had suffered from sleep troubles, fear, and confusion and had displayed inappropriate behaviour. When examined by a prison psychiatrist he had been diagnosed with an acute reaction to stress, put in the prison\u2019s medical wing and treated with sedatives, which had helped.","32.In the course of the trial, conducted in the presence of his lawyer A.Kh. and his mother acting as a lay defender, the applicant confirmed the account of the attack on D. which he had given in the course of the pre-trial investigation.","33.On 21 July 2005 the Toretsk Court convicted the applicant of murder without aggravating circumstances and theft and sentenced him to seven and a half years\u2019 imprisonment.","34.On 5 August 2005 the applicant, represented by his parents and a new lawyer, Y.K., appealed against the judgment. Additional appeals were also lodged by them on later dates. In the appeals the applicant retracted his confessions as false. He and his representatives alleged that the confessions had been extracted from him under physical and psychological pressure from the police, namely that he had been subject to \u201cphysical pressure\u201d, \u201cthreats and beatings\u201d, \u201cmoral and physical influence\u201d, that his statement of surrender \u201cresulted from beatings\u201d (\u201c\u043f\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0435\u043d\u044b \u043c\u0435\u0440\u044b \u0441\u0438\u043b\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0434\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f\u201d, \u201c\u0443\u0433\u0440\u043e\u0437\u0430\u043c\u0438, \u0438\u0437\u0431\u0438\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f\u043c\u0438\u201d, \u201c\u043c\u043e\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0438 \u0444\u0438\u0437\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0435 \u0432\u043e\u0437\u0434\u0435\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0438\u044f\u201d, \u201c\u0432\u044b\u0431\u0438\u0442\u0430 \u044f\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0441 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439\u201d respectively). According to him, he had been told that unless he confessed to murder he would be falsely accused of rape making his life in prison extremely difficult. He stated that two cellmates at the police detention facility also urged him to confess. He also noted that he had kept to his initial confessions until his conviction because his cellmates and the police had told him that the police would make his life difficult in prison if he told anyone of the pressure on him. On the other hand, they had assured him that if he chose to cooperate with the police they would make sure the charges against him were not serious and that he would be released from custody right after his trial. Accordingly, he had said nothing to his lawyers about his ill-treatment.","35.The prosecutor also appealed, in particular arguing that the sentence was excessively lenient.","36.On 4 October 2005 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) quashed the judgment of 21 July 2005 and returned the case for further investigation. The court noted that the judgment had been poorly reasoned. As far as the motives for the applicant\u2019s actions were concerned, it had also been based heavily on the applicant\u2019s confessions, without sufficient corroboration from other evidence. The description of the crime scene, for instance that the lock had been sawn off rather than broken off, had not matched the trial court\u2019s conclusion, based on the applicant\u2019s account, that the applicant had simply been exploring the shop out of curiosity. The victim had also had unexplained injuries on her genitals.","C.Further investigations and retrials","37.On 19 December 2005 and on several subsequent occasions the investigators attempted to question the applicant within the framework of the further investigations. However, he refused to answer any questions and denied any involvement in the crimes he had been charged with.","38.On 11 and 12 January 2006 the investigator reclassified the charges against the applicant from simple murder to aggravated murder for gain, and from theft to robbery. The applicant was also charged with theft of a friend\u2019s cell phone.","39.On 17 February 2006 the Regional Court released the applicant from custody, finding that a further extension of his detention would be in breach of the applicable procedural time-limits.","40.On 21 April 2006 the applicant\u2019s case was submitted for a retrial.","41.On 10 May 2006 the Toretsk Court again remanded the applicant in custody. It held that while the applicant had no prior convictions and had positive character references, he had no employment and had been charged with grave offences. Accordingly, it held that detention was necessary to prevent the applicant from absconding or interfering with the investigation and to ensure his compliance with procedural decisions. No time-limit for his detention was fixed in that decision or in those made on 30 November 2006, 21 May 2007, 24 July and 30 December 2008, and 27 May 2009 (see below).","42.On 30 November 2006 the Toretsk Court returned the case for further investigation and ruled that the applicant should remain in custody. The court based its decision on the gravity of the charges which, according to the court, made the applicant likely to abscond.","43.On 21 March 2007 the applicant\u2019s case was submitted to the Regional Court for a retrial.","44.On 21 May 2007 the Regional Court again sent the case back for further investigation and, without giving reasons, ruled that the applicant should remain in custody.","45.On 25 January 2008 the Regional Court convicted the applicant of robbery and the murder of D.","46.On 24 July 2008 the Supreme Court quashed the conviction, returning the case for further investigation. The Supreme Court also ruled that the applicant should remain in custody. It gave no reasons for the latter part of its decision.","47.On 30 December 2008 the Regional Court returned the case, which in the meantime had been re-submitted to it, for further investigation. It also ruled that the applicant should remain in custody. By way of reasoning it stated that there were no grounds to order his release given that, in view of the gravity of the charges against him, it could not be ruled out that the applicant would attempt to abscond. On 9 April 2009 the Supreme Court quashed that decision.","D.Final re-trial and conviction","48.On 27 May 2009 the Regional Court committed the applicant for trial and ruled that he should remain in custody for the same reasons as given in the order of 10 May 2006 (see paragraph 41 above).","49.In the course of the final retrial the applicant denied any involvement in the attack on D. and said that he had found the grinder, describing essentially the same circumstances as on 20 February 2005 (see paragraph 13 above). To explain the presence of his fingerprint in the shop where the victim had been killed he stated that he had bought cigarettes there on 15February 2005.","50.On 11 November 2009 the Regional Court convicted the applicant of robbery and aggravated murder and sentenced him to thirteen years\u2019 imprisonment. In particular, it made the following findings.","(a)It found established that the applicant had broken into the shop intending to burgle it, had discovered D. sleeping, had repeatedly hit her on the head with a brick and then, after she had become unconscious, had inserted the neck of a vodka bottle into her vagina.","(b)In finding the applicant guilty, the court referred to various pieces of evidence, including forensic examinations, witness statements and the applicant\u2019s confessions \u201cgiven by him when questioned as a suspect and as an accused\u201d (see paragraph 26 above), and the presence of the applicant\u2019s fingerprint at the crime scene. In particular, the trial court referred to the pre-trial identification of the applicant by witness Y. and to the testimony of V.B., who had seen the applicant near the shop around the time of the murder. The court considered the applicant\u2019s explanation for the presence of his fingerprint in the shop unconvincing since he had first mentioned the supposed visit to the shop on 15 February 2005 in the course of the retrial and had not previously mentioned that visit.","(c)The court rejected the applicant\u2019s argument that his confessions had been inadmissible because they had been obtained under duress. It noted in particular that there was no evidence that the applicant had suffered any physical injuries at the hands of the police. Moreover, the applicant had consistently repeated his confessions in the presence of his lawyers, mother, and psychiatric experts in the course of the first investigation and trial. His parents had voluntarily paid the victim\u2019s burial costs. Still, the applicant\u2019s confessions had only partially reflected the truth. In particular, according to the forensic and other evidence, D. had been raped with a vodka bottle, which was not in line with the applicant\u2019s initial statements that he had accidentally killed her after being surprised by her and had then run away almost immediately.","(d)The absence of the applicant\u2019s lawyer from the identification parade on 21 February 2005 had not breached the applicant\u2019s defence rights since he had not made any statements on that occasion and had simply been physically shown with other men in the line-up to the witness Y. through a one-way glass partition. It had been Y., and not the applicant, who had actively participated in that investigative measure, and therefore it had not had any impact on his chosen defence strategy. Moreover, contrary to the applicant\u2019s submissions, Y.\u2019s statements concerning the applicant\u2019s presence near the crime scene on the night of the murder had been consistent with the statements of other witnesses.","(e)On an application by the defence the court ruled certain expert evidence inadmissible.","(f)While the statement in the arrest report that \u201ceyewitnesses indicate the person who had committed the crime\u201d (see paragraph 15 above) had been technically incorrect in the applicant\u2019s case, the discovery of the grinder in the applicant\u2019s home had in fact constituted an independent legal basis for his arrest. Accordingly, the Regional Court refused to declare the applicant\u2019s arrest unlawful.","51.In an appeal to the Supreme Court the applicant gave the account of alleged ill-treatment by the police set out above. He stressed, however, that he had managed to withstand most of the pressure from the police. What had made him finally agree to plead guilty to a murder he had not committed had been the threat that he would be charged with rape and that that would lead to him being raped in prison. That threat had had a particularly strong impact on him given that he had already been made to spend several hours in a state of undress and vulnerability. He had chosen the false confession as a lesser evil. He had then maintained his confession throughout the trial because he had been assured by the lawyer B., who had good relations with the investigator in charge of the case, that the trial court would reclassify the charges against him from murder to a lesser charge of a \u201ckilling committed while exceeding the limits of legitimate defence\u201d. He had hoped that such a reclassification would allow him to get probation instead of an actual prison sentence. It was not true that, as stated by the Regional Court, he had repeated his confession to psychiatrists. In fact the investigator had assured him that the psychiatric assessment was pre\u2011arranged to allow for reclassification and its results would be worded accordingly. The applicant had not talked to the experts and his mother assured him that she had arranged for the psychiatrists\u2019 report to be worded in such terms that it may justify reclassification of charges against him.","52.On 3 June 2010 the Supreme Court upheld the above judgment and it became final.","E.Investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment","53.It would appear that the applicant first raised his allegations of ill\u2011treatment in his appeals against his first conviction (see paragraph 34 above). In those appeals his allegations were framed in rather general terms and were limited essentially to allegations of \u201cbeatings\u201d and \u201cpsychological pressure\u201d. He also stated, more specifically, that he had been told that, unless he confessed, charges of rape would be brought against him and this would make his life in prison extremely difficult.","Afterwards the applicant\u2019s parents also lodged complaints about his alleged ill-treatment with the prosecutor\u2019s office. It appears that the applicant\u2019s mother lodged first such complaints on 23 December 2005 and 16 January 2006. The Court has not been provided with copies of those complaints.","54.On 26 January 2006 the Toretsk prosecutor\u2019s office, in response to the applicant\u2019s mother\u2019s complaint of 16 January 2006, refused to institute criminal proceedings in relation to the applicant\u2019s complaints for lack of a corpus delicti in the police officers\u2019 actions, concluding that there was no evidence of any physical or psychological ill\u2011treatment. The prosecutors referred essentially to the lack of medical evidence of any injuries suffered by the applicant at the time of the alleged ill-treatment and the lack of any complaints from him before his first conviction. The prosecutors also stated that there had been no irregularities in the applicant\u2019s placement and holding in the police detention facility and that O. and K. with whom the applicant had been placed at that facility had had no prior convictions.","55.In the course of examination of the case against the applicant, on 14June 2006, the applicant complained to the trial court about the beatings, handcuffing, stripping and the threats of prison rape he had allegedly been subjected to by the police. On 15 June 2006 the trial court ordered the prosecutor\u2019s office to investigate the allegations.","56.On 29 June 2006 the prosecutor\u2019s office again refused to institute criminal proceedings essentially on the same grounds. No mention was made of the applicant\u2019s placement with adults in the detention facility.","57.On 26 September 2006 the applicant\u2019s mother complained to the regional prosecutor\u2019s office, reiterating her allegations that the applicant had been physically ill-treated by the police, left in a state of undress and handcuffed and threatened that he would be charged with rape and would, therefore, be raped in prison. She referred to her previous complaint of 23December 2005 on the same subject and complained that she had received no satisfactory answer to it.","58.On 16 October 2006 the regional prosecutor\u2019s office overruled the decisions of 26 January and 29 June 2006.","59.On 3 November 2006 the Toretsk prosecutor\u2019s office again refused to institute criminal proceedings, essentially on the same grounds as in its previous decisions. The prosecutors stated, with no further explanation, that there were no irregularities in the course of the applicant\u2019s placement and holding in the police detention facility. On 25 June 2007 the regional prosecutor\u2019s office overruled that decision as premature.","60.On 10 July 2007 the Toretsk prosecutor\u2019s office again refused to institute criminal proceedings essentially on the same grounds. No mention was made of the applicant\u2019s detention with adults. On 8 February 2008 the regional prosecutor\u2019s office upheld that decision.","61.Subsequently, other decisions refusing to institute criminal proceedings were taken, the most recent one on 31 December 2008. The copies of those decisions have not been provided to the Court.","62.On 6 January 2011 the Toretsk prosecutor\u2019s office wrote to the applicant\u2019s father in response to his complaint. It said that the records of local medical institutions showed that at the time the applicant had been placed in the cell with O. the latter had been registered as suffering from tuberculosis but, according to his file, he had not posed a danger of infection to others. He had been admitted to hospital in March 2005 to treat his tuberculosis. O. had had a conviction at some point in the past but his conviction had been considered sufficiently old to have been considered expunged by time the applicant had been detained with him.","63.On 14 March 2011 the Toretsk prosecutor\u2019s office wrote to the applicant\u2019s father, again in response to his complaint, stating that the placing of adult arrestees in the same cell with the applicant, a minor, had been in breach of domestic law (section 8 of the Pre-Trial Detention Act) and had constituted a disciplinary infraction on the part of the police officers who had taken that decision. However, they could not be disciplined because the six-month limitation period for disciplinary measures had expired. The prosecutor\u2019s office also confirmed that the applicant\u2019s cellmates were at the time registered as drug users."],"29357":["5.The applicants were born in 1973, 1985 and 1981 respectively. They live in Orsk in the Orenburg region, Krasnoturinsk in the Sverdlovsk region and Orenburg, respectively.","A.Mr Olisov\u2019s application","6.In May 2006 D. complained to the Department for Combating Organised Crime (the \u201cUBOP\u201d) of the Orenburg regional police department that the applicant was allegedly planning his murder. Kh. and P. \u2012 whom the applicant had allegedly hired to murder D. \u2012 agreed to cooperate with the UBOP and, acting on the latter\u2019s instructions, organised a meeting with the applicant, told him that they had killed D., showed him photographs simulating D.\u2019s death \u2012 which they had prepared as part of the UBOP covert operation \u2012 and asked for payment. After paying them later the same day, the applicant and his father, who had accompanied him, were taken to the UBOP office where they arrived at about 2 a.m. on 17 May 2006.","7.According to the applicant, he was interviewed at the request of the head of the UBOP, K., until 7.30 a.m. by several operative police officers, including M., G. and O., who demanded that he confess to having ordered D.\u2019s murder. They allegedly subjected him to ill-treatment which the applicant described as follows. They handcuffed him, punched him and subjected him to near\u2011suffocation by use of a plastic bag put over his head. He fainted several times. They forced his legs apart until he fell and then lifted him by his hands, which were shackled behind his back. They tied him up in a painful position with a belt so that his knees were pressed against his neck, and pulled up his shackled hands. They lifted the applicant up whilst thus tied, and dropped him down onto his coccyx. One of them stepped on his head.","8.At 7.30 a.m. the applicant was placed in a cell in which he stayed until 3p.m. He was then again interviewed and signed a document entitled \u201cexplanation\u201d (\u043e\u0431\u044a\u044f\u0441\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435) drawn up by the UBOP operative officer O., in which he gave statements which he later reiterated at his trial.","9.No record of the applicant\u2019s arrest was drawn up. At 6 p.m. the UBOP officers took the applicant home, carried out a search, and then left.","10.The next day the applicant was taken by his father to the Pirogov hospital in Orenburg. According to the hospital medical records, the applicant had many bruises on his body, in particular on the head, neck, abdomen and the lumbar region.","11.On the same day the applicant complained about his ill-treatment to the Leninskiy district police department no. 1 of Orenburg, which ordered a forensic medical examination.","12.On 18May 2006 an expert examined the applicant, his medical records, and his allegations of ill-treatment by the UBOP officers the previous day (namely being handcuffed and tied, punched and beaten with a bat), and concluded that bruises and abrasions on the applicant\u2019s body and upper and lower extremities had been inflicted by hard blunt objects at the time, as alleged by him (forensic medical expert report of 19 May 2006).","13.On 22 May 2006 the applicant was diagnosed with a fractured vertebra and hospitalised. His X-ray examination confirmed fractures of two vertebrae.","14.On 10 July 2006 the Leninskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office of Orenburg brought criminal proceedings against the applicant in relation to the attempted murder of D. On 12 July 2006 the applicant was arrested.","15.On12 and 13 July 2006 the applicant was examined by a forensic medical expert who concluded that, in addition to the injuries noted in the previous report of 19 May 2006, the applicant had a fracture of the seventh thoracic vertebra which resulted in health impairment of medium gravity and had been caused in May 2006 by the impact of a hard blunt object or as a result of hitting such an object with great mechanical force.","16.According to an additional forensic medical expert opinion of 31July 2006 produced on the basis of medical records, the fracture of the vertebra could not have resulted from being punched, kicked and beaten with a bat, or as a result of handcuffing, having the legs tied together with a belt, or lifting the applicant up by his hands. It could have resulted from an impact by a traumatic force along the axes of the spine.","17.On 31 July 2006 an investigator from the Promyshlenniy district prosecutor\u2019s office of Orenburg \u2012 who had carried out a pre-investigation inquiry into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill\u2011treatment by the UBOP officers \u2012 refused to initiate criminal proceedings, relying on statements by the UBOP police officers, in particular G. and O., that on 17May 2006 the applicant had been arrested on suspicion of having ordered a murder, and had been taken to the UBOP and interviewed, and that no violence had been used against him. The investigator also referred to statements by the applicant\u2019s father and other persons who had been in the UBOP building at the same time as the applicant and had not seen or heard that the applicant had been subjected to ill-treatment. On 26July 2006 the applicant had been diagnosed as suffering from a mental disorder. The investigator concluded that the applicant could not be trusted, that he had probably received his injuries as a result of hitting himself accidentally against some objects, and that the true circumstances in which he had received the injuries could not be established.","18.On 14 May 2008 the Promyshlenniy District Court granted an appeal lodged by the applicant against the investigator\u2019s decision. Subsequently, further refusals to open a criminal case followed on 24 July and 4 August 2008 and were annulled as unlawful by the prosecutor\u2019s office.","19.On 14 October 2008 the Orenburg Regional Court convicted the applicant of the attempted murder of D., sentenced him to five years\u2019 imprisonment and ordered him to pay damages to D. It took into account the fact that the applicant had no criminal record and also had positive references. At the trial the applicant denied his guilt, stating that his sister had been killed in a traffic accident caused by D.\u2019s drunk driving, that D. had unlawfully avoided serving his sentence of imprisonment, that he \u2012 the applicant \u2012 had wished to compel D. to serve his prison sentence by using the services of Kh. and P. \u2013 who had suggested planting drugs on D., inter alia \u2013 and had paid them out of fear for his family\u2019s safety. The applicant\u2019s argument that the crime of which he was accused was the result of police entrapment was dismissed by the court.","20.On 23 October 2008 an investigator from the investigative committee of the Orenburg regional prosecutor\u2019s office ordered, pursuant to Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that no criminal case be opened into the applicant\u2019s allegations for lack of the elements of a crime under Articles 285 and 286 of the Criminal Code (on abuse of powers) in the acts of the police officers. The decision relied on the same reasoning as that set out in the initial decision of 31 July 2006, adding that the applicant had recovered from his psychiatric disorder and had been convicted.","21.On appeal by the applicant, the investigator\u2019s decision was found lawful by the Orenburg Promyshlenniy District Court in a decision of 15January 2009, which was further upheld by the Orenburg Regional Court on 12 March 2009. The District Court held, in particular, that the fact that the applicant had been detained unlawfully for more than three hours at the UBOP premises was not in itself sufficient to prove that he had been ill\u2011treated by the police officers or that he had been deliberately subjected to unlawful detention. In reply to the applicant\u2019s criticism of the investigating authority\u2019s failure to carry out a thorough investigation and, in particular, to examine the room at the UBOP premises in which the applicant had been interviewed and allegedly ill\u2011treated, the District Court opined that there would be no sense in examining the UBOP office given the considerable length of time that had passed since the events in question.","22. On 26 January 2009 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction on appeal.","23.On 21 May 2015 the acting head of the supervisory department of the Orenburg regional investigative committee annulled the decision of 23October 2008 for being based on an incomplete inquiry and ordered an additional inquiry and the applicant\u2019s additional forensic medical examination.","B.Mr Danishkin\u2019s application","24.On 25 December 2010 between 8.43 a.m. and 11.50 a.m. the police searched the applicant\u2019s flat in Nizhniy Novgorod, pursuant to a decision of the Kanavinskiy District Court on 14 December 2010 concerning criminal proceedings against third persons, in order to find evidence of those persons\u2019 membership of extremist organisations. The police found explosives and bomb-making material. Once the search had been completed, they took the applicant to the Centre for Combating Extremism at the Nizhniy Novgorod regional police department.","25.Between 4 p.m. and 5.08 p.m. the applicant was questioned as a witness in the criminal proceedings against third persons by investigator A. of the Kanavinskiy district investigative committee, who later stated that at the time of the questioning the applicant had had no injuries on the visible parts of his body.","26.The investigator ordered that the case concerning the applicant\u2019s illegal possession of arms be transferred to an investigator at police department no. 1 of Nizhniy Novgorod.","27.The applicant was then interviewed by the head of the Centre for Combating Extremism, T., his deputy K. and three operative police officers of the Centre A., S. and Sh. According to the applicant, they demanded that he confess to preparing a terrorist act and sign a \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d (\u044f\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0441 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439). They allegedly subjected him to ill\u2011treatment which the applicant described as follows. They beat him up, punching and kicking him. With his hands handcuffed behind his back they bound him with a two-metre-long orange rope, so that his crossed legs were pressed to his torso. They pulled on the rope and lifted the applicant off the floor, subjecting him to near-suffocation as the knots in the rope were pressing against the front of his neck, making it impossible to breath. They then loosened the rope, so that the applicant fell and hit his buttocks on the floor, causing him severe pain. The applicant lost consciousness. At some point two other police officers Ch. and K. joined the others. K. punched the applicant in the face, making his lip bleed. The applicant\u2019s ill\u2011treatment lasted until approximately 8 p.m.","28.At about 9 p.m. the applicant was taken to police station no.1 of the Nizhniy Novgorod town police department, formally arrested at 11.30 p.m. and questioned as a suspect.","29.In his report of 25 December 2010 to the head of the Centre for Combating Extremism, T., police officer Sh. stated that physical force had been used in order to apprehend the applicant when he tried to escape. According to subsequent statements made by Sh. and A. to the investigative authority, Sh. had tripped the applicant up in order to prevent his escape and the applicant had fallen over, whereupon Sh. \u201chad used physical force to overcome the applicant\u2019s resistance\u201d and kept the applicant on the ground until the arrival of A. They had then handcuffed the applicant. As a result, the applicant had allegedly received abrasions to the head, face and neck.","30.After the applicant\u2019s questioning as a suspect he was taken to a temporary detention facility (an \u201cIVS\u201d). The IVS officer on duty saw the applicant\u2019s injuries and refused to admit him without a prior medical examination.","31.At 2.45 a.m. on 26 December 2010 the police officers took the applicant to town hospital no.40 in the Avtozavodskoy district of Nizhniy Novgorod, where a doctor recorded contusions and bruises on his face and assessed his condition as not precluding detention.","32.On the applicant\u2019s arrival at the IVS, the officer on duty examined the upper part of his body above the waist and recorded bruises and abrasions. The applicant stated that his injuries were the result of ill\u2011treatment to which he had been subjected by the police officers at the Centre for Combating Extremism from approximately 4 p.m. to 6 p.m. on 25December 2010. The applicant stated, in particular, in relation to the injuries on the face, that he had an abrasion in the temple area on the right side, a bruise under the right eye, an abrasion on the chin on the right side, and a damaged lip on the left side.","33.On 27 December 2010 the applicant was detained on remand by a court order and at 11.55 p.m. transferred from the IVS to pre-trial detention facility IZ-52\/1 (the \u201cSIZO\u201d), where an on-duty officer and medical assistant recorded the following injuries on his body: a bruise on the right of the abdomen, a bruise in the left axillary region and multiple bruises on the face and neck. The applicant reiterated that he had been ill\u2011treated by the police. The incident was reported to the head of the SIZO.","34.On 25 January 2011 the Kanavinskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office received a communication from the SIZO about the injuries found on the applicant on his admission and forwarded it to the Kanavinskiy district investigation division of the Nizhniy Novgorod regional investigative committee (\u0421\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u043e\u0442\u0434\u0435\u043b \u043f\u043e \u041a\u0430\u043d\u0430\u0432\u0438\u043d\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u0443 \u0433.\u041d.\u041d\u043e\u0432\u0433\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0434 \u0421\u0423 \u0421\u041a \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0438 \u043f\u043e \u041d\u0438\u0436\u0435\u0433\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0438). The applicant lodged a complaint with the investigative authorities about his alleged ill-treatment andon 4February 2011 gave a statement.","35.According to a forensic medical examination report of 24February 2011 prepared on the basis of the applicant\u2019s SIZO medical records (and ordered on 11 February 2011 by an investigator who inquired, inter alia, whether the injuries could have been self-inflicted), the applicant\u2019s injuries could be classified as blunt trauma. Although the description of the injuries in the SIZO report made it impossible to determine reliably the date of their infliction, the expert suggested that the bruises on the right part of the abdomen and multiple bruises on the face and neck could have been inflicted within a period of three days prior to the applicant\u2019s examination at the SIZO on 27 December 2010 and the bruise in the left axillary region could have been inflicted more than three days before that examination. The expert noted that the injuries were located on parts of the body within the reach of the applicant\u2019s own hands.","36.According to an additional forensic medical examination report of 2September 2011, prepared on the basis of the applicant\u2019s medical documents, the applicant\u2019s injuries could have originated either as a result of being punched and kicked, or as a result of the use of force as alleged by police officers Sh. and A.","37.According to a report of 23 March 2011, prepared on the basis of an internal inquiry and approved by the head of the internal security division of the Nizhniy Novgorod regional police department, Sh. stated that in order to overcome the applicant\u2019s resistance he had twisted the applicant\u2019s hand behind his back, and that the applicant had received the abrasions to the head and face as a result of falling over. The other four police officers who had interviewed the applicant had given similar statements. The report suggested that the question of the police officers\u2019 responsibility for the applicant\u2019s ill\u2011treatment could only be decided by the investigative committee pursuant to a pre-investigation inquiry.","38.The Kanavinskiy district investigative committee issued six refusals to institute criminal proceedings concerning the applicant\u2019s alleged ill\u2011treatment (on 28 February, 8 April, 19 August, and 5September 2011, 22February and 1July 2012). The first five decisions were revoked by the deputy head of the Kanavinskiy district investigative committee or the Kanavinskiy district deputy prosecutor for being based on an incomplete inquiry (decisions of 10March, 20July and 22August 2011, 30 January and 22June 2012).","39.On 15 June 2011 the Avtozavodskoy District Court of Nizhniy Novgorod convicted the applicant of illegal storage of explosives under Article 222 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code. On 18 November 2011 the Nizhegorodskiy Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal.","40.In the decision refusing to open a criminal investigation into the allegations of the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment of 1 July 2012, pursuant to Article24\u00a71 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for lack of the elements of a crime under Article 286 of the Criminal Code (on abuse of powers) in the actions of police officers Sh., A. and T., it was stated that the applicant had tried to escape during his transfer from the Centre for Combating Extremism to police station no.1 on 25December 2010 and could have received the injuries as a result of the lawful use of force by police officersSh. and A. in their effort to stop him. That conclusion was based on statements by police officers based at the Centre, namely Sh., A., T., K., Ch., G., M. and S., who had conducted the applicant\u2019s interview (\u043e\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0441) with a view to establishing the circumstances of the case concerning the explosives found in his flat and his possible accomplices, in particular persons who had supplied him with the explosives. They denied the use of any violence against the applicant. The investigator confirmed that, in accordance with Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Operational-Search Activities Act, the police officers had the right to conduct the applicant\u2019s interview.","41.The applicant appealed against the investigator\u2019s decision of 1July 2012 to a court. He complained, in particular, that the investigator had not given him the opportunity to challenge the police officers\u2019 version. The applicant\u2019s appeal was rejected by a decision of 16 May 2013 of the Kanavinskiy District Court, which was satisfied that the decision was reasoned and lawful. That decision was upheld by the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court on 5August 2013.","42.On 25 May 2015 an acting prosecutor of the Nizhniy Novgorod region annulled the refusal of 1 July 2012 as unlawful and based on an incomplete inquiry and ordered an additional inquiry, finding that the applicant\u2019s statements contesting the police officers\u2019 version of events and alleging the use of violence by police officer K. had not been investigated.","C.Mr Zontov\u2019s application","43.On 26 August 2011 a woman was attacked and robbed on the street.","44.On 27 August 2011 nine police officers (Sh., R., P., G., S., M., Kh., Z. and A.S.) were ordered to arrest the applicant, who was suspected of having committed the robbery. At about 10 a.m. they apprehended the applicant on a street in Podmayachnyy village in the Orenburg Region. The applicant tried to flee because, according to him, he did not realise that those pursuing him \u2012 who were dressed in plain clothes \u2012 were police officers. Sh. andR. stopped him. According to the applicant, they tied his hands with a belt. The applicant was taken to the Orenburg town police department.","45.The applicant described the events at the police station as follows. He was led through an entrance for staff only to an office on the first floor and handcuffed. The police officers, in particular O., demanded that he confess to having attacked the woman and stolen her gold chain and mobile phone.O. punched the applicant twice in the chest, then hit the applicant on his feet with a rubber truncheon for about forty minutes, while the other police officers, in particular A., pinned him down on the floor, holding onto his arms and legs. He was then asked to stand up on his feet but was unable to do so, fell over and was hit by the truncheon on the left side of his torso. His feet were stepped on and he was suffocated with a plastic bag. During the suffocation, which lasted three or four hours, he fainted several times.The applicant wrote a \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d (\u044f\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0441 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439), as requested. O. threatened him with further torture if he did not reiterate his confession to an investigator.","46.The \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d, in which the applicant confessed to having attacked the woman and stolen her gold chain, was recorded by the police. The applicant also signed a document entitled \u201cexplanation\u201d, drawn up by operative police officer D., with a detailed description of the circumstances of the crime.","47.At 8.40 p.m. an investigator drew up a record of the applicant\u2019s arrest as a suspect. The applicant gave self\u2011incriminating statements when questioned as a suspect in the presence of a State-appointed lawyer, reiterating the confession statement he had given earlier to the police officers.","48.At 12.25 a.m. on 28 August 2011 the applicant was placed in the temporary detention facility (the \u201cIVS\u201d) in Orenburg town police department, where the following injuries on his body were recorded: bruises on the chest, an abrasion on the face on the left cheek bone, many abrasions on the waist, abrasions on both wrists and scars on the left forearm. The applicant stated that those injuries had been inflicted during his arrest.","49.On 29 August 2011 the applicant was taken to a traumatology centre, where he was diagnosed with contusion of the left side of his chest and both wrists.","50.At 2.30 p.m. the applicant appeared before the Promyshlenniy District Court of Orenburg, which ordered his detention on remand. The court decision referred to the investigator\u2019s submissions that the applicant\u2019s involvement in the crime had been established on 26 August 2011 but he had been hiding from the law\u2011enforcement authorities until his arrest on 27August 2011.","51.On the same day he was placed in pre-trial detention facility IZ\u201156\/3, where bruises on the left side of his chest, both wrists and both feet were recorded.","52.On 30 August 2011 the applicant\u2019s lawyer A., who had been retained by his family, observed injuries on the applicant when visiting him in the detention facility. The applicant told her about his ill-treatment at the police station and the self\u2011incriminating statements he had given as a result.","53.On 31 August 2011 when questioned as an accused in the presence of lawyer A., the applicant retracted his self\u2011incriminating statements, explaining that he had given them on 27August 2011 as a result of his ill\u2011treatment by the police officers.","54.According to the applicant\u2019s mother and brother, and his acquaintance Zh., the applicant had no injuries before his arrest.","55.On 5 September 2011 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint concerning his alleged ill-treatment by the police.The Orenburg town investigative committee carried out a pre\u2011investigation inquiry. The operative police officers who had arrested the applicant on 27 August 2011 gave explanations. They stated that as soon as the applicant had seen them he had run away and they had lost sight of him. When running away the applicant had fallen over several times. The police officers had split into several groups in order to find and stop him. Police officers Sh. and R. had caught up with the applicant, knocked him to the ground and handcuffed his hands behind his back. R. suggested that any bruises or abrasions on the applicant\u2019s body could have been received as a result of his falling over when trying to run away from them. The police officers denied any deliberate use of force against the applicant either during his arrest or afterwards at the police station when they interviewed him.","56.On 5October 2011 an investigator refused to initiate criminal proceedings pursuant to Article 24\u00a71 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for lack of the elements of a crime under Articles 285 and 286 of the Criminal Code (on abuse of powers) in the acts of the police officers.Relying on the police officers\u2019 statements, the investigator found that the police officers had acted lawfully in using handcuffs and \u201cblocking\u201d the applicant, a suspect in criminal proceedings, who had tried to escape and resisted his arrest. On 10 October 2011 a deputy head of the Orenburg town investigative committee annulled the investigator\u2019s decision on the grounds that the inquiry had been incomplete, and ordered an additional inquiry. Subsequently fourteen more refusals to open a criminal investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill\u2011treatment were issued by investigators and annulled by their superiors within the investigative committee for being based on incomplete inquiries.","57.On 28 December 2012 the Promyshlenniy District Court of Orenburg convicted the applicant of robbery and sentenced him to three years\u2019 imprisonment. The applicant pleaded guilty in relation to the assault against the victim but denied robbery, stating that he had given the self\u2011incriminating statements at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings as a result of the ill-treatment by the police. The court considered his allegations of ill-treatment unfounded, relying on the results of the inquiry and one of the refusals to open a criminal case of 21 December 2012 which had not at that moment been annulled. The court declared the applicant\u2019s self\u2011incriminating statements of 27 August 2011 admissible evidence. The applicant\u2019s \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d served as a mitigating circumstance. The judgment became final.","58.During one of the additional rounds of the pre-investigation inquiry into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment two forensic medical expert reports were prepared, on 11 September and 18October 2013, based on the applicant\u2019s medical documents. The experts concluded that the applicant\u2019s injuries \u2013 the bruises on his chest and both feet, numerous abrasions on his waist, the abrasion on the face, and numerous abrasions and bruises on both wrists \u2013 could have been inflicted as a result of impacts from a hard blunt object shortly before his injuries had been recorded at the IVS and possibly on 27August 2011.","59.On 7 May 2014 an additional forensic medical expert report was prepared at the investigator\u2019s request. The expert concluded that the applicant\u2019s injuries had originated from the impact of a blunt hard object with a limited contact surface (with a limited narrow elongated contact surface in the case of the injuries to his wrists). The nature, location and mechanism of the origin of the injuries were consistent with the applicant\u2019s version. All his injuries could have been received as a result of ill\u2011treatment by the police officers as described by him. As regards the police officers\u2019 version, the abrasions on the applicant\u2019s face and waist could have been received as a result of the applicant falling over when running away during his arrest. The abrasions on the wrists could have been received as a result of the use of handcuffs. There was nothing, however, in the police officers\u2019 statements to explain the bruises on the chest and feet.","60.On 2 June 2014 investigator V. of the Orenburg north administrative circuit investigative committee initiated criminal proceedings into the applicant\u2019s allegations under Article 286 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Criminal Code (abuse of power with use of violence). He held that it was impossible to resolve the contradictions existing in the case-file material by means of a pre-investigation inquiry, and that it was therefore necessary to open a criminal case and examine the applicant\u2019s allegations by way of a criminal investigation, as there was sufficient data to indicate that a crime under Article 286 of the Criminal Code might have been committed.","61.The next day the acting prosecutor of the Promyshlenniy district of Orenburg annulled the investigator\u2019s decision as unlawful and ill\u2011founded, disagreeing with the investigator that there was sufficient data to indicate that a crime could have been committed. The prosecutor stressed that it was possible to implement urgent measures aimed at establishing the circumstances of alleged ill\u2011treatment within the framework of a pre\u2011investigation inquiry, in particular by ordering forensic medical examinations. He noted that the pre-investigation inquiry had established that the applicant had received the injuries during his arrest as a suspect, and that in the final judgment in the applicant\u2019s criminal case the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment had been found unsubstantiated and that it was therefore impossible to question that finding.","62.The applicant appealed against the prosecutor\u2019s decision. On 9February 2015 the Promyshlenniy District Court found the prosecutor\u2019s decision lawful. It held that under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the court did not have competence to assess whether the evidence or the presence of data indicating the elements of a crime constituted grounds for instituting criminal proceedings.That decision was upheld on 16April 2015 by the Orenburg Regional Court.","63.Following the prosecutor\u2019s decision, on 30 July 2014 investigator V. refused to open a criminal case. His decision was annulled on 18 August 2014 by a deputy head of the second procedural supervision department of the investigative committee of the Russian Federation for being based on an incomplete inquiry. Subsequently two more decisions refusing to open a criminal case \u2012 of 2 October 2014 and 26 March 2015 \u2012 were also annulled for the same reason, on 16 March and 21May 2015, respectively, by an acting head of the procedural supervision department of the Orenburg regional investigative committee.","64.In the investigator\u2019s decision of 26 March 2015, as in the previous decisions, it was found that the police officers had acted lawfully in using handcuffs and physical force, in particular for the purposes of \u201cblocking\u201d the applicant, who had actively resisted arrest. The applicant had received the injuries when trying to escape and resisting arrest. The injuries on his wrists had been caused by the lawful use of handcuffs.","65.On 22 May 2015 the acting district prosecutor pointed to flagrant violations of the criminal procedural law, in particular the reasonable time requirement for examination of reports about crimes. He noted that, due to the lack of supervision and the acquiescence of the investigative committee management, the investigative committee had failed to conduct a thorough and objective inquiry for more than four years \u2012 thereby violating the applicant\u2019s rights \u2012 and that this constituted a serious disciplinary offence.","66.According to a report by a psychologist who examined the applicant in September 2015 the applicant complained that, as a consequence of the police ill\u2011treatment, he suffered from frequent headaches, blood pressure abnormalities and sleep disturbances. He displayed signs that the ill\u2011treatment experienced by him and the lack of justice still affected him. He was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and was recommended treatment and rehabilitation measures."],"29358":["THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE","5.The applicant was born in 1988 and lives in the village of Trudobelikovskiy, Krasnodar region.","6.At around midnight on 15 August 2007 the applicant, who was 19years old at the time, and B. were taken in a police patrol car to the police station of the Syktyvdinskiy district of the Komi Republic for an examination of allegations of assault made against them by two individuals, in particular of the sexual assault of a woman. The police intervened immediately after the alleged assaults.","7.According to the applicant, at the police station investigator N. demanded that he confess to the crime, and threatened him with ill\u2011treatment and rape in a cell at the pre-trial detention facility. The applicant refused to sign self-incriminating statements and was allegedly subjected to ill-treatment which he described as follows. He was taken to a cell where two policemen held his hands while a third policeman kicked him in the stomach leaving a boot print on his T\u2011shirt; the two policemen then threw the applicant to the floor, face down.Thereafter, the policemen took the applicant to N.\u2019s office, where he signed a \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d (\u044f\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0441 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439).He was then taken to the toilet by a policeman who started insulting him. When the applicant responded, the policeman allegedly sprayed gas in his eyes and hit him several times with a rubber truncheon. The policeman then pushed the applicant into the cell so that the applicant hit his head against the wall and fell to the ground.","8.According to the police record drawn up by operative police officer K., the applicant signed the \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d at 2.35a.m. on 16 August 2007.","9.Investigator N. instituted criminal proceedings against him and B. and ordered a forensic medical examination of the applicant to establish, in view of the nature of the crime, whether the applicant had any pathology which would prevent him from performing sexual acts.","10.The applicant was taken to a forensic medical expert who found that the applicant had the following physical injuries (examination report of 16August2007): (i)two abrasions on the left side of the forehead, measuring 2.5cmby0.7cm and 0.7 cmby0.5 cm; (ii) an abrasion on the bridge of the nose, measuring 4.5 cmby1.5 cm; and (iii)a bruise around one eye, measuring 3 cmby4 cm. The applicant explained to the expert that his injuries had been caused by the three police officers who had physically assaulted him at the police station in the night of 15 August 2007, in particular by hitting his face against the wall. The expert concluded that the bruise and abrasions on the applicant\u2019s face could have been sustained in the circumstances and at the time alleged by the applicant.","11.After the medical examination the applicant was taken back to the police station, where investigator N. told him that he must come back at 3p.m. that day for questioning as a suspect and released him. His arrest was not recorded.","12.On the same day the applicant complained to the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Komi that he had been ill-treated at the police station.He also asked the traumatology unit of the hospital in Syktyvkar to record his injuries. According to the hospital medical records, the applicant had the following injuries: (i)an acentric fracture of the nose; (ii)a bruise on the forehead; and (iii)abrasions on the forehead.","13.On 17 August 2007 the applicant was arrested, questioned as a suspect and detained on remand by a court.","14.On 20 August 2007 the applicant\u2019s mother complained to the Syktyvdinskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office that the applicant had been ill\u2011treated at the police station. In her complaint she stated, inter alia, that at around noon on 16 August 2007 the applicant had returned home from the police station with bruises and abrasions on his body, and a print from a large boot on his T-shirt in the area of his stomach. The applicant had told her that he had been ill-treated at the police station.","15.On 29 August 2007 the prosecutor issued a refusal to open a criminal case against the law\u2011enforcement officers, finding, in accordance with Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that none of the elements of the crimes provided for in Articles 286 and 302 of the Criminal Code (on abuse of powers and forced confessions respectively) had been present in respect of the actions of investigator N. or police officers S.I., K.L., S.A., Sh., and K.N. The decision relied on the following statements.","16.Investigator N. stated that he had interviewed the applicant after he had signed his \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d. The applicant had not complained of any physical violence against him. After the applicant\u2019s forensic medical examination N. had talked to the applicant again and then released him. N. had not seen any injuries on the applicant, or a footprint on his T-shirt, during his interview or prior to his release from the police station. N. had heard about the applicant hitting his head against the wall later on from K.L. Investigator N. denied that the applicant had been put under any physical or psychological pressure.","17.The police officers denied subjecting the applicant to any ill\u2011treatment. S.I. stated that he had learned from K.L. that the applicant had struck his head against the wall. K.L. stated that he had learned from duty officer S.A. about the applicant striking his head against the bars of a cell. S.A. and Sh. stated that they had seen the applicant bang his head repeatedly against the bars and then against the wall in a room of the duty officer. While banging his head against the wall the applicant was allegedly shouting that he would complain to the prosecutor\u2019s office that police officers had beaten him up.","18.The applicant\u2019s mother challenged the refusal to open a criminal case against the police officers and investigator N. On 18 January 2008 the Syktyvdinskiy District Court dismissed her complaint.","19.On 4 March 2008 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic granted an appeal lodged by the applicant\u2019s mother and quashed the District Court\u2019s decision, noting that no assessment had been made of the contradiction between the medical expert\u2019s conclusions and the police officers\u2019 allegations of the applicant\u2019s self-harm. Nor had the court assessed the applicant\u2019s medical record concerning the nose fracture, the allegation of the applicant having been kicked and having a footprint from a boot on his T\u2011shirt, the presence of a video surveillance camera at the police station which should have recorded the incident, or statements by B. that he had heard the applicant screaming at the police station. The District Court had not taken into account circumstances which could have significantly influenced its conclusions and had not given reasons why, in so far as the conflicting evidence was concerned, it had given preference to some evidence whilst rejecting other. A fresh examination of the applicant\u2019s mother\u2019s appeal was ordered by a different composition of judges of the same court.","20.On 21March 2008 the Syktyvdinskiy District Court ruled that the refusal to open a criminal case of 29August2007 had been unjustified for reasons largely similar to those cited by the Supreme Court. The court ordered the investigation authorities to rectify those deficiencies.","21.On 23 April 2008 the deputy prosecutor of the Komi Republic overruled the refusal of 29 August 2007 to open a criminal case.","22.On 24 April 2008 the investigative committee of the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Komi Republic issued a new refusal to open a criminal case against the police officers and investigator N., finding, in accordance with Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the CCrP, that none of the elements of the crimes provided for in Articles 130, 286 and 302 of the Criminal Code (on insulting behaviour, abuse of powers and forced confessions respectively) were present in their actions. It was noted that, according to information received from the Syktyvdinskiy district police department, the video surveillance recordings of the room of the duty officer and the cells for administrative offenders for the period from 15 to 16 August 2007 had not been preserved. Such records were normally kept for three days and then automatically deleted. It was concluded that the applicant had caused injuries to himself at the police station with the purpose of avoiding criminal liability for the crime which he had committed.","23.On 24 April 2008 the applicant was found guilty by the Syktyvdinskiy District Court.","24.The applicant\u2019s mother challenged the second refusal to open a criminal case against the police officers and investigator N.","25.On 16 June 2008 the Syktyvdinskiy District Court dismissed her appeal. It examined the explanations given by the police officers and investigator N., and held that the allegations regarding the applicant\u2019s ill\u2011treatment had not been substantiated. The court also noted that the allegation regarding the applicant\u2019s forced confession had been examined during the applicant\u2019s criminal trial and had been dismissed as unfounded in the judgment of 24April 2008. The court further noted that the trial court had examined and endorsed the refusal of 24 April 2008 to open a criminal case against the police officers. Finally, the court concluded that the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment had been designed to discredit the law\u2011enforcement authorities.On 18 July 2008 the Supreme Court of Komi upheld that decision on appeal.","26.The judgment of 24 April 2008 in the applicant\u2019s criminal case was subsequently quashed and remitted to the first-instance court for fresh examination. On 13 November 2008 the Syktyvdinskiy District Court convicted the applicant of sexual assault, specifially holding the victim to enable B. to sexually assault her, and sentenced him to four years and three months\u2019 imprisonment.The applicant denied his guilt at trial, asserting that he had signed the \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d under physical pressure from the police officers and psychological pressure from investigator N. The trial court rejected the applicant\u2019s arguments, relying on the refusal of 24 April 2008 to open a criminal case against the police officers and investigator N. The applicant\u2019s \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d formed part of the evidence on which his conviction was based, and served as a mitigating circumstance. The applicant appealed against the judgment.","27.On 16January 2009 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic upheld the judgment on appeal, stating that it was irrelevant to the criminal case against the applicant whether or not the refusal to open a criminal case into his allegations of ill-treatment had been unfounded."],"29361":["5.The applicant was born in 1979 and is currently serving a prison sentence in Frolovo, Volgograd region.","6.On 17 April 2009 Mr K. was found with very serious bodily injuries in the entrance to a block of flats. He died in hospital several days later.","7.Between 7.15 a.m. and 8.55 a.m. on 18 April 2009 the scene of the incident was examined by investigator P. from the investigating unit of the Krasnoarmeyskiy district police department of Volgograd with the participation of attesting witnesses, police officers, and the applicant, who lived in the same block of flats. According to the record of the examination of the scene of the incident, the applicant stated that he had physically assaulted K. and described the circumstances of the crime committed by him against K. At around 9.30 a.m. the applicant was brought to the police station of the Krasnoarmeyskiy district of Volgograd (\u0423\u0412\u0414 \u043f\u043e \u041a\u0440\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0430\u0440\u043c\u0435\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u0443 \u0433. \u0412\u043e\u043b\u0433\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434\u0430), where operative police officers interviewed him about the circumstances of the crime.","8.According to the applicant, they demanded that he give statements concerning the circumstances of the crime committed by him and subjected him to ill-treatment which the applicant described as follows. Having handcuffed him, they punched and kicked him, hitting him with a rubber truncheon and giving him electric shocks using a device called a \u201cTP-50\u201d. The applicant gave the statements as demanded.","9.At 6 p.m. investigator Ye. of the investigating unit of the Krasnoarmeyskiy district police department of Volgograd initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant and his brother. At 8 p.m. the investigator drew up a record of the applicant\u2019s arrest as a suspect and questioned him from 8.30 p.m. until 10p.m. in the presence of D., a State-appointed lawyer invited by investigator Ye. The applicant repeated the statements incriminating himself and his brother and also stated that the previous evening he had been drunk and had fallen down a flight of stairs, and that he therefore had a headache and pain in the area of his ribs and kidneys.","10.At 2.15 a.m. on 19 April 2009 the applicant was placed in a temporary detention facility (an \u201cIVS\u201d) at the Volgograd town police department. According to a document signed by a senior police transportation officer, the IVS duty officer and the applicant, the applicant had: (i)a haematoma on the left side of the body; (ii)a swelling on the left hip; and (iii) a swelling and redness on the right ear.","11.On 20April2009 the Krasnoarmeyskiy District Court ordered his detention on remand. The applicant was taken to hospital no. 15. He complained of pain in his chest and in his left knee joint, and of generally feeling unwell. At the hospital he was diagnosed with contusion to the thoracic cage and left wrist, and his condition was assessed as not incompatible with being detained in a pre-trial detention facility.","12.On 21April 2009 the applicant was placed in pre-trial detention facility SIZO-4, where he was examined by the SIZO doctor who recorded multiple abrasions and haematomas on his trunk, and contusion to the thoracic cage and left wrist. The applicant was interviewed by the SIZO officer. He stated that he had received the injuries as a result of ill-treatment by police officers on 18 April 2009 whilst held at the Krasnoarmeyskiy district police department of Volgograd.","13.The SIZO operative unit carried out an inquiry into the incident and concluded in a report of 22 April 2009 \u2012 approved by the acting head of the SIZO \u2012 that the applicant\u2019s injuries had been inflicted by police officers from the Krasnoarmeyskiy district police department at about 11 a.m. on 18April 2009 during the applicant\u2019s interview.","14.On 28 April 2009 the applicant was examined as an accused in the presence of lawyer D. The applicant stated that when examined as a suspect on 18 April 2009 he had given statements \u2013 concerning the origin of his injuries and also his brother\u2019s involvement in the crime \u2013 as demanded by the police officers who had ill-treated him, as he had still been in physical pain and was under the influence of threats from them, as well as threats from investigator Ye. that he would find himself at the hands of those police officers again should he not give \u201ccorrect\u201d statements. The applicant described the circumstances of his alleged ill-treatment and retracted the statements he had given earlier incriminating his brother. The criminal proceedings against his brother were eventually discontinued for lack of evidence. The applicant reiterated his self-incriminating statements.","15.On 29 April 2009 the Krasnoarmeyskiy district investigation division of the investigative committee at the Volgograd regional prosecutor\u2019s office (\u201cthe Krasnoarmeyskiy district investigative committee\u201d) received a communication from the SIZO concerning the applicant\u2019s injuries.","16.On 5 May 2009 a forensic medical examination of the applicant was carried out at the request of the investigator in charge of the criminal case against the applicant. The applicant stated to the medical expert that on 18April 2009 he had been physically assaulted at the police station of the Krasnoarmejskiy district of Volgograd by police officers who had delivered many blows to his lumbar region, chest, shoulders, hips and ears, and had used a device called a \u201cTP-50\u201d to ill-treat him. He complained of pain in his chest. During the applicant\u2019s forensic medical examination, the expert detected only one linear abrasion, measuring 23 mmby2 mm, located within a bruise of indeterminate form on the left side of the applicant\u2019s chest. The expert concluded that this injury had come about as a result of at least one (possibly tangential) impact by a hard, blunt object of limited surface area seven to nine days before the applicant\u2019s examination, and had not caused him any \u201cdamage to his health \u201d.","17.On 6 May 2009 investigator N. in charge of the inquiry into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment ordered an examination of the applicant\u2019s medical records by the forensic medical expert . The investigator inquired whether the injuries could have been received as a result of the applicant falling down from his own height and hitting himself against \u201cprotruberant objects in the vicinity\u201d. A forensic medical expert concluded in a report of 8 May 2009 that the applicant\u2019s multiple abrasions and haematomas could have come about as a result of blows from hard, blunt objects or collisions with such objects and surfaces \u2013 including the applicant falling from his own height and colliding with curved objects. The expert further concluded that it was hard to establish the time at which the applicant\u2019s injuries had been inflicted.","18.Between 9 May 2009 and 16 June 2010 investigators from the Krasnoarmeyskiy district investigative committee issued eight refusals to initiate criminal proceedings into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment, finding, in accordance with Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that none of the elements of the offences provided for in Articles 285 and 286 of the Criminal Code (on abuse of powers) were present in respect of the police officers\u2019 actions. Those refusals were overruled by the head or deputy head of the Krasnoarmeyskiy district investigative committee as being unlawful, and the investigators were ordered to carry out additional inquiries.","19.On 10 September 2009 the Krasnoarmeyskiy District Court of Volgograd convicted the applicant of manslaughter and sentenced him to nine years and six months\u2019 imprisonment.The applicant was ordered to pay 500,000 Russian roubles to the victim\u2019s mother by way of compensation for non\u2011pecuniary damage. The applicant was found to have invited the victim to his flat, to have inflicted many injuries on him, then moving the victim to the landing of the stairwell near the applicant\u2019s flat and leaving him there. The applicant pleaded guilty and his confession served as a mitigating factor. The court based its judgment on the applicant\u2019s consistent confession statements, the results of the search carried out in his flat in which the victim\u2019s passport and clothing had been found, and other evidence. The trial court found that the applicant\u2019s injuries had been unrelated to the actions of the victim of the crime and had been sustained after the crime had been committed.","20.According to the most recent decision of an investigator of the Krasnoarmeyskiy district investigative committee of 11September 2010, the police officers in question denied subjecting the applicant to ill\u2011treatment.Investigator P. stated that during the examination of the scene of the incident on 18 April 2009 the applicant had confessed that he had committed the crime. According to police officers B., D. and M. \u2012 as well as E., the head of the criminal investigating unit of the Krasnoarmeyskiy district police department \u2012 the applicant had been brought to the police station on suspicion of having inflicted very serious bodily injuries on K. At some point the applicant had been taken from a cell to E.\u2019s office. The police officers had inteviewed the applicant and established the circumstances of the crime against K. According to B., the applicant had complained of pain in his chest, explaining that he had fallen down a flight of stairs. The applicant\u2019s mother stated that on 16 April 2009 she had seen the applicant without any sign of physical injury.","21.In his decision of 11 September 2010 the investigator noted that, while being questioned as a suspect on 18 April 2009, the applicant had explained that he had fallen down a flight of stairs the day before as a result of being in an inebriated state.The investigator further noted that the applicant\u2019s forensic medical examination results indicated that the applicant\u2019s multiple abrasions and haematomas could have come about as a result of blows from hard, blunt objects or collisions with such objects or surfaces \u2013 including the applicant falling from his own height.The investigator concluded that none of the constituent elements of the alleged crimes had been present in the conduct of the police officers and refused to institute criminal proceedings under Article 24 \u00a7 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.","22.On 2 March 2010 the Volgograd Regional Court upheld the judgment in the applicant\u2019s criminal case on appeal."],"29402":["10.The applicant was born in 1975 and is detained in Sofia Prison.","A.Criminal proceedings against the applicant","1.The applicant\u2019s arrest and detention in police custody","11. On 2 July 1999 two armed individuals burst into a bureau de change in Burgas. Shots were fired and two staff members were killed. The criminals fled with a sum of money. On the same day the Burgas investigation department instigated criminal proceedings against a person or persons unknown for armed robbery and homicide.","12.The bodies responsible for the criminal investigation implemented a number of investigative measures: inspection of the premises, autopsies on the victims and questioning of witnesses. The investigators quickly made a connection with the applicant and a certain A.S.","13.By decision of 9 July 1999 a police officer ordered the applicant\u2019s detention for twenty-four hours, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Ministry of the Interior Act. The order mentioned the detainee\u2019s right to assistance from a lawyer as from the time of his arrest. It also stated that a copy of the order should be presented to the arrestee. The copy of the relevant order in the case file is not signed by the applicant, who was on the run and being sought by the police at that time.","14.On 3 October 1999 the applicant was arrested in Sofia. None of the case papers indicate whether he received a copy of the 9 July 1999 order after his arrest. He remained in detention in Sofia that day and the next.","15. On 4 October 1999 an investigator from Burgas, on the basis of Article 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, ordered the applicant\u2019s detention for twenty-four hours from 8 p.m.","16.On 5 October 1999 the applicant was transferred to Burgas. His detention was extended by a prosecutor that same day.","17.The document containing the two decisions of 4 and 5 October 1999 does not mention the applicant\u2019s right to the assistance of a lawyer and does not bear his signature.","18.The applicant affirmed that he had submitted four requests, on 3, 4, 5and 6 October 1999, for contact with a lawyer, Mr V. Mihailov, and that the authorities had not acceded to those requests.","19.He stated that he had been questioned by the officers in charge of the investigation over the period from 3 to 6 October. While being questioned he had explained that he had taken part in the hold-up at the bureau de change but denied having committed the two murders.","20.The criminal case file contains no written trace of any such questioning. On the other hand, it includes a handwritten statement by A.S., the applicant\u2019s presumed accomplice, dated 3 October 1999, in which A.S. explained that the applicant had instigated the hold-up, that he himself had agreed to cooperate with the applicant and that the latter had used a gun during the incident.","21.On 6 October 1999 the investigator in charge of the investigation appointed an official lawyer for the applicant. At noon, assisted by his officially appointed lawyer, the applicant was formally charged with the double murder and the hold-up in the bureau de change in Burgas. When questioned immediately after being charged, he made the following statements:","\u201cI have read the charge sheet in thepresence of my officially appointed lawyer, D.Todorov.","I have been informed of my rights and obligations as a charged person and of my right to refuse to give evidence.","I shall make no submissions concerning the charges until my parents, who have been informed, have had time to engage a lawyer.\u201d","2.Continuation of the criminal proceedings against the applicant","22.On 7 October 1999 A.S. was questioned by the investigator in the presence of a lawyer. A.S. related the circumstances surrounding the preparation, execution and aftermath of the hold-up, and explained how he had helped the applicant at all those stages. He affirmed that it had been the applicant who had killed both victims.","23.On 8 October 1999 the applicant engaged a lawyer practising in Burgas, Mr Kanev. During his questioning in the presence of that lawyer on 12October 1999 he remained silent and stated that he would give evidence at a later date.","24.On 21 October 1999 the applicant confessed in the presence of his lawyer, Mr Kanev. He admitted that he had prepared and committed the hold-up at the bureau de change and claimed that the two victims had been killed by A.S.","25.On 22 December 1999 the applicant engaged a second lawyer, this time practising in Sofia, Ms Zheleva.","26.Subsequently, the officers responsible for the investigation gathered several different types of evidence, that is to say witness statements and medical, scientific, physical and documentary evidence.","27.On 4 January 2000 the applicant and A.S., assisted by Counsel, took cognisance of the case papers. They retracted their confessions, and their lawyers requested that their clients be questioned once again.","28.On 16 February 2000 the Burgas regional prosecutor returned the file to the investigator for further inquiries. He asked him, in particular, to conduct several investigative measures and to formally charge both suspects afresh.","29.On 7 March 2000 the applicant was charged with an additional offence, namely the unlawful purchase of the firearm which had been used during the robbery of 2 July 1999. On the same day the two suspects were questioned in the presence of their lawyers. In his statement the applicant related a version of events to the effect that the robbery and murders in question had been committed by a certain V., an Iranian national, aided and abetted by an unknown second person.","30.On 17 May 2000 the regional prosecutor\u2019s office drew up the indictment and committed the applicant and his presumed accomplice for trial before the Burgas Regional Court.","31.The Regional Court considered the criminal case between 25 July 2000 and 14 June 2001. During the proceedings the applicant, who was assisted by a lawyer, submitted that he and his presumed accomplice had indeed been in Burgas on 1 July 1999 and that they had indeed intended to commit a robbery in the bureau de change, but that they had changed their minds and returned to Sofia the same day.","32.On 14 June 2001 the Burgas Regional Court delivered its judgment. The applicant was found guilty of armed robbery in the Burgas bureau de change, committed jointly with A.S. and resulting in the murder of two persons. He was also found guilty of the unlawful purchase of a pistol and ammunition for it. The Regional Court imposed the heaviest sentence available under the Bulgarian Criminal Code, namely a whole-life sentence. In accordance with section 127b (1) of the Execution of Punishments Act, the Regional Court ordered the applicant\u2019s placement under the \u201cspecial\u201d prison regime.","33.Drawing on the evidence gathered during the preliminary investigation and at the trial, the Regional Court established the facts as follows: the applicant\u2019s former partner, D.K., had started work as a cashier in the bureau de change in question in 1997 when she was still living with him. While working there she had met the first victim, a certain N.B., who was a close relative of the owner and an employee in the same establishment. In June 1999 D.K. had left the applicant and moved in with N.B. in Burgas. The applicant had then decided to kill N.B. and to steal the cash kept in the bureau de change. He had acquired a \u201cMakarov\u201d pistol, a silencer and ammunition. The applicant had persuaded a friend, A.S., to take part in the robbery. On the afternoon of 1 July 1999 the applicant and A.S. had arrived in Burgas by coach. They had then gone to the building in which the bureau de change was located, and had gone up to the top floor to spend the night there. The next morning, just before 9 a.m., they had gone down to the floor on which the bureau de change was located and noted that N.B. was in the premises alone. A.S., who had been carrying the pistol, had burst into the premises and fired one point-blank shot at the victim\u2019s left temple. The victim had died instantly. The two accomplices had then placed the money found in the bureau de change in a bag which they had brought with them. Meanwhile the armed security guard of the bureau de change, a certain P.I., had rushed into the premises where the first victim had been killed. A.S. had fired two shots at him, hitting him in the face. The security guard had been killed instantly. A.S. and the applicant had left the building. They had then concealed the murder weapon under a rubbish bin, thrown away the clothes they had been wearing and hidden the stolen money. Some time later the two men had ordered a certain E.E. to fetch the money for them, which he had done.","34.The applicant appealed against that judgment. He complained that insufficient reasons had been given for the conviction, that his guilt had not been established, that the first-instance court had reached an erroneous decision, that there had been several breaches of procedural and substantive rules under domestic law and that the Regional Court had shown bias.","35.The applicant\u2019s lawyer requested the withdrawal of all the judges of the Burgas Court of Appeal. He argued that the media coverage of the criminal case had created a climate of intolerance and hostility towards his client. The defence called for an additional witness to be summoned, the re\u2011examination of one of the witnesses already heard by the trial court, and several additional expert opinions. On 4 December 2001 the reporting judge responsible for the criminal case rejected the requests for further evidence\u2011gathering as irrelevant. He dismissed the challenge to the judges of the Court of Appeal for lack of any evidence of bias.","36.The Court of Appeal considered the criminal case between February and July 2002. It examined a new witness and received additional conclusions from psychiatric experts on the mental state of the two accused.","37.On 6 August 2002 the Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of the first-instance court, giving its full backing to the latter\u2019s factual and legal findings. The evidence gathered during the preliminary investigation, presented before the first-instance court and produced for the first time before the Court of Appeal had demonstrated that the two accused had planned and carried out the robbery in the bureau de change and that the two victims had been killed by A.S. Yet the applicant had been the instigator of those crimes and had provided the weapon used by his accomplice. The Court of Appeal drew on the statements of the many witnesses questioned during the assessment of the case, on the results of the ballistic, technical and accountants\u2019 reports and the medical and psychiatric opinions, and also on the physical and documentary evidence gathered.","38.The Court of Appeal observed that the accused\u2019s initial statements during the preliminary investigation had differed considerably from their submissions to the first-instance court. The initial statements had corroborated the finding concerning their participation in committing the criminal offences in issue, whereas the subsequent ones set out a version of events to the effect that an Iranian national had committed those offences. The Court of Appeal gave credence to the accused\u2019s initial statements, which had been made to an investigator in their lawyers\u2019 presence after they had been formally charged. The two individuals thus charged had been advised that their statements could be used in court with a view to establishing the facts, and their prior medical examination had revealed no sign of physical violence, which contradicted the defence lawyer\u2019s allegation that the applicant\u2019s initial confession had been extracted from him.","39.The Court of Appeal turned its attention to the applicant\u2019s version of events to the effect that the two murders and the robbery had been committed by a certain V., an Iranian national, and that the applicant himself had been at his place of work in Sofia at the material time. Checks carried out in the Ministry of the Interior database had shown that no Iranian national of that name was present in Bulgaria. It was true that the applicant had been at his place of work in Sofia on 2 July 1999. However, he had been working as a night watchman and the robbery and murders had been committed early in the morning, which had given him enough time to cover the distance between Burgas and Sofia and to arrive at work the same evening. The Court of Appeal deemed unconvincing the statement by the only witness who had corroborated the applicant\u2019s version of events.","40.The Court of Appeal noted that the judgment of the first-instance court displayed none of the procedural defects mentioned by the defence. The factual and legal findings of the Regional Court had not been exclusively based on the accused\u2019s confessions but on the whole body of consistent evidence gathered during the criminal proceedings. The applicant had participated actively in the proceedings and his lawyers had submitted several requests linked to the progress of the trial and the gathering of evidence. The Regional Court had responded to all those requests and had provided full reasons for its procedural decisions. There had, moreover, been no sign of bias on the part of the judges who had examined the case, and the proceedings had been conducted in such a way as to safeguard the parties\u2019 interests.","41.The Court of Appeal excluded a statement by one witness from the evidence for non-compliance with the procedural rules, but did not consider that statement decisive in terms of the factual and legal conclusions in the case. It held that even though the Regional Court had been dilatory in issuing the grounds for its judgment, the defence had nonetheless been able to submit additional observations on appeal after having secured a copy of those grounds.","42.The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, reiterating his submissions to the Court of Appeal. In that appeal, which ran to forty pages, his lawyer raised seventy-four objections concerning the gathering and the interpretation of various pieces of evidence, as well as the factual and legal findings of the lower-level courts. In paragraph 33 of his submissions the lawyer contested the admissibility of a record of a reconstruction of the events of 7 October 1999, arguing that on that day his client had not been assisted by a lawyer of his choosing. At the time his client had been assisted by an officially appointed lawyer who had not been nominated by the local bar association, as required by the applicable legislation. The applicant\u2019s lawyer added that his client had undeniably been deprived of a defence lawyer on 4 October 1999, when he had been taken into custody; he regarded this as an infringement of the provisions of section 70(4) of the Ministry of the Interior Act and of the Constitution. That was the only sentence relating to the circumstances of the applicant\u2019s detention in police custody.","43.By a judgment of 17 December 2003 the Supreme Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law. It found that none of the circumstances mentioned by the defence demonstrated the existence of bias on the part of the judges who had considered the criminal case. The applicant had had an opportunity to defend himself effectively during the criminal proceedings: he had given evidence and challenged the evidence against him. Some of his requests for further evidence-gathering had been accepted by the lower-level courts, and proper reasons had been given for their rejection of other requests by the defence for evidence to be taken.","44.Furthermore, in endorsing the Court of Appeal\u2019s other arguments, the Supreme Court of Cassation considered that the facts had been well established, that the substantive and procedural rules had been appropriately applied and that the accused\u2019s rights had been fully respected.","B.The applicant\u2019s conditions of detention","45.The applicant was held in Burgas Investigation Detention Facility from 5 October 1999 to 27 January 2000, and again from the beginning of March to 14 April 2000. He was incarcerated in Burgas Prison from 27January 2000 to the beginning of March 2000, and again from 14 April 2000 to 25 February 2004. On the latter date he was transferred to Sofia Prison, where he is still being held.","1.Burgas Investigation Detention Facility","46.The applicant submitted that he had been held in a cell without windows, a toilet or running water. The premises had had poor ventilation and lighting. He had not been allowed to exercise in the open air. Access to sanitary facilities had been restricted and the time allowed for washing had been insufficient. The applicant emphasised that the conditions of hygiene in the detention facility had been deplorable. He had subsequently been moved to another cell with two other detainees. The three detainees had had to take turns sleeping because the cell only had one bench.","47.According to a rapport by the Director General of Prisons submitted by the Government, at the time the only furniture in the cells in Burgas Investigation Detention Facility had been a bench. The cells had had no windows and the only daylight had entered through holes in metal plates affixed to the doors. The facility in question had only had one shared washroom and lacked any open-air facilities for detainees. The report also mentioned that between 2002 and 2009 the facility had been completely renovated and redeveloped to bring the conditions of detention into line with the detainees\u2019 human dignity.","2.Burgas Prison","48.The applicant alleged that his cell in Burgas Prison had had a surface area of 6 sq. m. It had contained a bed and a metal rack. There had been neither running water nor a toilet in his cell. He had used a plastic bucket for his bodily functions. Like all the prisoners he was allowed out of his cell for thirty minutes three times a day, in order to empty the bucket and fill his water bottle. The applicant submitted, in support of those allegations, a statement by his co-accused A.S., who had been detained with him under the same conditions in Burgas Prison. The applicant added that he had been forced to wear a convict\u2019s uniform even though he should have been allowed to wear his own clothes, under the prison rules.","49.The applicant explained that at the beginning of his term in Burgas Prison he had been deprived of open-air exercise. According to A.S.\u2019s statement (see paragraph 48 above), prisoners were allowed one-hour\u2019s open-air exercise every other day. The applicant was not involved in any organised activities in Burgas Prison. He had submitted several requests to the prison authorities to allow him to join in the various vocational training and occupational programmes and had applied for a transfer to Sofia Prison in order to be closer to his family, but no action had ever been taken on his requests.","50.According to a report by the governor of Burgas Prison submitted by the Government, the applicant had problems adapting to the prison regulations; his attitude to the wardens and the prison authorities had been refractory and disrespectful. However, the applicant had enjoyed all the rights afforded to persons deprived of their liberty. He had board and lodging in accordance with normal prison standards. He had open-air exercise every day and free access to the prison library. He had consulted a psychologist on several occasions and had had a number of meetings with the prison\u2019s activity coordinator.","3.Sofia Prison","51.Following his transfer to Sofia Prison the applicant was subject to the \u201cspecial\u201d prison regime, involving virtually total isolation from the rest of the prison population.","52.The applicant submitted that over the period from February 2004 to summer 2006 he had been confined to a cell measuring 4 m by 2 m, which he had shared with another prisoner. The two beds had taken up most of the floor area, leaving the two prisoners with a free area of only 2 sq. m. There had been no running water in the cell and the prisoners had used a bucket as a toilet.","53.The applicant stated that he had spent most of the day sitting on his bed for lack of free space in the cell. He had eaten his meals in the cell and had been allowed to walk in the prison yard for one hour every day. His access to the prison library had been limited to the few minutes it took to choose and borrow a book, after which he had been immediately taken back to his cell. He had been allowed to attend the prison chapel twice a year, at Easter and Christmas, although not during worship so that he would not meet other prisoners.","54.Up until 2005 the high-security wing of the prison had been overcrowded and ill prisoners had not been held separately from other prisoners, which had fostered the transmission of infectious diseases. The physical conditions had improved somewhat after the renovation work in the high-security wing in 2005 and 2006. In December 2008 the applicant\u2019s prison regime had relaxed. However, like all prisoners in his category, he had still been kept separate from the rest of the prison population and his cell had been kept locked during the day. In 2004 and 2005 he had occasionally worked in his cell folding envelopes. Since 2010 he had been allowed into an activities room, where he could talk to other life prisoners and read books.","55.According to a report by the governor of Sofia Prison dated 11October 2011, the high-security wing of Sofia Prison had been completely renovated in 2005 and 2006. On the date of the report in question the applicant had been held in an individual cell measuring 7.7sq.m., with a bed, a table, a rack, a shower and a private toilet. His cell had been heated and had running water and proper lighting.","56.Apart from the restrictions imposed by his prison regime, the applicant had access to all the activities provided to other prisoners: he could work, visit the library and the prison chapel, receive visits from his relatives, and write and receive letters. He was also eligible for relaxation of his prison regime under section 198 of the Prisons Act, subject to a favourable opinion from the relevant special panel, and could ultimately be accommodated with the rest of the prison population.","57.Furthermore, in 2010 the applicant applied to have a number of the provisions of the implementing regulations of the Prisons Act declared void as regards the conditions for the execution of his life sentence. His application was dismissed with final effect by a judgment of 14 September 2011 delivered by the Supreme Administrative Court, which found that the impugned provisions of the implementing regulations were not contrary to the Prisons Act and that the adoption of the regulations had not involved any irregularities justifying their being declared void.","76.The Burgas Investigation Detention Facility was visited in 1999 by a CPT delegation. The relevant part of the report published after that visit was quoted in paragraph 54 of the Chamber judgment.","77.Burgas Prison was visited by a CPT delegation in April 2002. The relevant part of the report published by the delegation was quoted in paragraph 55 of the Chamber judgment.","78.Sofia Prison was visited by a CPT delegation in September 2006, December 2008, March and April 2014 and February 2015. The four visit reports were published. The relevant parts of the reports on the first three visits were quoted in paragraphs 57-59 of the Chamber judgment.","79.The relevant part of the last report on a visit to this prison, in 2015, reads as follows:"," \u201c3.Conditions of detention","a.material conditions","...","39.At the time of the visit, the closed section of Sofia Prison was holding 816 prisoners for an official capacity of 650. The closed section of Varna Prison was accommodating 422 prisoners for an official capacity of 350. And as for Burgas Prison, at the time of the visit, there were 579 prisoners in the closed section for an official capacity of 371.","In the three prisons, the overwhelming majority of the cells were extremely overcrowded ... The situation at Sofia and Varna prisons remained similar to that observed in the past, with most inmates having just a little more than 2 m\u00b2 of living space per person.","40.The situation was aggravated even more by the fact that material conditions in all the three prisons visited in 2015 still demonstrated an ever-worsening advanced state of dilapidation and insalubrity, despite some last-minute cosmetic efforts observed. Most of the common sanitary facilities at Sofia, Burgas and Varna prisons were totally dilapidated and unhygienic. Moreover, they were accessible to prisoners only during the day; at night the majority of the inmates had to resort to buckets (one for each cell).","The cells were mostly equipped with two-tier and three-tier bunk beds and access to natural light and ventilation was poor. Walls were covered with mould, floors were damaged, and ceilings leaking; cells were infested with cockroaches, bedbugs and other vermin. It should be noted in this regard that no cleaning materials were made available to the prisoners.","Heating was functioning only a couple of hours a day (the delegation measured some 14o C in cells and 10o C in in-cell toilets at Sofia Prison ...","It can thus be stated that most parts of these establishments were unfit for human accommodation and represented a serious health risk both for inmates and staff. Despite the repeated criticism, no progress was observed as regards the implementation of the CPT\u2019s recommendations made after its visits in 2010, 2012 and 2014. To sum up, in the CPT\u2019s opinion, the material conditions alone in the three prisons visited could be seen as amounting to inhuman and degrading treatment.","\u2026","b.Regime","...","43.Possibilities for purposeful activities in Sofia, Varna and Burgas prisons were very limited. The cells were unlocked during the day (with the exception of the high security and admission units) and most prisoners just roamed the corridors or stayed in their cells watching TV or playing board games with other inmates. All inmates had access to a library and a multi-faith area.","The only activity for most prisoners was daily outdoor exercise, usually lasting one hour at Varna Prison, one-and-a-half hours at Sofia Prison and two hours at Burgas Prison.","44.As regards work, at Sofia Prison, 258 prisoners had jobs (but 120 of the work places were unpaid), most of them on general prison maintenance services. ... Educational activities were offered to 78 prisoners at Sofia and 49 prisoners at Varna Prison. Other activities included language courses and IT classes (with 225 inmates attending at Sofia Prison) ...\u201d","80.On 26 March 2015 the CPT issued a public statement on Bulgaria under Article 10 \u00a7 2 of the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The statement reads as follows (footnotes omitted):","\u201c1.The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) has carried out ten visits to Bulgaria since 1995. In the course of those visits, delegations of the Committee have visited all but one prison, several investigation detention facilities (IDFs) and numerous police establishments in the country.","2.Major shortcomings have been identified during the above-mentioned visits, especially as concerns the police and penitentiary establishments. Repeated recommendations have been made over the last 20 years concerning these two areas.","In its reports, the CPT has many times drawn the Bulgarian authorities\u2019 attention to the fact that the principle of co-operation between State Parties and the CPT, as set out in Article 3 of the Convention establishing the Committee, is not limited to steps taken to facilitate the tasks of a visiting delegation. It also requires that decisive action be taken to improve the situation in the light of the CPT\u2019s recommendations.","The vast majority of these recommendations have remained unimplemented, or only partially implemented. In the course of the Committee\u2019s visits to Bulgaria in 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2015, the CPT\u2019s delegations witnessed a lack of decisive action by the authorities leading to a steady deterioration in the situation of persons deprived of their liberty.","3.In the report on its 2012 visit, the Committee expressed its extreme concern about the lack of progress observed in the Bulgarian prison system and stressed that this could oblige the CPT to consider having recourse to Article 10, paragraph 2, of the European Convention on the Prevention of Torture or Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment.","This procedure was set in motion after the March\/April 2014 visit; indeed, the Committee\u2019s findings during that visit demonstrated a persistent failure by the Bulgarian authorities to address certain fundamental shortcomings in the treatment and conditions of detention of persons deprived of their liberty. The visit report highlighted a number of long-standing concerns, some of them dating back to the very first periodic visit to Bulgaria in 1995, as regards the phenomenon of ill-treatment (both in the police and the prison context), inter-prisoner violence, prison overcrowding, poor material conditions of detention in IDFs and prisons, inadequate prison health-care services and low custodial staffing levels, as well as concerns related to discipline, segregation and contact with the outside world.","4.The responses of the Bulgarian authorities to the report on the CPT\u2019s 2014 visit and to the letter by which the Committee has informed the authorities of the opening of the procedure set out in Article 10, paragraph 2, of the Convention have, to say the least, not alleviated the CPT\u2019s concerns. In particular, the responses were succinct, contained very little new information and failed to address the majority of the Committee\u2019s recommendations, usually merely quoting the existing legislation and\/or explaining the lack of action by referring to budgetary constraints. Further, most of the information contained in the CPT\u2019s report as concerns ill-treatment and inter-prisoner violence was simply dismissed.","The 2015 visit was therefore an opportunity for the Committee to assess the progress in the implementation of its long-standing recommendations and to review, in particular, the treatment and detention conditions of persons held at Sofia, Burgas and Varna Prisons, as well as at Sofia IDF (located on G.M. Dimitrov Boulevard).","Regrettably, the findings made during the aforementioned visit demonstrate that little or no progress has been achieved in the implementation of key recommendations repeatedly made by the CPT.","For these reasons, the Committee has been left with no other choice but to make a public statement, pursuant to Article 10, paragraph 2, of the Convention; it took this decision at its 86th plenary meeting in March 2015.","Police ill-treatment","5.In the course of the 2015 visit, the Committee\u2019s delegation received a significant number of allegations of deliberate physical ill-treatment of persons detained by the police; the number of such allegations had not decreased since the 2014 visit but was even on the rise in Sofia and Burgas. The alleged ill-treatment generally consisted of slaps, kicks, and in some cases truncheon blows. The delegation concluded that men and women (including juveniles) in the custody of the police continued to run a significant risk of being ill-treated, both at the time of apprehension and during subsequent questioning.","6.Very little progress, if any, has been made as regards the legal safeguards against police ill-treatment, and the CPT\u2019s key recommendations in this sphere are still to be implemented. In particular, access to a lawyer remained an exception during the initial 24 hours of police custody and the ex officio lawyers did not perform their function as a safeguard against ill-treatment. Further, persons in police custody were still rarely put in a position to notify promptly a person of their choice of their detention, and were not systematically informed of their rights from the outset of their custody.","...","Detention in the Ministry of Justice\u2019s establishments","8.The situation as regards physical ill-treatment of prisoners by staff remains alarming in the three prisons visited in 2015. Many allegations of deliberate physical ill-treatment (usually consisting of slaps, punches, kicks and truncheon blows) were again heard at Sofia and Burgas Prisons and, at Varna Prison, the Committee\u2019s delegation was flooded with such allegations. In a number of cases, the delegation found medical evidence consistent with the allegations received.","...","12.Overcrowding remains a very problematic issue in the Bulgarian prison system. For example, at Burgas Prison, the vast majority of inmates had less than 2 m\u00b2 of living space in multi-occupancy cells, with the notable exception of the remand section. The situation at Sofia Prison remained similar to that observed in the past, with most inmates having just a little more than 2 m\u00b2 of living space per person.","13.The material conditions at Sofia, Burgas, and Varna Prisons remained characterised by an ever-worsening state of dilapidation. In particular, most of the sanitary facilities in these three prisons were totally decrepit and unhygienic, and the heating systems functioned for only a few hours per day. The majority of prisoners still did not benefit from ready access to a toilet during the night and had to resort to buckets or bottles to comply with the needs of nature. The kitchens at Burgas and Varna Prisons (and the dining hall at Varna Prison) remained filthy and unhygienic and infested with vermin, with leaking and over-flowing sewage pipes, and walls and ceilings covered in mould. Most parts of the establishments visited were unfit for human accommodation and represented a serious health risk for both inmates and staff. To sum up, in the Committee\u2019s view, the material conditions alone in the three prisons visited could be seen as amounting to inhuman and degrading treatment.","14.The vast majority of inmates (including almost all the remand prisoners) in the three prisons visited in the course of the 2015 visit still had no access to organised out-of-cell activities and were left in a state of idleness for up to 23 hours per day.","...","Concluding remarks","17.In its previous reports, the Committee has taken due note of the repeated assurances given by the Bulgarian authorities that action would be taken to improve the situation of persons placed in the custody of the police, or held in establishments under the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice. However, the findings of the 2015 visit demonstrate again that little or nothing has been done as regards all the above\u2011mentioned long-standing problems. This state of affairs highlights a persistent failure by the Bulgarian authorities to address most of the fundamental shortcomings in the treatment and conditions of detention of persons deprived of their liberty, despite the specific recommendations repeatedly made by the Committee. The CPT is of the view that action in this respect is long overdue and that the approach to the whole issue of deprivation of liberty in Bulgaria should radically change.","18.The Committee fully acknowledges the challenges that the Bulgarian authorities are facing. In the CPT\u2019s view, there is a real need to develop a comprehensive prison policy, instead of concentrating exclusively on material conditions (which, as should be stressed, have only improved to an extremely limited extent). Having in place a sound legislative framework is no doubt important. However, if laws are not backed by decisive, concrete and effective measures to implement them, they will remain a dead letter and the treatment and conditions of persons deprived of their liberty in Bulgaria will deteriorate even further. As regards the treatment of persons detained by law enforcement agencies, resolute action is required to ensure the practical and meaningful operation of fundamental safeguards against ill-treatment (including the notification of custody, access to a lawyer, access to a doctor, and information on rights).","The Committee\u2019s aim in making this public statement is to motivate and assist the Bulgarian authorities, and in particular the Ministries of the Interior and Justice, to take decisive action in line with the fundamental values to which Bulgaria, as a member state of the Council of Europe and the European Union, has subscribed. In this context, the CPT\u2019s long-standing recommendations should be seen as a tool that helps the Bulgarian authorities to identify shortcomings and make the necessary changes. In furtherance of its mandate, the Committee is fully committed to continuing its dialogue with the Bulgarian authorities to this end.\u201d"],"29429":["5.The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Petro\u015fani.","6.She married N.C. in 1979 and they had four children, born in 1980, 1988, 1992 and 1999. According to the applicant, N.C. was violent towards her and their children on numerous occasions throughout their marriage. In 2007, assaults against the applicant intensified during their divorce proceedings. The divorce was finalised on 6 December 2008.","A.Events of 24 June, 3 and 8 September 2007","7.On 24 June and 3 September 2007 the applicant was physically assaulted and threatened by her husband.","8.According to a forensic medical certificate issued on 28 June 2007, the applicant had numerous bruises on her face, arms, back and thorax, which required five to six days of medical care. A second forensic medical certificate, issued on 6 September 2007, stated that the applicant had an excoriation (scratches) on her ear lobe and several bruises on her arm and thighs. It was possible the injuries had been caused on 3 September. They required two to three days of medical care.","9.On 8 September 2007 the applicant was again physically assaulted by her husband. After the arrival of the police, she was taken to hospital by ambulance. She was diagnosed with an open facial trauma and a contusion of the nasal pyramid. According to a forensic medical certificate issued on 13 September 2007, the injuries might have been caused by impact with or on a hard object and required nine to ten days of medical care.","10.In their duty reports for the above dates, the police officers called by the applicant noted that she had been injured in a domestic dispute and that they had informed her that she could lodge formal complaints against N.C. In the report drafted on 24 June 2007, the police officer on duty also mentioned that when he had arrived at the scene of the incident he had found that N.C. had locked the applicant out of their joint residence.","B.Criminal proceedings concerning the events of 24 June, 3 and 8September2007","11.On 3 August and 2 October 2007 the applicant lodged complaints with the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Petro\u015fani District Court, alleging that she had been physically assaulted by her husband in their home, in the presence of their children, on 24 June, and 3 and 8 September 2007. She attached copies of the medical certificates drawn up after the incidents.","12.On 28 August 2007 the applicant also sent a letter to the Hunedoara County police chief, in which she alleged that she had been the victim of repeated acts of violence by her husband, who often assaulted her in the presence of their children. She mentioned that on several occasions he had locked her out of their home and asked for help from the police in solving these problems.","13.On 11 September 2007 the applicant gave a detailed statement describing the three assaults to the policeman in charge with the investigation. She stated that on 24 June 2007 her husband had come home around noon and had started punching her in the face and head and threatened to kill her. She had managed to flee, but when she had returned an hour later her husband had refused to let her back into the apartment. She also mentioned that he had told the children not to speak about it.","14.In statements dated 12 September 2007, the applicant\u2019s mother and brother told the police that throughout 2007 the applicant had very often come to their house, complaining that N.C. had beaten her, threatened to kill her or that he had locked her out of their apartment.","15.On 15 November 2007 the applicant\u2019s and N.C.\u2019s adult daughters, C.B.A. and C.C.A., told the police that the applicant used to drink and that she became aggressive when she got drunk. They also stated that their father had not hit their mother. C.C.A. mentioned that although she earned her own living, her father had always given her money. Her mother, on the other, had constantly been short of money and had debts to banks.","16.On 19 November 2007 N.C. was questioned by the police. He stated that he had argued with the applicant over their divorce, but had not laid a hand on her. He added that the applicant had not been cleaning the house properly and had a drinking problem. He also stated that \u201cI did not hit her so hard as to cause her injury\u201d and that \u201cshe may have fallen in the bathroom\u201d. He alleged that the medical certificates submitted by the applicant had been forged.","17.On 13 and 19 December 2007 the applicant wrote to the head prosecutor of the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Petro\u015fani District Court, complaining that N.C., who had moved out of their apartment and had taken two of the children with him, had threatened to kill her when they had accidentally met on the street a week before. She stated that she feared for her life and asked for the proceedings to be speeded up and for protection from N.C.","18.On the same date, the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Petro\u015fani District Court decided not to press criminal charges against N.C. and imposed an administrative fine of 200 Romanian lei (RON) (approximately 50 euros (EUR)) on him. The prosecutor held that the applicant had provoked the disputes after drinking alcohol and referred to N.C.\u2019s statements and those of the applicant\u2019s two adult daughters. As regards the alleged threats, it was considered that the applicant had failed to prove her accusations.","19.The prosecutor concluded that, although N.C. had committed the crime of bodily harm, his actions had not created any danger to society, because he had been provoked by the victim, had no previous criminal record and was a retired person (pensionar).","20.The applicant\u2019s complaint against that decision was rejected as ill\u2011founded on 25 March 2008 by the superior prosecutor.","21.On 21 April 2008 the applicant lodged a complaint against the prosecutors\u2019 decisions of 19 December 2007 and 25 March 2008 with the Petro\u015fani District Court, asking that N.C. be charged with bodily harm, be convicted and ordered to pay non-pecuniary damages for the suffering she had endured. She alleged that the administrative fine, which N.C. had refused to pay, had not had a deterrent effect on him as he had continued to assault her after the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 19 December 2007. She also asked the court to impose criminal sanctions on him and requested permission to submit a recording of a conversation with N.C. in order to prove that she had been assaulted and threatened by him in September 2007. In the last paragraph of her submission, the applicant stated that she feared for her life and asked the court to \u201cpunish [N.C.] as provided for by law ... to forbid him from entering the apartment ... and to forbid him from coming near [her] ...\u201d.","22.At the second hearing before the Petrosani District Court, the applicant applied to be given a court-appointed lawyer because she did not have the financial means to hire one. The court dismissed the application, holding that the subject matter of the case did not require representation by a lawyer.","23.By an interlocutory judgment of 23 June 2008, the Petrosani District Court decided to partially quash the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 19 December 2007 in respect of the crime of bodily harm and the penalty imposed for it and to examine that part of the case on the merits. The prosecutor\u2019s findings in respect of the threats were upheld. The recording was not admitted as evidence because the court considered that it had no relevance to the case.","24.The applicant and N.C. gave statements before the court. N.C. explained that on 8 September 2007 the applicant had been drunk and had threatened him with a knife. In order to defend himself, he had pushed her but he denied having ever hit the applicant.","25.On 10 February 2009 the court heard a statement from the applicant\u2019s daughter, C.B.A., who testified as follows:","\u201cMy father used to hit my mother [the applicant] and us, the children, many times. He used to do it when he had not come home at night and my mother asked him where he had been. Then he would get angry and hit her. The main reason he got angry was lack of money ... Even after July 2007, when I moved out of my parents\u2019 apartment, my mother continued to be hit by my father; I saw some of these incidents personally. Before 2007, my mother used to drink alcohol, but it was within normal limits, and in 2007 she stopped drinking.","I retract the statement I gave during the criminal proceedings because I gave it after threats from my father.\u201d","26.On 17 February 2009 the Petro\u015fani District Court decided to acquit N.C. of the crime of bodily harm. The court considered that C.B.A.\u2019s statement could not be taken into consideration, without mentioning any reasons for that decision. The court concluded as follows:","\u201cThe injured party [the applicant] has not proved her allegations that on 24.06.2007, 3.09.2007 and 8.09.2007 ... she was physically assaulted by the defendant. The court considers, also in view of the evidence collected during the criminal investigation, that such assaults by the defendant took place principally because of the injured party\u2019s alcohol consumption and because she was not taking adequate care of her four children. The defendant\u2019s acts are not so dangerous to society as to be considered crimes and he shall therefore be acquitted of the three counts of bodily harm and shall pay an administrative fine of RON 500.\u201d","27.The court further dismissed the applicant\u2019s claims for damages as ill-founded, without giving reasons. No mention was made in the judgment of the applicant\u2019s request for protective measures made in her complaint of 21 April 2008 (see paragraph 21 above).","28.The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (recurs) against that judgment. She alleged, among other arguments, that N.C. was a violent person who continued to assault her, even after being punished with an administrative fine by the prosecutor on 19 December 2007.","29.On 12 May 2009 the Hunedoara County Court dismissed as ill\u2011founded the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law and upheld the decision of 17 February 2009. The court held that the acts of violence committed by N.C. had been provoked by the applicant and had therefore not reached the level of severity required for them to fall within the scope of the crime of bodily harm. For the same reason, an award for damages was not justified.","C.Events during 2008","30.Between 19 February and 21 April 2008 the applicant made five complaints to the Petro\u015fani police concerning new incidents of assault or threats by N.C. to which she attached medical reports.","31.In the meantime, on 27 March 2008, the applicant asked the Hunedoara County police to apply the measures provided by law in order to stop the constant assaults she was being subjected to by N.C. She stressed that she felt that her life was in danger. A similar request was sent by the applicant to the police on 11 April 2008.","32.On 29 September 2008 the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Petro\u015fani District Court decided not to press charges against N.C. for the five incidents described by the applicant. He was however punished with an administrative fine of RON 100 (approximately EUR 25).","33.The applicant\u2019s letter of 27 March 2008, requesting the police to take the necessary measures in order to stop the constant assaults against her, was not taken into consideration. The prosecutor found that it could not be considered a formal complaint because, unlike the other complaints, it did not refer to a specific assault.","34.The applicant did not lodge any further complaints against the above-mentioned decision.","45.In its 2016\/2017 annual report on Romania, Amnesty International stated:","\u201cAccording to General Police Inspectorate data, 8,926 cases of domestic violence were registered in the first six months of 2016 \u2013 79% of the victims were women and 92.3% of the aggressors were men. National NGOs reported that the actual number of cases was much higher. In July, NGOs requested that the government expedite the adoption of measures to combat violence against women and domestic violence.\u201d","46.In a communication submitted in the context of the supervision of the execution of the Court\u2019s judgment in the case of E.M. v. Romania (no.43994\/05, 30 October 2012), the Network for Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women (VAW), an informal grouping of twenty-four organisations active in the field of promoting women\u2019s rights in Romania, stated that 91% of requests for a protection order between 2012 and 2015 had been made by women. In 2014 alone there had been 155 victims of homicide in situations of domestic violence, an increase of 32.5% on the period between 2004 and 2012."],"29483":["6.The applicant was born in 1956 in the Tambov Region. Before his arrest he lived in St Petersburg.","A.The applicant\u2019s arrest and detention","7.The applicant was arrested on 23 August 2007. He remained in detention throughout the investigation and trial.","8.On 9 November 2009 the Kuybyshevskiy District Court of StPetersburg found him guilty of aggravated fraud and money laundering committed within an organised criminal group and sentenced him to fourteen years\u2019 imprisonment. That judgment was upheld on appeal by the St Petersburg City Court on 30 March 2010.","9.On 6 March 2012, in another set of criminal proceedings, the Kuybyshevskiy District Court, found the applicant guilty of two counts of aggravated extortion committed within an organised criminal group and imposed a cumulative prison sentence of fifteen years. The judgment became final on 12 July 2012 when endorsed by the City Court.","B.The applicant\u2019s state of health and medical treatment","10.In 1994 the applicant lost his right arm. He suffered heart attacks in 2000 and 2007 and a kidney affected by cancer was removed in 2003. At the time of his arrest the applicant\u2019s diagnoses listed: ischemic disease, exertional angina of the second functional group, atherosclerotic and post infarction cardiosclerosis, third-stage hypertension with a high risk of vascular complications; cardiac failure of the second functional group; chronic post-traumatic pericarditis with effusion; remote cancer metastases requiring permanent supervision; kidney stones; concretion of the right kidney; chronic pyelonephritis; chronic kidney failure of the first degree; adenocarcinoma of the prostate gland; chronic prostatitis; chronic cystitis, and constantly recurrent multidrug-resistant infection of the urinary tract. To keep his medical condition under control, the applicant followed a daily complex drug regimen comprising up to ten medicaments and underwent an in-depth medical examination every two months in a hospital where he received necessary treatment in respect of his oncological illnesses.","11.On 24 August 2007 upon his admission to remand prison no.IZ\u201177\/1 in Moscow the applicant informed the prison medical authorities of his condition, submitting the full list of his diagnoses.","12.In September 2007 he started complaining about a number of symptoms such as a heart pain, fatigue, difficulty in breathing, and frequent urination. He received basic treatment which alleviated a part of his health problems, but the urinary condition worsened. In November 2007 he complained of a pain in the low abdomen and inability to urinate. On 20November 2007 a surgeon recommended urinary catheterisation, that is to say the insertion of a tube into the patient\u2019s bladder via the urethra. That procedure was performed approximately 250 times during the first year of detention. In the meantime the urinary condition became more acute.","13.On 4 December 2008 the applicant was examined by a urologist for the first time whilst in detention. The doctor recommended treatment with antibiotics, regular urological supervision and to avoid catheterisation in so far as possible.","14.Throughout 2009 the applicant\u2019s urinary condition persisted. He urinated up to thirty-seven times per day and his nocturnal sleep was interrupted every hour or two. He had to continue resorting to urinary cauterisation. On several occasions he had a consultation with a urologist.","15.On 12 October 2009, at the request of the applicant\u2019s lawyer, three medical experts prepared a report assessing the capability of the custodial authorities to properly treat the applicant. Having examined the medical file on the applicant compiled in the civilian hospital, submissions by the custodial authorities and the applicant\u2019s own comments, the experts concluded that he required systematic treatment with amendments to the chemotherapy regimen and periodic admissions to a specialised cardiology hospital for instrumental examinations and necessary amendments to drug regimen. Given the absence of proper medical supervision, the experts also warned of a possible deterioration of the applicant\u2019s urinary and oncological problems and a risk of those illnesses advancing to a stage requiring surgery, or to a stage with no prospects of the applicant being cured or even his life being saved. The experts observed that the medical unit of the detention facility where the applicant was kept was not equipped for treating patients in such a medical condition.","16.On 28 December 2009, 19 March, 15 June, 26 July, 25 August and 30November 2010 the applicant was examined in the Moscow Scientific Institute of Urology (hereinafter \u201cthe Urology Institute\u201d), having been diagnosed with neurogenic bladder dysfunction. The treatment provided slightly improved his condition.","17.On 21 December 2010 the doctors from the Urology Institute performed a surgery on the applicant. A suprapubic catheter was inserted into his bladder through a cut in the abdomen. The applicant was discharged from the hospital to a remand prison under the supervision of the resident doctor.","18.Three days later the applicant complained of continuous bleeding from the abdominal incision. The next day, having lost more than one litre of blood, he was sent back to the Institute, where his condition was brought under control.","19.In April 2011, in the remand prison, the applicant developed an acute inflammation of the urethra, which was successfully treated in the Institute.","20.From 2012 to 2014 the applicant\u2019s urinary condition remained stable. He continued using the suprapubic catheter to remove the urine.","C.Court proceedings","21.In the meantime, in December 2009 the applicant brought a court claim against the detention authorities, seeking that the lack of appropriate medical treatment be declared unlawful.","22.On 28 June 2010 the Preobrazhenskiy District Court of Moscow dismissed his claim. The court found as follows:","\u201cFrom the [applicant\u2019s] medical file submitted by the [remand prison] it is apparent that ... [the authorities] provided him with medical aid, subjected him to medical testing, and prescribed treatment. In particular, on 4December 2008, 25 September and 15November 2009 he was seen by a urologist... On 28 December 2009 he was examined in the [Urology Institute]. It is not apparent from the medical file that the authorities refused to provide [the applicant] with the medical assistance or that he was deprived of the requisite medication\u201d.","23.On 24 March 2011 the Moscow City Court upheld that decision on appeal."],"29595":["6.The applicant was born in 1968 and is currently detained in Vratsa Prison.","A.Background","7.In 2012 the applicant was detained in Varna Prison, serving a combined sentence of eighteen years\u2019 imprisonment for aggravated murder, lewd acts, aggravated theft and car theft.","8.He suffers from many chronic medical conditions and a personality disorder which manifested itself in, inter alia, several attempts at self-harm and some suicide threats.","9.In 2007 the applicant was treated on the psychiatric ward of Lovech Prison Hospital.","10.Following his placement in an isolation cell in April 2008, he again threatened to harm himself and for eight days was kept almost constantly immobile by having his hands and feet handcuffed to a bed (see DimchoDimov v. Bulgaria, no. 57123\/08, 16 December 2014, where the Court found violations of the substantive and procedural limbs of Article 3 of the Convention in that regard).","11.In early 2012 the applicant was part of a prisoner group that included MrK.I. The latter was serving a combined sentence of six and a half years for aggravated racketeering and numerous instances of threats of murder and aggravated hooliganism. According to a later psychological report, MrK.I. had previously been admitted many times to the psychiatric ward of Lovech Prison Hospital and he suffered from a mixed personality disorder with elements of dissocial behaviour, paranoia and emotional instability.","B.Facts at issue in the case","1.The incident on 15 February 2012","12.On the morning of 15 February 2012 the applicant went to the wing for prisoners who were being transferred to fetch a mattress he had allegedly lent to another inmate. When he entered the cell, Mr K.I., with whom he had had a conflict since January that year, began arguing with him, telling him that he had no right to come in and remove items. A guard intervened and took the applicant out of the wing, leaving him in the prison barbershop. According to statements made by the applicant later, Mr K.I. followed him, grabbed him by the collar through the bars separating the barbershop from the corridor, and hit him on the head and nose. In a report drawn up several days later, the social worker in charge of the applicant\u2019s group said that there was no evidence of such an incident as no other inmate had confirmed the applicant\u2019s allegations, and the applicant had not requested a medical examination.","13.Alerted by the guard, the social worker came and talked with the applicant, repeating that he could not go back into that wing. According to her report about the incident, her words upset him and he began arguing with her in a loud voice. That in turn irritated Mr K.I., who began to shout at the applicant. The social worker took Mr K.I. and two other inmates to a cell, where she reminded them of their duties and warned them that any violence would be in breach of prison rules and entail disciplinary measures. They agreed that they had overreacted and undertook to make efforts to put relations in the group right. After that, the social worker had a talk with the applicant, who was in a highly emotional state. She told him of Mr K.I.\u2019s undertaking to calm the conflict. The applicant began shouting and insulting MrK.I., who heard him and shouted back. To calm things down, the social worker had the applicant isolated in a cell.","14.The next day, the social worker received complaints from five other inmates from the group. They protested against the applicant\u2019s return to the group, saying that he had systematically bullied and assaulted them. The applicant also filed a complaint, saying that he could no longer remain in the same group as Mr K.I.","15.As a result, on 21 February 2012 the social worker recommended that the prison governor move the applicant to another group. She was of the view that his remaining in his old group would worsen relations within it because he would take on inmates who had not taken his side in the conflict with Mr K.I., which would also be bad for his emotional well-being and security. In the meantime, the applicant was provisionally held in a cell on another floor.","2.The incident on 21 February 2012","16.Six days after the first incident, on 21 February 2012, a guard took the applicant back to his old corridor so that he could fetch his belongings from his locker. According to the guard\u2019s report, filed the same day, the applicant swore at and threatened Mr K.I. when passing him by. The latter, upset, punched the applicant on the jaw. The social worker carried out an enquiry over the following days at the request of the prison governor and obtained statements from eight other inmates, confirming the events. She proposed that Mr K.I. be given a disciplinary warning and that the applicant be kept in his new group to avoid further altercations between the two. As a result of the blow he had received the applicant suffered a fractured jaw, but this was not detected immediately (see paragraphs 18, 25 and 28 below). Three weeks after the incident, on 13 March 2012, the prison governor issued Mr K.I. with a disciplinary warning.","3.Medical care provided to the applicant after the incidents","17.The applicant expressed no wish to be given a medical examination after the incident which allegedly took place on 15 February 2012.","18.After the incident on 21 February 2012 he was brought to Varna Prison\u2019s medical centre, where he was seen by the feldsher as the prison\u2019s only doctor was on long-term sick leave at the time (see paragraph40 below). The applicant told the feldsher that he had been punched next to his right ear and had pain in the ear and the lower jaw. The feldsher noted some redness in his ear, but reported nothing more serious. She also noted that the applicant had no signs of other traumatic injuries to his body. She wrote a note to the prison administration, detailing her findings. According to a statement which he made in the course of the ensuing criminal proceedings against Mr K.I. (see paragraph 35 below), the applicant asked the feldsher to send him for an X-ray, but she refused.","19.On 22 February 2012 the applicant went to the medical centre again and was given vitamins, an anti-inflammatory drug, a muscle relaxant and antibiotics.","20.He visited the centre once more on 24 February 2012 and was given a painkiller.","21.According to a statement by the applicant in the criminal proceedings against Mr K.I. (see paragraph 35 below), he repeatedly asked to be sent to an external medical specialist for an examination.","22.His next visit to the centre was on 7 March 2012, when he complained of a loss of hearing in his right ear. The feldsher decided to refer him to an external specialist. The consultation took place seven weeks later, on 26 April 2012 (see paragraph 25 below). The Government said the delay was because the applicant\u2019s symptoms had not suggested that he had a medical condition that required urgent attention and because it took time to organise a medical examination outside the prison.","23.The applicant went to the prison\u2019s medical centre again on 13March 2012 and threatened to go on a hunger strike. According to a statement which he made in the course of the criminal proceedings against MrK.I. (see paragraph 35 below), he made that threat to pressure the prison authorities to send him for a medical examination by an outside specialist.","24.His next visit to the centre was on 23 April 2012, when he obtained a painkiller but apparently did not complain further about his health.","25.On 26 April 2012 the applicant was seen by an external otolaryngologist, who noted that he was experiencing pain in his right temporomandibular joint and ears and had poor hearing. He also noted that the applicant had some redness on his eardrums. He prescribed painkillers and antibiotics, and suggested that the applicant be seen by a maxillofacial surgeon. The prison paid for the consultation.","26.On 27 April and 7 and 10 May 2012 the applicant again visited the prison\u2019s medical centre and obtained antibiotics and analgesics. On 12 May 2012 he was taken out of prison for a consultation with a psychiatrist.","27.On 14 May 2012 the prison\u2019s feldsher told the applicant that she would ask the prison administration to pay for a consultation with a maxillofacial surgeon. The Government explained that that had been necessary because such consultations were not covered by Bulgaria\u2019s health insurance scheme and the prison had to make a special payment for such a consultation.","28.On 19 May 2012 the applicant was examined by a maxillofacial surgeon and given a panoramic X-ray. The surgeon noted that the applicant had a fracture of the right condyloid process that had not healed properly and post-traumatic arthritis of the right temporomandibular joint. He recommended that the applicant have physiotherapy for that joint. The consultation and the X-ray were paid for by the prison administration.","29.On 21 May 2012 the prison feldsher offered to send the applicant to Sofia Prison Hospital for physiotherapy. He refused.","30.On 15 June 2012 the applicant agreed to be sent to Sofia Prison Hospital, and was admitted on 18 July 2012. He was examined and given an X-ray of the skull. It was noted that he had a fracture of the jaw that had already healed and could no longer be operated on, and a deviated nasal septum. He was treated with antipsychotic, anticonvulsant and mood\u2011stabilising drugs, and had physiotherapy for his temporomandibular joints. He was in the hospital until 1 August 2012, when he returned to Varna Prison.","31.Between June and October 2012 the applicant visited the prison medical centre on several occasions. He was generally given pain medication and further on request external medical consultations were discussed.","32.The second consultation with an otolaryngologist took place on 27December 2012. She noted that the applicant complained of poor hearing and pain in the right ear. She found that he had normal eardrums but poor teeth, which caused luxation of the temporomandibular joint, and also had a dysfunction of that joint. She prescribed painkillers.","33.In a medical report drawn up on 11 February 2013, the Varna Prison doctor noted that the applicant had no money to pay for surgery on his jawbone and that the national health insurance scheme did not cover it. In November 2013 the applicant had surgery for the deviated nasal septum in a hospital in Varna.","4.Investigation into and criminal proceedings relating to the assault on 21 February 2012","34.On an unknown date in 2012 the applicant complained to the Varna district prosecutor\u2019s office about the incidents on 15 and 21 February 2012. In June 2012 the prosecutor\u2019s office refused to open criminal proceedings. It found that no prison staff had committed any offences during the incidents. On appeal by the applicant, the Varna regional prosecutor\u2019s office upheld that decision in August 2012. The applicant appealed further and, on 10October 2012, the Varna appellate prosecutor\u2019s office quashed the refusal to open criminal proceedings against Mr K.I., but upheld the refusal to open proceedings against prison staff. It noted that the internal inquiry had established that the incident involving the two inmates had been promptly dealt with and that there had been no culpable omissions by prison staff. It referred the case back with instructions to the lower prosecutor\u2019s offices to check whether Mr K.I.\u2019s actions had amounted to causing moderate bodily harm.","35.Following a criminal investigation and delays in the resulting trial due to Mr K.I.\u2019s mental health, in February 2015 the Varna District Court found Mr K.I. guilty of causing moderate bodily harm to the applicant by breaking his jaw. It sentenced him to six years\u2019 imprisonment and ordered him to pay the applicant 2,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage. The court noted that the fracture had impaired the applicant\u2019s chewing and speech functions for at least four months and had caused him considerable pain and suffering (see \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0441. \u2116 68 \u043e\u0442 12.02.2015\u0433. \u043f\u043e \u043d. \u043e. \u0445. \u0434. \u2116 3419\/2013 \u0433., \u0420\u0421-\u0412\u0430\u0440\u043d\u0430).","36.In March 2016, following an appeal by Mr K.I., the Varna Regional Court fully upheld the lower court\u2019s judgment (see \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 61 \u043e\u0442 07.03.2016\u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0432. \u043d. \u043e. \u0445. \u0434. \u2116 301\/2015 \u0433., \u041e\u0421-\u0412\u0430\u0440\u043d\u0430).","5.Claim against the prison authorities for damages","37.In September 2014 the applicant brought a claim for damages against the Chief Directorate for the Execution of Punishments at the Ministry of Justice. He alleged that over the previous two months the authorities at Varna Prison had failed to provide him with adequate medical care for pain in the right ear, his fractured jaw and numbness in his left arm.","38.The Varna Administrative Court heard the case on 1 December 2014 and 2 February 2015, when the applicant unexpectedly withdrew his claim and the court discontinued the proceedings.","39.A delegation of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (\u201cthe CPT\u201d) visited Bulgaria between 18 and 29 October 2010. The visit included a visit to Varna Prison. In its ensuing report (CPT\/Inf (2012) 9), the CPT noted the following (footnotes omitted):","\u201c88.At both Plovdiv and Varna Prisons, inter-prisoner violence was rife. It transpired from the examination of documentation on disciplinary punishments that there was at least one violent altercation between prisoners every week, leading to placements in a disciplinary cell and occasionally to a medical intervention or hospitalisation. ...","At Varna Prison in particular, the low staffing level, coupled with severe overcrowding, could easily compromise the safety of staff and prisoners alike. ...","89.... The Committee considers that an effective strategy to tackle inter-prisoner intimidation\/violence should seek to ensure that prison staff are placed in a position to exercise their authority in an appropriate manner. In particular, staff should be encouraged more closely to supervise the activities of prisoners and enter in direct contact with them with a view to developing dynamic security. This implies making available sufficient numbers of staff and providing them with appropriate initial and advanced training. When incidents of inter-prisoner intimidation\/violence do occur, staff must be both resolved and properly trained to intervene. ...","In addition to implementing an individualised risk and needs assessment, the prison system may also need to develop the capacity to ensure that potentially incompatible categories of prisoners are not accommodated together. ...","121.Despite the goodwill and commitment of health-care staff at the prisons visited, the provision of health care to prisoners remained problematic, due to the serious shortage of staff and resources. The delegation heard a number of complaints from prisoners at both Plovdiv and Varna Prisons concerning delayed or difficult access to a doctor, inadequate quality of care (in particular dental care), problematic access to outside specialists and delays in transfer to outside hospitals. ...","At Varna Prison, the health-care staff team comprised a psychiatrist and a feldsher. The impossibility to replace the head doctor who was on prolonged sick leave placed an overwhelming burden on the psychiatrist and the feldsher. As a stop-gap solution, the doctor from the nearly hostel \u2018Razdelna\u2019 periodically visited the prison (i.e. four to five times a month). ...\u201d","40.A delegation of the CPT visited Bulgaria again between 4 and 10May 2012. The visit again included a visit to Varna Prison. In its ensuing report (CPT\/Inf (2012) 32), the CPT noted the following (footnotes omitted):","\u201c19.The delegation received many allegations of inter-prisoner violence at both Burgas and Varna Prisons (including verbal and physical intimidation), and even witnessed itself such episodes. This was hardly surprising considering the combination of severe overcrowding and extremely low staffing levels at both establishments.","Despite long-standing recommendations on this issue, the findings from the 2012 visit suggest that very little progress has been made to tackle inter-prisoner violence. The Committee must stress again that the duty of care which is owed by the prison authorities to prisoners in their charge includes the responsibility to protect them from other prisoners who might wish to cause them harm. In particular, prison staff must be alert to signs of trouble and be both resolved and properly trained to intervene. Such a capacity to intervene will of course depend, inter alia, on an adequate staff\/prisoner ratio and on providing all staff members with appropriate initial and advanced training. In addition, the prison system as a whole may need to develop the capacity to ensure that potentially incompatible categories of prisoners are not accommodated together. ...","40.The provision of health-care was very problematic at both prisons due to an extreme shortage of staff and resources. The delegation was submerged by complaints about difficulties in having access to prison medical staff, inadequate quality of care (including dental care), problematic access to outside specialists\/hospitals (in particular for insurance reasons) and delays in transfer to outside hospitals.","At Varna Prison, the health-care staff consisted of a general practitioner \u2013 who had just returned to his duties after a lengthy period of sick leave \u2013 and a feldsher, both working full-time. The doctor from the nearby prison hostel \u2018Razdelna\u2019 had been ensuring medical cover when the feldsher was absent. The psychiatrist\u2019s post had been vacant since January 2011. A part-time dentist was present for two hours, five days a week. No qualified nurse was present at the establishment. To sum up, since January 2011, the establishment\u2019s needs in terms of health-care had been covered essentially by a single feldsher. The delegation was impressed by her professionalism and commitment, which was also recognised by inmates; nevertheless, the fact that no arrangement was found to compensate the absence of the GP for at least 18 months is unacceptable. ...","41.The above-mentioned staffing situation rendered virtually impossible the provision of health care worthy of the name in the establishments visited. Further, there was an over-reliance on feldshers, causing them to practise beyond the limits of their competence. ...","43.No specific screening for injuries was performed upon arrival or after a violent episode in prison, and very limited medical information could be found at Varna Prison ... in this respect. Further, it appeared that reporting of injuries depended on the prisoner concerned making a specific request, usually to the social worker, on a special form (a copy of the form was not kept in the medical file). There appeared to be no systematic reporting of traumatic injuries to the Main Directorate for the Execution of Sanctions.","In the light of the above, the CPT reiterates its recommendation that steps be taken to ensure that prison health-care services perform a thorough screening of newly-arrived prisoners for injuries. In this context, the report completed by the doctor should contain, in addition to a detailed description of injuries observed, any allegations made by the prisoner concerned and the doctor\u2019s conclusions as to the consistency between those allegations and the objective medical findings. ...","The same approach should be followed whenever a prisoner is medically examined following a violent episode in prison.\u201d"],"29619":["5.The applicant was born in 1972 and currently lives in Ukraine. Prior to the events at issue, notably during an unspecified period before 1998, the applicant used to serve in the police. He provided no further details in that regard.","I.The applicant\u2019s arrest and administrative detention","6.On 11 June 2004 the police were informed that the applicant and one of his suspected accomplices, who at the time were on a wanted list for having committed multiple robberies, were on a train travelling to Moldova. The police were also informed that they could be in possession of a gun. At about 11 p.m. on that day a group of four police officers boarded the train and arrested the applicant and his accomplice, using, as noted in the relevant official documents, \u201chand-to-hand combat techniques\u201d and handcuffs to subdue them. According to the Government, during the arrest the applicant tried to escape. Subsequently, the applicant was taken to Kotovsk police station.","7.On 12 June 2004 the police drew up a report on the applicant\u2019s arrest in which it was noted that he had been arrested for \u201chaving resisted lawful demands of the police\u201d, which was an administrative offence, on 12 June 2004 in Kotovsk. The police report on the offence, joined to the above arrest report of 12 June 2004, specified that the applicant \u201chad behaved aggressively, had refused to present his identity documents, had tried to run away [and] had grabbed the police officers\u2019 clothes\u201d. According to the parties, the information concerning the time and place of the arrest contained in the reports was false.","8.Later that day the Kotovsk Town Court found the applicant guilty of the abovementioned administrative offence and ordered his administrative detention for twelve days. The applicant remained in police custody.","9.On 17 August 2004 the regional police department examined the circumstances of the applicant\u2019s arrest and issued a report, finding that the police officers concerned had lawfully used \u201chand-to-hand combat techniques\u201d and handcuffs against the applicant. No further details were given in that connection. In the report, it was also noted that the applicant had had bruises on his body after the arrest.","II.Alleged ill-treatment of the applicant","10.According to the applicant, while in police custody during the night of 11 to 12 June 2004, he was ill-treated by several police officers with the aim of extracting his confession to the crimes of which he was suspected (see paragraph 6 above). In particular, police officers allegedly beat him up, administered electric shocks to him, suffocated him using a gas mask, inserted needles under his nails, hung him over a metal bar, and attempted to sexually abuse him. Unable to withstand the ill-treatment, the applicant made self-incriminating statements and also statements incriminating several other persons, who later became his co-defendants in the proceedings. The applicant stated that had he not done so, the police officers would have killed him as they had killed a certain M., whom the police had suspected of being the applicant\u2019s accomplice, during his questioning in the same police station on 18 March 2004. As was later found by the trial court, M. had died in the course of a robbery he had committed together with the applicant (see paragraph 54 below).","11.Allegedly, the police officers also forced the applicant to sign a written statement that he had no complaints about them and that he had received his injuries elsewhere.","12.On 12 June 2004 the applicant complained to a prosecutor\u2019s office that he had been tortured by the police. On the same day, on the prosecutor\u2019s office\u2019s instructions, the applicant was examined by a medical expert who noted multiple bruises on the applicant\u2019s body and face, which the expert classified as minor. During his medical examination the applicant stated that he had been beaten up by the police officers at the police station during the night of 11 to 12 June 2004. The expert noted that the applicant could have been punched and kicked in the head and body during that time.","13.According to the applicant, the police officers continued torturing him for the next three days. The applicant stated that two people had witnessed him being ill-treated by the police. He did not give their details.","14.On 29 June 2004 the applicant handed the investigators a written statement informing them of his wish to withdraw his complaints of ill\u2011treatment. Notably, he stated that he had no grievances against the police and that he had been injured due to his own fault in a different location. He did not provide any details of how he had been injured.","15.On 30 June 2004 an investigator from the Kotovsk police station, having questioned the applicant in the presence of his lawyer (see paragraph38 below), decided not to launch a criminal investigation in respect of the applicant\u2019s injuries, noting, mainly, that the applicant had withdrawn his complaints.","16.Subsequently, the applicant lodged new complaints of alleged ill\u2011treatment by the police on 11-12 June 2004 with a prosecutor\u2019s office.","17.In particular, in August 2004 the applicant complained to the prosecutor overseeing the investigation that he had been beaten up by the police. On 30 August 2004 the prosecutor met with the applicant and allegedly tried to force him to confess to having committed other crimes. As the applicant refused, the prosecutor allegedly beat him up. As a result, the applicant decided to stop making complaints to that prosecutor.","18.The applicant\u2019s complaints of ill-treatment by the police on 11\u201112June 2004 made to other prosecutors were re-examined on several occasions. In particular, the prosecutors\u2019 decisions refusing to prosecute the police officers issued on 6 July and 31 August 2004, 25 January, 28 July and 25 November 2005 were annulled by senior prosecutors for failure to investigate the matter in full.","19.By a decision of 11February 2006, the prosecutor\u2019s office again rejected the complaints as unsubstantiated, finding that it had not been demonstrated that the police officers had committed a crime and that there was no evidence that the police had forced the applicant to give self\u2011incriminating statements after his arrest. Statements of a number of police officers were relied upon in that regard. It was also noted that at some point in time the applicant and his lawyer had made statements that the applicant had not been ill-treated by the police after his arrest, and that he had refused to give details as to how he had received the injuries noted in the medical examination of 12 June 2004 (see paragraphs 14 and 15 above). The prosecutor\u2019s office further found no issue in the way the police had arrested the applicant, relying on the report of 17August 2004 (seeparagraph 9 above).","20.The applicant did not challenge that decision in a separate appeal to a higher prosecutor or the courts, though he raised the complaints of ill\u2011treatment by the police raised during his trial (see paragraph 49 below).","21.According to the applicant, during further stages of the criminal proceedings against him, he was subjected to beatings by the police on several occasions.","22.The applicant also stated that during his trial he had been subjected to various forms of ill-treatment by the guards, who had been escorting him to court hearings. In particular, the guards had twisted his hands and tried to break his vertebral column; they had not provided him with food during the lunch breaks; and they had threatened the applicant with physical punishment. They had also placed him temporarily in cells together with inmates whom the applicant claims he had arrested when he had worked for the police (see paragraph 5 above). The guards had informed the inmates that they would go unpunished had they killed or raped the applicant. Allegedly, the prosecutors to whom the applicant had brought his complaints of ill-treatment did not examine those complaints on the merits.","23.After his trial, in particular between February 2009 and November 2012, the applicant was detained in \u201cordinary\u201d prisons, where he was allegedly subjected to abuse and threats by inmates on account of his previous service in the police. Eventually he was transferred to a specialised prison in Mena in which inmates with law-enforcement backgrounds were detained.","24.On 15 February 2016 the applicant was released from prison.","III.Allegedly inadequate medical assistance to the applicant while in detention","25.The applicant stated that during his detention he had suffered from different health issues, including a gastric ulcer, kidney disease and an eye issue, for which he had not been provided adequate medical assistance. Consequently, his health condition had deteriorated. The applicant had lodged multiple complaints concerning his allegedly inadequate medical assistance with a prosecutor\u2019s office.","26.In 2006 the prosecutor\u2019s office instructed the head of the Prisons Service in Odessa to ensure that the applicant received adequate medical assistance while he was detained in Odesa Pre-Trial Detention Centre (\u201cthe SIZO\u201d). Allegedly, the SIZO administration did not comply with that instruction and he was not given the assistance he needed. Thus, he continued to lodge complaints with the prosecutor\u2019s office. The prosecutor\u2019s office eventually rejected the complaints as unsubstantiated, having studied the applicant\u2019s medical file and noted that he had been medically examined and provided with adequate medical assistance during his detention in the SIZO. The applicant\u2019s further complaints of inadequate medical assistance while in prison were also rejected as unsubstantiated.","27.The Government submitted detailed information regarding the medical assistance which the applicant had received in detention. It demonstrates that throughout the period of his detention in the SIZO and in different prisons he had been examined by various doctors, including those from civilian medical institutions, and had been provided with treatment for the different medical issues he had had at the time.","IV.The applicant\u2019s detention prior to his conviction on 30 March 2007","28.After his arrest on 11June 2004, the applicant was detained on the basis of the decision of the Town Court of 12 June 2004 sentencing him to twelve days\u2019 administrative detention (see paragraph 8 above).","29.On 24 June 2004 the applicant was informed that he was being arrested in connection with his criminal prosecution. The next day the Town Court ordered his further detention for two months on the grounds that the applicant was accused of serious crimes and that he might evade investigation or commit a new crime. No further details were given in that regard.","30.The applicant did not appeal against the decision of the Town Court of 25 June 2004. Nor did he appeal against the decision of the same court of 10August 2004 extending the maximum period of his detention to 21October 2004.","31.Between 21 October and 24 December 2004 the applicant was detained solely on the basis of his case having been referred to the trial court.","32.Subsequently, the applicant was detained partly on the basis of the decision of the Town Court of 24 December 2004 and the decisions of the Odesa Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Appeal Court\u201d) of 3 June 2005 and 10 January 2006 returning the case for additional investigation, and partly on the basis of the decisions of the Appeal Court of 4 March, 29 July and 2November 2005 and 10 March 2006 repeatedly extending the maximum period of his pre-trial detention. Those decisions were based mainly on the grounds that further investigative measures had to be performed, that the applicant was accused of serious crimes, and that he might evade investigation and trial and obstruct the establishment of the truth in the case. Those decisions contained no further details in that connection. No appeal against those decisions could be lodged. The applicant alleged that they were taken in violation of procedural norms, in particular without him or his lawyer taking part in the hearings on the matter.","33.Some of the periods of the applicant\u2019s detention between 4 March 2005 and 18 April 2006 \u2013 notably, from 10 May to 3 June and from 4to 16December 2005 \u2013 were not covered by any decision at all, the applicant having been detained on the grounds that the case was pending commencement of the trial.","34.According to the applicant, his detention between 10 and 15 May 2005 was also not covered by any decision at all.","V.The applicant\u2019s criminal prosecution","35.On 13 June 2004 the applicant was questioned as a witness concerning several cases of robbery. The applicant made self-incriminating statements, giving details of the crimes which he and several other persons had committed.","36.On 15 June 2004 the applicant was questioned on suspicion of murder, as one of his accomplices had given statements implicating him in that crime, which he had allegedly committed in the course of a robbery. The accomplice had been with the applicant when the murder had been committed, but had not seen how it had happened. In the course of the applicant\u2019s questioning on that date he confessed to having committed the murder and gave details in that regard. On the same date the applicant was officially charged with that crime. The applicant stated that he had been questioned without a lawyer being present. The Government did not address this submission. No documents regarding the applicant\u2019s questioning of 15June 2004 were provided. Reference to that questioning was made in the judgment of 30 March 2007 (see paragraph 53 below). Notably, when assessing evidence concerning the murder charges, the Appeal Court held that:","\u201c... [T]he questioning of Sadkov V.A. was conducted with the participation of a lawyer [while Mr Sadkov had the procedural status of] a suspect on 15June 2004 ([pages] 64-65, [volume] 12 [of the case file]) and an accused ([pages] 69-70, [volume] 12 [of the case file]) ... during which Sadkov explained that he had stabbed [the victim] repeatedly with a knife ... [and that] subsequently, he threw that knife into a lake. [His] statements contained information about the way the victim had been stabbed ... which was later confirmed by a forensic expert ... and which was not present in the statements of [his accomplice] ... [O]n 15 June 2004, immediately after that information was received, the police officers searched the lake which [Mr Sadkov and his accomplice] had indicated and found a knife, which, according to the experts\u2019 report, could have been used to inflict the injuries of the victim ...\u201d","37.Subsequently, the applicant took part in a number of investigative procedures, notably crime reconstructions and witness confrontations. According to the applicant and the information contained in the judgment of 30 March 2007 (see paragraph 53 below), he was not represented by a lawyer during those procedures.","38.According to the parties\u2019 submissions, on 24 June 2004 a lawyer was appointed by the investigator to represent the applicant in the proceedings. No copy of the relevant decision was provided. The applicant was questioned in the lawyer\u2019s presence where he confirmed his previous statements to the police.","39.During questioning at later stages of the investigation and at the trial, the applicant, with his lawyer present, repeatedly changed his version of the events pertaining to the charges against him. For instance, while initially he testified that it had been only him who had committed the murder, during subsequent questioning he stated that one of his co-defendants had also taken part in the murder. Ultimately, the applicant denied his responsibility for the murder and the majority of the counts of robbery. In particular, he stated that the crimes had been committed by his co\u2011defendants, who had informed him of the relevant details, and that his confession during the initial questioning in June 2004 had been extracted as a result of ill\u2011treatment by the police.","40.On 22 October 2004 the investigation was completed and the applicant was given the case file to study.","41.On 24 December 2004 the Town Court returned the case for additional investigation for failure to complete the required investigative steps in full. It also instructed the investigator to look into one of the applicant\u2019s co-defendants\u2019 complaints of ill-treatment by the police.","42.Subsequently, the case was returned to the prosecutor\u2019s office for additional investigation two more times, on 3 June and 16 December 2005, mainly for failure to complete the required investigative steps in full.","43.In the meantime, on 28 April 2005 the applicant asked the investigators to terminate the criminal proceedings against him and to release him from detention, stating that the charges against him were based on his self-incriminating statements obtained as a result of ill-treatment in June 2004.","44.On 29 April 2005 the request was refused as unsubstantiated.","45.On 30 November 2005 the investigators rejected a similar request made by the applicant\u2019s lawyer on 29 November 2005, in which he also alleged that the applicant\u2019s complaints of ill-treatment by the police had not been duly examined.","46.During the pre-trial investigation the applicant was given access to the entire case file and studied it together with his lawyer on several occasions, notably in April and September 2005 and February 2006. He was also given access to the case file during the trial.","47.According to the reports of the police, while the applicant was studying the case file on 29 September 2005 he tried to destroy several documents, in particular those concerning his statements made on 29 June 2004 (see paragraph 14 above). The applicant did not make any comments in that regard.","48.In April 2006 the case was referred to the Appeal Court for trial.","49.During the trial the applicant denied being guilty of the crimes he was charged with. The applicant\u2019s principle argument was that the charges were based on his and his co-defendants\u2019 testimony obtained as a result of ill-treatment by the police, and on false evidence.","50.On 30 March 2007 the Appeal Court found the applicant and five others guilty of a number of crimes, including murder, illegal possession of firearms and on multiple counts of robbery, sentenced the applicant to fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment and ordered the confiscation of all his property.","51.The court based its judgment regarding most of the charges mainly on the testimony of the applicant\u2019s co-defendants obtained in the course of the investigation and during the trial. The court also relied on the testimony of a number of witnesses and victims of the crimes and on the conclusions of several forensic, ballistic and other expert examinations.","52.The court noted that the applicant\u2019s and his co-defendants\u2019 arrest and administrative detention at the initial stage of the investigation (in the applicant\u2019s case between 11 and 24 June 2004) had been contrary to Articles106 and 115 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (setting-out rules on pre\u2011trial detention), as they had actually been arrested on suspicion of having committed crimes. The court also noted that during that period they had been questioned as witnesses concerning the relevant events and had taken part in other investigative procedures, notably crime reconstructions and witness confrontations. According to the court, that situation had entailed a violation of their right to mount a defence. The court decided not to accept as evidence all the verbatim records of the investigative actions in which the applicant and his co-defendants had taken part as witnesses during the relevant periods (see paragraph 35 above).","53.As regards the charge of murder, the court relied principally on the statements of one of the applicant\u2019s accomplices and the applicant\u2019s self\u2011incriminating statements made at the pre-trial stage, in particular during his interview on 15 June 2004 and during subsequent questioning, having noted that the applicant had been assisted by a lawyer when he had made those statements (see paragraphs 36 and 38 above). The court found that the statements were reliable and noted that during the trial the applicant had made conflicting submissions concerning the relevant events, which could not be accepted.","54.Relying on the prosecutor\u2019s office\u2019s decision of 11 February 2006 (see paragraph 19 above), the court found that the applicant\u2019s complaints of ill-treatment by the police had been unsubstantiated. The court also found that, contrary to the applicant\u2019s submissions, one of his accomplices, M., had died of blood loss after he had been injured by the applicant\u2019s other accomplice in the course of one of the robberies they had committed.","55.The applicant and the prosecution challenged the judgment of 30March 2007 on appeal. While the prosecution disagreed with the first-instance court\u2019s legal qualification of some of the crimes, the applicant argued that he had not been guilty, that he had made self-incriminating statements as a result of ill-treatment by the police and that his co\u2011defendants had made untruthful statements concerning his involvement in the crimes.","56.On 4 December 2007 the Supreme Court heard the case and delivered its decision in the applicant\u2019s presence. It upheld the judgment of 30March 2007 in so far as it concerned the majority of the convictions, including murder. The Supreme Court found that the applicant\u2019s guilt had been duly established. In its decision, it referred to the statements of the applicant\u2019s co-defendants, witnesses and victims, and also to different forensic evidence.","57.By the same decision, the Supreme Court ordered a retrial of several of the convictions of robbery, holding that the first-instance court had erred in the legal qualification of the crimes. In particular, it ordered the examination of whether those crimes could be considered as having been committed by an \u201corganised group\u201d.","58.The applicant stated that a copy of the decision of the Supreme Court of 4December 2007 had been given to him, after a substantial delay, on 19June 2008.","59.During the retrial the applicant argued that he was not guilty and that he had been ill-treated by the police on 11-12 June 2004.","60.On 11 August 2008 the Appeal Court convicted the applicant and his co-defendants on the remaining counts of robbery. It did not change the applicant\u2019s sentence. The conviction was based mainly on the testimony of the applicant\u2019s co-defendants obtained in the course of the investigation and trial. To a certain extent, the court also relied on the testimony of several witnesses and victims and the results of various expert examinations.","61.Relying on the prosecutor\u2019s office\u2019s decision of 11 February 2006, the court found that the applicant\u2019s complaints of ill-treatment by the police were unsubstantiated.","62.The applicant appealed in cassation.","63.On 16 December 2008 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of 11August 2008, noting, inter alia, that there had been no evidence that the applicant\u2019s co-defendants had perjured themselves. It also noted that the applicant had acknowledged his guilt and had given details of the relevant events on several occasions during the investigation. The Supreme Court did not specify the period of the investigation to which it referred.","64.The Supreme Court generally noted that the applicant\u2019s complaints of a violation of his right to mount a defence did not have any basis in the case file. It further found no violation of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1960 (\u201cthe CCrP\u201d) in that the applicant had taken part in the investigative actions during his administrative detention. The applicant\u2019s complaints of ill-treatment were considered to be unsubstantiated.","65.On 13 February 2009 the Appeal Court sent the applicant a copy of the decision of the Supreme Court of 16 December 2008, noting that after that date the applicant would not be entitled to study the case file.","VI.The application to the Court","66.In June and July 2005 the applicant made submissions to the Court, complaining principally of ill-treatment by the police and of the unlawfulness of his arrest and detention.","67.By a letter of 22 August 2005, the Court invited the applicant to provide copies of documents pertinent to his complaints.","68.In his letter of 29 September 2005, the applicant stated that his requests for copies of the necessary documents had been refused by the domestic authorities. In particular, in September 2005 the prosecutor\u2019s office informed the applicant that the CCrP did not provide for the issuing of copies of documents from criminal case files and that once the investigation had been completed the applicant and his lawyer would be given a possibility to study the case file and to make copies of documents by hand.","69.By a letter of 5 December 2005, the Court invited the Government to provide factual information concerning the applicant\u2019s complaints regarding his inability to obtain copies of the documents needed for his application.","70.In January 2006 the applicant and the Government submitted copies of a number of documents relating to the applicant\u2019s complaints of ill\u2011treatment and unlawful detention.","71.In their reply to the Court\u2019s letter of 5 December 2005, the Government also stated that pursuant to the CCrP the applicant had the right to study the case file and to make copies of documents after the completion of the investigation against him.","72.Subsequently, the applicant allegedly also had difficulties obtaining copies of other documents from the case file. He stated that his requests to the prosecutor\u2019s office and the courts for such copies had been to no avail. According to the documents provided by the parties, it was noted that the applicant had been given access to his case file during the criminal proceedings against him and that the courts had not been required to issue him copies of documents other than judgments in his criminal case.","73.The applicant alleged that the administration of a prison in which he had been detained in August 2009 had destroyed a letter which he had asked them to send to the Court on 3 August 2009.","74.The prosecutor\u2019s office examined the alleged destruction of the letter and found that it had been duly dispatched.","75.The Court did not receive a letter from the applicant dated 3 August 2009."],"29682":["6.The applicant was born in 1957. He is detained in the Paifve social-protection institution (\u201cthe Paifve EDS\u201d).","A.The applicant\u2019s initial detention","7.In 1997 the applicant was convicted of theft and of sexual assault, by the Li\u00e8ge Court of Appeal and the Eupen Criminal Court respectively. The prison sentences were due to end on 20 February 2004.","8.While imprisoned, the applicant committed offences in respect of which fresh proceedings were brought. On 16 June 2003 the Committals Division (chambre du conseil) of the Li\u00e8ge Court of First Instance decided, pursuant to section 7 of the Law of 9April1930 on Social Protection in respect of Mental Defectives, Habitual Offenders and Persons Convicted of certain Sexual Offences (the \u201cSocial Protection Act\u201d), and on the basis, inter alia, of a neuropsychiatric report by DrL., dated 15December 2001, and a report by psychologist H., dated 20 August 2002, to order the applicant\u2019s preventive detention.","9.On 1 August 2003 the Indictment Division of the Li\u00e8ge Court of Appeal upheld that decision. The applicant did not appeal on points of law.","10.On 15 January 2004, based among other elements on a psychiatric report by Dr V. dated 23 September 2003, the Minister of Justice also decided that the applicant was to be detained in a psychiatric institution, pursuant to section 21 of the Social Protection Act, as a continuation of the sentences imposed in 1997.","11.On 21 January 2004 the applicant entered the Paifve EDS, located in the French-speaking region, further to a decision of 16October 2003 by the Social Protection Board for the Lantin Prison psychiatric wing (the \u201cCDS\u201d).","B.The first application to the CDS for release on a trial basis and the request for day release","12.On an unspecified date the applicant made an initial application for release on a trial basis.","13.On 27 January 2006 the CDS postponed its examination of the request for release on a trial basis until March 2006, and recommended finding an institution that could admit the applicant and provide him with therapy in German, the only language he could understand and speak.","14.The application was examined by the CDS on 9 June 2006. At the hearing, the head of the Paifve EDS acknowledged that the institution was unable to provide the therapeutic care recommended by the experts who had already been consulted, given that no German-speaking doctor, therapist, psychologist, social worker or warden was employed in the institution.","15.In consequence, the CDS held:","\u201cIt is undisputed that the detainee speaks only German, and that the medical, welfare and prison staff in the institution in which he is detained are unable to provide him with any therapeutic or welfare assistance; he has been abandoned to his fate without any treatment since his arrival in Paifve (on 21 January 2004), even if some individuals have, on a voluntary basis, made considerable efforts to explain to him his situation, which he experiences as an injustice;","In the present case, the two-fold legal aim of the preventive detention, namely protection of society and of the patient\u2019s health, can only be achieved if the deprivation of liberty is accompanied by the treatment necessitated by the detainee\u2019s mental health; since this double condition is not fulfilled, [Mr] Rooman\u2019s detention is unlawful; ...\u201d","16.The CDS postponed its examination of the application for release on a trial basis until a hearing in September 2006, pending the appointment of German-speaking employees to the Paifve EDS.","17.In accordance with an order by the chairperson of the CDS of 24September 2006, the applicant was transferred to Verviers Prison so that its German-language psychosocial team could assess his mental health and ascertain whether he posed a danger to the public. On 30 October 2006 the CDS confirmed this order and postponed the case to a later date.","18.On 26 January 2007 the CDS dismissed the application for release on parole. It had been indicated in a report of 24 January 2007, drawn up by the German-language psychosocial team in Verviers Prison, that the applicant had a psychotic personality and paranoid character traits (high self-opinion, feeling of omnipotence, lack of self-criticism and threatening remarks) and that he was refusing any treatment. Furthermore, the CDS noted that there was no institution in Belgium which could meet the security and language requirements in the applicant\u2019s specific case; the only German-language hospital which could be considered was an open hospital, and it had thus to be ruled out in view of the applicant\u2019s mental health.","19.On 14 April 2008 the applicant applied for day release. On 5 June 2008 the CDS noted that it had proved impossible to provide any treatment and that the search for a German-language institution had proved unsuccessful. Accordingly, it ordered the Eupen remand prison to prepare a plan for release on a trial basis, and ordered a new expert report in order to assess the level of danger posed by the applicant. It adjourned examination of the request sine die.","C.The contested proceedings, concerning the second application to the CDS for release on a trial basis","20.Having received a new application from the applicant for release on a trial basis, the CDS held, in a decision of 5 May 2009:","\u201cThere has been no progress in Mr Rooman\u2019s situation; progress cannot occur until he is in a setting where he can be understood in his own language, like any citizen of this country. A single member of the prison staff, a nurse [A.W.], is temporarily providing him with social contact, whereas a psychiatrist and\/or a psychologist should be available to him.","The prison authorities have not put forward any kind of solution to this problem, of which its various services are fully aware. Worse, as those authorities are unable to provide him with the necessary treatment, they seem to have resigned themselves to a role that extends no further than an unfair repressive detention.","The medical reports and [Dr Ro.\u2019s] expert report indicate that Rooman, who continues to present a danger to society, cannot be released without support and preparation in an institutional setting, something that cannot currently be provided in Belgium, but is available abroad.\u201d","21.In consequence, the CDS invited the Eupen remand prison to prepare, together with applicant, a plan for release on a trial basis, and encouraged the authorities to take, rapidly, the measures necessary to improve the applicant\u2019s situation. It adjourned the case to a later date. 22.On 13 October 2009 the CDS found:","\u201cIn the years since this file was opened (October 2003), the persons involved in this case have been thwarted by the fact that the detainee speaks and understands only one language, and that the authorities have no German-speaking staff available for him, with the exception of one nurse [A.W.] (who is apparently due to retire in the near future);","In September 2005 Doctor [Ri.], expert, wrote that relaxation of the detainee\u2019s regime \u2018is possible only in parallel with successful treatment, assessed by predefined steps. The treatment must begin in a secure establishment, then in a closed institution...\u2019 Given that treatment in Germany is impossible, it was to begin in Paifve with German-speaking psychiatrists and therapists;","Since that time the detainee\u2019s situation has not changed: he converses with and leaves the building only in the company of the sole German-speaking member of staff, and a treatment programme has not even been put in place. No satisfactory follow-up has been given to the requests by the [Social Protection] Board for an end to be put to this unlawful situation for Mr Rooman, who is deprived of his freedom in order, on the one hand, to protect society from possible dangerous conduct by him, and on the other, to provide him with the treatment necessary for his reinsertion;...","In the light of the authorities\u2019 failure, the question now before the Board is whether there exists, outside the social-protection facility, a unit or persons who could provide home-based therapy for Mr Rooman; ...\u201d","23.On those grounds, and pointing out that German was one of the national languages and that the applicant was thus entitled to speak, be understood and receive treatment in that language, the CDS asked the Eupen remand prison to search in and around Verviers and Eupen for either a mental health unit, or a doctor or clinic, which could provide home-based therapy for the applicant in his mother tongue. It reserved its decision on the application for release on parole.","24.On 12 January 2010 the applicant submitted pleadings in support of his application for release. He criticised the failure to provide him with therapeutic care and the effect on his health of any prospect of seeing his situation improve. As his main submission, he requested his immediate release on the grounds of the illegality of his detention. Alternatively, he asked that the CDS impose an obligation on the relevant authorities to take all necessary measures so that he would receive the treatment required by his mental-health condition in his mother tongue.","25.By an interlocutory decision of 13 January 2010, the CDS noted that the applicant\u2019s situation had not changed and that the reply from the Eupen judicial assistance unit left no hope of ensuring that the applicant would receive appropriate treatment, in a secure establishment or elsewhere. The CDS considered that it was necessary to attempt one last plea to the Minister of Justice, whose intervention had previously led to some changes, even if they were insufficient to resolve the problem. The CDS accordingly ordered that an \u201cofficial denunciation\u201d of the applicant\u2019s situation be sent to the Minister of Justice.","26.On 29 April 2010 the CDS noted that the Minister of Justice had not replied to its submission and that the applicant\u2019s situation had worsened, in that he could no longer count on help from the German-speaking nurse A.W., who had left the Paifve EDS. The CDS continued:","\u201cIt follows from the report [from the psychosocial department] of 30 March 2010 that, except for occasional meetings with a social worker \u201cwho speaks German\u201d, the detainee has no social contact in his language and that he has had no opportunity for several months to converse and to gain a fresh perspective in the outside world; the doctor and psychologist who signed this report do not seem particularly convinced by the completion of the \u2018ongoing measures (taken) by the department to enable a German-language psychologist to intervene occasionally to provide care for the German-speaking patients in the EDS\u2019;","Mr Rooman\u2019s situation is frozen: an ill individual, he is detained in a prison medical institution where no one is able to provide the treatment to which he is entitled; the Minister and his departments are turning a deaf ear, with no concern for the despair to which this manifestly unjust attitude may give rise;","In spite of the unlawfulness of Mr Rooman\u2019s detention, his health condition means that release cannot be envisaged unless it is accompanied by therapy and practical support;","The [Social Protection] Board has no powers, firstly, to restore the detainee\u2019s basic rights, namely, the rights to liberty, to health care and to respect for his humanity, and secondly, to compel the Minister to put an end to this situation, which his administration has been fully aware of for more than six years.\u201d","27.The CDS decided, while \u201cremaining open to any proposals\u201d, to leave the applicant\u2019s situation unchanged; in other words, it rejected his application for release.","28.The applicant appealed against that decision to the Higher Social Protection Board (\u201cthe CSDS\u201d).","29.In parallel, the applicant made an urgent application to the President of the Li\u00e8ge Court of First Instance, in order to have his detention declared unlawful and obtain his immediate release, or, alternatively, to obtain a decision ordering the Belgian State to provide him with the medical care required by his situation.","30.By an order of 12 May 2010, the president of the court held that he did not have jurisdiction, on the grounds that the CDS was the lawful body with power to release the applicant or decide on his continued detention.","31.On 27 May 2010 the CSDS upheld the CDS\u2019s decision of 29April 2010 to maintain the applicant in detention. Unlike the CDS, the CSDS held that the applicant\u2019s detention was perfectly legal, given that he had been lawfully detained and that he did not fulfil the conditions for definitive or conditional release. Under section 18 of the Social Protection Act, release could only be ordered if the detainee\u2019s mental condition had improved sufficiently and if the conditions for his social reinsertion had been satisfied. However, this was not the situation here. The CSDS also considered that the mere fact that the applicant spoke only German did not mean that the authorities had not taken all the necessary steps to provide him with the treatment required by his condition.","32.The applicant appealed on points of law, alleging a violation of Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention.","33.On 8 September 2010 the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal on points of law. In response to the argument alleging a violation of Article5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, it held that legal reasons had been given for the CSDS\u2019s decision and that it had been justified in law. It found:","\u201cAs preventive detention is primarily a security measure, the therapeutic action necessitated by such detention is not legally required in order for the detention to be lawful, even if its aim, secondary to that of protecting society, is to provide the detained person with the necessary treatment.","The social protection boards derive from section 14 (2) of the Act the power, rather than the obligation, to order, in a decision giving specific reasons, placement in an institution that is appropriate in terms of the security measures and the treatment to be given. It follows that execution of the preventive detention measure does not become unlawful solely because it is implemented in one of the institutions created by the government for that purpose, rather than in another institution specifically designated for the possible treatment it might provide.\u201d","34.The argument alleging a violation of Article 3 of the Convention was declared inadmissible, since its examination would require a factual verification of the conditions in which the preventive detention was being conducted and such an examination fell outside the scope of the Court of Cassation\u2019s jurisdiction. For the remainder, the Court of Cassation considered that the CSDS had replied to the applicant\u2019s complaint in finding that the fact that he spoke only German did not mean that the relevant authorities had not taken all the necessary steps to provide him with the care he required.","D.The third application to the CDS for release","35.On 13 November 2013 the applicant again applied for release.","36.A report by the psychosocial department of the Paifve EDS, dated 13January 2014, reiterated that the applicant had a poor command of the French language, and spoke only a few words of French, which did not enable him to conduct a conversation; in consequence, he had very little contact with the other patients and members of staff. The report also referred to a single meeting between the applicant and a German-speaking psychologist in June 2010. The report noted an improvement in the applicant\u2019s behaviour; he was apparently less aggressive and intolerant than before. Further, the applicant had never expressed a wish to meet members of the psychosocial team on a regular basis. The report concluded that he should remain in detention in the Paifve EDS, citing among other reasons his \u201cuntreated mental health problems\u201d.","37.On 24 January 2014 the CDS noted, firstly, the content of the reports by DrRi., of 5 September 2005, and Dr Ro., of 21 January 2009, which stressed the need for psychopharmacological and psychotherapeutic treatment in a secure establishment, then in a closed institution, before an open facility could be envisaged. The CDS noted that, in the interim, the various attempts to find a solution to the language problem had not succeeded in bringing about a significant improvement in the applicant\u2019s health: the rare outings accompanied by a German-speaking member of the prison staff had been abandoned when this employee, who was not replaced, became unavailable; attempts to find a German-language institution, doctor or therapist had met with failure; no follow-up seemed to have been given to the announcement that a minimum number of German-speaking staff were to be recruited, and the applicant had, of his own accord, declined the assistance of the German-speaking social worker with whom he had occasionally met. The CDS rejected the application for release on parole, finding that the conditions for release (an improvement in the applicant\u2019s mental state and guarantees for his social rehabilitation) were not met. With regard to the alleged absence of treatment in German, the CDS specified:","\u201cThe detainee claims that he is not receiving the appropriate treatment for his mental health condition in German, his mother tongue, without however describing or even mentioning the treatment that he has allegedly been denied and that he would agree to accept or in which he would take part. The mere fact that he only speaks German does not mean that the Paifve social-protection facility has not taken all the necessary steps to provide him with the care his condition requires.","While, as the applicant points out in his submissions, it is for the relevant authorities to take all the necessary measures for his health, it is not, however, within the [Social Protection] Board\u2019s powers to release a detainee who claims to be the victim of shortcomings on the part of the authorities...","Nor does the Board have jurisdiction to issue orders to the authorities or to third parties, [or] to penalise their actions or shortcomings ...\u201d","38.On 3 April 2014 the CSDS upheld the decision by the CDS, finding, among other points:","\u201cContrary to what he alleges in his pleadings, the detainee receives all the treatment required by his condition, from competent and qualified staff in the Paifve EDS, and his specific medical needs are fully taken into account. In spite of the treatment given, the detainee\u2019s mental condition has not yet improved sufficiently, on account of his paranoid and psychopathic character traits, his lack of self-criticism and his constant demand. The detainee is thus clearly wrong in attributing the lack of improvement in his mental condition to the language issue alone.","The continued preventive detention in a EDS that is adapted to his medical condition of an individual who would represent a danger to the public in the event of release, where his mental condition has not sufficiently improved and the conditions for his social rehabilitation are not met, is not unlawful and does not amount to a violation of the provisions of the [Convention].\u201d","39.On 25 June 2014 the Court of Cassation quashed the decision by the CSDS on the grounds that it had not addressed the applicant\u2019s argument that he was not receiving care appropriate to his situation, in view of the fact that he spoke and understood only German and that no German-speaking staff members were available in the facility where he was being held. The case was sent back to the CSDS with a differently constituted membership.","40.On 22 July 2014 the CSDS issued an interlocutory finding, requesting the CDS to appoint a group of German-speaking experts to update the psychiatric report of 21January 2009. It instructed the head of the Paifve EDS institution to take all the necessary measures to ensure that the requisite care was made available, by at least providing the services of a German-speaking psychiatrist and psychologist. It ordered that the case be reopened and scheduled a hearing for 17 October 2014.","41.The Court has not been informed of the progress of those proceedings.","E.The proceedings before the Brussels urgent-applications judge","42.In the meantime, on 28 March 2014 the applicant brought proceedings against the Belgian State before the President of the French-language Brussels Court of First Instance, as the judge responsible for hearing urgent applications in application of Article 584 of the Judicial Code. He asked for his release or, as a subsidiary measure, the imposition of the measures required by his state of health.","43.By an interlocutory order of 4 July 2014, the president of the court asked the head of the Paifve EDS and Dr B. from the psychosocial unit in that EDS to submit statements concerning the treatment available in the Paifve EDS and the treatment that had in fact been provided to the applicant.","44.Statements submitted by the head of the Paifve EDS and by Dr B. on 28August 2014 indicated that the applicant now had access to consultations with a German-speaking psychologist and that the authorities had made contact with a German-speaking psychiatrist who had agreed to meet the applicant.","45.In an order of 10 October 2014, the president of the court noted that, until September 2014, the applicant had never had access to a psychiatrist who could communicate with him in German. He had had access to a German-speaking psychologist, outside the EDS, between May and November 2010. He noted that the consultations with the psychologist had come to an end not, as alleged by the State in its pleadings, because the applicant no longer wished to attend them, but because of late payment by the Belgian State of the psychologist\u2019s fees and expenses. The consultations with the psychologist had, however, resumed in July 2014. The president then noted that, until April 2010, the applicant had benefitted from the presence of and care provided by a German-speaking nurse, that that nurse had in the meantime left the Paifve EDS, but that since August 2014 he had been authorised to accompany the applicant on outings. Lastly, the order noted that the applicant had had contacts with a German-speaking social worker, but that he had declined the latter\u2019s services in February 2014.","46.With regard to the main request, the president held that he did not have jurisdiction to order the applicant\u2019s release, as only the social protection bodies had power to do so. With regard to the subsidiary request, the president noted that the applicant had not had access to the mental health treatment required by his condition, and that there was prima facie a violation of his right of access to health care. His situation amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. In consequence, the president ordered the Belgian State to appoint a German-speaking psychiatrist and medical auxiliary for the applicant, subject to a penalty in the event of non-compliance, and to put in place the care routinely provided to French-speaking detainees suffering from a mental illness similar to that of the applicant.","47.On the basis of the information produced, no appeal has been lodged against this order. According to the applicant\u2019s representative, the Belgian State appointed a German-speaking psychiatrist and psychologist, who visited the applicant several times. However, these visits stopped at the end of 2015.","F.Claim for damages","48.In the meantime, on 2 May 2014 the applicant had filed a negligence claim against the Belgian State, on the basis of Article 1382 of the Civil Code.","49.By a judgment of 9 September 2016, the French-language Brussels Court of First Instance held the fact of having failed to provide the applicant with psychological treatment in his mother tongue between 2010 and 2014 to be negligent. It held, in particular:","\u201cIt is undeniable that the psychiatric and psychological treatment which [the applicant] must enjoy must be provided to him in German, the only language in which he is fluent and, moreover, one of the three national languages in Belgium.","However, between 2010 and 2014 [the applicant] received no medico-psychiatric treatment in his own language.","Whatever the quality \u2013 which is, indeed, undisputed \u2013 of the care provided to detainees in the Paifve [EDS], it is totally inappropriate for [the applicant\u2019s] mental-health condition merely on account of the fact that it is not available in German.","In spite of the official and repeated denunciations of this situation by the Social Protection Board to the Belgian State since 2010, the latter has taken no steps to correct it. In addition, it has produced no evidence of the least action taken by it to that end.","This failure to act amounts to negligence within the meaning of Article 1382 of the Civil Code.","...","Moreover, and as [the applicant] also submits, Articles 3 and 5 [of the Convention] require the Belgian State to take the necessary measures to provide him with access to the basic care necessitated by his mental health.","...","In the present case, the applicant\u2019s vulnerability on account of the very nature of his psychological disorder and the absence of any genuine possibility of contact in his language have necessarily exacerbated his feelings of distress and anxiety.","It is immaterial that, in any event, the [applicant\u2019s] state of mental health does not allow for his release. The mere fact of having been detained for an indefinite period without appropriate care amounts in the present case to a violation of Articles 3 and 5 [of the Convention].","Contrary to the submissions of the Belgian State, the fact that [the applicant] is not always receptive to psychological, medical and social therapy does not allow for minimisation of the Belgian State\u2019s negligent attitude towards a person who suffers from a mental disorder, whose discernment is, by assumption, uncertain.","By the same token, at the risk of setting aside the lived experience of the person suffering from a mental disorder, [the applicant\u2019s] stable conduct within the institution does not suffice to establish that he received appropriate care for his condition.\u201d","50.Finding that this absence of treatment had caused mental suffering to the applicant, the court ordered the State to pay him 75,000 euros (\u201cEUR\u201d), an amount assessed ex aequo et bono, in compensation for the period for the January 2010 to October 2014.","51.According to information provided on 19 June 2017 by his representative, the applicant was due to lodge an appeal against this judgment. He challenges the period accepted by the court and argues that the lack of treatment pre-dated 2010; he also complains about a lack of treatment in 2016 and the decision to award compensation ex aequo et bono rather than on a daily basis."],"29768":["5.The applicant, Mr Piotr Budnik, is a Polish national who was born in 1980 and lives in Leszno.","The circumstances of the case","6.The facts of the case were not in dispute and may be summarised as follows.","1.The period of the applicant\u2019s detention","7.The applicant was detained in \u0141owicz Prison from 27 January 2007 to 19April 2009 (2 years, 2 months and 22 days).","2.The conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention","8.The applicant submitted that throughout his detention in \u0141owicz Prison he had been held in overcrowded cells in which the space per person had been below the Polish statutory minimum standard of 3 sq. m.","9.The domestic courts established, without giving any further details, that the applicant had been detained in overcrowded cells during various unspecified periods from 27 January 2007 to 19 April 2009. The overcrowding led to many quarrels between the prisoners as the tables did not have enough space for everybody.","10.The applicant was placed in a solitary confinement cell for fourteen days as part of a disciplinary measure, where the toilet was not separated from the living space.","11.In reply, The Government submitted that the applicant had been held in solitary confinement owing to a need to monitor his behaviour. The number of stools and beds in all cells matched the number of inmates. All the cells were equipped with ventilation and heating systems. The applicant was entitled to one hot shower per week and one hour of outdoor exercise per day.","3.Civil proceedings against the State Treasury","12.On 12 May 2009 the applicant, represented by a legal aid lawyer, brought a civil action over an infringement of his personal rights on account of the inadequate living conditions in \u0141owicz Prison from 27January 2007 to 19April 2009. The applicant argued that he had been detained in overcrowded cells with space that was below the statutory minimum. He claimed 100,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) (approximately 25,000 euros (EUR)) in compensation.","13.On 20 July 2012 the \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Regional Court (S\u0105d Okregowy) granted the applicant PLN 3,000 (EUR 750) in compensation and dismissed the remainder of his claim. The domestic court found that the applicant had been detained in overcrowded cells from 27 January 2007 to 19 April 2009. Moreover, he had been detained in a solitary confinement cell as a disciplinary punishment for fourteen days.","14.On 1 March 2013 the \u0141\u00f3d\u017a Court of Appeal (S\u0105d Apelacyjny) amended the above judgment, increased the compensation to PLN7,000 (approximately EUR1,750) and dismissed the remainder of the action."],"29860":["1. The applicant, Mr Omar Mahamud Ahmed, is a Somali national, who was born in 1996 and at the time of the introduction of the application was detained in Safi Barracks detention centre.","2. He was represented before the Court Dr M. Camilleri and Dr K. Camilleri, lawyers practising in Valletta. The Maltese Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Dr P. Grech, Attorney General.","A. The circumstances of the case","3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.","1. Background to the case","4. The applicant entered Malta in an irregular manner by boat on 11 May 2013. Upon arrival, he was registered by the immigration police and given an identification number (13D-020). During the registration process the immigration authorities asked the applicant to provide his personal details including name, nationality and age. He informed them that he was born in 1996 and was therefore seventeen years old.","5. He was then presented with a Return Decision and a Removal Order and was detained at Safi Barracks.","6. Two weeks following the applicant \u2019 s arrival he was called in for an information session provided by the staff of the Office of the Refugee Commissioner. He was assisted in submitting the preliminary questionnaire thereby registering his wish to apply for asylum. He stated on the form that he had been born in 1996 and that therefore he was seventeen years old.","2. The applicant \u2019 s age-assessment procedure","7. On 14 May 2013, three people from the Agency for the Welfare of Asylum Seekers (hereinafter \u201c AWAS\u201d) interviewed the applicant, in the presence of an interpreter. After the interview they informed him that as they could not confirm his age through the interview they would send him for an FAV test \u2013 that is to say an X-ray of the bones of the wrist. He was taken for the FAV test almost six weeks later, on 24 June 2013.","8. According to the documentation supplied by the Government from the FAV test it was concluded that the applicant \u2019 s approximate calculated bone age was fifteen at the time of the test. The results were approved on 11 July 2013 by a State hospital. This information was not given to the applicant at this stage. In the absence of a reply, and being unable to contact the AWAS, the applicant tried to draw their attention by different means, through the detention centre staff and NGOs, and even by refusing food.","9. On 16 September 2013, he was informed verbally by AWAS staff that he had been found to be a minor and that he would be released shortly.","10. Until the date of the lodging of the application (1 November 2013), that is to say more than five and a half months after his arrival in Malta, the applicant had not received a written decision informing him of the outcome of the age-assessment procedure and he was still in detention.","3. Latest developments","11. Given that there is a two-year margin of error in the FAV test, the date of birth of the applicant was established as 1 January 1996. The applicant was released from detention on 4 November 2013 after a care order had been issued.","12. The applicant \u2019 s last day of registration at the open centre for unaccompanied minors was 15 November 2013. Since the attempts by the Office of the Refugee Commissioner to contact the applicant failed, and on his part he no longer kept contact with that office, on 1 February 2014 the applicant \u2019 s asylum application was implicitly \u201cwithdrawn as discontinued\u201d.","13. According to the Government the applicant absconded and was found in Sweden by the Swedish authorities. On 17 March 2014 the latter requested that the Maltese authorities take back the applicant and supply them with information concerning his claim that he was an unaccompanied minor. Although the Maltese authorities supplied the information, they do not have records as to whether the applicant was actually returned to Malta by the Swedish authorities.","14. By a letter of 24 July 2017 the applicant \u2019 s legal representatives informed the Court that the applicant had left Malta without informing them and that they had tried to contact him several times to no avail."],"29843":["5.The applicant was born in 2001 and lives in Bucharest. His parents, C.I. and D.D., separated in April 2004 and divorced in September2004, mainly because of D.D.\u2019s abusive behaviour towards his wife and their son. The applicant remained with his mother. On 27 February 2004 C.I. called the hotline of the Bucharest Child Protection Authority (Direc\u0163ia General\u0103 de Asisten\u0163\u0103 Social\u0103 \u015fi Protec\u0163ia Copilului) to report the domestic abuse she and the applicant had been suffering at the hands of D.D. Since then, the case has been monitored by the Authority. On 7 October 2008 the Child Protection Authority certified that since 2004 it had included the applicant in a psychological counselling programme.","The Child protection Authority issued the following statement concerning the monitoring of the applicant\u2019s case (on 29 August 2005 for the purpose of court proceedings):","\u201cMrs [C.I.] kept contact with our institution, the case being monitored by the Legal Counselling Service (legal counselling concerning eviction from home ...) as well as by the Service concerning emergency relocation and the Centre for Psychological Counselling for Parents.\u201d","6.On 5 March, 16 April, 7 May and 30 June 2004 C.I. lodged complaints with the Bucharest Police about the alleged violence inflicted by her husband on the applicant. No action was taken on these complaints. On 1 July 2004 C.I. lodged a new complaint with the police concerning the alleged abuse. The police heard evidence from witnesses on behalf of the applicant and obtained information about the applicant\u2019s situation from the centre where he and his mother had been relocated. Based on the evidence gathered, the police sent the file to the prosecutor\u2019s office attached to the Bucharest District Court (\u201cthe prosecutor\u201d).","7.On 1 November 2005 the prosecutor instituted a criminal investigation against D.D. It heard evidence from C.I., D.D. and sixwitnesses and examined the expert reports concerning the applicant\u2019s and D.D.\u2019s psychological evaluations. It concluded that the applicant had suffered trauma during his early childhood because of his father who had done everything he could to torment him and to make him suffer.","8.On 27 December 2007 the prosecutor indicted D.D. for abusive behaviour towards his son.","9.The Bucharest District Court heard evidence from a psychologist who had observed the applicant during therapy, from C.I. and other witnesses, as well as from D.D., the last mentioned denying having hurt his son. C.I. did not request damages on behalf of the applicant. In a decision of 9June2008 the court acquitted D.D. on the grounds that his occasionally inappropriate behaviour towards the applicant had not been severe enough to constitute a crime. This decision was upheld by the County Court on 19February2009, but on 19 June 2009 the Bucharest Court of Appeal quashed this latter decision and remitted the case to the County Court, as it considered that the lower courts should have heard evidence from the applicant and relied on the psychological reports.","10.On 14 December 2009 the County Court held a private hearing and interviewed the applicant. He told the judges how D.D. used to hit him, lock him in a small room without lights, throw water on him while he was sleeping and call him names. He stated that D.D. had often fought with his mother and that sometimes he had thrown the applicant\u2019s maternal grandmother and aunt \u2013 who were bringing food to the child \u2013 out of their apartment. The applicant told the court that he did not want to live with D.D. or even meet him on the street. He was persuaded that D.D. would want to hurt him. He stated that he wished that D.D. would be punished for what he had done to him.","11.In a decision rendered on 22 December 2009 the County Court convicted D.D. of ill-treatment inflicted on a minor and sentenced him to a suspended penalty of four years\u2019 imprisonment. It considered that the evidence in the prosecution file, in particular the psychological reports and the testimony given by a psychologist, confirmed that the child had suffered trauma as a consequence of his father\u2019s abusive behaviour.","The court also noted that C.I. had not requested damages on behalf of the applicant (see paragraph 9 above). Based on Article 17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCP\u201d, see paragraph 24 below), the court, on its own initiative, awarded the applicant 20,000Romanian lei (RON) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.","12.Upon an appeal on points of law lodged by D.D., on 7April2010 the Bucharest Court of Appeal remitted the case to the County Court and ordered that court to obtain an expert examination of the applicant by the Forensic Medicine Institute.","13.On 26 April 2012 the County Court rendered a new decision. Based on the evidence before it, notably the expert evaluations, psychologist\u2019s testimony, witness statements, as well as the parents\u2019 and the applicant\u2019s statements, the County Court considered it established that D.D. had physically and verbally abused his child from 2002 to 2004. It stated:","\u201cThe County Court notes that the acts perpetrated by [D.D.] cannot be considered as isolated and random acts of physical punishment which parents can administer to their minor children, but became more severe and caused childhood attachment troubles.\u201d","14.D.D. was convicted of ill-treatment inflicted on a minor. He was given a suspended sentence of one year\u2019s imprisonment; in addition, his right to be elected and his parental rights were suspended during the sentence and for two additional years.","15.When sentencing D.D., the court took into account the undue length of the criminal proceedings and that there had been significant periods of inactivity by the authorities involved, in particular by the investigators and the Forensic Medicine Institute.","16.No award of damages was made. The court did not give any explanation in its judgment as to why it decided not to award compensation to the applicant.","17.All parties appealed on points of law. Relying on Article 17 of the CCP (see paragraph 24 below), the applicant and the prosecutor complained notably about the fact that the County Court had not awarded damages.","18.The Bucharest Court of Appeal examined the parties\u2019 submissions in the light of the evidence before it. It reaffirmed that D.D. had physically and verbally abused his child; his sentence was recalculated based on the same criteria, including the reduction as a remedy for the length of the trial. The court accordingly increased the sentence to three years\u2019 imprisonment and suspended it. The additional penalty of restricting D.D.\u2019s right to be elected and his parental rights was maintained.","19.The court further considered that in so far as both the prosecutor and the applicant had limited their initial appeals to solely the criminal aspects of the District Court\u2019s decision of 9 June 2008, the County Court had been right in not awarding damages on its own initiative. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:","\u201cIn so far as the prosecutor\u2019s office and the injured party argued that the [County Court] should have examined the award of damages on its own initiative because the injured party was a minor, it is to be observed from the content of the decision under review that both the prosecutor\u2019s office and the injured party had expressly limited their appeals to the criminal aspects of the case.","In this situation, the [County Court] was right in limiting its examination strictly to the issues brought before it.\u201d","20.The Court of Appeal rendered its final decision on 1November2012 and rectified the text of the operative part on 22 November 2012.","A.Council of Europe","25.The Council of Europe through various conventions and implementing mechanisms as well as large-scale campaigns is fighting against domestic violence affecting children. In particular, children\u2019s rights are specifically addressed in several articles of the European Social Charter, notably: Article 7 (the right of children and young persons to protection) and Article 17 (the right of children and young persons to social, legal and economic protection). The European Committee of Social Rights, which monitors the European Social Charter took note of the wide consensus at both the European and international level that corporal punishment of children should be expressly and comprehensively prohibited in law (Decision on the merits: Association for the Protection of All Children (APPROACH) Ltd. v. France, Complaint No.92\/2013, 12September2014).","Romania ratified the Social Charter on 7 May 1999.","26.In his 2008 Issue Paper on \u201cChildren and corporal punishment: \u2018The right not to be hit also a children\u2019s right\u2019\u201d, the Council of Europe\u2019s Human Rights Commissioner made a thorough analysis of the situation of domestic abuse against children and the progress made towards ending corporal punishment:","\u201cProgress towards ending corporal punishment of children at global level","There is a global context for making quick progress: the key message of the United Nations Secretary General\u2019s Study on Violence against Children, reported to the General Assembly in October 2006, is that no violence against children is justifiable; all violence against children is preventable. The Study urges all States to move quickly to prohibit all forms of violence against children \u2013 including all corporal punishment \u2013 setting a target of 2009.","\u2018The Study should mark a turning point \u2013 an end to adult justification of violence against children, whether accepted as \u2018tradition\u2019 or disguised as \u2018discipline\u2019. There can be no compromise in challenging violence against children. Children\u2019s uniqueness \u2013 their potential and vulnerability, their dependence on adults \u2013 makes it imperative that they have more, not less, protection from violence.\u2019","At present, globally, some 23 states have prohibited all corporal punishment, including in the family.","Progress towards ending corporal punishment of children in Europe","Though some progress has been made in efforts against corporal punishment, it is clear that this form of abuse has an alarming frequency and prevalence all over the world. Statistics show that it is a world-wide phenomenon which affects children irrespective of their country or social origin. The prevalence of corporal punishment has been substantiated by interview surveys conducted in a number of countries with parents, other carers and increasingly with children to determine more about why and how often corporal punishment occurs.","In its Recommendation 1666 (2004) calling for a Europe-wide ban on corporal punishment of children, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe considered that","\u2018any corporal punishment of children is in breach of their fundamental right to human dignity and physical integrity. The fact that such corporal punishment is still lawful in certain member states violates their equally fundamental right to the same legal protection as adults. The social and legal acceptance of corporal punishment of children must be ended.\u2019","Therefore the Recommendation called for a coordinated and concerted campaign for the total abolition of corporal punishment of children. Noticing the success of the Council of Europe in abolishing the death penalty, it called for Europe to become, as soon as possible, \u2018a corporal punishment-free zone for children.\u2019","The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has for more than 20years encouraged Member States to prohibit corporal punishment. It started in 1985 with a Recommendation of which the preamble notes that \u2018the defence of the family involves the protection of all its members against any form of violence, which all too often occurs among them\u2019. The explanatory memorandum describes corporal punishment as \u201can evil which must at least be discouraged as a first step towards outright prohibition. It is the very assumption that corporal punishment of children is legitimate that opens the way to all kinds of excesses and makes the traces and symptoms of such punishment acceptable to third parties\u201d. This condemnation was echoed in further recommendations in 1990 and 1993. The Committee of Ministers has insisted on the need to begin, in all Member States, a coordinated and concerted campaign for the abolition of all violence against children.","Therefore, in order to pursue that objective, it announced a comprehensive three\u2011year programme of action on \u201cChildren and Violence\u201d with the following objectives:","- assist member states in implementing international standards at national and local levels, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the European Social Charter and the European Convention on the Exercise of Children\u2019s Rights;","- by 2008, to propose a coherent and comprehensive set of instruments and methodological guidelines covering all aspects of the question;","- improve the visibility and the impact of Council of Europe\u2019s work in the field.","...","Conclusions","The imperative for removing adults\u2019 assumed rights to hit children is that of human rights principles. It should therefore not be necessary to prove that alternative and positive means of socializing children are more effective. However, research into the harmful physical and psychological effects of corporal punishment in childhood and later life and into the links with other forms of violence do indeed add further compelling arguments for banning the practice and thereby breaking the cycle of violence.\u201d","27.Furthermore, the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention) requires States Parties to prevent violence against women, protect victims and prosecute the perpetrators. It introduces a number of criminal offences for physical, sexual and psychological violence for which more severe sentences are required when the offence is committed against or in the presence of a child.","On 27 June 2014 Romania signed that convention with reservations and on 1 September 2016 the Istanbul Convention entered into force with respect to the Respondent State.","28.The Recommendation CM\/Rec(2009)10 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to Member States on integrated national strategies for the protection of children from violence, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 18November2009, emphasises that \u201cchildren\u2019s fragility and vulnerability and their dependence on adults for the growth and development call for greater investment in the prevention of violence and protection of children on the part of families, society and the State\u201d.","29.On 17 November 2010 at the 1098th meeting of the Ministers\u2019 Deputies, the Committee of Ministers adopted Guidelines on child-friendly justice (CM\/Del\/Dec(2010)1098\/10.2). It reiterated that the best interest of children must be a primary consideration in all matters involving or affecting them and that justice must be adapted to and focused on the needs and rights of the child, including his or her right to respect for his or her physical integrity and dignity. The guidelines recognise the children\u2019s right to legal counselling and to expeditious proceedings.","B.United Nations","30.The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution44\/25 of 20 November 1989, also recognises the children\u2019s right to be protected from domestic abuse and urges States to put in place adequate procedures and mechanisms to deal with the matter (Article 19):","Article 19","\u201c1.States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other person who has the care of the child.","2.Such protective measures should, as appropriate, include effective procedures for the establishment of social programmes to provide necessary support for the child and for those who have the care of the child, as well as for other forms of prevention and for identification, reporting, referral, investigation, treatment and follow-up of instances of child maltreatment described heretofore, and, as appropriate, for judicial involvement.\u201d","31.The relevant part of General Comment no. 8 (2006) on the right of the child to protection from corporal punishment and other cruel or degrading forms of punishment (arts. 19; 28, para. 2; and 37, inter alia) adopted by the Committee on the Rights of the Child at its forty-second session held from 15 May to 2 June 2006, reads as follows:","\u201c40.The principle of equal protection of children and adults from assault, including within the family, does not mean that all cases of corporal punishment of children by their parents that come to light should lead to prosecution of parents. The de minimis principle \u2013 that the law does not concern itself with trivial matters \u2013 ensures that minor assaults between adults only come to court in very exceptional circumstances; the same will be true of minor assaults on children. States need to develop effective reporting and referral mechanisms. While all reports of violence against children should be appropriately investigated and their protection from significant harm assured, the aim should be to stop parents from using violent or other cruel or degrading punishments through supportive and educational, not punitive, interventions.","41.Children\u2019s dependent status and the unique intimacy of family relations demand that decisions to prosecute parents, or to formally intervene in the family in other ways, should be taken with very great care. Prosecuting parents is in most cases unlikely to be in their children\u2019s best interests. It is the Committee\u2019s view that prosecution and other formal interventions (for example, to remove the child or remove the perpetrator) should only proceed when they are regarded both as necessary to protect the child from significant harm and as being in the best interests of the affected child. The affected child\u2019s views should be given due weight, according to his or her age and maturity.","42.Advice and training for all those involved in child protection systems, including the police, prosecuting authorities and the courts, should underline this approach to enforcement of the law. Guidance should also emphasize that article 9 of the Convention requires that any separation of the child from his or her parents must be deemed necessary in the best interests of the child and be subject to judicial review, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, with all interested parties, including the child, represented. Where separation is deemed to be justified, alternatives to placement of the child outside the family should be considered, including removal of the perpetrator, suspended sentencing, and so on.\u201d","32.On 18 April 2011 the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child issued a general comment on the right of the child to freedom from all forms of violence giving an overview of the instances of violence in children\u2019s lives and a comprehensive legal analysis of Article 19 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (General Comment No. 13 (2011)). It affirmed that no form of violence against children, however light, could be tolerated, including in the familial sphere, and reiterated the States\u2019 obligation to prevent violence and protect child victims. The Committee further reiterated that corporal punishment, as defined in its general comment No. 8, however light, was also banned. The relevant parts read as follows:","\u201c17.No exceptions. The Committee has consistently maintained the position that all forms of violence against children, however light, are unacceptable. \u201cAll forms of physical or mental violence\u201d does not leave room for any level of legalized violence against children. Frequency, severity of harm and intent to harm are not prerequisites for the definitions of violence. States parties may refer to such factors in intervention strategies in order to allow proportional responses in the best interests of the child, but definitions must in no way erode the child\u2019s absolute right to human dignity and physical and psychological integrity by describing some forms of violence as legally and\/or socially acceptable.","...","24.Corporal punishment. In general comment No. 8 (para. 11), the Committee defined \u201ccorporal\u201d or \u201cphysical\u201d punishment as any punishment in which physical force is used and intended to cause some degree of pain or discomfort, however light. Most involves hitting (\u201csmacking\u201d, \u201cslapping\u201d, \u201cspanking\u201d) children, with the hand or with an implement \u2013 a whip, stick, belt, shoe, wooden spoon, etc. But it can also involve, for example, kicking, shaking or throwing children, scratching, pinching, biting, pulling hair or boxing ears, caning, forcing children to stay in uncomfortable positions, burning, scalding, or forced ingestion. In the view of the Committee, corporal punishment is invariably degrading. Other specific forms of corporal punishment are listed in the report of the independent expert for the United Nations study on violence against children (A\/61\/299, paras. 56, 60 and 62).","...","41.State parties that have not yet done so must:","...","(d)Review and amend domestic legislation in line with article 19 and its implementation within the holistic framework of the Convention, establishing a comprehensive policy on child rights and ensuring absolute prohibition of all forms of violence against children in all settings and effective and appropriate sanctions against perpetrators;","...","61.Article 3 (best interests of the child). The Committee emphasizes that the interpretation of a child\u2019s best interests must be consistent with the whole Convention, including the obligation to protect children from all forms of violence. It cannot be used to justify practices, including corporal punishment and other forms of cruel or degrading punishment, which conflict with the child\u2019s human dignity and right to physical integrity. An adult\u2019s judgment of a child\u2019s best interests cannot override the obligation to respect all the child\u2019s rights under the Convention. In particular, the Committee maintains that the best interests of the child are best served through:","(a)Prevention of all forms of violence and the promotion of positive child-rearing, emphasizing the need for a focus on primary prevention in national coordinating frameworks;","(b)Adequate investment in human, financial and technical resources dedicated to the implementation of a child rights-based and integrated child protection and support system.\u201d","33.The Special Representative of the Secretary General of the UN on violence against children actively participates in programmes and activities aimed at tackling the issue of domestic violence against children, to name the most recent: support to the Panama Declaration on Ending Violence against Children adopted by over five hundred faith leaders from 70countries at the 5th Forum of the Global Network of Religions for Children in May 2017; participation in 2015 in the study and report \u201cCounting Pennies\u201d, reviewing Official Development Assistance (ODA) allocations to end violence against children; global survey to help map and assess progress in the implementation of the 2006 UN Study recommendations on ending violence against children, and set future priorities.","34.In December 2013 UNICEF launched the initiative #ENDviolence which builds on growing public consensus that violence against children can no longer be tolerated and that it can only be stopped by the collective efforts of ordinary citizens, policymakers, governments and international stakeholders. In this context, in September 2014 UNICEF launched the report \u201cHidden in Plain Sight\u201d, consisting of statistical data on violence against children and which aims to show the extent of physical, sexual and emotional abuse to which children are exposed all over the world. According to UNICEF, the statistical data gathered over two decades provided evidence that countries need to develop effective policies, legislation and programmes to address violence. Relevant in this campaign is also UNICEF\u2019s report \u201cEnding violence against children: six strategies for action\u201d, also launched in September 2014, in which UNICEF proposed the main tools to enable society as a whole, from families to governments, to prevent and reduce violence against children. The strategies developed include supporting parents and equipping children with life skills; changing attitudes; strengthening judicial, criminal and social systems and services; and generating evidence and awareness about violence and its human and socio-economic costs, in order to change attitudes and norms.","C.European Union","35.The European Union\u2019s Victims\u2019 Directive (2012\/29\/EU) reiterates that children\u2019s best interests must be a matter of primary consideration and urges States to implement a child-sensitive approach, taking due account of the child\u2019s age, maturity, views, needs and concerns. It regulates the right to compensation in the following terms:","Article 4","Right to receive information from the first contact with a competent authority","\u201c1.Member States shall ensure that victims are offered the following information, without unnecessary delay, from their first contact with a competent authority in order to enable them to access the rights set out in this Directive:","...","(e) how and under what conditions they can access compensation;","...\u201d","Article 16","Right to decision on compensation from the offender in the course of criminal proceedings","\u201c1.Member States shall ensure that, in the course of criminal proceedings, victims are entitled to obtain a decision on compensation by the offender, within a reasonable time, except where national law provides for such a decision to be made in other legal proceedings.","2.Member States shall promote measures to encourage offenders to provide adequate compensation to victims.\u201d"],"29865":["5.The applicant was born in 1968 and is currently detained in J\u0113kabpils Prison. He is a person with special needs. The applicant is deaf and mute since birth and his knowledge of sign language is poor.","6.At least as of 2 March 2001, when his disability was certified as permanent, the applicant has been recognised as being category 3 disabled (the least severe level of disability). On an unspecified date his disability was re-categorised as category 2 (medium level of disability).","A.The applicant\u2019s conviction and detention","7.On 7May 2008 the applicant was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to fifteen years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. That judgment became final on 24February 2009. He started serving his sentence in the most restrictive \u201clower\u201d regime in Liep\u0101ja Prison.","1.Detention in Brasa Prison","8.On 23December 2011 the applicant was transferred to Brasa Prison. He was placed in the medium regime as he had served one quarter of his sentence. He was held in cell no. 301 (from 1 January 2012 to 26February 2013) and cell no. 303 (from 26 February to 30 October 2013).","9.On 30 October 2013 the applicant was placed in the most restrictive \u201clower\u201d regime. He was held in cell no. 203 (from 30 October 2013 until 16February 2015).","10.On 24 February 2016 the applicant was placed in the least restrictive \u201chigher\u201d regime. It appears that as of that date he was held in three different multi-occupancy cells. The number of his cellmates varied from two to fourteen. Each inmate had no less than 4 sq. m of living space in those cells.","2.Conditions of detention","11.According to the applicant, he was held in dormitory\u2011type cells nos.301, 303 and 203 together with other inmates, all of whom were in good health except for the applicant. The applicant\u2019s submissions as to the overall surface area in those cells as well as the size of the sanitary facilities were consistent with the Government\u2019s submissions (see paragraph13 below). His account of the number of inmates was slightly different \u2013 he alleged that he had been held together with ten to twenty inmates in cells nos. 301 and 303. However, as concerns cell no. 203 he agreed with the Government \u2013 six inmates had been held in that cell.","12.The applicant submitted that the heating had not been sufficient in those cells. He had been neither able to communicate with other inmates, nor with the prison management due to his disability. He had been in social isolation and had not received any special assistance.","13.According to the Government, the applicant was held in three different cells, the conditions of which are detailed in the table below. The calculation of personal space (overall surface area with the in-cell sanitary facility deducted, divided by number of inmates held therein) is based on an approximate measurement of the sanitary facility according to the floor plans of Brasa Prison.","Cell no.","Period of detention","Total number of inmates","Overall surface area in sq. m","Sanitary facility sq. m","Personal space in sq. m","301","01.01.2012- 26.02.2013","12","36","3.15","2.74","303","26.02.2013-30.10.2013","8","29","2.73","3.28","203","30.10.2013-16.02.2015","6","20","1.48","3.09","14.As regards out-of-cell activities, the Government indicated that while being held in the medium regime \u2013 in cells nos.301 and 303 \u2013 the applicant had been able to freely leave those cells in daytime and to use the common area. The Government further submitted that cell no.301 had been equipped with one window. That window had been fitted with bars and had been placed in a wall (adjacent to a corridor) facing another window (in the corridor). This cell had had three fluorescent lamps, including one night lamp located above the door. Heating had been provided by one heating pipe of 5 cm in diameter and the heaters located in the adjacent corridor and in the hallway. A new automatic boiler had been installed in Brasa Prison, which had ensured a temperature of 18\u02daC. Heating arrangements in cell no.303 had been the same as in cell no. 301.","15.While being held in the most restrictive \u201clower\u201d regime \u2013 in cell no.203 \u2013 the applicant had been able to leave this cell only for a daily walk (one hour), to take a shower or for appointments with a doctor, a prison chaplain or a social worker when necessary.","16.Overall, inmates in Brasa Prison had had access to a psychologist, but the applicant had never availed himself of this possibility. He had, however, met with a prison chaplain and a social worker on several occasions. The Government provided records of three conversations between the applicant and a social worker in 2016, including a meeting on 11April 2016 where the latter had called a non-governmental organisation (Latvijas Nedzird\u012bgo Savien\u012bba) concerning the applicant\u2019s hearing aid. Lastly, the applicant had visited a psychiatrist at least on six occasions in the time period from 1April 2015 to 7 September 2016.","3.State of the applicant\u2019s health","17.On 27 December 2011 the state of the applicant\u2019s health was examined for the first time in Brasa Prison. It was noted that the applicant was deaf and mute and that he suffered from spondylosis.","18.The applicant submitted an extract of his medical record in Brasa Prison. According to that document (dated 26 July 2016), he had been deaf since birth. On 13 August 2009 a psychiatrist had detected a psychiatric health condition (psihiskas vesel\u012bbas probl\u0113mas), namely, \u201creaction to situations with anxiety\u201d (situ\u0101cijas reakcija ar trauksmi). On 21January 2010 the same psychiatrist had detected another sleep-related condition. On 10December 2015 another psychiatrist diagnosed the applicant as having \u201corganic personality disorder\u201d (organiski person\u012bbas trauc\u0113jumi).","19.The Government submitted another extract of the applicant\u2019s medical record in Brasa Prison. According to that document (dated 7April 2015), upon admission to Brasa Prison the applicant had been diagnosed as being deaf and mute and having spondylosis. During the above-mentioned period the applicant had consulted prison medical staff on thirty\u2011nine occasions. He had been examined, treated and provided with medication when necessary. No serious health conditions, which would have required an in\u2011depth examination, had been diagnosed. There had been no indications that outpatient examination or treatment had been necessary. The applicant had most often complained of colds, headache, poor sleep, gastritis and back pain related to spondylosis. Those complaints had not concerned his disability. In 2013 and 2014 the prison medical staff had organised an outpatient medical examination (in relation to tuberculosis) and a consultation by an ophthalmologist to obtain glasses. On 1April 2015, upon the request of the Prisons Administration (Ieslodz\u012bjuma vietu p\u0101rvalde), the applicant\u2019s state of health had been examined. It had been satisfactory, he had not had any complaints and he had gained weight while in prison. In sum, his health had not deteriorated.","B.Review of the applicant\u2019s complaints","1.Complaints examined by prison authorities","20.Over the course of two years (2012-14) the applicant lodged some twenty\u2011five handwritten complaints with various institutions (the management of Brasa Prison, the Prisons Administration, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior).","21.He informed the authorities that he had been deaf and mute since birth and complained as follows:","1)he had communication problems and conflicts with other inmates (he referred to \u201cconflicts\u201d, having been \u201cinfluenced\u201d, \u201coffended\u201d and \u201claughed about\u201d by other inmates);","2)he wished to be transferred to a single or dual-occupancy cell;","3)he wished to be transferred to another prison;","4)he wished to have his prison regime changed;","5)his conditions of detention were inadequate and","6)his medical care was inadequate.","22.His complaints were examined by the Prisons Administration, save for three of them that were examined by the management of Brasa Prison.","23.The following conclusions were made:","(1)There had been no real threat to the applicant\u2019s life or health in Brasa Prison. He had not been subjected to psychological harassment. His complaints to the management of Brasa Prison had not concerned any threats from other inmates.","(2)The applicant did not have a subjective right to choose his cell or cellmates. It fell within the competence of the management of Brasa Prison. There was a limited number of cells with a capacity of four inmates and those inmates could not be moved for security reasons.","(3)The decision concerning the applicant\u2019s transfer to another prison had to be taken by the Prisons Administration. Taking into account that the applicant\u2019s state of health had permitted his placement in any prison, there had been no grounds to transfer him to another prison; he had had to continue serving his sentence in Brasa Prison.","(4)The possibility of his transfer to the most lenient prison regime could not be examined before 10 June 2015, when he would have served the relevant proportion of his prison sentence. As to the possibility of his transfer back to the more restrictive prison regime such actions could only be taken in cases of serious or systematic breaches of the prison regime.","(5)The conditions in cell no. 301 had been adequate. It had measured 36sq.m. Natural and artificial lighting as well as heating had been sufficient. The temperature in cell had been 18\u02daC.","The conditions in cell no.303 had been similar to cell no. 301 \u2013 lighting and heating had been adequate.","The conditions in cell no. 203 had been adequate. According to the Prisons Administration and the relevant floor plans that cell had measured 19.86sq.m (including 1.87 sq. m for sanitation facilities). Besides the applicant, it had accommodated five other inmates. A reference was made to the Court\u2019s case-law and the applicable domestic standard of 2.5 sq.m per male inmate. The temperature in the cell had been 18\u02daC.","(6)The applicant\u2019s medical care had been carried out in accordance with domestic law. He had received the necessary medication in response to his complaints. He had never complained to prison doctors of \u201cneurological diseases\u201d, \u201cnoises\u201d or \u201cfears\u201d, but he had had at least one consultation with a psychiatrist. In any event, he had been able to complain of the quality of medical care in prison to the Health Inspectorate.","2.Complaints to the administrative courts","24.On 1October 2012 a judge of a first-instance court refused to allow the applicant\u2019s application to be transferred to another prison and to have his prison regime changed to a more restrictive one, a request made by the applicant in order to allow him to be held in a cell with a smaller number of inmates. Those issues fell within the realm of criminal law and could not be examined by the administrative courts.","25.On 25October 2012 another judge refused to allow the applicant\u2019s application to be transferred to another prison and to be relieved from the obligation to continue serving his sentence. As concerns his transfer, reference was made to the decision by the Prisons Administration whereby a conclusion had been drawn that the Administrative Procedure Law had not applied. As concerns judicial review of that decision, such a complaint had already been examined (see paragraph 24 above). As concerns the release application, it fell within the realm of criminal law; this issue could thus not be examined by the administrative courts.","26.The applicant attempted to appeal against the above-mentioned refusals, but his appeal did not appear sufficiently clear. Accordingly, on 21November 2012 another judge decided not to proceed with his appeal (atst\u0101t bez virz\u012bbas), asking the applicant to render it more precise.","27.On 10 December 2013 another judge examined further complaints by the applicant. His application to be transferred to a more lenient prison regime and another prison were refused because such complaints had already been examined (see paragraphs 24-25 above). His complaint about insufficient heating in Brasa Prison did not appear sufficiently clear; the judge decided not to proceed with it, asking the applicant to render it more precise. As the applicant did not provide further information, the latter complaint was considered as not submitted (uzskat\u012bt par neiesniegtu).","28.On 2 April 2014 the applicant complained to the administrative courts that the Prisons Administration had extended the time-limit for its last reply. On 29 May 2014 a judge terminated the administrative proceedings in this connection since the Prisons Administration had issued its decision in the meantime.","C.Events subsequent to the communication","29.On 31 August 2016 a panel in Brasa Prison examined the possibility of the applicant\u2019s transfer to a more lenient prison regime. The applicant and a sign-language interpreter were present. It was established that the applicant had been working in prison until 18 December 2015; he had stopped working owing to his state of health. He had a category 2 disability. He had completed secondary education but had not pursued his education further owing to being deaf and mute and needing a specialised learning programme. He had been working with an officer and a social worker for rehabilitation purposes. He had regularly visited a chaplain in prison; however, he had not met with a psychologist. He had participated in addiction recovery meetings. He had dedicated his free time to himself. He had received three positive citations (pamudin\u0101jums) from the prison management.","30.A conclusion was drawn that the applicant had participated in nearly all the rehabilitation activities provided in the prison taking into account his capabilities. Therefore it was possible to transfer him to a more lenient prison regime in a partly closed prison.","31.On 7 September 2016 the applicant was transferred to a partly closed prison in J\u0113kabpils, where he was held in a cell with two other inmates. One of them had a similar hearing impairment.","A.Relevant international documents","32.The relevant parts of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ratified by Latvia on 1 March 2010, have been outlined in Grimailovs v. Latvia (no. 6087\/03, \u00a7 78, 25 June 2013).","33.The relevant parts of the Interim Report of 28 July 2008 (A\/63\/175) by the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment have been outlined in the above-cited Grimailovs case (ibid., \u00a7 79).","B.Relevant domestic law","34.The Administrative Procedure Law (Administrat\u012bv\u0101 procesa likums), which came into force on 1 February 2004 provides, among other things, for the right to challenge administrative acts and actions of public authorities before the administrative courts. The relevant provisions of that Law have been summarised in the case of Meln\u012btis v. Latvia (no. 30779\/05, \u00a7\u00a724\u201126, 28February 2012).","C.Domestic reports","35.In his annual report dedicated to human-rights issues in Latvia for the year 2013, the Ombudsman (Ties\u012bbsargs) noted that inmates, including those in Brasa Prison, most commonly complained of conditions of detention (overcrowding, lack of ventilation, insufficient access to natural light, insufficient separation of sanitation facilities, unsanitary conditions in showers and toilets). He noted that he had issued recommendations to the competent domestic authorities in previous years in this connection. Nevertheless, inmates had continued to submit complaints concerning detention conditions; these conditions had not substantially improved. He recounted that in 2013 he had completed an on-site visit of Brasa Prison, which had been started in 2012. While he did not describe the results of that visit in full, he noted that his most important recommendation to the competent domestic authorities had concerned insufficient access to natural light, insufficient separation of sanitation facilities and ventilation in cells, as well as the number of inmates per cell."],"29867":["5.The applicant was born in 1993 and is detained in J\u0113kabpils. On 9February 2011 he reached the age of majority.","A.The applicant\u2019s trial and the alleged ill-treatment","6.The applicant (who was a minor at the time of the criminal trial) and his co-accused, V.P., P.V. and F.\u010c., were charged with the aggravated murder of a fifteen-year-old girl, and the intentional destruction of property. The case was heard in May 2010 by the Riga Regional Court (R\u012bgas apgabaltiesa). The applicant pleaded \u201cpartially guilty\u201d (vainu atz\u012bst da\u013c\u0113ji). He was held in detention on remand in Riga Central Prison (R\u012bgas centr\u0101lcietums) and was transported to the Riga Regional Court for the hearings.","7.The applicant submits that on the trial days, that is to say on 20, 21, 24 and 25May 2010, in the holding area in the basement of the Riga Regional Court, he was insulted and physically assaulted by the detainee escort officers to make him confess to the crimes. He was made to perform different exercises, such as a \u201cwall-sit\u201d exercise, push-ups and a \u201cduck walk\u201d (walking slowly in a squatting position). While the applicant was performing the exercises he received blows to the back with a rubber truncheon. The applicant submits further that the escort officers assaulted him before and after the hearings and during the breaks. They beat him on different parts of the body. During the beatings they expressed their opinion regarding the criminal proceedings and manifested a negative and belittling attitude towards him. They also threatened to kill or mutilate the applicant if he did not plead guilty. Having been psychologically broken and without having consulted his lawyer, during the hearing of 25May 2010 the applicant admitted his guilt and refused to testify.","8.On 26May 2010 the applicant\u2019s mother visited him in Riga Central Prison. On the following day the applicant\u2019s mother, acting as his representative, lodged a complaint with the prosecution service. She stated that the escort officers had kicked her son on his body, arms, legs and head, and that he had shown her many bruises. She requested the prosecution service to institute criminal proceedings in respect of these events. On 31May 2010 the prosecution service forwarded the complaint to the Riga regional division of the State Police. On 2June 2010 the applicant\u2019s mother lodged a similar complaint with the Internal Security Office of the State Police (Valsts policijas Iek\u0161\u0113j\u0101s dro\u0161\u012bbas birojs \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Internal Security Office\u201d) (see paragraph17 below).","9.On 26May 2010 employees of the Ombudsman\u2019s Office visited the applicant in Riga Central Prison. On the following day the Ombudsman wrote a letter to the Internal Security Office stating that the applicant had alleged that the escort officers had assaulted him. He had borne traces of the alleged violence \u2013 a haematoma on his side and abrasions on his arm and legs. The Ombudsman requested the Internal Security Office to examine the actions of the escort officers. He informed the Riga Regional Court about this letter.","10.On 27May 2010 the applicant\u2019s lawyer visited him in Riga Central Prison. Following the meeting, the applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged a complaint with the prosecution service. He stated that between 20 and 25May 2010 the applicant had been beaten by the detainee escort officers in order to make him confess to the crime. The applicant had shown him his injuries. As a result of this coercion at the hearing on 25May 2010 the applicant had admitted his guilt, contrary to his defence position. The applicant\u2019s lawyer requested the prosecution service to institute criminal proceedings in respect of these events. On 2June 2010 the prosecution service sent the complaint to the Riga regional division of the State Police.","11.At a hearing on 28May 2010 the applicant stated that on all four trial days he had been assaulted, as a result of which he had admitted his guilt. He maintained his earlier plea of \u201cpartially guilty\u201d. Moreover, the applicant\u2019s co-accused also stated that they had been assaulted. The applicant\u2019s lawyer stated that the applicant had a black eye and that he had been hit on his head. He argued that the applicant was unable to testify. The judge adjourned the hearing in order to request information from Riga Central Prison on the applicant\u2019s and his co-accused\u2019s state of health.","12.On 28May 2010 Riga Central Prison faxed to the Riga Regional Court a copy of a medical certificate issued after the applicant had been medically examined on 26May 2010. The handwritten medical certificate, dated 26May 2010, provided to the Court by the Government stated that the applicant had the following injuries: wounds on his lower legs and on the right hand \u201cin the typical area\u201d; a haematoma on the left forearm; and a haematoma on the right side. The applicant had stated that he had been beaten with a truncheon while being escorted on 20,21 and 24May. The Government also provided a typewritten report, dated 14June 2010, from Riga Central Prison. According to the report, the applicant\u2019s state of health on 26 May 2010 had been satisfactory; he had had several injuries covered by scabs on his lower legs; injuries covered by scabs on the \u201ctypical area\u201d of the right hand caused by the use of handcuffs; a haematoma four centimetres in diameter on his left forearm; and a haematoma six centimetres in diameter in the \u201cphase of absorption\u201d on the right side in the area of the kidney.","13.At a hearing on 29 May 2010 the applicant stated that he was unable to testify because he had a headache. His lawyer argued that the applicant\u2019s medical examination had been superficial. The prosecution was of the view that the applicant was seeking to delay the proceedings. The judge decided to proceed with the trial. The same day the Riga Regional Court found the applicant and his co-accused guilty and sentenced him to ten years\u2019 imprisonment. The applicant and his mother lodged appeals indicating inter alia that the applicant had been assaulted by the escort officers. The case was forwarded to the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court (Augst\u0101k\u0101s tiesas Krimin\u0101llietu tiesu pal\u0101ta).","14.At a hearing on 30 January 2013 the prosecution informed the appellate court that the criminal investigation in relation to the applicant\u2019s \u201cbodily injuries\u201d had been terminated, that that decision had taken effect and that no appeal had been lodged against that decision. The relevant material was included in the case file. At a hearing on 9 December 2013 the applicant admitted his guilt in full and asked the court to review his conviction only in so far as it concerned his sentence.","15.On 11December 2013 the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction, but reduced his sentence to nine and a half years\u2019 imprisonment. In setting the sentence the court took into account that the proceedings before it had included a period of inactivity of more than one year and thus had lasted for unreasonably long time.","16.On 29 October 2014 the Supreme Court with a final decision dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal on points of law.","B.Initial inquiry","17.As submitted by the Government, on 7June 2010 the Internal Security Office instituted an internal inquiry. It requested the applicant\u2019s medical records from Riga Central Prison. On 18June 2010 the Internal Security Office, referring to the complaint lodged by the applicant\u2019s mother (see paragraph 8 above), sent a copy of the file to the Riga regional division of the State Police for it to decide on the lawfulness of the actions of its employees. The Internal Security Office stated that the file did not indicate that the escort officers had committed a criminal offence.","18.On 28June 2010 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Internal Security Office regarding his alleged ill-treatment, stating that he would be able to identify the alleged perpetrators. The Internal Security Office sent the complaint to the Riga regional division of the State Police.","19.On 3 August 2010 the Riga regional division of the State Police, terminated the internal inquiry. It noted that according to the medical documentation concerning the applicant provided by Riga Central Prison the applicant\u2019s state of health on 26 May 2010 had been satisfactory. He had had several wounds on his lower legs covered by scabs; wounds on the right hand covered by scabs, caused by the use of handcuffs; a haematoma four centimetres in diameter on his left forearm; and a haematoma six centimetres in diameter \u201cin the phase of absorption\u201d on the right side. The Riga regional division of the State Police noted the injuries found on V.P. At the same time, there had been no visible injuries found on P.V. or F.\u010c. According to explanations (paskaidrojumi) obtained from sixteen officers, neither the applicant nor his co-accused had been assaulted. The Riga regional division of the State Police concluded that the information gathered did not indicate that the officers had committed a disciplinary offence. It returned the file to the Internal Security Office.","20.On 11 August 2010 the Internal Security Office refused to institute criminal proceedings in view of the fact that the constituent elements of the offence of \u201cexceeding official authority\u201d under section317(2) of the Criminal Law (Krimin\u0101llikums) were lacking in the officers\u2019 actions. The applicant\u2019s mother appealed against this decision.","21.On 26August 2010 the prosecution service found that the Internal Security Office had based the impugned decision on an inquiry conducted by another institution of the State Police and medical documentation provided by Riga Central Prison. It was necessary to question the applicant and his co-accused regarding the circumstances of their transportation and to find out whether any of the employees of Riga Central Prison had seen injuries on them prior to and after their transportation and whether any of the employees had received any complaints from them in this regard. It was also necessary to find out whether between 20 and 25May 2010 or earlier the applicant or his co-accused had been involved in any kind of conflict in the prison as a result of which they could have sustained the injuries. The prosecution service referred the case back to the Internal Security Office.","22.In reply to a request from the Internal Security Office, on 22October 2010 Riga Central Prison provided information that prison employees who had between 20 and 25May 2010 searched (p\u0101rmekl\u0113t) the applicant and his co-accused each time prior to and after their being transported had not seen any injuries on them. The applicant and his co-accused had not made any complaints. There were no records showing that between 1 and 26May 2010 they had been involved in any conflicts in the prison. On 5November 2010 the Internal Security Office obtained explanations from the applicant and his co-accused, who maintained that the escort officers had assaulted them. As regards the daily physical security checks that they had undergone in the prison, they stated that prison employees had not asked them to undress. Therefore their injuries had remained undetected.","23.On 10November 2010 the Internal Security Office again refused to institute criminal proceedings, stating that the information gathered during the additional inquiry did not indicate that the officers had committed any offence under section317(2) of the Criminal Law. The applicant\u2019s mother appealed against this decision.","24.On 17December 2010 the prosecution service quashed the decision as it had been based on an incomplete inquiry. It instructed the Internal Security Office to question the persons with whom the applicant and his co\u2011accused had shared cells between 20 and 25May 2010 and to obtain information regarding breaks during the trial days on which the applicant and his co-accused had allegedly been assaulted. It was also necessary to question further the escort officers.","25.On 29November 2011 the Internal Security Office obtained information from Riga Central Prison regarding the applicant\u2019s and his co\u2011accused\u2019s cellmates. In December 2011 and January 2012 it took explanations from them. According to the applicant\u2019s cellmate, A.D., the applicant had told him that the escort officers had assaulted him and his co\u2011accused. He had shown him marks left by the beatings. It was difficult for A.D. to recall details as a long time had passed. Between 19and 30January 2012 the Internal Security Office questioned the escort officers, who stated that they had not assaulted the applicant or his co-accused.","26.On 31January 2012, for the third time, the Internal Security Office refused to institute criminal proceedings, stating that the information gathered during the additional inquiry did not indicate that the officers had committed any offence under section317(2) of the Criminal Law. The applicant\u2019s mother appealed against this decision.","27.On 22February 2012 the prosecution service quashed the decision. It considered that the Internal Security Office had not clarified the contradictions between the statements of the applicant and his co-accused on the one hand, and the statements of the escort officers on the other hand, and the circumstances in which the applicant and V.P. had obtained the injuries established on 26May 2010. In view of the information gathered during the internal inquiry it was possible that above-mentioned offence under section317(2) of the Criminal Law had been committed. Accordingly, the prosecution service instituted criminal proceedings and returned the file to the Internal Security Office for further investigation. On 23 February 2012 the prosecution service informed the applicant\u2019s mother that the criminal proceedings had been instituted.","C.Criminal investigation","1.Investigative steps and closure of the investigation","28.Between 29February and 21March2012 the Internal Security Office questioned as witnesses fifteen escort officers, who gave largely the same statements. They had not beaten the applicant or his co-accused. They explained that officers wore belts which they never removed because handcuffs, truncheon, gun, pepper spray and gun belt were attached to them. They could not give more detailed statements as a long time had passed since the events. One escort officer, M.S., who was questioned as a witness on 11April2012, stated that he had seen bruises on the applicant and his co-accused during their personal search in the court building. M.S. had thought that they had been beaten in the prison. The escort officers had not assaulted them.","29.On 20 March 2012 an inspector of the Internal Security Office questioned one of the applicant\u2019s co-accused, V.P., as a witness.","30.V.P. stated that on the first trial day the escort officers had made him perform push-ups and a \u201cduck walk\u201d, during which two escort officers had hit him on his back, abdomen, legs and chest with their legs, fists, a belt and truncheons. The escort officers had also beaten the applicant, who had been next to him. The officers had placed V.P. in a holding cell, and after some time they had escorted him to the court room.","31.P.V. and F.\u010c., the applicant\u2019s co-accused, stated that on the second trial day the escort officers had made them perform push-ups and a \u201cduck walk\u201d. While they had been performing the exercises the escort officers had beaten them. P.V. had been hit during a break by two escort officers with a black belt on his back ten to twelve times. F.\u010c. had been hit by one escort officer on his back and legs approximately ten times. He had also been hit on his buttocks with a belt twenty to thirty times.","32.P.V. had heard the applicant screaming. On the way back to the prison the applicant had told P.V. that he had been beaten; later, in the prison, he had shown him two bruises on his chest. After the occurrence of the alleged beating had been raised during the trial P.V. had been examined by a prison doctor. He had had no injuries.","33.V.P., P.V. and F.\u010c. stated that they would not be able to identify the officers who had beaten them. They could not recall the events in detail. They did not wish to be declared victims in the proceedings.","34.On 3 April 2012 the applicant was questioned as a witness. He stated that on the trial days in the basement of the court building the escort officers had made him perform different exercises, such as a wall-sit exercise, push\u2011ups and a \u201cduck walk\u201d. While he had been performing the exercises, the escort officers had beaten him. He further stated that the escort officers had beaten him on different parts of the body. They had also hit him with a belt. On 7June 2012 the inspector presented photographs of the escort officers to the applicant for the purposes of identification. He could not identify the officers who had allegedly assaulted him.","35.As submitted by the Government, on 2May 2012 the Riga Regional Court confirmed that the court building premises were equipped with a video surveillance system. However, they stated that video recordings were stored for two to three months and then erased.","36.On 3 May 2012 the Internal Security Office requested an expert medical report.","In respect of V.P., P.V. and F.\u010c. the report concluded that their medical documentation contained no records of injuries sustained over the time period in question. In respect of the applicant the report stated that the description of the injuries contained in the medical documentation, in the record of the applicant\u2019s questioning by the police, and in the hearings transcripts was incomplete. Therefore, it was not possible to determine the exact time at which the injuries had been sustained, how extensive they had been, and the degree of trauma or force that had been employed to inflict them. However, it could not be excluded that the injuries had appeared between 20 and 25May 2010 in the circumstances indicated in the record of the applicant\u2019s questioning. While it was indicated in the record of the applicant\u2019s questioning and in the hearings transcripts that injuries had also been inflicted to the applicant\u2019s face, abdomen, buttocks, lower part of the back, back, and left side of the thorax, such injuries had not been identified in the medical examination of 26 May 2010.","37.On 18May 2012 the Internal Security Office questioned P.V.\u2019s former cellmate, V.A., who stated that he had seen red patches on P.V.\u2019s back. P.V. had told him that the escort officers had beaten him in the basement of the court building; they had also beaten the applicant. According to V.A. this had happened prior to 5May2010. V.A. had heard that the applicant had also been beaten in the prison.","38.On 20July 2012 the Internal Security Office terminated the criminal proceedings on the grounds that the elements of the offence had not been made out. There was no irrefutable evidence that the escort officers had inflicted the injuries as alleged. According to the expert report, the injuries had not been recorded in the medical documentation precisely. The persons involved in the criminal proceedings had given contradictory accounts of the circumstances in which the injuries had been inflicted.","2.Appeal against closure of the investigation","39.On 6 August 2012 the applicant\u2019s mother lodged an appeal with the prosecution service against the decision to terminate the criminal proceedings, the applicant having on 21October 2011 granted her power of attorney (univers\u0101lpilnvara) to take any action concerning his property. This included the right to represent the applicant before the police, the courts and other institutions in relation to all rights vested in him as a victim. Prior to the authorisation she had represented the applicant on the grounds of his being a minor. In the wording of the appeal the applicant\u2019s mother indicated that she was acting on behalf of the applicant.","40.She complained of deficiencies in the criminal investigation which had precluded obtaining important information. Namely, the presentation of photographs to the applicant for the purpose of identifying the alleged perpetrators had been organised in a manner intended to impede justice \u2011 while he had been shown the small black-and-white frontal photographs he had been surrounded by seven escort officers in an effort to intimidate him. She asked that the investigating authorities organise an identity parade for the applicant and his co-accused and question the applicant\u2019s co-accused regarding the events in question.","41.On 6September 2012 a prosecutor dismissed her appeal, noting that during the presentation of photographs the applicant had been assisted by his lawyer. They had not made any remarks or requests as regards this procedure. The investigating authorities had established that no force had been used against the applicant and his co-accused and that no threats had been made. From the moment at which the trial had started the Ombudsman had paid particular attention to the applicant and his co-accused. All of the escort officers had been questioned as witnesses. They had had no interest in the outcome of the trial. Therefore, there had been no reason to doubt their account of the events. The applicant\u2019s co-accused had also been questioned and their evidence assessed. There was no need to take any further investigative steps as the constituent elements of the offence under section317(2) of the Criminal Law were lacking in the officers\u2019 actions. The prosecutor indicated that her decision was amenable to appeal before a higher prosecutor.","42.On 22 September 2012 the applicant\u2019s mother appealed against the aforementioned decision before a higher prosecutor. She indicated that she was acting on behalf of the applicant. In addition to the issues raised previously she complained that a long time had passed before criminal proceedings had been instituted. She considered that it had been a deliberate delay to hide any traces of assault. Furthermore, during the internal inquiry the Internal Security Office had \u201cinterviewed\u201d the applicant and the co\u2011accused, who had been minors at the relevant time, in the absence of a lawyer or a representative. After those \u201cinterviews\u201d the co-accused had all refused to testify.","43.On 24 October 2012 a higher prosecutor dismissed the applicant\u2019s mother\u2019s appeal. He upheld the findings of the lower prosecutor \u2013 the decision to terminate the criminal proceedings had been lawful as the constituent elements of the offence had been missing. At the same time, he noted that the applicant had not been declared a victim in the criminal proceedings and hence could not be represented by another person. Furthermore, at the time when the criminal proceedings had been instituted he had reached the age of majority. The higher prosecutor indicated that the applicant\u2019s mother did not have the right to complain about the decision to terminate the criminal proceedings and that it had been wrong for the lower prosecutor to examine her complaint on the merits. That being said, the higher prosecutor also examined her complaint on the merits for the reason of legal certainty as the lower prosecutor had done so. He concluded by indicating that the applicant\u2019s mother could not lodge further complaints about the decision to terminate the criminal proceedings.","44.On 9 November 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal with the prosecution service against the aforementioned decision. He stated that his mother had been authorised to lodge complaints in his name under the power of attorney that he had granted her on 21October 2011. He further noted that the assessment of the flaws in the proceedings had been superficial and had not properly addressed the points raised by his mother. He emphasised that no explanation had been given for the injuries that he had sustained while in custody or for the delay in the institution of the investigation and the superficial manner in which it had been conducted. He argued that it might have been that the State, acting through its agents, had been willing to cover-up his assault.","45.On 12 December 2012 a chief prosecutor responded that the applicant\u2019s procedural status was that of a witness and that, unlike victims, witnesses had no right to authorise other persons to exercise their procedural rights on their behalf. Furthermore, the applicant himself did not have a right to challenge the response that had been given to his mother, as he was not the addressee of this letter sent to her. Lastly, because he had not been the one who had lodged the initial appeals, the applicant had missed the time-limit for lodging an appeal against the decision of 20July 2012 terminating the criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the applicant\u2019s appeal was not examined. The applicant was informed of the fact that in accordance with domestic law this decision was not amenable to appeal.","D.Report of the Ombudsman","46.On 28 July 2011 the applicant complained to the Ombudsman, who then instituted an inquiry and requested information from Riga Central Prison, the State Centre for Forensic Medical Examination (Valsts tiesu medic\u012bnas ekspert\u012bzes centrs) and the Internal Security Office.","47.On 16May 2012 the Ombudsman delivered a report in which he observed that, as the criminal investigation was still ongoing, it would be premature to assess the proceedings as a whole. However, with regard to the internal inquiry, the Ombudsman expressed concerns regarding the institutional independence of the Internal Security Office when analysing offences allegedly committed by the police officers.","48.Furthermore, the internal inquiry had lasted one year and seven months \u2013 beyond a reasonable time-limit. The inquiry had not been carried out with the requisite diligence, as exemplified by the repeated quashing of decisions not to institute criminal proceedings. The Ombudsman expressed concerns that flaws in the internal inquiry might render it impossible to establish whether the applicant\u2019s injuries had been inflicted by the police officers. Thus, the internal inquiry undertaken by the State Police could not be regarded as constituting an effective remedy within the meaning of Article13 of the Convention. Nonetheless, the Ombudsman considered that it would be premature to pronounce on a violation of Article3 of the Convention."],"29907":["THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE","5.The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Benevento.","A.The events of 2 April 2013","6.On 2 April 2013, between 1 and 1.15 p.m., the applicant was stopped by two officers of the Benevento municipal police while she was driving her car.","7.According to the applicant, the police officers checked her driver\u2019s licence and her vehicle documents. An argument broke out between the applicant and the officers. In the applicant\u2019s view, her nervous and hostile attitude led the police officers to suspect that she was intoxicated, which she denied. As the officers did not have the necessary equipment to perform a breathalyser test, they requested the assistance of the road police (Polizia Stradale). The applicant returned to her car. Once she had got back into the vehicle, one of the police officers pulled the car door open and dragged her out by the arm.","8.As recorded in the municipal police officers\u2019 report of 3April 2013, the applicant had been stopped because she had been driving in an erratic manner, braking suddenly and changing lanes abruptly. The applicant did not seem to be able to exit the vehicle by herself and had had to be assisted by one of the officers. The officers reported that they had smelt alcohol on her breath and that she had been unsteady on her feet. The applicant had insulted and threatened them.","9.At 1.30 p.m. traffic police officers arrived on the scene with the breathalyser equipment.","10.According to the applicant, she was not able to take the test because she was in a state of anxiety that had been exacerbated by one of the officers shouting at her that she was drunk. That had caused her to tremble and had meant she could not keep the breathalyser tube in her mouth. The applicant requested that carabinieri be called to the scene, but the request was denied.","11.According to the traffic police report (annotazione di servizio della Polizia Stradale), the applicant agreed to be breathalysed, but did not blow into the device in the manner she had been told to do by the officers and refused to cooperate. At one point she had thrown the device\u2019s mouthpiece into the face of one of the officers. The applicant was described as being in a \u201cclearly altered\u201d state, smelling strongly of alcohol and staggering.","12.The applicant was taken to the municipal police station (Comando di Polizia Municipale), where she arrived at approximately 1.50 p.m.","13.According to the applicant, once at the station the lieutenant on duty started drafting an offence report (verbale di contestazione) for driving under the influence of alcohol. The two officers who had stopped her in the street and escorted her to the station and another officer were also present. She repeatedly requested that she be allowed to use a telephone to let her family and her lawyer know of her whereabouts but her requests were denied. When she tried to pick up a telephone, one of the officers hit her in order to make her sit down. The same officer twisted her arms behind her back and handcuffed her, hurting her wrists. He then squeezed her buttocks and asked her if the handcuffs were tight enough. The applicant started screaming loudly and the officer removed the handcuffs in a violent manner. In doing so, he fractured the applicant\u2019s right thumb and caused other injuries to her wrists. He then warned her not to cause further trouble and threatened her. The applicant left the station between 2.15 and 2.30 p.m. and proceeded further on foot as her car had been seized.","14.As recorded in the joint report issued on 3April 2013 by the two municipal police officers who had stopped her in the street and the lieutenant on duty at the municipal police station, upon her arrival at the station the applicant had started threatening and insulting them. When the lieutenant started drafting the offence report, she grabbed a telephone from a desk and ran into the corridor. When the lieutenant tried to stop her, the applicant pushed him violently, causing him to fall. She then threw the telephone out of the window. The applicant, who was in an extremely agitated state, pushed and kicked the other two officers, and they eventually handcuffed her. When the applicant calmed down, the handcuffs were removed. The applicant ran out of the station, leaving her bag and personal belongings behind. Her vehicle and driver\u2019s licence had been seized under road traffic legislation. The same account of the events is recorded in the offence notification (informativa di reato) filed by the directing commander of the Benevento municipal police with the Benevento public prosecutor on 3April 2013.","15.According to the applicant, once she had left the station she got a lift to the emergency department of a local hospital, where she was examined.","16.At approximately 8 p.m. the applicant went to the State Police and attempted, unsuccessfully, to lodge a criminal complaint against the municipal police officers. According to the report of the officer on duty, the applicant complained that she had been assaulted by Benevento municipal police officers and that her finger had been fractured. When the officer informed her that the she could not file a criminal complaint because the station was closed, the applicant started speaking incoherently in a loud voice. Given her nervous and agitated state, the officer called the local questura (police headquarters) for backup. The applicant requested that an ambulance be called. The ambulance arrived at 8.30p.m. and the applicant was examined by the ambulance medics. She was taken home by ambulance at approximately 9 p.m.","B.Criminal complaint against the police officers and the ensuing investigation","17.On 4 April 2013 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against the two police officers who had stopped her in the street on 2April 2013 and the other two officers who had been present at the municipal police station, but whose names she did not know, alleging assault and battery, infliction of bodily harm, abuse of office, and threats.","18.An investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations was initiated. Seven people identified by the applicant as witnesses (persone informate sui fatti) were interviewed. Two were people who stated they had seen one of the officers dragging the applicant out of her vehicle. One was the owner of a bar where the applicant had gone in order to call her former spouse once she had left the hospital on 2April 2013. Another was the applicant\u2019s former spouse, who stated that her alcohol intake was limited to consumption during meals. He further stated that because of a traumatic event in her life the applicant became agitated, trembled and had trouble expressing herself when subjected to stress. The other three were colleagues, who stated that the applicant had not appeared to be intoxicated when she had left her office on 2 April 2013. The police officers who had allegedly been involved in the ill-treatment were not interviewed, and neither was the applicant.","19.On 17 January 2014 the public prosecutor requested that the proceedings be discontinued. The basis of the request was that \u201cthe allegations in the criminal complaint are not confirmed by the statements made by the witnesses identified by the victim\u201d.","20.On 27 February 2014 the applicant lodged an objection against the prosecutor\u2019s request to discontinue the proceedings. She complained about the lack of reasoning in the prosecutor\u2019s request and alleged that the investigation had not been thorough. In that connection, she complained about the \u201ctotal absence\u201d of investigative measures with respect to the events that had occurred at the municipal police station and requested that the investigating judge order such measures without delay. Moreover, the applicant complained that she had not been questioned and requested that she be interviewed immediately. She also requested that officials interview the person who had taken her to the hospital when she had left the police station and other individuals. She also challenged the credibility of the official police reports, as they were in stark contrast with her account of the impugned events.","21.At a hearing on 22 September 2014 the applicant\u2019s lawyer repeated the complaints and requests contained in the objection against the prosecutor\u2019s request to discontinue the proceedings and reiterated, in particular, the request to conduct an investigation into the events that had occurred at the municipal police station.","22.By an order of 3 October 2014, served on the applicant on 27October 2014, the Benevento District Court preliminary investigations judge (giudice per le indagini preliminari) decided to discontinue the proceedings. The order stated that the evidence gathered during the preliminary investigation had not been sufficient to warrant indicting the officers. It stated that the victim\u2019s allegations had not been corroborated by evidence and that further investigative measures, as requested by the victim, would have \u201cno influence whatsoever\u201d.","C.Criminal proceedings against the applicant","23.On 25 October 2013 the applicant was charged with a number of offences in connection with the events of 2 April 2013, including resisting a police officer, insulting a public official, and driving under the influence of alcohol. The applicant was also charged with causing bodily harm to a police officer.","24.On an unspecified date, the public prosecutor and the applicant reached a plea agreement with respect to the offence of bodily harm and requested that the judge proceed with the imposition of a sentence (applicazione della pena su richiesta delle parti).","25.On 21 November 2014 the Benevento preliminary hearings judge took note of the plea agreement and gave the applicant a suspended sentence of twenty-eight days\u2019 imprisonment. On the same day, the preliminary hearings judge suspended the proceedings against the applicant in connection with the charges of resisting a police officer, insulting a public official and driving under the influence of alcohol. The applicant was placed on probation with a requirement that she perform community service.","D.Medical documentation","1.Medical reports in connection with the events of 2 April 2013","26.On 2 April 2013, the applicant went to the emergency department of a local hospital. At 6.42 p.m. she was examined by a radiologist, who established that her right thumb was fractured.","27.On 3 April 2013 the applicant returned to the emergency department. According to the medical report, the applicant arrived at the hospital in an agitated state, complaining about pain in several parts of her body. She was examined by a doctor who noted the presence of a splint on her right hand to treat a fracture. The doctor further noted the presence of bruising resulting from traumatic injury (trauma contusivo con ecchimosi) to the right thigh, right shoulder and left wrist.","28.On 4 April 2013 the applicant went to a different hospital. She was examined by an orthopaedist, who confirmed the fracture of the thumb and the presence of bruises on her left thigh and on her back. The doctor recommended surgery to treat the fracture.","2.Expert psychological report submitted by the applicant in the course of the criminal proceedings against her (extracts)","29.Owing to a traumatic event in her life, the applicant suffers from chronic post-traumatic stress disorder, which has evolved into a major depressive disorder. She also suffers from a disorder which is characterised by mood swings which are exacerbated in times of particular stress, by the consumption of alcohol or sleep deprivation. The disorder in question includes peaks of manic behaviour when the applicant loses contact with reality and experiences a sense of impending threat to her own safety and that of those around her. The applicant was prescribed drugs for insomnia in February 2013. Combining the drugs with even moderate amounts of alcohol can have the same consequences as excessive alcohol consumption."],"29982":["6.The first applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Turin. The second applicant was born in 1975 and was detained in Turin up to the time of his death on 10 January 2017.","A.The events of December 2004","7.In 2004 the applicants were detained in the Asti Correctional Facility.","8.On 10 December 2004 the second applicant intervened in a fight that had broken out between the first applicant and a prison officer.","9.The manner in which the impugned events occurred, as submitted by the applicants and as it emerges from their witness statements during the domestic proceedings, may be summarised as follows.","1.The first applicant\u2019s account","10.On 10 December 2004, following an altercation with the prison officer, the first applicant was summoned to a meeting with the correctional unit commander (comandante di reparto della polizia penitenziaria). Before he reached the commander\u2019s office, he was stopped by a group of prison officers, who took turns beating him. Following the meeting, he was stripped of his clothes and led to a cell in the solitary confinement wing.","11.The only item of furniture in the cell was a bed with no mattress, bed linen or covers. As to sanitary facilities, the cell had a squat toilet without running water and was not equipped with a sink. The cell window had no window panes and the only source of heating was a small, malfunctioning radiator, which provided little protection against the December weather. For a number of days, although it is unclear for how many exactly, he was left naked.","12.During the first week of his detention in solitary confinement no food was provided and he was given only scant amounts of water. He was subsequently given rationed quantities of food.","13.He was beaten on a daily basis, several times per day. He was repeatedly punched, kicked and hit in the head by prison officers, who assaulted him in groups of varying sizes.","14.He was also subjected to sleep deprivation, as the beatings often took place at night and the prison officers verbally abused him in order to keep him awake.","15.During the detention in solitary confinement the applicant did not receive visits from his lawyer or his family.","2.The second applicant\u2019s account","16.On 10 December 2004, following the same altercation with the prison officer, the second applicant was stripped of his clothes and led to a cell in the solitary confinement wing of the correctional facility. The bed in the cell had no mattress, sheets or covers, and the cell had no sink. Initially there were no panes in the windows, which were covered with some plastic sheeting after an unspecified number of days. For a number of days, although it is unclear for how many exactly, he was left naked. He was subsequently given some light clothing.","17.The applicant\u2019s food was rationed, and at certain times he was given only bread and water. On some days he received no food at all.","18.The applicant was beaten by prison officers, often more than once per day. He was subjected to various forms of physical violence, including being repeatedly punched, kicked and slapped, at one point with his head being pinned to the ground by one of the prison officers\u2019 boots. The beatings occurred both during the day and at night.The applicant was beaten by four or five officers at a time. One prison officer ripped out a chunk of his hair.","19.On 16December 2004 he was admitted to the hospital.","20.During the period he spent in solitary confinement he was only allowed outside the cell twice, once to shower and once for some outdoor time.","B.Criminal proceedings against the prison officers","21.A criminal investigation into the impugned treatment was launched in 2005. It was initiated when it emerged, in the context of covert surveillance in an operation to investigate drug smuggling in the Asti correctional facility, that a number of the prison officers had discussed the ill-treatment inflicted on the applicants.","22.On 7 July 2011 five prison officers, C.B., D.B., M.S., A.D., and G.S., were committed for trial. They were charged with ill-treatment of the applicants under Article 572 of the Italian Criminal Code (\u201cthe Criminal Code\u201d), in conjunction with Article61\u00a79 of the Criminal Code, a provision which considers the commission of an offence by a civil servant abusing his or her position to be an aggravating circumstance.","23.On the same date the applicants joined the proceedings as civil parties.","1.Proceedings before the Asti District Court","24.The Asti District Court\u2019s judgment was delivered on 30January 2012. Its findings may be summarised as follows.","25.As to the establishment of the facts concerning the ill-treatment, the court found that the evidence gathered during the investigation and produced at the trial showed that the events had occurred in the manner described by the victims in their submissions during the trial. The Court relied on statements to the effect that the applicants had been subjected to physical and verbal abuse, coupled with the deprivation of food, water, sleep, and clothing, and had been detained in cells without adequate access to sanitation, heating, and bedding.","26.The court further found it to be established beyond reasonable doubt that the applicants had been subjected not merely to isolated acts of harassment and abuse, but to repeated ill-treatment which had been put into practice in a systematic manner.","27.More specifically, the court found it established beyond reasonable doubt that the first and second applicants had been subjected to repeated physical violence from 10 to 29 December 2004 and from 10 to 16December 2004 respectively. The court found that the beatings occurred regularly at all times of the day, and particularly at night.","28.The court noted that the second applicant had been admitted to the emergency room of the Asti Civil Hospital on 16 December 2004 with traumatic injuries. With regard to the first applicant, the court acknowledged his hospitalisation following the events without citing a date or specific medical documentation to this effect.","29.Moreover, the court found it to be established beyond reasonable doubt that in 2004 and 2005 in the Asti Correctional Facility there had existed what it defined as a \u201cgeneralised practice of ill-treatment\u201d that had been systematically inflicted on prisoners considered to be problematic. Measures which the court defines as exceeding the bounds of permitted disciplinary or security measures were routinely taken to punish and intimidate problematic detainees and to deter other disorderly behaviour. As part of this practice, a detainee would generally be taken to a cell in the solitary confinement unit where he would be subjected to repeated harassment and abuse by prison officers. The abuse would primarily take the form of physical violence, as detainees would be beaten by groups of prison officers, often during the night. In addition, detainees would be routinely subjected to sleep, food and water deprivation, and would also be denied access to sanitary facilities.","30.The court further found ample evidence that the prison officers operated in a climate of impunity. This was due, in the court\u2019s view, to the acquiescence of high-level prison administrators and the complicity that existed among prison officers.","31.It emerges that the court ordered an inspection of the correctional facility, including the solitary confinement wing, during the course of the trial. The court found that several cells in the solitary confinement wing of the Asti Correctional Facility were unfit for holding detainees. Some did not have bed linen, mattresses, sanitary facilities or heating. Although the windows in some cells had no panes and others had windows covered by metal plates with small perforations, the cells were nonetheless used during the winter months. Some cells were equipped with a bed and a squat toilet but no other furniture or sanitary facilities.","32.Following the establishment of the facts, the court went on to assess responsibility for the established conduct. In this regard, G.S. was acquitted as to his involvement in the ill-treatment, and A.D. and D.B. were acquitted of the charge of ill-treatment under Article 572 of the Criminal Code. The court nonetheless held that the conduct of A.D. and D.B. amounted to infliction of bodily harm contrary to Article 582 of the Criminal Code. However, it ordered that the proceedings against them be discontinued due to the expiry of the applicable time-limit as laid down in the statute of limitations.","33.With respect to C.B. and M.S., the court held that there existed sufficient evidence to conclude that they had been responsible for most, if not all, of the acts of physical, psychological, and \u201cmaterial\u201d abuse at issue. The court then considered that the acts at issue could be classified as torture pursuant to the definition provided by the UnitedNations (UN) Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. It went on to observe that Italy had failed to incorporate the offence of torture into national legislation, in breach of its international obligations. It was therefore obliged to conclude that, under Italian law, there existed no legal provision that would allow it to classify the impugned conduct as acts of torture.","34.Having taken note of the above-mentioned considerations, the court proceeded to assess which existing offence was more suitable in respect of the legal classification of C.B. and M.S.\u2019s conduct. When conducting its assessment, the court relied on the conclusion that the primary purpose of the impugned treatment was to punish the applicants, to \u201cmaintain order\u201d in the correctional facility, and to convey a clear message to the other detainees.","35.The court considered that the conduct of the two prison officers thus fell most appropriately within the scope of Article 608 of the Criminal Code, which deals with abuse of authority against arrested or detained persons. However, the statutory limitation period for the offence in question had elapsed, as the court had found no procedural action which would have the effect of interrupting it.","The court stated that C.B. and M.S. were also responsible for the infliction of bodily harm, but that, as the statute of limitations was applicable to that offence as well, such a finding did not alter the substance of the decision. The court therefore ordered that the proceedings against C.B. and M.S be discontinued because the applicable time-limit as laid down in the statute of limitations had expired.","2.Proceedings before the Court of Cassation","36.On 22 February 2012 the public prosecutor lodged an appeal with the Court of Cassation, arguing that the Asti District Court had erred in the legal classification of the offence with respect to C.B. and M.S. The prosecutor contended that the most appropriate offence for the purposes of classification of the conduct in question would have been aggravated ill\u2011treatment under Article 572 of the Italian Criminal Code \u2012 as initially identified in the bill of indictment \u2012 in conjunction with Article 608 of the Criminal Code.","37.By a judgment issued on 21 May 2012, and filed with the court Registry on 27 July 2012, the Court of Cassation declared the public prosecutor\u2019s application inadmissible. The court expressed its agreement with the prosecutor\u2019s contention as a matter of principle but, as the statute of limitations had been likewise applicable to the offence of aggravated ill\u2011treatment, a decision in favour of the prosecution would have been devoid of any practical effect.","3.Subsequent proceedings","38.On 26 July 2012 C.B. lodged an objection to execution (incidente d\u2019esecuzione) with the Asti District Court, arguing that its decision of 30January 2012 (see paragraph 24 above) could not be considered as final and binding insofar as he was concerned, as the decision had not been properly served on him.","39.In a decision issued on 31 October the Asti District Court dismissed C.B.\u2019s objection on the grounds that C.B. must have had cognisance of the decision at the moment the public prosecutor lodged an appeal with the Court of Cassation (see paragraph 36 above) or, at the latest, when his representative filed a defence brief at a hearing before the Court of Cassation in May 2012.","40.On 26 July 2012 C.B. appealed against the decision before the Court of Cassation.","41.In a judgment delivered on 11 July 2013, and filed with the Registry on 1 August 2013, the Court of Cassation granted the appeal. It found that the failure to serve the decision on C.B. could not be remedied by C.B.\u2019s potential knowledge of the decision at a later stage, as argued by the District Court. The Asti District Court judgment of 30 January 2012 could not, accordingly, be considered final and binding insofar as C.B. was concerned.","42.Based on the latter decision, on 10 October 2013 C.B. lodged an appeal against the Asti District Court judgment of 30 January 2012 with the Turin Court of Appeal, seeking an acquittal.","43.No further information has been provided by the parties as to the outcome of the proceedings.","C.Disciplinary proceedings against the prison officers","44.In their observations of 31 March 2016, the Government indicated that four prison officers had undergone disciplinary proceedings in connection with the impugned events and by different decisions issued on 29 January 2013 the following disciplinary sanctions had been imposed:","\u2013C.B. was dismissed from his functions (destituito dal servizio). Hewas, however, reinstated on 26 November 2013, following the Court of Cassation judgment of 11 July 2013 which suspended the binding nature of the Asti District Court\u2019s judgment (see paragraph 41 above);","\u2013M.S. was dismissed from his functions;","\u2013A.D. was suspended from duty for a period of 4 months;","\u2013D.B. was suspended from duty for a period of 6 months.","45.According to a document issued by the Staff Director of the Prison Administration Department of the Ministry of Justice on 12 October 2015, and furnished by the Government, the four prison officers were not suspended from duty (sospensione precauzionale dal servizio) during the course of the investigation or the trial.","D.Medical documentation","46.At the Court\u2019s request, the Government submitted extracts from the prison medical record of the second applicant between 26November 2004 and 5 March 2005 and typed copies of his hospitalisation record of 16December 2004.","47.The prison medical record indicates that on 13 December 2004 the second applicant was examined visually (whilst still \u201cbehind bars\u201d). He complained of pain in the thoracic area and right ear. The reporting physician noted the presence of ecchymoses and haematomas around the patient\u2019s ribcage. He recommended a more thorough medical examination and\/or transfer to the infirmary.","48.The record further indicates that another visual examination (also \u201cbehind bars\u201d) took place on 15 December2004. The information in this entry is the same as in the previous entry. Transfer to the infirmary for a medical examination was recommended.","49.On 15 December 2004 the record shows that the applicant underwent a medical examination in the afternoon. The physician reported ecchymoses on the patient\u2019s ribcage and in the retroauricular region. Palpation of the patient revealed diffuse pain. The reporting physician recommended that X\u2011rays be performed for a suspected fracture. Painkillers were administered.","50.The entry of 16 December 2004 reports the applicant\u2019s transfer to the emergency room of the Asti Civil Hospital as a consequence of traumatic injury.","51.According to the medical record of the Asti Civil Hospital, an X-ray revealed a fractured rib and the medical examination disclosed diffuse bruising in the thoracic and abdominal area and pain on palpation. The record states that the applicant told the doctor his injuries occurred as a consequence of an accidental fall.","52.The prison medical record entry on the applicant\u2019s discharge from the hospital on 16 December 2004 shows that he was prescribed painkillers.","53.As to the first applicant, no copy of the prison medical register had been submitted by the Government, notwithstanding the Court\u2019s request for such information."],"29997":["6.The applicant was born in 1990 and lives in Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6spata. He is of Roma origin.","A.The incident","7.On 12 August 2010 at about 1.50 a.m. the applicant was taken to Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6s Police Department after he and his accomplices had been apprehended while driving a car containing goods apparently stolen from a nearby summer house.","8.The applicant submitted that shortly afterwards, for about twenty minutes, he had been ill-treated by two police officers; at about 4.30a.m. the two officers had returned and had continued hitting and kicking him for another thirty minutes or so. Some two hours later the two officers had escorted the applicant to another room for questioning, but had then continued beating him, together with several other officers. In the applicant\u2019s account of the events, altogether six officers and two security guards took part in the ill-treatment, with the apparent intention of extracting his confession to further offences. He stated that he had been hit in the face, forced to his knees and kicked repeatedly; a paper bag had been pulled over his head and the soles of his feet had been hit many times with a piece of wood. The officers had insisted that he admit to at least three counts of theft in order for them to stop hitting him, and they had repeatedly insulted him, making references to his Roma origin. One of them had said that they would not mind if he died \u2013 there would just be one Gypsy less.","9.The applicant eventually signed the record of the questioning, which stated that the questioning had taken place between 5.51 a.m. and 6.33a.m.","10.Later that morning, at about 6 a.m., the applicant was allegedly escorted to the toilet, where he said the officers had again started hitting and kicking him. One of them had removed a towel-holder from the wall and hit the applicant\u2019s hand with it. Again, references were allegedly made to the applicant being a Roma.","11.The applicant was released at about 2 p.m.","12.Later that day, at the request of the applicant\u2019s mother, the general practitioner of the neighbouring village, Dr C.S., came to the applicant\u2019s house and examined him. Since she had apparently been told only about chest complaints, she did not examine the applicant\u2019s legs or feet. She did not identify any marks indicating external injury on the applicant but found that his ribs were sore and suggested that he go to hospital if he wished to obtain a medical certificate recording his injuries. Dr C.S. herself did not produce a medical report on the premises.","13.On the same evening the applicant went to the emergency room of Bug\u00e1t P\u00e1l Hospital in Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6s. At 7.34 p.m. he was issued with a medical certificate, for which he paid the fee due, stating that he had bruises on the forehead, the nose and the left shoulder and an abrasion on the right hip; both his hands and arms were swollen and hyperaemic; and the rear surface of both thighs, as well as the soles of his feet, were swollen, red and sore. According to the certificate, the applicant had numerous contusions that had been inflicted by other persons.","14.Still on the same evening, at 8.38 p.m., X-rays were taken of the applicant at Albert Schweitzer Hospital in Hatvan, a town at a distance of 32kilometres, where the applicant was driven by his family members. He was diagnosed with a \u201cchest contusion\u201d, a \u201cskull contusion\u201d and \u201cbodily injury inflicted by human force\u201d.","15.The applicant stated that he had been unhurt at the time that he had been taken to the police department. He added that between his release and the medical inspection, he had been continuously accompanied by his relatives, who testified in the ensuing proceedings that he had not suffered any injuries outside the police department.","B.Criminal investigation against the alleged perpetrators","16.On 27 September 2010 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint alleging that he had been brutalised by police officers. The applicant alleged that during the ill-treatment the officers had made repeated references to his Roma origin. The case was being investigated by the Miskolc Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office.","17.On 8 November 2010 the applicant was heard as a witness and shown, for the purposes of his identifying his alleged assailants, the photos of police officers serving at the Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6s Police Department. The applicant acknowledged from the outset that he would be able to identify with certainty only three of the several perpetrators. Nevertheless, he finally identified eight persons as the perpetrators \u2013 six police officers (T.B., M.Z., Gy.K., K.V., F.I. and H.A.) and two security guards employed by the police department (P.G. and Z.A.). Subsequently, the applicant became uncertain about the involvement of K.V. and H.A.","18.The prosecutor\u2019s office appointed a forensic expert. This expert had at his disposal the medical reports issued by Bug\u00e1t P\u00e1l and Albert Schweitzer Hospitals. In his opinion given in retrospect, he made the following statement as to the time when the applicant\u2019s injuries had been sustained:","\u201cThe exact time of the infliction of the injuries cannot be established. Given that the doctor examining the applicant did not document any lesions characteristically pointing to an inveterate injury, it can only be said that the injuries had been sustained within a 24-48-hour-time-frame preceding the medical care. Since, according to the police report on the application of coercive measures, the local police constable handed the applicant over to the officer on duty without any complaints or injuries, the injuries were likely to have occurred after this point in time.\u201d","\u201cA s\u00e9r\u00fcl\u00e9sek pontos keletkez\u00e9si ideje nem hat\u00e1rozhat\u00f3 meg. Tekintettel arra, hogy a vizsg\u00e1l\u00f3 orvos id\u0151s\u00fcl\u0151ben l\u00e9v\u0151 s\u00e9r\u00fcl\u00e9sre jellegzetes elv\u00e1ltoz\u00e1sokat nem dokument\u00e1lt, az val\u00f3sz\u00edn\u0171s\u00edthet\u0151, hogy a s\u00e9r\u00fcl\u00e9sek az orvosi ell\u00e1t\u00e1st megel\u0151z\u0151 24-48 \u00f3r\u00e1s id\u0151tartamon bel\u00fcl alakultak ki. Mivel a k\u00e9nyszer\u00edt\u0151 eszk\u00f6z alkalmaz\u00e1s\u00e1ra \u00edrt rend\u0151ri jelent\u00e9s adatai szerint a k\u00f6rzeti megb\u00edzott panasz \u00e9s s\u00e9r\u00fcl\u00e9smentesen adta \u00e1t nevezettet az \u00fcgyeletes tisztnek, a s\u00e9r\u00fcl\u00e9sek val\u00f3sz\u00edn\u0171s\u00edthet\u0151en ezen id\u0151pontot k\u00f6vet\u0151en keletkeztek.\u201d","19.On 28 December 2010 the Miskolc Investigating Prosecutor\u2019s Office discontinued the investigation, holding in essence that the applicant\u2019s version of events was not plausible. The prosecutor emphasised the fact that since the applicant had been apprehended just after he had committed the crime in question (and still in possession of the proceeds of that crime), coercive interrogation by police officers with the intention of extracting his confession to the offence in question seemed pointless and thus hardly plausible. Relying on the internal records of the police department recording the shifts of the officers, the prosecutor was satisfied that three of the alleged perpetrators, Gy.K., F.I. and H.A., had alibis for the time of the incident, in that early in the morning of that day, they had been assigned to patrol service. Therefore, they could not possibly have been present at the applicant\u2019s questioning. Furthermore, the two security guards (P.G. and Z.A.) were not allowed to leave their station and thus could not have been present at the incident. The prosecutor also observed that a general practitioner had examined the applicant between his release from the police department and the first hospital inspection, but had recorded no injuries. The prosecutor also found it material that the applicant had been uncertain of the identities of the alleged perpetrators when shown photos of the Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6s police officers; that he had contradicted himself on several occasions; and that he had complained about the alleged incident only on 27September 2010, not before.","20.On 16 January 2012 the Borsod-Aba\u00faj-Zempl\u00e9n County Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint against the discontinuation order. The prosecutor was satisfied that the investigation had been adequate and comprehensive, and that the obtaining of further evidence \u2013 in particular, by questioning the applicant\u2019s brother and friend, who were present at his release \u2013 was superfluous. The applicant\u2019s allegations about racist motives behind the ill-treatment were not addressed.","This decision was served on the applicant on 23 January 2012.","C.Substitute private prosecution","21.On 21 March 2012 the applicant brought a substitute private prosecution against the eight presumed perpetrators \u2013 that is to say, six police officers and two security guards \u2013 on charges of coercive interrogation. The motion included assertions about racial insults being uttered during the incident.","22.The Eger High Court held a hearing on 26 September 2012. At that hearing the applicant stated that he did not recognise the defendants P.G. and Z.A. and that he was not certain if K.V. had beaten him, so he dropped the charges against them. Accordingly, the court terminated the proceedings against these three defendants.","23.The remaining defendants either denied the charges or refused to make any statements. The High Court heard Dr C.S., who confirmed that she had not seen any marks of external injury on the applicant\u2019s body when examining him on the day of the incident. A court-appointed medical expert stated that if the applicant had had the injuries in question when examined by Dr C.S. then the latter must have noticed them. The court also obtained testimony from the applicant\u2019s mother and brother and a friend (the two latter had not been heard during the investigation), who had been waiting for him in front of the Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6s Police Department on his release. They all stated that the applicant had already had those injuries at the moment of his release.","24.The High Court was satisfied that Gy.K., F.I. and H.A. had alibis for the time of the incident. As to the charges against the two other officers, T.B. and M.Z., the court highlighted that even though the applicant said that he had been ill-treated in order to force him to admit to at least three counts of theft \u2013 which he finally did \u2013 there was actually no reference in the record of the questioning to any further counts of theft. The court also emphasised that, contrary to the statements of the applicant, the two officers could not have been continuously present in the Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6s Police Department because between 3 a.m. and 5 a.m. they had been carrying out some onsite inspections in another town, Gy\u00f6ngy\u00f6spata.","25.On 28 November 2012 the Eger High Court acquitted the officers for want of sufficient evidence. According to the reasoning of the judgment, the court relied on documentary evidence relating to the applicant\u2019s apprehension and questioning, documents relating to the service particulars of the officers involved, the testimony of the applicant, medical documentation, and the testimony of the officers.","26.The applicant did not appeal.","D.Prosecution against the applicant","27.As a consequence of the applicant lodging, but subsequently withdrawing, a criminal complaint against K.V., criminal proceedings on charges of false accusation were conducted against the applicant. On 7November 2013 the Eger District Court found him guilty as charged and placed him on three-year probation. The judgment was upheld in essence by the Eger High Court on 10 June 2014; however, the applicant\u2019s sentence was altered to 180 days of community work.","29.A resource guide entitled Prosecuting Hate Crimes \u2013 A Practical Guide, published by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE\/ODIHR) in 2014, contains the following relevant passages:","Chapter3: Building a case","\u201c3.1.1 Using bias indicators to identify a potential hate crime case","Sometimes, when a prosecutor first reviews a case file, the bias motivation is immediately evident, for example, when the facts of the offence involve the use of words or symbols that show bias, or when the defendant admits that the crime was bias-motivated.","In cases where the bias motivation is not obvious, bias indicators are an excellent tool to help identify whether a crime constitutes a hate crime. Bias indicators help guide investigators and prosecutors through the factors that normally point towards a bias motive. The presence of one or more of these indicators suggests the existence of a bias crime, and should result in further investigation into motive. Bias indicators provide objective criteria by which probable motives can be discerned, but do not necessarily prove that an offender\u2019s actions were motivated by bias. Many of them can be used to build circumstantial evidence of the motive behind the offence, as discussed further in this guide.","A decision to flag a case as a hate crime can be taken at different stages by either the police or the prosecution. Bias indicators are, therefore, relevant both at the crime scene and when reviewing evidence of a crime. Some countries have developed their own list of bias indicators that police and prosecutors apply to all cases to help determine motive....","3.1.2 Brutality of the attack","In the case of a violent attack that has no obvious other motive, and where there is a racial or other group difference between the victim and the perpetrator, the brutality of the crime is a strong indicator that the crime might have been motivated by bias. Anyone can be a victim of a hate crime, regardless of whether or not they are a member of a minority group. However, certain groups suffer disproportionately from hate crimes based on their religion, race, ethnicity, disability or sexual orientation. In some, albeit rare, cases, bias crimes demonstrate extreme, brutal violence that stems from the way in which perpetrators seek to dehumanize victims against whom they hold biased and intolerant views. Hence, if the victim belongs or appears to belong to such a minority, and there is no other obvious motive (for example, economic), a further investigation into the motive for the crime is warranted.","...","3.3 Working with hate crime victims and witnesses","Hate crimes have some distinguishing features that prosecutors and investigators need to keep in mind when assessing evidence from victims and witnesses. Many victims of hate crimes are reluctant to come forward and tell the full story of their victimization for a variety of reasons. They are often members of marginalized communities and, as such, experience discrimination as a regular part of their daily lives. Authorities need to be aware that for some victims, approaching law enforcement can be a challenge in itself. The special needs of hate crime victims in criminal proceedings are acknowledged in regional legal instruments, such as the EUVictims Directive.","...","3.4 Preparing the evidence","Once the prosecution is satisfied that a case could be bias-motivated, the next step is to ensure that there is sufficient evidence of the bias motive and, if not, to gather more. While the need to prove a bias motive distinguishes hate crimes from other offences, this distinction should not be exaggerated. Prosecutors regularly have to prove a defendant\u2019s mental state, such as intent, recklessness or negligence. As with these other mental elements, motive can be inferred from the words, actions and circumstances surrounding the incident. As pointed out earlier in this chapter, the prosecution may want to revisit the bias indicators when establishing the evidence in a hate crime case.","Because hate crimes are message crimes, perpetrators often leave clear indications of their motives, which can be identified by looking in the right places. Hate crime prosecutions often rely on the defendant\u2019s statements or admissions. In the absence of admissions, the prosecution can rely on inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence within the totality of the evidence.","...","3.4.2 Common types and sources of direct evidence","Because hate crimes are message crimes, offenders often want others to know their motives. Therefore, they sometimes make offensive statements to the victim or leave hateful words and symbols as graffiti on property. The offender may also boast about the crime to friends, family or in public settings. They often make admissions to police and investigators about their bias.","The key is finding out when, where and to whom the suspect admitted her or his motives. Identifying where the suspect was immediately before and after the incident or the places that the suspect regularly frequents is a good starting point to finding witnesses who might have heard the suspect\u2019s admissions. Evidence of words said immediately before or after the crime will always be easier to use than those expressed long before or after the event. Even if words used further in time from the incident are not used in the case, they can still be useful for intelligence purposes or to direct the investigation. For example, they may provide sufficient grounds to seek judicial authorization for more intrusive investigative steps, such as searching the suspect\u2019s home, place of employment and personal belongings, including cell phones and computers.\u201d","30.The Hungarian public prosecutors\u2019 protocol on bias-motivated crimes, which is based on the recommendations of the 2010 working paper of OSCE\/ODIHR, contains the following relevant passages:","\u201cSubstantiating hate crimes is more difficult. It is necessary to demonstrate with concrete evidence that the crime was committed [on the basis of] biased motivation. This requires more work from the criminal justice system actors. ... Public prosecutors must ensure that supplementary evidence that could lead to more severe punishment is presented before the court.","...","Indicators to identify biased motivation","...","The suspect and the victim are dissimilar in terms of belonging to different national, ethnic, religious or sexual groups.\u201d"],"30002":["6.The applicants are nationals of Uzbekistan. Their initials, dates of birth, the dates on which their applications were introduced, application numbers, as well as the particulars of the domestic proceedings and other relevant information are set out in the Appendix.","7.On various dates they were charged in Uzbekistan with religious and politically motivated crimes, their pre-trial detention was ordered in absentia, and international search warrants were issued by the authorities.","8.Subsequently the Russian authorities took final decisions to remove (that is to say extradite or expel) the applicants to Uzbekistan, despite consistent claims that in the event of removal the applicants would face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.","10.The relevant reports by the UN agencies and international NGOs on the situation in Uzbekistan up until 2015 were cited in the case of Kholmurodov v. Russia (no. 58923\/14, \u00a7\u00a7 46-50, 1 March 2016)."],"30029":["7.The applicant was born in 1980. He arrived in Russia in 2003. He travelled to Tajikistan on a number of occasions to visit his parents for short periods of time.","8.On 3 May 2011 the applicant was charged in absentia in Tajikistan with participating in an extremist religious movement, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and an international search and arrest warrant was issued in his name. On 6 May 2011 the Tajik authorities ordered his pre-trial detention.","9.On 3 November 2013 the applicant was arrested in Moscow and detained. On 4November 2013 the Meshchanskiy District Court of Moscow (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) ordered his detention pending extradition.","A.Extradition proceedings","10.On 4 December 2013 the Tajik prosecution authorities requested the applicant\u2019s extradition on the basis of the above charges. The request included assurances regarding his proper treatment, which were formulated in standard terms.","11.On 12 December 2013 the District Court extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 3 May 2014.","12.An appeal by the applicant of 16 December 2013 was dismissed by the Moscow City Court (\u201cthe City Court\u201d) on 3 February 2014.","13.On 29 April 2014 the District Court again extended the applicant\u2019s detention until 3 August 2014.","14.An appeal by the applicant of 5 May 2014 was dismissed by the City Court on 23 July 2014.","15.On 9 October 2014 the applicant\u2019s extradition was refused by the Deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation, owing to the absence of culpable actions under Russian criminal law.","16.On 13 October 2014 the applicant was released from detention.","B.Expulsion proceedings","17.On 13 October 2014, immediately after his release, the applicant was rearrested for violating migration regulations.","18.On 14 October 2014 the District Court found the applicant guilty of violating migration regulations, fined him and ordered his administrative removal. Allegations by the applicant regarding a real risk of ill-treatment were dismissed, and he was detained pending expulsion. The District Court assessing the risks stated that \u201c[t]he claims of the representative ... are of a speculative nature and not confirmed by the case materials\u201d","19.The above judgment was upheld on appeal by the City Court on 24October 2014. Claims by the applicant under Article 3 of the Convention were dismissed with reference to the District Court\u2019s assessment of the case, which took into consideration \u201c...the nature of the administrative offence, the character of the accused [who was criminally convicted in Russia]... the length of his stay in Russia and other circumstances of the case\u201d.","20.According to the latest submissions of his representative in 2015, the applicant was still in detention.","C.Other relevant proceedings","21.On 18 December 2013 the applicant lodged a request for refugee status, referring to persecution in Tajikistan and a real risk of ill-treatment.","22.On 15 September 2014 his request was refused by a final administrative decision of the migration authorities. The applicant challenged that decision in the courts, referring, inter alia, to the risk of ill\u2011treatment.","23.On 12 November 2015 his appeals were dismissed by a final decision of the City Court."],"30059":["A.Background to the case","5.The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Hamburg. He is the brother of the late Y.C., also a Gambian national, who was born in 1987 and applied for asylum in Austria in 2004.","6.On 4 April 2005, the Vienna Regional Criminal Court (Straflandesgericht) convicted Y.C. of drug trafficking and sentenced him to seven months\u2019 imprisonment. Y.C. began serving his sentence at Vienna\u2011Josefstadt Prison (Strafvollzugsanstalt). On 2 May 2005 he was transferred to Linz Prison.","7. On 18 April 2005 the Vienna Federal Police Authority (Bundespolizeidirektion) dismissed Y.C.\u2019s asylum application and ordered his expulsion to the Gambia. An appeal lodged by Y.C. was dismissed by the Vienna Federal Asylum Office (Bundesasylamt) on 6 June 2005. He did not appeal against this decision and it became legally binding on 5July 2005.","8.On 8 September 2005 the Linz Federal Police Authority issued an order for Y.C. to be placed in detention with a view to his expulsion.","9.On 12 September 2005 Y.C. was conditionally released from prison and directly transferred to the Linz police detention centre (Polizeianhaltezentrum \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe detention centre\u201d).","10.Upon his admission to the detention centre, Y.C. was examined by a police doctor (Polizeiarzt), who noted that Y.C. was in a good general state and was fit for detention. His weight was recorded at 76.5 kg and his height at 170 cm. Communication between the authorities and Y.C. took place in English.","11.On 26 September 2005 the police doctor, while conducting a routine examination which all detainees have to undergo at two-week intervals, again noted that Y.C.\u2019s state of health was good and recorded his weight at 70 kg.","12.On 27September 2005 Y.C. went on hunger strike. On 28September 2005 he informed the authorities thereof. Representatives of Human Rights Association Austria (Verein Menschenrechte \u00d6sterreich), a non-governmental organisation (NGO) who had already been counselling him since the day of his admission to the detention centre, came to talk to him. On the same day Y.C. was subject to an initial hunger-strike examination (Hungerstreik-Eingangsuntersuchung). Y.C. was handed an information pamphlet on hunger strikes (in English) and was also orally informed by the public medical officer of the possible consequences of a hunger strike. A medical hunger-strike protocol (Hungerstreikprotokoll) was filled out, in which his state of health was described as follows:","\u201cMusculature in a good, well-trained state, pronounced muscles of the upper arm, six-pack like someone who practices athletic sports, appears vital, overall.\u201d","13.On the hunger-strike protocol it was noted that at the outset of his hunger strike, Y.C. had weighed 67kg. On the basis of this, Y.C.\u2019s \u201ccritical weight\u201d was calculated at 54kg (see paragraph 64 below). Under the heading \u201creasons given for hunger strike\u201d, it was noted that Y.C. \u201cabsolutely wanted to be transferred back to cell no. 36\u201d. He had been placed in a different cell because he and his cellmates had allegedly tried to escape from cell no. 36.","14.Daily health checks of Y.C. were subsequently carried out, during which his weight was checked, his blood pressure was taken and his oxygen saturation level was measured. Until 1 October 2005, no anomalies were detected.","15.On 2 October 2005 the public medical officer noted that Y.C.\u2019s tongue was slightly dry, and on 3 October 2005 that his lips were \u201cbarky\u201d (borkig). Further, there were occasional comments on the hunger-strike form to the effect that Y.C. resisted examination and was \u201cmalingering\u201d (simuliert) \u2013 for example, he had \u201cpretended to fall\u201d, \u201crefused to be examined\u201d, \u201cneeded to be carried by other detainees\u201d, and \u201ctilted over from [his] chair in an ostentatious manner\u201d.","16.After examining Y.C. during the morning of 4 October 2005, DrF.G., the police doctor in charge, noted the following:","\u201cPretends to be weak, has to be physically supported by two detainees \u2013 therefore weight check not possible. Dry tongue, barky lips. I request a medical assessment by a specialist. Possibly blood test, ionogram.\u201d","17.On 4 October 2005 at 9.30 a.m., Y.C. was taken to Linz General Hospital (Allgemeines Krankenhaus) for examination and an assessment of whether he was fit enough for further detention. Because Y.C. resisted the examination and kicked out at a nurse, his hands and feet had to be shackled by the police officers who had accompanied him to the hospital. According to a report drawn up by the treating doctor on 4 October 2005, it was \u201cnot possible to assess the intake of liquids\u201d, \u201ccommunication [was] difficult\u201d because Y.C. did not speak German, he had \u201cdry lips\u201d and had his eyes \u201cconstantly closed\u201d, but \u201cwalking [was] possible if [he was] supported\u201d. The hospital further noted that if his general condition worsened, he would have to be force-fed and taken to a psychiatric ward, because he \u201clashed out from time to time\u201d. Taking his blood for a blood test had been difficult and risky; nevertheless, with the support of the two police officers, who secured Y.C. in a chair in the examination room, the doctor nonetheless managed to take a small amount of blood. After consulting the senior doctor, the treating doctor formally confirmed Y.C.\u2019s fitness for detention and noted the police doctor\u2019s telephone number in order to contact him after obtaining the results of the blood test.","18. Y.C. was subsequently taken back to the detention centre and at around 11 a.m. was placed alone in a security cell (Sicherheitszelle) because of his behaviour at the hospital. His shackles were removed. The security cell did not contain a water outlet, but Y.C. could request a water bottle at any time. A police officer checked on Y.C. every fifteen to thirty minutes. At 12.30 p.m., Y.C., who was lying on the bed, reacted to the police officer\u2019s presence by lifting his head. When the officer next checked, at 12.50 p.m., he was not breathing anymore and had no pulse. At 1.20 p.m. he was declared dead by an emergency doctor who had been immediately called to the scene. The presumed time of death was 12.40 p.m. His weight was recorded at 59kg. At 1.42 p.m. the blood test results from the hospital examination (see paragraph 17 above) were produced. They indicated that Y.C. had been dehydrated and that he should have been hydrated intravenously and placed in intensive care.","19.In a report of 5 October 2005 the doctor from the hospital noted that Y.C. had been uncooperative during his examination. It had been virtually impossible to take a blood sample as the patient had resisted strongly. At that time nothing had indicated that Y.C.\u2019s physical condition could become life-threatening. In a statement given on 14October 2005 the doctor described Y.C. as not having been weak at all, rather, he had been physically strong and had steadily resisted treatment with all his might (nach Leibeskr\u00e4ften), using the whole of his body and kicking out with his legs. After examination of his tongue, pulse, respiration, heartbeat and skin, he had observed Y.C.\u2019s dry lips, but had seen none of the other usual signs of dehydration or other abnormalities. He further stated that even as an experienced emergency unit doctor, a rapid and fatal development of Y.C.\u2019s situation had not at all been foreseeable by him.","B.Criminal investigation","20.On 4 October 2005, the day of Y.C.\u2019s death, the Linz public prosecutor\u2019s office (Staatsanwaltschaft \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe public prosecutor\u201d) instituted a criminal investigation against \u201cunknown offenders\u201d and requested the Linz Regional Court (Landesgericht) to conduct a judicial investigation. The investigating judge ordered that an autopsy be conducted by a sworn and judicially certified expert (beeideter und gerichtlich zertifizierter Sachverst\u00e4ndiger); the autopsy was conducted on 5October 2005. On the same day, the investigating judge, in response to a request made by the public prosecutor, delivered a decision ordering the seizure of the blood samples taken from Y.C., together with the pertinent examination report.","21.On 5 October 2005 the Linz Federal Police Authority submitted a detailed report on the circumstances of Y.C.\u2019s death.","22.On 6 October 2005 the public prosecutor requested the Office for Internal Affairs at the Ministry of the Interior (B\u00fcro f\u00fcr interne Angelegenheiten des Bundesministeriums f\u00fcr Inneres \u2013 hereinafter the \u201cOIA\u201d) for it to carry out an investigation. The request included that interviews be conducted with: the two police officers who had accompanied Y.C. to the hospital on the day of his death; the police doctor who had examined Y.C. on that day; the doctor at Linz General Hospital who had examined Y.C.; the police officers who had been checking on Y.C. when he was placed in the security cell; and Y.C.\u2019s cellmate.","23.On 12 October 2005 the public prosecutor added to the case file a note regarding a telephone conversation between him and Dr H., the expert who had conducted the autopsy, regarding the preliminary findings of that autopsy.","24.The OIA subsequently conducted an investigation at the detention centre\u2019s medical service, procured documents from the detention centre, and produced written records of the requested interviews (see paragraph22 above). The OIA\u2019s report was submitted to the public prosecutor on 18October 2005.","25.On 24 October 2005 the investigating judge complied with a request lodged by the public prosecutor for the inclusion in the case file of the results of the investigation up until that date, as well as for Y.C.\u2019s medical history to be obtained from the detention centre, and for these documents to be transmitted to the expert Dr H. It was further decided that the scale used to weigh Y.C. at the detention centre be seized and sent for technical examination.","26.On 5 November 2005 the OIA submitted a report containing the results of the supplementary investigation.","27.On 1 December 2005, after being supplied with all pertinent documents by the OIA, the Austrian Human Rights Advisory Board (Menschenrechtsbeirat \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Advisory Board\u201d \u2013 an independent monitoring body established in 1999 at the Ministry of the Interior) issued a report on Y.C.\u2019s death. In that report, the Advisory Board considered several points to be problematic: that Y.C., after his visit to Linz General Hospital on 4 October 2005, had been further monitored only by police officers, rather than by medical professionals; that no interpreter had been present during the said hospital visit; that a blood sample had been taken from Y.C. against his will; and that the calculation of Y.C.\u2019s critical weight had been questionable. The issues of Y.C.\u2019s possible dehydration and carrying sickle cell disease had not been addressed in the report, as it had been drawn up before the delivery of the final autopsy report by Dr H. (see paragraph 30 below).","28.On 12 December 2005 the applicant, who was represented by counsel, joined the criminal proceedings as a private party.","29.By an order of 14 December 2005 the investigating judge urged the expert to submit his report.","30.On 4 January 2006 Dr H., the forensic expert who had conducted the autopsy, submitted his final autopsy report (dated 5 October 2005), as well as his expert report on Y.C.\u2019s death, to the Linz Regional Court. He stated in the autopsy report that Y.C.\u2019s body had not shown signs of \u201csignificantly acute malnutrition\u201d, nor had there been signs of \u201cclassic dehydration\u201d.","31.In the more detailed expert report, Dr H. stated that Y.C.\u2019s body had not shown signs of any injuries; therefore, death caused by the use of force could be excluded. Y.C. had been slim, but had not appeared malnourished. His body had weighed 59.3 kg; his height had been 171 cm. No typical external signs of dehydration had been visible, except for the lips appearing to be slightly dry. The results of the internal investigation had recorded a thickening of the blood, which indicated a possible alternation to the blood while Y.C. had still been alive caused by a lack of hydration. Dr H. noted that a hunger strike alone could not lead to a thickening of the blood, as long as enough fluids were consumed. As concerns the hunger strike, Dr H. stated that it was likely that Y.C. had not eaten solid food for several days, but that it was unlikely that he had engaged in a long-term total hunger strike as the large intestine had still been filled with an abundance of stool along its entire length.","32.Dr H. further stated that neither Y.C.\u2019s external appearance nor the medical reports produced until 4 October 2005 had indicated a life\u2011threatening situation, although there had been a significant reduction in his weight. Rather, it was more likely that a shift in the electrolyte system had commenced over a period of several days, as indicated by the results of the blood test conducted by Linz General Hospital on 4 October 2005. A post-mortem examination of Y.C.\u2019s blood (conducted in the course of the autopsy) had shown that he had been a carrier of sickle cell trait (Sichelzellanlage). Dr H. explained that sickle cell disease (Sichelzellenkrankheit) was an inherited red blood cell disorder; while red blood cells (containing normal haemoglobin) were disc-shaped, sickle haemoglobin could form stiff rods within the cell, changing it into a sickle shape. Dr H. added that the disease was rare among the white population, occurring mostly among black people. Unlike in the case of people suffering from sickle cell disease, in Y.C.\u2019s blood the trait had been present in the heterozygous form, which is why the disease had remained undetected during his lifetime. In cases like Y.C.\u2019s, symptoms of sickle cell disease only manifested themselves if there were further damaging external factors, such as dehydration or a lack of oxygen.","33.Dr H. concluded that the cause of Y.C.\u2019s death had been dehydration, combined with the fact that he had been a carrier of sickle cell trait, which had caused a shift in the electrolyte system and had ultimately caused his heart to stop beating. Neither the authorities nor Y.C. himself had been aware that he had been a carrier of sickle cell trait. Dr H. stated that Y.C.\u2019s death could only have been prevented if he had been tested earlier for sickle cell trait, or if he had been aware that he was a carrier thereof. However, the hunger-strike protocol had not indicated any necessity for a blood test in that respect. The test results from the hospital on the day of Y.C.\u2019s death would have given reason for further tests. However, the results had only been produced after Y.C.\u2019s death.","34.On 12 October 2005 the public prosecutor made a note in the criminal file (Aktenvermerk) about a conversation with Dr H. The doctor had expressed the opinion that with hindsight Y.C.\u2019s extraordinarily aggressive behaviour at the hospital on the day of his death had resembled a delirious state caused by advanced dehydration and the consequent disintegration of his blood cells.","35.On 13 January 2006 the public prosecutor decided to discontinue the criminal investigation into the death of Y.C., as no sufficient evidence could be found to warrant criminal proceedings. The applicant was informed that he had the right to ask the Council Chamber (Ratskammer) of the Linz Regional Court to conduct a preliminary investigation. However, he was also informed that he would have to bear the full costs of the criminal proceedings should the Council Chamber grant his request but the proceedings did not result in a criminal conviction. This decision was served on the applicant\u2019s counsel on 19 January 2006. The applicant did not request that a preliminary investigation be instituted.","36.On 2 March 2006 the applicant submitted the decision of 13February 2006 issued by the Upper Austria Independent Administrative Panel (Unabh\u00e4nigiger Verwaltungssenat Ober\u00f6sterreich \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe IAP\u201d) (see paragraph 46 below) to the public prosecutor and requested him to investigate further. On 13 March 2006 the public prosecutor replied that the documents submitted had already been made available to him, but that they could not change his assessment of the procedural results obtained so far, since every aspect of the legal question to be answered had already been clarified by Dr H.\u2019s autopsy report and his comprehensive expert report.","C.Administrative proceedings","37.On 15 November 2005 the applicant requested the IAP to review the lawfulness of Y.C.\u2019s detention (Schubhaftbeschwerde) and at the same time lodged a complaint about the conditions of his detention (Ma\u00dfnahmenbeschwerde). He submitted in particular that Y.C. should not have continued to be kept in detention because he had no longer been fit to be detained on account of his hunger strike. As regards the conditions of Y.C.\u2019s detention, he submitted that the medical treatment of Y.C. had not been in conformity with section 10(1) of the Detention Ordinance (Anhalteordnung \u2013 see paragraph 59 below). He furthermore claimed that his brother had been placed in a security cell, without access to water, on the day of his death, in contravention of section5(5) of the Detention Ordinance.","38.On 13 February 2006 the competent member of the IAP held a hearing during which he examined as witnesses the applicant, a cellmate of Y.C., one of the police doctors who had examined Y.C. during his hunger strike, and the police officers who had been in charge of examining detainees on the day of Y.C.\u2019s death.","39.Y.C.\u2019s former cellmate, H.C., stated that they had gone on hunger strike together to protest the duration of their detention, and that they had not been treated correctly by the police officers; however, he did not specify how that treatment had not been correct. He said that he did not remember the exact day on which they had begun their hunger strike, but that they had not eaten or drunk anything at all for twelve days. H.C. stated that he had had the impression that Y.C. had been \u201cterribly weak\u201d during the three days before his death.","40.According to the witness statements by employees of the NGO Human Rights Association Austria who had visited Y.C. on several occasions, Y.C. had not raised any allegations of ill-treatment during their visits. In fact, with the exception of his former cellmate, all other witnesses who had been in contact with Y.C. until his death had also stated during the IAP hearing that he had not appeared to be ill or weak, but that on the contrary, even on the day of his death he had seemed athletic and strong; which had been corroborated by photographs taken of his dead body and its description by Dr H. in the autopsy report (see paragraph 30 above).","41.One of the police doctors, Dr F.G., gave evidence regarding, inter alia, the reason why the calculation of the critical weight of a detainee on hunger strike was based on his or her weight at the outset of the hunger strike, and not the weight recorded upon admission to the detention centre. He stated that detainees usually lost weight slightly during their detention, but that it was also possible for them to gain weight. He acknowledged that he had not even checked Y.C.\u2019s initial weight, as the 65.5 kg recorded on the day after Y.C. had announced his hunger strike had in principle amounted to a normal weight, given his height. Dr F.G. furthermore stated that on 3October 2005 Y.C. had walked into the examination room without support. One day later, Y.C. had showed signs of dehydration and had come to the examination room supported by two police officers. Dr F.G. stated that he had accordingly ordered him to be examined at the hospital.","42. H., the police officer who had accompanied Y.C. to and from the hospital on the day of his death, stated that the reason for Y.C.\u2019s placement in solitary confinement had been that \u2013 following Y.C.\u2019s behaviour at the hospital \u2013 he and the other officer in charge had feared that Y.C. might harm himself or others. H. confirmed that there had been no water outlet in the security cell, but that Y.C. could have requested a water bottle at any time by ringing a bell.","43.B., the police officer who had been in charge of checking on Y.C. while he was being held in the security cell, stated that he had received an order to do so every fifteen to thirty minutes. During the checks, he had had to make sure that the detainee reacted when spoken to. When B. had checked on Y.C. at 12.30 p.m., the latter had moved his head. At the next check at 12.50 p.m., he had showed no reaction and had subsequently been pronounced dead by the emergency doctor, who had immediately been called to the scene.","44.During the IAP hearing on 13 February 2006 the applicant presented an undated and unsigned three-page statement by DrW.G., whom he had engaged himself and who was a general practitioner in Linz with a focus on nutritional medicine. Dr W.G, who had not examined Y.C.\u2019s body, had based his report on the autopsy report and expert report issued by Dr H., the report of the OIA (see paragraph 24 above) and the report by Linz General Hospital, and had come to the following opinion. On 12 September 2005, the day on which Y.C. had been taken into detention with a view to his expulsion, he had weighed 76.5 kg. On 28September 2005, the day on which Y.C. had announced that he was on hunger strike, he had had a body weight of only 67 kg. The police doctor had made a mistake in taking the latter as the normal weight of Y.C. for the purposes of calculating his critical body weight. The doctor had not taken into account the fact that Y.C. had already lost 9.5 kg between 12 and 28September 2005, meaning that Y.C. must have already started his hunger strike before he had officially announced it. From 28 September until the day of his death on 4October 2005, Y.C. had lost a further 8 kg in body weight. However, the doctor had used Y.C.\u2019s weight on 28 September (namely 67 kg) as a starting point, and had established his critical weight as 54 kg, which in Dr W.G.\u2019s view was incorrect. The police doctor should have based his calculations on how much Y.C. had weighed when he had arrived at the detention centre. If he had, the correct critical weight would have been determined at 67 kg, minus 10%. Instead, Y.C. at the time of his death had already lost approximately 18% of his weight in fluids. For an adult person a loss of even 10% in fluids constituted a life-threatening situation. Dr W.G. assumed that Y.C. had died of dehydration resulting from the erroneous calculation of his body weight. He did not deal with the question of how far the sickle cell trait present in Y.C.\u2019s blood had played a role in his death, nor did he provide any scientific source for his calculations. Dr W.G.\u2019s opinion was later not supported by any of the official experts.","45.The applicant asked the IAP that the second police doctor in charge at the detention centre on the day of Y.C.\u2019s death be questioned, and that another expert report be obtained in order to refute the expert report issued by Dr H. (see paragraphs 30-33 above). The IAP refused these requests.","46.The IAP, at the end of the hearing of 13 February 2006, ruled that Y.C.\u2019s detention pending his expulsion had been unlawful and that the conditions of detention during his hunger strike had violated Y.C.\u2019s right under Article 3 of the Convention to protection against ill-treatment. Concerning the cause of Y.C.\u2019s death, the IAP reiterated the findings of the autopsy report and the expert report attached thereto (see paragraphs 30-33 above). The IAP argued that the State authorities had not fulfilled their role of guarantor of the applicant\u2019s rights under Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention. It found that given the frequency of sickle cell disease among people from sub-Saharan Africa, the State was under an obligation to offer a test for sickle cell disease to all detainees from that specific geographic area, and in particular to those on hunger strike.","47.The Ministry of the Interior appealed against that decision.","48.On 30 August 2007, the Administrative Court quashed the IAP\u2019s decision. It held that the applicant had no locus standi regarding the request for a review of the lawfulness of the detention of his brother because rights under Article 5 of the Convention were not transferable to other persons. Therefore, the IAP had not had authority to issue a decision in that respect. Concerning the complaint under Article 3 of the Convention, it held that the mere fact that a person was detained did not place any duty on the State to take measures (the need for which had not necessarily been foreseeable) because of the genetic disposition of that person without a manifest outbreak of disease in that person. Moreover, it found that the IAP had not respected certain procedural requirements, which is why the Administrative Court referred the case back to the IAP.","49.On 1 April 2008 the applicant lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights concerning the above-mentioned judgment of the Administrative Court; it was registered as Ceesay v. Austria (no. 17208\/08). Thereupon, the IAP decided to suspend the fresh proceedings until such time as the Court rendered its decision in respect of this complaint.","50.On 21 May 2010 the Court declared application no. 17208\/08 inadmissible, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention, as the proceedings were still pending before the IAP and the complaints lodged by the applicant with the Court were therefore premature.","51.The IAP resumed the proceedings and on 11 June 2010 again issued a decision finding a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the conditions of Y.C.\u2019s detention. It essentially reiterated the reasoning contained in its previous decision, explaining that the proceedings were not aimed at identifying an individual who could be held culpable for Y.C.\u2019s death but at identifying errors inherent in the detention system \u2013 specifically, the lack of a standardised test for sickle cell disease for certain high-risk groups and the lack of clear instructions for the staff of the detention centre concerning detainees on hunger strike.","52.The Ministry of the Interior again lodged a complaint, arguing that there had been sufficient rules and instructions in place concerning the treatment of detainees. In the present case, there had not been any indications that Y.C. had suffered from sickle cell disease. Not even hospitals conducted standardised tests for this blood anomaly where there was no concrete suspicion in that respect. It added that the death of Y.C. had nonetheless prompted the Ministry of the Interior to issue a directive to detention centre authorities instructing them to (i) inform detainees who were on hunger strike and who belonged to a high-risk group of the possible consequences of sickle cell disease, and (ii) conduct the necessary tests.","53.On 20 October 2011 the Administrative Court again quashed the IAP\u2019s decision. It reminded the IAP that it was bound by the legal interpretation that the Administrative Court had expressed in its previous judgment concerning the obligations of the State under Article 3 of the Convention towards detainees (see paragraph 48 above). Moreover, it suggested that the IAP order an expert report in order to determine whether the reduced mental and physical condition of Y.C. should have given rise to an investigation into the possibility that he had been suffering from sickle cell disease and whether appropriate medical treatment from that moment onwards could have prevented the death of Y.C.","54.During the course of the new round of proceedings, the IAP ordered an expert report, as suggested by the Administrative Court. In a report dated 19 May 2012, as well as during the hearing of 21 June 2012, the expert in question, Dr L., confirmed that according to his findings, Y.C. had been a sickle cell trait carrier. He added that this was the case in respect of 30% of the population of countries in sub-Saharan Africa, such as the Gambia (where Y.C. had been from), and that this trait served as a protection from Malaria. The fact that a person was a carrier of sickle cell trait did not mean that he or she was ill or had a lower life expectancy. Nonetheless he or she would face a higher risk of death in the event of engaging in strenuous activities (anstrengungsassoziierte Todesf\u00e4lle), and the trait could also cause rapid dehydration in the event of reduced liquid intake. Dr L. explained that sickle cell disease could only be detected through an analysis of blood samples, but that the need for such an analysis had at no point been clearly indicated in Y.C.\u2019s case, even in the light of his reduced mental and physical condition.","55.The applicant submitted the same unsigned statement that he had already submitted during the hearing of 13 February 2006 (see paragraph 44 above). He did not submit any further requests. When the expert Dr L. was questioned by the IAP regarding the calculation of Y.C.\u2019s critical weight, he stated that he was inclined to believe that Y.C.\u2019s weight had been correctly calculated, but that that calculation had been wrongly recorded. In his opinion, it was unlikely that Y.C. could have lost 9 kg over the course of a sixteen-day hunger strike.","56.On 13 July 2012 the IAP dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint about the conditions of Y.C.\u2019s detention, basing its decision on the finding contained in the expert report of Dr L. (see paragraph 54 above) that the need for an analysis of Y.C.\u2019s blood in respect of sickle cell trait had not been indicated. It reiterated that according to the Administrative Court\u2019s legal interpretation, by which it was bound, the State had no duty to take measures the need for which had not been foreseeable in respect of a person because of a certain genetic disposition without a manifest outbreak of the disease in that person. Therefore, the authorities\u2019 conduct had not constituted a violation of Article3.","57.The applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court, which was dismissed on 22 November 2013.","58.On 25April 2014 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Administrative Court, which, referring to its decisions of 30 August 2007 and 20 October 2011, dismissed it. This decision was served on the applicant on 16 May 2014.","69.The World Medical Association Declaration on Hunger Strikers (adopted by the 43rd World Assembly, Malta, November 1991, editorially revised at the 44th World Medical Assembly in Marbella, Spain, September 1992 and ultimately revised at the 57th WMA General Assembly in Pilansberg, South Africa, October 2006), addresses the conflicting situations faced by doctors in treating hunger strikers and provides guidelines for dealing with them. The relevant provisions of September 1992 \u201cMalta Declaration\u201d, the version in force at the relevant time, can be found in Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine, no. 54825\/00, \u00a769, ECHR 2005\u2011II (extracts)."],"30060":["5.The first applicant is a French national who was born in 1970 and lives in Mouroux. He is the brother of the victim, M.B. born in 1968.","The second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants, who were born in 1977, 1973, 1972, 1939 and 1951 respectively, are the victim\u2019s sister, widow, brother, father and mother. They live in Mouroux, Massy, Valentigney and Thulay respectively.","6.On 12 November 2009, at about 4.30 p.m., M.B., who was 1 m80 tall and weighed about 100kilos, went into a pharmacy in Valentigney. He was known to the staff there, where he habitually went to collect the medicine prescribed for his psychiatric disorders.","7.M.B. asked to exchange some medicine dispensed without a prescription, saying he was not satisfied with it. A pharmacist\u2019s assistant, MsR., and the owner of the shop, MrF., explained to him that the effects of the medicine had diminished because he had become addicted to it. M.B. started to become angry, throwing the medicine boxes on the floor, raised his voice and started speaking incoherently:","\u201cI\u2019m fed up with your night visits, with your assistant and with you!\u201d","8.M.B. told Mr F. that he intended to file a complaint against him. Mr F asked MsR. to call the police. M.B. sat down on one of the chairs for customers at the pharmacy.","9.At 4.53 p.m. four police officers arrived on the scene after receiving a call from the incident room instructing them to intervene in an incident involving an individual with psychiatric disorders.","10.Deputy police sergeant L. and police constable M. asked M.B. several times to accompany them out of the pharmacy. When he vehemently refused, sergeant L. and constable D. seized him by the arm in order to remove him from the pharmacy. Constable M. seized M.B. by his right leg. M.B. struggled and called for help.","11.At the doorstep up to the pharmacy M.B. found himself on the ground. Constable M. attempted to handcuff him behind his back while he continued to struggle and appeal to the police for help. Constable M. punched M.B. twice in the solar plexus but still did not succeed in handcuffing him.","12.M.B. was then turned onto his right side and constable D. was able to handcuff him in the front with two pairs of interlinking handcuffs.","13.Deputy police sergeant P. went to get the police vehicle to move it closer to the pharmacy. Two police officers seized M.B. by the arm in order to put him in the van. Despite putting up resistance, M.B. was forced inside the police van.","14.M.B. continued struggling and shouting in the police van and pushed one police officer against the luggage holder above and another against a shelf before falling face downwards. Deputy police sergeant L. positioned himself above his shoulders in order to fasten another pair of handcuffs attaching M.B. to the fixed part of the back seat in the van. ConstablesD. and M. positioned themselves on top of him, on his legs and on his buttocks.","15.At 4.58 p.m., that is, exactly five minutes after they had arrived, the three police officers present in the vehicle contacted their headquarters requesting assistance from the fire brigade and the mobile emergency medical service (SAMU).","16.According to the incident room\u2019s telephone log, at 5.07 p.m. the fire brigade asked the police to transfer M.B. to their vehicle. Deputy police sergeantL. refused to do so on grounds of M.B.\u2019s extremely agitated state.","17.The firemen then drew up a record of M.B.\u2019s condition. He had calmed down, but his heart rate could not be measured with the pulse oximeter because the sensors were not working. One of the firemen constantly monitored his breathing, which stopped at one point. A fireman noted the absence of blood circulation.","18.The team of firemen brought M.B. inside the pharmacy. One of them alerted the ambulance service by radio. The firemen inserted a semi-automatic defibrillator and started carrying out cardiac massage.","19.An emergency doctor from the mobile emergency and intensive care service (SMUR), called out by the firemen, administered specialist cardiopulmonary resuscitation. He recorded M.B.\u2019s death at 6.02 p.m.","20.An investigation into the cause of M.B.\u2019s death was commenced immediately.","21.Of the three pharmacists who gave a statement that day, on 12November 2009, two were present when the police officers had asked M.B. to leave the premises. They confirmed that when M.B. had refused to comply, the police officers had approached him and seized him. They said that M.B. had begun shouting and struggling at that point and had continued shouting and struggling when he had got into the police van, handcuffed. None of the three witnesses had seen what had happened in the police van.","22.One of them stressed the fact that M.B. had been a customer at the pharmacy for a year and a half and had always been very pleasant during his monthly visits to collect his neuroleptics prescription.","23.On the same day Mr S., a volunteer firefighter, was also questioned. He stated that on his arrival M.B. had still been in a highly agitated state, lying face down in the van, with the police officers restraining him: one either sitting or kneeling on the victim\u2019s buttocks, and the other holding his legs; his hands were outstretched and fastened by several handcuffs to the back seat of the van; the victim\u2019s head was on the driver\u2019s side, and his right cheek face down on the floor. He explained that he had requested medical reinforcements and that then, when they observed that his heart had stopped beating, the firemen had decided to take him back into the pharmacy to continue carrying out cardiac massage.","24.On 13 November 2009 one of the pharmacists was questioned a second time. He stated that M.B. had been a regular customer at the pharmacy. He said that the police officers had not hit M.B.","25.Constable M. was questioned the same day. He stated that deputy sergeant L. had introduced himself to M.B. and had asked him to come outside \u201cto explain the problem, as in this type of intervention the aim is to separate the parties\u201d. He explained that M.B. had refused to leave the pharmacy several times despite repeated requests by the police, who had finally dragged hm towards the door. He said that he had then seized M.B.\u2019s right leg and that, just in front of the entrance to the pharmacy, M.B., who had lost his balance, had fallen down. He added that the police officers had then attempted to handcuff him and that when he had resisted attempts to put him in the police van constable D. had pulled his legs, which had unbalanced him and caused both of them and deputy police sergeant L. to fall over in the police van. He said that L. had managed \u201cI don\u2019t know how to pin him back down on the ground\u201d. He also said that in order to finish handcuffing him deputy sergeantL. had squatted down on M.B.\u2019s shoulders while constable D. remained at leg level; as M.B. had continued struggling, he himself had stood on his buttocks. He stated that they had remained \u201clike that for a while, but I cannot tell you how long, it felt like a long time, with me on his buttocks, my colleague on his shoulders and the third officer on his feet, assisted by P., who had crossed his legs to stop him moving. It was then that the fire brigade arrived\u201d.","26.Deputy sergeantL. was also questioned on 13 November 2009. He stated that he had received instructions from his headquarters to go to a pharmacy and had been informed that M.B. \u201csuffered from psychiatric disorders\u201d. He confirmed that M.B. had put up a violent struggle before letting himself slide to the ground in front of the entrance to the pharmacy. He explained that constable M. had administered two punches to the abdomen, using a technique known as \u201cdiversionary blows\u201d. As regards the rest, he confirmed the above-mentioned conditions in which M.B. had been handcuffed in the police van.","27.An autopsy was carried out on 13 November 2009. The forensic doctor described and explained the traumatic injuries observed: the injury to the left eyebrow and the associated swelling did not suggest injuries following a blow but were related to an impact by that part of his face on a ridged surface. The other facial injuries suggested close contact on a rough surface. The injuries to the wrists were characteristic of handcuffing. Those to the lower part of the chest and in the abdominal cavity could have been incurred as a result of two violent blows to that area. The forensic doctor specifed that the injuries had caused neither internal bleeding nor fractures. He mainly noted marks on the lungs and 70% stenosis on a heart artery. Dr H.\u2019s report, drawn up on 16November2009, contained the following conclusions:","\u201cDeath in all likelihood occurred as a result of heart failure.","An atheromatous attack observed on an artery of the heart exposed him to a severe risk of cardiac rhythm disorders and sudden death.","The state of stress and agitation presented by the victim on his arrest may have contributed to heart failure.","Restriction of chest expansion may have occurred when the victim was restrained, but it cannot be affirmed that mechanical asphyxiation was the cause of death. ...","Recent traumatic injuries consistent with action by third parties were observed. In any event, the various injuries did not directly contribute to the death; nor is there any injury consistent with blows to the face.\u201d","28.On 14 and 23 November 2009 MsS., a shopkeeper, was questioned and stated that she had heard shouts from her shop opposite the pharmacy. She said that she had seen four police officers with a man lying face down with his arms behind his back being punched and kicked. Through a side window of the police van she stated that she had seen a female and a male police officer trampling on the spot while hanging on to the roof of the van, one administering three punches in a downwards movement and lifting his knee up very high before bringing it down in one sharp movement.","29.On 23 November 2009 the shopkeeper\u2019s minor son was questioned and stated that he had seen two police officers trampling on M.B. in the road and that a female police officer had hit him several times with a truncheon in the stomach, back and face.","30.On 3 December 2009 a judicial investigation for manslaughter was opened in respect of a person or persons unknown and assigned to two investigating judges.","31.On an unknown date the applicants applied to join the proceedings as civil parties.","32.On 7 January 2010 Ms C., a neighbour next to the pharmacy, stated that she had seen M.B. struggling, face downwards, outside the pharmacy. She said that the police officers had \u201cthrown him into the van\u201d and that she had left after the doors were closed. She stated that the police officers had not hit M.B.","33.On 21 January 2010 chief brigadier M.D., an instructor in defence and arrest techniques and in the psychological and behavioural aspects of police intervention, was heard as a witness. He stated that in the event of a dispute between people, \u201cthe opposing parties shouldin so far as possible be separated\u201d: the police officers, in attempting to induce the M.B. to leave the pharmacy, had sought to avoid a fight in the shop. He said that the blows administered by constable M. and described as \u201ctwo punches to the suspect\u2019s abdominal area with the aim of distracting and and securely handcuffing him [were] among the priority areas for attempting to weaken the resistance of the person concerned. They [the police officers] had not been over zealous and had completed the handcuffing in the front. The officers had also acted in an emergency situation. The technique used by constable M. appear[ed] the most appropriate in the context of the intervention\u201d. He added that all the techniques taught were designed to weaken resistance to arrest. He specified that, with regard to the immobilisation of M.B. in the van, standing on a person\u2019s buttocks was not among the techniques taught and that positioning oneself across M.B.\u2019s shoulders, as sergeant L. had done, was one of the procedures taught. That technique enabled the officer to prevent the suspect from moving while avoiding postural asphyxiation. He concluded that the intervening officers, having regard to the context of the intervention, had acted with pragmatism and discernment.","34.Reports were produced by several experts appointed by one of the investigating judges. On 23 June 2010 DrL., professor of forensic medicine, and DrR., lecturer in forensic medicine, provided a forensic medical report after examining M.B.\u2019s body on 18December 2009. They stated that their examinations had revealed \u201ca series of cutaneous lesions that could not have contributed to the death\u201d. They did not indicate evidence of any \u201cfactor suggesting death by chest compression\u201d. There was thus no evidence of \u201cpetechial subconjunctival injuries or of facial petechial injuries\u201d. They stated as follows:","\u201cour examination of the sealed evidence has not revealed any elements indicating the cause of death of [M.B.]. The sealed evidence shows that he was receiving psychiatric treatment for psychosis with several episodes of hallucination requiring the regular ingestion of antipsychotic medicines. ... At the levels measured, the ingestion of psychoactive drugs revealed by the toxicological investigations does not appear capable of explaining the victim\u2019s death by a process of direct toxicity. ... In conclusion, the death of [M.B.] ... is in all likelihood the result of myocardial failure. The death is due to natural causes.\u201d","35.On 10 December 2010 Dr T. and Dr F. produced their anatomopathological expert report after examining a copy of the autopsy report of 16November 2009, a copy of the interviews with the members of the police patrol team who had arrested M.B., a copy of the record of examination of two witnesses, various sealed samples collected both by Dr H. and by Professor L. and Dr R.:","\u201c[M.B] died suddenly of cardiac rhythm disorders owing to a coronary spasm triggered by a context of intense and prolonged emotional and physical stress.... In conclusion, the intense and prolonged emotional stress, and the prolonged and severe agitation, which started in the pharmacy and contined during the arrest explain the series of physiopathological phenomena which caused the death: (1) intense stimulation of the sympathetic nervous system (adrenergic neuro-hormonal system), (2) coronary-ischemic spasm, (3) fatal cardiac rhythm disorders.\u201d","36.On 14 and 16 December 2010 and 19 January 2011 the four police officers appeared for the first time as assisted witnesses.","37.On 8 April 2011 a reconstruction was organised, by the two investigating judges in charge of the case, in the presence of the civil parties\u2019 lawyers and the assisted witnesses. During the visit to the scene the forensic doctor stated that he had not noted any traumatic injury consistent with the violence described by the witness Ms S, the only injuries suggesting direct action by a third party being those corresponding to the punches administered to the stomach.","38.On 5 July 2011 Dr C., university professor, neurologist and psychiatrist, and head of a forensic medical department, examined M.B.\u2019s medical file at his psychiatrist\u2019s surgery, his medical file at the casualty department of Montb\u00e9liard Hospital, and the medical file kept by M.B.\u2019s general practioner. He stated that M.B., who had been receiving psychiatric care for many years, had been admitted to a hospital psychiatric unit several times and presented a psychotic disorder characterised by delusional notions of a betwitching, persecutory and interpretative type During his most recent hospital consultation he had been diagnosed with paranoid psychosis, which is related to schizophrenia. Dr C. concluded his report as follows:","\u201c[M.B.] presented a serious psychiatric disorder, namely, delusional psychosis, which explains the initial altercation with the pharmacist and his subsequent state of extreme agitation when the police officers attempted to induce him to leave the pharmacy. It is also possible that the intervention by the police was interpreted in a delusional manner.","When the SMUR [mobile emergency and intensive care service] intervened the criterion of seriousness was ... the fact that [M.B.] had been suffering from heart failure for approximately twenty minutes.","The superficial injuries observed, during the autopsy, to the right-hand side of the face and the front of the knees [appear to him] compatible with immobilisation on the floor of the van and the petechial injuries to the upper abdomen and the left abdominal region are compatible with punches administered as described in the autopsy report.\u201d","39.On 25 November 2011 the Ombudsman, an institution independent of the State, having the task, inter alia, of ensuring compliance by the police with their code of professional ethics, to whom a member of parliament had submitted the case, produced a report. He found that whilst the police officers had been very quick to seek the assistance of the fire brigade and the emergency medical service, it was regrettable that the situation had been inaccurately described by the incident room to the firemen prior to their intervention (the latter had been informed of M.B.\u2019s \u201cwithdrawal symptoms\u201d). He considered that there had been no imminent danger to people or property in the pharmacy and thus no urgent need to remove M.B. as soon as possible. He stated that the immobilisation and compression procedures carried out in the van had been dangerous and disproportionate. He described as \u201camouting to a serious infringement of human dignity and to inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3\u201d the techniques used by constables D. and M. to pin M.B. to the floor of the police van. The Ombudsman also noted conflicting statements by the police officers regarding whethere there had been physical violence other than the two diversionary blows and pointed out that no witnesses had been present throughout the entire incident. The Ombudsman concluded that the precipitation with which the police had acted had led them to make an erroneous assessment of M.B.\u2019s situation and to react in a stereotypical manner rather than adjust their conduct during the intervention, despite the fact that they knew that M.B. was receiving treatment for psychiatric disorders and that they had been able to observe abnormal behaviour on his part. He recommended reinforcing the initial and continuous training of police officers with regard to dealing with persons suffering from a mental disorder. Lastly, he recommended that disciplinary proceedings be brought against the four police officers who had arrested M.B. for \u201cdisproportionate use of force or failing to cease using such force\u201d.","40.On 18 January 2012 Dr T. and Dr F. supplemented their expert report of 10December 2010. They confirmed the conclusion of their earlier report and ruled out mechanical asphyxia: \u201cM.B. died suddenly of cardiac rhythm disorders, with no occurrence of mechanical asphyxia.\u201d They reiterated the part played by extreme stress in the death, stating that \u201cthe adrenergic stimulation was related to the extreme and prolonged emotional and physical stress. The stress lasted approximately one hour and thirty minutes, starting in the pharmacy and continuing throughout the arrest\u201d.","41.On 26 March 2012 the four police officers who had arrested M.B. were charged with manslaughter as a result of the manifestly wilful violation of a legal or statutory duty of caution and security.","42.On 5 November 2012 the the public prosecutor at the Montb\u00e9liard tribunal de grande instance filed submissions recommending that the charges be dropped.","43.On 21 December 2012 the investigating judges ruled that there was no case to answer. They found that whilst it was true that M.B. had been in a relatively calm state, the pharmacist had nonetheless considered his behaviour sufficiently disturbing to inform the police of the presence in his establishment of a person in an agitated state and suffering from psychiatric disorders. They observed that the police officers had not immediately used force and that, on being informed of M.B.\u2019s pyschiatric pathology, they had called the emergency medical service. The judges found that the evidence given by MsS. had been invalidated by the observations made during the reconstruction, the statements made by the pharmacists and the conclusions of the forensic doctor. The investigating judges observed as follows:","\u201c... pinning [M.B.] to the ground was not identified by the medical experts as the direct cause of the death. Whilst the intervention by the police inevitably generated stress, the victim had already been stressed well before their intervention. As the police did not know about [M.B.\u2019s] heart disease, of which he himself was unaware, they could not foresee that the combination of these two factors [stress and heart disease] could create a risk for the victim.\u201d","44.The judges considered that the force used by the police officers had been necessary and proportionate \u201ceven if being pinned down in the van, byL. and P. and M.\u2019s position \u2013 standing on [M.B.\u2019s] legs \u2013 may appear objectionable in absolute terms\u201d.","45.The applicants appealed against that ruling. On 16October 2013 the Investigation Division of the Besan\u00e7on Court of Appeal upheld the decision finding no case to answer on the following grounds:","\u201c[M.B.\u2019s death was due] according to the forensic doctor who carried out the initial autopsy ... to heart failure in circumstances of stress and effort acting on a predisposed heart condition; the second forensic report supported the finding of cutaneous injuries that could not have been a contributory cause of death and ruled out death due to chest compression; the experts indicated that the death of [M.B.] was, in all likelihood, the result of myocardial failure and natural causes; the anatomopathological report ... [led] the experts to conclude that [M.B.] had died suddenly of cardiac rhythm disorders owing to a coronary spasm triggered by a context of intense and prolonged emotional and physical stress, and formally ruled out mechanical asphyxia; lastly, the forensic and psychiatric expert ... concluded that [M.B.] presented a serious psychiatric disorder ... which explained the initial altercation with the pharmacist and the ensuing state of extreme agitation when the police officers attempted to induce him to leave the pharmacy, as their intervention could have been interpreted in a delusional manner\u201d.","46.With regard to the conditions of arrest, the Investigation Division found that the agitated state and the \u201crecalcitrant, not to say violent, behaviour of [M.B.] had obliged the police officers to use force and intervention techniques, which they had been taught, to restrain him\u201d, including the two punches administered by constable M. \u201cwho explained that he had used a technique taught to police officers to assist in handcuffing suspects by creating a surprise effect, that explanation being confirmed by his colleagues and instructor\u201d. The Investigation Division found that M.B. had been pinned to the floor of the van in conditions that had been \u201cadmittedly unusual, or even objectionable\u201d, but that these had preserved the respiratory capacity and ventilation of a person who \u201cwas continuing to oppose strong resistance to the police officers\u201d. It concluded that \u201cno inadvertence, lack of care, inattention, negligence or breach of a statutory or legal duty of protection or care, or gross negligence [could] be attributed [to the police officers] in the death of [M.B.]\u201d.","47.The applicants appealed on points of law. On 18 November 2014 the Court of Cassation dismissed their appeal on the following grounds:","\u201c... the Court of Cassation is satisfied on the basis of the grounds of the judgment being appealed that in upholding the decision finding no case to answer the Investigation Division, after analysing all the facts referred to it and addressing the main grounds in the statement of appeal, gave sufficient and coherent reasons for their finding that the investigation had been thorough and that there was insufficient evidence on which to convict the persons charged with of manslaughter or any other offence...\u201d","..."],"30100":["THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE","5.The applicant was born in 1971 and is serving a prison sentence in Valuyki, the Belgorod region.","A.The applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment in police custody","6.On 14 June 2006 Ms I., a university student, disappeared.","7.On 15 June 2006 her mother reported her missing to the Severnyy police department of the Kominternovskiy district of Voronezh, which initiated a search for her.According to the applicant, on the morning of 17June 2006 the police searched his flat without drawing up a record. They then searched his car.According to police records, the applicant\u2019s car was searched between 10.10 and 11.20 a.m. that day in connection with I.\u2019s disappearance by an investigator of the Severnyy police department.","8.After the search the applicant was taken to the Severnyy police department, where he was interviewed about I.\u2019s whereabouts. He stated that he knew I. and had last seen her on 14 June 2006 but was unaware of her whereabouts. A record of his \u201cexplanation\u201d (\u043e\u0431\u044a\u044f\u0441\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435) was drawn up by operative officer M.","9.According to the applicant, police officers beat him up in order to extract information from him about I.\u2019s whereabouts.","10.According to the Government, after being interviewed the applicant was released and later taken again to the police station. A record drawn up by operative officer M. states that at 9 p.m. on 17 June 2006 the applicant was taken in for committing petty hooliganism in the vicinity of the police station by swearing at passers-by. It is stated in the record that he had no injuries. According to a decision delivered by the acting head of the Severnyy police department in administrative proceedings conducted the same day, the applicant was found guilty of petty hooliganism and fined. At 11.50 p.m. that evening his administrative detention was ordered by the police.","11.The applicant was detained at the Severnyy police department until 10.40 a.m. on 19 June 2006. He was then taken to the Sovetskiy police department, where further operative measures in connection with I.\u2019s disappearance were carried out.","12.According to the applicant, he was subjected to beatings and given electric shocks by police officers of the Sovetskiy police department in order to make him give information about I.\u2019s whereabouts. He allegedly had a cap put on his head so that he could not see anything and was taken by car out of town, where he was beaten up and given electric shocks with wires attached to his little fingers. His mouth was taped so that he would not scream. When he was ready to give a statement in order to stop the torture, he was taken to a river bank and shown a dead body. He was thrown on the ground and kicked. When taken back to the Sovetskiy police department, he made a confession statement to an investigator in the presence of the same police officers who had ill\u2011treated him.","13.According to the applicant\u2019s \u201cexplanation\u201d (\u043e\u0431\u044a\u044f\u0441\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435) given to investigator S. of the Sovetskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office of Voronezh on 19 June 2006, he confessed to the murder of I. by strangulation. He also stated that he had been beaten up and had received all his injuries at the Severnyy police department, but had not been subjected to any ill\u2011treatment at the Sovetskiy police department, and had no complaints against its officers. The applicant was then taken to the place where he had allegedly hidden I.\u2019s body. According to a record drawn up by investigator S., an examination of the place was carried out between 11 p.m. and midnight, and a woman\u2019s body was recovered.","14.At 12.50 a.m. on 20 June 2006 investigator S. arrested the applicant as a suspect and questioned him between 1 and 1.50 a.m., and then between 11 and 11.15 a.m., in the presence of P., a State-appointed lawyer invited by investigator S. The applicant reiterated his earlier self\u2011incriminating statements, as well as the statements concerning his ill\u2011treatment at the Severnyy police department. He also stated that he had burnt I.\u2019s body after he had strangled her. Between 11.30 a.m. and 1.32p.m. his statements were verified at the scene of the crime by investigator S. in the presence of lawyer P. and operative officers of the Sovetskiy police department. The applicant also showed where he had hidden the victim\u2019s mobile telephone.","15.On 20 June 2006 investigator S. ordered a forensic medical examination of the applicant. That day an operative officer of the Sovetskiy police department took him to the Voronezh Regional Forensic Medical Bureau. An expert recorded multiple bruises and abrasions on his face, head, trunk and upper and lower extremities. The applicant stated that the injuries had been inflicted after his arrest on 17June 2006 by police officers who had punched him in the head and different parts of his body and beaten him with a rubber baton on the back and legs. The expert concluded that the injuries could have been inflicted by a blunt object between one and three days before the examination.","16.On 21 June 2006 the applicant was questioned as an accused by investigator S. in the presence of lawyer P. He confirmed his earlier self\u2011incriminating statements and statements concerning his alleged ill\u2011treatment at the Severnyy police department.","17.On the same day the Sovetskiy District Court of Voronezh (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) ordered the applicant\u2019s detention at a hearing in the presence of lawyer P. He was placed in detention facility SIZO-36\/1. In the criminal proceedings that followed the applicant was represented by a lawyer hired for him by his family.","18.On 28 June 2006 investigator S. communicated the applicant\u2019s allegations concerning the unlawful actions of the police officers from the Severnyy police department to the Kominternovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office of Voronezh. An investigator of that prosecutor\u2019s office carried out a pre-investigation inquiry and refused to institute criminal proceedings into the applicant\u2019s complaint. His two decisions of 1July and 2 August 2006 were annulled by his superiors on the grounds that they had been based on an incomplete inquiry.","19.In the most recent refusal of 29 September 2006 to institute criminal proceedings for lack of evidence that the officers of the Severnyy police department had committed a crime, the investigator established the facts as follows, relying on the police officers\u2019 statements.On 17June 2006 certain operative officers of the criminal search unit of the Severnyy police department carried out operational-search activities in connection with I.\u2019s disappearance. In order to check the applicant\u2019s involvement in I.\u2019s disappearance they took him to the Severnyy police department with his consent and interviewed him. After receiving his \u201cexplanation\u201d M. released him. That evening M. took him to the police station again for swearing on the street near the police station. From 9.50p.m. on 17 June until 10.40 a.m. on 19June 2006 the applicant was detained in a cell for administrative offenders. He was then taken to the Sovetskiy police department. No physical force was used against him, and no complaints were made by him.","20.The investigator noted that on the two occasions the applicant had been taken to the Severnyy police department \u2013 first, for giving statements in relation to I.\u2019s disappearance, and second, for having committed the administrative offence \u2013 he had had no injuries. In the same decision the investigator suggested that the applicant\u2019s injuries could have been inflicted by a third party outside the Severnyy police department, between 17 and 19June 2006, between one and three days before his medical examination by the forensic expert on 20 June 2006.","21.On an unspecified date the applicant also complained about the unlawful actions of officers of the Sovetskiy police department, explaining that he had blamed the officers of the Severnyy police department for all his injuries for fear of reprisals from the officers of the Sovetskiy department, in whose hands he had been at the time. An investigator of the Sovetskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office of Voronezh carried out a pre\u2011investigation inquiry and refused to institute criminal proceedings into the applicant\u2019s complaint. His decision of 10 August 2006 was annulled by his superior as unlawful and unfounded.","22.In the most recent refusal of 21 September 2006 to institute criminal proceedings for lack of evidence that a crime had been committed, the investigator found, relying on statements by the operative officers of the Sovetskiy police department, that the applicant had been taken to the station with his consent and had confessed to the murder of I. He had also shown where he had hidden her body voluntarily, without any coercion.","23.An appeal by the applicant of 17 May 2007 against the investigators\u2019 decisions was not examined by the District Court because by that time he had been convicted by a final judgment, as was stated by the court in a letter of 4 June 2007.","B.The applicant\u2019s trial","24.At his trial the applicant pleaded innocent and submitted that he had given the self-incriminating statements at the preliminary investigation stage as a result of physical coercion by officers of the Severnyy and Sovetskiy police departments.His counsel requested that the records of the investigative measures carried out on 19, 20 and 21June 2006 be declared inadmissible, arguing, inter alia, that they had been obtained in the presence of lawyer P., who had been invited by investigator S. in breach of the relevant procedure and without the applicant\u2019s consent.","25.The District Court dismissed the request, noting that all investigative measures since the applicant\u2019s arrest as a suspect on 20 June 2006 had been carried out in the presence of lawyer P. Moreover, there was no evidence that the applicant had rejected her services. Following his confession, recorded in his \u201cexplanation\u201d to the investigator of 19June 2006, the applicant had shown where he had hidden I.\u2019s body, which had not required the presence of a lawyer. The court based its findings on the self\u2011incriminating statements given by the applicant in the preliminary investigation, noting that his allegations of ill\u2011treatment in police custody had been examined and dismissed by the Sovetskiy and Kominternovskiy district prosecutor\u2019s offices in decisions of 21 and 29 September 2006 respectively.","26.On 25 October 2006 the District Court convicted the applicant of aggravated murder and sentenced him to twelve years\u2019 imprisonment.","27.On 30 November 2006 the Council of the Voronezh Regional Bar Association examined a disciplinary case against lawyer P. which originated in a complaint by the applicant. It found that P. had defended the applicant at investigator S.\u2019s direct invitation, surpassing the Council of the Voronezh Regional Bar Association in breach of the relevant procedure. P. was subjected to disciplinary liability in the form of a warning. On 5 December 2006 the Council informed the applicant of its decision, explaining that there was nothing to suggest that P. had failed to properly defend the applicant. However, it had established a breach of the procedure for providing legal assistance at the invitation of the investigating authorities.","28.On 6 February 2007 the Voronezh Regional Court upheld the judgment on an appeal by the applicant, fully endorsing the trial court\u2019s findings.","29.Applications by the applicant for supervisory review of his case were dismissed by the Regional Court."],"30130":["6.The applicant was born in 1965. When he lodged his application he was in prison serving a sentence for economic offences.","A.The applicant\u2019s imprisonment and applications for an interruption of the sentence on medical grounds","7.In 2002 the National Anti-Corruption Prosecution Service commenced proceedings against the applicant on charges of involvement in a vast criminal network operating in the economic field, involving several dozen individuals and some one hundred business companies. With the complicity of bank employees, fraudulent appropriations were granted to those companies, which money was then misused for the benefit of the accused.","8.By final judgment of 28 February 2013 the High Court of Cassation and Justice convicted the applicant on conspiracy charges, sentencing him to three years, four months\u2019 imprisonment.","9.Meanwhile, in November 2012, the applicant had been diagnosed with prostate cancer. At that time the illness had already reached an advanced stage and the applicant displayed bone metastases, brain haematoma and intraocular haemorrhages. On 27November 2012 the applicant had been admitted to the Bucharest Institute of Oncology, from which he had been discharged on 11 January 2013. From 14 to 18 January 2013 he had once again been admitted to hospital. He had undergone prostate surgery and begun chemotherapy. He had subsequently had several short stays in hospital. In January 2013 the diagnosis reached by the oncologist had emphasised the seriousness of the applicant\u2019s condition. The prognosis was that he had a short time to live given that the disease had spread to the bone, for which condition the existing treatment was insufficient. On 26February 2013 the applicant was examined by a medical board, which issued him with a certificate of severe disability.","10.On 28 February 2013 the applicant was taken into Bac\u0103u Hospital oncology department. His state had worsened and he was suffering from bone pain. The applicant continued his chemotherapy and remained in hospital until 4 March 2013, when he was handed over to police officers who had come to escort him to Bac\u0103u Prison where he was to begin serving his sentence.","11.On the same day the applicant, through the intermediary of his lawyer, applied to the Bac\u0103u County Court for an interruption of his prison sentence on health grounds. He pointed out that since he could not receive his treatment in prison, his life would be in danger.","12.On 27 March 2013 he was transferred to the Rahova Prison Hospital. On 5 April 2013 he returned to Bac\u0103u Prison. On 15 April 2013 he was readmitted to the Rahova Prison Hospital, and then transferred back to Bac\u0103u prison on 28 May 2013.","13.The court commissioned a report on the applicant\u2019s condition from a board of the National Institute of Forensic Medicine. At the board\u2019s request, the applicant underwent several medical examinations, which showed that his condition required radiotherapy sessions and further chemotherapy. Furthermore, it transpired from the medical documents made available to the committee that the applicant had had chemotherapy sessions at Bac\u0103u Hospital on 12 April 2013 and at the Bucharest Institute of Oncology on 10 and 17 May 2013.","14.In its report of 19 June 2013 the board concluded that the applicant\u2019s survival depended on the medical care with which he was being provided and a complex form of treatment which he could only receive in specialised clinics operating under the Ministry of Health. Consequently, it considered that the court had to order either an interruption of the applicant\u2019s sentence or his hospitalisation under supervision in one of the aforementioned establishments.","15.On 25 June 2013 the court allowed the applicant\u2019s request and ordered a three-month interruption of his sentence. Having regard to the seriousness of the applicant\u2019s illness, it ruled that hospitalisation under supervision would considerably reduce his chances of survival and recovery owing to the stress and mental suffering caused by the continued execution of his sentence. Moreover, the court emphasised that the applicant posed no threat to public order, that the sentence, one third of which had already been served, was reasonably short and that the applicant\u2019s conduct had been good throughout the criminal proceedings. The prosecution appealed.","16.The applicant was released on the same day. On 4 and 19 July 2013 he underwent chemotherapy at Bac\u0103u Hospital and continued the treatment on 1 and 16 August 2013 at the Bucharest Institute of Oncology.","17.On 29 August 2013 the Bac\u0103u Court of Appeal considered the prosecution appeal. By final judgment delivered the same day, it allowed the appeal and dismissed the applicant\u2019s request. Relying on Articles 455 and 453 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereafter \u201ctheCPP\u201d - see paragraph 34 below), the Court of Appeal ruled that the interruption of the applicant\u2019s sentence was unjustified provided that his treatment could continue, under guard, in a civil hospital. In a dissenting opinion, one of the judges on the trial bench considered that the sentence should be interrupted on humanitarian grounds; consequently, having regard to the applicant\u2019s condition, he considered that his continued detention was in breach of the proportionality principle and reduced his chances of survival.","18.On 31 August 2013 the applicant was imprisoned in Bac\u0103u to serve his sentence. On 24 September 2013 he was transferred to Vaslui Prison. On 27 September 2013 he was admitted to the Rahova Prison hospital. On 3 October 2013 he returned to Vaslui Prison.","19.On 4October 2013 the applicant was admitted to T\u00e2rgu Ocna Prison hospital, diagnosed with \u201cprostatic neoplasia with bone and brain metastases\u201d. On the same day, noting the deterioration in the applicant\u2019s general condition, a multidisciplinary team from the T\u00e2rgu Ocna Prison hospital placed a prisoner on constant standby to assist the applicant in his everyday activities. That prisoner reportedly assisted the applicant up until the day of his last transfer to Bac\u0103u Hospital (see paragraph 28 below).","20.On 9 October 2013 the applicant was once again transferred to Bac\u0103u Prison, from whence he was taken, on the same day, to the Bac\u0103u Hospital oncology department. He was unable to move, was suffering from severe bone pain and had almost completely lost his sight and hearing. Furthermore, he was also showing signs of severe depression. His condition was so severe that he could no longer undergo chemotherapy, which was replaced by palliative care.","21.The applicant remained in the Bac\u0103u Hospital oncology department until 24 October 2013, when he was transferred to Ia\u015fi Prison. On 28October 2013 he was taken into the Ia\u015fi Regional Institute of Oncology for five palliative radiotherapy sessions geared to alleviating his bone pain. He remained in the institute until 1 November 2013. He lost his sight completely and his depression continued.","22.On 5 November 2013 he was transferred to Vaslui Prison. On 6November 2013 he was admitted to the T\u00e2rgu Ocna Prison hospital where he stayed until 12 November 2013, when he was transferred to Bac\u0103u Prison.","23.On 22 November 2013 the judge delegated to Bac\u0103u Prison granted the applicant the most favourable possible detention regime, allowing him to move around inside prison and to take part in outdoor activities unsupervised.","24.Still on 22 November 2013, the applicant was admitted to the Bac\u0103u Hospital oncology department. The senior medical officer said that the applicant\u2019s condition could deteriorate suddenly and that he therefore needed round-the-clock medical care. From 25 to 27November 2013 the applicant received palliative care in the same hospital before being transferred to Bac\u0103u Prison and then to the T\u00e2rgu Ocna Prison hospital.","25.In reply to a request from the applicant to be released on licence, the Prison Director told him that his request would be examined in 2015.","26.The applicant wrote to the President of the Romanian Republic and the Director of T\u00e2rgu Ocna Prison to request their assistance regarding his release. He explained that he was dying and that he wanted to have his family present. He pointed out that he was now bedridden, blind and deaf, and that there was no one in prison to assist him in his everyday activities. He added that the doctors had been reluctant to treat him because had was keep under guard and in handcuffs.","27.The National Administration of Prison Authorities replied that only a court could order his release.","28.On 4 December 2013 the applicant was transferred to Bac\u0103u Prison and then to Bac\u0103u Hospital, where he remained until 7 December 2013. On that date he was transferred to the T\u00e2rgu Ocna Prison Hospital. On 19December 2013 he returned to Bac\u0103u Prison and the same day was admitted to the Bac\u0103u Hospital oncology department. He died there on 24December 2013.","B.The medical reports supplied by thehospitals","29.It transpires from the medical files included in the case file that between 24January 2013 and 24 December 2013, the date of his death, the applicant was admitted to Bac\u0103u hospital eighteen times, including several hospital stays lasting several days. During those stays he had some fifteen chemotherapy sessions, usually at fortnightly intervals: prior to 24 October 2013 in the framework of the cancer treatment, and after that date, in the framework of palliative treatment. He also received various types of treatment for the illnesses caused by the metastatic progression of his prostate cancer.","30.In a report drawn up at the Government agent\u2019s request, the senior medical officer at the Bac\u0103u Hospital oncology department highlighted certain dysfunctions in the administration of the treatment. Drawing on the medical files relating to the applicant\u2019s stays in that hospital, he pointed out that on 14 March 2013 the applicant had begun the chemotherapy without having received the radiotherapy recommended by the doctors in his department. He added that the chemotherapy session scheduled for between 28 and 30 March 2013 had not taken place because the applicant had been absent, having been transferred to the Bucharest Institute of Oncology for examinations. Lastly, he noted that on 18September 2013 the applicant had arrived late at the hospital to continue his chemotherapy. Furthermore, when the applicant had been hospitalised, he had been guarded by two police officers and had remained handcuffed to the bed, even after he had become blind and deaf and was suffering extreme bone pain.","31.In a report of 21 September 2015, the Ia\u015fi Regional Institute of Oncology pointed out that between 28October and 1 November 2013, the applicant had had five radiotherapy sessions, had kept the medical appointments made and had been neither handcuffed nor immobilised during those sessions.","32.In a report of 22 September 2015, the Bucharest Institute of Oncology pointed out that the applicant had been hospitalised several times in the institute between 27 November 2012 and 24 May 2013, primarily for chemotherapy. The institute\u2019s senior medical officer stated in the report that the applicant had duly respected all his medical appointments and that during his stays at the institute he had not been constrained but had been guarded by prison officers.","C.The applicant\u2019s conditions of detention","33.According to the information provided by the prison authorities, the applicant had been held in Bac\u0103u Prison in a cell measuring 33 m2, which he had shared with six other prisoners. At Rahova Prison hospital he had shared a 38-m2 cell with four other prisoners. At Vaslui Prison, where he was held from 24 to 27 September, from 3 to 4 October and from 5 to 6November 2013, he had occupied a 14.75-m2 cell with six other prisoners. At T\u00e2rgu Ocna Prison hospital he had been held in a 48-m2 cell with eight other prisoners. At Ia\u015fi Prison he had remained from 24 October to 5 November 2013 in a 15.92-m2 cell with three other prisoners."],"30175":["7.The applicant was born in 1973, lives in Austria since 2001 and is currently in detention pending extradition at Vienna-Josefstadt Prison.","8.The application concerns proceedings for extradition from Austria to Kosovo, which have the following background:","9.S.Lu. is the former husband of the applicant\u2019s sister, T.L. In the course of an argument on 9 October 2001, S.Lu. stabbed the applicant in the chest. On 27 May 2002 S.Lu. was convicted in Austria of attempted intentional homicide (versuchter Totschlag) committed in a comprehensible state of emotion (in einer allgemein begreiflichen heftigen Gem\u00fctsbewegung) under Articles 15 and 76 of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) and sentenced to five years\u2019 imprisonment. The applicant testified as a witness during that trial.","10.After S.Lu. was released from prison in 2005, the applicant\u2019s sister reported him to the police for having repeatedly raped her during their marriage, and for threatening to kill her and her family. Out of fear of her husband, she changed her and her children\u2019s names. An order to determine S.Lu.\u2019s whereabouts (Ausschreibung zur Aufenthaltsbestimmung) was issued by the Vienna public prosecutor\u2019s office in 2008 and is in effect until 2February 2018.","11.On the basis of an international arrest warrant issued by the Mitrovica District Court (Kosovo) on 26 November 2010 and 6 May 2011, the applicant was apprehended and taken into detention pending extradition by a decision of the Vienna Regional Criminal Court (Straflandesgericht Wien \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Criminal Court\u201d) of 15 January 2016. On 20January 2016 the Ministry of Justice of Kosovo requested the applicant\u2019s extradition. According to the arrest warrant, the applicant was suspected of aggravated murder under Article 147 \u00a7 7 in conjunction with Article 24 of the Kosovo Criminal Code. He had allegedly ordered L.Q. in July 2010 to murder S.Lu. (his former brother-in-law) for a payment of 30,000 euros (EUR). On 3 August 2010 L.Q. fired gunshots at a car in the vicinity of the intended victim S.Lu., but instead killed N.Lu., S.Lu.\u2019s cousin.","12.During the extradition proceedings, the applicant alleged that he had nothing to do with the murder in Kosovo. He claimed that the accusations had been invented by S.Lu. as revenge for the applicant\u2019s having testified against him during the criminal proceedings in Austria. Furthermore, the \u201cLu. clan\u201d (the family of S.Lu.) was very influential in Kosovo and had connections to the highest Government officials and the justice authorities there, which is why the applicant could not expect a fair trial in that jurisdiction. In addition, the conditions of detention in Kosovo prisons were deplorable and would amount to torture, inhuman and degrading treatment. Because of the threat emanating from S.Lu. and his family, the applicant would have to fear for his life there. They could easily get to him in prison by using their connections.","13.On 24 February 2016, after having held an oral hearing, the Criminal Court declared the applicant\u2019s extradition to Kosovo permissible. It held that during the extradition proceedings, the court was not called on to examine whether the applicant was guilty or innocent, but merely to assess whether there was enough evidence to raise suspicions against him, which according to the documents submitted by the Kosovo authorities was the case. None of the evidence offered by the applicant had been capable of dispelling these suspicions immediately and without doubt, as would have been required by section 33(2) of the Extradition and Legal Aid Act (Auslieferungs- und Rechtshilfegesetz \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe Extradition Act\u201d). The fact that S.Lu. had been convicted of attempted intentional homicide in 2002 and the allegation that he wanted to take revenge on the applicant did not dispell the suspicion either. Furthermore, the court remarked that S.Lu.\u2019s cousin had actually been killed, which called into question the applicant\u2019s theory of that being a contrived story. It could equally be argued that the applicant had wanted to take revenge on S.Lu. for stabbing him. Concerning the applicant\u2019s fear for his life in Kosovo, the court stated that the mere possibility of inhuman or degrading treatment did not suffice. The applicant had failed to adduce specific evidence of an actual, individual threat of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. Furthermore, in case of extradition to a member state of the Convention, the responsibility of the extraditing state was limited, as the person concerned could seek protection against a violation of the Convention in the receiving state.","14.On 24 March 2016 the applicant appealed. He submitted that if extradited to Kosovo, he risked treatment contrary to Article 3, because Lu. Clan wished to take revenge on him. In fact, Sm. Lu., a very influential member of that clan, was detained at Mitrovica prison and following extradition to Kosovo, he would be detained at that prison as well. Security in prison in Kosovo was a problem, as prisoners became frequently victims of aggression, and he would therefore also risk to become the victim of an assault.","15.On 31 May 2016 the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht Wien \u2011 hereinafter \u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal. It confirmed the Criminal Court\u2019s finding that the applicant had failed to substantiate a real and individual risk of being subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, or that the Kosovo authorities would not be able to protect him from third, private parties. Furthermore, members of the allegedly influential Lu. clan were themselves imprisoned in Kosovo. In particular, on 21 January 2008 S.Lu. was convicted in Kosovo for issuing a dangerous threat against the applicant, which demonstrated that the Kosovo authorities were indeed capable of taking adequate measures to protect the applicant. Moreover, the Lu. clan could not be that influential if it was not capable of keeping its own members out of prison. Concerning the conditions of detention, the court held that the report on Kosovo by the Committee for the Prevention of Torture (hereinafter \u201cthe CPT\u201d) of 2011 (see paragraph 30 below) did not state that ill-treatment was the rule in Kosovo prisons, but that there were merely sporadic incidents of violence. The mere possibility of ill-treatment by prison officers did not suffice to stop the applicant\u2019s extradition. In relation to the material conditions of detention in Mitrovica Detention Centre, where the applicant alleged he would most likely be held if extradited, the Court of Appeal again quoted the above-mentioned CPT report of 2011, where it was found that inmates were able to move freely within that facility during the day and could exercise outside on a daily basis for three and a half hours, and that fitness and computer rooms have recently been installed.","16.On 13 June 2016 the Austrian Federal Minister of Justice (Justizminister) approved the applicant\u2019s extradition to Kosovo.","17.On 20 June 2016 the applicant requested that the Court indicate to the Austrian Government to stay his extradition to Kosovo under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. He complained under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention that he would run the risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or even death, as the Lu. clan wanted to take revenge on him and the Kosovo authorities were not willing or able to afford him protection.","18.On 22 June 2016 the Court granted the applicant\u2019s request.","19.On 17 June 2016 the applicant lodged applications for the reopening (Wiederaufnahme) of the extradition proceedings and a stay of the extradition with the Criminal Court. He produced a certified declaration by L.Q., who had retracted his previous confession to the police that the applicant had ordered the murder of S.Lu. He asserted that he had been tortured by the Kosovo police during his questioning and had been pressured into blaming the applicant for ordering the murder. L.Q. alleged that he had fallen unconscious several times because of the \u201cmental and physical torture\u201d. L.Q. averred that he did not even know the applicant in person. The applicant further submitted into evidence several sworn statements from family members and friends, who attested that his life was in danger in Kosovo because of threats from S.Lu. and his clan.","20.On 23 June 2016 the Criminal Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s applications. It held that in accordance with section 33(2) of the Extradition Act, the applicant had failed to adduce evidence which would have been capable of immediately dispelling the suspicion against him raised in the extradition request. L.Q.\u2019s declaration did not constitute objective evidence and did not indicate any violations in Kosovo of the applicant\u2019s rights under the Convention either. The applicant appealed.","21.On 18 July 2016 the applicant lodged an application for a renewal (Erneuerung) of the extradition proceedings with the Supreme Court under Article 363a of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung \u2013 hereinafter \u201cthe CCP\u201d), requesting suspensive effect at the same time.","22.On 6 September 2016 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant\u2019s application. It found that the new evidence the applicant had produced in the proceedings before it were a matter for the pending reopening proceedings, not for requesting a renewal of the extradition proceedings. In relation to the alleged violations of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention in the event of his extradition, the Supreme Court found that mere allegations referencing general reports on the human rights situation were not capable of substantiating a real and immediate risk to the applicant under these provisions. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the applicant did not have a right under the law to request suspensive effect, which is why that request had to be rejected.","23.On 24 January 2017 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the Criminal Court\u2019s decision of 23 June 2016 (see paragraph20 above). The court found that the applicant had failed to produce objective evidence which would have indicated a real and immediate risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention if extradited to Kosovo and therefore would have warranted a reopening of the extradition proceedings. While the sworn statement by L.Q. in principle raised doubts in relation to the suspicions against the applicant, it had not constituted the only evidence against him. More pertinent had been the fact that, during the criminal proceedings against L.Q. in Kosovo, a microcassette had been put into evidence by S.Lu. which had allegedly contained a conversation confirming his statements that the applicant had been to blame for the murder. In addition, L.Q.\u2019s initial incriminating statements against the applicant had been made in the presence of his lawyer. Moreover, L.Q. had not specified what exactly the police had allegedly done to him, which had made it impossible to evaluate whether the alleged treatment had actually amounted to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. The Court of Appeal reiterated that it was in any event for the Kosovo courts to evaluate the evidence against the applicant. In sum, it confirmed that the statement by L.Q. was not capable of immediately dispelling the suspicion against the applicant on which the extradition request was based. Lastly, the Court of Appeal found that despite not being a State Party to the Convention or the Council of Europe, Article 22 of the Constitution of Kosovo granted the Convention direct effect under and superiority to national law, therefore domestic law equally offered protection from violations of the Convention. The Court of Appeal\u2019s decision to dismiss the applicant\u2019s appeal was served on his counsel on 30January 2017."],"30174":["5.The five applicants are Iraqi nationals. They now live in Switzerland, where they were granted asylum in July 2017 (see paragraph 31 below). The first and second applicants, Mr S.F. and Mrs W.O., born respectively in 1975 and 1978, are spouses. The other three applicants, Mr Y.F., Mr S.F. and Mr A.F., born respectively in 1999, 2004 and 2014, are their sons.","A.The applicants\u2019 interception and arrest","6.On 14 August 2015 the applicants, who had fled from Iraq, covertly crossed the Turkish-Bulgarian border. They were travelling with four other families. From there, they took taxis which drove them to the outskirts of Sofia, where they slept under the open sky for two nights. On 17 August 2015, they hired other taxis to drive them to the Bulgarian-Serbian border, somewhere around the town of Bregovo. Shortly before the border, the applicants switched cars, getting into a Toyota sports utility vehicle, which was supposed to take them through a wooded area to the border itself. They intended to cross that border covertly as well, and from there continue towards Western Europe.","7.At that time, the second applicant was three months pregnant.","8.According to media reports, over the last few years the above\u2011mentioned route has been a popular one for migrants trying to cross Bulgaria covertly on their way to Western Europe. According to a report submitted by the Government, in August 2015 the Bulgarian border police intercepted 350 adult migrants and 132 minor migrants near Bregovo and took them into custody.","9.In the late afternoon of 17 August 2015 the applicants were driven in the Toyota towards the Bulgarian-Serbian border near the village of Rabrovo, which is about fifteen kilometres south of Bregovo, twenty-five kilometres west of the town of Vidin, and about two kilometres from the border. It was also transporting the four other families; together with the applicants, it carried a total of eighteen passengers, eight of whom were minors.","10.At about 5 p.m., when the Toyota was just a few metres away from the border, two officers of the Bulgarian border police intercepted it. The driver fled. One of the officers gave chase, while the other ordered all the passengers to step out of the vehicle. The first officer could not catch up with the driver and came back. According to the applicants, he was apparently annoyed about his inability to detain the driver and hit one of the passengers. The applicants submitted that they had been afraid that he might hit them as well.","11.Half an hour later, two more officers came to the scene; subsequently, a bus, with a driver and a photographer, also arrived. According to the applicants, the officers insulted the arrestees, called them \u201cmice\u201d (the applicants did not specify in what language), and made insulting gestures. They ordered the applicants and the other passengers to get into the bus and drove them to the Bregovo Border Police Department\u2019s detention facility in Vidin. According to the applicants, the drive took about an hour. According to the Government, the drive could not have taken less than three hours. The preparation of the documents relating to the applicants\u2019 arrest then took another hour, and the written declarations that they had been acquainted with their rights were stamped as having been signed at 9 p.m. The applicants could not have therefore been placed in their cell earlier than 10 p.m.","B.The applicants\u2019 detention in Vidin","12.Upon their arrival at the border police\u2019s detention facility in Vidin, the applicants were searched. According to them, all their effects \u2013 including travelling bags, mobile telephones, money, food, and even the fifth applicant\u2019s nappies, baby bottle and milk \u2013 were taken away from them, except for a mobile telephone belonging to the third or the fourth applicant, which they managed to conceal. According to a search report submitted by the Government, when searching the second applicant the authorities seized from her four mobile telephones, SIM cards, a USB flash drive, two digital video disks and cash. The Government also pointed out that in a video submitted by the applicants (see paragraph 15 below), travel bags and personal effects were visible inside their cell.","13.After the search, the arrestees were split into two groups. The applicants and another family were put in one cell, and the others in an adjoining one. In the application form, the applicants stated that both cells were on the detention facility\u2019s second floor.","14.According to the applicants, the cell was hot and its window could not be opened.","15.The applicants also submitted a video, which according to them had been shot with the mobile telephone that they had managed to conceal during the search (see paragraph 12 above). It shows that the cell was at ground level, about 4 by 4 metres, with a large double window (secured on the inside by a mesh grille), an open door, and a padlocked metal grille on the door. In the video the cell looks run-down, with dilapidated walls, paint coming off the ceiling in flakes, and a dirty floor partly covered with dirty (and in places damp) cardboard sheets. The furniture consists of two old and dilapidated bunk beds and a single bed, with four or five bare soiled mattresses. Two of the mattresses are on the floor, one is on the single bed, and one is on the bottom bunk of one of the bunk beds. A single crumpled\u2011up bed sheet lies on one of the mattresses on the floor. Personal effects, such as a small shoulder bag, training shoes and some litter, are strewn about. Other random objects \u2013 food remains, empty plastic bottles, rubbish and a torn blanket \u2013 are piled up in a corner. The third and fourth applicants can be seen sitting on one of the bunk beds, whereas the fifth applicant (the toddler) can at first be seen sitting on the floor beside the door and then being picked up and carried around by the first applicant. Apart from the five applicants, three other people can be seen in the cell: a middle\u2011aged woman lying on the single bed, a boy (perhaps two or three years old), and the man shooting the video.","16.The video was submitted by the applicants on a digital video disk containing two video files. One is in .mpg format and bears a time stamp according to which it was last modified at 5.36 p.m. on 17 September \u200e2015; and the other is in .mp4 format and bears a time stamp according to which it was last modified at 3.27 p.m. on 15 December 2015. The footage in both files is identical, except that: (a) the faces of the applicants in the first one have been pixelated (whereas in the second they have not); (b) the running time of the first video is one minute and twenty-one seconds (whereas that of the second is one minute and thirty-two seconds, as it continues for another ten seconds); and (c) in the first file the footage is horizontal whereas in the second it is rotated to the right at a ninety-degree angle. The footage in the first file has a definition of 1,280 by 720 pixels and is at twenty-four frames per second, whereas that in the second file has a definition of 1,920 by 1,080 pixels and is at twenty-nine frames per second.","17.The applicants explained that the above-mentioned dates and times corresponded with when they had copied the video files in Switzerland, and that they had in fact recorded the original video on 18 August 2015, at about noon. Since they had taken the SIM cards out of the mobile telephone several times in the course of their journey and then re-inserted them, the telephone had not indicated the correct time and date, making it impossible to pinpoint the exact date and time when the video had been recorded.","18.In a letter to the Government Agent, an official from the Migration Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Sofia, having compared the video footage with the photographs in the applicants\u2019 migration files, stated that he could confirm that the applicants were indeed the people featured in the video.","19.According to the Government, the border police\u2019s detention facility in Vidin was equipped in accordance with the relevant regulations. They did not provide further details in that respect.","20.According to the applicants, after being put in the cell, they were not given anything to eat or drink, or allowed to go to the toilet. Since there was no toilet or a bucket in the cell, they had to urinate onto the floor. The Government did not comment on that point.","21.About four hours later, at about 10 p.m., officers came and took the first applicant to another building in order to take his picture and to digitally fingerprint him. After that, the officers took out the second applicant for fingerprinting. After the fingerprinting procedure, the officers left the applicants in the cell for the night.","22.Between 10.30 a.m. and 11 a.m. and between 11 a.m. and 11.30 a.m. the next day, 18 August 2015, a border police investigator interviewed respectively the first and the second applicants. The interviews were conducted in English and translated into Bulgarian with the help of an interpreter.","23.According to the applicants, after the interview the second applicant asked the guards to give her back her bag, so that she could prepare a baby bottle for her toddler (the fifth applicant), and the guards did so. The Government did not comment on that point.","24.After that, the guards took the applicants one by one out of the cell to go to the toilet.","25.According to the applicants, later that day, a ten-month-old child in the adjoining cell touched an electrical wire and suffered an electric shock. That caused panic among the detainees, and the guards allowed all of them out of their cells. An ambulance was called. When hearing that the applicants had not had anything to eat or drink since their arrest, the nurse who came with the ambulance argued with the guards and took the second applicant and her youngest child, the fifth applicant, to a hospital in Vidin, where the second applicant was examined by a gynaecologist between 8.05p.m. and 8.35 p.m., and the fifth applicant was examined by a paediatrician between 8.20 p.m. and 8.40 p.m. Two or three hours later they were taken back to the detention facility.","26.According to the applicants, at that point the guards told them that they would give them food if they paid for it; the guards then took money from their bags and gave them two loaves of bread, a yoghurt, four bottles of Coca-Cola, one kilogram of tomatoes, one kilogram of cucumbers, one kilogram of bananas, and a small piece of pat\u00e9. According to the Government, the applicants were provided with food and water, in accordance with the relevant regulations. In support of their assertion, the Government submitted a table setting out the prescribed daily rations for adult and minor detained migrants and a report, drawn up by the head of the Bregovo Border Police Department on 1 September 2015, which listed the names of all migrants \u2013 including the applicants \u2013 which had been detained in the Department\u2019s detention facility in Vidin during the month of August2015 and provided with food there.","27.Then, at about 10 p.m. or 11 p.m., the applicants were put back in the cell. According to them, they were allowed to go to the toilet before that, but had not been able to do so during the night. The Government did not comment on that point.","28.The next day, 19 August 2015, the applicants were served with orders for the first and second applicants\u2019 removal from Bulgaria and for their detention pending removal, all issued the previous day. It does not appear that separate orders were issued with respect to the third, fourth and fifth applicants, who were mentioned as accompanied minors in the orders for the first and second applicants\u2019 detention (see paragraph 33 below).","C.Ensuing developments","29.According to the applicants, at about midday on 19 August 2015 they were given back their belongings and driven to an immigration detention facility in Sofia. According to the Government, that happened much earlier that day, at about 6 a.m. or 7 a.m., since the relevant records showed that the applicants had been placed in the detention facility in Sofia at 2.45 p.m., and the normal travel time between the two facilities was about six or seven hours.","30.On 24 August 2015 the applicants sought international protection in Bulgaria. Their applications were registered by the State Agency for Refugees on 31 August 2015, and they were released from the immigration detention facility in Sofia and settled in an open facility for the accommodation of asylum-seekers. On 23 September 2015 those proceedings were, however, discontinued because the applicants had vanished from the facility.","31.In the meantime, the applicants made their way to Switzerland, where they likewise sought international protection on 8 September 2015. On 8 January 2016 the Swiss authorities decided not to examine their applications but rather to transfer them back to Bulgaria under Regulation(EU) No 604\/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third\u2011country national or a stateless person (\u201cthe Dublin III Regulation\u201d), which also applies to Switzerland (see A.S. v. Switzerland, no. 39350\/13, \u00a7\u00a712-13, 30 June 2015). Following legal challenges by the applicants, on 7July 2016 the Swiss authorities varied their own decision and proceeded with the examination of the applications. Just over a year later, on 27 July 2017, the applicants were granted asylum in Switzerland.","39.According to data published by Eurostat, in 2014 672,215 third\u2011country nationals were found to be illegally present on the territory of Member States of the European Union. The numbers for 2015 and 2016 were respectively 2,154,675 people and 983,860 people.","40.The respective numbers for Greece and Hungary, States which sit, respectively, on the south-eastern border of the European Union and on the south-eastern border of the main Schengen Area, were as follows. For Greece, they were 73,670 people in 2014, 911,470 people in 2015, and 204,820 people in 2016. For Hungary, they were 56,170 people in 2014, 424,055 people in 2015, and 41,560 people in 2016.","41.For Bulgaria, the respective numbers were 12,870 people in 2014, 20,810 people in 2015, and 14,125 people in 2016."],"30181":["A.Mr Ksenz\u2019s application","6.The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Pskov.","7.At about 2 a.m. on 17 August 2005 the applicant was travelling in a car with B. \u2013 who was driving \u2013 M. and T. Their car was stopped by the police. Police Officers F. and K. asked for their ID cards. The applicant, who did not have his ID card on him, was taken to Zavelichenskiy police station in Pskov.","8.The applicant described events at the police station as follows. F. and K. had demanded that he stand facing a wall, hands raised, and had searched him. They had allegedly insulted him verbally and physically. In particular, they had punched him repeatedly in the face and the lumbar region and had tried to knock him down.","9.They then took him to the Pskov regional addiction-treatment clinic. When coming out of the police station they were approached by B., M., T. and I., the applicant\u2019s brother. According to statements by B. and I., the applicant was depressed, his sweater was dirty and the bridge of his nose was red. I. also saw injuries on the applicant\u2019s torso when he asked the applicant to lift his sweater.","10.At 2.56 a.m. a doctor at the addiction-treatment clinic carried out a breath test and tested his coordination. She stated in a record of \u201cmedical examination for establishment of alcohol consumption and state of inebriation\u201d that the applicant\u2019s examination had been initiated by Officer K. in connection with an administrative offence, and that the applicant had consumed alcohol but had revealed no signs of inebriation. She noted in the part of the record concerning the tested person\u2019s \u201cappearance\u201d that the applicant had no injuries, and in the part concerning \u201cvegetative-vascular reactions\u201d that his face was \u201chyperemic\u201d.","11.According to the applicant, the doctor did not ask him to undress and did not examine his body. Nor was he asked to sign the record of his examination or given its copy.","12.After the test the applicant was taken back to the police station. At the request of a police officer he signed a statement that at about 1a.m. on 17August 2005, when passing by a bus stop in B.\u2019s car, he had called out through an open window to girls at the bus stop inviting them for a drive in the car. After that a police car had followed them and B. had stopped the car. The police officers had ordered him to proceed with them to the police station \u201cfor the reason that he had used foul language\u201d.","13.At about 5 a.m. he was released.","14.At 10 a.m. the applicant was examined at his request by a forensic-medical expert at the Pskov Regional Forensic-Medical Bureau. The applicant explained that he had been punched and kicked by two police officers at about 2 a.m. that day. According to the medical report, the applicant had the following injuries: (i)an abrasion measuring 1.2 by 0.2cm on the bridge of the nose, (ii)a bruise measuring 2 cm by 2cm in the area of the right cheekbone, (iii)a bruise measuring 2.5 by 1 cm on a finger of the left hand, and (iv)a bruise measuring 2.5 by 2 cm on the left side of the lumbar region. The expert concluded that the injuries, which were not considered harmful to the applicant\u2019s health, could have been caused on that day by hard blunt objects, for example by fists or feet.","15.On the same day Officer K. lodged a criminal complaint that at 2.10a.m. on 17 August 2005 the applicant had sworn at him through an open car window when passing by. In the course of enquiries into the police officer\u2019s allegations the applicant denied swearing or any other misbehaviour on his part. The Pskov police found no elements of criminal offences such as hooliganism (Article 213\u00a71 of the Criminal Code) or insult of a public official (Article 319 of the Criminal Code) in the applicant\u2019s actions and refused to institute criminal proceedings against him (decision of 24 August 2005).","16.On 22 August 2005 the applicant complained to the Pskov town prosecutor\u2019s office about the unlawful actions of the police officers, indicating their service identification numbers.","17.Investigators of the Pskov town prosecutor\u2019s office carried out a pre\u2011investigation inquiry and refused to institute criminal proceedings into the applicant\u2019s complaint. Their two decisions of 7 October and 2 December 2005 were annulled by their superiors, who considered that the decisions had been based on an incomplete inquiry.","18.In the most recent refusal of 23 December 2005 to institute criminal proceedings for lack of the elements of a crime in the actions of the police officers, the investigator established the facts as follows, relying on the police officers\u2019 statements. At 2a.m. on 17 August 2005 the applicant had addressed F. and K. with foul language from the window of his car, which had stopped near their police car. After that, the car with the applicant had started driving away. F. and K. had pursued the car and stopped it. They had taken the applicant to the police station. K. had explained to the applicant that he had been arrested for having committed a criminal offence under Article 319 of the Criminal Code (insult of a public official). On their way to the police station the applicant had behaved provocatively and threatened the police officers that they would have problems at work and would be dismissed. During the applicant\u2019s escorting to the police station the police officers had not used physical force or any means of restraint. F. and K. had taken the applicant from the police station to an addiction-treatment clinic for a medical examination because he had been drunk. Before leaving for the clinic they had been approached by the applicant\u2019s brother, who had enquired about the reasons for the applicant\u2019s detention and a further procedure. The applicant\u2019s brother had suggested that the applicant should have simulated concussion and complained that he had been beaten up by the police officers.","19.The investigator further noted that the drug-clinic doctor had not recorded any injuries on the applicant; and that in his statement signed at the police station the applicant had not denied using foul language and had not complained of any use of force or means of restraint against him. The investigator dismissed statements by I., M. and T. in support of the applicant\u2019s allegations as unreliable and held that the applicant\u2019s allegations had not been confirmed.","20.On 31 January 2006 the Pskov Town Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the investigator\u2019s decision of 23 December 2005. It noted that F. and K. had \u201ccategorically\u201d denied that they had beaten up the applicant. It held that there was no evidence of the applicant\u2019s ill\u2011treatment at the police station and that his injuries could have been received in \u201cother circumstances\u201d. On 22 March 2006 the Pskov Regional Court upheld the Town Court\u2019s decision on the applicant\u2019s appeal. It stressed that there had been no eyewitnesses to the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment, and that the applicant had not complained of any ill-treatment to the drug-clinic doctor. Referring to the \u201ccategorical\u201d denial of any ill-treatment by F. and K., the Regional Court held that the applicant had failed to prove his ill-treatment and that he could have received his injuries in \u201cother circumstances\u201d on 17August 2005, in a time span between his examination at the addiction\u2011treatment clinic and his examination by the forensic-medical expert.","B.Mr Lebedev\u2019s application","21.The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Novyy Toryal in the Mariy-El Republic.","22.At about 1 a.m. on 31 March 2007 a car without a licence plate, in which the applicant and other young men were going home after a party, was stopped by the traffic police officer. Soon another police car arrived with four or five police officers who, according to the applicant, pushed him and the other young men to the ground, and punched and kicked them. The applicant identified the police officers as M., O., S., V. and Zh.","23.The applicant and the other three men were taken to the police station in Novyy Toryal, where they arrived at 1.45 a.m.","24.According to the applicant, the events at the police station were as follows. Police Officers M., O. and S. interviewed him, asking who had been driving the car and whether the car had been stolen. The applicant denied that he had been driving the car and stated that the driver had run away and that he did not know him. The police officers repeatedly punched and kicked him in the head and on other parts of his body.","25.At 3.20 a.m. the applicant and the others were released. The applicant\u2019s mother met them at the police station and called the ambulance. All four men were taken to the emergency unit of Novyy Toryal Central District Hospital, where they were recorded as having injuries.","26.The applicant was examined at 3.26 a.m. and admitted to the hospital surgical unit in a condition of \u201cmedium seriousness\u201d at 4.20 a.m. His right ear was swollen and bleeding. He had a swelling on the back of the head measuring 7 by 4 cm, numerous bruises on the face and temples, and numerous abrasions on the back, neck, shoulders, the right side of the torso and one of his fingers. He had no alcohol on his breath. He was diagnosed with closed craniocerebral injury, brain contusion, traumatic perforation of the right eardrum and numerous contusions to the head and the lumbar region. He was exempted from attending school until 22April 2007 due to his temporary disability on account of the closed craniocerebral injury and concussion. The hospital communicated information about the applicant\u2019s hospitalisation with injuries allegedly received as a result of his ill\u2011treatment by police officers to the Novyy Toryal police.","27.On 31 March 2007 the Novyy Toryal police officers reported to their superior that they had pursued a car which had had no licence plates and had not stopped at their initial order. When the car had eventually stopped, several young men, seemingly drunk, had sworn at them, refused to get into the police car and tried to run away. The police officers had used force to overcome their resistance, managing to restrain them on the ground and search them, and had then taken them to the police station.","28.On the same day the applicant\u2019s mother complained to the Novyy Toryal district prosecutor\u2019s office about the unlawful actions of the police officers. An investigator of the Novyy Toryal district prosecutor\u2019s office carried out a pre-investigation inquiry into her complaint.","29.On 4 April 2007 the applicant was examined by a forensic-medical expert from the Novyy Toryal division of the Mariy-El Republic Forensic\u2011Medical Bureau. The applicant had bruises around both eyes and an abrasion measuring 4 by 2 cm on the back of the head. Having examined the applicant\u2019s hospital records, the expert concluded in a report of 13 April 2007 that the applicant\u2019s injuries, notably brain contusion, traumatic perforation of the right eardrum, bruises on the face, abrasions on the head, torso and limbs and swelling in the lumbar region, could have been sustained on 31 March 2007 by impacts from hard, blunt objects. The injuries had resulted in short-term health issues for the applicant including a temporary incapacity for work lasting up to three weeks, that is to say minor harm to his health.","30.On 8 May 2007 the Novyy Toryal police brought administrative proceedings against the applicant, issuing administrative-offence records and a decision which stated that at 1a.m. on 31March 2007 the applicant had driven a car without a licence plate and without a driving licence and had not stopped the car on a police officer\u2019s repeated order. A fine was imposed on the applicant.","31.On 9 May 2007 a deputy prosecutor of the Novyy Toryal district prosecutor\u2019s office decided that material concerning the applicant\u2019s unlawful driving on 31 March 2007 should be examined separately from the material concerning the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment.","32.On 20 May 2007 the Novyy Toryal police decided that no criminal proceedings should be brought against the applicant, whose actions disclosed no elements of a crime under Article 166\u00a71 of the Criminal Code (carjacking). It found that it had been the applicant who had been driving the car with no licence plates before being stopped by the police on 31March 2007. The applicant had bought it from a third person. However, he had not paid the full price and the previous owner had not given him the documents necessary for re\u2011registering the car in his name and obtaining licence plates.","33.Investigators of the Novyy Toryal district prosecutor\u2019s office thrice refused to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment for lack of the elements of a crime in the police officers\u2019 actions. The refusals were annulled by their superiors, who considered that the inquiry was incomplete.","34.In the most recent decision of 22 June 2007 the investigator, relying on the police officers\u2019 statements, established the facts as follows. During the night of 30-31 March 2007 the applicant, who had been driving a car without a licence plate, had disobeyed a traffic policeman\u2019s order to stop and had tried to escape, thereby violating the traffic rules and committing administrative offences. However, administrative proceedings had not been brought against him in accordance with the law as a result of negligence on the part of the police officers responsible for drawing up administrative-offence records. The police had acted lawfully in apprehending the applicant and taking him to the police station. Officers O., M., S., V., S.K. and N.K. had lawfully used physical force in the course of the applicant\u2019s apprehension, as a result of which he had sustained the injuries described in the forensic-medical expert\u2019s report.","35.That decision was declared lawful and well-founded by the Novyy Toryal district deputy prosecutor (report of 24 June 2007) and by the Novyy Toryal District Court (decision of 14 August 2007, upheld by the Mariy\u2011El Supreme Court on 26 September 2007).","36.On 25 February 2013 the Mariy-El Republic deputy prosecutor annulled the decision of 22 June 2007 as unlawful and unfounded and ordered a fresh pre-investigation inquiry.","C.Mr Korolev\u2019s application","37.The applicant was born in 1988 and lives in Diveyevo in Nizhniy Novgorod Region.","38.At about 11 p.m. on 24 March 2007 the applicant was attending a discotheque at the Diveyevo Cultural Centre when he was approached by Police Officer K., who led him to the police car and took him to the Diveyevo district police station. According to the applicant, Police Officer K. twisted his arms behind his back when leading him to the car.","39.According to the applicant the events at the police station were as follows. He was requested to stand facing the wall. K., who wore army-type boots, kicked him at least ten times on the legs. Then he was placed in an administrative-detention cell, where he stayed until his release at about noon on 26 March 2007.","40.In reports to their superiors dated 24 March 2007 Officer K. and two police trainees stated that at 11.30 p.m. on 24March 2007 at the Diveyevo Cultural Centre the applicant, who had been drunk, had used foul language in their presence, ignoring their orders to stop.","41.N., a police officer on duty at the Diveyevo police station, drew up an administrative-detention record, in which he stated that the applicant, who had committed petty hooliganism, had been subjected to administrative detention for the purpose of the averting the offence. No injuries on the applicant were mentioned in the part of the record concerning the routine procedure of inspection of detainees for injuries. The time of the record was drawn up was indicated as 11.30 p.m. on 24March 2007.","42.Officer T. drew up an administrative-offence record, in which he stated that at 11.30 p.m. on 24 March 2007 at the Diveyevo Cultural Centre the applicant, who was drunk, had used foul language and ignored police officers\u2019 orders to stop. He had thereby committed an administrative offence of petty hooliganism. The time of the drawing-up the record was indicated as 11.40 p.m. on 24 March 2007. The acting head of the Diveyevo district police issued the applicant a fine of 1,000 Russian roubles (RUB). The applicant did not appeal against that decision.","43.After his release from the police station, at 3.20 p.m. on 26 March 2007 the applicant was examined by a doctor at Diveyevo Hospital, who recorded bruises on the interior of the left calf (in the upper and middle parts), an abrasion on the front of the left shin, a bruise on the left ankle, a bruise on the right knee, a bruise on the left elbow, and an abrasion on the left hand. The applicant was diagnosed with contusions of the left shin, left ankle, right knee and left elbow, and abrasions of the left shin and left hand.","44.The hospital passed on information about the applicant\u2019s injuries, allegedly inflicted by the police, to the Diveyevo district prosecutor\u2019s office.On the same day the applicant lodged a criminal complaint seeking K.\u2019s prosecution. An investigator of the prosecutor\u2019s office carried out a pre\u2011investigation inquiry.","45.On 27March 2007 the applicant was examined by a forensic\u2011medical expert from the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Forensic\u2011Medical Bureau. The applicant had two bruises on the interior of the left calf (in the upper and middle parts) measuring 7 by 3 cm and 10 by 5 cm, a 1.5 by 0.5 cm bruise on the front of the left shin, a 2 by 1 cm bruise on the left ankle, and a 3 by 1.5 cm bruise on the left elbow. He also had an abrasion on the front of the left shin measuring 1.5 by 0.8 cm, an abrasion on the right ankle measuring 1 by 0.4 cm and an abrasion on the left hand measuring 3 by 2 cm. The areas of the back of the left shoulder in the middle part, the left knee, the left shin and the left ankle were painful at palpation. The expert concluded that the injuries, which had not resulted in harm to the applicant\u2019s health, had been caused by hard blunt objects two or three days before the examination, as a result of at least five traumatic impacts (report of 27 March 2007). In reply to the investigator\u2019s additional question as to whether the applicant could have received the injuries when getting into the police car, the expert stated that such a possibility could not be excluded.","46.The Diveyevo district police carried out an internal inquiry into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment, in the course of which K., other police officers and witnesses gave statements about the events in question. On 28 April 2007 the head of the Diveyevo district police approved a report on the inquiry in which the facts were established as follows. After 10 p.m. on 24March 2007 K. and two police trainees had approached the applicant and rebuked him for using foul language; he had ignored their commands and continued swearing; K. had ordered that he go with them to the police station but he had refused; K. took him by the sleeve and led him to the police car; they took the applicant to the police station. It was established that no physical force had been used against the applicant. A number of other internal inquiries into the same events were carried out later, with the most recent one (report of 4 March 2013 approved by an acting head of the Nizhniy Novgorod regional police force) finding no disciplinary misconduct in K.\u2019s actions. There was no mention in the report of the applicant receiving injuries when getting into the police car. Nor did K. mention it in his statements given in the course of the internal inquiry on 30 November 2007. K. stated that no physical force or means of restraint had been used against the applicant for lack of resistance on his part.","47.Investigators refused to institute criminal proceedings against Police Officer K. Their refusal was annulled five times by their superiors, who considered that their inquiry was incomplete.","48.The most recent refusal to institute criminal proceedings for lack of the elements of a crime in K.\u2019s actions was taken on 2September 2008 by an investigator from the Sarov investigative committee of the Nizhniy Novgorod regional prosecutor\u2019s office. Relying on statements by K. and other police officers, who had denied any violence against the applicant, the investigator held that the applicant could have received the injuries when getting into the police car before being taken to the police station on 24March 2007. The investigator\u2019s decision was declared lawful and well\u2011founded in the Sarov Town Court\u2019s decision of 16January 2009, upheld by the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court on 13March 2009.","49.In May 2013 the applicant was examined by a psychiatrist. He complained of a sleep disorder on account of his ill-treatment in police custody on 24March 2007. He was diagnosed with sleep disorder related to the legs injuries sustained on that day and recommended a consultation and treatment by a neurologist and a trauma specialist.","D.Mr Ivanov\u2019s application","50.The applicant was born in 1969 and lived in Cheboksary.","51.At about 12.30 a.m. on 29 June 2006 the applicant\u2019s car was stopped by Officers V.and Z. of the traffic police. According to the applicant, they knocked him to the ground and kicked him repeatedly. The police officers then drew up records, stating that he was drunk. He disagreed, requesting that he be taken for a medical examination which would confirm that he was not. The police officers took him to the Kaliniskiy district police station instead.","52.According to records drawn up by V. between 12.30 a.m. and 1.50a.m.: (i)the applicant was suspended from driving because he had signs of alcohol intoxication (alcohol on his breath, red eyes and slurred speech); (ii)hehad been ordered to undergo a medical examination to determine whether he had been in a state of alcohol intoxication, but he had refused to do so; (iii)his car had been impounded; and (iv)the applicant had been found to have committed an administrative offence by refusing to undergo a medical examination at the request of the police.","53.At the police station V. and Z. reported to their superior that the applicant had disobeyed their order to stop his car; that they had pursued him until he had eventually stopped; that he had resisted arrest; and that in order to apprehend him they had twisted his arm behind his back, as a result of which he had fallen.","54.At about 5 a.m. the applicant was released from the Kaliniskiy district police station.","55.On the same day both the applicant and Officer Z. lodged criminal complaints with the Kalininskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office, Cheboksary. The applicant complained that he had been beaten up by V. and Z. The latter complained that in the course of the applicant\u2019s apprehension he had hurt his hand when they both had fallen.","56.On 30 June 2006 an investigator ordered the applicant\u2019s forensic\u2011medical examination, which was carried out on 3July 2006. A forensic-medical expert from the Chuvashia Republic Forensic-Medical Bureau recorded ten abrasions measuring from 0.2 by 0.1 cm to 10 by 5cm on the upper and middle parts of the lower right arm, on the right wrist and on both knees. The applicant also had four bruises on the middle part of the right upper arm and on the upper and middle parts of the left upper arm, measuring 1.6 by 1.2 cm, 1.7 by 1.3 cm, 0.9 by 0.3 cm and 0.2 by 0.2 cm. The expert concluded that all injuries, which had not resulted in harm to the applicant\u2019s health, could have been caused by hard blunt objects.","57.On 3August 2006 the Justice of the Peace of Court Circuit no. 7 of the Kalininskiy District of Cheboksary held a hearing in the administrative proceedings against the applicant. The applicant contested the police officers\u2019 versions of events on 29 June 2006 and stated that he had not been drunk and had demanded to undergo a medical examination that would have confirmed that fact; however, the police officers had not let him be examined. His statements were supported by a witness. The court found the applicant guilty of disobedience of a police officer\u2019s lawful order to undergo a medical examination to detect alcohol intoxication, and sentenced him to the seizure of his driving licence for a year and a half. On 31 August 2006 the Kalininskiy District Court, following a prior appeal by the applicant, upheld the judgment.","58.Investigators refused to institute criminal proceedings into the applicant\u2019s alleged ill\u2011treatment by the police officers. Their refusals were annulled by their superiors more than twenty times on the grounds that they had been based on an incomplete inquiry. On several occasions the Kalininskiy District Court of Cheboksary rejected the applicant\u2019s appeals on the grounds that the investigators\u2019 decisions had already been annulled. On two occasions the District Court granted the applicant\u2019s appeals and found the decisions unlawful and unfounded.","59.The most recent refusal to institute criminal proceedings for lack of the elements of a crime in the police officers\u2019 actions was issued on 28September 2009 by an investigator from the Cheboksary inter-district investigative committee. Relying on the reports by Officers V. and Z. and similar statements given by them later, the investigator held that the applicant\u2019s injuries had been the result of the lawful use of force by the police officers during his arrest. The investigator\u2019s decision was declared lawful and well\u2011founded in the Kalininskiy District Court\u2019s decision of 12November 2009, and was upheld by the Chuvashia Supreme Court on 17December 2009.","60.In the same decision of 28September 2009 the investigator dismissed the criminal complaint lodged by Z., finding no fault on the part of the applicant as Z. had fallen and hurt his hand when arresting him.","61.The applicant brought civil proceedings, seeking to have the investigating authority\u2019s failure to carry out an effective investigation declared unlawful and claiming compensation. On 26May 2008 the Leninskiy District Court dismissed his application, finding that he had failed to prove that the investigating authority had acted unlawfully, that he had been harmed as a result of its actions or inaction, that there had been a causal connection between specific unlawful behaviour and any harm, and that there had been evidence of an alleged tortfeasor\u2019s liability. It held that domestic law did not provide for compensation of non\u2011pecuniary damage in a case of a delayed decision in reply to a criminal complaint or in a case of the annulment of such a decision. On 30 June 2008, following an appeal by the applicant, the Chuvashia Supreme Court upheld the judgment.","E.Mr Kolistratov\u2019s application","62.The applicant was born in 1989 and lives in Novocheboksarsk.","63.At about 6 a.m. on 8 February 2008 the applicant and other young men, who were sitting in his parked car, were approached by traffic-police officers and taken to Novocheboksarsk police station following a complaint from a certain P. that they had broken a window in her car and tried to steal a child seat. The applicant was handcuffed.","64.The applicant described events at the police station as follows. One of the police officers had grabbed him by the neck with one hand and by his head with the other and hit his face against a wall. The applicant\u2019s two front teeth had fallen out and he had felt unwell. Later, he had asked to have the handcuffs removed as they had been causing him pain. Instead, a police officer lifted his hands shackled behind him, inflicting more pain.","65.According to the records drawn up by Officer B. between 6.50a.m. and 9.20 a.m. on 8 February 2008: (i)the applicant was suspended from driving because he had signs of alcohol intoxication (alcohol on his breath, red eyes and trembling fingers); (ii)hewas ordered to undergo a medical examination for detecting alcohol intoxication, but refused to do so; (iii) his car was impounded; and (iv) the applicant was found to have committed an administrative offence by refusing to undergo a medical examination at the request of the police. The applicant was subsequently found guilty of disobeying a police officer\u2019s lawful order to undergo a medical examination for detecting alcohol intoxication, and sentenced to the seizure of his driving licence for a year and a half (judgment of the Justice of the Peace of Court Circuit no. 5 of Novocheboksarsk of 14 March 2008, and was upheld by the Novocheboksarsk Town Court on 19 May 2008).","66.In a report to his superior, Officer M. stated that the applicant had behaved aggressively at the police station and that he himself had hit his head against a wall and had broken his tooth.","67.No criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant in relation to P.\u2019s complaint in respect of the attempted theft of a child seat (Novocheboksarsk town police decision of 18 February 2008).","68.After his release at about 6 p.m. on 8 February 2008 the applicant was examined by a doctor at the traumatology unit of the Novocheboksarsk town hospital. The applicant had abrasions on the right side of his face, his lip, the left side of his neck and the wrists, and the crowns of two upper teeth on the right side were broken. On the same day he was examined by a dentist who recorded that the upper front tooth on the right was missing, the crown of the next tooth to the right was broken, and that the two lower front teeth were loose as a result of a traumatic subluxation.","69.On 12 February 2008 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint that he had been ill-treated at the police station. The Novocheboksarsk investigative committee at the Chuvashiya Republic prosecutor\u2019s office carried out a pre-investigation inquiry.","70.An investigator obtained an opinion of a forensic-medical expert from the Novocheboksarsk division of the Chuvashia Republic Forensic-Medical Bureau, who considered that the applicant\u2019s injuries could have been received within twenty-four hours of the applicant\u2019s medical examination on 8 February 2008, as a result of an impact from a hard blunt object, for example as a result of hitting a wall as regards the injuries to the front teeth, lip and face. The injuries had resulted in short-term health problems lasting up to three weeks, that is to say minor harm to the applicant\u2019s health.","71.Investigators of the Novocheboksarsk investigative committee refused to institute criminal proceedings into the applicant\u2019s alleged ill\u2011treatment by the police. Their refusal was annulled fourteen times by their superiors, who considered that it had been based on an incomplete inquiry, and a fresh pre\u2011investigation inquiry was ordered.","72.The most recent refusal to institute criminal proceedings for lack of the elements of a crime in the police officers\u2019 actions was taken by an investigator on 5November 2009. He cited the police officers\u2019 statements that the applicant had tried to run away, they had therefore handcuffed him in order to take him to the police station, where the applicant himself had struck his face against a wall. Relying on the police officers\u2019 statements, the investigator concluded that the applicant had inflicted the injuries on himself by striking his face against a wall at the police station, and that the abrasions on his neck and wrists had been a result of the lawful use of force by the police officers in the course of his arrest. The investigator\u2019s decision was declared lawful and well-founded by the Novocheboksarsk Town Court\u2019s decision of 23 April 2010, and was upheld by the Chuvashia Supreme Court on 25May 2010.","F.Mr Sergeyev\u2019s application","73.The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Moscow.","74.At about 5.20 a.m. on 28 May 2008 the applicant was arrested by Police Officers P. and V. in a twenty-four-hour shop and taken to the Mitino district police station of the Moscow North-Western administrative circuit. According to the applicant, in the police car he was slapped in the face several times, and at the police station the police officers repeatedly punched him in the head and other parts of the body and kicked him in the chest.","75.In their reports concerning the incident the police officers did not mention that the applicant had had any injuries.","76.In a record of the applicant\u2019s administrative detention at 5.30 a.m. on 28 May 2008, drawn up at 5.32 a.m. that day, an officer on duty at the police station noted the applicant\u2019s complaint that the police officers had inflicted injuries on him. The record further stated that the applicant\u2019s examination had revealed no injuries on him.","77.At 6 a.m. the applicant was examined by a doctor at an addiction\u2011treatment hospital and was found to be in a state of alcohol intoxication. The doctor noted that the applicant was handcuffed and had abrasions on his face.","78.According to an administrative-offence record drawn up on 28 May 2008 by the officer on duty, at 5.20 a.m. on 28 May 2008 the applicant had breached public order by using foul language in a public place and ignoring police officers\u2019 requests to stop.On the same day the Justice of the Peace of the Mitino District Court Circuit no. 175 found that the applicant had committed petty hooliganism and imposed a RUB 500 fine on him. The applicant, who pleaded guilty, did not appeal against the judgment. He was released after the hearing.","79.On the same day he was examined by a doctor at polyclinic no. 229 who recorded bruising to the area of both eyes and the nose, bleeding of the sclera of both eyes, a fractured nose and a possible concussion.On 3 June 2008 the applicant was examined at town hospital no. 71 and diagnosed with acute right\u2011side perforated post-traumatic otitis and bruising of the soft tissue of the head, in particular in the area of the left eye and the cheek bones.On 9 June 2008 he was examined at polyclinic no. 2 and diagnosed with hearing difficulties on both sides and acute right\u2011side perforated post\u2011traumatic otitis.","80.Following the applicant\u2019s criminal complaint of 2 July 2008, the Tushinskiy district investigative committee at the Moscow prosecutor\u2019s office carried out a pre\u2011investigation inquiry.","81.The applicant\u2019s medical records were examined by a forensic\u2011medical expert from the Moscow City Forensic-Medical Bureau. The expert concluded that the bruising and fracture of the nose (which had resulted in short-term health problems lasting up to three weeks, that is to say minor harm to the applicant\u2019s health), the bruising in the area of both eyes and the cheek bones and the bleeding to the sclera of both eyes could have been sustained on 28 May 2008 as a result of impacts from hard blunt objects. As no injuries had been recorded in the area of the external right ear, the expert doubted that the perforated otitis had been a result of trauma or its connection to the alleged police ill-treatment (the expert\u2019s report of 9October 2009).","82.Investigators refused to institute criminal proceedings for lack of the elements of a crime in the police officers\u2019 actions. Their three refusals issued between July 2008 and October 2009 were annulled because they were based on an incomplete inquiry.","83.In the most recent refusal to open a criminal case of 28January 2010 an investigator held that the applicant, who had been drunk, could have fallen and injured himself. It relied, inter alia, on Officer P.\u2019s report dated 7July 2008 that the applicant had been brought to the police station with \u201cvisible injuries\u201d. That decision was declared lawful and well-founded in the Tushinskiy District Court\u2019s decision of 19March 2010, and later upheld by the Moscow City Court on 17 May 2010."],"30230":["5.The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Zemun.","A.Background to the case","6.On 12March2003 the Serbian Prime Minister, Mr Zoran \u0110in\u0111i\u0107, was assassinated by members of a criminal group known as the Zemun Clan (Zemunski klan).","7.The Prime Minister\u2019s assassination prompted the Serbian Government to declare a state of emergency and introduce measures in accordance with the State of Emergency Act 1991 (Zakon o merama za slu\u010daj vanrednog stanja, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no.19\/1991).","8.During that time a large-scale police operation known as Operation Sabre (Sablja) took place. Approximately 10,000 people were arrested during the operation and placed in pre-trial detention.","9.The state of emergency lasted until 23April2003.","B.The applicant\u2019s treatment during his arrest, questioning and subsequent detention","10.The applicant was a member of a criminal group linked to the Zemun Clan. During Operation Sabre all members of the Zemun Clan and groups linked to it were arrested and questioned about the Prime Minister\u2019s assassination. Those arrested were also questioned about other crimes such as murders, abductions and drug trafficking.","11.The applicant\u2019s arrest took place at around 4p.m. on 1April2003, when five members of the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit broke into the apartment in which he was hiding with five friends.","12.The applicant claims that on the arrival of the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit he was subjected to physical and verbal abuse. Its members immediately started to kick and beat him indiscriminately all over his body and face. They put a pillowcase over his head, verbally abused him and made threats aimed at his family. The maltreatment continued for an hour. On the recording of his arrest, which was broadcast on national television at the beginning of April 2003, he was shown with visible bruises on his face.","13.At around 6p.m. the applicant and his friends were taken to the police station and left in the corridor. According to the applicant, police officers passing by sporadically hit and kicked him and his friends. He could not identify them as his face was still covered with a pillowcase.","14.At some point two police officers came and took the applicant for questioning. He was taken to an office in which seven to nine people were present. Two or three of them were women.","15.According to the applicant, the maltreatment continued there. He was beaten with baseball bats and police truncheons. He was beaten on the soles of his feet and the palms of his hands. A truncheon was inserted several times into his anus. At one point, a nylon bag was put over the pillowcase which made him lose consciousness. During all that time the applicant remembered hearing his friends screaming.","16.At around 3.30a.m. on 2April2003 two police officers took him to a solitary confinement cell. He was unable to walk so the officers carried him. In the cell his handcuffs were taken off and a detention order was put before him for signature.","17.As alleged by the applicant, approximately half an hour later two police officers entered the cell. They handcuffed him, put a bag over his head and took him for questioning. During that time he was again beaten, kicked and maltreated. Throughout this time, he was not allowed to drink any water.","18.In the applicant\u2019s version of events, after approximately two hours of maltreatment he was returned to the solitary confinement cell. He was kept there for eleven days. During the first five days no food was given to him. Afterwards, he was given one sandwich per day. Throughout that period police officers routinely questioned and ill-treated him in the same way as before.","19.At approximately 10p.m. on 12April2003 the applicant was transferred to Belgrade District Prison (Okru\u017eni zatvor), where he remained for a year and two months pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings instituted against him.","20.On 15April2003 a prison doctor examined him and issued a medical certificate, which contained an extensive list of his injuries. These included large haematomas on the soles of his feet, palms of his hands, face, shoulders and buttocks, as well as conjunctival hyperaemia (redness) on the external parts of his eyes. The certificate also contained a statement that the applicant had been \u201cbeaten in the police station\u201d.","21.During the first sixty days of his detention in Belgrade District Prison he was placed in a solitary confinement cell and only had contact with the doctors who examined him. After two months he had fully recovered from the ill-treatment he had suffered.","22.On 13October2003 the applicant was charged with illegal production and trafficking of drugs (neovla\u0161\u0107ena proizvodnja i stavljanje u promet opojnih droga), abduction (otmica) and unlawful deprivation of liberty (protivpravno li\u0161enje slobode). On 22June2004 he was sentenced to four years and ten months\u2019 imprisonment. He was released from pre-trial detention on 25June2004 pending the outcome of appeal proceedings.","C.The investigation concerning the alleged ill-treatment","23.On 18 May2004 the applicant\u2019s mother lodged a complaint with the Inspector General\u2019s Service of the Ministry of the Interior (Generalni inspektorat Ministarstva unutra\u0161njih poslova), alleging that her son had been tortured by members of the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit and police officers working for the Narcotics Department of the Criminal Police Directorate (Odeljenje za suzbijanje narkomanije Uprave kriminalisti\u010dke policije, also known as the Fourth Department) in Belgrade.","24.On 11May2005, 26May2005, 8June2005 and 12January2006 the applicant\u2019s mother submitted additional information complaining that her son had been ill-treated, and that moveable property had been confiscated from his home.","25.On 24February2006 the applicant was invited to the Inspector General\u2019s Service to give a statement about his mother\u2019s allegations. He confirmed that he had been ill-treated.","26.On 16March2006 the Inspector General\u2019s Service interviewed D.S., the Deputy District Public Prosecutor (zamenik Okru\u017enog javnog tu\u017eioca) in Belgrade, who stated that in April 2003 he had been at the police station during the applicant\u2019s questioning. D.S. gave the names of several of the police officers involved and stated that he had not seen any injuries on the applicant. On the contrary, the applicant had seemed pleased because he had been informed that he would be charged with lesser offences than expected. D.S. also claimed that the applicant had had no complaints about his treatment.","27.On 13June2006 statements were taken from two police officers, R.P. and A.K. Both claimed that they had not participated in the immediate arrest, but had entered the apartment after the members of the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit had already arrested the applicant and his friends. In the apartment they had seen several people dressed in only their underwear, being handcuffed and lying face down. They denied having seen any bruises or injuries on those arrested.","28.On 10July2006 the Inspector General\u2019s Service interviewed the applicant\u2019s wife, who made no complaints about the applicant\u2019s treatment during his arrest or while in detention. She only complained about the confiscation of certain movables from their home.","29.On 28September2006 the chief of the Fourth Department of the Criminal Police Directorate in Belgrade (Na\u010delnik \u010detvrtog odeljenja UKP SUP), Z.K., gave a statement to the Sector for the Internal Control of the Police. He said that he had had no knowledge of the applicant or his friends having been subjected to any ill-treatment.","30.On 21March2007 the applicant\u2019s mother\u2019s complaint of ill-treatment of her son was rejected by the Inspector General\u2019s Service for lack of evidence of a crime.","31.On 1July2007 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the First Municipal Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office (Prvo op\u0161tinsko javno tu\u017eila\u0161tvo \u2013 \u201cthe prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d) against a number of the unknown perpetrators as well as against three police officers identified only by surname.","32.On 20July2007 the prosecutor\u2019s office opened an official inquiry with requests for the police to provide evidence and the names of those involved in the applicant\u2019s arrest and questioning, and an investigative judge to question the applicant. He was interviewed on 9October2007.","33.On 30November2007 the Sector for the Internal Control of the Police identified three police officers, V.M., S.P., and Z.K., in connection with the applicant\u2019s arrest and questioning. The officers stated that no violence had ever been used against the applicant. On 27December2007 the prosecutor\u2019s office dropped the charges against them for lack of evidence.","34.At the same time the case against the unidentified police officers remained open because, according to the prosecutor\u2019s office, \u201cit transpired from the evidence gathered that Krsmanovi\u0107 \u0110or\u0111e had sustained injuries while in detention\u201d (iz prikupljenih dokaza utvr\u0111eno je da je Krsmanovi\u0107 \u0110or\u0111e zadobio povrede u periodu dok mu je bio odre\u0111en pritvor). It would appear that the case is still open.","35.After learning of that decision, on 23January2008 the applicant took over the criminal proceedings as a subsidiary prosecutor (o\u0161te\u0107eni kao tu\u017eilac) by requesting to have an investigation opened against V.M., S.P., and Z.K.","36.On 21April and 18November2008 the investigating judge to whom the case was assigned interviewed three doctors who worked at the prison hospital. On 15January2009 he also interviewed the police officers accused of ill-treatment. On 24March2009 he refused to open an investigation because there was not enough evidence to prove that the accused had committed the crime they were suspected of. On 23September2009 the pre-trial chamber of the First Belgrade Municipal Court upheld the decision of the investigating judge. The applicant appealed. On 13April2010 the Belgrade Appellate Court upheld that decision.","37.On 10July2010 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the prosecutor\u2019s office, which was rejected on 11October2010.","38.On 11July2010 the applicant also lodged a constitutional appeal. He complained principally about the lack of an effective investigation into the events under Articles 21, 25, 27, 29, 32, 33 and 36 of the Constitution and Articles 3, 6, 13 and 14 of the Convention. On 23July2013 his constitutional appeal was rejected by the Constitutional Court, whose decision was served on the applicant on 11September2013. The court primarily considered the applicant\u2019s complaints under Article 6 of the Convention and found them to be manifestly ill-founded. As to the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article3 of the Convention, the Constitutional Court found it to be outside its temporal jurisdiction in view of the date of entry into force of the Constitution itself. In respect of the other complaints, the Constitutional Court held, inter alia, that:","\u201cit is not enough to allege a violation of one\u2019s rights in a constitutional appeal or list the constitutional rights that are considered to be violated and reasons for their violations based on the appellant\u2019s subjective estimation or evaluation, but to put each mentioned reason into a direct relationship with the allegedly violated constitutional right, and a violation or denial of a certain constitutional right has to be caused by an act or action that occurred before the entry into force of the Constitution. This also implies that specific and detailed reasons of the alleged violation of the constitutional right have to be specified in the constitutional appeal, because only a causal link presented in such manner may compel the Court to find a violation or denial of a certain right.\u201d","A.European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT)","49.In its report to the Government on its visit to Serbia and Montenegro from 16 to 28September2004 (CPT\/Inf (2006) 18; 18May2006) the CPT stated, among other things:","\u201c30.The CPT delegation heard numerous allegations of deliberate physical ill-treatment of persons deprived of their liberty by the police throughout Serbia. ...","Many detainees interviewed by the delegation alleged that they had been slapped, punched, kicked or beaten with batons during police custody. A certain number of persons interviewed by the delegation alleged that they had been beaten with baseball bats, while forced to wear bullet-proof vests in order to prevent their injuries becoming visible. Some others alleged that they had been handcuffed to a radiator for several hours in painfully contorted positions. A number of allegations received included recent accounts of: beating on the palms of the hands; beating on the soles of the feet (a practice known as \u2018falaka\u02bc); placing a plastic bag over the detainee\u2019s head to cause temporary asphyxiation; the infliction of electric shocks on different parts of the body, including the genitals; sleep deprivation for prolonged periods; being forced to eat salt without being offered water to drink for the whole day. The ill-treatment alleged was in several cases of such a severity that it could well be considered to amount to torture. ...","32.In almost all of the police stations visited in Belgrade, the delegation found baseball bats and other non-standard and unlabelled objects (such as metal bars or wooden sticks) in offices used for interrogation purposes. This lends further credibility to the allegations received that persons deprived of their liberty by the police had been beaten with such objects. ...","34.The information at the CPT\u2019s disposal suggests that persons suspected of a criminal offence run a significant risk of being ill-treated by the police in Serbia at the time of their apprehension and during the first hours of police custody, and that on occasion such persons may be subject to severe ill-treatment (or even torture). The number and severity of allegations of police ill-treatment received and documented by the delegation calls for urgent action by the national authorities; senior officials did not contest that the ill-treatment of persons deprived of their liberty by the police represents a serious problem in Serbia. Constant vigilance will be required if the absolute prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment is to be upheld.\u201d","B.United Nations Human Rights Committee","50.The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted under the auspices of the United Nations on 16December1966, entered into force in respect of Serbia on 12March2001. The relevant part of the \u201cconcluding observations\u201d on Serbia of the UN Human Rights Committee, the body of independent experts set up to monitor the implementation of the treaty, reads as follows (document CCPR\/CO\/81\/SEMO of 12August2004, \u00a715):","\u201cWhile taking note of the establishment in Serbia of [Inspector General\u2019s Service] in June 2003, the Committee is concerned that no independent oversight mechanism exists for investigating complaints of criminal conduct against members of the police, which could contribute to impunity for police officers involved in human rights violations. The State party should establish independent civilian review bodies at the Republic level with authority to receive and investigate all complaints of excessive use of force and other abuse of power by the police.\u201d"],"30381":["The applicant, Mr Konstantin Nikolayevich Dmitriyev, is a Russian national who was born in 1971 and lives in St Petersburg. He was represented before the Court by Ms O. Preobrazhenskaya, a lawyer admitted to practise in Moscow.","The Russian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were initially represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office, Mr M. Galperin.","The circumstances of the case","The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.","1. The events of 12 February 2005","According to the applicant, on 12 February 2005 two masked men broke into his flat and attacked him and his wife. The applicant fought back and threw the attackers out of the flat. The applicant \u2019 s wife called the local police station, reporting the attack and seeking help. Her complaint was registered and two police officers were sent to the applicant \u2019 s flat.","On 13 February 2005 the applicant was admitted to hospital, where he was diagnosed with a closed marginal fracture of the left kneecap, hemarthrosis of the left knee joint, a compound fracture of a finger on the right hand, and injuries to the left forearm. He remained in the hospital for in-patient treatment until 18 February 2005.","2. Refusals to open criminal proceedings issued in 2005 and 2006 and their revocation","On 14 February 2005 a police officer, V., issued a decision refusing to open criminal proceedings into the events of 12 February 2005 for lack of the elements of a crime. According to the reasoning for the decision, after the applicant \u2019 s wife had called the police station on 12 February 2005, a police officer had arrived at the applicant \u2019 s flat. However, the applicant \u2019 s wife had written a statement asking for no enquiries to be made into the incident given its \u201cpersonal nature\u201d and refusing to give any further explanation. V. submitted that both the applicant and his wife had asked that a criminal case not be opened. The police officer \u2019 s attempt to collect additional information about the incident by questioning the applicant \u2019 s neighbours had yielded no result, as no one had seen or heard anything.","On 25 May 2005 the prosecutor of the Tsentralnyy District in St Petersburg (\u201cthe district prosecutor\u201d) quashed the decision of 14 February 2005, having found that the police inquiry had been incomplete. The prosecutor ordered that the applicant and his wife be interviewed, that medical documents be collected in order for the severity of the health damage sustained by the applicant to be determined, and that witnesses to the incident be identified and questioned.","On 19 September 2005 V., the police officer, again issued a decision refusing to open a criminal case on the same grounds as before and noted that the attempts ( i ) to contact the applicant and his wife in order to question them and (ii) to identify witnesses had been futile.","On 3 October 2005 the deputy prosecutor of the Tsentralnyy District in St Petersburg (\u201cthe deputy district prosecutor\u201d) quashed that decision and ordered that the investigative measures listed in the decision of 25 May 2005 be carried out and that the police officers who had arrived on the scene be interviewed.","On 21 February 2006 V. again issued a decision refusing to open criminal proceedings on the same grounds as before.","In March 2006 the applicant \u2019 s mother lodged a complaint with the General Prosecutor \u2019 s Office, arguing that the St Petersburg prosecutor \u2019 s office had taken no measures to ensure a proper inquiry into the attack on her son.","In April 2006 the St Petersburg prosecutor \u2019 s office informed her that on 27 March 2006 the deputy district prosecutor had quashed the decision of 21 February 2006 and remitted the matter for additional inquiry, which had to be completed by 16 May 2006.","On 31 July 2006 police officer V. again issued a decision refusing to open criminal proceedings on the same grounds as before.","On 17 August 2006 the deputy district prosecutor quashed that decision and remitted the matter for additional inquiry.","On 27 September 2006 the police once again issued a decision refusing to open a criminal case.","On 10 October 2006 the applicant \u2019 s mother again lodged a complaint with the General Prosecutor \u2019 s Office about the St Petersburg prosecutor \u2019 s office.","On 30 October 2006 the St Petersburg prosecutor \u2019 s office informed the applicant \u2019 s mother that the decision of 27 September 2006 had been quashed and that the prosecutor had asked that disciplinary measures be taken against the officers concerned for procrastination and procedural violations committed during the inquiry.","On 12 November 2006 R., a police officer, issued a decision refusing to open a criminal case. According to that decision, the applicant did not reside at the address that the authorities had for him and the police had not had an opportunity to question the applicant and his wife. One of the police officers who had been at the scene on 12 February 2005 had been dismissed from his post and questioning him was not possible. Another police officer had stayed in the patrol car when he and his colleagues had arrived at the applicant \u2019 s home and so could not testify about what had happened there. R. referred to the refusal of the applicant \u2019 s wife to pursue the case.","3. The applicant \u2019 s first complaint to a court","On 2 May 2007 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Smolninskiy District Court of St Petersburg, submitting that after two years of inquiry no criminal proceedings had been initiated into the attack on him, that the decision of 3 October 2005 had not been complied with and that since 30 October 2006 he had not received any information about the progress of the inquiry. Having regard to the above the applicant submitted that the district prosecutor had failed to duly supervise the inquiry into the attack on him. The Smolninskiy District Court returned the complaint to the applicant for his failure to indicate the address of the place at which he had been attacked.","On 12 July 2007 the applicant resubmitted his complaint to the Smolninskiy District Court of St Petersburg.","On 26 July 2007 the Smolninskiy District Court left the applicant \u2019 s complaint unexamined, having found that the inquiry into the events had been conducted by the police department, which was under an obligation to inform him of its results. The applicant had never complained to the district prosecutor about the length of the inquiry and had never asked to be informed of the results of the inquiry. It followed that the applicant had brought the complaint against the wrong defendant.","On 15 October 2007 the St Petersburg City Court upheld that decision.","4. The applicant \u2019 s complaint to the Investigative Committee","On 1 February 2008 the applicant applied to the head of the Investigative Committee with the Prosecutor \u2019 s Office of Russia with a request for the opening of criminal proceedings into the attack on him and his wife. He also submitted that he had not been provided with copies of decisions taken during the inquiry into the attack on him. His complaint was forwarded to the district prosecutor.","On 2 August 2008 the applicant lodged a complaint with the St Petersburg prosecutor \u2019 s office, submitting that he had not been informed of any decision taken in respect of his complaint of 1 February 2008. The applicant also asked to be provided with copies of all decisions to refuse to institute criminal proceedings and of all the decisions quashing them.","On 20 August 2008 the St Petersburg prosecutor \u2019 s office informed the applicant that a reply to his complaint of 1 February 2008 had been sent to his address on 29 April 2008.","5. Decisions issued in 2008 and 2009","On 1 September 2008 the deputy district prosecutor quashed the decision of 12 November 2006 refusing to institute criminal proceedings and remitted the matter for additional inquiry.","On 7 October 2008 K. again issued a decision refusing to open criminal proceedings.","On 30 January 2009 the deputy district prosecutor quashed the decision of 7 October 2008 and remitted the matter for additional inquiry.","6. The applicant \u2019 s further complaints to courts","On 8 December 2008 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Oktyabrskiy District Court of St Petersburg, stating that the St Petersburg prosecutor \u2019 s office had not informed him of the results of the inquiry into his complaint of 2 August 2008 and had therefore failed to monitor the actions of the district prosecutor. The applicant \u2019 s complaint was forwarded to the Smolninskiy District Court.","On 25 May 2009 the Smolninskiy District Court dismissed the applicant \u2019 s complaint, finding that the district prosecutor did not have the authority to open a criminal case and that the district prosecutor had acted diligently.","Following an appeal by the applicant, on 4 August 2009 the St Petersburg City Court upheld that decision.","7. Information provided by the Government","According to the Government, on 6 July 2011 the register of incoming information on crimes, together with material concerning inquiries carried out in 2005, were destroyed, in accordance with the applicable rules on the storage of documents.","On 2 September 2011, following the communication of the application to the Government, a new inquiry into the applicant \u2019 s complaint about his ill \u2011 treatment by unidentified individuals in February 2005 was opened.","On 8 September 2011 a police officer, G., acknowledged that the acts of the unidentified individuals who had attacked the applicant on 12 February 2005 disclosed elements of an offence punishable under Article 112 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code. However, he issued a decision refusing to open criminal proceedings on the grounds that the offence had become statute-barred.","On an unspecified date the decision of 8 September 2011 was quashed and the matter was sent for additional inquiry, which is still pending."],"30385":["4.The applicant was born in 1997.","5.Following the death of her grandmother in 2010 the applicant, who was a minor at the time, began to show signs of distress. Her parents sought the opinion of a psychiatrist, who emphasised that their daughter was suffering from emotional instability, alternating between periods of anger and periods of agitation.","6.On 19 April 2013 the applicant went to a party where there were drugs and alcohol. The police arrived, seized the drugs and alcohol and checked the identity of the minors who were present.","A.The proceedings before the Youth Court and the minor\u2019s placement","7.On 23 April 2013 the prefect of Rome informed the public prosecutor at the Rome Youth Court (\u201cthe Youth Court\u201d) of the police operation carried out on 19 April 2013 and of the presence of V.C., a minor, at the scene. A criminal investigation was opened and the public prosecutor at the Youth Court was informed.","8.On 31 May 2013 the public prosecutor heard evidence from V.C.\u2019s parents. They stated that their daughter had been having difficulties and that they were worried about her, saying that she was taking drugs and stealing money at home. They also told the prosecutor that, according to the psychiatrist who was treating the applicant, she suffered from a bipolar disorder and an attention deficit disorder caused by drug use and also showed signs of a borderline and anti-social personality.","9.Subsequently, in June 2013, V.C.\u2019s parents informed the prosecutor that they had discovered through their daughter\u2019s Facebook page that she had been approached by a photographer to pose for pornographic photographs. The Government maintained that the parents had told the prosecutor on that occasion that their daughter did not want to be placed in a specialist institution.","10.On 5 June 2013 the public prosecutor heard evidence from the applicant, who stated that she had started to take drugs when she was twelve but had since stopped. The applicant stated that she did not wish to be placed in a specialist institution or in a foster family.","11.On 25 June 2013 the applicant\u2019s mother informed the public prosecutor by telephone that the situation had not improved and that the applicant had been approached to pose for pornographic photographs.","12.On 2 July 2013 the public prosecutor informed the Youth Court that it was clear from the statements made by the parents and the applicant, who had admitted stopping school and using drugs, and from the psychiatrist\u2019s diagnosis, that V.C. was in danger as she was no longer attending school and there was a risk that she might be caught up in a child prostitution ring, given that she had been approached to pose for photographs. The public prosecutor therefore requested the Youth Court to institute urgent proceedings under Article 25 of Royal Decree no. 1404 of 1934 and to have the minor placed in a specialist institution and in the care of the social services.","13.On 24 July 2013 the Youth Court appointed a judge (giudice onorario) to hear evidence from the applicant, her parents and the social services, in order to learn more about her environment and take the appropriate measures to protect her.","14.On 14 October 2013, that is, almost three months later, the Youth Court gave the social services notice to appear before it. However, they did not appear.","15.The Youth Court gave notice to the applicant\u2019s parents to appear before it on 21 October 2013. The parents gave evidence without the social services being present and stated that their daughter did not want to give evidence.","16.On 24 October 2013 the public prosecutor requested the judge to place the child in the care of the social services and in a specialist institution.","17.On 9 December 2013 the Youth Court, after hearing evidence from the parents and adding to the file the conversations which the applicant, who had refused to give evidence, had had on Facebook, and taking into account the fact that the social services had not attended the hearing, decided that it was necessary to place the child in the care of the social services. The court ordered her placement in a specialist institution for an initial twelve-month period so that she could follow a specific programme designed to help her to amend her behaviour, which the court described as erratic, and thus to resume a normal life.","18.On 11 December 2013 the social services received a copy of the Youth Court\u2019s decision.","19.On 17 December 2013 a first meeting was held between the social services and the applicant\u2019s parents. During the meeting the parents told the social services that there was a risk that their daughter might be caught up in a prostitution ring. They informed the social services that a criminal investigation was in progress.","20.On 18 December 2013 the social services contacted the psychiatrist who was treating the applicant and later met the applicant.","21.On 19 December 2013 the public prosecutor at the District Court informed the public prosecutor at the Youth Court that a criminal investigation was in progress concerning two individuals for exploitation of the applicant for prostitution. The applicant had given evidence on 4 and 9December 2013 (see paragraph 48 below).","The public prosecutor stressed that the arrest of the two suspects was imminent, and requested the prosecutor at the Youth Court to inform him of the measures taken to implement the Youth Court\u2019s decision of 9 December 2013 (see paragraph 17 above), given that the applicant was due to give evidence at the ad hoc hearing (incidente probatorio) (see paragraph 51 below).","22.On 20 December 2013 the applicant reiterated that she did not wish to be placed in a specialist institution.","23.However, in January 2014 she consented to such placement.","24.On 30 January 2014 the social services contacted the regional drug addiction agency for advice on how to help the applicant withdraw from drugs.","25.During the night of 30 January 2014 V.C. was the victim of a rape (violenza sessuale) committed by two individuals (see paragraph 54 below). On 31 January the applicant went to hospital with a police officer and her mother in order to be examined.","26.On 6 February 2014 the social services told the Youth Court that they had had several meetings with V.C.\u2019s parents and with the psychologist and psychiatrist whom she was seeing. They also informed the court that the girl had agreed to be placed in a specialist facility with a view to drug rehabilitation treatment.","27.On 7 February 2014 the social services were informed of the assault on the applicant.","28.On 19 February 2014 the President of the Youth Court made an urgent request to the social services to inform her of the measures taken to assist the applicant. She stressed that, in view of the applicant\u2019s age, it was still possible for her to change her behaviour and that a programme should be put in place to protect her from the risks she was facing.","29.On 25 February 2014, having received no information on the applicant\u2019s situation, the Youth Court requested the competent social services departments to draw up a report on the measures taken to assist her.","30.On 13 March 2014 the youth mental health department informed the Youth Court that the applicant had been diagnosed as being anti-social and drug-dependent and that she had agreed to being placed in a treatment centre (comunit\u00e0 terapeutica). The department had therefore requested the V.L. centre to admit her.","31.On 17 March 2014 the department dealing with drug dependency issues informed the Youth Court that the applicant had not consented to her placement and that, in any event, a psychiatric expert opinion was required prior to placement.","32.On 27 March 2014 the social services requested that the applicant be placed in a care facility as a temporary measure. On 31 March 2014 the care facility that been chosen stated that it did not have any places available.","33.In a report of 3 April 2014 the department dealing with drug dependency issues informed the court that it had chosen a treatment centre where the applicant could undergo rehabilitation.","34.On 3 April 2014 V.C.\u2019s parents requested the Youth Court to enforce the decision of 9 December 2013 ordering their daughter\u2019s placement in a specialist institution in order to help her. They also requested that a curator be appointed and that the court take urgent steps to protect their daughter.","35.On 4 April 2014 the Youth Court ordered the child\u2019s immediate placement in the Karisma treatment centre. The measure took effect on 14April 2014.","36.On 2 July 2014 the staff of the Karisma centre observed that the applicant\u2019s behaviour was challenging owing to her drug and alcohol dependency.","37.On 19 December 2014 the Karisma treatment centre informed the social services that the applicant\u2019s problems persisted and that it did not have the necessary infrastructure to deal with them in view of the applicant\u2019s drug addiction. They requested her transfer to a facility specialising in the treatment of minors with drug dependency problems.","38.The social services did not respond to this request.","39.On 7 September 2015 V.C. left the Karisma centre and returned to live with her parents.","40.On 22 October 2015 the social services sent a report to the Youth Court stressing that two meetings had been held with the applicant\u2019s parents and that a psychiatric expert assessment had been carried out. According to the expert, the applicant had problems with numeracy and was advised to follow a course of pharmacological treatment.","41.On 19 May 2016 the Youth Court held a hearing that was not attended by the social services. The applicant gave evidence. She stated that she had gone back to school and was continuing to be monitored by the social services. She said that she had made new friends and had had a positive experience in the treatment centre.","42.On 1 June 2016 the public prosecutor\u2019s office approved the continuation of the programme that had been put in place. The applicant stated that no such programme had actually been in place.","43.On 22 December 2016 the Youth Court gave notice to two representatives of the social services to appear before it in order to provide an update on the applicant\u2019s situation. According to the social services, the applicant\u2019s situation had improved and their involvement was thus no longer necessary.","44.On 10 January 2017 the public prosecutor issued an opinion in favour of discontinuing the proceedings instituted on the basis of Article 25 of Royal Decree no. 1404 of 1934.","45.In a decision of 17 January 2017 the Youth Court discontinued the proceedings.","B.The criminal proceedings concerning the prostitution ring","46.An investigation into the prostitution ring was opened in April 2013 and was concluded in December of that year.","47.On 25 September 2013 the public prosecutor at the Youth Court reported on the applicant\u2019s situation to his counterpart at the Rome District Court.","48.The applicant gave evidence in the criminal investigation on 4 and 9December 2013. She said that she had worked as a prostitute for two individuals.","49.On 16 January and 6 February 2014 two suspects were arrested.","50.On 21 January 2014 the prosecuting authorities again heard evidence from the applicant.","51.On 26 March 2014, at the ad hoc hearing (incidente probatorio), the applicant reiterated that she had worked as a prostitute for the two suspects between August and December 2013.","52.On 17 November 2014 the Rome District Court sentenced the two defendants to prison terms of five years and four years respectively for living on the earnings of prostitution. It also ordered them to pay damages to the applicant, who had applied to join the proceedings as a civil party. The court found that the two defendants had put pressure on the applicant to engage in prostitution, had benefited from the applicant\u2019s prostitution and had shared the proceeds. In its decision the court stated that the applicant had been the victim of sexual exploitation from August to December 2013 and that the defendants had been aware of her age.","On 4 February 2016 the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.","53.The applicant stated that she had not received the amount awarded by the courts in respect of damages.","C.The criminal proceedings concerning the rape of the applicant","54.An investigation into the gang rape (violenza sessuale di gruppo) of the applicant on the night of 30 January 2014 was opened concerning two suspects. The case was set down for preliminary hearing on 6 November 2015 before the Rome District Court. It appears from the file that a further hearing was held on 16 February 2016 and that the proceedings are still pending."],"30478":["4.The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in the Altay region.","5.At the material time the applicant was serving a sentence for robbery in correctional colony no. LIU-8 in the Altay region.","6.On 22 June, 12 July and 20 December 2004 he attempted suicide by opening his veins.","7.On 12 July 2004 a prison psychiatrist diagnosed the applicant as suffering from a slight mental retardation, psychopathy and claustrophobia with elements of self-aggression. An entry was made in his medical records that solitary confinement was contraindicated for mental health reasons. The correctional colony authorities were informed accordingly. The applicant was prescribed treatment. Since that time he had been examined by the prison psychiatrist at regular intervals. The prison psychiatrist\u2019s diagnosis and recommendations were confirmed by the psychiatric unit of prison hospital no. 12 where the applicant was treated from 2 to 26 April 2005.","8.On 3 May 2005 the governor of the correctional colony ordered the applicant\u2019s placement in a punishment cell for thirteen days as a punishment for the disorderly state of his bed and bedside table.","9.On 5 May 2005 the applicant was examined by the prison doctor on duty who found that his state of health permitted his placement in a punishment cell, provided that he was not held in solitary confinement.","10.The applicant was then placed in punishment cell no. 32 designed to accommodate two inmates. He was left alone in the cell, but the door was kept open.","11.On the same day the applicant went on a hunger strike in protest against his placement in solitary confinement.","12.At 8 p.m. on 8 May 2005 the applicant was visited by the prison doctor on duty who examined him and found that his health was satisfactory. He reiterated the recommendation that given the applicant\u2019s mental condition solitary confinement was contraindicated.","13.After the doctor left, the door of the applicant\u2019s cell was shut. About an hour later the applicant had a panic attack and attempted to open his veins with his teeth. The doctor was called back. He noted numerous lacerated wounds on the applicant\u2019s forearms and made bandages.","14.By letters of 15 June, 8 August and 1 November 2005 the applicant asked the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Altay Region to initiate criminal proceedings against the warders on duty.","15.On 15 December 2005 a deputy prosecutor of Barnaul refused to open criminal proceedings. He referred to statements by a warder, Mr Sh., that the applicant had himself asked him to shut the door. Moreover, the applicant\u2019s health had not been seriously damaged as a result of the incident.","16.It follows from the letter of 16 December 2005 from the prosecutor of Barnaul that the prosecutor\u2019s office had found that the applicant had been lawfully placed in a punishment cell. At the same time, the warders had disrespected the doctor\u2019s recommendation by leaving the applicant alone in a closed cell. The governor of correctional colony no. LIU-8 had been warned against \u201cpermitting similar incidents to occur in future\u201d.","17.Following to further complaints by the applicant, in which he stated in particular that he had never asked the warders to close the door, the prosecutor of Barnaul conducted an additional inquiry. He questioned the applicant and Mr Sh. He also questioned warders Mr K. and Mr S. who testified that the door to the applicant\u2019s cell had been temporarily closed to prevent his communication with other inmates who were at that time receiving clean bedding in the storage room opposite to the applicant\u2019s cell.","18.On 27 January 2006 the prosecutor of Baranaul refused to open criminal proceedings against the warders. He found that the warders had acted in compliance with the internal regulations and had had no intention of provoking the applicant to self-injury.","19.The applicant challenged the prosecutor\u2019s decisions of 15 December 2005 and 27 January 2006 before the Tsentralniy District Court of Barnaul.","20.On 27 September 2006 the Tsentralniy District Court upheld the prosecutor\u2019s decisions, finding that the inquiry had been thorough and the refusals to open criminal proceedings had been lawful and justified.","21.The applicant appealed. He submitted, in particular, that the warders had known that he suffered from claustrophobia and had closed the door to take vengeance on him for going on a hunger strike.","22.On 2 November 2006 the Altay Regional Court upheld the decision of 27 September 2006 on appeal."],"30490":["4.The applicant was born in 1987 and is detained in Tiszal\u00f6k.","5.On 19 July 2012 at approximately 9 a.m. the applicant, who had been placed in pre-trial detention in Budapest Prison, was transported to the premises of the Budapest Main Police Department for questioning. He was accompanied by two guards and was handed over for questioning at around 9.20 a.m., when he showed no sign of injuries.","6.The questioning started at approximately 9.55 a.m. and lasted until approximately 11.30 a.m. It was conducted by police officers A and B The applicant chose not to give a statement.","7.On being released after the interrogation, the applicant was handed over to the guards of Budapest Prison who, in the presence of the police officer, asked him whether he had been ill-treated. The applicant declared that he had not been.","8.After being transported back to Budapest Prison, the applicant underwent a medical examination before his readmission during which he claimed that he had been ill-treated by police officer A. Certain injuries were noted on the applicant. A report was drawn up on the incident and photos were taken of the injuries.","9.Right after the medical examination the applicant was again transported to the Budapest Main Police Department for questioning, from where he was taken to the military hospital by the police officer conducting his interrogation and allegedly assaulting him. At the hospital he was examined in the presence of the police officer. The medical report noted bleeding on the lower lip, jaw sensitive to pressure, and bruises on the ribs, all likely to heal within eight days.","10.According to the applicant\u2019s submission, following his return to Budapest Prison, he was again subjected to a medical examination.","11.The police report filed by A on 19 July 2012 stated that the applicant had not been ill-treated during questioning. None of the police officers had seen the applicant harming himself but A. had observed him biting his nails and lips. Also, according to the report, the applicant had been left alone for a few minutes at the police station without constant surveillance.","12.On 20 July 2012 the applicant complained of a headache and dizziness and was again examined by medical staff at Budapest Prison. He asserted that he had been ill-treated during his interrogation. The medical report recorded the following injuries: swelling on the right cheek, head sensitive to pressure, bruising on the lower lip, and abrasions on the lower right ribs and on the left shoulder blade.","13.Budapest Prison initiated criminal proceedings on charges of forced interrogation. Furthermore, the applicant\u2019s statements given during the medical examination (see paragraph 8 above) were qualified as a criminal complaint by the investigation authorities.","14.In the ensuing criminal investigation conducted by the Central Investigation Office the applicant gave a testimony on 14November 2012, stating that during his questioning he had refused to make a statement and as a consequence had been punched by one of the police officers several times on his head, neck and back. He had fallen against a chair and when he had tried to get up, he had been slapped four or five times in the face. He had been shown the results of a DNA test, and when he refused to comment on it, had again been beaten by the police officer. The same police officer had also punched him in the mouth when he had failed to recognise a person shown to him in a photograph. He had been pushed against the door and when he again fell over, the police officer had kicked him on his left side.","15.On 24 July 2013 one of the prisoner escort officers, C was questioned, and recalled that the applicant had complained of ill-treatment upon his return to the prison facility, which had surprised him since he had previously asked the applicant whether he had any complaints and had seen no injuries on the applicant\u2019s body. He also stated that he had noted the injuries on the applicant\u2019s face following the medical examination at Budapest Prison. He had asked the applicant why he had not complained of his ill-treatment earlier, to which the applicant had replied that he had been afraid of the police officers. According to C, as a general practice, detainees had been transferred in a special prisoner transport vehicle where they had not been constantly monitored and would have had the opportunity to inflict injuries on themselves.","16.On 25 July 2013 D, the other prisoner escort officer who accompanied the applicant to his interrogation, was also heard as a witness. He did not remember either the applicant or the circumstances of his transfer. He had a vague recollection that since there had been some complaints from the applicant\u2019s side once they had arrived back at the prison facility, they had had to transfer him back to the police department. He maintained that if they had seen any injury on the applicant\u2019s face following interrogation, they would surely have inquired of him whether he had been ill-treated by the police officers. Therefore, in his estimation the applicant could not have shown any visible signs of injury when he was handed back from the interrogation.","17.On 6 October 2013 E, the prison security officer who had taken photos of the applicant\u2019s injuries during his readmission was questioned as a witness. He could not give any details of the incident. He could not remember whether he had escorted the applicant to the medical examination, but suggested that the applicant\u2019s injuries must have occurred before he had been examined by the medical staff, which was why he had been called on to take photos.","18.On 18 November 2013 F, the nurse on duty at Budapest Prison was questioned, but she did not remember the incident. She could only confirm that if she had seen the applicant\u2019s injuries prior to his transfer, she would surely have inquired about their origin.Examining the photos of the applicant, she asserted that the bruises on the applicant\u2019s face would have occurred immediately after an impact and that the applicant could have caused them himself.","19.On 5 December 2013 G, the guard on duty at Budapest Prison, was questioned as a witness; he could not remember either the applicant or anything else concerning his complaint. He nonetheless maintained that if he had seen injuries on the applicant as presented to him on a photo, he would surely have inquired about their origin.","20.On 2 January 2014 the Central Investigation Office also heard evidence from H and I, two prison escort officers from Budapest Prison who had been on duty on the day of the incident, and who were responsible for transferring detainees to the healthcare facilities. They did not remember the applicant and could not recall the circumstances of his medical examination or admission to the prison, since, as one of them explained, they were responsible for escorting thirty to forty prisoners a day. H stated that as a general practice detainees were under constant supervision while waiting for medical examinations, whereas I asserted that there were instances where detainees were left alone when placed in so\u2011called \u201chealthcare waiting rooms\u201d. Neither of the witnesses knew with certainty whether this had been the case for the applicant.","21.On the same day, three members of the medical staff of Budapest Prison were also heard as witnesses. Two of them could not recall anything about the incident and did not remember the applicant, mostly because they were responsible for a large number of cases. Another member of the healthcare staff stated that she had a recollection of an incident, but was not sure whether it involved the applicant or another person. As a general rule, the witnesses explained that they would not admit a detainee into the prison if he showed signs of injuries. Examining the photos of the applicant, two of the medical staff stated that because of the bad quality of the photos, they weren\u2019t even sure if they showed actual injuries or simply the shape of the applicant\u2019s face, while the third asserted that the injury must have been fresh when the photo was taken.","22.The prison doctor was also questioned the same day. She could not identify the applicant, did not remember whether she had met him, had no recollection of the incident and could only recount what she had previously stated in the medical report. However, she stated that if the applicant had been left alone, he could have inflicted the injuries on himself.","23.The Central Investigation Office commissioned a forensic expert opinion. According to the expert assessment, the applicant\u2019s account of the origins of his injuries was implausible, since if he had been ill-treated in the way described by him, his injuries would have been of a more serious nature. Furthermore, the location of the injuries had not corresponded to the applicant\u2019s description of the incident either. The report stated that it was impossible to establish when the applicant\u2019s injuries had occurred. Referring to the witness testimonies and the location of the injuries, it suggested that the applicant could have inflicted them on himself.","24.The investigation was discontinued on 8 May 2014 on the grounds that the applicant\u2019s allegations could not be substantiated beyond doubt in the absence of any witness testimony and taking into account the conclusions of the forensic expert opinion. According to the reasoning, the available evidence neither refuted nor proved the applicant\u2019s allegations. The applicant complained, seeking the continuation of the investigations. The first-instance decision was upheld by the Chief Prosecutor\u2019s Office on 15 July 2014. The decision called the applicant\u2019s attention to the possibility of lodging of initiating substitute private prosecution proceedings."],"30561":["1. The applicant, Mr Bayzhan Kholmuradovich Ismogulov, is a Russian national who was born in 1971 and lives in St Petersburg. He was represented before the Court by Ms A.V. Boychenyuk, a lawyer practising in Paris.","2. The Russian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and then by his successor in that office, Mr M. Galperin.","A. The circumstances of the case","3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.","1. Events of 2 September 2002","4. The applicant and his family occupied one room of a flat within a hostel ( \u043e\u0431\u0449\u0435\u0436\u0438\u0442\u0438\u0435 ).","5. On 2 September 2002 the applicant had an argument with I., the manager of the hostel, who demanded that the applicant vacate the room. When the applicant refused to let him in, I. called the police.","6. When police officers P. and Ch. arrived, the applicant opened the door. According to the applicant, as soon as he did so I. punched him several times holding a set of keys, and the applicant tried to shut the door. At that moment P. sprayed the applicant with tear gas and threatened him with a gun.","7. An ambulance paramedic recorded the injuries found on the applicant \u2019 s body: grazes on the surface of his stomach and burning of the mucous membrane of the eyes. This document, however, was not made available to the Court by the parties.","2. Criminal proceedings against the applicant in connection with the incident of 2 September 2002","8. On 21 October 2002 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant under Articles 213 \u00a7 1 (hooliganism) and 119 \u00a7 1 (threat of murder or infliction of grave bodily harm) of the Criminal Code.","9. In the course of a preliminary investigation it was established that at about 9.30 p.m. on 2 September 2002 in the communal corridor of the hostel, the manager of the hostel, I., and police officer P. asked the applicant to provide an explanation for his unlawful stay in room no. 702. In response the applicant started using obscene language and administered two blows to I \u2019 s face, causing him bruising to the left cheekbone and abrasions on his fingers. It was also established that the applicant had been occupying the room without any legal grounds and had prevented access to another room situated in the same flat to its lawful residents, M. and Sh.","10. On 7 February 2003 charges were brought against the applicant under Articles 213 \u00a7 3 (hooliganism) and 330 \u00a7 1 (taking the law into one \u2019 s own hands) of the Criminal Code.","11. On 14 December 2007 the Kalininskiy District Court of St Petersburg (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) convicted the applicant under Articles 116 \u00a7 1 (physical assault) and 330 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to a fine. The sentence was not enforced owing to the expiry of the procedural time-limit for prosecution.","12. On 7 April 2008 the St Petersburg City Court quashed the above judgment on appeal, terminated the proceedings in so far as they concerned the charges under Article 330 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code, and referred the rest of the case to the District Court for a fresh examination by a different bench.","13. On 6 November 2008 the District Court returned the case to the prosecutor, who in turn sent it back to the investigations department.","14. On 19 September 2009 the investigating authority reclassified the applicant \u2019 s acts under Article 213 \u00a7 1 of the Criminal Code.","15. On an unspecified date the proceedings were terminated because the legislature had decriminalised the acts committed by the applicant.","3. Investigation into the applicant \u2019 s allegations of ill-treatment","16. Meanwhile, on 23 May 2003 the applicant applied to the prosecutor \u2019 s office seeking the institution of criminal proceedings against I., P. and Ch.","17. On three occasions \u2012 1 July 2003, 11 May 2005 and 30 May 2006 \u2013 the Deputy Prosecutor of the Kalininskiy District of St Petersburg refused to institute criminal proceedings against I., P. and Ch. for lack of constituent elements of a crime (illegal entry to a dwelling, abuse of power and service forgery) in their actions.","18. Following complaints lodged by the applicant on 25 August 2004, 12 September 2005 and 15 January 2007 respectively, the District Court found the above-mentioned decisions unsubstantiated and ordered the prosecutor \u2019 s office to carry out an additional inquiry, questioning all the persons involved in the incident.","19. In the absence of any progress in the conduct of the inquiry by December 2007, the applicant challenged the inactivity of the prosecutor \u2019 s office before the District Court.","20. On 15 May 2008 the District Court found unlawful the inactivity of the prosecutor \u2019 s office in conducting a proper inquiry in the applicant \u2019 s case and ordered the Kalininskiy District Prosecutor to resolve the situation.","21. The material concerning the applicant \u2019 s complaint was subsequently lost.","22. Following communication of the present application to the Russian Government in June 2014, on 11 August 2014 an investigator of the Kalininskiy District Investigations Department of the Federal Investigating Committee for St Petersburg refused to institute criminal proceedings against I., P. and Ch.","23. On 30 January 2015 the above-mentioned decision was set aside by the prosecutor of the Kalininskiy District of St Petersburg, who ordered an additional inquiry.","24. The case file contains no further information as to the outcome of the proceedings."],"30673":["A.The applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment","5.The applicant was born in 1966 and lived in Nizhniy Novgorod. He is currently serving a prison sentence in the Nizhniy Novgorod region.","6.On 24 April 2004 a robbery took place at the offices of a company in Nizhniy Novgorod. On the same day the Nizhegorodskiy district police department of Nizhniy Novgorod opened a criminal case into the robbery. The Operational-Search Division of the Chief Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation in the Privolzhskiy Federal Circuit (\u041e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043d\u043e-\u0440\u043e\u0437\u044b\u0441\u043a\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0431\u044e\u0440\u043e \u0413\u0423 \u041c\u0412\u0414 \u0420\u0424 \u043f\u043e \u041f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u043e\u043b\u0436\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u0444\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u043e\u043a\u0440\u0443\u0433\u0443 \u2013 \u201cthe ORB police unit\u201d, \u201cthe police\u201d or \u201cpolice officers\u201d) carried out operational-search activities in the case, including phone tapping. The results were declassified and transferred to S., an investigator from the investigation division of the Nizhniy Novgorod regional police department (\u0421\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0447\u0430\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0413\u043b\u0430\u0432\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u043f\u0440\u0438 \u0413\u0423\u0412\u0414 \u041d\u0438\u0436\u0435\u0433\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0438) in charge of the robbery case, on 2June 2004. According to the police report, the robbery was committed by the applicant and five other individuals. On 4June 2004 S. requested a court order to search the applicant\u2019s flat, on the grounds that he was suspected of committing the robbery.","7.On 7 June 2004 Judge D. of the Nizhegorodskoy District Court of Nizhniy Novgorod granted the investigator\u2019s request and ordered that the applicant\u2019s flat be searched, referring to the applicant as a suspect.","1.The applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment on 8 and 22 June 2004","8.From 6.18 to 7.56 a.m. on 8 June 2004 police officers searched the applicant\u2019s flat in his presence. They then took him to the offices of the ORB police unit in Nizhniy Novgorod (\u201cthe police station\u201d).","9.The applicant\u2019s account of the subsequent events is as follows. His request for access to a lawyer was ignored. The police demanded that he confess to the robbery. He refused. Three of the officers who had arrested him were joined by other police officers, including K., Pr. and S. They subjected him to various forms of violence, such as punching and kicking him, blocking his airway by covering his mouth and nose with a rag, and tying him up in a painful position. They made him sit on the floor cross\u2011legged, with his hands cuffed behind his back and a bag put over his head so that he could not see anything. His feet were tied with a rope, which was connected to his neck and the handcuffs. The police officers pulled the rope to contort the applicant into a painful position, then sat on his back and jumped on him. When the applicant lost consciousness they poured water on him. He heard the officers tell each other not to leave any marks on his body. The investigator entered the room several times and demanded that the applicant write a confession.","10.According to the applicant, his ill-treatment lasted for several hours until he wrote a confession statement as requested.","11.According to the police records, the applicant confessed to committing the robbery with three other individuals at 9.30 a.m. on 8 June 2004. His confession was recorded in the form of a voluntary \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d (\u044f\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0441 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439) by operational officer P. in room no. 329. The record stated that at 9.30 a.m. on 8June 2004 the applicant had turned himself in to the police and reported that he had committed the crime.","12.According to a record of the applicant\u2019s arrest as a suspect in the robbery case, drawn up by S., the applicant was arrested at 9.40 a.m. on 8June 2004, and the record was drawn up at the same time. Between 5.05 and 5.30 p.m. he was questioned as a suspect in the presence of a lawyer appointed by S. The applicant refused to give statements, relying on his constitutional right not to incriminate himself. He was then placed in the temporary detention centre of the Nizhniy Novgorod regional police department.","13.On 9 June 2004 the applicant was brought before Judge D. of the Nizhegorodskoy District Court, who granted the investigator\u2019s request for the applicant to be remanded in custody. According to the applicant, at the hearing in the presence of a lawyer appointed by his family, he complained to the judge that he had been ill-treated by police officers and had signed a confession statement as a result, but the judge did not take any action.","14.According to the applicant, after the court hearing he was not placed in a remand centre as was normal practice. He was instead detained in the temporary detention centre of the Privolzhskiy Federal Circuit police department for five days, before being placed in a remand centre, SIZO\u20111.According to the Government, the applicant was held in SIZO-1 from 9June 2004.","15.On 15 June 2004 the applicant was charged with robbery and questioned as an accused by S. in the presence of his lawyer. The applicant pleaded his innocence and again refused to give statements.","16.On 22 June 2004 the applicant was taken from SIZO-1 to the police station. According to him, police officers, in particular Ch., K., P. and Pr., again subjected him to ill-treatment to force him to give confession statements.","17.On 24 June 2004 the applicant, through his lawyer, lodged complaints with the head of the remand centre, the Nizhniy Novgorod regional prosecutor, the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office and the Presidential Human Rights Committee. He described suffering acts of violence at the hands of the police officers on 8 and 22 June 2004 (see paragraphs 9 and 16 above). He requested that action be taken and that he be placed under protection, adding that he could identify the police officers concerned. He stated that as a result of the violence he had confessed to a crime which he had never committed in a \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d which had been dictated to him by the police officers and S.","2.The applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment on 28 June 2004","18.The applicant\u2019s account of events on 28 June 2004 is as follows. On 28 June 2004 the applicant was taken from SIZO-1 to the police station, where he was again subjected to ill-treatment and asked to give confession statements. Police officers, in particular Ch., K., P. and Pr., punched and kicked him and tied him up in painful positions. Both his legs were tied with a rope and pulled apart. As on the previous occasion on 22June 2004, no investigative activities were carried out with the applicant.","19.On 29 June 2004 the applicant asked a doctor at the remand centre to record the injuries allegedly inflicted on him the previous day, notably contusions to his chest which made it difficult for him to breathe and abrasions. At 11.20a.m. the doctor, Ch., recorded circular abrasions on the lower third of both shins with a brown \u201cwet\u201d surface 1.5 to 2 centimetres wide. The doctor concluded that the injuries had been inflicted the previous day. The injuries were reported to the head of SIZO-1.","20.On the same day the applicant, who had received no response to his previous complaint, lodged another complaint with the head of the remand centre stating that he had been beaten up at the police station on 28 June 2004, as a result of which he had sustained contusions to his ribcage and abrasions. He asked for an investigation into the incident and to be given a full medical examination. He stated that despite the severe pain in his chest the medical staff of the remand centre had refused to give him a proper medical examination. He asked the head of the remand centre to stop taking him to the police and to instead conduct any investigative activities at the remand centre in his lawyer\u2019s presence.","21.On 30 June 2004 the applicant sent a second complaint to the Nizhniy Novgorod regional prosecutor, complaining that on 28 June 2004, in a room at the police station with the sign \u201cnos. 326-331\u201d on the door, police officers had beaten him up for several hours to force him to confess to crimes which he had not committed. Upon his return to the remand centre he had asked the medical staff to record his injuries. The applicant asked for the police officers to be prosecuted and stated that he could identify them.","3.The applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment during his detention in correctional colony IK-14 in July-November 2004","22.On 13 July 2004 a police officer, M., reported to the head of division no.3 of the ORB police unit, which provided \u201coperational support\u201d in the applicant\u2019s criminal case, that three of the five people detained in the case had confessed to the robbery and had been cooperating with the investigation by uncovering further evidence of criminal activity by the group. According to operational information, the applicant had attempted to intimidate the co\u2011accused held in the same remand centre who had started cooperating with the investigating authority, thereby making them fear for their lives and health and hampering the investigation. The report recommended that the applicant be transferred to correctional colony IK\u201114.","23.On 14 July 2004 S. ordered that the applicant be transferred to a unit functioning as a remand centre at IK-14 for the same reasons as those stated in the police report (see paragraph 22 above).","24.It appears that the applicant was transferred there on 21 July 2004.","25.The applicant\u2019s account of the subsequent events is as follows. He was placed in a punishment cell for eighteen days. During this time he was beaten unconscious, to make him confess to a series of armed robberies, by several convicted prisoners acting on the police\u2019s instructions and with the connivance of the administration of IK-14. They punched and kicked him, hit him with a rubber truncheon and hung him upside down. Subsequently, for some time he was detained together with convicted prisoners. He was repeatedly visited by the police, in particular officers Ch. and P., who demanded that he confess to a series of robberies and beat him up when he refused. They also asked some of the convicts, in particular S.P. and A.V., to beat him up. After the beatings he could hardly move on his own. One convict, Z., threatened him with sexual violence if he did not sign confession statements. The staff of the medical unit at IK-14 allegedly refused him medical treatment.","26.According to the applicant\u2019s medical records from IK-14, from 21 to 29September 2004 he received inpatient treatment for a neurological disorder.","27.On an unspecified date during his detention in IK-14 the applicant confessed to six crimes and his confessions were recorded as \u201cstatements of surrender and confession\u201d.","28.On 3November 2004 at IK-14 the applicant reiterated his confession statements in the presence of S. and his lawyer. The statements were documented in a record of his questioning as an accused. According to the applicant, the confessions were the result of torture by the police and convicts, which he could not stand any longer.","29.On 1 December 2004 S. ordered the applicant\u2019s transfer back to the remand centre on the grounds that the risk of him intimidating his co\u2011accused no longer existed since all necessary investigative measures had been carried out. On 2 December 2004 the applicant was transferred to SIZO-1.","30.According to the Government, during his detention in IK-14 the applicant was held in a unit functioning as a remand centre. He was allowed short-term visits from his wife on 13 August and 24 September 2004. According to a letter of 29 July 2010 signed by the Sukhobezvodnenskiy prosecutor, the applicant was detained in a unit at IK\u201114 functioning as a remand centre from 6 August to 2December 2004.","31.The applicant submitted several envelopes with postage stamps in which he had sent letters to his family in November 2004. His handwritten address was indicated as unit no. 14 at IK-14.","32.The applicant submitted to the Court the following witness statements recorded by a representative of the non-governmental organisation Committee Against Torture in Nizhniy Novgorod in February 2006:","(i)According to a statement by I.K., he was serving a sentence of imprisonment in unit no. 14 at IK-14, where he was informally given the task of monitoring discipline. In September 2004 the applicant, who was not a convicted prisoner like the others, was transferred to the unit. I.K. learned from B., who was high in the unofficial hierarchy of convicted prisoners in the unit, that the applicant had been transferred there so that he could be coerced into giving confession statements at the request of law\u2011enforcement officers by whatever means. The applicant had bruises under his eyes and haematomas on his head. He could hardly move on his own and was depressed. He was visited several times by officers from the ORB police unit. After the visits he had to seek others\u2019 help to get to his cell and looked very oppressed. On one occasion, after a visit, the applicant wrote a statement in which he described being tortured and beaten up during his interviews. I.K. handed the statement over to B. Later that day two convicts, A.V. and S.P., went to see the applicant and took him to a storage room. Through the thin plywood walls I.K. could clearly hear A.V. and S.P. yelling at the applicant and threatening him with physical and sexual violence if he kept complaining and refusing to write the statements which the police had asked him to give. On several other occasions I.K. heard one convict, Z., threaten the applicant with sexual violence if he refused to give statements. After the applicant had been coerced into giving several confession statements in a row he was no longer threatened and beaten up and soon left the colony. I.K. stated that he was ready to confirm his statements before the investigating authority and the courts, adding that he feared pressure from the police and the prosecutor\u2019s office.","(ii)According to a statement by G., he was serving a sentence of imprisonment in IK-14. In September 2004 the applicant, who was not a convicted prisoner like the others, was transferred to his unit. He had bruises under his eyes and complained of pain on both sides of his body and in his spine. On repeated occasions he was called for interviews by officers from the ORB police unit. The interviews began in the morning and lasted until evening. After the interviews the applicant was unable to move on his own and had fresh injuries, notably abrasions and bruises on his face. He explained that he had been beaten up by police officers. On one occasion three convicts, V., B. and Z., took him to a storage room. G. heard them yelling at the applicant and threatening him, demanding that he confess to some crimes and write confession statements as requested by the police officers. After that incident the applicant had several fresh bruises on his face.","(iii)According to statements by the applicant\u2019s wife, at the court hearing on 9June 2004 the applicant looked very depressed. He had bruises on his head and abrasions on his wrists. When she visited him in IK-14 his face was bruised, he was dragging his leg behind him and had difficulty sitting down. He said that he was being detained with convicted prisoners in unit no. 14 and visited regularly by police officers demanding that he give confession statements in relation to serious crimes. During subsequent visits, on at least three occasions, the applicant looked like he had been beaten up, with abrasions and bruises on his face and head and bruises on his wrists. He had difficulty speaking, made long pauses and could hardly move. On one occasion, he said that he had signed several confession statements in a row as a result of torture. At one of the court hearings for the extension of his detention he complained of severe back pain.","(iv)According to the applicant\u2019s son, D.M., at the same hearing on 9June 2004 the applicant looked very depressed and shocked. His face was swollen, his lips were smashed and he was walking with difficulty. He did not recognise his family. When visiting his father in IK-14 D.M. learned of the violence he had suffered at the hands of the police officers and convicts.","4.The applicant\u2019s medical records","33.The Government submitted extracts from the applicant\u2019s medical records relating to the period of his detention, in particular:","(i)A form entitled \u201cexamination by a doctor on duty\u201d with the following pre-printed sections: \u201cheight\u201d, \u201cweight\u201d, \u201ccomplaints\u201d, \u201cpharynx and cutaneous coverings\u201d, \u201cheart and lungs\u201d, \u201carterial pressure\u201d, \u201ctuberculosis\u201d, \u201cvenereal diseases\u201d, \u201cmental diseases\u201d, \u201cviral hepatitis\u201d. The word \u201cheadache\u201d is written in the \u201ccomplaints\u201d section, while \u201cclean\u201d appears in the \u201cpharynx and cutaneous coverings\u201d section. The form does not give details as to which parts of the applicant\u2019s body were examined and where the examination took place. It is signed and dated 9 June 2004.","(ii)A form entitled \u201cbodily injuries upon arrival\u201d states that there were \u201cno bodily injuries\u201d on 9 April 2007 at IK-20. The form is signed and dated 9June 2004 and contains a similar signature to the form described above.","B.Pre-investigation inquiries into the applicant\u2019s alleged ill\u2011treatment","34.The investigating authorities carried out pre-investigation inquiries into the applicant\u2019s allegations of violence by the police and convicts acting on their instructions with the connivance of the administration of IK\u201114. No criminal proceedings were opened into his allegations. Details of the decisions taken by the investigating authorities are as follows.","1.The applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment on 8 and 22 June 2004","35.On 16 July 2004 an investigator from the Nizhegorodskoy district prosecutor\u2019s office of Nizhniy Novgorod refused to initiate criminal proceedings into the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment on 8 and 22 June 2004, pursuant to Article 24 \u00a7 1 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for lack of evidence that a crime had been committed. Relying on statements by S. and the police officers, who all denied the applicant\u2019s allegations, the investigator held that the applicant\u2019s allegations were not supported by evidence.","36.On 23 August 2004 the Nizhegorodskoy district prosecutor found that decision lawful, well-reasoned and based on a comprehensive and impartial inquiry.","37.On 6 March 2006 the Nizhegorodskoy deputy district prosecutor revoked the decision of 16 July 2004 as unlawful and ill-founded for failure to identify all the police officers concerned.","2.The applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment on 28 June 2004","38.On 2 August 2004 an investigator from the Nizhegorodskoy district prosecutor\u2019s office refused to initiate criminal proceedings into the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment on 28 June 2004, pursuant to Article24\u00a71(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for lack of the constituent elements of a crime under Article 286 of the Criminal Code (abuse of powers) in the actions of Ya., one of the police officers who had taken the applicant on 28June 2004 from SIZO-1 to the police station and back. The investigator relied on statements by Ya. and S. denying any ill\u2011treatment of the applicant. The investigator held that there was no evidence that the abrasions on the applicant\u2019s shins, as described in the medical record of 29 June 2004, had been caused at the police station.","39.On 6 March 2006 the Nizhegorodskoy district deputy prosecutor revoked that decision as unfounded for failure to identify all the police officers concerned.","40.On 13 March 2006 an investigator from the district prosecutor\u2019s office issued a new decision refusing to open criminal proceedings against officer Ya., identical to the previous decision. On 31 March 2006 the Nizhegorodskoy district deputy prosecutor annulled that decision as unfounded.","41.In the course of a new pre-investigation inquiry the applicant gave \u201cexplanations\u201d, describing in detail his alleged ill-treatment by police officers Ch., K., P. and Pr., and stating that he could identify several others. Pr. stated that after the applicant\u2019s arrest and before the arrival of the investigator in charge of the criminal case the police officers had interviewed the applicant.","42.Relying on the police officers\u2019 statements denying any ill-treatment of the applicant, two more decisions refusing to open a criminal case against the police officers were issued on 10 April 2006 (annulled the same day) and 19April 2006.","3.The applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment during his detention in IK-14 from July to November 2004","43.On 8 April 2005 a deputy prosecutor from the Sukhobezvodnenskaya prosecutor\u2019s office, which supervised law observance in penal facilities, refused to institute criminal proceedings into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment in IK-14, pursuant to Article24\u00a71 (1) of Code of Criminal Procedure for lack of evidence that a crime had been committed.","44.The decision stated that, according to the applicant, while in IK-14 he had been held in a punishment cell in a unit functioning as a remand centre and in unit no. 14 together with convicted prisoners, who had subjected him to psychological and physical violence to force him to give \u201cstatements of surrender and confession\u201d. His allegations had included regular beatings by convicts A.A., B., M.K., S.P. and A.V., a member of the administration of IK-14, Captain V., and police officers, in particular P. and his subordinates.","45.Relying on statements by police officers M., P. and Ya., the investigator S., convicts A.A., M.K., and A.V., and T., the head of the unit functioning as a remand centre, who all denied the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill\u2011treatment, the deputy prosecutor held that the applicant\u2019s allegations were not supported by evidence.","46.On the same day the head of the Nizhniy Novgorod regional prosecutor\u2019s office division responsible for supervising investigations and inquiries reviewed the decision of the Sukhobezvodnenskaya prosecutor\u2019s office of 8 April 2005 and found it lawful and well-reasoned, stating that during his detention in IK-14 the applicant had confessed to six crimes, and \u201chis statements had been documented in records of surrender and confession (\u044f\u0432\u043a\u0438 \u0441 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439) which had been forwarded to the [Operational-Search Division of the Chief Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation] in the Privolzhskiy Federal Circuit (\u041e\u0420\u0411 \u0413\u0423 \u041c\u0412\u0414 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0438 \u043f\u043e \u041f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u043e\u043b\u0436\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u0444\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u043e\u043a\u0440\u0443\u0433\u0443)\u201d.","47.The applicant lodged appeals against the decision of 8 April 2005, which were dismissed by various levels of prosecutor\u2019s office, as stated in a letter from an assistant Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation of 20February 2006, and letters from the Nizhniy Novgorod regional prosecutor\u2019s office dated 9 March and 10 April 2006.","C.The applicant\u2019s trial","48.The applicant was tried by jury before the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court. At a preliminary hearing on 19 October 2005 he requested that the records of his questioning as an accused and some other records of investigative activities conducted in his case be excluded as evidence because the self\u2011incriminating statements recorded therein had been obtained from him under duress by police officers and convicts of IK-14.","49.At the applicant\u2019s request the trial court heard two witnesses. The applicant\u2019s son S.I. stated that at his custody hearing, the applicant had been in a \u201cdelirious state\u201d, had had a swollen face, had been limping a lot and had been helped by others to move around. When S.I. had visited his father in IK-14 at the end of August 2004 he had had a bruise near one of the eyes, a cut lip, bluish hands and bruises and abrasions on his wrists. The applicant had written to his family in September or October 2004, asking them to lodge an official complaint regarding the beatings. However, he had then changed his mind and asked them not to do so.","50.I.K. stated that he had served a sentence of imprisonment in IK-14. The day after his arrival the applicant had been admitted to the medical unit with complaints of pain in his back and leg. He had had bruises on his face which, according to him, had been inflicted on him by other convicts. The applicant had been taken out of the unit for visits regularly, about three times a month. I.K. had learnt from the applicant that the visitors had been the police. After the visits the applicant had been unable to walk up the stairs and had complained of pain in his head and back.","51.The trial court found that the witness statements did not support the applicant\u2019s allegations. It noted that the disputed records had been signed by a lawyer and contained information about the applicant\u2019s procedural rights. In the court\u2019s opinion, the applicant\u2019s medical history, notably post\u2011traumatic encephalopathy, osteochondrosis of the cervical spine and a form of dystonia, which he had been diagnosed with in 1991, explained his complaints of headaches and pain in his back and legs. The court also relied on statements by S., who denied the applicant\u2019s allegations, and on the Sukhobezvodnenskiy prosecutor\u2019s decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings into the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment. It held that the applicant\u2019s allegations that his confession statements had been given under duress were not based on fact and rejected his requests to have the impugned evidence declared inadmissible.","52.On 8 June 2006 the applicant and his co-accused were convicted of theft and a series of armed robberies committed in 1998, 1999, 2002 and on 24April 2004 by a criminal group led by two of the applicant\u2019s co\u2011accused. The applicant was sentenced to nineteen years\u2019 imprisonment. In sentencing the applicant the court applied Article 61 \u00a7 1 (i) of the Criminal Code, which provided that a \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d, active cooperation in investigating a crime and exposure of other participants in a crime were extenuating circumstances which warranted a less severe punishment.","53.The applicant appealed. He stated that after his arrest he had been beaten up by police officers and had given a \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d under duress, which he had revoked at trial. His injuries had been confirmed by medical evidence. On 21 July 2004 he had been unlawfully transferred to correctional facility IK-14 under the pretext that he had intimidated his co-accused, which he had never done. He had been held in a punishment cell and then in a unit together with convicted prisoners who had subjected him to beatings as a result of which he had given self\u2011incriminating statements. This had been confirmed by witness I.K.","54.On 22 February 2007 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation reduced the applicant\u2019s sentence to sixteen years\u2019 imprisonment, correcting calculation errors by the trial court, and upheld the remainder of the judgment. Relying on the Sukhobezvodnenskiy prosecutor\u2019s decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings, it upheld the trial court\u2019s findings in relation to the applicant\u2019s allegations of police violence and his request for the evidence allegedly obtained under duress to be excluded.","55.On 25 November 2013 the Varnavinskiy District Court of the Nizhniy Novgorod region reduced the applicant\u2019s sentence to fifteen and a half years\u2019 imprisonment following amendments to the Criminal Code."],"30676":["5.The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Perm.","6.On 9 April 2007 at about 11 p.m. the applicant was stopped by the police and taken to the Dzerzhinskiy District Department of the Interior of the town of Perm (\u0414\u0437\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0438\u043d\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0420\u041e\u0412\u0414 \u0433. \u041f\u0435\u0440\u043c\u0438 \u2013 \u201cthe police station\u201d) for an identity check.","7.After the applicant\u2019s identity was established the applicant was informed that he was wanted on suspicion of having committed a crime.","8.On 10 April 2007 at 1 a.m. the applicant was placed in the cell for administrative detainees at the police station. At 9 a.m. he was handed over to a police officer, P. According to the applicant, P. subjected him to ill\u2011treatment by administering several blows to his chest, abdomen and face.","9.Subsequently the applicant was interrogated by an investigator, B., in the presence of N. (the head of the police station), P., and Zh. (another police officer), as a witness in criminal case no.1470 instituted on 8March 2007 under Article161 \u00a7 2 of the Criminal Code (robbery). After his questioning the applicant was released.","10.Immediately after his release on 10 April 2007 the applicant complained at the police station of having been beaten by P.","11.On the same day the applicant went to a traumatology centre, where he was diagnosed with bruising on the left side of his forehead.","12.On 11 April 2007 the applicant complained of the beatings to the prosecutor\u2019s office. He was made to undergo an expert examination, which revealed the following injuries: bruises on the left side of his forehead, at the outer corner of his left eye and on the left side of his neck, and an abrasion behind his left ear. The expert concluded that the above-mentioned injuries could have been caused by his being hit by a hard blunt object(s) or by that object being drawn across the applicant\u2019s skin, possibly at the time and under the circumstances indicated by the applicant.","13.On 9 June 2007 the investigator of the Dzerzhinskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office of the town of Perm decided not to institute criminal proceedings against P., in the absence of any indication that a criminal act had been committed. Having questioned the applicant and others involved in the incident and having examined the medical evidence, the investigator found that there were no objective data confirming that the injuries had been inflicted by the police officer. The investigator noted, in particular, the discrepancies between the applicant\u2019s description of the alleged beatings and the injuries that he had actually sustained.","14.On 27 June 2007 the applicant challenged the above-mentioned decision before the court.","15.On 2 July 2007 the Dzerzhinskiy District Court of Perm (\u201cthe District Court\u201d) declined to examine the applicant\u2019s challenge.","16.Following an appeal by the applicant, on 24 July 2007 the Perm Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) quashed the decision of 2July 2007.","17.On 24 August 2007 the District Court held that the decision of 9June 2007 not to institute criminal proceedings against P. had been unlawful and unjustified. The court held that the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment had been substantiated by medical evidence.","18.On 20 September 2007 the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 24August 2007 (since it had been delivered in the absence of P.), and remitted the matter for fresh examination by a different bench.","19.On 9October 2007 the District Court held that the decision of 9June 2007 not to institute criminal proceedings against P. had been unlawful and unjustified. The court pointed out that the decision in question had been based on the submissions of the police officers, without due assessment of the fact that the applicant, who had had no bodily injuries prior to his arrest by the police (as confirmed by I., A. and Pan.), had been diagnosed as having such injuries immediately after his release from the police station.","20.On 13November 2007 the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 9October 2007 on appeal and remitted the matter for fresh examination by a different bench.","21.On 29November 2007 the District Court again held that the decision of 9June 2007 not to institute criminal proceedings against P. had been unlawful and unjustified. The court\u2019s reasoning was similar to that in respect of the judgment of 9October 2007.","22.Following an appeal by the district prosecutor on 20December 2007 the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 29November 2007 on appeal and referred the matter again for fresh examination by a different bench.","23.On 30January 2008 the District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s claim. The court found that the investigator had rightly come to the conclusion that there had been no objective information confirming the applicant\u2019s allegation of ill-treatment by the police officer, P., and that the above-mentioned conclusion had been reached on the basis of comprehensive evidence.","24.Following an appeal by the applicant, on 19February 2008 the Regional Court upheld the above-mentioned judgment on appeal."],"30699":["1. The applicants are Mr H (the \u201cfirst applicant\u201d), born in 1992; his wife, Ms I (the \u201csecond applicant\u201d), born in 1994; and their two children, Ms J (the \u201cthird applicant\u201d), born in 2008, and Mr K (the \u201cfourth applicant\u201d), born in 2016. They are all nationals of the Central African Republic. The President granted their request for their identity not to be disclosed to the public (Rule 47 \u00a7 4 of the Rules of Court).","2. The applicants, who had been granted legal aid, were represented before the Court by Ms R. Massara, a lawyer practising in Z\u00fcrich. The Swiss Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Deputy Agent, Mr A. Scheidegger, of the Federal Office of Justice.","3. The applicants alleged, in particular, that they would face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention if they were transferred to Italy under the Dublin III Regulation.","4. On 24 November 2016 the duty judge decided to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, indicating to the Government that the applicants should not be removed to Italy for the duration of the proceedings before the Court, and granted priority to the application under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.","5. On 10 March 2017 the complaint concerning Article 3 of the Convention was communicated to the Government and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissible pursuant to Rule 54 \u00a7 3 of the Rules of Court.","A. The circumstances of the case","1. Background to the case","6. In 2013 the first, second and third applicants left the Central African Republic due to ongoing civil unrest and violence against Muslims. After a two-year stay in Chad the applicants travelled to Libya, from where they embarked for Italy at the end of May 2016. The applicants were rescued by the Italian Coast Guard and subsequently taken to Italy. Upon their arrival the applicants were fingerprinted. They did not apply for asylum in Italy. They subsequently travelled to Switzerland, where they applied for asylum on 26 June 2016.","7. At the beginning of July 2016 the fourth applicant was born and the second applicant was diagnosed with HIV. Subsequently, the second applicant received antiviral medication and her viral load was closely monitored, which led to adjustments in her medical treatment. The new \u2011 born was provided with HIV prophylaxis for four weeks.","2. The proceedings at issue","8. After orally hearing the applicants, on 22 July 2016 the State Secretariat for Migration requested the applicants \u2019 transfer to Italy under the Dublin III Regulation. On 4 October 2016 the Italian authorities confirmed the transfer, stating that the applicants would be accommodated in a family unit in a SPRAR (System of Protection for Asylum-Seekers and Refugees) reception centre in accordance with the circular letter of 8 June 2015 of the Italian Ministry of the Interior. These assurances set out the names and dates of birth of the applicants.","9. On 12 October 2016 the State Secretariat for Migration decided not to examine the applicants \u2019 asylum request in substance and ordered their transfer to Italy.","10. On 26 October 2016 the Federal Administrative Court rejected the applicants \u2019 appeal. It considered that the Italian authorities had provided assurances that the applicants would be placed in one of the family units in a SPRAR reception centre and that it was not necessary to obtain additional assurances. The second applicant \u2019 s health was sufficiently stable for travel and Italy was obliged by European law to provide the applicants with the necessary medical care. The fourth applicant no longer required antiviral medication, but only periodic examinations. There were no indications that the applicants would not receive the necessary medical treatment in Italy. Lastly, the Swiss authorities were obliged to inform their Italian counterparts about the health of the applicants and their medical needs before they were transferred.","3. Subsequent developments","11. By email of 30 March 2017 the Italian authorities stated that the applicants \u2019 health and medical needs would be taken into account when identifying their accommodation and that they would have equal access to all necessary medical treatment compared to Italian citizens.","12. The applicants have submitted medical certificates concerning the state of health of the second and fourth applicants to the Court at regular intervals. By June 2017 the treating physician stated that the second applicant \u2019 s HIV infection had stabilised and was not at an advanced stage. It was important that she continue to take the prescribed medication (antiretroviral therapy) on a daily basis. Nonetheless, a life \u2011 threatening medical emergency could occur any time, for example as a result of an opportunistic infection. In October 2017 the second applicant was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and depression. By letter of 23 March 2018 the applicants \u2019 counsel informed the Court that the second applicant had been undergoing psychiatric treatment at a specialised clinic since February 2018. The fourth applicant has so far tested as HIV-negative; however, a fully reliable result will only be possible when he is two years old.","B. Relevant country information on Italy","13. On 9 February 2017 the Swiss Refugee Council and the Danish Refugee Council co-published the report \u201cIs Mutual Trust Enough? The situation of persons with special reception needs upon return to Italy\u201d. The report concerns the reception conditions and access to the asylum procedure for families with minor children or other persons with special needs who were transferred from either Switzerland or Denmark to Italy under the Dublin III Regulation between April 2016 and January 2017. It details six cases of vulnerable persons \u2013 pregnant women and families or individuals with minor children \u2013 who were not provided with accommodation at a SPRAR reception centre designed for families with minor children upon arrival. The information about their particular needs had been communicated to the reception facility in question. Furthermore, they encountered obstacles in accessing the asylum procedure."],"30705":["5.The applicants were or are still detained in Korydallos Prison Hospital (\u201cthe Prison Hospital\u201d). They all suffer from HIV infection, apart from the third applicant who suffers from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.","A.Data concerning the applicants\u2019 detention","6.The first applicant, Dimitrios Zabelos, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 6 March 2014 until 17 June 2015, when he made use of the remedy provided for by Article 110A of the Criminal Code.","7.The second applicant, Adriatik Berberaj, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 6 April 2010 until 21 January 2011 and from 7 February 2012 until 1 July 2015, the date on which he was released following use of the remedy provided for by section 12 of Law no. 4322\/2015, having served one third of his sentence.","8.The third applicant, Dimitrios Berberidis, was detained in the Prison Hospital on 6 December 2012 and was released on 11 June 2015 following use of the remedy provided for by section 12 of Law no. 4322\/2015, having served one third of his sentence.","9.The fourth applicant, Pola Honein, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 18 December 2012 until 1 July 2015. He was released after having made use of the remedy provided for by Article 110A of the Criminal Code.","10.The fifth applicant, Theodoros Iliopoulos, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 8 January 2013 until 2 June 2015, the date on which he was released following use of the remedy provided for by section 12 of Law no.4322\/2015, having served two fifths of his sentence.","11.The sixth applicant, Marouf Kamoli, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 30 December 2013 until 19 May 2015, the date on which he was released following use of the remedy provided by section 11 of Law no.4274\/14, having served two fifths of his sentence.","12.The seventh applicant, Davit Khutsishvili, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 1 July 2014 until 27 October 2016. He was released after having made use of the remedy provided for by section 12 of Law no.4322\/2015.","13.The eighth applicant, Roustam Konstantinidis, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 23 August 2013 until 14 December 2015. He was released following an application on the basis of section 3 of Law no.4322\/2015.","14.The ninth applicant, Ioannis Machos, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 1 November 2012. He was still in detention when the parties submitted their observations.","15.The tenth applicant, Andreas Martzaklis, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 28 May 2013 until 3 August 2015, when he was released after he lodged an application on the basis of section 12 of Law no.4322\/2015. He was again detained in the Prison Hospital from 22January 2016, and was still in detention there when the parties submitted their observations.","16.The eleventh applicant, Saeed Hamo Moradyan, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 8 February 2013 until 27 January 2016, the date on which he was released on the basis of section 12 of Law no. 4322\/2015, having served one third of his sentence.","17.The twelfth applicant, Antonios Oikonomakos, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 27 November 2013 until 30 September 2015, when he was released, having served one tenth of his sentence, on the basis of section12 of Law no. 4322\/2015. He was again detained from 6November 2015 until 23 December 2015 when he was released, having served two fifths of his sentence, on the basis of the same provision.","18.According to the documents before the Court, the thirteenth applicant, Nikolaos Papadopoulos, was detained in the Prison Hospital for significant periods of time from 4 April 2014 until 16 July 2015.","19.The fourteenth applicant, Spiridon-Xenofon Pirpiniadis, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 20 December 2013 until 13 August 2015, when he was released on the basis of section 12 of Lawno.4322\/2015, having served two fifths of his sentence.","20.The fifteenth applicant, Sabri Sabrioglou, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 22 January 2013 until 24 December 2014 and from 11February until 20 October 2015.","21.The sixteenth applicant, Dimitrios Samlidis, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 8 July 2014 until 26 February 2015, when he was released, after having made use of the remedy provided for by Article 110A of the Criminal Code.","22.The seventeenth applicant, Emmanouil Toufektsis, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 30 October 2013 and was still in detention there when the parties submitted their observations.","23.The eighteenth applicant, Chrisovalantis Tsiriklos, was detained in the Prison Hospital from 4 July 2013 until 8 July 2015, when he was released after having made use of the remedy provided for by Article 110A of the Criminal Code. He was again detained on 21 August 2015 and was still in detention there when the parties submitted their observations.","B.The applicants\u2019 description of the conditions of their detention","24.The applicants submitted that the Prison Hospital had been overcrowded which, in addition to causing poor sanitary conditions, had resulted in the deterioration of their already fragile health. They maintained that all of them had been detained in hospital wards which had measured 44sq. m and which had been occupied by twelve detainees on average for the period between 2013 and 2015. In addition, the second and third applicants had been detained in cells measuring 17 sq. m and which had held four inmates. They further argued that they had not been able to move freely within the wards owing to the space occupied by furniture. In particular, bunk beds were not used in the Prison Hospital and extra furniture, such as medical equipment, was required; therefore half the area of each ward had been occupied by furniture, which had resulted in them having a personal space in which they could move freely of below 2 sq. m.","25.The above-mentioned conditions had led them to receiving inadequate health care. There had been a high risk of infection with contagious diseases as there had not been effective separation of detainees according to the disease from which they had suffered. In addition, only four toilets had been available for the detainees in a total of five wards on the first floor.","26.Meals had been insufficient and of poor quality and the absence of recreational activities had affected their psychological health. Central heating had been inadequate and collection of rubbish, especially in the kitchens, had not been sufficient, creating hygiene problems and resulting in bad smells and the presence of pests. The applicants also complained of the lack of medical staff and properly equipped laboratories for their medical examinations. In particular, during the period 2013-14 only one general practitioner had been available to the hospital.","27.The applicants acknowledged that the conditions of their detention had improved in mid-2016 and that the medical-staff numbers had increased, resulting in conditions which met the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention but only for the period after June 2016.","28.On 18 December 2014 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Prison Board under Article 6 of the Penal Code (Law No. 2776\/1999), to which they have not received any reply to date.","C.The Government\u2019s description of the conditions of the applicants\u2019detention","29.According to the Government, the Prison Hospital\u2019s official capacity was sixty patients and at the time of the applicants\u2019 detention the hospital had held between 180 and 220 patients. Specifically as regards the applicants, some of them had been detained in wards 7 and 8 on the first floor of the hospital and some others in wards 1, 2 and 3 on the second floor. The wards measured 44.40 sq. m each, and each of them hosted eight to thirteen detainees. Therefore, the personal space available to them ranged from 3.4 sq. m to 5.5 sq. m. It was also noted that toilets had been in the corridors, not inside the wards, which had remained unlocked so as to ensure unobstructed access to the bathrooms.","30.The Prison Hospital was an establishment providing primary medical care by operating as a clinic. Detainees who required more intense or specialised care were referred to public hospitals, a procedure which was used for the third, fourth, ninth, fifteenth and seventeenth applicants. The patients were separated by disease. They were examined regularly by doctors and they were submitted often to general and specialised laboratory examinations.","31.Wards were sufficiently ventilated and heated and had adequate natural light via six large windows. Hot water was ensured by solar water heaters and by boilers which operated for four hours per day. Wards were regularly cleaned by cleaning crews consisting of detainees and disinfected by specialist companies. The hospital\u2019s social service provided personal hygiene products to detainees who could not afford them. All wards and corridors had rubbish bins which were emptied regularly.","32.As regards detainees\u2019 meals, they were designed under medical supervision to ensure that patients received all necessary nutrients. The Government submitted the menu of two random weeks to demonstrate that they had been comprised of a variety of food.","33.According to the Government, detainees were not obliged to spend all day in the wards; on the contrary, they could move along the corridors and spend time in the yard. Various recreational activities were organised and detainees had had the opportunity to enrol in educational programmes since October 2015. Detainees were also granted days of leave that they could spend outside the prison hospital; the third, fifth and eleventh applicants had benefitted from such leave.","34.Lastly, according to the Government, during 2015 and 2016 conditions of detention in the Prison Hospital were drastically improved. That was mainly due to measures taken to reduce overcrowding in prisons under Law no. 4322\/2015, which provided for early release schemes. In November 2014 a women\u2019s ward had been opened at the hospital and work had been carried out to improve the facilities. In addition, new and updated medical equipment was procured and medical-staff numbers had been reinforced by the recruitment of three new doctors of various specialties. The Government specified that all the above-mentioned improvements had made the Prison Hospital a detention facility significantly different to the image given in the Greek Ombudsman\u2019s (\u03a3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ae\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03a0\u03bf\u03bb\u03af\u03c4\u03b7) report, which had been prepared on the basis of a visit in February 2012, that is to say on a date that had no relevance to the present case.","A.Ombudsman","38.On 24 October and 9 November 2011, twenty-eight people infected with HIV and detained at the Prison Hospital submitted a complaint to the Ombudsman about the conditions of their detention. On 8 February 2012, a delegation from the Ombudsman\u2019s office visited the premises. In a report issued on 26 October 2012 following this visit, the Ombudsman emphasised that the wards were overcrowded, that the detainees did not have at their disposal any recreational activities and that the resources and infrastructure were inadequate. In particular, as regards detainees infected with HIV, the Ombudsman mentioned that the prescription of medication was not regular and that despite the fact that they were hospitalised in order to have easier access to medical care, their continuously growing numbers had led to worse conditions of detention (see Martzaklis and Others v. Greece, no.20378\/13, \u00a7 40, 9 July 2015).","39.In a press release issued on 6 March 2014, the Greek Ombudsman reiterated his findings concerning the Prison Hospital and urged the authorities to take measures.","B.Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe","40.On 26 June 2013 the Parliamentary Assembly adopted Resolution 1946 (2013) entitled \u201cEqual access to health care\u201d in which it pointed out that inequalities in access to care particularly affect vulnerable groups, including persons in detention. While preparing her report, Liliane Maury Pasquier (Switzerland, SOC), PACE rapporteur on equal access to health care, visited Greece and noted the negative impact of austerity measures on access to health care. On 4 March 2014, Ms Maury Pasquier, alarmed by the living conditions at the Prison Hospital in Athens, called on the Greek authorities to improve the situation as soon as possible. In particular she noted the following:","\u201cI am very concerned at the insalubrious conditions of inmates at [the Prison Hospital] in Athens, reported in the media. The hospital, which was designed to cater for 60 persons, is said to currently be housing 200 prisoners, most of whom are allegedly HIV-positive or suffering from contagious diseases such as tuberculosis and hepatitis. In such conditions, it is impossible to ensure that prisoners receive appropriate treatment, not to mention the fact that overcrowding obviously contributes to the spreading of contagious diseases, thereby endangering the lives of all prisoners in the hospital.","The right to health is a fundamental human right and the State must guarantee everyone equal access to appropriate health care. This applies in particular to prisoners who are entirely under the authority and responsibility of the State. I therefore call on the Greek government to improve the living conditions of prisoners at [the Prison Hospital] as soon as possible. The possible release of some prisoners from the hospital, as announced by the Minister of Justice, would only make sense if the Greek government were to guarantee that, on release, they would receive the treatment they require.\u201d","C.Report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (\u201cthe CPT\u201d)","41.Following its visit to Greece in April 2015, the CPT published its report dated 1 March 2016 (CPT\/Inf (2016) 4). It stated, inter alia, the following:","\u201c89.The conditions in [the Prison Hospital] have been the subject of several media reports, and images depicting the appalling state of affairs in the establishment have been posted online. However, at the time of the CPT\u2019s visit, urgent action had still not been taken to remedy the situation which was so drastic that the place could be compared to a dumping ground for sick prisoners who are subsequently neglected and not provided with the care required. Such an appalling state of affairs cannot be permitted to continue.","The hospital has an official capacity of 80 beds and on the day of the visit was accommodating 141 prisoners, not including the 47 HIV positive prisoners in Korydallos Women Prison who were under the responsibility of the hospital. This is certainly an improvement from the period prior to November 2014, when some 220patients were held in the hospital, but the hospital remains severely overcrowded. For example, in the smaller rooms, five patients were held in 17m\u00b2 while the larger rooms of 43m\u00b2 were accommodating 10 or 11 patients with beds crammed together; in a hospital setting, Greek law fixes a standard of 6m\u00b2 of living space per person. In addition to the cramped conditions, the rooms were filthy and cluttered and hygiene was extremely poor.","Moreover, the current drastic understaffing makes it impossible to provide all patients with the proper care they require. The four resident doctors (a general practitioner, a surgeon and two microbiologists) worked Mondays to Fridays from 7h00 to 14h30, and a separate duty resident doctor rota of eight doctors covered the hours of 14h30 to 7h00 and weekends. Approval has apparently been obtained to recruit five additional physicians, which is sorely required. Further, after an absence of two years, a dentist now visits the hospital twice a week.","In addition, a number of specialists visit the hospital (psychiatrists, dermatologists, ophthalmologist, cardiologist and an ear, nose and throat surgeon). However, there is a lack of formal process in exchanging information on patients between the specialists and the treating doctors, and much depends on the individual relationships between doctors.","As regards the nursing complement, 11 of the 14 posts were filled at the time of the visit. Typically, this resulted in four nurses on duty during weekday mornings and two in the afternoons, and at weekends one in the mornings and two in the afternoons. At night, there is only ever one nurse on duty who, in addition to the hospital, has to provide cover for Korydallos Men\u2019s and Women\u2019s Prisons as well as for the psychiatric hospital (i.e. more than 2,500 prisoners). As a result of the lack of nurses, a number of prisoners were employed as auxiliaries, not only to undertake janitorial duties, but also to provide care to patients such as assistance with feeding and personal hygiene. The delegation received detailed accounts inter alia of how fellow patients had provided care for a cancer patient in the period prior to his death in the hospital in February 2015, and how he was not provided with pain relieving medication until just before his death. It also came across patients who had been neglected and not provided the follow-up care required, such as a prisoner with a post-surgery lax anal sphincter causing him faecal incontinence; once his case was brought to the attention of the doctor, steps were taken to address his problem. Otherwise, nursing staff only had time to distribute medication (including at Korydallos Women\u2019s Prison) and undertake complex dressings.","91.At the end of the visit, the CPT\u2019s delegation requested that the Greek authorities, as a matter of urgency, undertake a full review of the prison hospital and put in place a plan to resurrect it as a place of care, where prisoners are treated for their illnesses and provided the necessary care in decent conditions. If this review has not yet been conducted, given the very serious right to life issues under Article 2 ECHR as well as the serious ill-treatment concerns under Article 3 ECHR, the CPT recommends that immediate steps are taken to carry out this review. Further, the Committee wishes to be informed of the outcome of the review and the follow-up steps planned to remedy the current situation.\u201d"],"30741":["1. The applicant, Mr Fjotolf Hansen, formerly Anders Behring Breivik, is a Norwegian national who was born in 1979 and is in preventive detention. He was represented before the Court by Mr \u00d8. Storrvik, a lawyer practising in Oslo.","A. The circumstances of the case","2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.","1. The acts of terrorism and the applicant \u2019 s conviction","3. On 24 August 2012 the City Court ( tingrett ) convicted the applicant of acts of terrorism committed on 22 July 2011. He had set off a car bomb in the Government quarter in Oslo and attacked participants at a political youth camp on Ut\u00f8ya Island outside Oslo with semi-automatic weapons. He had killed 77 people and wounded 42. He was sentenced to preventive detention for 21 years, with a minimum of 10 years to be served, pursuant to Articles 39c and 39e of the 1902 Penal Code (see paragraph 140 below). In its judgment the City Court stated, inter alia :","\u201cAlthough none of the experts believe the defendant to be a borderline case, there seems to be agreement that he is \u2018 a special case \u2019, as the experts Aspaas and T\u00f8rrissen write to conclude their supplementary report. The experts Husby and S\u00f8rheim touch upon similar ideas when they, in connection with the danger assessment, describe the defendant \u2019 s \u2018 uncommon symptom profile \u2019 with a combination of affective flattening, persistent homicidal thoughts, solid delusions of a right to select victims and kill, combined with the lack of any identifiable cognitive impairment and with no disturbing sensory delusions like hallucinosis.","The court itself is struck by the defendant \u2019 s wordy presentation of his fanatical far \u2011 right extremist attitudes mixed with pretentious historical parallels and infantile symbolism. His conceptions are accompanied by an unfettered and cynical justification of the acts of violence as being \u2018 cruel, but necessary \u2019. A recurring question during the trial has furthermore been the importance of the reported acts for the diagnostication. However, as was pointed out during several of the testimonies given by the expert witnesses, glorification of violence or extreme acts of violence do not form part of the ICD-10 diagnostic criteria for psychosis.\u201d","4. As reasons for the sentencing, the City Court stated, inter alia, the following:","\u201cFurthermore, at the time of the delivery of the judgment there is an imminent risk that the defendant will commit new murders and serious acts of violence. The court makes reference to the fact that the defendant believes that the murders at the Government District and on Ut\u00f8ya were legitimate acts, and that extreme violence is a necessary means to achieve his political goals. The defendant has in court also related his alternative plans, like blowing up the Royal Palace and newspaper editorial offices, and killing journalists at the SKUP conference. The murders at the Government District, the murders on Ut\u00f8ya and the defendant \u2019 s plans demonstrate the extreme violence he has the will and capacity to carry out. The defendant has furthermore stated that there will be more terror attacks; this is also written in his compendium. The thought of extreme violence and murder is evidently stimulating to the defendant. This was clearly seen in court when he described how he had planned to kill Gro Harlem Brundtland by decapitation. The defendant seemed excited during the description and gave the impression that he enjoyed giving it. In its assessment of the danger, the court has also attached importance to the defendant having demonstrated a capacity for planning the acts of terrorism without being discovered.","The court also makes reference to the fact that the court-appointed expert witnesses Aspaas and T\u00f8rrissen ... conclude that there is a \u2018 high risk of serious acts of violence in the future \u2019, and in connection with this they make reference to the defendant stating that violence and terror are necessary to have his extreme political views prevail. The court-appointed expert witnesses Husby and S\u00f8rheim also concluded in their report that the risk of future violence was very high ... When deciding what importance to attach to the assessment made by the latter experts it must, however, be taken into consideration that their danger assessment is based on the precondition of psychotic delusions.","The basic requirement of protection of society is linked to the risk of a repeat offence, but when assessing the need for such protection the perspective must be turned towards the future, ...","There is no doubt that a sentence of imprisonment based on ordinary principles of sentencing in the case at hand would have been set at the maximum sentence under the law: 21 years of imprisonment.","The defendant has, after several years of planning, carried out a bomb attack aimed at the central government administration and thus also at the country \u2019 s democratic institutions. He has killed 77 persons, most of whom were youths who were mercilessly shot face to face. The defendant subjected a large number of persons to acute mortal danger. Many of those affected have sustained considerable physical and\/or psychological injuries. The bereaved and next of kin are left with unfathomable grief. The material damage is enormous. The cruelty of the defendant \u2019 s acts is unparalleled in Norwegian history.","It follows from the Supreme Court \u2019 s practice that it takes a lot to assume that such a long sentence for a specific term is not considered sufficient to protect society against the danger a convicted person represents at the time of the delivery of the judgment ... Notwithstanding this, the court is in no doubt that also the basic requirement for preventive detention is fulfilled in this special case.","If the defendant is to serve a 21-year prison sentence without release on probation, he will be 53 years old at the time of his release. Even though 21 years is a very long sentence, the court finds it improbable that the element of time per se will reduce the risk of a repeat offence. At the time of release the democracy that the defendant wants to abolish, will still exist. Norway will still have inhabitants of different ethnic backgrounds, different cultures and different religions. The defendant stated in court that he wants to continue his political struggle behind the prison walls. After having served his sentence, the defendant will most probably have the will and capacity to carry out many and very brutal murders. The experts Aspaas and T\u00f8rrissen, who believe the defendant suffers from personality disorders, write ... that \u2018 [t]he kind of personality pathology that has been found is not very accessible to therapy. Factors that worsen the prognosis of violence will be close contact with environments that acknowledge and support the observee \u2019 s political ideology and views on political violence \u2019. The way the court sees it, a similar prognosis must be assumed even if the defendant \u2019 s personality were not to fulfil the fundamental diagnostic criteria for personality disorder, being rather the manifestation of deviant personality traits. This means that the defendant also after having served a 21-year prison sentence will be a very dangerous man. Against this background, the court is of the view that the requirements for imposing a sentence of preventive detention are fulfilled, and thus believes that a sentence of preventive detention should be imposed.\u201d","2. The applicant \u2019 s detention","5. The applicant was transferred to Ila Detention and Security Prison (\u201cIla\u201d) on 27 July 2011. There a maximum security department (a department with \u201c s\u00e6rlig h\u00f8yt sikkerhetsniv\u00e5 \u201d \u2013 a \u201cparticularly high level of security\u201d) was established, and on 8 August 2011 the correctional services authorities, for the first time, made a decision that the applicant be confined to that department. Similar decisions have since been made every six months and the applicant has lodged unsuccessful administrative appeals against these decisions. Between July and September 2012 the applicant stayed at Telemark Prison, before returning to Ila. On 9 September 2013 he was again transferred to Telemark Prison and has since served there, also in a maximum security department.","6. In general, domestic legislation provides that inmates in maximum security departments are not to interact with inmates in other departments, whereas it is left to the local correctional services authorities to decide whether multiple inmates confined to maximum security departments should be allowed to interact with each other. In Telemark Prison, the applicant has had three cells, including one for physical exercise and one for studies, with ventilation and windows. His cells have been normally furnished with, inter alia, a toilet, shower, refrigerator, television, video game console, books and pictures (see, further, paragraphs 44 and 133 below), and delimited by a security gate to the other areas of the department. The material conditions had been relatively similar at Ila.","3. Proceedings before the City Court","7. On 1 July 2015 the applicant instigated civil proceedings against the Norwegian Government, claiming that the conditions of his detention violated Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. He complained, notably, that there had been a breach of those provisions due to the extent of the security measures that had been put in place, including his being confined to maximum security departments and not being allowed to socialise with other inmates, his being subjected to body searches, use of handcuffs and control of his visits, correspondence and telephone calls.","8. In its judgment of 20 April 2016 the City Court ( tingrett ) found that the applicant \u2019 s rights under Article 3 of the Convention had been violated, but not those under Article 8. As to Article 3, the City Court assessed first of all that the authorities should have made further attempts to socialise the applicant with other inmates, and in any event that the formal reasons given in the decisions confining the applicant to a maximum security department had not been sufficiently detailed on this matter.","4. Proceedings before the High Court","(a) Introduction","9. The Government appealed against the City Court \u2019 s judgment as concerned the finding of a breach of Article 3 of the Convention. The applicant appealed as concerned the finding that Article 8 had not been breached.","10. The High Court ( lagmannsrett ) heard the case from 10 to 18 January 2017. Prior to the hearing, the High Court had taken evidence at Ila and Telemark Prison. The hearing took place at Telemark Prison. The applicant was present and represented by counsel. Ten witnesses were heard.","11. In its judgment of 1 March 2017 the High Court found that none of the applicant \u2019 s rights under the Convention had been violated.","(b) The High Court \u2019 s assessment under Article 3 of the Convention","12. As to Article 3 of the Convention, the High Court took as its general starting point case-law of the European Court of Human Rights such as Mur\u0161i\u0107 v. Croatia [GC], no. 7334\/13, ECHR 2016; Piechowicz v. Poland, no. 20071\/07, 17 April 2012; Babar Ahmad and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 24027\/07 and 4 others, 10 April 2012; Van der Ven v. the Netherlands, no. 50901\/99, ECHR 2003 \u2011 II; and Ramirez Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 59450\/00, ECHR 2006 \u2011 IX.","13. Turning to the concrete assessment of the conditions of the applicant \u2019 s detention, the High Court noted that there was extensive documentation both as concerned decisions on use of force, reports on the implementation of the sentence, and as to the applicant \u2019 s health. It stated that the parties largely agreed on the specific events that had taken place and which measures had been implemented; they disagreed instead on the assessments, in particular as concerned the risk relating to the applicant and the consequences of the security measures for the applicant and his health.","i. The risk relating to the applicant","14. Starting with the risk assessment, the High Court noted that the type and seriousness of the crimes that had led to his sentencing was the central point of departure. It pointed out, inter alia, that most of the victims on Ut\u00f8ya had been youths at a political summer camp, whom the applicant had mercilessly shot face to face. In the sentencing, the City Court had relied on the assessments of court-appointed psychiatric experts, who had assessed that there was a high risk of serious violent acts in future; the applicant had shown the capacity to plan acts of terrorism over a number of years without being discovered. The City Court had considered that even after serving 21 years, the applicant would be very dangerous. The applicant believed that his criminal acts had been justified and that extreme violence was a necessary tool in order to achieve political goals.","15. The High Court further noted that the acts of terrorism had been carried out in accordance with an extensive text (\u201ccompendium\u201d) that the applicant had worked on for several years and published on the Internet on the day of the acts. This text also included a detailed manual for terrorism and plans for taking hostages and escaping from prison.","16. The correctional services authorities had considered the risk related to the applicant on numerous occasions. This included six psychiatric assessments made between 18 August 2011 and 5 December 2016 and different assessments of the probability of different types of violent acts and their consequences. Questions concerning the risk had also been dealt with in weekly meetings about the applicant among the prison personnel, and the considerations during those meetings had been registered in monthly reports. There were also a number of other decisions that contained risk assessments.","17. In one of the assessments, an extensive report dated 16 January 2013, a psychiatrist had considered that the applicant was suffering from dissocial and dramatising personality disorders and, inter alia, completely lacked remorse for what he had done and was entirely without empathy for those who had become victims of his acts.","The report had concluded that, as concerned the risk relating to release on parole, if the applicant did not change his political beliefs considerably and go through a longer period of genuine remorse, depression and wishes that his acts could be undone, he would be likely to carry out violent acts again.","As to the risk of violence in prison, it had been concluded, inter alia, that the applicant would be capable of taking hostages, harm prison officers or carry out other violent acts \u2013 also against himself \u2013 if he found this opportune. According to the report, the challenge was that, because of the applicant \u2019 s peculiar view of the world and his logic built upon that view, it would be difficult for the institution to understand when his motives might change. The applicant was considered as extremely self-centred and preoccupied with the spectacular. If he were to feel that he did not receive sufficient media attention, that the world was not interested in his analyses and that his affairs were forgotten, he would be capable of staging another spectacular event.","With respect to impulsive violence, it was stated in the report that the applicant could be capable of committing less serious, impulsive acts of violence if he were to perceive anything in prison as a serious narcissistic offence, his way of thinking (\u201c hans hensiktsmessighetstenkning \u201d) could be challenged, and he would be capable of committing less serious, impulsive acts of violence in spite of his usually appearing very controlled.","On the topic of violence against the applicant, it was stated in the report that if he were to interact with other inmates without meticulous supervision, one or several of the others could possibly try to \u201ctake him out\u201d.","18. In a new risk assessment of 5 December 2016 the psychiatrist had concluded that the risk of violence, for the most part, remained unaltered. The risk of violent acts in prison had somewhat decreased, but the psychiatrist pointed to certain factors that could increase the risk of planned violence in prison. She had stated that in her view, observation had to continue until well after the end, in January 2018, of the proceedings before the High Court, since it could be several years before the applicant would again receive any considerable media attention. She further considered that, even though the applicant functioned inconspicuously on a day-to-day-basis, one should never disregard the possibility of his having plans that also included violence.","As concerned the risk of impulsive violence at that time, it was stated that one could not forget that the applicant was of the view that he could obtain weapons for use in a common department ( fellesskapsavdeling ) and that he had undoubtedly thought through how objects of daily life could be used as weapons. The psychiatrist opined that the applicant should be observed at a time when he received little response to his ideological initiatives and with respect to how this would cause stress to him.","19. The psychiatrist had testified before the High Court and then stated that her assessments from 2013 were essentially appropriate also at the time of the hearing, both as concerned the diagnoses and with respect to the risk of new violence.","She was further of the view that the applicant \u2019 s goal remained the same. He wanted to lead a fascist and \u201cethno-nationalist\u201d revolt in Europe. He had by then turned towards neo-nazism, which she perceived as a pragmatic move to adjust to the surroundings. In her view, the risk of violence was primarily long-term \u2013 the applicant was relatively stable mentally and had shown that he could handle the day-to-day frustrations well; therefore the risk of violence in prison in the short-term was considered to have diminished.","20. The applicant had, in his statement during the appeal hearing, submitted that since the autumn of 2012 he had opposed advancing his political goals by the use of violence. He had stated that his acts on 22 July 2011 had been intended as revenge for what nationalists had suffered since 1945. This revenge, he maintained, had been completed in 2011 and the applicant would abandon his political project if \u201cethno-nationalists\u201d were allowed to participate in Norwegian democracy.","21. The High Court noted that, after the applicant had reported Ila to the police for torture in 2013, he had followed up with a letter in which he had stated that, if he wanted to, he could attack prison officers with weapons for hitting or stabbing created from objects in his cell. In a letter to the correctional services authorities of 23 December 2014, he had informed them that he was considering establishing an \u201cAryan Brotherhood\u201d community in Norwegian prisons, as a parallel to the Aryan Brotherhoods known in the United States.","22. Before the High Court, the applicant had further stated that he was a \u201cparty secretary in the Nordic State\u201d; in a letter to, inter alia, politicians in September 2016 he had stated that he was also a \u201cspokesperson for Norwegian national socialists, fascists and other ethno-nationalists\u201d. A prison journal of 9 November 2016 read that, when the conversation had turned to 22 July 2011, the applicant had been clear that he did not feel remorse and did not in any way have problems defending what he had done on Ut\u00f8ya and in Oslo. This had, among other things, been revenge against the Labour Party for what it had subjected persons sharing his opinions ( meningsfeller ) to since 1945. He had maintained that he was Norway \u2019 s sole political prisoner and that he had tens of thousands of supporters in Norway and elsewhere. The prison staff had perceived that both his body language and his way of speaking emphasised that this was his firm belief.","23. In the High Court \u2019 s view, it was reasonable to understand the recent nuances in the applicant \u2019 s political views primarily as reflections of considerations of appropriateness ( hensiktsmessighetsvurderinger ). This included his approaching national-socialistic theories and environments of the more \u201ctraditional type\u201d; his political project and fundamental frames of reference had not changed particularly since 2011.","24. The High Court considered that the particular features of the applicant \u2019 s personality had to be given major weight when assessing the risk of violence in the future. His generally calm and polite behaviour during approximately five and a half years \u2019 imprisonment therefore did not give reason to consider the risk of planned violence in the long term as reduced. The risk assessments made by the correctional services authorities had been thorough and appropriate. No errors had been pointed out in their factual bases or in the psychiatric assessments. In the High Court \u2019 s view, there were no grounds to deviate from the conclusions that had been drawn in the assessments.","25. In summary, the High Court pointed out that throughout the whole period, there had been a high risk of new, serious violence from the applicant. In addition, on the basis of the text that the applicant had written prior to his acts of terror and former statements he had made, there had particularly in 2011 and 2012 been reasons for taking into account the possibility of him having a network that could be apt to use violence in order to help him escape from prison.","26. In the High Court \u2019 s view it was unlikely that the applicant no longer supported the use of violence as a political means. There was still a high risk of violent acts in the long-term \u2013 not least if the applicant were to perceive reduced attention to himself and his political project. Although the risk in the short-term was perceived as having diminished, the security for prison staff, not least, indicated that extensive security measures should be in place.","27. Furthermore, the risk concerned completely limitless violence if the applicant were to find this opportune. It was very difficult to reveal any increase in the risk \u2013 the acts of terrorism for which the applicant had been convicted had been secretly planned for a very a long time; the violence had not been provoked by any close prior events, emotional strain or visible changes to his mental health.","28. Turning to the risk of violence against the applicant in prison, the High Court was of the view that that sort of risk still clearly existed. It mentioned, inter alia, that on one occasion in 2015, an inmate had managed to make his way to the door leading into the department where the applicant was held. The inmate had hammered on the door while shouting death threats. After this, physical measures had been adopted in order to avoid similar situations in future. Another inmate, who had been friends with a person present on Ut\u00f8ya on 22 July 2011, had expressed the wish to take revenge on the applicant. Although time had passed, the High Court concluded that there was still a relatively high risk of violence and serious threats against the applicant from other inmates. It added that it was not a simple task to clarify which persons might be capable of violence against the applicant, should they be given the opportunity.","29. On the question of whether there was a risk that the applicant could inspire others to carry out violent acts, the High Court concluded that the applicant could inspire persons in right-wing extremist environments and stated that his wish to establish networks with persons who shared his opinions had to be viewed against that background. The High Court also noted that the applicant could be a source of inspiration even for persons outside any such networks. There had already been examples of serious violent acts and, inter alia, bomb threats, that had to be assumed to have been inspired by the applicant \u2019 s acts.","ii. The implemented security measures","30. Turning to the measures adopted to counter the above risks related to the applicant, and the consequences these measures had for him, the High Court initially noted that the conditions of the applicant \u2019 s detention were, as a starting point, clearly more burdensome than an ordinary prison sentence would imply, both due to the possibility of his detention being prolonged and due to the strict security regime in the maximum security department.","(\u03b1) The confinement to a maximum security department","31. The High Court went on to note that in general, serving at a maximum security department would normally imply exclusion from interaction with other inmates \u2013 in domestic procedural law often coined as \u201cisolation\u201d. Full isolation was considered as a very far-reaching measure to be used with great caution and also other limitations on contact with other inmates over time could be harmful.","In more detail, the High Court set out that lack of personal contact represented a serious psychological strain and could also lead to somatic issues, such as problems with concentration and sleep, apathy and head and muscle pain. Research had shown that anxiety, depression and psychosis could develop. Isolation in prisons could, over time, lead to mental illnesses and increased risk of suicide. Reference was made to witnesses who had appeared in court, case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, and recommendations from the Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT). The burdens of isolation were heavier if the inmate was concurrently subjected to limitations in social contact with persons outside prison through control of letters, visits and telephone calls, and if further restrictions on access to information and sense impressions were imposed, for example restrictions on access to newspapers and television or lack of a view outside through a window. Other limitations on the freedom to act and move would imply extra burdens, for example use of handcuffs or limitations to the possibilities for going outside. Repeated body searches would often be perceived as degrading and increase the total mental strain resulting from the security measures.","32. The High Court observed that maximum security departments had been used only infrequently in Norway. Some ten inmates had served under this system since it was introduced in 2002. Apart from the applicant \u2019 s case, inmates had been held at maximum security departments for periods lasting from one month and up to one year and nine months. When the applicant had arrived at Ila in July 2011, maximum security departments had not been used since 2008 and never at Ila, wherefore it had been necessary to alter the building and draw up a local directive ( instruks ).","33. The reasons for the applicant \u2019 s confinement to maximum security departments had essentially been the same throughout the whole period. In a decision of 21 June 2016 from the Directorate of the Norwegian Correctional Service ( Kriminalomsorgsdirektoratet ) it had been stated that the applicant represented a particular risk of escaping, of taking hostages and a danger of new, particularly serious crime. In the proportionality analysis it had been stated that it was not appropriate, for security reasons, that the applicant interact with other inmates, and that there were no other inmates serving at maximum security departments at the time. According to the relevant domestic rules, the restrictions on interaction following from serving at maximum security departments should be compensated by increased contact with staff and satisfactory work, teaching and other activity offers. The Directorate had come to the same conclusion in its decision of 19 December 2016.","34. The applicant himself had, from the outset, argued that he had suffered harm due to isolation and both Ila and Telemark Prison had focussed on the risk of such harm; this matter had been discussed in notes, journals and reports. The applicant had had extensive contact with health personnel at Ila, in conversations which had often had characteristics of social contact. Since October 2011 such contact had taken place in a visiting room with a glass wall. In Telemark Prison the applicant had been offered the opportunity to speak with a psychiatrist as well as other health personnel twice weekly.","35. In a report from Ila dated 10 December 2012, reference had been made to changes in the applicant \u2019 s behaviour that might be due to isolation. He had been perceived as more questioning and quarrelsome towards measures and routines after returning from Telemark Prison, where he had stayed for two months (see paragraph 5 above). After the transfer to Telemark in 2013 (ibid.), it had, in a report of 11 November 2013, been remarked that on some occasions he had appeared confused and forgetful with respect to which activities he had, for example, carried out the day before. Forgetfulness had also been noted in further reports of 5 September and 14 July 2015. In the latter, the question of harm due to isolation had been passed on to the health department.","36. The prison doctor at Ila at the time had stated before the High Court that some symptoms had been registered during the applicant \u2019 s stay there, but that he had not suffered harm due to isolation. The applicant had seemed downcast for a period in 2012, but this had been perceived as a reaction to the conditions of his detention, for example that he had not immediately obtained approval to have a personal computer or that letters to persons who shared his opinions had been stopped. The doctor did not perceive the applicant as mentally vulnerable.","37. The applicant had also reacted with despair and frustration when, in October 2015, he had been informed that he would have to share the maximum security department with other inmates and that, in connection with this, the area available to him would be reduced. Journals from the autumn of that year noted that the applicant, on some occasions, had stated that he had \u201cisolation headache\u201d. The prison doctor had concluded that he was suffering from tension headaches. With time, the applicant had chosen to break off contact with the psychiatrist and later also with the prison doctor. The High Court understood that the applicant had feared that contact with a psychiatrist could be perceived as weakness and used against him towards persons who shared his opinions.","38. The prison doctor in Telemark Prison from September 2013 to January 2016 had never found signs of serious isolation harm. The matter had been considered both by a psychiatrist and the health team in the prison. The doctor had noted that the applicant had, for certain periods, suffered from headaches, but headaches were common for many people.","39. The applicant had maintained during the appeal hearing that he had become \u201cmore right-wing radical\u201d and referred, as an example, to his performing a \u201cNazi salute\u201d at the opening of the hearing. He was of the view that this political radicalisation was a result of isolation, including the fact that his opinions were never corrected.","40. The psychiatrist had concluded that there were no signs of particular vulnerability to isolation. She had perceived the applicant \u2019 s mental condition to be relatively stable throughout his whole stay in prison and referred to his not having developed typical symptoms such as apathy, change of circadian rhythm, reduced cognitive functioning or delusions.","41. In the High Court \u2019 s view, the applicant \u2019 s health and manners had not changed much in spite of the very long stay under very strict security measures. He had kept a normal circadian rhythm and had worked a great deal on studies, on the conditions of his detention and his political project. He had not reported any noteworthy physical problems and there had not been any need for treatment for mental problems. He had not reported any specific serious mental problems. None of the psychiatrists or doctors who had examined him had concluded that he had suffered any harm due to isolation. Neither his situation prior to the criminal acts nor his behaviour in prison indicated, in the High Court \u2019 s opinion, that he had any particular mental vulnerability. The High Court noted that, prior to his imprisonment, he had also periodically lived with moderate interaction with others.","42. Based on the above, the High Court concluded that there were no clear signs of harm due to isolation. In this assessment it also took into account the possibility that the applicant had under-reported mental problems in order to appear as a strong leader.","43. The absence of signs of harm due to isolation was, however, not sufficient for there not to be a breach of Article 3 of the Convention. The High Court, accordingly, went on to examine other aspects relating to the applicant \u2019 s having been confined to maximum security departments.","44. In that respect, the High Court stated that the physical and material conditions of the applicant \u2019 s detention were, in its view, very good compared to those of other inmates in Norwegian prisons. The applicant had three cells, all with ventilation and each with a window \u2013 some with privacy film. He had a television, fridge, shower and toilet. There was no camera in his living cell. In his study cell there was a desk and a personal computer. He had access to an exercise bicycle if he so wished and the cells were otherwise furnished normally. He had pictures, books, films, games and letters on shelves and in boxes. He could play music and had a gaming console. His cell area was delimited by a security gate to the other areas of the department. The material conditions had been relatively similar at Ila.","45. The applicant studied political social sciences and received outlines and sometimes recordings of lectures; he had taken several exams, with good results. He could spend one hour outside in the prison yard every day. In Telemark Prison, since December 2015, he had also had the option to use a larger outdoor area every second week, in 2016 increased to approximately once a week; at Ila he had not had access to a similar area. He had access to newspapers every morning and in his time off he watched television and films and played video games. He also spent a lot of time on writing letters, on his political activities, or working with administrative appeals related to the conditions of his detention. In addition he worked out a couple of times a week and walked daily in the small prison yard.","46. Through the testimony and records of conversations with the applicant made in medical papers and reports from prison officers, the High Court had gained a clear impression that the applicant \u2019 s studies in political social sciences were of considerable importance to him. There were reasons to assume that he perceived that the studies strengthened his political project. He therefore experienced his day-to-day life as clearly more meaningful than if he had had more ordinary work tasks.","47. The High Court noted, moreover, that the applicant was authorised to have monitored visits. He had, however, only remained in contact to a very limited degree with persons he had known before his acts of terrorism. He had had some visits from his mother when serving at Ila \u2013 all but one of which had taken place with a glass wall. The applicant had not wanted contact with his father as long as he did not endorse his political project. The prison staff had refused visits from three persons whom the applicant had not known from before; apparently these had not been cleared due to suspicion that the purpose of the visits had been to establish contact with right-wing extremist environments.","48. In Telemark Prison the applicant had regular contact with a volunteer visitor ( bes\u00f8ksvenn ). From April 2016 they had met for one and a half hours once a week, previously it had been every second week. The contents of their conversations were not recorded, but the High Court understood that they often discussed items of current interest in which they were both engaged. The visitor stated before the High Court that he had also brought up the applicant \u2019 s acts of terrorism with him.","49. The applicant also had a weekly conversation with a priest, which had been the case throughout his detention. This gave the applicant a possibility for confidential contact, as the priest was under a duty of confidentiality.","50. Furthermore, the applicant had, throughout his detention, been offered regular contact with health personnel. During the initial time in custody, he had been checked upon daily. After a while, this had been reduced to five, and ultimately to three times weekly. The reasons for the frequent supervision in the initial period had been, inter alia, fears of suicide attempts. The contact entailed speaking with psychiatrists, doctors or nurses. In addition to questions about the applicant \u2019 s health, other day \u2011 to \u2011 day matters and societal issues were often discussed, and the conversation had often lasted for around 30 minutes. With time, the applicant had also used these conversations to ask for help in achieving relief in the conditions of his detention, which in his view amounted to torture.","51. Upon transfer to Telemark Prison, the arrangement for regular conversations with the health service had continued. In early 2014, the applicant had discontinued further conversations with the psychiatrist and psychologist because he thought this contact could weaken his political credibility. After some time he had had conversations with a nurse approximately twice weekly. In addition there had been possibilities for consultation when particularly needed. He had partly used the conversations to advance his wishes concerning relaxation of the conditions of his detention. In the summer of 2016 he had stopped regular conversations with the health services. Since then, the staff had continually considered whether there were signs of changes to his health.","52. The applicant still had no interaction with other inmates. He had not at any time seen any other inmate; when he moved through common areas, other inmates there would be locked in their cells due to fears of unrest and comments of disapproval towards the applicant if he were seen.","53. The applicant had on many occasions complained of the lack of opportunities for social contact. From October 2012 he had consistently appealed against the decisions that he be confined to a maximum security department. According to the domestic legislation, inmates in maximum security departments should not interact with inmates in other departments. Whether multiple inmates under maximum security should be allowed to interact with each other had to be decided by the correctional services authorities (see also paragraph 6 above) and would depend largely on risk assessments.","54. The correctional services authorities had referred to the fact that interaction with other inmates could give the applicant the opportunity to establish an extreme right-wing network in the prison, or give him the opportunity to obtain assistance in communication with such networks outside the prison. It was evident from the risk assessment report of 5 December 2016 that the applicant would like to serve his sentence in a mixed-inmate department. He had in this context presumed that this would be a department with only imprisoned fascists, so that they could form a group. He had also stated that, if he were placed in a mixed-inmate department, he would build himself up to become very strong and acquire weapons. The High Court noted that the applicant had made considerable efforts to make contact with likeminded people.","55. Other inmates had been placed in the maximum security department at Telemark Prison only for two short periods during the applicant \u2019 s sentence. On these two occasions, the conditions had not been suitable for interaction with him: for example, one of the inmates had stated that it would be unfortunate for his criminal case if he were to interact with the applicant. The High Court also pointed out that, while the prison could place an inmate in a certain department without consent, inmates could not be forced to participate in social activities with others.","56. The High Court went on to state that the opportunity to interact with other inmates was of great significance, not least for those serving long sentences. Interaction provided social impulses in day-to-day life and could reduce the risk of developing mental ailments. Inmates had few others they could confide in without confidential information concerning personal matters being reported to prison management. This applied particularly to those serving sentences in maximum security departments. Interaction with other inmates furthermore provided the opportunity to choose for oneself who to talk to.","57. The high risk of violence from the applicant, should he become frustrated in the future, combined with the risk of violence against him from other inmates, made it difficult to establish a secure arrangement for interaction. The problems were amplified by his expressed desire to enlist inmates to support his political project, and to establish contact with extreme right-wing individuals outside prison. On the basis of the risk of violence, contact with other inmates would be difficult to carry out without the presence of personnel.","58. The High Court was of the view that the correctional services authorities should, at an earlier date, have conducted more extensive assessments of the opportunity to carry out interaction with one or more inmates who were not confined to the maximum security department. No concrete plans for interaction had been presented to the court, for example whether the applicant and another inmate could be on either side of the security gate or carry out a joint sports activity.","59. The applicant had very extensive contact with prison personnel and the objective of this was partly to ensure that he had social interaction. Multiple personnel were always present when the applicant was having contact. The officers did not have a duty of confidentiality towards prison management as to what inmates confided in them. Material information would be logged. Contact with personnel normally took place through the security gate in connection with routine inspections. In the circumstances, the contact with prison personnel nevertheless helped cover the applicant \u2019 s social needs. The scope and content of conversation with personnel was therefore significant in the assessment of whether the lack of interaction with other inmates entailed a breach of Article 3 of the Convention.","60. During the first phase at Ila until the judgment in the criminal case had been rendered, there had been frequent inspections. In the initial period, there had been two inspections each hour. The correctional officers had then normally only had brief conversations with the applicant, except for the department manager, who had sometimes had multiple conversations with him each day. The manager had then also discussed current affairs such as news items with the applicant; their total conversation time could vary between 15 and 50 minutes each day. During this period, the applicant had also been subject to a number of police interrogations and had had extensive contact with his defence counsel. There had also been conversations with forensic psychiatrists, and the applicant had for a period been under observation in a psychiatric hospital.","61. In the second phase, correctional officers had also been allowed to discuss, for example, current affairs with the applicant. The total daily conversation time with personnel had then increased by an estimated 30 to 40 minutes. This relatively extensive contact with the applicant had been intended to compensate for the fact that he was prohibited from interacting with other inmates.","62. In the third phase, which had started when the applicant was transferred to Telemark Prison in September 2013, the routines had been generally equivalent to those at Ila. The correctional officers could, however, initially not discuss political issues or issues concerning his case with the applicant. The manager of the applicant \u2019 s department at the time had also had conversations with the applicant lasting 15-20 minutes on a number of occasions.","63. As of the winter of 2014, the applicant had more extensive contact with personnel. Common subjects of conversation were, for example, films, television series and everyday topics. A social consultant had also assisted him in preparing a rehabilitation plan, and not least in planning and facilitating his studies. As of the summer of 2014, there had been no restrictions as regarded topics that could be discussed and the new department manager had generally had daily conversations with the applicant for 15-20 minutes. The applicant had been interested in hearing the personnel \u2019 s opinions on, for example, topics in the news.","64. Over the last two years before the High Court \u2019 s judgment, inspections had lasted up to one hour. Sometimes personnel would play backgammon or other games with the applicant at the security gate. The scope of contact with personnel had been increased as a consequence of some compensatory measures being discontinued during two periods in the autumn of 2015, when another inmate had been in the department.","65. An arrangement had started in April 2014 involving one hour of interaction with personnel each week as a purely social measure. In January 2016, this organised interaction had been expanded to twice each week. Once a week they would, for example, cook in the common area outside the security gate and once a week they would have other social activities.","66. An observation programme ( observasjonsprogram ) had been implemented since 1 January 2016 as part of the preventive detention sentence. The applicant had, in this connection, been confronted with his acts of terrorism. Training in independent living skills had also started in 2015, which meant that the applicant was responsible for washing his cell area and his clothes.","67. Since the summer of 2016, the extent of social activities with the applicant, such as in connection with inspections, had been logged. Since then, the applicant had had, on average, daily social contact with personnel for more than two hours. This came in addition to exercise in the fresh air, organised interaction with personnel twice each week and conversations with the social consultant, priest, volunteer prison visitor and, if needed, medical personnel.","68. As a preliminary summary concerning social contact, the High Court noted that being denied interaction with other inmates constituted a clear strain and it was entirely extraordinary for an inmate not to have contact with other inmates over a period of about five and a half years. On the other hand, the correctional services authorities had implemented very extensive compensatory measures. This concerned both the time spent by personnel in connection with inspections, the organised joint activities with personnel twice each week, as well as the fact that the applicant had, to a considerable degree, had conversations with the social consultant, priest, volunteer prison visitor and, if desired, medical personnel. The High Court also noted that the scope of compensatory measures had increased in recent years, prior to its judgment.","(\u03b2) Body searches","69. Turning to the body searches, the High Court noted that these posed a number of questions pursuant to Article 3 of the Convention. They had to be examined in isolation, but also as a part of the overall strain on the applicant. Body searches where inmates were examined without clothes were a particularly invasive control measure that inmates might experience as highly degrading. Reference was made to Van der Ven, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 58 et seq.","70. A very considerable number of body searches had been conducted at Ila during the first phase of the applicant \u2019 s detention. The correctional services authorities had registered a total of 117 searches in 2011, 199 in 2012 and 76 in 2013. When searches conducted by the police were added, the applicant had estimated the total number of body searches during this period at 880.","71. The scope had to be viewed in the light of the available risk assessments during this period; the acts of terrorism had indicated a substantial risk of new violence from the applicant. This had been further amplified by the applicant having stated that he belonged to a larger network.","72. The High Court assumed that the searches conducted by the police had taken place in connection with being subject to police interrogations and during the criminal case, that is, when the applicant had left or entered the prison. It was of the view that these searches had been justified and not disproportionate, to ensure that the applicant had not gained access, for example, to objects which might be used as stabbing weapons.","73. The body searches conducted by the correctional services authorities had primarily taken place in connection with stays outside the maximum security department. As a result of the possibility that someone could, for example, have tossed objects into the exercise yard, without this being noticed by camera surveillance or personnel nearby, the High Court was of the opinion that there were no grounds for criticising the authorities for conducting body searches following use of the yard. The same applied to searches following use of the shower room or other parts of the building outside the security gate. Structural changes had not been made to prevent the applicant from finding objects that could be used as stabbing weapons on these premises. The applicant had been interested in, and described opportunities to find, objects in the prison that could be used as weapons.","74. Body searches had also been conducted on a number of occasions as an unannounced control measure. This was in compliance with the routine set for confinement to a maximum security department.","75. The applicant had hardly ever been in the proximity of people other than personnel. Visits had taken place in a visiting room with a glass wall. The cells had been converted so that it would not be possible to find building components or loose objects that could be used as weapons. The likelihood of finding objects that could be used as, for example, a stabbing weapon had then been reduced considerably. Nothing had ever been found during the body searches, and the applicant had so far acted in accordance with what was required from prison inmates. Depending on the circumstances, searches could also alternatively take place over his clothes. The objective could furthermore be partially achieved using a metal detector, which at the time of the High Court \u2019 s judgment happened frequently at Telemark Prison.","76. In the view of the High Court, there should not have been that many unannounced body searches at Ila during periods when the applicant had only been in the maximum security department. The other extensive control measures had indicated that it would be highly unlikely that, in such a situation, he would have concealed, for example, potential weapons on his body.","77. The number of searches had clearly been lower in recent years. The correctional services authorities had registered 75 in 2014, 35 in 2015 and 5 in 2016. During the appeal proceedings it had been stated that body searches had not been conducted since the end of 2015 or early 2016. This had been linked to structural adaptations at Telemark Prison, the use of a fixed metal detector, the risk of violence having been considered somewhat lower and to there having been a general relaxation in the use of security measures as long as the applicant remained exclusively in secure prison areas.","(\u03b3) Handcuffs","78. The prison had continually made decisions concerning the use of handcuffs for up to six months at a time. Handcuffs had been used during the stay at Ila a total of 768 times in 2011 and 1007 in 2012. The total number of times had been 441 in 2013, distributed between Ila and Telemark Prison. The police had also used handcuffs during transfer out of the prison. As a point of departure, the applicant had been handcuffed every time he exited a cell door. The use of handcuffs had eventually been reduced, not least after 15 April 2013, when a door had been fitted between the living area cell and the study cell at Ila.","79. At Ila, handcuffs had been applied before the cell door was opened, by having the applicant put his arms through the hatch. The handcuffs had then been held in place while the applicant moved forward with the opening door. This had involved him having to take small steps over the threshold, a method used for security reasons, because of the possibility of his having gained access to utility articles with the potential to be shaped into stabbing weapons.","80. Following the transfer to Telemark Prison, handcuffs had been used a total of 150 times in 2014, 80 times in 2015, and 33 in 2016. The use had been considerably reduced at Telemark Prison once a security gate had been installed, so that the applicant could move freely between all three cells at his disposal. From September 2015, handcuffs had not been used as long as the applicant had been in the maximum security department \u2013 only when he had been out, for example, in the large exercise yard.","81. On the basis of the continuous risk assessments, the High Court found that there was no basis for criticising the correctional services authorities for the scope of or method for using handcuffs during movement. There was no indication that the purpose has been to punish or humiliate the applicant; the use of handcuffs had been gradually reduced, in part following structural changes and in part on the basis of new assessments of the security risk.","(\u03b4) Inspections during the night","82. During the first period at Ila, there had been two inspections each hour. This also took place at night. In practice, this had taken place by opening the cell hatch and checking whether the applicant gave any sign of life, and that there was otherwise nothing unusual. A flashlight had also been used if necessary. This had also entailed extra strain, although it had been stated that the applicant had normally slept through the night. The scope of night inspections had been reduced following the City Court \u2019 s judgment, and at the time of the High Court \u2019 s judgment only comprised inspections of areas outside the cell door. The High Court had no remarks concerning the scope of, or procedure used for, night inspections on the basis of the available risk assessments.","(\u03b5) The control of the applicant \u2019 s visits and telephone use","83. The High Court noted that control of the applicant \u2019 s correspondence was relevant both to Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. For practical reasons, it described the letter inspection in more detail when examining Article 8, though it was taken into account also when examining Article 3.","84. Turning to the control of the applicant \u2019 s visits and his telephone use, the High Court noted as a point of departure that domestic legislation provided that one or more telephone calls lasting a total of up to 20 minutes were allowed each week. During the stay at Ila, the applicant had been granted extra telephone time with his mother.","85. In addition to the telephone contact with his mother while she was still alive the applicant had, for several periods, been in regular telephone contact with a few female friends with whom he had become acquainted during his imprisonment. He had chosen to terminate some of this telephone contact himself. The correctional services authorities had refused telephone contact with three people.","86. The High Court noted that the extent of visits and telephone calls had been relatively limited throughout the imprisonment. An important reason had been that the applicant \u2019 s social network had been limited, and had been so also before the terror acts he committed on 22 July 2011. He had himself chosen to terminate contact with his father and, on two occasions, with female telephone friends with whom he had become acquainted during his imprisonment.","87. The conversations with the volunteer prison visitor, the priest and most visits from the applicant \u2019 s mother had been conducted in a visiting room with a glass wall. The same had generally applied for contact with medical personnel and, until June 2016, his attorneys. The High Court stated that a glass wall reduced personal presence during interaction. The volunteer prison visitor had stated that he eventually forgot that they were separated by a glass wall.","88. The High Court was of the view that the applicant \u2019 s visitors had had to be subject to visitor control for security reasons. The experience of personal presence could also have been reduced by the fact that correctional officers were sitting close by during the conversations.","89. Since June 2016 visits from the applicant \u2019 s lawyers had been conducted by having them sit on either side of the security gate in the wing. This had to be presumed to provide the experience of more personal contact.","90. In the High Court \u2019 s opinion, attempts should have been made to conduct more visits at the security gate, rather than using the glass wall. The use of a visiting room with a glass wall was, in the situation in question, nevertheless not a weighty element in the assessment pursuant to Article 3 of the Convention. The key aspect was the scope of social contact and the impulses this could provide for the applicant.","iii. Other aspects","91. The High Court pointed out that the purpose of the extensive security measures had been to prevent violence from the applicant, protect the applicant from violence against him, and to prevent him from influencing others to carry out violent acts. The authorities had obviously had no intention to break down the applicant either physically or mentally, nor had the purpose been to prevent the applicant from communicating his political message, save for encouragement to use violence.","92. The High Court noted that the conditions of the detention had gradually been relaxed. The extent of social contact had increased, not least throughout 2016. At the same time the use of far-reaching security measures, such as body searches, had clearly been reduced.","93. Relaxation of the security measures had been considered, inter alia, in connection with the preparation of decisions concerning continued detention in a maximum security department. These decisions were taken for six months. In addition, continuous assessments had been made in the coordination group for the applicant \u2019 s detainment. This group had met on a weekly basis and included leaders and experts in the prison. Trying out interaction with other inmates had been discussed, but had not yet been carried out.","94. In the High Court \u2019 s view, there was reason to attempt, within a relatively short time, interaction with one or a few other inmates in strictly controlled situations. It had been mentioned that interaction by the security gate or as a sports activity could be tried. The High Court assumed that consideration would be given to trying interaction with inmates not serving in a maximum security department.","95. Several types of decisions could be appealed against administratively, and their validity could also be challenged before the courts. The applicant had prospects to achieve further relaxation and have his detention conditions examined again in future. The decisions to confine the applicant to maximum security departments were valid for six months only, as were decisions concerning handcuffs. They had been reasoned and could be appealed against. The same was true for other decisions, such as refusal of post, visits or telephone use and use of the glass wall. The applicant had, to very considerable degrees, appealed against the decisions. Close to 200 decisions concerning conditions of his detention had been made.","96. The applicant had not brought the decisions before the courts, but he had complained to the Parliamentary Ombudsman ( Sivilombudsmannen ) and the Ombudsman \u2019 s preventive unit had thereto conducted inspections at Telemark Prison, including of the maximum security department. The applicant had also filed a police report concerning the detention conditions and had submitted complaints concerning medical personnel to the Norwegian Board of Health Supervision ( Helsetilsynet ).","97. In a letter of 12 April 2014, the Parliamentary Ombudsman had pointed out that the correctional services authorities should have provided more thorough grounds for the decision for continued imprisonment in the maximum security department. The High Court agreed that the requirements for the assessments and grounds in such decisions had to be stringent, still they had to be viewed in the light of previous assessments. There had been dedicated coordination groups both at Ila and Telemark Prison that had been responsible for following up the applicant \u2019 s prison conditions.","98. The special conditions that the applicant was serving under, as well as the large number of appeals from him, entailed that the advisers and decision-makers had been very familiar with previous assessments. In the High Court \u2019 s view, there was much to indicate that the considerations underlying the decisions had been sufficiently extensive. In any event, deficiencies in the grounds alone would not constitute a basis for ascertaining a violation of the Convention.","99. In the letter of 12 April 2014, the Parliamentary Ombudsman had also expressed the view that the correctional services authorities should follow up and provide feedback on aspects addressed as regarded imprisonment in a maximum security department regardless of whether there was a right to appeal under administrative law. The High Court agreed that objections to the use of security measures that did not require a formal decision under domestic legislation should also have been processed and specifically responded to. Not least, this applied because the overall security measures had been so strict over such a long period.","100. The applicant had also asserted that it had to be emphasised under Article 3 of the Convention that he had not been granted legal aid. The High Court noted at this point that there did not seem to have been any need for legal aid in connection with the applicant \u2019 s very high number of appeals, which had not been covered. The present case related to issues of great significance to his welfare, but his not having been granted legal aid was in any event not a weighty element in the assessment pursuant to Article 3.","iv. Comparison with the Court \u2019 s case law, summary and conclusion","101. The High Court carried out a detailed comparison of the applicant \u2019 s case and cases that had been examined by the European Court of Human Rights, in particular \u00d6calan v. Turkey (no. 2), nos. 24069\/03 and 3 others, 18 March 2014; Piechowicz, cited above; and Ramirez Sanchez, cited above.","102. In summarising the applicant \u2019 s case, the High Court opened by stating that being excluded from interaction with other inmates over a longer time entailed considerable mental strain that could inflict mental harm, and that both the European Court of Human Right \u2019 s case-law as well as Norwegian legislation were based on the presumption that such exclusion had to be limited in time. It went on to highlight, inter alia, the following:","\u2013 The mental state of the specific applicant was still stable after a lengthy stay under strict security measures, and there were no clear signs of any harm due to isolation.","\u2013 The applicant was still strongly marked by his right-wing extremist political universe \u2013 weight could not be attached to his statements to the effect that he was no longer a proponent of violence.","\u2013 It was likely that the risk of violence would increase, should the applicant perceive that he was not receiving much attention for himself or his political project; the risk could also increase if he experienced being treated as an ordinary inmate. There was, accordingly, a high long-term risk of new violent acts, in particular minutely planned, spectacular violence to attract attention. One could not expect to register changes in the applicant \u2019 s behaviour prior to such acts. There was also a need for extensive assessments and practical measures to protect the applicant from other inmates.","\u2013 A number of measures had been implemented to compensate for the lack of interaction with other inmates; the applicant received social stimulus to a relatively large extent.","\u2013 The applicant had considerable freedom as to his day-to-day life. He often found his days meaningful by way of his studies, his political project and working on his detention conditions. Prior to the terrorism acts, he had also spent considerable time on his political project and computer games.","\u2013 The limitations on the applicant \u2019 s freedom of movement had, to some degree, been compensated by his having three cells at his disposal; no other inmates had their own study room or a cell for working out.","\u2013 The lack of contact with other inmates, the extent of body searches and the use of handcuffs were clear strains that had characterised the applicant \u2019 s detention; in other areas he had clearly enjoyed better conditions than inmates in Norwegian prisons would experience. Overall, the compensatory measures appeared very well-suited for the applicant \u2019 s needs. The High Court still deemed that the opportunity for some limited interaction with some other inmates should be examined in detail and, if appropriate, tested within a relatively short time.","103. Based on the high risk of violence from and against the applicant, the extensive compensatory measures that had been implemented, the applicant \u2019 s health, the extensive procedural guarantees and the circumstances overall, the conditions of the applicant \u2019 s detention were not found to have been disproportionately burdensome. They had been necessary to ensure the security of society and of the applicant and it was not likely that safety could have been adequately secured through alternative, less burdensome means. The number of non-notified body searches should, in the High Court \u2019 s view, have been lower, but the threshold under Article 3 had not been crossed.","104. After an overall assessment of the conditions of the applicant \u2019 s detention, the High Court concluded that there had been no breach of Article 3 of the Convention either at the day of its judgment or when viewing the whole period from July 2011 to January 2017 as a whole. There was neither inhuman nor degrading treatment in the sense given to those terms in that provision.","v. Whether Article 3 of the Convention had been breached in some periods","105. The High Court went on to examine whether the conditions at Ila prior to the transfer to Telemark Prison in September 2013, viewed in isolation, had entailed a breach of Article 3 of the Convention.","106. In that respect, the High Court had regard to how the risk of planned or impulsive violence had been assessed as higher during the first phase at Ila, which was connected to his arrest for particularly extensive and limitless violence and the descriptions in the text he had written. It had also been considered that the applicant might have emotional reactions if he understood what he had done, which indicated a need for measures to prevent suicide.","107. The measures had been exclusively implemented for security reasons; the purpose had not been to affect the applicant \u2019 s mental state. Ila had not been adapted for maximum security prisoners and it had been necessary to make structural changes to the building. In the meantime, security had had to be ensured by way of measures targeting the applicant.","108. The number of body searches and the use of handcuffs had to be viewed in the light of how the applicant had often been outside his cell in connection with meetings with counsel, psychiatrists and health personnel, as well as police questioning and court hearings. He had at this time also had to move around more in connection with showers and going outside into the prison yard. Later on he had moved in connection with his mother \u2019 s visits, contact with health personnel and the priest, as well as going to the prison yard. It was relevant that the security measures had been relaxed with time.","109. The High Court compared the instant case to that of van den Ven, cited above. It noted in that respect, inter alia, that there had been a particular risk in the instant case, and the applicant had concretely considered and described the possibility of attacking staff using weapons created with objects available in prison; moreover the focus on a possible suicide risk had been legitimate. Furthermore, in contrast to the situation in van den Ven, the applicant had not been harmed by the conditions and the body searches had not been carried out in a similarly degrading way to those in that case.","110. Based on an overall assessment, the thresholds for neither inhuman nor degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention had been exceeded during the period from July 2011 to September 2013.","(c) The High Court \u2019 s assessment under Article 8 of the Convention","111. As to Article 8 of the Convention, the High Court took as its general starting point case-law such as A.K. v. Latvia, no. 33011\/08, 24 June 2014; Bensaid v. the United Kingdom, no. 44599\/98, ECHR 2001 \u2011 I; Erdem v. Germany, no. 38321\/97, ECHR 2001 \u2011 VII (extracts); and Silver and Others v. the United Kingdom, 25 March 1983, Series A no. 61.","112. As the case appeared before the High Court, it had only been asked to examine the issue of control of the applicant \u2019 s correspondence and that of the lack of treatment for his alleged mental vulnerability.","i. Control of the applicant \u2019 s correspondence","113. The High Court noted that for inmates confined to maximum security departments, the opportunity to conduct correspondence was an important element in the right to privacy and this particularly applied when the inmate had few or no visits from family and traditional social networks from before the imprisonment.","114. There had been a complete ban on correspondence for the applicant during his remand in custody from July to November 2011. Thereafter a liberal practice had been followed until the summer of 2012, when the correctional services authorities had learnt that the applicant was sending letters to right-wing extremists in other countries, which led to more stringent control and practice.","115. The applicant had not been subjected to a ban on correspondence since November 2011. He had conducted extensive correspondence by letter with private individuals, press agencies as well as public institutions. Permission had been granted to send and receive letters to and from authorities, media and organisations, as well as letters to individuals without associations with extreme right-wing groups. More than 4,000 letters had been sent and received by the applicant over five and a half years and between 20 and 25 percent of them had been stopped by the letter inspection.","116. The stopped letters had primarily been from the applicant, while most incoming correspondence had been delivered to him. There had been no inspection of letters to or from attorneys.","117. The correctional services authorities had stopped what they had considered to be mass dispatches of letters to ideologically like-minded individuals; individual letters to or from known right-wing extremist convicts; and individual letters to sympathisers that had to be presumed to contribute to the establishment of extreme right-wing networks. This had to be viewed in the light of the fact that the applicant had maintained his goal of building networks through correspondence. Certain letters had also not been sent because they could not be inspected, for example due to very dense writing or crossed-out text.","118. The High Court observed that the restrictions had been in accordance with the law and served a legitimate aim. As to the proportionality, it stated that the letter inspection had also to be assessed against the background of the applicant \u2019 s conviction for politically \u2011 motivated terror acts and that there was a high risk of planned and completely limitless acts of violence. In the text written by the applicant prior to the terror acts (see paragraph 15 above), he had called for violence to change society. Letters from the applicant had been published on right \u2011 wing extremist websites. The applicant had a form of \u201chero\u201d status in certain right-wing extremist groups and his acts had already been a source of inspiration for serious violence in Germany and also criminal acts (threats) in Norway. Society thus had a strong interest in stopping letters that contained direct or indirect incitements to violence or which could, for example, serve to build right-wing extremist networks. Concurrently, the letter inspection had not affected contact with the applicant \u2019 s family, close friends or other social relations established before his imprisonment.","119. Furthermore, the High Court pointed out that the letters had been assessed individually and that the applicant had been awarded legal safeguards in the right to appeal, of which he had largely availed himself \u2013 on some occasions successfully.","120. Following an overall assessment, the High Court concluded that Article 8 of the Convention had not been violated in connection with the mandatory letter inspection.","ii. Treatment of mental vulnerability","121. Turning to the applicant \u2019 s allegations concerning the lack of \u201ccare\u201d for \u201cmental vulnerability\u201d, the High Court noted that it was not a question of \u201ccare\u201d as in ordinary medical care, but rather that the applicant claimed that the limitations to his possibilities for social contact entailed a breach of Article 8 of the Convention.","122. The High Court made reference to case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, such as Vasileva v. Bulgaria, no. 23796\/10, \u00a7 63, 17 March 2016, with further references. It assumed that the considerations in Bensaid, cited above, \u00a7 47 \u2013 which concerned expulsion \u2013 to the effect that Article 8 of the Convention could protect against measures by the authorities that have negative consequences for mental health \u2013 could apply also to prison inmates. In the instant case, however, the applicant \u2019 s mental condition was stable; he still had a dissocial and dramatising personality disorder and little had changed. There were no grounds for considering him to have any particular mental vulnerability. The applicant had good access to health services. He had himself chosen not to avail himself of these services for a time, but the health personnel still continually considered whether he needed supervision. There would thus, in any event, not be issues concerning proportionality under Article 8 of the Convention because of alleged mental vulnerability.","5. Proceedings before the Supreme Court","123. The applicant appealed against the High Court \u2019 s judgment.","124. On 8 June 2017 the Supreme Court \u2019 s Appeals Leave Committee ( H\u00f8yesteretts ankeutvalg ) (\u201cthe Committee\u201d) unanimously refused leave to appeal.","125. As concerned the applicant \u2019 s appeal against the High Court \u2019 s assessment of evidence, the Committee noted that the evidence presented before the City Court and the High Court had been extensive and included inspections on site. The appeal to the Supreme Court had not substantiated any claims of significant new evidence, nor any changes or developments that could affect the assessment. The Committee found that, in the interest of clarifying the case, there was no need for the Supreme Court to review the evidence again; such review by the Supreme Court would, in any case, be based on the presentation of secondary evidence. Furthermore, no other compelling reasons existed to serve as grounds on which to grant leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the assessment of evidence. Leave was therefore refused for this part of the appeal, including the claim that the applicant was mentally vulnerable. The Committee referred to the High Court \u2019 s judgment, which concluded that the applicant suffered from no such vulnerability.","126. As concerned the applicant \u2019 s appeal against the High Court \u2019 s application of the law, the Committee noted that the applicant had claimed that the High Court had misconstrued and misapplied Article 3 of the Convention in concluding that the conditions of his confinement did not constitute inhuman or degrading treatment. In particular, he had emphasised the stress of continuous solitary confinement, in the light of the security measures otherwise imposed.","127. The Committee observed that the isolation of the applicant from other inmates had lasted close to six years. This was an extraordinarily long time ( ekstraordin\u00e6rt lenge ). The isolation had not been found to have harmed his physical or psychological health. However, the risk of severe and irreversible psychological trauma associated with such prolonged isolation from regular, meaningful human interaction was generally quite high. Weighty reasons were therefore required to justify such solitary confinement with reference to Article 3 of the Convention.","128. Committing the applicant to solitary confinement was considered necessary on the grounds that he was dangerous. In its judgment of 24 August 2012, where the applicant was sentenced to preventive detention, the City Court had concluded that there was a high risk of him committing serious violent offences in the future, even after serving a regular prison sentence of 21 years. As had been detailed in the High Court \u2019 s judgment, a number of risk assessments had been carried out throughout his detention, and they had all come to similar conclusions. Based on the extensive evidence presented, the High Court had concluded that the correctional services authorities were justified in concluding that the applicant represented, and continued to represent, a considerable security risk for his environment and society in general, even during his detention. He was isolated from other prisoners in order to prevent violence within the prison, reduce the risk of escape, prevent networking for the purpose of instigating new attacks and prevent the applicant from inspiring others to commit the kind of extreme violence he himself had committed.","129. Keeping the applicant from interacting with other inmates was also motivated by the assumption that the acts of terrorism for which he had been convicted \u2013 and the message he continued to attempt to communicate in various contexts \u2013 entailed a considerable risk of serious attacks on his person.","130. In the early phases of the applicant \u2019 s detention, especially, the security measures implemented had been stringent, including frequent night-time inspections and the use of handcuffs and body searches. Over time these measures had been eased, in line with, inter alia, recommendations in a visit report, dated November 2015, by the Parliamentary Ombudsman. Handcuffs had not been used inside the department since September 2015, and no body searches had been carried out since the end of 2015 or early 2016. Night-time inspections had, over time, been limited to inspecting the areas outside the cell door.","131. Generally speaking, there was no doubt that the conditions of the applicant \u2019 s confinement caused the applicant great hardship, and they were also potentially harmful. However, overall, they caused no distress or hardship exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in the long period of detention he was serving and in the fact that on several levels he had represented, and continued to represent, an unusually high risk of very serious incidents. The High Court had concluded that alternative, less invasive measures had so far not been able to achieve a satisfactory level of security.","132. It had been established that all measures implemented in connection with the applicant \u2019 s conditions of confinement had been authorised by or implemented pursuant to law, and they had been based on what the European Court of Human Rights had referred to as \u201cgenuine grounds both ab initio as well as when its duration is extended\u201d (see Babar Ahmad and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 24027\/07 and 4 others, \u00a7 212, 10 April 2012). The issue of whether solitary confinement was necessary had been reviewed regularly. Health personnel had continually and closely monitored the applicant \u2019 s health. Decisions to commit him to a maximum security department, which in reality had entailed solitary confinement, had been reasoned. These decisions had also been reviewed through administrative appeals procedures. As part of the case pending before the Committee, the applicant had also been given the opportunity for judicial review of his case in several courts. The procedural safeguards emphasised by the European Court of Human Rights had therefore been satisfactorily implemented.","133. The physical environment of the applicant \u2019 s detention was, under the circumstances, very good. He had access to three continuous cells, with daylight and access to a television, a shower, a toilet, a refrigerator, a computer, exercise equipment, a stereo system and a video game console. He had the option of going outside in the yard for one hour each day and access to a newspaper every morning. During his detention, he had been able to receive instruction, study and take exams at university level with good results. Increasingly, steps had been taken to facilitate more extensive and social interaction between the applicant and various categories of prison personnel. He had a regular prison visitor, whom he was free to talk with every week. These moderating elements made it easier for the applicant to cope with the stringent detention regime and the lack of ordinary human interaction. They contributed to giving his days a certain structure and meaning, and they facilitated physical and mental stimulation. They also largely served as a psychological substitute for the lack of social interaction with other prisoners.","134. In its judgment, the High Court had criticised the correctional services authorities on the grounds that the possibility of at least some degree of interaction with other inmates should have been given greater consideration and that the decisions should have included a more detailed justification. Furthermore, the use of random body searches at Ila was, in the High Court \u2019 s assessment, unnecessarily high. Also, greater consideration should have been given to the possibility of using bars instead of glass walls for visiting purposes.","135. These criticisms were relevant for an assessment of whether the conditions of confinement have been, and continue to be, inhuman or degrading. However, the material elements of the applicant \u2019 s detention regime \u2013 including the degree of isolation \u2013 were based on verifiable professional assessments, and they were implemented for the purpose of safeguarding critical security concerns as well as the applicant \u2019 s health and dignity. The Committee recognised that the correctional services authorities, in the applicant \u2019 s case, faced a considerable challenge in maintaining an optimal balance in this respect.","136. Upon an overall and comprehensive assessment, the High Court had concluded that the threshold for infringement of rights established by Article 3 had not been exceeded. The Committee saw no basis on which to draw a different conclusion. At this point, the applicant \u2019 s appeal had no prospects of succeeding before the Supreme Court.","137. As concerned the remaining parts of the appeal, the Committee took into account the applicant \u2019 s claim that the use of handcuffs and body searches constituted independent violations of Article 3 of the Convention. In this context, the Committee found it sufficient to refer to the High Court \u2019 s judgment, with which the Committee concurred.","138. Furthermore, the applicant claimed that monitoring his correspondence and visits violated his right to respect for his private life and his correspondence pursuant to Article 8 of the Convention. The High Court had given a comprehensive assessment on this issue as well, and had concluded that the measures had statutory authority, pursued legitimate aims and were proportionate \u2013 and thus also justifiable under Article 8. The Committee saw no basis on which to draw a different conclusion.","139. These other parts of the applicant \u2019 s appeal also had, in the Committee \u2019 s view, no prospects of succeeding in a hearing before the Supreme Court.","B. Relevant domestic law","140. The applicant \u2019 s preventive detention had been ordered pursuant to Article 39c of the Penal Code of 22 May 1902 no. 10 ( straffeloven ), in force at the time of the applicant \u2019 s criminal acts and his conviction, the relevant parts of which read:","\u201cWhen a sentence for a specific term is deemed to be insufficient to protect society, a sentence of preventive detention in an institution under the correctional services may be imposed instead of a sentence of imprisonment when the following conditions in no. 1 or no. 2 are fulfilled:","1. The offender is found guilty of having committed or attempted to commit a serious violent felony, sexual felony, unlawful imprisonment, arson or other serious felony impairing the life, health or liberty of other persons, or exposing these legal rights to risk. In addition there must be deemed to be an imminent risk that the offender will again commit such a felony. In assessing such risk importance shall be attached to the felony commited or attempted especially as compared with the offender \u2019 s conduct and social and personal functioning capacity. Particular importance shall be attached to whether the offender has previously commited or attempted to commit a felony as specified in the first sentence.","... \u201d","The two first paragraphs of Article 39e of the 1902 Penal Code read:","\u201cWhen passing a sentence of preventive detention the court shall fix a term that should usually not exceed 15 years and may not exceed 21 years. On application by the prosecuting authority the court may, however, extend the fixed term by up to five years at a time. Proceedings for such extention may be instituted in the District Court not later than three months before the period of preventive detention expires.","A minimum period of preventive detention not exceeding 10 years should also be termined\u201d.","The 1902 Penal Code was replaced by a new penal code of 20 May 2005 no. 28, which entered into force on 1 October 2015. Article 39e of the 1902 Penal Code was continued in substance in Article 43 of the 2005 Penal Code."],"30735":["5.The applicants were born in 1975 and 1976 and live in Cahul and Cetireni respectively.","6.The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.","A.Conditions of the applicants\u2019 detention","7.The applicants were convicted by Moldovan courts and, at the time of the events, were serving their sentences in prison no. 8 situated in the town of Tighina (Bender), in the Transdniestrian region of the Republic of Moldova. The town is situated in the security zone under the control of peacekeepers from Moldova, Russia and the self-proclaimed \u201cMoldavian Republic of Transdniestria\u201d (\u201cMRT\u201d)[1]. Prison no. 8 is under the exclusive control of the Moldovan authorities. By October 2003 some 236 people were detained there; some of them, such as the applicants, were ill with tuberculosis.","8.On 23 September 2002 the Bender local administration, which is subordinated to the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities, disconnected prison no. 8 from the electricity, water and heating supplies. As a result, the detainees were deprived of conditions of basic hygiene, and the food they received did not meet the minimum standards of quality.","9.The prison authorities informed the Moldovan Ministry of Justice, the President\u2019s Office, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Red Cross and the Council of Europe, as well as local human rights organisations, with a view to obtaining assistance in resolving the problem arising from the disconnection from the town\u2019s utilities network.","10.On 12 August 2003 the Bender prosecutor\u2019s office (which forms part of the official Moldovan authorities) informed the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Moldova (\u201cthe CHDOM\u201d), for which the applicant\u2019s representative worked, that, as a result of pressure from the OSCE, the Bender authorities had reconnected the prison to the electricity and water supply systems on 23February 2003. On 10 July 2003 the last of the people who were ill with tuberculosis were transferred to a newly-built hospital wing in Pruncul prison hospital, situated in Moldova. According to the head of prison no. 8, some 236 healthy detainees, including the applicants, remained in the prison after that date. However, also on 10July 2003, the local authorities disconnected prison no. 8 from the electricity and water supply systems again, without any warning. The \u201cMRT\u201d authorities insisted that the prison needed to be closed down.","11.On 15 September 2004 Mr Pocasovschi (the first applicant) was transferred to another prison. He was released on parole on 14 April 2005. Mr Mih\u0103il\u0103 (the second applicant) was transferred to another prison on 1March 2004 and was released on parole on 28 March 2005.","B.Criminal proceedings against those responsible for disconnecting prison no. 8 from the utilities systems","12.On 21 July 2003 the applicants\u2019 representatives asked the Moldovan Prosecutor General\u2019s Office to initiate criminal proceedings against those responsible for disconnecting prison no. 8 from the utilities systems. On 12August 2003 the Bender prosecutor\u2019s office replied in general terms, describing the difficult situation with regard to prison no. 8 and the unsuccessful negotiations with the local authorities.","13.On 29 August 2003 the CHDOM asked the Bender District Court (which is part of the Moldovan court system) to order the prosecutor\u2019s office to remedy the human rights violations taking place in prison no. 8.","14.On 7 October 2003 the head of prison no. 8 informed the court that, owing to insufficient access to water and electricity, detainees in his institution could not receive appropriate medical assistance or food of a sufficient standard, or maintain proper hygiene.","15.On 31 October 2003 the Bender District Court ordered the prosecutor\u2019s office to initiate criminal proceedings against those responsible for disconnecting prison no. 8 from the utilities supply. That decision was upheld by the Bender Court of Appeal on 18 December 2003.","16.According to the Moldovan Government, on 18 November 2003 the Bender prosecutor\u2019s office contacted the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities with a view to prosecuting those responsible for disconnecting prison no. 8 from the utilities. It also informed the Joint Control Commission (see Ila\u015fcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia ([GC], no. 48787\/99, \u00a7 90, ECHR 2004\u2011VII) of the need to include the subject on its agenda. On 20December 2003 the \u201cMRT\u201d prosecutor\u2019s office refused to open a criminal investigation on the ground that no crime had been committed.","17.On 19 January 2004 the relatives of two of the detainees made another complaint to the CHDOM regarding the inhuman conditions of detention in prison no. 8. That letter was forwarded to the Moldovan Ministry of Justice, the President of the Republic of Moldova and the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, along with a request to take all necessary steps to immediately improve the conditions of detention.","18.On 1 March 2004 the CHDOM asked the Bender prosecutor\u2019s office what action had been taken pursuant to the above-mentioned court decisions. On 12 March 2004 the Bender prosecutor\u2019s office replied that all the material was at the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, which was dealing with the case.","19.On 15 March 2004 the Ministry of Justice informed the CHDOM that the State was making all necessary efforts to ensure acceptable conditions of detention at prison no. 8, and that, at that time, the conditions of detention at that prison did not differ from those at other prisons in the Republic of Moldova.","20.On 20 April 2004 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office informed the CHDOM that it had lodged an extraordinary appeal with the Supreme Court of Justice against the decisions of 31 October 2003 and 18 December 2003. On 3August 2004 the Supreme Court of Justice upheld those decisions.","21.On 1 June 2009 the CHDOM asked the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office what actions had been undertaken after the judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of 3 August 2004. On 14 July 2009 the Bender Prosecutor\u2019s Office replied that the actions of the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities could not be investigated by the Moldovan authorities as long as the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities de facto controlled the territory of the \u201cMRT\u201d.","C.Civil action lodged by the applicants","22.On 15 March 2004, on behalf of 141 detainees in prison no.8, including the applicants, the CHDOM lodged a civil action against the Ministry of Justice, asking for the finding of a violation of the rights guaranteed under Article 3 of the Convention. The detainees had authorised the organisation to act on their behalf. The CHDOM also asked for an improvement in the conditions of detention and for the payment of compensation in the amount of 15,000 Moldovan lei (MDL \u2013 approximately 1,000euros (EUR) at the time) for each detainee.","23.On 16 and 22 April 2004 the President of the Bender District Court asked the Supreme Court of Justice to decide whether the case should be examined by another court. On 19 May 2004 the Supreme Court of Justice rejected the request and left the case with the Bender District Court.","24.On 18 June 2004 the Bender District Court decided to transfer the case to the Buiucani District Court in Chi\u015fin\u0103u, in accordance with territorial competence principles. The claimants (the detainees) and their representatives were not consulted. On 22June 2004 the CHDOM challenged that decision. On 14July 2004 the Bender Court of Appeal set aside the decision of 18June 2004 and ordered the urgent examination of the case by the Bender District Court.","25.On 28 December 2004 the Bender District Court declined to examine the claim because it did not satisfy legal requirements. On 1February 2005 the Bender Court of Appeal set aside that decision.","26.After February 2005 many of the 141 detainees who were plaintiffs in the above-mentioned civil action were transferred to other prisons in various parts of the country, which made it more difficult for the CHDOM to obtain confirmation of each individual\u2019s power of attorney, as requested by the Bender District Court. In such circumstances, the CHDOM selected nine cases (including those of the applicants in the present case) with which to continue the proceedings. Since the individuals concerned were also detained in separate prisons, the CHDOM made an application for their cases to be examined separately, an application which the Bender District Court refused on 11November 2005.","27.On 26 April 2006 the Bender District Court rejected the CHDOM\u2019s application to summon as defendants the individuals from the relevant local \u201cMRT\u201d authorities in Bender responsible for violating the detainees\u2019 rights. On an unknown date in June 2006 the Bender Court of Appeal set aside that decision and ordered the summoning as defendants of A.P., A.M. and V.M., the heads of the relevant local \u201cMRT\u201d authorities in Bender. According to the applicants, none of these individuals was summoned by the Bender District Court.","28.On 15 December 2006 the judge who had been examining the case withdrew from it. On 18 May 2007 the judge who had taken over the case also withdrew from it. Subsequently, all other judges of the Bender District Court withdrew, allegedly for fear of persecution by the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities. As a result, the Bender Court of Appeal was asked to decide which other court could examine the case. On 13 November 2007 the Bender Court of Appeal decided that the case should be examined by the Anenii-Noi District Court.","29.On 26 December 2007 the Anenii-Noi District Court declined to examine the claim because it did not fulfil certain legal requirements. It found in particular that there was a lack of valid powers of attorney in favour of the CHDOM.","30.On 6 March 2008 the CHDOM lodged a reformulated court action in accordance with the legal requirements. It also asked for the Russian Government to be summoned as a defendant in the case, as it had de facto control over the territory of the \u201cMRT\u201d. It claimed EUR 10,000 and EUR7,000 respectively for the breach of the applicants\u2019 rights. On the same date the Anenii-Noi District Court declined to examine the claim because the powers of attorney issued by the detainees in favour of the CHDOM had expired.","31.On 20 May 2008 the Bender Court of Appeal set aside the decision of 6 March 2008, noting that, in the applicants\u2019 cases, the powers of attorney had been renewed.","32.On 18 June 2008 the Anenii-Noi District Court adjourned the hearing because of the absence of a representative of the Ministry of Justice. The same thing occurred on 29 October 2008. The court also informed the CHDOM that, in a letter dated 2 July 2007, the Ministry of Justice had informed the court that a representative of the Russian Federation could only be summoned via the Ministry of Justice.","33.On 30 December 2008 the Anenii-Noi District Court adopted a judgment in which it allowed the applicants\u2019 claims in part. It awarded each of them damages in the amount of EUR 200, to be paid by the Moldovan Ministry of Finance, and EUR 500, to be paid by the Russian Ministry of Finance.","34.On 30 June 2009 the Bender Court of Appeal quashed that judgment in part. It found that, following the prison\u2019s disconnection from the utilities, the prison administration had no longer been able to offer food or medical treatment for tuberculosis which was of an adequate quality; there had been no access to showers, a very poor situation concerning personal hygiene, and only two hours of electricity per day, ensured by a low-power generator. None of the complaints made to the State authorities had resulted in an improvement in the conditions of detention until much later, as established in 2008. The court acknowledged a breach of the applicants\u2019 right not to be held in inhuman conditions of detention, and increased the award in favour of each of them to MDL 20,000 (EUR 1,266 at the time). It also found that the Russian Federation could not be a defendant in Moldovan courts unless it expressly agreed to that, which was not the case here.","35.On 27 April 2010 the Supreme Court of Justice accepted the applicants\u2019 appeal on points of law in part, and amended the judgment of the lower court. It analysed in detail the length of the civil proceedings (between 22March 2004 and the date of adopting its own judgment on 27April 2010), the complexity of the case, how the parties and the courts had contributed to the length of the proceedings, as well as the significant interest at stake for the applicants. The court found that, despite the applicants\u2019 representatives\u2019 actions contributing to the overall length of the proceedings (twenty-six out of the sixty-seven months), a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time had taken place, requiring additional compensation which it set at MDL6,000 (approximately EUR 358 at the time). It did not amend the remainder of the lower court\u2019s judgment.","D.General action undertaken by the Moldovan authorities","36.The Moldovan Government submitted a long list of actions concerning their efforts to assert their sovereignty over the \u201cMRT\u201d territory and ensure that human rights were observed in the region. They also submitted copies of documents concerning prison no. 8 in Tighina\/Bender specifically, raising in particular the issue of the prison being disconnected from utilities within the framework of the \u201c5+2\u201d negotiations process (between the OSCE, Russia, Ukraine, the European Union and the USA, in addition to Moldova and the \u201cMRT\u201d) and with various international organisations.","37.Relevant reports of various inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations concerning the situation in the \u201cMRT\u201d have been summarised in Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC] (no.11138\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 61-68, ECHR 2016)."],"30753":["A.The so-called \u201cHigh-Value Detainee Programme\u201d","1.The establishment of the HVD Programme","(a)The US President\u2019s memoranda","(i)Memorandum of 17 September 2001","(ii)Memorandum of 7 February 2002","(b)Abu Zubaydah\u2019s capture and transfer to a CIA covert detention facility in March 2002","(c)Setting up the CIA programme \u201cto detain and interrogate terrorists at sites abroad\u201d","2.Enhanced Interrogation Techniques","(a)Description of legally sanctioned standard and enhanced interrogation techniques","(b)Expanding the use of the EITs beyond Abu Zubaydah\u2019s interrogations","3.Standard procedures and treatment of \u201chigh value detainees\u201d in CIA custody (combined use of interrogation techniques)","4.Conditions of detention at CIA \u201cBlack Sites\u201d","5.The scale of the HVD Programme","6.Closure of the HVD Programme","B.The United States Supreme Court\u2019s judgment in Rasul v. Bush","C.Role of Jeppesen Dataplan, Richmor Aviation and other air companies in the CIA rendition operations","1.Jeppesen Dataplan Inc.","2.Richmor Aviation","3.Other companies","D.Review of the CIA\u2019s activities involved in the HVD Programme in 2001-2009 by the US Senate","1.Course of the review","2.Findings and conclusions","A.Restrictions on information about the applicant\u2019s secret detention and his communication with the outside world","B.The applicant\u2019s capture, transfer to CIA custody, secret detention and transfers from 27 March 2002 to 22 September 2003, as established by the Court in Husayn (Abu Zubaydah)v.Poland and supplemented by the 2014 US Senate Committee Report","C.The applicant\u2019s transfers and detention between his rendition from Poland on 22 September 2003 and his alleged rendition to Lithuania on 17 February or 18 February 2005 as established by the Court in Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, reconstructed on the basis of the 2014 US Senate Committee Report and other documents and as corroborated by experts heard by the Court","D.The applicant\u2019s alleged secret detention at a CIA \u201cBlack Site\u201d in Lithuania from 17 February or 18 February 2005 to 25 March 2006 as described by the applicant, reconstructed on the basis of the 2014 US Senate Committee Report and other documents and as corroborated by experts heard by the Court","1.The applicant\u2019s alleged rendition to Lithuania on 17 February or 18February 2005 and his rendition from Lithuania on the plane N733MA on 25 March 2006","(a)The applicant\u2019s submissions","(i)Rendition to Lithuania (17 or 18 February 2005)","(ii)Rendition from Lithuania (25 March 2006)","(b)Evidence before the Court","(i)The 2015 Reprieve Briefing","(\u03b1)As regards the colour-coded names of the CIA detention facilities and periods of their operation","(\u03b2)As regards the CIA prisoners\u2019 transfers into Lithuania","\u2013February 2005 transfers","\u2013October 2005 transfer","\u2013March 2006 transfer","(ii)Expert evidence","(iii)\u201cDetention Site Violet\u201d in the 2014 US Senate Committee Report","2.Detention and treatment to which the applicant was subjected","E.The applicant\u2019s further transfers during CIA custody (until 5September 2006) as reconstructed on the basis of the 2014 US Senate Committee Report and other documents and as corroborated by experts heard by the Court","F.The applicant\u2019s detention at the US Guant\u00e1namo Bay facility since 5 September 2006 to present","G.Psychological and physical effects of the HVD Programme on the applicant","H.Identification of locations of the colour code-named CIA detention sites in the 2014 US Senate Committee Report by experts","I.Parliamentary inquiry in Lithuania","1.The Seimas investigation and findings","2.Extracts from transcripts of the Seimas\u2019 debates on the CNSD Findings","J.Criminal investigation in Lithuania","1.Investigation conducted in 2010-2011","2.Reopening of the investigation on 22 January 2015 and further proceedings","A.United Nations Organisation","1.Statement of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on detention of Taliban and Al-Qaeda prisoners at the US Base in Guant\u00e1namo Bay, Cuba, 16January 2002","2.Statement of the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture","3.UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 29\/2006, MrIbn al-Shaykh al-Libi and 25 other persons v. United States of America, UN Doc.A\/HRC\/4\/40\/Add.1 at 103 (2006)","B.Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolution no.1340 (2003) on rights of persons held in the custody of the United States in Afghanistan or Guant\u00e1namo Bay, 26 June 2003","C.International non-governmental organisations","1.Amnesty International, Memorandum to the US Government on the rights of people in US custody in Afghanistan and Guant\u00e1namo Bay, April 2002","2.Human Rights Watch, \u201cUnited States, Presumption of Guilt: Human Rights Abuses of Post-September 11 Detainees\u201d, Vol. 14, No. 4 (G), August 2002","3.Human Rights Watch, \u201cUnited States: Reports of Torture of Al\u2011Qaeda Suspects\u201d, 26 December 2002","4.International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, \u201cAnti\u2011terrorism Measures, Security and Human Rights: Developments in Europe, Central Asia and North America in the Aftermath of September 11\u201d, Report, April 2003","5.Amnesty International Report 2003 \u2013 United States of America, 28May 2003","6.Amnesty International, \u201cUnlawful detention of six men from Bosnia-Herzegovina in Guant\u00e1namo Bay\u201d, 29 May 2003","7. Amnesty International, \u201cUnited States of America, The threat of a bad example: Undermining international standards as \u2018war on terror\u2019 detentions continue\u201d, 18 August 2003","8.Amnesty International, \u201cIncommunicado detention\/Fear of ill\u2011treatment\u201d, 20 August 2003","9.International Committee of the Red Cross, United States: ICRC President urges progress on detention-related issues, news release 04\/03, 16 January 2004","10.Human Rights Watch - Statement on US Secret Detention Facilities of 6 November 2005","11.Human Rights Watch \u2013 List of \u201cGhost Prisoners\u201d Possibly in CIA Custody of 30 November 2005","A.International media","1.Reports published in 2002","2.Reports published in 2005","3.ABC News reports of 2009","4.Other Reports (2009- 2011)","B.Lithuanian media","A.Council of Europe","1.Procedure under Article 52 of the Convention","2.Parliamentary Assembly\u2019s inquiry - the Marty Inquiry","(a)The 2006 Marty Report","(b)The 2007 Marty Report","(c)The 2011 Marty Report","B.European Parliament","1.The Fava Inquiry","2.The 2007 European Parliament Resolution","3.The Flautre Report and the 2012 European Parliament Resolution","4.The 2013 European Parliament Resolution","5.The 2015 European Parliament Resolution","6.The October 2015 hearing before the LIBE","7.The 2016 European Parliament Resolution","C.The 2007 ICRC Report","D.The 2010 UN Joint Study","Witness A","Witness A1","Witness A2","Witness A3","Witness A4","Witness B","Witness B1","Witness B2","Witness B3","Witness B4 (also referred to as \u201cperson B\u201d by the Government)","Witness C","Witness C1","Witness C2 (also referred to as \u201cperson C\u201d by the Government)","Witness D","Witness D1","Witness E","Witness E1","Witness F","Witness F1","Witness G","Witness G1","Witness G2","Witness H","Witness H1","Witness K","Witness L","Witness M","Witness N","1.Questioning on 9 March 2010","2.Questioning on 16 March 2010","Witness O","1.Questioning on 9 March 2010","2.Questioning on 10 March 2010","Witness P","Witness Q","Witness R","Witness S","Witness T","1.Questioning on 2 March 2010","2.Questioning on 16 March 2010","Witness U","Witness U1","Witness V","Witness X","Witness Y","Witness Z","A.The 2011 CPT Report","B.The Lithuanian Government\u2019s Response to the 2011 CPT Report","C.Mr Fava\u2019s testimony regarding the \u201cinformal transatlantic meeting\u201d given in Al Nashiri v. Poland and Husayn (Abu Zubaydah)v.Poland","D.Documents concerning the on-site inspection of Project No. 1 and Project No. 2 carried out by the investigating prosecutor","1.Record of on-site inspection of Project No. 1 of 17 March 2010.","2.Record of the on-site inspection of Project No. 2 of 4 June 2010","E.Resolution and Operational Action Plan of 25 July 2002","F.Report on the incident of 6 October 2005 in Vilnius airport","G.Letter from former President of Lithuania Mr Adamkus to the CNSD of 26 November 2009","H.Letter from the Ministry of the Interior of 9 December 2009","I.Letter from Palanga airport of 15 March 2010","J.The Customs Department letter of 12 April 2010","K.The SBGS letter of 27 April 2010","A.Presentation by Senator Marty and Mr J.G.S. \u201cDistillation of available evidence, including flight data, in respect of Lithuania and the case of Abu Zubaydah\u201d","B.Senator Marty","C.Mr J.G.S.","D.Mr Black"],"30754":["A.Terrorist attacks of which the applicant has been suspected","1.USS Cole bombing in 2000","2.MV Limburg bombing in 2002","B.The so-called \u201cHigh-Value Detainee Programme\u201d","1.The establishment of the HVD Programme","(a)The US President\u2019s memoranda","(i)Memorandum of 17 September 2001","(ii)Memorandum of 7 February 2002","(b)Abu Zubaydah\u2019s capture and transfer to a CIA covert detention facility in March 2002","(c)Setting up the CIA programme \u201cto detain and interrogate terrorists at sites abroad\u201d","2.Enhanced Interrogation Techniques","(a)Description of legally sanctioned standard and enhanced interrogation techniques","(b)Expanding the use of the EITs beyond Abu Zubaydah\u2019s interrogations","3.Standard procedures and treatment of \u201chigh-value detainees\u201d in CIA custody (combined use of interrogation techniques)","4.Conditions of detention at CIA \u201cblack sites\u201d","5.The scale of the HVD Programme","6.Closure of the HVD Programme","C.The United States Supreme Court\u2019s judgment in Rasul v. Bush","D.Role of Jeppesen Dataplan, Richmor Aviation and other air companies in the CIA rendition operations","1.Jeppesen Dataplan Inc.","2.Richmor Aviation","3.Other companies","E.Military Commissions","1.Military Order of 13 November 2001","2.Military Commission Order no. 1","3.The 2006 Military Commissions Act and the 2009 Military Commissions Act","4.Publicly expressed concerns regarding the procedure before the military commission","F.Review of the CIA\u2019s activities involved in the HVD Programme in 2001-2009 by the US Senate","1.Course of the review","2.Findings and conclusions","A.The applicant\u2019s capture, transfer to the CIA\u2019s custody, his secret detention and transfers from mid-October 2002 to 6 June 2003, as established by the Court in AlNashiri v. Poland and supplemented by the 2014 US Senate Committee Report","B.The applicant\u2019s transfers and detention between his rendition from Poland on 6 June 2003 and his alleged rendition to Romania on 12 April 2004 as reconstructed on the basis of the 2014 US Senate Committee Report and other documents and as corroborated by experts heard by the Court","1.Transfer from Poland to Morocco and detention in Morocco (from 6June to 23 September 2003)","2.Transfer from Morocco to Guant\u00e1namo and detention in Guant\u00e1namo (from 23 September 2003 to 12 April 2004)","C.The applicant\u2019s alleged secret detention at a CIA \u201cblack site\u201d in Romania from 12 April 2004 to 6 October or 5 November 2005 as described by the applicant, reconstructed on the basis of the 2014 US Senate Committee Report and other documents and as corroborated by experts heard by the Court","1.The applicant\u2019s initial submissions","2.The applicant\u2019s alleged rendition to Romania on the plane N85VM on 12 April 2004","3.Detention and treatment to which the applicant was subjected","4.The applicant\u2019s alleged rendition from Romania on 6 October or 5November 2005","D.The applicant\u2019s further transfers during CIA custody (until 5September 2006) as reconstructed on the basis of the 2014 US Senate Committee Report and other documents and as corroborated by experts heard by the Court","E.The applicant\u2019s detention in Guant\u00e1namo Bay and his trial before the military commission from 6 September 2006 to present","1.Hearing before the Combatant Status Review Tribunal","2.Trial before the military commission","F.Psychological effects of the HVD Programme on the applicant","G.Identification of locations of the colour code-named CIA detention sites in the 2014 US Senate Committee Report by experts","H.\u201cDetention Site Black\u201d in the 2014 US Senate Committee Report","I.Parliamentary inquiry in Romania","J.Criminal investigation in Romania","1.Submission by the Government of confidential documents from the investigation file","2.The course of the investigation according to documentary evidence produced by the Government","A.United Nations","1.Statement of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on detention of Taliban and al-Qaeda prisoners at the US Base in Guant\u00e1namo Bay, Cuba, 16January 2002","2.Statement of the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture","3.UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Opinion No. 29\/2006, MrIbn al-Shaykh al-Libi and 25 other persons v. United States of America, UN Doc.A\/HRC\/4\/40\/Add.1 at 103 (2006)","B.Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolution no.1340 (2003) on rights of persons held in the custody of the United States in Afghanistan or Guant\u00e1namo Bay, 26 June 2003","C.International non-governmental organisations","1.Amnesty International, Memorandum to the US Government on the rights of people in US custody in Afghanistan and Guant\u00e1namo Bay, April 2002","2.Human Rights Watch, \u201cUnited States, Presumption of Guilt: Human Rights Abuses of Post-September 11 Detainees\u201d, Vol. 14, No. 4 (G), August 2002","3.Human Rights Watch, \u201cUnited States: Reports of Torture of Al\u2011Qaeda Suspects\u201d, 26 December 2002","4.International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, \u201cAnti\u2011terrorism Measures, Security and Human Rights: Developments in Europe, Central Asia and North America in the Aftermath of September 11\u201d, Report, April 2003","5.Amnesty International Report 2003 \u2013 United States of America, 28May 2003","6.Amnesty International, \u201cUnlawful detention of six men from Bosnia-Herzegovina in Guant\u00e1namo Bay\u201d, 29 May 2003","7.Amnesty International, \u201cUnited States of America, The threat of a bad example: Undermining international standards as \u2018war on terror\u2019 detentions continue\u201d, 18 August 2003","8.Amnesty International, \u201cIncommunicado detention\/Fear of ill\u2011treatment\u201d, 20 August 2003","9.International Committee of the Red Cross, United States: ICRC President urges progress on detention-related issues, news release 04\/03, 16 January 2004","10.Human Rights Watch - Statement on US Secret Detention Facilities of 6 November 2005","11.Human Rights Watch \u2013 List of \u201cGhost Prisoners\u201d Possibly in CIA Custody of 30 November 2005","A.International media","B.Romanian media","C.Der Spiegel\u2019s publications in 2014 and 2015","A.Council of Europe","1.Procedure under Article 52 of the Convention","2.Parliamentary Assembly\u2019s inquiry - the Marty Inquiry","(a)The 2006 Marty Report","(b)The 2007 Marty Report","(c)The 2011 Marty Report","B.European Parliament","1.The Fava Inquiry","2.The 2007 European Parliament Resolution","3.The 2011 European Parliament Resolution","4.The Flautre Report and the 2012 European Parliament Resolution","5.The 2013 European Parliament Resolution","6.The 2015 European Parliament Resolution","7.LIBE delegation\u2019s visit to Romania (24-25 September 2015)","8.Follow-up to the visit","9.The 2016 European Parliament Resolution","C.The 2007 ICRC Report","D.United Nations","1.The 2010 UN Joint Study","2.The 2015 UN Committee against Torture\u2019s Observations","A.Transcript of witness X\u2019s statement made on 18September 2013","B.Transcript of testimony given by witness Y on 4 May 2015","C.Transcript of witness Z\u2019s statement made on 17 September 2013","D.Transcript of testimony given by witness Z on 18 June 2015","E.Transcripts of statements from other witnesses","1.Witness A","2.Witness B","3.Witness C","4.Witness D","5.Witness E","6.Witness F","7.Witness G","8.Witness H","9.Witness I","10.Witness J","11.Witness K","12.Witness L","13.Witness M","14.Witness N","15.Witness O","16.Witness P","17.Witness Q","18.Witness R","A.RCAA letter of 29 July 2009","B.List of twenty-one \u201csuspicious flights\u201d produced by the Government","C.Documents concerning the N313P rendition mission on 16-28 January 2004 produced by Senator Marty and Mr J.G.S. in the course of the PowerPoint presentation","D.The 2010 Findings of the Lithuanian Seimas Committee on National Security and Defence (extracts)","E.Mr Hammarberg\u2019s affidavit of 17 April 2013","Affidavit of Thomas Hammarberg","F.Dossier (Memorandum) of 30 March 2012 provided by MrHammarberg to the Romanian Prosecutor General (extracts)","G.Mr Hammarberg\u2019s replies to questions put to him in writing by the Court and the parties","1.The Court\u2019s questions","2.The Romanian Government\u2019s questions","3.The applicant\u2019s questions","H.Senator Marty\u2019s affidavit of 24 April 2013","I.The 2015 LIBE Briefing","A.Mr Fava","B.Presentation by Senator Marty and Mr J.G.S. \u201cDistillation of available documentary evidence, including flight data, in respect of Romania and the case of Al Nashiri\u201d","C.Senator Marty","D.Mr J.G.S.","E.Mr Black"],"30757":["6.The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Canada.","A.The applicant\u2019s arrest, detention and alleged ill-treatment","1.The applicant\u2019s version of events","7.The applicant\u2019s version of events relating to his encounter with the police, as set out in his application form, is the following.","8.On 27 February 2011, while in front of an automated teller machine (\u201cATM\u201d), the applicant was attacked from behind by a police officer and was illegally arrested without a warrant. He was then taken to the police station where he was detained for six hours. Throughout his detention his hands were handcuffed behind his back.","9.During this period he was tortured by members of the police with the aim of forcing him to confess to the offence of theft through the use of a forged credit card. The applicant was repeatedly beaten with a wooden stick all over his body and his head until he lost consciousness, beaten with a metallic chair while lying on the floor, punched on the body and face and kicked and punched on the head, nose and mouth, causing one of his teeth to break. He also received blows to the region that the police officers had been informed he had been operated on (the applicant does not give any clarifications in this respect). The above acts were accompanied by death threats. The officers refused to give him his asthma medicine. They also refused to take him to hospital until his lawyer at the time, C.H., intervened.","10.At around 3.30 p.m. the same day, following C.H.\u2019s request, the applicant was taken to hospital because of his injuries. He overheard the police officers telling the doctor that he had fallen to the ground. One of the police officers then took the doctor aside and started talking to him in private. The applicant was not given painkillers by the doctor until the Honorary Consul of Canada in Cyprus (\u201cthe Canadian Consul\u201d) visited him. The Canadian Consul asked the attending doctor the reasons for which the applicant had ended up in hospital and was in such a bad condition. The doctor informed her that there was nothing wrong with the applicant and that he had simply examined his pancreas. No other explanation was given.","2.The Government\u2019s version of events derived from the investigation files","11.On 27 February 2011 the police were informed by a card payment and processing company of illegal withdrawals with a fake credit card from an ATM of a bank in Limassol. Special Constable G.S. from the police traffic department, who was on motorcycle patrol in the area, arrived at the scene and spotted the applicant in front of the ATM. G.S. was in uniform and wearing a helmet. According to G.S.\u2019s account of the events, he approached the applicant from behind and touched his left shoulder. He then said \u201cpolice\u201d and asked him, both in Greek and in English, to identify himself. The applicant did not reply but hit him on the head and stomach and then ran away. G.S. chased the applicant, who at some point fell on the pavement and hit his head. A struggle ensued. G.S. did not hit the applicant but merely tried to handcuff him by holding him with his hands and by pushing him. Special Constable P.K. arrived at the scene and assisted G.S. in arresting the applicant. The applicant was arrested for the flagrant criminal offences of assaulting a police officer and resisting lawful arrest (sections 244 (a) and (b) of the Criminal Code, Cap. 154). Two officers of the Crime Prevention Squad (\u039f\u03c5\u03bb\u03b1\u03bc\u03cc\u03c2 \u03a0\u03c1\u03cc\u03bb\u03b7\u03c8\u03b7\u03c2 \u0395\u03b3\u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u2013 \u201cthe CPS\u201d), Special Constable C.S. and Senior Constable S.M., arrived at the scene. According to them, when they arrived they found the applicant and G.S. on the ground. The fake credit card had been retained by the ATM and was subsequently retrieved.","12.After the applicant was handcuffed, he was handed over to C.S. and S.M., who drove the applicant to the police station.","13.Upon arrival at the police station around 9.30 a.m. the above officers handed over the applicant to Constable P.P., who carried out a body search and confiscated objects found on him, including the amount of 10,000 euros (EUR) in EUR 50 notes. The applicant was then transferred to the Economic Crime Investigations Office (\u0393\u03c1\u03b1\u03c6\u03b5\u03af\u03bf \u0394\u03b9\u03b5\u03c1\u03b5\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b7\u03c2 \u039f\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03cd \u0395\u03b3\u03ba\u03bb\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u2013 \u201cthe ECID\u201d) where P.P. passed everything he had found on the applicant on to Constable E.L. The applicant was handed over to Constable F.O., who also carried out a body search. At 10 a.m. F.O. handed over the applicant to Inspector I.S., the head of the ECID. At 11.30 a.m. F.O. returned and kept the applicant under his supervision. At 11.45 a.m. the applicant was allowed to call his lawyer, C.H. At 12 noon F.O. handed over the applicant to Constable M.P., who had been appointed as investigator in the case.","14.Between 1 p.m. and 1.30 p.m. the applicant was interviewed by M.P. with the assistance of an interpreter, S.K. During the interview, only one other officer entered the interview room, Constable A.P.","15.At the end of the interview, around 1.35 p.m., the applicant was taken to the detention facilities in the station where Constable C.T. carried out a body search. He recorded injuries in the applicant\u2019s prisoner record. These were: abrasions on the left part of the applicant\u2019s forehead (\u03b1\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03ae \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03c9\u03c0\u03b9\u03b1\u03af\u03b1 \u03c7\u03ce\u03c1\u03b1) and left shoulder blade (\u03c9\u03bc\u03bf\u03c0\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7). The applicant was taken to a cell at approximately 1.45 p.m.","16.The applicant was visited by his lawyer, C.H., from 3.05 p.m. until 3.30 p.m. Before leaving the station, C.H. complained to the head of the detention facility, Sergeant P.H., that the applicant had been ill-treated during his arrest, transfer to the station and questioning.","17.At approximately 3.50 p.m. the applicant was taken to Limassol General Hospital by Constable C.K. and Special Constable D.Y.","18.In the meantime, at 3.30 p.m., the District Court of Limassol issued an arrest warrant on the grounds that there was a reasonable suspicion based on evidence that the applicant had been involved in a number of offences, including, inter alia, various forgery and theft-related offences, assault occasioning actual bodily harm and resisting lawful arrest. At approximately 4.45 p.m. while the applicant was at the hospital he was presented with the arrest warrant and was detained on that basis. The applicant was guarded by officers at the hospital.","19.The applicant was discharged from hospital at 11.20 p.m. and was taken back to the detention facilities at the police station.","20.The next day the applicant was taken to the District Court of Limassol, which ordered his detention on remand for eight days. The court ordered that during his detention the applicant be provided with medical care and treatment and, if need be, that he be taken to hospital.","21.On 8 March 2011 the court extended the applicant\u2019s detention on remand by a further eight days.","22.On 16 March 2011 the court ordered his detention pending trial (seeparagraph 64 below).","B.Medical examinations and reports","1.The applicant","(a)Examinations at Limassol General Hospital on the day of his arrest","23.On the day of his arrest, at approximately 4 p.m., the applicant was examined by a pathologist, Dr A.K., at the Emergency Department of Limassol General Hospital. The applicant complained of loss of consciousness after being beaten, dizziness, nausea, a severe headache, neck pain, and a pain in his knee. The pathologist carried out a physical examination. He found that the applicant had a cephalohaematoma (\u03ba\u03b5\u03c6\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1) in the right temporal region; abrasions in the parietal area; abrasions and mild oedema on his nose; bruising of his lower lip; a broken upper incisor (\u03c3\u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\/\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03ae \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c3\u03b8\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ac\u03bd\u03c9 \u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03b1 \u03bf\u03b4\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2); a bruise on the left hemithorax with sensitivity and a few abrasions; oedema and abrasions on both wrists (\u03c0\u03b7\u03c7\u03b5\u03bf\u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03c0\u03b9\u03ba\u03ad\u03c2 \u03b1\u03bc\u03c6\u03ce); a few abrasions on the knees, with no evidence of inflammation; pain during the examination of the movement of the right knee; sensitivity of the upper thoracic vertebra and the upper lumbar spine. The CT scans of the brain, the facial bones and the cervical spine showed no injuries or fractures. There was only loss of neck curve (\u03b5\u03c5\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03c3\u03bc\u03cc\u03c2 \u03b1\u03c5\u03c7\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1). Furthermore, the X-ray of the thorax and the right knee did not reveal any fractures or fluid in the thorax or the pneumothorax. A splint was placed on the applicant\u2019s right knee and he was prescribed analgesics. The doctor\u2019s final diagnosis was cranio-cerebral injury (\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03b5\u03b3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c6\u03b1\u03bb\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae \u03ba\u03ac\u03ba\u03c9\u03c3\u03b7), neck strain (\u03b8\u03bb\u03ac\u03c3\u03b7 \u03b1\u03c5\u03c7\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1), bruising on the thorax (\u03ba\u03ac\u03ba\u03c9\u03c3\u03b7 \u03b8\u03ce\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03b1), bruising on his knee (\u03ba\u03ac\u03ba\u03c9\u03c3\u03b7 \u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03ac\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5), and a broken tooth (\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03ae \u03bf\u03b4\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2).","24.The applicant was also examined by a general surgeon, Dr C.T. The applicant complained of neck and chest pain, a headache and pain in the thoracic spine. The doctor observed that the physical examination (\u03b7\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u03b9\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae \u03b5\u03be\u03ad\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b7) was within physiological limits (\u03b5\u03bd\u03c4\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c6\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u03ce\u03bd \u03bf\u03c1\u03af\u03c9\u03bd). The surgeon ascertained that the applicant had marks from blows, mainly on his chest and face.","(b)Subsequent medical examinations","(i)Limassol General Hospital","25.On 1 March 2011 the applicant was taken to the Emergency Department of Limassol General Hospital owing to vomiting and dizziness. He was examined by Dr Y.I., who observed that the applicant\u2019s external injuries were still there. The results of the physical and clinical examinations were normal. In his report the doctor stated that the applicant had been discharged from hospital at 7 p.m. \u201cfeeling very well\u201d. He referred the applicant for an orthopaedic examination the next day.","26.On 2 March 2011 the applicant was taken back to the hospital for examination by an orthopaedic surgeon, Dr. P.T. The applicant complained that he had been hit; he also complained of pain in the lumbar spine and an injury to the right knee. Dr P.T. did not ascertain any bone damage or neurological symptomatology (\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae \u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03af\u03b1). He suggested rest and prescribed analgesics.","(ii)Medical examination by a private practitioner","27.On 7 March 2011, following a request by the Canadian Consul, a private practitioner, Dr. S.J \u2013 a traumatologist orthopaedic surgeon \u2013 visited the applicant at the police station and carried out a medical examination. In his report dated 10 May 2011 he stated, in the original English, as follows:","\u201cI visited the patient on the 7th of March 2011 in the central police station of Limassol. He was complaining of multiple injuries causing him severe pain which did not allow him to come to rest especially at night.","During my clinical examination carried out on that day, the patient had restriction in motion due to pain especially during maximal flexion and extension of the lower back. He had pain sensation during the palpation of the soft tissue without any external injuries observed. Further he had a bruise measuring 10 x 5 cm at the left side of the chest at the auxiliary line height which gave him pain during palpation, compression and maximal inspiration.","Mr Kabbara further had restriction of motion and muscular tension at the cervical spine region without any pathologic neurologic observation. The patient had a loss of half the left upper incisor tooth with no mobility dysfunction of the jaw.","Due to the above injury, Mr Kabbara described severe pain especially in the evening which did not allow him to sleep. I prescribed him anti-inflammatory pain killers on a regular basis. If there was no response to the medication I advised him to contact me again.\u201d","2.Special Constable G.S.","28.On 27 February 2011 Special Constable G.S. also went to Limassol General Hospital, where he was examined by a general practitioner, Dr V.D. He complained that, while he had been trying to arrest someone, he had received a punch on the head. As, however, he had been wearing a helmet there had been no bruising. He also complained that he had been kicked in the stomach, had fallen backwards to the ground and hit the right side of his hip. X-rays, scans and tests were carried out and he was diagnosed with a strain (\u03b8\u03bb\u03ac\u03c3\u03b7) of his lumbar spine. The doctor also found that his kidney was not in its normal position. She instructed that G.S. be examined by an orthopaedic specialist and a nephrologist. G.S. was prescribed nine days\u2019 sick leave.","C.Administrative investigation","29.On 1 March 2011 the applicant reported the alleged ill-treatment to the High Commission of Canada.","30.On the same day the Canadian Consul visited the applicant while at the hospital with her assistant. The applicant told her that he had been ill\u2011treated. Her assistant took a written statement from the applicant which reads, in the original English, as follows:","\u201cTO CANADIAN AUTHORITIES","On Sunday Feb 27 at approx. 9.20 am, I was attacked from a policeman from behind and trying to protect myself, my elbow hit him at Athinon street. Then a number of the policemen (3-4) started kicking me on the head and immobilized me and hand\u2011cuffed me. I passed out (first time), woke up in a police car and all the way to the Police Station I asked to contact my lawyer and the Canadian Consulate but they refused and they hit me more. At the police station, Mr [G] hit me. They took me upstairs to the Financial Crime Department. I asked again to contact my Consulate or my lawyer and they refused. I was then taken to another room where Mr [M] was. Four policemen walked in and hit me. They took a chair and broke it over my right leg. They also hit me on the head with the chair several times. I fell down and then I was asked where I live. I said I don\u2019t want to say anything without my lawyer. They hit me again and broke my tooth. I was tortured and my human rights were violated. I was also threatened to be killed by high-leveled people. I am now afraid of my life. This continued for about 4 hours until finally I got in touch with my lawyer and sent to the hospital.\u201d","31.On 2 March 2011, in the light of the applicant\u2019s lawyer\u2019s complaint (see16 paragraph above), the Limassol police appointed an investigating officer, Police Chief Inspector M.M., who was in charge of the Ayios Ioannis police station in Limassol, to conduct an administrative investigation into the applicant\u2019s complaint.","32.On 3 March 2011 the Canadian High Commissioner in Cyprus sent a note verbale reporting the ill-treatment of the applicant to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and requesting that the applicant\u2019s complaint be investigated.","33.An investigation was conducted by M.M. and a report was prepared. M.M. secured copies of written statements contained in the criminal file gathered for the purposes of the criminal proceedings against the applicant (see paragraph 64 below) as well as statements from all the officers who had come into contact with the applicant, directly and indirectly, during his arrest and detention. The statements were not question and answer statements.","34.The applicant refused to provide a written statement claiming that he could not trust the police and informed M.M. that his lawyer and the Canadian Consul had been informed of the details of his ill-treatment.","35.Special Constable G.S., in his statement of 27 February 2011, stated that on that day at around 9.13 a.m. while he had been on motorcycle patrol he had received a message concerning an illegal cash withdrawal from an ATM. He had immediately gone to the bank concerned. On arrival he had spotted an unknown person who had appeared to be withdrawing money from the ATM and putting it in the left pocket of his tracksuit top. G.S. had got off the motorcycle. He had approached the applicant from behind and touched his left shoulder, had said \u201cpolice\u201d and had then asked the applicant both in Greek and in English to give him his identity card so he would be able to ascertain his identity. The applicant had not replied but instead had turned towards him and attacked him by pushing him backwards with both hands. G.S. had tried to immobilise him. The applicant had then punched his police helmet with his right hand and kicked him in the stomach, causing G.S. to lose his balance. G.S. had fallen backwards on the pavement. The applicant had fled and G.S. had chased him. The applicant, while running, had lost his balance and had fallen to the ground, hitting his face. G.S. had tried to immobilise him and a struggle had ensued between the two. Attempting to resist arrest, the applicant had pushed G.S. and hit him with his hands. Special Constable P.K had arrived at the scene. With his help, and using proportionate force in the circumstances, G.S. had arrested and handcuffed the applicant. He had drawn the applicant\u2019s attention to the law but the applicant had not replied. Two members of the CPS had arrived and he had handed over the applicant to them. G.S. had then gone to the Emergency Department of Limassol General Hospital, where he had been examined by DrV.D.","36.The most relevant written statements of other officers read as follows:","(i)Constable P.P., who had been the first to receive the applicant at the police station, in his statement of 27 February 2011 stated that he had carried out a body search and described what he had found on the applicant, which included EUR 10,000. He did not mention any injuries in his statement.","(ii)Constable E.L., who had seen the applicant when Officer P.P. had entered her office to give her the applicant\u2019s possessions, in her statement of 27 February 2011 stated that the applicant had had wounds on his face, his clothes had been messy and his tracksuit trousers had been torn.","(iii)Special Constable P.K. who had been on traffic patrol on the day of the events, in his statement of 27 February 2011 stated that when he had arrived at the scene G.S. had been on the ground with an unknown man. G.S. had asked him to pass him the handcuffs so he could handcuff the applicant as he had been resisting arrest. Then he had gone to the ATM and found five withdrawal receipts of EUR2,000 each, which he had subsequently given to Constable P.P. when they had arrived at the station. He did not mention any injuries in his statement.","(iv)Constable C.T., who had received the applicant at 1.35 pm. at the detention centre at the station to put him in his cell, in his statement of 3March 2011 stated that he had carried out a body search and had noted that the applicant had had an abrasion on the left frontal area (\u03b1\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03ae \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03c9\u03c0\u03b9\u03b1\u03af\u03b1 \u03c7\u03ce\u03c1\u03b1) and behind the left shoulder. He had locked the applicant in the cell at 1.45 p.m.","(v)Sergeant P.H. in his statement of 3 March 2011 stated that he had seen the applicant at 1.35 p.m. when M.P. had brought him to the station\u2019s detention facilities and he had then given instructions to Constable C.T. to carry out a body search. The applicant\u2019s lawyer, C.H, had visited the applicant and at 3.05 p.m. had informed P.H. that the applicant had complained to him that he had been beaten by police officers during his arrest and questioning and had wanted the complaint to be reported. He had also requested that the applicant be sent to the hospital. P.H. had immediately given instructions to this effect and within little time the applicant had been taken to the hospital and the complaint of ill-treatment had been reported. He did not mention any injuries in his statement.","(vi)Inspector I.S. in his statement of 11 March 2011 stated that he had noticed that when the applicant had arrived at the station he had had injuries on the face which according to Officer G.S. had been caused when he had tried to arrest the applicant. He had also noticed that the applicant\u2019s clothes had been messy and his tracksuit trousers had been torn. The applicant had not complained to him that he had been hit nor had he been hit by anyone.","(vii)Senior Constable S.M. in his statement of 12 March 2011 stated that when he had arrived at the scene G.S. had already arrested the applicant and handcuffed him. S.M. then took the applicant along with Special Constable C.S. in the police car to the police station where at 9.30 a.m. he handed him over to Constable P.P. The applicant had minor abrasions and bruises and his clothes were messy.","(viii)Special Constable C.S., who had accompanied the applicant to the police station with Senior Constable S.M., in his statement of 12 March 2011 stated that when he had arrived at the scene G.S. had already arrested the applicant and handcuffed him. He did not mention any injuries in his statement.","(ix)Constable A.P., who had seen the applicant during his interview with M.P., in his statement of 14 March 2011 stated that the applicant had had abrasions on his face and that he had been informed by M.P. that this had been caused during his arrest.","(x)Constable F.O. in his statement of 15 March 2011 stated that he had carried out a body search and had not found anything suspect (\u03b5\u03c0\u03b9\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf) on the applicant. He also stated that the applicant had had wounds on his face and had told him that he had been hit by an officer. Furthermore, his clothes had been messy and his tracksuit bottoms torn.","(xi)Constable M.P., who had interviewed the applicant at the station, in his statement of 17 March 2011 stated that the applicant had had abrasions on the face and when he had asked the applicant how the latter had got them, the applicant had told him that he had been hit during his arrest. During the interview, constable A.P. had entered in the room and M.P. had informed him of the applicant\u2019s statement and his injuries. At 1.35 p.m. M.P. had taken the applicant to the detention facilities.","37.According to the findings of the investigator in his report of 26 April 2011, the applicant had been uncooperative from the beginning of his detention and refused to provide a written statement and answer any questions during his interview. He had also refused to cooperate with the investigator himself and to give a statement concerning his ill-treatment allegations. He had told the investigator that he did not trust the police. In view of the above, it could not be excluded that the complaint had been made to further the applicant\u2019s own interests. According to Inspector I.S., who had supervised the applicant\u2019s questioning in relation to the criminal case against him, no member of the police had ill-treated or used any kind of violence against the applicant during his detention and questioning. The only contact the applicant had had with a member of the police had been during his struggle with the police officers when attempting to flee arrest. In his report, the investigator noted that Special Constable G.S. had been injured while trying to arrest the applicant and that he had been put on sick leave by the doctor who had examined him at the hospital.","38.The report concluded that none of the applicant\u2019s allegations regarding ill-treatment had been proven and that the case should be closed.","39.The Limassol divisional police headquarters and the Chief of Police agreed with the conclusions.","40.On 26 May 2011 the Ministry of Foreign affairs informed the High Commissioner of Canada of the findings of the investigation.","D.First investigation by the Independent Authority for the Investigation of Allegations and Complaints against the Police (\u201cthe IAIACAP\u201d)","41.By a letter dated 14 July 2011 the applicant\u2019s lawyer complained to the Attorney General, requesting that an independent investigation be conducted into his client\u2019s complaint and that the officers responsible be brought to justice. The next day the Attorney General referred the applicant\u2019s complaint to the president of the IAIACAP ordering an investigation.","1.Investigation","42.On 20 July 2011 the IAIACAP appointed a lawyer, Mr A.S., as investigator.","43.On 10 October 2011 the investigator prepared a report with a summary of the statements obtained and his findings.","44.In the course of the investigation, the investigator singled out four police officers as suspects. These were G.S., P.K., S.M. and C.S. Statements in the form of questions and answers were obtained from these officers. He also took statements from the applicant and twenty-four other persons, including the officers who had been in touch with or seen the applicant on the day of the alleged ill-treatment, the interpreter, the doctor who had examined G.S., Dr V.D. (see paragraph 28 above) and three of the doctors who had examined the applicant, namely, Dr A.K. and Dr C.T. from Limassol General Hospital and Dr S.J., the private practitioner (seeparagraphs 23, 24 and 27 above).","45.The applicant gave a statement to the investigator on 23August2011, adopting the content of a handwritten statement he had prepared in June 2011 for his lawyer. In his written statement the applicant alleged that on 27 February 2011 at 9.15 a.m. he had been trying to familiarise himself with the ATM in case he would ever need to use his own cards and check the balance of his account. He had, inter alia, a credit card in his name on him and EUR 10,000, which had been given to him by his lawyer at the time, C.H. This was the cash bail that had been returned from the court in another case against him. At 9.20 a.m. he had been suddenly attacked from behind by someone who had been wearing a helmet and who he had not recognised. This person had not identified himself. The applicant had thought that it had been a robbery. This person had choked him from behind. The applicant had been scared and had defended himself. He had then been attacked by a second person in civilian attire. They had started hitting the applicant on the head and the back with a small wooden stick. The applicant had fallen to the ground and lost consciousness. The officers had woken him up by throwing water on his face. He had woken up in a brown jeep, handcuffed. He had then realised that he had been intercepted by the police. The officers had slapped and punched him on the face and body all the way to the police station. They had been asking him about money and credit cards but had not asked him to identify himself. Nor had they shown him any documents in respect of his arrest and informed him of his rights. They had taken everything he had had on him including his asthma inhalers. They had refused to allow him to talk to his lawyer or with an official from the Canadian embassy. He had been taken to the station at approximately 10 a.m. He had been received by the head of the police, \u201cMrY.\u201d, an officer acting as an interviewer, \u201cMr M.\u201d, and two other officers \u201cMr P.\u201d and \u201cMr A.\u201d. In the interview room there had been officers of the CPS and another officer, \u201cV.\u201d. Officer M. had asked him questions. The applicant had refused to reply, saying that he would do so only in the presence of his lawyer. At that point the officer who had attacked him at the ATM had started beating and \u201ctorturing\u201d him while he had been unable to defend himself, as he had still been in handcuffs. He had kept asking them to stop and let him contact his lawyer. They had continued to punch and beat him using the same small wooden stick used before (he clarified that this had been a small baseball bat). He had asked for his asthma inhalers and tried to tell them that he had had back surgery. He had been very scared and had started breathing heavily. They had hit him on the back and on his right knee with a metallic chair with blue handles. They had beaten him with that chair and kicked him savagely on the head while asking him questions. The applicant stated that he had lost consciousness for a while and he had woken up after water had been thrown on his face.","46.At approximately 1 p.m. the applicant had called his lawyer; before that they had warned him not to tell him anything. The applicant had spoken to his lawyer and had informed him of the ill-treatment. He had then been taken back to the interview room where the officers had continued to beat him. He had fallen to the floor again with his hands behind his back. One of the officers had stood on his handcuffs while another one had kicked him. Because of the kicks to the head the applicant had become very dizzy, bleeding from his face, nose and mouth. His front tooth had broken from the punches. He had also had a small asthma attack. Although Officer M. had not physically abused him he had not intervened to stop the ill-treatment. Two female officers of the ECID had also witnessed his ill-treatment. The applicant said that he had asked the head of the police to take him to hospital but he had refused. At around 3 p.m. they had taken him to the detention facility in the station. His lawyer had come to visit him and when he had seen the state of him he had made a complaint of ill-treatment to the officers and asked that the applicant be taken immediately to hospital. During his transfer to the hospital the applicant had been punched by one of the two police officers who had been escorting him. The officer had also threatened that his boss Mr Y. would put him in prison if he did not withdraw his complaint. When he had arrived at the hospital at 3.30 pm. one of the officers had lied to the doctor and had told him that he had fallen on his face. The other police officer had then taken the doctor aside and talked to him alone. The doctor had refused to give him painkillers. He had only given those when the Canadian Consul had come to visit him.","47.The applicant alleged that he could identify the individuals responsible for his ill-treatment.","48.In their statements provided to the criminal investigator, the police officers denied ill-treatment and maintained their original version of events. Some of the officers could not remember whether the applicant had had injuries or what type of injuries he had had and therefore were not able to answer the investigator\u2019s questions in this connection. The most relevant statements were as follows:","(i)Sergeant P.H., who had made no mention of the applicant\u2019s appearance in his previous statement, in his statement of 26 August 2011 stated that when the applicant had been brought to the detention facilities he had noticed that he had been upset (\u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c4\u03c9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2) and red in the face. He had not noticed whether his clothes had been torn.","(ii)Constable A.P in his statement of 29 August 2011 stated that he could not remember what type of wounds the applicant had had on his face or whether his clothes had been torn.","(iii)Constable P.P., who had not made any mention of the applicant\u2019s appearance in his previous statement, in his statement of 31 August 2011 stated that:","\u201c... there were areas which indicated that [the applicant] had fought with someone, without however bearing any external injuries. He had dishevelled hair, his clothes were creased, but not torn, and he was red owing to tiredness, but not owing to blows.\u201d","(iv)Constable C.T. in his statement of 31 August 2011 stated that the applicant had had an abrasion on part of left frontal area and on the left shoulder blade. He could not remember if any of the applicant\u2019s clothing had been torn.","(v)Constable M.N., who had guarded the applicant from 7.40 p.m. to 10.30 p.m. at the hospital, in his statement of 31 August 2011 stated that he had noticed that the applicant had had various injuries (\u03c7\u03c4\u03c5\u03c0\u03ae\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1) but he could not remember whether they had been on the face or the body.","(vi)Constable I.K., who had guarded the applicant from 7.40 p.m. to 10.30 p.m. at the hospital, in his statement of 1 September 2011 stated that the applicant had been in a wheelchair at one point because he had claimed he had not been able to walk and that he had, with the assistance of the other officer guarding him, helped him onto a bed. He had noted that the applicant had had some small scratches on his face and one of the hands.","(vii)Constable F.O. in his statement of 5 September 2011 stated that owing to the passage of time he could not remember what type of wounds the applicant had had nor where the tracksuit had been torn.","(viii)The interpreter S.K. in her statement of 12 September 2011 stated that she had arrived before 1 p.m. and had translated from 1 p.m.-1.30 p.m. and that the applicant had had a bruise on his face near his eye and his trousers had been torn. In her presence no officer had hit or threatened him.","(ix)Inspector I.S. in his statement of 13 September 2011 stated that:","\u201c[I]t was like when someone\u2019s face is rubbed against the ground. I think that he had something similar on his hands.\u201d","(x)Special Constable P.K. in his statement of 15 September 2017, when asked about whether he had noticed injuries stated that the time of the events, stated that he had been concentrating on helping handcuff the applicant and had not noticed.","(xi)Constable M.P. in his statement of 18 September 2011 stated that he could not remember the applicant\u2019s teeth or what type of scratches the applicant had had on his face.","(xii)Senior Constable S.M. in his statement of 20 September 2011 stated that:","\u201c[The applicant\u2019s] face was red as if he had been running and [he] was short of breath. With regard to the minor-abrasions and bruises, these were definitely not black marks but mild redness.\u201d","(xiii)Special Constable C.S., who had previously made no mention of the applicant\u2019s appearance, in his statement of 20 September 2011 stated that:","\u201c[The applicant] was to begin with, unkempt, messy as to his clothes, his hair was also tousled (\u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03c9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1) and his face was red. He did not have bruising (\u03bc\u03b1\u03cd\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03bc\u03b1) however, nor did I see scratches.\u201d","2.Investigator\u2019s findings","49.In his report dated 10 October 2011 the investigator found, taking into account the evidence at hand, that the applicant\u2019s testimony had been unconvincing in many respects and contradicted solid evidence:","-his assertions as to what he had been doing at the ATM and why he had had EUR10,000 in his possession were very difficult to believe.","-based on the police officers\u2019 testimony, the investigator noted that on the day of the arrest, the officers who had arrested the applicant had been in uniform and had not had batons as they had been simple traffic officers.","-the applicant had been taken to the police station in a white saloon police car; the Limassol CPS did not have brown jeeps.","-the applicant had stated that they had taken everything from him in the car yet according to the evidence given by Constable P.P. everything had been taken from the applicant at the station.","-the applicant had described a savage beating but had stated that during an interval he had spoken to his lawyer, C.H.. The investigator considered it odd that the officers, knowing that the applicant had spoken to his lawyer, would have continued to beat him after the call as he had alleged. C.H. had refused to give a statement.","-all of the police officers denied having ill-treated the applicant, and the interpreter, an independent witness, had stated that during her presence the applicant had not been ill-treated.","-the applicant had alleged that the ill-treatment had continued until 3p.m., but in his prisoner record it had been recorded that he had been taken to a cell in the detention facilities of the station at approximately 1.45 p.m.","-the applicant had claimed that the doctor at the hospital had refused to give him painkillers but this had been refuted by Dr A.K. and was in contradiction with the hospital records of Dr C.T.","50.The investigator considered it unlikely that officers of the CPS would have interrogated a suspect for offences under the authority of the another unit, the ECID, and that they would have ill-treated the applicant in the car given the close distance between the scene of arrest and the police station, which was only about 1 to 1.5 km. Furthermore, the description of certain people given by the applicant did not correspond to the officers working for the CPS. On this basis the investigator concluded there had not been police officers from the CPS in the interview room.","51.The investigator also noted that the allegation that the applicant had been beaten and threatened by one of the two officers escorting him to the hospital was surreal as those officers had not been aware of the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment complaint.","52.The investigator pointed out that Special Constable G.S. had not denied the use of force against the applicant: following the applicant\u2019s violent reaction he had pushed the applicant with his hand somewhere between his chest and neck and had also used some wrestling holds (\u03bb\u03b1\u03b2\u03ad\u03c2 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bb\u03b7\u03c2) in order to turn him round and handcuff him. Furthermore, when the applicant had tried to flee he had fallen to the ground, hitting his face. This version of events could justify the injuries on the applicant\u2019s face and his right knee but the investigator stated the he could not accept it easily. He stated that he was puzzled by the fact that Constable P.P., who had seen the applicant just before he had been led to the offices of the ECID, had noticed no exterior wounds other than the fact that the applicant was red. This was in line with G.S.\u2019s statement that he had not hit the applicant.","53.Bearing in mind the above, the investigator concluded that G.S. had not used excessive force to arrest the applicant and that neither criminal nor disciplinary proceedings against him were merited.","54.The investigator pointed out that this did not mean that he accepted the facts as described by all the officers as, on the basis of their version of the events, one would expect that the applicant would have had fewer injuries. At the same time, he did not accept the applicant\u2019s version of the facts as on the basis of his version, it would have been expected that he would have had more injuries.","55.The report concluded that there was no concrete evidence justifying criminal or disciplinary charges against any of the officers. The investigator noted that although he had been troubled by the case, the applicant had not helped him in his task, as his account had been full of inconsistencies and improbabilities (\u03b1\u03c0\u03b9\u03b8\u03b1\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2).","3.Report of the president of the IAIACAP","56.The investigator transmitted his report and findings to the president of the IAIACAP. The latter prepared a report dated 16 November 2011 adopting the investigator\u2019s findings. He noted, however, that he did not accept the evidence that had been given stating that the applicant did not bear exterior injuries or abrasions, as this was contrary to the findings of the doctors; nor did he accept that the applicant was merely red due to tiredness but not due to blows. Nonetheless, he observed that on the basis of these injuries it could not be concluded that the force used had been disproportionate under the circumstances. He therefore could not suggest that criminal or disciplinary action be taken against the four officers in question. He also considered that even if an identity parade had been held, he doubted that it would have made a difference to the outcome of the investigation, in view of the applicant\u2019s conduct. The struggle between officer G.S and the applicant had been expected (\u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03b7) in order for the applicant to avoid arrest at the moment he had been appropriating a large sum of money.","57.The president of the IAIACAP concluded that despite the fact that the quality of the evidence at hand had not been satisfactory, the commission of neither disciplinary nor criminal offences had been established.","58.Both reports and the file of the case were submitted to the Attorney General for a decision.","4.Decision taken by the Attorney General","59.On 13 February 2012 the Attorney General concluded that although a certain degree of force had been used against the applicant, this had been necessary under the circumstances in order to prevent him from fleeing arrest. He concluded on this basis that the prosecution of any member of the police was not warranted and instructed that the file be closed.","60.In his decision he stated that it appeared from the evidence that Special Constable G.S. had asked the applicant, who at the time had been at the ATM machine, for his particulars. The applicant had reacted and had hit the police officer in an attempt to flee. The applicant had explained his behaviour by stating that he had thought it had been a robbery. Special Constable G.S. had, however, been in uniform as had been the officer who had subsequently come to help.","61.The Attorney General further observed that the applicant\u2019s explanations concerning his attempt to flee and the money found in his possession as well as his allegations as to the injuries sustained and his alleged ill-treatment going to and at the police station did not correspond to the reality. Furthermore, his allegation that the doctor who had examined him at the hospital had refused to give him painkillers had been refuted by the doctor. Most of the applicant\u2019s statement appeared to be imprecise and untrue. Special Constable G.S. had not denied the use of force: following the applicant\u2019s violent reaction he had used proportionate force in the circumstances in order to prevent him from fleeing until help arrived. As a result not only had the applicant been injured but the officer himself, who had also had to go to hospital, had been. In addition, the applicant had claimed that he had been tortured by members of the police during his transfer to the police station and before the arrival of his lawyer, C.H. The latter, however, had refused to give a statement. The applicant\u2019s allegations had been disputed by all the members of the police involved.","62.By a letter dated 16 February 2012 the Attorney General informed the applicant of his decision.","63.By a letter dated 7 March 2012 to the Attorney General, the applicant\u2019s lawyer expressed his disappointment concerning the conclusions of the investigation and pointed out that no explanation had been given, at least in respect of the ill-treatment the applicant had been subjected to at the police station while handcuffed and as a result of which he had ended up in hospital. He noted in this connection that the Canadian Consul had ascertained the applicant\u2019s condition whilst the independent medical report by the private practitioner corroborated the applicant\u2019s allegations. Lastly, he informed the Attorney General of his intention to lodge an application with the Court on behalf of the applicant.","E.Criminal proceedings","1.First-instance proceedings","64.In the meantime, the applicant was charged with 439 counts of different offences and criminal proceedings were instituted against him before the District Court of Limassol (case no. 4474\/11). The charges were subsequently reduced to three, namely theft, assault occasioning actual bodily harm (to Special Constable G.S.) and resisting lawful arrest (sections20, 255 (1)-(3), 262, 243 and 244 (a) of the Criminal Code, Cap.154).","65.On 14 September 2012 the court held that the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and found the applicant guilty on all counts. On 19 September 2012 it imposed sentences of imprisonment of one year, one month and two months respectively for each offence to run concurrently. The time the applicant had already been in detention counted towards the sentence.","66.The court found that the applicant\u2019s testimony had been completely unreliable and unconvincing and that he had made a poor impression as a witness both in terms of the quality of his testimony and his credibility. He had made serious contradictions; his allegations were unsubstantiated, lacked logic and were contrary to hard evidence. It therefore dismissed his evidence as being false. The court also noted that the defence had made claims concerning certain of the prosecution witnesses which, however, it had not put to the witnesses themselves during cross-examination in order to give them the opportunity to at least comment. Similarly, although allegations had been made by the defence against some of the prosecution witnesses, it did not itself provide any evidence in this connection.","67.With regard to the allegations of ill-treatment raised by the applicant, the court pointed out, inter alia, that the applicant had failed to submit a medical report with reference to his alleged injuries and had only produced a receipt for the medical examination by Dr S.J. He had also failed to call Dr S.J. as a witness. His allegations therefore remained completely unsubstantiated. Furthermore, the court pointed out that the CCTV footage contradicted his allegation that he had been attacked at the ATM and that he had not seen that G.S. had been a police officer. The footage showed the applicant in front of the ATM with his body and head turned towards officer G.S., who was also looking at him. G.S. had been in police motorcycle uniform and the word \u201cpolice\u201d in capitals was on his uniform across his chest.","2.Appeal proceedings","68.On 27 September 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court (appeal no. 197\/2012) against his conviction. This was dismissed on 19 February 2013.","69.With regard to the applicant\u2019s grounds of appeal concerning his alleged ill-treatment, the Supreme Court upheld the findings of the first\u2011instance court pointing to the complete lack of medical evidence on the part of the defence. It also noted that the Canadian Consul who had visited the applicant in hospital had not been called by the defence as a witness.","F.The applicant\u2019s departure from Cyprus","70.Following the dismissal of his appeal, the applicant was deported from Cyprus and was put on the authorities\u2019 \u201cstop list\u201d (a register of individuals whose entry into and exit from Cyprus is banned or subject to monitoring).","G.Second investigation by the IAIACAP","1.Investigation","71.On 9 April 2013 the Attorney General appointed two new investigators to reinvestigate the applicant\u2019s complaints. The Attorney General\u2019s office, upon re-examination of the file, spotted gaps in the investigation and particular omissions and inconsistencies in the reports. Furthermore, his office had been informed by the investigator A.S. that after the conclusion of the investigation, he had had an informal conversation with Inspector I.S, the head of the ECID of the Limassol CPS, who had confided in him that the applicant had been ill-treated while at the police station.","72.The investigators singled out nine officers as suspects: Inspector I.S., Senior Constable S.M., Special Constables G.S., C.S. and P.K, and Constables M.P., A.P., F.O. and E.L. In the course of the investigation, the investigators took statements from forty-nine persons in addition to the nine abovementioned officers. This included all the individuals that had been interviewed by A.S. in the previous investigation, all the doctors that had examined by the applicant, a number of other officers and various individuals who either had personal knowledge of the facts or were suspected of having such knowledge, such as the Canadian Consul and her assistant. They were not able to get into contact with the applicant despite getting in touch with his lawyer. According to the investigators, the applicant\u2019s previous lawyer, C.H., had asked for documents and witness statements in order to give a statement but the investigators considered that this would jeopardise the investigation and the ascertainment of the truth. The investigators did not assent and as a result he did not give a statement. The investigators also obtained documentary and other evidence related to the applicant\u2019s case. These included, inter alia, photographs from the area near the ATM, CCTV footage from the bank relating to the day of the alleged ill-treatment, copies from police diaries kept at the police station and the record of the criminal proceedings before the District Court of Limassol and the Supreme Court.","73.In her statement of 22 April 2013 to the investigators the Canadian Consul submitted that when she had arrived at the hospital on 1 March 2011 the applicant had been in a wheelchair and on a drip and had been in the process of being moved to a bed. She had seen a big bruise on his left shoulder and other bruises on his body. He had had a broken tooth, his right leg had been bandaged and he had not been able to walk. He had had a head injury (\u03c7\u03c4\u03cd\u03c0\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1) and bruises on the face. The applicant had informed her that he had been ill-treated by police officers during his transfer to and for four hours at the police station in order to force him confess to a crime he had not committed. She had asked to speak to a doctor. The doctor had informed her that there had been nothing wrong with the applicant and that he had been responsible only  for examining the applicant\u2019s pancreas. She would have to talk to the doctors who had examined him earlier for further information. She had also asked her assistant to take a statement from him.","74.The Consul\u2019s assistant, in her statement of 3 June 2013 to the investigators, stated that when they had arrived at the hospital the applicant had been in a wheelchair and on a drip. He had then been moved to a bed. He had had injuries on the face and looked injured, but she could not remember the exact injuries and she had not taken notes at the time. One of his front teeth had been half broken and he had had a bandage on his right knee. He had also been on a drip. The applicant had said he had been ill\u2011treated by the police. The doctor had told the Consul that the applicant had had no severe internal injuries, but had not been able to give her more information as he had only been responsible for examining the applicant\u2019s pancreas. She had taken a statement from the applicant on the Consul\u2019s instructions.","75.A number of the officers interviewed refused to provide answers to the investigators, reconfirmed their previous statements or stated that they could not recall the events. Inspector I.S. denied the occurrence of a discussion between him and the investigator A.S.","76.At the end of their investigation the investigators prepared a lengthy report on the investigation procedure and their findings","2.Investigators\u2019 findings","(a)With regard to the investigations that had already been conducted","77.In their report the investigators pinpointed a number of deficiencies in the investigation of the case from the very beginning on the part of the police and the first investigation by the IAIACAP. In particular, they noted the following.","78.First of all, Inspector I.S., who had at the time been in charge of the ECID, ought to have given instructions that the applicant\u2019s injuries be photographed when he had arrived at the station. This had not been done. Nor had the applicant\u2019s clothes been taken as evidence. If these steps had been carried out, it would have been possible to determine what had really happened.","79.With regard to the administrative investigation, the investigators first of all stressed that such investigations by the police themselves, following complaints that could on the face of it constitute criminal offences, were problematic and that such complaints should be from the very beginning transferred to the IAIACAP. In addition, they observed that there had been a number of omissions in the context of this investigation: the investigator M.M. had failed to ask the officers about the applicant\u2019s injuries and how they had happened; nor had he asked constable P.P., who had been the first officer to receive the applicant at the police station at 9.30 a.m., if the applicant had had any injuries on him at the time; he had merely filed (\u03b1\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03b8\u03ad\u03c4\u03b7\u03c3\u03b5) P.P.\u2019s statement; he had also not taken any investigative steps with regard to the applicant\u2019s injuries \u2013 he had filed the medical report of the pathologist Dr A.K., which referred to the applicant\u2019s injuries and had not sought to obtain a medical report by Dr S.J., who had visited the applicant in hospital. Lastly, he had not asked for a medical report from DrV.D., who had examined special constable G.S.","80.In so far as the first investigation by the IAIACAP was concerned the investigators noted that investigator A.S. should have tried to elucidate significant inconsistencies in the applicant\u2019s allegations and statements when he had had the opportunity to do so and when the events had still been fresh. Furthermore, in view of the content of the applicant\u2019s statements, the investigators considered that an identity parade had been called for and, in fact, both the investigator A.S. and the IAIACAP had been under a legal obligation to conduct an identity parade whatever the result. The failure to do so had led to the possible loss of important evidence","81.According to the investigators, the CCTV footage ought to have also been closely examined by investigator A.S. as it showed that the facts as described by Special Constable G.S. as to the way he had approached the applicant at the ATM had been true, thus contradicting the applicant\u2019s version of events up to that point. In the footage G.S. can be seen approaching the applicant from behind; the applicant then turned his head and saw him. G.S can be seen touching the applicant\u2019s left shoulder with his hand. The applicant almost immediately pushed him. The CCTV did not record the rest.","82.Lastly, the investigators expressed their concern about the fact that the investigator A.S had kept the I.S.\u2019s admission to himself and had not informed the IAIACAP or the Attorney General immediately. He had therefore withheld important evidence.","(b)With regard to applicant\u2019s ill-treatment allegations","83.The investigators first noted the difficulties they had encountered in their investigation of the case which were mainly attributed to the passage of time as well as the fact that they had been unable to interview the applicant in order to receive further clarifications.","84.After assessing the evidence before them, they concluded that the force used during the applicant\u2019s arrest had not been excessive and had been reasonable and necessary and that it had caused certain injuries especially to the applicant\u2019s face and knee.","85.With regard to the evidence before them, they noted inter alia, the differences between certain of the officers\u2019 statements concerning the state of the applicant and the existence or degree of his injuries. They also pointed out that the doctors who had later examined the applicant at the hospital had found greater injuries than those described by the officers. The doctors had not, however, recorded wounds on the left shoulder blade as had been recorded in the prisoner record by Constable C.T. (see paragraph 15 above and compare to paragraphs 23-25 and 27 above). Furthermore, the Canadian Consul in her statement had described injuries which had not corresponded to those in the medical report of Dr Y.I., who had seen the applicant on the same day as her.","86.The investigators considered that the presumption of ill-treatment under section 6 of Law no. 235\/1990 (see paragraph 98 below) was applicable in the case: it was presumed that the person responsible for ill\u2011treatment was the person in charge of the police station and the questioning for the investigation of the case in relation to which an arrest and\/or detention was made unless an explanation was given for the cause of the injuries. Thus, according to the investigators there was sufficient evidence allowing the criminal prosecution of Inspector I.S. The same applied in respect of Constable M.P., who had been accused by the applicant of having been present during his ill-treatment but of not having done anything to stop it and of having ignored his request to be taken to hospital.","87.The investigators did not suggest the criminal prosecution of other members of the police owing to insufficient evidence. They also noted in this connection that some of the officers in question, namely Constables A.P., E.L. and P.P. and Special Constables G.S. and P.K., had given evidence before the District Court and had not been accused of ill-treating the applicant by the defence in the context of these proceedings despite the applicant\u2019s allegations in this connection. Although they considered that disciplinary offences had been committed by various members of the police they had been appointed to carry out a criminal investigation into the case and thus could not deal with these.","88.Lastly, they referred to the findings of the domestic courts in the criminal proceedings against the applicant noting that the applicant had not substantiated his ill-treatment allegations in the proceedings and pointed to the serious inconsistencies in his evidence and the failings by the applicant\u2019s defence counsel. They considered that this fact had to be taken into account when deciding on whether the applicant should be summoned as a witness for the prosecution if it were decided to prosecute any of the officers.","3.Further steps ordered by the Attorney General","89.On 9 July 2013 the investigators\u2019 report was delivered to the Attorney-General.","90.On 29 November 2013 the file was returned to the investigators with the request that they consult a forensic expert in order to establish how the applicant\u2019s injuries had been inflicted. The investigators were also instructed that questions be prepared and forwarded to the prosecuting authorities in Canada to obtain answers from the applicant.","91.On 10 January 2014 the forensic experts who had been contacted by the investigators concluded that they were unable to establish on the basis of the documents and photos how the applicant\u2019s injuries had been inflicted \u2013 whether they had been inflicted by ill-treatment or from another cause such as falling to the ground. They would have been in a better position if they had been called to examine the applicant on the day he had presented with the injuries.","92.In the meantime, on 3 January 2014, the investigators prepared a request for legal assistance by the Canadian authorities, asking that a statement be provided by the applicant. Their questions to the applicant were included in writing. An email exchange followed between the applicant\u2019s lawyer and the Attorney General\u2019s office. It transpires from this that the applicant\u2019s lawyer refused to provide the authorities with the applicant\u2019s address and telephone number, which were necessary for the purposes of the request for legal assistance. He insisted instead that the Cypriot authorities pay for the applicant\u2019s expenses to travel to Cyprus to provide a statement or that the Cypriot authorities go to Canada to see him. As such, the request for legal assistance was not submitted and the applicant was subsequently not called to Cyprus.","4.Decision taken by the Attorney General","93.On 11 June 2014 the Attorney General concluded that the possibility that the applicant\u2019s injuries had been caused by the reasonable force during the applicant\u2019s arrest and\/or by the applicant\u2019s fall could not be excluded. Similarly, it could not be excluded that they had been caused by ill\u2011treatment at the police station. He disagreed with the investigators\u2019 suggestion that the presumption of ill-treatment under section 6 of Lawno.235\/1990 (see paragraphs 86 above and 98 below) was applicable as in the circumstances of the case it had not been established that the injuries the applicant had had after his transfer to the police station, had not been present before and\/or had not been caused during his arrest. From an examination of all the evidence in the case the Attorney General ascertained that the applicant\u2019s credibility had been irreversibly damaged. He referred, in particular, to the fact that the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment had been dismissed by the Limassol District Court in the criminal case against him. His grounds of appeal had also been rejected by the Supreme Court, including the ground challenging the first-instance court\u2019s findings on this point. In addition, the Attorney General pointed out that the applicant\u2019s version of events had been refuted by other independent and credible evidence.","94.In so far as the investigator in the first investigation had informed the second investigator of the admission of Inspector I.S., this did not have any bearing on the Attorney General\u2019s opinion that the applicant was an unreliable witness. This, in combination with the fact that it had not been clarified which of the officers had allegedly ill-treated him, led to the conclusion that it was extremely difficult to establish the commission of any offences by any of the officers.","95.Based on the above, the Attorney General concluded that the criminal prosecution of any individual was not justified."],"30938":["6.The applicants were born in 1982 and 1983 respectively and are currently serving sentences in penal facilities in the Republic of Komi and the Murmansk Region respectively.","A.The applicants\u2019 arrest and alleged ill-treatment","7.On 25 and 19 September 2002 respectively the applicants were arrested in Grozny in the Chechen Republic and taken to the Operational\u2011Search Division of the North Caucasus Operations Department of the Chief Directorate of the Russian Ministry of the Interior in the Southern Federal Circuit (\u041e\u0420\u0411-2 \u0421\u041a\u041e\u0423 \u0413\u0423 \u041c\u0412\u0414 \u0420\u0424 \u043f\u043e \u042e\u0424\u041e \uf02d hereinafter \u201cORB-2\u201d). After their arrest they were taken to the temporary detention facility at ORB-2 (hereinafter \u201cthe IVS\u201d). Official records of the applicants\u2019 arrest were drawn up on 30and 24September 2002 respectively. Throughout this time the applicants remained without legal assistance. Their families were unaware of their whereabouts.","8.According to the applicants, for several days during their unrecorded detention they were repeatedly ill\u2011treated by officers of ORB-2 and forced into confessing to being members of an illegal armed group in Grozny, and to the murders of several people, including police officers and military servicemen.","9.The applicants described in detail the circumstances of the alleged ill\u2011treatment. They submitted, in particular, that the officers of ORB-2 had punched and kicked them, beat them up with truncheons, administered electric shocks while putting gas masks or plastic bags over their heads, and had threatened them with rape and blackmail. According to the second applicant, he was also beaten over the head with a plastic bottle filled with water while his head was pressed against the floor. Furthermore, the perpetrators jumped on his head with all their weight, burnt his back with cigarette butts, beat his fingers with a varnished stick while his hands were pressed against a table, and threatened to pierce his hands with staples and shoot him. The applicants alleged that two of the perpetrators had been officers Yakh. and Gul.","10.Once the applicants\u2019 arrests were formalised, they reiterated their confession statements in the presence of the chief investigator, S., and two legal aid lawyers, Ts. and D. The applicants confirmed that they had made their statements voluntarily. According to them, officers Yakh. and Gul. were both present during their interviews.","11.When questioning the second applicant on 24September 2002 in the presence of D. and officer Yakh., S. lifted up his shirt and saw marks of beatings on his back (bruises, marks from electric wires and swellings). When asked how they had been caused, the second applicant said that he had fallen down the stairs. Several days later he told D. that he had received the injuries in a fight with his brother.","12.On 18 and 22 December 2002 respectively the applicants were transferred from the IVS to remand prison IZ-20\/2 in Chernokozovo in the Naurskiy District of northern Chechnya.","13.The Government failed to submit the applicants\u2019 medical documents for the period between September and December 2002, relying on the fact that they must have been destroyed following the expiry of their storage time-limit.","14.The Government provided a copy of a register of medical examinations of persons admitted to IZ-20\/2 in the period between 26November 2002 and 4 October 2003. The entries concerning both applicants state \u201cno bodily injuries\u201d.","B.Investigation into the applicants\u2019 complaints of ill-treatment and their conviction","15.After their transfer to the remand prison in December 2002 the applicants made several complaints to the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Chechen Republic of their having been subjected to torture while in police custody at ORB-2. However, the institution of criminal proceedings was refused. On 3December 2003 the investigator S. submitted as follows:","\u201cFollowing their transfer to the SIZO in Grozny there was a flow of complaints and applications. At the present time I cannot remember the exact dates when the decisions on the applicants\u2019 complaints and applications were made.\u201d","16.On 14 and 18 April 2003S. refused to institute criminal proceedings into the second applicant\u2019s complaints of ill-treatment. The decisions were taken on the basis of statements by officers Gul. and Yakh., who denied using any physical force against him. It appears that a further complaint of ill-treatment submitted on 9 July 2003 to the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Chechen Republic received no reply.","17.On 25November 2003, during the course of the trial, the applicants complained to the court that during their unrecorded detention (between 25and 30 September in respect of the first applicant and between 19and 24September in respect of the second applicant) they had been subjected to torture involving electric shocks, gas masks, beatings and threats by officers of ORB-2 and forced into making a confession. The applicants alleged that one of the perpetrators had been the chief operational officer, Yakh.","18.On the same day the Rostov Regional Court (\u201cthe Regional Court\u201d) requested the Prosecutor\u2019s Office of the Chechen Republic to conduct an inquiry into the applicants\u2019 allegations.","19.On 8 December 2003 D., an investigator from the Leninskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office of Grozny, having questioned S. (the investigator in charge of the pre-trial investigation in the criminal case against the applicants), Yakh. (the chief operational officer of ORB-2), T. (the legal aid lawyer for the applicants\u2019 co-defendant) and Ts. (the legal aid lawyer for the first applicant), as well as M. (an attesting witness in several investigative activities), refused to open a criminal investigation into the applicants\u2019 complaints of ill-treatment for lack of evidence that a crime had been committed. The decision, in so far as it concerns the applicants, reads as follows:","\u201c[S.] submitted that he had been in charge of the pre-trial investigation of the criminal case [against the applicants] and that operational assistance had been provided by officers of [ORB-2], including the chief operational officer, Yakh.","After their arrest [the applicants] were placed in the temporary detention facility at [ORB-2], following which they were transferred to remand prison [illegible]. ... During the initial pre-trial investigation [the applicants] made no complaints of having been subjected to any unlawful methods of investigation. However, they subsequently made [relevant] complaints, which were decided by [S.] in the framework of the criminal case under investigation. On each occasion the [applicants\u2019] arguments were not objectively confirmed and it was decided [that a criminal investigation would not be instituted]; he could not remember the dates of the relevant decisions ... [The applicants made their statements of their own free will; they were not subjected to any violence; all investigative measures were carried out with the participation of legal aid lawyers].","The legal aid lawyer Ts. submitted that she had represented [the first applicant] from 30September 2002 until the end of the preliminary investigation. During the course of the preliminary investigation [the first applicant] had not complained of having been subjected to unlawful methods of investigation and physical violence, and Ts. had not lodged any complaints of ill-treatment with the prosecutor\u2019s office on [the first applicant\u2019s] behalf.","...","[Yakh.] submitted that ... no physical violence had been used against [the applicants] by the officers of [ORB-2], and that [the applicants] had made their statements of their own free will.\u201d","20.On 9 December 2003 the presiding judge received a copy of the above-mentioned decision and read it out in court.","21.The trial court further questioned S. and the attesting witnessM., who submitted that no physical force had been used against the applicants, who had made all their statements voluntarily and without coercion. S.admitted that when he had questioned the applicants at ORB-2 they had been handcuffed to the radiator to prevent them escaping.","22.On 18 and 30 December 2003 and 12 April 2004 the applicants\u2019 lawyer asked the trial court to exclude the evidence obtained from the applicants under torture, but the requests were dismissed.","23.During the submissions the presiding judge allowed the prosecutor to amend one of the charges against the applicants in so far as it concerned a change to the date of the alleged murder of P. (from 30 to 29May 2001).","24.On 11 May 2004 the Regional Court convicted the applicants, along with another co-defendant, of membership of an illegal armed group, several counts of murder, attempts on the life of law-enforcement officers and illegal possession of firearms. They were sentenced to twenty\u2011five years\u2019 imprisonment. The applicants\u2019 conviction was based on self\u2011incriminating statements given by the defendants during the pre-trial investigation in the period between September and December 2002 while they had been on the premises of ORB-2 (records of their questioning as suspects, records of their questioning as accused, records of confrontation between the parties, records of crime-scene examinations), and the findings of forensic medical examinations. The court also relied on statements by prosecution witnesses, including Ts., L. and K., and victims, although these did not link the applicants to the crimes they had been charged with. Despite the court\u2019s rulings, most of the prosecution witnesses and the victims did not attend the trial. Having regard to the challenging social situation in the Chechen Republic, where the witnesses in question lived, the court used the statements obtained from them at the pre-trial stage as evidence. The defence witnesses were all heard during the trial and provided alibis for the applicants. The court, however, excluded their testimony, as they were all either their relatives or friends. The court decided that the applicants\u2019 sentences should start to run from 25 and 19September 2002 respectively.","25.The applicants appealed, claiming, inter alia, that they had been subjected to ill-treatment during the pre-trial investigation and convicted on the basis of evidence obtained under torture, that they had not been afforded an opportunity to examine the prosecution witnesses and the victims, and that during the submissions the presiding judge had allowed the prosecutor to amend one of the charges against them, thereby violating their right to defence. Attached to the second applicant\u2019s appeal were witness statements by D., the legal aid lawyer who had represented him during the pre-trial investigation. The relevant part reads as follows:","\u201cOn 24 September 2002, when [the second applicant] was being questioned as a suspect, we saw that his back was covered in bruises. I agreed to make the relevant submissions to the [Regional Court]. However, somebody has misled the trial court, stating that I had \u201cflatly refused to make any depositions\u201d. I was not questioned during the pre-investigation inquiry, nor [did I] give any depositions to anybody except the lawyer [representing the applicants during the trial].\u201d","26.On 18 August 2004 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the judgment on appeal and reduced the applicants\u2019 sentences to twenty-three and twenty\u2011four years\u2019 imprisonment respectively. The court held that the applicants\u2019 allegations had been reasonably found to be unsubstantiated, and that the difficult social situation in Chechnya could account for the inability to secure the attendance of the prosecution witnesses and victims. The appellate court found that the amendment of one of the charges against the applicants had not violated the applicants\u2019 right to defence since, in any event, in the statements made during the pre-trial investigation they had mentioned having committed the crime \u201cin around the spring of 2001\u201d and furthermore during the trial had denied committing it at all.","27.On 25 October 2013 the Ust-Vymskiy District Court of the Republic of Komi reviewed the first applicant\u2019s sentence in line with amendments to the criminal law and reduced it to twenty-two years\u2019 imprisonment.","C.Developments in the case following its communication to the Government","28.Following communication of the applicants\u2019 complaint of ill\u2011treatment to the Government in October 2011, on 6December 2011 the prosecutor of the Leninskiy district of Grozny quashed as unlawful and unsubstantiated the decision of 8December 2003 refusing to institute a criminal investigation into the applicants\u2019 complaints of ill-treatment. An additional pre-investigation inquiry was ordered, so that the applicants could be questioned concerning the circumstances of the alleged ill\u2011treatment, the identity of the alleged perpetrators, the injuries allegedly sustained as a result of the ill-treatment and any requests made for medical assistance in this connection.","29.The case file contains no further information about the outcome of the additional pre-investigation inquiry.","D.The applicants\u2019 allocation to correctional penal facilities","30.Following the applicants\u2019 conviction, in September 2004 their families requested the head of the Rostov Regional Department of the Russian Federal Penal Authority (\u201cthe FSIN\u201d) to allocate them to penal facilities in regions adjacent to their home region, the Chechen Republic.","31.In November 2004 the first applicant was allocated to a strict-regime correctional colony in the Republic of Komi, located over 3,000 kilometres from the Chechen Republic.","32.In December 2004 the second applicant was allocated to a strict\u2011regime correctional colony in the Omsk Region, located over 3,400kilometres from the Chechen Republic.","33.On 22 August 2005 the first applicant\u2019s family asked the head of the FSIN to transfer him to a penal facility in a less remote region. They referred, in particular, to his state of health (tuberculosis) and indicated that appropriate facilities were available in the Republic of Kalmykia. Their request was rejected.","34.The second applicant and his family lodged requests with the Omsk regional prosecutor, the head of the FSIN, the Prosecutor General of Russia and the Ombudsman for the Omsk Region seeking the applicant\u2019s transfer to a less remote penal facility. They argued that he was serving a twenty\u2011four year sentence over 3,400 km from his home region, and that his parents had difficulties travelling long distances in view of their advanced age. It was likely that over time they would be unable to travel and would have no opportunity to visit their son.","35.In May 2006 the FSIN refused the second applicant\u2019s request on the grounds that there were no strict-regime penal facilities in the Chechen Republic and no exceptional circumstances preventing him serving his sentence in the Omsk Region. Reference was made to Article73 \u00a7 2 and Article 81 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences (\u201cthe CES\u201d).","36.On 18 July 2006 the applicants and their families complained to the Supreme Court of Russia that the applicants were being detained in penal facilities far from their home region and asked it to facilitate contact. The complaint reached the court on 28July 2006. The case file contains no further information as to the outcome of this request.","37.On 4 December 2006 the second applicant asked the Prosecutor General of Russia to transfer him to a penal facility in the Chechen Republic or a nearby region. He pointed to difficulties in terms of family visits and contact.","38.On 15 March 2007 the FSIN again rejected the second applicant\u2019s request.","39.On 30 July 2009 the FSIN rejected the first applicant\u2019s request to be transferred to a penal facility in the Chechen Republic, with reference to Article73 \u00a7 4 and Article 81 \u00a7 2 of the CES.","40.Subsequently, on an unspecified date the second applicant was transferred from the correctional colony in the Omsk Region to a correctional colony in the Murmansk Region, located over 3,700 km from the Chechen Republic.","47.The relevant parts of the public statement of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) concerning the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation of 10July 2003, read as follows:","\u201c5.One establishment stands out in terms of the frequency and gravity of the alleged ill-treatment, namely ORB-2 (the Operative and Search Bureau of the North Caucasus Operations Department of the Chief Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Southern Federal District) in Grozny.","ORB-2 has never appeared on any official list of detention facilities provided to the CPT. However, persons certainly are being held there, on occasion for very lengthy periods of time. In the course of its visits in 2002, the CPT received a large number of allegations of ill-treatment concerning this establishment which were supported in several cases by clear medical evidence gathered by its delegation. During the CPT\u2019s most recent visit to the Chechen Republic, in May 2003, further allegations were received, once again supported in some cases by medical evidence.","When the CPT re-visited ORB-2 in May 2003, it was holding 17 persons, some of whom had been there for several months. The persons detained were extremely reluctant to speak to the delegation and appeared to be terrified. From the information at its disposal, the CPT has every reason to believe that they had been expressly warned to keep silent. All the on-site observations made at ORB-2, including as regards the general attitude and demeanour of the staff there, left the CPT deeply concerned about the fate of persons taken into custody at the ORB.","The CPT has repeatedly recommended that a thorough, independent inquiry be carried out into the methods used by ORB-2 staff when questioning detained persons; that recommendation has never been addressed in a meaningful manner. To argue that \u201ca formal, written complaint is required for action to be taken\u201d is an indefensible position to adopt given the climate of fear and mistrust which currently pervades the Chechen Republic, and constitutes a dereliction of responsibility. The CPT calls upon the Russian authorities to put a stop to ill-treatment at ORB-2 in Grozny.\u201d","48.For the public statements of the CPT concerning the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation of 13 March 2007 and 24January 2013, also mentioning ORB-2 in Grozny, see Mukayev v. Russia (no.22495\/08, \u00a7\u00a760-61, 14March 2017)."],"30959":["5.The applicant was born in 1979 and is detained in Strzelce Opolskie Prison.","6.The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.","A.The period of the applicant\u2019s detention","7.The applicant was detained in Mys\u0142owice Remand Centre from 20April 2010 to 12 January 2011 and in Wojkowice Prison from 12January 2011 to 9 March 2012 (1 year, 10 months and 20 days).","B.The conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention","8.The parties\u2019 statements relating to the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention from 20 April 2010 to 9 March 2012 are to a large extent contradictory.","9.The applicant submitted that throughout his detention in Mys\u0142owice Remand Centre and Wojkowice Prison, he had been held in overcrowded cells in which the space per person had been below the Polish statutory minimum standard of 3 m\u00b2.","10.In their observations, the Government submitted that the applicant had been detained in overcrowded cells only on 20 April, 18 and 19 May 2009.","11.In the course of civil proceedings instituted by the applicant (see paragraphs 14-16 below), the domestic courts established, without giving any further details, that the applicant had been detained in overcrowded cells from 20 April 2010 to 9 March 2012 (1 year, 10 months and 20 days).","12.Regarding the conditions of detention in Mys\u0142owice Remand Centre, the domestic court established that the overall conditions in cells were adequate. The applicant had one hot shower per week and one hour of outdoor exercise per day.","13.Regarding the conditions of detention in Wojkowice Prison, as established by the domestic courts, the toilets were separated from the cell\u2019s living area, every prisoner had his own bed, a stool and access to cold running water. The prisoners had basic hygiene products at their disposal. The ceiling was infested with humidity. The applicant had one hot shower per week and one hour of outdoor exercise per day.","C.Civil proceedings against the State Treasury","14.On 24 February 2012 the applicant brought a civil action for the infringement of his personal rights on account of inadequate living conditions in Wojkowice Prison from November 2005 to July 2006 and from January to March 2007, in Mys\u0142owice Remand Centre from 20 April 2010 to 12January 2011 and, subsequently, again in Wojkowice Prison from 12January 2011 to 9 March 2012. The applicant argued that he had been detained in overcrowded cells, where the space per person had been below the statutory minimum of 3 m\u00b2. He claimed 80,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) (approximately 20,000 euros (EUR)) in compensation.","15.On 18 December 2012 the Katowice Regional Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s action, finding that from 20 April 2010 to 9 March 2012 the applicant had been detained in cells above the minimum statutory standard. As regards the remainder of the period, the claim was time-barred as lodged outside the three-year period of statutory limitation.","16.On 27 June 2013 the Katowice Court of Appeal overruled the lower court\u2019s judgment and allowed the applicant\u2019s action, finding that from 20April 2010 to 9 March 2012 he had been detained in overcrowded cells. The court relied in this respect on the applicant\u2019s submissions, holding that the State Treasury had in fact acknowledged these by its multiple refusals to provide the first and the second instance courts with an official register of cells in which the applicant had been detained. It also granted the applicant PLN1,000 (EUR 250) in compensation, holding that the breach of the statutory minimum standard had not been significant."],"30966":["5.The applicants, who are police officers, were born in 1967, 1978, 1976, 1979 and 1964 respectively. The first and second applicants live in Chi\u0219in\u0103u and Cau\u0219eni and the remaining applicants live in Bender.","A.The applicants\u2019 arrest and alleged ill-treatment","6.On 14 June 2006 officers Mang\u00eer, Vasiliev and Condrea, who were conducting a criminal investigation in Tiraspol, were arrested by the secret service of the self-proclaimed \u201cMoldovan Republic of Transdniestria\u201d (\u201cMRT\u201d)[1]. During their arrest they managed to call the Bender police station.","7.The other two applicants (officers Da\u0163co and Pohila) went to Tiraspol to clarify the reasons for the arrest of their colleagues, but were also arrested upon their arrival.","8.The applicants were placed in the Tiraspol Remand Centre (IVS Tiraspol).","9.On 17 June 2006 officers Pohila, Da\u0163co and Vasiliev were released without charge and without any explanation for their arrest.","10.On 18 June 2006 officer Mang\u00eer was allegedly beaten up and injected with an unknown substance, which rendered him unconscious for four days. After his release he was admitted for in-patient treatment in the hospital of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Moldova, where he was diagnosedwith, inter alia, concussion.","11.On 20 June 2006 the Tiraspol City Court issued a warrant for officer Mang\u00eer to be detained for thirty days. On 23 June 2006 the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities released officers Mang\u00eer and Condrea. The head of the \u201cMRT\u201d secret service declared in an interview that the officers had been released after Russian authorities had \u201cgiven assurances\u201d that Moldovan authorities would not \u201ckidnap people\u201d in the \u201cMRT\u201d.","12.The applicants were accused in the \u201cMRT\u201d media of being members of \u201cblack squadrons\u201d created for the purpose of kidnapping politicians and other persons causing nuisance to the Moldovan authorities. According to the applicants, during their detention they were questioned by the \u201cMRT\u201d secret service and forced to declare that in Tiraspol they had been trying to kidnap \u201cMRT\u201d politicians. Officers Pohila, Da\u0163co and Vasiliev were allegedly beaten on the soles of their feet and threatened with the killing of members of their families, as well as with being transferred to cells occupied by common criminals, where they would be ill-treated or even killed.","13.Officer Condrea was allegedly subjected to so-called \u201cPalestinian hanging\u201d for up to seven hours and was taken to his cell unconscious thereafter.","B.Conditions of the applicants\u2019 detention","14.The applicants described as follows their conditions of detention at the Tiraspol Remand Centre. The cells in which they had been held had been in the basement and had not had access to natural light. In the absence of ventilation and because of overcrowding it had been difficult to breathe. Officer Condrea submits that he was detained in the same cell as that in which Mr Ilie Ila\u015fcu had been detained (for more details see Ila\u015fcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787\/99, ECHR 2004\u2011VII).","15.During their detention the applicants did not have any daily exercise and were not given access to a shower; they could not receive parcels containing food from their relatives, they did not have bed linen and they were not allowed to be seen by doctors.","C.The actions undertaken by the Moldovan authorities","16.After the applicants\u2019 release the Moldovan authorities initiated two sets of criminal proceedings concerning their unlawful detention and their alleged ill-treatment while in detention. However, several years later the investigation was discontinued.","17.The applicants were also subjected to medical check-ups, which found no traces of violence on their bodies. Only one applicant, Stefan Mang\u00eer, was found to be suffering from the consequences of concussion."],"30967":["5.The applicant was born in 1980. He is currently serving a prison sentence in Bezhetsk, Tver Region.","A.The applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment in police custody","6.On 10 July 2005 the body of B., a police driver with the Ruza District Police Department of the Moscow region (\u041e\u0412\u0414 \u0420\u0443\u0437\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u0430 \u041c\u043e\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0438), was found with multiple injuries near the village of Baranovo in the Ruza District.The next day the Ruza town prosecutor\u2019s office opened criminal investigation into B.\u2019s murder.","7.On 11 July 2005 at night the applicant was arrested in P.\u2019s house by three police officers. According to him, he did not resist the arrest, but the police officers kicked and punched him on the legs, in the kidneys and around the groin region at least seven times.After the arrest he was taken to a temporary detention facility (IVS) located on the premises of the Ruza district police department.Then two police officers took him out of the cell and led him to a room. There one of the officers hit the applicant with a rubber truncheon all over his body about twelve times. Then they brought him back to the IVS cell. Soon afterwards another officer entered the cell and punched the applicant in the face and body about five times. During the ill-treatment the officers demanded that the applicant confess to B.\u2019s murder.","8.At 4.05 a.m. on 11 July 2005 in the IVS, L., an investigator with the Ruza town prosecutor\u2019s office, drew up a record of the applicant\u2019s arrest. Between 3.05 p.m. and 5.20 p.m. the applicant was examined as a suspect in the presence of a State-appointed lawyer, K., in the IVS. The applicant confessed to the crime, stating that he had inflicted several blows to the victim\u2019s body. It was stated in the record of the interview that the applicant had been informed of his right under Article 51 of the Constitution not to incriminate himself.","9.On the same day the applicant\u2019s family members were notified of his arrest. They retained a lawyer, R., who came to see the applicant on the same day. According to the applicant, the prosecutor of the Ruza district denied R. access to him on the grounds that the latter was being examined as a suspect in the presence of the State-appointed lawyer at that moment.","10.On the evening of 11 July 2005 the applicant\u2019s mother saw the applicant appearing in a television programme, Vremechko. According to her, he could hardly move and bore evident signs of ill-treatment. At10.35p.m. on the same day, R. sent a telegram to the Ruza district prosecutor\u2019s office asking for a meeting with the applicant. He also requested the medical examination of the applicant, who had been allegedly subjected to ill-treatment in the IVS. The next day R. repeated these requests in another telegram sent to the Moscow Region prosecutor\u2019s office.","11.On 12 July 2005 the applicant was brought before a judge of the Ruza District Court, who ordered that he be placed in pre-trial detention. R., who represented the applicant at the hearing, submitted that the latter had been subjected to ill-treatment by the police officers from the moment of his arrest. The prosecutor responded that the telegrams sent by R. containing these allegations had been received and that there would be an inquiry into them.","12.According to the applicant, during the hearing on 12 July 2005 he had informed the judge and the prosecutor of his ill-treatment by police officers and had showed them traces of the beatings. However, they had remained unresponsive, not reacting to his allegations.After the hearing the escorting guards had taken the applicant to the first floor of the courthouse and subjected him to ill-treatment. They had punched him in the kidney region, demanding that he confess to the crime. The beatings had continued for about ten minutes, with breaks; afterwards the applicant had been taken to the IVS.","13.On 13 July 2005, following a meeting with the applicant, R. lodged an application with the Ruza district prosecutor\u2019s office for the applicant\u2019s immediate transfer to a remand centre in Mozhaysk, Moscow Region. He stated that the applicant had been subjected to ill-treatment by the police at the Ruza district police department and that the implicated police officers could interfere with the investigation of this incident. He sent a similar complaint to the Moscow Region prosecutor\u2019s office on the following day, adding that three of B.\u2019s brothers had worked at the Ruza district police department at the time of the applicant\u2019s detention in that facility. According to the applicant, he was transferred to remand centre IZ\u201150\/4 in Mozhaysk, Moscow Region only on 24 July 2005.","B.Pre-investigation inquiry into the applicant\u2019s complaint of ill\u2011treatment","14.On 12 and 13 July 2005 the applicant complained to the Moscow regional prosecutor of his alleged ill-treatment by police officers during his apprehension, while in police custody and while in the courthouse.","15.On 14 July 2005 a forensic medical expert from the Ruza Forensic Medical Bureau examined the applicant at the request of an investigator from the prosecutor\u2019s office. The expert recorded the following injuries: (i)two bruises on the eyelids measuring 3 cm by 2.5 cm and 2.5 cm by 1.5cm; (ii)a bruise on the chin measuring 3 cm by 3 cm, with abrasions on its surface 1.5 cm by 1.5 cm in size; (iii)eleven bruises on the back measuring from 0.3 cm by 0.7 cm to 7 cm by 1.5 cm; (iv) nineteen bruises on the chest and stomach measuring from 1 cm by 1 cm to 2 cm by 13 cm; (v) two abrasions on the left leg (from the knee to the foot) measuring 1 cm and 5 cm long, respectively, and (vi) a 6-cm-long abrasion on the internal side of the left hip. The applicant stated that the injuries had been inflicted during his arrest and while he had been in police custody by police officers who had punched and kicked him and beaten him with a truncheon. The expert concluded that the injuries could have been inflicted on the date and in the circumstances described by the applicant with a hard blunt object of limited surface area. He specified that bruises could have been inflicted with a hard blunt object of an elongated shape, and that the applicant\u2019s injuries were unlikely to have been caused by his falling from his own height.","16.On 21 July 2005, following a pre-investigation inquiry, a deputy prosecutor of Ruza refused to institute criminal proceedings against two police officers, Sh. and D.K., for lack of the elements of a crime in their actions, and against unidentified police officers for lack of evidence of a crime in their actions. He found, in particular, that the applicant\u2019s injuries could have been the result of the lawful use of force by Sh. and D.K. when apprehending the applicant, who had resisted arrest. They stated that they had used force lawfully during the applicant\u2019s arrest and submitted that they had had to lay him down on the floor, and while handcuffing him, had pressed their knees into his back to keep him still. The decision stated that P., who had been present during the applicant\u2019s arrest, had not confirmed the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment. The deputy prosecutor also considered that the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment in the IVS by unidentified police officers had not been confirmed. He relied on the statements of officers U., B. and V.P. (who had been on duty in the IVS on 11 July 2005) and denied any malpractice in respect of the applicant.","17.In August 2005 the Ruza town prosecutor made a submission (\u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435) to the head of the Ruza district police department, requiring him to conduct an internal inquiry into the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment by unidentified police officers in the IVS and to subject those responsible to disciplinary proceedings.","18.R. lodged an appeal against the decision of 21 July 2005 with the Ruza District Court. On 16 August 2005 the Ruza town prosecutor annulled the decision of 21 July 2005 and ordered an additional inquiry into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill\u2011treatment. In his decision the prosecutor held that the investigator should adduce the results of the ongoing internal inquiry into the alleged unlawfulness of the applicant\u2019s detention in the IVS, verify the applicant\u2019s allegations, and assess them.","19.By an order of 22 August 2005 the head of the Ruza district police department reprimanded officers U. and B., who had been on duty in the IVS when the applicant had been brought there, for lack of diligence. He found that \u2013 in breach of the law on the pre-trial detention of suspected and accused persons \u2013 on 11 July 2005 two unidentified police officers had taken the applicant out of the cell and subjected him to ill-treatment.","20.On 26 June 2006 R. lodged a request with the Ruza town prosecutor to inform him of the results of the additional inquiry. On 30 June 2006 the prosecutor provided him with a copy of a decision issued by an investigator of the Ruza town prosecutor\u2019s office dated 23 August 2005 refusing to open criminal proceedings against the police officers. The investigator of the Ruza town prosecutor\u2019s office, N., maintained the findings made in the decision of 21 July 2005.","21.In August 2006 R. lodged an appeal against the decision of 23August 2005 with the Ruza Town Court. He argued that the investigating authority had failed to explain the origin of the applicant\u2019s injuries.","22.On 9 October 2006 the Ruza District Court decided that the above\u2011mentioned decision had been unlawful and unsubstantiated and that an additional inquiry was needed. It held that the investigator had failed to address the instructions given by the prosecutor in his decision of 16 August 2005 \u2013 in particular, to take all necessary measures to identify the culprits and to hold them criminally responsible.","23.According to the Government, on 26 October 2006 the investigator of the Ruza Town Prosecutor\u2019s Office issued a new decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings against police officers. However, they failed to produce a copy of this decision. According to the applicant, neither he nor his lawyer was notified about it.","C.The applicant\u2019s trial","24.On 28 February 2006 a jury trial against the applicant and his co\u2011defendant began before the Moscow Regional Court.The applicant pleaded not guilty. At the hearing of 14 March 2006, L., who represented the applicant during the trial, requested that the record of the applicant\u2019s interview as a suspect be declared inadmissible and excluded from the body of evidence. He submitted that the statements made in the course of that interview had been obtained by means of the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment and in the presence of a State-appointed lawyer, who had not acted in the applicant\u2019s best interests. L. also requested to examine the report of 14 July 2005 containing the results of the applicant\u2019s forensic medical examination.","25.The trial court refused both requests, noting that the allegations of ill-treatment by the police officers were unconfirmed. It relied on the refusal of 23 August 2005 to open a criminal case on account of the alleged ill\u2011treatment (see paragraph 20 above), which had gone unchallenged at the time. The court also noted that the applicant had not objected to the participation of K., the State-appointed lawyer, in the proceedings and had made no remarks in the interview record to the effect that he had rejected his services. Furthermore, the court considered that the contents of the report by forensic medical expert did not constitute part of the factual circumstances to be determined by the jury. It therefore allowed to be read out before the jury the record of the applicant\u2019s interview as a suspect of 11July 2005.","26.On 11 April 2006 the jury found the applicant guilty of battery, the misappropriation of a car, murder, the causing of intentional damage to property, and the acquisition of property obtained in a criminal manner. The Moscow Regional Court sentenced him to eighteen years\u2019 imprisonment.","27.The applicant lodged an appeal against the judgment with the Russian Supreme Court, complaining, inter alia, that the initial statements that he had given during the investigation had been inadmissible.","28.On 13 July 2006 the Supreme Court of Russia dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal and upheld the judgment of the Moscow Regional Court. It stated that the trial court had duly assessed the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment, noting that the applicant had never denied the use of force by the police to restrain him during his apprehension.","29.On 12 October 2007, at the applicant\u2019s lawyer\u2019s request, the Ruza prosecutor\u2019s office re-opened the criminal case on account of newly discovered circumstances \u2013 namely certain information in the victim\u2019s medical records. However, the proceedings were terminated on 25October 2007, and (following an appeal by the applicant\u2019s lawyer) by a final decision of 18 February 2008 the Supreme Court upheld that decision."],"31153":["1. The case originated in an application (no. 33586\/15) against the Republic of Bulgaria lodged with the Court on 10 July 2015 under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (\u201cthe Convention\u201d) by twelve Bulgarian nationals whose names and years of birth are set out in paragraphs 5 and 7 below (\u201cthe applicants\u201d). They were represented by Ms D. Mihaylova and Mr A. Kashumov, lawyers practising in Sofia.","2. The Bulgarian Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Dimitrova of the Ministry of Justice.","A. The circumstances of the case","3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.","1. The applicants","4. The applicants are two families of Bulgarian nationals of Roma ethnic origin: the Aydarovi family and the Ilievi family.","5. The Aydarovi family consists of Mr Stoyan Aydarov, born in 1987, and Ms Lilyana Aydarova, born in 1989, and their three children. The first child, Mr Yosif Aydarov, was born in 2006. The second, Mr Mariyan Aydarov, was born in 2008. The third (who is not an applicant in these proceedings), Ms Lidia Aydarova, was born on 21 August 2015.","6. Mr Mariyan Aydarov and Ms Lidia Aydarova both suffer from congenital glaucoma in both eyes, for which they have undergone medical treatment and several operations since infancy.","7. The Ilievi family consists of Mr Krasimir Iliev, born in 1979, and Ms Makedonka Kirilova, born in 1984, and their six children. The first child, Ms Sinema Ilieva, was born in 2001. The second, Ms Elena Kirilova, was born in 2004. The third, Mr Iliya Kirilov, was born in 2006. The fourth, Mr Yoan Iliev, was born in 2009. The fifth, Mr Hristo Iliev, was born in 2011. The sixth, Mr Yosif Iliev, was born in 2013. It appears that after 2015 the family had another child; his or her name was not specified by the applicants, and he or she is not an applicant in these proceedings.","8. Mr Iliya Kirilov suffers from spastic diplegia (a form of cerebral palsy) and is completely paralysed.","2. Background to the case","9. The two applicant families live near the village of Marchevo, in the municipality of Garmen, in an area known as the Kremikovtsi settlement, which was apparently established in the late 1960s. The settlement consists of 134 houses in which about 770 people reside, all of Roma ethnic origin. About 350 of them are children, 140 of whom were between one and six years old in August 2015. The land in the area on which the settlement stands, known as Padarkata, belongs to the Garmen Municipality and is earmarked as agricultural. Most of the houses in the settlement, including the two houses inhabited by the applicant families, are or were crude one-storey brick buildings with one or two rooms.","10. Between December 2010 and February 2012 the Garmen Municipality issued 114 certificates saying that, although they had been unlawfully built, the houses in the Kremikovtsi settlement, including those in which the applicant families resided, could be tolerated under the transitional provisions of the Territorial Organisation Act 2001 (see paragraphs 44 and 45 below). The certificates relating to the houses in which the Aydarovi and Ilievi families lived stated that they had been built before 1987; it appears that this was only based on declarations to that effect by Mr Stoyan Aydarov and Mr Krasimir Iliev.","11. Between March 2011 and November 2012 the National Building Control Directorate \u2019 s regional office set aside 104 of those certificates and upheld the remaining ten. It is unclear whether the certificates relating to the two houses in which the applicant families lived were set aside or upheld.","12. In 2013 and 2014 the Garmen Municipality sold plots of land in Padarkata to twenty-four people who lived there. The applicants were not among those people. The municipality apparently stated that it intended to continue with such sales, but then halted them.","3. Demolition orders and proceedings for judicial review of the order addressed to Mr Stoyan Aydarov","13. On various dates in 2010 and 2011 officers of the National Building Control Directorate inspected 134 houses in the Kremikovtsi settlement and found that they had been unlawfully built. The house in which the Aydarovi family lived was inspected on 19 August 2010, and the house in which the Ilievi family live was inspected on 23 August 2010.","14. Based on the results of the inspection, in an order of 22 March 2011 the National Building Control Directorate \u2019 s regional office noted that the house in which the Ilievi family lived had been built in 2002-03 on land owned by the Garmen Municipality without the requisite construction papers, in breach of section 148(1) of the 2001 Act, and in the absence of a detailed zoning plan, in breach of section 12(2) of the same Act. There had been no procedure to legalise it under the Act \u2019 s transitional provisions. It was therefore unlawful and as such liable to be demolished.","15. Mr Krasimir Iliev, who was notified of the order on 14 December 2011, did not seek judicial review, and the order became final on 29 December 2011.","16. In an order of 22 June 2011, the same office noted that the house in which the Aydarovi family lived had been built in 2002-03 on land owned by the Garmen Municipality without the requisite construction papers, in breach of sections 137(3) and 148(1) of the 2001 Act; without a right to build on another \u2019 s land, in breach of section 182(1) of the Act; and in the absence of a detailed zoning plan, in breach of section 12(2) of the Act. There had been no procedure to legalise it under the Act \u2019 s transitional provisions. It was therefore unlawful and as such was liable to be demolished.","17. Between 2010 and 2012 the National Building Control Directorate \u2019 s regional office apparently issued a total of 124 similar demolition orders in relation to houses in the Kremikovtsi settlement.","18. Unlike Mr Krasimir Iliev, Mr Stoyan Aydarov sought judicial review of the order relating to the house in which his family lived. He argued that the order did not properly describe the house, that a procedure to legalise the house was pending, and that the Garmen Municipality had certified that the house could be tolerated under the 2001 Act \u2019 s transitional provisions (see paragraphs 10 above and 44 below).","19. On 20 October 2011 the Blagoevgrad Administrative Court dismissed the claim for judicial review. It found that the order had been issued in the proper form, with a proper description of the house, and in line with the relevant rules of procedure. The available evidence showed that there was no pending procedure to legalise the house. The house had been built on agricultural land belonging to the Garmen Municipality without a building permit or the requisite construction papers, and did not fall under any of the statutory clauses making those requirements less stringent with respect to certain classes of buildings. Nor did it fall within the ambit of the 2001 Act \u2019 s transitional provisions, as it was not tolerable under a relevant detailed zoning plan, as required under those provisions \u2013 no such plan existed with respect to the relevant area, which was agricultural land. The certificate issued by the Garmen Municipality confirming that the house was tolerable under those provisions could not preclude the court from determining that point for itself, and had no evidential value in proceedings for judicial review of a demolition order (see \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 1524 \u043e\u0442 20.10.2011 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 652\/2011 \u0433., \u0410\u0434\u043c\u0421-\u0411\u043b\u0430\u0433\u043e\u0435\u0432\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434 ).","20. Mr Stoyan Aydarov did not appeal against that judgment, and accordingly it became final on 11 November 2011.","21. The judgment was nearly identical to a series of judgments given by the Blagoevgrad Administrative Court between July and November 2011 in which it dismissed claims for judicial review of other orders to demolish other houses in the Kremikovtsi settlement (see paragraph 17 above, and \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 1154 \u043e\u0442 18.07.2011 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 425\/2011 \u0433.; \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 1158 \u043e\u0442 18.07.2011 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 416\/2011 \u0433.; \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 1171 \u043e\u0442 19.07.2011 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 418\/2011 \u0433.; \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 1172 \u043e\u0442 19.07.2011 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 478\/2011 \u0433.; \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 1214 \u043e\u0442 26.07.2011 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 470\/2011 \u0433.; \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 1329 \u043e\u0442 16.09.2011 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 540\/2011 \u0433.; \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 1330 \u043e\u0442 16.09.2011 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 543\/2011 \u0433.; \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 1331 \u043e\u0442 16.09.2011 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 552\/2011 \u0433.; \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 1332 \u043e\u0442 16.09.2011 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 522\/2011 \u0433.; \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 1339 \u043e\u0442 19.09.2011 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 479\/2011 \u0433.; \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 1344 \u043e\u0442 20.09.2011 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 521\/2011 \u0433.; \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 1347 \u043e\u0442 20.09.2011 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 379\/2011 \u0433.; \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 1379 \u043e\u0442 28.09.2011 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 417\/2011 \u0433.; \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 1437 \u043e\u0442 10.10.2011 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 590\/2011 \u0433.; \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 1461 \u043e\u0442 12.10.2011 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 672\/2011 \u0433.; \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 1462 \u043e\u0442 12.10.2011 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 654\/2011 \u0433.; \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 1478 \u043e\u0442 14.10.2011 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 554\/2011 \u0433.; \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 1488 \u043e\u0442 17.10.2011 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 539\/2011 \u0433.; \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 1491 \u043e\u0442 17.10.2011 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 673\/2011 \u0433.; \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 1543 \u043e\u0442 21.10.2011 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 377\/2011 \u0433.; \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 1585 \u043e\u0442 27.10.2011 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 653\/2011 \u0433.; and \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 1718 \u043e\u0442 11.11.2011 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 759\/2011 \u0433., \u0410\u0434\u043c\u0421-\u0411\u043b\u0430\u0433\u043e\u0435\u0432\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434 ). In all but two of those judgments the court examined whether the houses were tolerable under the 2001 Act \u2019 s transitional provisions and found that they were not, because no urban zoning plan with respect to the area covered by the Kremikovtsi settlement, which was agricultural, had ever existed. It does not appear that any of those judgments was appealed against.","4. Proceedings to enforce the demolition orders and related judicial review proceedings","(a) Unfolding of the enforcement proceedings until July 2015","22. In December 2013 the National Building Control Directorate decided to stay the enforcement of the demolition orders relating to the Kremikovtsi settlement pending a solution to the housing problem of the people living there.","23. About a year and a half later, on 25 May 2015, Blagoevgrad \u2019 s regional governor wrote to the National Building Control Directorate and its regional office, enquiring about the steps taken to enforce the orders. He referred to a letter of 23 February 2015 written by the inhabitants of Marchevo in which they protested against the \u201cbrutal gypsy raids on the property of the villagers [and] the uncontrolled settlement of a large gypsy community\u201d in Kremikovtsi.","24. It appears that the governor \u2019 s letter was triggered by an incident on 23 May 2015 in which a fight had erupted between a few Roma from the Kremikovtsi settlement and ethnic Bulgarians from Garmen. As a result of the incident, in the few days which followed police forces from the whole region had had to intervene and block the roads between the settlement and Garmen to prevent inter-ethnic clashes, and the Bulgarian inhabitants of Garmen had held several rallies, requesting the eviction of the Roma living in the settlement. The incident and the rallies had been widely reported by the national media.","25. In reply to the governor \u2019 s letter, the National Building Control Directorate asked the governor and Garmen \u2019 s mayor what steps, if any, had been taken to provide housing for the people concerned by the demolition orders, so that the enforcement of those orders could resume.","26. On 27 May 2015 the National Building Control Directorate \u2019 s regional office invited Mr Stoyan Aydarov and Mr Krasimir Iliev to comply with the demolition orders in their cases within fourteen days of receiving notice to do so, and advised them that failure to do so would prompt it to enforce the orders at their expense.","27. On 23 June 2015 the National Building Control Directorate, having noted that the orders had not been complied with, retained a private company to demolish the houses in which the applicant families lived between 13 and 24 July 2015.","28. In a letter of 6 July 2015 the Social Protection Agency informed the Blagoevgrad Building Control Directorate that children with disabilities lived in both houses.","29. In a letter of 16 July 2015 to all other authorities concerned by the case, the National Building Control Directorate noted, inter alia, that the houses in the Kremikovtsi settlement whose demolition had been ordered were buildings which were unsafe and had no sanitation facilities, and so put at risk the life and health of those living in them, especially the young children.","(b) First set of proceedings for judicial review of the enforcement of the demolition orders","30. Meanwhile, on 8 July 2015 Mr Stoyan Aydarov and Mr Krasimir Iliev had sought judicial review of the enforcement of the orders. They argued, inter alia, that enforcement would be in breach of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention because the houses liable to be demolished were their and their families \u2019 only homes, and their families included children who were minors, some of whom were disabled. They also argued that enforcement would run counter to the principle of proportionality, enshrined in Article 6 of the Code of Administrative Procedure 2006 as a general rule of Bulgarian administrative procedure. They requested that enforcement be stayed by way of interim measures pending the examination of their claims on the merits.","31. On 10 July 2015 the Blagoevgrad Administrative Court found that the claims for judicial review were out of time. Since, under Bulgarian law, a claim that an administrative decision or action is null and void is not limited by time, the court nevertheless examined the fundamental validity of the steps taken to enforce the demolition orders, and concluded that they were not null and void. Lastly, the court held that the applications for interim measures could only be entertained if they had been made alongside admissible claims for judicial review, which was not the case. Therefore, they could not be allowed (see \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 1124 \u043e\u0442 10.07.2015 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 535\/2015 \u0433., and \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 1125 \u043e\u0442 10.07.2015 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 536\/ 2015 \u0433., \u0410\u0434\u043c\u0421-\u0411\u043b\u0430\u0433\u043e\u0435\u0432\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434).","32. Mr Stoyan Aydarov and Mr Krasimir Iliev appealed. On 13 and 21 October 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court held that, in so far as the appeals concerned the refusals to impose interim measures, they were inadmissible, because no appeal lay against such rulings. The rulings that the enforcement measures were not null and void were final as well. However, the rulings that the claims for judicial review were out of time were open to appeal and had been tainted by a procedural irregularity, because, when making the rulings, the lower court had sat in three-judge rather than single-judge formations. Accordingly, the Supreme Administrative Court remitted those parts of the cases (see \u043e\u043f\u0440. \u2116 10577 \u043e\u0442 13.10.2015 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 10005\/2015 \u0433., \u0412\u0410\u0421, II \u043e., and \u043e\u043f\u0440. \u2116 10968 \u043e\u0442 21.10.2015 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 11571\/2015 \u0433., \u0412\u0410\u0421, II \u043e. ).","33. On 8 and 9 December 2015 the Blagoevgrad Administrative Court, this time sitting in single-judge formations, again found that the claims for judicial review were out of time (see \u043e\u043f\u0440. \u2116 1924 \u043e\u0442 08.12.2015 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 862\/2015 \u0433., and \u043e\u043f\u0440. \u2116 1928 \u043e\u0442 09.12.2015 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 861\/2015 \u0433., \u0410\u0434\u043c\u0421-\u0411\u043b\u0430\u0433\u043e\u0435\u0432\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434 ).","34. Mr Stoyan Aydarov and Mr Krasimir Iliev appealed. On 25 February 2016 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the lower court \u2019 s decision in the case of Mr Krasimir Iliev (see \u043e\u043f\u0440. \u2116 2188 \u043e\u0442 25.02.2015 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 1313\/2016 \u0433., \u0412\u0410\u0421, II \u043e. ), but on 18 March 2016 quashed the lower court \u2019 s decision in the case of Mr Stoyan Aydarov, holding that he had not been duly notified of the enforcement, as his address had not been correctly set out in the letter informing him of it (see \u043e\u043f\u0440. \u2116 3098 \u043e\u0442 18.03.2015 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 2796\/2016 \u0433., \u0412\u0410\u0421, II \u043e. ).","35. Following the remittal, the Blagoevgrad Administrative Court dismissed Mr Stoyan Aydarov \u2019 s claim on the merits in a judgment of 24 March 2016. It held, inter alia, that the principle of proportionality did not apply to the removal of an unlawful building, unless the demolition order only concerned a part of it, and that it was immaterial how many people lived in the building. Demolition did not amount to inhuman or degrading treatment or to an unjustified interference with the right to respect for one \u2019 s home. People who did not have a home could rent a dwelling or build one in a lawful way. No one could derive rights from his or her own unlawful conduct (see \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 441 \u043e\u0442 24.03.2016 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 861\/2015 \u0433., \u0410\u0434\u043c\u0421-\u0411\u043b\u0430\u0433\u043e\u0435\u0432\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434 ). That judgment was not amenable to appeal (see paragraph 41 below).","(c) Intervening developments","36. Meanwhile, on 13 July 2015, citing a request by the applicants for the indication of interim measures under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and a request for information sent by this Court in connection with this request, the National Building Control Directorate decided to adjourn enforcement of the two demolition orders until the end of July 2015.","(d) Second set of proceedings for judicial review of the enforcement of the demolition orders","37. On 20 July 2015 Mr Stoyan Aydarov and Mr Krasimir Iliev sought judicial review of the letters informing them of that adjournment. On 22 July 2015 the Blagoevgrad Administrative Court found that the letters did not amount to an enforcement measure amenable to judicial review, and declared the claims inadmissible (see \u043e\u043f\u0440. \u2116 1234 \u043e\u0442 22.07.2015 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 560\/2015 \u0433., and \u043e\u043f\u0440. \u2116 1238 \u043e\u0442 22.07.2015 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 559\/2015 \u0433., \u0410\u0434\u043c\u0421-\u0411\u043b\u0430\u0433\u043e\u0435\u0432\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434 ). Mr Stoyan Aydarov and Mr Krasimir Iliev appealed. On 15 and 16 October 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed those decisions and remitted the cases, as it found that the lower court had, in breach of the rules of procedure, sat in a three-judge formation, whereas it should have sat in a single-judge one (see \u043e\u043f\u0440. \u2116 10735 \u043e\u0442 15.10.2015 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 11498\/2015 \u0433., \u0412\u0410\u0421, II \u043e., and \u043e\u043f\u0440. \u2116 10797 \u043e\u0442 16.10.2015 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 11497\/2015 \u0433., \u0412\u0410\u0421, II \u043e. ). The Blagoevgrad Administrative Court, this time sitting in single-judge formations, again held that the letters did not amount to an enforcement measure amenable to judicial review (see \u043e\u043f\u0440. \u2116 1541 \u043e\u0442 20.10.2015 \u0433., \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 760\/2015 \u0433., and \u043e\u043f\u0440. \u2116 1560 \u043e\u0442 22.10.2015 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 769\/2015 \u0433., \u0410\u0434\u043c\u0421-\u0411\u043b\u0430\u0433\u043e\u0435\u0432\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434 ). Its decisions were upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court on 1 and 3 February 2016 (see \u043e\u043f\u0440. \u2116 1004 \u043e\u0442 01.02.2016 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 14276\/2015 \u0433., \u0412\u0410\u0421, II \u043e., and \u043e\u043f\u0440. \u2116 1099 \u043e\u0442 03.02.2016 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 14261\/2015 \u0433., \u0412\u0410\u0421, II \u043e. ).","(e) Intervening and subsequent developments in the applicants \u2019 cases","38. In the meantime, the building control authorities had adjourned enforcement of the two demolition orders until the end of August 2015, and then until the end of October 2015, on the basis that no alternative accommodation had been found for the applicants.","39. However, on 7 September 2015 the house in which the Aydarovi family lived was demolished. The Aydarovi family submitted that they had been informed of the demolition just minutes before it had taken place, and that after that they had spent several nights out in the open, until they had been accommodated in the house of Ms Aydarova \u2019 s mother. They did not provide further particulars. From the documents in the case file it is clear that, at the time of the demolition, the family \u2019 s youngest child, who is not an applicant in these proceedings, was seventeen days old (see paragraph 5 above).","40. According to a register available on the National Building Control Directorate \u2019 s website on 24 September 2018, the order to demolish the house in which the Ilievi family live has not yet been carried out, the matter having been formally adjourned until the end of March 2018. Its enforcement had previously been adjourned until the end of November 2015, then the end of January, April, June and September 2016, and then the end of January, May, June, July, August and October 2017.","B. Relevant domestic law and practice","1. Unlawful buildings and their demolition","41. The Court \u2019 s judgment in Ivanova and Cherkezov v. Bulgaria (no. 46577\/15, \u00a7\u00a7 25-27 and 33-40, 21 April 2016) set out the provisions of the Territorial Organisation Act 2001 and the 2006 Code of Administrative Procedure and the case-law of the administrative courts relating to the demolition of unlawful buildings and legal challenges against building control authorities \u2019 orders to that effect by way of (a) claims for judicial review of the demolition orders themselves; (b) claims under Article 294 of the Code for judicial review of the enforcement of the orders (which are examined at one level of court only \u2013 Article 298 \u00a7 4 of the Code); and (c) claims under Article 292 of the Code for a judicial declaration that enforcement should not proceed owing to newly emerged facts.","42. An examination of the Supreme Administrative Court \u2019 s case-law since that judgment shows that that court has fully adhered to its position that the building control authorities have no discretion in relation to the removal of unlawful buildings; that the only course of action open to them in such cases is to order their demolition; and that, in such cases, those authorities are not bound by the general requirement of proportionality laid down in Article 6 of the 2006 Code, because it only applies when the relevant authority has a discretion (see the following judgments given in proceedings for judicial review of demolition orders: \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 5103 \u043e\u0442 27.04.2016 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 8537\/2015 \u0433., \u0412\u0410\u0421, II \u043e.; \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 8956 \u043e\u0442 18.07.2016 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 3380\/2016 \u0433., \u0412\u0410\u0421, II \u043e.; and \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 8713 \u043e\u0442 05.07.2017 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 773\/2017 \u0433., \u0412\u0410\u0421, II \u043e., and the following judgments given in proceedings for a judicial declaration under Article 292 of the 2006 Code: \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 7893 \u043e\u0442 29.06.2016 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 14264\/ 2015 \u0433., \u0412\u0410\u0421, II \u043e., and \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 12463 \u043e\u0442 16.11.2016 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 4802\/2016 \u0433., \u0412\u0410\u0421, II \u043e. ).","43. By contrast, contrary to its earlier rulings under Article 294 of the 2006 Code (see \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 1791 \u043e\u0442 20.11.2015 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 869\/2015 \u0433., \u0410\u0434\u043c\u0421-\u0411\u043b\u0430\u0433\u043e\u0435\u0432\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434 ), in a recent case the Blagoevgrad Administrative Court examined, for the first time, the proportionality of the intended demolition of a house by reference to Article 8 of the Convention, as construed in Yordanova and Others v. Bulgaria (no. 25446\/06, 24 April 2012) and Ivanova and Cherkezov (cited above), and in view of the individual circumstances of the woman living in the house. The court found, inter alia, that the building control authorities had not duly elucidated whether the house was her only home, even though she had expressly made that point in the course of the proceedings to enforce the demolition order, and had not properly assessed whether the measure would be proportionate in the light of that fact. The court therefore annulled the steps taken to enforce the order and referred the case back to the building control authorities (see \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 1072 \u043e\u0442 30.06.2017 \u0433. \u043d\u0430 \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 316\/2017 \u0433., \u0410\u0434\u043c\u0421-\u0411\u043b\u0430\u0433\u043e\u0435\u0432\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434 ). A few similar decisions have recently been given in such proceedings by other first-instance administrative courts (see \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 72 \u043e\u0442 05.10.2015 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 47\/2015 \u0433., \u0410\u0434\u043c\u0421-\u0421\u0438\u043b\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430; \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 52 \u043e\u0442 02.03.2016 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 42\/2016 \u0433., \u0410\u0434\u043c\u0421-\u0414\u043e\u0431\u0440\u0438\u0447; \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 335 \u043e\u0442 29.08.2017 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 485\/2017 \u0433., \u0410\u0434\u043c\u0421-\u0414\u043e\u0431\u0440\u0438\u0447; \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 502 \u043e\u0442 27.10.2017 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 271\/2016 \u0433., \u0410\u0434\u043c\u0421-\u041f\u0430\u0437\u0430\u0440\u0434\u0436\u0438\u043a; and \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 467 \u043e\u0442 24.11.2017 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 34\/2017 \u0433., \u0410\u0434\u043c\u0421-\u0414\u043e\u0431\u0440\u0438\u0447 ).","2. The possibility of not demolishing unlawful buildings erected before the end of March 2001","44. The Court \u2019 s judgment in Ivanova and Cherkezov (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 28-29 ) also set out paragraph 16(1)-(3) of the transitional provisions of the 2001 Act and paragraph 127(1) of a 2012 Act for its amendment \u2013 according to which buildings erected before end of March 2001 without construction papers are not liable to be demolished if they were tolerable under the zoning plans and building regulations in force at the time of their construction, or under the corresponding plans and regulations issued under the 2001 Act.","45. Here, it should be added that by paragraph 16(1) in fine of the 2001 Act \u2019 s transitional provisions and paragraph 127(1) in fine of the 2012 Act \u2019 s transitional provisions, such buildings may be conveyed to others on the basis of certificates issued by municipalities \u2019 chief architects confirming that the buildings can be tolerated.","46. In accordance with the Supreme Administrative Court \u2019 s established case-law, those certificates do not legalise the buildings; their sole purpose is to permit the buildings \u2019 notarised conveyance. Nor do the certificates bind the building control authorities when they seek to determine whether a building is unlawful and as such liable to be demolished, or the courts reviewing their orders. In such proceedings, the building control authorities and the courts must ascertain a building \u2019 s legality for themselves (see \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 12649 \u043e\u0442 18.12.2006 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 8560\/2006 \u0433., \u0412\u0410\u0421, II \u043e.; \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 3440 \u043e\u0442 25.03.2008 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 415\/2008 \u0433., \u0412\u0410\u0421, II \u043e.; \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 2122 \u043e\u0442 16.02.2009 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 13312\/2008 \u0433., \u0412\u0410\u0421, II \u043e.; \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 13141 \u043e\u0442 05.11.2010 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 9816\/2010 \u0433., \u0412\u0410\u0421, \u043f\u0435\u0442\u0447\u043b. \u0441-\u0432; \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 466 \u043e\u0442 10.01.2012 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 12702\/2011 \u0433., \u0412\u0410\u0421, II \u043e.; \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 11348 \u043e\u0442 09.08.2013 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 5892\/2013 \u0433., \u0412\u0410\u0421, II \u043e.; \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 6287 \u043e\u0442 12.05.2014 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 10208\/2013 \u0433., \u0412\u0410\u0421, II \u043e.; \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 4949 \u043e\u0442 04.05.2015 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 2346\/2015, \u0412\u0410\u0421, II \u043e.; \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 6537 \u043e\u0442 02.06.2016 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 12664\/2015 \u0433., \u0412\u0410\u0421, II \u043e.; and \u0440\u0435\u0448. \u2116 7677 \u043e\u0442 19.06.2017 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0430\u0434\u043c. \u0434. \u2116 11244\/2016 \u0433., \u0412\u0410\u0421, II \u043e. ).","3. Protection against discrimination","47. The Protection Against Discrimination Act was enacted in 2003 and came into force on 1 January 2004. It prohibits, in section 4(1), any direct or indirect discrimination on the basis of gender, race, nationality, ethnicity, human genome, citizenship, origin, religion or belief, education, convictions, political affiliation, personal or social status, disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status, property status, or on any other grounds established by law or by an international treaty to which Bulgaria is party. In paragraph 1(6) of its additional provisions, the Act also defines racial segregation, and provides, in section 5, that it is a form of discrimination.","48. The authority responsible for ensuring compliance with the Act is the Commission for Protection Against Discrimination (section 40). It can act of its own motion or pursuant to complaints by those concerned (section 50). If the Commission finds a breach of the Act, it can order that it be averted or brought to an end, or that the status quo ante be restored (section 47(2)). It can also impose sanctions or order coercive measures, or give compulsory directions (section 47 (3) and (4)). The Commission \u2019 s decisions are subject to judicial review (section 68(1)).","49. People who have obtained a favourable decision by the Commission and wish to obtain compensation for damage suffered as a result of the breach established by the Commission can bring a claim for damages against the people or authorities that have caused the damage (section 74(1)). If the damage stems from unlawful decisions, actions or omissions of public authorities or officials, the claim must be brought under the State and Municipalities Liability for Damage Act 1988 (section 74(2)).","50. Alternatively, those complaining of discrimination can directly bring court proceedings and seek declaratory or injunctive relief or an award of damages (section 71(1)). The claim can be brought on behalf of the aggrieved party by a non-governmental organisation (section 71(2)). If the alleged discrimination affects many people, the non-governmental organisation can even bring the claim in its own name, in which case those directly affected can join the proceedings as third parties (section 71(3)).","51. Claims for damages under section 71(1) directed against public authorities or officials fall under the jurisdiction of the administrative courts (see \u0442\u044a\u043b\u043a. \u043f. \u2116 2 \u043e\u0442 19.05.2015 \u0433. \u043f\u043e \u0442\u044a\u043b\u043a. \u0434. \u2116 2\/2014 \u0433., \u041e\u0421\u0421 \u043d\u0430 \u0413\u041a \u043e\u0442 \u0412\u041a\u0421 \u0438 \u041e\u0421\u0421 \u043d\u0430 I \u0438 II \u043a. \u043d\u0430 \u0412\u0410\u0421, \u0442. 4 )."],"31175":["5.The applicants were born in 1979 and 1978 respectively and live in Tikhoretsk, Krasnodar region.","A.The applicants\u2019 arrest and alleged ill-treatment","6.On 3 January 2005 a young woman (S.) was found near a block of flats in Tikhoretsk with serious head injuries from which she died in a hospital on the following day. Criminal proceedings were initiated and an investigation was conducted firstly by Sh. and later, from 23January 2005, O. \u2013 both investigators with the Tikhoretsk inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office (\u201cthe inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d). Operational and search activities in the case were conducted by the criminal investigation unit of the Tikhoretsk Town and District Police Department (\u041e\u0423\u0420 \u0423\u0412\u0414 \u0433\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0430 \u0422\u0438\u0445\u043e\u0440\u0435\u0446\u043a\u0430 \u0438 \u0422\u0438\u0445\u043e\u0440\u0435\u0446\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u0430, \u201cthe Tikhoretsk Police Department\u201d) \u2013 in particular by three police officers, Ch., K. and R. Those officers established that B. could have been involved in the crime. On 20January 2005 B. was arrested and gave a statement incriminating the first applicant.","1.The first applicant (MrGolubyatnikov)","7.On 21 January 2005 Ch., K. and R. arrested the first applicant in the presence of witnesses and took him to the Tikhoretsk Police Department, where they interviewed him. The applicant denied his involvement in the crime.","8.The applicant\u2019s account of events at the police station is as follows. Officers Ch., K. and R. demanded that he confess to the crime. He refused. They knocked him down, punched and kicked him, beat him with a rubber truncheon, and put a gas mask over his head, blocking his access to air.","9.At 9 p.m. on 21 January 2005 Sh., the investigator, drew up a record of the applicant\u2019s arrest as a suspect.","10.The applicant was taken to the temporary detention facility (IVS) at the Tikhoretsk Police Department. At 10.30 p.m. the IVS officer called an ambulance.","11.The ambulance doctor examined the applicant and recorded multiple haematomas on his chest and back, sharp pain upon palpation in the area of sternum, and the applicant\u2019s complaints about pain in the chest and stomach, weakness and difficulty breathing. The applicant was diagnosed with a fracture of the ribs, multiple contusions and traumatic shock. The doctor noted the applicant\u2019s explanation that he had been beaten up and assessed his condition as grave.","12.At 11.30 p.m. the applicant was brought to Tikhoretsk town hospital for an X\u2011ray examination. He was examined by a surgeon and by a traumatologist, who diagnosed him with a fracture of the ribs on the left\u2011hand side. The applicant was taken back to the IVS.","13.On 22 January 2005 the applicant was examined by Sh. \u2013 in the presence of an officially assigned lawyer \u2013 as a suspect. He denied having been involved in the crime. According to the applicant, he complained to the investigator that the police officers had subjected him to violence in order to coerce him into giving a confession but that he had received no response.","14.On 23 January 2005 the Tikhoretsk Town Court ordered that the applicant be detained on remand.","15.On 31 January 2005 the applicant was charged with causing grievous bodily harm to S. leading to her death. During his examination as an accused on that day and on 20 May 2005 the applicant denied his involvement in the crime and refused to give a statement, citing his right not to incriminate himself.","16.On 25 March 2005 the applicant\u2019s mother lodged a complaint with the inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office submitting that the applicant had been subjected to violence by police officers from the Tikhoretsk Police Department and seeking the institution of criminal proceedings against those officers. On 18 April 2005 O., the investigator, replied that during his examinations as a suspect and as an accused the applicant had not complained that he had been subjected to ill-treatment by police officers. In May 2005 the applicant\u2019s mother complained to the Krasnodar regional prosecutor\u2019s office (\u201cthe regional prosecutor\u2019s office) that O. had used unlawful investigation methods.","17.The applicant\u2019s lawyer in a record dated 25 May 2005 noting his being granted access to the case file, stated, inter alia, that the applicant\u2019s involvement in the crime had not been proven as the prosecution case had been based, inter alia, on the second applicant\u2019s confession, which he had subsequently retracted as having been given under coercion.","18.According to an expert opinion of 5 May 2010 (ordered in the course of an inquiry into the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment by the police and prepared by a commission of forensic medical experts from the Krasnodar regional forensic medical examination bureau and a traumatologist), multiple haematomas on the applicant\u2019s chest and back recorded by the ambulance doctor on 21 January 2005 had been caused by multiple blows from a blunt object. Due to the brevity of the description of the haematomas in the medical records it was impossible to establish the time of their infliction. The experts further concluded that the applicant had sustained fractures to two ribs on the left-hand side, which could have been caused by a blunt object on 21January 2005 in the circumstances described by the applicant \u2013 for example as a result of the applicant being punched, kicked or hit with a rubber truncheon. Those fractures, complicated by traumatic shock, gave rise to a long-term health disorder for a period exceeding 21days and were classified as harm to health of medium gravity.","2.The second applicant (Mr Zhuchkov)","19.According to the second applicant, at around 8 a.m. on 26 January 2005 police officers K. and R. arrested him at his place of work in his colleagues\u2019 presence and took him to the Tikhoretsk Police Department.","20.The applicant\u2019s account of events at the police station is as follows. K., R. and another police officer demanded that he confess to having inflicted bodily injuries on S. He refused and was then beaten with a rubber truncheon. A gas mask was put over his head and his access to air was blocked. Thereafter the police officers handcuffed him to a ladder at the police station. The applicant spent the night at the police station. The following morning K. and R. started beating him again, demanding that he give a statement of surrender and confession (\u044f\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0441 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439) and telling him that V. ( another suspect in the case) had already given a statement of surrender and confession incriminating the first applicant and the second applicant, together with B., and himself (that is to say V.) in inflicting head injuries on S. The applicant could not stand the violence any longer and so wrote a statement of surrender and confession that was dictated by the police officers, stating that he and the first applicant, as well as B. and V., had inflicted head injuries on S.","21.His statement of surrender and confession (\u044f\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0441 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439) was recorded by K. at 1p.m. on 27 January 2005.","22.At 2.30 p.m. on 27 January 2005 O., the investigator, drew up a record of the applicant\u2019s arrest as a suspect. O. stated in the record that the applicant had been arrested at 2.30 p.m. that day.","23.According to the records of the Tikhoretsk Police Department IVS, in which the applicant was placed on the same day, the applicant did not complain about his health. According to the applicant, at the IVS he was not asked about his state of health and did not undergo any medical examination.","24.On 28 January 2005 the applicant was taken to O. According to the applicant, O. threatened him with further violence by police officers if he refused to repeat his confession. The applicant was examined as a suspect by O. in the presence of an officially assigned lawyer, D. The applicant reiterated his confession incriminating himself, the first applicant, B. and V. in the infliction of head injuries on S. On the same day the Tikhoretsk Town Court ordered that the applicant be detained on remand.","25.On 1 February 2005 from 2.30 p.m. to 4.05 p.m. O. carried out an on-site verification of the applicant\u2019s statements in the presence of D. and the applicant. According to the applicant, he had been told by the police officers \u201cwhat to show [them] and where\u201d. The applicant again reiterated his confession. These investigative steps were recorded on video.","26.According to the applicant\u2019s mother, who was present during the verification of the applicant\u2019s statements at the crime scene on 1 February 2005, there was a bruise on the applicant\u2019s face and he was limping. His limp was also visible on the video recording, which was shown on a local television channel.","27.On 2 February 2005 the applicant was taken by Kl., a police officer, to his grandparents from whom the applicant requested a sum of money. According to the applicant and his grandmother, when left alone with her, he explained that he had been beaten up by the police officers, that he had confessed to committing a crime out of fear for his life, and that he needed money in order to evade prosecution. His grandmother saw that he was limping and had a bruise on his face. His grandparents gave him the money.","28.On 3 February 2005 the applicant was informed that his mother had retained D., a lawyer, to defend him during the criminal proceedings against him. During their meeting on the same day the applicant told D. that he had given the confession as a result of his having been beaten up by the police officers. During his examination as an accused on the same day he pleaded not guilty and refused to testify, citing his right not to incriminate himself.","29.On 7 February 2005 the applicant\u2019s mother lodged a complaint with the inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office, submitting that over a twenty-four hour period the applicant had been held in police custody and beaten by police officers until he had given a confession.","30.On 15 February 2005 lawyer D. lodged a complaint with the inter\u2011district prosecutor\u2019s office, submitting that the applicant had been beaten up by police officers and that, as a result, he had given a confession (recorded as a statement of surrender and confession), which was repeated during his examination as a suspect and during the on-site verification of his statements, and that money (given to him by his grandparents) had been extorted from him by the police officers.","31.On 17 March 2005 the applicant lodged a complaint with a prosecutor at the inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office, submitting that he had been unlawfully detained and subjected to violence by police officers from the Tikhoretsk Police Department and had thus been coerced into giving a confession. On the same day he lodged a similar complaint with the investigator in charge of his criminal case, asking to be further examined as an accused.","32.On 25 March 2005 the applicant\u2019s mother lodged another complaint with the inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office, submitting that the applicant had been beaten up by police officers from the Tikhoretsk Police Department.","33.On 30 March 2005 the applicant\u2019s mother once again lodged a complaint with the inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office, submitting that after his arrest on 26January 2005 the applicant had been threatened and beaten during the night until he had confessed to a crime that he had not committed.","34.On 18 April 2005 D., the lawyer, complained to the inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office that his and the applicant\u2019s complaints had remained unanswered.","35.In a letter of the same date O., the investigator, replied to the applicant\u2019s mother\u2019s complaint dated 25 March 2005 that during his examinations as a suspect and as an accused in the presence of a lawyer the applicant had not complained that he had been subjected to ill-treatment by police officers. O. concluded that he had given his statements voluntarily.","36.On 26 April 2005 the applicant repeated his request to the investigator in charge of his criminal case that he be further examined as an accused, stating that he had not received any reply to his complaint of 17March 2005 (see paragraph 31 above).","37.On 3 May 2005 the applicant\u2019s mother lodged a complaint with the regional prosecutor\u2019s office, expressing her disagreement with the statement in investigator O.\u2019s letter of 18 April 2005 that the applicant had not complained about his alleged ill-treatment by police officers. She noted that her complaints about the applicant\u2019s alleged beating by the police \u2013 as well as similar complaints lodged by the applicant and his lawyer, D. \u2013 had remained unanswered, and that O. had failed to examine (in accordance with the law) the applicant\u2019s complaints.","38.During his examination as an accused on 16 May 2005 the applicant retracted his confession statements, asserting that they had been made under coercion exerted by police officers, and pleaded not guilty.","39.The applicant\u2019s lawyer, D., stated in a record dated 23 May 2005 noting his being granted access to the case file that in the course of the preliminary investigation the applicant and D. had repeatedly complained that the applicant had been beaten on 26 and 27January 2005 by police officers from the Tikhoretsk Police Department, as a result of which he had given a statement of surrender and confession incriminating himself and his co\u2011accused. They had not received any reply to their complaints and to requests lodged by them for an inquiry and confrontations to be held.","B.Refusals to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the applicants\u2019 alleged ill-treatment; the applicants\u2019 trial","1.Refusal of 2 June 2005","40.On 2June2005 an investigator from the regional prosecutor\u2019s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against O. for lack of evidence of a criminal event in his actions. The decision referred to the official records of the investigative activities undertaken and statements made by O., K. and R., which denied any ill-treatment of the applicants. In particular, O. stated that neither he nor the officers of the Tikhoretsk Police Department had used any unlawful physical or psychological measures in relation to the applicants, and that accordingly, no pre-investigation inquiry had been carried out. The decision of 2 June 2005 concluded that the applicants had been arrested, examined as suspects, detained on remand in custody and charged, in accordance with the law.","41.On 29 June 2005 at the preliminary hearing in the applicants\u2019 criminal case the second applicant requested that his statement of surrender and confession of 27 January 2005, the record of his examination as a suspect of 28January 2005 and the record of the on-site verification of his statements of 1 February 2005 be excluded from evidence on the grounds that his confession had been obtained through the use of physical violence by police officers who had unlawfully kept him in custody for twenty-four hours before his official arrest.The Tikhoretsk Town Court dismissed his request as premature and unfounded, stating that no such request had been lodged during the preliminary investigation in the case.","42.On 30 June 2005 the second applicant\u2019s mother lodged a complaint with the Town Court, submitting that the applicant had been unlawfully detained by the police officers for about twenty-four hours between his actual arrest at his place of work at about 7.45 a.m. on 26 January 2005 and his formal arrest on 27 January 2005. During that time Ch., K. and R. had subjected him to physical and psychological pressure, as a result of which he had made a confession in relation to a crime that he had not in fact committed. She requested that the police officers be prosecuted and that evidence be examined in support of her complaints.","43.On 6 July 2005 the Town Court dismissed the complaint of 30 June 2005 lodged by the second applicant\u2019s mother on the grounds that she had not been authorised to represent the applicant, who was not a minor, and that it was no longer possible to complain under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cCCrP\u201d) about the police officers\u2019 actions in respect of the preliminary investigation since the preliminary investigation in the case had been completed and the trial had started. On 11 July 2005 the second applicant lodged a complaint (similar to that lodged by his mother on 30June 2005) with the Town Court.","44.On 14 July 2005 the Town Court heard a certain St., who had allegedly shared a cell with the second applicant in March 2005 at the Tikhoretsk Police Department IVS. St. stated that he had been told by the second applicant that he (that is to say the second applicant) had committed a crime [against S.] together with other people but had decided to deny it and to argue that his statements had been obtained under coercion. St. stated that he knew that no pressure had actually been exerted on the applicant. St.did not remember whether there had been other people present when the applicant had told him this.","45.On the same day the Town Court heard the applicants and their co\u2011accused. All four defendants complained that they had been subjected to ill\u2011treatment by police officers. The first applicant argued, inter alia, that the second applicant\u2019s confession incriminating him of having murdered S. had been obtained as a result of the second applicant\u2019s ill-treatment by the police officers and therefore constituted inadmissible evidence. The second applicant reiterated the arguments that he had advanced at the preliminary hearing \u2013 namely, that he had actually been arrested on 26January 2005 and held continuously in police custody, where he had been subjected to violence until he had given a confession. He also stated that when he had been brought to O., the investigator, for questioning on 28 January 2005, he had complained about the above-mentioned ill-treatment; O. had replied that if he did not reiterate his statements he would spend another night with the police officers. The applicant furthermore stated that the police officers had visited him every day and had threatened him; his family had been unaware of his whereabouts; he had given confession statements out of fear for his life; and he had not in fact committed the crime in question. The Town Court ordered that the hearing be adjourned and an inquiry into the applicants\u2019 and their co-defendants\u2019 allegations be carried out by the inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office before the next hearing on 26July 2005.","46.On 22 July 2005 the Town Court dismissed the second applicant\u2019s complaint of 11 July 2005 (see paragraph 43 above) on the grounds that it was no longer open to him to complain under Article 125 of the CCrP about the police officers\u2019 actions during the preliminary investigation in respect of his case, since the preliminary investigation had been completed and the trial had started.","2.Refusal of 23 July 2005","47.On 23 July 2005 an investigator from the inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office issued a refusal (pursuant to Article24\u00a71(1) of the CCrP) to open a criminal case for absence of a criminal event under Articles 286 (abuse of powers) and 302 (forced extraction of confession) of the Criminal Code. The investigator relied on statements given by the investigators, O. and Sh., and the police officers, K. and R., all of whom had denied the applicants\u2019 allegations of ill\u2011treatment. O. also stated that no forensic medical expert examination had been carried out in relation to the applicants since no complaints concerning their state of health or the police officers\u2019 actions had been lodged by them. K. and R. stated that on 21 January 2005 they had established the first applicant\u2019s whereabouts, taken him to the Tikhoretsk Police Department and interviewed him. He had denied his involvement in the crime. He had later been arrested by Sh. The investigator also relied on statements given by K., R. and V.V., a police officer who had been on duty at the IVS, according to which during the first applicant\u2019s arrest and at his arrival at the IVS, respectively, they had heard him saying that he was suffering from a pain in the chest sustained during a fight with someone two days previously.","48.On 28 July 2005 at a hearing in the trial concerning the applicants\u2019 criminal case, M.S., a senior assistant to the prosecutor of the inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office who was representing the prosecution at the hearing, reported the results of the pre\u2011investigation inquiry, stating that the applicants\u2019 allegations of ill\u2011treatment by the police officers had not been confirmed. The applicants and their co-defendants objected, considering the inquiry to have been superficial and to have constituted a pure formality. The second applicant requested that an additional inquiry be carried out, since his complaints about extortion by the police officers who had taken him to his grandparents on 2February 2005, had remained unaddressed. The court ordered that an additional inquiry be carried out before the next hearing on 2 August 2005.","3.Refusal of 1 August 2005","49.On 1 August 2005 an investigator from the inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office issued a decision not to institute criminal proceedings for lack of evidence of a criminal event. He relied on the statements given by Kl., the police officer, that he had taken the second applicant out of the IVS on 2February 2005 in order to verify his suspected involvement in some thefts; and by taking the applicant to his grandparents he had done him a favour (see paragraph 27 above). The investigator concluded that Kl.\u2019s actions had had no connection with the second applicant\u2019s alleged coercion into making a confession concerning S.\u2019s death.","4.The request for the exclusion of the second applicant\u2019s confession from evidence","50.On 2 August 2005 the Town Court examined the results of the additional inquiry, which had been communicated to it by M.S. The applicants considered that inquiry to have been superficial and formalistic. At their request the Town Court examined witnesses. Two witnesses, in whose company the first applicant had spent time immediately before his arrest, stated that the first applicant\u2019s state of health before his arrest had been normal. It also examined G., the second applicant\u2019s colleague, who stated that at about 7.50 a.m. on 26January 2005 the applicant had left his place of work at the request of two persons who, as he had learned later during the day, had been from the police.","51.In a decision of 2 August 2005 the Town Court dismissed the request for the exclusion from the evidence of the record of the second applicant\u2019s examination as a suspect of 28January 2005 and the record of the on-site verification of his statements of 1February 2005 (see paragraph41 above). Relying on the refusals of 23 July and 1 August 2005 by the inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office to institute criminal proceedings and the official record dated 27 January 2005 of the second applicant\u2019s arrest (which indicated that the applicant had been arrested at 2.30 p.m. on 27January 2005), the Town Court found that his allegations of police ill\u2011treatment and unlawful detention had not been based on real facts. As regards the record of the second applicant\u2019s statement of surrender and confession of 27January 2005, the Town Court excluded it from evidence on the grounds that it had been obtained in the absence of a lawyer.","5.The applicants\u2019 conviction","52.On 5 August 2005 the Tikhoretsk Town Court convicted the applicants, who had pleaded not guilty, of causing grievous bodily harm to S. leading to her death and sentenced the first applicant to twelve years\u2019 imprisonment and the second applicant to nine years\u2019 imprisonment. Relying on the refusals to institute criminal proceedings issued by the inter\u2011district prosecutor\u2019s office and the regional prosecutor\u2019s office, the Town Court dismissed their allegations of ill-treatment by the police as unfounded. The evidence presented in the case included the record dated 28January 2005 of the second applicant\u2019s examination as a suspect and the record of the on-site verification of his statements of 1February 2005 (see paragraph 51 above), as well as the confession statements given by B. and V. during the preliminary investigation and subsequently retracted by them as having been given under coercion exerted by Tikhoretsk Police Department officers. The applicants appealed against that judgment, reiterating their arguments that they had been subjected to violence by the police officers and that the second applicant\u2019s confession incriminating them should have been excluded from evidence as having been given under duress.","53.On 29 March 2006 the Krasnodar Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal, endorsing the trial court\u2019s decision to dismiss the applicants\u2019 arguments concerning their alleged ill-treatment and the request for the exclusion of the second applicant\u2019s incriminating statements allegedly obtained under coercion exercised by the police officers. It referred to the refusals issued by the inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office and the regional prosecutor\u2019s office to institute criminal proceedings into the applicants\u2019 allegations.","54.The applicants lodged applications for supervisory review in respect of their case, which were dismissed on 9 June 2006 by the Krasnodar Regional Court and on 17September 2007 by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.","55.On 31 May 2011 the Promyshlenniy District Court of Stavropol reduced the first applicant\u2019s sentence of imprisonment by two months, in accordance with the amendments to the Criminal Code. The applicants\u2019 sentences of imprisonment ended and the applicants were released in 2014 (the second applicant) and 2016 (the first applicant).","C.Annulments of the refusals to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the applicants\u2019 alleged ill-treatment by the police, and further developments","1.Annulment of the refusal of 2 June 2005","56.On 6 February 2007 a deputy prosecutor of the regional prosecutor\u2019s office annulled the decision of 2 June 2005 refusing to open a criminal case against O., the investigator. A new refusal was issued on 8 February 2007 and was declared unlawful on 20November 2007 by the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Krasnodar. A further refusal dated 9 January 2008 pointed out that the allegations of the applicants\u2019 ill-treatment by the police had been the subject of a different inquiry, which was pending. On 6 August 2008 the Krasnodar Regional Court terminated proceedings initiated by the applicants\u2019 mothers to appeal against the refusal of 9 January 2008 on the grounds that it was no longer open to them to complain under Article 125 of the CCrP about the investigator\u2019s actions during the preliminary investigation in respect of the applicants\u2019 case, since the preliminary investigation had been completed. The Regional Court noted that should the unlawfulness of actions on the part of O. or the police officers from the Tikhoretsk Police Department be established during the investigation in the criminal case opened on 5 March 2008 (see paragraph 60 below), the decisions not to open criminal cases against them would be annulled and the proceedings in the criminal case against the applicants would be reopened owing to newly discovered circumstances.","2.Annulment of the refusals of 23 July and 1 August 2005","57.Following the numerous complaints lodged by the applicants, on 22March 2007 a deputy prosecutor from the inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office annulled as unlawful and based on an incomplete inquiry the refusals of 23July 2005 and 1 August 2005 to institute criminal proceedings, and ordered an additional inquiry. Eight further decisions taken by investigators refusing to open a criminal case between 27March 2007 and 6 January 2008 were annulled on the grounds that they were unlawful and had been based on an incomplete inquiry.Some of the annulments followed the delivery of court decisions under Article 125 of the CCrP finding refusals to institute criminal proceedings unlawful and unfounded (namely, the Town Court\u2019s decisions of 15 October 2007, 27December 2007 and 29 January 2008) \u2013 particularly in view of the investigating authority\u2019s failure to correct certain deficiencies (highlighted by courts and the supervising authorities) in the inquiry in question.","58.One of those eight decisions not to institute criminal proceedings, dated 23 May 2007, referred to the following statements collected by an investigator during the inquiry:","-According to V.Yu., the second applicant\u2019s colleague, shortly after 8a.m. on 26January 2005 the second applicant had left his place of work at the request of two men. They had all left by car. Before leaving, the applicant had had no visible injuries and had not complained about his health. Those men had enquired about the applicant\u2019s whereabouts the day before.","-The second applicant\u2019s mother stated that she had seen the second applicant during the verification of his statements at the crime scene on 1February 2005. He had had a bruise on his face and had been limping.","-According to the second applicant\u2019s grandmother, on 2February 2005 two police officers had brought the applicant to her place. He had been handcuffed. He had said that he needed money. When left alone with her, he had explained that he had been beaten unconscious and threatened by the police officers as a result of which he had signed a document at their request. He had had a bruise on the face and had been limping. His grandfather had given him the money he asked for.","-According to D., he \u2013 as one of the lawyers on duty \u2013 had been officially assigned to defend the second applicant during the applicant\u2019s examination as a suspect and during the verification of his statements at the crime scene. D. had not noticed any injuries on the applicant. After those investigative activities he had concluded an agreement with the applicant\u2019s mother to defend the applicant during the criminal proceedings against him. At their next meeting he had informed the applicant about the agreement concluded with his mother, and the applicant had told him that he had not committed the crime and had given statements incriminating himself and the first applicant as a result of coercion exercised by the police officers, who had threatened him and beaten him up. At the applicant\u2019s request D. had lodged complaints concerning his alleged ill\u2011treatment by the police. The applicant had not shown D. any injuries.","59.The following statements were also received during the inquiry:","-According to the second applicant\u2019s mother, the second applicant had been arrested by K. and R., the police officers, at his place of work at 7.45a.m. on 26January 2005 in the presence of a team of co-workers, including V.Yu., G. and three others. K. and R. had visited her the day before, when the applicant had not been at home, asking about his whereabouts. They had again come at 7.30 a.m. on 26 January 2005, shown their service identity cards and asked about the applicant\u2019s whereabouts. She had told them that the applicant had gone to work and they had left. When she had gone to the applicant\u2019s place of work she had been told that the applicant had been taken away by two men matching the description of K. and R. From 26 until 28 January 2005 she had called the Tikhoretsk Police Department many times but had been told that the applicant was not there. On 28 January 2005 D. had informed her that the applicant was suspected of having committed a grave crime and had offered his services as a lawyer.","-According to S.A. (the second applicant\u2019s girlfriend), after the second applicant\u2019s arrest she had seen the video recording of the verification of the applicant\u2019s statements at the crime scene on a local television channel. She had noticed that the applicant was limping and that his face was bruised and swollen. After the applicant had been taken away by police officers on 26January 2005, she had called the Tikhoretsk Police Department IVS on 27January 2005 but had been told that the applicant was not there. On 28January 2005 she had gone to the Tikhoretsk Police Department to enquire about the applicant\u2019s whereabouts, and had been informed by O., the investigator, that the applicant was suspected of having committed a murder.","3.Institution and termination of criminal proceedings in relation to the first applicant\u2019s injuries","60.On 5 March 2008 an investigator of the Tikhoretsk inter-district investigation unit of the investigative committee at the regional prosecutor\u2019s office (\u201cthe Tikhoretsk investigative committee\u201d) opened a criminal case under Article112\u00a71 of the Criminal Code (harm to health of medium gravity) in relation to the injuries inflicted on the first applicant by an unknown person at an unknown place at an unknown time in January 2005.By decisions of 5 June, 2 August, 13 September and 22 October 2008 the criminal proceedings were suspended for failure to identify any person to be charged with an offence. Those decisions were annulled by the head of the Tikhoretsk investigative committee.","61.The Tikhoretsk Town Court acknowledged repeatedly that the Tikhoretsk investigative committee\u2019s inaction had been unlawful and that it had failed to conduct the investigation in accordance with the law (namely, the Town Court\u2019s decisions of 30 May, 1 July, 21August and 26September 2008). The Tikhoretsk inter\u2011district prosecutor repeatedly called upon the Tikhoretsk investigative committee to put an end to violations of the CCrP being committed in the course of the criminal proceedings.Thereafter the proceedings were repeatedly terminated for lack of evidence of a criminal event or suspended for failure to identify any person to be charged with an offence, and the relevant decisions were annulled as unlawful and unfounded.","62.In 2010 the criminal case was transferred to the Tikhoretsk Police Department for further investigation for the reason that the police officers\u2019 involvement in the first applicant\u2019s ill\u2011treatment had not been established. On several occasions the investigation was suspended for failure to identify any person to be charged with an offence and then resumed again.","63.According to the investigating authority, in 2012 a certain N.K. turned himself in to the Tikhoretsk Police Department and confessed that in 2005 he had inflicted bodily injuries on the applicant two days before the applicant\u2019s arrest. The proceedings against N.K. were terminated as time\u2011barred.","64.In April 2013 an investigator of the Tikhoretsk Police Department was disciplined for violations of criminal procedure in the course of the investigation. On 4April 2013 the Tikhoretsk Town Court acknowledged numerous shortcomings in the investigation, such as the failure to question the applicant about allegations raised by N.K. in his testimony or to obtain a medical expert opinion as to whether the applicant\u2019s injuries could have been inflicted in the circumstances described by N.K.","4.Reopening and termination of the criminal proceedings against the applicants in the light of newly discovered circumstances","65.On 7 October 2008 the Tikhoretsk inter-district prosecutor allowed an application lodged by the applicants for the reopening of the criminal proceedings against the applicants (in the light of newly discovered circumstances) on the grounds that the refusals to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the applicants\u2019 allegations of police ill-treatment (on which the trial court had relied) had later been annulled.","66.On 15 July 2010 the prosecutor terminated the proceedings, holding that the applicants had been lawfully convicted by final judicial decisions, while their allegations of police ill-treatment were being examined in the course of the separate proceedings (concerning the applicants\u2019 complaints about their alleged ill-treatment by the police). On 28 July 2011 the Tikhoretsk Town Court upheld the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 15 July 2010.","5.Other refusals to institute criminal proceedings into the applicants\u2019 alleged ill-treatment by the police","67.In parallel with the proceedings described above, a joint pre\u2011investigation inquiry into both applicants\u2019 allegations of police ill\u2011treatment was carried out by the Tikhoretsk investigative committee, starting from November 2010 (after a number of refusals to open a criminal case into the second applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment had been issued and annulled between 26 November 2009 and 19November 2010).","68.Between 29November 2010 and 15 July 2015 seven more decisions not to institute criminal proceedings were taken and subsequently annulled as based on incomplete inquiries.Some of the annulments followed the delivery of court decisions under Article 125 of the CCrP finding refusals to institute criminal proceedings unlawful and unfounded, namely, the Tikhoretsk Town Court\u2019s decisions of 5March 2011 (which was upheld by the Krasnodar Regional Court on 13April 2011), 1 April 2013 and 23 April 2013.","69.The most recent decision not to institute criminal proceedings into the applicants\u2019 alleged ill-treatment in police custody \u2013 for lack of the constituent elements of crimes under Articles 285 and286 (abuse of powers) of the Criminal Code in the actions of Ch., K., R. and other police officers, as provided by Article 24\u00a71 (2) of the CCrP \u2013 was taken on 24February 2016 by an investigator from the Tikhoretsk district investigation unit of the Krasnodar regional investigative committee. Relying on the police officers\u2019 statements denying that they had ill-treated the applicants, the investigator concluded that no material showing that the police officers could have committed crimes against the applicants had been established. The decision also mentioned other statements, in particular the following:","-statements by Sh. and O., the investigators, denying the applicants\u2019 ill\u2011treatment;","-statements by several persons that the first applicant had not had any visible injuries before his arrest;","-statements by the police officers K., R. and V.V. (see paragraph47 above);","-statements by D. (see paragraph 58 above);","-statements by the police officers K. and R. that the second applicant had been arrested on 27January 2005 on suspicion of having committed the above-mentioned crime against S. and taken to the Tikhoretsk Police Department, where he had written a statement of surrender and confession, after which he had been arrested by O.; and","-statements by S.A. that after the second applicant\u2019s arrest she had seen him being filmed in detention on a programme on a local television channel; she had noticed that his face was an unnatural colour; and she had later seen on the same television channel another programme that had shown the video recording of the verification (with the applicant\u2019s participation) of the applicant\u2019s statements at the crime scene."],"31226":["7.The applicants are nationals of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Their initials, dates of birth, the dates on which their applications were introduced, application numbers, as well as the particulars of the domestic proceedings and other relevant information are set out in the Appendix.","8.On various dates they were charged in their countries of origin with religious and politically motivated crimes, their pre-trial detention was ordered in absentia, and international search warrants were issued by the authorities.","9.Subsequently the Russian authorities took final decisions to remove (that is to say extradite or expel) the applicants, despite consistent claims that in the event of removal the applicants would face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.","11.The references to the relevant reports by the UN agencies and international NGOs on the situation in Tajikistan were cited in the case of K.I. v. Russia (no. 58182\/14, \u00a7\u00a7 2-28, 7 November 2017) and on the situation in Uzbekistan in the cases of Kholmurodov v. Russia (no.58923\/14, \u00a7\u00a7 46-50, 1 March 2016), and T.M. and Others v. Russia ([Committee], no.31189\/15, \u00a7 28, 7 November 2017)."],"31276":["1. The applicant, Mr Zbigniew Or\u0142owski, is a Polish national who was born in 1959 and lives in Czerwionka.","2. The Polish Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Ms J. Chrzanowska, and subsequently by Mr J. Sobczak, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.","3. The Government has not objected to the examination of the application by a Committee.","4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.","5. In 2008 the applicant, who is a diabetic, started serving a four-year prison sentence which had been imposed on him on the basis of a cumulative sentence ( wyrok \u0142\u0105czny ) resulting from a number of his convictions.","A. Prison cell","1. Description of the material conditions","6. From 3 to 29 June 2010 and from 19 August to 23 September 2010 the applicant was detained in Kielce Remand Centre in cell no. 346.","7. A toilet annex was in the corner of the cell. It was separated from the living space by, on one side, a fibreboard partition 1.8 m high, and on another side, a cloth curtain. The window in the cell could not be opened, as it was blocked by a double layer of bars, internal and external.","2. Remedies used","8. The applicant complained on numerous occasions to the prison authorities that that arrangement infringed his dignity, firstly because it did not provide for a reasonable level of privacy, and secondly because the cell could not be ventilated. His requests to have the internal window bars taken down remained unanswered.","9. The applicant also lodged two civil actions against the State Treasury, seeking compensation for infringement of his privacy on account of the prison \u2019 s failure to adequately fit toilet facilities during his detention during each of the two periods which are described above.","10. In respect of the period from 3 to 29 June 2010, on 16 February 2011 the Kielce Regional Court ( S\u0105d Rejonowy ) awarded the applicant compensation in the amount of 800 Polish zlotys (PLN \u2013 approximately 200 euros (EUR)). The court held that the applicant \u2019 s personal rights and right to dignity had been breached, and that the defendant to the action had not explained why the internal window bars could not be taken down so as to make it possible to open the window and ventilate the cell. The defendant had not argued or shown that this would have necessitated any particular expense or entailed difficulty. The court further noted that the nuisance caused by the foul odour in the cell had been aggravated by the warm weather in June. On 21 June 2011 the Cracow Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal lodged by the defendant, fully upholding the findings of fact and law made by the first-instance court.","11. In respect of the period from 19 August until 23 September 2010, on 18 March 2011 the Kielce Regional Court ( S\u0105d Okr\u0119gowy ), relying on similar reasoning as that given in the first case, awarded the applicant compensation in the amount of PLN 500 (approximately EUR 125). On 13 July 2011 the Cracow Court of Appeal dismissed an action by the applicant after the defendant \u2019 s appeal. That judgment was served on the applicant on 16 September 2011. The appellate court did not question the findings of fact of the first-instance court. It observed that the impugned sanitary arrangements were compliant with standards from the 1970s \u2011 when the prison had been built \u2013 and with the applicable law. The State Treasury had thus not acted unlawfully, and no intention to act in bad faith or with the intention to cause harm or damage to the applicant could be established. It was concluded that, in the absence of unlawfulness, no breach of personal rights within the meaning of the provisions of the Civil Code on tort liability could be found. The court further observed that, in any event, the nuisance complained of had not exceeded normal difficulties inherent in serving a prison sentence.","B. Disciplinary punishment","1. Description of the relevant events","12. The following sequence of events in Kielce Remand Centre can be established from reports on the use of a measure of direct restraint ( protok\u00f3\u0142 z zastosowania \u015brodk\u00f3w przymusu bezpo\u015bredniego ) dated 16 March and 30 April 2009 (\u201cthe 16 March report\u201d and \u201cthe 30 April report\u201d); from findings made by the domestic court in the course of the proceedings described below; from the Government \u2019 s observations on the case; and from the applicant \u2019 s own submissions to the domestic court and to this Court.","(a) First period of confinement","(i) Events during the isolation measure","13. On the morning of 16 March 2009 the applicant became irritated by a cellmate \u2019 s personal hygiene habits and started kicking the cell doors. As submitted by the Government and established by the domestic court in the course of the proceedings described below, but contested by the applicant, the applicant was aggressive, was uttering obscenities and refused to calm down.","14. The prison officers put a straightjacket ( kaftan bezpiecze\u0144stwa ) on the applicant and at 10.50 a.m. placed him in an isolation cell.","15. At 12.30 p.m. the applicant refused to return to his cell and ignored the requests of his prison supervisor in this regard.","16. Between 11.40 a.m. and 7.55 p.m. prison guards entered the cell and checked on the applicant every hour. Each time, they considered that the restraining and isolation measures which had been implemented should remain in place, in view of the applicant \u2019 s continued inappropriate behaviour. Between 9.50 p.m. on that day and 6 a.m. on the following day the guards entered the cell to check on the applicant approximately every two hours.","17. From 6.05 p.m. on 16 April until presumably 6.04 a.m. on 17 April the applicant was provided with a mattress with bed linen. For the rest of the time, he was lying on the floor.","18. As stated in the 16 March report, and as established by the domestic court and submitted by the Government, at 9.50 p.m. (after approximately eleven hours) the straightjacket was removed because the applicant had calmed down. In the applicant \u2019 s submission, the straightjacket was removed at 10 p.m.","19. On 17 March 2009 the applicant was released from the isolation cell, as it was considered that his behaviour had improved. According to the domestic court, the Government and the 16 March report, the release took place at 8.03 a.m. (after approximately twenty-one hours). In the applicant \u2019 s submission, he was released at 10 a.m. (after approximately twenty-three hours).","20. At the time of his release the applicant had a superficial examination by an in-house doctor, having refused to undergo a more thorough physical examination. That examination did not reveal that he had any external injuries. The applicant complained to the doctor of backache.","(ii) Alleged urination incident","21. In the isolation cell the applicant did not have free access to a toilet.","22. According to the applicant, at an unspecified hour on 16 March, when he was still immobilised, he pressed the button calling for a guard in order to be taken to the toilet to urinate. By the time the guard arrived, thirty minutes later, the applicant had leaked some urine. The applicant was not given a chance to wash himself and change his wet clothes until after he was released the following day.","23. The 16 March report, in so far as it is legible, does not make any reference to the applicant \u2019 s use of the toilet or to the urination incident which is described above.","24. The domestic court considered that the incident described above was unsubstantiated by evidence. In particular, according to the court, at an unspecified moment a guard had expressly offered to take the applicant to the toilet.","25. The Government reiterated the content of the 16 March report and the findings of the domestic court.","(b) Second period of confinement","26. On 30 April 2009 the applicant shouted obscenities in the prison corridor. According to the findings of the domestic court and as noted in the 30 April report on the use of a measure of direct restraint, he also banged his head against the wall and was aggressive and disobedient. The applicant contested that he had hit his head against the wall.","27. The prison officers put a restraining belt ( pas obezw\u0142adniaj\u0105cy ) on the applicant and at 11.50 a.m. placed him in an isolation cell. In the cell, a protection helmet was also put on his head.","28. The applicant continued shouting, assaulting officers and reacting to any attempts to talk to him with obscenities and hostility. Attempts to reason with the applicant were made on 30 April at 2.47 p.m. by his supervisor and an in-house psychologist, and by the supervisor again on 1 May at 9.33 a.m.","29. Between 12.52 p.m. and 7.51 p.m. the prison officers entered the cell and checked on the applicant approximately every hour. During the night and the following day they entered the cell and checked on him approximately every two hours. Each time, they considered that the applicant was still acting up and should remain restrained and in isolation.","30. From 6.04 p.m. on 30 April until 6.06 a.m. on 1 May the applicant was provided with a mattress with bed linen. For the rest of the time, he was lying on the floor.","31. On 1 May 2009 at 9.30 a.m. the applicant was examined by an in \u2011 house doctor. The applicant uttered obscenities during the examination. The doctor recorded redness around the applicant \u2019 s wrists and authorised the continued use of the measures of direct restraint.","32. At 2.45 p.m. (after approximately twenty-seven hours) the protective helmet was taken off.","33. It is unknown whether the restraining belt was taken off prior to the applicant \u2019 s release. According to the 30 April report, prison officers checked and readjusted the applicant \u2019 s restraining belt on 1 May at 1.10 p.m. and at 4.48 p.m.","34. At 6.23 p.m. (after over thirty hours) the applicant was released from the isolation cell, as it was considered that he had calmed down.","35. At 6.50 p.m. the applicant was once more examined by a doctor. That examination revealed redness around his wrists. The doctor did not recommend any treatment.","(i) Urination incident","36. According to the applicant, at an unspecified hour during his isolation on 30 April he urinated on himself while he was immobilised, as he did not have access to a toilet. In addition, for several hours he was not given a chance to wash himself or change his wet clothes.","37. According to the 30 April report, in so far as it is legible, the applicant declined to go to the toilet when given such an opportunity at 12.52 p.m. At 1.30 p.m., 2.15 p.m., 3.30 p.m. and 4.15 p.m an officer checked on him and noted that he was lying down. The next note on the report shows that at 4.37 p.m. the applicant was allowed to change his wet trousers. At 5 p.m. he declined the opportunity to use the toilet. On 1 May at approximately 7.39 a.m. the applicant was given an opportunity to use the toilet.","38. The domestic court established that the applicant had urinated on himself on 30 April, having twice refused to be taken to the toilet and having used the toilet at 12.52 p.m. The court also established that a video recording of the cell revealed the following sequence of events starting at 2.20 p.m.: before the incident the applicant did not call the guards to communicate to them that he needed to go to the toilet; prison officers arrived at 4.45 p.m.; a doctor and a psychologist were also present in the cell (see paragraph 28 above); the applicant asked them to allow him \u201cto wash himself and change his clothes\u201d; a guard replied that that was impossible, but if the applicant improved his behaviour then he would be able to leave the isolation cell altogether; the guards loosened the applicant \u2019 s handcuffs (referred to here as \u201c kajdanki \u201d); the applicant told the guards that he would \u201cgo in his pants\u201d, he was swearing, acting aggressively and shouting that he wanted to wash himself and change his clothes; a guard reiterated that the moment the applicant improved his behaviour he would be able to leave the cell; the applicant replied that he did not want to leave; a guard asked whether the applicant needed to use the toilet; the applicant replied in the negative and repeated that he wanted to wash himself and change his clothes; a guard said that that was impossible; the applicant replied \u201cpity, then we will talk at the prosecutor \u2019 s [office]\u201d.","(ii) Use of handcuffs","39. According to the applicant, his handcuffs (referred to here as \u201c kajdany \u201d) were broken. As a result, they were so tight around his wrists that they hurt him. They were not loosened during the entire night that he was in isolation.","40. The 30 April report, in so far as it is legible, does not mention the use of handcuffs during the applicant \u2019 s isolation.","41. According to the Government, the 30 April report indicated that no handcuffs had been used during the applicant \u2019 s isolation.","2. Remedies used","42. According to the applicant, he complained to the prison judge in respect of both instances of disciplinary punishment described above. The domestic court established that he had lodged one such complaint, only in relation to the second period of confinement.","43. On 5 May 2009 the applicant complained to the prison judge that he had been tortured on 30 April 2009 in that he had been placed in an isolation cell and had not been allowed to wash himself. On 23 June 2009 the judge informed the applicant by letter that he considered his complaint ill-founded.","44. On 24 January 2011 the Kielce District Court upheld a prosecutor \u2019 s decision of 12 November 2010 to refuse to open a criminal investigation into some of the applicant \u2019 s allegations that between 16 March and 1 May 2009 prison officers had frequently woken him up and deprived him of access to the toilet, thus breaching their official duties. The court agreed with the findings of the prosecutor, which had been made on the basis of various reports and the video-recording from the isolation cell, that no wrongdoing could be attributed to the prison officers.","45. The applicant filed a civil action against the State Treasury, seeking compensation in the amount of PLN 10,000 for the alleged breach of his right to personal dignity. To this end, the applicant submitted, inter alia, that he had twice been put in a solitary isolation cell and immobilised; that on the first of these occasions he had urinated on himself and had not been allowed to change his clothes or wash himself; and that he had been woken up by the guards every two hours, which had made it impossible for him to sleep, and consequently he had been exhausted. The applicant argued that such treatment amounted to intentional harassment.","46. On 19 August 2010 the Kielce Regional Court dismissed the applicant \u2019 s action on the basis of evidence comprising: submissions which he had made at hearings on 28 September 2009 and 8 February 2010; his prison records; extracts of the video-recording from the cell; the testimony of eight prison officers who had been on duty at the material time; the 16 March and 30 April reports; and a number of letters from the Kielce Remand Centre \u2019 s administration.","47. The court concluded that, in the light of the available evidence, the force used on the applicant had not been unjustified or excessive. In particular, the straightjacket used during the first period of confinement and the restraining belt used during the second period of confinement had been removed as soon as the applicant had calmed down; he had not suffered any injuries, and if he had urinated on himself on 30 April 2009, this had been despite the fact that on two occasions shortly before prison officers had offered to take him to the bathroom. The court also observed that the applicant had been given the opportunity to wash himself and change his clothes on condition that his behaviour improved. He had refused, and instead had become even more agitated.","48. The court also took note of the redness of the applicant \u2019 s wrists, as registered by prison doctors during his second period of isolation. The court did not find any evidence that the condition in question had been caused by unlawful conduct on the part of the prison officers. The court concluded that it had most likely resulted from the fact that the applicant had not stayed calm during the thirty hours when he had been wearing the restraining belt. It was also observed that, in any event, the condition could not have been anything severe, since none of the doctors had ordered any treatment or had otherwise tried to remedy the applicant \u2019 s situation.","49. Overall, the court considered that the duration of the applicant \u2019 s solitary confinement had been justified, as he had continued to utter obscene and aggressive statements, and that the measure had not been intended to be harassment against the applicant.","50. On 19 November 2011 the Cracow Court of Appeal ( S\u0105d Apelacyjny ) dismissed an appeal by the applicant, upholding the first \u2011 instance court \u2019 s findings of fact and law in full."],"31273":["6.The applicants are Ukrainian nationals of Roma ethnicity. Before 10September 2002 the applicants lived in the village of Petrivka, Ivanivskyy District, Odessa Region (hereinafter also \u201cthe village\u201d). They currently live in Berezivka District, Odessa Region.","A.The events of 7 to 10 September 2002","7.On 7 September 2002 a 17-year-old ethnic Ukrainian was murdered in the village, allegedly by a Romany man who was apparently convicted of the murder afterwards. It appears that this occurred in the course of an altercation between Romany men and other youngsters from the village at a local bar or dancehall.","8.On 8 September 2002 a crowd of village residents gathered and demanded that the Roma be expelled from the village. According to the statement of the village mayor, Mr M.S., made in the course of a subsequent criminal investigation, the local officials attempted to defuse the situation and urged the villages not to do anything illegal.","9.On the same day the village council met. Among those present were: a representative of the Ivanivskyy District State Administration (\u201cthe District Administration\u201d) and the head of the Ivanivskyy District Police Department (\u201cthe District Police Department\u201d). According to the minutes of the meeting submitted by the applicants, in his opening remarks the mayor said, inter alia:","\u201c... today a cruel crime was committed [in the village] by a group of residents of Gypsy ethnicity. One student of [the village high school] was murdered and three others were injured and are now in hospital in a serious state. This crime was made possible by the fact that no appropriate measures are being taken against them in the event of their [engaging in crimes]. Everybody knows that the spread of drug addiction, which is taking place in our village, is their fault. Today a meeting of villagers took place at which a negative opinion was expressed about the banditry and other [forms of crime] on the part of this category of people ... I invite the council members to speak responsibly and to express their opinion about the crime committed and about the decision of the villagers. I would like this meeting not to turn into something which aggravates inter-ethnic relations.\u201d","10.At the close of the meeting the council decided, in particular, to \u201csupport the decision of the meeting of the village residents to expel persons of Gypsy ethnicity from the village\u201d.","11.On 9 September 2002 the village council met again. The heads of the District Administration and the District Police Department and the chairperson and members of the Ivanivskyy District Council were present. The village council examined the question of \u201cbringing the decision of the village council [of 8 September] concerning the expulsion of the persons of Gypsy ethnicity into compliance with legal norms\u201d. The head of the District Administration invited the village council members to carefully consider the wisdom of their decision, drawing a clear line between crime\u2011related problems and inter-ethnic relations. A council member, D., stated that whatever the wording of the decision it would have no legal consequences and that legal action against drug dealers would also be ineffective. In fact, it was not possible to keep the situation under control. D. furthermore stated that the neighbours of the Roma residents were saying that it was necessary to cut off their gas supply and to burn down the Roma\u2019s houses. At the close of the meeting the village council decided to ask law enforcement authorities \u201cto ensure the expulsion of socially dangerous individuals, regardless of ethnic origin, from the village\u201d.","12.On the evening of the same day the mayor and the local police advised the applicants to leave the village, as a \u201cpogrom\u201d was about to start. Electricity and gas supplies to their houses were cut. Subsequently, in the course of the night of 9-10 September 2002 a crowd of several hundred people, allegedly led by a certain MrO.M., ransacked the houses belonging to the Roma, destroying their belongings. A number of police officers were present but did not intervene to prevent the looting and apparently concentrated solely on preventing human casualties. The house where the first applicant lived had burned down. According to the Government, the results of the expert analysis of the causes of the fire were inconclusive (seeparagraph 118 below).","B.The applicants\u2019 statements concerning their particular situation","13.The applicants submitted a number of written statements from the applicants addressed to Ms Duducehava, the leader of a Roma association, and Mr Stoyanov, a lawyer who represented a number of applicants in the domestic criminal proceedings (see below). The statements bear various dates from 2004 and 2007, contain descriptions of the events of 7\u201110September 2002, and ask for help in dealing with the authorities. According to the general tenor of the statements, the applicants\u2019 had been urged to leave by the police prior to the pogrom, and in their absence their houses had been ransacked by the mob \u2013 in particular, doors and windows had been smashed, and furniture and belongings destroyed or stolen.","14.According to the fifth applicant\u2019s statement, dated 17 November 2007, she and the fourth applicant (her husband) had been away from the village at the time of the events and had only learned about them when they had returned on 20 September. She had had to sell her house \u201cat half the price\u201d (\u201c\u0437\u0430 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0446\u0435\u043d\u044b\u201d), as had other Roma victims of the pogrom. The seventh, eighth, thirteenth and sixteenth applicants\u2019 statements, as well as the statements of some other former Roma residents of Petrivka, were similarly worded, speaking of the houses having been sold for less than their normal price (for instance, Mrs M. Burlya, the second applicant\u2019s wife, characterised the price for which her house had been sold as \u201cvery cheap\u201d).","15.The applicants submitted eight undated photographs showing the ruins of one or several houses, certain photographs showing signs of fire. The origin of these photographs is unclear. In her statement to MsDuducehava in 2004 the sixth applicant referred to certain photographs showing damage to her and her relatives\u2019 houses.","16.The seventh and eighth applicants stated that all the Roma had left the village before the attack started.","17.Applicants identified in the Appendix asserted in their statements to Ms Duducehava, Mr Stoyanov or to the police in the course of the subsequent criminal investigation that they had been away from the village at the time of the events of 7-10 September 2002 and of the attack and had only learned about it later.","18.In her statement to Mr Stoyanov dated 18 November 2007 the ninth applicant stated that she had been at home with her two granddaughters (aged ten and fifteen at the time) when the attack started. Stones had started flying through the windows, four attackers had broken down the door and started shouting, and the older granddaughter had pleaded with the attackers not to kill them. The attackers had not touched the applicant or her granddaughters; the applicant had then fled.","However, in her statement to the police dated 26 September 2002 this applicant stated that she had fled the village prior to the attack and had returned the next day to find her home ransacked. In her statement (addressed to Ms Duducehava) and dated 13 June 2004 this applicant complained of having been expelled from her home but did not mention that she had personally witnessed any attack.","C.Aftermath of the events","19.According to a report published on 20 September 2002 in the regional newspaper Porto Franko and information given at a press conference held on 12 September 2002 by the Secretary of State (\u0414\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0430\u0432\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0441\u0435\u043a\u0440\u0435\u0442\u0430\u0440) for the Ministry of the Interior and by the head of the Odessa Regional Police Department (\u201cthe Regional Police\u201d), police officers had been present in force and had observed the attack. However, they had not attempted to prevent or stop it, apparently concentrating solely on preventing casualties.","20.The events were reported in a number of regional and national newspapers.","21.The applicants alleged that after the attack they had had to move to another town and live with family and friends in overcrowded and inadequate conditions.","D.Criminal investigation","22.On 10 September 2002 the Ivanivka district police initiated criminal proceedings against persons unknown on suspicion of disorderly conduct committed in a group (\u0445\u0443\u043b\u0456\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0441\u0442\u0432\u043e \u0432\u0447\u0438\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0435 \u0433\u0440\u0443\u043f\u043e\u044e \u043e\u0441\u0456\u0431).","23.On 10 September 2002 police investigators from Ivanivka, Berezivka, and several other districts conducted on-site examinations of the damaged houses in Petrivka (which included the taking of fingerprints). A regional police investigator conducted further on-site examinations in December 2002 and January 2003.","24.On 12 September 2002 it was decided to constitute an investigative team composed of a senior investigator from the regional police department and investigators and other police officers from the Ivanivka district and three other districts.","25.From 12 September to 9 October 2002 the regional police investigator obtained a number of expert opinions concerning the material found on the scene (notably assessing the damage there).","26.On 20 September 2002 an officer of the Ivanivka police questioned neighbours of some of the applicants. Those neighbours stated that on the night of the attack they had seen around 150 and 300 people near the applicants\u2019 houses.","27.From 23 September 2002 to 27 January 2003 at least sixty village residents, including O.\u041c. and P.M. (who were later accused by the applicants\u2019 representative Ms Duducehava of having a role in the attack \u2011 see paragraph 36 below), were questioned by the police \u2013 four of them by Ivanivka police officers and the rest by the regional police investigator. The villagers generally stated that there had long been tensions in the village between the Roma and non-Roma populations (many mentioning that this was connected with the alleged involvement of Roma residents in the drug trade), and that on the night of 9 September 2002 several hundred individuals had ransacked the houses of the Roma residents. This had been done to ensure that Roma would be expelled from the village. Some expressed approval of the attackers\u2019 actions (as having been triggered by the authorities\u2019 inaction against the drug trafficking), but denied that they had personally taken part in the attack.","28.The police also questioned a number of applicants, who gave statements largely consistent with the account of events set out in paragraphs 7-17 above.","29.On 14 November 2002 a certain Mr V. \u2013 apparently a Roma and a Petrivka resident at the time \u2013 was questioned. He stated that on 9September he had been called in to Ivanivka district police station and told that residents of Petrivka would be attacking Roma houses. Upon learning this, he returned to the village and helped to evacuate his family, as well as other Roma residents, to another village.","30.The police recognised the applicants listed in the Appendix as having the official status of aggrieved parties or of civil claimants (see paragraphs53 and 54 below).","31.In January 2003 (in the summary provided by the Government the relevant dates seem to be misstated as being in January 2002 and January 2007) the regional police investigator questioned three officers of the \u201cBerkut\u201d special police unit. They stated that about 2,000 persons had participated in the pogrom. They had asked the officers not to interfere in their actions. They had entered the houses and asked the individuals there not to resist and to leave.","32.In February 2003 the police obtained an expert opinion in an attempt to identify the voices on a video cassette. It appears that the video cassette contained a recording of a meeting of village residents held before the pogrom. The expert concluded that no voice could be identified owing to the poor quality of the recording.","33.On 4 February 2003 the police suspended the investigation for failure to identify the perpetrators. On 17 February 2003 the regional prosecutor\u2019s office ordered that it be resumed.","34.On 20 February 2003 the Ivanivsky district prosecutor\u2019s office (\u201cthe DPO\u201d) refused to institute criminal proceedings against the village council\u2019s officials for lack of constituent elements of a crime in their actions.","35.On 1 April 2003 the regional police investigator suspended it again.","36.On 27 February 2005 Ms Duducehava, the chairperson of Romani Zbora, an NGO, wrote to the Odessa regional prosecutor\u2019s office asking it to institute criminal proceedings against the persons who had participated in the attack and the officials who had allowed it. Specifically, she named MrO.M., Mr P.M. and Mr I.D., all of whom, she alleged, had incited the attack; she named M.S., the chairman of the village council, and O.V., the head of the district police department, as being among the officials who had allowed it. She named the first fifteen and the seventeenth to nineteenth applicants as persons whose property had been damaged, summarising their statements to her (see, in particular, paragraph 13 above).","37.On 28 March 2005 the Odessa regional prosecutor\u2019s office informed Ms Duducehava that an investigation into disorderly conduct had been initiated and suspended on 1 April 2003 but that operational measures were being taken to identify the perpetrators (see paragraph 58 below for a summary description of the legislative framework in respect of such measures). Twenty-three individuals, including those whose statements had been added to Ms Duducehava\u2019s complaint, had been recognised as aggrieved parties or civil claimants. Concerning the failure of the police to prevent the disorderly conduct in question, the head of the Regional Police had imposed disciplinary sanctions on the police officers at fault.","38.On 21 November 2005 Mr I.Stoyanov, a lawyer representing a number of the applicants, complained to the President of Ukraine and the Prosecutor General that the crime committed had been incorrectly classified as merely disorderly conduct, even though it could be characterised as an act of discrimination and mass disorder. The identity of the guilty parties was well known.","39.On 31 December 2005 the head of the regional police informed MrStoyanov that the investigation had been suspended on 1 April 2003 and that the regional prosecutor\u2019s office had examined the case and left the decision to suspend it in force.","40.On 25 January 2006 the DPO informed Mr Stoyanov of the decision not to institute criminal proceedings against the village officials (seeparagraph 34 above) and stated that Mr Stoyanov could obtain information about the situation in the hooliganism case from the regional police, who were in charge of it.","41.On 27 January 2006 the Ivanivka district police took over the investigation in respect of the hooliganism case and decided to resume it. On 5 April 2006 they suspended it again.","42.On 22 August 2008 Mr Stoyanov wrote to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office asking to be informed about the progress of the operational measures to identify the perpetrators and to be allowed to study the case file.","43.On 25 September 2008 the DPO informed Mr Stoyanov that the investigation had been lawfully suspended and that the aggrieved parties could only examine the case file once the investigation had been completed.","44.The applicants submitted a copy of a letter from the district police dated 13 July 2009 addressed to Mr Stoyanov. The letter informed MrStoyanov, in response to his query, that on 10 February 2009 the investigation had been renewed and on 2 March 2009 suspended again for failure to identify the perpetrators. No reason for the alleged renewal was mentioned. The Government argued that the letter was not genuine (seeparagraphs 88 to 91 below).","E.Judicial proceedings","1.Quashing of the village council\u2019s decision","45.On 21 March 2003 the Ivanivskyy District Court (\u201cthe District Court\u201d), having heard an appeal by the DPO, quashed the village council\u2019s decision of 9 September 2002 on the grounds that it was contrary to the Constitution and had been taken under the pressure exerted by a crowd of angry villagers in order to calm them down and prevent the lynching of the Roma.","2.Civil claim for damages","46.On 23 December 2005 the applicants (except the fourth and sixteenth) lodged with the District Court a civil claim for damages against the District Administration and the village council.","47.On 23 November 2007 the District Court rejected the applicants\u2019 claim, holding that it fell within the jurisdiction of the Odessa District Administrative Court. No appeal was lodged.","3.Administrative proceedings for the investigating authorities\u2019 inaction to be declared unlawful","48.On 3 May 2007 the first three and the fifth to nineteenth applicants lodged a claim seeking to have the failure of the DPO and the district police to investigate the incident declared unlawful.","49.On 9 February 2008 the Odessa Circuit Administrative Court rejected the claim without considering it on the merits, holding that it fell outside the jurisdiction of the administrative courts. On 17 March 2008 the Odessa Administrative Court of Appeal upheld this ruling.","4.Complaints to courts in the context of criminal procedure","50.On 5 June 2008 the District Court initiated proceedings concerning the claim brought by the first three and the fifth to nineteenth applicants under the Code of Criminal Procedure in which they challenged the decision to suspend the investigation. On 19 August 2008 and 8 April 2009 MrStoyanov lodged additional complaints on behalf of the first to third, sixth to fifteenth and seventeenth to nineteenth applicants in these proceedings. In those complaints, they stated that they had never been questioned and had never been recognised as aggrieved parties (\u043f\u043e\u0442\u0435\u0440\u043f\u0456\u043b\u0456). They asked the court to order the police to recognise them as such. According to the applicants, at the time of the application to the European Court of Human Rights the proceedings were still pending before the District Court and no decision had been made.","59.The relevant parts of the second report on Ukraine by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), adopted on 14December 2001, read as follows:","\u201c56.As is the case in some European countries, the Roma\/Gypsy population of Ukraine is faced with situations of severe socio-economic disadvantage, but also with manifestations of prejudice, discrimination and violence on the part of the majority population and sometimes on the part of the authorities, particularly law enforcement officials. ECRI expresses concern at this situation and considers that policies are urgently needed to address the position of the Roma\/Gypsy communities in Ukraine in order to ensure that the members of these communities enjoy in practice the same rights as the rest of the population of Ukraine. ECRI believes that the first necessary step towards developing an appropriate response to the problems faced by the Roma\/Gypsy population of Ukraine is the recognition on the part of the authorities that such problems exist and that they need to be addressed ...","...","58.Another priority area for action identified by ECRI is the behaviour of the law enforcement officials vis-\u00e0-vis members of the Roma\/Gypsy communities. In this respect, ECRI notes with concern frequent reports of excessive use of force, ill\u2011treatment, verbal abuse and destruction of property by law enforcement personnel. Discriminatory practices are also reported to be widespread and include arbitrary checks, unwarranted searches, confiscation of documents and, as noted in ECRI\u2019s first report, discriminatory enforcement of crime prevention policies targeting persons with criminal records. ECRI urges that action be taken to address manifestations of unlawful behaviour on the part of law enforcement officials generally, including through a more effective institutional response to such manifestations and through training and awareness raising measures. In addition, noting reports that the response of the police to crimes committed by the general population against Roma\/Gypsies is often inadequate, ECRI recommends that the Ukrainian authorities take measures to ensure that the police react promptly and effectively to all crimes, including those committed against Roma\/Gypsies and, in line with its recommendations formulated above, to ensure that the racist element of such offences is duly taken into account.\u201d","60.The relevant parts of the third report on Ukraine by the ECRI, adopted on 29June 2007, read as follows:","\u201c76.As previously indicated, Roma face a number of problems in their relationship with the police and other law enforcement agencies. ECRI has received reports according to which some police officers illegally arrest and harass members of Roma communities... Attempts to find a common understanding between Roma organisations and the Ministry of Interior, the Office of the Prosecutor and law enforcement officials have reportedly yielded few results. ECRI has also received reports according to which Roma do not receive an adequate response from the police when they are the victims of crime.\u201d","61.On 27 November 2002 the Council of Europe\u2019s Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (\u201cthe Advisory Committee\u201d) published its first opinion regarding Ukraine\u2019s compliance with that Convention. It concerned the first monitoring cycle and was based on the Advisory Committee\u2019s visit to Ukraine in December 2001. The relevant parts of the opinion read:","\u201c30.The Advisory Committee considers that Ukraine has not been able to secure full and effective equality between the majority population and Roma and that the situation of Roma remains difficult in such fields as employment and housing... These problems are exacerbated by the unsatisfactory situation of Roma in the educational system... The Advisory Committee is of the opinion that these issues merit increasing attention.","...","36.The Advisory Committee notes with concern that societal attitudes towards Roma remain negative, and sociological studies suggest that the prejudices towards Roma are markedly more widespread than towards persons belonging to other national minorities. The Advisory Committee believes that it would be helpful to design further initiatives aimed at promoting inter-cultural dialogue between Roma and others.","37.The Advisory Committee notes with concern that there have been incidents of discrimination and ill-treatment of Roma, including by law-enforcement officials, which have been reported inter alia by the Parliamentary Ombudsman. It is also concerned about credible reports about discrimination and hostility, including by law-enforcement officials, concerning asylum-seekers and other persons who have arrived in Ukraine relatively recently... The Advisory Committee deeply regrets that there appears to be some reluctance within the law-enforcement bodies to acknowledge and examine these problems, and it urges the authorities to increase the vigour with which these incidents are investigated and prosecuted.\u201d","62.The Advisory Committee\u2019s second opinion on Ukraine, issued on 30May 2008, reads, in the relevant part:","\u201c79.Some interlocutors informed the Advisory Committee that persons belonging to national minorities are affected by unjustified and\/or unlawful stop and search procedures which are carried out by law-enforcement officials. Roma, as well as persons belonging to visible minorities living in various regions of Ukraine, seem to be particularly targeted by this practice which is allegedly accompanied, in certain cases, by calls for bribes. Raids and home searches in Roma settlements, sometimes accompanied by an excessive use of force, have reportedly not ceased. Cases of ill-treatment by the police are still being reported, and the complaints brought against the officials under suspicion are often not properly investigated.","Moreover, there are reports of Roma convicted of crimes and subsequently sentenced to imprisonment, without substantive proof of guilt. By contrast, law-enforcement agencies are reported to be more reluctant to investigate crimes committed against Roma. Widespread negative stereotypes of the Roma population seem to be prevalent also within law enforcement agencies as well as the judiciary... and no doubt contribute to the risk of unequal treatment by these institutions.\u201d"],"31335":["5.The applicant was born in 1987 and lived in St Petersburg before his arrest.","A.The applicant\u2019s arrest and alleged ill-treatment","6.On 27 June 2013 D., an investigator at the Main Investigation Department of the Investigative Committee in St Petersburg (\u0413\u043b\u0430\u0432\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u0443\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0421\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043a\u043e\u043c\u0438\u0442\u0435\u0442\u0430 \u0420\u0424 \u043f\u043e \u0433.\u0421\u0430\u043d\u043a\u0442\u2011\u041f\u0435\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0431\u0443\u0440\u0433\u0443 \u2013 \u201cSt Petersburg Investigative Committee\u201d), instituted criminal proceedings into fraud against MsR. allegedly committed by the applicant.","7.At 4.30 p.m. on 4 July 2013 the applicant was arrested near his car on a street in St Petersburg by masked police officers of the special rapid response unit of the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs (GUVD) of StPetersburg and the Leningrad Region (\u0421\u041e\u0411\u0420 \u0413\u0423 \u041c\u0412\u0414 \u0420\u0424 \u043f\u043e \u0421\u0430\u043d\u043a\u0442\u2011\u041f\u0435\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0431\u0443\u0440\u0433\u0443 \u0438 \u041b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u043d\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0438\u00ad), and operational police officers of unit no. 7 of the operative\u2011search division of criminal investigation department no. 3 of the GUVD (\u043e\u043f\u0435\u0440\u0443\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u043e\u043c\u043e\u0447\u0435\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 7\u043e\u0442\u0434\u0435\u043b\u0430 \u041e\u0420\u0427 (\u0423\u0420) \u21163 \u0413\u0423 \u041c\u0412\u0414 \u0420\u0424 \u043f\u043e \u0421\u0430\u043d\u043a\u0442\u2011\u041f\u0435\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0431\u0443\u0440\u0433\u0443 \u0438 \u041b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u043d\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0434\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u2013 \u201cthe criminal investigation department\u201d). The applicant was dressed in a polo shirt and shorts. He lay on the ground until D.\u2019s arrival at the scene.","8.The following investigative measures were carried out that day:","(i)from 5.25 to 6.30 p.m. the applicant\u2019s car was searched;","(ii)at 7 p.m. he was arrested as a suspect and searched by D. at police station no. 59 in St Petersburg (a record of the arrest was drawn up at 8.50p.m.);","(iii)from 10 to 11.58 p.m. his apartment (which he rented from S.) was searched by D.;","(iv)shortly after midnight his wife\u2019s garage was searched, after which he was taken to D.\u2019s office at the St Petersburg Investigative Committee.","9.According to the applicant, he did not resist his arrest. From the time he was taken to police station no. 59 on 4 July 2013 until about 6 a.m. on 5July 2013 operational police officers Ch., K. and P. of the criminal investigation department, in D.\u2019s presence, allegedly subjected him to ill\u2011treatment in order to force him to confess to crimes. In particular, he was allegedly punched and kicked in the head and abdomen (by Ch. and K. at police station no. 59); struck with a book to the head, ears and back of the head and made to kneel on small objects spread out on the floor (by Ch., K. and P. during the search in his apartment); punched, kicked and dragged to the ground and spat upon in the face (during the search in the garage); punched in the head, abdomen and chest, nearly suffocated with a plastic bag placed over his head, struck several times in the torso and kicked in the left kidney (by Ch., K. and P. from 2a.m. to 6 a.m. in D.\u2019s office at the StPetersburg Investigative Committee), and threatened with a gun by Ch. D. allegedly refused to contact the applicant\u2019s family and lawyer.","10.From 7 to 8.30 a.m. on 5July2013 at the St Petersburg Investigative Committee D. questioned the applicant as a suspect in the presence of A.D., a State\u2011appointed lawyer invited by D.According to the applicant, he asked A.D. to inform the Internal Security Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of his alleged ill\u2011treatment, but he did not do so.","11.At around midday on 5 July 2013 police officers took the applicant to Aleksandrovskaya Hospital in St Petersburg, where the injuries on him were recorded. The applicant denied being physically assaulted. According to the applicant, he denied the assault because he had been threatened with violence by those who had ill-treated him if he \u201copen[ed] [his] mouth\u201d.","12.From 5.10 to 6.05 p.m. that day the Vyborgskiy District Court of StPetersburg held a hearing in the presence of the applicant and his lawyer. It granted a request by D. for the applicant\u2019s detention and remanded him in custody.","13.After the court hearing, the applicant was taken to a different police station (no.57) in St Petersburg, where his injuries were also recorded. The police records contain an explanation by the applicant stating that his injuries were caused from 4 to 5 July 2013 during his questioning at the Investigative Committee.","14.At around 9a.m. on 6 July 2013 the applicant was taken to hospital for a second time, where he remained until 9 July 2013.","15.On 9 July 2013 the applicant was placed in pre-trial detention facility IZ 47\/4 in St Petersburg.","B.The applicant\u2019s injuries","16.According to medical records from Aleksandrovskaya Hospital in StPetersburg, the applicant was admitted as an emergency and underwent inpatient treatment in the urology unit from 5to 9 July 2013. He complained, in particular, of pain in the left side of his lumbar region and in his abdomen and knee joints. He was diagnosed with a contusion of the left kidney. He also had a superficial abrasion on his upper abdomen, abrasions on both his knee joints (measuring from 0.5x1cm to 1x 1.5 cm) and bruising on his abdomen, chest and arms. After his hospitalisation the applicant was discharged for further supervision and outpatient treatment by a urologist.","17.According to records from police station no. 57 in StPetersburg of 5July 2013, where the applicant was examined by an on\u2011duty officer, the applicant had: (i)a bruise on his forehead; (ii)abrasions on his right elbow; (iii)bruising on his chest and abdomen and (iv)abrasions on both his knees.","18.On 9 July 2013 the applicant was examined by a doctor at pre-trial detention facility IZ 47\/4. He complained of pain in the left side of his lumbar region. The doctor recorded abrasions on the applicant\u2019s knee joints and bruising on his abdomen and noted that the injuries had been received on or around 5 July 2013.","19.On 2 September 2013 Sh., an investigator at the St Petersburg Investigative Committee in charge of a pre-investigation inquiry into the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment by the police, ordered a forensic medical examination of the applicant\u2019s medical documents, stating that he was in custody and could not therefore appear for the examination in person. The investigator summarised the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment as follows. After his arrest in the course of his questioning he had been repeatedly punched and kicked to the ears, back of the head and abdomen.","20.According to forensic medical report no. 3575 P, which was carried out in the absence of the applicant from 13 to 18September 2013 on the basis of the investigator\u2019s order of 2September 2013, and which comprised an analysis of the applicant\u2019s medical records, the applicant had the following injuries: (i)bruising on his forehead; (ii)bruising on his chest and abdomen; (iii)an abrasion on his abdomen; (iv)abrasions on his right elbow joint and both knee joints, recorded on 5July 2013; and (v)bruising on his arms, recorded on 8July 2013. The expert concluded that the applicant\u2019s injuries, as recorded on 5 and 8 July 2013, had been caused within the last fourteen to fifteen days. The expert did not exclude the possibility that the applicant\u2019s injuries had been caused on 4July 2013 and concluded that the injuries had originated from impact with a hard, blunt object or objects as a result of a blow or pressure (bruising), friction or a blow with friction (abrasions), and had not caused any \u201chealth damage\u201d to the applicant. The expert did not exclude the possibility that the applicant\u2019s injuries to his abdomen could have been caused by being kicked in that area, as was alleged by the applicant. The expert further defined no less than seven areas on the applicant\u2019s body where there was evidence that force had been used. The expert considered that in view of the available medical data it was impossible to confirm for certain a contusion of the applicant\u2019s left kidney, therefore it was not subject to expert assessment.","21.On 15 October 2013 Sh. ordered an additional forensic medical examination of the applicant\u2019s medical documents, stating again that the applicant was in custody and could not therefore appear for the examination in person. The investigator stated that it had been established based on the video recording of the applicant\u2019s arrest that in the course of his arrest the applicant had been \u201cknocked down\u201d (\u043f\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043b\u0435\u043d) to the ground, where had remained lying for some time, face down and motionless. The investigator further stated that, according to explanations gathered during the pre\u2011investigation inquiry, upon the arrival of the officers of the special rapid response unit the applicant had attempted to flee by spinning his car around (\u043e\u0433\u0438\u0431\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f). However, the officers had surrounded the vehicle from both sides. Since the applicant had further resisted arrest, the officers had used sambo techniques, as a result of which the applicant had been \u201cknocked down\u201d (\u043f\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043b\u0435\u043d) from behind, face down on the ground and handcuffed. According to eyewitnesses, there had been light fresh abrasions on the applicant\u2019s elbows and knees, which must have been caused by his falling to the ground. There had been no other injuries on him. The investigator ordered the expert to determine whether the applicant\u2019s injuries could have been caused as a result of his falling down onto hard asphalt ground.","22.On 15 November 2013 an additional forensic medical report (no.4414 P) was issued by the same expert. It was carried out in the absence of the applicant on the basis of the investigator\u2019s order of 15October 2013, and comprised an analysis of the applicant\u2019s medical documents and photographs in which he could be seen lying on the ground face down after his arrest in the presence of several police officers of the special rapid response unit. In reply to the investigator\u2019s question, the expert stated that the bruising on the applicant\u2019s forehead and abdomen and abrasions on his abdomen, elbow and knees could possibly have been caused as a result of a fall (\u043f\u0440\u0438 \u043f\u0430\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0438) onto hard asphalt. The expert further reiterated the conclusions made in the previous report about the other possible causes of the injuries such as being struck and, in particular, that he did not exclude the possibility that the applicant\u2019s injuries to his abdomen, taking into account their nature and localisation, could have equally been caused by being kicked in that area one or more times, as was alleged by the applicant.","C.Pre-investigation inquiry under Article 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure","23.On 7 August 2013 the applicant lodged a formal criminal complaint concerning his alleged ill-treatment (see paragraph 9 above) with the StPetersburg Investigative Committee.","24.Sh. at the St Petersburg Investigative Committee carried out a pre\u2011investigation inquiry under Article 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (\u201cthe CCrP\u201d).","25.On the dates specified below, and pursuant to Article24\u00a71(2) of the CCrP, Sh. refused to initiate criminal proceedings against the police officers and D. owing to the absence of the elements of an offence under Article 286 of the Criminal Code (abuse of powers) in their actions. Four of those refusals were overruled by a higher authority within the Investigative Committee as unsubstantiated and\/or unlawful, and the investigating authorities were ordered to carry out additional pre\u2011investigation inquiries:","(i)10 September 2013 (overruled on 16 September 2013);","(ii)15 October 2013 (overruled on 8 November 2013);","(iii)9 December 2013 (overruled on 7 October 2014);","(iv)18 December 2014 (overruled on 7 August 2015);","(v)5 September 2015.","1.Explanations and other material collected by Sh.","26.Sh. based his refusals to initiate criminal proceedings on the following explanations and other material collected during the pre\u2011investigation inquiry, as well as the forensic medical reports.","27.A. and S.B., police officers of the special rapid response unit, assisted Ch., K. and P. during the applicant\u2019s arrest. They stated that the applicant had attempted to abscond by spinning his car around; they had surrounded the vehicle and used the following techniques on the applicant: they had held him in a hammerlock (\u0437\u0430\u0433\u0438\u0431 \u0440\u0443\u043a\u0438 \u0437\u0430 \u0441\u043f\u0438\u043d\u0443) and \u201cstruck him with their feet\u201d (\u043f\u043e\u0434\u0441\u0435\u0447\u043a\u0430). Afterwards, they had laid (\u0443\u043b\u043e\u0436\u0438\u043b\u0438) him on the ground face down. He had then been handcuffed. They did not state that they had knocked the applicant down to the ground. Nor did they state that the applicant had fallen to the ground. L., a driver of the special rapid response unit, filmed the arrest. His account of the way the arrest had been carried out was identical to that of A. and S.B.","28.Ch., K. and P., the police officers of the criminal investigation department who participated in the applicant\u2019s arrest, stated that they had not seen the precise moment of his arrest, that is to say when he had been apprehended and laid face down on the ground by A. and B.S. According to Ch. and D. (who arrived after the arrest), the applicant had had fresh abrasions on his elbows and knees, which had probably been caused as a result of a fall to the ground. K. and P. had not noticed any visible injuries on him after his arrest. They stated that the applicant had \u201cpossibly\u201d had abrasions on his arms and forehead. He had not had any other injuries. No threats or physical force had been used against him after his arrest on the street, during the search of his car, at police station no. 59 in St Petersburg, during the searches of his home and his wife\u2019s garage, or at the StPetersburg Investigative Committee. The police officers denied subjecting the applicant to any form of threats or ill-treatment to extract a confession of fraud.","29.A.B. participated in the search of the applicant\u2019s car after his arrest as an attesting witness, together with M. According to A.B., the applicant had behaved calmly and not made any complaints. The police officers had not insulted or threatened him. A.B. had not noticed any injuries on the applicant. According to A.B., the neighbours from the building nearby (whose names are not indicated in the investigators\u2019 decisions) had allegedly seen the applicant attempting to run away from the police officers in the direction of his car; however, he had then been apprehended by the police officers of the special rapid response unit.","30.O. participated in the search of the applicant\u2019s apartment and the garage as an attesting witness, together with Sch. According to O., the applicant had behaved quietly and not made any complaints. The police officers had neither threatened nor physically assaulted him. O. had not seen any visible injuries on him.","31.S., the owner of the apartment rented by the applicant, stated that she had seen the applicant during the search of the apartment. She had not noticed any visible injuries on him. According to S., the applicant had been calm and had not complained of being assaulted by the police. S. further stated that the police officers had behaved politely. After the search of the apartment, the applicant had gone downstairs without protest. He had been in handcuffs.","32.The applicant\u2019s case file contained an undated internal memorandum by Ch. notifying D. of the applicant\u2019s arrest at 4.30 p.m. on 4 July 2013 on suspicion of fraud. The report indicates that \u201cduring the arrest, A.V.Samesov failed to obey and attempted to abscond. Sambo combat techniques and special devices \u2013 handcuffs \u2013 were therefore used on him\u201d (\u201c\u041f\u0440\u0438 \u0437\u0430\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0438 \u0421\u0430\u043c\u0435\u0441\u043e\u0432 \u0410.\u0412. \u043e\u043a\u0430\u0437\u0430\u043b \u043d\u0435\u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435, \u043f\u044b\u0442\u0430\u043b\u0441\u044f \u0441\u043a\u0440\u044b\u0442\u044c\u0441\u044f, \u0432 \u0440\u0435\u0437\u0443\u043b\u044c\u0442\u0430\u0442\u0435 \u0447\u0435\u0433\u043e \u0432 \u043e\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0438 \u043d\u0435\u0433\u043e \u0431\u044b\u043b\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0435\u043d\u044b \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0435\u043c\u044b \u0441\u0430\u043c\u0431\u043e \u0438 \u0441\u043f\u0435\u0446. \u0441\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430 \u2013 \u043d\u0430\u0440\u0443\u0447\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0438\u201d).","33.The video recording made by the special response unit showed the applicant after his arrest lying face down on the ground. According to Sh.\u2019s observations, injuries resembling abrasions were visible on the applicant\u2019s forehead and right elbow.","2.Refusal to open a criminal case of 5 September 2015","34.In the most recent refusal (5 September 2015) to open a criminal case \u2013 owing to the absence of the elements of offences under Articles 286 (abuse of powers) and 302 (forced extraction of confession) of the Criminal Code in the actions of Ch., K., P. and D. \u2013 Sh. considered that the applicant\u2019s allegations of police ill-treatment contained unresolved contradictions, evidencing his attempts to avoid criminal liability and provide false information to the investigating authorities. In particular, the applicant indicated that he had been physically assaulted many times, receiving injuries to his head, abdomen and extremities. However, according to his medical records, he had not had any head injuries, and the alleged contusion of his left kidney had not been confirmed. As to the abrasions on his limbs, head and abdomen, the investigator concluded that they had most probably been caused during the arrest as a result of the use of combat techniques on the applicant by the officers of the special rapid response unit and the applicant\u2019s position (\u043d\u0430\u0445\u043e\u0436\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435) on the ground. The investigator further indicated seven areas where force could have been used against the applicant on the forehead, chest, abdomen, arms and knees. The investigator noted that the applicant\u2019s injuries, as recorded on 5 and 8 July 2013, had been caused within the last fourteen to fifteen days. Accordingly, they could have been caused on a day other than 4July2013.","3.Judicial review of the refusals to open a criminal case","35.The applicant challenged the refusals (of 9December 2013, 18December2014 and 5 September 2015) to open a criminal case against the police officers under Article125 of the CCrP.","36.On 25 June 2014 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of St Petersburg dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the refusal of 9 December 2013. On 7October 2014 the St Petersburg City Court quashed that decision on appeal and found the refusal in question unlawful and unsubstantiated; it ordered the investigating authorities to rectify the deficiencies. In particular, the appellate court noted that the investigator had taken the decision to refuse to open a criminal case without identifying all the officers responsible, in breach of the criminal procedural law requirements. Moreover, the appellate court found that the pre\u2011investigation inquiry was incomplete, as not all of the applicant\u2019s arguments had been addressed.","37.On 26 June 2015 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of St Petersburg found the refusal of 18December 2014 unlawful and unsubstantiated, and the investigating authorities were ordered to rectify the deficiencies. In particular, the court found that the investigator had not addressed the applicant\u2019s arguments concerning the alleged threats and incidents of physical assault by the police during the search of the garage, and had not substantiated its refusal to open a criminal case.","38.On 6 May 2016 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of StPetersburg dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the refusal of 5 September 2015 which it considered lawful and well founded. On 2August 2016 the StPetersburg City Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant against the District Court\u2019s judgment."],"31337":["THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE","5.The applicant was born in 1995 and lives in Republic of Dagestan.","A.Applicant\u2019s allegations of rape","6.On 26June 2012 Mr N. reported to the inter-district investigative committee that, since 2010, his minor daughter, the applicant in the present case, had been repeatedly forced to have oral and anal sex with eleven men over a period of almost two years from October or September 2010 to June 2012. The men had filmed the events and had threatened to disclose this information to the public should the applicant refuse to comply with their demands.","B.Investigation in response to the applicant\u2019s complaint","1.Preliminary inquiry","7.In response to a complaint lodged by the applicant\u2019s father, the authorities instituted a preliminary inquiry during which P., an investigator, questioned the applicant (who provided a detailed account of the above-mentioned events), subjected the applicant to a gynaecological examination (which did not detect any traces of sexual assault on the applicant\u2019s body), conducted an inspection of the locations where the alleged rapes had taken place and collected wet towel wipes found at the location of the \u201cT.L.\u201d area (the applicant having explained that one of the rapists had wiped himself with a towel wipe). The wipes were sent for forensic examination. The investigator also questioned six of the men accused by the applicant of having raped her. They all denied her allegations. The investigator examined the mobile telephones belonging to those men and found none of the video recordings mentioned by the applicant.","8.On 18July 2012 the applicant\u2019s lawyer submitted a DVD with a video recording of one of the alleged occasions.","9.On 20July 2012 the investigator examined the video recording. Having discerned no visible traces of injuries on the applicant\u2019s body, he concluded that the applicant had been engaging in oral sex voluntarily.","10.Having examined the material obtained in the course of the inquiry, P., the investigator, discerned no evidence to support the applicant\u2019s allegations of rape and on 26July 2012 issued a decision declining to open a criminal investigation against the alleged perpetrators.","11.On 2August 2012 the head of the inter-district investigative committee quashed the decision of 26July 2012, noting that the investigator had not questioned all the alleged perpetrators and had failed to obtain the results of the forensic examination.","12.On 12August 2012 P. declined to open a criminal investigation. The relevant decision reiterated verbatim the wording of the decision of 26July 2012.","13.On 17August 2012 the deputy head of the investigative committee quashed the decision of 12August 2012, noting that the investigator had failed to comply with the decision of 2August 2012.","14.On 27August 2012 P. issued a decision declining to open a criminal investigation. The wording of that decision reiterated that of his earlier decisions and added that the forensic examination of biological material obtained from one of the perpetrators had not been completed. The said decision was quashed by the deputy head of the investigative committee on 4October 2012.","15.On 3November 2012 P., the investigator, declined to open a criminal investigation. He based his findings on the material collected in the course of the first inquiry. In addition, he relied on the statements made by the other three alleged perpetrators and the results of the forensic analysis, according to which the sperm found on the towel wipes could belong to Dzh.N. or K.G.","2.Criminal investigation","16.On 28November 2012 the head of the investigative committee opened a criminal investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations of rape.","17.On 15January 2013 the applicant was granted the status of victim of a crime and advised of her procedural rights.","18.On several occasions the investigator questioned the alleged perpetrators. The submissions that they made during that questioning are summarised in Annex I below.","19.On 10 and 11March 2013 M.G., Dzh.A., K.G., Dzh.N., Sh.D., M.M., N.A., and M.Kh. were arrested and remanded in custody on the charges of rape.","20.On 13 and 19March 2013 they were released.","21.On 17June 2013 the forensic expert prepared a report concerning the examination of the flash memory drives of six mobile telephones which the investigator had earlier obtained from the alleged perpetrators. The expert indicated that it was impossible to restore the flash memory drives of the phones because the laboratory did not have the necessary equipment.","22.On 9August 2013 the forensic expert concluded that the genetic material collected at the location indicated by the applicant could not have originated from Dzh.A., K.G. or Dzh.N.","23.On 4October 2013 an investigator, Z., ordered that the applicant undergo a polygraph test. On 7October 2013 the applicant underwent the test. According to the polygraph specialist\u2019s report, the applicant had been telling the truth when she had said that M.G. had sexually assaulted her at the B. Hotel, that he had blackmailed her and that he had slapped her.","24.On 9October M.G. underwent a polygraph testing. The polygraph specialist concluded, on the basis of the answers provided by M.G., that it was probable that he had blackmailed or threatened the applicant and had coerced her into performing oral sex on him at the B. Hotel.","25.On 6December 2013 D., an investigator, suspended the investigation.","26.On 13January 2014 the first deputy head of the republican investigative committee determined that the criminal investigation had been incomplete and perfunctory and quashed the decision of 6December 2013, ordering a further investigation.","27.On 25February 2014 D. discontinued the criminal investigation, noting that there was no evidence, except for the applicant\u2019s statements, implicating seven of the alleged perpetrators.","28.On 16May 2014 D. discontinued, on similar grounds, the criminal investigation against M.G. and A.P.","29.On 20June 2014 the Sovetskiy District Court dismissed a complaint lodged by the applicant against the decision of 25February 2014. On 20August 2014 the Supreme Court upheld the said decision on appeal.","30.On 28January 2015 the deputy head of the second division of the republican investigative committee quashed the decision of 16May 2015 and reopened the criminal investigation against M.G. and A.P. On the same date he discontinued the criminal investigation.","31.On 29January 2015 the District Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint against the decision of 16May 2014. On 1April 2015 the Supreme Court of the Dagestan Republic upheld the decision of 29January 2015 on appeal.","32.On 1September 2015 the District Court quashed the decision of 29January 2015.","33.On 30September 2015 the Presidium of the Supreme Court quashed the decisions of 20June 2014 and 20August 2014.","34.On 2October 2015 the investigative committee reopened the criminal investigation against M.G. and A.P.","35.On the same date the investigative committee discontinued the criminal investigation.","36.On 27October 2015 the District Court accepted the applicant\u2019s argument that the investigation had been incomplete and found the decision of 25February 2014 to have been unlawful.","37.After the reopening of the case, the investigator questioned Dzh.A., K.G., Dzh.N. and Sh.D.","38.On 30January 2016 the criminal investigation was discontinued. The investigator relied on the statements made by the applicant, her parents and the alleged perpetrators, and forensic evidence. He also indicated in the decision to discontinue the investigation that he had received a response from the relevant mobile-telephone service providers that they had not been able to obtain and submit information concerning mobile communications between the applicant and the alleged perpetrators. The investigator concluded as follows:","\u201c... the allegations that [the applicant was raped] are confirmed only by [the applicant] and her parents ... who learned about them from [the applicant]. The [applicant\u2019s] allegations contradict the statements of many witnesses and the forensic evidence. [The alleged perpetrators] denied the [applicant\u2019s] accusations. They maintained their innocence in [the applicant\u2019s] presence.","The investigation has not produced any additional evidence that would support the [applicant\u2019s] allegations. The [sexual] crimes were committed in the absence of witnesses, and obtaining proof of those crimes has become problematic. It should be also taken into consideration ... that a significant amount of time has passed since the crimes were committed.\u201d","3.Investigation case file","39.On 18November 2016 the Government were requested to submit a complete investigation file in the applicant\u2019s case.","40.On 29March 2017 the Government submitted an incomplete copy of the material from the case file (comprising 898 pages, including seventeen pages containing nine tables of contents). According to the tables of contents, the complete case file comprised nine volumes totalling 1,882pages. No explanation was given for the failure to submit the complete case file, as had been requested.","41.In particular, the Government did not submit any of the material referred to by the investigator in his decision of 30January 2016 as regards mobile communications between the applicant and the alleged perpetrators."],"31352":["1. The applicant, A.S. is a Sudanese national, who was born in 1986 and lives in the Netherlands. He was represented before the Court by Mr C. den Hartogh, a lawyer practising in the Netherlands, who has also assisted the applicant throughout the domestic proceedings set out below. The President decided ex officio not to disclose the applicant \u2019 s identity to the public (Rule 47 \u00a7 4 of the Rules of Court).","2. The Dutch Government (\u201cthe Government\u201d) were represented by their Agent, Mr R.A.A. B\u00f6cker, who was succeeded by Ms B. Koopman, and their Deputy Agent, Ms L. Egmond, who was succeeded by Ms K. Adhin, all of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.","A. The circumstances of the case","3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.","4. On 2 September 2011 the applicant applied for asylum in the Netherlands, claiming fear of persecution within the meaning of the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (\u201cthe 1951 Refugee Convention\u201d). On the same day the immigration authorities held a first interview ( eerste gehoor ) with the applicant about his identity, nationality and travel itinerary. The applicant stated among other things that he had travelled by boat from Port Sudan to Greece where he had stayed for about three months and from where he had travelled by boat to the Netherlands where he had arrived on 20 July 2011. He did not have any travel or identity documents and his journey had lasted about four months in total.","5. A written record of this interview was drawn up and the applicant was given the opportunity to submit corrections and additions, which the applicant \u2019 s lawyer did on the applicant \u2019 s behalf on 5 September 2011. In these written corrections and additions, the applicant \u2019 s lawyer mentioned that the applicant bore several scars on his body and requested the Minister for Immigration, Integration and Asylum Policy ( Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel; \u201cthe Minister\u201d) to have these scars examined. No such examination took place.","6. On 6 September 2011 a further interview ( nader gehoor ) was held with the applicant about his reasons for seeking asylum. A written record of this interview was drawn up and on 7 September 2011 the applicant \u2019 s lawyer submitted written corrections and additions, again including a request to have the applicant \u2019 s scars examined.","7. In his interviews, the applicant stated that his family originally hailed from Darfur and belonged to the Al Gimr population group. The applicant himself was born in a village near Khartoum, where he had lived all his life. He was married and had a daughter. His spouse and their child had not accompanied him but were living in the village in the household of his parents and his youngest brother. The applicant had never been politically active in Sudan. In March 2010 he had been arrested in his home by the National Intelligence and Security Service (\u201c the NISS\u201d). He was suspected of belonging to the rebel group Al-Ade wa Al Musawat (Justice and Equality Movement (\u201c the JEM\u201d)) and involvement in the attack of 12 May 2008 on Omdurman. This city lies on the western banks of the river Nile, opposite the capital Khartoum. He had been held for one year, during which period he had been ill-treated for the purpose of obtaining a confession from him. He had been taken thrice before a judge. On the last time he had been sentenced to death. During his detention, he had developed an itchy skin rash on his arms and torso. After one year he had managed to escape with the help of his uncle, who had bribed some of his guards. The applicant did not submit documents or other items to substantiate his claim.","8. On 8 September 2011 the Minister notified the applicant of his intention ( voornemen ) to reject the asylum application. On 9 September 2011 the applicant \u2019 s lawyer submitted written comments ( zienswijze ) on the Deputy Minister \u2019 s intended decision.","9. By decision of 12 September 2011 the Minister rejected the asylum application. In the absence of a detailed, coherent and verifiable account, the Minister disbelieved the applicant \u2019 s account of his journey from Sudan to the Netherlands. The Minister further did not believe the applicant \u2019 s claim that he had been arrested in Sudan. On this point, the Minister noted that the applicant had stated that, when he had been arrested by the NISS, they had mentioned his name whereas, according to the applicant, he was not registered in Sudan. According to the Minister the applicant had failed to demonstrate how the NISS had discovered his name and address. Furthermore, the Minister did not attach credence to the applicant \u2019 s account of his escape. In this respect the Minister noted that it appeared from the country assessment report on Sudan drawn up by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 22 June 2011 that persons arrested by the NISS were detained at unknown locations. It was therefore disbelieved that, as stated by the applicant, his uncle had managed to track him down and to bribe his guards. He had further failed to establish why two guards would risk their lives to help someone escape who had been sentenced to death.","10. The applicant appealed this decision. He further submitted a report of the Medical Examination Group of the Dutch Section of Amnesty International ( Medische onderzoeksgroep; \u201c the MOG\u201d) of 27 January 2012, which concluded that the applicant \u2019 s injuries could be the result of the ill \u2011 treatment he claimed to have undergone.","11. The report summarised the applicant \u2019 s asylum statements, described the applicant \u2019 s state of health and provided an interpretative opinion ( interpretatie bevindingen lichamelijk onderzoek ). It stated inter alia :","\u201cThe [applicant] has been arrested and blindfolded at night by 4 armed men and transported by car. He was accused of involvement with the [JEM] which he denied, but he was beaten with sticks and cables, also on his hands and feet, hanged by his cuffed hands and cold water poured over him. He stated that his ears had been pulled with pliers ....","The [applicant] has fallen ill in the prison in Sudan, he got a rash on his arms and torso with a lot of itching all over his body; he also got a small swelling on a buttock which, in the [applicant \u2019 s] words, has been cut out in prison. Because he was hit with a heavy iron bar on his toe, the nail of his big toe had loosened which had caused him a lot of pain. He had also been beaten on his calve with a baton with a nail sticking out which had caused a big wound due to which and for about 6 months he could poorly or barely walk. ...","The impaired and painful movement pattern of the left shoulder fits injuries caused by protracted stretching such as hanging by the arms. The origin of the small scars is less obvious; the [applicant] has been beaten with sticks but not on the naked body; through clothing this usually does not cause scars. The small sharp-defined scars may fit small injuries which were infected but have healed well. The scar on the left wrist may fit a burn. The scar on the left calve may fit an injury caused by a nail. The skin discolorations found on the front and back of the torso would be remnants of scabies suffered [by the applicant], as already also diagnosed and treated by the general practitioner. ...","The [applicant \u2019 s] mental state can be described as traumatised which shows in his lack of initiative and flat facial expressions; it is very well possible that this stems from the alleged motives. ...\u201d","12. On 16 March 2012 the Minister informed the applicant that the decision of 12 September 2011 had been withdrawn. The applicant therefore withdrew his appeal on 19 March 2012.","13. In his decision of 16 May 2012, following a fresh intended rejection of 25 April 2012 and written comments submitted by the applicant \u2019 s lawyer, the Minister again rejected the applicant \u2019 s asylum application. He considered that the applicant \u2019 s failure to substantiate in a sufficient manner his stated identity, nationality and travel itinerary as well as his failure to give a detailed, coherent and verifiable account of his journey from Port Sudan, via Greece, to the Netherlands, cast doubt on the sincerity of his asylum claim and detracted from the credibility of his asylum statement. As to the question whether nevertheless the applicant \u2019 s asylum statement should be accepted as positively persuasive ( positieve overtuigingskracht ), the Minister found that this was not the case. The applicant had failed to establish why he had been suspected of involvement in the JEM and on what grounds he had been sentenced to death. It was further considered that the applicant had failed to establish why he had been able to escape prison so easily. The medical report of the MOG did not alter this. The Minister emphasised that he did not challenge the medical complaints described in the report, but only the conclusions attached to them by the applicant. The Minister concluded that no credence could be attached to the applicant \u2019 s asylum statement and rejected the applicant \u2019 s arguments under Article 3 of the Convention.","14. On 11 June 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal to the Regional Court ( rechtbank ) of The Hague. He argued inter alia that, other than his Darfuri origins, he was not aware of any reasons why he would be suspected of JEM involvement. However, according to country-of-origin information, this (i.e. his Darfuri origins) could be enough. Thus, a report compiled by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and the Norwegian Refugee Council, dated 23 December 2010, stated:","\u201cFollowing the 10 May 2008 attack on Omdurman ... by the Darfuri rebels from the Justice and Equality Movement, several human rights organisations accused the Sudanese authorities of arbitrary arrests and detention, beatings, dubious judicial proceedings, extra-judicial executions, torture and ill-treatment of detainees. These practices were largely targeted at Darfuris living in Khartoum\/Omdurman on the basis of their ethnic origin or appearance.\u201d","15. The applicant also referred to a Report dated 27 October 2009 of the Panel of Experts established by the United Nations (UN) Security Council pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan, which stated:","\u201c269. The Panel has received a significant number of reports of arbitrary arrest and detention as well as ill-treatment and torture of persons while in the custody of the Government security apparatus. Most of these cases are related to the campaign carried out by NISS and the Military Intelligence with the cooperation of the Ministry of the Interior, in and outside Darfur, against Darfurians suspected of being linked to the attack against Omdurman on 10 May 2008. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, \u2018 among those arrested by NISS were hundreds of civilians of Darfurian origin who in many cases appeared to have been targeted solely because of their Darfurian ethnicity or appearance.\u201d","16. In addition, the applicant referred to the United States \u2019 Department of State 2009 Human Rights Report on Sudan, which included the following:","\u201cPersons continued to be tried in antiterrorism courts in connection with the May 2008 JEM attack on Omdurman. Authorities did not permit defendants access to lawyers before trial, held them incommunicado for up to four months, and reportedly tortured defendants. From April to June the antiterrorism courts sentenced 53 persons to death. At year \u2019 s end the total number of death sentences in the JEM trials was 103.\u201d","17. As to the Minister \u2019 s argument that the NISS kept detainees at unknown places and his uncle would therefore not have been able to find him, the applicant referred to country-of-origin information according to which the places of detention were not all that secret and he argued that his uncle had been in the army and that this background may have helped him trace the applicant. As for the country-of-origin information, the applicant referred to an Amnesty International document of 21 January 2010, according to which 106 death sentences had been passed by special courts since July 2008 and that all convicts were male and held in Kober prison in Khartoum.","18. He also referred to a Human Rights Watch report of June 2011 which stated inter alia :","\u201cThe security forces have targeted Darfuri activists for detention and t. In late October and early November 2010, for example, NISS arrested a group of 13 Darfuri journalists and human rights activists and detained them in their Khartoum offices before transferring them to Kober prison.\u201d","19. In its judgment of 27 December 2012, following a hearing held on 12 October 2012 which was attended by the applicant and his lawyer, the Regional Court of The Hague sitting in Arnhem rejected the applicant \u2019 s appeal. In its relevant part, this judgment reads:","\u201c6. ... In accordance with section 31 \u00a7 2(f) of the Aliens Act 2000 ( Vreemdelingenwet 2000 ), the circumstance that an alien is unable to submit any travel or identity documents or other materials in support of his asylum application which are necessary to assess that application is also taken into account in the assessment of an asylum application, unless the alien can demonstrate that this inability cannot be imputed to him.","7. It is established that the [applicant] has not submitted any travel documents. In the Court \u2019 s opinion the [Minister] could in reason have held this against the [applicant], because he has not produced any travel documents or other indicative evidence in substantiation of the account of his journey and neither has he been able to give a detailed, coherent and verifiable account of his travel itinerary. In this the [Minister] could take into account that the [applicant] has been unable to submit indicative evidence of the journey and that the [applicant], who has stated that he has travelled by boat from Port Sudan to Greece and subsequently to the Netherlands is unable to give any information about matters like the name of the boat, under what flag it was sailing and whether it has docked at another harbour on the way. The [Minister] could refuse to accept the mere statement of the [applicant] that he had boarded and disembarked during the night. ...","9. When a circumstance as referred to in section 31 \u00a7 2(f) of the Aliens Act 2000 obtains, the asylum statement must \u2013 according to paragraph C14\/204 of the Aliens Act 2000 Implementation Guidelines ( Vreemdelingencirculaire 2000 ) \u2013 have positive persuasiveness in order to attach credence to it.","10. The question then arises whether the [Minister] could in reason consider that the [applicant \u2019 s] asylum statement lacks positive persuasiveness. In this, the criterion is not the judge \u2019 s own opinion about the credibility of the asylum statement, but the question whether there is ground for holding that the [Minister] \u2013 noting the reasons set out in the intention and the impugned decision, considered in the light of the records drawn up on the interviews, the corrections, additions and written comments \u2013 could not in reason have reached his finding about the credibility of the asylum statement.","11. In the court \u2019 s opinion, the [Minister] could in reason find that the [applicant \u2019 s] asylum statement lacks positive persuasiveness. In this, the [Minister] has taken into account that the [applicant] has not established what caused his arrest, detention and conviction. The [applicant] has not indicated for what reason he was suspected of involvement with an opposition party in Darfur and his argument that his origin apparently sufficed for the suspicion is merely an own assumption which has remained wholly unsubstantiated. The [applicant \u2019 s] reference to the Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan does \u2013 according to the [Minister] \u2013 not affect that it remains for the [applicant] to establish the alleged events which were the cause for leaving the country. According to the Minister, a mere reference to this report does not suffice.","The [Minister] has further found not credible the relatively simple manner in which the [applicant] has escaped. In this, the [Minister] has taken into account that it appears from the official country report ( ambtsbericht ) on Sudan of 27 June 2012, which concerns the period from mid-April 2011 up to and including May 2012, that persons who have been apprehended by the Sudanese authorities are being detained on unknown locations and have in fact (temporarily) disappeared. The [Minister] has found vague and thus dismissed as insufficient, the [applicant \u2019 s] unsubstantiated claim that his uncle had a military past and thus had been able to find out where the [applicant] was being held. In the [Minister \u2019 s] opinion, the height of the bribe paid to free the [applicant] contrasts sharply with the life sentence and security measures imposed [on the applicant] and therefore also on this point the asylum statement is not persuasive. The [applicant \u2019 s] reference to a number of public sources does not render credible that his uncle has been able to find him, in which context the [Minister] has considered that written comments or grounds for appeal are not intended to adapt or make additions to \u2013 at wish and at a later stage \u2013 statements given by the [applicant].","12. The court further finds that it was possible for the [Minister] to conclude that, although admittedly concluded in the MOG report of Amnesty International submitted by the [applicant] that the noted [medical] complaints (can) fit the events alleged by the [applicant], this does not render his asylum statement positively persuasive. ... [the Regional Court quotes here the conclusion of the Medical Examination Group of the Dutch Section of Amnesty International (see paragraph 10 above) and part of \u00a7 187 of the Istanbul Protocol (see paragraph 28 below)] ....","16. The court notes that the gradations used in the MOG report concerning the level of consistency between the [applicant \u2019 s] medical complaints and what he has presented in his asylum statement about their origins leaves room for many other causes than the alleged torture. It was therefore possible for the [Minister] to adopt the position that the report does not alter the [Minister \u2019 s] finding about the credibility of the asylum statement. Since the ill-treatment c.q. torture has not been established, there is \u2013 other than argued by the [applicant] \u2013 no similar situation as in the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 9 March 2010, no. 41827\/07, R.C. v. Sweden, Jurisprudentie Vreemdelingenrecht [ Immigration Law Reports ] 2010\/147.","17. In view of the above and having taken into account the assessment framework as set out in paragraph 10 above, there is no ground for finding that the [Minister] could not reasonably have adopted the view that the [applicant \u2019 s] asylum statement lacks positive persuasiveness. The court, taking into account that the fear of persecution alleged by the [applicant] is derived from the arrest, detention, conviction and escape which have not been found credible by the [Minister], finds that it was not necessary for the [Minister] to assess the gravity ( zwaarwegendheid ) [of the asylum statement]. This means that the [Minister] has justly concluded that the [applicant] is not eligible for a[n asylum-based] residence permit based on one the grounds set out in section 29 \u00a7 1 of the Aliens Act 2000. ...\u201d","20. On 8 January 2013 the applicant lodged a further appeal before the Administrative Jurisdiction Division ( Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak ) of the Council of State ( Raad van State ). As a further appeal did not have automatic suspensive effect, the applicant applied for a provisional measure ( voorlopige voorziening ) allowing him to remain in the Netherlands pending the outcome of the further appeal. On 11 March 2013 the President of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division rejected the request for a provisional measure, finding that it was unclear whether and, if so when, removal would take place. This finding was not altered by the circumstance that on 20 February 2013 the applicant had been placed in immigration detention ( vreemdelingenbewaring ).","B. Subsequent developments","21. The application was lodged with the Court on 20 March 2013, together with a request to issue an interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of the Court seeking that the applicant \u2019 s removal to Sudan be stayed pending the proceedings before the Court.","22. On 9 April 2013 the Acting President of the Section to which the case had been allocated decided to grant the request to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, indicating to the Government that the applicant should not be expelled to Sudan until further notice. On 12 April 2013 and in connection with the decision to apply Rule 39, the order for the applicant \u2019 s placement in immigration detention was lifted and the applicant was released from immigration detention.","23. The applicant \u2019 s further appeal of 8 January 2013 was rejected on 12 February 2014 by the Administrative Jurisdiction Division. It held that under section 91 \u00a7 2 of the Aliens Act 2000, no further reasoning was called for, as the arguments submitted did not raise any questions requiring determination in the interest of legal unity, legal development or legal protection in the general sense. No further appeal lay against that ruling.","C. Relevant domestic law and practice","24. The admission, residence and expulsion of aliens are regulated by the Aliens Act 2000. Further rules are laid down in the Aliens Decree 2000 ( Vreemdelingenbesluit 2000 ), the Regulation on Aliens 2000 ( Voorschrift Vreemdelingen 2000 ) and the Aliens Act 2000 Implementation Guidelines ( Vreemdelingencirculaire 2000 ). The General Administrative Law Act ( Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht ) applies to proceedings under the Aliens Act 2000, unless indicated otherwise in the latter Act.","25. Section 13 of the Aliens Act 2000 provides that an application for a residence permit shall be granted only if:","a) international obligations require this;","b) the presence of the alien would serve a genuine interest of the Netherlands, or","c) urgent reasons of a humanitarian nature require this.","1. Asylum applications","26. A general overview of the relevant domestic law and practice as regards asylum proceedings has been set out in X v. the Netherlands (no. 14319\/17, \u00a7\u00a7 34-40, 10 July 2018).","2. Domestic policy in respect of Sudanese asylum seekers","27. An official country report ( algemeen ambtsbericht ) on Sudan released by the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs in June 2011 and covering the situation in Sudan in the period between May 2010 and mid \u2011 April 2011, states inter alia:","\u201cIn February 2010, the government of Sudan and the JEM signed a framework agreement in which the parties declared a cease-fire, and agreed on an amnesty for members of the JEM and release of all JEM prisoners and convicts. According to the framework agreement, a definitive agreement should be signed by 15 March 2010. However, this deadline was not met. In March 2010, the government of Sudan also concluded with the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) a framework agreement, including a cease-fire, which should form the starting point for further negotiations. In response to the negotiations between the LJM and the government, the JEM suspended the negotiations with the government.\u201d","28. The official country report on Sudan, released by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on 20 June 2017, covering the situation in Sudan in the period between July 2015 and the end of May 2017, contains the following statements:","\u201cDuring the reference period various parties ... have made attempts to obtain the return to the negotiating table of the [Sudanese] government and the rebel movements who have not signed the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, such as the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)\/Gibril, the Sudan Liberation Army\/Minni Minnawi (SLA\/MM) and the Sudan Liberation Army\/Abdul Wahid (SLA\/AW).","On 8 August 2016 SLA\/MM and JEM-Gibril as members of the Sudan Call signed the AUHIP [African Union High Level Implementation Panel for the Sudan and South Sudan] roadmap after all and the next day negotiations about a cease-fire were resumed. ... JEM and SLA\/MM are no longer a significant factor in Darfur as a consequence of the effective strategy of the government to curb the uprising. JEM now mainly operates in South-Sudan. ...","According to a source about one million Fur from Darfur are living in Khartoum and its surrounding area. Most Darfuris are living in poor neighbourhoods in North-Khartoum ..., the area between the Blue and the White Nile ... and in Omdurman ... Sometimes dilapidated neighbourhoods are cleared and their inhabitants forced to move further away from Khartoum. Darfuris and persons hailing from the Two Areas who can afford it are living in better neighbourhoods of the city, including the centre.","The improved economic situation in Khartoum, including improved employment rates, is one of the pull factors of migration from Darfur and the Two Areas to Khartoum. Many find work in the informal sector, for instance as guards, and in construction and agriculture. Many Darfuris work in laundry shops all over Khartoum. Darfuris are also working as university teachers. Because it is difficult for Darfuris and persons originating from the Two Areas to find work in the formal sector, those with an academic degree look for work abroad, for instance in the Gulf States or Europe.","Darfuris and persons originating from the Two Areas are still often referred to by members of Arabic tribes as \u2018 slave \u2019. However, despite systematic discrimination Darfuris and persons originating from the Two Areas can maintain themselves reasonably in daily life in Khartoum. They are not as much discriminated against by other citizens but by the public order police who extort them and by some authorities. According to sources in Khartoum, Darfuris are not looked down upon because of their ethnicity but because of their bad economic circumstances. ...","In general, it can be said that persons, who are considered a threat by the Sudanese authorities, risk falling victim to human rights violations upon return, including detention and torture. An example might be human rights defenders having profiled themselves as critical. According to various sources, this would only concern a small number of Sudanese asylum-seekers. It is assumed that the Sudanese Government monitors activities of opponents abroad but from this side it is not known to what extent and what the consequences thereof are. According to various sources, there are no indications that rejected asylum-seekers from Darfur or the Two Areas, after their forced return, have encountered problems upon arrival in Khartoum. Some rejected asylum-seekers have been removed from Switzerland and Norway during the reference period. None of them have been arrested upon return.\u201d","29. On 20 November 2017 the Deputy Secretary of Justice and Security sent a letter to the Lower House of Parliament ( Tweede Kamer der Staten \u2011 Generaal ) on the country-specific asylum policy in respect of Sudan. In its relevant part, it reads as follows:","\u201cOn 20 June 2017 the Minister of Foreign Affairs has released a new official country assessment report on Sudan, describing the situation in that country from July 2015 up to and including May 2017. Insofar as relevant for policy determination, it appears from this report that the security situation in Darfur as well as in the areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile has remained as bad as before. A national dialogue between the government and the (armed) opposition, which took place during the reporting period, has brought little change. Although some rebel groups have laid down their weapons, most opposition groups and the most important (armed) opposition group have boycotted the national dialogue. Just as during the previous reporting period, the situation in the conflict areas is diffuse and volatile. In the areas, there is still random violence and large numbers of refugees and displaced persons. In South Kordofan and Blue Nile, armed opposition groups continue their battle against the government. In Darfur, the battle dynamics have evolved from rebels versus the government to a multitude of actors in a diversity of conflicts. The highest number of battles in this region no longer takes place between government and rebel forces but in the context of tribal violence.","For the purpose of careful decision-making in individual cases and in order to be able \u2013 in assessing these cases \u2013 to do justice to the complex and evolving situation, some adjustments to the applicable policy are called for.","The starting point of the country-specific asylum policy in respect of Sudan remains that asylum applications of Sudanese foreign nationals are assessed on the basis of the individual asylum statement of the asylum-seeker. At the same time, special policies remain in place for specific population groups and specific areas in Sudan, but certain components must be adjusted.","Under the policy of previous years \u2013 in contrast to the other parts of Darfur \u2013 West Darfur was not considered as being in a situation as meant in Article 15c of the [Council Directive 2004\/83\/EC of 29 April 2004] Qualification Directive, because the situation there was relatively calm and stable. However, it appears from the official country assessment report that during the reporting period violent tribal violence, resulting in deaths and large numbers of displaced persons, has emerged also in West Darfur. The reason for the difference in policy between the different parts has thus been cancelled, especially now that most of the fighting takes place in the other parts of Darfur as part of tribal violence. In view of this, the policy has been adjusted in such a way that a situation as referred to in Article 15c of the Qualification Directive is now assumed to pertain throughout Darfur. The reason to differ in policy between the different parts has thus ceased to be valid, the more so now also in the other parts of Darfur most of the fighting occurs in the framework of tribal violence. In view of this, the policy has been adjusted in such a way that a situation as referred to in Article 15c of the Qualification Directive is now assumed to pertain throughout Darfur.","A further policy adjustment is called for, because it appears from the official report that the security situation has deteriorated for people who are committed to promoting respect for human rights. They are monitored, threatened, arrested, detained, ill-treated and persecuted by the Sudanese security services. Human rights activists are therefore designated as an at \u2011 risk group in the policy. This means that in respect of foreigners, who have demonstrated that they have been active in the field of human rights in Sudan, limited indications suffice to make a plausible case that problems connected with one of the grounds for persecution give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution. However, the individualisation requirement ( individualiseringsvereiste ) will remain applicable to foreigners who belong to this at-risk group.","It is expected that the above policy adjustments will have limited significance for the granting of permits. The influx of foreigners from Sudan is relatively constant. Moreover, the policy in respect of internal fight or internal relocation to another location in Sudan has remained unchanged.\u201d","30. The policy changes indicated in this letter are included in the decision of 31 May 2018, no. 2018\/3, amending the Aliens Act 2000 Implementation Guidelines ( Wijzigingsbesluit Vreemdelingencirculaire 2000; \u201cWBV 2018\/3\u201d) which entered into force on 13 June 2018. Under the new policy in respect of Sudan only those persons are considered as belonging to a risk-group:","- a non-Arab population group, hails from Darfur and had his\/her normal residence there before arriving in the Netherlands; or","- a non-Arab population group from the Nuba mountains and had his\/her normal residence there before arriving in the Netherlands.","It is further accepted under the new policy and in respect of persons hailing from Darfur and from South Kordofan (including Abyei) and Blue Nile, that in those areas the general situation is such that removal must be regarded as entailing a real risk of incurring serious harm.","D. Relevant international materials","31. In paragraph 187 of the United Nations Manual on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (\u201cthe Istanbul Protocol\u201d; see Bat\u0131 and Others v. Turkey, nos. 33097\/96 and 57834\/00, \u00a7 100, ECHR 2004 \u2011 IV (extracts)) it is stated:","\u201cFor each lesion and for the overall pattern of lesions, the physician should indicate the degree of consistency between it and the attribution given by the patient. The following terms are generally used:","(a) Not consistent: the lesion could not have been caused by the trauma described;","(b) Consistent with: the lesion could have been caused by the trauma described, but it is non-specific and there are many other possible causes;","(c) Highly consistent: the lesion could have been caused by the trauma described, and there are few other possible causes;","(d) Typical of: this is an appearance that is usually found with this kind of trauma, but there are other possible causes;","(e) Diagnostic of: this appearance could not have been caused in any way other than that described.\u201d","32. The Country of Origin Information Report on Sudan, released on 16 April 2010 by the UK Home Office contains the following passages:","\u201cThis Country of Origin Information Report (COI Report) has been produced by COI Service, United Kingdom Border Agency (UKBA), for use by officials involved in the asylum\/human rights determination process. The Report provides general background information about the issues most commonly raised in asylum\/human rights claims made in the United Kingdom. The main body of the report includes information available up to 1 March 2010. The \u2018 Latest News \u2019 section contains further brief information on events and reports accessed from 2 March 2010 to 10 April 2010. ...","18 March [2010] Sudan signed a ceasefire agreement with a second Darfur rebel group as part of the Government \u2019 s campaign to resolve the conflict before elections. However there were concerns the recent deal with the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), an umbrella group of small factions, could threaten the continued fragile peace accord signed by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). A spokesperson for JEM dismissed the latest deal with the LJM as \u2018 meaningless \u2019. ...","17 March [2010] Amid signs the peace deal with the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) was faltering, Sudanese security officials [re-]arrested 15 Darfur rebels weeks after President Al Bashir had pardoned and freed them as part of the Darfur peace process. Reuters Africa, Sudan security re \u2011 arrests Darfur rebels: lawyer, 17 March 2010 ...","3 March [2010] The rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) leader, Khalil Ibrahim, threatened to pull out of peace talks with the Government, because of parallel talks being progressed with other rebel groups. JEM has wanted to progress peace talks exclusively with the government and represent the collective interests of the various Darfur rebel groups. ...","Trials relating to the Justice and Equality Movement attack on Omdurman \u2013 10 May 2008","13.16 With regard to trials connected to the 10 May 2008 Justice and Equality Movement attack on Omdurman, the USSD Report 2008: Sudan, noted that there were special anti-terrorism courts set up to hear such cases but they \u2018 ... did not have the same rights as those tried in regular courts \u2019.","13.17 The Human Rights Watch report, End Unfair Trials, dated 24 June 2008, noted that Special Courts were created under terrorism law to specifically try individuals accused of participating in the Omdurman attack by JEM in May [2008]: \u2018 ... Lawyers for some of the 36 defendants told Human Rights Watch that they had limited or no access to their clients and described the court proceeding as arbitrary, forcing some defense lawyers to withdraw. Under Sudanese law, a defendant can be convicted on the basis of a confession made while in incommunicado detention or during coerced interrogations. \u2019","13.18 The Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights in the Sudan, published June 2009, noted that:","\u2018 In April and May 2009, anti-terrorism courts in Khartoum sentenced a further 41 individuals to death for participation in the May 2008 JEM attack, bringing the total number of death sentences for participation in the attack to 91. As in earlier trials, those condemned were convicted of charges under the Criminal Act, Anti-Terrorism Act, and Arms, Ammunitions and Explosives Act. The charges did not aim to establish individual criminal responsibility for killing or injuring civilians or recruiting child soldiers. Instead, they referred mainly to collective crimes including criminal conspiracy, membership of a terrorist organization and waging war against the state. Defendants were not granted access to defense counsel until the trials began. The accused were held incommunicado for up to four months before the trials, during which most of them registered confessions they later retracted in court, alleging the statements were made under duress. Nonetheless, the confessions were admitted as prosecution evidence and eventually formed part of the basis for the verdicts. In a meeting between the Special Rapporteur and the National Assembly \u2019 s Human Rights Committee on 3 June 2009, the Committee stated the court sessions were closed, and that its members were not able to attend. \u2019","13.19 The Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, dated 13 July 2009, reported that on 9 June 2009, a criminal court in Khartoum sentenced a further \u2018 12 members of the Justice and Equality Movement to death for their involvement ... [in the May 2008 attacks], bringing the total number of death sentences for members of the Justice and Equality movement to 103. \u2019","13.20 Reuters Africa reported on 20 January 2010, that a Khartoum court had passed a further two death sentences against suspected JEM members. A total of 105 people awaiting execution, were due to be freed under a good will agreement following the release of 82 prisoners by JEM in 2009. On 24 February 2010, Reuters Alertnet reported that the government had \u2018 ... freed 57 JEM fighters, half the number of men imprisoned by Khartoum after being implicated in the insurgent force \u2019 s shock attack on the capital in 2008. ... The releases were promised as part of the new JEM ... [temporary ceasefire agreed on 20 February 2010]. \u2019 ...","JEM and the aftermath of the Omdurman attack of May 2008","17.22 The Guardian article dated 12 May 2008, entitled \u2018 Sudan severs Chad ties after Darfur rebels attack capita \u2019 observed that:","\u2018 The assault by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) on Omdurman on Saturday [9 May 2008] marked the first time in decades of civil war that any rebel group had reached Sudan \u2019 s capital. Government forces repulsed the attack, which prompted an overnight curfew in Khartoum, and accusing fingers were immediately pointed towards neighbouring Chad.... Chad denied any involvement, but it does have a history of close military ties with JEM. ... Unlike other Darfur rebel movements, JEM has a countrywide agenda, and has launched previous attacks in Kordofan, including an assault on a Chinese-run oilfield last year. It accuses Bashir \u2019 s Arab-dominated regime of propagating inequality throughout Sudan, and wants the different regions to have a stronger say in national government.","With just a few thousand fighters, JEM is vastly outnumbered and outgunned by the 100,000 strong Sudanese army. But it does have money and powerful benefactors. \u2019","17.23 The UN Report of the Special Rapporteur dated June 2009 in considering the impact of the Omdurman attack reported:","\u2018 Government security forces arrested hundreds of people in Khartoum and other parts of Sudan on suspicion of alleged involvement. The UNMIS [United Nations Mission in Sudan] Human Rights section received reports of the arrests of close to 1,000 people, the majority of whom were ethnic Darfurians, and repeatedly sought confirmation of the arrests and detentions from the authorities since May 2008. The Special Rapporteur was pleased to attend the Human Rights Forum on 26 May 2009, where discussions were held to clarify the fate of around 200 people, including eight presumed children, who are not known to have been either charged or released following their reported arrests. On 3 June the Special Rapporteur met with the General Prosecutor for Khartoum State. According to the Prosecutor, 51 people were dismissed at the investigation stage by the Prosecutor; 24 were dropped at the trial stage by the Court; 53 were released on bail; 24 were released by Presidential decree; 12 were referred to Juvenile Court; 3 were acquitted on account of mental illness and referred to mental hospital; 91 convicted and sentenced to death; and one convicted and sentenced to five years imprisonment. The Prosecutor did not provide information on the approximately 200 people whose status and whereabouts remained unconfirmed. \u2019","17.24 Similarly Human Rights Watch in its report The Way Forward: Ending Human Rights Abuses and Repression across Sudan dated October 2009 reported that: \u2018 [t]he fate of up to 200 people who \u201cdisappeared\u201d in the government crackdown after the May 2008 attack on Omdurman by Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rebel forces remains unknown, while at least ten are still being held incommunicado without charge 15 months after their arrest. ... \u2019","17.25 Amnesty International \u2019 s (AI) 2009 Annual Report for Sudan, covering events in 2008, observed that following the JEM attack on Omdurman on 10 May 2008:","\u2018 Hundreds of civilians were arrested in the aftermath, with reports of extrajudicial executions, torture and other forms of ill-treatment. Many people were held incommunicado in unofficial places of detention. The youngest victim of such detention was a nine-month-old infant who was held with his mother underground in a detention centre for two months. At least one individual died as a result of ill \u2011 treatment in detention during the first two weeks after the arrests... Although many of the arrested individuals were released, many remained unaccounted for, their whereabouts and fate unknown. \u2019","17.26 The USSD Report 2008 also noted that: \u2018 NISS arrested and detained large numbers of Darfuris in May and June [2008] following the May 10 JEM attack on Omdurman. Human rights organizations claimed that while most of the detainees were released, the government continued to hold several hundred detainees without charges at year \u2019 s end. \u2019 The same report further added that: \u2018 Several members of S[udan] L[iberation] A[rmy]\/Minni Minawi were arrested at their homes, beaten, and detained overnight following the May 10 JEM attack. \u2019","17.27 The UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (EID), published in February 2009 noted:","\u2018 ... Credible sources reported that following an attack on 10 May 2008 by rebel forces [JEM] on Omdurman (one of the three towns that form the Sudanese capital of Khartoum) the Sudanese authorities arrested hundreds of men, women and children, many of whom were subjected to disappearance.","Many of those arrested were picked up in public locations, such as on public transport and on the street. State agents are reported to have transferred an unknown number of detainees to locations outside Khartoum, such as Shandi to the north of the capital and Port Sudan in eastern Sudan.","Allegedly, many relatives of arrested or disappeared individuals reported that they have been unable to get information on the whereabouts of their loved ones, and that the authorities have refused to acknowledge that they are in detention.","Reportedly, relatives who have tried to locate detainees contacted the media or the National Intelligence and Security Services Information Office have themselves been harassed and risked being arrested. ... \u2019","Treatment of ethnic groups from Darfur","... 22.33 Amnesty International \u2019 s (AI) 2009 Annual Report for Sudan, covering events in 2008, recorded that following the JEM attack on Omdurman on 10 May [2008] government forces combed Omdurman, arresting and detaining any individual \u2013 man, woman or child \u2013 of Darfuri appearance, those suspected of supporting opposition groups, and especially Zaghawas. Whilst the UN Report of the Special Rapporteur, dated June 2009, also noted that the UNMIS [United Nations Mission in Sudan] Human Rights section received reports, following the May 2008 attack, \u2018 ... of the arrests of close to 1,000 people, the majority of whom were ethnic Darfurians. \u2019","22.34 The UN Report of the Panel of Experts, dated 29 October 2009, also documented that it received \u2018 a significant number of reports of arbitrary arrest and detention, as well as ill-treatment and torture of persons while in the custody of the Government security apparatus \u2019 The report further noted that most cases were \u2018 ... against Darfurians suspected of being linked to the attack against Omdurman on 10 May 2008 \u2019. The report went on to quote the findings of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), report dated 28 November 2008, who observed: \u2018 [following the JEM attack in May 2008] among those arrested by NISS were hundreds of civilians of Darfurian origin who in many cases appeared to have been targeted solely because of their Darfurian ethnicity or appearance. \u2019 ...","22.35 The OHCHR \u2019 s report, entitled Tenth Periodic report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, dated 28 November 2008, observed:","\u2018 Darfurians in the Khartoum area are at heightened risk of being subjected to arbitrary arrests, in particular if they are suspected of maintaining links with Darfurian rebel groups or political movements. Darfurians may raise the suspicion of the security forces by the mere fact of travelling from other parts of Sudan to Darfur, by having travelled abroad, or by having been in contact with individuals and organizations abroad. Over the past three years, United Nations human rights officers have conducted numerous interviews with Darfurians who have been arbitrarily arrested and detained. Many reported that they were ill-treated and tortured. Reports on the questioning which they underwent in detention indicate that most of the detentions were carried out to obtain information about Darfurian political groups and rebel movements. \u2019 ...","22.37 The UN Report of the Panel of Experts, dated 29 October 2009, also reported that it documented specific cases of human rights violations carried out by the National Intelligence Security Services (NISS), which included mistreatment of individuals of Darfurian origin (although ethnicity is not specified as the reason for the ill-treatment in the report).\u201d","33. The United States (US) State Department \u2019 s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2010, issued on 8 April 2011, noted the following in respect of Sudan:","\u201cThere were no further developments in the cases of up to 2,500 Darfuris detained by the NISS following the 2008 JEM attack. Most had been released by the end of 2008. According to information in a July Amnesty International report, there may be approximately 200 persons whose whereabouts remained unknown. ...","In January antiterrorism courts tried and convicted two additional persons in connection with the 2008 JEM attack on Omdurman, bringing the total number of death sentences in the trials to 106. In trials involving these cases, authorities did not permit defendants access to lawyers before trial, held them incommunicado for up to four months, and reportedly tortured defendants. On February 24, following the signing of the framework agreement with the JEM, the government released 50 of the prisoners sentenced to death in these trials. Reportedly, some persons acquitted by these trials were not released, and authorities rearrested other persons who had been released.\u201d","34. The US State Department \u2019 s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011, issued on 24 May 2012, states in respect of Sudan:","\u201cThe whereabouts of an unknown number of Zaghawa Darfuris detained in Khartoum following the Justice and Equality Movement \u2019 s (JEM) attack on Omdurman in 2008 remained unknown.\u201d","35. In August 2016, a joint report \u201c Situation of Persons from Darfur, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile in Khartoum \u201d was released by the Danish Immigration Service and UK Home Office on joint fact finding missions to Khartoum, Kampala and Nairobi conducted in March 2016. The report focuses on the situation of persons from Darfur and the Two Areas (Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile State) in Khartoum, including treatment of such persons upon arrival at Khartoum International Airport, treatment by the authorities in Khartoum, prevalence of societal discrimination, and living conditions in Khartoum. Its executive summary reads:","\u201cSizeable populations from Darfur and the Two Areas reside in Khartoum. There are two main drivers behind the immigration of persons from these areas to Khartoum: the security situation in Khartoum and the socio-economic factors.","Persons with a political profile returning to Sudan may be questioned and\/or arrested upon arrival at Khartoum International Airport (KIA) depending on the person \u2019 s profile. Seeking asylum abroad would not in itself cause persons from Darfur and the Two Areas problems with the authorities upon return except returnees from Israel. Neither would returnees face severe difficulties with the authorities because of staying abroad for a longer period or travelling with emergency papers. A person \u2019 s ethnicity would not generally affect the treatment, he or she would receive on arrival at KIA.","The National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) acts with impunity. Persons from Darfur and the Two Areas with a political profile are at risk of being targeted by the NISS and its affiliated militias in Khartoum, particularly student activists and persons with an affiliation to rebel groups. The Darfuri and Two Areas communities in Khartoum are monitored by the NISS, principally to identify those with a political profile. Activists at most risk are likely to be those from the Darfuri African tribes of Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa, and persons from the Nuba Mountains.","Persons from Darfur and the Two Areas have access to documents, housing, education and healthcare in Khartoum. However, the quality of these services is low in the poor neighbourhoods surrounding Khartoum where a majority of these persons live. The main factor regarding access to housing and services is the person \u2019 s financial resources. There is in practice limited humanitarian assistance provided in Khartoum to those displaced by violence elsewhere in Sudan. Most Darfuris and persons from the Two Areas work in the informal sector as their access to employment in a number of sectors, particularly the public sector, is limited due to discrimination as well as the general adverse economic conditions in Sudan. Those working illegally, for example women selling tea without a licence, are at risk of arrest and prosecution under Public Order laws as well as harassment and extortion by the police.","Persons from Darfur and the Two Areas, and in particular those of African descent, may experience societal discrimination in Khartoum.","It is possible to travel by road and air between Khartoum and Darfur as well as Khartoum and the Two Areas. A person has to go through checkpoints controlled by different actors (the government, rebel groups and local armed groups). Access to certain parts of the Two Areas is restricted.","In general, Khartoum is a safe place for persons fleeing from a private conflict in their local areas. However, the level of security depends on individual circumstances, particularly whether the other party in the conflict has connections with the authorities.\u201d","36. According to the Swedish Migration Board Country Information Service (Lifos) report of 6 December 2016 on the security situation in Darfur and the situation for internally displaced persons in Khartoum, both the cultural affiliation and the skin colour of a person are of importance in the Sudanese society. Reports from several initiated sources state that people are discriminated against in society because of their ethnicity. Which ethnic group a person belongs to affects the understanding of that person \u2019 s political affiliation. Human rights activists, political opponents to the regime, leaders in civil society, students, lawyers and journalists risk intimidations from the authorities. They can be arrested and detained by the NISS without charge or trial. People from some non-Arab groups can be perceived as rebel affiliated and people from Darfur with a political profile, can be at risk also in Khartoum.","37. The final report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established by the UN Security Council pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005), as sent on 9 January 2017 to the President of the Security Council, states amongst other things:","\u201cJEM and ... no longer have a significant presence in Darfur as a result of the Government \u2019 s effective counter-insurgency strategy. JEM now operates mostly in South Sudan, while.... operates mainly in Libya. These groups are engaged in mercenary activities and, allegedly, in criminal activities in those countries. ...\u201d","38. The United Kingdom Home Office Country Policy and Information Note \u201c Sudan: Non-Arab Darfuris \u201d, released in August 2017, states inter alia as follows:","\u201c3.1.1 The security, human rights and humanitarian situation in Darfur continues to be poor. Non-Arab Darfuris in the Darfur region are likely to face human rights violations which amount to serious harm or persecution.","3.1.2 Existing case law has found that non-Arab Darfuris as an ethnic group are at risk of persecution in Darfur and cannot reasonably be expected to relocate elsewhere in Sudan, including to Khartoum.","3.1.3 The Home Office view is, however, that there is cogent evidence indicating that non-Arab Darfuris are not generally at risk of persecution or serious harm solely on the grounds of their ethnicity in Khartoum. This evidence provides strong grounds to depart from the existing case law of AA and MM.","3.1.4 Rather, a person \u2019 s non-Arab Darfuri ethnicity is likely to be a factor which may bring them to the attention of the state and, depending on other aspects of their profile and activities, may lead to a risk of serious harm or persecution in Khartoum.","3.1.5 Darfuris in Khartoum face discrimination in accessing public services, education and employment, experience forced eviction, societal harassment from other Sudanese, and do not have access to humanitarian assistance. However in general such treatment is not so severe that it is likely to amount to persecution but each case will need to be considered on its individual facts.","3.1.6 All returns are to Khartoum. It will generally be reasonable for a person, including those not previously resident in Khartoum, to return to that city but each case will need to be considered on its individual facts. If the person is able to demonstrate a risk of persecution or serious harm from the state in Khartoum, internal relocation to another part of Sudan will not be reasonable. ...","7.1.6 The UK-DIS FFM [the UK Home Office \u2013 Danish Immigration Service fact finding missions to Kenya, Uganda and Sudan] report, based on a range of sources, noted:","\u2018 A number of sources stated that they had no information to indicate that failed asylum seekers \/ returnees from Darfur or the Two Areas would generally experience difficulties on return to Khartoum International Airport (KIA), or they did not consider that claiming asylum overseas would put such a person at risk per se. Western Embassy (C) noted that they had monitored the forced return of two persons from Europe in 2015 and had no reason to believe that they experienced any difficulties or mistreatment, although the source acknowledged that they were not present throughout the arrival procedure. The diplomatic source mentioned that they had experience of a very few rejected asylum seekers being deported from Switzerland and Norway. According to the source it was unclear whether these returnees could get support upon return to Sudan. However the source added that those sent back from Norway had not faced any problems upon return. ... \u2019 ...","7.1.10 The British Embassy in Khartoum observed in September 2016: \u2018 As reported in our letter of February 2015 ... it remains the case that neither we nor our international partners are aware of substantiated cases of returnees, including failed asylum seekers, being mistreated on return to Sudan. \u2019 ...\u201d"],"31382":["5.The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Luhansk. She has had a first-degree disability since childhood.","6.On 2 April 1998, during her time at the Slavyanoserbskiy Psychoneurological Asylum run by the Luhansk Regional Council (\u0421\u043b\u0430\u0432\u2019\u044f\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0435\u0440\u0431\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u043f\u0441\u0438\u0445\u043e\u043d\u0435\u0432\u0440\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0433\u0456\u0447\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u0456\u043d\u0442\u0435\u0440\u043d\u0430\u0442 \u041b\u0443\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0457 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0457 \u0440\u0430\u0434\u0438) (\u201cthe asylum\u201d), another patient, B., inflicted grievous bodily harm on the applicant. Her injuries included concussion, a fractured jaw and nose, and numerous cuts on her face. Later she also lost the sight in her right eye and the sight in her left eye deteriorated which, according to the forensic examination report of 25 June 2007, was also due to the trauma sustained by the applicant on 2 April 1998.","7.On 16 September 1998 B. died.","A.Criminal proceedings","8.On 8 May 1998 the Slavyanoserbskiy district prosecutor\u2019s office of the Luhansk Region (\u043f\u0440\u043e\u043a\u0443\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0443\u0440\u0430 \u0421\u043b\u043e\u0432\u2019\u044f\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0435\u0440\u0431\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u0443 \u041b\u0443\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0457 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0456 \uf02d \u201cthe prosecutor\u2019s office\u201d) refused to institute criminal proceedings against two asylum employees (orderlies), N. and L. When questioned about the incident, the orderlies testified that on the morning of 2April 1998 they had been cleaning the rooms when they had heard someone crying. They had found the applicant on her bed with her face smashed. Other patients had told N. and L. that B. had beaten the applicant with a mop because she had hit B. The prosecutor noted that (i) B. was \u201cwithout legal capacity because of a mental disorder\u201d (\u043d\u0435\u0434\u0456\u0454\u0437\u0434\u0430\u0442\u043d\u0430 \u0432\u043d\u0430\u0441\u043b\u0456\u0434\u043e\u043a \u043f\u0441\u0438\u0445\u0456\u0447\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u043e\u0437\u043b\u0430\u0434\u0443) and thus could not be held criminally responsible for assaulting the applicant, and (ii) even though it appeared that orderlies N. and L. had been negligent in their duties (according to the asylum orderlies\u2019 list of duties submitted by the Government they were not allowed to leave patients unsupervised), which could possibly constitute a crime under Article 167 of the 1960 Criminal Code (see paragraph 27 below), they were not considered to be \u201cofficials\u201d who could be prosecuted under that provision.","9.On 9 December 2004, within civil proceedings (see paragraphs 11\u201316 below), the applicant\u2019s representative requested that the first-instance court reopen a criminal investigation into the incident. On the same date the request was rejected. The court noted that the prosecutor\u2019s office had already issued a decision on 8 May 1998, which had not been appealed against. Moreover, B. had died and therefore, in accordance with the law in force, no criminal proceedings could be instituted against her. The ruling was upheld by the Luhansk Regional Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Ukraine on 3 August 2005 and 31March 2006 respectively.","10.Following the entry into force of a new Criminal Procedure Code, on 26 December 2012 the applicant lodged a complaint with the police, alleging negligence by the orderlies. The complaint was registered and two separate investigations launched into negligent performance of duties by members of the medical or pharmaceutical profession and negligence of duties by officials. On 19 February 2013 both investigations were merged. Several witnesses were questioned including the applicant, her mother and orderly L. The latter testified that she had not seen the incident take place but had later learned that for an unknown reason B. had hit the applicant with a mop left by L. in their room. On 30 June 2013 the proceedings were terminated by a police investigator of the Slyavyanoserbskyy District Police Department (\u0441\u043b\u0456\u0434\u0447\u0456\u0439 \u0441\u043b\u0456\u0434\u0447\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0432\u0456\u0434\u0434\u0456\u043b\u0443 \u0421\u043b\u043e\u0432\u2019\u044f\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0435\u0440\u0431\u0441\u044c\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0439\u043e\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0432\u0456\u0434\u0434\u0456\u043b\u0443 \u0413\u0423\u041c\u0412\u0421 \u0423\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0457\u043d\u0438 \u0432 \u041b\u0443\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0456\u0439 \u043e\u0431\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0456). That decision was identical to the one of 8 May 1998 (see paragraph 8 above) and referred to the investigator\u2019s findings (i) that B. had been \u201cwithout legal capacity because of a mental disorder\u201d (\u043d\u0435\u0434\u0456\u0454\u0437\u0434\u0430\u0442\u043d\u0430 \u0432\u043d\u0430\u0441\u043b\u0456\u0434\u043e\u043a \u043f\u0441\u0438\u0445\u0456\u0447\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0440\u043e\u0437\u043b\u0430\u0434\u0443) and thus could not be held responsible for assaulting the applicant, and (ii) that even though it appeared that the orderlies N. and L. had been negligent in their duties, which could constitute a crime under Article 167 (negligence of duties by officials) or Article 140 of the new 2001 Criminal Code (negligent performance of duties by members of the medical profession), they were not considered to be \u201cofficials\u201d or \u201cmembers of the medical profession\u201d who could be prosecuted under those provisions of the law.","B.First set of civil proceedings","11.On 10 February 1999 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the asylum in the Zhovtnevyy Local Court of Luhansk, seeking compensation for non-pecuniary and pecuniary damage (the cost of medications and food expenses incurred while staying in a hospital between 2and 30 April 1998 and between 18 and 26 May 1998 and the costs of dental prosthesis care). The applicant claimed that following negligence on the part of the asylum employees L. and N. she had been beaten by B. The applicant also indicated that the asylum should not have placed B. in one room with the applicant since B. had been known for her violent behaviour.","12.On 4 May 1999, at the request of a prosecutor, the court launched proceedings to establish the applicant\u2019s legal capacity. Eight days later the consideration of the applicant\u2019s claim for compensation was suspended pending the outcome of the legal capacity proceedings.","13.On 9 October 2002 the legal capacity proceedings were terminated because the prosecutor failed to appear at the hearing.","14.On 19 June 2003 the first-instance court ordered a medical examination of the applicant and the case was forwarded to the Luhansk Bureau of Forensic Medical Examinations. On 19 October 2004 the case was returned to the first-instance court with an expert report confirming that the applicant had sustained grievous bodily harm.","15.On 3 October 2006 the Zhovtnevyy District Court of Luhansk awarded the applicant 30,000 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) in compensation for non\u2011pecuniary damage (approximately 4,500 euros (EUR) at the material time). In a court hearing the asylum\u2019s representative submitted that in his view the applicant had initiated the conflict with B. herself and thus there had been no negligence on the part of the asylum\u2019s employees. The court, having listened to the parties and witnesses and having examined the case material, concluded that on 2 April 1998 as a result of a fight between the applicant and B., \u201cwho at the material time was found to be without legal capacity\u201d (\u044f\u043a\u0430 \u043d\u0430 \u0442\u043e\u0439 \u043c\u043e\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0442 \u0431\u0443\u043b\u0430 \u0432\u0438\u0437\u043d\u0430\u043d\u0430 \u043d\u0435\u0434\u0456\u0454\u0437\u0434\u0430\u0442\u043d\u043e\u044e), the applicant had received injuries. The court expressly noted that those conclusions were not disputed by the parties. The court further referred to the decision of the prosecutor\u2019s office of 8 May 1998 (see paragraph 8 above) and held that harm had been inflicted on the applicant as a result of negligence by the asylum employees (orderlies). Lastly, the court rejected the applicant\u2019s claims for pecuniary damages (compensation for medication, food, loss of income and travel expenses) as not supported by relevant evidence.","16.The applicant lodged an appeal challenging the refusal of the court to award her pecuniary damages but later withdrew it. The decision of 3October 2006 thus became final and enforceable.","C.Disciplinary proceedings","17.On 13 December 2006 the prosecutor\u2019s office sent a demand to the asylum pointing out violations of work safety regulations which required remediation. According to the demand, the applicant\u2019s rights had been violated because there had been no internal investigation into the incident within the statutory time\u2011limit (of within ten days of the incident).","18.There is no information to suggest that the asylum complied with the demand.","D.Proceedings concerning the facts surrounding the incident","19.On 3 October 2007 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Zhovtnevyy District Court of Luhansk, seeking an acknowledgement that bodily harm had been inflicted on her. The applicant asserted, in particular, that the asylum was avoiding delivering a report on the incident even though it was necessary to establish the facts surrounding the incident and to recover damages for the injuries sustained.","20.On 22 November 2007 the complaint was allowed by the court. Referring to its decision of 3 October 2006, which had become final (seeparagraph 16 above), the court established that the applicant had had a fight with B. and had received injuries while at the asylum.","E.Second set of civil proceedings","21.On 18 February 2008 the applicant instituted a new set of proceedings against the asylum, seeking compensation for loss of labour capacity and expenses for medications which the applicant permanently needed.","22.On 15 June 2012 the Zhovtnevyy District Court allowed the claim. Referring to its judgment of 3 October 2006 (see paragraph 15 above), the court established that harm had been inflicted on the applicant as a result of negligence by the asylum employees. The court also noted that even though B. had not been declared to be without legal capacity, at the time of the incident both she and the applicant had been under the supervision of the asylum, which should accordingly have been held responsible for the incident. On 23 October 2012 the Luhansk Regional Court of Appeal upheld this decision.","23.On 30 January 2013 the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court of Ukraine, following an appeal by the defendant, quashed the decisions of the lower courts and remitted the case to the first-instance court for fresh consideration. It held that since B. \u201cha[d] not been declared to be without legal capacity\u201d (\u043d\u0435 \u0431\u0443\u043b\u0430 \u0432\u0438\u0437\u043d\u0430\u043d\u0430 \u043d\u0435\u0434\u0456\u0454\u0437\u0434\u0430\u0442\u043d\u043e\u044e), she had been partially responsible for the incident and thus the lower courts should have considered the extent of her liability.","24.On 27 September 2013 the first-instance court allowed the applicant\u2019s claim in part and awarded her UAH 44,130 (around EUR 4,140 at the material time). The asylum was ordered to pay the applicant each month UAH 779.52 (approximately EUR 71), which was 64% of the monthly minimum wage. The court noted that, according to the court decision of 3October 2006, harm had been inflicted on the applicant as a result of negligence by the asylum employees. However, since B. had not been officially declared to be without legal capacity and thus had been partially liable for the incident, liability for the incident and damages were divided between the asylum and B. as to 80% and 20%, respectively. No particular grounds for that assessment were given.","25.Both parties appealed against this judgment. The applicant argued that the asylum had been solely responsible for her injuries, referring to the court\u2019s findings on 3 October 2006 (see paragraph 15 above) and 22November 2007 (see paragraph 20 above). On 18 December 2013 the Luhansk Regional Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 27 September 2013, noting that \u201cthe first-instance court had correctly established the degree of guilt of those who had inflicted harm\u201d. On 17 February 2014 the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant\u2019s request for leave for appeal as unsubstantiated."],"31387":["THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE","A.Criminal proceedings against the applicant","5.The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Chevelcha.","6.Between October 2003 and November 2004 a number of thefts of cattle from different farms were committed and criminal proceedings were instituted on that account.","7.In the early morning of 2 November 2004 a cow and a bull were stolen from a farm in a village next to the one in which the applicant lived.","8.On 12 November 2004 criminal proceedings were instituted in respect of the theft of 2 November 2004.","9.On 14 November 2004 \u2013 at 8.30 a.m. according to the applicant \u2013 the applicant was taken by the police from her home to the Orzhytsya police station (\u201cthe police station\u201d) to verify her possible involvement in the above-mentioned criminal offences.","10.According to the applicant, at the police station she was subjected to beatings and psychological pressure with a view to extracting her confession to the cattle thefts. The police officers hit her in her face, laid her on the floor with her face dawn, stamped on her legs and twisted her arms back. She was also made to spread her legs as widely as possible while standing and threatened with a beating if she fell down. Her requests for legal assistance were allegedly rejected.","11.The Government maintained that the applicant had not been subjected to any ill-treatment.","12.On the same day, in police custody, the applicant drafted \u201cstatements of surrender and confession\u201d (\u044f\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0437 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u044e) in which she confessed to several counts of cattle theft and gave \u201cexplanations\u201d in which, according to the Government, she submitted that she had committed the criminal offences as a member of a group of persons. No copies of those statements and \u201cexplanations\u201d have been made available to the Court. As can be seen from the available complaints lodged by the applicant\u2019s lawyer with the domestic authorities, the applicant drafted a separate document for each of her confessions.","13.At 6.10 p.m. on the same date the investigator of the Orzhytsya police unit dealing with the criminal proceedings concerning the cattle thefts (\u201cthe investigator\u201d) drew up a report on the applicant\u2019s detention as a suspect. The applicant signed a record of the explanation of procedural rights to her; in that record she stated that she did not wish to be legally represented at that stage. The investigator therefore issued a decision to conduct the pre-trial investigation into the proceedings concerning the thefts committed in 2003-2004 without the involvement of a defence lawyer.","14.Thereafter, the applicant was questioned as a suspect in the absence of a lawyer. The verbatim record of the questioning suggests that her right to a lawyer and to a meeting with him before the first round of questioning (as well as her right not to incriminate herself) had been explained to the applicant before the start of the questioning. According to the record, the applicant confessed to a number of cattle thefts in 2003 and 2004, committed as a part of a group, and provided some details in this respect. No questions were put or remarks made by the investigator.","15.On 16 November 2004 the applicant\u2019s mother signed a contract for her legal representation with a lawyer, V. On three occasions on the same day and twice on 17 November 2004 (in the morning and afternoon) he attempted to hold a meeting with the applicant but for different reasons was denied access to the police station by duty officers. After each attempt on 17November 2004, he lodged a complaint with the prosecutor\u2019s office that the police had unlawfully obstructed him from meeting with the applicant, and submitted that all investigative steps taken with the applicant\u2019s participation but in his absence should be considered as having been conducted in breach of her defence rights.","16.On 17 November 2004, apparently during the lunch break, V. managed to see the investigator and requested to be admitted to the proceedings as the applicant\u2019s lawyer on the basis of the agreement concluded with the applicant\u2019s mother. The case-file suggests that on the same date the investigator admitted V. to the proceedings concerning the theft committed on 2 November 2004 and granted him permission to meet with the applicant.","17.On the same date \u2013 between 8.15 and 11.30 a.m. according to the official records, and in the afternoon according to the applicant \u2013 a reconstruction of the crime was carried out in the presence of the investigator, two attesting witnesses and an expert in criminal law. The relevant record, which was signed by the applicant without any observations, suggests that before the reconstruction commenced, the applicant had been apprised of her constitutional right not to make self-incriminating statements and her right to refuse to participate in the reconstruction or to insist that it be carried out in the presence of a lawyer. The applicant declined (\u201cin the lawyer\u2019s presence\u201d, according to the record) to exercise those rights and expressed her wish for the reconstruction to be carried out without the assistance of a lawyer.","18.During the reconstruction, the applicant provided details as to the theft committed during the early morning of 2 November 2004 and pointed out the place where the stolen animals had been slaughtered by her. The immediate inspection of the place revealed two detached cattle heads and two respective identification tags.","19.From 5 p.m. until 6.15 p.m. on the same date, a court hearing on the application of the preventive measure in respect of the applicant was held, following which the applicant\u2019s detention was extended to ten days. As suggested by the records of the hearing, at the beginning of the hearing the applicant submitted that she wished to be represented by V. and her request was granted by the court. Upon his arrival, the applicant requested a meeting in private with V. Having heard V., who submitted that he was entitled to represent the applicant as of 9 a.m. of 16 November 2004 but since then had been unlawfully obstructed from meeting her, the court announced a break until 6.10 p.m. in order to allow the applicant to meet the lawyer in private.","20.According to the applicant, no such meeting was ever ensured and V. was, in fact, excluded from the hearing. The verbatim record of the hearing refers to no intervention on V.\u2019s part after the break had finished.","21.On 17 November 2004 the applicant was transferred to the Lubny temporary detention facility (\u0456\u0437\u043e\u043b\u044f\u0442\u043e\u0440 \u0442\u0438\u043c\u0447\u0430\u0441\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0442\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044f \u2013 \u201cthe ITT\u201d). The admissions register of the facility suggests that upon her admission the applicant was found to be suffering from abrasions on her chin, left elbow and hip, a bruise on her right hip and a scratch mark on her left knee. It is furthermore stated in the register that the applicant\u2019s injuries had been sustained three days before her admission to the facility and that she raised no complaints before the ITT staff.","22.On 18 November 2004 V. unsuccessfully tried to meet the applicant in the Orzhytsya ITT as he had not been informed of her transfer to the Lubny ITT. On the same date he lodged a complaint with the prosecutor\u2019s office, stating that he had been unable to meet the applicant and had not been informed of her transfer to the Lubny ITT.","23.On 19 November 2004 the deputy head of the Lubny ITT declined to allow V. to meet with the applicant as the investigator\u2019s room was allegedly occupied and there was no other way to allow his request. On the same date V. complained to the prosecutor about this fact. He noted, in particular, that he had waited at the Lubny ITT until the end of the working day and had seen nobody coming out of the premises but the police officers from the Orzhytsya police unit; this, in his opinion, constituted evidence that they had been \u201cworking with the applicant\u201d in the lawyer\u2019s absence.","24.On 23 November 2004 V. again complained to the Orzhytsya prosecutor\u2019s office that he was still not able to see the applicant and that no response had been given by the prosecutor to his four earlier complaints about violations of the applicant\u2019s defence rights and his rights as her lawyer.","25.On the same date, from 12.29 until 4.14 p.m., another reconstruction of the crime was carried out in the presence of the investigator, two attesting witnesses and an expert in criminal law. The relevant verbatim record, which was signed by the applicant without observations, suggests that, on being informed of her procedural rights, the applicant declined to be assisted by a lawyer during this investigative step.","26.During the reconstruction, the applicant provided details as to nine episodes of cattle thefts that she had allegedly committed as part of a group in 2003 and 2004 and showed the directions from which her accomplices had brought the stolen animals to her and the places where the cattle had been slaughtered by her. The record of the reconstruction furthermore suggests that once the reconstruction was terminated, the applicant attested that she had given that evidence of her own free will, without any physical and psychological influence being exerted by the police.","27.On 24 November 2004, on being notified of her procedural rights as a suspect, the applicant expressed her wish to be represented by V. On the same date the latter was admitted to the proceedings concerning the thefts committed in 2003-2004.","28.On the same day, in V.\u2019s presence, the applicant was charged with having committed, as a member of a group, the theft on 2November 2004. She was then questioned as an accused in this respect. The applicant denied her guilt for the theft and submitted that she had given her earlier statements after being told that other persons had incriminated her in the theft and that there was thus no point in her denying her guilt. When asked how it had then happened that she had known and shown the place where the slaughtered animals\u2019 heads had been hidden, she stated that she had been told about the place by the attesting witnesses.","29.On 3 December 2004 a new investigator was appointed to the criminal proceedings concerning the applicant.","30.On 9 December 2004 the Orzhytsya prosecutor ordered the head of the Orzhytsya police unit to cease the violations of the applicant\u2019s defence rights and to ensure that she could meet with her lawyer, V., without any limitations as to the number and duration of such meetings.","31.On 17 December 2004 V. was denied a meeting with the applicant as he had not received any authorisation to do so from the newly appointed investigator to the case. On the same day V. complained about this fact to the prosecutor, referring to the police\u2019s failure to comply with the prosecutor\u2019s order of 9 December 2004 (see paragraph 30 above).","32.On 22 December 2004, on being notified of her procedural rights in the case concerning the theft committed during the early morning of 2November 2004, the applicant expressed a wish to be represented by V. On the same date, the investigator admitted V. to these proceedings.","33.On 23 December 2004 V. was again denied a meeting with the applicant as \u201cthere had been no information proving his admission to the proceedings\u201d. On the following day the applicant lodged a complaint with the prosecutor\u2019s office regarding this refusal to allow her to meet her lawyer. The latter furthermore submitted that on 22 December 2004 his meeting with the applicant had been interrupted and she had been taken out of the meeting room.","34.On the same date, on 23 December 2004, during a court hearing regarding the application of the preventive measure, which was held in the presence of V., from 10 until 12 a.m., the applicant submitted, inter alia, that on the morning of 14 November 2004, at the police station, she had denied having participated in the thefts and had unsuccessfully requested the assistance of a lawyer. She furthermore complained that the police officers had ill-treated her and forced her to draft confessions to a number of thefts, as dictated by them. She provided details of her ill\u2011treatment on 14November 2004, as summarised above (see paragraph 10 above), and submitted that she had been afraid of raising any complaint during her examination by a forensic expert on 22 November 2004.","35.On an unspecified date criminal proceedings concerning all instances of theft were joined into a single case.","36.On 19 February 2005, being apprised of her procedural rights as an accused, the applicant stated that she wished to be represented by V. In his presence, she was charged with having organised in 2003 a criminal group and having committed in 2003 and 2004 a number of cattle thefts.","37.On 2 March 2005, when signing a record stating that she had been acquainted with the contents of the case file, the applicant denied her guilt and stated, without giving any details, that all investigative actions had been carried out in breach of her defence rights. V. submitted that there had been no evidence of the applicant\u2019s guilt and requested, accordingly, that the criminal proceedings against the applicant be terminated. On the same day the investigator refused the lawyer\u2019s request as unsubstantiated and having been raised in only general terms.","38.On 22 March 2005 the case against the applicant and her alleged accomplices was sent for trial to the Chornukhinskiy District Court, Poltava Region (\u201cthe District Court\u201d).","39.On 19 April 2005 the District Court held a preparatory hearing in the presence of all the defendants and of V. No complaints were raised by them during that hearing.","40.During the trial the applicant pleaded not guilty and claimed, inter alia, that her self-incriminating statements had been obtained by the police by means of ill-treatment and in the absence of a lawyer. Similar statements were made by the applicant\u2019s co-defendants.","41.On 15 September 2005 the District Court found the applicant guilty on a number of counts of theft and sentenced her to five years\u2019 imprisonment. In doing so, it referred mainly to the self-incriminatory statements made by the applicant on 14, 17and 23 November 2004 (see paragraphs 12, 14, 18 and 26 above) and the confessions given by her accomplices during the pre-trial investigation. When dismissing the applicants\u2019 allegations of ill-treatment by the police, the District Court referred to the statements of attesting witnesses present at the crime reconstructions of 17 and 23November 2004 (see paragraphs 17 and 25 above); according to those witnesses, the applicant and other defendants had given evidence at those crime reconstructions of their own free will. It furthermore referred to evidence given by the police officers concerned (all of whom had denied all allegations of ill-treatment) and to the fact that no injuries had been found on the applicant\u2019s body during her medical examinations on 22 and 25November 2004 (see paragraphs 52 and 55 below). The court also stated that during the whole pre-trial investigation the defendants had acknowledged their guilt and had never complained about any ill-treatment, but had retracted their statements only during the trial (which the court considered they had done simply as part of their defence strategy).","42.On appeal of the applicant, on 15 March 2006 the Poltava Regional Court of Appeal (\u201cthe Court of Appeal\u201d) quashed the above-mentioned judgment and remitted the case for fresh examination. It noted, inter alia, the selective approach taken by the trial court to the assessment of evidence in the case, including the evidence concerning the alleged ill-treatment, and a breach of the applicant\u2019s defence rights.","43.On 20 March 2007 the prosecutor withdrew charges against the applicant on four counts of theft for lack of evidence.","44.On 18 April 2007 the District Court found the applicant and her co\u2011defendants guilty as charged and sentenced them to different terms of imprisonment. The applicant was given a four-year suspended sentence. The court based the applicant\u2019s conviction on: her voluntary surrender to the police and the self-incriminatory statements that she had made on 14,17and on 23 November 2004 (see paragraphs 12, 14, 18 and 26 above); confessions given by her accomplices during the pre-trial investigation; the records of the crime scene examinations; and statements by the victims (that is to say farm owners) and witnesses confirming the fact that animals had been stolen from the farms.","45.The District Court dismissed the defendants\u2019 allegations of ill\u2011treatment by the police as ill-founded. It noted in this respect that the police officers concerned had denied all allegations of ill-treatment; a surgeon, N., who examined the applicant on 25 November 2004 (see paragraph 55 below) had submitted that he had found no bodily injuries when he had examined her; the forensic expert who had examined the applicant on 22 November 2004 had also attested that no injuries had been found by him on the applicant\u2019s body (see paragraph 52 below); and attesting witnesses who had been present at the crime reconstructions (in which the defendants had participated) had submitted that the applicant and other defendants had given evidence of their own free will.","46.The applicant appealed, submitting that the District Court had failed to comply with the instructions of the Court of Appeal and to duly examine the allegations made by her and her co-defendants of ill-treatment by the police. She stated, inter alia, that the District Court had deliberately ignored evidence proving her bodily injuries. She relied, inter alia, on the relevant data from the admissions register of the Lubny ITT (see paragraph 21 above) and the testimony of a prosecutor who had seen the applicant\u2019s injuries. The applicant furthermore contested the credibility of the statements given by the police officers in the light of the fact that they were direct perpetrators. She also stated that two of the attesting witnesses could not be objective as at the time of the events in question one of them had been undergoing prosecution by the police and the other one was himself a former police officer who had close ties with the police. She furthermore submitted that the District Court had falsified the statement made by N., the surgeon, during the trial regarding the results of the applicant\u2019s examination on 25 November 2004 (see paragraph 55 below). She noted in this respect that N. had in fact confirmed that there had indeed been bodily injuries, which he had recorded in the applicant\u2019s medical file. Lastly, the applicant stated that she had been unlawfully deprived of legal assistance between 14and 24November 2004 and that all the evidence on which her conviction had been based, in particular her confessions, had been obtained during that period. She also referred in this regard to the unsuccessful attempts made by her lawyer to hold a meeting with her within the above-mentioned period and to the complaints that he had unsuccessfully lodged with the prosecutor\u2019s office in this respect.","47.On 2 July 2008 the Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of the District Court. In doing so the court referred to (i) the applicant\u2019s voluntary surrender to the police and to the further self-incriminatory statements that she had made during her questioning, which had been corroborated by those made by her alleged accomplices, and (ii) the fact that remains of animals had been found at the place pointed out by the applicant during the reconstruction of the crime. It furthermore stated that the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment had been correctly dismissed by the first-instance court as unsubstantiated, given that the police officers had denied any ill\u2011treatment and no injuries had been uncovered in the course of the applicant\u2019s medical examinations of 22 and 25 November 2004 or during her further medical examinations in detention in view of the worsening of her chronic health conditions.","48.The applicant lodged a cassation appeal, maintaining, inter alia, her complaints concerning her alleged psychological and physical ill-treatment in police custody and the lack of access to a lawyer between 14 and 24November 2004. She submitted in this respect that the courts had deliberately ignored evidence proving the fact that she had had bodily injuries shortly after her arrest.","49.On 26 March 2009 the Supreme Court upheld the applicant\u2019s conviction. It noted that her guilt had been proved by her own statements as a suspect in which she had confessed to the thefts and which she had later confirmed during the reconstructions of crimes. The Supreme Court furthermore found that the applicant\u2019s statements had been corroborated by the confessions of her co-defendants. It noted that her complaint of ill\u2011treatment had been thoroughly examined by the lower courts and had been lawfully rejected as unsubstantiated. It also noted that the applicant\u2019s allegations had been disproved by the testimony of the surgeon, N., and the forensic expert, as well as by that given by the police officers. As regards the alleged violation of the applicant\u2019s defence rights, the Supreme Court noted that during the pre-trial investigation, the applicant had been informed of her right to a lawyer and that the lawyer of her choice had been admitted to the proceedings. The judgment of the Supreme Court was sent to the applicant on 8 April 2009.","B.Investigation of the allegations of ill-treatment","50.On a number of occasions between 16 and 21 November 2004 lawyer V. complained to the Orzhytsya prosecutor\u2019s office of the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment in police custody and requested that she be given a medical examination, in his presence, in order to secure evidence of that ill\u2011treatment.","51.On 18 and 19 November 2004 similar complaints were made by the applicant\u2019s mother.","52.On 22 November 2004 the applicant was examined by a forensic medical expert. The relevant record suggests that the applicant had had no bodily injuries and had raised no complaints. According to the applicant, she had done so because she had been afraid of further beatings by the police.","53.On 23 November 2004 the Orzhytsya prosecutor\u2019s office declined to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the complaints of the applicant\u2019s lawyer that the applicant had been ill-treated and her defence rights violated. No copy of that decision has been made available to the Court. According to the Government, the decision was based on the results of the applicant\u2019s medical examination of 22 November 2004 (see paragraph 52 above), the police officers denial of ill\u2011treatment and on the fact that the applicant had not raised any complaint about her ill-treatment during a court hearing on the application of a preventive measure. As regards the defence rights, it was also noted that under the decision of the Orzhytsya District Court of 17November 2004 lawyer V. had been granted permission to have a meeting with the applicant (see paragraph 19 above).","54.On 25 November 2004 the applicant, through her lawyer, requested a meeting with the prosecutor with a view to making statements regarding \u201cwhat [had been] done to her at the police station\u201d and \u201chow her voluntarily surrenders [had] appeared\u201d. She also denied her guilt of any criminal offence and asked for a medical examination of her to be conducted in order to identify and treat the injuries that she had been suffering from as a result of her ill-treatment by the police and to protect her from fresh beatings.","55.According to the extracts from the applicant\u2019s medical file, which was provided by the latter to the Court, on the same date, on 25 November 2004, the applicant complained about her poor state of health, including pain in her left elbow. She was examined by N., a surgeon from the local civil hospital who discovered \u201cactive yellow marks\u201d (\u043a\u0432\u0456\u0442\u0443\u0447\u0456 \u043f\u044f\u0442\u043d\u0430 \u0436\u043e\u0432\u0442\u0443\u0432\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043a\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043e\u0440\u0443) from 0.5 to 1 cm in diameter on the applicant\u2019s forearms, hips and right breast. Following the examination, N. found that the applicant\u2019s state of health did not require any medical intervention.","56.On 26 November 2004, after having a meeting with the applicant and being given the results of the aforesaid medical examination, lawyer V. again complained to the prosecutor\u2019s office of the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment by the police and requested, inter alia, that she be given another forensic medical examination in his presence.","57.On 29 November 2004 the applicant was transferred to the Poltava Temporary Detention centre (\u201cthe Poltava SIZO\u201d). As can be seen from a certificate issued by the SIZO governor, upon her arrival the applicant underwent a medical examination which uncovered a bruise on her left hip measuring 5 cm by 3 cm and an inflammation on her left forearm.","58.On 17 December 2004 lawyer V. complained to the prosecutor\u2019s office that no response had been made to the applicant\u2019s complaints of ill\u2011treatment.","59.On the same date the applicant refused to undergo a medical examination unless her lawyer was present.","60.On 21 December 2004 lawyer V. complained to the Poltava prosecutor\u2019s office about the lack of any response to the complaints lodged regarding the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment; the failure to conduct a medical examination of her in the absence of police officers and in the presence of her lawyer; and violations of her defence rights. He furthermore drew the prosecutor\u2019s attention to the allegations of ill-treatment made by the applicant\u2019s alleged accomplices, one of whom had been allegedly hospitalised after being beaten by the police.","61.On 10 January 2005 the Poltava prosecutor\u2019s office quashed the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 23 November 2004 (see paragraph 53 above) as unsubstantiated and ordered an additional investigation in respect of V.\u2019s allegations. It noted, inter alia, that the case file contained no explanations by the officers from the Orzhytsya and the Lubny ITTs and no information regarding whether the applicant had been provided with medical assistance when in the Poltava SIZO and whether she had undergone a medical examination with a view to establishing whether she had bodily injuries. It was furthermore noted that M.M., the applicant\u2019s alleged accomplice, had also lodged a complaint about his physical and psychological ill-treatment by police officers of the Orzhytsya police unit.","62.According to the Government, on 20 January 2005 the Orzhytsya prosecutor\u2019s office had declined to institute criminal proceedings and the applicant had not appealed against that decision. No copy of that decision has been made available to the Court.","63.The applicant furthermore unsuccessfully raised a complaint in respect of her ill-treatment by the police before the domestic courts (seeparagraphs 40-49 above)."],"31512":["4.The applicant was born in 1968 and was detained in LPU-3, Chelyabinsk.","A.Ill-treatment in respect of the applicant","1.Beatings by prison warders and criminal charges against the applicant","5.On 14 November 2003 the Saint Petersburg City Court found the applicant guilty of aggravated murder and possession of firearms, and sentenced him to twenty-one years\u2019 imprisonment. On 1November 2004 the conviction was upheld on appeal.","6.On 28 September 2007 the applicant arrived at medical detention facility no. LPU-3 in Chelyabinsk, where he stayed until 30 October 2007.","7.On 2 October 2007 the applicant was ordered to leave his cell. He entered the corridor, turned to face the wall and took up a spread-eagle position leaning against the wall. Having refused to strip naked for a body search, he was immediately subjected to beatings. A warder hit him a number of times on the buttocks with a rubber truncheon. At the same time another warder started kicking and hitting the applicant on the back and head. Trying to protect himself from more serious harm, the applicant turned and faced his assailants. He raised his arm and inadvertently hit the warder\u2019s face. The beatings intensified and the applicant was pushed to the floor. The warders continued kicking and punching him and hitting him with truncheons. The applicant lost consciousness. A warder dragged him back to the cell and the applicant was left there on the floor.","8.On the same date the applicant was examined by a prison doctor. The doctor found hematomas on his buttocks and documented them in the applicant\u2019s medical records as follows:","\u201cSkin hyperaemia on both buttocks, traces of blunt injury, blue hematomas. Moderate pain on palpation.\u201d","9.On 5 October 2007 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant on suspicion of assault on a warder and disruption of order in the detention facility. The prosecution\u2019s case was that on 2 October 2007 the applicant had refused to be subjected to a body search and had waved his hands to prevent the search. Warder B. had warned the applicant about the intention to use force should he fail to comply with the order. In response, the applicant had punched another warder, Mr L., in the face, splitting his lip.","10.On 2 September 2008 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court, by a jury verdict, acquitted the applicant. Having established that he had hit warder L. once and had split his lip, the jury nevertheless concluded that the applicant had caused the injury in an attempt to protect himself. The relevant part of the judgment read as follows:","\u201cThe jury has established in a verdict that two injuries to Mr L.\u2019s lower lip were caused by [the applicant] with a single punch to Mr L.\u2019s face. [The applicant] had refused to strip naked and to submit his clothes to a check-up, and had asked for a copy of a decision by the head or deputy head of the facility authorising a full body search. [The applicant] who had stayed with his face to the wall, had been subsequently kicked and punched, and hit with rubber truncheons a number of times, at least ten, on various parts of his body, head [and] limbs. [The beating] had been accompanied by verbal assaults. In an attempt to prevent further beatings and to protect himself, [the applicant], while falling down, had turned and taken an aimless swing in the direction of the persons who had continued hitting him.\u201d","11.On 18 November 2008 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the judgment on appeal.","2.Investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment","12.After the acquittal had become final, the applicant lodged a complaint with the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Chelyabinsk Region, providing his version of the events of 2 October 2007 and complaining of ill\u2011treatment.","13.On 28 January 2009 the investigative department of the Metallurgicheskiy District of Chelyabinsk opened a criminal investigation into the events of 2 October 2007 on charges of abuse of power committed with violence. The investigators questioned the applicant along with fourteen witnesses and conducted three cross-examinations.","14.On 28 September 2009 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the alleged perpetrators.","15.On 18 November 2009 the investigation was reopened.","16.On 22 December 2009 the criminal proceedings against the prison warders were discontinued and the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the alleged perpetrators. The investigators had questioned the warders B. and L. mentioned in the acquittal judgment of 2 September 2008, who had testified that they had indeed administered up to six truncheon blows to the applicant\u2019s buttocks because he had refused to go through a body search and had hit warder L. in the face.","17.On 8 November 2012 the criminal proceedings against the warders were reopened.","18.On 19 November 2012 the investigation was suspended again for failure to identify the alleged perpetrators. The investigator analysed the depositions of warders and other witnesses, and the findings of the medical examination of 2 October 2007, and concluded that the applicant had not obeyed the warders\u2019 lawful orders and had been aggressive. Therefore, the use of rubber truncheons had been justified. Moreover, the medical records contained a vague summary description of the applicant\u2019s injuries, which were not life-threatening. Lastly, the jurors\u2019 verdict did not contain any assessment of the warders\u2019 actions or any proof of the warders\u2019 guilt.","19.On 14 November 2013 the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Chelyabinsk Region quashed the decision of 19 November 2012 and reopened the investigation.","20.On 28 February 2014 the criminal proceedings against the warders were terminated. The investigator found that the warders had not abused their powers and had acted in accordance with the law.","3.Challenging the investigator\u2019s decisions before the court","(a)Challenging the decision of 28 September 2008","21.The applicant\u2019s representative challenged the decision of 28September 2009, arguing that the jury verdict of 2 September 2008 had already identified the assailants and that there had therefore been no reason to adjourn the proceedings.","22.On 10 February 2011 the Metallurgicheskiy District Court of Chelyabinsk dismissed the complaint, having found as follows:","\u201cAs follows from the case-file materials, on 28 September 2009 a senior investigator of the investigative department, Mr V., refused to open a criminal case against officers of [medical colony no. 3], Mr M., Mr B. and Mr L., who, as follows from that decision, had lawfully used force against [the applicant]. That decision remains in force.","In those circumstances, the decision by which the criminal proceedings were adjourned is lawful and well-founded; there are no grounds to consider it unlawful.\u201d","23.On 9 April 2012 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court quashed that decision on appeal and remitted the case for re-examination.","24.On 1 June 2012 the Metallurgicheskiy District Court of Chelyabinsk held to discontinue the proceedings as the decision of 28 September 2008 had been quashed on 18 November 2009.","(b)Challenging of the investigator\u2019s decision of 22 December 2009 and other decisions","25.On an unspecified date the applicant asked the court to declare unlawful the investigator\u2019s decisions of 28 September 2008, 11 November 2008, 22December 2009 and an opinion of 12 October 2009 justifying suspension of the investigation. He argued that those decisions contradicted each other and sought to conceal the warders\u2019 crime.","26.On 9 November 2012 the Metallurgicheskiy District Court of Chelyabinsk discontinued the proceedings on the applicant\u2019s claim.","27.On 21 March 2013 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court quashed that decision and remitted the case for fresh examination.","28.On 18 April 2013 the District Court allowed the applicant\u2019s claim. It held that the decisions of 28September 2008 and 22 December 2009 lacked sufficient reasoning, did not contain any references to the jurors\u2019 verdict, and were based only on the testimony of warders. It ordered that the violations found be remedied.","B.Compensation proceedings","29.The applicant brought a civil action against the prosecutor\u2019s office of the Chelyabinsk Region, the Treasury and the Ministry of Finance, seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage caused by the unlawful institution of criminal proceedings. He also sought apologies from the implicated officials.","30.On 10 August 2011 the applicant and his lawyer asked the court to consider the case in their absence.","31.On 11 August 2011 the Tsentralnyy District Court of Chelyabinsk awarded the applicant 15,000 Russian roubles (RUB) (353 euros (EUR)) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage and dismissed the remaining claims. The District Court held the hearing in the applicant\u2019s absence. The applicant lodged an appeal against this decision.","32.On 6 February 2012 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court upheld the decision of 11 August 2011 and rejected the applicant\u2019s appeal. The appellate court also noted that as an inmate, the applicant had been duly notified of the court hearing but had failed to attend it."],"31515":["5.The applicant was born in 1969 and is now serving his sentence in a detention facility at Nizhniy Tagil.","6.The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.","7.On 7 November 2013 a group of nine detainees, including the applicant, was scheduled for a transfer from a police station to a remand prison. A Gazel prison van was available for transfer. It was designed to transport a maximum of seven prisoners, but Police Major V., who was in charge of the transfer, took the decision to take all nine prisoners at once to save fuel.","8.The prison van was manned by four officers. Driver G. and Major V. were seated in the front, and Officers K. and D. were riding in the rear part of the cabin next to the prisoner cells.","9.Five prisoners were placed in the large cell in the van, and three prisoners in individual cells. As the applicant was a former law-enforcement officer, the transfer regulations required that he should be separated from the other detainees. However, no other individual cells were available, so he was allowed to ride in the rear together with Officers K. and D.","10.Approximately half way to the destination, prisoners Sa., Ma. and Mu. kicked out the door of the large cell and attacked the convoy officers. Prisoner Mu. overpowered Officer D. and seized his holster containing a handgun. A struggle for the gun ensued and Mu. fired a shot at the floor. Prisoner Sa. grabbed Officer D. from behind, and a second shot was fired.","11.Meanwhile, Officer K. pushed prisoner Ma. aside, drew his gun and told everyone to freeze or he would shoot. Prisoners Sa. and Mu. were still struggling with Officer D. for the gun. Officer K. shot at Sa. and hit him.","12.Major V. came running to the back of the van and opened the door. More shots followed. Eventually, prisoner Mu. released the gun and threw it out of the van. At some point, a bullet ricocheted, wounding the applicant in his left shin.","13.The applicant was taken to a local military hospital where his wounded leg was put in a cast. On the following day he was discharged and transferred to a prison hospital.","14.In December 2013 the applicant complained to a prosecutor that he had been injured as a consequence of the grossly negligent actions of convoy officers who had breached the transfer regulations.","15.On 9 January 2014 an investigator with the Bashkortostan Regional Division of the Investigations Committee refused to open a criminal case. He found no indications of gross negligence arising from the decision to transport two prisoners in excess of the van\u2019s design capacity and that not putting the applicant in a cell had been motivated by \u201cconsiderations of budgetary austerity and saving money allocated for the purchase of fuel\u201d.","16.On 4 December 2014 a deputy prosecutor of the Kirovskiy District in Ufa rejected the applicant\u2019s complaint against the investigator\u2019s decision.","17.On 30 April 2015 the Kirovskiy District Court in Ufa upheld the investigator\u2019s decision as lawful, noting that it had been within his competence to issue such a decision, and that the decision contained no defects of form. On 20 July 2015 the Supreme Court of the Bashkortostan Republic rejected an appeal against the District Court\u2019s judgment.","18.On 14 September 2015 the acting head of the regional division of the Investigations Committee ordered an additional \u201cpre\u2011investigation inquiry\u201d into whether an offence of negligence causing grievous bodily harm had been committed. Ten days later the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings:","\u201c... it does not appear possible to establish with certainty that the bullet which hit [the applicant] was shot from the handgun of Officer V., rather than from [the handgun of] Officer D., while it was in the possession of prisoner Mu. Besides, under Article [41] of the Criminal Code, causing damage to interests protected by criminal law is not a criminal offence if the act causing such damage was based on a reasonable risk assessment and sought to achieve a socially useful objective, such as preventing an attempted escape in the instant case.\u201d","19.On 8 February 2016 the deputy head of the regional division upheld the investigator\u2019s decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings.","20.On 5 May 2016 the supervising deputy prosecutor of the Bashkortostan Republic set the decision aside and ordered a forensic assessment of the applicant\u2019s injury. On 6 June 2016 the investigator with the Central Investigations Department in Ufa again refused to institute criminal proceedings, noting that the applicant\u2019s medical record could not be located. It had been sent to the facility where he was serving his sentence and that facility had not responded to the investigator\u2019s request for a copy.","21.In parallel criminal proceedings, on 22 December 2014 the Ordjonikidzevskiy District Court in Ufa convicted prisoners Mu. and Sa. of attempted escape from prison and sentenced them to five years\u2019 imprisonment each. Convoy Officers K., D. and V. had been given the status of injured parties in those proceedings. The applicant testified as a witness."],"31517":["6.The applicant, Mr Fabian Gjini, a Croatian citizen of Albanian origin, was born in 1972 and lives in Crikvenica, Croatia.","A.The applicant\u2019s arrest","7.On 22 August 2008 the applicant was arrested by the Serbian police on suspicion of having attempted to pay a toll at Tovarnik border crossing (a border crossing between Serbia and Croatia) with a counterfeit ten\u2011euro(EUR) banknote.","8.Upon his arrest, the applicant was taken before an investigating judge. The applicant was unable to provide the EUR 6,000 security for his bail, and the investigating judge ordered his detention.","9.The applicant spent 31 days in custody in Sremska Mitrovica Prison and was released from detention on 22 September 2008.","10.On 30 September 2008 the criminal proceedings against the applicant were discontinued by the prosecuting authorities, because the expert tests performed on the allegedly counterfeit banknote showed that it was actually genuine.","B.The applicant\u2019s ill-treatment by his cellmates","1.The applicant\u2019s version of events","11.The applicant alleges that in Sremska Mitrovica Prison he was placed in a four-bed cell which already housed four other inmates. Because of the lack of space, the applicant had no proper bed and had to sleep on the floor, on a sheet of foam material.","12.According to the applicant, the ill-treatment and humiliation started immediately. His cellmates forced him to mop the cell floor. While he was mopping, they did not allow him to raise his head, and would kick him sporadically. After he had mopped up, the cellmates would slap and kick the applicant for his \u201cfailure\u201d to mop the floor properly. The applicant was compelled to clean the floor again and again. He could not remember how many times he had mopped the cell floor. He remembered, however, that his cellmates poured the water containing detergent over him to teach him how to get \u201cthings\u201d clean.","13.According to the applicant, his cellmates thought that he was an informer. They did not believe that he had been put in their cell because of a counterfeit note. Rather, they thought that he had been placed there to spy on them and find out about their crimes.","14.The cellmates threatened the applicant by saying that they would stage his suicide if he told anyone what was happening in the cell. At night, the applicant was put in the toilet. There, the cellmates forced him to keep his feet in cold water for the whole night. He was not allowed to move. The morning after, the skin on his feet tore off and open wounds appeared.","15.The situation worsened after the applicant\u2019s cellmates found out about his origin. Upon learning that he lived on the Croatian coast, they said that they wanted to test him to see how well a person from the coast could \u201cdive\u201d. They filled a bucket with water and put the applicant\u2019s head in it. Afterwards, they would shower the applicant with cold water. This test was performed over and over again.","16.On one occasion, the applicant\u2019s cellmates gave him a wet towel and forced him to fight with another prisoner. After the applicant had managed to hit his opponent, his four cellmates jumped on him, punched and kicked him, and abused him for daring to hit a Serb.","17.They made him sing Serb nationalist songs (\u010detni\u010dke pesme). After he said that he did not know any, they taught him some and forced him to sing them for several nights. The applicant could not remember whether he had also been forced to sing Croat nationalist songs (usta\u0161ke pesme).","18.According to the applicant, his cellmates raped him. Although he could not remember the rape itself, he assumed that it happened as follows. One day the cellmates gave him a glass of water. The water caused him to feel dizzy, and he felt unable to walk and quickly lost consciousness. The next morning, he had pain in his anus and saw blood in his faeces. On that day his cellmates shaved him and shaved his eyebrows. Later, he discovered that shaved eyebrows were a sign that he had become someone\u2019s \u201cgirl\u201d (curica). Being a \u201cgirl\u201d meant that he had been sodomised.","19.According to the applicant, the prison guards were perfectly aware of what was happening to him. In particular, all the events happened while one guard \u2013 who appeared to be a school friend of one of the applicant\u2019s cellmates \u2013 was on duty. The applicant remembered that the prison guards laughed at him openly during his walks in the prison yard. He also had impression that everything that happened to him was because of his origin and nationality.","20.Several days after the start of his detention, the applicant\u2019s lawyer noticed changes in the applicant\u2019s behaviour and sensed that something was wrong. The applicant was afraid to say anything to his lawyer. Nevertheless, the lawyer urged the prison authorities to move the applicant to another cell.","21.After his relocation, the applicant was no longer ill-treated.","2.The Government\u2019s version of events","22.The Government contended that the applicant\u2019s version of the events was not supported by evidence. They did not provide a separate description of the events from 22August 2008 until 22 September 2008 when the applicant was detained in Sremska Mitrovica Prison.","C.Proceedings and developments before the domestic authorities","1.Civil proceedings","23.On 29 October 2008 the applicant invited the Ministry of Justice to make a payment in respect of his allegedly unlawful detention. He received no reply.","24.On 1 September 2009, the applicant amended his proposal, adding a request for compensation for the ill-treatment he had suffered during the period of detention. Again, he received no reply.","25.On 25 December 2009 the applicant lodged a civil complaint against the Republic of Serbia with the Second Municipal Court (subsequently renamed the Court of First Instance) in Belgrade. He requested compensation for his detention, and in respect of the non-pecuniary damage he had sustained in terms of fear, physical pain and mental anxiety owing to the ill-treatment to which he had been subjected during his time in detention.","26.On 12 March 2010 the Republic Attorney General\u2019s Office (Republi\u010dko javno pravobranila\u0161tvo) contested the applicant\u2019s claims. The office underlined that the applicant had failed to submit any medical evidence in support of his claims concerning the alleged ill-treatment.","27.On 15 June 2010 a hearing was held before the Court of First Instance. The Republic Attorney General\u2019s Office was not present. The applicant was represented by his lawyer. However, owing to the nature of the applicant\u2019s complaints, the domestic court decided that the applicant had to be present at hearings. The applicant was summoned to attend the next hearing, scheduled for 21 October 2010, subsequently rescheduled for 2February 2011.","28.At the hearing of 2 February 2011, and the further hearing on 20May 2011, the judge interviewed several witnesses: (i) P.S., who had been serving a sentence in Sremska Mitrovica Prison at the same time when the applicant had been there; (ii) D.\u017d., who had represented the applicant in the criminal proceedings and was familiar with the events in prison; and (iii)M.\u010c., the applicant\u2019s uncle.","29.P.S. stated that he had met the applicant in Sremska Mitrovica Prison. The applicant was placed in a cell in the part of the prison where he was imprisoned. P.S. remembered hearing someone singing Serb and Croat nationalist songs at night. That was before the applicant was transferred to another part of the prison. P.S. and the applicant used to talk during the morning walks in the prison. One morning P.S. observed that the applicant\u2019s eyebrows had been shaved. On that occasion, he also noticed haematomas behind the applicant\u2019s ears and on the upper part of his arm. He could see the injuries because it was summer and they were all in T-shirts. The applicant had a strange look in his eyes and seemed very scared. The applicant avoided the company of other prisoners and complained to P.S. regarding the ill-treatment to which he had been subjected by his cellmates. The applicant also complained that his anus was bleeding and that he had been given some medicine which had made him lose consciousness. P.S. could not remember whether someone had screamed at night. Their cells were 10-15 metres apart. P.S. confirmed that shaved eyebrows in prison meant that the person had been raped. He also saw the damaged skin on the applicant\u2019s feet. The guards in prison must have heard that somebody was singing songs, and they must also have noticed other signs of maltreatment. The guards knew what shaved eyebrows meant. Prison guards patrolled the prison corridors day and night. Through peepholes, they controlled what prisoners did in their cells. There were cameras placed in the corridors, but there were no cameras in the cells. The applicant was moved to another cell after his lawyer urged the prison authorities to relocate him. P.S. left Sremska Mitrovica Prison seven to eight days before the applicant.","30.D.\u017d. met the applicant in 2008 when he represented him in the criminal proceedings concerning the use of an allegedly forged banknote. He visited the applicant in prison. On that occasion, D.\u017d. noticed that the applicant had been shaved and his eyebrows had also been shaved. The applicant looked disorientated and scared. D.\u017d. asked the applicant whether there was any problem, but the applicant could not give him a clear answer. The applicant seemed frightened and confused. D.\u017d. urged the prison authorities to transfer the applicant to another cell. Specifically, D.\u017d. called the prison authorities, expressed his concern about the applicant\u2019s treatment, and underlined that the authorities should respect the laws and regulations concerning the placement and status of detainees. D.\u017d. also talked to another client, V.D., who informed him what had happened to the applicant.","31.M.\u010c. had known the applicant since birth. He was the applicant\u2019s uncle. He visited the applicant once during his time in prison. On that occasion, he could not recognise the applicant. The applicant was bald, with shaved eyebrows. M.\u010c. also noticed bruises on the applicant\u2019s right arm, as well as bruises on his head. M.\u010c. stated that he wanted to know what had happened to the applicant, yet the applicant was evasive and avoided eye contact. M.\u010c. had previously known the applicant to be a happy and cheerful person, but said that the applicant had never fully recovered from what had happened to him in prison.","32.Between the two hearings, a statement was taken from another witness, V.D., who was still serving his sentence in Sremska Mitrovica Prison. This witness remembered the applicant, but was not exactly sure what had happened to him during his time in the prison. V.D. recalled seeing him with shaved eyebrows and a strange haircut. He also recalled hearing the applicant singing or screaming at nights, but he could not remember what he had actually been singing.","33.At the hearing of 9November2011 two expert witnesses \u2013 an expert on traumatology and a neuropsychiatrist \u2013 submitted their reports. They found that, due to his suffering in prison, the applicant had suffered certain physical pain and had sustained an overall loss of 10% in his \u201cvital activity\u201d (umanjenje op\u0161te \u017eivotne aktivnosti).","34.The Republic Attorney General\u2019s Office denied the events in Sremska Mitrovica Prison as alleged by the applicant. It, in particular, referred to the absence of medical evidence.","35.On 9 November 2011 the Court of First Instance in Belgrade accepted the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the request for compensation for his detention, but rejected his request in respect of compensation for non-pecuniary damage caused by ill-treatment in a State-owned institution. The court found:","\u201c[The applicant has] no medical certificate proving the injuries. Medical expert witnesses testified on the basis of the claimant\u2019s statement. The testimonies of other witnesses are based on what the claimant told them. The claimant, if injured at all, should have gone to see the doctor in the detention unit; he ought to have visited the doctor, who would have confirmed the injuries, or he should have said something in order to be transferred to another cell and protected. The claimant has no medical certificate concerning any injuries.\u201d","36.On 17 October 2012 the Court of Appeal in Belgrade upheld the Court of First Instance\u2019s decision as regards the compensation for detention, but quashed the rejection of the claim for compensation in respect of the ill\u2011treatment. The case was remitted to the Court of First Instance for reconsideration. As regards the Court of First Instance, the Court of Appeal stated the following:","\u201c[It] failed to properly evaluate the evidence in accordance with Article 8 of the Law on Civil Procedure, in accordance with which a court must decide on the facts established as proven, but on the basis of a conscientious and meticulous assessment of each particular piece [of evidence] and of all the evidence together, as well as in relation to the outcome of the whole proceedings. Given that such an evaluation was not carried out in this particular case, the findings of the first-instance court that it had not been proved that the claimant had been ill-treated and molested by other cellmates during his time in detention \u2013 causing him to sustain different types of non-pecuniary loss for which the [State] could be held responsible as defined in Article 172 of the Obligations Act (Zakon o obligacionim odnosima) \u2013 cannot be accepted with any certainty.\u201d","37.In the reopened proceedings, the Court of First Instance re-examined the applicant\u2019s first lawyer, D.\u017d., as well as the two expert witnesses. The court also considered reports produced by a psychologist and a psychiatrist from Rijeka, Croatia concerning the applicant\u2019s current mental health and emotional distress. Those reports confirmed that, because of the ill-treatment he had sustained in Sremska Mitrovica Prison, the applicant was still in a state of mental anxiety.","38.On 10 May 2013 the Court of First Instance awarded the applicant 200,000 Serbian dinars (RSD \u2013 approximately EUR 1,900) in respect of non-pecuniary damage for the 10% loss in his general vital activity associated with the events in detention. However, the claim for the applicant\u2019s physical suffering was rejected because, in the court\u2019s view, his suffering had not constituted grievous but rather slight bodily harm, for which no compensation could be awarded, according to the law. Also, the court refused to award the applicant compensation for non-pecuniary damage for his fear.","39.On 10 December 2013 the Court of Appeal in Belgrade upheld the decision of the Court of First Instance in part and reaffirmed the findings of that court that the applicant had suffered from an acute stress disorder as a result of being detained and harassed by other inmates, which, in general, had led to his experiencing post-traumatic stress and a loss in his general vital activity. However, the Court of Appeal awarded the applicant an additional RSD 50,000 (approximately EUR 450) for the fear arising from the events during his detention, and explained its reasoning in the following manner:","\u201cTaking into account the established factual situation and all the circumstances of the present case, as well as the findings of the neuropsychiatrists, according to which the claimant suffered post-traumatic stress during and after his detention, this being, in itself, a complex reaction when a person\u2019s physical and personal integrity is threatened, which [in this case] lasted for days and involved fear, emotional distress, a feeling of sadness, distraction and despair, and being a reaction which, by its nature, is more complex than a fear of strong intensity, the Court of Appeal finds that, in accordance with Article 200 of the Obligations Act, the claimant is entitled to a just award for non-pecuniary damage for the fear he experienced.\u201d","40.On 18 January 2014 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. He complained under Articles 21, 23, 25, 28, 29, 32, 35 and 36 of the Constitution (articles corresponding to Articles 3, 6, 13 and 14 of the Convention). In particular, his complaint was as follows:","\u201cThe domestic courts have unlawfully and unconstitutionally rejected the claimant\u2019s clearly justified claim for compensation in respect of the non-pecuniary damage he suffered on account of the violation of his human dignity after being placed in illegal detention, where he was molested for days by a group of prisoners as a person of Croatian and Albanian origin, being beaten and kicked all over his body, drenched with water, beaten with wet towels, tortured, battered, raped and thereafter shaved all over his body, which was the symbol of a raped person, and being subjected to real and serious threats that he would \u2018commit suicide by hanging [himself] over the door handle\u02bc, or be cut with a razor blade and similar items. And all this was done with the silent approval of prison officers who knew which cell they had put the claimant in, and who knew or ought to have known about everything that happened to him.\u201d","41.On 9 June 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant\u2019s constitutional appeal. It only considered his complaint under Article 6 of the Convention, and found it to be manifestly ill-founded. The Constitutional Court did not address any other complaint raised by the applicant.","2.Other relevant facts","42.About the ill-treatment he had suffered during the period of detention, the applicant also complained to the President of the Republic and to the Minister of Justice herself. No one ever replied to those complaints.","43.On 24 February 2010 the applicant\u2019s representative complained to the Provincial Ombudsperson (Pokrajinski ombudsman) regarding the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment in prison. On 16 March 2010 the Provincial Ombudsperson replied that he had no jurisdiction over the case, as the applicant was no longer in detention.","44.On 1 March 2010 the applicant\u2019s representative also informed the State Ombudsperson (Za\u0161titnik gra\u0111ana Republike Srbije) about the detention and ill-treatment of the applicant. He particularly highlighted the fact that even if State authorities knew or ought to know about the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment in detention, none had ever launched an investigation into the case. The State Ombudsperson replied on 26April2010 that he had no jurisdiction over the work of the public prosecutor\u2019s office or the courts, and accordingly had no jurisdiction over the case."],"31538":["5.The applicants, a brother and two sisters, were born in Bulgaria and lived in a centre for children left without parental care, located in the village of Strahilovo (\u201cthe orphanage\u201d). X (\u201cthe first applicant\u201d) was born in 2000, Y (\u201cthe second applicant\u201d) was born in 2002, and Z (\u201cthe third applicant\u201d) was born in 2003. In June 2012, aged twelve, ten and nine respectively, they were adopted by an Italian couple and moved to Italy.","6.In October 2012, following an argument with her brother, the third applicant complained about his behaviour towards her, accusing him of abusing her sexually. Alerted by the complaint and by the behaviour of the third applicant, who had begun biting her mother, shutting herself in the bathroom and crying out, the adoptive parents had the children examined by two psychologists specialising in child abuse who worked in a relationship counselling centre.","7.The report drawn up by the psychologists does not contain a verbatim record of the applicants\u2019 statements, but rather represents an account which also includes the psychologists\u2019 comments. According to the report, the psychologists had conversations first with the parents and then with the children during October 2012. The conversations with the applicants, described as \u201ctherapy sessions\u201d, were conducted using the methods recommended for children who had been victims of abuse, and were recorded. The first applicant was the first to speak to the psychologists. As the three children did not speak Italian very well at the time, the adoptive father accompanied the first applicant, at the latter\u2019s request, and helped to explain what he was saying.","8.During this conversation the first applicant stated that one of the boys in the orphanage, D., used to enter the smallest children\u2019s dormitory during the night and abuse some of them sexually while forcing the others to watch, and used to hit children. The first applicant did not name the children concerned, apart from D. and D.\u2019s sister. He described the acts in question using few words, from which it transpired that D. had touched the intimate parts of some of the children and placed his penis in their mouths. The first applicant said that he had reported these events to the director of the orphanage, E., who had assured him that she would call the police if it happened again.","9.The second and third applicants spoke to the psychologists together. The part of the report concerning the second applicant stated as follows: \u201cY seems to have viewed it all as a game and did not attach negative connotations to the events, saying \u2018I saw M. and B. doing sex and I did it with [my brother]\u2019. On the other hand, both sisters appear worried about [their brother], who was the victim of violence on several occasions, saying \u2018X got hit more, I wasn\u2019t hit so much\u2019\u201d. The report did not name the alleged perpetrator. Speaking to the psychologists, the third applicant mentioned another situation in which the children from the orphanage had allegedly been taken to a \u201cdiscotheque\u201d where they had danced and where some men had arrived and \u201cplayed\u201d with them. The third applicant stated that she was the only one who had put up a struggle, and said \u201cI cried out loudly and hit him\u201d.","10.During the conversation, the applicants were asked to point out the body parts in question on dolls given to them by the psychologists.","11.Other conversations were held with the children in November and December 2012. On 5 November 2012 the first applicant stated that, in the \u201cdiscotheque\u201d, some men had played sexual games with the children from the orphanage and had filmed them.","12.The children were monitored regularly. According to the psychologists\u2019 report, the applicants subsequently refused to speak about the events in question and said that they were \u201csick of Bulgaria\u201d.","13.On 16 November 2012 the children\u2019s adoptive father sent an email to the Bulgarian State Agency for Child Protection (hereafter \u201cthe Agency\u201d) stating that he wished to lodge a complaint concerning abuse in an orphanage. In a reply written in Bulgarian, the Agency stated that it needed further information in order to carry out a check, and in particular the name of the institution in question and the children\u2019s Bulgarian names. The father wrote back saying that he could not understand the letter. There was no further correspondence.","14.On 22 November 2012 the applicants\u2019 adoptive parents alerted the Italian association that had assisted them during the adoption process, and subsequently the Italian Commission for Intercountry Adoption. In their letter to the Commission they described the events referred to in the psychologists\u2019 report, together with other information given to them by the applicants. They gave the forenames of seven men and four women, including a certain N., whom the applicants had allegedly identified as the perpetrators of the abuse. Some of the persons concerned were members of the orphanage\u2019s staff while others were from outside. The applicants\u2019 adoptive parents alleged that groups of children from the orphanage had been taken \u201con holiday\u201d to a village where they visited a place they called a \u201cdiscotheque\u201d on a daily basis, and where they were touched and assaulted by men from outside the orphanage. The first applicant had allegedly been forced to watch his sisters being raped. It was alleged that the children, left unsupervised during the night at the orphanage, had subsequently repeated with the younger children the behaviour of which they had themselves been victims.","15.On 21 December 2012 the applicants\u2019 adoptive parents lodged a criminal complaint with the Italian police.","16.The adoptive parents also contacted an investigative journalist. At the beginning of January 2013 the weekly news magazine L\u2019Espresso published an article entitled \u201cBulgaria, in the paedophiles\u2019 den\u201d which reported on the allegations made by the applicants\u2019 parents but without naming them. The article stated that dozens of children from the orphanage in which the applicants had been placed in Bulgaria had been subjected to systematic sexual abuse by staff members and outsiders, in particular at a discotheque in a holiday village. The article described an organised network, with acts of paedophilia and violence, including threatening with weapons, being carried out by masked men, and stated that some scenes had been videoed. It stated that the youngest children had been the victims of one of the older children, who had entered their dormitory, and that the first applicant had reported the incidents to the director of the orphanage, who had done nothing. The author of the article said that he had travelled to Bulgaria in December 2012 and had visited the places described by the applicants, which, he said, matched their descriptions. He had made informal contact with a police officer and had passed on the information given to him by the applicants\u2019 parents. However, the police officer had later told him that his supervisors had forbidden him to take up the case.","17.On 15 January 2013 the Italian public prosecutor dealing with the case forwarded the information in his possession to the Bulgarian embassy in Rome, taking the view that it was for the Bulgarian authorities to investigate the allegations.","18.On 22 February 2013 the journalist from L\u2019Espresso gave a statement to the Italian prosecutor.","19.Having learnt about the article published in the Italian press, in particular via reports broadcast on Bulgarian radio, the Agency ordered an inspection of the orphanage on 14 and 15 January 2013. The Ruse Regional Child Rights Monitoring Department was tasked with carrying out the inspection. The inspectors interviewed the mayor of Strahilovo municipality, the director of the orphanage, the general practitioner, the welfare assistant, the psychologist, the nurse and the other staff members who were on duty at the time of the inspection. The inspectors also spoke to the thirteen children who were present, aged between eight and thirteen. The staff and the children were asked to complete an anonymous questionnaire concerning possible violent incidents, the quality of life in the orphanage and the relationship between children and staff.","20.According to the report drawn up by the inspectors on 21 January 2013, the children in the orphanage were never left unsupervised, access by outside visitors was subject to checks and there were CCTV cameras around the outside of the premises, the footage from which was viewed on a regular basis. The report stated that the children were divided into different dormitories by age and, in the case of the older children, by gender, and that the layout of the dormitories was such that the children could not move from one dormitory to another without being seen by the staff members on duty. The children\u2019s replies to the questionnaire made no mention of violence or sexual abuse, but merely referred to arguments and to sometimes being hit by other children, who had apparently been reprimanded by staff as a result. According to the psychologist who had monitored the applicants while they were living in the orphanage, they had never mentioned ill-treatment or sexual abuse and had shown no signs of it.","21.The Agency sent a team of psychologists to the orphanage from 18 to 24 January 2013. The team likewise found no cause for alarm.","22.On the basis of this report, the Agency concluded that there was no evidence that the children in the orphanage had been subjected to the treatment reported in L\u2019Espresso. In view of the seriousness of the allegations, however, the Agency forwarded the file to the Veliko Tarnovo district and regional prosecutors\u2019 offices.","23.On 28 January 2013 the Veliko Tarnovo district prosecutor\u2019s office opened a preliminary investigation (\u043f\u0440\u0435\u043f\u0438\u0441\u043a\u0430) into the reports of abuse. Taking the view that there was no evidence in these reports that a criminal offence had been committed, the prosecutor\u2019s office asked the Agency whether it had any other evidence. The Agency confirmed that the inspection carried out did not suggest that any abuse had been committed.","24.In an order of 18 November 2013 the prosecutor\u2019s office found that there were no grounds for criminal prosecution and discontinued the case.","25.While the first set of proceedings was pending, a second investigation was opened on 18 February 2013 by the regional prosecutor\u2019s office following a further report from the director of the Agency, which had received a report on 8 January 2013 from the Italian Association SOS Telefono Azzuro. The association\u2019s report gave the names and descriptions of persons allegedly implicated in abusing children from the orphanage, and was accompanied by the reports of the Italian psychologists who had spoken to the applicants. The file was transmitted to the Veliko Tarnovo district prosecutor\u2019s office, which opened a preliminary investigation on 22February 2013. A team of investigators from the police and the local and regional healthcare, social welfare and child protection departments visited the orphanage on 25 and 26 February 2013.","26.The investigators consulted the documents available in the orphanage, including the children\u2019s medical files, and spoke to members of staff (the director, the psychologist, two supervisors, a childcare assistant, and the driver, caretaker and heating technician), to a photographer and an electrician who occasionally worked in the institution, and to four children aged between eleven and thirteen. On 6 March 2013 a police report was drawn up describing the running of the institution and the activities and care provided to the 53 children who were living there at the time. The report stated that, in the course of the regular medical check-ups carried out by the general practitioner from outside the orphanage, no signs of physical or sexual assault had been observed on the children. It mentioned that a complaints box was available to the children, as well as a telephone which gave the number of the national helpline for children in danger, and that no incidents corresponding to the applicants\u2019 allegations had been reported by those means.","27.The report noted that only three staff members were men \u2013 the driver, the caretaker and the heating technician \u2013 and that they were not allowed to enter the dormitories unless accompanied by the director of the orphanage or by a female member of staff.","28.The report further noted that the orphanage underwent regular inspections by the local child protection department and that a police officer visited every week. It stated that security measures were in place, particularly regarding entry by outside visitors, and that no incidents of sexual abuse of children had been reported, either during the interviews with staff members in the course of the investigation or in the years preceding the investigation.","29.The report also referred to investigations conducted by the public prosecutor\u2019s office or the police into incidents occurring at the orphanage since 2002, and in particular one case of ill-treatment by an employee who had subsequently been dismissed, and one case in which some children had accidentally swallowed medication. It noted that no reports of sexual abuse had been recorded.","30.According to a second police report, dated 5 June 2013, the police also questioned the director of the orphanage, the psychologist, the welfare assistant, the photographer, and the electrician who had worked in the orphanage and the initial of whose forename was N. (see paragraph 14 above). B., one of the children from the orphanage, who had been mentioned in the documents transmitted by the Italian authorities, was also questioned with the assistance of the orphanage\u2019s psychologist. The report found that the applicants\u2019 allegations were not corroborated by the evidence gathered and, in particular, that \u2013 contrary to the applicants\u2019 assertions \u2013 the director of the orphanage was not called E., no incidents of sexual abuse had been reported to her by the applicants, and the children had not been taken to a \u201cdiscotheque\u201d. The only occasion on which the children had had an opportunity to dance had been at a party during the annual class excursion organised by an association. The children had been accompanied by the supervisors from the orphanage and the only other person present had been a disc jockey who had been invited for the evening. According to the report, the psychologist had stated that the third applicant had not displayed the symptoms referred to (crying out while she was in the bath) during her time at the orphanage, and that the first and second applicants had a tendency to manipulate other people, including adults. The witness statements indicated that D. and his sister (see paragraph 8 above) had been adopted by Italian parents in the late summer of 2011, when D. was 12 years old.","31.The Agency report on the visits to the orphanage observed that the institution largely complied with the relevant regulations and that there were no grounds to suspect sexual abuse. The report made several recommendations including improvements to the programme of activities offered to the children.","32.On conclusion of the preliminary investigation the district prosecutor\u2019s office, in an order of 28 June 2013, decided not to institute criminal proceedings and discontinued the case. According to the order, the allegations made by the applicants\u2019 parents had not been confirmed, the male staff members and the electrician N. (who had worked only occasionally in the orphanage) had not had access to the children without a female supervisor being present, and the children had not come into contact with any men on outside excursions without the female staff being present. The public prosecutor concluded that the evidence gathered in the case did not lead to the conclusion that a criminal offence had been committed.","33.On 8 April 2013 the first and second applicants gave evidence to the public prosecutor at the Youth Court, with a psychologist present. However, the record of that interview was not produced before the Court. On 24 June 2013 the public prosecutor transmitted the file to the Youth Court.","34.The Youth Court appointed an expert specialising in paediatric neuropsychiatry to assess the credibility of the applicants\u2019 testimony. According to the assessment made by the expert on the basis of the written reports and the recordings of the interviews with the applicants, their allegations appeared sufficiently credible.","35.On 29 June 2013 the public prosecutor at the Youth Court proposed that the court should order a review of the applicants\u2019 psychological counselling and rule that it was unnecessary to question the applicants again as requested by the Bulgarian authorities.","36.By a decision of 13 May 2014 the Youth Court held that there were no grounds for ordering a protective measure in respect of the applicants or for reviewing their psychological counselling, and found that the ability of the adoptive parents to take care of and raise the children was not in question. However, the court noted that the conduct of the adoptive parents had been inappropriate in so far as they should have applied to the Youth Court or another competent authority immediately rather than having recourse to a journalist. It held that it was not in the children\u2019s interests to subject them to further questioning by the courts.","37.On 22 January 2014 the Italian Ministry of Justice sent an official letter to the Bulgarian authorities, forwarding the information gathered by the Italian public prosecutor\u2019s office and asking them to open an investigation into the allegations. On 14 March 2014 the public prosecutor\u2019s office at the Supreme Court of Cassation sent a translation of the Italian documents to the Veliko Tarnovo regional prosecutor\u2019s office, which in turn forwarded them to the Veliko Tarnovo district prosecutor\u2019s office. On 4April 2014 the district prosecutor\u2019s office opened a preliminary investigation. On 15 April 2015 the prosecutor noted that three sets of proceedings had been opened concerning the same facts, and forwarded the files to the regional prosecutor\u2019s office, proposing that the proceedings be joined and that the orders made be set aside.","38.In an order of 5 June 2014 the Veliko Tarnovo regional prosecutor\u2019s office ordered the joinder of the three set of proceedings and set aside the order of 28 June 2013 on the grounds that it had been made while the first set of proceedings had been pending. The discontinuance order of 18November 2013 thus remained in force.","39.In December 2014 and January 2015 a representative of the Italian embassy in Sofia made an official enquiry regarding the progress of the investigation. On 23 January 2015 the Bulgarian authorities informed the Italian embassy in Sofia that the criminal investigation had been closed by means of the order of 18 November 2013. A copy of the order was sent to the embassy on 28 January 2015.","40.On 19 January 2015 the Italian Ministry of Justice requested its Bulgarian counterpart to inform it of the outcome of the criminal proceedings. It received the information in a letter of 11 March 2015.","41.On 11 December 2015 the applicants\u2019 adoptive father wrote to the Italian Ministry of Justice requesting access to all the information in the file. On 1 February 2016, in response to that request, the Italian authorities sent to the adoptive parents the decisions given by the Bulgarian prosecuting authorities, translated into Italian, including the order of the Veliko Tarnovo district prosecutor\u2019s office of 18 November 2013. The order stated that it was open to appeal to the regional prosecutor\u2019s office.","42.On 7 June 2016 the Italian Ministry of Justice sent additional information concerning the case to its Bulgarian counterpart, and in particular a letter from the applicants\u2019 adoptive parents challenging the investigation carried out and casting doubt on the independence of the Veliko Tarnovo district prosecutor\u2019s office.","43.These documents were forwarded to the Veliko Tarnovo district prosecutor\u2019s office on 1 August 2016. On 2 August 2016 the prosecutor in charge withdrew from the case, in view of the doubts raised by the applicants\u2019 parents regarding the way in which it was being handled. A different prosecutor was put in charge of the case. He forwarded the file to the regional prosecutor\u2019s office, taking the view that the letter from the adoptive parents should be treated as an appeal against the order of the district prosecutor\u2019s office of 18 November 2013.","44.In an order of 30 September 2016 the regional prosecutor\u2019s office upheld the discontinuance order of 18 November 2013. It noted that the order had been based on an inspection carried out by the Agency which had not identified any shortcomings in the running of the orphanage or any infringement of the children\u2019s rights, and that the prosecutor had concluded accordingly that the information contained in the article in the Italian weekly magazine had not been corroborated.","45.The prosecutor in charge of the case made the following observations. In the course of the second set of proceedings, opened following the report by the association SOS Telefono Azzuro, an investigation had been conducted by the police and the various relevant departments. In that context, evidence had been taken from the following members of the orphanage staff: the director, the psychologist, two supervisors, the driver, the heating technician, the caretaker and a childcare assistant. Some outsiders who had worked in the orphanage, namely a photographer and an electrician, had also given evidence on that occasion. The police investigators had then conducted further interviews with the director, the psychologist, the welfare assistant, and one child, and also with the electrician, the photographer and the municipality\u2019s IT officer, all of whom had carried out work in the orphanage. The investigation had shown that the children were supervised during the night and had not had any contact with individuals from outside the orphanage without being accompanied by a childcare assistant or a supervisor from the centre. The children went each summer to a holiday camp in Lyaskovets, where they were also accompanied by supervisors from the orphanage. A party was usually organised at the end of their stay, at which the only outside person present was a disc jockey.","46.The public prosecutor noted that only three men had worked in the orphanage and that they did not have access to the rooms used by the children. The outside photographer came to the orphanage only to take photographs or make videos for adoption purposes or for parties or ceremonies. There was no employee with the initial N; the only person of that name was an electrician who had come to the orphanage occasionally to repair kitchen equipment, and there had never been a director called E.","47.Hence, in the prosecutor\u2019s view, there was nothing in the evidence gathered to suggest that any offences had been committed against the three applicants.","48.The prosecutor also observed that the documents sent subsequently by the Italian authorities confirmed the information contained in those that had already been sent and did not add anything to it. He therefore concluded that there were no grounds for a criminal prosecution, and upheld the discontinuance order of 18 November 2013.","49.On 17 November 2016 that decision was upheld by the Veliko Tarnovo appellate prosecutor\u2019s office in the context of a review performed of its own motion.","50.On 27 January 2017 a prosecutor from the public prosecutor\u2019s office at the Supreme Court of Cassation reviewed the order of the appellate prosecutor\u2019s office of her own motion. She found that the investigation carried out appeared to have been comprehensive and did not reveal that the applicants had been subjected to ill-treatment in the orphanage. She noted that the applicants\u2019 initial statements to the psychologists and their replies when questioned by the prosecutor at the Italian Youth Court had been at variance with each other and that the circumstances in which they had allegedly witnessed acts of a sexual nature were not clear. She considered it likely that the applicants had witnessed touching of a sexual nature between other children and had repeated similar acts between themselves, and that in view of their adoptive parents\u2019 disapproval of such behaviour and in order to avoid upsetting them, they had made up a story in which they were victims of abuse.","51.In addition to the inspections conducted in the orphanage following the applicants\u2019 allegations, the child protection services carried out a further check in June 2013 following a report by the association the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee concerning the quality of the educational activities, the presence of children older than the statutory maximum age, and the presence of the heating technician in rooms intended only for the children, in breach of the rules. The report of the child protection services noted, in particular, that the heating technician had not entered the rooms occupied by the children unless accompanied by a staff member. However, the director of the orphanage told the child protection services that one employee had made inappropriate remarks about adult relationships in front of the children and had been reprimanded by the director.","52.A criminal investigation was also opened in 2013 by the Veliko Tarnovo district prosecutor\u2019s office following a report by the social welfare department of a town in the region concerning complaints made by three children M., S. and Y., stating that, when they had lived in the orphanage between 2011 and 2012, one of the childcare assistants had hit them with a stick. The public prosecutor\u2019s office ordered an inspection to be carried out by the police and the Svishtov child protection department. A further check was carried out by the Strahilovo social services, on the orders of the mayor, concerning the same report. In an order of 19 June 2013 the district prosecutor\u2019s office discontinued the case, noting that there was insufficient evidence to find that the children had been ill-treated by members of staff. It emerges from the order that the young girl M. had previously complained of sexual abuse within her family and had told the other children in the orphanage about it.","53.The orphanage was closed in July 2015 as part of a policy of deinstitutionalisation aimed at placing as many children as possible with families.","54.Under Articles 207 to 211 of the 2006 Code of Criminal Procedure, criminal proceedings are instituted by the authorities where there are legal grounds (\u0437\u0430\u043a\u043e\u043d\u0435\u043d \u043f\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0434) and sufficient evidence (\u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0442\u044a\u0447\u043d\u043e \u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u0438) pointing to the commission of a criminal offence. The legal grounds may be a report (\u0441\u044a\u043e\u0431\u0449\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435) addressed to the public prosecutor or another competent body stating that an offence has been committed, a press article, statements made by the perpetrator of an offence, or direct observation by the prosecuting authorities of the commission of an offence.","55.Under Article 213 of the Code, where the public prosecutor decides not to institute criminal proceedings, he or she must inform the victim of the offence or his or her heirs, the legal entity affected and the person who made the report. Those persons may lodge an appeal against the decision to discontinue the case with the higher-ranking prosecutor, who has the power to order the opening of criminal proceedings. The higher-ranking prosecutor may also review the discontinuance decision of his or her own motion.","56.Under section 17(1) of the Child Protection Act, the Chair of the Agency is empowered, among other things, to monitor respect for children\u2019s rights by schools, healthcare establishments and social services providers such as orphanages. In the event of an infringement of these rights or of the applicable rules, he or she may issue binding instructions with a view to remedying the shortcomings identified.","57.Under section 20 of the Act, the municipal social welfare department is responsible for child protection at local level."],"31547":["7.The applicants are nationals of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Their initials, dates of birth, the dates on which their applications were lodged, the application numbers, as well as the particulars of the domestic proceedings and other relevant information are set out in the appendix.","8.On various dates the applicants were charged in their countries of origin with religious and politically motivated crimes, their pre-trial detention was ordered in absentia, and international search warrants were issued by the authorities.","9.Subsequently, the Russian authorities took final decisions to remove (that is to say extradite or expel) the applicants, despite consistent claims that in the event of removal the applicants would face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.","11.The relevant reports by UN agencies and international NGOs on the situation in Tajikistan were cited in the case of K.I. v. Russia (no. 58182\/14, \u00a7\u00a72-28, 7 November 2017) and on the situation in Uzbekistan in the cases of Kholmurodov v. Russia (no.58923\/14, \u00a7\u00a7 46-50, 1 March 2016), and T.M. and Others v. Russia ([Committee], no.31189\/15, \u00a7 28, 7 November 2017)."],"31546":["6.The applicant is a national of Uzbekistan born on 5 November 1972. The relevant details of the application are set out in the appended table.","7.On 21 July 2015 the applicant was charged in Uzbekistan with religious and politically motivated crimes. On 22 July 2015 his pre-trial detention was ordered in absentia, and international search warrant was issued by the authorities.","8.Subsequently the Russian authorities decided to deport the applicant (see the appended table), despite his consistent claims that in the event of removal he would face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention in his country of origin.","10.The relevant reports by the UN agencies and international NGOs on the situation in Uzbekistan up until 2015 were cited in the case of Kholmurodov v. Russia (no. 58923\/14, \u00a7\u00a7 46-50, 1 March 2016).","11.Furthermore, the most recent Amnesty International\u2019s Report 2017\/18 \u201cThe State of the World\u2019s Human Rights\u201d reveals some steps taken for improving the human rights protection in Uzbekistan:","\u201cIn November, the President issued a decree explicitly prohibiting the use of torture to obtain confessions and their admission as evidence in court proceedings.\u201d","12.However, the relevant chapter of the same report on Counter-Terror and Security issues reads as follows:","\u201cThe authorities continued to secure forcible returns, including through extradition proceedings, of Uzbekistani nationals they identified as threats to the \u201cconstitutional order\u201d or national security. NSS officers continued to abduct wanted individuals (so\u2011called renditions) from abroad. Those abducted or otherwise forcibly returned were placed in incommunicado detention, often in undisclosed locations, and tortured or otherwise ill-treated to force them to confess or incriminate others. In many cases, security forces pressured relatives not to seek support from human rights organizations, and not to file complaints about alleged human rights violations.\u201d","13.Similar conclusions were drawn in Human Rights Watch World Report 2016 and Amnesty International\u2019s Submissions to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in the group of cases Garabayev v.Russian Federation (No.38411\/02)."],"31599":["8.The applicant, who belongs to the German-speaking minority in Belgium, was born in 1957. He is detained in the Paifve social-protection facility (\u00e9tablissement de d\u00e9fense sociale, or \u201cEDS\u201d).","A.The applicant\u2019s initial placement in compulsory confinement","9.In 1997 the applicant was convicted of indecent assault of a minor aged under 16, rape of a minor aged under ten, theft, destruction and damage, and possession of prohibited firearms by the Li\u00e8ge Court of Appeal and the Eupen Criminal Court. The prison terms were due to expire on 20February 2004.","10.While in prison the applicant committed other offences, in respect of which fresh proceedings were brought, in particular for threats, harassment and making false accusations against members of the judiciary. In consequence, on 16 June 2003 the Committals Division (chambre du conseil) of the Li\u00e8ge Court of First Instance ordered that he be placed in a psychiatric institution, pursuant to section 7 of the Law of 9 April 1930 on Social Protection in respect of Mental Defectives, Habitual Offenders and Perpetrators of certain Sexual Offences (the \u201cSocial Protection Act\u201d), applicable at the material time, and on the basis, inter alia, of a neuropsychiatric report by Dr L., dated 15 December 2001, and a report by psychologist H., dated 20 August 2002.","11.On 1 August 2003 the Indictment Division of the Li\u00e8ge Court of Appeal upheld that decision. The applicant did not appeal on points of law.","12.On 15 January 2004, based on, among other information, a psychiatric report by Dr V. dated 23 September 2003, the Minister of Justice also ruled that the applicant was to be placed in compulsory confinement, pursuant to section 21 of the Social Protection Act, in continuation of the sentences imposed in 1997.","13.On 21 January 2004, further to a decision of 16 October 2003 by the Social Protection Board for the Lantin Prison psychiatric wing (commission de d\u00e9fense sociale, or \u201cCDS\u201d), the applicant entered the Paifve EDS, located in the French-speaking region of Belgium.","14.An expert psychiatric report drawn up by Dr Ri. on 5September 2005 stated, in particular, as follows:","\u201c... there is no doubt that Mr Rooman requires treatment which focuses initially on his paranoiac psychosis. Here, therapy must be undertaken simultaneously at psychopharmacological and psychotherapeutic level. ... Long-term therapy over several years is required. The psychotherapy must be carried out by therapists specialising in the treatment of chronic psychosis, with, in the present case, support meetings and psycho-educational and pedagogical aspects. It is essential in this context that the therapies are administered in parallel; that is, that the psychotropic drugs help to prepare the patient for the psychotherapy and that, in turn, the psychological sessions enable the patient to respond to the psychotropic drugs.","... The therapy should therefore begin in a secure institution; treatment might then be possible in the closed unit of a long-stay institution, before envisaging treatment in an open unit. Confirmation that [the applicant] has achieved the required level in order to vary the [place of] therapy must be given by a psychiatric expert.","... With regard to practical implementation of the therapy, the language raises a significant problem. The psychopharmacological and psychotherapeutic treatment must take place in German. ...\u201d","B.The first application for conditional discharge and the request for day release, submitted to the CDS","15.On an unspecified date the applicant made an initial application for conditional discharge.","16.On 27 January 2006 the CDS postponed its examination of the request for conditional discharge until March 2006, holding that it was necessary to identify an institution that could admit the applicant and provide him with therapy in German, the only language that he understood and spoke.","17.On 9 June 2006 the CDS examined the application. At the hearing, the director of the Paifve EDS acknowledged that the institution was unable to provide the therapeutic care recommended by the experts who had already been consulted, given that no German-speaking doctor, therapist, psychologist, welfare officer or custodial staff member was employed in the institution.","18.In consequence, the CDS issued the following conclusions:","\u201cIt is undisputed that the detainee speaks only German, and that the medical, welfare and prison staff in the institution in which he is detained are unable to provide him with any therapeutic or welfare assistance; that he has been abandoned to his fate without any treatment since his arrival in Paifve (on 21 January 2004), although some individuals have, on a voluntary basis, made considerable efforts to explain to him his situation, which he experiences as an injustice;","In the present case, the two-fold legal aim of the compulsory confinement, namely protection of society and of the patient\u2019s health, can only be achieved if the deprivation of liberty is accompanied by the treatment necessitated by the detainee\u2019s mental health; since this dual condition is not fulfilled, [Mr] Rooman\u2019s detention is unlawful; ...\u201d","19.The CDS postponed its examination of the application for conditional discharge until a hearing to be held in September 2006, pending the appointment of German-speaking employees to the Paifve EDS.","20.In accordance with an order by the chairperson of the CDS of 24September 2006, the applicant was transferred to Verviers Prison so that its German-language psychosocial team could assess his mental health and ascertain whether he posed a danger to the public. On 30 October 2006 the CDS confirmed this order and postponed the case to a later date.","21.On 26 January 2007 the CDS dismissed the application for conditional discharge. A report of 24 January 2007, drawn up by the German-language psychosocial team in Verviers Prison, indicated that the applicant had a psychotic personality and paranoid character traits (high self-esteem; lack of respect for others, whom he used only for his own purposes; a feeling of omnipotence; lack of self-criticism; use of threatening remarks), and that he was refusing any treatment. Furthermore, the CDS noted that there was no institution in Belgium which could meet the security and language requirements arising from the applicant\u2019s specific profile, and that the only German-language hospital which could be considered was an open hospital, and had thus to be ruled out in view of the applicant\u2019s mental health.","22.On 14 April 2008 the applicant applied for day release. On 5 June 2008 the CDS noted that it had proved impossible to provide any treatment and that the search for a German-language institution had proved fruitless. Accordingly, it ordered the Eupen remand prison to prepare a plan for conditional discharge, and ordered a new expert report to assess the level of danger posed by the applicant. It adjourned examination of the request sine die.","C.The proceedings concerning the second application to the CDS for conditional discharge","23.Having received a new application from the applicant for conditional discharge, the CDS issued a decision on 5 May 2009, finding as follows:","\u201cThere has been no progress in Mr Rooman\u2019s situation; progress cannot occur until he is in a setting where he can be understood in his own language, like any citizen of this country. A single member of the prison staff, a nurse [A.W.], is temporarily providing him with social contact, whereas a psychiatrist and\/or a psychologist should be made available to him.","For years, the prison authorities have failed to put forward any kind of solution to this problem, of which its services are fully aware. Worse, as those authorities are unable to provide him with the necessary treatment, they seem to have resigned themselves to a role that extends no further than an unfair repressive detention.","The medical reports and [Dr Ro.\u2019s] expert report [of 21 January 2009] indicate that Rooman, who continues to present a danger to society, cannot be discharged without support and preparation in an institutional setting, something that cannot currently be provided in Belgium, but is available abroad.\u201d","24.In view of those findings, the CDS invited the Eupen remand prison to prepare, together with the applicant, a plan for conditional discharge, and requested that the authorities rapidly take the necessary measures to improve the applicant\u2019s situation.","25.On 13 October 2009 the CDS found as follows:","\u201cIn the years since this file was opened (October 2003), the persons involved in this case have been thwarted by the fact that the individual in compulsory confinement speaks and understands only one language, and that the authorities have no German\u2011speaking staff available for him, with the exception of one nurse [A.W.] (who is apparently due to retire in the near future);","In September 2005 Doctor [Ri.], expert, wrote that changes to the detainee\u2019s regime \u2018are possible only in parallel with successful treatment, assessed by predefined steps. The treatment must begin in a secure establishment, then in a closed institution...\u2019 Given that treatment in Germany is impossible, it was to begin in Paifve with German-speaking psychiatrists and therapists;","Since that time the detainee\u2019s situation has not changed: he converses and leaves the building only with the sole German-speaking member of staff, and a treatment programme has not even been put in place. No satisfactory follow-up has been given to the requests by the [Social Protection] Board for an end to be put to this unlawful situation for Mr Rooman, who is deprived of his freedom in order, on the one hand, to protect society from possible dangerous conduct by him, and on the other, to provide him with the treatment necessary for his reinsertion; ...","In the light of the authorities\u2019 failure, the question now before the Board is whether there exists, outside the social-protection facility, a unit or persons who could provide home-based therapy for Mr Rooman; ...\u201d","26.In consequence, and pointing out that German was one of the national languages of Belgium and that the applicant was thus entitled to speak, be understood and receive treatment in that language, the CDS asked the Eupen remand prison to search in and around Verviers and Eupen for either a mental health unit, or a doctor or clinic, which could provide home\u2011based therapy for the applicant in his mother tongue. It reserved its decision on the application for conditional discharge.","27.On 12 January 2010 the applicant submitted pleadings in support of his application for discharge. He criticised the failure to provide him with therapeutic care and complained about the effect on his health of the absence of any prospect of improvement in his situation. As his main submission, he requested his immediate discharge on the grounds of the illegality of his deprivation of liberty. Alternatively, he asked that the CDS impose an obligation on the relevant authorities to take all necessary measures so that he would receive, in his mother tongue, the treatment required by his mental-health condition.","28.In an interlocutory decision of 13 January 2010, the CDS noted that the applicant\u2019s situation had not changed and that the reply from the Eupen judicial assistance unit gave no grounds for hoping that he could receive appropriate treatment, in a secure establishment or elsewhere, in the foreseeable future. It considered that it was necessary to attempt one last plea to the Minister of Justice, whose intervention had previously yielded some fruit, even if this had been insufficient to resolve the problem. The CDS accordingly ordered that an \u201cofficial report\u201d on the applicant\u2019s situation be sent to the Minister of Justice.","29.On 29 April 2010 the CDS noted that the Minister of Justice had not responded to its submission and that the applicant\u2019s situation had worsened, since he was no longer assisted by the German-speaking nurse A.W., who had left the Paifve EDS. It found as follows:","\u201cIt follows from the report [from the psychosocial department] of 30 March 2010 that, except for occasional meetings with a welfare officer \u201cwho speaks German\u201d, the detainee has no social contact in his language and that he has had no opportunity for several months to converse and to gain a fresh perspective in the outside world; the doctor and psychologist who signed this report do not seem particularly convinced of progress in the \u2018ongoing measures (taken) by the department to enable a German\u2011psychologist to intervene occasionally to provide care for the German\u2011speaking patients in the EDS\u2019;","Mr Rooman\u2019s situation is deadlocked: an ill individual, he is detained in a prison medical institution where no one is able to provide the treatment to which he is entitled; the Minister and his departments are turning a deaf ear, with no concern for the despair to which this manifestly unjust attitude may lead;","In spite of the unlawfulness of Mr Rooman\u2019s detention, his health condition means that discharge cannot be envisaged unless it is accompanied by therapy and practical support;","The [Social Protection] Board has no powers, firstly, to restore the detainee\u2019s basic rights, namely, the rights to liberty, health care and respect for his humanity; and secondly, to compel the Minister to put an end to this situation, which his administration has been fully aware of for more than six years.\u201d","30.The CDS decided, while \u201cremaining open to any proposals\u201d, to leave the applicant\u2019s situation unchanged; in other words, it rejected his application for discharge.","31.The applicant appealed against that decision to the Higher Social Protection Board (Commission sup\u00e9rieure de d\u00e9fense sociale or \u201cthe CSDS\u201d).","32.In parallel, he made an urgent application to the President of the Li\u00e8ge Court of First Instance, asking that his detention be declared unlawful and requesting his immediate discharge, or, in the alternative, that a decision be issued ordering the Belgian State to provide him with the medical care required by his situation.","33.By an order of 12 May 2010, the president of the court held that he did not have jurisdiction to hear this application, on the grounds that the CDS was the legally competent body to decide on the applicant\u2019s discharge or his continued compulsory confinement.","34.On 27 May 2010 the CSDS upheld the decision of 29 April 2010 by which the CDS had held that the applicant was to remain in compulsory confinement. Unlike the CDS, it held that the applicant\u2019s detention was perfectly legal, given that he had been lawfully placed in compulsory confinement and that he did not meet the necessary conditions for definitive or conditional discharge. It noted that, under section 18 of the Social Protection Act, discharge could only be ordered if the detainee\u2019s mental condition had improved sufficiently and if the conditions for his reintegration into society were satisfied. It considered, however, that this was not the situation here. It also found that the mere fact that the applicant spoke only German did not mean that the authorities had not taken all the necessary steps to provide him with the treatment required by his condition.","35.The applicant appealed on points of law, alleging a violation of Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention.","36.On 8 September 2010 the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal on points of law. In response to the argument alleging a violation of Article5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, it held that legal reasons had been given for the CSDS\u2019s decision and that it had been justified in law. It argued as follows:","\u201cAs compulsory confinement is primarily a security measure, the therapeutic action necessitated by such detention is not legally required in order for the deprivation of liberty to be lawful, even if a secondary aim, after that of protecting society, is to provide the detained person with the necessary treatment.","Under section 14(2) of the Act, the social protection boards have the power, rather than the duty, to order, in a decision giving specific reasons, placement in an appropriate institution, corresponding to the relevant security measures and treatment required. It follows that execution of the compulsory confinement measure does not become unlawful solely because it is implemented in one of the institutions created by the government for that purpose, rather than in another institution specifically designated for the treatment it may provide.\u201d","37.The Court of Cassation declared inadmissible the argument alleging a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, on the grounds that examining it would require a factual verification of the conditions in which the applicant was detained and such an examination fell outside the scope of its jurisdiction. For the remainder, it considered that the CSDS had replied to the applicant\u2019s complaint in stating that the fact that he spoke only German did not mean that the relevant authorities had not taken all the necessary steps to provide him with the required treatment.","D.The third application to the CDS for discharge","38.On 13 November 2013 the applicant again applied for discharge.","39.A report by the psychosocial department of the Paifve EDS, dated 13January 2014, reiterated that the applicant had a poor command of the French language, speaking only a few words of French which were insufficient to enable him to conduct a conversation; in consequence, he had very little contact with the other patients and members of staff. The report also indicated that the applicant had met a German-speaking psychologist on a single occasion, in June 2010; his behaviour had improved, he was less aggressive and intolerant than before, and he had recently been moved from the cell wing to the community wing; in addition, he had never expressed a wish to meet members of the psychosocial team on a regular basis. The report concluded that the applicant should remain in the Paifve EDS, citing among other reasons his \u201cuntreated mental health problems\u201d.","40.On 24 January 2014 the CDS issued its decision. It noted, firstly, the content of the reports by Dr Ri., dated 5 September 2005, and Dr Ro., dated 21January 2009, finding that it was necessary for the applicant to receive psychopharmacological and psychotherapeutic treatment in a secure establishment, then in a closed institution, before his admission to an open facility could be envisaged. It noted that, since those reports were drawn up, the various attempts to resolve the language problem had not succeeded in securing a significant improvement in the applicant\u2019s health: his rare outings accompanied by a German-speaking member of the prison staff had been abandoned, since this employee was no longer available and had not been replaced; attempts to find a German-language institution, doctor or therapist had met with failure; no follow-up seemed to have been given to the commitment that a minimum number of German-speaking staff were to be recruited, and the applicant had, of his own accord, declined the assistance of the German-speaking welfare officer with whom he had occasionally met. Nonetheless, the CDS rejected the application for conditional discharge, finding that the conditions for discharge, namely an improvement in the applicant\u2019s mental state and guarantees for his social rehabilitation, were not met. With regard to the absence of treatment in German, complained of by the applicant, it held:","\u201cThe detainee claims that he is not receiving the appropriate treatment for his mental health condition in German, his mother tongue, without however describing or even referring to the treatment allegedly denied to him, and that he would agree to accept or participate in. The mere fact that he only speaks German does not mean that the Paifve social-protection facility has not taken all the necessary steps to provide him with the treatment his condition requires.","While, as [the applicant] points out in his submissions, it is for the relevant authorities to take all the necessary measures for his health, it is not, however, within the [Social Protection] Board\u2019s powers to discharge a detainee who claims to be the victim of shortcomings on the part of the authorities...","Nor does the Board have jurisdiction to issue orders to the authorities or to third parties, [or] to reprimand them for their actions or shortcomings ...\u201d","41.On 3 April 2014 the CSDS upheld the CDS\u2019s decision. It held, interalia, as follows:","\u201cContrary to what he alleges in his pleadings, the detainee receives all the treatment required by his condition from competent and qualified staff in the Paifve EDS, and his specific medical needs are fully taken into account. In spite of the treatment given, the detainee\u2019s mental condition has not yet improved sufficiently, on account of his paranoid and psychopathic character traits, his lack of self-criticism and his constant demands. The detainee is thus clearly wrong in attributing the lack of improvement in his mental condition to the language issue alone.","The continued compulsory confinement in an EDS suited to his medical condition of an individual who would represent a danger to the public in the event of discharge, when his mental condition has not sufficiently improved and the conditions for his social rehabilitation are not met, is not unlawful and does not amount to a violation of the provisions of the [Convention].\u201d","42.On 25 June 2014 the Court of Cassation quashed the decision by the CSDS on the grounds that it had not addressed the applicant\u2019s argument that he was not receiving care appropriate to his situation, in view of the fact that he spoke and understood only German and that no German-speaking staff members were available in the facility where he was being held. The case was sent back to the CSDS with a differently constituted panel.","43.On 22 July 2014 the CSDS issued an interlocutory order, requesting the CDS to appoint a group of German-speaking experts to update the psychiatric report of 21 January 2009. It invited the director of the Paifve EDS institution to take all the necessary measures to ensure that the requisite care was made available to the applicant, by at least providing the services of a German-speaking psychiatrist and psychologist. It ordered that the case be reopened and scheduled a hearing for 17 October 2014.","44.In a decision of that date, the CSDS took note of the fact that the applicant had been treated by a German-speaking psychologist since 11July 2014 and by a German-speaking psychiatrist since 16 September 2014. It ordered that a panel of experts be appointed; assisted by a German interpreter, it was to update Dr Ro.\u2019s report of 21 January 2009.","45.The updated report, prepared by three experts who had each examined the applicant separately, was submitted on 27 March 2015. The experts concluded that the paranoia-like delusional disorder persisted, that the psychotic aspect of the applicant\u2019s personality was also still present, and that his neuropsychological condition was practically identical to what it had been in 2009 when Dr Ro. had drawn up his report.","46.By a decision of 20 May 2015, the CSDS dismissed the request for final or conditional discharge, considering that the applicant\u2019s state of health had not improved sufficiently and that the conditions for his reintegration into society were not met. It also specified that it had not been established that this lack of improvement in the applicant\u2019s situation was due solely to the fact that he had not had an opportunity to be in contact with German\u2011speaking individuals, particularly in view of the treatment provided by medical staff since 11 July 2014.","47.The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against that decision, which the Court of Cassation dismissed in a judgment of 28October 2015. The Court of Cassation restated the CSDS\u2019s conclusions and specified that, having regard to the reasons given by it, it was not necessary to examine the applicant\u2019s submissions alleging a violation of Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention.","E.The proceedings before the Brussels urgent-applications judge","48.In the meantime, on 28 March 2014 the applicant had brought proceedings against the Belgian State before the President of the French\u2011language Brussels Court of First Instance, as the judge responsible for hearing urgent applications in accordance with Article 584 of the Judicial Code. He requested his discharge or, in the alternative, that the authorities be ordered to take the measures required by his state of health.","49.By an interlocutory order of 4 July 2014, the president of the court asked the director of the Paifve EDS and Dr B. from that EDS\u2019s psychosocial unit to inform him, firstly, about the treatment available in that EDS and, secondly, about the treatment that had in fact been provided to the applicant.","50.In their respective replies, dated 28 August 2014, the director of the Paifve EDS and Dr B. indicated that the applicant now had access to consultations with a German-speaking psychologist and that the authorities had made contact with a German-speaking psychiatrist who had agreed to meet the applicant. Dr B. stated, in particular:","\u201cPsychiatry is a branch of medicine which deals with mental disorders, and its modus operandi entails, first and foremost, a specific dialogue between a patient and his or her therapist, the doctor. This implies the use of language; it also implies, of course, that there is mutual understanding; it implies that the two sides have access to a common language, enabling them to communicate and allowing the psychiatrist to assess accurately all the nuances of the patient\u2019s condition and its development.","From this perspective, however, we have constantly emphasised that [the applicant] is essentially German-speaking. Admittedly, he occasionally comes out with a few simple words in French, but, clearly, the years spent in Paifve have not persuaded him to learn to use French more fluently so as to communicate more meaningfully with those caring for him. Alternatively, as certain examinations seem to indicate, he is so cognitively disadvantaged that he cannot achieve this.","... One can of course always hope that in [the applicant\u2019s] case, permanent support and appropriate treatment in the German language could improve his personality disorder somewhat, but, to repeat, I am more of the opinion that with this type of paranoid personality disorder, paranoia with anti-social traits, positive progress is unlikely.\u201d","51.In an order of 10 October 2014, the president of the court noted that, until September 2014, the applicant had had no access to a psychiatrist who could communicate with him in German. He had had access to an external German-speaking psychologist between May and November 2010. The president noted that the consultations with that psychologist had ended, not because the applicant no longer wished to attend them, as alleged by the State in its pleadings, but because of the Belgian State\u2019s late payment of the psychologist\u2019s fees and expenses, and that the consultations had resumed in July 2014. He noted that, until April 2010, the applicant had benefitted from the presence and care of a German-speaking nurse, who had in the meantime left the Paifve EDS, but that since August 2014 the same nurse had been authorised to accompany the applicant on outings. Lastly, he noted that the applicant had met a German-speaking welfare officer, but had declined the latter\u2019s services in February 2014.","52.With regard to the main request, the president held that he did not have jurisdiction to order the applicant\u2019s discharge, holding that only the social protection bodies had power to do so. Ruling on the subsidiary request, the president noted that the applicant had not had access to the mental-health treatment required by his condition, and considered that, prima facie, there had been a breach of his right of access to health care and that he had sustained inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article3 of the Convention. In consequence, he ordered the Belgian State to appoint a German-speaking psychiatrist and medical auxiliary to treat the applicant, subject to a penalty in the event of non-compliance, and to initiate the treatment routinely provided to French-speaking persons in compulsory confinement who suffered from a similar mental illness to the applicant.","53.No appeal was lodged against that order. According to the applicant\u2019s representative, the Belgian State appointed a German-speaking psychiatrist and psychologist, who visited the applicant several times. However, those visits appear to have stopped towards the end of 2015.","F.The claim for damages","54.In the meantime, on 2 May 2014 the applicant had filed a negligence claim against the Belgian State on the basis of Article 1382 of the Civil Code.","55.By a judgment of 9 September 2016, the French-language Brussels Court of First Instance held that the failure to provide the applicant with psychological treatment in his mother tongue between 2010 and 2014 had been negligent. It held, in particular:","\u201cIt is undeniable that the psychiatric and psychological treatment which must be provided to [the applicant] must be provided to him in German, the only language in which he is fluent and, moreover, one of the three national languages in Belgium.","However, between 2010 and 2014 [the applicant] received no medico-psychological treatment in his own language.","Whatever the quality \u2013 which is, indeed, undisputed \u2013 of the care provided to detainees in the Paifve [EDS], it is totally inappropriate for [the applicant\u2019s] mental\u2011health condition purely and simply on account of the fact that it is not given in German.","In spite of the official and repeated denunciations of this situation by the Social Protection Board to the Belgian State since 2010, the latter has taken no measures to correct it. In addition, it has produced no evidence of the slightest step taken by it to that end.","This failure to act amounts to negligence within the meaning of Article 1382 of the Civil Code.","...","Moreover, and as [the applicant] also submits, Articles 3 and 5 [of the Convention] require the Belgian State to take the necessary measures to provide him with access to the basic care necessitated by his mental health.","...","In the present case, the applicant\u2019s vulnerability on account of the very nature of his psychological disorder and the absence of any real possibility of contact in his language have necessarily exacerbated his feelings of distress and anxiety.","It is immaterial that, in any event, the [applicant\u2019s] state of mental health does not permit his discharge. The mere fact of having been detained for an indefinite period without appropriate treatment amounts in the present case to a violation of Articles3and 5 [of the Convention].","Contrary to the submissions of the Belgian State, the fact that [the applicant] is not always receptive to psychological, medical and social therapy does not permit minimisation of the Belgian State\u2019s negligent attitude towards an individual suffering from a mental disorder, and whose discernment is, by assumption, uncertain.","Equally, at the risk of disregarding the lived experience of the person suffering from a mental disorder, [the applicant\u2019s] stable conduct within the institution does not suffice to establish that he received appropriate treatment for his condition.\u201d","56.Finding that this absence of treatment had caused the applicant mental suffering, the court ordered the State to pay him 75,000 euros (EUR), an amount assessed ex aequo et bono, in compensation for the period from January 2010 to October 2014. It is unclear from the case file on what date this judgment was served on the parties.","57.On 24 January 2018 the applicant lodged an application with the Brussels Court of Appeal requesting legal aid in order to appeal against the judgment of the French-language Brussels Court of First Instance. By an order of 26 January 2018, the Brussels Court of Appeal granted that request.","58.For its part, the Belgian State appealed against the same judgment on 19 February 2018, arguing that the applicant\u2019s complaints were inadmissible and\/or ill-founded. A preliminary hearing was held before the Brussels Court of Appeal on 22 March 2018.","59.At the date of adoption of the present judgment those proceedings were still pending.","G.The application for discharge submitted to the Social Protection Division","60.In their observations to the Grand Chamber, the parties produced documents showing that fresh proceedings had been brought for the applicant\u2019s discharge, under the new Law of 5May 2014 on compulsory confinement (\u201cthe Compulsory Confinement Act\u201d, see paragraphs91\u201197 below). In this context, on 12 January 2017 a team from the psychological and welfare service of the Paifve EDS, which included a psychiatrist, a psychologist and a welfare officer, drew up a multi-disciplinary psychiatric and psycho-social report on the applicant\u2019s situation. It stated that the information set out in its report had been drawn from various psychiatric examinations conducted during the applicant\u2019s period in compulsory confinement, and that in view of the language barrier, it had been impossible to obtain other information or compare the information from previous expert reports with the applicant\u2019s statements at the time the report was being prepared. It then confirmed that the patient spoke only German and that he knew only a few words of French, which were not sufficient to enable him to hold a conversation, with the result that he had limited contact with the other patients and with members of staff. The team which produced the report added that this language barrier had restricted and complicated the clinical observation, and that, in view of this shortcoming in the assessment, it was unable to provide a sufficiently informed psychiatric opinion on the application for discharge. Nonetheless, in spite of this difficulty in providing an objective assessment of the applicant\u2019s dangerousness, the likelihood of his reoffending, and his capacity for autonomy, it considered it possible to state that grey areas still remained. It indicated, in particular, that the applicant continued to display an obsession with vengeance, as highlighted in the 2015 expert report, and that the risk of his harassing the victims could not be ruled out. It therefore gave an unfavourable opinion in respect of the applicant\u2019s application for discharge.","61.On 5 May 2017 the director of the Paifve EDS prepared a separate report in which she indicated that the applicant continued to require an institutional setting, given his pathology and the fact that he remained dangerous in that he was still likely to commit offences or harass the victims. She considered that, in order for \u201cthe conditions for conditional discharge to be satisfied, and given Mr Rooman\u2019s personality, the only safe option was [conditional] discharge to an institution [a structured facility]\u201d. She also expressed the view, in light of the existing situation, that the applicant should not be discharged.","62.Basing its decision on the arguments contained in these two reports, on 29 May 2017 the public prosecutor at the Li\u00e8ge Post-Sentencing Court (TAP) issued an opinion in favour of maintaining the applicant in compulsory confinement and opposing the request for conditional discharge.","63.On 28 July 2017 the Social Protection Division (CPS) at the Li\u00e8ge TAP, sitting in a different composition, which now had jurisdiction under the new 2014 Compulsory Confinement Act (see paragraph 97 below) to rule on whether to extend compulsory confinement and, if appropriate, to order the applicant\u2019s discharge, issued an interlocutory decision. It ordered that the proceedings be reopened, so that the parties could submit relevant information on whether the situation which had led the European Court of Human Rights to find a violation of Article 3 in the Chamber judgment of 18July 2017 persisted. Pending receipt of that information, the CPS adjourned its examination of the case. It also summoned the Director General of Prisons to a hearing fixed for November 2017.","64.On 16 November 2017 the CPS held a hearing, in private, at the Paifve EDS, at which the applicant was present; he was assisted by his lawyers and an interpreter.","In its judgment, delivered on 27 December 2017, the CPS found as follows:","\u201c... According to the information submitted to the Division, [the applicant] can now contact a German-speaking psychologist (3 visits since August 2017). If he so wishes, he can also request a visit from a German-speaking psychiatrist. He has one outing a month, accompanied by a German-speaking nurse. Contact with German-speaking psychological and welfare assistants has been organised. A German interpreter will be called upon whenever necessary (CAP, disciplinary hearings, expert reports). Clinical consultations have been scheduled in order to assess the treatment plan and to adapt it as necessary (one meeting has already taken place, another is scheduled).","... It is established that [the applicant\u2019s] detention, during those periods when he was not being treated by German-speaking medical staff, was in breach of Article 3 of the [Convention].","It was demonstrated in the hearings on 16 November 2017 that that violation has now ceased, as the Paifve EDS and the prison authorities have done what was necessary to ensure that German-speaking care providers are available, both in terms of his psychological and psychiatric treatment and with regard to welfare assistance and supervised outings. An interpreter is also called upon whenever required. ...","... while accepting [the applicant\u2019s] argument that the failure to provide treatment in his mother tongue broke the link between the compulsory confinement and the illness at its origin, so that the detention became unlawful ..., it should again be noted that the unlawful nature of the detention ended following the measures currently put in place.","[The applicant\u2019s] current detention is justified by his mental health, and the conditions of his detention make it possible to provide him with treatment while at the same time ensuring his safety and that of others.","... there remain obstacles to [the applicant\u2019s] discharge, namely:","- the lack of prospects for social reintegration, given his mental disorder ...","- the risk that offences will be committed ...","- the risk that he will harass the victims, and his attitude towards the victims of the offences which resulted in his compulsory confinement ...\u201d","65.On those grounds, the CPS dismissed the main request for final discharge and held that it was also inappropriate to grant conditional discharge. With regard to the subsidiary request for treatment in German, it added that this had become devoid of purpose. It ordered an eight-month observation period, at the close of which the director of the Paifve EDS would be required to provide a fresh opinion on the applicant\u2019s situation.","66.By a judgment of 28 February 2018 the Court of Cassation dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant against the CPS\u2019s judgment of 27 December 2017.","H.Chronological summary of the treatment provided to the applicant, attached to the Government\u2019s observations submitted to the Grand Chamber","67.In support of the observations submitted in the proceedings before the Grand Chamber, the Government attached a chronological summary of the treatment administered to the applicant since he was placed in compulsory confinement in the Paifve EDS in 2004. They also provided factual clarifications at the public hearing on 6 June 2018.","68.With regard to psychiatric treatment, the document submitted by the Government indicates that the applicant was treated by various French\u2011speaking psychiatrists. The frequency of the consultations is not specified. From 2004 to 1 February 2014, a German-speaking nurse assisted the psychiatrists during those meetings by providing interpretation. Between March 2008 and August 2009 the applicant was monitored by a psychiatrist who spoke elementary German. On 20 May 2015 the applicant met with DrV., a German-speaking psychiatrist. This meeting did not give rise to regular meetings. The psychiatrist noted that the applicant had expressed no particular requests or asked for psychiatric assistance. She had nonetheless agreed to return if necessary. She had reiterated her availability on 23March 2016, then at the end of 2017, in a telephone conversation with the in-house psychiatrist at the Paifve EDS. At the public hearing before the Court, the Government stated that the applicant, who was deemed to be capable of forming his own views, did not wish to enter into regular contact with the psychiatrist.","69.With regard to psychological treatment in German, the applicant had attended nine meetings with a psychologist in 2010, and nine other meetings in 2014-2015. Between 18 August 2017 and 12 March 2018, the date on which the Government\u2019s observations were submitted, the applicant had had monthly meetings with this psychologist, the most recent, according to the information provided to the Court at the public hearing on 6 June 2018, being on 20 March and 27 April 2018. For his part, the applicant stated that he had had no further meetings since March, and submitted that the last meeting had taken place in February 2018.","70.With regard to welfare assistance, the Government stated that since 1October 2006 the applicant had received welfare assistance from a German-speaker, except for the periods from May to September 2014 (on account of maternity leave), and from 1 April to 1 November 2017 (on account of a change in post). Since November 2017, the German-speaking welfare assistant had returned to her post in the Paifve EDS and continued to meet the applicant several times a month. She had essentially dealt with the applicant\u2019s requests for administrative help, or for practical help in his contacts with the outside world, especially with his lawyer.","71.With regard to psychiatric nursing care, the document submitted by the Government indicated that, from his arrival at the Paifve EDS, the applicant had been assisted regularly by a German-speaking male nurse. In addition to his somatic nursing skills, this nurse had specialised psychiatric care skills and had been able to spend time with the applicant, mainly to support him and help him deal with his stress. According to the Government, this nurse\u2019s listening skills had enabled him to assess the applicant\u2019s state of mind and report his observations to the psychiatrist. The nurse had been transferred to the prison on 1 February 2014 and retired on 1December 2016. After that date, he had continued to meet the applicant in order to maintain contact with him and accompany him on outings, the last of these having taken place on 24 April 2017.","72.Moreover, the applicant was able to see a general practitioner once a month. Since 30 November 2017, an interpreter had been called in to translate at these meetings.","73.On 25 November 2017 a multidisciplinary meeting of the care team had taken place, in the presence of the applicant and an interpreter. At the public hearing, the Government stated, without submitting any document in support of this assertion, that a coordination meeting of the various actors involved in the applicant\u2019s treatment both inside and outside the Paifve EDS had been held, in the applicant\u2019s presence. At that meeting, the team had, in particular, sought the applicant\u2019s permission for the external German\u2011speaking psychologist to transmit to the in-house psychosocial team information obtained in her monthly meetings with him, as well as her conclusions regarding developments in his state of health, given that the psychosocial team was responsible for preparing an assessment of the degree of danger posed by him and of the prospects for his rehabilitation. The applicant had refused to consent to this transmission of information.","74.Lastly, the applicant had been authorised to leave the institution on day-release, accompanied by the nurse. The number of these daytrips had progressively increased from one in 2007 to six in 2017. Since 2015 the applicant had made regular visits to Germany. In 2016 he had resumed contact with his family. It appears from other information in the file that the applicant has a brother with whom he has renewed contact in the past few years."],"31645":["5.The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Mankivka.","6.On 2 April 2007 the applicant underwent surgery in connection with an umbilical hernia (exomphalos).","A.The applicant\u2019s arrest, alleged ill-treatment by the police, and ensuing investigation","7.According to the applicant, on 9 February 2008 the police arrested him in Vinnytsya on suspicion of abduction and murder. On the same day he was transferred to Kyiv and placed in detention in a cell of the Shevchenkivskyy district police station.","8.According to the Government, the applicant was arrested in Kyiv on 10 February 2008 on suspicion of abduction and murder, and on the same day he was placed in detention in a cell of the Shevchenkivskyy district police station.","9.According to the applicant, between 10 and 16 February 2008 he was beaten by police officers who tried to force him to confess to the abduction and the murder. In particular, Officer G., the first deputy head of Kyiv Shevchenkivskyy district police station, kicked the applicant in the face and abdomen, injuring the area where he had had the operation for his umbilical hernia (see paragraph 6 above). After the beating, the applicant started suffering from constant pain in his abdomen.","10.On 16 February 2008 the applicant confessed to the murder and the abduction and signed several documents which were undated. On the same day the police transferred him to the Kyiv Temporary Detention Facility (hereinafter, \u201cthe ITT\u201d). The ITT medical staff examined the applicant on the same day and noted that he had a bruise under his right eye.","11.According to the applicant, on 19 February 2008 the Kyiv Pre-trial Detention Centre (hereinafter, \u201cthe SIZO\u201d) administration refused to admit him because of his poor state of health. This was the second time that the SIZO administration refused to admit him (see paragraph 39 below). The applicant was sent back to the ITT and the ITT staff called an ambulance, which transported him to the Kyiv Medical Emergency Hospital (\u201cthe Emergency Hospital\u201d). According to a certificate issued by the Emergency Hospital, the applicant stayed there from 20 to 25 February 2008 and received treatment for \u201ccontusion to the abdomen and facial tissue\u201d.","12.On 26 February 2008 the applicant was placed in the SIZO. He was examined by a SIZO doctor, who diagnosed him with a \u201cpost-operative condition\u201d following the operation on his umbilical hernia in 2007.","13.On 16 May 2008 the applicant\u2019s defence lawyer complained to the prosecutor\u2019s office regarding the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment by the police officers of the Kyiv Shevchenkivskyy district police station between 10 and 16 February 2008.","14.On 24 June 2008 the investigator dealing with the criminal case against the applicant ordered a forensic medical expert to establish the injuries the applicant had sustained between 9 and 16 February 2008. The forensic medical expert examined the applicant on 4 July 2008 and did not find any injuries on him which could have been inflicted during that period. The expert noted that a liquid was leaking from the applicant\u2019s navel, and recommended that he be examined by a surgeon.","15.On 11 August 2008 the applicant\u2019s lawyer submitted a petition to the prosecutor\u2019s office in which he stated that the applicant had been beaten by Officer G., the first deputy head of the Kyiv Shevchenkivskyy district police station.","16.On 16 September 2008 the investigating officer of the Kyiv Shevchenkivskyy district prosecutor\u2019s office refused to institute criminal proceedings in relation to the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment complaints on the grounds that there were no constituent elements of an offence. The investigating officer based his decision on statements of the investigator and the police officers dealing with the initial investigative activities concerning the applicant. Those questioned denied that the applicant had been ill\u2011treated.","17.On 29 September 2008 the applicant\u2019s defence counsel lodged a complaint with the Kyiv City public prosecutor against the decision of 16September 2008.","18.On 16 October 2008 the Kyiv City public prosecutor\u2019s office considered that there were no legal grounds for quashing the decision of 16September 2008 (see paragraph 16 above).","19.On 18 November 2008 the Kyiv Shevchenkivskyy District Court (hereinafter, \u201cthe local court\u201d) quashed the decision of 16 September 2008. It held that, in the course of the inquiry, the investigating officer had failed to question the applicant and Officer G., the police officer whom the applicant had pointed out. The local court also found that the investigator had failed to append to the case file the results of the forensic examination of the applicant\u2019s injuries which his lawyer had referred to in the application of 11August 2008 (see paragraph 15 above).","20.On 19 December 2008, following an inquiry into the applicant\u2019s ill\u2011treatment complaints, the prosecutor\u2019s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers because there were no constituent elements of an offence. In the course of the above inquiry, Officer G. was questioned. He said that he had not taken part in the applicant\u2019s arrest or in any other investigative activities relating to him.","21.On 1 December 2009 the local court quashed the above decision and remitted the case file for an additional inquiry. The local court noted that the investigating officer had failed to comply with the instructions it had given in the decision of 18 November 2008 (see paragraph 19 above). In particular, the investigating officer had not questioned the applicant and had failed to provide any substantiation for his decision of 19 December 2008 (see paragraph 20 above).","22.On 30 January 2010, following an additional inquiry into the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment complaints, the prosecutor\u2019s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers because there were no constituent elements of an offence. In the course of the above inquiry, Officers \u041e., L., Psh., and S., were additionally questioned and they denied physically or psychologically coercing the applicant into making a confession.","23.On 18 May 2010 the local court quashed the above decision and remitted the case file for an additional inquiry. The court noted that the instructions it had given in the decisions of 18 November 2008 and 1December 2009 (see paragraphs 19 and 21 above) had not been followed by the investigating officer.","24.On 23 August 2010, following an additional inquiry into the applicant\u2019s complaints, the prosecutor\u2019s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against Officer G., the person who had allegedly ill-treated the applicant (see paragraph 9 above), because there were no constituent elements of an offence. In the course of that additional inquiry, the applicant was questioned and he reiterated his account of the events relating to the ill\u2011treatment. The investigating officer concluded that there was no evidence proving Officer G.\u2019s involvement in those events.","25.On 5 December 2010 and 30 March 2011 the applicant lodged petitions with the Prosecutor General of Ukraine in which he reiterated, inter alia, that he had been ill-treated by Officer G. and that the investigation into his complaints in that respect had been ineffective.","26.On 17 January 2011 a superior prosecutor quashed the decision of 23August 2010 (see paragraph 24 above) and remitted the case file for an additional inquiry.","27.On 12 April 2011, following an additional inquiry into the applicant\u2019s complaints, the investigating officer refused to institute criminal proceedings against Officer G. because there were no constituent elements of an offence. In the course of the above inquiry, the investigating officer questioned Officer Ovs., who had been on duty at the time of the applicant\u2019s arrest. The officer denied that there had been blood on the applicant\u2019s body in the stomach area. The investigating officer also noted that the applicant had not raised any complaints either during his time at the police station or after his transfer to the Kyiv SIZO. On 30 March 2012 the local court quashed that decision and remitted the case file for an additional inquiry.","28.On 28 June 2012, following an additional inquiry, the prosecutor\u2019s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against Officer G. because there were no constituent elements of an offence. The investigating officer came to the conclusion that it was impossible to question the people who had been at the police station with the applicant in February 2008. On an unspecified date that decision was quashed and the case file was remitted for an additional inquiry.","29.On 7 September 2012, following an additional inquiry, the investigating officer refused to institute criminal proceedings against Officer G. because there were no constituent elements of an offence. On 17September 2012 a superior prosecutor quashed that decision and remitted the case file for an additional inquiry.","30.On 27 September 2012, following an additional inquiry into the applicant\u2019s complaints regarding ill-treatment, the prosecutor\u2019s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against Officer G. because there were no constituent elements of an offence. In the course of the inquiry, the inspector on duty at the material time, Inspector Ag., was questioned and stated that he didn\u2019t remember whether he had seen the applicant.","31.On 7 May 2013 the local court quashed the decision of 27 September 2012 (see paragraph 30 above) and remitted the case file for an additional inquiry. The court held that the investigating officer had failed to interrogate and\/or properly analyse the statements of:","- the people who had been detained with the applicant in the cell at the Kyiv Shevchenkivskyy district police station in February 2008;","- the ITT and SIZO staff, in relation to the applicant\u2019s alleged ill\u2011treatment and the SIZO\u2019s alleged refusal to admit him after the court had ordered his arrest;","- the medical personnel from the emergency service who had provided the applicant with medical assistance in February 2008;","- the surgeon from Buchanska Prison Hospital who had performed an operation on the applicant on 20 January 2010;","- the police officers who had arrested the applicant in Vinnytsya on 9February 2008.","32.On 21 May 2013 the information about the physical injuries inflicted on the applicant was entered into the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations and the respective pre-trial investigation started, in accordance with the provisions of the new Code of Criminal Procedure.","33.On 27 June 2013, following the results of the pre-trial investigation, the prosecutor\u2019s office issued a decision to terminate the criminal proceedings because there were no constituent elements of an offence.","34.On 4 July 2013 a superior prosecutor quashed the above decision, holding that the investigating officer had failed to follow the instructions given by the local court in its decision of 7 May 2013 (see paragraph 31 above).","35.On 5 July 2013 the investigating officer questioned S., who had been detained with the applicant in the ITT cell. The witness stated that he did not remember the applicant being beaten.","36.On 29 August 2013, following the results of the investigation, the prosecutor\u2019s office issued a decision to terminate the criminal proceedings because there were no constituent elements of an offence. On 18 February 2014 the local court upheld that decision.","37.On 15 April 2014 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal quashed the decision of the investigating officer of 29 August 2013 and the decision of the local court of 18 February 2014 (see paragraph 36 above) and remitted the case file for a pre-trial investigation. The court held that the investigating officer had failed to comply with the instructions given by the local court in its decision of 7May 2013 (see paragraph 31 above), and in particular had failed to establish the origin of the injuries sustained by the applicant in February 2008.","38.The parties did not submit information about further developments in the case.","B.The applicant\u2019s detention and the medical assistance provided to him","39.Meanwhile, on 13 February 2008 the local court had ordered the applicant\u2019s detention on remand and ordered that he be transferred to the SIZO. As indicated before (paragraph 11 above), according to the applicant, the SIZO administration refused to admit him because of his poor state of health. The police then transported the applicant back to the Shevchenkivskyy district police station.","40.On 16 February 2008 the applicant was placed in the \u0406\u0422\u0422 (see paragraph 10 above). As a result of a medical examination, a bruise was found under his right eye. It was classified as a minor physical injury.","41.Following a deterioration in the applicant\u2019s state of health, the ITT staff called an ambulance, which transported him to the Emergency Hospital. According to a certificate issued by the Emergency Hospital, the applicant stayed in that facility from 20 to 25 February 2008 and received treatment for \u201ccontusion to the abdomen and facial tissue\u201d (see paragraph11 above).","42.On 26 February 2008 the applicant was transferred from the ITT to the SIZO. As indicated in paragraph 12 above, upon his arrival he was examined by a SIZO doctor, who diagnosed him with a post-operative condition following his umbilical hernia operation in 2007 (see paragraph 6 above).","43.According to the applicant, on 29 February, 5, 10, and 16 March 2008 he complained to the SIZO staff of constant pain in his abdomen. The SIZO doctors examined him and established that the pain was due to a post-operative navel fistula. On 21 March 2008 he was examined by a SIZO general practitioner who gave him an anaesthetic. Between 13 May and 2July 2008 the applicant stayed in the SIZO medical unit and was treated with the following: lactulose, aloe, fluconazole, ascorbic acid, and Captopril. His navel injury was treated with hydrogen peroxide, vitamins \u04121 and \u04126, Thiotriazolin, Levomekol (an ointment), Riboxin, and angiotensin-converting enzyme (ACE). After being treated, he was discharged and placed in a cell.","44.On 13 June 2008 the applicant was examined by a surgeon from the Emergency Hospital, who diagnosed a suture sinus (a type of wound complication) following the umbilical hernia operation. He recommended that a bandage be applied to the applicant\u2019s navel area, and also recommended that he be treated with antiseptics, antibiotics and have elective surgery. The surgeon noted that the applicant did not need urgent inpatient treatment, and the applicant was returned to the SIZO on the same day.","45.On 22 October 2008 the applicant was examined in the SIZO by another surgeon, who noted that he did not need inpatient treatment or an urgent operation in connection with his navel fistula.","46.From 26 November to 15 December 2008 the applicant had examinations at the Emergency Hospital in connection with the constant pain in his abdomen. He was diagnosed with omphalitis (inflammation of the navel and the surrounding area) and a suture sinus following the umbilical hernia operation in 2007 (see paragraph 6 above). He was also diagnosed with: ischemic heart disease, myocardial cardiosclerosis, category II hypertension, hypertonic crises of 27 November, 1 and 4December 2008, category I cardiac failure with cephalgia phenomena, asthenoneurotic syndrome, discirculatory encephalopathy, and chronic acute cholecystopancreatitis. The applicant received the following treatment: antispasmodic drugs, hepatoprotectors, antibiotics, biocatalysts, antihypertensive drugs (inhibitors, angiotensin-converting enzyme, beta-blockers, diuretics), and bandages on his umbilical area. On 5 December 2008 and 30 January 2009 the surgeon from the Emergency Hospital recommended that the applicant have elective surgery on the fistula and continue with the care and treatment of his symptoms under the surgeon, neuropathologist and cardiologist at the SIZO medical unit.","47.Between 9 February and 10 April 2009 the applicant stayed in the SIZO medical unit. He was diagnosed with and received treatment for: omphalitis, a urachal cyst, a navel fistula and suture sinus, ischemic heart disease, encephalopathy and an exacerbation of his chronic pancreatitis. The treatment consisted of oral medication and the application of antiseptic to the applicant\u2019s navel area.","48.On 6 and 7 May 2009 the applicant was examined by the SIZO cardiologist, neuropathologist and surgeon. He was diagnosed with a urachal cyst, a ligature fistula and category II hypertension. He was prescribed outpatient treatment for his symptoms.","49.On 31 July 2009 the SIZO surgeon recommended that the applicant have an operation on the fistula, to be performed in a public hospital.","50.On 4 August 2009 the SIZO informed the applicant\u2019s wife that the operation to remove his navel fistula would be arranged as soon as the court dealing with the criminal case against him allowed him to be transferred to an outside medical facility.","51.On 15 August 2009 the applicant was examined by the SIZO therapist. He was diagnosed with a urachal cyst, a ligature fistula, and category II hypertension. It was recommended that he continue with the prescribed outpatient treatment.","52.On 24 September 2009, during hearings at the Kyiv City Court of Appeal, an ambulance was called for the applicant. The ambulance team suggested that the applicant had peritonitis, and recommended that he be hospitalised urgently. According to the ambulance team report, the person in charge of the prison escort refused to allow him to be hospitalised. After the hearing, the applicant was taken back to the SIZO medical unit. He remained in that unit until 8 October 2009 and was treated for his navel fistula and inflammation of the navel. He received oral medication and antiseptic was applied to his navel area.","53.On 29 September 2009 the applicant was transported to the Emergency Hospital in connection with the constant pain in his abdomen. A duty surgeon and a supervising surgeon diagnosed him with omphalitis with a small amount of purulent discharge. The doctors did not prescribe any emergency operation, but recommended that bandages be applied, with Levomekol and Ceftriakson. On the same date the applicant was returned to the SIZO.","54.Between 24 September and 8 October 2009 the applicant remained in the SIZO medical unit, where he received the necessary treatment. He was discharged with a recommendation that his health be further monitored by the therapist and the surgeon of the SIZO medical unit.","55.On 30 October 2009 the Court granted the applicant\u2019s request under Rule39 of the Rules of the Court and indicated to the Government that he should be placed in a medical facility where he could receive appropriate medical treatment.","56.On 4 November 2009 the SIZO administration proposed to place the applicant in the Emergency Hospital. The applicant refused that proposal, explaining that he did not trust the Emergency Hospital\u2019s doctors. An ambulance team which had been called for the applicant did not transfer him to the Emergency Hospital, but recommended that he see a surgeon.","57.On the same day V., one of the applicant\u2019s lawyers, asked the SIZO administration to transfer the applicant to Public Hospital no. 6 for inpatient treatment in connection with his fistula. Another of the applicant\u2019s lawyers, A., asked the SIZO to place the applicant in a private hospital. The applicant agreed to be placed in that hospital. Eventually, he was not placed in either of those hospitals.","58.On the same day the SIZO staff called an ambulance for the applicant. The ambulance team noted that the applicant did not require urgent hospitalisation, and recommended that he continue with the outpatient treatment in connection with his fistula. The applicant was then placed in the SIZO medical unit.","59.On 9 November and 16 November 2009, in reply to the requests of the applicant\u2019s lawyers concerning his hospitalisation, the SIZO administration advised that it was not competent to decide on the applicant\u2019s placement in an outside medical facility, and suggested that the lawyers should address the requests to the court dealing with the applicant\u2019s case.","60.On 10 November 2009 the applicant was taken to Public Hospital no. 9 for an examination. The doctors recommended that he have an operation on his navel fistula. On the same date the applicant was returned to the SIZO.","61.On 24 November 2009 an ambulance doctor examined the applicant in the hearing room of the Kyiv City Court of Appeal in connection with the constant pain in his abdomen. The applicant was given treatment for his symptoms.","62.On 26 November 2009 an ambulance doctor examined the applicant in the SIZO in connection with the constant pain in his abdomen, and found that he did not require urgent hospitalisation.","63.On 27 November 2009 a surgeon from the Emergency Hospital examined the applicant and recommended that he continue with the outpatient treatment for his navel fistula.","64.On 4 December 2009, in the light of additional information from the respondent Government on the applicant\u2019s state of health and the treatment provided to him in the SIZO, the Court decided to lift the interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (see paragraph 55 above).","65.In December 2009 the applicant lodged several requests with the SIZO administration, asking to be transferred to any medical facility in view of the serious deterioration in his state of health.","66.On 25 December 2009 the SIZO administration informed the applicant\u2019s lawyer that the applicant did not require urgent hospitalisation in an outside medical facility and was receiving adequate medical treatment for his fistula in the SIZO.","67.On 18 January 2010 the applicant was placed in the surgery department of Buchanska Prison Hospital, diagnosed with a ligature fistula of the umbilical area.","68.On 20 January 2010 the applicant underwent an operation to remove the navel fistula. On 26 February 2010 he was discharged and sent back to the SIZO.","69.The Government did not provide information or supporting documents as to the treatment provided to the applicant after his discharge from the hospital. They submitted that the medical documentation for the period of time from 26 February 2010 onwards had been lost.","C.Material conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in the SIZO","70.According to the applicant, the cells in which he was kept in the SIZO lacked natural light, and the electric light was dim and constantly on. The inmates slept on beds without mattresses or bed linen.","71.He added that the food was unsatisfactory in terms of quality and quantity, and the prisoners were given tea and bread in the morning, porridge in the afternoon and boiled water in the evening.","D.Provision of food and water to the applicant on hearing days","72.According to the applicant, he was not provided with food and water on hearing days, since Ukrainian legislation did not make provision for this. It was not possible to have meals or drinks at the courts dealing with his case.","75.The relevant Council of Europe material and other material establishing standards for the conditions of detention, together with reports concerning the conditions of detention in Ukraine, can be found in Davydov and Others v. Ukraine (nos.17674\/02 and 39081\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 101-108, 1 July 2010) and Gorbatenko v.Ukraine (no. 25209\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 97-100, 28 November 2013)."],"31657":["9.The first applicant was born in 1942 and at the time of the events he lived in Baku.","10.He was a linguist and worked at the Linguistic Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Azerbaijan. He was of Talysh ethnicity and carried out research on the Talysh language. He also worked as editor-in-chief of the Tolishi Sado, a bilingual Azerbaijani-Talysh newspaper, and regularly published articles therein.","A.The first applicant\u2019s arrest, alleged ill-treatment and administrative conviction","1.The first applicant\u2019s version of events","11.At around 4 p.m. on 2 February 2007 the first applicant was arrested by agents of the MNS in Javid Park in Baku. He was taken to the premises of the MNS where he was questioned for twenty-three hours about his alleged collaboration with the Iranian intelligence service.","12.He was deprived of water and food and was kept awake. He was also subjected to physical violence. In particular, the fingers of his right hand were several times squashed with a door and he got injuries on his left shoulder. His ill-treatment was stopped owing to his high blood pressure.","13.At around 4 p.m. on 3 February 2007 the MNS\u2019s agents took the first applicant by car to the area near the Elmler Akademiyasi metro station in Baku and released him there. The applicant was not provided with any document concerning his arrest and detention.","14.Immediately after his release while the first applicant crossed the road, a police officer approached and arrested him because of his alleged failure to comply with the police officer\u2019s request to identify himself. He was taken to Yasamal District Police Station no. 28, where an administrative-offence record was drawn up by police officers. The first applicant refused to sign the record.","15.On the same day the first applicant was taken to the Yasamal District Court and appeared before a judge. The judge found him guilty under Article 310 \u00a7 1 (failure to comply with a lawful order of a police officer) of the Code of Administrative Offences and sentenced him to fifteen days\u2019 administrative detention.","16.On 5 February 2007 the first applicant\u2019s lawyer appealed against that decision. He claimed that the first applicant\u2019s administrative conviction had been totally unjustified and that the first-instance court had not examined any evidence proving his guilt. His lawyer further noted that the first applicant had been ill-treated on the premises of the MNS, where he had been unlawfully detained from 4 p.m. on 2 February 2007 to 4 p.m. on 3February 2007. In that connection, the lawyer submitted that there were bruises on his hand and asked the court to order his forensic examination. The relevant part of the complaint reads as follows:","\u201cIt appeared at the court hearing [before the first-instance court] that N. Mammadov [the first applicant] had also been subjected to physical violence. In fact, the existence of bruises on his left hand was clearly seen.\u201d","17.On 9 February 2007 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the first-instance court\u2019s decision. The appellate court\u2019s decision made no mention of the lawyer\u2019s particular requests and complaints. The hearing was held in the absence of the first applicant.","18.Following his administrative conviction on 3 February 2007 by the Yasamal District Court, he was returned to the premises of the MNS where he was kept until 17 February 2007. He was again ill-treated by MNSagents during that period. In particular, although he suffered from hypertension, prostatitis and hyperthyroidism, he was not provided with the relevant medical care and medication. He was questioned in general at night and no record was drawn up in respect of those interviews. He was given false information about his family according to which his two sons had also been arrested and detained in the next cells and that his wife had been hospitalised and was suffering from a serious disease. He was not provided with clean clothing during this period. His family was not informed of his place of detention.","19.It appears from the documents in the case file that an investigator at the MNS, N.Z., compiled on 9 February 2007 a record on the first applicant\u2019s questioning as a witness on the premises of the MNS. The investigator questioned him about his travels to and relations with Iran.","2.The Government\u2019s version of events","20.The Government submitted that they had been unable to obtain the files of the case concerning the first applicant\u2019s administrative detention as they had been destroyed owing to the expiration of their term of storage. For this reason, the Government were not able to clarify the conditions of the first applicant\u2019s detention and treatment to which he had been subjected during this period.","B.Remedies used in respect of the first applicant\u2019s alleged ill\u2011treatment and unlawful detention on the premises of the MNS","21.As the first applicant\u2019s family had no information about his place of detention following his administrative conviction, his lawyer sent numerous letters and telegrams to the MNS, the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Court of Appeal asking for information about the first applicant\u2019s place of detention. The lawyer also indicated in his submissions that there were bruises on the first applicant\u2019s hand, and that the first applicant had to follow a special diet and be provided with the relevant medication because of his state of health.","22.In reply to the above-mentioned requests, by a letter of 9 February 2007 the MNS informed the lawyer that the first applicant had not been arrested or detained on their premises. By a letter of 16 February 2007 the Ministry of Internal Affairs also informed the lawyer that the first applicant had not been taken to or detained in the detention facilities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.","23.On 15 February 2007 the second applicant lodged a request with the Prosecutor General asking for the first applicant\u2019s forensic examination in the presence of his lawyer. In that connection, she noted that at the hearing of 3 February 2007 before the Yasamal District Court the first applicant\u2019s family members had noticed injuries to the index finger of his right hand. She further noted that she had not been informed of his place of detention and that the first applicant could not live without his medication because of his state of health.","24.By a letter dated 20 February 2007 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office informed the second applicant that her request concerning the allegedly unlawful actions taken against her husband had been transferred to the Baku City Prosecutor\u2019s Office and that she would be informed of the outcome.","25.It appears from the case file that on 7 April 2007 the investigator in charge of the case ordered the first applicant\u2019s forensic examination. According to forensic report no. 32\/TM, during his examination by the expert on 12 April 2007, the first applicant complained of having been ill\u2011treated on the premises of the MNS on 2 February 2007. In particular, he stated that the index finger of his right hand had been squashed with a chair and that he had been struck on his left rib cage. The expert concluded that there was not at that time any objective sign of injury on the first applicant\u2019s body. The first applicant was not provided with a copy of the report. Despite the Court\u2019s explicit request to the Government to submit copies of all the documents relating to the domestic proceedings, the Government failed to provide the Court with a copy of the above-mentioned forensic report.","26.On 8 October 2007 the first applicant lodged an action with the Sabail District Court, asking the court to find violations of his rights protected under Articles 3, 5 and 14 of the Convention. He alleged, inter alia, that he had been ill-treated by agents of the MNS between 2 and 17February 2007, that his arrest and detention on the premises of the MNS from 2 to 3 February 2007 had been unlawful, and that he had been discriminated against on the grounds of his ethnicity. The part of the complaint concerning the first applicant\u2019s ill-treatment reads as follows:","\u201cIt appeared from the submissions that he [the first applicant] made to his representative in the presence of the investigator on 17 February 2007 that, although he had not officially asked for medical aid, he suffered from hypertension, prostatitis and poor eyesight. During the period when he had been administratively detained on the premises of the MNS, he had been subjected to unrecorded interviews with 200\/220 mm Hg blood pressure, he had not been provided with the relevant medication, and on several occasions, he had not been allowed to go to the toilet with the intention of breaking his will.","... N. Mammadov had been threatened on several occasions and had been given false information according to which his two sons had also been arrested and detained in the next cells and his wife had been hospitalised on account of a serious heart disease ...","Although the application and request of his wife and representative concerning the violence against N. Mammadov had been addressed to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office, those complaints had been sent first to the Yasamal District Prosecutor\u2019s Office and the Baku City Prosecutor\u2019s Office, and then again to the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office. The latter sent the complaints made on 9 March for a legal assessment two months later to the Investigation Department of the MNS. They were dealt with with delay on purpose so that the visible trace of injuries to the index finger of his right hand would disappear and recover; and the forensic examination had been ordered only in April 2007.\u201d","27.On 18 October 2007 the Sabail District Court, which examined the action under the procedure established by Articles 449-51 of the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning appeals against the prosecuting authorities\u2019 actions and decisions, dismissed it without addressing any of the first applicant\u2019s particular complaints.","28.On 24 October 2007 the first applicant appealed against that decision, reiterating his previous complaints.","29.On 16 November 2007 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 18 October 2007.","C.Institution of criminal proceedings against the first applicant and his remand in custody","30.On 17 February 2007 the first applicant was charged with the criminal offence of high treason under Article 274 of the Criminal Code.","31.On the same day the Sabail District Court, relying on the official charges brought against the first applicant and the prosecutor\u2019s request for the preventive measure of remand in custody to be applied, ordered the first applicant\u2019s detention for a period of three months. The judge substantiated the necessity of this measure by the seriousness of the first applicant\u2019s alleged criminal acts, and the possibility of his absconding and obstructing the investigation.","32.On an unspecified date the first applicant appealed against the Sabail District Court\u2019s decision of 17 February 2007. He claimed, in particular, that there had been no justification for the application of the preventive measure of remand in custody. He also complained that the court had failed to take into account his personal situation, such as his age and his having a permanent place of residence, when it had ordered his detention pending trial.","33.On 1 March 2007 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the detention order was justified.","34.On 12 May 2007 the Sabail District Court extended the first applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention until 3 August 2007. The court substantiated the need for the extension by the seriousness of the charges and by the necessity of additional time to carry out further investigative steps.","35.On an unspecified date the first applicant appealed against that decision, claiming that he had not committed any crime and that there was no reason for his continued detention.","36.On 31 May 2007 the Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court\u2019s decision.","37.On 28 July 2007 the Sabail District Court extended the first applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention until 3 December 2007. The court substantiated the necessity of this extension on the grounds that a number of investigative steps needed to be carried out and thus more time was needed to complete the investigation.","38.On 3 August 2007 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court\u2019s decision.","39.On 15 November 2007 the first applicant\u2019s case was sent to the Assize Court for trial.","40.On 7 December 2007 the Assize Court held a preliminary hearing. The first applicant complained at the hearing that he had been ill-treated and had been unlawfully detained on the premises of the MNS and asked the court to return the case to the investigators for a new examination. On the same day the Assize Court dismissed his applications. The court further decided that the preventive measure of remand in custody in respect of the first applicant should remain \u201cunchanged\u201d, as there were no grounds for his release.","41.In the course of the proceedings before the Assize Court, the first applicant reiterated his previous complaints relating to the alleged violation of his rights protected under Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention. In this regard, he claimed that he had been ill-treated by agents of the MNS between 2 and 17 February 2007 and that he had been unlawfully arrested and detained by them.","42.It appears from the case file that on 5 March 2008 a judge of the Assize Court ordered the applicant\u2019s forensic medical examination, asking the expert to clarify the conclusions of forensic report no. 32\/TM (see paragraph 25 above). Following the first applicant\u2019s examination on 3 April 2008, the expert concluded in his report, no. 54\/TM, that there was no objective sign of injury on the first applicant\u2019s body. The expert also concluded that the first applicant\u2019s pain in his left shoulder had not been noted in the conclusions of forensic report no. 32\/TM as it had not constituted an objective sign of injury. It further appears from report no.54\/TM that the first applicant complained of pains in his left shoulder and these pains were having an effect on the fourth finger of his left hand. However, there was no sign of injury to his finger or left shoulder.","43.On 5 March 2008, following a request from the first applicant\u2019s lawyer, a judge at the Assize Court asked the MNS to inform the court, inter alia, whether the first applicant had been on the premises of the MNS on 2,3 and 9 February 2007, whether he had been questioned on the premises of the MNS on 9 February 2007, and whether he had been subjected to a medical examination and what his diagnosis had been.","44.In reply to the judge\u2019s letter of 5 March 2008, by a letter dated 16April 2008 the MNS informed the judge that the first applicant, who was at that time detained in the MNS pre-trial detention facility, had been diagnosed with hypertension and was being provided with the relevant treatment. However, the MNS\u2019s letter was silent as to the judge\u2019s requests for information concerning the first applicant\u2019s presence on the premises of the MNS on 2,3and 9 February 2007.","45.On 24 June 2008 the Assize Court convicted the first applicant of high treason and sentenced him to ten years\u2019 imprisonment and confiscation of his property. The Assize Court also held, relying on the conclusions of forensic report no. 54\/TM, that there had been no objective sign of injury to the first applicant\u2019s body.","46.On 26 December 2008 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the Assize Court\u2019s judgment of 24 June 2008.","47.On 27 May 2009 the Supreme Court upheld the Baku Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment of 26 December 2008.","D.The first applicant\u2019s conditions of detention and death in prison","48.According to the first applicant, he suffered from various medical conditions, including hypertension, prostatitis and hyperthyroidism and poor eyesight before his arrest. He regularly received medical treatment in connection with the above-mentioned conditions.","49.It appears from the documents in the case file that the first applicant was detained from 17 February 2007 to 25 June 2008 in the MNS pre-trial detention facility, from 25 June 2008 to 14 January 2009 in pre\u2011trial detention facility no. 1, from 14 January to 28 July 2009 in prison no. 15, and from 28 July 2009 until his death on 17 August 2009 in the medical facility of the Prison Service (\u201cthe medical facility\u201d).","50.It appears from the extracts of the first applicant\u2019s detention-facility medical record (tibbi kitab\u00e7a) no. 353, as well as from the documents in the case file, that in 2007 and 2008 the first applicant was examined on numerous occasions by doctors. During this period the first applicant\u2019s state of health was stable and he mainly complained of high blood pressure and headaches. According to medical record no. 353, which covered the first applicant\u2019s detention from 17 February 2007, the first applicant was subjected to initial examination (ilk bax\u0131\u015f) upon his arrival at the detention facility. The initial examination did not contain references to any injury on his body. The date of the initial examination was not indicated in the medical record, but there was a stamp dated 20 February 2007 on that page of the medical record indicating the result of the first applicant\u2019s blood test.","51.It appears from two letters dated 1 and 12 September 2007 sent from the first applicant\u2019s lawyer to the head of the MNS pre-trial detention facility that the lawyer asked for information about the first applicant\u2019s medical treatment. The lawyer also expressed his gratitude for the conditions created for the first applicant\u2019s medical treatment in detention.","52.It also appears from a request from the first applicant dated 30 June 2008 that he asked the head of pre-trial detention facility no. 1 to allow his lawyer to provide him with the medication.","53.As regards the period of his detention from 14 January to 28 July 2009 in prison no. 15, on 14 January 2009, upon his transfer to that facility, the head of that prison decided to place the first applicant in a punishment cell for a period of fifteen days. It appears from the case file that following the intervention of the Azerbaijani Committee against Torture, a local non-governmental organisation, on 21January 2009 the first applicant was transferred to a normal cell.","54.On 26 January and 19 February 2009 the first applicant\u2019s lawyer wrote to the head of prison no. 15, complaining about the first applicant\u2019s conditions of detention. The lawyer noted that the first applicant had been placed in a punishment cell for a period of fifteen days without any reason and asked for a copy of the decision in this regard. The lawyer further submitted that although the first applicant suffered from various medical conditions, he had not been provided with the adequate medical assistance.","55.On 23 February 2009 the first applicant\u2019s lawyer lodged an action with the Nizami District Court, complaining of the first applicant\u2019s conditions of detention and the violation of his rights protected under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention. In particular, he pointed out that the first applicant had been unlawfully placed in a punishment cell and had not been provided with the adequate medical assistance.","56.On 6 March 2009 the Nizami District Court partially allowed the action, holding that the first applicant\u2019s placement in a punishment cell had been unlawful. The court also found that the first applicant had not been subjected to a medical examination upon his arrival at the prison and ordered the latter to carry out a medical examination of the first applicant and to provide him with adequate medical care. It further appears from the judgment that the head of the medical department of prison no. 15 stated at the court hearing that he had been on leave when the first applicant had been placed in a punishment cell and that he had requested to be transferred to a normal cell immediately after his return to work. He further stated that the first applicant suffered from hypertension and that he had informed the first applicant of the necessity of his transfer to a specialised medical establishment, but the first applicant had rejected that suggestion.","57.On 29 March 2009 the first applicant appealed against that judgment, noting that the first-instance court had failed to acknowledge the violation of his rights protected under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention. In particular, he noted that he had been detained from 14 to 21 January 2009 in a punishment cell which had been windy, wet and not heated. He also pointed out that the cell had not received natural light and that he had not been provided with the relevant clothing. During this period, he had been obliged to remain standing from 5 a.m. to 9 p.m. every day as there had been no chair in the cell. In his appeal the first applicant confirmed that the head of the medical department of prison no. 15 had proposed his transfer to a specialised medical establishment. In that connection, he submitted that he had refused that proposal because of his financial situation as he had not considered that he would have been provided with the adequate medical assistance free of charge.","58.On 16 April 2009 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The appellate court\u2019s decision was not amenable to appeal.","59.It appears from the documents in the case file that in the meantime, as evidenced by a document dated 30 March 2009 and signed by the first applicant, the latter refused to be transferred to a specialised medical establishment. He substantiated his refusal by the poor quality of medical treatment in that particular medical establishment.","60.It appears from the documents in the case file that on 7 July 2009 the first applicant again refused to be transferred to a specialised medical establishment. In that connection, he submitted that he had not had any financial means and that he had not thought that he would have been provided with the adequate medical assistance there.","61.It further appears from the extracts of the first applicant\u2019s medical records that he refused on several occasions to be examined by the doctors. Various medical records were compiled by the doctors in this connection.","62.On 28 July 2009 the first applicant was transferred upon his consent to the medical facility with the diagnosis of osteochondrosis of the cervical vertebrae (boyun f\u0259q\u0259r\u0259l\u0259rinin osteoxondrozu) and right shoulder plexus (sa\u011f t\u0259r\u0259fli \u00e7iyin pleksiti).","63.It appears from a letter dated 14 August 2009 and signed by the head of the medical facility, sent in reply to an information request from the first applicant\u2019s lawyer, that upon his arrival at the medical facility the first applicant mainly complained of neck pains, general weakness and dyspnea. On various dates indicated in the letter the first applicant was examined by a number of specialists, including a neurosurgeon, an endocrinologist, a urologist and an ophthalmologist, who confirmed the diagnosis of osteochondrosis of the cervical vertebrae and right shoulder plexus. The doctors also confirmed that the first applicant suffered from various other medical conditions such as hypertension, prostatitis, acute cholecystitis, bronchitis, hyperthyroidism and cataracts.","64.On 17 August 2009 the first applicant died. According to the death certificate, the death resulted from an ischemic cerebral infarction (ba\u015f beyinin i\u015femik infarkt\u0131).","E.Criminal investigation concerning the first applicant\u2019s death","65.Following the death of the first applicant, the Nizami District Prosecutor\u2019s Office launched a criminal inquiry into the circumstances of his death.","66.On 18 August 2009 the deputy prosecutor of the Nizami District Prosecutor\u2019s Office ordered a post-mortem examination of the body, which was carried out on the same day, for the purposes of determining the cause of death. Report no. 105 dated 29 August 2009 showed that death had resulted from an acute ischemic cerebral infarction (ba\u015f beyinin k\u0259skin i\u015femik infarkt\u0131).","67.On 24 August 2009 the second applicant lodged a request with the Prosecutor General, claiming that the first applicant had died in detention because he had not been provided with the adequate medical treatment after January 2009. In that connection, she submitted that the first applicant\u2019s state of health had worsened following his placement in a punishment cell between 14 and 21 January 2009 in prison no. 15 and that his medical treatment following that had not been adequate.","68.By a letter dated 27 August 2009, the Baku City Prosecutor\u2019s Office returned the documents of the criminal inquiry to the Nizami District Prosecutor\u2019s Office, finding that the inquiry into the first applicant\u2019s death had not been conducted thoroughly. In particular, the Baku City Prosecutor\u2019s Office held that the Nizami District Prosecutor\u2019s Office had failed to determine the medical conditions from which the first applicant had suffered and whether he had been provided with adequate medical assistance. It further found that the first applicant\u2019s cellmates and the doctors examining him in prison had not been questioned by the prosecuting authorities.","69.On 31 August 2009 the deputy prosecutor of the Nizami District Prosecutor\u2019s Office ordered a forensic examination by a panel of experts. The prosecutor asked the experts to establish whether the first applicant had been provided with adequate medical assistance, whether his medical conditions had been correctly diagnosed and whether his death had resulted from a lack of adequate medical treatment in detention.","70.Report no. 177\/KES dated 1 September 2009, which examined only the period of the first applicant\u2019s treatment following his transfer to the medical facility on 28 July 2009, showed that the first applicant\u2019s medical conditions had been correctly diagnosed and treated in the medical facility. The three experts furthermore found that, although the first applicant had been suffering from numerous conditions (such as osteochondrosis, hypertension, prostatitis, cataracts), the latter could not have developed during a short period of time and could only have appeared following long pathological processes in his body. The report further found that the death had resulted from a cerebral infarction as a result of thrombosis inside cerebral blood vessels and was not related to his medical treatment.","71.On 28 September 2009 the deputy prosecutor of the Nizami District Prosecutor\u2019s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings in connection with the first applicant\u2019s death because of the lack of evidence of a crime in his death. He relied in this connection on the findings of the above-mentioned two forensic expert reports, concluding that the first applicant\u2019s medical treatment had been adequate and that there had been no causal link between his medical treatment and death. The decision also referred to the statements from various doctors and the first applicant\u2019s cellmates according to which the medical treatment had been adequate and that the first applicant had not made any complaint in this connection during his treatment. In particular, the head of the medical department of prison no. 15 stated that although the first applicant\u2019s transfer to the medical facility had been proposed on several occasions, he had refused that proposal.","72.On 21 October 2009 the second and third applicants lodged a complaint against the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 28 September 2009 with the Nizami District Court, asking the court to overrule it. They claimed that the first applicant had not been provided with adequate medical assistance in detention and that his unlawful placement in a punishment cell on 14January 2009 had resulted in the development of numerous diseases. In that connection, they complained that the first applicant had been transferred to the medical facility only on 28 July 2009, despite the fact that on 6 March 2009 the Nizami District Court ordered prison no. 15 to provide the first applicant with adequate medical care. They further submitted that they had not been provided with a copy of the first applicant\u2019s medical records and the forensic reports relating to his death and that they had been provided with a copy of the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 28September 2009 only on 19 October 2009.","73.On 2 November 2009 the Nizami District Court dismissed the complaint. The court found that the first applicant had been provided with adequate medical care. It further noted that although his transfer to the medical facility had been proposed on several occasions before 28 July 2009, he had rejected these proposals.","74.On 5 November 2009 the second and third applicants appealed against that decision, reiterating their previous complaints.","75.On 17 November 2009 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. As to the argument that the Nizami District Court\u2019s decision of 6March 2009 had not been executed, the appellate court found that the first applicant had refused to be transferred to the medical facility. That decision was not amenable to appeal."]},"law":{"28470":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION38.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the refusal to grant him drug substitution therapy in prison, which had made him suffer considerable pain and had caused damage to his health, and the refusal to have the necessity of drug substitution therapy examined by an external medical expert amounted to inhuman treatment. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d39.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility40.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant41.\u00a0\u00a0According to the applicant\u2019s submission, the authorities\u2019 refusal to offer him drug substitution therapy in detention, without having consulted an external medical expert, had constituted inhuman treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.42.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that in the circumstances of his case, drug substitution therapy had been the only suitable treatment for his condition. By refusing him that treatment, the authorities had exceeded the margin of appreciation they had in respect of the provision of medical treatment to prisoners and had therefore disregarded their positive obligations under Article 3.43.\u00a0\u00a0In order to support this view, the applicant submitted that he has been addicted to heroin for some forty years. The Munich Court of Appeal itself, in its decision of 25 June 2010 (see paragraph 8 above), had considered that he stood no chance of leading a drug-free life for a considerable time. Prior to his imprisonment, he had received drug substitution therapy without interruption from 1991 to 2008.44.\u00a0\u00a0In the applicant\u2019s view, drug substitution therapy had been necessary to alleviate his severe neurological pain and had previously proved successful in attaining that aim. In contrast, the mere treatment of his pain with painkillers had been ineffective and thus insufficient. Drug substitution therapy had also been the adequate treatment for reducing his craving for heroin and allowing for the proper treatment of his other serious disease, namely the treatment with Interferon of the hepatitis C from which he suffered. It would have enabled him, as it had during the time when he had received substitution treatment, to lead a \u201cnormal\u201d everyday life. By illegally refusing him that treatment, the authorities had caused him to suffer intense physical and mental pain.45.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the applicant submitted that the authorities had not sufficiently examined the necessity of providing him with drug substitution therapy. The necessity to offer him such treatment should have been examined by an independent medical expert, as requested by him throughout the proceedings before the domestic authorities. In the applicant\u2019s view, the prison doctors of Kaisheim Prison, where no drug substitution treatment had ever been carried out, did not have the professional training and experience to assess the necessity of substitution therapy.46.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further stressed that neither the prison doctor nor the courts had had regard to, or at least mentioned, the applicable provisions (section 13 of the Narcotic Substances Act, read in conjunction with section\u00a05 of the Prescription of Narcotic Substances Regulation and the Federal Medical Association\u2019s Guidelines for the Substitution Treatment of Opiate Addicts) which regulated the provision of drug substitution therapy. The requirements for drug substitution therapy had been met in his case. In accordance with section 5 \u00a7 1 of the Prescription of Narcotic Substances Regulation, it would have served to support the necessary treatment of the serious illnesses, namely hepatitis C, HIV and polyneuropathy, from which he was suffering alongside his drug addiction. Moreover, as required by section 5 \u00a7 2 of the said Regulation, there were no indications that the applicant would consume, in prison, substances of a type or quantity endangering the objective of the substitution treatment. His drug substitution treatment had been interrupted in breach of paragraph 8 of the Federal Medical Association\u2019s Guidelines when he started serving his sentence.47.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed that he had been discriminated against by the refusal of drug substitution treatment in comparison to other heroin addicts who were not imprisoned and those who were imprisoned in the Land of Baden-W\u00fcrttemberg, who had the opportunity to obtain substitution treatment in accordance with the relevant medical guidelines. Substitution had been denied to him as a matter of principle and for outdated ideological, rather than medical, reasons.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government48.\u00a0\u00a0The Government took the view that the refusal to grant the applicant drug substitution therapy in prison, without an external medical expert having been consulted, had not violated Article 3 of the Convention.49.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Government\u2019s submission, the applicant had received the required adequate medical treatment in detention. They contested that drug substitution therapy had been necessary treatment for the applicant\u2019s condition, and still less the only treatment suitable to sustain the applicant\u2019s health. As found by the prison doctor, substitution treatment had not been necessary on medical grounds. Such treatment had equally been unnecessary to attain the aims pursued by the execution of a term of imprisonment. It would have run counter to the aim of rehabilitating of the applicant in prison and enabling him to lead a drug-free life. Therefore, the refusal of drug substitution treatment had fallen within the State\u2019s margin of appreciation in respect of the choice between different types of medical treatment of a detainee. This applied all the more as the applicant\u2019s diseases had not been caused by State action.50.\u00a0\u00a0The Government explained that the applicant, having been properly examined by the prison doctor, had received comprehensive medical care in accordance with sections 58 and 60 of the Bavarian Execution of Sentences Act (see paragraph 27 above). He received suitable treatment for his diseases, including painkillers as well as psychiatric care, to alleviate the chronic pain from which he was suffering and to treat his drug addiction. He had also been examined by specialised doctors regarding his HIV and hepatitis C infections and was given medication accordingly. His state of health had been stable while in detention and, at the relevant time, he no longer suffered from physical withdrawal symptoms.51.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Government expressed doubts as to whether the relevant requirements for offering drug substitution treatment laid down in section 13 of the Narcotic Substances Act, read in conjunction with section\u00a05 of the Prescription of Narcotic Substances Regulation and the Federal Medical Association\u2019s Guidelines for the Substitution Treatment of Opiate Addicts (see paragraphs 28-30 above) were met in the applicant\u2019s case. Contrary to the requirements laid down in section 5 \u00a7 1 of the Prescription of Narcotic Substances Regulation, the applicant did not pursue the aim of gradually restoring his abstinence from narcotic substances. Moreover, it was doubtful whether the requirements of section 5 \u00a7 2 of the said Regulation were met as it was to be expected that the applicant, just as in the past, would consume substances of a type or quantity endangering the objective of the substitution treatment, namely heroin, in addition to his substitution treatment, which would be life-threatening. Furthermore, in accordance with the Federal Medical Association\u2019s Guidelines, drug substitution treatment was to be provided in prison only in individual reasoned cases. The prison doctors had not considered this requirement to be met.52.\u00a0\u00a0The Government conceded that a recent expert study commissioned by the Federal Ministry of Health (see paragraph 31 above) had revealed that stable abstinence from narcotic substances was a rare phenomenon in practice and appeared to be an unrealistic treatment objective in the long run. However, according to the experts\u2019 findings, abstinence could nevertheless be a legitimate aim of substitution treatment fixed between doctor and patient.53.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further argued that the authorities had sufficiently examined the necessity to provide the applicant with drug substitution treatment. They stressed that the applicant, prior to his detention in Kaisheim Prison, had been detained in the G\u00fcnzburg drug rehabilitation centre, where the doctors specialised in treatment for drug addiction had not considered it necessary to provide him with drug substitution treatment. Moreover, they submitted that one of the applicant\u2019s treating doctors in prison had carried out drug substitution therapy many times while employed in the Land of Lower Saxony. He had therefore equally had the necessary professional qualifications and experience to assess the necessity of providing the applicant with drug substitution treatment. This had been verified by the domestic courts. The applicant did not have a right to choose freely his medical treatment and his treating doctor while in detention and therefore could not ask to be examined and treated by an external doctor.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0Recapitulation of the relevant principles54.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that to come within the scope of the interdiction contained in Article 3 of the Convention the treatment inflicted on or endured by the victim must reach a minimum level of severity. The assessment of this minimum level of severity is a relative one, depending on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, inter alia, Blokhin v. Russia [GC], no. 47152\/06, \u00a7\u00a0135, ECHR 2016, with further references).55.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention imposes on the State a positive obligation to ensure that a person is detained under conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject the individual to distress or hardship exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, the person\u2019s health and well-being are adequately secured by, among other things, the provision of the requisite medical assistance and treatment (see Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7 94, ECHR 2000\u2011XI; McGlinchey and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 50390\/99, \u00a7 46, ECHR\u00a02003\u2011V; and Farbtuhs v. Latvia, no. 4672\/02, \u00a7 51, 2 December 2004). In this connection, the \u201cadequacy\u201d of medical assistance remains the most difficult element to determine. Medical treatment provided within prison facilities must be appropriate, that is, at a level comparable to that which the State authorities have committed themselves to provide to the population as a whole. Nevertheless, this does not mean that every detainee must be guaranteed the same level of medical treatment that is available in the best health establishments outside prison facilities (see, inter alia, Blokhin, cited above, \u00a7 137).56.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has clarified in this context that it was essential for a prisoner suffering from a serious illness to undergo an adequate assessment of his or her current state of health, by a specialist in the disease in question, in order to be provided with appropriate treatment (compare Keenan v.\u00a0the\u00a0United Kingdom, no. 27229\/95, \u00a7\u00a7 115-116, ECHR 2001\u2011III, concerning a mentally ill prisoner; Khudobin v. Russia, no. 59696\/00, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a095\u201196, ECHR 2006\u2011XII (extracts), concerning a prisoner suffering from several chronic diseases including hepatitis C and HIV; and Testa v.\u00a0Croatia, no. 20877\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 51-52, 12 July 2007, concerning a prisoner suffering from chronic hepatitis C).57.\u00a0\u00a0The prison authorities must offer the prisoner the treatment corresponding to the disease(s) the prisoner was diagnosed with (see Poghosyan v. Georgia, no. 9870\/07, \u00a7 59, 24 February 2009), as prescribed by the competent doctors (see Xiros v. Greece, no. 1033\/07, \u00a7 75, 9\u00a0September 2010). In the event of diverging medical opinions on the treatment necessary to ensure adequately a prisoner\u2019s health, it may be necessary for the prison authorities and the domestic courts, in order to comply with their positive obligation under Article 3, to obtain additional advice from a specialised medical expert (compare Xiros, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 87 and 89-90; and Budanov v. Russia, no. 66583\/11, \u00a7 73, 9 January 2014). The authorities\u2019 refusal to allow independent specialised medical assistance to be given to a prisoner suffering from a serious medical condition on his request is an element the Court has taken into account in its assessment of the State\u2019s compliance with Article 3 (compare, for instance, Sarban v. \u00a0Moldova, no. 3456\/05, \u00a7 90, 4 October 2005).58.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further reiterates, being sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role, that it is not its task to rule on matters lying exclusively within the field of expertise of medical specialists and to establish whether an applicant in fact required a particular treatment or whether the choice of treatment methods appropriately reflected the applicant\u2019s needs (see Ukhan v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 30628\/02, \u00a7 76, 18 December 2008; and Sergey Antonov, no. \u00a040512\/13, \u00a7 86, 22 October 2015). However, having regard to the vulnerability of applicants in detention, it is for the Government to provide credible and convincing evidence showing that the applicant concerned had received comprehensive and adequate medical care in detention (see Sergey\u00a0Antonov, ibid.).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of these principles to the present case59.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is called upon to determine whether, in the light of the foregoing principles, the respondent State complied with its positive obligation under Article 3 of the Convention to ensure that the applicant\u2019s health was adequately secured during his detention by providing him with the requisite medical treatment, at a level comparable to that which the State authorities have committed themselves to provide to persons in freedom.60.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that it is contested between the parties whether, in the circumstances of the case, drug substitution therapy was to be regarded as the necessary medical treatment which had to be provided to the applicant in order for the State to comply with its said obligation.61.\u00a0\u00a0The Court accepts that the States have a margin of appreciation in respect of the choice between different suitable types of medical treatment for a prisoner\u2019s diseases. This holds true, in particular, where medical research does not lead to a clear result as to which of two or more possible therapies is more suitable for the patient concerned. The Court, having regard to the material before it, is aware of the fact that drug substitution therapy with methadone entails the replacement of an illicit drug with a synthetic opioid. While drug substitution treatment has become increasingly widespread in the Council of Europe Member States during the past years, the measures to be taken to treat drug addiction are still the subject of controversy. The States\u2019 margin of appreciation in respect of the choice of medical treatment for a prisoner\u2019s diseases applies, in principle, also to the choice between abstinence-oriented drug therapy and drug substitution therapy and to the setting-up of a general policy in this field, as long as the State ensures that the standards set by the Convention in the field of medical care in prison are complied with.62.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that in the present case, it does not need to decide whether the applicant in fact needed drug substitution therapy. It rather has to determine whether the respondent State has provided credible and convincing evidence proving that the applicant\u2019s state of health and the appropriate treatment were adequately assessed and that the applicant subsequently received comprehensive and adequate medical care in detention.63.\u00a0\u00a0In this context, the Court notes that there are a number of strong elements indicating that drug substitution treatment could be regarded as the requisite medical treatment for the applicant in view of the following. First, it is uncontested between the parties that the applicant is a manifest and long-term opioid addict. At the relevant time of the domestic authorities\u2019 decisions, he had been addicted to heroin for some forty years. All his attempts to overcome his addiction, including five in-house drug rehabilitation therapies, had failed. In the light of these circumstances, a domestic court itself had confirmed, in proceedings related to those here at issue, that it could no longer be expected with sufficient probability that the applicant could be cured of his drug addiction or prevented for a considerable time from relapsing into drug abuse (see\u00a0paragraph 8 above). It is further uncontested that the applicant suffered from chronic pain linked to his long-term drug consumption and polyneuropathy.64.\u00a0\u00a0In view of his state of health, prior to his detention here at issue, the applicant\u2019s heroin addiction had been treated with medically prescribed and supervised drug substitution therapy for seventeen years, from 1991 until 2008. The Court notes in this context that according to the relevant domestic guidelines, that is, the Federal Medical Association\u2019s Guidelines for the Substitution Treatment of Opiate Addicts of 19 February 2010, adopted in accordance with section 5 \u00a7 11 of the Prescription of Narcotic Substances Regulation, opiate addiction was a serious chronic disease requiring medical treatment. It is further clarified that substitution treatment was a scientifically tested therapy for manifest opiate addiction (see paragraph 30 above). According to a study commissioned by the Federal Ministry of Health, drug substitution treatment was to be considered as an established therapy and the best possible therapy in that case (see paragraph\u00a031 above). The statistical data before the Court show, accordingly, that opioid substitution therapy programmes were operational already at the relevant time of the proceedings at issue in 41 out of 47 of the Council of Europe Member States in the community and 30 out of 47 of those State also provided such therapy to prisoners (see paragraphs 36-37 above).65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that it is uncontested by the Government that drug substitution therapy is, in principle, available in prisons in Germany, as it is outside prison, and is actually provided in practice in prisons in several L\u00e4nder other than Bavaria. The applicable provisions of domestic law (section 13 of the Narcotic Substances Act, read in conjunction with section 5 of the Prescription of Narcotic Substances Regulation and paragraph 8 of the Federal Medical Association\u2019s Guidelines for the Substitution Treatment of Opiate Addicts) specify, in particular, that in case of imprisonment, the continuity of the substitution treatment started outside prison by the institution in which the patient is placed, is to be secured (see paragraph 30 above).66.\u00a0\u00a0The Court would note in that context that this approach is in line with the standards fixed by the Council of Europe in respect of health care services in prison. Both the CPT standards and the Committee of Ministers\u2019 Recommendation Rec(2006)2 on the European Prison Rules (which do not specifically focus on drug therapy), as well as the Committee of Ministers\u2019 Recommendation no. R\u00a0(98)\u00a07 concerning the ethical and organisational aspects of health care in prison, lay down the principle of equivalence of care. Under that principle, prisoners are entitled to medical treatment in conditions comparable to those enjoyed by patients in the outside community and should have access to the health services available in the country without discrimination on grounds of their legal situation (see paragraphs 32-34 above and for the Court\u2019s own definition paragraph 55 above).67.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that not only the doctors having prescribed the applicant drug substitution therapy prior to his detention considered that treatment to be necessary in the applicant\u2019s case. An external doctor for internal medicine commissioned by the prison authorities, H., who had examined the applicant in person, had suggested that the prison medical service, who had not considered it necessary to provide the applicant with such treatment, reconsider granting the applicant drug substitution treatment (see paragraph 10 above). Moreover, a doctor specialised in drug addiction treatment (B.) had equally confirmed, albeit only on the basis of the written findings of doctor H., that from a medical point of view, drug substitution treatment had to be provided to the applicant (see paragraph 11 above).68.\u00a0\u00a0The Court would add that the strong indication that drug substitution treatment could be regarded as the requisite medical treatment for the applicant was subsequently further supported by the fact that the applicant was again prescribed and provided with drug substitution treatment immediately after his release from detention.69.\u00a0\u00a0The Court would refer in this context to its case-law under which it is for the Government to provide convincing evidence showing that the applicant concerned received comprehensive and adequate medical care in detention (see paragraph 58 above). It notes that abstinence-oriented therapy constituted a radical change in the medical treatment the applicant had received for seventeen years prior to his detention and that the domestic courts, based on the opinion of the treating doctors in the drug detoxification centre, considered that this therapy had failed. The Court finds that, in these circumstances, the domestic authorities were under an obligation to examine with particular scrutiny if maintaining the abstinence\u2011oriented therapy was to be considered as appropriate.70.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers, in this context, the authorities\u2019 argument that, at the time when the applicant was transferred from the drug rehabilitation centre to Kaisheim Prison, where he applied for drug substitution treatment, he had not been provided with drug substitution therapy for several months and no longer suffered from physical withdrawal symptoms. However, in the Court\u2019s view, this element does not militate against the potential necessity of drug substitution treatment. The applicant\u2019s health in detention was characterised, in particular, by chronic pain which he suffered independently of previous physical withdrawal symptoms. Moreover, it emerges from the material before the Court that the treatment with Polamidon was interrupted against the applicant\u2019s will, and apparently contrary to what is provided by the above\u2011mentioned Federal Medical Association Guidelines (see paragraph 30 above), at the outset of his detention and during his stay in the drug rehabilitation centre, where abstinence-based treatment for his addiction was carried out without additional substitution treatment. The authorities cannot, therefore, rely on a situation which they themselves brought about. Furthermore, given that the abstinence-oriented therapy had failed both in the view of the treating doctors in the drug detoxification centre and in the view of the domestic courts (see paragraph 8 above), the authorities were called upon to assess anew which therapy was suitable for the applicant.71.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further considers that its above findings are not called into question by the Government\u2019s argument that drug substitution therapy would run counter to the aim of rehabilitating the applicant by making him overcome his drug addiction in prison and thus enabling him to lead a life free of illegal drugs outside prison. The Court considers that this objective is, in principle, a legitimate aim which may be taken into account in the assessment of the necessity of the medical treatment of a drug addict. However, the Court notes that in the applicant\u2019s case, the authorities themselves had considered, prior to refusing the applicant drug substitution treatment in the proceedings at issue, that having regard to his history of drug addiction, this aim could not reasonably be expected to be attained. In particular, the Court of Appeal, when confirming the termination of the applicant\u2019s treatment in a detoxification facility after consultation of the applicant\u2019s treating doctors, considered that it could no longer be expected with sufficient probability that the applicant could be cured of his drug addiction (see paragraph 8 above).72.\u00a0\u00a0The authorities\u2019 assessment in this respect is equally confirmed by medical research showing that stable abstinence from opioids was a rare phenomenon and should, in the case of manifest opioid addicts, only be attempted if the patient was motivated to attain that aim (see paragraph 31 above), which was clearly not the applicant\u2019s case at the relevant time. Therefore, the refusal of drug substitution treatment could not be based on that unattainable objective.73.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Court takes note of the Government\u2019s argument that providing the applicant with substitution treatment would have put his life and limb in jeopardy as he might have consumed additional illegal drugs in prison. In the Government\u2019s submission, he therefore also had not met the requirements for drug substitution treatment under section 5 \u00a7 2 of the Prescription of Narcotic Substances Regulation. The Court considers that this argument is somewhat at odds with another argument the authorities forwarded in the context of their refusal to provide substitution treatment, namely that it was very difficult to obtain opioids in prison. In any event, the Court observes that this risk appeared to have been manageable even in the community over the previous seventeen years during which the applicant had received drug substitution treatment. In contrast, the risk caused to the life and limb of a drug addict who was released from prison without substitution treatment was acknowledged also by the prison authorities (see paragraph 25 above). The Court therefore finds that this element equally did not exempt the domestic authorities from analysing in detail the suitable treatment options for the applicant.74.\u00a0\u00a0The Court would add that it is aware that medical treatment in the prison context may entail additional difficulties and challenges for the domestic authorities, notably those related to security concerns. However, the Government have not forwarded any reasons for finding that providing the applicant with drug substitution treatment was incompatible with the practical demands of imprisonment. In\u00a0contrast, as expert B. had stressed, such treatment would help prevent the spread of infectious diseases such as HIV and hepatitis C from which the applicant suffered, in the interests of his fellow prisoners and the community as a whole. The Court further accepts that the provision of such treatment may serve to diminish the trafficking and uncontrolled consumption of illegal drugs in prison.75.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Court would stress that, in order for a State to comply with its positive obligation to ensure that a prisoner\u2019s health was adequately ensured, it is not only necessary to assess adequately a prisoner\u2019s state of health which, in case of serious illnesses, requires consultation of a specialist doctor (see paragraph 56 above). The necessary medical treatment adequately addressing the prisoner\u2019s state of health must also be determined with the help of the medical expert and provided to the detainee. The Court notes in this context that the importance of drawing on external medical experts providing specialised assistance to addicts in order to provide prisoners with appropriate treatment is equally stressed in the Committee of Ministers\u2019 Recommendation no. R\u00a0(98)\u00a07 concerning the ethical and organisational aspects of health care in prison (see paragraph 34 above).76.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the Court cannot but note that the domestic authorities had strong elements before them indicating that drug substitution therapy could be the adequate medical treatment for the applicant\u2019s state of health. Moreover, as shown above (see paragraph 67), following the termination of the abstinence-oriented therapy for lack of success, they were faced with several opinions of medical doctors, including specialists in drug addiction treatment, diverging from that of the specialised internal doctors treating the applicant in prison and, before the abstinence-oriented therapy failed, in the detoxification facility, on the question of the necessary medical treatment to be provided to the applicant. The Court further cannot but note in that context that it is uncontested that no drug substitution treatment had ever been provided in practice to prisoners in Kaisheim Prison.77.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances, the Court considers that in order to ensure that the applicant received the necessary medical treatment in prison the domestic authorities, and in particular the courts, were required to verify, in a timely manner and with the help of an independent doctor skilled in drug addiction treatment, whether the applicant\u2019s condition was still adequately treated without such therapy. However, there is no indication that the domestic authorities, with the help of medical expert advice, examined the necessity of drug substitution treatment with regard to the criteria set by the relevant domestic legislation and medical guidelines. Despite the applicant\u2019s previous medical treatment with drug substitution therapy for seventeen years, no follow-up was given to the opinions expressed by external doctors H. and B. on the necessity to consider providing the applicant again with drug substitution treatment.78.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the effects of the refusal of drug substitution treatment in prison on the applicant, the Court, having regard to the material before it, considers that drug withdrawal as such causes serious physical strain and extreme mental stress to a manifest and long-term opioid addict which may attain the threshold of Article\u00a03. It notes that, while the applicant was found no longer to suffer from the physical withdrawal symptoms which occur at the beginning of forced abstinence, the \u2013 albeit limited\u00a0\u2013 material before the Court, in particular external doctor H.\u2019s assessment, suggests that the chronic pain from which the applicant was suffering throughout the relevant period could have been alleviated more effectively with drug substitution treatment than with the painkillers he received. It was also not contested that this pain in his feet, neck and spine was such that, at least during certain periods of time during the applicant\u2019s detention at issue, some three and a half years, the applicant spent most of his time in bed. The Court further accepts that his suffering was exacerbated by the fact that he was aware of the existence of a treatment which had previously alleviated his pain effectively, but which he was refused.79.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further considers it established that the refusal to provide the applicant continuously with drug substitution treatment despite his manifest opioid addiction caused him considerable and continuous mental suffering for a long time. The\u00a0applicant also made it plausible that the deterioration of his already poor state of health, and in particular his chronic pain, combined with his craving for heroin, reduced his ability to participate in social life. In the light of these elements, the Court is satisfied that the physical and mental strain the applicant suffered as a result of his health condition as such could, in principle, exceed the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and attain the threshold of Article 3. The domestic authorities therefore had to properly evaluate which was the adequate treatment for his disease in order to secure that he received adequate medical care but, as shown above, failed to prove that the applicant\u2019s treatment with painkillers alone was sufficient in the circumstances.80.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the respondent State failed to provide credible and convincing evidence showing that the applicant had received comprehensive and adequate medical care in detention, at a level comparable to that which the State authorities have committed themselves to provide to persons in freedom, where drug substitution treatment was available. In coming to this conclusion, the Court bears in mind the particular circumstances of the applicant\u2019s case as a long\u2011term drug addict without any realistic chance of overcoming addiction and having received substitution treatment for many years. In this context, the authorities failed to examine with particular scrutiny and with the help of independent and specialist medical expert advice, against the background of a change in the medical treatment, which therapy was to be considered as appropriate. The respondent State therefore failed to comply with its positive obligation under Article 3.81.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION82.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage83.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 11,911.20 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage. He argued that as a result of the refusal of drug substitution treatment he had been unable to work in prison, where he would have earned EUR 14.18 per day on twenty working days per month during his three years and six months\u2019 imprisonment. He further claimed EUR\u00a010,000 in non-pecuniary damages. He claimed, in particular, that as a result of the refusal of drug substitution treatment, he had suffered from serious neurological pain throughout his detention, craving for drugs and social isolation resulting from his poor health.84.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that the applicant had suffered pecuniary damage by the alleged breach of Article 3. They submitted that the applicant, who had worked for the last time in the 1980s, would not have worked in prison. As for the non-pecuniary damages claimed, the Government considered that the applicant\u2019s claim was excessive. They stressed that the applicant could only claim compensation for damage caused by the refusal of drug substitution treatment since June 2011.85.\u00a0\u00a0As for the applicant\u2019s claim in respect of pecuniary damage, the Court observes that it emerges from the documents before it that the applicant has been receiving an employment disability pension since 2001 (see paragraph 6 above). It therefore does not consider it proved that it was as a result of the refusal of drug substitution treatment that the applicant had been unable to work and draw wages in prison. It therefore rejects the applicant\u2019s claim in this respect for lack of a causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged.86.\u00a0\u00a0As for the applicant\u2019s claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage, the Court refers to its above finding that the domestic authorities breached Article\u00a03 in that they did not sufficiently examine whether the applicant, for whose diseases as such the respondent State is not responsible, received adequate medical care in detention. The Court does not wish to speculate on the outcome of a proper examination of the question which was the adequate treatment for the applicant and on the effects of the potentially adequate drug substitution treatment compared to the treatment with painkillers the applicant received. The Court therefore considers that in the particular circumstances of the case, the finding of a violation of Article 3 constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage suffered.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses87.\u00a0\u00a0Submitting documentary evidence, the applicant also claimed EUR\u00a01801.05 (including value-added tax (VAT)) for the lawyers\u2019 costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and EUR 833 (including VAT) for those incurred before the Court. He explained that the lawyers\u2019 costs had been advanced on loan by third persons and that he was obliged to reimburse the costs to them as soon as possible following his release from detention.88.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not comment on this point.89.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court awards the applicant the sum of EUR\u00a01,801.05 (including VAT) claimed for costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant. As for the costs and expenses for the proceedings before this Court, the Court, having regard to the sum claimed and the fact that the applicant was granted legal aid for these proceedings, does not make an award under this head.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest90.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28507":"21.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates the relevant principles of Article 3 of the Convention, as set out most recently in Tarakhel v. Switzerland ([GC], no.\u00a029217\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 93-99, ECHR 2014 (extracts), which include the need for the ill-treatment to attain a minimum level of severity to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment and its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim.22.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicant\u2019s situation as a single mother of two minor children is one of the relevant factors in making this assessment. The material date for making this assessment is the actual date of expulsion. However, if an applicant has not yet been removed when the Court examines the case, the relevant time for assessing the existence of the risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 will be that of the proceedings before the Court (see Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, \u00a7 86, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011V; Saadi v. Italy [GC], no.\u00a037201\/06, \u00a7 133, ECHR 2008; M.A. v. Switzerland, no. 52589\/13, \u00a7 54, 18\u00a0November 2014; and Khamrakulov v. Russia, no. 68894\/13, \u00a7 64, 16\u00a0April 2015).23.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant mother was registered in Italy in the beginning of June\u00a02014. On 20\u00a0June February 2014 she entered Denmark and applied for asylum. On 1 October 2014, Italy agreed to take back the applicant and her daughters under Article 13 (1) of the Dublin Regulation. It thus has to be determined whether the situation in which the applicant mother is likely to find herself in Italy can be regarded as incompatible with Article 3, taking into account her situation as an asylum\u2011seeking single mother with two children and, as such, belonging to a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special protection (see Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7 97, and also M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece ([GC], no.\u00a030696\/09, \u00a7 251, ECHR 2011).24.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the current situation in Italy for asylum\u2011seekers cannot be compared to the situation in Greece at the time of the M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece judgment (cited above) and that the structure and overall situation of the reception arrangements in Italy cannot in themselves act as a bar to all removals of asylum-seekers to that country (see Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 114-115).25.\u00a0\u00a0As to the applicant\u2019s personal situation, the Court has noted that,\u00a0similar to the applicants in Tarakhel (cited above), who were a family with six minor children, the applicant is a single mother with two young children. However, unlike the situation in Tarakhel, the Danish authorities \u2013 as regards transfers to Italy under the Dublin Regulation \u2013 decide in consultation with the Italian authorities how and when the transfer of an asylum-seeker to the competent Italian authorities will take place. In particular, where it concerns a family with children, prior notice of transfer is given to the Italian authorities, thus allowing the latter to identify where adequate accommodation is available.26.\u00a0\u00a0The Court accepts that for efficiency reasons the Italian authorities cannot be expected to keep open and unoccupied for an extended period of time places in specific reception and accommodation centres reserved for asylum-seekers awaiting transfer to Italy in accordance with the Dublin Regulation and that, for this reason, once a guarantee of placement in a reception centre has been received by the State requesting transfer, transfer should take place as quickly as practically possible.27.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the Refugee Appeals Board\u2019s decision of 3\u00a0February 2016 was based, among other things, on the circular letter of 8\u00a0June 2015 from Italy and Italy\u2019s subsequent assurances on the appropriate standard of its reception capacity at the meeting of the Contact Committee on 24\u00a0June 2015, and the decisions in J.A. and Others v. the Netherlands ((dec.), no.\u00a021459\/14, 3\u00a0November 2015) and A.T.H. v. the Netherlands ((dec.), no.\u00a054000\/11, 17\u00a0November 2015). It was thus a prerequisite for the applicants\u2019 removal to Italy that they would be accommodated in one of the said reception facilities earmarked for families with minor children, that those facilities satisfied the requirements of suitable accommodation which could be inferred from Tarakhel and, in addition, that the Italian Government would be notified of the applicants\u2019 particular needs before the removal.28.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further understands from the two circular letters sent by the Italian Dublin Unit (see paragraphs 11 and 16), that the applicant and her children will be placed together in one of the reception facilities in Italy which have been earmarked for families with minor children.29.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has noted the applicants\u2019 concern that the number of places earmarked will be insufficient but, in the absence of any concrete indication in the case file, does not find it demonstrated that the applicant and her children will be unable to obtain such a place when they arrive in Italy. Furthermore, the Court considers that the applicant has not demonstrated that her future prospects, if returned to Italy with her children, whether looked at from a material, physical or psychological perspective, disclose a sufficiently real and imminent risk of hardship that is severe enough to fall within the scope of Article 3 (see, also, N.A. v Denmark (dec.), no. 15636\/16, 28 June 2016).30.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and therefore inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7 4.For these reasons, the Court unanimouslyDeclares the application inadmissible.Done in English and notified in writing on 6 October 2016.Hasan Bak\u0131rc\u0131Paul Lemmens Deputy RegistrarPresident\u00a0","28527":"I.\u00a0\u00a0PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS: THE LOCUS STANDI OF AGORA28.\u00a0\u00a0The Court must first address the issue of Agora\u2019s entitlement to pursue the application lodged by the applicant.29.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that on 22 October 2015 Agora informed it of the applicant\u2019s death end expressed a wish to take his place in the proceedings before the Court. Agora stated that the present case concerned an allegation of a serious violation of a core human right, and that there was a strong link between the applicant and Agora, because its lawyers had represented him in the proceedings before the national authorities and the Court.30.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that Agora had no locus standi to pursue the application, since the rights enshrined by Article 3 of the Convention were eminently personal and non-transferable.31.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has found that the next-of-kin or heir may in principle pursue the application, provided that he or she has sufficient interest in the case (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v.\u00a0Romania [GC], no. 47848\/08, \u00a7 97, ECHR 2014). It is not only material interests which the successor of a deceased applicant may pursue by his or her wish to maintain the application. Human rights cases before the Court generally also have a moral dimension and persons near to an applicant may thus have a legitimate interest in ensuring that justice is done, even after the applicant\u2019s death (see Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no.\u00a033071\/96, ECHR 2000-XII). Whether the rights at issue are transferable to an heir willing to pursue an application on behalf of a deceased person is not therefore a decisive factor (see Fartushin v. Russia, no.\u00a038887\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a031\u201134, 8\u00a0October 2015 and Ergezen v. Turkey, no. 73359\/10, \u00a7 29, 8\u00a0April 2014). It has been also established that, in exceptional circumstances and cases concerning allegations of a serious nature, it should be open to associations to represent victims in the absence of a power of attorney, and notwithstanding that a victim may have died before the application in question was lodged under the Convention. The Court considered that to find otherwise would amount to preventing such serious allegations of a violation of the Convention from being examined at an international level, with the risk that a respondent State might escape accountability under the Convention (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu, cited above, \u00a7 112, and Association for the Defence of Human Rights in Romania \u2013 Helsinki Committee on behalf of Ionel Garcea v.\u00a0Romania, no. 2959\/11, \u00a7 42, 24\u00a0March 2015).32.\u00a0\u00a0Considering the information in its possession, the Court notes that the applicant died in custody. He left no known relatives. Agora\u2019s lawyers represented him in his proceedings against the domestic authorities, and continued to do so even after his death, in the absence of any objections from the respective authorities. Accordingly, the Court considers that there was a strong link between the applicant and Agora.33.\u00a0\u00a0Against the above background, the Court is satisfied that in the exceptional circumstances of this case and bearing in mind the serious nature of the allegations, it should be open to Agora to pursue the application (see, mutatis mutandis, Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu [GC], cited above, \u00a7 112).34.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Government\u2019s objection and finds that Agora has standing to pursue the application.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 34 OF THE CONVENTION35.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that the Government\u2019s failure to have his\u00a0medical\u00a0examination performed had been in breach of the interim measure indicated by the Court under Rule 39, and had thus violated his right of individual application. He relied on Article 34 of the Convention, which reads:\u201cThe Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.\u201d36.\u00a0\u00a0Rule 39 provides:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber or, where appropriate, its President may, at the request of a party or of any other person concerned, or of its own motion, indicate to the parties any interim measure which it considers should be adopted in the interests of the parties or of the proper conduct of the proceedings before it.2.\u00a0\u00a0Where it is considered appropriate, immediate notice of the measure adopted in a particular case may be given to the Committee of Ministers.3.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber may request information from the parties on any matter connected with the implementation of any interim measure it has indicated.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties37.\u00a0\u00a0The Government opened their argument with an assertion that it could not be inferred from Article 34 of the Convention or \u201cfrom any other source\u201d that the interim measure indicated under Rule 39 was legally binding and that, accordingly, their failure to submit answers to the questions raised by the Court had not entailed a violation of Article 34, or any other provision of the Convention.38.\u00a0\u00a0The Government continued by arguing that the applicant\u2019s right to communicate with the Court had in no way been interfered with. The applicant had retained counsel, who had submitted his application and continued to communicate freely with the Court. Lastly, the Government submitted that they had furnished medical\u00a0reports prepared by prison doctors in response to the Court\u2019s questions, and that their submissions had answered the questions posed.39.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that the situation was similar to the case of Amirov, cited above, in which the Court had found a violation of Article\u00a034 of the Convention following the Government\u2019s failure to comply with an interim measure imposed under Rule 39. As in the\u00a0Amirov\u00a0case (ibid.), the Russian authorities had again failed to comply with an order of the Court to provide an expert opinion by independent\u00a0medical\u00a0specialists assessing the applicant\u2019s state of health.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles40.\u00a0\u00a0The applicable general principles are\u00a0set out in\u00a0the cases of Paladi v.\u00a0Moldova [GC] (no. 39806\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 84-92, 10 March 2009), and Amirov (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 65-68).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of the general principles to the present case41.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that on 27 March 2015 it indicated to the Government that\u00a0it was desirable in the interests of the proper conduct of the proceedings that the applicant should immediately be examined by medical experts independent of the prison system, with a view to determining: (1)\u00a0whether the treatment he was receiving in the prison hospital was adequate with regard to his condition; (2) whether his state of health was compatible with detention in prison hospital conditions; and (3)\u00a0whether his condition required placement in a specialist, possibly civilian, hospital. Furthermore, the Government were to ensure the applicant\u2019s transfer to a specialist hospital in the event of an expert conclusion to that effect.42.\u00a0\u00a0The Government responded by submitting various medical certificates and reports, including a report by a medical panel on the applicant\u2019s eligibility for early release. They also asserted that the scope and quality of the treatment being provided to the applicant in the prison hospital corresponded fully to his state of health.43.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is not convinced by the Government\u2019s arguments. It reiterates that the aim of the interim measure in the present case was to obtain an independent medical expert assessment of the state of the applicant\u2019s health, the quality of the treatment he was receiving and the adequacy of the conditions of his detention in view of his medical needs. That expert evidence was necessary to decide whether, as the applicant argued, his life and limb were at real risk as a result of the alleged lack of requisite medical care in detention. In addition, the Court was concerned about the contradictory nature of the evidence in its possession. The interim measure in the present case was therefore also meant to ensure that the applicant could effectively pursue his case before the Court (see\u00a0Amirov, cited above, \u00a7 70, and Shtukaturov v. Russia, no.\u00a044009\/05, \u00a7 141, ECHR\u00a02008).44.\u00a0\u00a0Whilst the formulation of an interim measure is one of the elements to be taken into account in the Court\u2019s analysis of whether a State has complied with its obligations under Article 34 of the Convention, the Court must have regard not only to the letter, but also to the spirit of the interim measure indicated (see\u00a0Paladi, cited above, \u00a7 91), and indeed to its very purpose. As indicated by the Court, the main purpose of the interim measure was to prevent the applicant\u2019s exposure to inhuman and degrading suffering in view of his poor health, and his detention in a prison hospital which was, according to him, unable to ensure adequate medical assistance, and the Government did not claim to be unaware of this purpose . There could have been no doubt about either the purpose or rationale of that interim measure.45.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not need to assess the independence, professional expertise or qualifications of the doctors who prepared the documents submitted by the Government. It notes that the Government did not make arrangements for the requested medical examination, which was to provide answers to the Court\u2019s questions, to be carried out. Neither the medical reports nor certificates issued by the authorities contained any analysis of the adequacy of the applicant\u2019s medical treatment or the compatibility of the conditions of his detention with his state of health. Nothing suggests that the doctors compared the quality of the medical assistance afforded to the applicant with the requirements of applicable medical standards, guidelines or regulations.46.\u00a0\u00a0The scope of the medical examination on 30 October 2014 was limited to checking the applicant\u2019s medical condition against an exhaustive list of illnesses provided for by Government decree which could have warranted his release. At no point during the examination did the doctors from the prison hospital assess the applicant\u2019s state of health independently without reference to that list, or evaluate whether his illness, given its manifestation, nature and duration at that point in time, required his transfer to a specialist hospital. The Court therefore concludes that the documents furnished by the authorities have little relevance to the implementation of the interim measure it indicated to the Russian Government.47.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further argued that they themselves had responded to the three questions put by the Court on 27 March 2015. In this connection, the Court notes that, in view of the vital role played by interim measures in the Convention system, they must be strictly complied with by the State concerned. The Court therefore cannot conceive of allowing authorities to circumvent an interim measure, such as the one indicated in the present case, by replacing expert medical opinion with their own assessment of an applicant\u2019s situation. However, that is exactly what the Government have done in the present case. In so doing, the State has frustrated the purpose of the interim measure, which was to enable the Court, on the basis of relevant, independent medical opinion, to effectively respond to and, if need be, prevent the possible continued exposure of the applicant to physical and mental suffering in violation of the guarantees of Article 3 of the Convention (see\u00a0Khloyev v. Russia, no.\u00a046404\/13, \u00a7 67, 5\u00a0February\u00a02015, and\u00a0Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine,\u00a0no.\u00a028005\/08, \u00a7\u00a0222, 14\u00a0March 2013).48.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not demonstrate any objective impediment to compliance with the interim measure (see Paladi, cited above, \u00a7\u00a092). Consequently, the Court concludes that the State has failed to comply with the interim measure indicated in the present case under Rule 39, in breach of its obligation under Article 34 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION49.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been unable to obtain effective medical care while in detention, which had put him in a life-threatening situation and subjected him to severe physical and mental suffering, in violation of the guarantees of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties50.\u00a0\u00a0The Government put forward two arguments. Firstly, they argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. They stated that he should have raised a complaint with the domestic authorities, such as the authorities which managed the detention facilities in question, a prosecutor\u2019s office or a court. Secondly, relying on the decisions of the domestic authorities, in particular the decision not to open a criminal case, the Government argued that the applicant had been provided with the requisite medical treatment.51.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaints. He argued that the medical assistance afforded to him was deficient, as confirmed by the expert report of 23 May 2015, particularly in view of the belated diagnosis of prostate cancer and the absence of any active medical treatment. He further stated that the authorities had been aware of his condition, but had not addressed the issue. The legal avenues proposed by the Government were ineffective.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility52.\u00a0\u00a0In assessing the Government\u2019s argument that the applicant failed to exhaust the available avenues of domestic protection regarding the allegedly inadequate medical treatment, the Court reiterates that it has consistently held that the remedies proposed by the Government do not satisfy the relevant criteria (see Ivko, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 85-88; Khalvash v. Russia, no.\u00a032917\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 49-52, 15 December 2015; Patranin v. Russia, no.\u00a012983\/14, \u00a7\u00a7 82-88, 23 July 2015; Koryak v. Russia, no.\u00a024677\/10, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a082-86, 13 November 2012; and Reshetnyak v. Russia, no.\u00a056027\/10, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a065-73, 8 January 2013). The Court therefore rejects the non-exhaustion objection.53.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 3 is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles54.\u00a0\u00a0The applicable general principles were recently summarised in\u00a0the case of Ivko (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 91-95).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the general principles to the present case55.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes that while in detention the applicant suffered from a life-threatening disease, cancer. His main contentions were that he had not been diagnosed with cancer in time, that he had not received active medical treatment, and had been detained in a medical institution which had no licence to provide the required medical services. The Government disagreed. They insisted that he had received comprehensive medical assistance in detention.56.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has examined a large number of cases against Russia concerning complaints of inadequate medical services afforded to inmates (see, among the most recent examples, Ivko, cited above; Koryak, cited above, 13\u00a0November 2012; Dirdizov v. Russia, no. 41461\/10, 27\u00a0November 2012; Reshetnyak, cited above; Mkhitaryan v. Russia, no. 46108\/11, 5\u00a0February 2013; Gurenko v. Russia, no. 41828\/10, 5\u00a0February 2013; Bubnov v. Russia, no. 76317\/11, 5\u00a0February\u00a02013; Budanov v. Russia, no.\u00a066583\/11, 9 January 2014; and Gorelov v. Russia, no. 49072\/11, 9\u00a0January 2014). Paying particular attention to the vulnerability of the applicants in question in view of their detention, the Court has called on the Government to provide credible and convincing evidence showing that the applicants concerned received comprehensive and adequate medical care in detention. In the absence of an effective remedy in Russia whereby such complaints can be aired, the Court has had to examine the evidence before it to determine whether the guarantees of Articles 2 or 3 of the Convention have been observed.57.\u00a0\u00a0Coming back to the expert report and other evidence submitted by the applicant in the present case, the Court is satisfied that there is prima facie evidence in favour of his submissions, and that the burden of proof should shift to the respondent Government.58.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to its findings under Article 34 of the Convention, the Court is prepared to draw inferences from the Government\u2019s conduct, and having closely scrutinised the evidence submitted by them in support of their position, it finds that they have failed to demonstrate conclusively that the applicant received effective medical treatment for his illnesses while in detention. The evidence in question is unconvincing and insufficient to rebut the applicant\u2019s account of the treatment to which he was subjected in detention. In such circumstances, the Court considers that the applicant\u2019s allegations have been established to the requisite standard of proof.59.\u00a0\u00a0The Court thus accepts that the applicant\u2019s diagnosis was not established in a timely fashion, and that, being detained in a prison hospital and unable to access the requisite medical services, he was left without essential medical care (including active medical treatment) for his illnesses.60.\u00a0\u00a0The Court expresses particular concern about the fact that even after the applicant\u2019s doctor acknowledged in open court the incompatibility of the applicant\u2019s health status with the conditions of his detention in the prison hospital, his transfer to an appropriate facility was not arranged.61.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the above, the Court considers that the lack of comprehensive and adequate medical treatment had the effect of exposing the applicant to prolonged mental and physical suffering, and constituted an affront to his human dignity. The authorities\u2019 failure to provide the applicant with the medical care he needed thus amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment for the purposes of Article 3 of the Convention.62.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there was a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION63.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage64.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not make a claim for damages.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses65.\u00a0\u00a0Agora claimed 850 euros (EUR) to ensure remuneration for the services of its lawyer, who worked for the applicant pro bono.66.\u00a0\u00a0The Government left this issue to the Court to decide.67.\u00a0\u00a0Taking into account the absence of any supporting documents or costs actually incurred, the Court cannot grant the claim. It therefore rejects the claim in full.","28546":"The Government submitted that, in the absence of a valid authority form or the applicant\u2019s original signature, the application was inadmissible ratione personae.The Court asked the applicant to comment on the Government\u2019s submissions but did not receive any reply.The Court reiterates that, where the application is not lodged by the victims themselves, Rule 45\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03 of the Rules of Court requires a written\u00a0authority\u00a0to act, duly\u00a0signed, to be produced. It is essential for representatives to demonstrate that they have received specific and explicit instructions from the alleged victim on whose behalf they purport to act before the Court (see Lambert and Others v. France [GC], no.\u00a046043\/14, \u00a7\u00a091, ECHR 2015 (extracts), with further references).In the instant case, the application form was not signed by Mr\u00a0Ivanov who was listed as the applicant. No authority form authorising Ms\u00a0Zhiglaeva to act on his behalf has been provided. Moreover, there have been no apparent reasons to consider that Mr\u00a0Ivanov was a vulnerable person who was not able to lodge complaints to the Court himself (compare Isakov v. Russia (dec.), no.\u00a052286\/14, \u00a7\u00a039 et seq., 5\u00a0July\u00a02016, and Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v. Romania\u00a0([GC], no.\u00a047848\/08, ECHR 2014).Regard being had to the above, the Court concludes that Ms\u00a0Zhiglaeva did not have standing to introduce the application on behalf of Mr\u00a0Ivanov. It follows that the application is incompatible\u00a0ratione personae\u00a0with the provisions of the Convention pursuant to Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03 (a) and must be rejected pursuant to Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04 of the Convention.For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,Declares the application inadmissible.\u00a0Done in English and notified in writing on 13 October 2016.Fato\u015f Arac\u0131Branko Lubarda\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Deputy RegistrarPresident","28548":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE ALLEGED ILL-TREATMENT OF THE APPLICANT AFTER HIS ARREST ON 18 SEPTEMBER 200181.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been ill-treated by police officers following his arrest on 18\u00a0September 2001 and that there had been no effective investigation into the matter. He relied on Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention. The Court considers it appropriate, however, to examine the above complaints only under Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility82.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant\u2019s allegation of ill\u2011treatment was unfounded and not supported by any evidence.83.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant insisted that his complaint was admissible.84.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the complaint of ill-treatment raises serious issues requiring an examination of the merits. Therefore, contrary to the Government\u2019s submissions, the complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention (see Serikov v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 42164\/09, \u00a7 53, 23 July 2015). It is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions85.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaint based on his account of the events (see paragraph 10 above). He submitted that immediately after his arrest on 18 September 2001 he had been severely beaten by the police. He contended that not all his injuries had been documented by a forensic medical expert on that date and that even those that had been documented had not corresponded to the level of force applied to him during his arrest. According to the applicant, the swelling and bruises on his head could not have been inflicted by two or three hits with the handle of a gun, but had resulted from more serious ill-treatment, which he had sustained after his arrest.86.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant drew the Court\u2019s attention to his prolonged detention in the ITT (for seventeen days instead of the legally established limit of three days \u2013 see paragraphs 34 and 77 above). According to him, that time had been required for his injuries to heal. At the same time, the applicant alleged that he had been continually tortured during that period (see\u00a0paragraph\u00a015 above).87.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also submitted that the domestic investigation into his allegation of ill-treatment had been ineffective, superficial and formalistic.88.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill\u2011treatment as not based on any evidence.89.\u00a0\u00a0They submitted that he had only raised that complaint for the first time during his trial in 2003, that is, about two years after his alleged ill\u2011treatment. According to the Government, the domestic authorities investigated the matter in an expedient and efficient manner. Having found no evidence in support of the applicant\u2019s complaint, they had rightly dismissed it as unfounded.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0Alleged ill-treatment90.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has consistently pointed out in its case-law that, in respect of a person who is deprived of his liberty, or, more generally, is confronted with law-enforcement officers, any recourse to physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by his or her own conduct diminishes human dignity and is an infringement of the right set forth in Article 3 (see Ribitsch v.\u00a0Austria, 4 December 1995, \u00a7 38, Series A no. 336; and Bouyid v.\u00a0Belgium [GC], no. 23380\/09, \u00a7 101, 28 September 2015). The use of force in the context of an arrest, even if it entails injury, may fall outside Article 3, particularly in circumstances resulting from the applicant\u2019s own conduct (see Berli\u0144ski v. Poland, nos. 27715\/95 and 30209\/96, \u00a7 64, 20 June 2002).91.\u00a0\u00a0In assessing evidence, the Court has generally applied the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18\u00a0January 1978, \u00a7 161, Series A no. 25). However, such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention. Indeed, the burden of proof may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation (see\u00a0Ribitsch, cited above, \u00a7 34, and Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986\/93, \u00a7\u00a0100, ECHR 2000-VII).92.\u00a0\u00a0It is undisputed in the present case that the applicant vigorously resisted arrest and that the police applied force to restrain him. However, his complaint is not about that. The applicant has never contested the nature or intensity of that force and has consistently accepted the authorities\u2019 account that the police officers hit him several times on the head with the handle of a gun with a view to securing his arrest. Nor has the applicant alleged that the force used against him was unjustified or disproportionate. The scope of his complaint under Article 3 is confined to his alleged ill-treatment by the police after his arrest and after he had been handcuffed.93.\u00a0\u00a0More specifically, the applicant\u2019s allegation concerns two episodes. Firstly, he complained of having been extensively kicked, punched and hit with rubber truncheons immediately after his arrest and prior to his medical examination on the same day, 18 September 2001. Secondly, he contended that he had been subjected to continual torture during the seventeen days of his detention in the ITT as a part of the police system (from 18\u00a0September to 5 October 2001).94.\u00a0\u00a0The Court attaches particular weight to the forensic medical evidence submitted by the parties. It has often stated in this connection that the medical examination of persons in police custody, together with the right of access to a lawyer and the right to inform a third party of the detention, constitutes one of the most essential safeguards against ill\u2011treatment (see, among other authorities, T\u00fcrkan v. Turkey, no.\u00a033086\/04, \u00a7\u00a042, 18\u00a0September 2008).95.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that in the present case the applicant underwent a forensic medical examination on the day of his arrest. The expert documented some injuries on his head and concluded that they could have resulted from being hit with the handle of a gun (see paragraph 11 above). Having regard to the circumstances of the applicant\u2019s arrest, his general constitution and behaviour, as well as the nature, gravity and location of the injuries documented, the Court considers the explanation of the origin of those injuries to be plausible overall (compare with Danilov v.\u00a0Ukraine, no.\u00a02585\/06, \u00a7 65, 13 March 2014). It further notes that the applicant explicitly stated to the expert that he had not been subjected to any ill\u2011treatment following his arrest.96.\u00a0\u00a0The Court takes note of the applicant\u2019s allegations that the police threatened him, that they talked to the expert in private and that the expert limited his examination of the applicant to the visible parts of his body and failed to document some injuries. However, those submissions are neither corroborated by any evidence nor supported by factual inferences, and the Court is not in a position to verify them. As regards the failure of the domestic authorities to investigate those allegations, it will be examined in the context of the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the effectiveness of the investigation into his alleged ill-treatment (see paragraphs\u00a0103-113 below).97.\u00a0\u00a0There is no indication in the case file that by the time of his medical examination on 18 September 2001 the applicant had sustained any injuries in addition to those inflicted on him during his arrest, which he did not complain about.98.\u00a0\u00a0Nor does the Court discern any direct or indirect evidence in support of the applicant\u2019s generally phrased allegation that he was subjected to continual torture from 18 September to 5 October 2001.99.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not lose sight of the fact that, as pointed out by the applicant, he was detained in the ITT for seventeen days, whereas the applicable legislation required his transfer to the SIZO within three days of his arrest (see paragraphs 34, 77 and 86 above). However, that fact alone is not sufficient to support a finding that he was ill-treated during that period (see, mutatis mutandis, Kapustyak v. Ukraine, no. 26230\/11, \u00a7 69, 3 March 2016). Furthermore, the applicant\u2019s submissions in this connection are not consistent. On the one hand, he explained his continued detention in the ITT by the authorities\u2019 intention to conceal his ill-treatment by allowing time for his injuries to heal. On the other hand, he contended that he had been tortured throughout that period.100.\u00a0\u00a0It is not without relevance that the medical examination of the applicant upon his arrival at the Kherson SIZO on 5\u00a0October 2001 did not detect any injuries. His related submissions to the Court and to the domestic authorities appear to lack consistency too. For example, he stated to the Court that he had undergone that examination, but alleged that it had been incomplete (see paragraph 14 above). In his submissions at the domestic level, however, he alleged that no such examination had in fact taken place (see paragraphs 16 and 17 above). Such contradictions provide grounds for the Court to draw factual inferences unfavourable for the applicant (see and compare with Khayrov v. Ukraine, no. 19157\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 53, 56 and 57, 15\u00a0November 2012).101.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the material in the case file does not provide an evidentiary basis sufficient to enable the Court to find \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d that the applicant was subjected to the ill-treatment alleged following his arrest on 18 September 2001.102.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court cannot but conclude that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive limb.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Effectiveness of the domestic investigation103.\u00a0\u00a0The Court emphasises that where an individual raises an arguable claim that he has been seriously ill-treated by the police or other such agents of the State unlawfully and in breach of Article 3, that provision requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible. If this were not the case, the general legal prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment would be ineffective in practice and it would be possible in some cases for agents of the State to abuse the rights of those within their control with virtual impunity (see Assenov and Others v.\u00a0Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, \u00a7\u00a0102, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011VIII).104.\u00a0\u00a0Although in the present case the Court has not found it proved, on account of a lack of evidence, that the applicant was ill-treated by the police after his arrest, that does not in principle preclude the complaint in relation to Article 3 from being \u201carguable\u201d for the purposes of the positive obligation to investigate (see B\u00f6ke and Kandemir v. Turkey, nos. 71912\/01, 26968\/02 and 36397\/03, \u00a7 54, 10 March 2009, and Aleksandr Smirnov v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 38683\/06, \u00a7 57, 15 July 2010).105.\u00a0\u00a0It is not known when the applicant first complained to the domestic authorities about his alleged ill-treatment. According to him, he did so immediately after his transfer to the SIZO on 5 October 2001. To substantiate that statement, he submitted to the Court a handwritten copy of his respective complaints to the prosecution authorities and to the SIZO\u2019s administration (see paragraphs 16 and 17 above). The Court notes some inconsistencies in the applicant\u2019s submissions. For example, as his cellmates confirmed in writing on the copy of his complaint to the Kherson prosecutor\u2019s office of 5 October 2001, the guard on duty had accepted the complaint for dispatching. However, two days later the applicant complained to the SIZO\u2019s administration that the guards had torn up his complaints to the prosecution authorities on 5 and 6 October 2001. As regards the applicant\u2019s supposed complaint to the prosecutor of 9\u00a0October 2001, the copy provided to the Court does not contain any evidence that such a complaint was indeed written, dispatched and received by its addressee.106.\u00a0\u00a0In sum, the Court has no evidence before it showing that the applicant complained to the domestic authorities about his ill-treatment earlier than during his trial at the beginning of 2003 (see\u00a0paragraph\u00a020\u00a0above). Nor has the Court any basis for concluding that the applicant had in fact been prevented from raising such complaints.107.\u00a0\u00a0However, even assuming that the applicant complained of his ill\u2011treatment in police custody only in 2003, as pointed out by the Government and confirmed by the documentary evidence, the Court considers that in the circumstances of the case, regard being had to the use of force against the applicant during his arrest and the fact that he underwent a medical examination after spending several hours in police custody, it was incumbent on the authorities to conduct an investigation into his allegations of ill-treatment (see Minikayev v. Russia, no. 630\/08, \u00a7 64, 5\u00a0January 2016).108.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has always emphasised in its case-law that an investigation into serious allegations of ill-treatment must be both prompt and thorough. The authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill\u2011founded conclusions to close their investigation or as the basis of their decisions. They must take all reasonable steps available to them to secure evidence concerning the incident including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard (see, for example, Kopylov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a03933\/04, \u00a7\u00a0133, 29 July 2010).109.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in the present case the authorities contented themselves with delivering two identically reasoned decisions not to institute criminal proceedings following the applicant\u2019s complaints of ill\u2011treatment, which were based largely on the accounts of the officers implicated in the events taken at face value (for the facts see paragraphs\u00a021 and 23 above, and for the case-law see Kaverzin, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0175). The case file material discloses no meaningful effort to verify or disprove the applicant\u2019s account of events, including by thoroughly questioning him, organising confrontations or posing specific questions to the independent medical experts (see Danilov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a070).110.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that it found the explanation of the applicant\u2019s injuries as documented on 18 September 2001 to be plausible overall given the circumstances of his arrest and the absence of any complaints from the applicant, both at the national level and before the Court, as regards the force applied to him during that arrest (see paragraph 95 above). That circumstance alone does not, however, refute the applicant\u2019s allegations about the incompleteness of the examination and the involvement of the police in its conduct. Although the applicant complained that the examination in question had been limited to an inspection of the visible parts of his body, the authorities did not consider it necessary to question the expert as regards the actual format of that examination. Nor did they make any effort to verify the applicant\u2019s submission about the police communicating with the expert in private.111.\u00a0\u00a0The case file before the Court contains a copy of another forensic medical report, dated 18 February 2002 (see paragraph 19 above). It appears that it merely reiterated the findings of the examination of the applicant of 18\u00a0September 2001. In any event, in the absence of any information as to whether that second report was ever relied on by the domestic authorities, the Court does not consider it to be of relevance for its assessment of the effectiveness of the domestic investigation.112.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in a number of other cases against Ukraine it has already condemned patterns of investigation similar to the one in the present case (see, inter alia, Drozd v. Ukraine, no. 12174\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 68-71, 30\u00a0July 2009; Savitskyy v. Ukraine, no. 38773\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 121-22, 26 July 2012; and Grinenko v. Ukraine, no. 33627\/06, \u00a7 62, 15 November 2012). In the case of Kaverzin (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 173-80) the Court found that the reluctance of the authorities to ensure that a prompt and thorough investigation of the ill-treatment complaints by the criminal suspects was carried out constituted a systemic problem within the meaning of Article\u00a046 of the Convention. In view of the circumstances of the present case and its earlier case-law, the Court concludes that in the present case, too, no serious effort was made to investigate the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment.113.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural limb in this regard.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE ALLEGED ILL-TREATMENT OF THE APPLICANT ON 16 AUGUST 2005114.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also complained under Article 3 of the Convention that a SIZO guard had beaten him on 16 August 2005 and that the domestic authorities had failed to duly investigate the incident. He also relied on Article 13 in respect of the last-mentioned issue.115.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will consider the above complaint only under Article\u00a03 (see also paragraph 81 above).116.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted the remedies available to him under domestic law, as required by Article 35 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention. They contended that he could have raised his complaints before the public prosecutor in charge of supervising the general lawfulness of conduct in penal institutions. Any decision taken by the prosecutor could have been further challenged before the domestic courts.117.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant disagreed. He maintained that he had done everything that could have reasonably been expected of him to raise his complaint before the domestic authorities. According to the applicant, the authorities were aware of his injuries, which had been documented in the medical examinations of 4 and 26 October 2005 (see paragraphs\u00a056 and 58 above).118.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not consider it necessary to examine the Government\u2019s objection, given that this part of the application is in any event manifestly ill\u2011founded for the reasons set out below.119.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the factual issues which arise in the present complaint fall within the knowledge of the domestic authorities. Accordingly, it could be accepted that the applicant experienced certain difficulties in procuring evidence to substantiate his allegations. Nevertheless, in such cases applicants may well be expected to submit at least a detailed account of the facts complained of and provide \u2013 to the greatest possible extent \u2013 some evidence in support of their complaints (see\u00a0Khayrov, cited above, \u00a7 51). The Court also notes that the procedural obligation under Article 3 of the Convention to investigate an allegation of ill-treatment only arises where an individual raises an arguable claim that he has been subjected to ill-treatment prohibited by that provision (see, among many authorities, Assenov and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 102 et seq.).120.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant relied mainly on the reports of 4\u00a0and 26 October 2005 as the medical evidence for the injuries he had allegedly sustained on 16\u00a0August 2005. The Court notes that both reports documented the same pigmented skin marks on the applicant\u2019s left hip and stomach, without any changes in their description or size. Moreover, it appears that exactly the same marks were reported during the applicant\u2019s examination on 13\u00a0February 2006, that is about six months after the alleged ill-treatment (see paragraph 60 above). The applicant did not provide any comment on that last-mentioned report. Accordingly, the Court does not consider it to be proved that the applicant sustained any injuries in the Kyiv SIZO as he alleged.121.\u00a0\u00a0Nor has the Court any basis for drawing factual inferences in support of that allegation. It notes that the applicant, in his submissions to both the domestic authorities and the Court, failed to provide any factual details as regards the incident, which purportedly took place on 16\u00a0August 2015. He did not mention the exact circumstances or sequence of events. Furthermore, the applicant failed to give any information able to facilitate the identification of the guard who had allegedly beaten him. Lastly, he provided no explanation as to what might have provoked the alleged violence against him.122.\u00a0\u00a0In those circumstances the Court, having regard to the available material, considers that the present complaint is too vague and inconsistent and is unsupported by any evidence. It has not been properly substantiated and developed by the applicant and should be rejected as manifestly ill\u2011founded. The Court further considers that the applicant failed to make an arguable complaint of ill-treatment before the domestic authorities which would trigger the State\u2019s procedural obligation under Article\u00a03 of the Convention to carry out an effective investigation of ill-treatment.123.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the complaint should be rejected as inadmissible, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION IN RESPECT OF THE CONDITIONS OF THE APPLICANT\u2019S DETENTION124.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further complained of a violation of Article\u00a03 of the Convention in respect of the conditions of his detention in various detention centres from 5\u00a0October 2005 to 24 December 2012, including the physical conditions, medical care and transportation.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0Physical conditions of detention125.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that this aspect of the case was inadmissible on the ground of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. They contended that the applicant could have raised his complaints before the public prosecutor in charge of supervising the general lawfulness of conduct in penal institutions. Any decision taken by the prosecutor could have been further challenged before the domestic courts.126.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contested the effectiveness of the above remedies, considering that the problems complained of were of a structural nature.127.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it has already dismissed similar objections by the Government on a number of occasions, finding the remedy referred to by the Government ineffective on the ground that it had not been shown that recourse to such proceedings could have brought an improvement in the applicant\u2019s conditions of detention (see, for example, Savinov v. Ukraine, no.\u00a05212\/13, \u00a7 36, 22 October 2015, with further references). The Court sees no reason to depart from that finding in the present case and therefore considers that this part of the application cannot be rejected for failure to exhaust domestic remedies.128.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention nor inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Medical care129.\u00a0\u00a0The Government raised an objection based on non-exhaustion of domestic remedies similar to that concerning the applicant\u2019s complaint about the physical conditions of his detention (see paragraph 125 above).130.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contested the Government\u2019s arguments.131.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not consider it necessary to examine the Government\u2019s objection given that this complaint is in any event manifestly ill\u2011founded for the following reasons.132.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that an unsubstantiated allegation that medical care has been non-existent, delayed or otherwise unsatisfactory is normally insufficient to disclose an issue under Article 3 of the Convention. A credible complaint should normally include, among other things, sufficient reference to the medical condition in question, medical treatment that was sought, provided, or refused, and some evidence, such as, expert reports, which are capable of disclosing serious failings in the applicant\u2019s medical care (see Valeriy Samoylov v. Russia, no. 57541\/09, \u00a7\u00a080, 24 January 2012; and Yevgeniy Bogdanov v. Russia, no. 22405\/04, \u00a7 93, 26 February 2015).133.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court observes that the applicant\u2019s complaint regarding his medical care in detention was limited to a vague and general statement which was not supported by any evidence. He failed to specify the health problems he had suffered from, what treatment he had actually required and why the medical care provided to him had been inadequate (compare with Ustyugov v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 251\/04, 1\u00a0September 2015).134.\u00a0\u00a0At the same time, the Government submitted various documents relating to the applicant\u2019s medical treatment in detention (see paragraph\u00a072 above). Those materials disclose no serious shortcomings on the part of the national authorities in regard to the applicant\u2019s treatment (see and compare with Yevgeniy Bogdanov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 95 and 96).135.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the applicant complained of having contracted tuberculosis in a SIZO, the Court reiterates its consistent approach that even if an applicant did contract tuberculosis while in detention, that in itself would not imply a violation of Article 3, provided that he received treatment for it (see Alver\u00a0v. Estonia, no. 64812\/01, \u00a7 54, 8 November 2005, and Pitalev v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a034393\/03, \u00a7 53, 30 July 2009, with further references). The applicant has not shown to the Court that his treatment for tuberculosis was inadequate.136.\u00a0\u00a0Overall, the Court considers that the applicant\u2019s allegations in respect of the medical care he received in detention are unsubstantiated and should be rejected as manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) and 4 of the Convention.3.\u00a0\u00a0Conditions of transportation137.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.4.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion138.\u00a0\u00a0The Court declares the applicant\u2019s complaints under Article\u00a03 of the Convention about the physical conditions of his detention and transportation admissible and rejects his complaint about the medical care in detention as inadmissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0Physical conditions of detention139.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant referred to his factual submissions (see paragraph\u00a065 above) and maintained that the physical conditions of his detention in the Odessa, Kherson and Kyiv SIZOs had been incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention.140.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the applicant\u2019s arguments. At the same time, they noted that they were not able to provide more details about the conditions of his detention given that the part of the Kherson SIZO in question had been demolished (see paragraph 66 above).141.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that\u00a0Article 3 of the Convention requires States to ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity and that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention (see\u00a0Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7 94, ECHR 2000-XI).142.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that information about the physical conditions of detention falls within the knowledge of the domestic authorities. Accordingly, applicants might experience certain difficulties in procuring evidence to substantiate a complaint in that connection. Still, in such cases applicants may well be expected to submit at least a detailed account of the facts complained of and provide \u2013 to the greatest possible extent \u2013 some evidence in support of their complaints. The Court has considered as evidence in such situations, for example, written statements by fellow inmates or photographs provided by applicants in support of their allegations (see Visloguzov v. Ukraine, no.\u00a032362\/02, \u00a7 45, 20 May 2010, with further references, and Gavula v. Ukraine, no.\u00a052652\/07, \u00a7 73, 16\u00a0May 2013). After the Court has given notice of the applicant\u2019s complaint to the Government, the burden is on the latter to collect and produce the relevant documents (see Korneykova and Korneykov v. Ukraine, no. 56660\/12, \u00a7\u00a0133, 24 March 2016). A failure on their part to submit convincing evidence on material conditions of detention may give rise to the drawing of inferences as to the well-foundedness of the applicant\u2019s allegations (see\u00a0Gubin v. Russia, no.\u00a08217\/04, \u00a7 56, 17\u00a0June 2010, and Khudoyorov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 6847\/02, \u00a7\u00a0113, ECHR 2005\u2011X (extracts)).143.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the applicant did not specify when he had been detained in the three SIZOs in question. Nor did he submit any details concerning the size of the particular cells in which he had stayed, for how long or the number of inmates held in each one. At the same time, the Court takes note of the evidence submitted by the applicant (the statements of his cellmates and photographs), which shows that at least some of the cells in which he was detained lacked space, were poorly lit and had inadequate sanitary arrangements (see paragraph\u00a065 above). Accordingly, it was for the Government to refute his allegations. However, they contented themselves with a general statement that the relevant part of the Kherson SIZO had been demolished and that they could not therefore provide more details. The Government did not comment at all on the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in the Kyiv and Odessa SIZOs. This provides grounds for the Court to make factual inferences favourable for the applicant.144.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it has already found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in another application brought by an individual detained in the same detention facilities (the Odessa and Kyiv SIZOs) in its judgment in the case of Andrey Yakovenko (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a092-97). Furthermore, the Court attaches weight to the CPT\u2019s findings following its visits to Ukraine in 2009 and 2011, which found persistent overcrowding in Ukrainian pre\u2011trial detention facilities, with the three in which the applicant was detained in the present case (Kyiv, Kherson and Odessa) being cited as the most problematic (see paragraphs\u00a078 and 79 above).145.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also observes that the issues raised by the applicant concern serious structural problems in Ukrainian detention facilities, such as overcrowding and poor sanitary conditions, which the Court has criticised on many occasions (see, for example, Melnik v. Ukraine, no. 72286\/01, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0102 and 103, 28\u00a0March 2006; and, for more recent references, Rodzevillo v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 38771\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 52-55, 14\u00a0January 2016; and Zakshevskiy v.\u00a0Ukraine, no.\u00a07193\/04, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a061-69, 17\u00a0March 2016). The Court does not find any reason to depart from its previous approach in assessing these matters, and considers that the material conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention were degrading.146.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on this account.2.\u00a0\u00a0Transportation conditions147.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaint relying, in particular, on the relevant CPT reports (see paragraph 80 above).148.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contended that the above complaint had been duly examined and dismissed by the domestic courts. The Government did not therefore comment on the conditions of the applicant\u2019s transportation as such.149.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in his complaints relating to the conditions of his transportation, the applicant did not specify the exact dates and duration of his travel between the various transit points. At the same time, based on the material on file, the conditions complained of appear to have been similar to those which were sharply criticised by the CPT during its visits to Ukraine. Similar factual submissions also gave rise to the finding of a violation of Article 3 in the Court\u2019s judgments in Yakovenko v.\u00a0Ukraine (no.\u00a015825\/06, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0105-113, 25 October 2007) and Andrey Yakovenko (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 100-103). The Court does not find any reason to take a different approach in the present case and considers that the conditions of the applicant\u2019s transport were in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION IN RESPECT OF THE CONDITIONS OF THE APPLICANT\u2019S DETENTION150.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further complained under Article 13 of the Convention that there were no effective remedies for his complaints under Article 3 regarding the physical conditions of his detention and transportation, as well the medical care provided for him. The\u00a0relevant provision reads as follows:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d151.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested those arguments.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0Medical care152.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it has found that the applicant has not made out an arguable claim under Article\u00a03 of the Convention in respect of his medical care in detention (see paragraph 136 above). The guarantees enshrined in Article\u00a013 do not therefore apply to that complaint (see\u00a0Vergelskyy v.\u00a0Ukraine, no.\u00a019312\/06, \u00a7\u00a0124, 12\u00a0March 2009).153.\u00a0\u00a0That part of the application is therefore inadmissible and must be rejected, in accordance with the requirements of Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) and 4 of the Convention.2.\u00a0\u00a0Physical conditions of detention and transportation154.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits155.\u00a0\u00a0With reference to its earlier case-law (see, among other authorities, Melnik, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 113-116; Ukhan v. Ukraine, no. 30628\/02, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a091 and 92, 18 December 2008; Iglin v. Ukraine, no. 39908\/05, \u00a7 77, 12 January 2012; and Rodzevillo, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 70 and 71) and the circumstances of the present case, the Court finds that the Government have not proved that the applicant had an opportunity in practice to secure effective remedies for his complaints \u2013 that is to say, remedies which could have prevented the violations from occurring or continuing, or could have afforded the applicant appropriate redress.156.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore concludes that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention on account of the lack of an effective and accessible remedy under domestic law for the applicant\u2019s complaints regarding the physical conditions of his detention and transportation.V.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION157.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 of the Convention of the unlawfulness and length of his detention from 18\u00a0September 2001 onwards, excluding the periods from 7\u00a0December 2004 to 11 May 2006, from 20 April 2007 to 10 October 2007, and from 29\u00a0December 2009 to 20 September 2011. He further complained of a violation of his rights under Article\u00a05 \u00a7 4 of the Convention. Lastly, he complained under Article\u00a05 \u00a7 5 that he had not had an effective and enforceable right to compensation for his detention in contravention of paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of that Article. The provisions relied on read as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:...(c)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so[.]...3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph\u00a01\u00a0(c) of this Article shall be ... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.4.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.5.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility158.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this part of the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention159.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contended, in particular, that there had been a delay of about seven hours in documenting his arrest. He further submitted that there had been no legal basis for his deprivation of liberty after seventy-two hours had elapsed after his arrest and before his detention had been endorsed by a judicial decision.160.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant next complained that his detention between the completion of the pre-trial investigation and the beginning of the trial had not been covered by any judicial decision.161.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, he submitted that his detention after his committal for trial had been unlawful given that the court had neither given any reasoning nor set any time-limits for it.162.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained that the applicant\u2019s detention had been in compliance with domestic legislation. They further emphasised that it had been justified given the gravity of the charges against the applicant and his lack of cooperation with the police in the past.163.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant\u2019s allegation about the delay in documenting his arrest appears to be supported by the case file material (see\u00a0paragraphs 7 and 30 above). Furthermore, the Government have not refuted it. The Court therefore considers it established that the applicant was in unacknowledged detention from 3 a.m. to 10 a.m. on 18 September 2001.164.\u00a0\u00a0The Court emphasises that the unacknowledged detention of an individual is a complete negation of the fundamentally important guarantees contained in Article 5 of the Convention, and discloses a most grave violation of that provision. Failure to make a record of such matters as the date, time and location of detention, the name of the detainee, the reasons for the detention, and the name of the person carrying it out must be seen as incompatible with the requirement of lawfulness and with the very purpose of Article 5 of the Convention (see, for example, Menesheva v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a059261\/00, \u00a7 87, ECHR 2006\u2011III, with further references).165.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already found violations in cases where formalisation of an applicant\u2019s status as an arrested crime suspect was delayed without a reasonable explanation (see, for instance, Smolik v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 11778\/05, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a046-48, 19 January 2012; Grinenko, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a077 and 78; and Belousov v. Ukraine, no. 4494\/07, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a084-88, 7\u00a0November 2013). It finds that the present case constitutes another regrettable example of that administrative practice.166.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that under Ukrainian legislation the police had seventy-two hours at most following the applicant\u2019s arrest to either obtain a judicial order for his detention or release him.167.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates in this connection that when the maximum period of detention is absolute, laid down by the law, and thus known in advance, the authorities responsible for the detention are under a duty to take all necessary precautions to ensure that the permitted duration is not exceeded (see K.-F. v. Germany, 27 November 1997, \u00a7 72, Reports 1997\u2011VII, and, for a more recent reference, Gal v. Ukraine, no. 6759\/11, \u00a7\u00a026, 16 April 2015).168.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the court order on the applicant\u2019s detention was obtained on 22\u00a0September 2001. The exact time of the delivery of that decision is unknown. Even assuming that the court delivered the order at exactly 9 a.m. on 22\u00a0September 2001, it was still thirty hours after the expiry of the seventy-two-hour statutory period. The holding of the applicant in police custody during the period under examination was therefore not lawful (see Belousov, cited above, \u00a7 87).169.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that it has regularly found violations of Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention in Ukrainian cases as regards periods of detention not being covered by any court order, namely for the period between the end of the investigation and the beginning of the trial. The Court has concluded that this issue seemed to stem from a legislative lacuna (see Kharchenko v. Ukraine, no. 40107\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 70-72 and 98, 10\u00a0February 2011).170.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has also held in other cases that the recurrent practice in Ukraine of having court orders during the trial stage which set no time\u2011limits for the further detention of a defendant, and which uphold rather than extend his or her previous detention, is not compatible with the requirements of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention (see, for example, Kharchenko, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 76 and 98, and Kushch v.\u00a0Ukraine, no.\u00a053865\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 118-120, 3\u00a0December 2015).171.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court observes that the applicant\u2019s detention, which had been ordered by the judicial decision of 10\u00a0January 2002, expired on 18\u00a0March 2002. Meanwhile, on 1 March 2002 the pre-trial investigation had been declared completed and the applicant had received access to the case file. On an unspecified later date the case had been referred to the first-instance court for trial. On 5 August 2002 the Kherson Court held its preparatory hearing, at which it ordered the applicant\u2019s further detention as a preventive measure. It follows that his detention between 18\u00a0March and 5 August 2002 was not covered by any judicial decision.172.\u00a0\u00a0The Court next notes that although the Kherson Court upheld the pre\u2011trial detention measure in respect of the applicant on 5 August 2002 it did not set a time-limit for his continued detention and did not give any reasons for its decision. That left the applicant in a state of uncertainty as to the grounds for his detention after that date.173.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers the above considerations sufficient for concluding that there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention in the present case.2.\u00a0\u00a0Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7 3 of the Convention174.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that the length of his pre-trial detention had been excessive. He maintained that the judicial decisions to that effect had lacked sufficient or relevant reasons.175.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contended that there had been sufficient grounds for the applicant\u2019s detention given the seriousness of the charges against him and his behaviour prior to his arrest. They also maintained that the authorities had been diligent in dealing with his case.176.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that when assessing the length of pre-trial detention where applicants were held in custody during investigation and trial and continued to be deprived of their liberty while the criminal proceedings were pending at the appeal stage and after, the Court has consistently regarded such multiple periods of pre-trial detention as a whole (see, among numerous authorities, Solmaz v. Turkey, no.\u00a027561\/02, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a034\u201137, 16\u00a0January 2007, and Idalov v. Russia [GC], no.\u00a05826\/03, \u00a7\u00a0125, 22 May 2012).177.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, in the present case the following periods have to be taken into consideration: (1) from 18 September 2001 to 7 December 2004; (2) from 11 May 2006 to 20 April 2007; (3) from 8\u00a0April 2008 to 29\u00a0December 2009; and (4) from 20 September 2011 to 8\u00a0October 2012.\u00a0The period in question amounted therefore to over seven years.178.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the general principles established in its case-law (see I.A. v. France, 23 September 1998, \u00a7 102, Reports 1998\u2011VII; Labita v.\u00a0Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 153, ECHR\u00a02000-IV; and I\u0142owiecki v.\u00a0Poland, no.\u00a027504\/95, \u00a7 61, 4 October 2001), the Court notes that the period of the applicant\u2019s detention before conviction was particularly long. The Court accepts the Government\u2019s view that the charges against the applicant were very serious. At the same time, regard being had to the length of the applicant\u2019s detention, the Court considers that the competent authorities should also have expressly adduced other reasons justifying holding him in custody during the entire period at issue (see Kobernik v.\u00a0Ukraine, no.\u00a045947\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 50-52, 25 July 2013). However, the seriousness of the charges remained the only ground relied on by the authorities in justification of the applicant\u2019s continued detention. The\u00a0Court also takes note of the absence of any reasoning at all for keeping that very restrictive measure against the applicant in the Supreme Court\u2019s ruling of 11 May 2006, by which the first-instance court\u2019s judgment was quashed (see paragraph\u00a042 above). Moreover, its later, similar ruling, of 8 April 2008, did not even mention the issue of preventive measures, while the applicant remained in detention thereafter (see paragraph\u00a044 above).179.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing considerations the Court holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention.3.\u00a0\u00a0Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7 4 of the Convention180.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that the domestic courts had provided only a purely formalistic review of the lawfulness of his detention. He drew the Court\u2019s attention to the standard set of grounds that had been relied on in all the respective judicial decisions.181.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further noted that there had been a long delay in examining some of his applications for release at the trial stage. He submitted that the speediness of the review of the lawfulness of his detention at that stage had depended on the schedule of court hearings.182.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicant contended that certain decisions on the extension of his pre-trial detention had been taken in his absence and had not been communicated to him in due time.183.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had had at his disposal an effective procedure to challenge his detention. In particular, it had been open to him during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings to lodge appeals against the court decisions on his detention and its extension. However, the applicant had not done so. Furthermore, his right to apply for release during the judicial stage of the proceedings had not been restricted, and his respective applications had been examined without delay.184.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the lawfulness of the applicant\u2019s detention was considered by the domestic courts on many occasions, both during the pre\u2011trial investigation and during the trial. However, those decisions cannot be regarded as satisfying the requirements of Article 5 \u00a7 4 because they merely reiterated a standard set of grounds for the applicant\u2019s detention without any examination of the plausibility of such grounds in the circumstances of his particular situation. Furthermore, as regards the trial stage, the Court has already found that Ukrainian law did not provide for a procedure to review the lawfulness of continued detention after the completion of pre-trial investigations which satisfied the requirements of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention (see Kharchenko, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 85 and\u00a0100, and Kushch, also cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 129 and 130).185.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not find it necessary to analyse each of the applicant\u2019s arguments advanced in support of his complaint, as it considers the above considerations sufficient for finding a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention.186.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of that provision.4.\u00a0\u00a0Article 5 \u00a7 5187.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further complained that he had not had an enforceable right to compensation in respect of the aforementioned violations of the other paragraphs of Article 5.188.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that Ukrainian legislation provided for the possibility to claim compensation for unlawful detention subject to a judicial decision acknowledging such unlawfulness. It had not, however, been applicable to the circumstances of the present case because the applicant\u2019s detention had been lawful.189.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 5 \u00a7 5 guarantees an enforceable right to compensation to those who have been the victims of arrest or detention in contravention of the other provisions of Article 5 (see Steel and Others v. the United Kingdom, 23 September 1998, \u00a7 81, Reports 1998\u2011VII).190.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case the Court has found several violations of Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a01, 3 and 4, in conjunction with which the present complaint is to be examined (see paragraphs 173, 179 and 186 above). It follows that Article 5 \u00a7 5 of the Convention is applicable. The Court must therefore establish whether Ukrainian law afforded or now affords the applicant an enforceable right to compensation for the breaches of Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a01, 3 and 4 of the Convention in his case.191.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the issue of compensation for unlawful detention is regulated in Ukraine by the Law on the Procedure for the Compensation of Damage caused to Citizens by the Unlawful Actions of Bodies in charge of Operational Enquiries, Pre-trial Investigation Authorities, Prosecutors or Courts (\u201cthe Compensation Act\u201d). The right to compensation arises, in particular, where the unlawfulness of the detention has been established by a judicial decision.192.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that as long as the applicant\u2019s detention is in formal compliance with the domestic legislation it is impossible for him to claim compensation in that regard at the national level. Furthermore, there is no legally established procedure in Ukraine for bringing proceedings to seek compensation for a deprivation of liberty found to be in breach of one of the other paragraphs by the Strasbourg Court (see Nechiporuk and Yonkalo v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 42310\/04, \u00a7 233, 21 April 2011).193.\u00a0\u00a0This means that one of the principles of Article 5 \u00a7 5 \u2013 namely, that the effective enjoyment of the right to compensation guaranteed by it must be ensured with a sufficient degree of certainty (see Stanev v.\u00a0Bulgaria [GC], no. 36760\/06, \u00a7 182, 17\u00a0January 2012, with further references) \u2013 does not appear to be met in the present case.194.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 5 of the Convention.VI.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION IN RESPECT OF THE LENGTH OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE APPLICANT195.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings in his criminal case had been unreasonable. He relied on Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:\u201cIn the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility196.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits197.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the applicant\u2019s claim, stating that his case had been complex, from both a legal and factual point of view. In particular, he had been charged with a number of serious crimes and the proceedings in question had involved many co-defendants, victims and witnesses.198.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained that the authorities had been responsible for the protracted length of the proceedings in his case and that the overall duration of the proceedings had not been justified.199.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, and the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities (see, among many other authorities, P\u00e9lissier and Sassi v. France [GC], no. 25444\/94, \u00a7 67, ECHR 1999-II).200.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the period to be taken into consideration began on 18 September 2001 at the latest (there had already been criminal proceedings pending against the applicant at that time, but in the absence of further details, the Court will consider the above-mentioned date as the dies a quo in the present case). The proceedings in question ended on 28\u00a0October 2012, when the verdict in the applicant\u2019s case became final. The period in question therefore lasted for about eleven years and one month.201.\u00a0\u00a0The Court appreciates that the criminal proceedings at issue, which concerned several serious crimes and involved a number of co-defendants, victims and witnesses, were of a certain complexity.202.\u00a0\u00a0The Court attaches weight, however, to the fact that the case was repeatedly remitted for retrial because of procedural violations, for which the courts were responsible (see paragraphs 42, 44 and 46 above). That appears to be the main reason for the delay in the proceedings.203.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to those in the present case (see\u00a0P\u00e9lissier and Sassi, cited above, and Gorbatenko v.\u00a0Ukraine, no.\u00a025209\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 152-56, 28 November 2013).204.\u00a0\u00a0Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.205.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.VII.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION IN RESPECT OF THE COMPLAINT UNDER 6 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION CONCERNING THE LENGTH OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS206.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further complained under Article 13 of the Convention that there were no effective domestic remedies in respect of his complaint relating to the length of the criminal proceedings.207.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.208.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is linked to the one examined above (see paragraphs 195-205) and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.209.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 13 guarantees an effective remedy before a national authority for an alleged breach of the requirement under Article 6 \u00a7 1 to hear a case within a reasonable time (see Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0156). The Court further refers to its earlier findings in other Ukrainian cases about the lack of an effective and accessible remedy under domestic law for complaints in respect of the length of criminal proceedings (see\u00a0Merit v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 66561\/01, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a078 and 79, 30 March 2004; Shalimov v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 20808\/02, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a094-97, 4\u00a0March 2010; and Drogobetskaya v.\u00a0Ukraine [Committee], no. 41662\/05, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a021 and 22, 3\u00a0January 2013).210.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not find any reasons to depart from that case-law in the present case.211.\u00a0\u00a0There has, therefore, been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention.VIII.\u00a0\u00a0COMPLAINT UNDER ARTICLE 34 OF THE CONVENTION212.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the authorities had denied him the opportunity to obtain copies of his cassation appeals against the judgment of 7\u00a0December 2004, which the Registry of the Court had requested him to submit to substantiate his application (see paragraphs 73-75 above). He\u00a0relied on Article 34 of the Convention, which provides as follows:\u201cThe Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.\u201d213.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contended that Ukraine had complied with Article\u00a034 of the Convention.214.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has established that Article 34 of the Convention may impose on the State authorities an obligation to provide copies of documents to applicants who find themselves in situations of particular vulnerability and dependence and are unable to obtain the documents needed for their files without State support (see, as a recent authority, Naydyon v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 16474\/03, \u00a7 63, 14 October 2010).215.\u00a0\u00a0In the case of Naydyon (cited above), the Court took note of the applicant\u2019s specific situation at the time he had lodged and pursued his application. In particular, it noted that the criminal proceedings against the applicant had been completed and his criminal case file was being kept at the trial court. As he had been imprisoned, the applicant could not consult the file himself. He had no contact with his family and had only limited contact with the outside world. To complete his application, therefore, the applicant in that case was dependent on the authorities (\u00a7\u00a7 64-69).216.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant\u2019s situation in the present case is different. In contrast to Naydyon (cited above), the applicant had ample access to the case material after he lodged his application with the Court as the criminal proceedings were still pending at that time. Furthermore, the applicant did not refute the authorities\u2019 submission that the copies of the documents in question had been provided to him (see paragraph 75 above).217.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court concludes that the respondent State has not failed to comply with its obligations under Article\u00a034 of the\u00a0Convention.IX.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION218.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage219.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed EUR 500,000 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage and EUR 30,000 in respect of pecuniary damage (expenses for medications and \u201ccompensation for the deterioration of his health\u201d).220.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the claims were excessive and unsubstantiated. They also considered that there was no causal link between the pecuniary damage claim and the alleged violations of the Convention.221.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged and it therefore rejects that claim. However, deciding in equity, it awards the applicant EUR 15,000 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses222.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 6,500 for costs and expenses incurred before the Court, to be paid directly to his representative, Mr\u00a0Markov. That amount comprised EUR\u00a06,300 for 63 hours of legal work at the rate of EUR 100 per hour and EUR\u00a0200 for administrative costs. To substantiate his claim, the applicant submitted a legal assistance contract with Mr Markov of 14\u00a0November 2013 and a report on the work performed of 25 June 2014.223.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the above claim.224.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the material in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to allow the applicant\u2019s claim for costs and expenses in part and to award him the sum of EUR 1,000 covering costs under all heads, to be paid to his representative directly.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest225.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28591":"I.\u00a0\u00a0PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS: THE LOCUS STANDI OF THE APPLICANT\u2019S SISTER35.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant died on 8 April 2015, while the case was pending before the Court. The applicant\u2019s sister, Ms Artemyeva, wished to pursue the application after his death. The Government did not comment. The Court has already, in a number of cases in which applicants have died in the course of the proceedings, examined and confirmed the locus standi of their heirs or close relatives, such as brothers or sisters, to pursue the proceedings before the Court, including in cases brought under Article 3 of the Convention (see, among many other authorities, Dalban v. Romania [GC], no. 28114\/95, \u00a7 39, ECHR 1999\u2011VI; Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 33071\/96, ECHR 2000-XII; Ergezen v. Turkey, no.\u00a073359\/10, \u00a7\u00a029, 8 April 2014; Koryak v. Russia, no. 24677\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 58-68, 13\u00a0November 2012; Getiren v. Turkey, no. 10301\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 61-62, 22 July 2008; and Toteva v. Bulgaria, no. 42027\/98, \u00a7 45, 19 May 2004).36.\u00a0\u00a0The decisive element for the Court to determine while assessing the locus standi of persons wishing to pursue the proceedings on behalf of a late applicant is whether those people, in principle, can claim a legitimate interest in requesting the Court to deal with the case on the basis of the applicant\u2019s wish to exercise his or her individual and personal right to lodge an application with the Court (see Ergezen, cited above, \u00a7 29). In this respect, the Court has developed a strong presumption that human rights cases before it generally have a moral dimension and persons near to an applicant may thus have a legitimate interest in ensuring that justice be done, even after the applicant\u2019s death (see Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 33071\/96, ECHR 2000-XII).37.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the above and given the elements of the case, the Court holds that Ms Artemyeva has a legitimate interest in pursuing the application on the applicant\u2019s behalf and that respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires a continuation of the examination of the case.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 34 OF THE CONVENTION38.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that the Government\u2019s failure to have his medical examination performed with a view to answering the three questions asked by the Court had been in breach of the interim measure indicated by the Court under Rule 39 of the Rule of Court and had thus violated his right to individual application. He relied on Article 34 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cThe Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.\u201dRule 39 of the Rules of Court provides:\u201c1. The Chamber or, where appropriate, its President may, at the request of a party or of any other person concerned, or of its own motion, indicate to the parties any interim measure which it considers should be adopted in the interests of the parties or of the proper conduct of the proceedings before it.2. Where it is considered appropriate, immediate notice of the measure adopted in a particular case may be given to the Committee of Ministers.3. The Chamber may request information from the parties on any matter connected with the implementation of any interim measure it has indicated.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties39.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that their alleged failure to submit an independent medical report as requested by the Court had not prevented the effective exercise by the applicant of his right to communicate with the Court and thus did not entail a violation of Article 34, or of any other provision of the Convention. The applicant\u2019s right to communicate with the Court had in no way been interfered with. The applicant had retained counsel, who had submitted his application to the Court. He and his counsel had communicated freely with the Court. Lastly, the Government submitted that that it had been open to the applicant to submit an independent medical opinion assessing the quality of his treatment. They also stressed that the Court had received the reports prepared by the medical panel whose independence and competence did not raise any doubts, particularly in view of the fact that the panel had recommended the applicant\u2019s release on grounds of ill health.40.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his claim.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles41.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, pursuant to Article 34 of the Convention, Contracting States undertake to refrain from any act or omission that may hinder the effective exercise of the right of individual application, and this has been consistently reaffirmed as a cornerstone of the Convention system (see Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827\/99 and 46951\/99, \u00a7 102, ECHR 2005\u2011I). Although the object of Article 34 is essentially that of protecting an individual against any arbitrary interference by the authorities, it does not merely compel States to abstain from such interference. In addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there are positive obligations inherent in Article 34 requiring the authorities to furnish all the necessary facilities to make possible the proper and effective examination of applications. Such an obligation will arise in situations where applicants are particularly vulnerable (see Naydyon v.\u00a0Ukraine, no.\u00a016474\/03, \u00a7 63, 14 October 2010; Savitskyy v. Ukraine, no.\u00a038773\/05, \u00a7\u00a0156, 26 July 2012; and Iulian Popescu v. Romania, no. 24999\/04, \u00a7\u00a033, 4\u00a0June 2013).42.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s established case-law, a respondent State\u2019s failure to comply with an interim measure may entail a violation of the right of individual application (see Mamatkulov and Askarov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0125, and Abdulkhakov v. Russia, no. 14743\/11, \u00a7 222, 2 October 2012). The Court cannot emphasise enough the special importance attached to interim measures in the Convention system. Their purpose is not only to enable an effective examination of the application to be carried out, but also to ensure that the protection afforded to the applicant by the Convention is effective. Such measures subsequently allow the Committee of Ministers to supervise the execution of the final judgment. Interim measures thus enable the State concerned to discharge its obligation to comply with the final judgment of the Court, which is legally binding by virtue of Article 46 of the Convention (see Mamatkulov and Askarov, cited above, \u00a7 125; Shamayev and Others v.\u00a0Georgia and Russia, no. 36378\/02, \u00a7 473, ECHR 2005\u2011III; Aoulmi v.\u00a0France, no. 50278\/99, \u00a7\u00a0108, ECHR 2006\u2011I; and Ben Khemais v.\u00a0Italy, no. 246\/07, \u00a7\u00a082, 24\u00a0February 2009).43.\u00a0\u00a0The crucial significance of interim measures is further highlighted by the fact that the Court issues them, as a matter of principle, only in truly exceptional cases and on the basis of a rigorous examination of all the relevant circumstances. In most of these cases, the applicants face a genuine threat to life and limb, with the ensuing real risk of serious, irreversible harm in breach of the core provisions of the Convention. The vital role played by interim measures in the Convention system not only underpins their binding legal effect on the States concerned, as upheld by the established case-law, but also requires that the utmost importance be attached to the question of the States Parties\u2019 compliance with the Court\u2019s indications in that regard (see, inter alia, the firm position on that point expressed by the States Parties in the Izmir Declaration and by the Committee of Ministers in Interim Resolution CM\/ResDH(2010)83 in the above-mentioned case of Ben Khemais). Any laxity on this question would unacceptably weaken the protection of the core rights in the Convention and would not be compatible with its values and spirit (see Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7 July\u00a01989, \u00a7\u00a088, Series A no. 161); it would also be inconsistent with the fundamental importance of the right of individual petition and, more generally, undermine the authority and effectiveness of the Convention as a constitutional instrument of European public order (see Mamatkulov and Askarov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 100 and 125, and, mutatis mutandis, Loizidou v.\u00a0Turkey (preliminary objections), 23 March\u00a01995, \u00a7\u00a075, Series A no. 310).44.\u00a0\u00a0Article 34 will be breached if the authorities of a Contracting State fail to take all the steps which could reasonably be taken in order to comply with an interim measure indicated by the Court (see Paladi v.\u00a0Moldova [GC], no. 39806\/05, \u00a7 88, 10 March 2009). It is for the respondent Government to demonstrate to the Court that the interim measure was complied with or, in an exceptional case, that there was an objective impediment which prevented compliance and that the Government took all reasonable steps to remove the impediment and keep the Court informed about the situation (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 92-106; see also Aleksanyan v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a046468\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 228-232, 22 December 2008, in which the Court concluded that the Russian Government had failed to honour their commitments under Article 34 of the Convention as a result of their failure to promptly transfer a seriously ill applicant to a specialist hospital and have him examined by a mixed medical panel including doctors of his own choosing, in disregard of an interim measure imposed by the Court under Rule 39).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application to the present case45.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that in a letter sent on 13 November 2014 it indicated to the Russian Government, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in the interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings before the Court, that the applicant should be immediately examined by medical experts independent from the penal system with a view to determining three issues: (i) whether the treatment he was receiving in detention was adequate to his condition; (ii) whether his state of health was compatible with the conditions of his detention; and (iii) whether his condition required his admittance to specialist hospital or release. The Government responded, submitting the applicant\u2019s medical record and certificates drawn up by the detention authorities. They also answered the three questions put by the Court themselves (see paragraphs 27 and 28 above).46.\u00a0\u00a0Following communication of the case, the Government insisted that they had fully complied with the interim measure, as the Court had received a report by the medical panel recommending the applicant\u2019s release. They had also provided answers to the Court\u2019s questions in their letter of 4\u00a0December 2014. The Court is not convinced by the Government\u2019s argument. It reiterates that the aim of the interim measure in the present case \u2013 as formulated in the Court\u2019s decision of 12 November 2014, of which the Government were notified in a letter of 13 November 2014 \u2013 was to obtain an independent medical expert assessment of the applicant\u2019s state of health, the quality of the treatment he was receiving and the adequacy of the conditions of his detention in view of his medical needs. That expert evidence was necessary to decide whether, as the applicant argued, his life and limb were at real risk as a result of the alleged lack of requisite medical care in detention. In addition, the Court was concerned with the contradictory nature of the evidence collected by the applicant and submitted with his application and his request for an interim measure, and the information submitted by the Government in response to the request sent by the Court in August 2014 (see paragraphs 23 and 24 above). The interim measure in the present case was therefore also meant to ensure that the applicant could effectively pursue his case before the Court (see, mutatis mutandis, Shtukaturov v. Russia, no. 44009\/05, \u00a7 141, ECHR 2008).47.\u00a0\u00a0Whilst the formulation of an interim measure is one of the elements to be taken into account in the Court\u2019s analysis of whether a State has complied with its obligations under Article 34, the Court must have regard not only to the letter but also to the spirit of the interim measure indicated (see Paladi, cited above, \u00a7 91) and, indeed, to its very purpose. The main aim of the interim measure, as indicated by the Court in the present case \u2011 and the Government did not claim to be unaware of this \u2013 was to prevent the applicant\u2019s exposure to inhuman and degrading suffering in view of his poor health and his remaining in a correctional colony that was \u2011 according to him \u2013 unable to ensure that he received adequate medical assistance. There could have been no doubt about either the purpose or the rationale of that interim measure.48.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not need to assess the professional expertise or qualifications of the doctors of the medical panels which prepared the reports of 6 and 28 March 2013 and 2 July 2014, or their independence from the penal system, as it considers that their opinion as reflected in the three reports did not provide any answers to the three questions put by the Court. The aim of the three medical examinations, the results of which were set out in those reports, was to compare the applicant\u2019s medical condition with the exhaustive list of illnesses provided for by the Government decree no. 54 of 6 February 2004, and which could have warranted his release. At no point during the examinations did the doctors from the panels assess the applicant\u2019s state of health independently of that list or evaluate whether his illness, given its current manifestation, nature and duration, required his transfer to a specialist hospital. Nor did they apply their minds to the quality of the medical care he had been receiving while in detention, or to the conditions in which he was being detained. The reports therefore have no relevance to the implementation of the interim measure indicated by the Court to the Russian Government in the present case (see, for similar reasoning, Amirov, cited above, \u00a7 91).49.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that the Government themselves responded to the three questions put to them in the decision of 12\u00a0November 2014. The Court notes in this connection that in view of the vital role played by interim measures in the Convention system, they must be strictly complied with by the State concerned, acting in good faith. The Court cannot conceive, therefore, of allowing the authorities to circumvent an interim measure such as the one indicated in the present case by replacing expert medical opinion with their own assessment of the applicant\u2019s situation. Yet that is exactly what the Government did in the present case (see paragraphs 27 and 28 above). In so doing, the State has frustrated the purpose of the interim measure, which sought to enable the Court, on the basis of relevant, independent medical opinion, to effectively respond to and, if need be, prevent the possible continued exposure of the applicant to physical and mental suffering in violation of the guarantees of Article 3 of the Convention (see Khloyev v.\u00a0Russia, no. 46404\/13, \u00a7 67, 5\u00a0February 2015, and Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine, no. 28005\/08, \u00a7\u00a0222, 14\u00a0March 2013.50.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not demonstrate any objective impediment preventing compliance with the interim measure (see Paladi, cited above, \u00a7\u00a092). Consequently, the Court concludes that the State has failed to comply with the interim measure indicated by it in the present case under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in breach of its obligation under Article 34 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION51.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been unable to obtain effective medical care while in detention, which had put him in a life-threatening situation and subjected him to severe physical and mental suffering, in violation of the guarantees of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties52.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stressed that the applicant had received comprehensive medical care in detention. They relied on documents enclosed with their reply of 15 September 2014 (see paragraph 24 above), also submitting that there was no expert report identifying the absence of proper medical care as the cause of his death.53.\u00a0\u00a0Relying on the expert reports of 22 April and 20 October 2014 and 17 January 2015, as well as the District Court\u2019s decision of 1 October\u00a02014 acknowledging the authorities\u2019 failure to provide anti-cancer treatment, the applicant argued that he had been left without any medical assistance and thus had been put in a life-threatening situation.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility54.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0 Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles(i)\u00a0\u00a0As to the Court\u2019s evaluation of the facts and the burden of proof55.\u00a0\u00a0In cases in which there are conflicting accounts of events, the Court is inevitably confronted with the same difficulties as those faced by any first-instance court when establishing the facts. It reiterates that, in assessing evidence, it has adopted the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d. However, it has never been its purpose to borrow the approach of the national legal systems that use that standard. Its role is not to rule on criminal guilt or civil liability, but on Contracting States\u2019 responsibility under the Convention. The specific nature of its task under Article 19 of the Convention \u2013 to ensure the observance by the Contracting States of their engagement to secure the fundamental rights enshrined in the Convention \u2011 determines its approach to issues of evidence and proof. In proceedings before the Court, there are no procedural barriers to the admissibility of evidence or pre-determined formulae for its assessment. It adopts conclusions that are, in its view, supported by a free evaluation of all the evidence, including such inferences as may flow from the facts and the parties\u2019 submissions. In accordance with its established case-law, proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Moreover, the level of persuasion necessary for reaching a particular conclusion and, in this connection, the distribution of the burden of proof, are intrinsically linked to the specific nature of the facts, the nature of the allegation made and the Convention right at stake. The Court is also attentive to the seriousness that attaches to a ruling that a Contracting State has violated fundamental rights (see Creang\u0103 v. Romania [GC], no. 29226\/03, \u00a7 88, 23 February 2012, and the cases cited therein).56.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, it should be pointed out that Convention proceedings do not in all cases lend themselves to a strict application of the principle affirmanti incumbit probatio. They should also allow taking into account the specific circumstances of each case, including the nature of the facts at issue and the difficulty for the parties to present evidence in support of their submissions. The Court reiterates its case-law under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention to the effect that where the events at issue lie within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons under their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries, damage and death occurring during that detention. The burden of proof in such a case may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation (see \u00c7ak\u0131c\u0131 v. Turkey [GC], no.\u00a023657\/94, \u00a7 85, ECHR 1999-IV; Salman v. Turkey [GC], no.\u00a021986\/93, \u00a7\u00a0100, ECHR 2000-VII; and Oleg Nikitin v. Russia, no.\u00a036410\/02, \u00a7\u00a045, 9\u00a0October 2008). In this case, in the absence of such an explanation the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the respondent Government (see, for instance, Orhan v. Turkey, no. 25656\/94, \u00a7\u00a0274, 18\u00a0June 2002, and Buntov v. Russia, no. 27026\/10, \u00a7 161, 5\u00a0June 2012).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0As to the application of Article 3 and standards of medical care for detainees57.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of a democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim\u2019s behaviour (see, for example, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000-IV). Ill\u2011treatment must, however, attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among other authorities, Verbin\u0163 v.\u00a0Romania, no. 7842\/04, \u00a7 63, 3 April 2012, with further references).58.\u00a0\u00a0Ill-treatment that attains such a minimum level of severity usually involves actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering. However, even in the absence of these, where treatment humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for or diminishing his or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual\u2019s moral and physical resistance, it may be characterised as degrading and also fall within the prohibition of Article\u00a03 (see Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346\/02, \u00a7 52, ECHR 2002-III, with further references).59.\u00a0\u00a0The State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure of deprivation of liberty do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured (see Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 92-94, ECHR 2000-XI, and Popov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 26853\/04, \u00a7 208, 13 July 2006). In most cases concerning the detention of persons who were ill, the Court has examined whether or not the applicant received adequate medical assistance in prison. The Court reiterates in this regard that even though Article 3 does not entitle a detainee to be released \u201con compassionate grounds\u201d, it has always interpreted the requirement to secure the health and well-being of detainees, among other things, as an obligation on the State to provide detainees with the requisite medical assistance (see Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7 94; Kalashnikov, cited above, \u00a7 95; and Khudobin v. Russia, no. 59696\/00, \u00a7\u00a096, ECHR 2006-XII (extracts)).60.\u00a0\u00a0The \u201cadequacy\u201d of medical assistance remains the most difficult element to determine. The Court insists that, in particular, authorities must ensure that diagnosis and care are prompt and accurate (see Hummatov v.\u00a0Azerbaijan, nos. 9852\/03 and 13413\/04, \u00a7 115, 29 November\u00a02007; Yevgeniy Alekseyenko, cited above, \u00a7 100; Gladkiy v. Russia, no.\u00a03242\/03, \u00a7\u00a084, 21 December 2010; Khatayev v.\u00a0Russia, no. 56994\/09, \u00a7\u00a085, 11\u00a0October 2011; and, mutatis mutandis, Holomiov v.\u00a0Moldova, no.\u00a030649\/05, \u00a7 121, 7 November 2006), and that, where necessitated by the nature of a medical condition, supervision is regular and systematic and involves a comprehensive therapeutic strategy aimed at adequately treating the detainee\u2019s health problems or preventing their aggravation (see Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 109 and 114; Sarban v.\u00a0Moldova, no.\u00a03456\/05, \u00a7\u00a079, 4\u00a0October 2005; and Popov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0211). The authorities must also show that the necessary conditions were created for the prescribed treatment to be actually followed through (see Holomiov, cited above, \u00a0\u00a7\u00a0117, and Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7 116). Furthermore, medical treatment provided within prison facilities must be appropriate, that is, at a level comparable to that which the State authorities have committed themselves to provide to the population as a whole. Nevertheless, this does not mean that every detainee must be guaranteed the same level of medical treatment that is available in the best health establishments outside prison facilities (see Blokhin v. Russia [GC], no. 47152\/06, \u00a7 137, 23 March\u00a02016 and Cara-Damiani v. Italy, no. 2447\/05, \u00a7 66, 7 February 2012).61.\u00a0\u00a0On the whole, the Court reserves to itself sufficient flexibility in defining the required standard of health care, determining it on a case\u2011by\u2011case basis. That standard should be \u201ccompatible with the human dignity\u201d of a detainee, but should also take into account \u201cthe practical demands of imprisonment\u201d (see Aleksanyan, cited above, \u00a7 140).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case62.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes that the applicant suffered from an oncological illness at an advanced stage, with growing multiple metastases having spread to the lungs and lymph nodes.63.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s main contention was that he did not receive any treatment for his illness. No immunotherapy, chemotherapy or radiotherapy which could have, perhaps, improved his condition and extended his life, was given to him in detention. The Government disagreed. They insisted that he had received proper medical assistance in detention and that there had been no threat to his life (see paragraph 28 above).64.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already stressed the difficult task it faces in evaluating the differing and even mutually contradictory evidence submitted by the parties in the present case (see paragraph 46 above). Its task has been further complicated by the need to assess evidence calling for expert knowledge in various medical fields. In this connection, it emphasises that it is sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role (see McKerr v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 28883\/95, 4 April 2000). Nonetheless, where allegations are made under Article 3 of the Convention the Court must apply a \u201cparticularly thorough scrutiny\u201d (see, mutatis mutandis, Ribitsch v. Austria, 4 December\u00a01995, \u00a7\u00a032, Series A no. 336, and Georgiy Bykov v. Russia, no. 24271\/03, \u00a7\u00a051, 14\u00a0October 2010).65.\u00a0\u00a0Coming back to the medical reports and certificates, as well as other evidence submitted by the applicant in the present case, the Court is satisfied that there is prima facie evidence in favour of his submissions, particularly so in view of the Government\u2019s failure to submit evidence requested by the Court.66.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to its findings under Article 34 of the Convention, the Court considers that it can draw inferences from the Government\u2019s conduct and is ready to apply a particularly thorough scrutiny to the evidence submitted by them in support of their position. It therefore finds that the Government have failed to demonstrate conclusively that the applicant received effective medical treatment for his illnesses while in detention. The evidence submitted by the Government is unconvincing and insufficient to rebut the applicant\u2019s account of the treatment to which he was subjected in detention. In such circumstances, the Court considers the applicant\u2019s allegations established to the requisite standard of proof. The Court\u2019s conclusion becomes even more salient in view of the Ingondinskiy District Court\u2019s decision on 1 October 2014 to authorise the applicant\u2019s transfer from the correctional colony to the prison hospital, given the colony administration\u2019s failure to provide him with anti-cancer treatment (see paragraph 20 above).67.\u00a0\u00a0The Court thus finds that the applicant was left without the vital medical care for his illnesses. Despite the authorities\u2019 knowledge of his diagnosis and their awareness of the steady progress of his illness since August 2012, the applicant did not receive any cancer-related treatment, save for symptomatic treatment of his illness with anaesthetics, until December 2014, that is merely four months before his death. The medical supervision afforded to him was insufficient to maintain his health. Moreover, he was prescribed a drug which did not exist (see paragraphs 27 and 30 above). There was no thorough evaluation of his condition. The prison medical staff did not take any steps to deal with the rapid progress of his illness. The Court is also particularly concerned with the fact that despite the District Court\u2019s decision authorising the applicant\u2019s transfer to the correctional colony, he still remained in an ordinary correctional colony without any specialist medical care (see paragraph 27 above). Lastly, the Court considers particularly noteworthy the Government\u2019s argument, raised in their letter of 4 December 2014, that the applicant\u2019s condition was satisfactory and that there was no threat to his life given the quality of the medical care afforded to him. In their assessment of the applicant\u2019s state of health they relied on certificates issued by the colony administration at the end of November 2014. Without placing too much emphasis on the quality or credibility of the information submitted by the detention authorities, the Court again notes that the applicant\u2019s death occurred approximately four months after they had drafted their certificates.68.\u00a0\u00a0To sum up, the Court considers that, as a result of the lack of comprehensive and adequate medical treatment, the applicant was exposed to prolonged mental and physical suffering that diminished his human dignity. The authorities\u2019 failure to provide him with the medical care he needed amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment for the purposes of Article 3 of the Convention.69.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION70.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage71.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.72.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the claim was unsubstantiated and that, even if the Court were to find a violation of the Convention and award compensation, the sum of that compensation would have to be decreased as it would be paid to the applicant\u2019s sister, who was not the direct victim of such a violation.73.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, making its assessment on an equitable basis, decides that the sum claimed by the applicant shall be paid in full to his sister, Ms\u00a0Artemyeva, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses74.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 2,000 in legal fees for his representation before the Russian authorities and the Court. He supported his claim with a copy of a contract with his lawyer, Ms Khrunova, by virtue of which she was paid 120,000 Russian roubles (RUB) for her services.75.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the sum should be calculated in line with the current exchange rate or paid in Russian roubles. They also considered the sum to be excessive, as the work done had not been particularly difficult.76.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the above criteria, and to the documents in its possession, including the documents prepared by the applicant\u2019s lawyer in the course of the proceedings before the Court and the legal contract, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,600 for costs and expenses, to be paid into the bank account of the applicant\u2019s representative.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest77.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28592":"I.\u00a0\u00a0PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS: THE LOCUS STANDI OF THE APPLICANT\u2019S MOTHER25.\u00a0\u00a0The Court must first decide whether Ms Maylenskaya can pursue the application lodged by the applicant. It reiterates that on 21\u00a0December 2015 she informed the Court of her wish to continue the proceedings on her son\u2019s behalf.26.\u00a0\u00a0The Government expressed doubts as to whether\u00a0the applicant\u2019s mother had locus standi to pursue the application since the rights enshrined by Article 3 of the Convention are eminently personal and non-transferable.27.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it normally permits the next of kin to pursue an application, provided he or she has a legitimate interest, where the original applicant died after lodging the application with the Court (see Murray v.\u00a0the Netherlands [GC], no. 10511\/10, \u00a7 79, 26 April 2016; Malhous v.\u00a0the\u00a0Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 33071\/96, ECHR 2000\u2011XII; and Larionovs and Tess v. Latvia (dec.), nos. 45520\/04 and 19363\/05, \u00a7 172, 25\u00a0November\u00a02014). Having regard to the subject matter of the application and all the information in its possession, the Court considers that the applicant\u2019s mother has a legitimate interest in pursuing the application and that she thus has the requisite locus standi under Article 34 of the Convention (see Koryak v. Russia, no. 24677\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 58-68, 13\u00a0November 2012). It therefore dismisses the Government\u2019s preliminary objection.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 34 OF THE CONVENTION28.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that the Government\u2019s failure to ensure he have a medical\u00a0examination to answer the questions asked by the Court had been in breach of the interim measure indicated by the Court under Rule 39 of the Rule of Court and had thus violated his right to individual application. He relied on Article 34 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cThe Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.\u201d29.\u00a0\u00a0Rule 39 provides:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber or, where appropriate, its President may, at the request of a party or of any other person concerned, or of its own motion, indicate to the parties any interim measure which it considers should be adopted in the interests of the parties or of the proper conduct of the proceedings before it.2.\u00a0\u00a0Where it is considered appropriate, immediate notice of the measure adopted in a particular case may be given to the Committee of Ministers.3.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber may request information from the parties on any matter connected with the implementation of any interim measure it has indicated.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties30.\u00a0\u00a0The Government opened their argument with an assertion that it could not be inferred from Article 34 of the Convention or \u201cfrom any other source\u201d that the interim measure indicated under Rule 39 was legally binding. They further stressed that the Rules of Court, and accordingly the interim measure applied, did not have binding force on the State Party and that, accordingly, their failure to submit answers to the questions raised by the Court did not entail a violation of Article 34, or of any other provision of the Convention.31.\u00a0\u00a0The Government continued by arguing that the applicant\u2019s right to communicate with the Court had in no way been interfered with. The applicant had retained counsel, who had made submissions and had continued to communicate freely with the Court. Lastly, the Government submitted that in response to the Court\u2019s questions they had furnished medical\u00a0reports prepared by prison doctors and that their submissions had in substance answered the questions posed.32.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that the situation was similar to the case of\u00a0Amirov v. Russia (no. 51857\/13, 27 November 2014), in which the Court had found a violation of Article 34 of the Convention following the Government\u2019s failure to comply with an interim measure imposed under Rule 39. As in\u00a0Amirov (ibid.), the Russian authorities had again failed to comply with an order by the Court to provide an expert opinion from independent\u00a0medical\u00a0specialists on the applicant\u2019s state of health.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles33.\u00a0\u00a0The applicable general principles are\u00a0set out in\u00a0Paladi v. Moldova ([GC], no. 39806\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 84-92, 10 March 2009) and Amirov (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a065-68).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of the general principles to the present case34.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that on 23 March 2015 it indicated to the Russian Government that\u00a0the applicant should be immediately examined by medical experts who were independent from the prison system, with a view to determining (1)\u00a0whether he was receiving adequate treatment in the prison hospital for his condition; (2)\u00a0whether his state of health was compatible with detention in the conditions of a prison hospital; and (3)\u00a0whether his condition required his placement in a specialist, possibly civilian, hospital. Furthermore, the Government were to ensure his transfer to a specialist hospital if the medical experts concluded that that was necessary. The Government responded by submitting various medical reports, certificates and documents related to the applicant\u2019s detention (see paragraph 17 above). They also asserted that the scope and quality of the treatment provided to the applicant in the prison hospital had been exactly what had been needed for his state of health.35.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is not convinced by the Government\u2019s arguments. It reiterates that the aim of the interim measure in the present case was to obtain an independent medical assessment of the state of the applicant\u2019s health, the quality of the treatment he was receiving and the adequacy of the conditions of his detention in view of his medical needs. That expert evidence was necessary to decide whether, as the applicant argued, his life was at real risk as a result of the alleged lack of requisite medical care in detention. In addition, the Court was concerned with the contradictory nature of the evidence in its possession. The interim measure was therefore also meant to ensure that the applicant could effectively pursue his case before the Court (see Amirov, cited above, \u00a7 70, and Shtukaturov v. Russia, no.\u00a044009\/05, \u00a7 141, ECHR 2008).36.\u00a0\u00a0Whilst the formulation of an interim measure is one of the elements to be taken into account in the Court\u2019s analysis of whether a State has complied with its obligations under Article 34 of the Convention, the Court must have regard not only to the letter but also to the spirit of the interim measure indicated (see\u00a0Paladi, cited above, \u00a7 91) and, indeed, to its very purpose. The main purpose of the interim measure, as indicated by the Court in the present case \u2013 and the Government did not claim to be unaware of this\u00a0\u2013 was to prevent the applicant\u2019s exposure to inhuman and degrading suffering in view of his poor health and his remaining in a prison hospital that was \u2013 according to him \u2013 unable to ensure that he received adequate medical assistance. There could have been no doubt about either the purpose or the rationale of that interim measure.37.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not need to assess the independence, professional expertise or qualifications of the doctors who prepared the documents submitted by the Government. It notes that the medical examination it requested, aimed at answering the Court\u2019s questions, was not ordered by the Government. Neither the medical reports, nor the certificates issued by the authorities contained any analysis of the adequacy of the applicant\u2019s medical treatment and the compatibility of the conditions of his detention with his state of health. Nothing suggests that the doctors compared the quality of medical assistance afforded to the applicant with the requirements of applicable medical standards, guidelines or regulations.38.\u00a0\u00a0The aim of the medical examination of 26 September 2014 was limited simply to a comparison of the applicant\u2019s medical condition with the exhaustive list of illnesses in a Government decree which warranted early release. At no point during the examination did the doctors from the prison hospital assess the applicant\u2019s state of health independently from that list or considered whether his illness, given the stage it was at, its nature and duration, required his transfer to a specialist hospital.\u00a0The Court therefore concludes that the documents furnished by the authorities have little relevance to the implementation of the interim measure indicated by the Court to the Russian Government in the present case.39.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further argued that they themselves had responded to the three questions put by the Court on 23 March 2015. The Court notes that in view of the vital role played by interim measures in the Convention system, they must be strictly complied with by the State concerned. The Court cannot conceive, therefore, of allowing the authorities to circumvent an interim measure such as the one indicated in the present case by replacing expert medical opinion with their own assessment of the applicant\u2019s situation. Yet that is exactly what the Government did. In so doing, the State has frustrated the purpose of the interim measure, which sought to enable the Court, on the basis of relevant, independent medical opinion, to effectively respond to and, if need be, prevent the possible continued exposure of the applicant to physical and mental suffering (see\u00a0Khloyev v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a046404\/13, \u00a7 67, 5 February 2015, and\u00a0Salakhov and Islyamova v.\u00a0Ukraine,\u00a0no.\u00a028005\/08, \u00a7 222, 14\u00a0March 2013).40.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not show that there was any objective impediment preventing compliance with the interim measure (see Paladi, cited above, \u00a7\u00a092). Consequently, the Court concludes that the State has failed to comply with the interim measure indicated by it in the present case under Rule 39, in breach of its obligation under Article 34 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION41.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the authorities had failed to provide him with the requisite medical care in detention, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties42.\u00a0\u00a0The Government put forward two lines of argument. Firstly, they argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies as he had not raised his complaint before the domestic authorities, such as the administration of the detention facilities, a prosecutor\u2019s office or a court. Secondly, they argued that the applicant had been provided with the requisite medical treatment.43.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that the medical assistance afforded to him was deficient, as confirmed by the experts\u2019 report of 20 May 2015, particularly in view of his continued treatment with ineffective drugs. He further stated that the authorities had known of his condition, but had not addressed the issue. The legal avenues proposed by the Government were ineffective.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility44.\u00a0\u00a0In assessing the Government\u2019s argument that the applicant failed to exhaust the available avenues of domestic protection regarding the allegedly inadequate medical treatment, the Court notes that it has consistently held that the remedies proposed by the Government do not satisfy the relevant criteria (see Ivko, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 85-88; Khalvash v. Russia, no. 32917\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 49-52, 15 December 2015; Patranin v. Russia, no.\u00a012983\/14, \u00a7\u00a7 82-88, 23 July 2015; Koryak, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a082-86; and Reshetnyak v. Russia, no.\u00a056027\/10, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a065-73, 8 January 2013). The Court therefore rejects the non-exhaustion objection.45.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article\u00a03 of the Convention is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article\u00a035 \u00a7 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles46.\u00a0\u00a0The applicable general principles were recently summarised in\u00a0Ivko (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 91-95).(b)\u00a0\u00a0 Application of the general principles to the present case47.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes that the applicant suffered from advanced tuberculosis and HIV. The life\u2011threatening nature of that condition was beyond doubt. His main contention was that he did not receive adequate treatment for his illness, especially in the initial period, when he was prescribed medication to which his tuberculosis had developed resistance. The Government disagreed. They insisted that he had received comprehensive medical care in detention.48.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has examined a large number of cases against Russia raising complaints of inadequate medical provision for inmates (see, among the most recent examples, Ivko, cited above; Koryak, cited above; Dirdizov v. Russia, no. 41461\/10, 27 November 2012; Reshetnyak, cited above; Mkhitaryan v. Russia, no. 46108\/11, 5 February 2013; Gurenko v. Russia, no. 41828\/10, 5\u00a0February 2013; Bubnov v. Russia, no. 76317\/11, 5\u00a0February\u00a02013; Budanov v. Russia, no. 66583\/11, 9 January 2014; and Gorelov v. Russia, no. 49072\/11, 9 January 2014). In the absence of an effective remedy in Russia to deal with such complaints, the Court has had, of necessity, to undertake the role of a court of first instance in determining whether the guarantees of Articles 2 or 3 of the Convention have been observed. In that role, paying particular attention to the vulnerability of applicants who are in detention, the Court has called on the Government to provide credible and convincing evidence that the applicant concerned received comprehensive and adequate medical care in detention.49.\u00a0\u00a0Coming back to the medical certificates and the experts\u2019 report of 20\u00a0May 2015 submitted by the applicant (see paragraph 19 above), the Court is satisfied that there is prima facie evidence in favour of his submissions and that the burden of proof should shift to the respondent Government.50.\u00a0\u00a0Having closely scrutinised the evidence submitted by them in support of their position, it finds that they have failed to demonstrate conclusively that the applicant received effective medical treatment for his illnesses while in detention. The evidence in question is unconvincing and insufficient to rebut the applicant\u2019s account of the treatment he had in detention and the experts\u2019 conclusion of 20 May 2015. In such circumstances, the Court considers that the applicant\u2019s allegations have been established to the requisite standard of proof.51.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the medical authorities were indeed aware of the applicant\u2019s serious ailments, including untreated tuberculosis and advanced HIV, right from the start of his detention in June 2012 (see paragraph 10 above). However, a drug susceptibility test was only performed on 23 January 2013 (see paragraph 12 above). Although the test revealed that the drugs being received by the applicant were totally ineffective, the treatment was not altered until April 2013 (see paragraph 12 above). In the absence of drugs able to kill or inhibit the growth of the tuberculosis bacteria, the disease progressed to a stage where pulmonary cavities appeared.52.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes the authorities\u2019 failure to perform a drug susceptibility test in a timely fashion. The importance and value of that test may be seen from the Guidelines of the World Health Organisation listed in paragraph 24 above. Given the applicant\u2019s history of unsuccessful tuberculosis treatment, there was a vital necessity to perform that test. In particular, it was impossible to choose the appropriate treatment for the applicant without testing him for drug resistance. The Court has already condemned delays in recommending and performing drug susceptibility tests in the initial stages of the diagnostic process (see Ivko, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0105; Kushnir v.\u00a0Ukraine, no.\u00a042184\/09, \u00a7\u00a0146, 11 December 2014; Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. Georgia, no.\u00a035254\/07, \u00a7\u00a090, 22\u00a0November 2011; and Gladkiy v. Russia, no. 3242\/03, \u00a7 93, 21\u00a0December\u00a02010). As a result of the authorities\u2019 failure to arrange that vital test, the prospects of success of the first ten months of the tuberculosis treatment were undermined. The Court also considers that it was unacceptable that even though they had learned of the resistance of the applicant\u2019s tuberculosis to the treatment being used, the medical authorities did not change it within a reasonable time, but continued to use it for the next two months.53.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the above deficiencies on the part of the medical authorities were tantamount to deprivation of the requisite medical care and amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION54.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage55.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.56.\u00a0\u00a0The Government left the issue to the Court to decide.57.\u00a0\u00a0The Court awards the applicant the sum claimed in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage in full, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount to be paid in full to the applicant\u2019s mother, Ms Maylenskaya.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses58.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 850 to ensure some remuneration for his lawyer, who provided his services pro bono.59.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also left that issue to the Court to decide.60.\u00a0\u00a0Taking into account the absence of any supporting documents or actually incurred costs, the Court cannot grant the claim. It therefore rejects the claim in full.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest61.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28596":"A.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violation of the Convention in respect of the first, second and fourth applicants1.\u00a0\u00a0Complaint under Article 3 of the Convention30.\u00a0\u00a0The first, second and fourth applicants alleged that given the poor general reception conditions of asylum seekers in Italy, if removed to that country they would be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention. Article 3 provides as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d31.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates the relevant principles under Article 3 of the Convention, as set out in its judgment in the case of Tarakhel (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 93-99 and 101-104), including that, to fall within the scope of Article 3, ill\u2011treatment must attain a minimum level of severity. The assessment of this minimum is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment and its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim. In determining whether it has been shown that the applicant runs a real risk of suffering treatment proscribed by Article 3 if transferred to Italy, the Court will examine the issue in the light of all the material placed before it or, if necessary, material obtained proprio motu (see Saadi v. Italy [GC], no.\u00a037201\/06, \u00a7 128, ECHR 2008).32.\u00a0\u00a0The first, second and fourth applicants are to be regarded as asylum\u2011seekers in Italy. It therefore has to be determined whether the situation in which these applicants are likely to find themselves in that capacity can be regarded as incompatible with Article 3, taking into account that they belong to a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special protection (see Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7 97; and M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696\/09, \u00a7 251, ECHR 2011).33.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the situation in Italy for asylum\u2011seekers can in no way be compared to the situation in Greece at the time of the M.S.S.\u00a0v.\u00a0Belgium and Greece judgment (cited above), and that the structure and overall situation of the reception arrangements in Italy cannot, in themselves, act as a bar to all removals of asylum-seekers to that country (see Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 114-115).34.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the Italian Government were duly informed by their Swiss counterparts that the first and fourth applicants are a single mother with a minor child, and about their scheduled transfer to Italy. The Court understands from the circular letters dated 2 February, 15\u00a0April and 8\u00a0June 2015 from the Italian Ministry of the Interior (see paragraph 15 above) that the first and fourth applicants would be assigned one of the places in reception facilities in Italy which have been reserved for families with minor children and has no reason to believe that none of these places would be available to them upon their arrival in Italy (see A.T.H. v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 54000\/11, \u00a7 38, 17 November 2015).35.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further finds that the first and fourth applicants have not demonstrated that their prospects, on return to Italy, whether considered from a material, physical or psychological perspective, disclosed a sufficiently real and imminent risk of hardship severe enough to fall within the scope of Article 3. The Court finds no basis on which it can be assumed that the applicants would not have access to the available resources in Italy for an asylum-seeking single mother with a minor child, or that, in the event of health-related or other difficulties, the Italian authorities would not respond in an appropriate manner. In any event, it remains possible for the first and fourth applicants to lodge a fresh application with the Court (including a request for an interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court) should that need arise (A.T.H. v. the Netherlands, cited above, \u00a7 41). No submissions have been made by the applicant since the return.36.\u00a0\u00a0As to the second applicant, the Court recalls that it has already concluded that the transfer from Switzerland to Italy of adult asylum seekers, including those requiring medical treatment but who are not critically ill, would not give rise to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention (A.S. v. Switzerland, no. 39350\/13, \u00a7 38, 30 June 2015; A.M.\u00a0v.\u00a0Switzerland (dec), no. 37466\/13, \u00a7 20, 3 November 2015).Since the second applicant is an adult and has not established that he is critically ill, the Court does not see any reason to depart from its conclusions in the above-mentioned cases.37.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and therefore inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7 4.2.\u00a0\u00a0Complaints under Article 8 of the Convention38.\u00a0\u00a0Under Article 8 of the Convention the first, second and fourth applicants alleged that, by severing their ties with their numerous relatives living in Switzerland, in removing them to Italy, Switzerland would violate their right to respect for their private and family life. Article 8 reads as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.2.\u00a0\u00a0There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.\u201d39.\u00a0\u00a0The Court recalls that where a Contracting State tolerates the presence of an alien in its territory, thereby allowing him or her to await a decision on an application for a residence permit, an appeal against such a decision or a fresh application for a residence permit, such a Contracting State enables the alien to take part in the host country\u2019s society, to form relationships and to create a family there. However, this does not automatically entail that the authorities of the Contracting State concerned are, as a result, under an obligation pursuant to Article 8 of the Convention to allow him or her to settle in their country. In a similar vein, confronting the authorities of the host country with family life as a fait accompli does not entail that those authorities are, as a result, under an obligation pursuant to Article 8 of the Convention to allow the applicant to settle in the country. The Court has previously held that, in general, persons in that situation have no entitlement to expect that a right of residence will be conferred upon them (Jeunesse v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 12738\/10, \u00a7 103, 3\u00a0October 2014).40.\u00a0\u00a0The same applies to cases of asylum seekers whose presence on the territory of a Contracting State is tolerated by the national authorities on their own motion or accepted in compliance with their international obligations (A.S. v. Switzerland, cited above, \u00a7 44).41.\u00a0\u00a0Like Jeunesse (\u00a7 104) and A.S. v. Switzerland (\u00a7 45), the present case may be distinguished from cases concerning \u201csettled migrants\u201d as this notion has been used in the Court\u2019s case-law, namely, persons who have already been granted formally a right of residence in a host country. A subsequent withdrawal of that right, for instance because the person concerned has been convicted of a criminal offence, will constitute an interference with his or her right to respect for private and\/or family life within the meaning of Article 8. In such cases, the Court will examine whether the interference is justified under the second paragraph of Article 8. In this connection, it will have regard to the various criteria which it has identified in its case-law in order to determine whether a fair balance has been struck between the grounds underlying the authorities\u2019 decision to withdraw the right of residence and the Article 8 rights of the individual concerned (Jeunesse, \u00a7 104).42.\u00a0\u00a0As the factual and legal situation of a settled migrant and that of an alien seeking admission, whether or not as an asylum seeker, are not the same, the criteria developed in the Court\u2019s case-law for assessing whether the withdrawal of a residence permit of a settled migrant is compatible with Article 8 cannot be transposed automatically to the situation of the first, second and fourth applicants. Rather, the question to be examined in the present case is whether, having regard to the circumstances as a whole, the Swiss authorities were under a duty pursuant to Article 8 to grant the first, second and fourth applicants a residence permit in Switzerland, whether or not as asylum seekers, thus enabling them to exercise any family life they might have established on Swiss territory (mutatis mutandis, ibid., \u00a7 105). The instant case thus concerns not only family life but also immigration lato\u00a0sensu. For this reason, it is to be seen as one involving an allegation of failure on the part of the respondent State to comply with a positive obligation under Article 8 of the Convention (mutatis mutandis, ibid., \u00a7\u00a0105).43.\u00a0\u00a0The Court recalls that in a case which concerns family life as well as immigration, the extent of a State\u2019s obligations to admit to its territory relatives of persons residing there will vary according to the particular circumstances of the persons involved and the general interest. Factors to be taken into account in this context are the extent to which family life would effectively be ruptured, the extent of the ties in the Contracting State, whether there are insurmountable obstacles in the way of the family living in the country of origin of the alien concerned and whether there are factors of immigration control (for example, a history of breaches of immigration law) or considerations of public order weighing in favour of exclusion (ibid., \u00a7 107).44.\u00a0\u00a0Another important consideration is whether family life was created at a time when the persons involved were aware that the immigration status of one of them was such that the persistence of that family life within the host State would from the outset be precarious. It is the Court\u2019s well\u2011established case-law that, where this is the case, it is likely only to be in exceptional circumstances that the removal of the non-national family member will constitute a violation of Article 8 (ibid., \u00a7 108).45.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the Court notes that there is no trace of the applicants\u2019 presence in Switzerland before they had lodged their asylum request on 27 August 2013 and their presence thereafter on Swiss territory was tolerated by the domestic authorities for about one month (see\u00a0paragraph 4 above) and only for the purpose of assessing their status as asylum seekers and complying with their relevant obligations under the Dublin Regulation and national law (mutatis mutandis, A.S. v. Switzerland, cited above, \u00a7 49).The Court has previously held that there will be no family life, within the meaning of Article 8, between parents and adult children or between adult siblings unless they can demonstrate additional elements of dependence (Slivenko v. Latvia [GC], no. 48321\/99, \u00a7 97, ECHR 2003-X; Kwakye-Nti and Dufie v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 31519\/96, 7 November 2000), and similar considerations apply to other familial relations such as that between aunt and niece (F.N. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 3202\/09, \u00a7 36, 17\u00a0September 2013).Assuming that the first, second and fourth applicants and their relatives living in Switzerland, including the third applicant, had maintained family ties when they were living in Syria and assuming that additional elements of dependence could be demonstrated in the applicants\u2019 case, it cannot be argued that the tolerance by the domestic authorities of the applicants\u2019 presence on Swiss territory for a lengthy period of time had enabled them to establish and develop strong family ties in Switzerland (a contrario, Jeunesse, cited above, \u00a7 116).Bearing in mind the margin of appreciation afforded to States in immigration matters, the Court found that a fair balance had been struck between the competing interests at stake, namely the personal interests of the first, second and fourth applicants, in establishing any family life in Switzerland on the one hand and, on the other, the public order interests of the respondent Government in controlling immigration (ibid., \u00a7 51).46.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above considerations, the first, second and fourth applicants\u2019 complaint under Article 8 is manifestly ill-founded and therefore inadmissible, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 of the Convention.3.\u00a0\u00a0Complaint under Article 13 combined with Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention47.\u00a0\u00a0The first, second and fourth applicants alleged that they had been denied an effective remedy in Switzerland, in respect of their complaints under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention because in its decision of 21\u00a0October 2013 the Federal Administrative Court failed to take into account the information indicating a real risk that they would be exposed to extremely poor living conditions in Italy. Article\u00a013 of the Convention provides:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d48.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will confine itself to noting that, according to its standing case-law, Article 13 requires a remedy in domestic law to be available in respect only of such grievances as are \u201carguable\u201d in terms of the Convention (see, among many other authorities, Boyle and Rice v. the United Kingdom, 27 April 1988, \u00a7 52, Series A no. 131; more recently, Athanassoglou and Others v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27644\/95, \u00a7 58, ECHR 2000\u2011IV; Hatton\u00a0and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 36022\/97, \u00a7 137, ECHR 2003\u2011VIII; Taheri Kandomabadi v. the Netherlands (dec.), nos. 6276\/03 and 6122\/04, 29 June 2004; and El Morabit v. the Netherlands (dec.), no.\u00a046897\/07, 18 May 2010). In view of its findings above, the Court does not consider that an arguable claim has been established under Articles\u00a03 and 8 of the Convention.49.\u00a0\u00a0Consequently this complaint too is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and of the Convention.B.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violation of the Convention in respect of the third applicant50.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the third applicant has been granted refugee status in Switzerland on 9 March 2015. She is therefore no more subject to a risk of transfer to Italy.For this reason, the Court considers that the matter has been resolved within the meaning of Article 37 \u00a7 1 (b) of the Convention (Khan\u00a0v.\u00a0Germany [GC], no. 38030\/12, \u00a7 33, 21 September 2016; K.U.\u00a0v.\u00a0Switzerland (dec.), no. 30349\/13, 20 January 2015; T.A. and others\u00a0v.\u00a0Switzerland (dec.), no. 50165\/14, 7 July 2015) and that this part of the application should be struck out of its list of cases.Moreover, in accordance with Article 37 \u00a7 1 in fine, the Court finds no special circumstances regarding respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and its Protocols which require the continued examination of the case in respect of the third applicant.51.\u00a0\u00a0The Court points out that, unlike Article 41 of the Convention, which comes into play only if the Court has previously found \u201cthat there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto\u201d, Rule 43\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04 allows it to make an award solely for costs and expenses in the event that an application has been struck out of the list of cases (see Sisojeva and Others v.\u00a0Latvia [GC], no. 60654\/00, \u00a7 132, ECHR 2007 and Kova\u010di\u0107 and Others v.\u00a0Slovenia [GC], nos. 44574\/98, 45133\/98 and 48316\/99, \u00a7 275, 3\u00a0October\u00a02008).52.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the third applicant claims CHF 1,390.83 (approximately EUR 1,280) for costs and expenses incurred as a result of the Swiss authorities\u2019 refusal to recognize he right to maintain family life in Switzerland (see paragraph 11 above).53.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that, when the Federal Administrative Court delivered its judgment on 21 October 2013, the third applicant was not legally married and her partner was only tolerated on Swiss territory for the purpose of his own asylum application. She could therefore not reasonably expect to be entitled to stay in Switzerland.In these circumstances, the Court finds no reason to make any specific award in respect of reimbursement of costs.For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,Declares the application inadmissible in respect of the first, second and fourth applicants ;Decides to strike the application out of the list of cases in respect of the third applicant.Done in English and notified in writing on 27 October 2016.Fato\u015f Arac\u0131Luis L\u00f3pez Guerra\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Deputy RegistrarPresident","28598":"A.\u00a0\u00a0Complaint under Article 3 of the Convention20.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that, if they were transferred to Italy, they would be exposed to a risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. Article 3 of the Convention reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d21.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates the relevant principles of Article 3 of the Convention, as set out most recently in Tarakhel v. Switzerland [GC], no.\u00a029217\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 28-48 and \u00a7\u00a7 101-104, ECHR 2014 (extracts), which include the need for the ill-treatment to attain a minimum level of severity to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment and its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim.22.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicants\u2019 situation as a family with minor children is one of the relevant factors in making this assessment. The material date for this assessment is the actual date of expulsion. However, if an applicant has not yet been removed when the Court examines the case, the relevant time for assessing the existence of the risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 will be that of the proceedings before the Court (see Chahal v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, \u00a7 86, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-V; Saadi v. Italy [GC], no.\u00a037201\/06, \u00a7 133, ECHR 2008; M.A. v. Switzerland, no. 52589\/13, \u00a7 54, 18 November 2014; and Khamrakulov v. Russia, no. 68894\/13, \u00a7 64, 16\u00a0April 2015).23.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants are to be considered as asylum-seekers in Italy. It thus has to be determined whether the situation in which the applicants are likely to find themselves in Italy can be regarded as incompatible with Article 3, taking into account the family\u2019s situation as asylum-seekers with young children and serious health problems and, as such, belonging to a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special protection (see Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7 97; and M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696\/09, \u00a7 251, ECHR 2011).24.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the situation in Italy for asylum-seekers cannot be compared to the situation in Greece at the time of the M.S.S. v.\u00a0Belgium and Greece judgment (cited above) and that the structure and overall situation of the reception arrangements in Italy cannot in themselves act as a bar to all removals of asylum-seekers to that country (see Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 114-115).25.\u00a0\u00a0As to the applicants\u2019 personal situation, they are a family with two minor children. Their situation is thus similar to that of the applicants in Tarakhel (cited above), who were a family with six minor children. However, unlike the situation in Tarakhel, the Finnish authorities \u2013 as regards transfers to Italy under the Dublin Regulation \u2013 decide in consultation with the Italian authorities how and when the transfer of an asylum-seeker to the competent Italian authorities will take place. In particular, where a family with children is involved, prior notice of transfer is given to the Italian authorities, thus allowing the latter to identify where adequate accommodation is available.26.\u00a0\u00a0The Court accepts that for efficiency reasons, the Italian authorities cannot be expected to keep open and unoccupied for an extended period of time places in specific reception and accommodation centres reserved for asylum-seekers awaiting transfer to Italy in accordance with the Dublin Regulation and that, for this reason, once a guarantee of placement in a reception centre has been received by the State requesting transfer, transfer should take place as quickly as practically possible (see M.R. and Others v.\u00a0Finland (dec.), no. 13630\/16, \u00a7 27, 24 May 2016; and S.M.H. v.\u00a0the\u00a0Netherlands (dec.), no. 5868\/13, \u00a7 49, 17 May 2016).27.\u00a0\u00a0In this context, the Court notes that on 23 March and 27 May 2015 respectively the Italian Government were duly informed by the Finnish authorities about the applicants\u2019 family situation. The Court is confident that, when the applicants\u2019 removal takes place, the Finnish authorities will duly inform the Italian authorities of the applicants\u2019 removal, in order for the applicants to be taken charge of, upon arrival, in a manner appropriate to the age of the children and that the family will be kept together (see Tarakhel, cited above, and the Italian authorities\u2019 assurances provided in the letter of 8 June 2015 (see paragraph 12 above)).28.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes the applicants\u2019 concern that no individual or specific guarantees have yet been given by the Italian authorities but, in the absence of any concrete indication in the case file, does not find it demonstrated that the applicants would be unable to obtain such guarantees before their removal to Italy. Furthermore, the Court considers that the applicants have not submitted any evidence showing that their future prospects, if returned to Italy, whether looked at from a material, physical or psychological perspective, disclose a sufficiently real and imminent risk of hardship that is severe enough to fall within the scope of Article 3.29.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and therefore inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7 4.30.\u00a0\u00a0Consequently, the application of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court comes to an end.B.\u00a0\u00a0Complaint under Article 13 of the Convention31.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also complained under Article 13 of the Convention that they had no effective remedy, as their removal order could be immediately enforced and they would therefore be unable to take full advantage of their right to appeal.32.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. Accordingly, this part of the application must also be rejected as manifestly ill-founded and declared inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.For these reasons, the Court unanimouslyDeclares the application inadmissible.\u00a0Done in English and notified in writing on 27 October 2016.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Renata DegenerKristina Pardalos\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Deputy RegistrarPresident","28639":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION45.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been unlawfully deprived of his liberty on 6 October 2006, as he had been held at the police station and subsequently in hospital, in handcuffs and in the presence of a police officer, before his formal arrest. He relied on Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. The relevant part reads as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:...(c)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; ...\u201d46.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that on 6 October 2006 the applicant had been arrested on suspicion of theft and murder, but denied that there had been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1. It had been impossible to draw up a record of the applicant\u2019s arrest as a suspect because he had jumped out of the window and been hospitalised. As soon as he had been discharged he had been remanded in custody in the criminal proceedings concerning the theft and murder and placed in a detention facility.47.\u00a0\u00a0They also claimed that the applicant had not properly raised his complaints of a delay in drawing up the record of his arrest and the unlawfulness of his detention before the domestic authorities. They considered that his request to institute criminal proceedings had not been a proper remedy because there had actually been grounds for his arrest and detention. His complaint was therefore inadmissible.48.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that the officers had failed to promptly draw up the record of his arrest after taking him to the police station. He argued that because the criminal case had been opened before his arrest and he had been placed on the police wanted list as a suspect in the case, he should have been questioned as a suspect as opposed to being \u201cinterviewed\u201d by the police officers. He would have had the benefit of the relevant procedural guarantees, including access to a lawyer. Moreover, his \u201cinterview\u201d at the police station had not been documented and his procedural status had remained unclear. He argued that his criminal complaint had been sufficient for an inquiry to be carried out into the lawfulness of his detention.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility49.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes at the outset that the applicant, who was on the police wanted list, was de facto arrested on suspicion of theft on 6\u00a0October 2006, that a record of his arrest as a suspect in the theft case was drawn up on 10 October 2006, that his mother had lodged a complaint concerning the lawfulness of his detention from 6 to 10 October 2006 (see paragraph\u00a031 above) and that the authorities had carried out an inquiry into that complaint. The inquiry found that on 6\u00a0October 2006 the applicant had been arrested on suspicion of theft, that he had subsequently been interviewed by police officers Ch. and F. for five hours in room no. 217 on the first floor of the police station, that he had been handcuffed, that he had jumped out of the window, that he had been handcuffed in hospital and that his hospitalisation had made it impossible for him to be formally arrested as a suspect (see paragraphs 35 and 36 above). The inquiry resulted in the decision not to institute criminal proceedings, in particular because none of the elements of the offences provided for in Articles 127 and 301 of the Criminal Code (unlawful deprivation of liberty and unlawful arrest and detention respectively) were present in respect of the actions of the police officers (see paragraph 33 above). That decision was upheld by the domestic courts (see paragraph 40 above).50.\u00a0\u00a0The authorities had been made aware of the alleged unlawfulness of the applicant\u2019s detention by way of the criminal\u2011law complaint which prompted the inquiry by the investigative authorities, whose outcome was upheld by the domestic courts. The Government\u2019s non\u2011exhaustion objection should therefore be dismissed (see Aleksandr Sokolov v. Russia, no.\u00a020364\/05, \u00a7 66, 4\u00a0November 2010).51.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits52.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is not convinced by the Government\u2019s argument that, while having lawful grounds for the applicant\u2019s arrest and detention, the authorities had had a reason not to record his arrest as a suspect in a timely manner because he had jumped from the window and been subsequently hospitalised.53.\u00a0\u00a0It notes that there were at least five hours between the applicant\u2019s actual arrest on suspicion of theft and his fall from the window. During that time he was interviewed by the police officers, while handcuffed, about the circumstances of the theft and murder. It also notes that the prosecutor\u2019s office expressed concerns about the lawfulness of the police interviews in view of the applicant\u2019s actual status as a suspect in the criminal case (see paragraph 34 (i) above).54.\u00a0\u00a0The Court found a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 in the case of Fartushin v.\u00a0Russia (no.\u00a038887\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a049\u201154 8\u00a0October 2015), which raised an identical problem, namely the unrecorded detention of a suspect in a criminal case by the police. In the present case, as in Fartushin, the applicant\u2019s unrecorded detention at the hands of the police led to his being deprived of access to a lawyer and all other rights of a suspect, which meant that he was left completely at the mercy of those holding him. As such, he was vulnerable not only to arbitrary interference with his right to liberty but also to ill-treatment.55.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes that he was deprived of his liberty within the meaning of Article 5 while being held at the police station.56.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the subsequent period, the Court observes that after his fall from the first floor window the applicant, who was conscious, was taken to hospital in handcuffs, accompanied by police officers Ch. and F. He was shackled to the bed by one of his hands and guarded by a police officer, the lawfulness of which raised a concern for the domestic courts (see paragraph\u00a039 above). The Court considers that the applicant was also deprived of his liberty during this period within the meaning of Article\u00a05 (see Aleksey Borisov v. Russia, no. 12008\/06, \u00a7 85, 16 July 2015).57.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that the applicant\u2019s condition was not an obstacle to the authorities carrying out investigative measures on the day of his hospitalisation. He was questioned twice, first in the theft case and then in the murder case. The Government\u2019s argument that the applicant\u2019s hospitalisation made it impossible for the authorities to draw up a record of his arrest is therefore not made out.58.\u00a0\u00a0The Court takes note of the relevant domestic law (see paragraphs\u00a041\u201144 above), which expressly stipulated that a record of arrest had to be drawn up within three hours of the time the suspect was brought to the investigating authorities, and that the period of arrest could not be more than forty-eight hours without a court order.59.\u00a0\u00a0It finds the applicant\u2019s unrecorded detention from the time of his actual arrest on 6 October 2006 until his formal arrest on 10\u00a0October 2006 a negation of the fundamentally important guarantees contained in Article\u00a05 and incompatible with the requirement of lawfulness and the very purpose of that Article.60.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION61.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been subjected to ill-treatment by officers at the police station and that no effective investigation into his complaint had been carried out. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d62.\u00a0\u00a0The Government disputed the applicant\u2019s allegations, relying on the investigating authority\u2019s most recent decision. They submitted that he had not provided evidence in support of his account of events, while the investigating authority had carried out a comprehensive inquiry in accordance with the domestic law.63.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaint, noting in particular that the Government\u2019s version that he had jumped out of the window in an attempt to abscond was unreasonable: it had been cold outside; he had been handcuffed and he would have had to jump on the table in front of the window unnoticed, which would have been hard to accomplish with two police officers in the room. Furthermore, he maintained that the investigation into his complaint of police ill-treatment had been ineffective. The forensic medical expert review had been carried out two months after the incident and in his absence. The Government had not provided any evidence to show that he had refused to participate in his forensic medical examination in person. Moreover, the inquiry into his complaint of ill\u2011treatment had not been prompt, which had resulted in the loss of evidence.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility64.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0Substantive aspect of the complaint65.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant general principles were recently summarised by the Court\u2019s Grand Chamber in the case of Bouyid v. Belgium ([GC], no.\u00a023380\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 81-88, ECHR 2015). In particular, where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of individuals within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention. The burden of proof is then on the Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation by producing evidence establishing facts which cast doubt on the account of events given by the victim. In the absence of such an explanation, the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the Government. That is justified by the fact that those in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them (ibid., \u00a7 83).66.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not dispute that for at least five hours during the night the applicant was interviewed while handcuffed by two police officers in a room on the first floor of the police station about the circumstances of the theft and murder of which he was suspected, until he fell out of the window.67.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did dispute, however, the applicant\u2019s allegations that during the police interviews he was subjected to ill-treatment in order to make him confess to the crimes.68.\u00a0\u00a0The Court acknowledges that the\u00a0witness statements suggest that the applicant had no injuries before his arrest (see paragraph 9 above). It also notes that after the time spent in police custody he had medically diagnosed injuries. While the fractures to both feet were, according to the official version of events, the result of the applicant falling out of the window (see paragraphs 29-30 above), the remaining injuries on different parts and sides of his body \u2013 the eyes, face, left ear, right tooth, knees and left hip \u2013 could arguably have been received, at least partially, as a result of being punched and kicked in addition to falling from the first floor (see the forensic medical expert\u2019s opinion in paragraph 30 above). The above factors are sufficient to create a presumption in favour of the applicant\u2019s account of events. The fact that he was deprived of his liberty arbitrarily makes this presumption stronger.69.\u00a0\u00a0The Government suggested little to dispute the applicant\u2019s account of events. They submitted that he had refused to participate in the forensic medical examination, as was stated in the expert\u2019s report (see paragraph\u00a030 above); that he had allegedly told the police officers that he had jumped out of the window himself in order to flee; that the forensic expert had been unable to establish the exact time and order of the injuries, but had considered that they could have been received as a result of a fall from the first floor; and that the allegation of a 40 kg weight shackled to his hands had been refuted by the examination of the police station and the explanations given by the police officers and ambulance staff. They further pointed to the applicant being drunk, suffering from a psychiatric disorder according to the experts\u2019 report of 24 November 2006, his criminal record, as well as his practising diving at a young age.70.\u00a0\u00a0Even though the factors relied on by the Government are of a secondary nature and not capable of casting doubt on the applicant\u2019s account of events, the Court will address them. It notes that the Government did not produce any written refusal by the applicant to participate in the forensic medical examination and that the circumstances of that alleged refusal were never clarified. Given the authorities\u2019 duty to take all reasonable steps available to them to secure evidence concerning alleged ill\u2011treatment, including, inter alia, forensic evidence (see, for example, Vladimir Fedorov v. Russia, no.\u00a019223\/04, \u00a7 67, 30 July 2009), the Court cannot lend credence to the Government\u2019s statement. Nor can it lend any credence to the police officers\u2019 explanations that the applicant allegedly told them off the record that he had jumped out of the window himself in order to flee without any influence by the police officers (see paragraph\u00a038 above). The forensic medical expert, as noted above, did not exclude the possibility that the injuries (other than those to the feet) could have been received as a result of a fall from the first floor just as much as being punched and kicked.71.\u00a0\u00a0As to the Government\u2019s argument that the allegation of a heavy weight being shackled to the applicant\u2019s hands in office no. 217 was refuted by evidence, the Court notes that the paramedic and his assistant explained that they had found the applicant lying on the tarmac handcuffed, without any weights shackled to him. However, the exact order of events, including the time and witnesses to the applicant\u2019s fall, was never established. The investigating authority thus referred to explanations by police officer T. that he had been the first to see the applicant and go near him after his fall from the window and that nothing had been shackled to his hands. However, in his earlier statements the same officer had asserted that he had not gone near the applicant and had not seen him or whether there had been any objects nearby (see paragraph 38 above). No explanation to the change in his statements was given in the domestic inquiry. Furthermore, office no.\u00a0217 was not examined immediately after the incident, which was one of the grounds for the annulment of the investigator\u2019s refusal to open a criminal case (see paragraph 34 (i) and (ii) above). It was examined more than two months after the incident, which makes it impossible to conclude that there had been no weight there.72.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court observes that the psychiatric experts\u2019 report did not examine the applicant\u2019s fall from the window and cannot therefore be relied on to argue that his psychiatric disorder had caused him to jump out of the window himself without any connection to the police officers\u2019 actions.73.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the Government failed to discharge their burden of proof and to produce evidence capable of casting doubt on the applicant\u2019s account of events, which it therefore finds established.74.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not claim that the recourse to physical force the applicant complained of had been made strictly necessary by his own conduct; they simply denied that any force had been used. The Court finds that the acts of violence the applicant was subjected to during the police interviews amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment.75.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has been a violation of the substantive aspect of Article 3.76.\u00a0\u00a0This finding makes it unnecessary to resolve the parties\u2019 dispute as to the immediate cause of the applicant\u2019s fall from the window, the applicant asserting that he was pushed by a police officer and the Government claiming that he jumped out of the window himself. The Court notes, however, that even assuming that the applicant, after enduring ill\u2011treatment for five hours and in order to stop it, could have himself jumped out of the window \u2013 which was opened by the police officers despite the risk of him fleeing or committing suicide according to their own assessment (see paragraphs 13, 22 and 37 above) \u2013 this would not absolve the State from responsibility given the authorities\u2019 duty to protect the physical well\u2011being of persons in custody and take certain basic precautions in order to minimise any potential risk (see, mutatis mutandis, Lykova v.\u00a0Russia, no. 68736\/11, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0114-15 and 128-31, 22 December 2015).2.\u00a0\u00a0Procedural aspect of the complaint77.\u00a0\u00a0It is not disputed by the Government that the State was under a procedural obligation, arising from Article 3 of the Convention, to carry out an effective investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill\u2011treatment.78.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has previously found that in the context of the Russian legal system in cases of credible allegations of treatment proscribed under Article 3 of the Convention, it is incumbent on the authorities to open a criminal case and conduct a proper criminal investigation in which the whole range of investigative measures are carried out and which constitutes an effective remedy for victims of police ill\u2011treatment under domestic law. The mere fact of an investigating authority\u2019s refusal to open a criminal investigation into credible allegations of serious ill\u2011treatment in police custody is indicative of the State\u2019s failure to comply with its obligation under Article 3 to carry out an effective investigation (see Lyapin v. Russia, no. 46956\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 129 and 132-36, 24 July 2014 and subsequent cases, in many of which the Government acknowledged a violation under the procedural aspect of Article 3, such as Razzakov v. Russia, no. 57519\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a057\u201161, 5\u00a0February 2015; Gorshchuk v. Russia, no. 31316\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a035-38, 6\u00a0October 2015; Turbylev v. Russia, no.\u00a04722\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 67-72, 6 October 2015; Fartushin, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a044-45; and Aleksandr Andreyev v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a02281\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 63-65, 23\u00a0February 2016).79.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has no reason to hold otherwise in the present case, involving credible allegations of ill-treatment of which the authorities were promptly made aware. The investigating authority carried out the pre\u2011investigation inquiry and decided that there was nothing to show that the elements of a crime were present in respect of the actions of the police officers. On that basis they refused to open a criminal investigation. In total, they took twenty-four such decisions. The decisions were so poorly reasoned that the higher domestic authorities repeatedly set them aside as unsubstantiated, unlawful or based on an incomplete inquiry, sometimes on the same or next day. Those authorities noted on several occassions that their instructions, issued between half a year to a year and a half earlier, had never been fulfilled by the investigators responsible for dealing with the applicant\u2019s complaint, one of whom was found liable in disciplinary proceedings for stalling the inquiry. This makes it all the more surprising that such an inquiry was concluded two years later by the domestic courts, finding that the investigating authority had carried out all measures necessary for establishing the relevant facts fully, objectively and thoroughly, and had taken a reasoned decision on the basis of a full and comprehensive inquiry in accordance with the law (see paragraph\u00a040 above). In assessing whether the investigating authority\u2019s refusal to open a criminal case was lawful and well founded, in the proceedings under Article\u00a0125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the domestic courts applied strikingly low standards which fell short of the requirements of Article 3.80.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the Court finds that the refusal to open a criminal case into the applicant\u2019s credible allegations of ill-treatment at the hands of the police amounted to a failure to carry out an effective investigation as required by Article 3 of the Convention.81.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural head.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION82.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained, under Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 3, that the authorities had failed to carry out an effective investigation into his complaint of ill-treatment in police custody. Article 13 reads as follows:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d83.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had availed himself of an effective domestic remedy with respect to his complaint under Article\u00a03 of the Convention.84.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that he had been denied an effective remedy for his complaint, since the pre\u2011investigation inquiry, without a criminal case being opened against the police officers, had not secured an effective investigation into his complaint. He further submitted that there had been no effective supervision by the prosecutor\u2019s office over the refusals to open a criminal case, and that the five-year term for keeping the pre-investigation inquiry material had resulted in evidence being destroyed before the expiration of the relevant time-limits for prosecution.85.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is closely linked to the issue raised under the procedural aspect of Article 3 of the Convention and that it should therefore be declared admissible.86.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the finding of a violation of Article 3 under its procedural aspect on account of the respondent State\u2019s failure to carry out an effective investigation, the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine this complaint under Article 13.IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION87.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage88.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 200,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.89.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the claim, arguing that the amount claimed should be significantly reduced. In particular, they noted that the applicant had not sustained any serious injuries, and that there had been no serious consequences for his health.90.\u00a0\u00a0Making its assessment on an equitable basis and having regard to the nature of the violations found, the Court awards the applicant EUR\u00a023,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses91.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not claim any amount in respect of pecuniary damage.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest92.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28670":"I.\u00a0\u00a0SCOPE OF THE CASE60.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant raised several new complaints in her reply to the Government\u2019s observations of 10 April 2012 on the admissibility and merits of this case. In particular, she additionally complained, under Article 6 of the Convention, that the length of proceedings in her case had been unreasonable, and referred to Article\u00a013 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in respect of the facts of the present case.61.\u00a0\u00a0In the Court\u2019s view, the applicant\u2019s new complaints are not an elaboration of her original complaints to the Court on which the parties had commented before they were raised. The Court considers, therefore, that it is not appropriate to take up these matters in the context of the present case (see, in particular, Piryanik v. Ukraine, no. 75788\/01, \u00a7 20, 19 April 2005).II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE\u00a03 OF THE CONVENTION62.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that for an extended period of time the State authorities had failed to protect her from systematic inhuman and degrading treatment, that is, violence and verbal harassment by the co\u2011owners of her flat, and their guests and tenants. She relied on Article\u00a03 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility63.\u00a0\u00a0The Government alleged that the available domestic remedies in respect of the above complaint had not been exhausted when their observations had been lodged (23\u00a0December 2013). First of all, at that time the criminal proceedings against the co-owners of the applicant\u2019s flat, instituted in 2007, had been still pending at the material time; thus it had been premature to prejudge their outcome. Secondly, had the applicant been unsatisfied with the manner in which the law-enforcement authorities had conducted these proceedings or generally responded to her complaints, it had been open for her to lodge a complaint against them seeking damages for delayed and ineffective investigation. Finally, it had always been open to the applicant to institute private criminal prosecution proceedings to seek punishment of the alleged offenders for the episodes of violent behaviour, in particular, under Articles\u00a0125 and 126 of the Criminal Code. She had not done so until July 2006, and even then she had failed to pursue her claim.64.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant disagreed. She submitted, in particular, that the public criminal proceedings against the alleged offenders had been instituted with undue delay and had been unreasonably protracted and thus ineffective. As regards the other remedies mentioned by the Government, they were prima facie ineffective in her case. In particular, a private criminal action was incapable of redressing the situation of continuous and systematic harassment. At best, it could result in insignificant penalties for isolated incidents of physical violence. In any event, the applicant had tried this remedy in 2006, and her complaint had been rejected on formal procedural grounds more than a year after it had been accepted for examination. By that time the public criminal proceedings against the principal offenders had been instituted. In the applicant\u2019s view, these proceedings could reasonably have led to incorporation and proper qualification of the entirety of her complaints. In this situation it had become pointless for the applicant to pursue a separate private action. Lastly, as regards the civil claim against the law-enforcement authorities, the Government had not shown how this remedy would have operated in practice and how it would have been capable of speeding up the resolution of the applicant\u2019s systematic problem.65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that, as regards the first objection raised by the Government, on 18 September 2014 the final decision was taken in the criminal proceedings against A.N., V.S. and A.L. Accordingly, it considers that the Government\u2019s objection that the applicant\u2019s complaint had been premature is no longer valid (see Kirpichenko v. Ukraine, no. 38833\/03, \u00a7\u00a063, 2 April 2015).66.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the other objections, they are closely linked to the substance of the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article\u00a03 of the Convention and must therefore be joined to the merits.67.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that otherwise this complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits68.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that for a number of years starting from November\u00a02001 she had lived in a continuous situation of harassment from the co-owners of her flat, and their guests and tenants. In the meantime, for a very long period of time, the authorities had been \u201cdissecting\u201d this continuous situation into isolated trivial conflicts and had refused to see the underlying structural problem. While eventually the criminal proceedings had been initiated and the applicant\u2019s submissions had been adequately incorporated in the body of the evidence against the principal offenders, the delay in instituting these proceedings and their subsequent length had rendered them ineffective.69.\u00a0\u00a0The Government acknowledged that the applicant, a retired single woman, was a vulnerable person, and that the State had a positive duty to protect her from ill-treatment by her flat co-owners and their guests and tenants. Further, they argued that this duty had been duly discharged in the applicant\u2019s case. In particular, the initial reluctance of the police to institute criminal proceedings against the purported offenders was understandable and justified: it had not been easy to distinguish the applicant\u2019s case from a trivial domestic dispute. The co-owners of the applicant\u2019s flat and their guests and tenants had a legal right to be in that flat. Both sides had accused each other of provoking the conflicts and creating intolerable living conditions. As the time lapsed, it had become obvious that the situation had been more complicated. Accordingly, criminal proceedings had been instituted and the applicant\u2019s offenders had been sentenced to significant prison terms. It had also always been open to the applicant under the law to appeal in court against the decisions not to institute criminal proceedings against the offenders as well as to prosecute them in private criminal actions for the particular incidents of ill-treatment. The fact that she had not pursued these avenues cannot be held against the State.70.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the obligation on the High Contracting Parties under Article\u00a01 of the Convention to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, taken together with Article\u00a03, requires States to put in place effective criminal-law provisions to deter the commission of offences against personal integrity, backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and punishment of breaches of such provisions. This requirement extends to ill-treatment administered by private individuals (see, among other authorities, D.F. v. Latvia, no. 11160\/07, \u00a7 83, 29 October 2013 and Valiulien\u0117 v. Lithuania, no. 33234\/07, \u00a7 75, 26 March 2013). For this positive obligation to arise, it must be established that the ill-treatment complained of reached the threshold of severity proscribed under Article\u00a03 (see B.V. and Others v. Croatia (dec.), no. 38435\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 152-53, 15\u00a0December 2015) or that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk of such ill-treatment (see \u0110or\u0111evi\u0107 v. Croatia, no. 41526\/10, \u00a7 139, ECHR 2012).71.\u00a0\u00a0The State authorities may not be expected to set in motion the criminal-law machinery in every case where neighbours, household members or other individuals engage in trivial disputes and seek to settle an ongoing personal conflict by involving the criminal justice authorities (see B.V. and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0153, 155-58). On the other hand, it is important that measures of effective protection against domestic violence and other types of harassment are put in place for vulnerable persons, including reasonable steps to prevent likely ill-treatment (see \u0110ur\u0111evi\u0107 v. Croatia, no. 52442\/09, \u00a7\u00a0102, ECHR 2011 (extracts)). Where an individual makes a credible assertion of having been subjected to repeated acts of domestic violence or other types of harassment, however trivial the isolated incidents might be, it falls on the domestic authorities to assess the situation in its entirety, including the risk that similar incidents would continue. This assessment should, above all, take due account of the psychological effect that the risk of repeated harassment, intimidation and violence may have on the victim\u2019s everyday life (see Valiulien\u0117, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 68-69; \u0110or\u0111evi\u0107, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a090-93; and M. and M. v. Croatia, no. 10161\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 141-42, ECHR\u00a02015 (extracts)). Where it is established that a particular individual has been systematically targeted and future abuse is likely to follow, apart from responses to specific incidents, the authorities may be called upon to implement an appropriate action of a general nature to combat the underlying problem (see \u0110or\u0111evi\u0107, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0147-49).72.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes the repeated and premeditated nature of the verbal and physical assaults, to which a group of younger and stronger men was subjecting the applicant, a retired single woman, for several years. While some episodes complained of, taken in isolation, could qualify as trivial domestic disputes between lawful flat occupants, other instances of violence, resulting in injuries (see paragraphs\u00a010, 13 and\u00a018 above), were very serious in and of themselves. As the incidents regularly repeated over a period of time, they must be viewed as a continuing situation, which is an aggravating circumstance (see Valiulien\u0117, cited above, \u00a7\u00a068). It also follows from the case file that repeated physical and verbal attacks caused the applicant profound mental suffering, distress and constant fear for her life and limb. This suffering was aggravated in view that violence and harassment occurred in the privacy of the applicant\u2019s home, which prevented any outside help.73.\u00a0\u00a0Regard being had to the repeated and premeditated nature of verbal attacks coupled with incidents of physical violence by a group of men against a single senior woman, the Court considers that the treatment, to which the applicant was subjected, reached the threshold of severity falling within the ambit of Article\u00a03 of the Convention. It further finds that this treatment engaged the State\u2019s positive duty under Article\u00a03 of the Convention to put in motion the protective legislative and administrative framework.74.\u00a0\u00a0It follows from the case file that eventually the applicant\u2019s principal miscreants were publicly prosecuted and sentenced to significant prison terms. In addition to that, the judicial authorities ordered confiscation of their property. It is notable that the charges against the applicant\u2019s aggressors were qualified in law as extortion rather than harassment or a similar offence. However, it appears from the domestic judgments that violent conduct vis-\u00e0-vis the applicant was taken into account in the courts\u2019 analysis and that the measures adopted have effectively shielded her from the risk of sharing the flat with her former aggressors or their acquaintances in future. Nevertheless, assuming that the charges against the applicant\u2019s aggressors have adequately addressed her complaints concerning their violent conduct and systematic harassment, the Court notes that it took the State authorities over twelve years to resolve the matter.75.\u00a0\u00a0In view of this, the Court reiterates that for the purposes of Article\u00a03, the protective measures should allow the authorities to respond as a matter of particular urgency in a manner proportionate to the perceived risk faced by the person concerned (see D.F., cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a091 and 95). Where a situation warrants institution of criminal proceedings, these proceedings as a whole, including the trial stage, must satisfy the requirements of Article\u00a03 of the Convention and allow for the examination of the merits of the case within a reasonable time (see, for example, M. and M., cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0147\u2011152).76.\u00a0\u00a0The Court accepts that at the early stages of the confrontation between the applicant and her flat co-owners the domestic authorities might have experienced certain difficulties in qualifying the situation in law. However, it has not been presented with a plausible explanation, which could justify the entire delay of over twelve-years.77.\u00a0\u00a0As regards a possibility to initiate a private prosecution under Articles\u00a0125 and 126 of the Criminal Code (cited in paragraph\u00a057 above) or to institute civil proceedings against the law-enforcement authorities for inaction, the Court reiterates that the crux of the applicant\u2019s complaint was her systematic harassment. In the meantime, the national authorities, although aware of that situation, failed to take appropriate measures to punish the offenders and prevent further assaults and insults. Thus, the situation called for a swift intervention by the public officials. The Government have not shown that either of the aforementioned remedies could lead to such an intervention and effective resolution of the underlying systemic problem.78.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances the Court dismisses the Government\u2019s objection as to the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies previously joined to the merits and finds that the respondent State failed in discharging its positive duty under Article\u00a03 of the Convention to protect the applicant from repeated verbal harassment and physical violence by the co-owners of her flat and their acquaintances on account of extreme delays in instituting and conducting public criminal proceedings against the co-owners of the applicant\u2019s flat.79.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION80.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also complained that the State authorities had failed to protect her home and private life from unwanted intrusion by strangers. She relied on Article\u00a08 of the Convention in this respect. The provision in question, insofar as relevant, reads as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. ...\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility81.\u00a0\u00a0The Government alleged that the available domestic remedies in respect of the above complaint had also not been exhausted. In so far as the applicant\u2019s complaint may have been related to the incidents of violent and abusive conduct by the co-owners of her flat and their guests and tenants, the Government adduced the arguments similar to those discussed above in respect of Article\u00a03.82.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the more trivial side of the conflict (that is to say, disagreements concerning the manner in which the premises and household appliances had to be used) \u2013 in the Government\u2019s view, the applicant had never tried to use the numerous civil-law remedies available for settling such conflicts. These remedies had included a claim for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, a demand to cease and desist from interfering with exercising the applicant\u2019s right to use her property, or an action for establishing the rules of use of an object of joint ownership (see the relevant provisions of Domestic Law in paragraph\u00a056 above).83.\u00a0\u00a0In the Government\u2019s view, the applicant had not used any of these remedies, because she had not been genuinely interested in resolving the dispute and achieving harmonious relations with her flat co-owners. Her only wish had been to gain the entire flat for herself. This option had also been possible under domestic law under Article\u00a0365 of the Civil Code (see paragraph\u00a056 above). However, from this point of view the State\u2019s duty had not been to protect the applicant\u2019s home from unwanted intrusions, but to ensure equal protection of the intersecting property interests of two private parties. The applicant had tried to use this remedy, however, as she had wanted to pay a symbolic, insignificant sum in compensation for her co\u2011owners\u2019 share, the judicial authorities could not be reproached for rejecting this proposal. It had always been open to the applicant to renegotiate dispossession of her flat co-owners on more reasonable conditions.84.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant disagreed. She submitted that the one-bedroom flat, in which she had resided, was designed as a one-family residence. It had not been possible to divide it into two separate dwellings or somehow establish two separate households in it, enabling a senior lady to cohabit with unrelated young males in a sensible and harmonious manner. In any event, A.N. and V.S. had not intended to cohabit with the applicant. They had acquired a share in her flat with an obvious criminal intent: to extort the remaining share under grossly unfavourable terms by terrorising the applicant and creating intolerable living conditions. In this situation there could not have been any fair negotiation and balancing of private interests; only a criminal-law remedy would have been appropriate. The applicant had made an honest attempt to redeem her co-owners\u2019 share in the flat via civil court proceedings. She agreed that the price she had offered had been below the price, which could be obtained for it, if the flat had been sold in its entirety, free from any occupation or other encumbrances. However, in her view, a virtual share in an indivisible one-bedroom flat occupied by residents would have had no market value. In any event, the applicant\u2019s opponents, according to the documents, had received their share in her flat free of charge, except the acquisition taxes calculated on the basis of the nominative value indicated in the gift deed. In these circumstances, payment of a higher compensation \u2013 onerous for a retired pensioner \u2013 would have amounted to unjustified enrichment for her antagonists.85.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the Government\u2019s objection is closely linked to the substance of the applicants\u2019 complaints under Article\u00a08 of the Convention and that it must therefore be joined to the merits.86.\u00a0\u00a0It notes that otherwise this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The submissions by the parties87.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged that the arrival of uninvited strangers in her flat constituted a gross intrusion into her home and private life. This was more so as the new cohabitants had refused to use the flat sensibly and had harassed and terrorised the applicant. For years all the applicant\u2019s attempts to resolve the matter either by negotiation, civil proceedings or appeals to law-enforcement authorities had been futile and, unable to tolerate her co\u2011habitants, she had to seek refuge elsewhere and had found herself practically homeless.88.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the respondent State had properly discharged its positive duties under Article\u00a08 vis-\u00e0-vis the applicant, as there had been an appropriate legal and administrative framework in place to protect her home and private life from unwelcome intrusions. Among all other instruments, Article\u00a0365 of the Civil Code provided the applicant with a possibility to dispossess her flat co-owners of their share in the flat on the ground that her co-habitation with them was intolerable. However, it was important in this context that V.S. and subsequently A.N. had lawfully acquired their shares in the disputed flat. Accordingly, they had been entitled to possess, use and dispose of them on a par with the applicant. In these circumstances the applicant had to pay market-value compensation in order to dispossess them, and she did not want to do so. She could not expect the domestic law to give her the tools to obtain exclusive right to reside in the flat by herself without having paid fair compensation to its other co-owners. The State authorities could also not be held responsible for the applicant\u2019s failure to use the other, softer legal tools mentioned in paragraph\u00a082 above, which could help her negotiate fair terms of cohabitation in the flat with its co-owners.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment89.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that, in so far as the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article\u00a08 may relate to the acts of harassment and violence, it falls within the ambit of Article\u00a08 (see, for example, Hajduov\u00e1 v. Slovakia, \u00a7\u00a046, 30\u00a0November 2010; Sandra Jankovi\u0107, cited above, \u00a7\u00a045; Remetin, cited above, \u00a7\u00a090; and B.V. and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0149-54). However, as the Court has already examined the applicant\u2019s relevant submissions under Article\u00a03 above, it is not necessary to address them also under Article\u00a08 of the Convention (see, for example, \u0110or\u0111evi\u0107, cited above, \u00a7\u00a093, and M.\u00a0and\u00a0M. cited above, \u00a7\u00a0143).90.\u00a0\u00a0At the same time, the Court notes that there are other aspects of the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article\u00a08, which have not yet been examined by it. In particular, it follows from the applicant\u2019s submissions that, in addition to her complaints about violence and harassment, she also complains (a)\u00a0of the very fact that she was obliged to tolerate the presence inside her home of persons foreign to her household; and (b)\u00a0of their disagreeable, but essentially non-criminal conduct (notably, discourteous use of the flat and the applicant\u2019s belongings, spoliation of the flat amenities, noise and other nuisances, and so forth).91.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the criminal proceedings, in the course of which V.S. and A.N. were charged with extortion, eventually redressed these aspects of the applicant\u2019s complaint. In particular, as follows from the Kyivskiy Court\u2019s verdict of 12 October 2012, A.N. and V.S. were ordered to pay compensation to the applicant for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. In addition, they were also divested of their share in the flat as a result of the property confiscation order. However, regard being had to the extreme delays in the institution and conduct of these proceedings, which have already been discussed in paragraphs\u00a076 and 78 above, their effectiveness in the applicant\u2019s case was significantly compromised. Accordingly, the applicant\u2019s rights under Article\u00a08 of the Convention were set at naught for a very considerable period of time (see Surugiu, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a060-67, and Udovi\u010di\u0107, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0158-59).92.\u00a0\u00a0At the same time, the Court reiterates that there is no absolute right under the Convention to obtain the prosecution or conviction of any particular person (see S\u00f6derman v. Sweden [GC], no.\u00a05786\/08, \u00a7\u00a083, ECHR\u00a02013). While a criminal-law remedy may be necessary in cases relating to particularly serious encroachments upon the person\u2019s physical or psychological integrity, in respect of less serious intrusions into the sphere protected by Article 8 the relevant obligation on the member States may be discharged by putting in place other, in particular, civil-law instruments, which, where necessary, should include such procedural remedies as the granting of an injunction (ibid, \u00a7\u00a085). In the light of these observations, the Court must proceed to examine whether, in the specific circumstances of the case before it, the respondent State had an adequate non-criminal legal framework providing the applicant with acceptable level of protection against the intrusions on her privacy and enjoyment of her home (see,\u00a0mutatis mutandis, ibid, \u00a7\u00a091).93.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that guarantees afforded by Article\u00a08, and, in particular, the right to respect for home, among them, are of central importance to an individual\u2019s identity, self-determination, physical and moral integrity, maintenance of relationships with others and a settled and secure place in the community (see, in particular, Connors, cited above, \u00a7\u00a082, and Kryvitska and Kryvitskyy v. Ukraine, no.\u00a030856\/03, \u00a7\u00a044, 2\u00a0December 2010). A home is usually the place, where an individual is supposed to feel safe (see S\u00f6derman, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0117) and sheltered from unwanted attention and intrusions. This concerns not only physical intrusions, such as unauthorised entries, but various nuisances, such as noise or smells and other forms of interference which preclude the inhabitants from quiet, undisturbed enjoyment of the amenities of their abode (see Udovi\u010di\u0107, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0136).94.\u00a0\u00a0In light of these considerations, the Court finds that sharing one\u2019s home with uninvited strangers, regardless of how sensibly they behave, creates very important implications for a person\u2019s privacy and other interests protected by Article\u00a08. Accordingly, where a member State adopts a legal framework obliging a private individual, for one reason or another, to share his or her home with persons foreign to his or her household, it must put in place thorough regulations and necessary procedural safeguards to enable all the parties concerned to protect their Convention interests.95.\u00a0\u00a0It appears that in the present case applicable law did not afford to the applicant any meaningful forum in which she could object against cohabitation with A.N., V.S. and their acquaintances on the ground that such cohabitation created disproportionate consequences for her rights guaranteed by Article\u00a08 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, McCann v. the United Kingdom, no. 19009\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 49-50 and 55, ECHR 2008; \u0106osi\u0107\u00a0v. Croatia, no. 28261\/06, \u00a7 21-23, 15 January 2009; and B.\u00a0v.\u00a0the\u00a0Republic of Moldova, no. 61382\/09, \u00a7 74, 16 July 2013) and obtain appropriate and expeditious protection against unwanted intrusions into her personal space and home, including, if necessary, by way of an injunction order (see, mutatis mutandis, S\u00f6derman, \u00a7\u00a085).96.\u00a0\u00a0In particular, it is notable that initially the flat was designed to be occupied and was occupied by a single family (the applicant\u2019s family), then by the applicant alone. The legal arrangement, whereby V.S., a person outside the applicant\u2019s family, received an entitlement to move into the flat, was created without the applicant\u2019s consent having been sought. This arrangement, found to be lawful by the domestic courts (see paragraphs\u00a022\u201123 above) also automatically gave V.S. the right to invite other persons to live there and to bestow his share in the flat without the applicant\u2019s consent on other third parties. Accordingly, the applicant lost any control over how many persons would obtain the right to occupy her flat or over the choice of these persons. Thus, her one-bedroom flat was virtually converted into a hostel without the applicant having any means of objecting to such a change.97.\u00a0\u00a0Similarly, after the aforementioned arrangement was created, the applicant had no legal remedy enabling her to argue that co-habitation with A.N., V.S. and their acquaintances had resulted in disproportionate burden for her ability to enjoy the rights guaranteed under Article\u00a08. The Court is prepared to accept that the civil remedies, mentioned by the Government in paragraph\u00a082 above, such as an action for damages, a demand to cease and desist from interfering with enjoyment of another\u2019s possessions, or an action for establishing the rules of use of an object of shared property could be helpful in a situation where lawful cohabitants need to settle specific disagreements concerning the use of a common flat. However, it follows from the case-file that the situation in the present case was much less trivial. Notably, the applicant\u2019s complaint was that her flat was not suitable for use by more than one family and that V.S. and A.N., had entered it by breaking in and taking possession of it against her will. The Government have not shown how the aforementioned remedies could address and redress the core of the above complaint.98.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the Government have also referred in their observations to Article\u00a0365 of the Civil Code, as a legal instrument, on the basis of which the cohabitation arrangement in the applicant\u2019s case could be terminated by a competent court. This Article (see the text in paragraph\u00a056 above) established a possibility of dispossessing a co-owner of his\/her share in an object of indivisible property, if other co-owners considered that joint use of this object was not possible. However, it follows from the text of this provision that it could be used only against the co-owners, whose share was \u201cinsignificant\u201d. More importantly, it has not been shown by the Government that this remedy, apparently geared towards resolving the ownership disputes, could grant prompt relief for the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning forced entry into the flat, which was her established \u201chome\u201d previously possessed by her family for years, against the applicant\u2019s will and despite that it was not designed to accommodate more than one family. In light of the above, the Court fails to see how this procedure could have provided an expeditious and appropriate remedy for the applicant\u2019s particular complaint concerning intrusion by strangers into her home and private space. Accordingly, the Court is not convinced that Article\u00a0365 of the Civil Code could provide any relief to the applicant, regardless of any price-related or other arguments.99.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that neither the case-file material, nor the Government\u2019s observations demonstrate that the applicant had any meaningful forum available to her for raising an argument that a duty to share her home with V.S., A.N., and their acquaintances disproportionately affected her private life and enjoyment of her home. Accordingly, the Court considers that the domestic legal framework did not provide the applicant with requisite procedural safeguards for protecting her right to respect for home and private life under Article\u00a08 of the Convention.100.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Government\u2019s objection concerning non-exhaustion raised in paragraphs\u00a082-83 above.101.\u00a0\u00a0Regard being had to the considerations presented in paragraphs\u00a091 and 99 above, the Court finds that there has been a breach of Article\u00a08 of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION102.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicant also complained, under Article 6 of the Convention, about the outcome of two sets of her civil proceedings and referred to Articles\u00a09, 14 and 17 of the Convention and Article\u00a02 of Protocol\u00a0No.\u00a04 to the Convention in respect of the facts of the present case.103.\u00a0\u00a0Having considered these complaints in the light of all the material in its possession, the Court finds that, in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.104.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this part of the application must be declared inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) and 4 of the Convention.V.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION105.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage106.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant initially claimed 100,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage on account of the alleged breach of Article 8 (in her reply to the Government\u2019s observations of 10 April 2012) and a further EUR\u00a0200,000 in respect of the alleged breach of Article\u00a03 of the Convention (in her reply to the Government\u2019s additional observations of 25 December 2013). In addition, in her reply to the Government\u2019s observations of 10\u00a0April 2012, she also asked that the respondent State be obliged to buy her share in the disputed flat at a fair price, corresponding to the market value of half the flat, in order to enable the applicant to buy another flat, which would belong to her exclusively.107.\u00a0\u00a0The Government alleged that this claim was exorbitant and unsubstantiated.108.\u00a0\u00a0The Court recalls that the case at issue concerned breaches of Articles\u00a03 and 8 of the Convention. It does not see a correlation between the breaches of these provisions and a requirement to finance acquisition of a new flat for the applicant. It therefore dismisses this claim. On the other hand, the Court considers that the applicant must have suffered anguish and distress on account of the facts giving rise to the finding of breaches of Articles\u00a03 and 8 of the Convention. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards the applicant EUR\u00a04,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses109.\u00a0\u00a0In her reply to the Government\u2019s observations of 10\u00a0April\u00a02012, the applicant also claimed legal fees for her representation before the Court, unspecified court fees and costs of translation of unspecified documents into English. She submitted some documents, including a copy of her contract with a firm called Dimex for legal representation; however, she did not specify the exact amount of her claim for legal fees or any other expenses. In her reply to the Government\u2019s additional observations of 25\u00a0December 2013 the applicant did not reiterate her previous claim and did not submit any new claims under this head.110.\u00a0\u00a0The Government pointed out that the applicant had been provided with legal aid to cover the costs of her representation before the Court, and that in any event she had failed to substantiate her claims for costs and expenses with appropriate documentary evidence.111.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, the Court recalls that the applicant has been provided with legal aid and considers, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, that the applicant\u2019s claim for costs and expenses should be rejected for lack of substantiation.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest112.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28671":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION47.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that he had been subjected to physical ill-treatment and psychological pressure by the police on 18 August 2005 and thereafter, and that the authorities had failed to carry out an effective investigation into the matter. He also complained under the same provision about the conditions of his detention in Ladyzhynska prison no. 39. Article 3 of the Convention relied on by the applicant reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged ill-treatment of the applicant and effectiveness of the investigation48.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted available domestic remedies given his failure to challenge the prosecutor\u2019s refusal of 15 February 2006 before a higher prosecutor or a court.49.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contended that the present case was different from that of Kaverzin v. Ukraine (no. 23893\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 173-180, 15 May 2012), in which the Court had found that the reluctance of the authorities to ensure a prompt and thorough investigation of ill-treatment complaints by criminal suspects constituted a systemic problem in Ukraine. In the Government\u2019s view, the fact that the prosecutor issued his decision two days after the applicant had raised his complaint indicated the willingness of the authorities to investigate the matter, unlike in the Kaverzin case cited above.50.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant disagreed. Relying on the extensive case-law of the Court, he contended that the remedies referred to by the Government could not be considered effective in his case. He also submitted that the mere fact that his complaint had been dismissed within two days did not indicate that the domestic investigation was effective, but rather showed a hasty attempt of the authorities to close that issue.51.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it has previously rejected similar objections by the Government as to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies in the context of allegations of ill-treatment, for example in the case of Kaverzin (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 84 to 99). The Court does not accept the Government\u2019s argument that the cited case was different from the present one. In that case, in similar factual circumstances the Court concluded that the applicant had taken sufficient steps at the domestic level to bring his complaints of police ill\u2011treatment to the attention of the national authorities, noting that the fact that the complaints had been rejected by the prosecutor had not prevented the domestic courts from examining them on the merits in the course of the applicant\u2019s trial.52.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore considers that this complaint cannot be rejected for failure to exhaust domestic remedies.53.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further finds that this complaint is neither manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention nor inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in Ladyzhynska prison no.\u00a03954.\u00a0\u00a0The Government provided detailed information about the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in the prison and claimed that there had been no violation of his rights under Article 3 of the Convention.55.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant replied that those conditions were not acceptable.56.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not find it necessary to analyse the exchange of the parties\u2019 observations on the merits of this complaint as it considers it to be inadmissible in any event.57.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant failed to duly raise this grievance in the proceedings before the Court. Thus, unlike his numerous other complaints, this was the only one submitted not by him personally, but by his mother albeit acting as his representative (see paragraphs 43-45 above). It is clear from the case-file materials that the applicant complained of the conditions of his detention in the prison to his mother. It is less clear though that he intended to bring the matter before the Court.58.\u00a0\u00a0However, even assuming that it was him rather than his mother who raised the complaint in question, the Court notes that the allegations with respect to the physical conditions of his detention in Ladyzhynska prison no.\u00a039 were limited to brief, general and fragmental statements, in contrast to his complaints about the Sumy ITT and SIZO, which were very detailed and specific (but which had been declared inadmissible for other reasons \u2013 see paragraph 4 above).59.\u00a0\u00a0The Court acknowledges that in cases concerning complaints about detention conditions it has not always required that an applicant support each and every allegation with particular documents, recognising that relevant information and opportunities to investigate the facts in such cases lie primarily in the hands of the authorities. At the same time, the Court notes that an applicant must provide an elaborate and consistent account of the conditions of his or her detention mentioning the specific elements, which would enable the Court to determine that the complaint is not manifestly ill-founded or inadmissible on any other grounds. Only a credible and reasonably detailed description of the allegedly inhuman or degrading conditions of detention constitutes a prima facie case of ill-treatment and serves as a basis for giving notice of the complaint to the respondent Government (see Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525\/07 and\u00a060800\/08, \u00a7 122, 10 January 2012, and Ukhan v. Ukraine, no. 30628\/02, \u00a7\u00a064, 18 December 2008).60.\u00a0\u00a0In the Court\u2019s opinion, this requirement has not been met in the present case. Thus, the applicant did not provide an account of the events that was sufficiently coherent, detailed, comprehensive and reasonably supported by evidence to raise a reasonable suspicion that the extent of his suffering on account of the physical conditions of detention in Ladyzhynska prison no. 39 reached a threshold of severity that brought the matter within the ambit of Article\u00a03 of the Convention or that he might have otherwise been ill-treated by the prison staff within the meaning of the aforementioned provision (see and compare with Rodzevillo v. Ukraine, no. 38771\/05, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a045\u201147, 14 January 2016).61.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore rejects this part of the application as manifestly ill-founded under Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged ill-treatment of the applicant(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions62.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his account of the events (see paragraph\u00a010 above). He observed that, as established by the medical evidence, he had sustained a number of injuries while being under the control of the police between 17 and 18 August 2005. The authorities had not, however, accounted for the origin of those injuries. The applicant also submitted that the police officers in question had continued to put psychological pressure on him during his pre-trial detention.63.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicant\u2019s allegations lacked convincing evidence. They noted that his first questioning had taken place in the presence of his lawyer and that it had been the applicant\u2019s choice to confess to the criminal offences incriminated to him. The Government further submitted that the applicant had raised his allegation of ill-treatment with an inexplicable delay, which should be interpreted as undermining its plausibility.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment64.\u00a0\u00a0As the Court has stated on many occasions, Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the core values of democratic societies (see, among many other references, Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803\/94, \u00a7 95, ECHR 1999\u2011V). Where allegations are made under this provision, the Court must conduct a particularly thorough scrutiny and will do so on the basis of all the evidential material submitted by the parties (see Matyar v. Turkey, no.\u00a023423\/94, \u00a7 109, 21 February 2002, and \u00dclk\u00fc Ekinci v. Turkey, no.\u00a027602\/95, \u00a7 136, 16 July 2002).65.\u00a0\u00a0In assessing evidence, the Court has adopted the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d. According to its established case-law, proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Furthermore, it is to be recalled that Convention proceedings do not in all cases lend themselves to a strict application of the principle affirmanti incumbit probatio. Where the events in issue lie within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons under their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during that detention. The burden of proof in such a case may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation (see El-Masri v.\u00a0the\u00a0former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 151 and 152, ECHR 2012, with further case-law references).66.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court notes that, according to the medical evidence in the case file, the applicant had certain injuries at the moment of his arrest on 17 August 2005. More specifically, he had some abrasions on his back and stomach (see paragraph 7 above). While he did not explain the origin of those injuries in his submissions before the Court, he has never attributed them to the authorities. The Court further observes that a day later the applicant underwent a forensic medical examination, which documented many more injuries on him. Thus, at the time of that examination he had numerous bruises and abrasions on his head, torso and on the left thigh. Furthermore, there were linear abrasions on his both wrists. The origin of those additional injuries, which the applicant had sustained while being under the authorities\u2019 control, has never been explained.67.\u00a0\u00a0That being the case, the Court considers it sufficiently established that the applicant sustained the injuries as a result of ill-treatment for which the Government must bear Convention responsibility and which must be classified as inhuman and degrading.68.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is mindful of the particular cruelness of the ill-treatment suffered by the applicant according to his version of the events (see paragraph 10 above). Undoubtedly, if sufficiently established, it would be classified as torture. However, the Court has no evidential basis before it enabling it to establish to the required standard, \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d, that the treatment the applicant suffered reached the level of \u201ctorture\u201d.69.\u00a0\u00a0There has, accordingly, been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.2.\u00a0\u00a0Effectiveness of the domestic investigation70.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that there had been no genuine effort to investigate his allegation of ill-treatment. He submitted that he had tried to raise that complaint as soon as possible, but he had been scared given that the police officers in question had had an unhindered access to him during his detention in the ITT and even later. He further submitted that he had not trusted the lawyer appointed for him and had not been able to confide to him. In any event, the applicant noted that he had brought the issue to the attention of the authorities on 30 September 2005 and that there had been no follow up to it. As regards his complaint raised on 13\u00a0February 2006, the applicant admitted that the authorities had reacted to it in a prompt manner. However, in the applicant\u2019s opinion, the prosecutor\u2019s refusal to institute criminal proceedings into the matter, which had been issued only two days later, was rather an indication of ineffectiveness of the investigation.71.\u00a0\u00a0The Government noted that the applicant had raised this complaint for the first time only on 13 February 2006, that is with a delay of about six months. They observed that the investigation had been launched immediately thereafter and that all the essential investigative steps had been taken to verify the applicant\u2019s allegations. The fact that those allegations had proved unsubstantiated could not be held against the authorities. The Government also observed that the applicant had not challenged the decision taken following the results of the investigation.72.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes, however, that in their observations concerning the applicant\u2019s complaint about the violation of his right to legal defence (see paragraph 82 below) the Government admitted that the applicant had complained to the investigator of his ill-treatment and of the continued psychological pressure by the police as early as on 30 September 2005.73.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that any investigation into serious allegations of ill-treatment must be both prompt and thorough. That means that the authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what has happened and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation or to provide a basis for their decisions. They must take all reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard (see, for example, Serikov v. Ukraine, no.\u00a042164\/09, \u00a7 78, 23 July 2015).74.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court considers it sufficiently established that the applicant complained to the authorities for the first time about his alleged ill-treatment on 30 September 2005. No investigation in the matter followed. Moreover, it appears that the applicant was not duly protected against the continued psychological pressure by the police officers whom he had accused of his ill-treatment. Thus, as indicated by the case-file materials, they continued visiting him in the ITT and later in the SIZO, in spite of the investigator\u2019s assurances to the contrary (see paragraphs 19, 24 and 26 above).75.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court considers that the delay with the beginning of the investigation is to be attributed to the authorities, but not to the applicant as the Government tried to convince it.76.\u00a0\u00a0The Court next observes that, when the investigation was eventually launched, it was mainly confined to the questioning of the police officers concerned who denied the veracity of the applicant\u2019s allegations. Furthermore, although there was unequivocal medical evidence that the applicant had sustained some of his injuries while being under the control of the police, the prosecutor chose not to analyse that matter, having contented himself with a general observation that the applicant had already had injuries at the moment of his arrest.77.\u00a0\u00a0Overall, the case file material discloses no meaningful effort to verify or disprove the applicant\u2019s account of events, including by thoroughly questioning him, organising confrontations or posing specific questions to the Kyiv police officer and the forensic medical expert who had examined the applicant on 17 and 18 August 2005 respectively (see Danilov v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 2585\/06, \u00a7\u00a070, 13 March 2014).78.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in a number of other cases against Ukraine it has already condemned patterns of investigation similar to the one in the present case (see, inter alia, Drozd v. Ukraine, no. 12174\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 68-71, 30\u00a0July 2009; Savitskyy v. Ukraine, no. 38773\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 121-22, 26 July 2012; and Grinenko v. Ukraine, no. 33627\/06, \u00a7 62, 15 November 2012). In the case of Kaverzin (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 173-80) the Court found that the reluctance of the authorities to ensure that a prompt and thorough investigation of the ill-treatment complaints by the criminal suspects was carried out constituted a systemic problem within the meaning of Article 46 of the Convention. In view of the circumstances of the present case and its earlier case-law, the Court concludes that in the present case, too, no serious effort was made to investigate the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment.79.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural limb in this regard.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION80.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention that his right not to incriminate himself had been violated. He also complained under Article 6 \u00a7 3 (c) that he had been denied access to a lawyer during the first two days after his arrest and that his lawyers had not defended his rights properly. Lastly, he complained under Article 6 \u00a7 3 (d) that he had not had the possibility to get summoned and question all the important defence witnesses. The relevant provisions of Article 6 of the Convention read as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...3.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:...\u00a0(c)\u00a0\u00a0to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require;(d)\u00a0\u00a0to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; ...\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0Self-incrimination under duress81.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It also notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Right to legal defence82.\u00a0\u00a0The Government observed that the applicant had not raised this complaint in his appeal on points of law. They therefore contended that he had not exhausted the domestic remedies as required by Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. In the alternative, the Government submitted that this complaint was manifestly ill-founded, in particular, because the applicant had been represented by a lawyer from his first questioning as a suspect. They observed in this connection that on 30 September 2005 the applicant, while still represented by the appointed lawyer, retracted his earlier confessions as obtained under duress. In the Government\u2019s view, that could be regarded as an indication of the applicant\u2019s trust towards that lawyer and of the due performance of his duties by the latter.83.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that he had complained before the Supreme Court, among other issues, \u201cabout the unfairness of the proceedings\u201d. Accordingly, he invited the Court to dismiss the Government\u2019s argument.84.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, it may only deal with an issue after all domestic remedies have been exhausted. The purpose of Article 35 is to afford the Contracting States the opportunity of preventing or putting right the violations alleged against them before those allegations are submitted to the Court (see, for example, Civet v. France [GC], no. 29340\/95, \u00a7 41, ECHR 1999\u2011VI). Thus, the complaint submitted to the Court must first have been lodged with the appropriate national courts, at least in substance, in accordance with the formal requirements of domestic law and within the prescribed time-limits (see, among other authorities, Cardot v. France, 19 March 1991, \u00a7 34, Series\u00a0A no. 200, and El\u00e7i and Others v. Turkey, nos. 23145\/93 and\u00a025091\/94, \u00a7\u00a7 604 and 605, 13\u00a0November 2003). Nevertheless, the obligation to exhaust domestic remedies requires only that an applicant make normal use of remedies which are effective, sufficient and accessible in respect of his Convention grievances (see Balogh v. Hungary, no.\u00a047940\/99, \u00a7 30, 20 July 2004).85.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has held that an appeal on points of law to the Supreme Court in Ukraine is considered an effective remedy for complaints concerning various aspects of the fairness of criminal proceedings guaranteed by Article\u00a06 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 of the Convention (see, for example, Arkhipov v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 25660\/02, 18 May 2004, Oleg Kolesnik v.\u00a0Ukraine, no.\u00a017551\/02, \u00a7 28, 19 November 2009, and Zhyzitskyy v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 57980\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 58-60, 19 February 2015).86.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that in its judgment on the case of Buglov v.\u00a0Ukraine it held that the applicant had not exhausted the domestic remedies in respect of his complaint about the early restriction of his right of access to a lawyer because his complaint concerning the violation of his right to defence before the domestic courts had been based on arguments that were different from those advanced before this Court (no. 28825\/02, \u00a7 110, 10\u00a0July 2014).87.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court observes that the applicant did not mention in his appeal on points of law the issues of the alleged early restriction on his right to be legally represented or the performance of the lawyer appointed for him by the investigator. The Court therefore considers that this part of the application should be rejected under Article 35\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a01 and\u00a04 of the Convention for the applicant\u2019s failure to exhaust the domestic remedies.3.\u00a0\u00a0Right to summon witnesses88.\u00a0\u00a0In the applicant\u2019s submission, when convicting and sentencing him the domestic courts had refused to hear witnesses who could have proved his innocence. The applicant argued in the domestic proceedings that the criminal offences imputed to him had in fact been committed by A. and Se. and requested the trial court to summon witnesses who might have known those persons or who might have seen him in their company in a local bar. Furthermore, the applicant submitted that the trial court had not summoned all the witnesses heard during the pre-trial investigation.89.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicant had not proved that the testimonies of the witnesses, whom the trial court had refused to summon, had been necessary to prove his innocence or to establish the truth in the case. The Government further submitted that the applicant, who was legally represented by a lawyer of his choice, had had the benefit of adversarial proceedings, in which he had been able to raise all his arguments and had enjoyed ample opportunity to challenge the evidence against him.90.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the right to call witnesses is not absolute and can be limited in the interests of the proper administration of justice. Article 6 \u00a7 3 (d) does not require the attendance and examination of every witness on the accused\u2019s behalf; its essential aim, as indicated by the words \u201cunder the same conditions\u201d, is full equality of arms in the matter. The task of the Court is to ascertain whether the proceedings in issue, considered as a whole, were fair (see Vidal v. Belgium, 22 April 1992, \u00a7 33, Series A no.\u00a0235\u2011B). An applicant claiming a violation of his right to obtain the attendance and examination of a defence witness should show that the examination of that person was necessary for the establishment of the truth and that the refusal to call that witness was prejudicial to his defence rights (see Guilloury v. France, no. 62236\/00, \u00a7 55, 22 June 2006). Although it is normally for the national courts to assess the evidence before them, as well as the relevance of the evidence which defendants seek to adduce, there might be exceptional circumstances which could prompt the Court to conclude that the failure to hear a person as a witness was incompatible with Article 6 (see Bricmont v. Belgium, 7 July 1989, \u00a7 89, Series A no. 158, and Destrehem v. France, no. 56651\/00, \u00a7 41, 18 May 2004).91.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that the use in evidence of statements obtained at the police inquiry and judicial investigation stages is not in itself inconsistent with paragraphs 3 (d) and 1 of Article 6, provided that the rights of the defence have been respected. As a rule, these rights require that the defendant be given an adequate and proper opportunity to challenge and question a witness against him or her \u2013 either when that witness is making a statement or at a later stage of the proceedings (see L\u00fcdi v. Switzerland, 15\u00a0June 1992, \u00a7 49, Series A no. 238, and Buglov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0115).92.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes that the trial court heard many witnesses who, according to the applicant, might have helped with identifying A. and Se. (see paragraph 34 above). At the same time, some witnesses were not examined by the court and the applicant had no opportunity to confront them. It does not, however, appear from the circumstances of the case that the witnesses in question could have proved the applicant\u2019s innocence in any way: the only thing the applicant had been expecting from them was a confirmation that A. and Se. existed and that the applicant had been seen in their company at a time and at places having no relevance for the criminal offences incriminated to the applicant. The Court is therefore not persuaded that the failure of the domestic courts to hear the witnesses to whom the applicant referred was significant enough to compromise the outcome of the criminal proceedings (see and compare with Balitskiy v. Ukraine, no. 12793\/03, \u00a7 45, 3 November 2011). Nor has the applicant shown that he could not duly challenge the statements of some witnesses, which had been made at the pre-trial stage or that that evidence was sole or decisive for his conviction.93.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits94.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained that his confessions, which had been extracted from him by coercion, had played a crucial role in securing his conviction. He noted that, even though he had ceased to be subjected to the physical ill-treatment by the beginning of his first questioning as a suspect, its psychological and physiological effects had lasted beyond its actual application, particularly given that he had been under the constant threat of being subjected to ill-treatment again if he acted contrary to the police\u2019s interests. He considered that the after-effects of the ill-treatment and the threats of further ill-treatment had to be taken into account in assessing the nature and degree of compulsion used to obtain the confessions. He also noted that he had not had a proper opportunity to challenge the admissibility of the evidence obtained through coercion, and his complaints of ill-treatment and forced confession had never been properly examined.95.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the criminal proceedings against the applicant had been fair. They noted that the applicant had only been questioned in the presence of his lawyer and that he had been advised of the right not to incriminate himself. As regards his allegations of ill-treatment, they were not substantiated.96.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further contended that the applicant\u2019s confessions had not been the sole evidence justifying his conviction.97.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the use of evidence obtained in breach of the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination, the Court reiterates that these are generally recognised international standards which lie at the heart of the notion of a fair trial under Article\u00a06. Their rationale lies, inter\u00a0alia, in the protection of the accused against improper compulsion by the authorities, thereby contributing to the avoidance of miscarriages of justice and to the fulfilment of the aims of Article\u00a06. The right not to incriminate oneself, in particular, presupposes that the prosecution in a criminal case seek to prove their case against the accused without resort to evidence obtained through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused (see Shabelnik v. Ukraine, no. 16404\/03, \u00a7 55, 19 February 2009, with further references).98.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the admission of statements obtained as a result of torture or of other ill-treatment in breach of Article 3 as evidence to establish the relevant facts in criminal proceedings render the proceedings as a whole unfair. This finding applies irrespective of the probative value of the statements and irrespective of whether their use is decisive in securing the defendant\u2019s conviction (see G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, \u00a7 166, ECHR 2010, with further references, and Zyakun v. Ukraine, no. 34006\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 62-64, 25 February 2016).99.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has found in the present case that the State authorities bore responsibility for the applicant\u2019s injuries sustained by him in unexplained circumstances, while he had been under the control of the police shortly before his first questioning (see paragraphs 66-69 above). The applicant brought this issue to the attention of the trial court and requested it to discard those confessions. He also complained during his trial about the psychological pressure continuously put on him by the police officers in question. However, the trial court took no efforts to verify the applicant\u2019s allegations and dismissed his complaint on the sole ground that the issue had already been investigated by the prosecution authorities. Such a formalistic approach is even more surprising given the fact that the trial court did find a problem as regards the excessively long detention of the applicant in the ITT (a detention facility of the police), where he had been exposed to any pressure by the police officers implicated in his alleged ill\u2011treatment.100.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, in the circumstances of the present case the Court considers that the self-incriminatory statements made by the applicant played an important role for his conviction, even though he had eventually retracted them as obtained under duress.101.\u00a0\u00a0The above considerations are sufficient for the Court to find a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention on account of the breach of the applicant\u2019s right to the privilege against self-incrimination.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL APPLICATION102.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the domestic authorities had hindered the effective exercise of his right of application to the Court, because they refused him access to the documents he needed to support his complaints before the Court. He relied on Article 34 of the Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:\u201cThe Court may receive applications from any person ... claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.\u201d103.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument and contended that Ukraine had complied with Article\u00a034 of the Convention.104.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has established that Article 34 of the Convention may impose on the State authorities an obligation to provide copies of documents to applicants who find themselves in situations of particular vulnerability and dependence and are unable to obtain the documents needed for their files without State support (see, as a recent authority, Naydyon v. Ukraine, no. 16474\/03, \u00a7 63, 14 October 2010). At the same time, the obligation of the State not to hinder the right of individual application does not automatically mean that it has a duty to provide applicants with copies of all or any desired documents or to furnish them with the technical facilities of their choice to make their own copies (see Kornakovs v. Latvia, no.\u00a061005\/00, \u00a7\u00a7 171-174, 15 June 2006).105.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court observes that the applicant encountered no difficulties with collecting copies of documents requested from him by the Court (see paragraphs 40 and 41 above). Even assuming that some of his requests for copies of unspecified documents, which he considered necessary for substantiation of his application, had been rejected, in view of all the information before the Court this fact alone does not raise any issue under Article 34 of the Convention.106.\u00a0\u00a0In sum, the Court considers that the State has not failed to comply with its obligations under Article 34 of the Convention in the present case.IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION107.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage108.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed a retrial and 100,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.109.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested this claim as unsubstantiated and in any event exorbitant.110.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to all the circumstances of the present case, the Court accepts that the applicant suffered non-pecuniary damage which cannot be compensated for solely by the finding of a violation. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR\u00a09,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable to him.111.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Court notes that where an individual, as in the instant case, has been convicted by a court in proceedings which did not meet the Convention requirement of fairness, a retrial, a reopening or a review of the case, if requested, represents in principle an appropriate way of redressing the violation (see, for example, Leonid Lazarenko v. Ukraine, no.\u00a022313\/04, \u00a7 65, 28 October 2010).B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses112.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR\u00a02,975 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court, to be paid into his lawyer\u2019s account directly. In substantiation, he submitted a legal assistance contract signed by him and Mr Tarakhkalo on 22 October 2013. It stipulated an hourly charge-out rate of EUR\u00a095. According to the contract, that payment would be made after completion of the proceedings in Strasbourg and within the limits of the sum awarded by the Court in costs and expenses. The applicant also submitted a report of 18 June 2014 on the work completed under the aforementioned contract. It specified that Mr Tarakhkalo had worked on the case for twenty-eight hours (EUR 2,660) and that he had incurred administrative and postal costs in the amounts of EUR 213 and EUR\u00a0106 respectively.113.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the claim as exorbitant and unsubstantiated.114.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. The Court notes that only the applicant is contractually bound to pay fees vis-\u00e0-vis Mr Tarakhkalo. Having regard to the documents submitted, the Court considers those fees to have been \u201cactually incurred\u201d (see Tebieti M\u00fchafize Cemiyyeti and Israfilov v. Azerbaijan, no. 37083\/03, \u00a7\u00a0106, ECHR 2009).115.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Court notes that the applicant has not submitted any documents in substantiation of the administrative and postal costs. Accordingly, having regard to all the documents before it, the Court awards the applicant EUR 1,810 (which is equal to EUR\u00a02,660 less EUR\u00a0850, the sum received by way of legal aid), plus any value-added tax that may be chargeable to the applicant. The net award is to be paid into the bank account of the applicant\u2019s lawyer, Mr Tarakhkalo, as indicated by the applicant (see, for example, Belousov v. Ukraine, no.\u00a04494\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 116-117, 7\u00a0November 2013).C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest116.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28680":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 8, 13 AND 14 OF THE CONVENTION22.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained of an infringement of his private life on the grounds that he had lived in Greece for twelve years in a situation of uncertainty as regards his status, despite the favourable opinion issued by the Advisory Board on Asylum. More specifically, he submitted that he had been living in a state of insecurity for a very long period, and complained of the impact which that had had on his working and family life throughout that period and the lack of adequate procedural safeguards to protect him against arbitrary treatment by the authorities. He also alleged that he had had no effective remedy in order to complain of the aforementioned situation. He relied on Article 8 of the Convention read alone and in conjunction with Article\u00a013.23.\u00a0\u00a0Finally, under Article 8 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 14, the applicant complained that he had suffered discrimination on grounds of his nationality.24.\u00a0\u00a0Those provisions read as follows:Article 8\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.2.\u00a0\u00a0There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.\u201dArticle 13\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201dArticle 14\u201cThe enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.\u201d...B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions32.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that the uncertainty and insecurity to which he had been subjected for twelve years and the various restrictions placed on him as an asylum-seeker had affected the very fabric of his personal, social and economic relations, which he considered as part of his private and family life. He had therefore suffered interference which, moreover, had not been prescribed by law, had not pursued a legitimate aim and had not been necessary in a democratic society. In that regard he pointed out, first of all, that the authorities had given no reason for the waiting period imposed upon him, which he described as very long, and, secondly, that he had been in a situation of vulnerability and should have been granted official protection much more quickly.33.\u00a0\u00a0The Government summited that the failure to grant the applicant refugee status had had no effect on his private and family life and that he had benefited from, and was still enjoying, all the rights ordinarily granted to asylum-seekers. On that point, they added that the applicant had got married before coming to Greece, that he had lived with his wife for most of his time of residence in Athens and that their cohabitation had ended as a result of their divorce. They also pointed out that the applicant had worked and was still working unhampered in the construction industry and that he was renewing his asylum-seeker\u2019s card\u00a0every six months.34.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that the reason why the applicant had been deprived of certain rights which were granted exclusively to refugees was that he had chosen to remain in Greece to work. Consequently, any restriction on the applicant\u2019s private and family life had been due to the fact that, in the light of the circumstances of the case, he had been granted the rights traditionally afforded to asylum-seekers. Such restriction was therefore compatible with Article 8 \u00a7 2 of the Convention.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment35.\u00a0\u00a0According to the established case-law of the Court, the Convention does not secure the right of an individual to enter or reside in a State of which he is not a national, or his right not to be expelled from such State, and the Contracting States have the right to control, pursuant to a well-established principle of international law, the entry, stay and removal of non\u2011nationals. Moreover, Article 8 of the Convention does not go so far as to grant applicants the right to any particular type of residence permit (permanent, temporary, etc.), provided that the solution proposed by the authorities enables them to exercise unhindered their right to respect for private and family life (see Aristimu\u00f1o Mendizabal v. France, no. 51431\/99, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a065-66, 17 January 2006).36.\u00a0\u00a0The Court emphasises that it has affirmed on many occasions that under Article 8 of the Convention the positive obligation of the State inherent in an effective respect for private life may involve the adoption of an effective and accessible procedure designed to secure respect for private life, and in particular the introduction of a statutory framework setting up an enforceable judicial mechanism to protect individuals\u2019 rights and, if necessary, of appropriate specific measures. Even though the boundaries between the State\u2019s positive and negative obligations under the Convention do not lend themselves to precise definition, the applicable principles are nonetheless similar (see Fern\u00e1ndez Mart\u00ednez v.\u00a0Spain ([GC], no.\u00a056030\/07, \u00a7 114, ECHR 2014 [extracts]).37.\u00a0\u00a0Those positive obligations also include the competent authorities\u2019 duty to examine the person\u2019s asylum request promptly, in order to ensure that his or her situation of insecurity and uncertainty is as short-lived as possible (see M.S.S.\u00a0v.\u00a0Belgium and Greece [GC] (no. 30696\/09, \u00a7 262, 21 January 2011).38.\u00a0\u00a0The Court first of all draws a distinction between the present case and that of M.E. v. Sweden ([GC], no. 71398\/12, 8 April 2015), in which the applicant complained, inter alia, about the anxiety, uncertainty and tension caused by the authorities\u2019 initial decision to return him to Libya. The Court struck the case out of the list (Article 37 \u00a7 1 [b] of the Convention) because the authorities had in the meantime issued him with a permanent residence permit.39.\u00a0\u00a0Secondly, the Court notes that the applicant\u2019s situation is also different from one where the authorities refused to grant a residence permit to applicants who were illegally settled in the host country and were hoping to confront those authorities with family life as a fait accompli (see the case-law cited in the Jeunesse v. the Netherlands judgment [GC], no.\u00a012738\/10, \u00a7 103, 3 October 2014). In the present case, the issue at stake is the failure of the Minister for Public Order, for twelve years, to decide on the applicant\u2019s request for asylum, even though the Advisory Board on Asylum had issued a favourable opinion and the Greek judicial authorities, including the Court of Cassation, had rejected a request for extradition from the Turkish authorities. It is clear that in this situation the uncertainty experienced by the applicant as regards his status far surpassed that of an applicant awaiting the completion, within a reasonable time, of his or her asylum procedure.40.\u00a0\u00a0In the instance case, the Court considers that the alleged violation of Article 8 of the Convention also originated, not in any removal or expulsion order, but in the situation of insecurity and uncertainty experienced by the applicant over a long period, that is to say from 21 March 2002 \u2013 when he lodged his appeal against the decision to reject his asylum application \u2013 to the date of delivery of the present judgment.41.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that the applicant worked in the construction industry without a work permit.42.\u00a0\u00a0It should be noted in that connection that at the material time there were restrictive conditions on asylum-seekers vis-\u00e0-vis obtaining work permits. According to Article 4 of Decree No.\u00a0189\/1998 (abolished in April\u00a02016), proof had to be provided, in particular, that no person already holding refugee status had expressed interest in working in the particular occupational sector. Moreover, a 19\u00a0October 2012 circular from the Labour Minister pointed out that in order to obtain a work permit an asylum-seeker had to present a certificate from a public body attesting that there had been no unemployed nationals, EU nationals or persons with refugee status wishing to work in the sector in question. In addition to this statutory obstacle, there was also a further\u00a0practical difficulty bound up with the economic crisis and the large number of unemployed job-seekers.43.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the Court notes that because of his insecure status, the applicant, who submitted that he had wished to enrol at university, had been unable to do so and that, since he merely held an asylum-seeker\u2019s card, he had also been unable to open a bank account or obtain a tax reference number, which were preconditions for engaging in gainful employment. Nor had he even been able to secure a driving licence.44.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the applicant\u2019s private life, the Court observes that his cohabitation with his wife had not become and legally or materially possible until 2008, on the basis that the latter had obtained a short-term work permit in Greece, rather than in accordance with the legal provisions on family reunion.45.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds unjustified the failure of the Minister for Public Order to decide on the applicant\u2019s asylum request, for which no reasons had been given and which had continued for more than twelve years (and is still ongoing), even though the domestic authorities had come down in favour of granting the applicant asylum and had rejected the request for extradition submitted by the Turkish authorities.46.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court holds that in the circumstances of the present case the competent authorities failed in their positive obligation under Article\u00a08 of the Convention to establish an effective and accessible procedure to protect the right to private life by means of appropriate regulations to guarantee that the applicant\u2019s asylum request is examined within a reasonable time in order to ensure that his situation of insecurity is as short-lived as possible (see also paragraph 37 above). There has therefore been a violation of Article 8.47.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to its conclusions set out in the foregoing paragraphs, the Court finds that there has also been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 8....","28790":"I.\u00a0\u00a0JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS58.\u00a0\u00a0In accordance with Rule 42 \u00a7 1 of the Rules of Court, the Court decides to join the applications, given their similar factual and legal background.II.\u00a0\u00a0PRELIMINARY ISSUESArticle 37 \u00a7 1 of the Convention59.\u00a0\u00a0Article 37 \u00a7 1 of the Convention allows the Court to strike an application out of its list of cases and provides as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0The Court may at any stage of the proceedings decide to strike an application out of its list of cases where the circumstances lead to the conclusion that(a)\u00a0\u00a0the applicant does not intend to pursue his application; or(b)\u00a0\u00a0the matter has been resolved; or(c)\u00a0\u00a0for any other reason established by the Court, it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application.However, the Court shall continue the examination of the application if respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto so requires.\u201d60.\u00a0\u00a0In their first round of observations the Government submitted that it was not clear whether the first applicant intended to pursue his application, given the fact that he had absconded and had not kept the Court informed of his whereabouts, or of the outcome of his judicial proceedings in Germany. In their view, this behaviour was clear evidence that he was no longer interested in pursuing the application, and thus the Court should strike out his application. In their second round of observations, following the declaration produced by the first applicant\u2019s legal representative, the Government highlighted that the signature on the declaration did not correspond to that on the application form; in consequence it could not be taken as a valid expression of interest to continue pursuing the application.61.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant\u2019s legal representatives, who submitted that they were still in touch with the first applicant, relied on the declaration made by him (in February 2015), in which he stated that he was in Germany and that he was still interested in pursuing his case before the Court, through his legal representatives who remained authorised to so do. In their further submissions they noted that they were regularly in contact - by telephone and with an interpreter - with the first applicant throughout the proceedings before this Court. They further explained that a photograph of the declaration signed by the first applicant (in February 2015) had been sent through a free instant messaging service for mobile telephones. They submitted that following the Government\u2019s contestation (August 2015) the first applicant\u2019s legal representatives again contacted the first applicant and his lawyer in Germany in order to obtain a further declaration. However, the first applicant informed them that he was unable to make the trip to his lawyer\u2019s office in Frankfurt to have the declaration and signature authenticated, as he had no money for the journey. The first applicant\u2019s legal representatives also submitted a signed declaration, dated 14\u00a0September 2015, by Ms Lena Ronte, an advocate practising in Germany, currently representing the first applicant in the proceedings in Germany. In the mentioned declaration she confirmed that the first applicant was residing in a reception centre in Schonbach, Germany, awaiting the outcome of his asylum proceedings. She confirmed that the first applicant\u2019s representatives before this Court had contacted her to obtain a fresh declaration by him but that she had been unable to meet him, although she had spoken with him by telephone. According to her declaration, the first applicant told her that he was still interested in pursuing the case before the Court and confirmed that he was represented by Dr Michael Camilleri and Dr Katrine Camilleri, as stated in the authority form he signed on 16\u00a0April 2013.62.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the first applicant\u2019s legal representatives have not rebutted the Government\u2019s challenge concerning the difference in the first applicant\u2019s signatures in the application and the declaration. Nevertheless, in the Court\u2019s view, while the signatures on the two documents are certainly different, it cannot be excluded that the first applicant, being Somali, was little accustomed to the Latin alphabet at the time of his signature in 2013. This situation may have evolved by the time the applicant signed his declaration in 2015 and thus the Court finds no reason to doubt its veracity in the present circumstances. Indeed, the Court considers that the submissions made by the first applicant\u2019s legal representatives, together with the first applicant\u2019s declaration in February 2015 as well as that of his lawyer in Germany dated September 2015, leave no doubt that the first applicant wishes to pursue his application.63.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court rejects the Government\u2019s request to strike the application no. 25794\/13 out of its list of cases under Article 37 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, and continues the examination of the case.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION64.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained about the conditions of their detention in Warehouse 2 and Block B in Safi Barracks. They relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s objection as to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions65.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicants had not brought their complaint before the domestic authorities. They considered that the applicants had a twofold remedy, namely constitutional redress proceedings to challenge the conditions of their detention while they were in detention and an action for damage in tort after they left detention. They further noted that an action under the European Convention Act was not subject to any time-limits. A summary of their submissions can be found in Mahamed\u00a0Jama v. Malta (no. 10290\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 49-53, 26 November 2015).66.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that there existed no effective domestic remedy which should have been used. A summary of their lawyers\u2019 submissions can be found in Mahamed Jama (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 54-57).(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment67.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in the present case, when the applicants lodged their application with the Court (on 17 April 2013) complaining, inter alia, about their conditions of detention, the applicants were still in detention, and thus, apart from requiring a remedy providing compensation, they required to have a preventive remedy capable of putting an end to the ongoing violation of their right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment.68.\u00a0In a number of cases concerning the same situation, the Court has already found that\u00a0none of the remedies indicated by the Government, alone or in aggregate, satisfy the requirements of an effective remedy in the sense of preventing the alleged violation or its continuation in a timely manner (see Mahamed Jama, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 58-66, and Moxamed Ismaaciil and Abdirahman Warsame v. Malta, nos. 52160\/13 and 52165\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 43-51, 12\u00a0January 2016).69.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the Government\u2019s objection is dismissed.2.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion70.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants71.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants considered the conditions of detention to be basic. They noted in particular the lack of access to constructive or recreational activities, insufficient provision of basic needs (including clothing), lack of information, difficulties in communicating with the outside world, limited access to open air, and obstacles in obtaining the most basic services. Other factors which had to be taken into consideration were their young age, their inability to communicate in any language apart from Somali, and the fact that they were detained in a facility with adult men from many different ethnic, linguistic and cultural backgrounds. Further, the detention centre was staffed by men, most having a security background, leaving a huge gap in the provision of social welfare services to detainees, in spite of their best efforts. In their view all the above took a greater toll, given their personal circumstances and situation while they were in detention. In particular both applicants claimed that they had been bullied and victimised by fellow detainees in both the facilities where they had been detained.72.\u00a0\u00a0They referred to the international reports about the matter, noting that while those reports did not refer to Warehouse 2, but solely to Warehouse 1, the conditions were practically identical in both warehouses. According to the CPT the warehouses were unsuitable to accommodate people in the long term.73.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant also considered the warehouses to be overcrowded. There was no privacy, and he felt insecure as there was no protection from abuse and victimisation. He also emphasised that he had a number of health problems while he was in detention, during which period he was unable to obtain the necessary medical care; no support was provided while he was waiting for his age-assessment procedure.74.\u00a0\u00a0Relying on the Court\u2019s case-law the applicants submitted that when assessing conditions of detention account had to be taken of the cumulative effect of the conditions, and that the minimum level of severity of ill\u2011treatment or degrading treatment depended on the circumstances of the case, such as the duration, physical and mental effects, sex, age and state of health of the victim. In the present case, at the time of their detention both the applicants were minors. They noted that in Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium (no. 13178\/03, ECHR 2006\u2011XI) concerning the detention of a five-year-old child, the Court had emphasised that steps should be taken to enable the effective protection of children and vulnerable members of society, including reasonable measures to prevent ill-treatment of which the authorities have or ought to have knowledge (\u00a7 53). According to the Court, her very young age, her immigration status, and the fact that she was unaccompanied rendered that child extremely vulnerable, and the respondent State owed her a duty of care and protection as part of its positive obligations under Article 3 (\u00a7 55). The applicants submitted that even though they were older than the applicant in the aforementioned case, they were nevertheless minors and thus should have benefited from the enhanced guarantees provided by law for the protection of this vulnerable category of asylum seekers.75.\u00a0\u00a0They referred to Article 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (see paragraph 41 above), to which Malta was a party. They noted that national law provided that \u201cin the implementation of the provisions relating to material reception conditions and health care, account shall be taken of the specific situation of vulnerable persons which shall include minors, unaccompanied minors and pregnant women, found to have special needs after an individual evaluation of their situation\u201d. It also stipulated that in the implementation of the provisions relating to the reception of minors \u201cthe best interests of the child shall constitute a primary consideration\u201d. It did allow, however, that unaccompanied minors \u201caged sixteen years or over may be placed in accommodation centres for adult asylum seekers\u201d. Moreover, minor asylum seekers are entitled to \u201chave access to the education system under similar conditions to Maltese nationals... Access to the education system shall not be postponed for more than three months from the date the application for asylum was lodged by the minor... Provided that this period may be extended to one year where specific education is provided in order to facilitate access to the education system.\u201dThey noted that although the law does not specifically prohibit the detention of minors, several human rights monitoring bodies had emphasised that detention of children should be avoided (see paragraphs 48 and 54 above).76.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants clarified that their complaint did not only relate to the physical conditions in which they were detained, which they considered to be very bad, but also to the severely detrimental impact that detention had on their wellbeing due to their particular personal circumstances. They noted that both the applicants spent around five months (from August to mid\u2011January) in Warehouse 2 and around three months (from mid-January to the respective dates of their release in April) in Block B.77.\u00a0\u00a0They referred to the report by the ICJ (see paragraphs 52 et seq., above) and further noted that Warehouse 2, as its name implied, was designed for storage purposes and not to accommodate people. From the inside of the warehouse it was practically impossible to look outside, as all the windows were set high in the wall. This also limited the light inside the building and the ventilation. The only exits from the building were two doors to the yard, which were locked during the night. The first applicant complained that in summer it was scorching hot, and that he had been the victim of abuse by one of the hundreds of people of various ethnicities housed in the warehouse. The applicants submitted that according to information obtained at the time, in August and September 2012 Warehouse\u00a02 contained far more than the stipulated 200 detainees (approximately 290-320 people). From October the number of people held there went down to 200 or less and continued to go down progressively until January, when the detainees still held there were transferred to Block\u00a0B.78.\u00a0\u00a0The only recreational activity available in detention was watching television or spending time in the yard adjoining the block. This lack of facilities had been commented on by the CPT and the ICJ. The first applicant noted that it was however difficult to join in playing football because the yard was small and all the other detainees were older than him. Both applicants complained that there was hardly anything for them to do to occupy their minds during their time in detention; the second applicant noted that he was left with a lot of time to worry about his situation.79.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants noted that it was not true that English classes were offered at Safi (they were offered at Lyster Barracks, another detention centre) and the SPARKLET project ended in November 2012, so it was only operating for the first three months of the applicants\u2019 detention and even while it was operational it only served small groups of migrants at any given time.80.\u00a0\u00a0Both applicants complained about their access to medical care and the quality of medical care provided. In particular they noted the unavailability of interpreters (excluding fellow detainees); missed hospital appointments; and delay in the provision of medication\/unavailability of medicine prescribed. While not doubting the efficacy of the medical personnel providing a service - given that they were more often than not communicating with migrants with little or no knowledge of English - it was difficult to understand how they could provide a quality service in an average of six minutes per patient (in the light of the Government submissions, see paragraph 94 below). The applicants again referred to the CPT report and the JRS Malta report, Bridging Borders (see IV. Relevant Materials, above).81.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that the centres at Safi Barracks were both staffed exclusively by Detention Service personnel, most of whom came from a security background and were neither trained nor competent to provide psychological or social support to detainees. While the applicants acknowledged that the personnel did their best, there was no provision of psycho-social support to detainees, especially to the applicants who were minors. Thus many of their concerns related to the treatment they experienced at the hands of fellow detainees which could not be addressed. The applicants highlighted that they were not provided with support to deal with the harsh realities of life in detention.82.\u00a0\u00a0Both applicants complained about the food in detention and that they mostly ate chicken while in detention. The first applicant complained that his skin was itching from the bad diet and when he tried to complain to the soldiers he was told that the food would remain as it was. They considered that the quality and quantity of the food provided lacked variety and was not culturally appropriate. According to reports by M\u00e9decins Sans Fronti\u00e8res and the JRS (relevant links submitted to the Court) the diet provided had led to a number of gastrointestinal problems among detainees.83.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that they received very little information apart from that provided by the Refugee Commissioner at the initial stages of the asylum procedure. Neither of them understood the written information, provided by the immigration authorities in Arabic, about their rights and obligations while in detention. They were also provided with very little information about the age-assessment procedure, to the extent that the second applicant felt compelled to go on a hunger strike in protest about the length of the procedure to determine his age. They referred to reports on the matter (see IV. Relevant Materials, above).84.\u00a0\u00a0As to the lack of contact with the outside world, the applicants noted that like all the other detainees they were provided with a five\u2011euro phone card once every two months. This meant that their contact with their families was extremely limited. Being minors this was particularly hard for them to bear. The credit provided was quite limited and often insufficient to make long\u2011distance calls. Other, less costly, options were not available since detainees did not have Internet access. The lack of Internet access also hampered their access to information about what was happening in the outside world.85.\u00a0\u00a0Contrary to what the Government claimed, both applicants stated that they were not provided with the basic items they needed while in detention. The first applicant explained that when he arrived in detention the only things he was given were two sheets, one T-shirt, a blanket and two pairs of underwear but no shoes, not even flip-flops. It was only after four months that he was given shoes he could wear to play football, and that was only because he protested. In the meantime he had had to make do with some shoes which had been left behind by other Somalis who had since been released.86.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants found the living conditions in detention very difficult, particularly because of the fact that they had to live with so many people. They highlighted how unsafe they both felt in the often tense and violent atmosphere of detention, where other violent individuals were hosted (despite criminal records); both applicants describe incidents of bullying and intimidation which left them feeling very threatened and unsafe in detention, where it was impossible for them to obtain protection or effective redress for the harm suffered. Apart from being a minor, the first applicant also belonged to a minority group in that he was a member of the Midgan, a minority tribe, which caused him to fear other detainees, who often also stole his food. The applicants failed to understand how they, as minors, could be detained with other aggressive individuals, without any form of protection, supervision or support. Furthermore they admitted that they did not always report certain individuals for fear of reprisals. They noted that incidents of assault in detention were common, particularly among detainees, although few if any were reported, possibly due to doubts about the efficacy of the system in place to provide redress. A report entitled Becoming Vulnerable in Detention, National Report on Malta, July 2010 under the DEVAS project, reported that 28% of respondents interviewed for the study reported being physically assaulted while in detention. Of these 68% were assaulted by other detainees; 18% of them reported that they had filed complaints in cases of physical assault, but none reported that the complaints had resulted in any change.87.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the applicants had to contend with the anxiety of not knowing what would happen to them or how long they would be detained. As the months went by, the adults who had arrived in Malta with them were released with protection, while they remained detained awaiting the outcome of the age-assessment procedure. This made life fraught with anxiety to the extent that the first applicant suffered from insomnia, and the second applicant repeatedly refused food in protest. The applicants claimed that prolonged detention caused a significant deterioration in their physical and mental well-being which was exacerbated by the lack of any real possibility of obtaining effective redress and the knowledge that detention was not serving any useful purpose and was in no way proportionate to the aim sought to be achieved.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s submissions88.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the Safi Detention centre (a military base) had two warehouses (House 1 and House 2) as well as (according to the photographs submitted) a two-storey building called B Block. They explained that Warehouse 2 had been closed at the beginning of 2013 for refurbishment. Both warehouses have a capacity of 200 persons and host only men and male minors undergoing age-assessment procedures. They consist of a single open space with half-length low partitions between rows of bunk beds. At the entrance of the warehouse, there is a common area with tables, benches and a television, which exits onto an outdoor recreational facility. There is also access to secluded sanitary facilities with hot and cold water which respect the privacy of the individual using the shower facilities. All compounds have recreation yards which are accessible to inmates from sunrise to sunset.89.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that they allocated substantial sums of money to secure the maintenance and upkeep of detention centres, while also providing shelter, food, clothing, and medical assistance to migrants. In the Government\u2019s view the facility catered for all the needs of the migrants. Further, as far as possible migrants with different ethnicities and religious beliefs were kept separate while in detention.90.\u00a0\u00a0 According to the Government, upon arrival an emergency bag is distributed and a second bag is supplied on the second day. Further supplies are provided on a regular basis to cater for the migrants\u2019 well-being, including that of the applicants, who did not have the financial means to purchase supplies. Every two weeks new cleaning products were supplied to each room in order to secure the cleanliness of the areas. The applicants were also given clothing and supplies to cater for personal hygiene, and had access to sanitary facilities equipped with hot and cold water, as well as secluded showers.91.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that whilst in detention the applicants were housed in a sheltered compound with adequate bedding and were provided with three meals a day on a daily basis (the menu changed daily and food was prepared in different ways) and mineral water. Meals were provided from a pre-set menu, however, particular dietary requests were regularly respected and the food supplied respected the relevant religious traditions. The detention centres had a medical practitioner and a nurse who provided on-site treatment and could make referrals to hospital treatment, and \u201ccustody clinics\u201d were set up in all compounds housing migrants.92.\u00a0\u00a0The detention centre is equipped with ceiling fans which can be used in the summer months and the building is equipped with windows that can be easily opened and which provide the necessary ventilation and circulations of air. The Government submitted that access to outside exercise was limited to one and a half hours daily, during which immigrants could engage in sports activities such as playing football.93.\u00a0\u00a0Immigration detainees were provided with telephone cards and various telephones can be found in the detention centre. Moreover, the Red\u00a0Cross also operated a mobile phone calling service on a daily basis. The Government submitted that access to the Internet or mobile phones was restricted for security reasons. Interpreters were provided for free at the detention centres. The detainees were further provided with stationery and books on request and have unlimited access to NGOs and legal assistance. In 2013 the immigrants also had the opportunity to take part in an EU funded project (SPARKLET) which provided, inter alia, educational and cultural activities.94.\u00a0\u00a0The Government explained that medical services at the Safi Detention Centre had been outsourced since April 2007. Two doctors and two nurses visited the detention centres every day (except weekends) between 8 am and 3 pm (nurses) and 9 am and 11 pm (doctors). On a daily basis each doctor examined forty inmates, meaning that 400 patients were examined each week. The clinics on site at each of the compounds in Safi were refurbished and equipped with basic medical equipment. During silent hours (when doctors were not present) detainees were allowed to visit the nearest health centre to see a doctor. Furthermore, nurses from the Malta Memorial District Nursing Association (MMDNA) reported to detention centres during weekdays in the evening and weekends both morning and evenings to dispense medicines. For migrants requiring mental health support, the doctor would refer them for further treatment at Mount Carmel Hospital (the State mental health hospital) and other referrals to the State General Hospital were made if specialised attention was necessary.95.\u00a0\u00a0As to the second applicant\u2019s allegation, the Government reiterated that the Safi Detention centre had a clinic staffed by a doctor and a nurse, and in their absence he would have been taken to a health centre had he sought medical assistance. However, the Government claimed that no such report had ever been made by the applicant with the detention staff, neither was any report made concerning any beating by a fellow immigrant \u2013 in respect of which the second applicant gave no details. Further, the Government alleged (without any supporting evidence) that one of the people the applicant feared was in prison while the second applicant was detained in Safi. The Government further noted that the authorities kept medical appointments, but that it was the migrants who often refused to attend them, and other dates thus had to be fixed. The Government also contested the second applicant\u2019s allegation that he was not given shoes on arrival, as the emergency bag distributed on the first day contains flip\u2011flops.96.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicants were given information on their arrival, by means of an information leaflet and verbally, and the Commissioner for Refugees holds information sessions with the aid of interpreters. As to information concerning the AWAS procedure the Government submitted that information was easily available had the applicants asked for it from the staff at the detention centre; however it did not appear that they had asked for it. The Government further noted that although coming from a security background the staff at the detention centre were given training to provide support to migrants.97.\u00a0\u00a0The Government referred to the Court\u2019s case-law (Sizarev v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 17116\/04, 17 January 2013; Selcuk and Akser v.\u00a0Turkey, nos.\u00a023184\/94 and 23185\/94, 24 April 1998; Pretty v.\u00a0the\u00a0United\u00a0Kingdom, no.\u00a02346\/02, ECHR 2002\u2011III; and particularly Aden\u00a0Ahmed v.\u00a0Malta, no.\u00a055352\/12, 23 July 2013), and the principles cited therein. They considered that the conditions of detention at issue could not be compared to those in facilities in respect of which the Court had found a violation (for example, Dougoz v.\u00a0Greece, no.\u00a040907\/98, ECHR 2001\u2011II; S.D. v.\u00a0Greece, no. 53541\/07, 11\u00a0June 2009; and A.A. v. Greece, no. 12186\/08, 22\u00a0July 2010). In the present case the applicants had been given ample personal space (as the warehouse was never overcrowded) with adequate ventilation and bedding as well as exercise time. They had a balanced and varied diet and other items as mentioned above. Moreover, according to the Government \u201cimmediate\u201d action was being taken to determine the applicants\u2019 age and conclude the procedure. In their view the applicants\u2019 age verification assessment (which had been concluded within seven months) had been determined diligently, and no room for uncertainty arose, given that their age could not be determined ictu oculi.98.\u00a0\u00a0The Government distinguished the case from that of Aden\u00a0Ahmed (cited above) in that the detention period in the present case was shorter, and the applicants were not particularly fragile given that they were sixteen and seventeen years of age respectively, thus were almost adults, who from the information provided did not require frequent medical attention. Their age also distinguished the case from that of Mubilanzila\u00a0Mayeka and Kaniki\u00a0Mitunga (cited above) which concerned a five-year old child. Bearing in mind all the above, the Government considered that there had not been a violation of Article 3.3.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles99.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, according to its case-law, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article\u00a03 of the Convention. The assessment of this minimum level of severity is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim. Furthermore, in considering whether treatment is \u201cdegrading\u201d within the meaning of Article\u00a03, the Court will have regard to whether its object is to humiliate and debase the person concerned and whether, as far as the consequences are concerned, it adversely affected his or her personality in a manner incompatible with Article 3. However, the absence of such a purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of a violation of Article 3 (see Riad and Idiab v.\u00a0Belgium, nos.\u00a029787\/03 and 29810\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 95-96, 24 January 2008).100.\u00a0\u00a0Under Article 3, the State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity and that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject the individual to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention (see Riad and Idiab, cited above, \u00a7\u00a099; S.D. v. Greece, cited above, \u00a7 47; and A.A. v.\u00a0Greece, cited above, \u00a7\u00a055). When assessing conditions of detention, account has to be taken of the cumulative effects of these conditions, as well as of specific allegations made by the applicant (see Dougoz, cited above, \u00a7 46). The length of the period during which a person is detained in specific conditions also has to be considered (see, among other authorities, Alver v. Estonia, no.\u00a064812\/01, \u00a7\u00a050, 8\u00a0November 2005, and Aden\u00a0Ahmed, cited above, \u00a7 86).101.\u00a0\u00a0The extreme lack of personal space in the detention area weighs heavily as an aspect to be taken into account for the purpose of establishing whether the impugned detention conditions were \u201cdegrading\u201d from the point of view of Article 3 (see Karalevi\u010dius v. Lithuania, no. 53254\/99, \u00a7\u00a036, 7\u00a0April 2005, and Yarashonen v. Turkey, no. 72710\/11, \u00a7 72, 24 June 2014, and, for a detailed analysis of the principles concerning the overcrowding issue, see Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525\/07 and 60800\/08, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0143\u201148, 10 January 2012).102.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further reiterates that, quite apart from the necessity of having sufficient personal space, other aspects of physical conditions of detention are relevant for the assessment of compliance with Article 3. Such elements include access to outdoor exercise, natural light or air, availability of ventilation, and compliance with basic sanitary and hygiene requirements (see Ananyev and Others, cited above, \u00a7 149 et seq. for further details, and M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696\/09, \u00a7 222, ECHR 2011). The Court notes in particular that the Prison Standards developed by the Committee for the Prevention of Torture make specific mention of outdoor exercise and consider it a basic safeguard of prisoners\u2019 well-being that all of them, without exception, be allowed at least one hour of exercise in the open air every day and preferably as part of a broader programme of out\u2011of\u2011cell activities (see Ananyev and Others, cited above, \u00a7 150).103.\u00a0\u00a0With more specific reference to minors, the Court has established that it is important to bear in mind that the child\u2019s extreme vulnerability is the decisive factor and takes precedence over considerations relating to the status of illegal immigrant (see Mubilanzila\u00a0Mayeka and Kaniki\u00a0Mitunga, cited above, \u00a7\u00a055, and Popov v.\u00a0France, nos.\u00a039472\/07 and 39474\/07, \u00a7 91, 19\u00a0January 2012). Children have specific needs that are related in particular to their age and lack of independence, but also to their asylum-seeker status. The Court has also observed that the Convention on the Rights of the Child encourages States to take appropriate measures to ensure that a child who is seeking to obtain refugee status enjoys protection and humanitarian assistance, whether the child is alone or accompanied by his or her parents (see to this effect Popov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a091).104.\u00a0 Accordingly, the reception conditions for children seeking asylum must be adapted to their age, to ensure that those conditions do not \u201ccreate\u00a0... for them a situation of stress and anxiety, with particularly traumatic consequences\u201d (see Tarakhel v. Switzerland [GC], no. 29217\/12, \u00a7 99, ECHR 2014 (extracts)). Otherwise, the conditions in question would attain the threshold of severity required to come within the scope of the prohibition under Article 3 of the Convention (ibid.).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application to the present case105.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it has already had occasion to express its concern about the appropriateness of the place and the conditions of detention in Safi Barracks (see Suso Musa v. Malta, no. 42337\/12, \u00a7 101, 23\u00a0July 2013 in the context of an Article 5 complaint). In that case it noted that various international reports had expressed concerns on the matter. Both the CPT and the ICJ considered that the conditions in question could amount to inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3 of the Convention; furthermore, those conditions had been exacerbated during the Libyan crisis, a time when Mr Suso Musa was in detention. In that light, the Court found it difficult to consider such conditions as appropriate for persons who have not committed criminal offences but who, often fearing for their lives, have fled from their own country.106.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the present case concerns a period subsequent to that commented on by international bodies (see above). However it is safe to assume that Warehouse 2 remained in the same conditions it was in in 2011 (date of reports) until it closed for refurbishment in 2013, the time when the applicants were moved to Block B. In respect of the latter Block the Government have not claimed that any further improvements have been made since those reports.107.\u00a0\u00a0As to overcrowding the Court notes that, on the one hand, the applicants submitted that in the months of August and September Warehouse 2 hosted approximately 290-320 inmates. On the other hand the Government have submitted that Warehouse 2 can host around 200 inmates and that it was never overcrowded. The Court observes that the Government did not provide any specific rebuttal to this allegation, nor did they submit any relevant documentation concerning the number of detainees present at the relevant time, or the size of the premises. The Court considers that in the absence of exact numbers and the relevant measurements of Warehouse\u00a02 being provided by any of the parties it cannot conclude with certainty that there existed overcrowding which was so severe as to justify in itself a finding of a violation of Article\u00a03. Nevertheless, the Court notes that even at the time of the CPT visit in 2011 Warehouse 1 was hosting more than 200 inmates (see paragraph 47 above). The Court thus considers that the numbers submitted by the applicants are credible. Those numbers indicate that Warehouse 2 hosted around 50% more individuals than it was intended to host, and in the Court\u2019s view this gives rise to a presumption that the applicants were detained in overcrowded conditions for around two months.108.\u00a0\u00a0In any event it is for the Court to assess the other aspects of the conditions of detention which are relevant to the assessment of compliance with Article 3.109.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the suffering from heat raised by the first applicant, the Court reiterates that suffering from cold and heat cannot be underestimated, as such conditions may affect well-being, and may in extreme circumstances affect health (see Aden Ahmed, cited above, \u00a7\u00a094). Nevertheless, the Court notes that ceiling fans were in place, and despite the fact that Malta is an extremely hot country in the summer months the Court considers that the authorities cannot be expected to provide the most advanced technology. The applicants were also provided with telephone cards and three meals a day. The meals of which the applicants complain do not appear to have been entirely unbalanced or to have affected their health \u2011 indeed it has not been shown that the first applicant\u2019s allegation as to itching was as a result of the food provided. Further, the applicants\u2019 basic needs had been seen to by the distribution of items free of charge, and even if it is regrettable that certain items were not readily available, the applicants were not left without clothes or in unhygienic conditions \u2013 even if partly with private help.110.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Court is concerned about a number of other factors. The applicants complained of limited light and ventilation - while this concern has not been specifically highlighted by international reports in connection with Warehouse 2 and Block B (where both applicants were detained for around five and three months respectively), the Court notes that such reports considered that Warehouse 2 was not intended to host people, and that it was not suitable to accommodate people for prolonged periods (see paragraphs 46 and 47 above). Similarly, although not emphasised by the applicants, the CPT report considered that the sanitary facilities in the warehouses were in a deplorable state and that the conditions of detention there were \u201cappalling\u201d. The situation appears to have improved slightly in the last three months of their detention when they were detained in Block B. However, the Court also notes that while the applicants had access to a common area equipped with a television, as well as to a yard, for a specific time daily, the CPT also highlighted the complete lack of any organised activity in the warehouses, and the poor situation prevailing also in Block B.111.\u00a0\u00a0These concerns assume a new dimension in view of the fact that the applicants were minors at the time of their detention (as confirmed by the domestic procedures). While it is true that the applicants were not young children, they still fell within the international definition of minors, in respect of which detention should be a last resort and which should be limited to the shortest time possible. As mentioned above, under the Court\u2019s case-law reception conditions for children seeking asylum must be adapted to their age. However no measures were taken to ensure that the applicants as minors received proper counselling and educational assistance from qualified personnel specially mandated for that purpose (see Mubilanzila\u00a0Mayeka and Kaniki\u00a0Mitunga, cited above, \u00a7 50). Nor were any entertainment facilities provided for persons of their age. Furthermore, the Court cannot ignore the applicants\u2019 submissions to the effect that there was a tense and violent atmosphere, as also documented by reports (see paragraph 86 above). The lack of any support mechanism for the applicants, as minors, as well as the lack of information concerning their situation, must have exacerbated their fears.112.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that a State\u2019s obligations concerning the protection of migrant minors may be different depending on whether they are accompanied or not (see Rahimi v. Greece, no. 8687\/08, \u00a7 63, 5\u00a0April 2011). However, the Court has found violations in both ambits. It found a violation of Article 3 in Popov (cited above, \u00a7 103) concerning accompanied minors in view of the children\u2019s young age (five months and three years), the length of their detention (over a period of fifteen days) and the conditions of their confinement in a detention centre. It also found a violation of Article 3 in the Muskhadzhiyeva and Others (cited above, \u00a7 63) concerning four young children who were held, accompanied by their mother, for one month pending their removal \u2013 the Court having taken into consideration their young age (seven months to seven years), the duration of the detention and their health status (see also Kanagaratnam v. Belgium, no.\u00a015297\/09, \u00a7 69, 13 December 2011). The Court has also previously found, in Rahimi (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 85-86) in respect of an unaccompanied minor (aged fifteen) in such facilities, that the conditions of his detention were so poor that they undermined the very essence of human dignity and that they could be regarded in themselves, without taking into consideration the length of the detention (a few days), as degrading treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention (see also Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki\u00a0Mitunga, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 50-59, in connection with a five-year-old unaccompanied minor).113.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that in the applicants\u2019 case the aforementioned conditions persisted for a period of around eight months, during which no specific arrangements were made for the applicants as migrants awaiting the outcome of their age-assessment procedure (whose status as minors was later confirmed). The Court reiterates that the applicants, as asylum-seekers, were particularly vulnerable because of everything they had been through during their migration and the traumatic experiences they were likely to have endured previously (see M.S.S., cited above, \u00a7\u00a0232). Moreover, in the present case the applicants, who were sixteen and seventeen years of age respectively, were even more vulnerable than any other adult asylum seeker detained at the time because of their age (see, a contrario, Mahamed\u00a0Jama, cited above, \u00a7 100).114.\u00a0\u00a0It follows, in the present case, that since the applicants were minors who were detained for a period of around eight months, the cumulative effect of the conditions complained of amounted to degrading treatment within the meaning of the Convention.115.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article\u00a03 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 4 OF THE CONVENTION116.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that they did not have a remedy which met the requirements of Article 5 \u00a7 4, as outlined in the Court\u2019s jurisprudence, to challenge the lawfulness of their detention. The provision reads as follows:\u201cEveryone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility117.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that Article 5 \u00a7 4 did not apply to the present case since, according to the Court\u2019s case-law, such a remedy is no longer required once an individual is lawfully free. They noted that the applicants had been released.118.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants noted that they were entitled to raise this complaint, since they had not had such a remedy during their detention, and had instituted proceedings before the Court while they were still in detention.119.\u00a0\u00a0While it is true that Article 5 \u00a7 4 cannot be relied on by a person who has been lawfully released (see Stephens v. Malta (no. 1), no.\u00a011956\/07, \u00a7\u00a0102, 21\u00a0April 2009), the Court notes that when the applicants lodged their application with the Court they were still detained and they were precisely complaining that they did not have an effective remedy to challenge the lawfulness of their detention during the time they were detained. They are not complaining of the absence of such a remedy following their release. In consequence the provision is clearly applicable. Moreover, the Court reiterates that a released person may nonetheless challenge under Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04 the speediness of a remedy (see Aden Ahmed, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0105).120.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the Government\u2019s objection must be dismissed.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions121.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants relied on the Court\u2019s findings in Louled\u00a0Massoud v.\u00a0Malta (no. 24340\/08, 27 July 2010), whereby the Court held that the available remedies in the Maltese domestic system were ineffective and insufficient for the purposes of Article 5 \u00a7 4. A summary of their submissions can be found in Mahamed Jama (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 109-11).122.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that this review was provided by Article 409A of the Maltese Criminal Code, and even if that were not so, it could be provided by means of proceedings before the constitutional jurisdictions. A summary of their lawyers\u2019 submissions can be found in Mahamed Jama (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 112-14).2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment123.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already had occasion to examine such complaints and found that it had not been shown that applicants in situations such as that of the present case had at their disposal an effective and speedy remedy under domestic law by which to challenge the lawfulness of their detention (see, inter alia, Mahamed Jama, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 115-21, and Moxamed\u00a0Ismaaciil and Abdirahman Warsame, cited above, \u00a7 112-18). There is no reason to hold otherwise in the present case.124.\u00a0\u00a0Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention has therefore been violated.IV.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION125.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also complained under Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f) that their continued detention for eight months was arbitrary and unlawful, as it did not fall under either of the two limbs under the mentioned provision. In any event, even assuming it fell under the first limb, the law was not precise and did not provide for procedural safeguards. Moreover, their continued detention could not be considered reasonably required for the purpose, nor was it closely connected to the purpose of preventing an unauthorised entry. Furthermore, they had been detained in conditions which were not appropriate for young asylum seekers. The provision reads as follows:\u201cEveryone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:(f)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility126.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicants had not brought their complaint before the domestic authorities.127.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already held that the applicants did not have at their disposal an effective and speedy remedy by which to challenge the lawfulness of their detention (see paragraph 123 above). It follows that the Government\u2019s objection must be dismissed.128.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants129.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that their initial detention was for the purpose of deportation as a result of the removal order and was in line with Article 14 (2) of the Immigration Act. Nevertheless once they applied for asylum, they could no longer be detained under either limb as, in their view, Maltese law provided that once such application was lodged the asylum seeker \u201cshall not be removed ... and the applicant shall be allowed to enter or remain in Malta pending a final decision\u201d (see Relevant domestic law). However, even assuming that their detention was to be considered as falling under the first limb, they considered that an approximately eight month detention (eight months and three days and seven months and twenty\u2011four days respectively) was arbitrary, as it exceeded the time reasonably required for its purpose, and thus could not be closely connected to the purpose of preventing an unauthorised entry.130.\u00a0\u00a0They noted that their detention was not the result of an individual decision to detain on the particular circumstances of their cases. It was not a measure taken after less coercive measures were deemed to be ineffective. Their detention was a result of a blanket policy applied to all without distinction, which made the detention arbitrary and discriminatory, irrespective of the Government\u2019s claims to the contrary.131.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, at no point was their continued detention reviewed in order to determine whether it remained closely connected to the purpose pursued or whether the length of their detention had exceeded that reasonably required for the purpose. They believe that their eight-month detention pending the outcome of age-assessment procedures in fact exceeded the length of time \u201creasonably required for the purpose\u201d and cannot be said to be \u201cclosely connected to the purpose of preventing unauthorised entry\u201d, especially given the relatively straightforward assessment process which consists of one or two interviews and an X-ray of the bones of the wrist. In their view, none of these procedures required more than a few days to be concluded. In fact, most of the months were spent waiting either to be sent for the \u2018bone test\u2019 or for the result of the test and the issuing of the care order. In fact the first applicant was taken for the bone test some weeks after his arrival but only released months later, although he was verbally informed in the interim that he was found to be a minor. As to the second applicant, he was interviewed some weeks after his arrival and taken for his bone test some five months later. They considered, that a huge influx of applications could not be used as a justification for unnecessarily prolonged administrative procedures, as a result of which they remained in detention.132.\u00a0\u00a0Further, the applicants submitted that in spite of the fact that the AWAS procedure can have a determining impact on the continued detention of individuals detained in terms of the Immigration Act, it was not adequately regulated by law or by publicly available rules or procedures. The only reference to age-assessment procedures was that in the Government\u2019s policy document and subsidiary legislation (see Relevant domestic law below). They considered that nearly eight months to reach a determination on age was unjustifiable, and had an impact on the amount of time spent in detention (irrespective of the result of that process).133.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants claimed that the Age-Assessment Procedure has often been criticised, as it is plagued by delays and by a lack of adequate procedural guarantees, including lack of information about the procedure followed and the possibility of appeal. No reasons are ever given for decisions and there is no real possibility to challenge the decision taken by the AAT. In addition, migrants undergoing Age-Assessment Procedures are detained throughout the procedures, usually in centres with adults without any special consideration for the fact that they are minors. They referred to the 2012 report of Human Rights Watch entitled \u2018Boat-ride to Detention: Adult and Child Migrants in Malta\u2019[2].134.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the applicants submitted that they had not been kept in conditions which were appropriate for minor asylum seekers, and that they had no access to procedural safeguards.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government135.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicants\u2019 deprivation of liberty was a consequence of their unauthorised entry and pending the examination of their asylum application, thus in line with the first limb of the provision. Once they resulted to be minors, they had been released. They noted that practically all immigrants reaching Malta did not carry documents and thus ascertaining their identities upon entry was a lengthy process which dependent on the cooperation of the migrants themselves. Moreover, the large number of undocumented migrants constituted a huge and entirely justified security concern for Malta.136.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that the detention was carried out in good faith, as the centre at issue had been set up especially for that purpose, and the detention had fulfilled all the conditions indicated by the Court in Saadi v.\u00a0the United Kingdom [GC] (no. 13229\/03, ECHR 2008). They also considered that detention was based in law and was not discriminatory, nor was it applied across the board.137.\u00a0\u00a0They further noted that age assessment of persons who were quite young was fast tracked as in such cases there was little difficulty in assessing the age. In straightforward cases release from detention was effected within a maximum of two weeks from arrival. On the other hand with teenagers close to the age of adulthood, the procedure involved more steps and thus inevitably took longer. The procedure involved the holding of interviews with AWAS officials, and if they were inconclusive a Further Age Verification (FAV) test which consists of an X-ray of the hand and wrist bones and which, according to the Government, gives accurate results. At the same time the Government also admitted that the test had a margin of error of two years.138.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that in 2013 567 individuals had claimed to be unaccompanied minors and most of them had required referral to the FAV test. Thus, any delay in the examination of the applicants\u2019 request was as a result of this huge influx. Moreover, one had to bear in mind the small size of the island and its limited resources, which sometimes resulted in a waiting list to carry out certain tests. They further noted that out of the 567 individuals, only 274 were ruled to be minors.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment139.\u00a0\u00a0The Court refers to its general principles relevant to the present case as reiterated in Mahamad Jama (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 136-40).140.\u00a0\u00a0It is noted that the applicants do not complain about the lawfulness and compliance with Article 5 of their detention between their arrival and the date when they applied for asylum (see paragraph 129 above, in primis).141.\u00a0\u00a0As to the subsequent period the Court observes that the applicants had been detained in accordance with the provisions of the Immigration Act (Articles\u00a05 and\u00a014(2), Chapter 217 of the Laws of Malta). While expressing reservations about the quality of all the applicable laws seen together in such context, the Court has already accepted that in cases similar to those of the applicants, the detention had a sufficiently clear legal basis, and that up to the decision on an asylum claim, such detention can be considered to fall under the first limb of Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(f), namely to \u201cprevent effecting an unauthorised entry\u201d\u00a0(see Suso Musa, cited above, \u00a7 99 and Mahamed\u00a0Jama, cited above, \u00a7 144). There is no reason to find otherwise in the present case.142.\u00a0\u00a0It remains to be determined whether the detention in the present case was not arbitrary, namely whether it was carried out in good faith; whether it was closely connected to the ground of detention relied on by the Government; whether the place and conditions of detention were appropriate and whether the length of the detention exceeded that reasonably required for the purpose pursued.143.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already noted a series of odd practices on the part of the domestic authorities when dealing with immigrant arrivals and subsequent detentions and it expressed its reservations as to the Government\u2019s good faith in applying an across-the-board detention policy (save for specific vulnerable categories) and the by-passing of the voluntary departure procedure (see Suso Musa, cited above \u00a7 100 and Mahamed\u00a0Jama, cited above, \u00a7 146) - reservations which it maintains, noting that the two practices persisted in the present case (see paragraphs\u00a07 and 10 above in connection with the first applicant, and paragraphs\u00a012 and\u00a015 with the second applicant).144.\u00a0\u00a0Nevertheless, the focus of the applicants\u2019 complaint concerns the fact that they were detained despite the fact that at the time they had claimed to be minors (and later found to be so). The Court reiterates that the necessity of detaining children in an immigration context must be very carefully considered by the national authorities (see Mahamed Jama, cited above, \u00a7 147). It is positive that in the Maltese context, when an individual is found to be a minor, the latter is no longer detained, and he or she is placed in a non-custodial residential facility, and that detention of minors should be no longer than what is absolutely necessary to determine their identification and health status (see paragraphs 31 and 36 above). An issue may however arise, inter alia, in respect of a State\u2019s good faith, in so far as the determination of age may take an unreasonable length of time - indeed, a lapse of various months may also result in an individual reaching his or her majority pending an official determination (ibid.).145.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is, on the one hand, sensitive to the Government\u2019s argument that younger looking individuals are fast tracked, and that the procedure is lengthier only in cases of persons close to adulthood, as well as their statement that in 2013 out of 567 individuals, only 274 were ruled to be minors (in 2012 only forty-six turned out to be minors out of seventy\u2011five \u2011 see Mahamed Jama, cited above, \u00a7 148). The Court observes that, as noted in Mahamed Jama, cited above, less than 10% of arrivals claimed to be minors in 2012 (that is when the applicants started their age\u2011assessment procedure). In this connection, the Court considers that despite the fact that \u201cborderline\u201d cases may require further assessment, the numbers of alleged minors per year put forward by the Government cannot justify a duration of more than seven months to determine the applicants\u2019 claims. Indeed, the Government have not explained why it was necessary for the first applicant in the present case to wait for a few weeks for his first age-assessment interview (see paragraph 18 above) and to wait for around seven months to have a decision following a standard medical test. The Court notes that during this time the first applicant remained in detention, despite having been told orally that he had been found to be a minor six months before (see paragraph 18). Similarly the Government have not explained why, following his interview, the second applicant had to wait for five months to have the FAV test and to wait for another two and a half months for such a decision, and therefore for his release under a care order. Indeed, in the present case it transpires that in October 2012 the authorities were already aware that the first applicant was a minor, and yet he remained in detention until a care order was issued on 19 April 2013, while the second applicant remained in detention for at least another month after his age was determined. In this connection the Court notes that Government policy clearly states that vulnerable people are exempt from detention and that unaccompanied minors are considered as a vulnerable category (see paragraphs 30 and 31 above).146.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that, even accepting that the detention was closely connected to the ground of detention relied on, namely to prevent an unauthorised entry, and in practice to allow for the applicants\u2019 asylum claim to be processed with the required prior age assessment, the delays in the present case, particularly those subsequent to the determination of the applicants\u2019 age, raise serious doubts as to the authorities\u2019 good faith. A situation rendered even more serious by the fact that the applicants lacked any procedural safeguards (as shown by the finding of a violation of Article\u00a05 \u00a7 4, at paragraph 124 above), as well as the fact that at no stage did the authorities ascertain whether the placement in immigration detention of the applicants was a measure of last resort for which no alternative was available (see, mutatis mutandis, Popov, cited above, \u00a7 119).147.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, as to the place and conditions of detention, the Court has already found that the situation endured by the applicants as minors, for a duration of eight months, was in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.148.\u00a0\u00a0In conclusion, bearing in mind all the above, the Court considers that in the present case the applicants\u2019 detention was not in compliance with Article 5 \u00a7 1. Accordingly, there has been a violation of that provision.V.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 2 OF THE CONVENTION149.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants further complained under Article 5 \u00a7 2 that the Return Decision and Removal Order, provided to them in English, a language they did not understand, did not contain sufficient information enabling them to challenge their detention. The provision reads as follows:\u201c\u00a0Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him.\u201d150.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the complaint was outside the six\u2011month limit, in so far as the applicants had been informed of the reasons of their detention on 16 and 31 August 2012 respectively, while they lodged their application only on 17 April 2013, which is eight months after the alleged violation.151.\u00a0\u00a0Relying on their submissions concerning non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, the applicants reiterated that migrant detainees had difficulties instituting judicial proceedings, and in consequence they submitted that they were not in a position to take action regarding this complaint within the six-month period prescribed by law.152.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in the absence of a remedy (see paragraph\u00a0123 above), in principle, the six-month time-limit must be calculated from the date of the omission complained of (see Aden Ahmed, cited above, \u00a7\u00a069, and Blokhin v. Russia [GC], no. 47152\/06, \u00a7 106, ECHR 2016).153.\u00a0\u00a0Even assuming that in the early stages of their detention the applicants were unable to contest such a measure because of their inability to understand the factual circumstances and their lack of knowledge of the English language, the Court observes that no specific reasons have been brought to the Court\u2019s attention, explaining why they were able to bring proceedings around eight months after their arrival and subsequent detention, but not two months earlier, in order to comply with the six-month rule (see Mahamed Jama, cited above, \u00a7 166).154.\u00a0\u00a0In such circumstances the Court considers that, the applicants having been informed of the reasons of their detention on 16 and 31\u00a0August 2012 respectively and having lodged their application on 17 April 2013, the complaint is inadmissible for non-compliance with the six-month rule set out in Article 35 \u00a7 1 and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7 4 of the Convention.VI.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION155.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage156.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants claimed 50,000 euros (EUR) each in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage, as a result of the violations of Article 3 and 5 in the present case.157.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the claims made by the applicants were excessive, and noted that such awards were made by the Court only in cases of excessive beatings by the authorities and other serious Article\u00a03 violations. They considered that a sum of EUR 3,000 would suffice in non\u2011pecuniary damage, given the circumstances of the case.158.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it has found a violation of Articles 3, 5\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 and\u00a05 \u00a7 4 in the present case, and therefore awards the applicants EUR\u00a012,000 each, in respect of non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses159.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also each claimed EUR 4,000 for costs and expenses incurred before the Court. The sum corresponded to sixty hours of legal work at an hourly rate of EUR 60, as well as clerical costs of EUR 400.160.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the award for costs and expenses should not exceed EUR 2,000 jointly.161.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the above criteria and the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 4,000 jointly, covering costs for the proceedings before the Court.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest162.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28835":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION29.\u00a0\u00a0Relying on Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention, the applicant complained that he had been ill-treated in police custody and that the domestic authorities had failed to investigate his allegation of ill-treatment. The Court considers that the present complaint falls to be examined solely under Article 3 of the Convention, which reads:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility30.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged ill-treatment of the applicant by the police(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions31.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained that the applicant had not been subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment in police custody. They argued that the two witnesses who had made statements in support of his allegation of ill-treatment had given conflicting description of the events. T.Y. and N.S. had been arrested with the applicant in connection with their participation in an unauthorised demonstration, so their witness statements had been biased.32.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the conclusions of the forensic report, the Government submitted that the injury noticed by the forensic expert was not serious and might have been sustained during the dispersal of the demonstration, as submitted by the police officer, I.M. The Government further pointed out that the applicant had failed to make any comment about his alleged ill-treatment in the administrative offence record drawn up on 2 April 2011.33.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contested the Government\u2019s submissions. He maintained that he had been beaten up by S.N. in the exercise yard of the NDPO temporary detention centre on 2 April 2011 and that his ill-treatment had been supported by the relevant medical evidence and the witness statements. He rejected the Government\u2019s argument that the statements of T.Y. and N.S were biased, submitting that the Government had failed to explain why T.Y. and N.S. should be considered more biased than the police officers questioned during the inquiry, who were hierarchically dependent on S.N.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles34.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic societies. Unlike most of the substantive clauses of the Convention, Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions, and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 \u00a7 2, even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation. Even in the most difficult circumstances, such as the fight against terrorism and organised crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (see Selmouni v. France [GC], no.\u00a025803\/94, \u00a7 95, ECHR 1999\u2011V; Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7\u00a0119, ECHR 2000\u2011IV; and Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380\/09, \u00a7 81, ECHR 2015).35.\u00a0\u00a0Ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. Assessment of this minimum level depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7\u00a0162, Series A no. 25; Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no.\u00a030210\/96, \u00a7 91, ECHR\u00a02000-XI; and Peers v. Greece, no. 28524\/95, \u00a7\u00a067, ECHR 2001-III). The Court has considered treatment to be \u201cinhuman\u201d because, inter alia, it was premeditated, applied for hours at a stretch and caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical and mental suffering. It has deemed treatment to be \u201cdegrading\u201d because it was such as to arouse in the victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them (see Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7 92).36.\u00a0\u00a0As to the distribution of the burden of proof, the Court reiterates that where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention. The burden of proof is then on the Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation by producing evidence establishing facts which cast doubt on the account of events given by the victim. In the absence of such explanation, the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the Government. That is justified by the fact that persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them (see Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7\u00a083).37.\u00a0\u00a0In assessing evidence, the Court adopts the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d. Such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see, among many other authorities, Av\u015far v. Turkey, no. 25657\/94, \u00a7 282, ECHR 2001-VII). The Court is sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role and recognises that it must be cautious in assuming the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact where this is not rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case (see, for example, McKerr v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 28883\/95, 4\u00a0April\u00a02000). Nevertheless, where allegations are made under Article 3 of the Convention, the Court must apply particularly thorough scrutiny, even if certain domestic proceedings and investigations have already taken place (see Av\u015far, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 283-84, and Muradova v. Azerbaijan, no.\u00a022684\/05, \u00a7 99, 2 April 2009).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application of these principles to the present case38.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes at the outset that the parties are in dispute about the question of whether the applicant was subjected to the use of force by the police at all (see Rizvanov v. Azerbaijan, no. 31805\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 46-48, 17\u00a0April 2012, and Hilal Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, no. 81553\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 78-84, 4 February 2016). In particular, the Government rejected the applicant\u2019s allegation of ill-treatment in police custody, whereas the applicant maintained his complaint that he had been beaten up by the police in the exercise yard of the temporary detention centre of the NDPO on 2\u00a0April\u00a02011.39.\u00a0\u00a0In view of all the materials in its possession, the Court considers that the applicant has been able to produce sufficiently strong evidence supporting the fact that he was subjected to the use of force in police custody on 2 April 2011. In this connection, the Court notes that the existence of a bruise on the applicant\u2019s right calf was established by the forensic report dated 9 April 2011 and that the Government did not dispute that fact in the domestic proceedings or before the Court. The forensic report, established following a medical examination of the applicant on 6\u00a0April 2011, concluded that the injury had been inflicted by a hard blunt object at a time corresponding to 2 April 2011 (see paragraph 15 above). It is undisputed that, on that date, the police arrested the applicant and took him to the NDPO where he was detained for approximately eight hours. At no stage has the Government claimed that the injury was or could have been sustained after the applicant\u2019s release from detention.40.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that, although the Government rejected the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment allegation, they did not put forward any satisfactory and convincing explanation by producing any evidence likely to cast doubt on the applicant\u2019s account of events. In this connection, the Government contented themselves with submitting that the injury might have been sustained during the dispersal of the demonstration. However, the Government did not submit any evidence in support of this argument nor is there any information indicating that there was any injury on the applicant\u2019s body before his arrest by the police. Moreover, the police officer, I.M., to whom the Government referred in this connection, stated that he had not been aware of any injury on the applicant\u2019s body when he had taken the applicant to the police office (see paragraph 19 above).41.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also cannot overlook the fact that neither the investigating authorities, nor the domestic courts in their decisions gave any explanation of how that injury was caused. In these circumstances, the Court considers that the respondent Government have failed to discharge their burden of proof and to submit a plausible explanation refuting the applicant\u2019s account of events and the medical evidence submitted. The statements provided by the different police officers questioned by the investigator were all drafted in an identical manner, despite the officers having been questioned separately, and no face-to-face confrontation was organised between the applicant and those officers (see paragraphs 18 and 19 above and paragraph\u00a052 below). Therefore, the Court has no reason to doubt the applicant\u2019s account of events and finds that the injury found on his body was sustained in police custody as a result of the use of force by the police on 2\u00a0April\u00a02011.42.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further considers that it has not been shown that the recourse to physical force against the applicant was made strictly necessary by his own conduct. It is undisputed that the applicant did not use violence against the police or pose a threat to them. It has not been shown that there were any other reasons justifying the use of force against him (see Najafli v.\u00a0Azerbaijan, no.\u00a02594\/07, \u00a7 39, 2 October 2012, and Hilal Mammadov, cited above, \u00a7 85).43.\u00a0\u00a0As to the seriousness of the act of ill-treatment, the Court considers that although the injury sustained by the applicant did not require any important medical intervention, it must have caused him physical pain and suffering. Moreover, the ill-treatment inflicted by the police officers on the applicant who was entirely under their control must also have caused him considerable mental suffering, diminishing his human dignity. In these circumstances, the Court considers that the ill-treatment complained of was sufficiently serious to attain the minimum level of severity to fall within the scope of Article 3 and to be considered as inhuman and degrading treatment.44.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive limb.2.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged failure to carry out an effective investigation(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions45.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained that the domestic authorities had failed to conduct an effective investigation into his ill-treatment.46.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the domestic authorities had conducted an effective investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegation of ill\u2011treatment. The investigating authorities had ordered his forensic examination and questioned all the relevant witnesses, as well as the applicant and S.N. Following a thorough and comprehensive inquiry, they had decided not to institute criminal proceedings. The Government further submitted that the domestic courts had also duly examined the applicant\u2019s allegation of ill-treatment. The domestic courts had been unable to examine the video recordings from the NDPO\u2019s security cameras because the recordings in question had been automatically deleted one month later due to the absence of memory cards in the security cameras.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment47.\u00a0\u00a0Where an individual raises an arguable claim that he or she has been ill-treated by the police in breach of Article 3, that provision \u2012 read in conjunction with the State\u2019s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to \u201csecure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in ... [the] Convention\u201d \u2012 requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation. This investigation should be capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible. Otherwise, the general legal prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment would, despite its fundamental importance, be ineffective in practice, and it would be possible in some cases for agents of the State to abuse the rights of those within their control with virtual impunity (see Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 28\u00a0October\u00a01998, \u00a7 102, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011VIII, and Labita,\u00a0cited above, \u00a7 131).48.\u00a0\u00a0An investigation into allegations of ill-treatment must be thorough, meaning that the authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill\u2011founded conclusions to close their investigation or to form the basis of their decisions (see\u00a0Assenov\u00a0and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 103 et seq.). They must take all steps reasonably available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard (see Bat\u0131 and Others v. Turkey, nos.\u00a033097\/96 and 57834\/00, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0134 and 137, ECHR 2004-IV).49.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes that, although the applicant raised an arguable claim, supported by the medical evidence and the witness testimonies, that he had been beaten up by the police in police custody on 2 April 2011, following a criminal inquiry the deputy prosecutor of the Nasimi district prosecutor\u2019s office refused to institute criminal proceedings in connection with the applicant\u2019s allegation of ill-treatment and that decision was upheld by the domestic courts. It remains to be assessed whether the criminal inquiry was effective, as required by Article 3.50.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, the Court observes numerous shortcomings in the criminal inquiry carried out by the domestic authorities.51.\u00a0\u00a0Firstly, the domestic authorities failed to take all the measures reasonably available to them to secure evidence concerning the applicant\u2019s allegation of ill-treatment. In particular, they failed to examine the video recordings from the security cameras of the NDPO temporary detention centre concerning the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment. The Court cannot accept the Government\u2019s argument that this failure was due to the absence of a memory card in the security cameras which had resulted in the automatic deletion of the video recordings in question one month later. Taking into account the fact that the applicant lodged his complaint with the prosecuting authorities on 4 April 2011, only two days after the incident, and was questioned by the investigator on 6 April 2011, the Court does not see any reason why the investigating authorities had failed to examine those video recordings within a period of one month after the incident when they were still available. Neither the Government in their submissions, nor the domestic courts in their decisions gave any explanation for this omission.52.\u00a0\u00a0There were also other deficiencies. In particular, the prosecuting authorities questioned two witnesses who testified in support of the applicant\u2019s claim and four police officers who testified against his claim. However, the reasoning provided for the prosecutor\u2019s decision not to institute criminal proceedings did not contain any assessment of the witness testimonies in favour of the applicant. The prosecutor did not provide any explanation as to why those testimonies were considered less credible than the police officers\u2019 statements (see Rizvanov, cited above, \u00a7 60). The Court further notes that the statements of the police officers were identical in their wording (see\u00a0paragraphs 18 and 19 above) and that, despite the fact that their statements clearly conflicted with the applicant\u2019s statement, the investigator in charge of the case did not order a face-to-face confrontation between the applicant and the police officers (see Hilal Mammadov, cited above, \u00a7 96). Nor can the Court overlook the fact that, although the applicant explicitly asked the domestic courts to hear the witnesses who had testified in support of his claim, the domestic courts\u2019 decisions made no mention of that point.53.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the investigation of the applicant\u2019s claim of ill-treatment was ineffective. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural limb.II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION54.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage1.\u00a0\u00a0Pecuniary damage55.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 450 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage for expenses for his medical treatment.56.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the claim, noting that the applicant had failed to substantiate his claim.57.\u00a0\u00a0The Court points out that under Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, any claim for just satisfaction must be itemised and submitted in writing together with the relevant supporting documents or vouchers, failing which the Court may reject the claim in whole or in part. In the present case, even assuming that there is a causal link between the damage claimed and the violations found, the Court observes that the applicant did not submit any documentary evidence supporting this claim. In particular, he has not submitted any receipts, prescriptions or other documents certifying his expenses for medical treatment.58.\u00a0\u00a0For the above reasons, the Court rejects the applicant\u2019s claim in respect of pecuniary damage.2.\u00a0\u00a0Non-pecuniary damage59.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed EUR 28,500 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.60.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the amount claimed as unsubstantiated and excessive.61.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicant has suffered non-pecuniary damage which cannot be compensated for solely by the finding of violations and that compensation should thus be awarded. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, as required by Article 41 of the Convention, the Court awards the applicant the sum of EUR 10,000 under this head, plus any tax that may be chargeable on this amount.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses62.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed EUR 3,000 for costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and the Court. In support of his claim he submitted a contract concluded with his lawyer on 12 April 2011.63.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that the claim was excessive.64.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 3,000 covering costs under all heads.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28866":"A.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violation of Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention57.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that their expulsion from Latvia to the Russian Federation had put them at risk of being subjected to torture or inhuman treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, and that they did not have an effective remedy in this respect as required by Article 13 of the Convention. The relevant Convention provisions read as follows:Article 3\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dArticle 13\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d1.\u00a0\u00a0Arguments of the parties58.\u00a0\u00a0The Government emphasised that prior to their expulsion to the Russian Federation the applicants had not brought to the knowledge of Latvian authorities any grounds for their fear of a risk of ill-treatment in the receiving State. The Government further argued that neither the general situation in the Russian Federation nor the applicants\u2019 individual situation exposed them to any real risk. In particular, the domestic authorities had examined in detail the applicants\u2019 possible involvement in the release of hostages in the Chechen Republic in 1998. Relying on publicly available information, the Government stated that another member of the Chechen community in Latvia, whose role in the above hostage release negotiation was confirmed, had been travelling freely to the Russian Federation. The same was true for both applicants \u2013 between 2010 and 2012 they had visited Russia twelve and five times respectively, therefore showing that they did not feel threatened when travelling there, or to the Chechen Republic.59.\u00a0\u00a0In relation to the Article 13 complaint, the Government considered that the applicants did not have an arguable claim under the Convention. They invited the Court to follow the approach adopted in the cases of Keipenvardecas v. Latvia ((dec.), no.\u00a038979\/03) and R\u016b\u017ea v. Latvia ((dec.), no.\u00a033798\/05), in which it had found the Article 3 complaint manifestly ill-founded and had therefore not examined the Article\u00a013 complaint. Alternatively, the Government contended that the applicants had not applied under the Asylum Law for any measure with suspensive effect which, according to the Government, attested to the fact that the allegations in relation to the risk of ill-treatment in the Russian Federation were unfounded.60.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants did not deny that prior to their expulsion they had not brought the risk of ill-treatment to the attention of the authorities or claimed asylum. They contended that this had been because of the hasty conditions in which their expulsion had been carried out. On the day of expulsion one of their lawyers had sent a fax informing the authorities about the risk of ill\u2011treatment after expulsion, but they had ignored this information. The applicants invoked that in 1998 they had collaborated with the Latvian State security services in the hostage liberation operation in the Chechen Republic, but their names had not been associated with the operation publicly. Contrary to what had been alleged by the Government, the only person known publicly to have taken part in the hostage operation had since 2000 avoided travelling to Russia for fear of persecutions.61.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants did not deny that they had been able to travel to Russia several times of their own volition. They blamed the Latvian authorities, not only for expelling them from Latvia without any means of subsistence or documents, but also for informing the Russian security forces about their expulsion to Russia. According to the applicants, \u201cthis certainly drew the attention of Russian authorities to the personalities of the applicants, and also was the reason for them to return to Chechnya, to meet the relatives [who had] helped them to settle financial and documentary issues\u201d.62.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the above allegations and explained that the applicants had never been handed over to officials of the Border Guard Service of the Russian Federation. Instead, since they had not shown their passports, the Border Guard Service of the Russian Federation were contacted so that the applicants could enter on the basis of copies. The Government also added evidence attesting to the allegation that even though the applicants had not shown their passports to the Border Guard Service, a week after their expulsion they had nevertheless presented them to a public notary in Chechnya.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0The relevant principles63.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that according to its well-established case-law, Contracting States have the right, as a matter of international law and subject to their treaty obligations, including the Convention, to control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens. However, the expulsion of an alien by a Contracting State may give rise to an issue under Article\u00a03 and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person in question, if expelled, would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article\u00a03 in the receiving country (see Saadi v. Italy [GC], no.\u00a037201\/06, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0124-125, ECHR 2008). In these circumstances, Article\u00a03 implies an obligation not to expel the individual in question to that country (see F.G. v. Sweden [GC], no.\u00a043611\/11, \u00a7\u00a0111, ECHR 2016 and J.K.\u00a0and\u00a0Others v. Sweden [GC], no. 59166\/12, \u00a7\u00a079, ECHR 2016, with the case-law cited therein).64.\u00a0\u00a0In order to determine whether there is a risk of ill-treatment, the Court must examine the foreseeable consequences of sending the applicants to the receiving country, bearing in mind the general situation there and their personal circumstances (see Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827\/99 and 46951\/99, \u00a7\u00a067, ECHR 2005\u2011I). Exceptionally, in cases where an applicant alleges that he or she is the member of a group systematically exposed to a practice of ill-treatment, the Court has considered that the protection of Article\u00a03 of the Convention comes into play when the applicant establishes that there are serious reasons to believe in the existence of the practice in question and his or her membership of the group concerned (see J.K. and Others v. Sweden, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0103-105; see also NA. v. the United Kingdom, no. 25904\/07, \u00a7\u00a0116, 17\u00a0July\u00a02008). In any event, an applicant\u2019s specific allegations in a particular case require corroboration by other evidence (see Mamatkulov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a073).65.\u00a0\u00a0The existence of the risk must be assessed primarily with reference to those facts which were known or ought to have been known to the Contracting State at the time of expulsion, but the Court is not precluded from having regard to information which comes to light subsequent to the expulsion (see J.K. and Others v. Sweden, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a083 and 87). Furthermore, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article\u00a03, and the assessment of this minimum is, in the nature of things, relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment or punishment, the manner and method of its execution, its duration and its physical or mental effects (see Mamatkulov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a070).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the principles to the particular case66.\u00a0\u00a0At the outset the Court notes that it is not disputed, and the applicants have confirmed both before the Court and the domestic authorities, that prior to their expulsion they had not brought to the Latvian authorities\u2019 attention any grounds for their fear of a risk of ill-treatment. Furthermore, the Court observes that the Minister of Interior\u2019s decision was sent to both of them (see paragraph 11 above), and they did not contest that the content or consequences of the decision were known to them. Following the adoption of the blacklisting measure, the applicants\u2019 representatives had submitted several complaints to various domestic authorities, though none of them raised a complaint of ill-treatment. In these circumstances, the Court is not convinced by the applicants\u2019 allegations that they had no time to lodge an appeal or apply for asylum. Even assuming that the fax to the Border Guard Service (see paragraph 24 above) was submitted before the applicants actually crossed the border, its brief and vague wording at such a late stage (see paragraph 60 above) would not fulfil the obligation to properly substantiate their fear of ill-treatment. The Court therefore concludes that no substantial grounds were shown to the Latvian authorities to suggest that, if expelled to Russia, the applicants would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article\u00a03.67.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, the Court notes that in the subsequent domestic proceedings leading to an examination of the information received from the applicants after they were expelled, three weeks after their expulsion an extensive complaint alleging their collaboration in 1998 with the Latvian State security services in the release of hostages in the Chechen Republic was brought to the attention of the authorities for the first time (see paragraph 13 above), but it did not refer to the episode of alleged ill\u2011treatment five days after their expulsion, as described by the applicants in their initial application to the Court (see paragraph 25 above). In the course of the investigation carried out following the above-mentioned complaint, the Prosecutor General did not find it established that the applicants had collaborated with the Latvian security services (see paragraph 16 above). In any event the purported collaboration, which had taken place a long time ago, although a factor to be taken into account in the decision-making process, could not alone serve a substantial ground in the assessment of potential exposure to ill-treatment (see, mutatis mutandis, Tatar v.\u00a0Switzerland, no. 65692\/12, \u00a7\u00a052, 14 April 2015). The Court observes that the applicants have not denied that since 1998 they have been travelling extensively to the Russian Federation, including Chechnya, a fact supported by the testimony of the applicants\u2019 relatives (see paragraph 16 above). In the light of the above, the Court observes that the personal circumstances of the applicants lead to the conclusion that they have themselves demonstrated a lack of fear or any personal threat related to any possible past collaboration with the security services.68.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, despite the fact that the applicants in their observations relied extensively on their own account of the hostage release events of 1998, no detailed or coherent submissions were provided of the alleged beating by the Chechen police before 10\u00a0August\u00a02012 (see paragraph\u00a025 above): they merely referred to this in their initial application form to the Court (contrast Savriddin Dzhurayev v. Russia, no. 71386\/10, \u00a7\u00a0131, ECHR\u00a02013 (extracts)). In this connection, the Court observes that the certificate referred to by the applicants in their initial application form had no letter head but simply an illegible stamp. Moreover, it was not corroborated by any other material (e.g. a copy of entries in the patients\u2019 registration journal of the hospital) or explanation attesting to the fact that they had been summoned to the police station, or that they had asked for the alleged ill-treatment thereafter to be investigated. The applicants, who were not in detention or otherwise considered to be in a vulnerable situation at the material time, could not be absolved from their obligation to substantiate the above allegation. In conclusion, the Court reiterates that a mere possibility of ill-treatment in circumstances similar to the present applicants is not in itself sufficient to give rise to a breach of Article 3 (see also Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, no.\u00a036378\/02, \u00a7 352, ECHR 2005\u2011III, with further references).69.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the above, there are no substantial grounds for believing that the applicants\u2019 expulsion to the Russian Federation exposed them to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. Accordingly, the complaint under that provision is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) of the Convention and must be declared inadmissible pursuant to Article 35\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04 of the Convention.70.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the aforementioned conclusion that the applicants do not have an arguable claim that there has been a breach of Article\u00a03, their complaint under Article 13 is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and must likewise be rejected pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7 4 of the Convention.B.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violation of Article 8 of the Convention71.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that their expulsion from Latvia was in breach of their right to respect for their private and family life. They relied on Article 8 of the Convention, which reads:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.2.\u00a0\u00a0There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.\u201d1.\u00a0\u00a0The Government72.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the Prosecutor General was an independent and impartial body, which had full access to secret intelligence material in relation to the applicants\u2019 case and which provided an effective review of the impugned decisions. In case the applicants did not consider that this procedure met \u201cthe quality of law\u201d standards established by the Court\u2019s case-law, they had to challenge the compatibility of section 61(1) of the Immigration Law with the Constitutional Court. The Court has recognised the individual constitutional complaint mechanism as an effective remedy, and the Constitutional Court had already found the previous wording of section 61(1) of the Immigration Law incompatible with the Constitution (see paragraph 53 above).2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants73.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants considered that the interference with their private and family life was not in accordance with the law. They maintained, in particular, that under the pretext of the status of State secrecy they had never been able to familiarise themselves with the reports according to which they had allegedly posed a threat to national security, nor to defend themselves against these allegations. In their opinion, the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office had carried out a purely formalistic examination of their complaints, including the allegations of their collaboration with the Latvian State security services in the hostage liberation operation in 1998. The applicants argued that, in any event, the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office was not an independent body carrying out such review as the Prosecutor General, before taking up the post, has to obtain security clearance from the SAB.74.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also dismissed the Government\u2019s argument that the Constitutional Court could provide an effective remedy in their case. They submitted that it was apparent from the Constitutional Court\u2019s case-law, in particular case no.\u00a02004-14-01 (see paragraph 53 above) and case\u00a0no.\u00a02010\u201155-0106 (see Meimanis v. Latvia, no.\u00a070597\/11, 21\u00a0July\u00a02015, \u00a7\u00a024), that the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office was to be considered an independent institution in the light of Article\u00a013 of the Convention. According to the applicants, they therefore had no grounds to consider that in their case the Constitutional Court would come to a different conclusion.3.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment75.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes at the outset that the applicants\u2019 complaint concerned two separate and consecutive, albeit linked, proceedings under the Immigration Law. Firstly, they complained that an appeal to the Prosecutor General regarding the applicants\u2019 inclusion in a blacklist on national security grounds had not provided them with sufficient information as to the allegations against them, thus depriving the applicants of sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness in the ensuing expulsion proceedings. Secondly, they complained that as a result of the expulsion proceedings there had been a disproportional interference with the applicants\u2019 right to respect for their private and family life. The Court will examine these complaints in turn.(a)\u00a0\u00a0Proceedings leading to the applicants\u2019 inclusion in the blacklist (the blacklisting proceedings)76.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that even where national security is at stake, the concepts of lawfulness and the rule of law in a democratic society require measures interfering with the rights guaranteed by Article\u00a08 to be subject to \u201csome form of adversarial proceedings before an independent body competent to review the reasons for the decision and relevant evidence, if need be with appropriate procedural limitations on the use of classified information\u201d (see Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, no. 50963\/99, \u00a7\u00a0123, 20 June 2002, and case-law cited herein). In the light of the above, the Court considers that the allegations regarding a lack of sufficient safeguards in the blacklisting proceedings fall within the scope of Article 8 of the Convention.77.\u00a0\u00a0The Government invoked that the applicants should have lodged an individual constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court. The applicants contested that. The Court reiterates that the purpose of Article\u00a035 of the Convention is to afford the Contracting States the opportunity of preventing or putting right the violations alleged against them before those allegations are submitted to it (see G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, \u00a7\u00a0142, ECHR 2010; for a recent summary of general principles pertaining to the exhaustion of domestic remedies see, for example, Chiragov and Others v.\u00a0Armenia [GC], no. 13216\/05, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0115-116, ECHR 2015). It is appropriate that the national courts should initially have the opportunity to determine questions of the compatibility of domestic law with the Convention and, if an application is nonetheless subsequently brought to Strasbourg, the European Court should have the benefit of the views of the national courts, as being in direct and continuous contact with the forces of their countries (see Burden v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 13378\/05, \u00a7\u00a042, ECHR 2008).78.\u00a0\u00a0In examining whether the applicants had at their disposal an effective remedy, the Court will look at whether the individual complaint mechanism before the Constitutional Court extended to the Convention complaint brought by the applicants and whether such proceedings offered reasonable prospects of success, taking into account in particular that the obligation to exhaust domestic remedies is limited to making use of those remedies which are likely to be effective and available, meaning that their existence is sufficiently certain and they are capable of directly redressing the alleged violation of the Convention (see, among other authorities, Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16\u00a0September 1996, \u00a7\u00a066, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011IV).79.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already found that in Latvia it is the Constitutional Court\u2019s practice to examine, inter alia, individual complaints challenging the compatibility of legal provisions not only with the Constitution itself, but also with the Convention (for relevant domestic law and practice see paragraphs 40-44 above, see also Larionovs and Tess v. Latvia (dec.), nos.\u00a045520\/04, 19363\/05, \u00a7\u00a0158, 25\u00a0November\u00a02014), unless the alleged violation has resulted from erroneous application or interpretation of a provision which, in its content, was not unconstitutional, and therefore fell outside the competence of the Constitutional Court (see Liep\u0101jnieks v. Latvia (dec.), no. 37586\/06, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a073 and 75, 2\u00a0November\u00a02010). A comparable conclusion was reached in a series of other cases, in particular, Elberte v. Latvia, no.\u00a061243\/08, \u00a7\u00a081, ECHR 2015; Nagla v. Latvia, no.\u00a073469\/10, \u00a7\u00a048, 16\u00a0July\u00a02013 and Savi\u010ds v. Latvia, no.\u00a017892\/03, \u00a7\u00a0115, 27\u00a0November\u00a02012.80.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes next that following the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment of 6\u00a0December\u00a02004 (see paragraph 53 above), the legislator gradually set up a system under which all decisions adopted by the Minister of Interior to include a person in the blacklist were subjected to administrative court review which was supplemented with several procedural safeguards, including the possibility of having access to State secret information (see paragraph 51 above).81.\u00a0\u00a0An exception was set out in section 61\u00a0(8) of the Immigration Law, which provided that decisions adopted by the Minister of Interior on the basis of information the State security institutions had obtained as a result of intelligence or counterintelligence activities were to be reviewed solely by the Prosecutor General whose decision was final. In the Prosecutor General\u2019s review proceedings the restriction on providing access to information obtained as a result of intelligence or counterintelligence activities was regulated by the State secret legislation which strictly limited the scope of its interpretation and application, as it has been demonstrated in practice, including in the present case (see paragraph 14 above).82.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that in all the cases where a person has been included in the blacklist on the basis of information which the State security institutions had obtained as a result of intelligence or counterintelligence activities, the authorities had to apply the procedure set out in section 61\u00a0(8) of the Immigration Law. The procedure enshrined limited scope of interpretation and application (contrary to, for example, Savi\u010ds, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0115 where the impugned interference did not derive from the provisions of the domestic law). In these circumstances the Court considers that the restriction on providing access to information was determined by operation of domestic law, and the Constitutional Court was not precluded from ruling on the constitutionality of a legal provision whose quality allegedly fell short of the procedural guarantees enshrined by Article 8 of the Convention.83.\u00a0\u00a0On the question of the possible forms of redress, the Court notes that the Constitutional Court proceedings could lead to a re-examination which could remedy the grievances. The Court has recognised that, even though following constitutional proceedings a successful applicant would have to request the reopening of his or her individual case, such a remedy could be considered capable of providing redress, as the domestic authorities would be bound by the Constitutional Court\u2019s judgment (see Larionovs and Tess, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0162, where a possible reopening of criminal proceedings was concerned). In this connection the Court also refers to the Constitutional Court\u2019s case-law in which \u2013 in addition to ruling on the constitutionality of a contested legal provision \u2013 an individual measure to the applicant has been introduced pertaining to his contested administrative proceedings (see paragraph 55 above).84.\u00a0\u00a0Finally, the Court finds no other circumstances which could have exempted the applicants from lodging a complaint to the Constitutional Court. As regards the case-law relied on by the applicants (see paragraph\u00a074 above), it must be distinguished from the present application. In those cases the Constitutional Court did not examine the issue of whether the review procedure provided by the Prosecutor\u2019s Office would provide sufficient safeguards against an interference with Article\u00a08 rights. Furthermore, there is no well-established Constitutional Court\u2019s case-law concerning the aspect whether the limits on providing access to information in the supervision proceedings carried out by the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office complies with the guarantees enshrined in Article\u00a08 of the Convention. Accordingly, the applicants were not exempted from availing themselves of this procedure on account of an established domestic courts\u2019 practice. In this connection the Court reiterates that even when a doubt exists as to the effectiveness of a remedy, that remedy has to be tried (see, among other authorities, Reif v.\u00a0Greece, no.\u00a021782\/93, 28\u00a0June\u00a01995).85.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that by failing to lodge an individual complaint with the Constitutional Court, the applicants did not exhaust domestic remedies.86.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the aforementioned considerations, the Court concludes that this part of the complaint must be rejected pursuant to Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04 of the Convention.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Expulsion proceedings87.\u00a0\u00a0In relation to the applicants\u2019 complaint that as a result of the expulsion proceedings there had been a disproportionate interference with their right to respect for private and family life, the Court considers that the expulsion orders constituted an interference with the applicants\u2019 rights to respect for their private and family life within the meaning of Article 8\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention. Under 8\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02 any interference must be in accordance with the law, pursue one or more legitimate aims, and be necessary in a democratic society.88.\u00a0\u00a0The wording \u201cin accordance with the law\u201d implies conditions which go beyond the existence of a legal basis in domestic law and requires that the legal basis be \u201caccessible\u201d and \u201cforeseeable\u201d (see, among other authorities, Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], no. 47143\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 \u00a0227-231, 4\u00a0December\u00a02015). In the present case the applicants\u2019 expulsion consisted of several separate and consecutive, albeit linked, proceedings under the Immigration Law. The decisions of the Minister of Interior of 26\u00a0July\u00a02012, by which the applicants were included in the blacklist, was at the origin of the applicants\u2019 expulsion proceedings. To the extent that the Court\u2019s examination of the lawfulness of the expulsion order and ensuing administrative proceedings might overlap with the assessment of the complaint pertaining to the alleged shortcoming in the blacklisting proceedings, the Court refers to its earlier findings (see paragraphs 76-86 above). The Court will therefore limit its examination to the administrative proceedings which were triggered by the adoption of expulsion orders with regard to both applicants (see paragraph 22 above).89.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the expulsion orders of 2\u00a0August\u00a02012 were adopted on the basis of provisions of the Immigration Law and clearly stated its aim (see paragraph 47 above). The Court therefore concludes that the impugned decisions were adopted \u201cin accordance with the law\u201d in the interest of national security and public safety, which are considered as legitimate aims within the meaning of Article 8\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02 of the Convention.90.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the question whether the domestic courts struck a fair balance between the relevant interests (see in this relation the principles established in the case of \u00dcner v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 46410\/99, \u00a7\u00a057, ECHR\u00a02006\u2011XII), the Court refers to the judgments adopted by the administrative courts in the expulsion proceedings and observes that they had assessed all the circumstances of the case, such as the applicants\u2019 ties with the expelling State and the receiving State (see paragraph 33 above), as well as the applicants\u2019 family situation (see paragraph 31 above).91.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that the applicants in their later submissions to the Court have not raised any arguments attesting to what extent their expulsion on 3\u00a0August\u00a02012 had affected the applicants\u2019 relationships with their family members. Besides, the legislation provides periodic reviews of the continued necessity to uphold the ban from entering and remaining in Latvia (see paragraph 52 above).92.\u00a0\u00a0Taking into account the margin of appreciation afforded to States under Article 8\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02 of the Convention the Court considers that the reasons relied on by the domestic courts were relevant and sufficient to show that the interference with the applicants right to respect for private and family life was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and, accordingly, was \u201cnecessary in a democratic society.93.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this part of the application is inadmissible under Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) as manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7 4 of the Convention.C.\u00a0\u00a0Article 34 of the Convention94.\u00a0\u00a0In a letter sent to the Court on 21\u00a0October\u00a02013 (see paragraph\u00a020 above), the applicants drew the Court\u2019s attention to the interest the national authorities had showed in their application. This submission was communicated to the Government under Article\u00a034 of the Convention.1.\u00a0\u00a0Arguments of the parties95.\u00a0\u00a0The Government emphasised, firstly, that even though at the beginning of 2013 the applicants had found out that a SAB officer in his conversation with a State police officer had allegedly threatened to hinder the applicants\u2019 complaint to the Court, the applicants had decided to draw the Court\u2019s attention to it only in October\u00a02013. In this connection the Government, recognising the procedural nature of Article 34, nevertheless insisted that the six-month rule should be applied. Secondly, the Government argued that the applicants had never explicitly raised an Article\u00a034 complaint before the Court. Thirdly, the Government were of the view that the applicants had not complained about the impugned actions to the domestic authorities.96.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants noted that they had merely drawn the Court\u2019s attention to the SAB\u2019s interest in the first applicant\u2019s complaint to the Court.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment97.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it is of the utmost importance for the effective operation of the system of individual petition instituted by Article\u00a034 that applicants or potential applicants be able to communicate freely with the Court without being subjected to any form of pressure from the authorities to withdraw or modify their complaints (see, among other authorities, Sisojeva and Others v. Latvia (striking out) [GC], no. 60654\/00, \u00a7\u00a0115, ECHR 2007\u2011I).98.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicants have not pursued their Article\u00a034 issue before the Court. Moreover, they did not allege that they had been contacted by any domestic authorities in relation to their application, or that they had felt intimidated or prevented from pursuing their complaint to the Court, nor is that supported by any other case material.99.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the above considerations, the Court concludes that there is no basis to pursue the matter (see, for example, Be\u00e7aj v. Albania (dec.), no. 1542\/13, 24\u00a0June\u00a02014).D.\u00a0\u00a0Other alleged violations of the Convention100.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicants also made complaints under Article\u00a02, Article\u00a05, Article 6 together with Article 13, and Article\u00a010 of the Convention.101.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court considers that the remainder of the application does not disclose any appearance of a violation of any of the Articles of the Convention relied on. It follows that these complaints are inadmissible under Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) and must be rejected pursuant to Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04 of the Convention.For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,Declares the application inadmissible;Decides not to pursue the complaint raised under Article\u00a034 of the Convention.\u00a0Done in English and notified in writing on 12 January 2017.Milan Bla\u0161koAngelika Nu\u00dfbergerDeputy RegistrarPresident","28858":"A. Joinder of the applications80.\u00a0\u00a0In accordance with Rule 42 \u00a7 1 of the Rules of Court, the Court decides to join the applications, given their similar factual and legal background.B.\u00a0\u00a0Complaints under Article 2 of the Convention81.\u00a0\u00a0With the exception of the applicant in application no. 9712\/16, the applicants complain that the security operations in Sur and Cizre were conducted without having regard to civilians living there and endangered their right to life, in breach of Article 2 of the Convention.82.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that it cannot, on the basis of the case file, determine the admissibility of these complaints and that it is therefore necessary, in accordance with Rule 54 \u00a7 2 (b) of the Rules of Court, to give notice of this part of the applications to the respondent Government.C.\u00a0\u00a0Complaints under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention83.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants in all applications alleged that the cumulative effects of their confinements to their homes in harsh winter conditions, cut off from the world and without water, electricity, health care and without access to other public services and being forced to live in such conditions in fear for their lives for an uncertain period of time, had amounted to inhuman treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.84.\u00a0\u00a0Finally, with the exception of the applicants in application nos. 6990\/16 and 9712\/16, the applicants complained that their confinement to their homes had been in breach of their rights under Article 8 of the Convention.85.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies stipulated in Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention requires that normal recourse should be had by an applicant to remedies which are available and sufficient to afford redress in respect of the breaches alleged (see, among other authorities, Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, \u00a7\u00a065, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011IV).86.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the nature of the applicants\u2019 complaints and the circumstances giving rise to those complaints, the Court considers that compensation proceedings, a remedy that the Turkish legal system affords and which could lead both to the establishment of any liability on the part of the authorities in respect of the applicants\u2019 complaints and to the payment of damages, is a relevant and effective remedy in respect of these complaints. The Court observes, however, that the applicants have not made use of the possibility of bringing any such proceedings in respect of these complaints.87.\u00a0\u00a0In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the complaints under Article 3 and 8 of the Convention must be rejected under Article 35\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention on account of the applicants\u2019 failure to exhaust domestic remedies.D.\u00a0\u00a0Complaints under Article 5 of the Convention88.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complain that they were effectively imprisoned in their own homes for indefinite periods of time on account of the decisions of the local governors and without an adequate legal basis and that their right to liberty and security within the meaning of Article 5 of the Convention was thus breached.89.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that it cannot, on the basis of the case file, determine the admissibility of these complaints and that it is therefore necessary, in accordance with Rule 54 \u00a7 2 (b) of the Rules of Court, to give notice of this part of the application to the respondent Government.E.\u00a0\u00a0Remaining complaints90.\u00a0\u00a0As set out above, some of the applicants complained that the curfews and the measures taken during the curfews had also been in breach of their rights under Articles 17, 18 and 34 of the Convention, Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention.91.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that these complaints do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.92.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that these complaints are manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 of the Convention.For these reasons, the Court unanimouslyDecides to join the applications;Decides to adjourn the examination of the complaints under Articles 2 and 5 of the Convention;Declares the remainder of the applications inadmissible.\u00a0Done in English and notified in writing on 15 December 2016.Hasan Bak\u0131rc\u0131Julia Laffranque\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Deputy RegistrarPresidentAppendixList of the Applicants:\u00a0NoApplication NoLodged onApplicantDate of birthPlace of residenceRepresented by \u00a063129\/1529\/12\/2015\u00d6mer EL\u00c7\u013003\/02\/1951\u015e\u0131rnak\u00a0Erkan \u015eENSES \u00a063138\/1512\/01\/2016Ahmet VESEK01\/01\/1949\u015e\u0131rnak\u00a0Veysel VESEK \u00a0478\/1612\/01\/2016Kasim ERO\u011eLU10\/08\/1981Diyarbak\u0131r\u00a0Meral ERO\u011eLU20\/09\/1984Diyarbak\u0131r\u00a0\u00a0Murat G\u00dcZEL \u00a0480\/1612\/01\/2016Latife G\u00d6RG\u00d6Z01\/03\/1966Diyarbak\u0131r\u00a0Ye\u015fim G\u00d6RG\u00d6Z17\/05\/2001Diyarbak\u0131r\u00a0\u00a0Murat G\u00dcZEL \u00a0891\/1612\/01\/2016Sultan D\u00dcZG\u00dcN26\/03\/1987Diyarbak\u0131r\u00a0S\u00fcleyman D\u00dcZG\u00dcN06\/05\/1983Diyarbak\u0131r\u00a0Murat G\u00dcZEL \u00a0901\/1612\/01\/2016Bedri D\u00dcZG\u00dcN01\/04\/1939Diyarbak\u0131r\u00a0Halime D\u00dcZG\u00dcN01\/01\/1950Diyarbak\u0131r\u00a0\u00a0Murat G\u00dcZEL \u00a02200\/1608\/01\/2016Meliha \u00c7A\u011eLAK20\/05\/1960Diyarbak\u0131r\u00a0Cemile TURHALLI BALSAK \u00a06990\/1603\/02\/2016Mehmet Senan DA\u011eLI01\/09\/1967\u015e\u0131rnak\u00a0Melahat DA\u011eLI02\/06\/1971\u015e\u0131rnak\u00a0Muhammed DA\u011eLI26\/03\/2002\u015e\u0131rnak\u00a0Narin ZEREN10\/11\/1988\u015e\u0131rnak\u00a0Mehmet \u015eirin ZEREN05\/02\/1959\u015e\u0131rnak\u00a0Gurbet ZEREN01\/01\/1960\u015e\u0131rnak\u00a0Zeynep ZEREN16\/08\/1999\u015e\u0131rnak\u00a0Mehmet ZEREN20\/03\/1986\u015e\u0131rnak\u00a0Mehmet Selim DE\u011eER01\/02\/1970\u015e\u0131rnak\u00a0Emin KIRMIZIG\u00dcL01\/01\/1959\u015e\u0131rnak\u00a0Vecihe DE\u011eER01\/03\/1964\u015e\u0131rnak\u00a0\u00a0Medine KIRMIZIG\u00dcL13\/11\/1971\u015e\u0131rnak\u00a0Elif DE\u011eER07\/09\/1993\u015e\u0131rnak\u00a0Cemile DE\u011eER10\/08\/1998\u015e\u0131rnak\u00a0Suzan KIRMIZIG\u00dcL27\/08\/1996\u015e\u0131rnak\u00a0Dijvar DE\u011eER24\/07\/2006Cizre\u00a0Zilan KIRMIZIG\u00dcL13\/04\/1998\u015e\u0131rnak\u00a0Renas DE\u011eER12\/02\/2003Cizre\u00a0Jiyan KIRMIZIG\u00dcL23\/11\/1999Cizre\u00a0\u0130smail KIRMIZIG\u00dcL25\/03\/2001\u015e\u0131rnak\u00a0Helin KIRMIZIG\u00dcL02\/01\/2004\u015e\u0131rnak\u00a0Abdullah KIRMIZIG\u00dcL21\/12\/2005\u015e\u0131rnak\u00a0\u00a0\u00d6zt\u00fcrk T\u00dcRKDO\u011eAN \u00a09712\/1618\/02\/2016Fatma KAYA13\/04\/1960Diyarbak\u0131r\u00a0Mahmut \u00c7\u0130FT\u00c7\u0130\u00a0","28853":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION69.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been subjected to ill-treatment by police officers and that no effective investigation had been carried out into the incident. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d70.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility71.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that if after the receipt of the applicant\u2019s first letter the Court had given him six months to submit his application form, this would have violated the six-week time-limit set out in the Practice Direction on the Institution of Proceedings dated 1\u00a0November 2003. They further noted that significant time had passed between the applicant\u2019s first letter to the Court and his application form. The date of lodging the application should therefore be the date on which the application form had been sent, that is between 24 November 2006 (date on the application form) and 4 January 2007 (date of receipt of the application form by the Court). The Government argued that in any event the applicant had lodged his application more than six months after the investigating authority\u2019s most recent decision before the date of lodging the application, namely that of 9\u00a0March 2004. The decisions of 4 February and 9 September 2005 had never been taken, according to the prosecutor\u2019s office report of 31\u00a0January 2012 (see paragraph 45 above). Finally, the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies as he had not lodged an appeal against the decision of 3\u00a0June 2012.1.\u00a0\u00a0Six months72.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes at the outset that it is undisputed by the parties that the applicant\u2019s first letter dated 24 June 2006 and sent on 12\u00a0September 2006 was \u201cthe first communication from the applicant setting out, even summarily, the subject matter of the application\u201d. It also notes that according to Rule 47 \u00a7 5 in force at the time the date of first communication was considered to be the date of lodging the application, thus interrupting the six-month limit set by Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. In the event of a discrepancy, as in the present case, between the date on the application form and the date of the postmark, the latter will be taken as the date of lodging (see Kemevuako v. the Netherlands (dec.), no.\u00a065938\/09, \u00a7 24, 1 June 2010).73.\u00a0\u00a0The Court takes note of the Government\u2019s reference to the Practice Direction of 1 November 2003, which set a time-limit of six weeks for a completed application form to be returned to the Registry. However, that time-limit was indicative, rather than obligatory. It was aimed at ensuring that the applicants pursue their applications \u201cwith reasonable expedition\u201d (see Smertin v. Russia, no.\u00a019027\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 26-28, 2\u00a0October 2014).74.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes further that the Government essentially claimed that the application had not been submitted within the six\u2011month time-limit which started to run on 9\u00a0March 2004, when the investigating authority\u2019s most recent decision \u2013 before lodging the application was taken. The Court observes that, according to the letters from the prosecutor\u2019s office, the proceedings were reopened on 4\u00a0February 2005, discontinued on 10 March 2005 and reopened again on 9\u00a0September 2005 (see paragraphs 39 and 40 above). The Court sees no reason to give preference to the prosecutor\u2019s office report concluding in 2012 that the decisions of 4\u00a0February and 9\u00a0September 2005 had never been taken, since they were nowhere to be found (see paragraph 45 above). The Court also observes that, following the decision of 9\u00a0September 2005, the proceedings were apparently discontinued again. After a long interruption the proceedings were reopened on 21\u00a0December 2011. New investigative measures, such as examinations of witnesses and suspects, were carried out and new evidence was collected, including new medical expert opinions. On 30 April 2012 the proceedings were discontinued, then reopened again and discontinued on 3 June 2012.75.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the most recent developments in the case, it is apparent that the application was introduced while the proceedings were pending. The Government\u2019s objection concerning the six\u2011month time-limit is therefore without merit and should be dismissed.2.\u00a0\u00a0Exhaustion of domestic remedies76.\u00a0\u00a0Between 2002 and 2012 the decisions discontinuing the criminal proceedings relating to the applicant\u2019s alleged ill\u2011treatment were set aside at least five times, twice since 2011. In these circumstances, the Court is not convinced that an appeal to a court, which could only have had the same effect, would have offered the applicant any redress. It considers, therefore, that an appeal in the particular circumstances of the present case would have been devoid of any purpose (see Nechto v. Russia, no.\u00a024893\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 80-82, 24\u00a0January 2012).77.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that the applicant was not obliged to pursue that remedy and that the Government\u2019s objection concerning his failure to appeal against the decision of 3 June 2012 should therefore be dismissed.3.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion78.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It also notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0Substantive aspect of the complaint79.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained the findings of the investigative committee, arguing that the forensic medical examination in 2012 showed that the applicant\u2019s injuries, notably the abrasion on the chest and bruising to the ribs, could have been received in the fight with V. before his arrest. For the Government, there was no objective evidence to support the applicant\u2019s allegation that he had received those injuries in police custody.80.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the relevant general principles were recently summarised by the Court\u2019s Grand Chamber in the case of Bouyid v. Belgium ([GC], no.\u00a023380\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 81-88, ECHR 2015). In particular, where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of individuals within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention. The burden of proof is then on the Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation by producing evidence establishing facts which cast doubt on the version of events given by the victim. In the absence of such an explanation, the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the Government. That is justified by the fact that those in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them (ibid., \u00a7 83).81.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that, apart from the applicant being allegedly hit on the hip with a spade handle during his fight with V., the\u00a0witness statements suggest that he had no injuries before his arrest. These include statements by the applicant\u2019s wife, T. and P. (see paragraphs 25, 56 and 57 above). P. stated that the applicant had been \u201cabsolutely healthy\u201d and had had no bruises or other injuries. Moreover, Sh., one of the officers suspected of ill\u2011treatment, also stated on 15\u00a0January 2003 that he had not noticed any injuries on the applicant during his arrest on 5 August 2002, journey to the police station or at the police station (see paragraph 33 above).82.\u00a0\u00a0It is true that Sh., together with the three other police officers concerned, gave different statements in 2012, stating that the applicant had had traces of blood on his face and coagulated blood in his left ear, and that he had been moaning and holding the left side of his chest, clearly in pain (see paragraph 59 above). However, in the absence of any explanation as to the change in their statements, there is no reason to consider that those given more than nine years after the events should be more reliable than those given several months after the events. The same is true in relation to the statements by police officer S., who stated on 15\u00a0January 2003 that he had seen abrasions on the applicant\u2019s face immediately after his arrest, but changed his statements in 2012. Furthermore, his description of the applicant\u2019s injuries (abrasions on the face) is rather inconsistent with the applicant\u2019s condition as described by police officer G., the detainee K. and the paramedic (see paragraphs 60-61 above), and his medically diagnosed injuries.83.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also observes that there is a wealth of evidence that before his arrest the applicant was engaged in active and aggressive behaviour, \u201cstarting a brawl\u201d, using abusive language, threatening, shouting, attempting to hit and physically assaulting people (see paragraphs 7, 10, 12, 55, 56 and 67\u00a0above). This further corroborates the witness statements that before being taken into police custody the applicant did not have the injuries later found on him and which made him so weak that he had difficulty breathing, walking or lifting his hands above chest height (see paragraph\u00a060 above).84.\u00a0\u00a0The injuries diagnosed immediately after the applicant had spent time in police custody, in particular those to the chest and ribs, as well as the head injury later diagnosed following his complaints of recurrent headaches, ringing in the ears, dizziness and hearing loss, could arguably have been received as alleged by him, as a result of being punched by police officers in the head and chest after his arrest (see paragraphs 28, 29 and 32 above).85.\u00a0\u00a0The above factors are sufficient to create a presumption in favour of the applicant\u2019s version of events.86.\u00a0\u00a0It remains for the Court to examine whether the Government produced any evidence establishing facts which would cast doubt on the version of events given by the applicant.87.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained the conclusions of the investigating authority. The Court observes that according to the most recent decisions of 30\u00a0April and 3 June 2012 (see paragraphs 63 and 68 above), the abrasion on the left of the chest and bruising to the left ribs were the only injuries confirmed as a result of the forensic medical examination in 2012, and could have been received by the applicant in the fight with V., as confirmed by V. in his statements in 2012.88.\u00a0\u00a0According to those decisions, on 19 March 2012 V. stated that during the incident on 5\u00a0August 2002 he had pushed the applicant, who had fallen onto his left side (see paragraph 58 above). According to the report of 29\u00a0March 2012 prepared by Zh., the abrasion on the chest and bruising to the ribs could have been received on 5 August 2002 as a result of the applicant falling over and striking himself against protruding hard blunt objects, and that it was unlikely that they had been inflicted by punching and kicking (see paragraph 48 above).89.\u00a0\u00a0It appears from the above that the investigating authority meant to explain the abrasion on the applicant\u2019s chest and bruising to the ribs by his falling over during the fight with V.90.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that those conclusions could not reliably be made on the basis of the relevant evidence.91.\u00a0\u00a0Firstly, the report prepared by Zh. of 29\u00a0March 2012 was earlier considered insufficient by the investigating authority for drawing conclusions because it fully contradicted the reports prepared by the experts in 2002 and 2003. The investigating authority therefore ordered an additional opinion, which was prepared by the panel of five forensic medical experts on 19\u00a0April 2012 (see paragraphs 49-53 above). According to its report, the abrasion on the chest could have been caused on 5\u00a0August 2002 by a hard blunt object with a limited surface area, as a result of hitting or being hit by it (see paragraph 50 above). The panel\u2019s opinion thus suggested that the abrasion could have just as easily been received by the applicant as a result of falling and striking himself against a hard blunt object with a limited surface area as having been punched. As to the injury to the ribs, the panel did not confirm the diagnosis of bruising, unlike Zh. It stated instead that no conclusions could be made at that time about the rib fractures, diagnosed in 2002 and 2003, because the relevant X-ray images had been lost (see paragraph 52 above).92.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the expert reports of 2002 and 2003 remain the only forensic medical evidence in the case uncontested by the panel of experts in 2012 concerning the injuries to the head and ribs. According to both reports, the fractured left temporal bone, mild bruising on the brain and fracture of at least one rib could have been received as alleged by the applicant, as a result of being punched by the police officers after his arrest on 5 August 2002. The expert, S., explained that this was confirmed by their nature, number and location, the mechanism and means of their infliction, the positions of the victim and attackers in relation to each other, and the direction of the blows (see paragraph 32 above).93.\u00a0\u00a0The investigating authority\u2019s conclusions that the applicant\u2019s head injury and rib fractures were not medically confirmed are therefore at variance with the forensic medical evidence in the case, which diagnosed those injuries and confirmed that they could have been received as a result of the applicant being assaulted by the police officers after his arrest on 5\u00a0August 2002.94.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the investigating authority\u2019s conclusion made with reference to V.\u2019s statements in 2012 that the abrasion on the chest could have been received by the applicant as a result of falling and hitting himself against a protruding hard blunt object with a limited surface area during his fight with V., the Court notes that according to V.\u2019s statements, set out in detail in the forensic medical report of 29 May 2012 (see paragraph\u00a066 above), the accuracy of which is not disputed by the parties, his description of the fight in his statements of 6\u00a0February 2012 did not mention the applicant\u2019s fall, instead mentioning V.\u2019s being knocked down and the ensuing fight on the floor. Nor was the applicant\u2019s fall mentioned in V.\u2019s subsequent statements on 19\u00a0March 2012 or during the reconstruction of events. In his later statements V. described that after being knocked down he had been lying on the floor on his back, while the applicant had sat on him and T. had held him by the legs. V. had then managed to slip out and trap the applicant underneath him. T. had then pulled him off the applicant by the legs. Similarly, in 2002 V. stated that he had trapped the applicant underneath him and that T. had pulled him off by the legs (see paragraph\u00a026 above). The Court does not see how the conclusion that the applicant had fallen and struck himself against a protruding hard blunt object with a limited surface area could reliably be made on the basis of the above statements.95.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the Government failed to discharge their burden of proof and produce evidence capable of casting doubt on the applicant\u2019s version of events.96.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that the acts of violence the applicant was subjected to in police custody amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment.97.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 under its substantive limb.2.\u00a0\u00a0Procedural aspect of the complaint98.\u00a0\u00a0The authorities, which were promptly made aware of the applicant\u2019s credible allegations of police ill-treatment, were under a procedural obligation, arising from Article 3 of the Convention, to carry out an effective investigation (see Kopylov v. Russia, no. 3933\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 132-35, 29\u00a0July 2010).99.\u00a0\u00a0The criminal proceedings relating to the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill\u2011treatment were instituted after a delay of almost a month. In discontinuing the proceedings because none of the elements of a crime were present in respect of the police officers\u2019 actions in 2003 to 2005, the investigating authority relied heavily on the testimony of the police officers who denied any involvement in the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment. Its decisions lacked reasons for discarding the evidence which supported the applicant\u2019s consistent statements, such as the forensic medical opinions of 2002 and 2003 or the witness statements that before his arrest the applicant had not had the injuries found on him immediately after his release from police custody. Nor did the investigating authority make any efforts to elucidate the discrepancies in the evidence, for example, between police officer Sh.\u2019s initial statements that he had not seen any injuries on the applicant before his arrest, his denial of any ill-treatment and the evidence of the applicant\u2019s injuries after the time spent by him in police custody. As a result, the investigating authority did not provide any explanation as to the applicant\u2019s medically diagnosed injuries in those decisions.100.\u00a0\u00a0The same is true as regards the investigation after the reopening of the proceedings in 2011, in so far as the head injury and rib fractures are concerned. The investigating authority\u2019s conclusions that those injuries were not medically confirmed are at odds with the forensic medical evidence in the case. Those conclusions, as well as the conclusion that the other injuries could have been received by the applicant in the fight with V. before he was taken into police custody, could not reliably be made on the basis of the relevant evidence (see paragraphs 90-94 above). No effort was made to reconcile contradictory evidence or give reasons for discarding the evidence supporting the applicant\u2019s allegations.101.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that the investigating authority\u2019s conclusions were not based on a thorough, objective and impartial analysis of all the relevant elements (see Razzakov v. Russia, no. 57519\/09, \u00a7 63, 5 February 2015).102.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural head.II.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION103.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has examined the remainder of the applicant\u2019s complaints as submitted by him. However, having regard to all material in its possession, the Court finds that these complaints do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0and\u00a04 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION104.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage105.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 169,781 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage.106.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the claims.107.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On the other hand, it awards the applicant EUR 13,000 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest108.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28893":"I.\u00a0\u00a0THE GOVERNMENT\u2019S REQUEST TO STRIKE OUT A PART OF THE APPLICATION UNDER ARTICLE 37 OF THE CONVENTION47.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted a unilateral declaration concerning issues raised under Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention which did not offer a sufficient basis for finding that respect for human rights as defined in the Convention does not require the Court to continue its examination of the case (Article 37 \u00a7 1). The Court rejects the Government\u2019s request to strike out a relevant part of the application and will accordingly pursue its examination of the merits of the case (see Tahsin Acar v. Turkey (preliminary objections) [GC], no. 26307\/95, \u00a7 75, ECHR 2003\u2011VI).II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE CONDITIONS OF DETENTION48.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the conditions of his detention in the remand prison from 12 August 2008 to 2 June 2009 had been incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties49.\u00a0\u00a0In their observations of 19 October 2012 the Government acknowledged\u00a0that the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in the remand prison had been incompatible with the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention. In the further observations of 15 February 2013 they confirmed that position.50.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaint.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility51.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits52.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the documents in the Court\u2019s possession as well as to the Court\u2019s findings in many similar cases concerning conditions of detention in Russian remand prisons (see\u00a0Mela, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a061-69, 23\u00a0October 2014; Tsarenko v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a05235\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 47-53, 3\u00a0March 2011; Gorbulya v. Russia, no.\u00a031535\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 64-73, 6 March 2014; Malyugin v.\u00a0Russia, no. 71578\/11, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a020-23, 13 March 2014; and Ananyev and Others v.\u00a0Russia, nos.\u00a042525\/07\u00a0and\u00a060800\/08, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0143-48, 161-62 and 166), it considers that the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in the remand prison amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE QUALITY OF MEDICAL TREATMENT53.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the authorities had not taken steps to safeguard his health and well-being, having failed to provide him with adequate medical assistance in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties54.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant\u2019s medical condition in detention had not called for skeletal traction and that in custody he had received adequate medical care. In particular, several days after his arrest he had been transferred to a prison hospital for medical examination and treatment. He had been discharged from hospital in satisfactory condition and had thereafter received the prescribed treatment in full.55.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged that the interruption of the skeletal traction after his arrest had run contrary to the treatment needed for his medical condition and doctors\u2019 recommendations. He stated that in the first week of his detention he had not received any painkillers to relieve the acute leg pain. The lack of skeletal traction had caused the broken bone to mend badly and resulted in a permanent limp.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility56.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant\u2019s complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles57.\u00a0\u00a0The applicable general principles were recently summarised in the cases of Blokhin v. Russia [GC] (no. 47152\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 135-40, ECHR 2016), and Ivko (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 91-95).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case58.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates, being sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role, that it is not its task to rule on matters lying exclusively within the field of expertise of medical specialists and to establish whether an applicant in fact required a particular treatment or whether the choice of treatment methods appropriately reflected the applicant\u2019s needs (see Ukhan v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 30628\/02, \u00a7 76, 18 December 2008, and Sergey Antonov v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 40512\/13, \u00a7 86, 22 October 2015). However, having regard to the vulnerability of applicants in detention, it is for the Government to provide credible and convincing evidence showing that the applicant concerned had received comprehensive and adequate medical care in detention (see Sergey Antonov, ibid.).59.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case the applicant\u2019s insistence on the necessity of that medical procedure was primarily based on the medical opinion of his attending doctor (see paragraph 12 above). In their turn, the Government pointed to the fact that skeletal traction had been explicitly recommended neither in the discharge summary, nor by the surgeon of the prison hospital (see paragraphs\u00a031 and 37 above).60.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that a few days before the applicant\u2019s arrest his attending doctor opposed the interruption of his treatment. It is evident that the treatment had not been completed on 12 August 2008, the day of the applicant\u2019s arrest, as he still remained under skeletal traction. Even if the discharge summary did not explicitly mention skeletal traction, the doctor\u2019s order prescribing the \u201ccontinuation of the treatment\u201d could hardly be interpreted in any other way than the need to continue that treatment, as it was the method used to treat the applicant. This is particularly so when one takes into account that treatment with skeletal traction is of a continuous nature. The Government cited the prison surgeon\u2019s decision to remove the metal pin from the applicant\u2019s bone as evidence that that procedure was not necessary. However, that decision was made in the absence of an X-ray examination and a significant amount of time after the interruption of the therapy. Even if skeletal traction was unnecessary at that time the Court finds that it was exigent at the time of the applicant\u2019s arrest.61.\u00a0\u00a0In addition to the interruption of the skeletal traction itself, the Court notes the manner in which the applicant was arrested and taken to the remand prison. In particular, it notes that the police, in blunt disregard of the opinion of the attending doctor regarding the applicant\u2019s serious medical condition, and without introducing any special arrangements for his transport, interrupted his therapy and took him to the prison. In the following days the applicant, whose grave health condition was evident to the authorities, was not only left without medical attention and assistance, but also placed in a severely overcrowded cell without a sleeping place. He was provided neither with the prescribed crutches nor with painkillers.62.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that a week later the remand prison\u2019s authorities ensured the applicant\u2019s admission to the prison hospital. However, that belated measure was not capable of remedying the aforementioned major failures on the part of the authorities. The applicant was not subjected to a key medical test \u2013 an X-ray examination (see paragraph 36 above). The surgeon did not consider whether it was necessary to remedy the interruption of the therapy. He also failed to assess whether the lack of the treatment at the initial, most crucial, stage of the therapy had led to certain health issues, such as possible misunion of the bones in need of correction or closer medical attention. Furthermore, no follow-up on the necessity of osteosynthesis, prescribed by civilian doctors, was carried out by the prison medical staff.63.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court cannot overlook the fact, which was not disputed by the Government, that after the medical treatment received in detention the applicant developed a perpetual limp and had constantly to use a walking stick.64.\u00a0\u00a0Assessing the facts of the case as a whole, having regard in particular to the cumulative effects of the inadequate medical care and the inappropriate conditions in which the applicant was held throughout his detention, which clearly had a detrimental effect on his health and well\u2011being (see Kalashnikov v. Russia, no. 47095\/99, \u00a7 98, ECHR 2002 VI), the Court considers that the nature, duration and severity of the ill-treatment to which the applicant was subjected are sufficient to be qualified as inhuman and degrading (see Musia\u0142ek and Baczy\u0144ski v. Poland, no.\u00a032798\/02, \u00a7 137, 26 July 2011; Labzov v. Russia, no. 62208\/00, \u00a7 45, 16\u00a0June 2005; Mayzit v.\u00a0Russia, no. 63378\/00, \u00a7 42, 20 January 2005; and Egmez v. Cyprus, no.\u00a030873\/96, \u00a7 77, ECHR 2000-XII).65.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the quality of the medical treatment in detention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION66.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 5 of the Convention that his detention between 12 August and 23 September 2008 pending extradition proceedings had been arbitrary and unlawful. The applicable provisions of that Article read as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:(f)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties67.\u00a0\u00a0The Government acknowledged that the applicant\u2019s detention from 12 August to 23 September 2008 had been unlawful and thus in breach of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.68.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaints.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility69.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant\u2019s complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits70.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the Government\u2019s admission, as well as to its earlier findings in cases raising a similar issue (see, for instance, Yefimova v.\u00a0Russia, no. 39786\/09, \u00a7 261, 19 February 2013; Abdulkhakov v. Russia, no.\u00a014743\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 170-73, 2 October 2012; and Nasrulloyev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a077, 11 October 2007), the Court finds that the applicant\u2019s detention between 12 August and 23 September 2008 was not covered by any domestic legal provision clearly establishing the grounds for his detention and the procedure and the time-limits applicable to that detention pending the receipt of the\u00a0extradition\u00a0request.71.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of Article 5\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention in respect of the applicant\u2019s detention during the mentioned period.V.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION72.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicant complained under Articles 13 and 14 of the Convention of the lack of effective remedies to complain of the unfairness of his criminal proceedings and of the discrimination against him on the grounds of his ethnic origin and nationality.73.\u00a0\u00a0However, having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as these complaints fall within its competence, the Court finds that there is no appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 of the Convention.VI.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION74.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage1.\u00a0\u00a0Pecuniary damage75.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 578 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage on account of his allegedly unlawful extradition to the Republic of Belarus in 2012.76.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the claim was irrelevant to the circumstances of the case.77.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged, it therefore rejects this claim.2.\u00a0\u00a0Non-pecuniary damage78.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed EUR 450,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.79.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stated that the claim was excessive.80.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, making its assessment on an equitable basis, considers it reasonable to award the applicant EUR 19,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses81.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 1,000 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court.82.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicant had not provided any evidence in support of his claim to show that those expenses had indeed been incurred.83.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the lack of relevant documents and the above criteria, the Court rejects the applicant\u2019s claim for costs and expenses.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest84.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28895":"I.\u00a0\u00a0PRELIMINARY ISSUES124.\u00a0\u00a0Following the applicant\u2019s death, his relatives expressed the wish to pursue the proceedings (see paragraph 1 above).125.\u00a0\u00a0The respondent Government did not submit any observations on this issue.126.\u00a0\u00a0The Court normally permits the next-of-kin to pursue an application, provided he or she has a legitimate interest, where the original applicant has died after lodging the application with the Court (see Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 33071\/96, ECHR 2000\u2011XII, and Murray v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 10511\/10, \u00a7 79, ECHR 2016). In the present case, the Court takes note of the wish expressed by the applicant\u2019s family (see paragraph 1, above) to pursue the proceedings. Having regard to its conclusion in paragraph 133 below, however, it considers that it is unnecessary to determine whether the family have a legitimate interest in that regard.127.\u00a0\u00a0The Court must nevertheless ascertain whether, in view of the applicant\u2019s death and the nature of the alleged violations, the application should be struck out of the list of cases or whether, on the contrary, there are special circumstances requiring its continued examination pursuant to Article\u00a037 \u00a7 1 in fine.128.\u00a0\u00a0In that connection, Article 37 \u00a7 1 of the Convention provides:\u201cThe Court may at any stage of the proceedings decide to strike an application out of its list of cases where the circumstances lead to the conclusion that(a)\u00a0\u00a0the applicant does not intend to pursue his application; or(b)\u00a0\u00a0the matter has been resolved; or(c)\u00a0\u00a0for any other reason established by the Court, it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application.However, the Court shall continue the examination of the application if respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto so requires.\u201d129.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the human rights cases before it generally also have a moral dimension, which must be taken into account when considering whether the examination of an application after the applicant\u2019s death should be continued (see Karner v. Austria, no.\u00a040016\/98, \u00a7 25, ECHR 2003\u2011IX, and Malhous (dec.), cited above).130.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has repeatedly stated that its judgments serve not only to decide those cases brought before it but, more generally, to elucidate, safeguard and develop the rules instituted by the Convention, thereby contributing to the States\u2019 observance of the engagements undertaken by them. Although the primary purpose of the Convention system is to provide individual relief, its mission is also to determine issues on public-policy grounds in the common interest, thereby raising the general standards of protection of human rights and extending human rights jurisprudence throughout the community of Convention States (see Karner, cited above, \u00a7\u00a026).131.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the present case was referred to the Grand Chamber on 20\u00a0April 2015 in accordance with Article 43 of the Convention, which provides that cases can be referred if they raise \u201ca serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, or a serious issue of general importance\u201d.132.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that there are important issues at stake in the present case, notably concerning the expulsion of aliens who are seriously ill. Thus, the impact of this case goes beyond the particular situation of the applicant, unlike most of the similar cases on expulsion decided by a Chamber (compare F.G. v. Sweden [GC], no. 43611\/11, \u00a7 82, ECHR 2016).133.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the foregoing, the Court finds that special circumstances relating to respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto require it to continue the examination of the application in accordance with Article 37 \u00a7 1 in fine of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 2 AND 3 OF THE CONVENTION134.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged that substantial grounds had been shown for believing that if he had been expelled to Georgia he would have faced a real risk there of inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention and of a premature death in breach of Article 2. Those Articles provide:Article 2\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone\u2019s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law....\u201dArticle 3\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber judgment135.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber began by examining whether the applicant\u2019s removal to Georgia would breach Article 3 of the Convention (see paragraphs\u00a0117\u201126 of the Chamber judgment).136.\u00a0\u00a0It observed that, according to the case-law established in N. v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 26565\/05, ECHR 2008), Article 3 protected aliens suffering from an illness against removal only in very exceptional cases, where the humanitarian grounds against the removal were compelling. The fact that the individual\u2019s circumstances, including his life expectancy, would be significantly reduced if he were to be removed did not constitute such grounds. In the instant case, the illnesses from which the applicant suffered were all stable and under control as a result of the treatment received in Belgium; he was fit to travel and his life was not in imminent danger.137.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber noted that medication to treat the applicant\u2019s illnesses existed in Georgia. It acknowledged that its accessibility was not guaranteed and that, owing to a shortage of resources, not all the persons concerned received all the medicines and treatment they required. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that the applicant would not be left wholly without resources if he were to return, the fact that the Belgian authorities had been providing him with medical assistance while the case was pending before the Court and the fact that Georgia was a Contracting Party to the Convention, the Court held that, as matters stood, there were no exceptional circumstances precluding the applicant\u2019s removal.138.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber considered that the examination of the applicant\u2019s complaints from the standpoint of Article 2 did not lead to a different conclusion (see paragraph 127 of the Chamber judgment).B.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 observations before the Grand Chamber1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant139.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that, in keeping with the Court\u2019s case-law as established in the judgments in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece ([GC], no.\u00a030696\/09, ECHR 2011) and Tarakhel v. Switzerland ([GC], no.\u00a029217\/12, ECHR 2014 (extracts)), the alleged violation of Article 3 of the Convention had to be examined in concreto and in the light of all the facts of the case, taking into consideration the accessibility of treatment in the country of destination and the particular vulnerability of the person concerned.140.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s particular vulnerability resulted primarily from his state of health. His leukaemia had reached the most serious stage, Binet stage C. He had already undergone numerous courses of chemotherapy and the illness put him at risk of severe complications which called for regular monitoring in a specialised setting. He was being treated with a drug \u2013 Ibrutinib \u2013 which was very expensive, costing around EUR 6,000 per month, and the dosage of which had to be continually adjusted to his treatment for hepatitis C. The latter had recently become active again following a relapse in 2012 and 2013 and also required very expensive treatment costing EUR 700 per day. As soon as his overall condition permitted, it was planned to treat him by means of a donor transplant, at an estimated cost of EUR 150,000. This was his only hope of a cure, and the search was under way for a compatible unrelated donor. The applicant\u2019s condition was further weakened by the repeated secondary infections caused by his chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, which had become severe and was not being monitored. In addition, the applicant had had three fingers amputated and his left arm was paralysed.141.\u00a0\u00a0Besides the fact that, according to his doctor, neither Ibrutinib nor a donor transplant would have been available in Georgia, the applicant had had no guarantee that he would have had access in practice to life-saving treatment, given the proven shortcomings of the Georgian health-care system. In 2008 the Law on compulsory health insurance had been replaced by a two-tier system. People who could afford it were encouraged to take out private insurance and to avail themselves of the care provided by the hospitals that had gradually been privatised. Meanwhile, the least well-off (estimated at 20% of the population) were eligible in principle for free basic health care under a special universal insurance scheme. However, in practice, owing to an ineffective system for determining eligibility, the health-care costs of around half of the least well-off were still not covered. In addition, the provision of care and infrastructure to the least well-off was very limited.142.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, in the applicant\u2019s submission, the burden of proving the existence of real and practical access to health care in Georgia lay with the Belgian authorities, who had greater investigative resources.143.\u00a0\u00a0More specifically, it was for the Belgian authorities, in the context of the request for regularisation based on section 9ter of the Aliens Act, to assess the risk of a breach of Article 3 of the Convention in the light of the information available to them on the applicant\u2019s personal, family and medical situation and the shortcomings of the Georgian health-care system, and not to deprive the applicant as a matter of principle of the only possibility open to him of asserting a fundamental right.144.\u00a0\u00a0A fortiori, even assuming that the Belgian State had examined the request for leave to remain on the merits, it could not simply have presumed that the applicant would be treated in accordance with the requirements of the Convention. As made clear by the judgment in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, the fact that Georgia was a Contracting Party to the Convention did not mean that it could be presumed ipso facto that Georgia could not be held responsible for breaches of the Convention. Acceptance of the treaties guaranteeing respect for fundamental rights was not sufficient to afford adequate protection against the risk of ill-treatment where, as in the present case, reliable sources reported practices on the part of the authorities, or tolerated by them, that were manifestly in breach of the Convention.145.\u00a0\u00a0On the contrary, it was for the Belgian authorities to make enquiries and to satisfy themselves in advance that the Georgian authorities could actually guarantee in practical terms that the applicant would receive the health care he needed in order to survive and that his illness would be treated in a manner compatible with human dignity. Access to medical care must not be theoretical but must be real and guaranteed.146.\u00a0\u00a0Since the Belgian State had failed to contribute, at the time of the refusal of the applicant\u2019s request for leave to remain, to verifying the accessibility in Georgia, in real and practical terms, of the treatment which the applicant needed, and in the absence of guarantees in that regard, its responsibility under Article 3 of the Convention would have been engaged if it had proceeded with the applicant\u2019s removal to Georgia. If removed he would have been exposed to a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment and an earlier death owing to the withdrawal of the intensive and specialised treatment he had been receiving in Belgium, and to the end of any hope of receiving a donor transplant. In addition, there was the impact which his removal would have had on his family. All of these circumstances could be regarded by the Court as \u201cexceptional\u201d within the meaning of D. v. the United Kingdom (2 May 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997\u2011III) and N. v. the United Kingdom (cited above).147.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further submitted that the fact that his irregular residence status had continued for over seven years after he had requested leave to remain on medical grounds, without his request having been examined on the merits, had played a major part in placing him in a precarious and vulnerable situation.148.\u00a0\u00a0In sum, the applicant had been in greater need of protection owing to his particular vulnerability linked to his state of health, the stakes in terms of his life and physical well-being, his emotional and financial dependency and the existence of his family ties in Belgium. The Belgian State\u2019s responsibility under Article 3 of the Convention stemmed from the fact that it was proceeding with the applicant\u2019s removal without taking these factors into account, thereby demonstrating a lack of respect for his dignity and placing him at serious risk, in the event of his return to Georgia, of a severe and rapid deterioration in his state of health leading to his swift and certain death.149.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant requested the Court to go beyond its findings in N.\u00a0v.\u00a0the United Kingdom and to define, in the light of these considerations, a realistic threshold of severity that was no longer confined to securing a \u201cright to die with dignity\u201d. He relied in that connection on the recent developments in the case-law of the Belgian courts, which had distanced themselves from the findings in N. v. the United Kingdom and now afforded more extensive protection than that provided for under Article 3 of the Convention (see paragraphs 101 et seq. above).2.\u00a0\u00a0The Belgian Government150.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that, although it was acknowledged in the Court\u2019s case-law that the responsibility of a Contracting Party could be engaged under Article 3 on account of the expulsion of an alien and his exposure to a risk of a breach of his economic and social rights, it nevertheless had to be taken into consideration that, where the person concerned suffered from an illness, neither the returning State nor the receiving State could be held directly responsible for the shortcomings of the health-care system and the repercussions on the health of the individual concerned. The case-law demonstrated that in order for the threshold of severity required by Article 3 to be attained in such cases the extreme nature of the applicant\u2019s living conditions or his or her extreme vulnerability had to be established. The circumstances contrary to human dignity had to be exceptional to such a degree that the person concerned, owing to his or her critical condition prior to removal, would inevitably be placed in a situation of intense suffering solely on account of the removal procedure and the complete absence of care and treatment in the receiving country. Human rights were not synonymous with compelling humanitarian considerations and a general obligation to provide social welfare assistance could not be inferred from Article 3 even in the name of human dignity.151.\u00a0\u00a0In view of this case-law it could not be concluded that the criteria for engaging the responsibility of the Belgian State had been met in the present case.152.\u00a0\u00a0With reference, firstly, to developments in the applicant\u2019s state of health, the Government argued that while his overall condition had deteriorated since the time of the Chamber judgment, mainly as a result of collateral diseases, and his condition was still life-threatening, the illnesses from which the applicant suffered had been kept under control for a long time by the medicines being administered to him in Belgium. According to the report of the Aliens Office\u2019s medical officer of 23 June 2015, the applicant\u2019s condition could not be regarded as critical, he was fit to travel, his illnesses were not directly life-threatening and none of his vital organs was in a condition that placed his life in immediate danger.153.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, since the applicant had failed to provide more detailed information concerning the content of the study in the context of which his leukaemia was being treated, it was difficult to establish any objective basis for his general practitioner\u2019s assertion that the only option at this stage had been the administration of Ibrutinib followed by a donor transplant and that in the absence of that treatment the applicant\u2019s life expectancy would have been three months. Other factors entered into the equation, such as the increase in life expectancy as a result of the medication, the feasibility of the operation, which itself depended on how the applicant\u2019s general condition evolved, and the low success rate of the operation. In sum, this was a private initiative on the part of the applicant\u2019s general practitioner and appeared to be a hypothetical, strategic choice linked to research considerations. It was questionable whether there was a need to ensure its continuation. As to the applicant\u2019s other illnesses, it had not been possible to assess their state of advancement on the basis of the medical information provided.154.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that, in view of this lack of clarity and of the complex and risky nature of the transplant procedure, consideration might have been given, on the basis of the information in the medical file, to abandoning the idea of a donor transplant and instead continuing to treat the applicant with Ibrutinib in Georgia under the supervision of a haematology department.155.\u00a0\u00a0The next issue was whether there had been reason to believe that, following his removal, the applicant would have faced a serious risk of inhuman and degrading treatment. The Government argued that the burden of proof in that regard depended on whether the threshold of severity defined in D. v.\u00a0the United Kingdom and N. v. the United Kingdom (both cited above) was changed. If the current case-law was maintained, the disparity in the level of care between the returning State and the receiving State was relevant only if the person\u2019s condition was critical at the time of his or her expulsion. If, on the other hand, it was now a question of providing evidence, not of the conditions in which the person concerned would die but of the conditions in which he or she should be kept alive, the burden of proof shifted to the living conditions in the receiving State. This shift raised a number of issues.156.\u00a0\u00a0One of the factors to be taken into consideration was the exact personal situation of the individual concerned and in particular the ties he or she had maintained with his or her country of origin and the resources available to him or her in order to continue treatment. The applicant had not provided any detailed information on that subject. Another factor was the situation of the social welfare system in the receiving State. The assessment of that situation was, by definition, complex and general and would not allow a specific treatment to be identified. Furthermore, if the sole criterion was the prospect of survival, it had to be ascertained at what stage in the applicant\u2019s treatment his expulsion should be deemed contrary to Article 3. Bearing in mind the evolving and multi-faceted nature of medical techniques, this decision was largely arbitrary. If, as the applicant had suggested, he should have been considered vulnerable and thus recognised as having victim status on account of the deterioration of his state of health, the question then arose as to what differentiated him from other Georgian nationals suffering from illness who were reliant on the Georgian health\u2011care system. It would be difficult to argue that the difference lay in his unlawful residence and his medical treatment in Belgium. Instead of producing clear answers, these questions gave rise to general assumptions based on speculation which were insufficient to establish the State\u2019s international responsibility beyond any reasonable doubt.157.\u00a0\u00a0In the Government\u2019s view, even if this speculative aspect could have been overcome by obtaining assurances from the receiving State, as mentioned by the Court in Tatar v. Switzerland (no. 65692\/12, 14\u00a0April 2015), such assurances should be deemed to have existed in the present case and to have been sufficient. The applicant had been medically fit to travel and the local authorities would have been informed of the specific nature of his condition or would have received a list of the medication needed. No more specific guarantees had been required in the absence of any indication that the Georgian authorities would have treated the applicant less favourably than the rest of the Georgian population or that he would have been unable to obtain medical treatment that took account of the specific features of his illness. In that connection, it might have been possible to continue to treat the applicant with Ibrutinib by having his medication sent through the post under the supervision of his doctor and with the assistance of doctors in Georgia. The Government added that if a donor transplant had proved possible they would not have taken any steps to prevent it or to secure the applicant\u2019s removal while he was in hospital.158.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, account had to be taken of the fact that the applicant would have been removed to Georgia, a Contracting Party to the Convention, and that if he had been shown to be particularly vulnerable, Belgium\u2019s responsibility could have been engaged only if it had been established that the Georgian State would manifestly fail to comply with its Convention obligations, for instance if it had been shown that the applicant would be entirely dependent on public assistance and would be in a state of deprivation contrary to human dignity. In the absence of any indication to that effect it should have been presumed that the Georgian authorities would comply with the requirements of the Convention. Should that have proved not to be the case, it would have been up to the applicant to apply to the Court under Article 34 of the Convention.C.\u00a0\u00a0Observations of the third-party interveners1.\u00a0\u00a0The Georgian Government159.\u00a0\u00a0The Georgian Government submitted that, since 2012, they had implemented an extensive programme of universal medical cover which had resulted to date in 90% of the population being covered in terms of primary health care. If the applicant had returned to Georgia he would have had access to that universal cover in the same way as the local residents.160.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Georgian health-care system could have provided appropriate treatment for the illnesses from which the applicant had suffered, in terms of both medical infrastructure and health-care personnel. The health care provided conformed to international standards and was approved by the domestic rules.161.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to the treatment of tuberculosis, a State tuberculosis management programme had been approved by Decree no. 650 of 2\u00a0December 2014, which provided for free TB examinations and medication for Georgian citizens, stateless persons resident in Georgia, prisoners and any person in the country identified as a TB carrier. New experimental treatments for tuberculosis had been introduced in Georgia over the past several years and were available on the market in sufficient quantities. The applicant would be able to take advantage of them.162.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to leukaemia, the Georgian Government submitted that the programme of universal medical cover covered diagnosis, treatment (including chemotherapy and radiotherapy), medical examinations and medication for persons living below the poverty threshold who were suffering from oncological diseases. Between 2013 and 2015, 859 patients with chronic lymphocytic leukaemia had received specialised chemotherapy. This was administered in five clinics in Georgia which were equipped with all modern medical facilities.163.\u00a0\u00a0The main improvements made since the information provided at the Chamber stage concerned hepatitis C. Whereas, previously, hospital treatment for patients presenting with a significant viral load and\/or cirrhosis had only been covered at 50% of an amount fixed by the Government, and medicines had not been reimbursed at all, since 20\u00a0April 2015 socially vulnerable families were entitled to 70% of the diagnostic costs and other patients to 30% of the costs. Under a special programme for residents of the city of Tbilisi, 100% cover was provided. Furthermore, access to medicines was free of charge \u201cfor all patients involved in the treatment protocol on the basis of a decision by a special commission\u201d. Finally, a pharmaceutical company had supplied Georgia with doses of a new antiretroviral treatment involving the drugs Solvadi and Harvoni, which could have been administered to the applicant if he had returned.164.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, with regard to chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, the Georgian Government stated that all modern forms of basic treatment were available in Georgia. There were also several hospitals in Tbilisi which treated this illness. Any surgery that might be needed would be covered by the programme of universal medical cover.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Human Rights Centre of Ghent University165.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Human Rights Centre, the present case afforded a unique opportunity to depart from the excessively restrictive approach adopted by the Court in N. v. the United Kingdom with regard to the expulsion of persons suffering from serious illness.166.\u00a0\u00a0The intervener began by arguing that this approach contrasted with the general case-law concerning potential violations of Article 3 of the Convention.167.\u00a0\u00a0Hence, in the judgment in Pretty v. the United Kingdom (no.\u00a02346\/02, \u00a7 52, ECHR 2002\u2011III), the Court had indicated on what grounds and to what extent the responsibility of the Contracting State could be engaged. The Court had observed the connection between a naturally occurring illness and its exacerbation by the measure for which the authorities could be held responsible. However, in N. v. the United Kingdom, while the Court had still referred to naturally occurring illness, it had not linked it to the measure taken by the authorities that would exacerbate the illness, but to the lack of sufficient resources to deal with it in the receiving country, from which it had inferred that the alleged future harm did not engage the direct responsibility of the Contracting State.168.\u00a0\u00a0However, in cases concerning the expulsion of persons suffering from serious illness, the event that triggered the inhuman and degrading treatment was the intentional removal of the persons concerned from a place where they could obtain life-saving treatment to a place where they could not, thereby exposing them to a near-certain but avoidable risk of suffering and death that engaged the State\u2019s responsibility. The Court had consistently acknowledged that in cases where there were serious reasons for believing that the person concerned, if removed, faced a risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3, the absolute nature of that provision prohibited the Contracting Parties from proceeding with the person\u2019s removal.169.\u00a0\u00a0In N. v. the United Kingdom the Court had also based its reasoning on the \u201csearch for a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual\u2019s fundamental rights\u201d and on the observation that a finding of a violation \u201cwould place too great a burden on the Contracting States\u201d. Such an approach was in glaring contradiction with the case-law arising out of the judgment in Saadi v. Italy ([GC], no. 37201\/06, ECHR 2008), in which the Court had clearly rejected the idea of conducting a balancing exercise or applying a test of proportionality in order to assess whether an applicant\u2019s removal was compatible with Article 3.170.\u00a0\u00a0The intervener therefore suggested opting for an alternative to the criteria established in N. v. the United Kingdom, one that would be compatible with the absolute nature of the prohibition contained in Article\u00a03. This would entail examining carefully all the foreseeable consequences of removal in order to determine whether the reduction in the life expectancy of the persons concerned and the deterioration in their quality of life would be such that the threshold of severity required by Article 3 was attained. The parameters to be taken into consideration would be, in addition to the state of health of the persons concerned, the appropriateness or otherwise, in terms of quality and promptness, of the medical treatment available in the receiving State and whether it was actually accessible to the individuals concerned. This last criterion could be assessed taking into account the actual cost of treatment, the level of family support available to the persons concerned, the distance they would have to travel in order to have access to the treatment and specific factors linked to their state of health that would heighten their vulnerability.171.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the intervener proposed that Article 3 of the Convention be found to impose a procedural obligation on the domestic authorities in the expelling State requiring them to seek or obtain assurances from the receiving State that the persons concerned would actually have access to the treatment they needed and thus be protected against treatment contrary to Article 3.D.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles172.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Contracting States have the right as a matter of well-established international law and subject to their treaty obligations, including the Convention, to control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens (see N. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 30). In the context of Article 3, this line of authority began with the case of Vilvarajah and Others v. the United Kingdom (30 October 1991, \u00a7 102, Series A no.\u00a0215).173.\u00a0\u00a0Nevertheless, the expulsion of an alien by a Contracting State may give rise to an issue under Article 3 of the Convention where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the receiving country. In such circumstances, Article 3 implies an obligation not to expel the individual to that country (see Saadi, cited above, \u00a7 125; M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0365; Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7 93; and F.G. v. Sweden, cited above, \u00a7 111).174.\u00a0\u00a0The prohibition under Article 3 of the Convention does not relate to all instances of ill-treatment. Such treatment has to attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of that Article. The assessment of this minimum is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see N. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 29; see also M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, cited above, \u00a7 219; Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7 94; and Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no.\u00a023380\/09, \u00a7 86, ECHR 2015).175.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that it has held that the suffering which flows from naturally occurring illness may be covered by Article 3, where it is, or risks being, exacerbated by treatment, whether flowing from conditions of detention, expulsion or other measures, for which the authorities can be held responsible (see Pretty, cited above, \u00a7 52). However, it is not prevented from scrutinising an applicant\u2019s claim under Article 3 where the source of the risk of proscribed treatment in the receiving country stems from factors which cannot engage either directly or indirectly the responsibility of the public authorities of that country (see D. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 49).176.\u00a0\u00a0In two cases concerning the expulsion by the United Kingdom of aliens who were seriously ill, the Court based its findings on the general principles outlined above (see paragraphs 172-74 above). In both cases the Court proceeded on the premise that aliens who were subject to expulsion could not in principle claim any entitlement to remain in the territory of a Contracting State in order to continue to benefit from medical, social or other forms of assistance and services provided by the returning State (see D. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 54, and N. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 42).177.\u00a0\u00a0In D. v. the United Kingdom (cited above), which concerned the decision taken by the United Kingdom authorities to expel to St Kitts an alien who was suffering from Aids, the Court considered that the applicant\u2019s removal would expose him to a real risk of dying under most distressing circumstances and would amount to inhuman treatment (see D. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 53). It found that the case was characterised by \u201cvery exceptional circumstances\u201d, owing to the fact that the applicant suffered from an incurable illness and was in the terminal stages, that there was no guarantee that he would be able to obtain any nursing or medical care in St Kitts or that he had family there willing or able to care for him, or that he had any other form of moral or social support (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 52-53). Taking the view that, in those circumstances, his suffering would attain the minimum level of severity required by Article 3, the Court held that compelling humanitarian considerations weighed against the applicant\u2019s expulsion (ibid., \u00a7 54).178.\u00a0\u00a0In the case of N. v. the United Kingdom, which concerned the removal of a Ugandan national who was suffering from Aids to her country of origin, the Court, in examining whether the circumstances of the case attained the level of severity required by Article 3 of the Convention, observed that neither the decision to remove an alien who was suffering from a serious illness to a country where the facilities for the treatment of that illness were inferior to those available in the Contracting State, nor the fact that the individual\u2019s circumstances, including his or her life expectancy, would be significantly reduced, constituted in themselves \u201cexceptional\u201d circumstances sufficient to give rise to a breach of Article 3 (see N. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 42). In the Court\u2019s view, it was important to avoid upsetting the fair balance inherent in the whole of the Convention between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual\u2019s fundamental rights. A finding to the contrary would place too great a burden on States by obliging them to alleviate the disparities between their health-care system and the level of treatment available in the third country concerned through the provision of free and unlimited health care to all aliens without a right to stay within their jurisdiction (ibid., \u00a7 44). Rather, regard should be had to the fact that the applicant\u2019s condition was not critical and was stable as a result of the antiretroviral treatment she had received in the United Kingdom, that she was fit to travel and that her condition was not expected to deteriorate as long as she continued to take the treatment she needed (ibid., \u00a7 47). The Court also deemed it necessary to take account of the fact that the rapidity of the deterioration which the applicant would suffer in the receiving country, and the extent to which she would be able to obtain access to medical treatment, support and care there, including help from relatives, necessarily involved a certain degree of speculation, particularly in view of the constantly evolving situation with regard to the treatment of Aids worldwide (ibid., \u00a7 50). The Court concluded that the implementation of the decision to remove the applicant would not give rise to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention (ibid., \u00a7\u00a051). Nevertheless, it specified that, in addition to situations of the kind addressed in D. v. the United Kingdom in which death was imminent, there might be other very exceptional cases where the humanitarian considerations weighing against removal were equally compelling (see D. v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 43). An examination of the case-law subsequent to N. v. the United Kingdom has not revealed any such examples.179.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has applied the case-law established in N. v. the United Kingdom in declaring inadmissible, as being manifestly ill-founded, numerous applications raising similar issues, concerning aliens who were HIV positive (see, among other authorities, E.O. v. Italy (dec.), no.\u00a034724\/10, 10 May 2012) or who suffered from other serious physical illnesses (see, among other authorities, V.S. and Others v. France (dec.), no.\u00a035226\/11, 25\u00a0November 2014) or mental illnesses (see, among other authorities, Kochieva and Others v. Sweden (dec.), no. 75203\/12, 30 April 2013, and Khachatryan v. Belgium (dec.), no. 72597\/10, 7 April 2015). Several judgments have applied this case-law to the removal of seriously ill persons whose condition was under control as the result of medication administered in the Contracting State concerned, and who were fit to travel (see Yoh-Ekale Mwanje v. Belgium, no. 10486\/10, 20 December 2011; S.H.H. v. the United Kingdom, no. 60367\/10, 29 January 2013; Tatar, cited above; and A.S. v. Switzerland, no. 39350\/13, 30 June 2015).180.\u00a0\u00a0However, in its judgment in Aswat v. the United Kingdom (no.\u00a017299\/12, \u00a7 49, 16 April 2013), the Court reached a different conclusion, finding that the applicant\u2019s extradition to the United States, where he was being prosecuted for terrorist activities, would entail ill\u2011treatment, in particular because the conditions of detention in the maximum security prison where he would be placed were liable to aggravate his paranoid schizophrenia. The Court held that the risk of significant deterioration in the applicant\u2019s mental and physical health was sufficient to give rise to a breach of Article 3 of the Convention (ibid., \u00a7 57).181.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes from this recapitulation of the case-law that the application of Article 3 of the Convention only in cases where the person facing expulsion is close to death, which has been its practice since the judgment in N. v. the United Kingdom, has deprived aliens who are seriously ill, but whose condition is less critical, of the benefit of that provision. As a corollary to this, the case-law subsequent to N. v. the United Kingdom has not provided more detailed guidance regarding the \u201cvery exceptional cases\u201d referred to in N. v. the United Kingdom, other than the case contemplated in D. v. the United Kingdom.182.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, and reiterating that it is essential that the Convention is interpreted and applied in a manner which renders its rights practical and effective and not theoretical and illusory (see Airey v.\u00a0Ireland, 9 October 1979, \u00a7 26, Series A no. 32; Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827\/99 and 46951\/99, \u00a7 121, ECHR 2005-I; and Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765\/09, \u00a7 175, ECHR 2012), the Court is of the view that the approach adopted hitherto should be clarified.183.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the \u201cother very exceptional cases\u201d within the meaning of the judgment in N. v. the United Kingdom (\u00a7 43) which may raise an issue under Article 3 should be understood to refer to situations involving the removal of a seriously ill person in which substantial grounds have been shown for believing that he or she, although not at imminent risk of dying, would face a real risk, on account of the absence of appropriate treatment in the receiving country or the lack of access to such treatment, of being exposed to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his or her state of health resulting in intense suffering or to a significant reduction in life expectancy. The Court points out that these situations correspond to a high threshold for the application of Article 3 of the Convention in cases concerning the removal of aliens suffering from serious illness.184.\u00a0\u00a0As to whether the above conditions are satisfied in a given situation, the Court observes that in cases involving the expulsion of aliens, the Court does not itself examine the applications for international protection or verify how States control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens. By virtue of Article 1 of the Convention the primary responsibility for implementing and enforcing the guaranteed rights and freedoms is laid on the national authorities, who are thus required to examine the applicants\u2019 fears and to assess the risks they would face if removed to the receiving country, from the standpoint of Article 3. The machinery of complaint to the Court is subsidiary to national systems safeguarding human rights. This subsidiary character is articulated in Article 13 and Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention (see M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 286-87, and F.G. v. Sweden, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 117-18).185.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, in cases of this kind, the authorities\u2019 obligation under Article 3 to protect the integrity of the persons concerned is fulfilled primarily through appropriate procedures allowing such examination to be carried out (see, mutatis mutandis, El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630\/09, \u00a7 182, ECHR 2012; Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7 104; and F.G. v. Sweden, cited above, \u00a7 117).186.\u00a0\u00a0In the context of these procedures, it is for the applicants to adduce evidence capable of demonstrating that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if the measure complained of were to be implemented, they would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 (see Saadi, cited above, \u00a7 129, and F.G. v. Sweden, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0120). In this connection it should be observed that a certain degree of speculation is inherent in the preventive purpose of Article 3 and that it is not a matter of requiring the persons concerned to provide clear proof of their claim that they would be exposed to proscribed treatment (see, in particular, Trabelsi v. Belgium, no. 140\/10, \u00a7\u00a0130, ECHR 2014 (extracts)).187.\u00a0\u00a0Where such evidence is adduced, it is for the authorities of the returning State, in the context of domestic procedures, to dispel any doubts raised by it (see Saadi, cited above, \u00a7 129, and F.G. v. Sweden, cited above, \u00a7 120). The risk alleged must be subjected to close scrutiny (see Saadi, cited above, \u00a7 128; Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, nos. 8319\/07 and 11449\/07, \u00a7 214, 28 June 2011; Hirsi Jamaa and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0116; and Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7 104) in the course of which the authorities in the returning State must consider the foreseeable consequences of removal for the individual concerned in the receiving State, in the light of the general situation there and the individual\u2019s personal circumstances (see Vilvarajah and Others, cited above, \u00a7 108; El-Masri, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0213; and Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7 105). The assessment of the risk as defined above (see paragraphs 183-84) must therefore take into consideration general sources such as reports of the World Health Organisation or of reputable non-governmental organisations and the medical certificates concerning the person in question.188.\u00a0\u00a0As the Court has observed above (see paragraph 173), what is in issue here is the negative obligation not to expose persons to a risk of ill\u2011treatment proscribed by Article 3. It follows that the impact of removal on the person concerned must be assessed by comparing his or her state of health prior to removal and how it would evolve after transfer to the receiving State.189.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the factors to be taken into consideration, the authorities in the returning State must verify on a case-by-case basis whether the care generally available in the receiving State is sufficient and appropriate in practice for the treatment of the applicant\u2019s illness so as to prevent him or her being exposed to treatment contrary to Article 3 (see paragraph 183 above). The benchmark is not the level of care existing in the returning State; it is not a question of ascertaining whether the care in the receiving State would be equivalent or inferior to that provided by the health-care system in the returning State. Nor is it possible to derive from Article 3 a right to receive specific treatment in the receiving State which is not available to the rest of the population.190.\u00a0\u00a0The authorities must also consider the extent to which the individual in question will actually have access to this care and these facilities in the receiving State. The Court observes in that regard that it has previously questioned the accessibility of care (see Aswat, cited above, \u00a7 55, and Tatar, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 47-49) and referred to the need to consider the cost of medication and treatment, the existence of a social and family network, and the distance to be travelled in order to have access to the required care (see Karagoz v. France (dec.), no. 47531\/99, 15 November 2001; N. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 34-41, and the references cited therein; and E.O. v. Italy (dec.), cited above).191.\u00a0\u00a0Where, after the relevant information has been examined, serious doubts persist regarding the impact of removal on the persons concerned \u2013 on account of the general situation in the receiving country and\/or their individual situation \u2013 the returning State must obtain individual and sufficient assurances from the receiving State, as a precondition for removal, that appropriate treatment will be available and accessible to the persons concerned so that they do not find themselves in a situation contrary to Article 3 (on the subject of individual assurances, see Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7 120).192.\u00a0\u00a0The Court emphasises that, in cases concerning the removal of seriously ill persons, the event which triggers the inhuman and degrading treatment, and which engages the responsibility of the returning State under Article 3, is not the lack of medical infrastructure in the receiving State. Likewise, the issue is not one of any obligation for the returning State to alleviate the disparities between its health-care system and the level of treatment existing in the receiving State through the provision of free and unlimited health care to all aliens without a right to stay within its jurisdiction. The responsibility that is engaged under the Convention in cases of this type is that of the returning State, on account of an act \u2013 in this instance, expulsion \u2013 which would result in an individual being exposed to a risk of treatment prohibited by Article 3.193.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the fact that the third country concerned is a Contracting Party to the Convention is not decisive. While the Court agrees with the Government that the possibility for the applicant to initiate proceedings on his return to Georgia was, in principle, the most natural remedy under the Convention system, it observes that the authorities in the returning State are not exempted on that account from their duty of prevention under Article 3 of the Convention (see, among other authorities, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 357-59, and Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 104-05).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of the general principles to the present case194.\u00a0\u00a0It is not disputed that the applicant was suffering from a very serious illness, chronic lymphocytic leukaemia, and that his condition was life-threatening.195.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant provided detailed medical information obtained from Dr L., a doctor specialising in the treatment of leukaemia and head of the haematology department in a hospital devoted entirely to the treatment of cancer. According to this information, the applicant\u2019s condition had become stable as a result of the treatment he was receiving in Belgium. This was a highly targeted treatment aimed at enabling him to undergo a donor transplant, which offered the last remaining prospect of a cure provided it was carried out within a fairly short timeframe. If the treatment being administered to the applicant had had to be discontinued, his life expectancy, based on the average, would have been less than six months (see paragraph 46 above).196.\u00a0\u00a0In a report of 23 June 2015 the medical adviser of the Aliens Office stressed that the medical information concerning the applicant did not disclose a direct threat to his life or indicate that his state of health was critical (see paragraph 68 above).197.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that, according to the information available to Dr L., neither the treatment he was receiving in Belgium nor the donor transplant was available in Georgia. As to the other forms of leukaemia treatment available in that country, he argued that there was no guarantee that he would have access to them, on account of the shortcomings in the Georgian social insurance system (see paragraph 141 above). In the Court\u2019s view, these assertions are not without some credibility.198.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that on 10 September 2007 and 2 April 2008 the applicant made two requests for regularisation of his residence status in Belgium on medical grounds, on the basis of section 9ter of the Aliens Act (see paragraphs 54 and 59 above). His requests were based primarily on the need to obtain appropriate treatment for his leukaemia and on the premise that he would have been unable to receive suitable care for his condition in Georgia.199.\u00a0\u00a0On 26 September 2007 and 4 June 2008 the applicant\u2019s requests for regularisation were refused by the Aliens Office on the grounds that he was excluded from the scope of section 9ter of the Act because of the serious crimes he had committed (see paragraphs 55 and 60 above). The Aliens Appeals Board, called upon to examine the applicant\u2019s requests for a stay of execution of these decisions and his applications to set them aside, held in judgments dated 28 August 2008 and 21 May 2015 that, where the administrative authority advanced grounds for exclusion, it was not necessary for it to examine the medical evidence submitted to it. With regard to the complaints based on Article 3 of the Convention, the Aliens Appeals Board further noted that the decision refusing leave to remain had not been accompanied by a removal measure, with the result that the risk of the applicant\u2019s medical treatment being discontinued in the event of his return to Georgia was purely hypothetical (see paragraphs 57 and 62 above). The Conseil d\u2019\u00c9tat, to which the applicant appealed on points of law, upheld the reasoning of the Aliens Appeals Board and specified that the medical situation of an alien who faced removal from the country and whose request for leave to remain had been refused should be assessed at the time of enforcement of the removal measure rather than at the time of its adoption (see paragraph 64 above).200.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes from the above that, although the Aliens Office\u2019s medical adviser had issued several opinions regarding the applicant\u2019s state of health based on the medical certificates provided by the applicant (see paragraphs 67-68 above), these were not examined either by the Aliens Office or by the Aliens Appeals Board from the perspective of Article 3 of the Convention in the course of the proceedings concerning regularisation on medical grounds.201.\u00a0\u00a0Nor was the applicant\u2019s medical situation examined in the context of the proceedings concerning his removal (see paragraphs 73, 78 and 84 above).202.\u00a0\u00a0The fact that an assessment of this kind could have been carried out immediately before the removal measure was to be enforced (see paragraph\u00a0199 in fine above) does not address these concerns in itself, in the absence of any indication of the extent of such an assessment and its effect on the binding nature of the order to leave the country.203.\u00a0\u00a0It is true that at the hearing on 15 September 2015 the Belgian Government gave assurances that, should it ultimately be decided to perform a donor transplant in Belgium, the Belgian authorities would not take any steps to prevent it or to secure the applicant\u2019s removal while he was in hospital. The Court takes note of that statement.204.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further submitted that it might have been possible to continue the applicant\u2019s treatment by having his medication sent through the post under the supervision of his doctor and with the assistance of doctors in Georgia. However, the Government did not provide any specific information regarding the practical feasibility of such a solution.205.\u00a0\u00a0In conclusion, the Court considers that in the absence of any assessment by the domestic authorities of the risk facing the applicant in the light of the information concerning his state of health and the existence of appropriate treatment in Georgia, the information available to those authorities was insufficient for them to conclude that the applicant, if returned to Georgia, would not have run a real and concrete risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention (see paragraph 183 above).206.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that, if the applicant had been returned to Georgia without these factors being assessed, there would have been a violation of Article 3.207.\u00a0\u00a0In view of this finding the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine the complaint under Article 2 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION208.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that his removal to Georgia, ordered together with a ten-year ban on re-entering Belgium, would have resulted in his separation from his family, who had been granted leave to remain in Belgium and constituted his sole source of moral support. He alleged a violation of Article 8 of the Convention, which provides:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.2.\u00a0\u00a0There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber judgment209.\u00a0\u00a0Under Article 8 of the Convention viewed from the standpoint of the State\u2019s positive obligations (see the Chamber judgment, \u00a7 138), the Chamber considered that the applicant\u2019s convictions weighed heavily with regard to both the number and seriousness of the offences and the nature of the last penalty imposed (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 145\u201147).210.\u00a0\u00a0It also noted that at no point during his fifteen-year stay in Belgium had the applicant been in possession of a valid residence permit and that, despite the applicant\u2019s repeated convictions, the Belgian authorities had displayed remarkable tolerance (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 149-50). It further took account of the fact that the members of the family were Georgian nationals and that, as they had Belgian residence permits, his wife and children could leave and re-enter the country lawfully (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 151-53).211.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, taking into consideration the medical aspect of the case and the fact that the family could decide to leave Belgium temporarily for Georgia, the Chamber stressed that it did not discern any exceptional circumstances that would require the Belgian authorities to refrain from removing the applicant or to grant him leave to remain (ibid., \u00a7 154).212.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, it held that there had been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention (ibid., \u00a7 156).B.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 observations before the Grand Chamber1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant213.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained that the Belgian authorities\u2019 refusal to regularise his residence status on humanitarian grounds or to examine his request for regularisation on medical grounds amounted to interference with his private and family life in breach of Article\u00a08.214.\u00a0\u00a0He argued that the Belgian authorities had been under a duty to carry out a balanced and reasonable assessment of all the interests at stake. They should have applied the rules taking into consideration the children\u2019s best interests and the requirement to afford them special protection on account of their vulnerability. Although the applicant\u2019s children had Georgian nationality, from a \u201csociological\u201d perspective they were Belgian, and they spoke only French. They had been given leave to remain in Belgium in 2010 and two of them had been born in Belgium. They had no ties in Georgia, did not speak Georgian or Russian and would be eligible to become fully fledged Belgian citizens in the medium term.215.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, the couple\u2019s eldest daughter, with whom his wife had arrived in Belgium in 1998, was now an adult and lived in Belgium with her two children.216.\u00a0\u00a0The refusal to regularise the applicant\u2019s status had left the family in a state of economic and social vulnerability which had had a major psychological impact and had hindered the development of their daily life. The practical implications of this situation for the applicant \u2013 the fact that he was barred from working and could not contribute to the household expenses, the constant fear of arrest, the negative effect on his self-esteem, and so forth \u2013 had affected the relationship between the children and their father. The applicant\u2019s criminal behaviour, which had been motivated largely by the need to survive financially, belonged to the past. The applicant was in a very weak state and stayed mostly at home, venturing out only to collect his children from school.217.\u00a0\u00a0The worsening of the applicant\u2019s condition, coupled with the impossibility of maintaining his state of health in Georgia and with the length of his residence and that of his family in Belgium, should have prompted the Court to reconsider the approach taken in the Chamber judgment, to assess the situation in its entirety and to find that the applicant\u2019s family had specific needs linked to their integration in Belgium. The solution advocated by the Chamber, which would have entailed the family moving to Georgia for long enough to take care of the applicant until his death, would not have been feasible as it would have meant taking the children out of school in Belgium and taking them to a country they did not know and where they did not speak the language. Their mother would have been unable to ensure the family\u2019s upkeep in Georgia in view of the applicant\u2019s condition, and the applicant would have died in particularly distressing circumstances. Furthermore, if they had had to remain in Georgia for more than one year, the applicant\u2019s wife and children would have forfeited the right to return to Belgium. Such a solution would have been, to say the least, disproportionate when weighed against the interests of the Belgian State.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Government218.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stressed the significance that should be attached to the applicant\u2019s criminal record and the fact that he had persisted in his criminal conduct despite his illness.219.\u00a0\u00a0As to the children\u2019s best interests, the Government considered that these were difficult to determine because the children were not applicants and especially because there was nothing to indicate that they would have been unable to follow their father to Georgia for a time and attend school there. Furthermore, as the applicant had not provided detailed information regarding the extent of his family in Georgia and the persons with whom he was in contact, it was difficult to make an overall assessment of the situation.220.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further submitted that residence permits had been issued by a decision of 29 July 2010 to the applicant\u2019s wife and their children, granting them indefinite leave to remain under sections 9 and 13 of the Aliens Act. The permit in question was a \u201ctype B\u201d, in other words, a certificate of entry in the aliens\u2019 register which was valid for five years and could be renewed for the same period \u2013 in advance, if necessary \u2013 by the municipal authorities in the place of residence. This residence permit entitled the members of the applicant\u2019s family to leave Belgium for one year or more and return to the country, provided that they had complied with the requisite formalities in the municipality of residence and had ensured that they had a valid permit. The formalities varied according to the length of the stay outside the country: in the case of stays of three months to a year, the aliens concerned had to report to the municipal authorities before leaving and within fifteen days of returning or risk automatic removal from the municipality\u2019s register. In the case of stays of over one year, they forfeited their right to remain unless they could demonstrate before their departure that their centre of interests still lay in Belgium and they informed the municipal authorities in their habitual place of residence of their intention to leave the country and return. The persons concerned also had to be in possession of a valid residence permit on their return and to report to the municipal authorities within fifteen days of returning.C.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment221.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the applicability of Article 8 and the standpoint from which the complaints should be examined, the Grand Chamber will proceed on the same premises as the Chamber (see the Chamber judgment, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0136\u201138). Firstly, it is not disputed that family life existed between the applicant, his wife and the children born in Belgium. This renders irrelevant the disagreement as to whether the applicant was the father of the child born before their arrival in Belgium, who is now an adult (ibid., \u00a7 136). Furthermore, assuming that the removal measure could have been examined from the standpoint of the applicant\u2019s private life, the \u201cfamily life\u201d aspect should take precedence in view of the specific issues raised by the present case and the parties\u2019 submissions. Secondly, while the case concerns both the domestic authorities\u2019 refusal to grant the applicant leave to remain in Belgium and the threat of his removal to Georgia, in view of the specific features of the case and recent developments the Chamber found that the key question was whether the Belgian authorities were under a duty to allow the applicant to reside in Belgium so that he could remain with his family (ibid., \u00a7 138). The Grand Chamber considers that examining the complaint alleging a violation of Article 8 in this way from the standpoint of the Belgian authorities\u2019 positive obligations is made all the more necessary by the developments in the case, in particular the deterioration of the applicant\u2019s health and his eventual death. Lastly, the Grand Chamber reiterates that in the context of both its positive and its negative obligations, the State must strike a fair balance between the competing interests of the individual and of society as a whole, and that the extent of the State\u2019s obligations will vary according to the particular circumstances of the persons involved and the general interest (ibid., \u00a7 140, and the references cited therein).222.\u00a0\u00a0However, unlike the Chamber, having observed that the Belgian authorities did not examine the applicant\u2019s medical data and the impact of his removal on his state of health in any of the proceedings brought before them, the Grand Chamber has concluded that there would have been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention if the applicant had been removed to Georgia without such an assessment being carried out (see paragraph 206 above).223.\u00a0\u00a0A fortiori, the Court observes that the Belgian authorities likewise did not examine, under Article 8, the degree to which the applicant was dependent on his family as a result of the deterioration of his state of health. In the context of the proceedings for regularisation on medical grounds the Aliens Appeals Board, indeed, dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 8 on the ground that the decision refusing him leave to remain had not been accompanied by a removal measure (see paragraph 58 above).224.\u00a0\u00a0Nevertheless, just as in the case of Article 3, it is not for the Court to conduct an assessment, from the perspective of Article 8 of the Convention, of the impact of removal on the applicant\u2019s family life in the light of his state of health. In that connection the Court considers that this task not only falls to the domestic authorities, which are competent in the matter, but also constitutes a procedural obligation with which they must comply in order to ensure the effectiveness of the right to respect for family life. As the Court has observed above (see paragraph 184), the machinery of complaint to the Court is subsidiary to national systems safeguarding human rights.225.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, if the Belgian authorities had ultimately concluded that Article 3 of the Convention as interpreted above did not act as a bar to the applicant\u2019s removal to Georgia, they would have been required, in order to comply with Article 8, to examine in addition whether, in the light of the applicant\u2019s specific situation at the time of removal (see, mutatis mutandis, Maslov v. Austria [GC], no. 1638\/03, \u00a7 93, ECHR 2008), the family could reasonably have been expected to follow him to Georgia or, if not, whether observance of the applicant\u2019s right to respect for his family life required that he be granted leave to remain in Belgium for the time he had left to live.226.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that, if the applicant had been removed to Georgia without these factors having been assessed, there would also have been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION227.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage228.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed EUR 10,434 in respect of pecuniary damage. This amount corresponded to his out-of-pocket expenses for treatment in Belgium which had not been covered owing to his irregular residence status in the country.229.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged, and dismisses this claim.230.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 5,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage resulting from his precarious socio-economic situation.231.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, the conclusion it has reached under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention (see paragraphs 206 and 226 above) constitutes sufficient just satisfaction in respect of any non-pecuniary damage that may have been sustained by the applicant. It therefore makes no award under this head.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses232.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further claimed EUR 9,411 in respect of the fees payable to his lawyers for the preparation of the written observations they had submitted to the Court prior to the request for referral to the Grand Chamber. He submitted copies of the relevant invoices in support of his claim, and stated that he had already paid approximately half of the fees, that is, EUR 4,668, and was unable to pay the remainder.233.\u00a0\u00a0In their observations before the Chamber the Government argued that the applicant, as an alien, was presumed under domestic law to be in financial need and thus eligible for legal aid, including for the expenses linked to the proceedings before the Court.234.\u00a0\u00a0Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court decides that the sum of EUR 5,000 is to be paid to the applicant\u2019s family in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable to them (see, mutatis mutandis, Karner, cited above, \u00a7 50).C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest235.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28910":"A.\u00a0\u00a0Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention28.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that it would be in breach of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention to deport them to Afghanistan. These provisions read as follows:Article 2\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone\u2019s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.2.\u00a0\u00a0Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:(a)\u00a0\u00a0in defence of any person from unlawful violence;(b)\u00a0\u00a0in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;(c)\u00a0\u00a0in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.\u201dArticle 3\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles29.\u00a0\u00a0At the outset the Court observes that in the context of expulsion, where there are substantial grounds to believe that the person in question, if expelled, would face a real risk of capital punishment, torture, or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the destination country, both Articles 2 and 3 imply that the Contracting State must not expel that person. The Court will therefore examine the two Articles together (see, among other authorities, mutatis mutandis, Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], nos. 10865\/09, 45886\/07 and 32431\/08, \u00a7 314, ECHR 2014 (extracts); T.A.\u00a0v. Sweden, no. 48866\/10, \u00a7 37, 19 December 2013; K.A.B. v. Sweden, no.\u00a0886\/11, \u00a7 67, 5 September 2013; Kaboulov v. Ukraine, no. 41015\/04, \u00a7\u00a099, 19 November 2009; and F.H. v. Sweden, no. 32621\/06, \u00a7 72, 20\u00a0January 2009).30.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates the general principles regarding the assessment of applications for asylum under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention as recently set out in the judgment in the case of F.G. v. Sweden ([GC], no.\u00a043611\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 111-118, 23 March 2016, with further references). Most importantly, the machinery of complaint to the Court being subsidiary to national systems safeguarding human rights, the Court does not itself examine the actual asylum applications. Its main concern is whether effective guarantees exist that protect the applicant against refoulement, be it direct or indirect, to the country from which he or she has fled. Moreover, where domestic proceedings have taken place, it is not the Court\u2019s task to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the domestic courts \u2013 as a general principle, the national authorities are best placed to assess not just the facts but, more particularly, the credibility of witnesses since it is they who have had an opportunity to see, hear and assess the demeanour of the individual concerned.31.\u00a0\u00a0The judgment in F.G. v. Sweden also contains an overview of the State\u2019s procedural duties in the examination of applications for asylum (F.G. v. Sweden, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 119-127). Of particular relevance to the present case are the Court\u2019s following considerations:\u201c123.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of sur place activities the Court has acknowledged that it is generally very difficult to assess whether a person is genuinely interested in the activity in question, be it a political cause or a religion, or whether the person has only become involved in it in order to create post-flight grounds (see, for example A.A. v. Switzerland, no. 58802\/12, \u00a7 41, 7 January 2014). That reasoning is in line with the UNCHR Guidelines on International Protection regarding Religion-Based Refugee Claims of 28 April 2004, which state \u2018that particular credibility concerns tend to arise in relation to sur place claims and that a rigorous and in-depth examination of the circumstances and genuineness of the conversion will be necessary ... So-called \u201cself-serving\u201d activities do not create a well-founded fear of persecution on a Convention ground in the claimant\u2019s country of origin, if the opportunistic nature of such activities will be apparent to all, including the authorities there, and serious adverse consequences would not result if the person were returned\u2019 (see paragraph 52 above). See also the Court\u2019s finding in, for example, Ali Muradi and Selma Alieva v. Sweden ((dec.), no.11243\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 44-45, 25 June 2013) to this effect.\u201d32.\u00a0\u00a0In the recent judgment in A.M. v. the Netherlands (no. 29094\/09, 5\u00a0July 2016) the Court held the following regarding the general security situation in Afghanistan and the situation of the Hazaras:\u201c86. Although this argument has only been raised in the domestic proceedings but not in the present application, the Court has examined the question whether the applicant runs a risk of being subjected to ill-treatment on account of his Hazara origin. On this point, the materials before the Court contain no elements indicating that the applicant\u2019s personal position would be any worse than most other persons of Hazara origin who are currently living in Afghanistan. Although the Court accepts that the general situation in Afghanistan for this minority may be far from ideal, it cannot find that it must be regarded as being so harrowing that there would already be a real risk of treatment prohibited by Article 3 in the event that a person of Hazara origin were to be removed to Afghanistan.87. Regarding the question of whether the general security situation in Afghanistan is such that any removal there would necessarily breach Article 3 of the Convention, in its judgment in the case of H. and B. v. the United Kingdom (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 92-93), it did not find that in Afghanistan there was a general situation of violence such that there would be a real risk of ill-treatment simply by virtue of an individual being returned there. In view of the evidence now before it, the Court finds no reason to hold otherwise in the instant case.\u201d2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of the general principles to the present case33.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the Swedish authorities were, in so far as the applicants\u2019 alleged conversion from Islam to Christianity is concerned, confronted with a sur place activity in Sweden. Thus, the domestic authorities initially had to assess whether the applicants\u2019 conversion was genuine and had attained a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance (see F.G. v. Sweden, cited above, \u00a7 144, with further references), before assessing whether the applicants would be at risk of treatment contrary to Article 2 or 3 of the Convention upon their return to Afghanistan.34.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the Migration Agency interviewed the applicants on two occasions in the course of the examination of their asylum applications. The first applicant did not mention at the first interview that he had previously tried to convert in Greece and planned to convert in Sweden. As noted by the Migration Court, he was not able to describe what in the Christian faith attracted him or show any particular knowledge about the religion, despite having claimed that he had been interested in it for ten years. As regards the second applicant, she maintained that she was Muslim until the Migration Court\u2019s judgment in the original proceedings. However, she was baptised soon after in the same church as her husband. In the Court\u2019s view, the domestic instances were justified in finding that their conversion to Christianity was not genuine and that they were not likely to live as Christians if returned to Afghanistan (see, for similar reasoning concerning removal to Afghanistan of applicants who converted to Christianity, J. G. v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 70602\/14; M.H.A. v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 61402\/15; and T.M. and Y.A. v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 209\/16; all decisions taken on 5 July 2016). Furthermore, their conclusions were reached with due account taken of the statements made by the applicants, as well as the documents submitted by them, and after thorough examinations of all the relevant and available information. No submissions made by the applicants thereafter give reason to come to a different conclusion.35.\u00a0\u00a0In regard to the first applicant\u2019s alleged burning of a mosque and the second applicant\u2019s fears of her alleged ex-husband, the Court also agrees with the findings of the domestic instances which deemed central parts of these accounts to be vague and contradictory.36.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that the applicants were able to appeal against the decisions rejecting their asylum applications and their request for a stay of enforcement of the expulsion order and that they were represented by counsel throughout the proceedings. It also notes that a hearing was held in the appeal proceedings before the Migration Court (see paragraph 12 above).37.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, it cannot find any indications that the proceedings before the domestic instances lacked effective guarantees to protect the applicants against refoulement or that they were otherwise flawed. .38.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, in the judgment in A.M. v. the Netherlands (cited above, \u00a7\u00a026) the Court found that neither the general security situation in Afghanistan nor the specific situation for the Hazaras were such as to render an expulsion in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. Noting that the Swedish Migration Court in the present case indicated Herat and Mazar\u2011e\u2011Sharif as safe provinces for the applicants, the Court finds no reason to come to a different conclusion in the present case.39.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the above, the Court considers that the applicants have failed to show that their return to Afghanistan would expose them to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 2 or 3 of the Convention on account of their alleged conversion or on any other ground.40.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3\u00a0(a) and 4 of the Convention.41.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, it is appropriate to discontinue the application of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.B.\u00a0\u00a0Articles 5, 6 and 9 of the Convention42.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also complained under Articles 5, 6 and 9 of the Convention. Having regard to the conclusions reached by the Court in relation to the applicants\u2019 complaints under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, it finds that the present complaints do not raise any separate issue.43.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly ill\u2011founded and must be declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7\u00a03 (a) and 4 of the Convention.For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,Declares the application inadmissible.\u00a0Done in English and notified in writing on 19 January 2017.Fato\u015f Arac\u0131Dmitry Dedov Deputy RegistrarPresident\u00a0","28924":"I.\u00a0\u00a0PRELIMINARY OBJECTION51.\u00a0\u00a0In a document of 9 July 2013 containing their additional observations and submissions on just satisfaction before the Chamber, the Government for the first time raised an objection that domestic remedies had not been exhausted, on the ground that the applicants had not appealed to the Italian judicial authorities against the refusal-of-entry orders.52.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber took the view that the Government were estopped from raising the objection that domestic remedies had not been exhausted. It pointed out that under Rule 55 of the Rules of Court, any plea of inadmissibility must be raised by the respondent Contracting Party, in so far as the nature of the objection and the circumstances so allowed, in its written or oral observations on the admissibility of the application (see N.C. v. Italy [GC], no. 24952\/94, \u00a7 44, ECHR 2002-X). In the present case, the Government had not clearly raised an objection as to the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies in their observations of 25 September 2013 on the admissibility and merits, and the question of a failure by the applicants to lodge an appeal against the refusal-of-entry orders was raised only in their additional observations and submissions on just satisfaction. The Chamber further noted that the Government had not provided any explanation for that delay and that there was no exceptional circumstance capable of exempting them from their obligation to raise an objection to admissibility in a timely manner (see paragraphs 38 and 39 of the Chamber judgment).53.\u00a0\u00a0The Grand Chamber does not see any reason to depart from the Chamber\u2019s findings on that point. It further notes that during the proceedings before it the Government did not indicate any impediment by which they had been prevented from referring, in their initial observations of 25\u00a0September 2013 on the admissibility and merits of the case, to a failure by the applicants to challenge the refusal-of-entry orders.54.\u00a0\u00a0It is therefore appropriate to confirm that the Government are estopped from relying on a failure to exhaust domestic remedies.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION55.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that they had been deprived of their liberty in a manner that was incompatible with Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:(a)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;(b)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non- compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law;(c)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;(d)\u00a0\u00a0the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority;(e)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;(f)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Chamber judgment56.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber began by finding that the applicants had been deprived of their liberty within the meaning of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. The applicants\u2019 allegation that they had been prohibited from leaving the CSPA and the ships Vincent and Audace was not in dispute (see paragraphs\u00a046-51 of the Chamber judgment).57.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber then took the view that the deprivation of liberty imposed on the applicants fell under sub-paragraph (f) of the first paragraph of Article 5. However, it had no legal basis in Italian law. In that connection, the Chamber observed that Italian law did not provide for the detention of migrants placed in a CSPA. In addition, in his decision of 1\u00a0June 2012, the Palermo preliminary investigations judge had stated that the Agrigento police authority had merely registered the presence of the migrants in the CSPA without taking decisions ordering their detention. The Chamber explained that the existence of a practice of de facto detention of migrants in Italy had been confirmed by the reports of the Senate\u2019s Special Commission and the PACE Ad Hoc Sub-Committee. The April 2011 agreement between Italy and Tunisia had not been accessible to those concerned and its consequences had therefore been unforeseeable. In the Chamber\u2019s view, it could not be established that the agreement provided for satisfactory safeguards against arbitrariness. The Chamber concluded in the light of the foregoing that the applicants\u2019 deprivation of liberty had not been \u201clawful\u201d within the meaning of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention and that there had been a violation of that provision in the present case (paragraphs\u00a066-73 of the Chamber judgment).B.\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s objection to the applicability of Article 5 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The Government58.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued in the first place that Article 5 was inapplicable in the present case as the applicants had not been deprived of their liberty. They had been received in a CSPA, a centre not designed for detention but to provide first aid and assistance (in terms of health and hygiene in particular) to all the migrants who arrived in Italy in 2011 for the time necessary to identify them, in accordance with the relevant Italian and European rules, and to proceed with their return. The applicants had then been transferred, for their own safety, to the ships Vincent and Audace \u2013 which, in the Government\u2019s submission, had to be regarded as the \u201cnatural extension of the CSPA\u201d of Lampedusa \u2013 on account of the arson attack which had destroyed the centre (see paragraph 14 above).59.\u00a0\u00a0Faced with a humanitarian and logistical emergency, the Italian authorities had been obliged to seek new premises which, in the Government\u2019s view, could not be regarded as places of detention or arrest. The surveillance of the CSPA by the Italian authorities was merely protective, in order to avoid criminal or harmful acts being committed by the migrants or against the local inhabitants. In the Government\u2019s view, the need for such surveillance had been shown by the subsequent events, in particular the above-mentioned arson attack and the clashes between local people and a group of migrants (see paragraph 26 above).60.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Government argued, as they had done before the Chamber, that there had been neither \u201carrest\u201d nor \u201cdetention\u201d but merely a \u201cholding\u201d measure. The applicants had been rescued on the high seas and taken to the island of Lampedusa to assist them and to ensure their physical safety. The Government explained that the authorities had been obliged by law to save and identify the applicants, who had been in Italian territorial waters at the time their vessels had been intercepted by the coastguards. Any measure taken against the applicants could not therefore, in their view, be regarded as an arbitrary deprivation of liberty. On the contrary, the measures had been necessary to deal with a situation of humanitarian emergency and to strike a fair balance between the safety of the migrants and that of the local inhabitants.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants61.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants acknowledged that, under Italian law, the CSPAs were not detention centres but reception facilities. They argued, however, that this fact did not preclude the finding that, in practice, they had been deprived of their liberty in the Lampedusa CSPA and on the ships Vincent and Audace, in spite of the domestic law classification of the confinement. They observed that, to ascertain whether a person had been deprived of his or her liberty, the starting-point had to be his or her concrete situation and not the legal characterisation of the facility in question. Otherwise States would be able to implement forms of deprivation of liberty without any safeguards simply by classifying the premises in question as a \u201creception facility\u201d rather than a \u201cdetention facility\u201d.62.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants pointed out that they had been held in a secure facility under the constant watch of the police for periods of nine and twelve days respectively without the possibility of leaving. That situation had been confirmed by the reports of the PACE Ad Hoc Sub-Committee (see paragraph\u00a049 above) and of the Senate\u2019s Special Commission (see paragraph\u00a035 above). The Commission had reported prolonged periods of confinement, inability to communicate with the outside world and a lack of freedom of movement.2.\u00a0\u00a0Third-party intervention63.\u00a0\u00a0The Centre for Human Rights and Legal Pluralism of McGill University (\u201cthe McGill Centre\u201d) observed that the facts of the case were similar to those in Abdolkhani and Karimnia v.\u00a0Turkey (no.\u00a030471\/08, 22\u00a0September 2009), where the Court had dismissed the respondent Government\u2019s argument that the applicants had not been detained but accommodated.3.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0Principles laid down in the Court\u2019s case-law64.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, in proclaiming the right to liberty, the first paragraph of Article 5 is concerned with a person\u2019s physical liberty and its aim is to ensure that no one should be dispossessed of such liberty in an arbitrary fashion (see Medvedyev and Others v. France [GC], no. 3394\/03, \u00a7\u00a073, ECHR 2010). The difference between deprivation of liberty and restrictions on freedom of movement under Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 is merely one of degree or intensity, and not one of nature or substance. Although the process of classification into one or other of these categories sometimes proves to be no easy task, in that some borderline cases are a matter of pure opinion, the Court cannot avoid making the selection upon which the applicability or inapplicability of Article 5 depends (see Guzzardi v. Italy, 6 November 1980, \u00a7\u00a7 92-93, Series A no. 39). In order to determine whether a person has been deprived of liberty, the starting-point must be his or her concrete situation, and account must be taken of a whole range of criteria such as the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question (see Amuur v. France, 25 June 1996, \u00a7 42, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-III, and Stanev v.\u00a0Bulgaria [GC], no.\u00a036760\/06, \u00a7 115, ECHR 2012).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles in the present case65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court begins by noting that the Government acknowledged that the Italian authorities had kept the CSPA at Contrada Imbriacola under surveillance (see paragraph 59 above) and did not dispute the applicants\u2019 allegation (see paragraph 62 above) that they were prohibited from leaving the centre and the ships Vincent and Audace.66.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, like the Chamber, the Court notes that in paragraph 54 of its report published on 30\u00a0September 2011 (see paragraph 49 above), the PACE Ad Hoc Sub-Committee found that \u201c[d]espite the authorities\u2019 claim that the Tunisians were not detainees because they were not in cells, ... the conditions to which they were subjected [in the Contrada Imbriacola centre] were similar to detention and deprivation of freedom\u201d. It also stated that the migrants were, \u201c[i]n practice, ... imprisoned there without access to a judge\u201d (see \u00a7\u00a7 54-55 of the report).67.\u00a0\u00a0Similar observations can be found in the report of the Senate\u2019s Special Commission (see paragraph 35 above), which referred to the \u201cprolonged confinement\u201d, \u201cinability to communicate with the outside world\u201d and \u201clack of freedom of movement\u201d of the migrants placed in the Lampedusa reception centres.68.\u00a0\u00a0Before the Court, the Government did not adduce any material capable of calling into question the findings of those two independent bodies, one of which, the Senate\u2019s Special Commission, is an institution of the respondent State. Nor did the Government submit any information to suggest that the applicants were free to leave the Contrada Imbriacola CSPA. On the contrary, the applicants\u2019 version seems to be corroborated by the fact \u2013 not disputed by the Government \u2013 that when on 21\u00a0September 2011 they had managed to evade the police surveillance and reach the village of Lampedusa, they were stopped by the police and taken back to the reception centre (see paragraph 14 above). This suggests that the applicants were being held at the CSPA involuntarily (see, mutatis mutandis, Stanev, cited above, \u00a7 127).69.\u00a0\u00a0Similar considerations apply to the ships Vincent and Audace, which, according to the Government themselves, were to be regarded as the \u201cnatural extension of the CSPA\u201d (see paragraph 58 above). The Court finds no evidence in the file to suggest that the applicants could have left the ships, not even when they were moored in Palermo harbour.70.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes, lastly, that the duration of the applicants\u2019 confinement in the CSPA and on the ships, lasting for about twelve days in the case of the first applicant and about nine days in that of the second and third applicants, was not insignificant.71.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the classification of the applicants\u2019 confinement in domestic law cannot alter the nature of the constraining measures imposed on them (see, mutatis mutandis, Abdolkhani and Karimnia, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0126-27). Moreover, the applicability of Article 5 of the Convention cannot be excluded by the fact, relied on by the Government, that the authorities\u2019 aim had been to assist the applicants and ensure their safety (see paragraphs 58-59 above). Even measures intended for protection or taken in the interest of the person concerned may be regarded as a deprivation of liberty. The Court observes that Article 5 \u00a7 1 authorises, in its sub-paragraph (d), the \u201cdetention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision\u201d (see, for example, Blokhin v. Russia [GC], no. 47152\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 164-72, ECHR 2016, and D.L. v.\u00a0Bulgaria, no. 7472\/14, \u00a7\u00a7 6 and 69-71, 19 May 2016) and in its sub-paragraph\u00a0(e), the \u201clawful detention ... of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants\u201d (see, for example, De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, 18 June 1971, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a067-70, Series A no. 12; Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, 24 October 1979, \u00a7 39, Series A no.\u00a033; and, in particular, Witold Litwa v. Poland, no. 26629\/95, \u00a7 60, ECHR\u00a02000-III).72.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the restrictions imposed on the applicants by the authorities, the Court finds that the applicants were deprived of their liberty, within the meaning of Article 5, in the Contrada Imbriacola CSPA and on the ships Vincent and Audace, and that Article 5 is therefore applicable.73.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the Court has jurisdiction ratione materiae to examine the applicants\u2019 complaints under Article 5. The Government\u2019s objection in that connection must therefore be dismissed.C.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants74.\u00a0\u00a0According to the applicants, their deprivation of liberty had no legal basis. They observed that they had been held in closed facilities under constant police surveillance with the aim of \u201cpreventing them from unlawfully entering\u201d Italy. They argued, however, that the authorities had not acted in accordance with the law, because no refusal-of-entry or removal procedure compliant with domestic law had been initiated against them; instead they had been returned using a simplified procedure provided for by an agreement of 2011 between Italy and Tunisia (see paragraphs\u00a036-40 above). They emphasised that their deprivation of liberty had not been justified by any judicial decision.75.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants explained that under Italian law (Article 14 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998, see paragraph 33 above), the only legal form of deprivation of liberty of an unlawful migrant awaiting return was placement in a CIE, subject to judicial supervision (validation of administrative detention decisions by a Justice of the Peace), as required by Article 5 of the Convention.76.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants reiterated their observations before the Chamber. They argued in particular that, according to the legislation, the Lampedusa CSPA and the ships moored in Palermo harbour were not detention facilities but open reception facilities and that no form of validation of such placement by a judicial authority was provided for. By using the CSPA as a detention centre, Italy had removed the applicants\u2019 deprivation of liberty from any judicial supervision. The same could be said of their confinement on the ships.77.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also observed that the treatment to which they had been subjected could not be justified on the basis of Article 10 \u00a7 2 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998 (see paragraph 33 above), which in their view provided for so-called \u201cdeferred\u201d refusal of entry when an alien had entered Italy, \u201cfor purposes of public assistance\u201d. The above-cited Article\u00a010 made no mention of deprivation of liberty or of any procedure for a possible confinement measure.78.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the Government had argued that the situation complained of had been prompted by an emergency, the applicants argued that the real source of the problems on the island had been the political decision to concentrate the confinement of aliens on Lampedusa. In their view there was no insurmountable organisational difficulty preventing the authorities from arranging a regular service for the transfer of migrants to other places in Italy. Moreover, they explained that to deprive aliens of their liberty without judicial oversight was not permitted by any domestic legislation, even in an emergency. Article 13 of the Constitution (see paragraph\u00a032 above) provided that in exceptional cases of necessity and urgency, the administrative authority was entitled to adopt measures entailing deprivation of liberty; however, such measures had to be referred within forty-eight hours to a judicial authority, which had to validate them in the following forty-eight hours. In the present case the applicants submitted that they had been deprived of their liberty without any decision by an administrative authority and without validation by a judicial authority.79.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also noted that the conditions for derogation under Article 15 of the Convention were not met and that in any event Italy had not notified its intention to exercise its right of derogation. Accordingly, even if it were proven \u2013 contrary to the applicants\u2019 position \u2013 that the Italian Government had been obliged, at the relevant time, to handle an unforeseeable and exceptional arrival of migrants, no conclusion could be drawn therefrom for the purposes of Article 5 of the Convention.80.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants argued that, in spite of repeated criticisms from various national and international institutions, the procedure for managing the arrival of migrants as described in their application was still applied by the Italian authorities, with the result that there was a systemic and structural violation of the fundamental right to liberty of migrants and the courts had allowed it to continue. The applicants pointed out in this connection that from the autumn of 2015 onwards, the Lampedusa CSPA had been identified as one of the facilities where the so-called \u201chotspot\u201d approach could be implemented, as recommended by the European Union, whereby migrants would be identified and asylum-seekers separated from economic migrants. In 2016 the Italian authorities had continued to run this facility as a secure centre where migrants were detained without any legal basis.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government81.\u00a0\u00a0The Government observed, as they had done before the Chamber, that the facts of the case did not fall within the scope of sub-paragraph (f) of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention; the applicants had not been held pending deportation or extradition, but had on the contrary been temporarily allowed to enter Italy. In that connection, the Government pointed out that the applicants had been accommodated in a CSPA, and not sent to a CIE. They explained that the legal conditions for placing the applicants in a CIE had not been fulfilled; in particular, no additional verification of their identity had been necessary in their view.82.\u00a0\u00a0The Government acknowledged that, as indicated by the Palermo preliminary investigations judge in his decision of 1 June 2012 (see paragraphs\u00a024-29 above), the domestic provisions in force did not expressly provide for a confinement measure in respect of migrants placed in a CSPA. Such a measure, under the supervision of the Justice of the Peace, was, however, provided for when migrants were placed in a CIE. The presence of the migrants in the CSPA had nevertheless been duly recorded. Moreover, each of the migrants had been issued with a refusal-of-entry and removal order, mentioning the date of their unlawful entry into Italy. Those orders had been duly notified to the migrants concerned. In the Government\u2019s submission, they had not been referred to the Justice of the Peace because such supervision was only necessary in cases of deportation (espulsione) and not refusal of entry (respingimento).83.\u00a0\u00a0At the hearing before the Court, the Government further alleged that the bilateral agreement between Italy and Tunisia (see paragraphs\u00a036-40 above) could have constituted a legal basis for the holding of the applicants on the island of Lampedusa pending their prompt return. The aim of that agreement had been to reinforce border controls and to facilitate the return of irregular migrants through simplified procedures; it had also been announced, for example, on the websites of the Italian Ministries of the Interior and of Foreign Affairs and on that of the Tunisian Government. In the Government\u2019s view, it would not be credible to suggest that the applicants, who had access to modern information technology, had not been aware of the return procedures applicable to them.2.\u00a0\u00a0Third-party intervention(a)\u00a0\u00a0AIRE Centre and ECRE84.\u00a0\u00a0The AIRE Centre and ECRE argued that, under Article 1 of the European Union\u2019s Charter of Fundamental Rights, any measures entailing the deprivation of liberty of migrants and the conditions of such detention had to ensure respect for their human dignity and for the principle of non\u2011discrimination, regardless of the number of new arrivals and any situation of emergency that might arise in a given State. Moreover, recital\u00a016 in the preamble to the Return Directive (see paragraph 41 above) stated as follows:\u201cThe use of detention for the purpose of removal should be limited and subject to the principle of proportionality with regard to the means used and objectives pursued. Detention is justified only to prepare the return or carry out the removal process and if the application of less coercive measures would not be sufficient\u201d.In addition, States had to ensure that the necessary legal assistance and\/or representation was granted at the migrant\u2019s request (Article 13 \u00a7 4 of the Return Directive).85.\u00a0\u00a0The two third-party interveners observed that in its Bashir Mohamed Ali Mahdi judgment (case C-146\/14 PPU, 5 June 2014), the CJEU had explained that the Return Directive, read in the light of Articles 6 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, provided that any decision adopted by a competent authority, on expiry of the maximum period allowed for the initial detention of a third-country national, had to be in the form of a written measure that included the reasons in fact and in law for that decision. In addition, the review of the reasons for extending the detention of a third-country national had to be carried out on a case-by-case basis, applying the proportionality principle, to ascertain whether detention might be replaced with a less coercive measure or whether the migrant should be released. Lastly, the CJEU had found that the judicial authority had power to take into account the facts stated and evidence adduced by the administrative authority which had brought the matter before it, as well as any facts, evidence and observations which might be submitted to the judicial authority in the course of the proceedings.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The McGill Centre86.\u00a0\u00a0According to the McGill Centre, the principle of proportionality should guide the Court in its analysis of the arbitrary nature of a detention. The law and legal theory were lacking when it came to the status and protection applicable to irregular migrants who did not apply for asylum; this legal void made them particularly vulnerable. The United Nations Human Rights Committee had interpreted Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as incorporating a requirement of lawfulness and a broader protection against arbitrariness. It had specified that additional factors such as lack of cooperation or the possibility of absconding had to be present in order for the detention of an irregular migrant to be in conformity with Article 9, and that the existence of other, less invasive, means had to be taken into account (the intervening party referred, inter alia, to C.\u00a0v.\u00a0Australia, Communication no. 900\/1999, UN\u00a0document CCPRIC\/76\/D900\/1999 (2002)). Similar principles, such as that of the proportionality of the detention in the light of the circumstances, were to be found in texts of the Council of Europe and EU directives, to the effect that detention should be used only as a measure of last resort.87.\u00a0\u00a0The third-party intervener argued that the detention had to be based on a clear and certain legal basis or on a valid judicial decision, with the possibility of effective and rapid judicial supervision as to its conformity with national and international law. While the Court had been careful not to impose an excessive burden on States dealing with significant migratory flows, it nevertheless should only find the detention of migrants to be proportionate where there were no other, less invasive, means of achieving the aim pursued. The Court had taken a step in that direction in the case of Rusu v.\u00a0Austria (no. 34082\/02, 2 October 2008), where, as there was no indication that the applicant had any intention of staying illegally in Austria or that she would not have cooperated in the removal process, it had found the detention to be arbitrary.3.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0Principles established in the Court\u2019s case-law88.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 5 enshrines a fundamental human right, namely the protection of the individual against arbitrary interference by the State with his or her right to liberty. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) of Article 5 \u00a7 1 contain an exhaustive list of permissible grounds on which persons may be deprived of their liberty and no deprivation of liberty will be lawful unless it falls within one of those grounds. Moreover, only a narrow interpretation of those exceptions is consistent with the aim of that provision, namely to ensure that no one is arbitrarily deprived of his or her liberty (see, among many other authorities, Giulia Manzoni v. Italy, 1 July 1997, \u00a7\u00a025, Reports 1997-IV; Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7\u00a0170, ECHR 2000\u2011IV; Velinov v.\u00a0the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no.\u00a016880\/08, \u00a7 49, 19 September 2013; and Blokhin, cited above, \u00a7 166).89.\u00a0\u00a0One of the exceptions, contained in sub-paragraph (f) of Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01, permits the State to control the liberty of aliens in an immigration context (see Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.\u00a013229\/03, \u00a7\u00a043, ECHR 2008; A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.\u00a03455\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 162-163, ECHR 2009; and Abdolkhani and Karimnia, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0128).90.\u00a0\u00a0Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f) does not require the detention to be reasonably considered necessary, for example to prevent the individual from committing an offence or fleeing. However, any deprivation of liberty under the second limb of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f) will be justified only as long as deportation or extradition proceedings are in progress. If such proceedings are not prosecuted with \u201cdue diligence\u201d, the detention will cease to be permissible under Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f) (see A. and Others v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 164).91.\u00a0\u00a0The deprivation of liberty must also be \u201clawful\u201d. Where the \u201clawfulness\u201d of detention is in issue, including the question whether \u201ca procedure prescribed by law\u201d has been followed, the Convention refers essentially to national law and lays down the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules of that law, but it requires in addition that any deprivation of liberty should be in keeping with the purpose of Article\u00a05, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness (see Herczegfalvy v. Austria, 24 September 1992, \u00a7 63, Series A no. 244; Stanev, cited above, \u00a7 143; Del R\u00edo Prada v. Spain [GC], no. 42750\/09, \u00a7\u00a0125, ECHR 2013; and L.M. v. Slovenia, no. 32863\/05, \u00a7 121, 12 June 2014). In laying down that any deprivation of liberty must be effected \u201cin accordance with a procedure prescribed by law\u201d, Article 5 \u00a7 1 primarily requires any arrest or detention to have a legal basis in domestic law. However, these words do not merely refer back to domestic law. They also relate to the quality of the law, requiring it to be compatible with the rule of law, a concept inherent in all Articles of the Convention (see Amuur, cited above, \u00a7 50, and Abdolkhani and Karimnia, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0130).92.\u00a0\u00a0On this last point, the Court stresses that where deprivation of liberty is concerned it is particularly important that the general principle of legal certainty be satisfied. It is therefore essential that the conditions for deprivation of liberty under domestic law be clearly defined and that the law itself be foreseeable in its application, so that it meets the standard of \u201clawfulness\u201d set by the Convention, a standard which requires that all law be sufficiently precise to allow the person \u2013 if need be, with appropriate advice \u2013 to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail (see Baranowski v.\u00a0Poland, no. 28358\/95, \u00a7\u00a7 50-52, ECHR 2000-III; Steel and Others v. the United Kingdom, 23 September 1998, \u00a7 54, Reports\u00a01998\u2011VII; Je\u010dius v.\u00a0Lithuania, no.\u00a034578\/97, \u00a7 56, ECHR\u00a02000\u2011IX; Paladi v. Moldova [GC], no. 39806\/05, \u00a7 74, 10 March 2009; and Mooren v. Germany [GC], no.\u00a011364\/03, \u00a7 76, 9\u00a0July 2009).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles in the present case(i)\u00a0\u00a0The applicable rule93.\u00a0\u00a0The Court must first determine whether the applicants\u2019 deprivation of liberty was justified under one of the sub-paragraphs of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. As the list of permissible grounds on which persons may be deprived of their liberty is exhaustive, any deprivation of liberty which does not fall within one of the sub\u2011paragraphs of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention will inevitably breach that provision (see, in particular, the case-law cited in paragraph\u00a088 above).94.\u00a0\u00a0The Government, arguing that the applicants were not awaiting deportation or extradition, took the view that the facts of the case did not fall within sub-paragraph (f) of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, which authorised a person\u2019s \u201clawful arrest or detention ... to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country\u201d or when \u201cdeportation or extradition\u201d proceedings were pending against the person (see paragraph 81 above). The Government did not, however, indicate under which other sub-paragraph of Article 5 the deprivation of liberty could be justified in the applicants\u2019 case.95.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants were of the view, however, that they had been deprived of their liberty with the aim of \u201cprevent[ing them from] effecting an unauthorised entry into\u201d Italy (see paragraph 74 above).96.\u00a0\u00a0Like the Chamber, and in spite of the Government\u2019s submission and the classification of the applicants\u2019 return in domestic law, the Court is prepared to accept that the deprivation of liberty in the applicants\u2019 case fell within sub-paragraph (f) of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (see, mutatis mutandis, \u010conka v.\u00a0Belgium, no. 51564\/99, \u00a7 38, ECHR 2002-I). In that connection it observes that the applicants had entered Italy and that the refusal-of-entry orders concerning them (see paragraph 19 above) had stated expressly that they had entered the country by evading border controls, and therefore unlawfully. Moreover, the procedure adopted for their identification and return manifestly sought to address that unlawful entry.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Whether there was a legal basis97.\u00a0\u00a0It must now be determined whether the applicants\u2019 detention had a legal basis in Italian law.98.\u00a0\u00a0It is not in dispute between the parties that only Article 14 of the \u201cConsolidated text of provisions concerning immigration regulations and rules on the status of aliens\u201d (Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998 \u2013 see paragraph\u00a033 above) authorises, on the order of the Chief of Police, the detention of a migrant \u201cfor as long as is strictly necessary\u201d. However, that provision applies only where removal by escorting the person to the border or a refusal-of-entry measure cannot be implemented immediately, because it is necessary to provide assistance to the alien, to conduct additional identity checks, or to wait for travel documents or the availability of a carrier. As a result, migrants in this category are placed in a CIE. However, the Government themselves have admitted that the legal conditions for placement of the applicants in a CIE were not fulfilled, so they were not held in such a facility (see paragraph 81 above).99.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that Article 14 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998 could not have constituted the legal basis for the applicants\u2019 deprivation of liberty.100.\u00a0\u00a0The Court now turns to the question whether such basis could be found in Article 10 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998 (see paragraph\u00a033 above). This provision provides for the refusal of entry and removal of, among other categories of alien, those allowed to remain temporarily in Italy on public assistance grounds. The Court has not found any reference therein to detention or other measures entailing deprivation of liberty that could be implemented in respect of the migrants concerned. Indeed, the Government have not disputed this.101.\u00a0\u00a0In those circumstances the Court does not see how the above-mentioned Article 10 could have constituted the legal basis for the applicants\u2019 detention.102.\u00a0\u00a0To the extent that the Government take the view that the legal basis for holding the applicants on the island of Lampedusa was the bilateral agreement between Italy and Tunisia of April 2011 (see paragraph\u00a083 above), the Court would note at the outset that the full text of that agreement had not been made public. It was therefore not accessible to the applicants, who accordingly could not have foreseen the consequences of its application (see in particular the case-law cited in paragraph 92 above). Moreover, the press release published on the website of the Italian Ministry of the Interior on 6 April 2011 merely referred to a strengthening of the border controls and the possibility of the immediate return of Tunisian nationals through simplified procedures (see paragraphs 37-38 above). It did not, however, contain any reference to the possibility of administrative detention or to the related procedures.103.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the Government, in an annex to their request for referral to the Grand Chamber, produced for the first time a note verbale concerning another bilateral agreement with Tunisia, preceding that of April 2011 and dating back to 1998 (see paragraph 40 above). Even though that agreement does not seem to be the one applied to the applicants, the Court has examined the note verbale in question. It has not, however, found any reference in it to cases where irregular migrants might be subjected to measures depriving them of their liberty. Point 5 of Chapter II of the note verbale merely indicates that interviews could be carried out at the court office, or in the reception centre or medical facility where the persons concerned were legally residing, without adding any clarification. In those circumstances it is difficult to understand how the scant information available as to the agreements entered into at different times between Italy and Tunisia could have constituted a clear and foreseeable legal basis for the applicants\u2019 detention.104.\u00a0\u00a0The Court would further observe that its finding that the applicants\u2019 detention was devoid of legal basis in Italian law has been confirmed by the report of the Senate\u2019s Special Commission (see paragraph 35 above). The Special Commission noted that stays at the Lampedusa centre, which in principle should have been limited to the time strictly necessary to establish the migrant\u2019s identity and the lawfulness of his or her presence in Italy, sometimes extended to over twenty days \u201cwithout there being any formal decision as to the legal status of the person being held\u201d. According to the Special Commission, such prolonged confinement, \u201cwithout any legal or administrative measure\u201d providing for it, had led to \u201cheightened tension\u201d. It should also be noted that the PACE Ad Hoc Sub-Committee expressly recommended that the Italian authorities \u201cclarify the legal basis for the de facto detention in the reception centres in Lampedusa\u201d, and where Tunisians in particular were concerned, that they should \u201ckeep irregular migrants in administrative detention only under a procedure prescribed by law, authorised by a judicial authority and subject to periodic judicial review\u201d (see \u00a7 92, (vi) and (vii), of the report published on 30 September 2011, cited in paragraph 49 above).105.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the legal situation in Italy and the foregoing considerations, the Court takes the view that persons placed in a CSPA, which is formally regarded as a reception facility and not a detention centre, could not have the benefit of the safeguards applicable to placement in a CIE, which for its part had to be validated by an administrative decision subject to review by the Justice of the Peace. The Government did not allege that such a decision had been adopted in respect of the applicants and, in his decision of 1 June 2012, the Palermo preliminary investigations judge stated that the Agrigento police authority had merely registered the presence of the migrants in the CSPA without ordering their placement and that the same was true for the migrants\u2019 transfer to the ships (see paragraphs\u00a025-26 above). Consequently, the applicants were not only deprived of their liberty without a clear and accessible legal basis, they were also unable to enjoy the fundamental safeguards of habeas corpus, as laid down, for example, in Article\u00a013 of the Italian Constitution (see paragraph 32 above). Under that provision, any restriction of personal liberty has to be based on a reasoned decision of the judicial authority, and any provisional measures taken by a police authority, in exceptional cases of necessity and urgency, must be validated by the judicial authority within forty-eight hours. Since the applicants\u2019 detention had not been validated by any decision, whether judicial or administrative, they were deprived of those important safeguards.106.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the provisions applying to the detention of irregular migrants were lacking in precision. That legislative ambiguity has given rise to numerous situations of de facto deprivation of liberty and the fact that placement in a CSPA is not subject to judicial supervision cannot, even in the context of a migration crisis, be compatible with the aim of Article\u00a05 of the Convention: to ensure that no one should be deprived of his or her liberty in an arbitrary fashion (see, among many other authorities, Saadi, cited above, \u00a7\u00a066).107.\u00a0\u00a0Those considerations are sufficient for the Court to find that the applicants\u2019 deprivation of liberty did not satisfy the general principle of legal certainty and was not compatible with the aim of protecting the individual against arbitrariness. It cannot therefore be regarded as \u201clawful\u201d within the meaning of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.108.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention in the present case.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 2 OF THE CONVENTION109.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that they had not had any kind of communication with the Italian authorities throughout their stay in Italy.They relied on Article 5\u00a0\u00a7\u00a02 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201c2.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Chamber judgment110.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber observed that the applicants had most probably been made aware of their status as irregular migrants but found that basic information as to the legal status of a migrant did not satisfy the requirements of Article 5 \u00a7 2 of the Convention, under which the legal and factual grounds for the deprivation of liberty had to be notified to the person concerned. The Chamber further noted that the Government had failed to produce any official document addressed to the applicants containing such information. Moreover, the refusal-of-entry orders, which made no mention of the applicants\u2019 detention, were apparently notified only on 27\u00a0and 29 September 2011, respectively, whereas the applicants had been placed in the CSPA on 17 and 18 September. Thus they had not been provided with the information \u201cpromptly\u201d as required by Article 5 \u00a7 2. The Chamber thus concluded that there had been a violation of this provision (see paragraphs 82-85 of the Chamber judgment).B.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants111.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants observed that the refusal-of-entry orders had been adopted only at the time of the enforcement of their return, and thus only at the end of the period of detention. Consequently, they took the view that, even assuming that those orders had been notified to them, the guarantee of being informed \u201cpromptly\u201d under Article 5 \u00a7 2 of the Convention had not been observed. In addition, those orders had merely set out in a summary and standardised manner the legal basis for the refusal-of-entry measure, but had made no mention, not even implicitly, of the reasons for their detention pending removal.112.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants further took the view that the information provided for in Article 5 \u00a7 2 had to emanate from the authority carrying out the arrest or placement in detention \u2013 or, in any event, from official sources. During their deprivation of liberty they had had no contact with the authorities, not even orally, concerning the reasons for their detention. The fact that members of non-governmental organisations had been able to communicate with the migrants on this subject could not, in their view, satisfy the requirements of that provision.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Government113.\u00a0\u00a0The Government asserted that the applicants had been informed in a language which they understood, by police officers present on the island, assisted by interpreters and cultural mediators, of their status, which was that of Tunisian citizens temporarily admitted to Italian territory for reasons of \u201cpublic assistance\u201d, in accordance with Article 10 \u00a7 2 (b) of Legislative Decree no.\u00a0286 of 1998 (see paragraph 33 above). In their view, that status had automatically entailed the applicants\u2019 return to Tunisia, as provided for in the refusal-of-entry and removal orders. In any event, the members of the organisations which had access to the CSPA at Contrada Imbriacola had informed the migrants about their situation and the possibility of their imminent removal.C.\u00a0\u00a0Third-party intervention114.\u00a0\u00a0The McGill Centre observed that the right to be informed of the reason for detention was necessary in order to be able to challenge the lawfulness of the measure. The United Nations working group on arbitrary detention required that the information given to the detainee at the time of his or her arrest had to explain how the detention could be challenged. The Centre added that the lawfulness of the detention had to be open to regular review when it was extended.D.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Principles established in the Court\u2019s case-law115.\u00a0\u00a0Paragraph 2 of Article 5 lays down an elementary safeguard: any person who has been arrested should know why he is being deprived of his liberty. This provision is an integral part of the scheme of protection afforded by Article\u00a05: any person who has been arrested must be told, in simple, non-technical language that he can understand, the essential legal and factual grounds for his deprivation of liberty, so as to be able to apply to a court to challenge its lawfulness in accordance with paragraph 4 (see Van\u00a0der Leer v. the Netherlands, 21 February 1990, \u00a7 28, Series A no.\u00a0170\u2011A, and L.M. v. Slovenia, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 142-43). Whilst this information must be conveyed \u201cpromptly\u201d, it need not be related in its entirety by the arresting officer at the very moment of the arrest. Whether the content and promptness of the information conveyed were sufficient is to be assessed in each case according to its special features (see Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. the United Kingdom, 30 August 1990, \u00a7\u00a040, Series\u00a0A no. 182, and \u010conka, cited above, \u00a7 50).116.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, the Court has previously held that the requirement of prompt information is to be given an autonomous meaning extending beyond the realm of criminal law measures (see Van der Leer, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a027-28, and L.M.\u00a0v.\u00a0Slovenia, cited above, \u00a7 143).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles in the present case117.\u00a0\u00a0The Court would observe that it has already found, under Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7 1 of the Convention, that the applicants\u2019 detention had no clear and accessible legal basis in Italian law (see paragraphs 93-108 above). In those circumstances the Court fails to see how the authorities could have informed the applicants of the legal reasons for their deprivation of liberty or thus have provided them with sufficient information to enable them to challenge the grounds for the measure before a court.118.\u00a0\u00a0It is highly probable, of course, that the applicants were aware that they had entered Italy unlawfully. As the Chamber rightly pointed out, the very nature of their journey, on rudimentary vessels (see paragraph\u00a011 above), and the fact that they had not applied for entry visas, indicated that they had sought to circumvent immigration laws. Moreover, the PACE Ad Hoc Sub-Committee observed that the Tunisians with whom its members had spoken \u201cwere perfectly aware that they had entered Italian territory illegally\u201d (see \u00a7 56 of the report published on 30\u00a0September 2011, cited in paragraph\u00a049 above). Lastly, there is no reason to contradict the Government\u2019s statement that the applicants had been informed, in a language they understood, by police officers on the island, assisted by interpreters and cultural mediators, that they had been temporarily allowed to enter Italy for purposes of \u201cpublic assistance\u201d, with the prospect of their imminent return (see paragraph 113 above). Nevertheless, information about the legal status of a migrant or about the possible removal measures that could be implemented cannot satisfy the need for information as to the legal basis for the migrant\u2019s deprivation of liberty.119.\u00a0\u00a0Similar considerations apply to the refusal-of-entry orders. The Court has examined those documents (see paragraph 19 above), without finding any reference in them to the applicants\u2019 detention or to the legal and factual reasons for such a measure. The orders in question merely stated that they had \u201centered the territory of the country by evading the border controls\u201d and that they were to be returned.120.\u00a0\u00a0It should also be observed that the refusal-of-entry orders were apparently notified to the applicants very belatedly, on 27 and 29\u00a0September 2011, respectively, although they had been placed in the CSPA on 17 and 18 September (see paragraphs 19-20 above). Consequently, even if the orders had contained information as to the legal basis for the detention, which was not the case, they would not in any event have satisfied the requirement of promptness (see, mutatis mutandis, Shamayev and Others v.\u00a0Georgia and Russia, no. 36378\/02, \u00a7 416, ECHR 2005\u2011III, and L.M. v.\u00a0Slovenia, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0145, where the Court found that an interval of four days fell outside the time constraints imposed by the notion of promptness for the purposes of Article 5 \u00a7 2).121.\u00a0\u00a0The Court lastly notes that, apart from the refusal-of-entry orders, the Government have not adduced any document capable of satisfying the requirements of Article 5 \u00a7 2 of the Convention.122.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing considerations suffice for it to conclude that, in the present case, there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 2.IV.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 4 OF THE CONVENTION123.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants alleged that at no time had they been able to challenge the lawfulness of their deprivation of liberty.They relied on Article 5\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cEveryone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber judgment124.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber found that, since the applicants had not been informed of the reasons for their deprivation of liberty, their right to have its lawfulness decided had been deprived of all effective substance. This consideration sufficed for the Chamber to find that there had been a violation of Article\u00a05 \u00a7 4 of the Convention. It additionally observed that the refusal-of-entry orders did not mention the legal or factual basis for the applicants\u2019 detention and that the orders had been notified to the applicants shortly before their return by plane, and therefore at a time when their deprivation of liberty had been about to end. Accordingly, even assuming that the lodging of an appeal against those orders with the Justice of the Peace could be regarded as affording an indirect review of the lawfulness of the detention, such an appeal could not have been lodged until it was too late (see paragraphs\u00a095-98 of the Chamber judgment).B.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants125.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants did not deny that there had been a possibility of appealing against the refusal-of-entry orders, but submitted that they had not been able to challenge the lawfulness of their detention. No decision justifying their deprivation of liberty had been adopted or notified to them; accordingly, it had not been open to them to challenge any such decision in a court. In addition, the refusal-of-entry orders had not concerned their liberty, but rather their removal, and had been adopted at the end of their period of detention.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Government126.\u00a0\u00a0The Government noted that the refusal-of-entry orders had indicated that it was open to the applicants to lodge an appeal with the Justice of the Peace in Agrigento (see paragraph 19 above). Some other Tunisian migrants had in fact used that remedy, and in 2011 the Justice of the Peace had annulled two refusal-of-entry orders (see paragraphs\u00a030-31 above) as a result. The Government concluded that the applicants had certainly had the possibility of applying to a court to challenge the lawfulness of their alleged deprivation of liberty.127.\u00a0\u00a0At the hearing before the Court, the Government further argued that since the applicants had been accommodated in the CSPA and on board the ships for reasons of assistance, no judicial review of their detention had been necessary.C.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Principles established in the Court\u2019s case-law128.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 5 \u00a7 4 entitles detained persons to institute proceedings for a review of compliance with the procedural and substantive conditions which are essential for the \u201clawfulness\u201d, in Convention terms, of their deprivation of liberty. The notion of \u201clawfulness\u201d under paragraph 4 of Article 5 has the same meaning as in paragraph\u00a01, such that a detained person is entitled to a review of the \u201clawfulness\u201d of his detention in the light not only of the requirements of domestic law but also of the Convention, the general principles embodied therein and the aim of the restrictions permitted by Article 5 \u00a7 1. Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04 does not guarantee a right to judicial review of such a scope as to empower the court, on all aspects of the case including questions of pure expediency, to substitute its own discretion for that of the decision-making authority. The review should, however, be wide enough to bear on those conditions which are essential for the \u201clawful\u201d detention of a person according to Article 5 \u00a7 1 (see E. v. Norway, 29 August 1990, \u00a7 50, Series A no. 181-A). The reviewing \u201ccourt\u201d must not have merely advisory functions but must have the competence to \u201cdecide\u201d the \u201clawfulness\u201d of the detention and to order release if the detention is unlawful (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7 200, Series A no. 25; Weeks v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, 2 March 1987, \u00a7 61, Series A no. 114; Chahal v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, \u00a7 130, Reports 1996\u2011V; and A.\u00a0and Others v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0202).129.\u00a0\u00a0The forms of judicial review satisfying the requirements of Article\u00a05 \u00a7 4 may vary from one domain to another, and will depend on the type of deprivation of liberty in issue. It is not the Court\u2019s task to inquire into what would be the most appropriate system in the sphere under examination (see Shtukaturov v. Russia, no. 44009\/05, \u00a7 123, ECHR\u00a02008, and Stanev, cited above, \u00a7 169).130.\u00a0\u00a0The existence of the remedy must nevertheless be sufficiently certain, not only in theory but also in practice, failing which it will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness (see Vachev v.\u00a0Bulgaria, no.\u00a042987\/98, \u00a7\u00a071, ECHR 2004-VIII, and Abdolkhani and Karimnia, cited above, \u00a7 139).131.\u00a0\u00a0Article 5 \u00a7 4 also secures to persons arrested or detained the right to have the lawfulness of their detention decided \u201cspeedily\u201d by a court and to have their release ordered if the detention is not lawful (see, for example, Baranowski, cited above, \u00a7 68). Proceedings concerning issues of deprivation of liberty require particular expedition (see Hutchison Reid v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, no. 50272\/99, \u00a7 79, ECHR 2003-IV), and any exceptions to the requirement of \u201cspeedy\u201d review of the lawfulness of a measure of detention call for strict interpretation (see Lavrentiadis v.\u00a0Greece, no. 29896\/13, \u00a7 45, 22 September 2015). The question whether the principle of speedy proceedings has been observed is not to be addressed in the abstract but in the context of a general assessment of the information, taking into account the circumstances of the case (see Luberti v. Italy, 23\u00a0February 1984, \u00a7\u00a7 33-37, Series A no. 75; E. v. Norway, cited above, \u00a7\u00a064; and Delbec v. France, no.\u00a043125\/98, \u00a7 33, 18 June 2002), particularly in the light of the complexity of the case, any specificities of the domestic procedure and the applicant\u2019s behaviour in the course of the proceedings (see Bubullima v.\u00a0Greece, no. 41533\/08, \u00a7 27, 28 October 2010). In principle, however, since the liberty of the individual is at stake, the State must ensure that the proceedings are conducted as quickly as possible (see Fuchser v.\u00a0Switzerland, no. 55894\/00, \u00a7 43, 13 July 2006, and Lavrentiadis, cited above, \u00a7 45).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles in the present case132.\u00a0\u00a0In cases where detainees had not been informed of the reasons for their deprivation of liberty, the Court has found that their right to appeal against their detention was deprived of all effective substance (see, in particular, Shamayev and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0432; Abdolkhani and Karimnia, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0141; Dbouba v. Turkey, no.\u00a015916\/09, \u00a7\u00a054, 13\u00a0July 2010; and Musaev v. Turkey, no. 72754\/11, \u00a7 40, 21 October 2014). Having regard to its finding, under Article 5 \u00a7 2 of the Convention, that the legal reasons for the applicants\u2019 detention in the CSPA and on the ships had not been notified to them (see paragraphs\u00a0117-22 above), the Court must reach a similar conclusion under this head.133.\u00a0\u00a0This consideration suffices for the Court to conclude that the Italian legal system did not provide the applicants with a remedy whereby they could obtain a judicial decision on the lawfulness of their deprivation of liberty (see, mutatis mutandis, S.D. v.\u00a0Greece, no. 53541\/07, \u00a7\u00a076, 11\u00a0June 2009) and makes it unnecessary for the Court to determine whether the remedies available under Italian law could have afforded the applicants sufficient guarantees for the purposes of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention (see, for example and mutatis mutandis, Shamayev and Others, cited above, \u00a7 433).134.\u00a0\u00a0As an additional consideration, and in response to the Government\u2019s argument to the effect that an appeal to the Agrigento Justice of the Peace against the refusal-of-entry orders met the requirements of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention (see paragraph 126 above), the Court would note, first, that the refusal-of-entry orders did not make any reference to the applicants\u2019 detention or to the legal or factual reasons for such a measure (see paragraph 119 above), and secondly that the orders were only notified to the applicants when it was too late, on 27\u00a0and 29 September 2011 respectively (see paragraph 120 above), shortly before they were returned by plane. This was rightly pointed out by the Chamber. It follows that the orders in question cannot be regarded as the decisions on which the applicants\u2019 detention was based, and the lodging of an appeal against them with the Justice of the Peace could not, in any event, have taken place until after the applicants\u2019 release on their return to Tunisia.135.\u00a0\u00a0There has thus been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention.V.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION136.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants argued that they had sustained inhuman and degrading treatment during their detention in the CSPA at Contrada Imbriacola on the island of Lampedusa and on board the ships Vincent and Audace moored in Palermo harbour.They relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber judgment137.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber began by noting that, following the events surrounding the \u201cArab Spring\u201d, in 2011 the island of Lampedusa had been facing an exceptional situation characterised by mass arrivals of migrants and a humanitarian crisis, burdening the Italian authorities with many obligations and creating organisational and logistical difficulties (see paragraphs\u00a0124-27 of the Chamber judgment). However, in the Chamber\u2019s view, those factors could not release the respondent State from its obligation to secure to the applicants conditions of confinement that were compatible with respect for their human dignity, having regard to the absolute nature of the Article 3 rights (see paragraph 128 of the Chamber judgment).138.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber then found it appropriate to deal separately with the conditions in the CSPA and on the ships (see paragraph 129 of the Chamber judgment). As to the first situation, it took the view that the applicants\u2019 allegations about the overcrowding problem and general insalubrity of the CSPA were corroborated by the reports of the Senate\u2019s Special Commission, Amnesty International and the PACE Ad Hoc Sub\u2011Committee, thus finding a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, in spite of the short duration of their confinement \u2013 between two and three days (see paragraphs 130-36 of the Chamber judgment).139.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber reached the opposite conclusion as to the applicants\u2019 detention on the ships. It observed that the applicants had been held on the ships for between six and eight days, and that the allegations of poor conditions had been at least partly contradicted by the decision dated 1 June 2012 of the Palermo preliminary investigations judge, whose findings were in turn based on the observations of a member of parliament who had visited the ships and had talked to some of the migrants. In the Chamber\u2019s view, the fact that the MP had been accompanied by the deputy chief of police and police officers did not, in itself, cast doubt on his independence or on the veracity of his account. The Chamber thus found that there had been no violation of Article 3 under this head (see paragraphs 137-44 of the Chamber judgment).B.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants(a)\u00a0\u00a0The existence of a humanitarian emergency and its consequences140.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants argued that the exceptional situation of humanitarian emergency alleged by the Government (see paragraphs 150\u201151 below) could not justify the treatment of which they were victims, either in terms of domestic legislation or under the Convention. Moreover, the mass arrival of migrants on Lampedusa in 2011 had not been an exceptional situation. A similar influx had occurred before the \u201cArab Spring\u201d and the decision to restrict the initial accommodation of migrants to the island of Lampedusa had sought to give the public the impression of an \u201cinvasion\u201d of Italian territory, to be exploited for political ends. The media and the national and international human rights bodies (the applicants referred in particular to the Amnesty International report, see paragraph 50 above) had established that the crisis situation on the island of Lampedusa had arisen well before 2011. In those circumstances, they argued, it could not be concluded that the situation complained of was primarily the result of the urgency of having to deal with the significant influx of migrants following the \u201cArab Spring\u201d.141.\u00a0\u00a0In any event, the applicants argued that a State such as Italy had the means necessary to transfer migrants rapidly to other places. The conditions in the Lampedusa CSPA had remained atrocious even after 2011, and the migration crisis had continued in the following years, thus showing the systemic and structural nature of the violation of the migrants\u2019 rights.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Conditions in the CSPA at Contrada Imbriacola142.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants alleged that the Lampedusa CSPA was overcrowded. The figures produced by the Government showed that at the relevant time this facility had housed over 1,200 individuals, amounting to three times the centre\u2019s normal capacity (381 spaces), but also well above its maximum capacity in case of necessity (804 spaces). Those figures had in fact indicated the presence of 1,357 individuals on 16 September 2011, 1,325 individuals on 17 September, 1,399 on 18 September, 1,265 on 19\u00a0September and 1,017 on 20 September. The conditions of hygiene and sanitation had been unacceptable in the applicants\u2019 view, as shown by photographs and by reports of national and international bodies. In particular, owing to a lack of space in the rooms, the applicants alleged that they had been obliged to sleep outside, directly on the concrete floor, to avoid the stench from the mattresses. In their submission, they had had to eat their meals while sitting on the ground, since the CSPA had no canteen, and the toilets were in an appalling state and were often unusable. Both in the CSPA and on the ships the applicants had experienced mental distress on account of the lack of any information about their legal status and the length of their detention, and had also been unable to communicate with the outside world. Acts of self-harm by migrants held in the CSPA showed the state of tension which prevailed inside the facility.143.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants pointed out that the CSPA was theoretically intended to function as a facility for assistance and initial reception. In their view, that type of centre, which did not comply with the European Prison Rules of 11 January 2006, was unsuitable for extended stays in a situation of deprivation of liberty. In their submission, a violation of Article 3 of the Convention could not be excluded either on account of the nature of the CSPA or in view of the short duration of their detention. The duration in question was only one of the factors to be taken into consideration in assessing whether treatment exceeded the threshold of severity required for it to fall within the scope of Article 3. The Court had previously found violations of Article 3 of the Convention even in the case of very short periods of detention where there were other aggravating factors such as particularly appalling conditions or the vulnerability of the victims (the applicants referred to Brega v. Moldova, no. 52100\/08, 20 April 2010; T.\u00a0and A. v. Turkey, no. 47146\/11, 21 October 2014; and Gavrilovici v.\u00a0Moldova, no. 25464\/05, 15 December 2009, concerning periods of forty-eight hours, three days and five days respectively). The applicants argued that the same factors were present in their cases and pointed out that at the material time they had just survived a dangerous crossing of the Mediterranean by night in a rubber dinghy, and that this had weakened them physically and psychologically. They had thus been in a situation of vulnerability, accentuated by the fact that their deprivation of liberty had no legal basis, and their mental distress had increased as a result.144.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants explained that they were not complaining of having been beaten, but about the conditions of their detention in the CSPA. Accordingly, the Government\u2019s argument that they should have produced medical certificates (see paragraph 156 below) was not pertinent.(c)\u00a0\u00a0The conditions on the ships Vincent and Audace145.\u00a0\u00a0As to their confinement on the ships, the applicants complained that they had been placed in a seriously overcrowded lounge and that they had only been allowed outside in the open air, on small decks, for a few minutes each day. They had been obliged to wait several hours to use the toilets and meals had been distributed by throwing the food on the floor.146.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants disagreed with the Chamber\u2019s findings and alleged that the psychological stress suffered on the ships had been worse than in the CSPA on Lampedusa. The duration of their deprivation of liberty on the ships had been longer than in the CSPA and had followed on from that initial negative experience. In addition, on the ships the applicants had not received any relevant information or explanation and, according to them, the police had occasionally ill-treated or insulted them.147.\u00a0\u00a0In the applicants\u2019 submission, in view of the nature of the ships (which they described as secluded and inaccessible places), it was for the Government to adduce evidence as to what had happened on board. It would be difficult to imagine that the authorities had been able to guarantee better living conditions than those in the CSPA, which was designed to accommodate migrants. The description about beds with clean sheets, the availability of spare clothing, and the access to private cabins and hot water, was also quite implausible. The Government had merely produced a decision of the Palermo preliminary investigations judge (see paragraphs\u00a024-29 above), which was based on the statements of an MP taken only from a newspaper article and not reiterated at the hearing. It had to be borne in mind, in their view, that the police presence during the visit of the MP called into question the reliability of the migrants\u2019 statements to him as they may have feared reprisals. The Government had failed to produce any document attesting to the services allegedly provided on the ships or any contracts with the companies from which they were leased. Lastly, the Italian authorities had not responded to the appeal by M\u00e9decins sans Fronti\u00e8res on 28 September 2011, in which that NGO had expressed its concerns and asked to be allowed to carry out an inspection on the ships.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Government(a)\u00a0\u00a0The existence of a humanitarian emergency and its consequences148.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that they had monitored the situation on Lampedusa in the period 2011-2012 and had intervened on a factual and legislative level to coordinate and implement the measures required to provide the migrants with aid and assistance. The active presence on the island of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the IOM, Save the Children, the Order of Malta, the Red Cross, Caritas, the ARCI (Associazione Ricreativa e Culturale Italiana) and the Community of Sant\u2019Egidio had been placed within the framework of the \u201cPraesidium Project\u201d, financed by Italy and by the European Union. The representatives of those organisations had had unrestricted access to the migrants\u2019 reception facilities. In addition, on 28 May 2013 the Government had signed a memorandum of agreement with the Terre des hommes Foundation, which provided a service of psychological support at the Lampedusa CSPA. On 4 June 2013 the Ministry of the Interior had signed an agreement with the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) to coordinate the reception arrangements for migrants. Medical assistance had been available at all times to the migrants and, since July 2013, the association M\u00e9decins sans Fronti\u00e8res had begun to help train the staff at the CSPA and on the ships responsible for rescue at sea.149.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Government, the rescue of migrants arriving on the Italian coast was a problem not only for Italy but for all the member States of the European Union, which had to establish a proper common policy to deal with it. The local institutions in Lampedusa had financed the construction of new aid and assistance centres (6,440,000 euros (EUR) had been invested to create facilities capable of accommodating 1,700\u00a0persons). During his visit on 23 and 24 June 2013, the UNHCR representative for Southern Europe had noted with satisfaction the steps taken by the national and local authorities in order to improve the general situation on the island.150.\u00a0\u00a0The Government explained that in 2011 the massive influx of North African migrants had created a situation of humanitarian emergency in Italy. From 12\u00a0February to 31 December 2011, 51,573 nationals of countries outside the European Union (about 46,000 men, 3,000 women and 3,000\u00a0children) had landed on the islands of Lampedusa and Linosa. Over 26,000 of those individuals had been Tunisian nationals. That situation was well explained in the report of the PACE Ad Hoc Sub-Committee (see paragraph\u00a049 above), which had also reported on the efforts of the Italian authorities, in cooperation with other organisations, to create the necessary facilities for the reception and assistance of migrants, some of whom were vulnerable individuals.151.\u00a0\u00a0In the Government\u2019s opinion, in view of the many demands on States in situations of humanitarian emergency, the Court had to adopt a \u201crealistic, balanced and legitimate approach\u201d when it came to deciding on the \u201capplication of ethical and legal rules\u201d.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Conditions at the Contrada Imbriacola CSPA152.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stated that, during the relevant period, the CSPA at Contrada Imbriacola had been fully operational and had had the necessary human and material resources to provide aid and initial accommodation to migrants. In addition to the director and two deputy directors, the centre employed ninety-nine \u201csocial operators\u201d and cleaning staff, three social workers, three psychologists, eight interpreters and cultural mediators, eight administrative staff and three division managers responsible for supervising activities in the facility. Three doctors and three nurses provided medical assistance in a temporary unit. According to the results of an inspection carried out on 2 April 2011 by the Palermo health services, the conditions of hygiene were satisfactory, and so was the quality and quantity of the food provided. A further inspection immediately after the fire of 20\u00a0September 2011 reported that drinking water was provided in bottles and that the canteen was serving meals. Before being transferred to the Lampedusa CSPA, the applicants had undergone a medical examination which showed that they were in good health. Furthermore, minors and particularly vulnerable individuals had been separated from the other migrants and taken to the centre of Loran (see \u00a7 31 of the PACE report of 30 September 2011, cited in paragraph 49 above).153.\u00a0\u00a0At the hearing before the Court, the Government pointed out that the migrants accommodated in the Contrada Imbriacola CSPA had been able: (a) to move around freely inside the facility; (b) to have access to all the services available (medical assistance, clothing, food, water and sanitary facilities); (c) to communicate with the outside world and make purchases (on their arrival they had received a telephone card worth EUR 15 and vouchers to be used in the centre); and (d) to have contact with representatives of humanitarian organisations and lawyers. In the Government\u2019s view the centre, which could accommodate up to 1,000\u00a0individuals, was not overcrowded. At the hearing before the Court the Government observed that during the applicants\u2019 stay there, 917 migrants had been accommodated in the CSPA at Contrada Imbriacola.154.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Government submitted that the applicants had not been subjected to any inhuman or degrading treatment, \u201cbecause they were not considered to be under arrest or in custody but were simply being assisted pending their return to Tunisia\u201d. The applicants themselves had acknowledged that under Italian law the CSPA was designed for reception, and they had not claimed to have been physically injured there or otherwise ill-treated by the police or the centre\u2019s staff. The Chamber had not duly taken account of the criminal offences which had required the intervention of the local authorities to rescue the migrants and ensure their safety. The Government further emphasised that the applicants had only remained on Lampedusa for a short period.(c)\u00a0\u00a0Conditions on the ships Vincent and Audace155.\u00a0\u00a0The Government noted that, in his decision of 1 June 2012 (see paragraphs\u00a024-29 above), the Palermo preliminary investigations judge had found that the measures taken to cope with the presence of migrants on Lampedusa had been compliant with national and international law, and had been adopted with the requisite promptness in a situation of emergency. The judge had also taken the view that the reception conditions on the ships Audace and Vincent had been satisfactory.156.\u00a0\u00a0The Government lastly challenged the applicants\u2019 allegations of ill\u2011treatment by the police, pointing out that they were not based on any evidence such as medical certificates.C.\u00a0\u00a0Third-party intervention157.\u00a0\u00a0The Coordination Fran\u00e7aise pour le droit d\u2019asile, a coalition which submitted written comments on behalf of four associations (Avocats pour la d\u00e9fense des droits des \u00e9trangers, Groupe d\u2019information et de soutien des immigr\u00e9.e.s (GISTI), Ligue des droits de l\u2019homme et du citoyen and the International Federation for Human Rights (F\u00e9d\u00e9ration internationale des ligues des droits de l\u2019Homme \u2013 FIDH)), asked the Grand Chamber to \u201csolemnly uphold\u201d the Chamber judgment. It submitted that it was necessary to take into account the vulnerability of the migrants, and particularly those who had endured a sea crossing, in assessing the existence of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. It acknowledged that the Court had rarely found a violation of that Article in cases of short-term detention, and only in the presence of aggravating circumstances. However, the vulnerability of the migrants, combined with conditions of detention that impaired their human dignity, was sufficient for a finding that the level of severity required by Article 3 had been reached. This had been confirmed by the case-law developed by the Court in the case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece ([GC], no.\u00a030696\/09, ECHR\u00a02011), by the work of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) and by the observations of the UNHCR. Moreover, conditions of detention were a major factor in the deterioration of the mental health of migrants.D.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Principles established in the Court\u2019s case-law158.\u00a0\u00a0The Court would reiterate at the outset that the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment is a fundamental value in democratic societies (see, among many other authorities, Selmouni v. France [GC], no.\u00a025803\/94, \u00a7 95, ECHR 1999-V; Labita, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0119; G\u00e4fgen v.\u00a0Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, \u00a7 87, ECHR 2010; El-Masri v.\u00a0the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630\/09, \u00a7 195, ECHR 2012; and Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], nos. 10865\/09, 45886\/07 and 32431\/08, \u00a7\u00a0315, ECHR 2014 (extracts)). It is also a value of civilisation closely bound up with respect for human dignity, part of the very essence of the Convention (see Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no.\u00a023380\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a081 and 89\u201190, ECHR 2015). The prohibition in question is absolute, for no derogation from it is permissible even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation or in the most difficult circumstances, such as the fight against terrorism and organised crime, irrespective of the conduct of the person concerned (see, inter alia, Chahal, cited above, \u00a7 79; Georgia v.\u00a0Russia (I) [GC], no. 13255\/07, \u00a7 192, ECHR\u00a02014 (extracts); Svinarenko and Slyadnev v.\u00a0Russia [GC], nos. 32541\/08 and 43441\/08, \u00a7\u00a0113, ECHR\u00a02014 (extracts); and Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7 81).(a)\u00a0\u00a0Whether the treatment falls within Article 3 of the Convention159.\u00a0\u00a0Nevertheless, according to the Court\u2019s well-established case-law, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of that level is relative and depends on all the circumstances of the case, principally the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among other authorities, Ireland v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 162; Price v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, no. 33394\/96, \u00a7\u00a024, ECHR 2001\u2011VII; Mouisel v.\u00a0France, no.\u00a067263\/01, \u00a7 37, ECHR\u00a02002\u2011IX; Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no. 54810\/00, \u00a7 67, ECHR\u00a02006\u2011IX; G\u00e4fgen, cited above, \u00a7\u00a088; El-Masri, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0196; Naumenko v. Ukraine, no.\u00a042023\/98, \u00a7 108, 10\u00a0February 2004; and Svinarenko and Slyadnev, cited above, \u00a7 114).160.\u00a0\u00a0In order to determine whether the threshold of severity has been reached, the Court also takes other factors into consideration, in particular:(a)\u00a0\u00a0The purpose for which the ill-treatment was inflicted, together with the intention or motivation behind it (see Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7 86), although the absence of an intention to humiliate or debase the victim cannot conclusively rule out its characterisation as \u201cdegrading\u201d and therefore prohibited by Article\u00a03 (see, among other authorities, V. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.\u00a024888\/94, \u00a7\u00a071, ECHR 1999\u2011IX; Peers v.\u00a0Greece, no. 28524\/95, \u00a7\u00a7 68 and 74, ECHR 2001\u2011III; Price, cited above, \u00a7 24; and Svinarenko and Slyadnev, cited above, \u00a7 114).(b)\u00a0\u00a0The context in which the ill-treatment was inflicted, such as an atmosphere of heightened tension and emotions (see Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7\u00a086).(c)\u00a0\u00a0Whether the victim is in a vulnerable situation, which is normally the case for persons deprived of their liberty (see, in respect of police custody, Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986\/93, \u00a7 99, ECHR 2000\u2011VII, and Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7 83 in fine), but there is an inevitable element of suffering and humiliation involved in custodial measures and this as such, in itself, will not entail a violation of Article 3. Nevertheless, under this provision the State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured (see Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no.\u00a030210\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 92-94, ECHR 2000\u2011XI, and Rahimi v.\u00a0Greece, no.\u00a08687\/08, \u00a7 60, 5 April 2011).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Protection of vulnerable persons and detention of potential immigrants161.\u00a0\u00a0The Court would emphasise that Article 3 taken in conjunction with Article 1 of the Convention must enable effective protection to be provided, particularly to vulnerable members of society, and should include reasonable measures to prevent ill-treatment of which the authorities have or ought to have knowledge (see Z. and Others v.\u00a0the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29392\/95, \u00a7 73, ECHR 2001-V, and Mubilanzila Mayeka and Kaniki Mitunga v.\u00a0Belgium, no. 13178\/03, \u00a7 53, ECHR 2006-XI). In this connection, the Court must examine whether or not the impugned regulations and practices, and in particular the manner in which they were implemented in the instant case, were defective to the point of constituting a violation of the respondent State\u2019s positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention (see Mubilanzila Mayeka et Kaniki Mitunga, cited above, \u00a7\u00a054, and Rahimi, cited above, \u00a7 62).162.\u00a0\u00a0While States are entitled to detain potential immigrants under their \u201cundeniable ... right to control aliens\u2019 entry into and residence in their territory\u201d (see Amuur, cited above, \u00a7 41), this right must be exercised in accordance with the provisions of the Convention (see Mahdid and Haddar v.\u00a0Austria (dec.), no.\u00a074762\/01, 8 December 2005; Kanagaratnam and Others v. Belgium, no. 15297\/09, \u00a7 80, 13 December 2011; and Sharifi and Others v.\u00a0Italy and Greece, no.\u00a016643\/09, \u00a7 188, 21 October 2014). The Court must have regard to the particular situation of these persons when reviewing the manner in which the detention order was implemented against the yardstick of the Convention provisions (see Riad and Idiab v.\u00a0Belgium, nos. 29787\/03 and 29810\/03, \u00a7\u00a0100, 24 January 2008; M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0217; and Rahimi, cited above, \u00a7 61).(c)\u00a0\u00a0Conditions of detention in general and prison overcrowding in particular163.\u00a0\u00a0When assessing conditions of detention, account has to be taken of the cumulative effects of these conditions, as well as of specific allegations made by the applicant (see Dougoz v.\u00a0Greece, no.\u00a040907\/98, \u00a7\u00a046, ECHR\u00a02001-II). In particular, the length of the period during which the applicant was detained in the impugned conditions will be a major factor (see Kalashnikov v. Russia no. 47095\/99, \u00a7 102, ECHR 2002-VI; Kehayov v.\u00a0Bulgaria, no. 41035\/98, \u00a7 64, 18 January 2005; Alver v.\u00a0Estonia, no.\u00a064812\/01, \u00a7 50, 8\u00a0November 2005; and Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525\/07 and 60800\/08, \u00a7 142, 10 January 2012).164.\u00a0\u00a0Where overcrowding reaches a certain level, the lack of space in an institution may constitute the key factor to be taken into account in assessing the conformity of a given situation with Article\u00a03 (see, in respect of prisons, Karalevi\u010dius v.\u00a0Lithuania, no.\u00a053254\/99, \u00a7 39, 7 April 2005). Extreme lack of space in prison cells weighs heavily as an aspect to be taken into account for the purpose of establishing whether the impugned detention conditions were \u201cdegrading\u201d within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention (see Mursi\u010d v. Croatia [GC], no. 7334\/13, \u00a7 104, 20\u00a0October 2016).165.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, in examining cases of severe overcrowding, the Court has found that this aspect sufficed in itself to entail a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. As a general rule, although the space considered desirable by the CPT for collective cells is 4\u00a0sq. m, the personal space available to the applicants in the relevant cases was less than 3\u00a0sq. m (see Kadikis v.\u00a0Latvia, no.\u00a062393\/00, \u00a7\u00a055, 4\u00a0May 2006; Andrey Frolov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a0205\/02, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a047-49, 29\u00a0March 2007; Kantyrev v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a037213\/02, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a050-51, 21\u00a0June\u00a02007; Sulejmanovic v.\u00a0Italy, no.\u00a022635\/03, \u00a7 43, 16 July 2009; Ananyev and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 144-45; and Torreggiani and Others v.\u00a0Italy, nos. 43517\/09, 46882\/09, 55400\/09, 57875\/09, 61535\/09, 35315\/10 and 37818\/10, \u00a7 68, 8 January 2013).166.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has recently confirmed that the requirement of 3 sq. m of floor surface per detainee (including space occupied by furniture but not counting the in-cell sanitary facility) in multi-occupancy accommodation should be maintained as the relevant minimum standard for its assessment under Article 3 of the Convention (see Mursi\u010d, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 110 and 114). It also stated that a weighty but not irrebuttable presumption of a violation of Article 3 arose when the personal space available to a detainee fell below 3\u00a0sq. m in multi-occupancy accommodation. The presumption could be rebutted in particular by demonstrating that the cumulative effects of the other aspects of the conditions of detention compensated for the scarce allocation of personal space. In that connection the Court takes into account such factors as the length and extent of the restriction, the degree of freedom of movement and the adequacy of out-of-cell activities, as well as whether or not the conditions of detention in the particular facility are generally decent (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 122-38).167.\u00a0\u00a0However, in cases where the overcrowding was not significant enough to raise, in itself, an issue under Article 3, the Court has noted that other aspects of detention conditions had to be taken into account in examining compliance with that provision. Those aspects include the possibility of using toilets with respect for privacy, ventilation, access to natural air and light, quality of heating and compliance with basic hygiene requirements (see also the points set out in the European Prison Rules adopted by the Committee of Ministers, as cited in paragraph 32 of the judgment in Torreggiani and Others, cited above). As the Court found in Mursi\u010d (cited above, \u00a7 139), in cases where a prison cell measuring in the range of 3 to 4 sq. m of personal space per inmate is at issue, the space factor remains a weighty consideration in the Court\u2019s assessment of the adequacy of the conditions of detention. Thus, in such cases, the Court has found a violation of Article\u00a03 where the lack of space went together with other poor material conditions of detention such as: a lack of ventilation and light (see Torreggiani and Others, cited above, \u00a7 69; see also Babushkin v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a067253\/01, \u00a7 44, 18\u00a0October 2007; Vlasov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a078146\/01, \u00a7 84, 12 June 2008; and Moiseyev v. Russia, no.\u00a062936\/00, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0124-27, 9 October 2008); limited access to outdoor exercise (see Istv\u00e1n G\u00e1bor Kov\u00e1cs v.\u00a0Hungary, no. 15707\/10, \u00a7\u00a026, 17 January 2012) or a total lack of privacy in the cell (see Novoselov\u00a0v.\u00a0Russia, no. 66460\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 32 and 40-43, 2 June 2005; Khudoyorov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a06847\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 106-07, ECHR\u00a02005-X (extracts); and Belevitskiy v. Russia, no.\u00a072967\/01, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a073-79, 1\u00a0March 2007).(d)\u00a0\u00a0Evidence of ill-treatment168.\u00a0\u00a0Allegations of ill-treatment must be supported by appropriate evidence. To assess this evidence, the Court adopts the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d and such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 161 in fine; Labita, cited above, \u00a7 121; Jalloh, cited above, \u00a7 67; Ramirez Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 59450\/00, \u00a7 117, ECHR 2006\u2011IX; G\u00e4fgen, cited above, \u00a7 92; and Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7 82).169.\u00a0\u00a0Even if there is no evidence of actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering, where treatment humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for or diminishing his or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual\u2019s moral and physical resistance, it may be characterised as degrading and thus fall within Article 3 (see, among other authorities, G\u00e4fgen, cited above, \u00a7 89; Vasyukov v. Russia, no. 2974\/05, \u00a7\u00a059, 5\u00a0April 2011; Georgia v.\u00a0Russia (I), cited above, \u00a7 192; and Svinarenko and Slyadnev, cited above, \u00a7 114). It may well suffice for the victim to be humiliated in his own eyes, even if not in the eyes of others (see, among other authorities, Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, 25 April 1978, \u00a7\u00a032, Series A no. 26; M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, cited above, \u00a7 220; and Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7\u00a087).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above-mentioned principles in cases comparable to that of the applicants170.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already had occasion to apply the above\u2011mentioned principles to cases that are comparable to that of the applicants, concerning in particular the conditions in which would-be immigrants and asylum-seekers were held in reception or detention centres. Two of those cases have been examined by the Grand Chamber.171.\u00a0\u00a0In its judgment in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0223-34), the Grand Chamber examined the detention of an Afghan asylum-seeker at Athens international airport for four days in June 2009 and for one week in August 2009. It found that there had been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, referring to cases of ill-treatment by police officers reported by the CPT and to the conditions of detention as described by a number of international organisations and regarded as \u201cunacceptable\u201d. In particular, the detainees had been obliged to drink water from the toilets; there were 145 detainees in a 110 sq. m space; there was only one bed for fourteen to seventeen people; there was a lack of sufficient ventilation and the cells were unbearably hot; detainees\u2019 access to the toilets was severely restricted and they had to urinate in plastic bottles; there was no soap or toilet paper in any sector; sanitary facilities were dirty and had no doors; and detainees were deprived of outdoor exercise.172.\u00a0\u00a0The case of Tarakhel v. Switzerland ([GC], no. 29217\/12, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a093\u2011122, ECHR 2014) concerned eight Afghan migrants who alleged that in the event of their removal to Italy they would have been victims of inhuman or degrading treatment relating to the existence of \u201csystemic deficiencies\u201d in the reception facilities for asylum-seekers in that country. The Grand Chamber examined the general reception system for asylum-seekers in Italy and noted deficiencies in terms of the insufficient size of reception centres and the poor living conditions in the facilities available. In particular, there were long waiting lists for access to the centres, and the capacity of the facilities did not seem capable of absorbing the greater part of the demand for accommodation. While taking the view that the situation in Italy could \u201cin no way be compared to the situation in Greece at the time of the M.S.S. judgment\u201d and that it did not in itself act as a bar to all removals of asylum-seekers to that country, the Court nevertheless took the view that \u201cthe possibility that a significant number of asylum seekers [might] be left without accommodation or accommodated in overcrowded facilities without any privacy, or even in insalubrious or violent conditions, [could] not be dismissed as unfounded\u201d. Having regard to the fact that the applicants were two adults accompanied by their six minor children, the Court found that \u201cwere the applicants to be returned to Italy without the Swiss authorities having first obtained individual guarantees from the Italian authorities that the applicants would be taken charge of in a manner adapted to the age of the children and that the family would be kept together, there would be a violation of Article 3 of the Convention\u201d.173.\u00a0\u00a0The conditions of detention of migrants or travellers have also given rise to a number of Chamber judgments.In S.D. v. Greece (no.\u00a053541\/07, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a049-54, 11\u00a0June 2009) the Court found that to confine an asylum-seeker for two months in a prefabricated unit, without any possibility of going outside or using the telephone, and without having clean sheets or sufficient toiletries, constituted degrading treatment for the purposes of Article 3 of the Convention. Similarly, a detention period of six days, in a confined space, without any possibility of exercise or any leisure area, and where the detainees slept on dirty mattresses and had no free access to toilets, was unacceptable under Article\u00a03.174.\u00a0\u00a0Tabesh v.\u00a0Greece (no.\u00a08256\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 38-44, 26 November 2009) concerned the detention of an asylum-seeker for three months, pending the application of an administrative measure, on police premises without any possibility of leisure activity or appropriate meals. The Court held that this constituted degrading treatment. It reached a similar conclusion in A.A.\u00a0v.\u00a0Greece (no. 12186\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 57-65, 22 July 2010), which concerned the three-month detention of an asylum-seeker in an overcrowded facility where the cleanliness and conditions of hygiene were atrocious, where no facility was available for leisure or meals, where the poor state of repair of the bathrooms made them virtually unusable and where the detainees had to sleep in dirty and cramped conditions (see, to the same effect, C.D. and Others v. Greece, nos. 33441\/10, 33468\/10 and 33476\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 49-54, 19\u00a0December 2013, concerning the detention of twelve migrants for periods of between forty-five days and two months and twenty-five days; F.H.\u00a0v.\u00a0Greece, no.\u00a078456\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 98-103, 31 July 2014, concerning the detention pending removal of an Iranian migrant in four detention centres for a total duration of six months; and Ha.A. v. Greece, no. 58387\/11, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a026-31, 21\u00a0April 2016, where the Court noted that reliable sources had reported on the severe lack of space, 100 detainees having been \u201ccrammed\u201d into an area of 35 sq. m.; see also Efremidze v.\u00a0Greece, no.\u00a033225\/08, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a036\u201142, 21\u00a0June 2011; R.U. v.\u00a0Greece, no.\u00a02237\/08, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a062-64, 7 June 2011; A.F. v.\u00a0Greece, no.\u00a053709\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 71-80, 13 June 2013; and B.M.\u00a0v.\u00a0Greece, no.\u00a053608\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 67-70, 19 December 2013).175.\u00a0\u00a0The case of Rahimi (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 63-86) concerned the detention pending deportation of an Afghan migrant, who at the time was 15 years old, in a centre for illegal immigrants at Pagani, on the island of Lesbos. The Court found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, observing as follows: that the applicant was an unaccompanied minor; that his allegations about serious problems of overcrowding (number of detainees four times higher than capacity), poor hygiene and lack of contact with the outside world had been corroborated by the reports of the Greek Ombudsman, the CPT and a number of international organisations; that even though the applicant had only been detained for a very limited period of two days, on account of his age and personal situation he was extremely vulnerable; and that the detention conditions were so severe that they undermined the very essence of human dignity.176.\u00a0\u00a0It should also be pointed out that in the case of T. and A. v.\u00a0Turkey (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 91-99) the Court found that the detention of a British national at Istanbul airport for three days was incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention. The Court observed that the first applicant had been confined in personal space of at most 2.3 sq. m and as little as 1.23 sq. m, and that there was only one sofa-bed on which the inmates took turns to sleep.177.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, however, found no violation of Article 3 of the Convention in Aarabi v. Greece (no. 39766\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 42-51, 2 April 2015), concerning the detention pending removal of a Lebanese migrant aged 17 and ten months at the relevant time, which had taken place: from 11 to 13\u00a0July 2009 on coastguard premises on the island of Chios; from 14 to 26\u00a0July 2009 at the Mersinidi detention centre; from 27 to 30 July 2009 at the Tychero detention centre; and on 30 and 31 July 2009 on police premises in Thessaloniki. The Court noted in particular that the Greek authorities could not reasonably have known that the applicant was a minor at the time of his arrest and therefore his complaints had necessarily been examined as if they had been raised by an adult; that the periods of detention in the Tychero centre and on the coastguard and police premises had lasted only two or three days, and that no other aggravating factor had been put forward by the applicant (there were no CPT findings about the Tychero detention centre); that the applicant had spent thirteen days in the Mersinidi detention centre, in respect of which there were no reports from national or international bodies for the relevant period; that this centre had been mentioned in an Amnesty International report covering a subsequent period, referring to a lack of toiletries and the fact that some inmates slept on mattresses placed on the bare floor, without however reporting any general hygiene problems; that even though the Government had acknowledged that Mersinidi had exceeded its accommodation capacity, there was no evidence that the applicant had had less than 3\u00a0sq.\u00a0m of personal space in his cell; that on 26\u00a0July 2009 the authorities had decided to transfer a certain number of individuals, including the applicant, to another detention centre, thus showing that they had sought in a timely manner to improve the detention conditions endure by the applicant; and that following his visit to Greece in October 2010, the UN\u00a0Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment had described the detention conditions in Mersinidi as adequate.3.\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles in the present case(a)\u00a0\u00a0The existence of a humanitarian emergency and its consequences178.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds it necessary to begin by addressing the Government\u2019s argument that it should take due account of the context of humanitarian emergency in which the events in question had taken place (see paragraph 151 above).179.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection the Court, like the Chamber, cannot but take note of the major migration crisis that unfolded in 2011 following events related to the \u201cArab Spring\u201d. As the PACE Ad Hoc Sub-Committee noted on 30\u00a0September 2011 (see, in particular, \u00a7\u00a7 9-13 of its report, cited in paragraph\u00a049 above), following uprisings in Tunisia and Libya there was a fresh wave of arrivals by boat, as a result of which Italy declared a state of humanitarian emergency on the island of Lampedusa and appealed for solidarity from the member States of the European Union. By 21\u00a0September 2011, when the applicants were on the island, 55,298 persons had arrived there by sea. As indicated by the Government (see paragraph 150 above), between 12\u00a0February and 31 December 2011, 51,573 nationals of third States (of whom about 46,000 were men and 26,000 were Tunisian nationals) landed on the islands of Lampedusa and Linosa. The arrival en masse of North African migrants undoubtedly created organisational, logistical and structural difficulties for the Italian authorities in view of the combination of requirements to be met, as they had to rescue certain vessels at sea, to receive and accommodate individuals arriving on Italian soil, and to take care of those in particularly vulnerable situations. The Court would observe in this connection that according to the data supplied by the Government (ibid.) and not disputed by the applicants, there were some 3,000 women and 3,000 children among the migrants who arrived during the period in question.180.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the significant number of factors, whether political, economic or social, which gave rise to such a major migration crisis and taking account of the challenges facing the Italian authorities, the Court cannot agree with the applicants\u2019 view (see paragraph 140 above) that the situation in 2011 was not exceptional. An excessive burden might be imposed on the national authorities if they were required to interpret those numerous factors precisely and to foresee the scale and timeframe of an influx of migrants. In that connection it should be observed that the significant increase of arrivals by sea in 2011 compared to previous years was confirmed by the report of the PACE Ad Hoc Sub-Committee. According to that report, 15,527, 18,047, 11,749 and 31,252 migrants had arrived on Lampedusa in 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 respectively. The number of arrivals had diminished in 2009 and 2010, with, respectively, 2,947 and 459 individuals (see, in particular, \u00a7\u00a7 9 and 10 of the report, cited in paragraph 49 above). That reduction had been significant enough for the authorities to close the reception centres on Lampedusa (see, in particular, ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 10 and 51). When those data are compared with the figures for the period from 12\u00a0February to 31\u00a0December 2011 (see paragraphs\u00a0150 and 179 above), which saw 51,573 nationals from third countries arriving on Lampedusa and Linosa, it can be appreciated that the year 2011 was marked by a very significant increase in the number of migrants arriving by sea from North African countries on the Italian islands to the south of Sicily.181.\u00a0\u00a0Neither can the Court criticise, in itself, the decision to concentrate the initial reception of the migrants on Lampedusa. As a result of its geographical situation, that was where most rudimentary vessels would arrive and it was often necessary to carry out rescues at sea around the island in order to protect the life and health of the migrants. It was therefore not unreasonable, at the initial stage, to transfer the survivors from the Mediterranean crossing to the closest reception facility, namely the CSPA at Contrada Imbriacola.182.\u00a0\u00a0Admittedly, as noted by the Chamber, the accommodation capacity available in Lampedusa was both insufficient to receive such a large number of new arrivals and ill-suited to stays of several days. It is also true that in addition to that general situation there were some specific problems just after the applicants\u2019 arrival. On 20 September a revolt broke out among the migrants being held at the Contrada Imbriacola CSPA and the premises were gutted by an arson attack (see paragraphs 14 and 26 above). On the next day, about 1,800 migrants started protest marches through the island\u2019s streets (see paragraph 14 above) and clashes occurred in the port of Lampedusa between the local community and a group of aliens threatening to explode gas canisters. Acts of self-harm and vandalism were also perpetrated (see paragraphs 26 and 28 above). Those incidents contributed to exacerbating the existing difficulties and creating a climate of heightened tension.183.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing details show that the State was confronted with many problems as a result of the arrival of exceptionally high numbers of migrants and that during this period the Italian authorities were burdened with a large variety of tasks, as they had to ensure the welfare of both the migrants and the local people and to maintain law and order.184.\u00a0\u00a0That being said, the Court can only reiterate its well-established case-law to the effect that, having regard to the absolute character of Article\u00a03, an increasing influx of migrants cannot absolve a State of its obligations under that provision (see M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, cited above, \u00a7 223; see also Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 122 and 176, ECHR 2012), which requires that persons deprived of their liberty must be guaranteed conditions that are compatible with respect for their human dignity. In this connection the Court would also point out that in accordance with its case-law as cited in paragraph 160 above, even treatment which is inflicted without the intention of humiliating or degrading the victim, and which stems, for example, from objective difficulties related to a migrant crisis, may entail a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.185.\u00a0\u00a0While the constraints inherent in such a crisis cannot, in themselves, be used to justify a breach of Article 3, the Court is of the view that it would certainly be artificial to examine the facts of the case without considering the general context in which those facts arose. In its assessment, the Court will thus bear in mind, together with other factors, that the undeniable difficulties and inconveniences endured by the applicants stemmed to a significant extent from the situation of extreme difficulty confronting the Italian authorities at the relevant time.186.\u00a0\u00a0Like the Chamber, the Court is of the view that, under Article 3 of the Convention, it is appropriate to examine separately the two situations at issue, namely the reception conditions in the Contrada Imbriacola CSPA, on the one hand, and those on the ships Vincent and Audace, on the other.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Conditions in the Contrada Imbriacola CSPA187.\u00a0\u00a0The Court would begin by observing that it is called upon to determine whether the conditions of the applicants\u2019 detention in the Lampedusa CSPA can be regarded as \u201cinhuman or degrading treatment\u201d within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. For that purpose a number of factors must be taken into consideration.188.\u00a0\u00a0First, at the time of the applicants\u2019 arrival, the conditions in the CSPA were far from ideal. The applicants\u2019 allegations about the general state of the centre, and in particular the problems of overcrowding, poor hygiene and lack of contact with the outside world, are confirmed by the reports of the Senate\u2019s Special Commission and Amnesty International (see paragraphs\u00a035 and 50 above). The Special Commission, an institution of the respondent State itself, reported that rooms accommodating up to twenty-five persons contained four-tier bunk beds placed side by side, that foam-rubber mattresses, many of them torn, were placed along corridors and outside landings, and that in many rooms there were no light bulbs. In toilets and showers privacy was ensured only by cloth or plastic curtains placed in an improvised manner, water pipes were sometimes blocked or leaking, the smell from the toilets pervaded the whole area, and rainwater carried dampness and dirt into the living quarters. Amnesty International also reported on severe overcrowding, a general lack of hygiene and toilets which were smelly and unusable.189.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber rightly emphasised these problems. It cannot, however, be overlooked that the Senate\u2019s Special Commission visited the Contrada Imbriacola CSPA on 11 February 2009 (see paragraph 35 above), about two years and seven months before the applicants\u2019 arrival. The Court does not find it established, therefore, that the conditions described by the Special Commission still obtained in September 2011 at the time of the applicants\u2019 arrival.190.\u00a0\u00a0Information from a later date is available in a report by the PACE Ad Hoc Sub-Committee, which carried out a fact-finding mission on Lampedusa on 23 and 24 May 2011, less than four months before the applicants\u2019 arrival (see paragraph 49 above). It is true that the Ad Hoc Sub\u2011Committee expressed its concerns about the conditions of hygiene as a result of overcrowding in the CSPA, observing that the facility was ill\u2011suited to stays of several days (see, in particular, \u00a7\u00a7 30 and 48 of the report). That report nevertheless indicates the following points in particular (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7\u00a028, 29, 32 and 47):(a) The associations participating in the \u201cPraesidium Project\u201d (UNHCR, the IOM, the Red Cross and Save the Children) were authorised to maintain a permanent presence inside the reception centre, making interpreters and cultural mediators available.(b) All those participants were working together on good terms, endeavouring to coordinate their efforts, with the shared priority of saving lives in sea rescue operations, doing everything possible to receive new arrivals in decent conditions and then assisting in rapidly transferring them to centres elsewhere in Italy.(c) Reception conditions were decent although very basic (while rooms were full of mattresses placed side by side directly on the ground, the buildings \u2013 prefabricated units \u2013 were well ventilated because the rooms had windows; and the sanitary facilities appeared sufficient when the centre was operating at its normal capacity).(d) Anyone wishing to be examined by a doctor could be, and no request to that effect was refused.(e) A regular inspection of the sanitary facilities and food at the centres was carried out by the Head of the Palermo Health Unit.191.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of that information the Court takes the view that the conditions in the Lampedusa CSPA cannot be compared to those which, in the judgments cited in paragraphs 171 and 173-75 above, justified finding a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.192.\u00a0\u00a0As to the alleged overcrowding in the CSPA, the Court observes that, according to the applicants, the maximum capacity in the Contrada Imbriacola facility was 804 (see paragraph 142 above), whereas the Government submitted that it could accommodate up to about 1,000 (see paragraph\u00a0153 above). The applicants added that on 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20\u00a0September, the centre housed 1,357, 1,325, 1,399, 1,265 and 1,017\u00a0migrants respectively. Those figures do not quite correspond to the indications provided by the Government, which at the hearing before the Court stated that at the time of the applicants\u2019 stay there had been 917\u00a0migrants in the Contrada Imbriacola CSPA.193.\u00a0\u00a0In those circumstances, the Court is not in a position to determine the precise number of persons being held there at the material time (see, mutatis mutandis, Sharifi and Others, cited above, \u00a7 189). It would merely observe that if the applicants are correct in their indication of the number of persons held and the capacity of the CSPA, the centre must have exceeded its limit (804 persons) by a percentage of between 15% and 75%. This means that the applicants must clearly have had to cope with the problems resulting from a degree of overcrowding. However, their situation cannot be compared to that of individuals detained in a prison, a cell or a confined space (see, in particular, the case-law cited in paragraphs 163-67, 173 and 176 above). The applicants did not dispute the Government\u2019s assertions that the migrants held in the Contrada Imbriacola CSPA could move around freely within the confines of the facility, communicate by telephone with the outside world, make purchases and contact representatives of humanitarian organisations and lawyers (see paragraph 153 above). Even though the number of square metres per person in the centre\u2019s rooms has not been established, the Court finds that the freedom of movement enjoyed by the applicants in the CSPA must have alleviated in part, or even to a significant extent, the constraints caused by the fact that the centre\u2019s maximum capacity was exceeded.194.\u00a0\u00a0As the Chamber rightly pointed out, when they were held at the Lampedusa CSPA, the applicants were weakened physically and psychologically because they had just made a dangerous crossing of the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, the applicants, who were not asylum\u2011seekers, did not have the specific vulnerability inherent in that status, and did not claim to have endured traumatic experiences in their country of origin (contrast M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0232). In addition, they belonged neither to the category of elderly persons nor to that of minors (on the subject of which, see, among other authorities, Popov v.\u00a0France, nos. 39472\/07 and 39474\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 90-103, 19 January 2012). At the time of the events they were aged between 23 and 28 and did not claim to be suffering from any particular medical condition. Nor did they complain of any lack of medical care in the centre.195.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the applicants were placed in the Contrada Imbriacola CSPA on 17 and 18 September 2011 respectively (see paragraphs\u00a011 and 12 above), and that they were held there until 20\u00a0September, when, following a fire, they were transferred to a sports complex on Lampedusa (see paragraph 14 above). Their stay in that facility thus lasted three and four days respectively. As the Chamber pointed out, the applicants thus stayed in the CSPA for only a short period. Their limited contact with the outside world could not therefore have had serious consequences for their personal situations (see, mutatis mutandis, Rahimi, cited above, \u00a7 84).196.\u00a0\u00a0In certain cases the Court has found violations of Article 3 in spite of the short duration of the deprivation of liberty in question (see, in particular, the three judgments cited by the applicants as referred to in paragraph\u00a0143 above). However, the present case can be distinguished in various respects from those judgments. In particular, in the Brega judgment (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a039-43), a forty-eight-hour period of detention had been combined with wrongful arrest, a renal colic attack subsequently suffered by the applicant, a delay in medical assistance, a lack of bedding, and a low temperature in the cell. In the case of T. and A. v. Turkey (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a091-99), the personal space available to the first applicant for the three days of her detention had been limited (between 2.3 and 1.23 sq. m) and there had been only one sofa-bed on which the inmates took turns to sleep. Lastly, the Gavrilovici judgment (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 41-44) concerned a longer period of detention than that endured by the present applicants (five days), with the aggravating factors that the four inmates were obliged to sleep on a wooden platform about 1.8 m wide, that there was no heating or toilet in the cell and that the cells in the \u015etefan-Vod\u0103 police station had subsequently been closed because they were held to be incompatible with any form of detention. The Court also has regard to the cases of Koktysh v.\u00a0Ukraine (no.\u00a043707\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 22 and 91-95, 10 December 2009), concerning detention periods of ten and four days in a very overcrowded cell, where prisoners had to take it in turns to sleep, in a prison where the conditions had been described as \u201catrocious\u201d, and C\u0103\u015funeanu v. Romania (no.\u00a022018\/10, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a060\u201162, 16 April 2013), concerning a five-day period of detention in circumstances of overcrowding, poor hygiene, dirtiness, and a lack of privacy and outdoor exercise.197.\u00a0\u00a0That being said, the Court cannot overlook the fact, pointed out both by the PACE Ad Hoc Sub-Committee and by Amnesty International (see paragraphs 49-50 above), that the Lampedusa CSPA was not suited to stays of more than a few days. As that facility was designed more as a transit centre than a detention centre, the authorities were under an obligation to take steps to find other satisfactory reception facilities with enough space and to transfer a sufficient number of migrants to those facilities. However, in the present case the Court cannot address the question whether that obligation was fulfilled, because only two days after the arrival of the last two applicants, on 20\u00a0September 2011, a violent revolt broke out among the migrants and the Lampedusa CSPA was gutted by fire (see paragraph 14 above). It cannot be presumed that the Italian authorities remained inactive and negligent, nor can it be maintained that the transfer of the migrants should have been organised and carried out in less than two or three days. In this connection it is noteworthy that in the Aarabi case (cited above, \u00a7 50) the Court found that the decision of the domestic authorities to transfer a certain number of individuals, including the applicant, to another detention centre had demonstrated their willingness to improve the applicant\u2019s conditions of detention in a timely manner. The relevant decision in Aarabi, however, had been taken thirteen days after the applicant\u2019s placement in the Mersinidi centre.198.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that the applicants did not claim that they had been deliberately ill-treated by the authorities in the centre, that the food or water had been insufficient or that the climate at the time had affected them negatively when they had had to sleep outside.199.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to all the factors set out above, taken as a whole, and in the light of the specific circumstances of the applicants\u2019 case, the Court finds that the treatment they complained of does not exceed the level of severity required for it to fall within Article 3 of the Convention.200.\u00a0\u00a0It follows, in the present case, that the conditions in which the applicants were held at the Contrada Imbriacola CSPA did not constitute inhuman or degrading treatment and that there has therefore been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention.201.\u00a0\u00a0Finally, the Court has also taken note of the Government\u2019s statements (see paragraph 149 above) that significant amounts have been invested in order to set up new reception facilities, and that during his visit on 23 and 24 June 2013 the UNHCR representative for Southern Europe noted with satisfaction the steps taken by the national and local authorities in order to improve the general situation on the island of Lampedusa (see, mutatis mutandis, Aarabi, \u00a7 50 in fine).(c)\u00a0\u00a0The conditions on the ships Vincent and Audace202.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the conditions on the two ships, the Court notes that the first applicant was placed on the Vincent, with some 190 others, while the second and third applicants were transferred to the Audace, which held about 150 persons (see paragraph 15 above). Their confinement on the ships began on 22\u00a0September 2011 and ended on 29 or 27 September 2011, depending on the applicant; it thus lasted about seven days for the first applicant and about five days for the second and third applicants (see paragraph\u00a017 above).203.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has examined the applicants\u2019 allegations that, on board the ships, they were grouped together in an overcrowded lounge area, that they could only go outside onto small decks for a few minutes every day, and that they had to sleep on the floor and wait several hours to use the toilets; also that they were not allowed access to the cabins, that food was distributed by being thrown on the floor, that they were occasionally insulted and ill-treated by the police and that they did not receive any information from the authorities (see paragraphs\u00a016, 145 and 146 above).204.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that those allegations are not based on any objective reports, merely their own testimony. The applicants argued that the absence of any corroborating material could be explained by the nature of the ships, which they described as isolated and inaccessible places, and that in those circumstances it was for the Government to provide evidence that the requirements of Article 3 had been met (see paragraph 147 above).205.\u00a0\u00a0On the latter point, the Court has held that where an individual is taken into police custody in good health but is found to be injured at the time of release, it is incumbent on the State to provide a plausible explanation of how those injuries were caused, failing which a clear issue arises under Article 3 of the Convention (see G\u00e4fgen, cited above, \u00a7 92; compare also Tomasi v. France, 27 August 1992, \u00a7 110, Series A no.\u00a0241\u2011A; Ribitsch v. Austria, 4 December 1995, \u00a7 34, Series A no. 336; Aksoy v.\u00a0Turkey, 18 December 1996, \u00a7 61, Reports 1996-VI; and Selmouni, cited above, \u00a7 87). In addition, where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention. The burden of proof is then on the Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation by producing evidence establishing facts which cast doubt on the account of events given by the victim (see Salman, cited above, \u00a7 100; Rivas v.\u00a0France, no. 59584\/00, \u00a7\u00a038, 1 April 2004; Turan \u00c7ak\u0131r v. Belgium, no.\u00a044256\/06, \u00a7\u00a054, 10 March 2009; and Mete and Others v. Turkey, no. 294\/08, \u00a7\u00a0112, 4\u00a0October 2012). In the absence of any such explanation, the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the Government (see, among other authorities, El\u2011Masri, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0152). This is justified by the fact that persons in the hands of the police or a comparable authority are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them (see, Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 83-84; see also, in respect of persons in police custody, Salman, cited above, \u00a7 99).206.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of that case-law, the burden of proof in this area may be reversed where allegations of ill-treatment at the hands of the police or other similar agents of the State are arguable and based on corroborating factors, such as the existence of injuries of unknown and unexplained origin. The Court observes, however, that such factors are totally absent in the present case, as the applicants have failed to produce any documents certifying any signs or after-effects of the alleged ill-treatment or any third-party testimony confirming their version of the facts.207.\u00a0\u00a0In any event, the Court cannot but attach decisive weight to the fact that the Government adduced before it a judicial decision contradicting the applicants\u2019 account, namely that of the Palermo preliminary investigations judge dated 1 June 2012. That decision indicates (see paragraph 27 above) that the migrants were provided with medical assistance, hot water, electricity, meals and hot drinks. In addition, according to a press agency note dated 25\u00a0September 2011 and cited in the decision, a member of parliament, T.R., accompanied by the deputy chief of police and by police officers, boarded the vessels in Palermo harbour and spoke to some of the migrants. The MP reported that the migrants were in good health, that they had assistance and that they were sleeping in cabins with bedding or on reclining seats. They had access to prayer rooms, the Civil Protection Authority had made clothing available to them and the food was satisfactory (pasta, chicken, vegetables, fruit and water).208.\u00a0\u00a0The Court takes the view that there is no reason for it to question the impartiality of an independent judge such as the Palermo preliminary investigations judge. To the extent that the applicants criticised the judge\u2019s decision on the ground that it was based on the statements of an MP to the press and not reiterated at the hearing, and that the police had been present during the MP\u2019s visit (see paragraph 147 above), the Court reiterates that where allegations are made under Article 3 of the Convention it is prepared to conduct a thorough examination of the findings of the national courts, and that in doing so it may take account of the quality of the domestic proceedings and any possible flaws in the decision-making process (see Denisenko and Bogdanchikov v. Russia, no. 3811\/02, \u00a7 83, 12\u00a0February 2009, and Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7 85). Nevertheless, sound evidence alone, not mere hypothetical speculation, is necessary to call into question the assessment of the facts by an independent domestic court. The applicants have not, however, produced any evidence capable of showing that the press inaccurately reported the MP\u2019s statements. In addition, the police presence in the detention centre cannot be regarded as unusual and cannot, in itself, give rise to objectively justified doubts as to the reliability of the results of a visit to or inspection of such a facility. The Court would indicate its agreement with the Chamber\u2019s findings that the fact that the MP was accompanied by the deputy chief of police and police officers did not in itself mean that the MP\u2019s independence or the veracity of his account had to be called into question.209.\u00a0\u00a0As to the applicants\u2019 allegations about the appeal made to the Italian Government by M\u00e9decins sans Fronti\u00e8res on 28\u00a0September 2011 (see paragraph\u00a0147 above), the Court notes that on that date the return of the migrants who had been held on the ships was already in progress. The second and third applicants had already boarded planes for Tunis, while the first applicant was to do so the following day (29 September 2011 \u2013 see paragraph\u00a017 above). Even if the Government had responded to the appeal from M\u00e9decins sans Fronti\u00e8res as soon as possible, the inspection would have taken place when the ships were already being vacated. It could not therefore have realistically provided any useful evidence by which to assess the conditions of accommodation and, in particular, the existence of a serious overcrowding problem as described by the applicants.210.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the foregoing, it cannot be established that the accommodation conditions on the ships reached the minimum level of severity required for treatment to fall within Article 3 of the Convention. The applicants\u2019 allegations as to the lack of relevant information or explanations from the authorities and the point that their confinement on the ships followed on from their negative experience in the Contrada Imbriacola CSPA (see paragraph 146 above) cannot alter that finding.211.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the conditions in which the applicants were held on the ships Vincent and Audace did not constitute inhuman or degrading treatment. There has accordingly been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention under this head.VI.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 4 OF PROTOCOL No. 4 TO\u00a0THE CONVENTION212.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that they had been victims of collective expulsion.They relied on Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, which reads as follows:\u201cCollective expulsion of aliens is prohibited.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Chamber judgment213.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber noted that the applicants had been issued with individual refusal-of-entry orders, but that those orders nevertheless contained identical wording and the only differences were to be found in their personal data. Even though the applicants had undergone an identity check, this was not sufficient in itself to rule out the existence of a collective expulsion within the meaning of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4. In addition, the refusal-of-entry orders did not contain any reference to the personal situations of the applicants and the Government had failed to produce any document capable of proving that individual interviews concerning the specific situation of each applicant had taken place. The Chamber also took account of the fact that a large number of individuals of the same origin, around the time of the events at issue, had been subjected to the same outcome as the applicants. It observed that the agreement between Italy and Tunisia of April 2011, which had not been made public, provided for the return of unlawful migrants from Tunisia through simplified procedures, on the basis of the mere identification by the Tunisian consular authorities of the person concerned. Those elements sufficed for the Chamber to find that the applicants\u2019 expulsion had been collective in nature and that Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 had therefore been breached (see paragraphs 153-58 of the Chamber judgment).B.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants214.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that they had been expelled collectively solely on the basis of their identification and without any consideration of their individual situations. They observed that immediately after their arrival on Lampedusa, the Italian border authorities had registered their identity and taken their fingerprints. They had subsequently had no oral contact with the authorities in question about their situation; in particular, they had not been interviewed and had not been able to receive assistance from a lawyer or from independent qualified staff until they had boarded the planes to be returned to Tunis. At that point they had been asked to give their identity for the second time and the Tunisian Consul was then present. In those circumstances, the applicants had difficulty understanding at what point in time the Italian authorities could have gathered the information required for a careful assessment of their individual situations. The refusal-of-entry orders did not, moreover, contain any indication of such an assessment; they were standardised documents indicating only their date of birth and nationality and containing a set phrase to the effect that \u201cnone of the situations [provided for in] Article 10 \u00a7 4 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998 [was] present\u201d (see paragraph 19 above). A number of other Tunisian nationals had suffered the same fate, on the basis of a practice whereby the mere verification of Tunisian nationality sufficed for a simplified \u201creadmission\u201d procedure to be triggered. The ministerial note of 6\u00a0April 2011 (see paragraph 37 above) had announced such operations.215.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants alleged that the application of Article 4 of Protocol\u00a0No. 4 to the migrant crisis, which was currently at the forefront of European political debate, could not be refused on the sole ground that this phenomenon was different from other tragedies of history. In their view, to find otherwise would be tantamount to depriving the most vulnerable persons of protection in the current historic period.216.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the agreement between Italy and Tunisia that had been relied on by the Government (see paragraph 223 below), the applicants were of the view that it did not comply with the safeguards provided for by Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 and had been used to give an appearance of legality to a practice that was in breach of the Convention. Moreover, a violation of Convention rights could not be ruled out on the sole ground that the State\u2019s conduct was compliant with other international commitments. The applicants pointed out that in the case of Sharifi and Others (cited above, \u00a7 223), the Court had observed that no form of collective and indiscriminate removal could be justified by reference to the Dublin system. This applied all the more so to the bilateral agreement with Tunisia, which according to the applicants had only been disclosed by the Government at the time of their request for referral to the Grand Chamber (see paragraph\u00a040 above).217.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants observed that they had entered Italian territory and had remained there, deprived of their liberty, for a significant period of time. In international law, therefore, their removal had to be classified as an \u201cexpulsion\u201d and not as \u201cnon-admission\u201d. The concept of \u201cexpulsion\u201d applied not only to aliens who had entered the country legally but extended to those who had crossed the national border illegally, as had in fact been acknowledged by the respondent Government themselves in the case of Hirsi Jamaa and Others (cited above, \u00a7\u00a0160).218.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants further pointed out that under Italian law, when foreign nationals without the relevant documentation were allowed to enter the territory of the State in order to be given assistance, their removal could take two different legal forms, either \u201cdeferred refusal of entry\u201d, ordered by the Chief of Police (questore), or \u201cdeportation\u201d (espulsione), decided by the Prefect and followed by an implementing order of the Chief of Police, confirmed by the Justice of the Peace. If, as argued by the Government (see paragraph\u00a0226 below), the formal classification in domestic law were decisive for the application of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, this would entail the unacceptable conclusion that the national authorities were free to decide on the safeguards enshrined in that provision and to deprive aliens of such protection through the use of \u201cdeferred refusal of entry\u201d, a fast-track mechanism offering very few safeguards.219.\u00a0\u00a0In response to the Government\u2019s submission that Tunisia was a \u201csafe country\u201d, the applicants argued that Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 concerned the method of expulsion of a group of individuals and not the consequences that they might suffer in the destination country. It was thus a procedural safeguard providing \u201cprotection by anticipation\u201d for the purposes of Article 3 of the Convention, which prohibited removal to a country where the individual might be subjected to proscribed treatment.220.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that the key issue in the present case was whether an individual interview was necessary prior to their expulsion. They observed in this connection that only two aspects distinguished their case from Hirsi Jamaa and Others (cited above), namely the fact that they had actually been identified and that they had received identical \u201cdeferred refusal-of-entry\u201d orders. Even though the similarity between the orders did not, in itself, lead to the conclusion that there had been a collective expulsion, it was an indication to that effect. In addition, in Sharifi and Others (cited above) the Court had found a violation of Article 4 of Protocol\u00a0No. 4 in respect of one of the applicants who had been expelled (Mr Reza Karimi) even though he had been identified, because there was no evidence that, at the time of the identity check, an interpreter or independent legal adviser had been present, those being indications of an individual interview. Where there was evidence of such an interview, however, the Court had excluded any violation of that provision in the cases of M.A. v.\u00a0Cyprus (no. 41872\/10, ECHR 2013); Sultani v. France (no. 45223\/05, ECHR\u00a02007-IV); and Andric v.\u00a0Sweden ((dec.) no. 45917\/99, 23\u00a0February 1999). In the applicants\u2019 view, to exclude the need for an individual interview would render meaningless the procedural safeguard of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, because an expulsion could be justified purely on the basis that the alien\u2019s nationality \u2013 that is, the fact of belonging to a group \u2013 had been established.221.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants argued that their interpretation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 was confirmed by customary international law, by the case\u2011law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) \u2013 to the effect that aliens had the right to express their view on the legality of their stay (they referred, in particular, to the Khaled Boudjlida and Sophie Mukarubega judgments cited above in paragraphs 42-45) \u2013 and by a 2016 report of the Italian Senate\u2019s Special Commission. The Special Commission had criticised a common practice at the Lampedusa CSPA whereby, only a few hours after being rescued at sea, the migrants had been asked to fill in a form offering them the following options to explain why they had come to Italy: for work, family reunification, to escape poverty, to seek asylum or for other reasons. The applicants explained that those who ticked the box \u201cwork\u201d would be earmarked for removal on the basis of a \u201cdeferred refusal-of-entry\u201d. The Special Commission had recommended in particular that a real interview be conducted, to determine whether the alien needed protection, in the presence of UNHCR workers.222.\u00a0\u00a0At the hearing before the Court, the applicants\u2019 representatives observed that the Government\u2019s allegation that \u201cinformation sheets\u201d had been filled in for each migrant (see paragraph 224 below) had not been supported by any evidence and could not therefore be upheld. According to those representatives, it would have been pointless for their clients to indicate any reasons they might have wished to put forward in opposition to their return. The representatives also pointed out, however, that the applicants\u2019 individual circumstances did not enable them to rely on international protection or the non-refoulement principle; they were not claiming that they had a right of abode in Italy or that their return had exposed them to a risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment in Tunisia.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Government223.\u00a0\u00a0The Government alleged that no collective expulsion had taken place. They observed that the applicants had been returned according to the fast-track procedure provided for in the agreement with Tunisia (see paragraphs\u00a036-40 above), which could be regarded as a \u201creadmission\u201d agreement within the meaning of the Return Directive (see paragraph\u00a041 above). They argued that this agreement had contributed to the repression of migrant smuggling, as called for by the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime. Moreover, Tunisia was a safe country which respected human rights, this being shown by the fact that the applicants had not reported experiencing persecution or violations of their fundamental rights after their return.224.\u00a0\u00a0In the Government\u2019s submission, upon their arrival on Lampedusa all the irregular migrants had been identified by the police in individual interviews with each one, assisted by an interpreter or a cultural mediator. At the hearing before the Court, the Government further stated that \u201cinformation sheets\u201d containing personal data and any circumstances specific to each migrant had been filled in after the interviews. The forms concerning the applicants had been destroyed, however, during the fire at the Contrada Imbriacola CSPA (see paragraph 14 above). Moreover, photographs had been taken and the migrants\u2019 fingerprints recorded.225.\u00a0\u00a0In the Government\u2019s view, the applicants, like all the other migrants, had definitely been informed of the possibility of lodging an asylum application, but they had simply decided not to make use of that avenue. At the time of the fire, seventy-two other migrants on Lampedusa had in fact expressed their wish to apply for asylum and on 22 September 2011 they had been transferred to the reception centres of Trapani, Caltanissetta and Foggia in order to establish their status.226.\u00a0\u00a0The Government observed that the Chamber had referred to \u201crefoulement\u201d (refusal of entry) and to \u201cexpulsion\u201d (deportation), without pointing out the distinction between the two notions, which in reality corresponded to different procedures in domestic legislation, more specifically under Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998 (see paragraph\u00a033 above). In particular, \u201crefusal of entry at the border\u201d was a decision by the border guards to turn away aliens arriving at border crossings without papers and without meeting the requirements for admission to Italy. The \u201cdeferred refusal-of-entry\u201d procedure, ordered by the Chief of Police (questore), applied where an alien had entered the country illegally and had been allowed to stay temporarily to receive protection. Lastly, \u201cdeportation\u201d corresponded to a written and reasoned decision whereby the competent administrative or judicial authorities ordered the removal from the country of an alien who did not have, or no longer had, leave to remain in the country. The Italian legal system made no provision for collective expulsion and Article 19 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998 prohibited the return of an alien to a State where he or she might be subjected to persecution. The Government explained that in the present case the applicants had been issued with \u201crefusal-of-entry and removal\u201d orders and had not been subjected to a measure of \u201cexpulsion\u201d (i.e., deportation). Therefore, in the Government\u2019s view, it could not have been a \u201ccollective expulsion\u201d.227.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further observed that in the present case the refusal-of-entry orders had been individual documents drawn up for each of the applicants and issued after a careful examination of the respective situation. They had been based on the identification of the applicants, as confirmed by the Tunisian Consul in Italy, and the removal had been implemented on the basis of a laissez-passer issued to each of them individually. In the Government\u2019s submission, the meetings with the Tunisian Consul had been individual and effective, as shown by the fact that, following the establishment on those occasions of information about their age or nationality, some of the migrants listed by the Italian authorities had not been removed after all.228.\u00a0\u00a0The respective refusal-of-entry orders, translated into the applicants\u2019 mother tongue, had been notified to each of the applicants, who had refused to sign the record of notification. In the Government\u2019s submission, those orders had been largely similar because, even though they had had the opportunity to do so, the applicants had not indicated any points worthy of note. These factors, in the Government\u2019s view, distinguished the present case from \u010conka (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 61-63), concerning the expulsion of a group of Slovakian nationals of Roma origin.229.\u00a0\u00a0The Government lastly pointed out that the Palermo preliminary investigations judge, in his decision of 1 June 2012 (see paragraph\u00a026 above), has taken the view that the refusal-of-entry measure was lawful and that the time-frame for the issuance of the orders had to be construed in the light of the particular circumstances of the case. The first applicant, who had unlawfully entered Italy on 17 September 2011, had been removed on 29\u00a0September 2011; the two others, who had entered on 18\u00a0September, had been returned on 27\u00a0September. In the Government\u2019s view, those periods of twelve and nine days respectively could not be regarded as excessive.C.\u00a0\u00a0Third-party intervention1.\u00a0\u00a0Coordination Fran\u00e7aise pour le droit d\u2019asile230.\u00a0\u00a0This coalition of associations called upon the Court to retain the classification of \u201ccollective expulsion\u201d where migrants had been identified, but where there was no indication in the circumstances of the case that their individual situations had undergone a genuine and effective examination. Such an examination might render absolutely necessary the systematic presence of an interpreter and an official trained to examine the situations of aliens and asylum-seekers, and a consistent pattern of circumstances could reflect an intention to carry out an expulsion en masse. The Coordination Fran\u00e7aise pour le droit d\u2019asile took the view that the Chamber judgment fell squarely within the logic of the Court\u2019s case-law (it referred in particular to the \u010conka, Hirsi Jamaa and Others and Sharifi and Others judgments, cited above) and was in phase with the relevant international practice (it referred, inter alia, to the judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of 28 August 2014 in the Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic case, and General Recommendation no. 30 of the United Nations Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination). It asked the Court to exercise particular vigilance in cases where there were readmission agreements, which increased the risk of chain refoulement through fast-track procedures, and submitted that the safeguard under Article 4 of Protocol\u00a0No.\u00a04 ensured compliance with the obligation of non-refoulement. The absence of an explicit request for asylum did not release the State from that obligation. The expulsion of migrants without thoroughly examining their individual situation would significantly increase the risk of a breach of the non-refoulement principle.2.\u00a0\u00a0 The McGill Centre231.\u00a0\u00a0In the submission of the McGill Centre, Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 should be interpreted as imposing on the State a duty of procedural fairness towards each individual concerned by an expulsion decision, with safeguards that might vary depending on the context. The political and social context of expulsion decisions, in particular, should be taken into account (it referred, inter alia, to Georgia v. Russia (I), cited above, \u00a7 171).232.\u00a0\u00a0The Centre pointed out that collective expulsions were also prohibited under Article 22 \u00a7 9 of the American Convention on Human Rights and by Article 12 \u00a7 5 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples\u2019 Rights, which added the need for a discriminatory dimension on national, racial, ethnic or religious grounds. It was true that, according to the committee of experts responsible for drafting the Protocol, Article 4 was supposed to prohibit \u201ccollective expulsions of aliens of the kind which have already taken place\u201d, referring to events in the Second World War. However, through its evolutive interpretation of this Article the Court had moved away from the context in which it was drafted and would no longer require the existence of discrimination in order to establish that the expulsion of a certain number of aliens was collective in nature.233.\u00a0\u00a0It could be seen from the Court\u2019s case-law that there was a presumption of \u201ccollective\u201d expulsion where there was an expulsion of aliens as a group. The State would then have a duty to show that it had guaranteed a fair and individual procedure to each expelled individual, through a reasonable and objective examination of his or her specific situation. The Court did not, however, impose a \u201cmandatory decision\u2011making process\u201d. A similar approach had been adopted by the United Nations Human Rights Committee and by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which in its 1991 report on the \u201cSituation of Haitians in the Dominican Republic\u201d found that there had been a collective expulsion of Haitians by the Government of the Dominican Republic because the expelled individuals had not been given a formal hearing enabling them to claim their right to remain. According to the Commission, persons being expelled had the right to be heard and the right to know and to challenge the legal grounds for the expulsion.3.\u00a0\u00a0The AIRE Centre and ECRE234.\u00a0\u00a0Relying on the preparatory work in respect of Protocol No. 4, on the International Law Commission\u2019s Draft Articles on the expulsion of aliens, and on the interpretation of Article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, these two associations argued that Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 prohibited the \u201ccollectivity\u201d of an expulsion and the lack of any individualised consideration of each personal situation. Compliance with that provision would reduce the risk of discriminatory treatment.235.\u00a0\u00a0According to the AIRE Centre and ECRE, the fact that a State might generically be considered a \u201csafe country\u201d was not conclusive of the assumption that it was safe for the return of everyone. An individual assessment had to be made before the return, and the fact that the applicants had not alleged that their return to Tunisia had exposed them to a risk of a violation of Articles 2 or 3 of the Convention was immaterial. Similarly, in order to implement the UN Protocol against Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, individualised procedures had to be in place in order to identify the victims of human trafficking who wished to cooperate with the authorities. Moreover, the right of a migrant to be heard and to make known his or her views effectively before the adoption of an expulsion decision had been upheld by the CJEU in the Khaled Boudjlida and Sophie Mukarubega judgments (cited above, see paragraphs 42-45 above).236.\u00a0\u00a0The AIRE Centre and ECRE observed that Article 19 \u00a7 1 of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights prohibited collective expulsions and argued that at the material time Italy had been bound to comply with the Return Directive (see paragraph 41 above), not having expressly declared that it wished to apply Article 2 \u00a7 2 (a) of that instrument. The intervening associations also pointed out that in a decision adopted on 21 January 2016 in the case of ZAT, IAJ, KAM, AAM, MAT, MAJ and LAM v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, a United Kingdom court had held that vulnerable Syrian children in a camp in Calais, France, who had relatives in the United Kingdom should be transferred to that country immediately, as soon as they had filed their asylum applications in France.D.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Principles established in the Court\u2019s case-law237.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, collective expulsion is to be understood as \u201cany measure compelling aliens, as a group, to leave a country, except where such a measure is taken on the basis of a reasonable and objective examination of the particular case of each individual alien of the group\u201d (see Georgia v. Russia (I), cited above, \u00a7 167; see also Andric, decision cited above; Davydov v.\u00a0Estonia (dec), no. 16387\/03, 31\u00a0May 2005; Sultani, cited above, \u00a7 81; and Ghulami v. France (dec), no.\u00a045302\/05, 7 April 2009). This does not mean, however, that where the latter condition is satisfied the background to the execution of the expulsion orders plays no further role in determining whether there has been compliance with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 (see \u010conka, cited above, \u00a7 59, and Georgia v. Russia (I), cited above, \u00a7 167).238.\u00a0\u00a0The purpose of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 is to prevent States from being able to remove a certain number of aliens without examining their personal circumstances and therefore without enabling them to put forward their arguments against the measure taken by the relevant authority (see Hirsi Jamaa and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0177, and Sharifi and Others, cited above, \u00a7 210; see also Andric, decision cited above). In order to determine whether there has been a sufficiently individualised examination, it is necessary to consider the circumstances of the case and to verify whether the removal decisions had taken into consideration the specific situation of the individuals concerned (see Hirsi Jamaa and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0183). Regard must also be had to the particular circumstances of the expulsion and to the \u201cgeneral context at the material time\u201d (see Georgia v. Russia (I), cited above, \u00a7\u00a0171).239.\u00a0\u00a0As the Court has previously observed, the fact that a number of aliens are subject to similar decisions does not in itself lead to the conclusion that there is a collective expulsion if each person concerned has been given the opportunity to put arguments against his expulsion to the competent authorities on an individual basis (see, among other authorities, M.A. v. Cyprus, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 246 and 254; Sultani, cited above, \u00a7 81; Hirsi Jamaa and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0184; and Georgia v.\u00a0Russia (I), cited above, \u00a7\u00a0167).240.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has held that there is no violation of Article 4 of Protocol\u00a0No. 4 where the lack of an individual expulsion decision can be attributed to the culpable conduct of the person concerned (see Hirsi Jamaa and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0184; see also M.A. v. Cyprus, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0247; Berisha and Haljiti v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), no.\u00a018670\/03, 16 June 2005; and Dritsas v. Italy (dec), no.\u00a02344\/02, 1\u00a0February 2011).241.\u00a0\u00a0Without calling into question either the right of States to establish their own immigration policies (see Georgia v. Russia (I), cited above, \u00a7\u00a0177), potentially in the context of bilateral cooperation, or the obligations stemming from membership of the European Union (see Sharifi and Others, cited above, \u00a7 224), the Court has pointed out that problems with managing migratory flows or with the reception of asylum-seekers cannot justify recourse to practices which are not compatible with the Convention or the Protocols thereto (see Hirsi Jamaa and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0179). The Court has also taken note of the \u201cnew challenges\u201d facing European States in terms of immigration control as a result of the economic crisis, recent social and political changes which have had a particular impact on certain regions of Africa and the Middle East, and the fact that migratory flows are increasingly arriving by sea (see M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0223, and Hirsi Jamaa and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0122 and 176).242.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that to date it has found a violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 in only four cases. In the first (\u010conka, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a060\u201163) the measures of detention and removal had been adopted for the purpose of implementing an order to leave the country which made no reference to the applicants\u2019 asylum request, whereas the asylum procedure had not yet been completed. In addition, a number of people had been simultaneously summoned to the police station, in conditions that made it very difficult for them to contact a lawyer, and the political bodies responsible had announced that there would be operations of that kind. The applicants in the second case (Hirsi Jamaa and Others, cited above, \u00a7 185) had not undergone any identity checks and the authorities had merely put the migrants, who had been intercepted on the high seas, onto military vessels to take them back to the Libyan coast. In Georgia v.\u00a0Russia (I) (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 170-78) the finding of a violation was based on a \u201croutine of expulsions\u201d, which had followed a recurrent pattern throughout Russia, the result of a coordinated policy of arrest, detention and expulsion of Georgians, who had been arrested under the pretext of examination of their documents, taken to Militia stations where they were gathered in large groups, and expelled after courts had entered into preliminary agreements to endorse such decisions, without any legal representation or examination of the particular circumstances of each case. In Sharifi and Others (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 214-25), lastly, the Court, taking into consideration a range of sources, found that the migrants intercepted in Adriatic ports were being subjected to \u201cautomatic returns\u201d to Greece and had been deprived of any effective possibility of seeking asylum.2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles in the present case243.\u00a0\u00a0The Court must first address the Government\u2019s argument (see paragraph\u00a0226 above) that Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 is not applicable because the procedure to which the applicants were subjected was classified as a \u201crefusal of entry with removal\u201d and not as an \u201cexpulsion\u201d (deportation). The Court notes that the International Law Commission (ILC) has defined \u201cexpulsion\u201d as \u201ca formal act or conduct attributable to a State, by which an alien is compelled to leave the territory of that State\u201d (see Article 2 of the Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens, cited in paragraph 46 above). In the same vein, the Court has previously noted that \u201cthe word \u2018expulsion\u2019 should be interpreted \u2018in the generic meaning, in current use (to drive away from a place)\u2019\u201d (see Hirsi Jamaa and Others, cited above, \u00a7 174).244.\u00a0\u00a0The Court sees no reason to reach a different conclusion in the present case. It observes that there is no doubt that the applicants, who were on Italian territory, were removed from that State and returned to Tunisia against their will, thus constituting an \u201cexpulsion\u201d within the meaning of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4.It remains to be established whether that expulsion was \u201ccollective\u201d in nature.245.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, the ILC, informed by the Court\u2019s case-law, has indicated that \u201ccollective expulsion means expulsion of aliens, as a group\u201d (see Article 9 \u00a7 1 of the Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens and the Commentary to that Article, cited in paragraphs 46 and 47 above). Turning now to the facts of the present case, the Court observes at the outset that the applicants have not disputed the fact that they underwent identification on two occasions: immediately after their arrival at the Contrada Imbriacola CSPA by Italian civil servants (see paragraph 12 above), and before they boarded the planes for Tunis, by the Tunisian Consul (see paragraph\u00a018 above). However, the parties are not in agreement as to the conditions of the first identification. In the Government\u2019s submission, it had consisted of a genuine individual interview, carried out in the presence of an interpreter or cultural mediator, following which the authorities had filled out an \u201cinformation sheet\u201d containing personal data and any circumstances specific to each migrant (see paragraph 224 above). The applicants alleged, by contrast, that the Italian authorities had merely recorded their identities and fingerprints, without taking their personal situations into account and without any interpreter or independent legal adviser being present (see paragraph\u00a0214 above). They lastly disputed the Government\u2019s allegation that there were individual information sheets concerning each migrant, observing that there was no evidence of this (see paragraph 222 above).246.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the Government provided a plausible explanation to justify their inability to produce the applicants\u2019 information sheets, namely the fact that those documents had been destroyed in the fire at the Contrada Imbriacola CSPA (see paragraph 14 above). Moreover, it should be observed that the applicants did not dispute the Government\u2019s submission that ninety-nine \u201csocial operators\u201d, three social workers, three psychologists, and eight interpreters and cultural mediators worked at the CSPA (see paragraph 152 above). In that context, the Court also notes that, according to the report of the PACE Ad Hoc Sub-Committee (see paragraph\u00a049 above), interpreters and cultural mediators worked on Lampedusa from February 2011 onwards (see \u00a7 28 of that report). It is reasonable to assume that those persons intervened to facilitate communication and mutual understanding between the migrants and the Italian authorities.247.\u00a0\u00a0In any event, the Court is of the opinion that at the time of their first identification, which according to the Government consisted in taking their photographs and fingerprints (see paragraph 224 above), or at any other time during their confinement in the CSPA and on board the ships, the applicants had an opportunity to notify the authorities of any reasons why they should remain in Italy or why they should not be returned. In that context it is significant that, as stated by the Government (see paragraph\u00a0225 above) and the Palermo preliminary investigations judge (see paragraphs\u00a025 and 27 above), and not disputed by the applicants, seventy-two migrants held in the Lampedusa CSPA at the time of the fire expressed their wish to apply for asylum, thus halting their return and resulting in their transfer to other reception centres. It is true that the applicants stated that their individual circumstances did not allow them to invoke international protection (see paragraph 222 above). Nevertheless, in an expulsion procedure the possibility of lodging an asylum application is a paramount safeguard, and there is no reason to assume that the Italian authorities, which heeded the wishes of other migrants who sought to rely on the non\u2011refoulement principle, would have remained unreceptive in response to the submission of other legitimate and legally arguable impediments to their removal.248.\u00a0\u00a0The Court would point out that Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 does not guarantee the right to an individual interview in all circumstances; the requirements of this provision may be satisfied where each alien has a genuine and effective possibility of submitting arguments against his or her expulsion, and where those arguments are examined in an appropriate manner by the authorities of the respondent State.249.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the applicants, who could reasonably have expected to be returned to Tunisia in view of the conditions of their arrival on the Italian coast, remained for between nine and twelve days in Italy. Even assuming that they encountered objective difficulties in the CSPA or on the ships (see, in particular, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a049 and 50 of the PACE Ad Hoc Sub\u2011Committee\u2019s report, cited in paragraph 49 above), the Court is of the view that during that not insignificant period of time the applicants had the possibility of drawing the attention of the national authorities to any circumstance that might affect their status and entitle them to remain in Italy.250.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that on 27 and 29 September 2011, before boarding the planes for Tunis, the applicants were received by the Tunisian Consul, who recorded their identities (see paragraph 18 above); they thus underwent a second identification. Even though it was carried out by a representative of a third State, this later check enabled the migrants\u2019 nationality to be confirmed and gave them a last chance to raise arguments against their expulsion. The Government, whose claims on this point are not disputed by the applicants, substantiated them by pointing out that, after details as to their age or nationality had been established during their meetings with the Tunisian Consul, some of the migrants listed by the Italian authorities had not been removed after all (see paragraph 227 above).251.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber rightly observed that the refusal-of-entry orders had been drafted in comparable terms, only differing as to the personal data of each migrant, and that a large number of Tunisian migrants had been expelled at the relevant time. However, according to the case-law cited in paragraph 239 above, those two facts cannot in themselves be decisive. In the Court\u2019s view, the relatively simple and standardised nature of the refusal-of-entry orders could be explained by the fact that the applicants did not have any valid travel documents and had not alleged either that they feared ill-treatment in the event of their return or that there were any other legal impediments to their expulsion. It is therefore not unreasonable in itself for those orders to have been justified merely by the applicants\u2019 nationality, by the observation that they had unlawfully crossed the Italian border, and by the absence of any of the situations provided for in Article 10 \u00a7 4 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998 (political asylum, granting of refugee status or the adoption of temporary protection measures on humanitarian grounds, see paragraphs 19 and 33 above).252.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that in the particular circumstances of the case, the virtually simultaneous removal of the three applicants does not lead to the conclusion that their expulsion was \u201ccollective\u201d within the meaning of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention. It may indeed be explained as the outcome of a series of individual refusal-of-entry orders. Those considerations suffice for the present case to be distinguished from the cases of \u010conka, Hirsi Jamaa and Others, Georgia v.\u00a0Russia (I) and Sharifi and Others (all cited and described in paragraph\u00a0242 above), such as to preclude the characterisation of the applicants\u2019 expulsion as \u201ccollective\u201d.253.\u00a0\u00a0The Court would observe, moreover, that the applicants\u2019 representatives, both in their written observations and at the public hearing (see paragraph 222 above), were unable to indicate the slightest factual or legal ground which, under international or national law, could have justified their clients\u2019 presence on Italian territory and preclude their removal. This calls into question the usefulness of an individual interview in the present case.254.\u00a0\u00a0To sum up, the applicants underwent identification on two occasions, their nationality was established, and they were afforded a genuine and effective possibility of submitting arguments against their expulsion.There has therefore been no violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4.255.\u00a0\u00a0This finding makes it unnecessary for the Court to address the question whether, as the Government argued (see paragraph 223 above), the April 2011 agreement between Italy and Tunisia, which has not been made public, can be regarded as a \u201creadmission\u201d agreement within the meaning of the Return Directive (see paragraph 41 above), and whether this could have implications under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4.VII.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION TAKEN TOGETHER WITH ARTICLES 3 AND 5 OF THE CONVENTION AND WITH ARTICLE 4 OF PROTOCOL No. 4256.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that they had not been afforded an effective remedy under Italian law by which to raise their complaints under Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention and under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4.They relied on Article 13 of the Convention, which provides:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Chamber judgment257.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber began by considering that, to the extent that the applicants relied on Article 13 in conjunction with Article 5, their complaint was covered by the Court\u2019s findings under Article 5 \u00a7 4 (see paragraph 161 of the Chamber judgment).258.\u00a0\u00a0It went on to find a violation of Article 13 taken together with Article 3. It observed that the Government had not indicated any remedies by which the applicants could have complained about the conditions of their accommodation in the CSPA or on the ships. Moreover, an appeal to the Justice of the Peace against the refusal-of-entry orders would have served merely to challenge the lawfulness of their removal to Tunisia, and those orders had been issued only at the end of their period of confinement (see paragraphs 168-70 of the Chamber judgment).259.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, the Chamber noted that in the context of an appeal against the refusal-of-entry orders, the Justice of the Peace could assess their lawfulness in the light of domestic law and the Italian Constitution. The Chamber found that the applicants could thus have complained that their expulsion was \u201ccollective\u201d in nature and that there was nothing to suggest that such a complaint would have been disregarded by the judge. Nevertheless, the orders expressly stipulated that the lodging of an appeal with the Justice of the Peace would not have suspensive effect, and this appeared to run counter to the case-law set out by the Grand Chamber in its De Souza Ribeiro v. France judgment ([GC], no. 22689\/07, \u00a7 82, ECHR\u00a02012). On that basis the Chamber found a violation of Article 13 taken together with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 (see paragraphs 171-73 of the Chamber judgment).B.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants260.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants alleged that it had not been possible for them to submit to the Italian authorities a complaint about the degrading conditions to which they had been subjected during their deprivation of liberty. They added that the refusal-of-entry orders had provided for the possibility of an appeal, within a period of sixty days, to the Agrigento Justice of the Peace. However, such a remedy would not have stayed the execution of the removal. The applicants argued that it was clear from the Court\u2019s case-law (they referred in particular to Hirsi Jamaa and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0206) that the suspensive nature of a remedy was, in such matters, a condition of its effectiveness. That was merely a logical consequence of the hermeneutic principle that, to be effective, Convention provisions must be interpreted in a manner which guaranteed rights that were practical and effective and not theoretical and illusory. In the applicants\u2019 view, the assessment of the lawfulness of the expulsion must therefore take place before the measure is enforced.261.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants alleged that the violation that they had sustained was even more serious than that found by the Court in the \u010conka case (cited above), in a situation where the domestic legislation had provided, in abstracto, that a stay of execution could be ordered. In the present case, however, the refusal-of-entry orders had clearly indicated that appeals against them could never have suspensive effect.262.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, the applicants denied having received copies of the orders, as was proven, in their view, by the fact that their signatures did not appear on the records of notification. Nor had they been able to obtain legal assistance, because lawyers had no access to holding facilities and could not be contacted by telephone from inside such premises.263.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the decisions of the Agrigento Justice of the Peace annulling two refusal-of-entry orders (see paragraph\u00a031 above), the applicants observed that they had concerned two migrants who had not yet been removed and who, in accordance with Article\u00a014 of Legislative Decree no. 268 of 1998, had been placed in a CIE. The migrants in question, they explained, had challenged the lawfulness of the refusal-of-entry measure as the legal basis for their detention in the CIE, and they had been able to do so because they were still on Italian soil. The applicants observed that, unlike those migrants, they themselves could only have challenged their refusal\u2011of\u2011entry orders as the legal basis for their removal, and then only after their return to Tunisia.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Government264.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained their argument that the applicants had been entitled to appeal to the Agrigento Justice of the Peace against the refusal-of-entry orders (see paragraph 126 above).C.\u00a0\u00a0Third-party intervention265.\u00a0\u00a0The AIRE Centre and ECRE argued that, even in the absence of an express indication to that effect, the Return Directive (see paragraph 41 above) and the Schengen Borders Code, read in the light of the Convention and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, should be interpreted to mean that in the event of collective expulsion, remedies against removal should have automatic suspensive effect.D.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment266.\u00a0\u00a0The Court would begin by observing, as the Chamber did, that, according to its settled case-law, Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention provides a lex specialis in relation to the more general requirements of Article 13 (see Nikolova v. Bulgaria [GC], no.\u00a031195\/96, \u00a7 69, ECHR 1999-II, and Ruiz Rivera v. Switzerland, no. 8300\/06, \u00a7\u00a047, 18 February 2014). In the present case, the facts giving rise to the applicants\u2019 complaint under Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 5 are identical to those already examined under Article 5 \u00a7 4, and are thus covered by the Court\u2019s findings under the latter provision (see De Jong, Baljet and Van den Brink v.\u00a0the Netherlands, 22\u00a0May 1984, \u00a7 60, Series\u00a0A no. 77, and Chahal, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0126\u00a0and\u00a0146).267.\u00a0\u00a0It remains to be examined whether there has been a violation of Article 13 taken together with Article 3 of the Convention and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4.1.\u00a0\u00a0Principles established in the Court\u2019s case-law268.\u00a0\u00a0Article 13 of the Convention guarantees the availability at national level of a remedy to enforce the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they may happen to be secured. The effect of that provision is thus to require the provision of a domestic remedy to deal with the substance of an \u201carguable complaint\u201d under the Convention and to grant appropriate relief. The scope of the Contracting States\u2019 obligations under Article 13 varies depending on the nature of the applicant\u2019s complaint. However, the remedy required by Article 13 must be \u201ceffective\u201d in practice as well as in law. The \u201ceffectiveness\u201d of a \u201cremedy\u201d within the meaning of Article 13 does not depend on the certainty of a favourable outcome for the applicant. Nor does the \u201cauthority\u201d referred to in that provision necessarily have to be a judicial authority; but if it is not, its powers and the guarantees which it affords are relevant in determining whether the remedy before it is effective. Also, even if a single remedy does not by itself entirely satisfy the requirements of Article 13, the aggregate of remedies provided for under domestic law may do so (see, among many other authorities, Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7 157, and Hirsi Jamaa and Others, cited above, \u00a7 197).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles in the present case269.\u00a0\u00a0The Court first notes that it declared admissible the applicants\u2019 complaints under the substantive head of Article 3 of the Convention and under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4. Even though, for the reasons given above, it did not find a violation of those two provisions, it nevertheless considers that the complaints raised by the applicants thereunder were not manifestly ill-founded and raised serious questions of fact and law requiring examination on the merits. The complaints in question were therefore \u201carguable\u201d for the purposes of Article 13 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Hirsi Jamaa and Others, cited above, \u00a7 201).(a)\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violation of Article 13 of the Convention taken together with Article 3270.\u00a0\u00a0Like the Chamber, the Court observes that the Government have not indicated any remedies by which the applicants could have complained about the conditions in which they were held in the Contrada Imbriacola CSPA or on the ships Vincent and Audace. An appeal to the Justice of the Peace against the refusal-of-entry orders would have served only to challenge the lawfulness of their removal. Moreover, those orders were issued only at the end of their period of confinement.271.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that there has been a violation of Article 13 taken together with Article 3 of the Convention.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violation of Article 13 of the Convention taken together with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4272.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the applicants complained of the lack of any effective remedy by which to challenge their expulsion from the perspective of its collective aspect, the Court notes that the refusal-of-entry orders indicated expressly that the individuals concerned could appeal against them to the Agrigento Justice of the Peace within a period of sixty days (see paragraph\u00a019 above). There is no evidence before the Court to cast doubt on the effectiveness of that remedy in principle. Moreover, the Government adduced two decisions of the Agrigento Justice of the Peace showing that, on an appeal by two migrants, the judge examined the procedure followed for the issuance of the refusal-of-entry orders in question and assessed the lawfulness of that procedure in the light of domestic law and the Constitution. The Justice of the Peace decided, in particular, that the orders should be declared null and void on the ground that an excessive length of time had elapsed between the identification of each irregular migrant and the adoption of the order (see paragraphs 30\u201131 above). Like the Chamber, the Court sees no reason to doubt that, in the event of an appeal against a refusal-of-entry order, the Justice of the Peace would also be entitled to examine any complaint about a failure to take account of the personal situation of the migrant concerned and based therefore, in substance, on the collective nature of the expulsion.273.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that it can be seen from the records of notification appended to the refusal-of-entry orders that the addressees refused to \u201csign or to receive a copy\u201d of those documents (see paragraph 20 above). The applicants did not adduce any evidence that would cast doubt on the veracity of that annotation. They cannot therefore blame the authorities either for any lack of understanding on their part of the content of the orders, or for any difficulties that their lack of information might have caused for the purposes of lodging an appeal with the Agrigento Justice of the Peace.274.\u00a0\u00a0While there was certainly a remedy available, it would not, \u201cin any event\u201d, have suspended the enforcement of the refusal-of-entry orders (see paragraph 19 above). The Court must therefore determine whether the lack of suspensive effect, in itself, constituted a violation of Article 13 of the Convention taken together with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4.275.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber answered that question in the affirmative, basing its finding on paragraph\u00a082 of the judgment in De Souza Ribeiro (cited above), which reads as follows:\u201cWhere a complaint concerns allegations that the person\u2019s expulsion would expose him to a real risk of suffering treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, in view of the importance the Court attaches to that provision and given the irreversible nature of the harm that might occur if the risk of torture or ill-treatment alleged materialised, the effectiveness of the remedy for the purposes of Article 13 requires imperatively that the complaint be subject to close scrutiny by a national authority (see Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia, no. 36378\/02, \u00a7 448, ECHR\u00a02005\u2011III), independent and rigorous scrutiny of a claim that there exist substantial grounds for fearing a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 (see Jabari, cited above, \u00a7 50), and reasonable promptness (see Bat\u0131 and Others v.\u00a0Turkey, nos. 33097\/96 and 57834\/00, \u00a7 136, ECHR 2004\u2011IV). In such a case, effectiveness also requires that the person concerned should have access to a remedy with automatic suspensive effect (see Gebremedhin [Gaberamadhien], cited above, \u00a7 66, and Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765\/09, \u00a7 200, ECHR 2012). The same principles apply when expulsion exposes the applicant to a real risk of a violation of his right to life safeguarded by Article 2 of the Convention. Lastly, the requirement that a remedy should have automatic suspensive effect has been confirmed for complaints under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 (see \u010conka, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a081-83, and Hirsi Jamaa and Others, cited above, \u00a7 206).\u201d276.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that, while the last sentence of the above-cited paragraph 82 certainly appears to establish the need for \u201ca remedy with automatic suspensive effect ... for complaints under Article 4 of Protocol\u00a0No. 4\u201d, it cannot be read in isolation. On the contrary, it must be understood in the light of the paragraph as a whole, which establishes an obligation for States to provide for such a remedy where the person concerned alleges that the enforcement of the expulsion would expose him or her to a real risk of ill-treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention or of a violation of his or her right to life under Article 2, on account of the irreversible nature of the harm that might occur if the risk of torture or ill-treatment materialised. It should also be noted that the last statement in paragraph 82 of the De Souza Ribeiro judgment is corroborated by the citation of the \u010conka (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 81-83) and Hirsi Jamaa and Others (cited above, \u00a7 206) judgments. However, those two cases concerned situations in which the applicants had sought to alert the national authorities to the risk that they might be subjected to treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention in the destination countries, and not to any allegation that their expulsion from the host State was collective in nature.277.\u00a0\u00a0The Court takes the view that where, as in the present case, an applicant does not allege that he or she faces violations of Articles 2 or 3 of the Convention in the destination country, removal from the territory of the respondent State will not expose him or her to harm of a potentially irreversible nature.278.\u00a0\u00a0The risk of such harm will not obtain, for example, where it is argued that the expulsion would breach the person\u2019s right to respect for his or her private and family life. That situation is envisaged in paragraph 83 of the De Souza Ribeiro judgment, which must be read in conjunction with the preceding paragraph, and which reads as follows:\u201cBy contrast, where expulsions are challenged on the basis of alleged interference with private and family life, it is not imperative, in order for a remedy to be effective, that it should have automatic suspensive effect. Nevertheless, in immigration matters, where there is an arguable claim that expulsion threatens to interfere with the alien\u2019s right to respect for his private and family life, Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 8 requires that States must make available to the individual concerned the effective possibility of challenging the deportation or refusal-of-residence order and of having the relevant issues examined with sufficient procedural safeguards and thoroughness by an appropriate domestic forum offering adequate guarantees of independence and impartiality (see M. and Others v. Bulgaria, no.\u00a041416\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 122-32, 26\u00a0July 2011, and, mutatis mutandis, Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, no.\u00a050963\/99, \u00a7\u00a0133, 20 June 2002).\u201d279.\u00a0\u00a0In the Court\u2019s view, similar considerations apply where an applicant alleges that the expulsion procedure was \u201ccollective\u201d in nature, without claiming at the same time that it had exposed him or her to a risk of irreversible harm in the form of a violation of Articles 2 or 3 of the Convention. It follows that in such cases the Convention does not impose an absolute obligation on a State to guarantee an automatically suspensive remedy, but merely requires that the person concerned should have an effective possibility of challenging the expulsion decision by having a sufficiently thorough examination of his or her complaints carried out by an independent and impartial domestic forum. The Court finds that the Agrigento Justice of the Peace satisfied those requirements.280.\u00a0\u00a0The Court would also point out that the fact that the remedy available to the applicant did not have suspensive effect was not a decisive consideration for the conclusion reached in the De Souza Ribeiro case that there had been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention. That conclusion was based on the fact that the applicant\u2019s \u201carguable\u201d complaint, to the effect that his removal was incompatible with Article 8 of the Convention, had been dismissed rapidly, in fact extremely hastily (the applicant had appealed to the Administrative Court on 26 January 2007 at 3.11 p.m., and had been deported to Brazil on the same day at around 4 p.m. \u2013 see De Souza Ribeiro, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 84-100, and in particular \u00a7\u00a7 93-94 and 96).281.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the lack of suspensive effect of a removal decision does not in itself constitute a violation of Article 13 of the Convention where, as in the present case, the applicants do not allege that there is a real risk of a violation of the rights guaranteed by Articles\u00a02 or 3 in the destination country.Accordingly, there has been no violation of Article 13 of the Convention taken together with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4.VIII.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION282.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage283.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants claimed 65,000 euros (EUR) each in respect of the non-pecuniary damage that they alleged to have sustained. They argued that this amount was justified on account of the gravity of the violations of which they were victims. They requested that this sum be paid into their own Tunisian bank accounts.284.\u00a0\u00a0The Government took the view that the applicants\u2019 claims for just satisfaction were \u201cunacceptable\u201d.285.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the particular circumstances of the case and to the conclusions it has reached as to the applicants\u2019 various complaints, the Court finds that each applicant should be awarded EUR 2,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, amounting to a total of EUR 7,500 for all three applicants.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses286.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also claimed EUR 25,236.89 for the costs and expenses incurred by them before the Court. That sum covered: the travel expenses of their representatives for a visit to Tunis (EUR 432.48); the travel expenses of their representatives for attendance at the Grand Chamber hearing (EUR 700); the translation of the observations before the Chamber (EUR 912.03) and before the Grand Chamber (EUR 1,192.38); the consultation of a lawyer specialising in international human rights law (EUR 3,000) and a lawyer specialising in immigration law (EUR 3,000); and the fees of their representatives in the proceedings before the Court (in total, EUR 16,000). The applicants\u2019 representatives stated that they had advanced those expenses and requested that the sum awarded be paid directly into their respective bank accounts.287.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted no observations on this point.288.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case-law, the Court considers excessive the total sum claimed for the costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before it (EUR 25,236.89). It decides to award EUR 15,000 under that head to the applicants jointly. That sum is to be paid directly into the bank accounts of the applicants\u2019 representatives (see, mutatis mutandis, Oleksandr Volkov v.\u00a0Ukraine, no.\u00a021722\/11, \u00a7 219, ECHR 2013).C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest289.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28935":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ADMISSIBILITY41.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the application was lodged with the Court outside the six-month time-limit and was therefore inadmissible according to Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. It submitted that the completed application form was only received on 25 January 2008, i.e. eight months after the receipt of the applicant\u2019s first letter to the Court. Due to the delayed transmission of the application form the 25 January 2008 should be considered as the date of lodging the application. Since there were no effective remedies available to the applicant the six-month period started on 17\u00a0October 2006, the day Mr Togonidze died.42.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contested that argument and argued that the first letter was sent to the Court inside the six-month period and that she subsequently strictly followed the instructions of the Court on filling the application form.43.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant\u2019s first letter was sent to the Court on 17 April 2007 and therefore, even according to the calculation submitted by the Government, inside the six-month period as provided by Article 35 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention. On 26 July 2007 the Registry of the Court replied to the applicant\u2019s initial letter and instructed the applicant to fill in an application form and return it together with copies of all relevant documents within six months of the date of the letter. The completed application form was received on 25 January 2008. The Court therefore concludes that the applicant followed the instructions of the Court and that the application was lodged in time.44.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that the applicant complained under Articles 2, 3 and 13 of the Convention about the death of the applicant\u2019s late husband, his conditions of detention, the allegedly ineffective investigations and the lack of domestic remedies. Although the respondent State did not raise any objections as to the Court\u2019s competence ratione personae or the applicant\u2019s \u201cvictim status\u201d, this issues call for consideration ex\u00a0officio by the Court (see Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], no.\u00a023755\/07, \u00a7 70, ECHR 2016, Sejdi\u0107 and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], nos.\u00a027996\/06 and 34836\/06, \u00a7 27, ECHR 2009). It is reiterated that in order to be able to lodge a petition by virtue of Article\u00a034 of the Convention, a person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals must be able to claim to be the victim of a violation of the rights set forth in the Convention. In order to claim to be a victim of a violation, a person must be directly affected by the impugned measure or omission (see Sejdi\u0107 and Finci, cited above, \u00a7 28).45.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the direct victim of the alleged violations of the Convention died before the present application was lodged. It will therefore examine the standing of the applicant to bring the complaints before the Court on behalf of her late husband. The Court reiterates that where the direct victim dies before the application is lodged with the Court, by virtue of an autonomous interpretation of the concept of \u201cvictim\u201d it has been prepared to recognise the standing of a relative, either when the complaints raised an issue of general interest pertaining to \u201crespect for human rights\u201d (Article 37 \u00a7 1 in fine of the Convention) and the applicants as heirs have a legitimate interest in pursuing the application, or on the basis of the direct effect on the applicant\u2019s own rights (Boac\u0103 and Others v. Romania, no.\u00a040355\/11, \u00a7 45, 12 January 2016).46.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has acknowledged that human rights cases before it generally also have a moral dimension and persons near to an applicant may thus have a legitimate interest in seeing to it that justice is done even after the applicant\u2019s death. Accordingly, the Court normally permits the next of kin to pursue an application where the original applicant has died after lodging an application with the Court. However, the issues involved are different where the direct victim dies before his or her complaint is brought before the Court. Although the locus standi of a victim\u2019s next of kin has been recognised where the victim had died or disappeared in circumstances which were alleged to engage the responsibility of the State, the Court\u2019s approach has been more restrictive in cases where the alleged violation of the Convention was not closely linked to disappearances or deaths giving rise to issues under Article 2. As regards complaints of ill-treatment of deceased relatives under Article 3 of the Convention, the Court has accepted the locus standi of applicants only in cases where the ill-treatment was closely linked to the death or the disappearance (see Karpylenko v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 15509\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 104, 105, 11 February 2016, with further references).47.\u00a0\u00a0Applying these principles to the present case, the Court observes that the applicant complained about her late husband\u2019s death during detention and his prison conditions, which allegedly led to his death. The Court therefore Court accepts the applicant\u2019s locus standi in respect of her complaints under Articles 2 and 3 (substantive limb) of the Convention. As regards her complaint under Articles 13 and 3 under its procedural limb, the Court considers these complaints closely linked to her complaint under Article 2. It therefore also accepts her locus standi in respect of her complaints under Articles 13 and 3 (procedural) of the Convention.48.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the application is neither manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention nor inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION49.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that her husband died as a result of the insufficient health care during his detention in St Petersburg and the conditions of his detention and of his transportation to Moscow. She further complained that no adequate and effective investigation was conducted into her husband\u2019s death. She argued that there has been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention, which reads, as far as relevant, as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone\u2019s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.\u201d50.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.A.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties51.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that Mr Togonidze died as a direct result of his treatment by the Russian authorities. She alleged that her husband did not receive adequate medical treatment, given the fact that he suffered from asthma, and that his conditions of detention led to a deterioration of his health and ultimately to his death. The applicant further submitted that the investigation in her husband\u2019s death was inadequate, as several, in particular Georgian, witnesses were not interviewed, that the findings concerning the alleged long-term drug use were based on insufficient evidence, such as the non-determination of the methadone level in Mr Togonidze\u2019s blood, and that there was insufficient information collected concerning the authorities responsibility for the deterioration of Mr Togonidze\u2019s health in detention and during transportation.52.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that Mr Togonidze died of methadone intoxication. Given this cause of death and the lack of any evidence of coercive actions against Mr Togonidze, his death should not be considered as a death in suspicious circumstances (see Geppa v. Russia, no. 8532\/06, \u00a7\u00a086, 3 February 2011). Consequently the Government argued that there was no need for further investigative measures and the conducted investigation was in compliance with the requirements of Article 2 of the Convention. The Government did not submit any comments on the medical report provided by the applicant.53.\u00a0\u00a0The Georgian Government submitted that the death of Mr\u00a0Togonidze was a direct result of Russia\u2019s administrative practice of arrest, detention and expulsion of Georgian nationals from the Russian Federation in autumn 2006. The lack of medical care and the inhuman conditions of detention led to the deterioration of Mr Togonidze\u2019s health and ultimately to his death, even though the Russian authorities were aware of Mr Togonidze\u2019s medical condition. The Georgian Government also alleged that the investigation was ineffective, as not even the internal instructions concerning investigative measures were complied with.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0The death of Mr Togonidze54.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 2, which safeguards the right to life and sets out the circumstances when deprivation of life may be justified, ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in the Convention, to which no derogation is permitted. The object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings also requires that Article 2 be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective (see McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, 27\u00a0September 1995, \u00a7\u00a7 146, 147, Series A no. 324).55.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the importance of the protection afforded by Article 2, the Court must subject deprivations of life to the most careful scrutiny, taking into consideration not only the actions of State agents but also all the surrounding circumstances. Persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them. Consequently, where an individual is taken into police custody in good health and is found to be injured on release, it is incumbent on the State to provide a plausible explanation of how those injuries were caused (see, among other authorities, Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803\/94, \u00a7 87, ECHR 1999). The obligation on the authorities to account for the treatment of an individual in custody is particularly stringent where that individual dies (Salman v. Turkey [GC], no.\u00a021986\/93, \u00a7 99, ECHR 2000\u2011VII).56.\u00a0\u00a0In assessing evidence, the Court has generally applied the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18\u00a0January 1978, \u00a7 161, Series A no. 25). However, such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries and death occurring during such detention. Indeed, the burden of proof may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation (Salman, cited above, \u00a7 100).57.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the particular circumstances of the case the Court notes that according to the final assessment of the Russian authorities Mr\u00a0Togonidze died of methadone poisoning. Consequently, having regard to the circumstances of Mr Togonidze\u2019s death, the Court has to determine whether this submission constitutes a satisfactory and convincing explanation of his death during detention. The Court observes that the medical report submitted by the applicant indicates several inconsistencies regarding the finding of the Russian authorities and that the Government did not submit any comments \u2013 clarifying these inconsistencies \u2013 regarding the medical report (see paragraph 36-39). The Court notes in particular that the level of methadone in Mr Togonidze\u2019s blood had not been determined and that it was therefore impossible to determine the amount of methadone allegedly taken by Mr Togonidze. Furthermore, it notes that neither drugs nor drug related evidence were found on Mr\u00a0Togonidze and that there were no reports regarding drug use during his detention. In addition, the Court agrees with the findings in the medical report that the lower third of the left shoulder appears a very unusual site for self\u2011injection of drugs. Furthermore, it notes that establishing a long-term drug use from three injection marks seems improbable in the absence of any supporting evidence. The Court also observes that the Government submitted that Mr\u00a0Togonidze was searched before entering the bus and closely monitored during the bus ride and that it is therefore highly unlikely that he was able to buy or take drugs during the last 9-10 hours before his death. Finally, the Court notes that the specific circumstances of Mr\u00a0Togonidze\u2019s death and his conduct shortly before collapsing appear highly inconsistent with a methadone overdose.58.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the explanation provided by the Russian Government for the death of Mr Togonidze is, in particular in light of the medical report submitted by the applicant (see paragraphs 36 - 39) and the absence of an explanatory response by the Government, not satisfactory and convincing. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention under its substantive head.2.\u00a0\u00a0The subsequent investigation59.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the obligation imposed by Article 2 is not exclusively concerned with intentional killing resulting from the use of force by agents of the State but also extends, in the first sentence of Article\u00a02 \u00a7 1, to imposing a positive obligation on States that the right to life be protected by law. This requires by implication that there should be some form of effective official investigation when individuals have been killed as a result of the use of force (see \u00c7ak\u0131c\u0131 v. Turkey [GC], no. 23657\/94, \u00a7 86, ECHR 1999\u2011IV). In that connection, the Court points out that the obligation mentioned above is not confined to cases where it is apparent that the killing was caused by an agent of the State but also includes cases of deaths in custody (see Salman, cited above, \u00a7 105).60.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the case the Court notes that several of the questions raised in the decision to quash the dismissal of the investigation of 30 July 2007 (see paragraph 32 above) have never been answered by the subsequent investigation. Therefore, it has never been established which amount of methadone Mr Togonidze had allegedly taken and whether such a dose could have been lethal. The Court additionally notes that the investigation never clarified where Mr\u00a0Togonidze allegedly obtained the drugs from or how he was able to inject himself during the bus ride. Moreover, it has not been investigated why Mr\u00a0Togonidze\u2019s health deteriorated during the bus ride and whether he received adequate health care during his detention and transfer to the airport. Lastly, the Court reiterates that it found the explanation, given by the Russian authorities, for Mr Togonidze\u2019s death for different reasons not convincing, most of which could have been clarified by an effective investigation.61.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, therefore, concludes that the investigation into Mr\u00a0Togonidze\u2019s death was insufficient and ineffective and that there has been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention under its procedural head.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION62.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that her husband was subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment whilst being detained and transported to Moscow. She relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Preliminary Objection by the Government63.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the Court should refrain from examining the complaint under Article 3 of the Convention, as it has already, in its judgment on the inter-State application Georgia v. Russia (I) (cited above), found a violation of the right protected by Article 3 of particular nationals of the Republic of Georgia. One of the nationals named by the Georgian Government in these proceedings was Mr Togonidze. The Government argued that finding a violation of Article 3 regarding the same person under the same circumstances under proceedings instituted on an individual application would result in \u201cdouble jeopardy of the state\u201d, which would not be acceptable under international law.64.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the Convention only entails a prohibition of \u201cdouble jeopardy of states\u201d in so far as pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7 2 (b) of the Convention the Court shall not deal with any application that\u201c... is substantially the same as a matter that has already been examined by the Court or has already been submitted to another procedure of international investigation or settlement and contains no relevant new information.\u201d65.\u00a0\u00a0In that regard the Court reiterates that for an application to be \u201csubstantially the same\u201d, it must concern substantially not only the same facts and complaints but be introduced by the same persons. It is therefore not the case that by introducing an inter-State application an applicant Government thereby deprives individual applicants of the possibility of introducing, or pursuing, their own claims (Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 16064\/90, 16065\/90, 16066\/90, 16068\/90, 16069\/90, 16070\/90, 16071\/90, 16072\/90 and 16073\/90, \u00a7 118, ECHR 2009). Therefore the Court concludes that the prior examination of the inter-State case Georgia v.\u00a0Russia (I) (cited above) does not hinder the Court from examining the present complaint under Article 3.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits66.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that her husband, who had asthma and needed permanent medical care, was detained in unbearable conditions, without receiving the requisite medical assistance. She further argued that while being transported to Moscow in a bus without air conditioning he was prohibited from opening a window and therefore prevented from breathing fresh air.67.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the Court\u2019s findings regarding conditions of detention in the inter-State case (Georgia v. Russia (I), cited above) the Government refrained from commenting on the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 3.68.\u00a0\u00a0The Georgian Government also referred to the Court\u2019s findings in the inter-State case and submitted that there were no reasons for deviating from these findings in the present case.69.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates its findings from the inter-State case Georgia v.\u00a0Russia (I) regarding the conditions of detention of Georgian nationals in autumn 2006:\u201cHaving regard to all the material submitted to the Court, it appears first and foremost undeniable that the Georgian nationals were detained in cells in police centres or severely overcrowded detention centres for foreigners. In any event the personal space available to them did not meet the minimum standard as laid down in the Court\u2019s case-law. Moreover, the Georgian nationals had to take it in turns to sleep because of the lack of individual sleeping places.The extreme lack of space in a prison cell weighs heavily as an aspect to be taken into account for the purpose of establishing whether the impugned detention conditions were \u201cdegrading\u201d within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.Generally speaking, the Court has indicated on several occasions that overcrowding in Russian prisons was a matter of particular concern to it. In a large number of cases, it has consistently found a violation of the applicants\u2019 rights on account of a lack of sufficient personal space during their detention. The present case, which concerns detention centres for foreigners, is no exception in this respect.The Court also refers to the report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) on the Russian Federation of December 2001 in which it stated that it was very concerned about the conditions of detention of foreign nationals in these centres, stressing overcrowding in cells (report to the Russian Government on the CPT\u2019s visit to the Russian Federation from 2 to 7 December 2001, \u00a7 32, CPT\/Inf\u00a0(2003) 30).Furthermore, the Court cannot but note in the present case that the evidence submitted to it also shows that basic health and sanitary conditions were not met and that the detainees suffered from a lack of privacy owing to the fact that the toilets were not separated from the rest of the cells.In that connection the Court reiterates that the inadequacy of the conditions of detention constitutes a recurring structural problem in the Russian Federation which results from a dysfunctioning of the Russian prison system and has led the Court to conclude that there has been a violation of Article 3 in a large number of judgments since the first finding of a violation in 2002 in the case of Kalashnikov v. Russia (no.\u00a047095\/99, ECHR 2002\u2011VI) and to adopt a pilot judgment in the above-cited case of Ananyev and Others. The Court therefore sees no reason to depart from that conclusion in the present case.Having regard to all the foregoing factors, the Court concludes that the conditions of detention caused undeniable suffering to the Georgian nationals and should be regarded as both inhuman and degrading treatment which amounted to an administrative practice in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.Accordingly, the Court does not consider it necessary to examine the remainder of the parties\u2019 observations on the conditions of expulsion of the Georgian nationals during the period in question.\u201d(see Georgia v. Russia (I), cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 199-206, with further references).70.\u00a0\u00a0The Court sees no reason to depart from its findings from the inter\u2011State case and stresses that, having regard to the medical condition of the applicant\u2019s husband and his need for medical care, the conditions of detention and transportation appear particularly inhuman and degrading (see, mutatis mutandis, Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], no.\u00a011138\/10, \u00a7 182, ECHR 2016).71.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLES 2 AND 3 OF THE CONVENTION72.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further complained that no effective remedies were available either to her or to her husband to challenge the alleged violations of Articles 2 and 3. She relied on Article 13, which reads as follows:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d73.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3 the Court notes that in its pilot judgment Ananyev and Others it found that at the relevant time there was no effective remedy in the Russian legal system that could be used to put an end to the conditions of inhuman and degrading detention or to obtain adequate and sufficient redress in connection with a complaint about inadequate conditions of detention (see Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525\/07 and 60800\/08, \u00a7 119, 10 January 2012).74.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, it considers that this case is no different (see Georgia v.\u00a0Russia (I), cited above, \u00a7 216) and therefore concludes that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article\u00a03.75.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the finding of a violation of Article 2 under its procedural head (see paragraph\u00a061 above) on account of the respondent State\u2019s failure to carry out an effective investigation, the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine whether there has been a violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 2.V.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION76.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage77.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 40,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.78.\u00a0\u00a0The Government only contested the alleged violations but did not specifically comment on the amount claimed by the applicant. It asked the Court to apply Article 41 in compliance with its established case-law.79.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the violations found above, the Court considers that an award in respect of non-pecuniary damage is justified in this case. Deciding on an equitable basis, as required by Article 41 of the Convention, it awards the applicant EUR 40,000 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses80.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed 1,944.78 pounds sterling (GBP) for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court.81.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of GBP 1,944.78 for costs and expenses in the proceedings before the Court.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest82.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28936":"I.\u00a0\u00a0THE GOVERNMENT\u2019S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION44.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the Court should refrain from examining the issues raised in the individual application, as it has already, in its judgment on the inter-State application Georgia v. Russia (I) (cited above), found violations of the rights of particular nationals of the Republic of Georgia and therefore of the rights of the individual applicants. The Government argued that finding violations of Convention rights of the same persons under the same circumstances under proceedings instituted on an individual application would result in \u201cdouble jeopardy of the state\u201d, which would not be acceptable under international law.45.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants did not comment on this issue.46.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the Convention only entails a prohibition of \u201cdouble jeopardy of states\u201d in so far as pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7 2 (b) of the Convention the Court shall not deal with any application that\u201c... is substantially the same as a matter that has already been examined by the Court or has already been submitted to another procedure of international investigation or settlement and contains no relevant new information.\u201d47.\u00a0\u00a0In that regard the Court reiterates that for an application to be \u201csubstantially the same\u201d, it must concern substantially not only the same facts and complaints but be introduced by the same persons. It is therefore not the case that by introducing an inter-State application an applicant Government thereby deprives individual applicants of the possibility of introducing, or pursuing, their own claims (Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 16064\/90, 16065\/90, 16066\/90, 16068\/90, 16069\/90, 16070\/90, 16071\/90, 16072\/90 and 16073\/90, \u00a7 118, ECHR 2009). Therefore the Court concludes that the prior examination of the inter-State case Georgia v.\u00a0Russia (I) (cited above) does not hinder the Court from examining the present individual application.II.\u00a0\u00a0ESTABLISHMENT OF FACTS48.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that it is confronted with a dispute over the events starting from 22\/23 November 2006 and reiterates that the proceedings before the Court are adversarial in nature. It is therefore for the parties to substantiate their factual arguments by providing the Court with the necessary evidence. Whereas the Court is responsible for establishing the facts, it is up to the parties to provide active assistance by supplying it with all the relevant information (see Lisnyy and others v. Ukraine and Russia (dec.), nos. 5355\/15, 44913\/15, 50853\/15, \u00a7 25, 5 July 2016, with further references).49.\u00a0\u00a0The Court must therefore reach its decision on the basis of the evidence submitted by the parties. In the proceedings before it, there are no procedural barriers to the admissibility of evidence or predetermined formulae for its assessment. It adopts the conclusions that are, in its view, supported by the free evaluation of all evidence, including such inferences as may flow from the facts and the parties\u2019 submissions. According to its established case-law, proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Moreover, the level of persuasion necessary for reaching a particular conclusion and, in this connection, the distribution of the burden of proof, are intrinsically linked to the specificity of the facts, the nature of the allegation made and the Convention right at stake (see Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577\/98 and 43579\/98, \u00a7 147, ECHR 2005\u2011VII).50.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicants submitted documents regarding their medical history and confirming the death of the first applicant\u2019s unborn child. In relation to the events in question they provided copies of their passports and of the train tickets and records from the before mentioned television reports (see paragraph 29 above). In addition they submitted the complaint to the General Prosecutor\u2019s office as well as its reply.51.\u00a0\u00a0The Government provided the Court with the expulsion decision of the Ruzskiy District Court of the Moscow and the correlating administrative offence report.52.\u00a0\u00a0In regards to the parties\u2019 submissions and the provided documents the Court notes the following: The Government confirmed that the fifth applicant, a two year old child, was put off the train and registered by the Line Division of the Interior at Derbent station. Having particular regard to the age of the fifth applicant, this fact allows the inference that the other applicants accompanying the fifth applicant were also put off the train but not registered by the Line Division of the Interior. This inference is further corroborated by the television reports, showing the applicants in Derbent, and the applicants\u2019 detailed submission to the Court as well as to the Russian General Prosecutor\u2019s office.53.\u00a0\u00a0In sum the Court finds it established that the applicants\u2019 train travel from Moscow to Baku was interrupted by Russian authorities, that the applicants were put off the train in the night of 22\/23 November 2006 and that they awaited the issuance of transit visa in Derbent until the 4\u00a0December 2006.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF PROTOCOL No. 4 TO THE CONVENTION54.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that their freedom to leave the Russian Federation was restricted without any justification in violation of Article 2 of Protocol No.\u00a04 to the Convention, which, as far as relevant, reads as follows:\u201c ...2.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.3.\u00a0\u00a0No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are in accordance with law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the maintenance of ordre public, for the prevention of crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. ...\u201d55.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants argue that the Russian authorities prevented them from leaving Russian territory, by interrupting their train journey to Azerbaijan and forcing them to wait in Derbent for transit visa. They submit, in particular, that these actions were neither in accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society, since the Ruzskiy District Court of the Moscow Region had already ordered the expulsion of the applicants.56.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the factual foundation of the complaint, emphasised that the Ruzskiy District Court had only ordered the expulsion of the first applicant and argued that the applicants\u2019 stay in Derbent was caused by the fact that they had not duly issued documents.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility57.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits58.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 guarantees to any person the right to leave any country for any other country of the person\u2019s choice to which he or she may be admitted. Any measure restricting that right must meet the requirements of paragraph 3 of that Article, namely being lawful, pursuing one of the legitimate aims referred to in the third paragraph, and striking a fair balance between the public interest and the individual\u2019s rights (see Popoviciu v. Romania, no. 52942\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 82, 83, 1\u00a0March 2016, with further references).59.\u00a0\u00a0The Court established (see paragraph 54 above) that the applicants\u2019 train travel from Moscow to Baku was interrupted by Russian authorities, that the applicants were put off the train in the night of 22\/23 November 2006 and that they had to wait for the issuance of transit visa in Derbent until the 4 December 2006. The Court considers, therefore, that the applicants were hindered from leaving the Russian Federation between the 23\u00a0November and 4 December 2006 and that the actions of the Russian authorities interfered with the applicants\u2019 right to leave the country.60.\u00a0\u00a0Therefore, it must be established, whether or not the interference was lawful and necessary in a democratic society for the achievement of a legitimate aim. In that regard the Court notes that the Government only submitted that the applicants did not have duly issued papers, but that the Government did not explain specifically, which papers were missing or not duly issued and on the basis of which legal provision the applicants, who had lived in the Russian Federation since 2003, required a transit visa to leave the country. The Government did also not provide a legal basis for putting the applicants off the train to Azerbaijan. The Court further observes that the Ruzskiy District Court of the Moscow Region had ordered the expulsion of the first applicant and that she had not only a right to leave the country but also a legal obligation to do so.61.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the above, the Court finds that the interference with the applicants\u2019 right to leave the country was not in accordance with the law. This finding makes it unnecessary to examine whether it was necessary in a democratic society.62.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No.\u00a04 to the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 4 OF PROTOCOL No. 4 TO THE CONVENTION63.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that they, as Georgian nationals, were collectively expelled from the Russian Federation in violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, which reads as follows:\u201cCollective expulsion of aliens is prohibited.\u201d64.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants argued that from the beginning of October 2006 there was a coordinated policy in place in the Russian Federation to expel Georgian nationals. In accordance with that policy the applicants were expelled, without an examination of the individual case or the particular circumstances of each applicant.65.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stressed the fact that the decision of the Ruzskiy District Court of the Moscow Region had only concerned the first applicant and that no expulsion decision had been delivered in regard to the second, third, fourth and fifth applicant. Beyond that the Government referred to the findings of the Court in its judgment Georgia v. Russia (I) (cited above, \u00a7\u00a0178) finding a violation of inter alia Article 4 of Protocol No. 4.66.\u00a0\u00a0The Government of Georgia reiterated the arguments submitted in Georgia v. Russia (I) (cited above) and referred to the reports of international organisations referred to in the judgment. It further maintained that the expulsion of Georgian nationals at that time had been based on their national and ethnic origin and not on their situation under the immigration rules of the Russian Federation.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility67.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0General Principles68.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates its case-law according to which collective expulsion, within the meaning of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, is to be understood as any measure compelling aliens, as a group, to leave a country, except where such a measure is taken following, and on the basis of, a reasonable and objective examination of the particular case of each individual alien of the group (see Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], no.\u00a016483\/12, \u00a7 237, 15 December 2016, with further references). The Court has subsequently specified that a reasonable and objective examination requires that each person concerned has been given the opportunity to put arguments against his or her expulsion to the competent authorities on an individual basis (see, among other authorities, Sultani v. France, no.\u00a045223\/05, \u00a7 81, ECHR 2007\u2011IV (extracts), Hirsi Jamaa and Others v.\u00a0Italy [GC], no. 27765\/09, \u00a7 184, ECHR 2012). That does not mean, however, that where there has been a reasonable and objective examination of the particular case of each individual the background to the execution of the expulsion orders plays no further role in determining whether there has been compliance with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 (see Khlaifia and Others, cited above, \u00a7 237, with further references).69.\u00a0\u00a0In Georgia v. Russia (I) (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 159, 175, 178) the Court concluded that:\u201c...from October 2006 a coordinated policy of arresting, detaining and expelling Georgian nationals was put in place in the Russian Federation which amounted to an administrative practice for the purposes of Convention case\u2011law.... during the period in question the Russian courts made thousands of expulsion orders expelling Georgian nationals. Even though, formally speaking, a court decision was made in respect of each Georgian national, the Court considers that the conduct of the expulsion procedures during that period, after the circulars and instructions had been issued, and the number of Georgian nationals expelled \u2013 from October 2006 \u2013 made it impossible to carry out a reasonable and objective examination of the particular case of each individual.... the expulsions of Georgian nationals during the period in question were not carried out following, and on the basis of, a reasonable and objective examination of the particular case of each individual and that this amounted to an administrative practice in breach of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4.\u201d2.\u00a0\u00a0Application in the present case70.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that regarding the second, third, fourth and fifth applicant no official expulsion decision by a court or any other Russian authority had been issued. However, the Court also acknowledges that owing to the administrative practice in place at the relevant time Georgian nationals in the Russian Federation had to fear to be arrested, detained and expelled. The Court considers it therefore comprehensible that some Georgian nationals left the Russian Federation prior to an official expulsion order anticipating being arrested, detained and expelled. In addition the Court notes that the first applicant, the mother of the other four applicants was expelled from the Russian Federation by the decision of the Ruzskiy District Court of the Moscow Region of 7 November 2006 and that the court acknowledged that she had four minor children. Nonetheless, the Court also notices that the children\u2019s father remained in Russia and that the first applicant attempted to leave the Russian Federation without the fifth applicant on 29 November 2006.71.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the first applicant the Court concludes that she was subjected to the administrative practice of expelling Georgian nationals and that her expulsion was not carried out following, and on the basis of, a reasonable and objective examination of the particular case of each individual. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention.72.\u00a0\u00a0Nonetheless, in absence of such an official expulsion order or any other specific act by the authorities the Court finds itself unable to conclude that the second, third, fourth and fifth applicant have been the subject of a \u201cmeasure compelling aliens, as a group, to leave a country\u201d. Moreover, the Court further finds that the situation of the applicants, even though compelling to a certain degree in itself, cannot be equated with an expulsion decision or other official coercive measure. There has accordingly been no violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention in regards to these four applicants.V.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION73.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants invoked Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The Parties\u2019 submissions74.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants argued that, after they were hindered from continuing their travels to Baku, they were under the direct control of the Russian authorities and therefore in a comparable situation to persons in detention. The applicants further submitted that by not providing adequate care and protection to the applicants, as vulnerable members of society, the Russian authorities violated their positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention, since the conditions during their stay in Derbent led to physical suffering, feelings of humiliation and subsequent negative effects on the applicants\u2019 health.75.\u00a0\u00a0The Russian Government contested the factual foundation of the complaint but did, in view of the Court\u2019s judgment Georgia v. Russia (I) (cited above), not submit any observations on the merits of the complaint. In essence the Government stated that the reason for the applicants\u2019 stay in Derbent was the fact that they had not duly issued documents.76.\u00a0\u00a0The Georgian Government referred to the Court\u2019s judgment in the case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC] (no. 30696\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0263, 264, ECHR 2011) and argued that the circumstances of the applicants\u2019 two weeks stay in Derbent also amounted to treatment in violation of Article 3 of the Convention. They particularly emphasised that the first applicant\u2019s pregnancy and the young age of the other applicants as well as the disregard for these factors shown by the Russian authorities should be taken into account as aggravating factors.77.\u00a0\u00a0The third party intervener ADF also submitted that the Court should, when assessing the severity of the alleged ill-treatment, take particular account of the first applicant\u2019s pregnancy.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility78.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits79.\u00a0\u00a0At the outset the Court observes that the applicants were not in detention awaiting their expulsion or detained for any other reason. The present case does concern the question whether the State had a positive obligation under Article 3 of the Convention to provide the applicants with health care, accommodation, food, transport and logistical support, while they awaited the issuance of transit visa after they were hindered from leaving the Russian Federation.(a)\u00a0\u00a0General Principles80.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 3 cannot be interpreted as obliging the High Contracting Parties to provide everyone within their jurisdiction with a home (see Chapman v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27238\/95, \u00a7\u00a099, ECHR 2001\u2011I) and that Article 3 does not entail any general obligation to give refugees financial assistance to enable them to maintain a certain standard of living either (see M\u00fcslim v. Turkey, no. 53566\/99, \u00a7 85, 26\u00a0April 2005).81.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also emphasises that it has not excluded the possibility that State responsibility could arise for \u2018treatment\u2019 where an applicant, in circumstances wholly dependent on State support, found him or herself faced with official indifference when in a situation of serious deprivation or want incompatible with human dignity (see Budina v. Russia (dec.), no.\u00a045603\/05, 18 June 2009).82.\u00a0\u00a0In the case of M.S.S. (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0263, 264) the Court held that the inaction of Greek authorities in regards to the living conditions of an asylum seeker had violated Article 3. The Court attached \u201cconsiderable importance to the applicant\u2019s status as an asylum-seeker and, as such, a member of a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special protection\u201d (M.S.S., cited above, \u00a7 251).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application in the present case83.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case the Court notes that at the relevant time the first applicant was eight months pregnant and the second, third, fourth and fifth applicant, who accompanied their mother were eleven, nine, six and two years old respectively. Moreover, the Court notes that the applicants had only limited resources to their disposal and were, after having stayed at the train station for one night, only able to find accommodation in a basement flat, which they had to share with several other persons. The Court also observes that the first applicant had been expelled from the territory of the Russian Federation and that the Russian authorities interrupted her travel, which forced the applicants to stay in an unfamiliar city during winter and which temperatures below 5o C. In view of all the above the Court concludes that the applicants were in a very vulnerable situation.84.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that the applicants\u2019 stay in Derbent was based on the conduct of the Russian authorities, which constituted a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No.\u00a04 (see paragraphs 54-62 above). It also notes that the applicants were not provided with a reason for the interruption of their travels and that the duration of the stay was not foreseeable for them, but wholly dependent on the conduct of the Russian authorities. The Court also acknowledges that the contradictory conduct of expelling the first applicant and subsequently preventing the applicants, including the first applicant, from leaving the territory of the Russian Federation would have created a feeling of extreme despair, anxiety and debasement for the applicants.85.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the applicants did not have access to health care, that their very limited financial means only sufficed to afford basic food, and that the authorities, who had caused the applicants\u2019 stay in Derbent, did accommodate neither the particular needs of the highly pregnant first applicant nor of her young children.86.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes that the applicants were in a very vulnerable position. It further finds that their situation was caused by the conduct of the Russian authorities and that the applicants were depending on the Russian authorities to end their forced stay in Derbent. Finally, the Court considers that the Russian authorities showed indifference towards the applicant\u2019s extremely difficult situation. Having regard to all of the above, the Court concludes that the very special circumstances of the present case are sufficient to accept a positive obligation under Article 3 of the Convention. Since the Russian authorities did not provide the applicants\u2019 with any form of support, but delayed their stay in Derbent for about two weeks, the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 3.VI.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 387.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that they had no effective remedy, which could have provided redress for the alleged ill-treatment during their stay in Derbent. They relied on Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d88.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the effect of Article 13 is to require the provision of a domestic remedy allowing the competent national authority both to deal with the substance of the relevant Convention complaint and to grant appropriate relief (see Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, \u00a7 145, Reports 1996\u2011V). The remedy required by Article 13 must be \u201ceffective\u201d, both in practice and in law.89.\u00a0\u00a0Concerning domestic remedies in the Russian Federation against arrest and detention and against expulsion orders the Court established in Georgia v. Russia (I) (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 152-156) that\u201c[H]having regard to all the material in its possession, the Court considers that during the period in question there were real obstacles for the Georgian nationals in using those remedies, both during the proceedings before the Russian courts in the Russian Federation and once they had been expelled to Georgia.It considers that in the Russian Federation those obstacles arose as a result of the procedures carried out before the Russian courts as described by the Georgian witnesses, namely, that they had been brought before the courts in groups. Whilst some referred to an interview with a judge lasting an average of five minutes and with no proper examination of the facts of the case, others said that they had not been allowed into the courtroom and had waited in the corridors, or even in the buses that had delivered them to the court, with other Georgian nationals. They said that they had subsequently been ordered to sign the court decisions without having been able to read the contents or obtain a copy of the decision. They had had neither an interpreter nor a lawyer. As a general rule, both the judges and the police officers had discouraged them from appealing, telling them that there had been an order to expel Georgian nationals.Furthermore, the climate of precipitation and intimidation in which these measures were taken also explains the reluctance of the Georgian nationals to use those remedies.In Georgia, over and above the psychological factor, it considers that there were practical obstacles in using these remedies because of the closure of transport links between the two countries. Furthermore, it was very difficult to contact the consulate of the Russian Federation in Georgia, which was very short staffed with only three diplomats at the material time.\u201d90.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds no reason to depart from its earlier findings in the present case. In particular the practical obstacles for expelled Georgian nationals also existed for the present applicants after their return to Georgia. Moreover, the Court notes that the first applicant\u2019s oral complaints to the authorities in Derbent were to no avail and that her written complaint with the General Prosecutor\u2019s office of the Russian Federation did not lead to an official investigation or other outcome.91.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article\u00a013 in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention.VII.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLES 3 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION AND ARTICLES 2 AND 4 OF PROTOCOL No. 492.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants further complained that their expulsion and ill\u2011treatment were discriminatory on the ground of their ethnic origin. They relied on Article 14 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cThe enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.\u201d93.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that Article 14 of the Convention complements the other substantive provisions of the Convention and its Protocols. It has no independent existence since it has effect solely in relation to \u201cthe enjoyment of the rights and freedoms\u201d safeguarded by those provisions. Although the application of Article 14 does not presuppose a breach of those provisions, and to this extent it is autonomous, there can be no room for its application unless the facts at issue fall within the ambit of one or more of the latter. In addition, the Court has established in its case-law that in order for an issue to arise under Article 14 there must be a difference in treatment of persons in relevantly similar situations. Such a difference of treatment is discriminatory if it has no objective and reasonable justification (see H\u00e4m\u00e4l\u00e4inen v. Finland [GC], no. 37359\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 107, 108, ECHR 2014)94.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that, in the particular circumstances of the case, the complaints lodged by the applicants under Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Articles 2 and 4 of Protocol No. 4 are the same \u2013 even though submitted under a different angle \u2013 as those complaints brought under the substantive provisions (see Georgia v. Russia (I), cited above, \u00a7\u00a0220). The Court reiterates that it already found a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 regarding the applicants\u2019 stay in Derbent. The Court further found a violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 regarding the expulsion of the first applicant and concluded that the other four applicants were not expelled. Accordingly, it considers that it is unnecessary to determine whether there has in the instant case been a violation of Article\u00a014 taken in conjunction with those provisions on account of discriminatory treatment against Georgian nationals.95.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the applicants complaint under Article 14 in conjunction with Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention the Court notes that the applicants have not shown that other persons \u2013 non-Georgian nationals \u2013 had been treated differently in a situation comparable to the applicants\u2019 stay in Derbent. In particular they failed to establish that not providing the applicants with support in Derbent was based on their nationality and not a general practice of the Russian authorities. Accordingly the applicants\u2019 complaint under Article 14 in conjunction with Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention has to be declared inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention.VIII.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION96.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage97.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants claimed together 400,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.98.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered the claimed amount evidently excessive and submitted that due to the application of Article 41 in the inter-State case Georgia v. Russia (I), in which the applicants were named as victims, the Court should take the already granted application of damages into account.99.\u00a0\u00a0The Court awards, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, all five applicants together the total amount of EUR 30,000.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses100.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also claimed EUR 5,000 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court.101.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the claimed amount was evidently excessive and that the applicants did not submit any confirming documents regarding the claimed costs and expenses.102.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. The Court requires itemised bills and invoices that are sufficiently detailed to enable it to determine to what extent the above requirements have been met (see Maktouf and Damjanovi\u0107 v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], nos. 2312\/08 and 34179\/08, \u00a7 94, ECHR 2013 (extracts)). Pursuant to Rule 60 \u00a7\u00a7 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court all just satisfaction claims have to be submitted together with any relevant supporting documents, and a failure to do so may lead to a rejection of the claim in whole or in part.103.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicants have not submitted any legal or financial documents in support of their claim for cost and expenses. Having regard to the absence of these documents the Court dismisses their claim for cost and expenses.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest104.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","28948":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION22.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that the national authorities had failed to consider his claim that he could be at risk of ill\u2011treatment in the event of his removal to Uzbekistan, and that extradition would expose him to that risk if it were to take place. Article\u00a03 of the Convention reads:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d23.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested these arguments.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility24.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles25.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant general principles concerning the application of Article\u00a03 have been summarised recently by the Court in the judgment F.G.\u00a0v. Sweden ([GC], no. 43611\/11, \u00a7 111-27, ECHR 2016) and in context of removals from Russia to Uzbekistan in Mamazhonov v. Russia (no.\u00a017239\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 127-35, 23 October 2014).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles to the present case(a)\u00a0\u00a0Existence of substantial grounds for believing that the applicant faces a real risk of ill-treatment and the assessment thereof by the national authorities26.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has previously established that the individuals whose extradition was sought by the Uzbek authorities on charges of religiously or politically motivated crimes constituted a vulnerable group facing a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention in the event of their removal to Uzbekistan. (see Mamazhonov, cited above, \u00a7141).27.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, it is apparent that in the course of the extradition proceedings the applicant consistently and specifically argued that he had been prosecuted for religious extremism and faced a risk of ill\u2011treatment (see paragraph 11 above). The international search and arrest warrant and extradition request submitted by the Uzbek authorities were clear as to their basis, namely that he was accused of religiously and politically motivated crimes. The Uzbek authorities thus directly identified him with the groups whose members have previously been found to be at real risk of being subjected to proscribed treatment.28.\u00a0\u00a0In such circumstances, the Court considers that the Russian authorities had at their disposal a sufficiently substantiated complaint pointing to a real risk of ill-treatment.29. The Court is therefore satisfied that the applicant presented the Russian authorities with substantial grounds for believing that he faced a real risk of ill-treatment in Uzbekistan.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Duty to assess claims of a real risk of ill-treatment through reliance on sufficient relevant material30.\u00a0\u00a0Having concluded that the applicant had advanced at national level a valid claim based on substantial grounds for believing that he faced a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, the Court must examine whether the authorities discharged their obligation to assess this claim adequately through reliance on sufficient relevant material.31.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court considers that in the extradition proceedings the domestic authorities did not carry out a rigorous scrutiny of the applicant\u2019s claim that he faced a risk of ill-treatment in his home country. The Court reaches this conclusion having considered the national courts\u2019 simplistic rejection \u2013 without reference to evidentiary material \u2013 of the applicant\u2019s claims as hypothetical and lacking specific indications as to the level of risk, together with the comment that the situation in a requesting state might change over time. Moreover, the domestic courts\u2019 unquestioning reliance on the assurances of the Uzbek authorities, despite their formulation in standard terms, appears tenuous, given that similar assurances have consistently been considered unsatisfactory by the Court in the past (see, for example, Abdulkhakov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 14743\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 149-50, 2 October 2012, and Tadzhibayev v.\u00a0Russia, no. 17724\/14, \u00a7 46, 1 December 2015).32.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that the Russian legal system \u2013 in theory, at least \u2013 offers several avenues whereby the applicant\u2019s removal to Uzbekistan could be prevented, given the risk of ill-treatment he faces there. However, the facts of the present case demonstrate that the applicant\u2019s claims were not adequately considered in any relevant proceedings, despite being consistently raised.33.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes that, although the applicant had sufficiently substantiated the claim that he would risk ill-treatment in Uzbekistan, the Russian authorities failed to assess his claims adequately through reliance on sufficient relevant material. This failure opened the way for the applicant\u2019s extradition to Uzbekistan.(c)\u00a0\u00a0Existence of a real risk of ill-treatment or danger to life34.\u00a0\u00a0Given the failure of the domestic authorities to adequately assess the alleged real risk of ill-treatment through reliance on sufficient relevant material, the Court finds itself compelled to examine independently whether or not the applicant would be exposed to such a risk in the event of his removal to Uzbekistan.35.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that nothing in the parties\u2019 submissions, nor available relevant material from independent international sources (see paragraph 21 above and also Human Rights Watch World Report 2016, Amnesty International report Fast-track to Torture: Abductions and Forcible Returns from Russia to Uzbekistan, 21 April 2016), nor previously adopted judgments and decisions (see recently Kholmurodov v. Russia, no.\u00a058923\/14, 1 March 2016, and Mukhitdinov v. Russia, no. 20999\/14, 19\u00a0October 2015), indicate that there has been any improvement in either the criminal justice system of Uzbekistan in general or in the specific treatment of those prosecuted for religiously and politically motivated crimes.36.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has given due consideration to the available material disclosing a real risk of ill-treatment to individuals accused, like the applicant, of religiously and politically motivated crimes, and concludes that authorising the applicant\u2019s removal to Uzbekistan exposed him to a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.(d)\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion37.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that there would be a violation of Article 3 of the Convention if the applicant were to be removed to Uzbekistan.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION38.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 13 of the Convention of a lack of effective domestic remedies in Russia in respect of his complaint under Article 3 of the Convention. Article 13 reads:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d39.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is intrinsically linked to those examined above and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.40.\u00a0\u00a0 In view of the findings made under Article 3 of the Convention, the Court does not consider it necessary to deal with the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF AN INTERIM MEASURE UNDER RULE 39 OF\u00a0THE RULES OF COURT41.\u00a0\u00a0On 8 October 2015 the Court indicated to the respondent Government, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that the applicant should not be extradited, expelled or otherwise involuntarily removed from Russia to Uzbekistan or another country for the duration of the proceedings before the Court.42.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection the Court reiterates that, in accordance with Article\u00a028 \u00a7 2 of the Convention, the present judgment is final.43.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court considers that the measure indicated to the Government under Rule\u00a039 of the Rules of Court should be discontinued.IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION44.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage45.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.46.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not advance any specific argument in this respect and was of the view that any award should be made in compliance with the Court\u2019s established case-law.47.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the nature of the established violations of Article\u00a03 of the Convention and the specific facts of the present case, the Court considers that finding that there would be a violation of Article 3 of the Convention if the applicant were to be removed to Uzbekistan constitutes sufficient just satisfaction in respect of any non-pecuniary damage suffered (see, to similar effect, J.K. and Others v. Sweden [GC], no. 59166\/12, \u00a7 127, ECHR 2016).B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses48.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed EUR 6,300 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and before the Court, EUR 4,400 being payable for the services of Ms D. Trenina and EUR 1,900 for the services of Ms\u00a0E. Davidyan.49.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not advance any specific argument in this respect and considered that any award should be made in compliance with the Court\u2019s established case-law.50.\u00a0\u00a0Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case\u2011law, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 6,300 covering costs under all heads, with EUR 4,400 awarded to Ms D.\u00a0Trenina and EUR 1,900 to Ms E. Davidyan.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest51.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","29007":"I.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 37 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION68.\u00a0\u00a0By Article 37 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, the Court may decide to strike an application out of its list of cases where the circumstances lead to the conclusion that:\u201c(a)\u00a0\u00a0the applicant does not intend to pursue his application; or(b)\u00a0\u00a0the matter has been resolved; or(c)\u00a0\u00a0for any other reason established by the Court it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application.However, the Court shall continue the examination of the application if respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto so requires....\u201d69.\u00a0\u00a0By a letter of 30 January 2015 the applicants\u2019 representative informed the Court that he was no longer in contact with the third applicant. He believed the third applicant to have relocated to Switzerland, but was unable to take her instructions with regard to the Government\u2019s observations.70.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not comment on this issue.71.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is of the opinion that the third applicant\u2019s failure to inform her representative of her current whereabouts must be taken as indicating that she has lost interest in pursuing her application. Although it is true that she did authorise the AIRE Centre to represent her in the proceedings before the Court, it considers that this authority does not by itself justify pursuing the examination of her application. Given the representative\u2019s inability to establish any communication with the third applicant, the Court considers that the AIRE Centre cannot meaningfully pursue the proceedings before it (see V.M. and Others v. Belgium [GC], no. 60125\/11, \u00a7 36, 17\u00a0November\u00a02016, with further references).72.\u00a0\u00a0That being so, the Court finds that further examination of the third applicant\u2019s application is not justified. Consequently, it concludes that the third applicant may be regarded as no longer wishing to pursue her application within the meaning of Article 37 \u00a7 1 (a) of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Chirino v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 31898\/04, 4 May 2006, and Noor Mohammed v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 14029\/04, 27\u00a0March 2008).73.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that the third applicant has raised the same complaints as the other two applicants in the present case, which it will examine below. In accordance with Article 37 \u00a7 1 in fine, the Court therefore finds no reasons relating to respect for human rights, as defined in the Convention and its Protocols, which would require it to continue the examination of the application (see Denizci and Others\u00a0v.\u00a0Cyprus, nos.\u00a025316-25321\/94 and 27207\/95, \u00a7 369, ECHR 2001\u2011V).74.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court decides to strike the third applicant\u2019s application out of its list of cases. In the following parts of the present judgment, the expression \u201cthe applicants\u201d should be taken to refer to the first and second applicants only.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 4 OF THE CONVENTION75.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that they had been subjected to forced labour and human trafficking, and that the Austrian authorities had failed to comply with their positive obligations under the procedural limb of Article\u00a04 of the Convention.76.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant parts of Article 4 read:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0No one shall be held in slavery or servitude.2.\u00a0\u00a0No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour....\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The Government77.\u00a0\u00a0The Government firstly submitted that it appeared that the applicants had not complied with the six-month time-limit under Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. They stated that while the final domestic decision had been given by the Vienna Regional Court on 16 March 2012 (see paragraph 30 above), the application to the Court was dated 2 November 2012. It was therefore doubtful that the time-limit had been complied with.78.\u00a0\u00a0Secondly, the Government asserted that the case should be declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, as the applicants had failed to lodge an application for the renewal of criminal proceedings under Article 363a of the CCP (see paragraph 41 above) against the decision of the Vienna Regional Criminal Court of 16 March 2012.79.\u00a0\u00a0By referring to the Supreme Court\u2019s established case-law, beginning with its ruling of 1 August 2007 (no. 13 Os 135\/06m \u2013 see paragraph 42 above), the Government argued that an application for the renewal of proceedings under Article 363a of the CCP constituted an effective remedy at domestic level within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention. The applicants could have complained of a violation of Convention rights and asked the Supreme Court to order the continuation of the criminal investigation proceedings. Lodging such an application would have led to a comprehensive examination of the compatibility of the judicial decision with Convention rights, and could have led to the renewal of the proceedings and subsequently to a new judicial decision.80.\u00a0\u00a0The Supreme Court\u2019s ruling of 1 August 2007, wherein it had held that an application for the renewal of proceedings under Article 363a of the CCP could be lodged even prior to a decision by the Court, had been widely disseminated and discussed not only amongst legal scholars, but also in daily newspapers. Further, statistics showed that people had actually made use of the remedy: 37 times in 2011 and 40 times in 2012 and 2013 respectively.81.\u00a0\u00a0Also, the Supreme Court\u2019s ruling of 16 December 2010 (case no.\u00a013\u00a0Os\u00a0130\/10g \u2013 see paragraph 43 above) had not restricted the applicants\u2019 right to lodge an application for the renewal of proceedings, as it had merely referred to the rights of victims within the meaning of Article\u00a066 \u00a7 1 of the CCP, and did not affect alleged violations of the Convention.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants82.\u00a0\u00a0Concerning the six-month time-limit, the applicants submitted that the Government\u2019s doubts were mistaken. They had sent the letter of intent on 4 September 2012. The application form had been faxed and sent by post on 5 November 2012, in accordance with the deadline given by the Court. The time-limit under Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention had thus been complied with.83.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to the question whether domestic remedies had been exhausted, the applicants pointed to the decision of the Vienna Regional Court of 16 March 2012 (see paragraph 30 above), which expressly stated that, in accordance with Article 196 \u00a7 3 of the CCP, there was no right of appeal against that decision. This indicated already that domestic remedies had been exhausted.84.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants argued that an application for the renewal of criminal proceedings under Article 363a of the CCP (see paragraph 41 above) was not an effective remedy. The Government had failed to prove that the proposed remedy had been both effective and available in theory and in practice at the relevant time.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment85.\u00a0\u00a0Regarding the Government\u2019s contention that the application was submitted outside the time-limit provided for by Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention (see paragraph 77 above), the Court notes that the applicants\u2019 first letter of intent \u2013 which at the time of its submission was satisfactory to stop the six-month time-limit from running \u2013 reached the Court on 4 September 2012. The last domestic decision in the matter was served on the applicants\u2019 counsel on 23 March 2012 (see paragraph 30 in fine above), hence less than six months before that date. The Court is therefore satisfied that the admissibility criterion of Article 35 \u00a7 1 in fine has been complied with.86.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the Government\u2019s objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies (see paragraphs 78-81 above), the Court observes that in the case of ATV Privatfernseh-GmbH v. Austria ((dec.), no. 58842\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a032-37, 6 October 2015) it examined in detail the question whether Article 363a of the CCP was a remedy which was readily available and sufficient to afford redress in respect of an alleged breach of rights under Article 10 of the Convention in proceedings for compensation under section\u00a07 of the Media Act. It found that, in the circumstances of that case, an application under Article 363a of the CCP constituted an effective and sufficient remedy which an applicant would be obliged to use. However, it appears from the Supreme Court\u2019s case-law that victims of crimes and private prosecutors as well as public prosecutors are not entitled to that remedy (see F\u00fcrst-Pfeifer v. Austria, nos. 33677\/10 and 52340\/10, \u00a7 31, 17\u00a0May 2016, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of 10 December 2010 (no. 13 Os 130\/10g), cited in paragraph 43 above). The Government have not provided evidence to show that the availability of the remedy also extends to those groups of persons. It follows that the Government\u2019s objection with regard to the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies has to be dismissed.87.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants88.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that the credibility of their claims was highlighted by the fact that the Austrian authorities had dismissed the criminal allegations of theft made against them by their employers after the police had had an opportunity to question the applicants (see paragraph 26 above). They stressed that the authorities had accepted that their treatment fell within the notion of human trafficking, as defined by Articles 4 and 10 of the Council of Europe Anti\u2011Trafficking Convention, and the Court\u2019s judgment in Rantsev v.\u00a0Cyprus and Russia (no. 25965\/04, ECHR 2010 (extracts)).89.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the public prosecutor and the Vienna Regional Criminal Court had at no stage queried the veracity of the allegations of forced labour and human trafficking, but had simply stated that the incidents alleged to have taken place on Austrian soil were too short in duration to engage Austrian interests for the purpose of having jurisdiction over a criminal offence. It followed that the events which had occurred outside Austria were also to be considered credible. The incidents which had occurred in Austria \u2013 which had remained undisputed by the Government \u2013 could not be viewed in isolation, and had been part of an ongoing course of treatment. Indeed, the incidents prior to the applicants\u2019 arrival in Austria had been part of the trafficking chain relevant to the trafficking situation in Austria, and should be examined as part of the respondent State\u2019s procedural obligations (the applicants referred to Rantsev, cited above, \u00a7 307). As the applicants had been accepted in Austria as victims of human trafficking, the parts of the trafficking chain prior to their arrival in Austria, that is those parts in the Philippines (their recruitment, deception, and transportation at least) and in the United Arab Emirates (their exploitation and transportation at least), should be examined. Seeing in isolation the events which had occurred in Austria over the course of three days would be an unlawfully narrow window for examination, and was not supported by either authority or common sense. By confining their approach to their duty to investigate and prosecute the incidents in Vienna, the Government were ignoring the fact that the positive identification of a person as a victim of human trafficking was sufficient to trigger the duty under international law to investigate also those events which occurred abroad.90.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that there was a difference between the duty to identify and provide substantive assistance and support to victims of human trafficking, and the procedural obligation to investigate under international and EU law. While the Government had described a range of measures that had been applied in the applicants\u2019 case in respect of the former duty (see paragraphs 98-100 below), they had failed to comply with the latter. The investigation in the present case had been so inadequate as to be in breach of Article 4 of the Convention. The duty to investigate had been triggered by the applicants showing sufficient indicators to raise a credible suspicion of trafficking. In C.N. v. the United Kingdom (no.\u00a04239\/08, \u00a7 72, 13\u00a0November 2012) the Court had held that \u201cthe fact that the domestic authorities conducted any investigation into the applicant\u2019s complaints strongly indicates that, at least on their face, they were not inherently implausible\u201d. The applicants contended that that finding applied in their case, given that the public prosecutor had not treated their complaints as incredible or implausible, but had simply discontinued them for technical reasons.91.\u00a0\u00a0In this context, the applicants alleged that the relevant Articles of the CC had been interpreted too strictly and narrowly in their case, or in the alternative, that the Articles had been too narrowly framed to begin with, giving rise to a breach of Article 4 of the Convention.92.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that the respondent State\u2019s duty to investigate had been triggered in July 2011 (see paragraph 25 above), when they had turned to the police. That duty flowed from Articles 27 and 31 of the Anti-Trafficking Convention (see paragraphs 58 and 59 above), and Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the Palermo Protocol (see paragraphs 50-52 above). By discontinuing any investigation against the applicants\u2019 employers at such an early stage, the Austrian authorities had failed to satisfy the key aims of the State\u2019s international obligations relating to human trafficking, including ensuring the effective investigation and prosecution of the perpetrators of the crimes against the applicants.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government93.\u00a0\u00a0The Government emphasised at the outset that there was no evidence available to them as to whether and to what extent the incidents in the Philippines and the United Arab Emirates, as submitted by the applicants, had actually occurred. Only the events and proceedings in Austria were undisputed.94.\u00a0\u00a0Concerning the general and legislative measures Austria had taken in order to combat human trafficking and labour exploitation, the Government submitted that Austria was a State Party to all the relevant international legal instruments, such as the Council of Europe Anti-Trafficking Convention, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and the Palermo Protocol. The first Austrian \u201cNational Action Plan against Trafficking in Human Beings\u201d had been prepared in close cooperation with civil society organisations, and had been adopted by the Austrian Council of Ministers (Ministerrat) in March 2007 for a three-year period. Since then, further national action plans had been adopted. In the period 2010-11 Austria had been among the first Council of Europe member States to be evaluated by GRETA (see paragraph 61 above), whose recommendations, adopted on 26 September 2011 by the Committee of the Contracting Parties to the Anti-Trafficking Convention, had been taken into account and implemented in the National Action Plan 2012-2014, specifically concerning the exploitation of domestic staff. Austria had fully complied with its obligation to protect the victims of human trafficking and forced labour, in particular through the assistance of LEF\u00d6 (the intervention centre which had supported the applicants during the domestic proceedings \u2013 see paragraph 25 above), which was active throughout Austria on behalf of the Ministry of the Interior (Bundesministerium f\u00fcr Inneres) and the Ministry for Education and Women (Bundesministerium f\u00fcr Bildung und Frauen).95.\u00a0\u00a0The Government pointed out that Austria was therefore in full compliance with its obligations under international law. Article 104a of the CC (see paragraph 35 above), in force since 2010, constituted an adequate and efficient legal basis to prosecute and punish trafficking in human beings. In accordance with Article 64 of the CC (see paragraph 40 above), offences committed abroad were punishable even beyond the extent required by Article 31 of the Council of Europe Anti-Trafficking Convention, namely irrespective of whether the offence was punishable under criminal law in the country where it had been committed. Apart from territorial jurisdiction and the extended active and passive personality principle, Austrian laws also included a wider interpretation of the principle aut dedere aut iudicare. Austria assumed jurisdiction not only if an offender\u2019s extradition was rejected because of his or her nationality, but also if Austrian interests were at stake (see Article 64 of the CC). The Government underlined that the Anti-Trafficking Convention did not require its States Parties to establish universal jurisdiction to combat human trafficking and forced labour.96.\u00a0\u00a0The Government asserted that the provisions and measures described above had been applied in the applicants\u2019 case, and that the actions taken by the Austrian authorities had also been in full compliance with the Convention.97.\u00a0\u00a0The incidents with their former employers during their holidays in Austria, as described by the applicants, had occurred over the course of three days in July 2010. The applicants had only notified the police of these incidents approximately one year later. Even though they could not be blamed for turning to the police so late, it had made the investigation of their case more difficult. Owing to the initial investigation against the applicants because of the theft reported by their employers, the authorities had assumed that the applicants had long since left Austria, and could not be interrogated via letters of request (Rechtshilfeersuchen) from organs of the United Arab Emirates either. From general experience, the incidents described by the applicants as taking place at the hotel in Vienna (looking after the children, cooking and doing washing at unusual hours and in excessive amounts, intimidating behaviour on the part of their employers, and the confiscation of their passports), and especially the scene in the very popular zoo, could not be ascertained with the certainty required for criminal proceedings more than one year later. Therefore, it could no longer be assessed whether the applicants\u2019 treatment had actually reached an intensity to be qualified as labour exploitation within the meaning of Article 4, or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. The statements made during the questioning of the three presumed victims of human trafficking, and those of the hotel receptionist, who had only witnessed some of the incidents herself, had not seemed sufficient to substantiate such serious criminal charges.98.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants had been supported first by other Filipino nationals living in Vienna, and as of 2011 also by the NGO LEF\u00d6. After having left their employers, they had no longer been in either a situation of exploitation, or under any conceivable threat of being exploited in the future. On the contrary, it had been with the assistance of the Austrian State that they had been able to reside lawfully in Austria. From the point when they had turned to LEF\u00d6 \u2013 an institution financed by public funds \u2013 they had been provided with legal representation, procedural guidance, and assistance to facilitate their integration in Austria.99.\u00a0\u00a0In accordance with Article 10 of the Anti-Trafficking Convention (see paragraph 56 above), the applicants had not been questioned by ordinary police officers, but by officers specially trained and experienced in cases of cross-border human trafficking and labour exploitation. During the questioning, they had been accompanied by representatives of LEF\u00d6 (see paragraph 25 above). The applicants had not been expelled to their country of origin, nor had any other measures been taken to terminate their stay in Austria. Rather, they had been granted special protection under section 69a of the Residence Act (see paragraph 46 above), thus enabling them to reside lawfully in Austria. The applicants had therefore not only been treated in a manner going beyond Austria\u2019s obligations under Article 10 of the Anti\u2011Trafficking Convention, but had also been given the opportunity to work and secure their own livelihood in Austria. Furthermore, a personal data disclosure ban had been imposed on the Central Register, so their whereabouts were not traceable by the general public (see paragraph 34 above).100.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the Austrian authorities had also complied with their obligations under Article 27 of the Anti-Trafficking Convention (see paragraph 58 above). As described above, the applicants had been supported by LEF\u00d6 before the police authorities, within the meaning of Article 27 \u00a7 3, and by lawyers before the Vienna public prosecutor\u2019s office. It had not been possible to institute proceedings earlier, since the applicants\u2019 allegations against their former employers had only been brought to the authorities\u2019 attention in July 2011.101.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contended that the applicants\u2019 situation had thus differed significantly from the situation of applicants in previous cases before the Court, where an immediate and intensive investigation into the circumstances would have been required (the Government referred, notably, to Rantsev, cited above, \u00a7 289). In a case such as the instant one, there appeared to be no duty to cooperate with the competent authorities of the other State concerned (here, the United Arab Emirates) in the investigation of events which had occurred in that State (they cited, mutatis mutandis, Rantsev, loc. cit.). The legal assistance necessary for conducting criminal investigations against the applicants\u2019 former employers could not be obtained from the United Arab Emirates, as no mutual legal assistance agreement between Austria and the United Arab Emirates yet existed. Even simple requests for legal assistance had repeatedly been rejected in the past without discernible reason. There were also no indications that the applicants\u2019 former employers were still staying in the United Kingdom, where they had allegedly planned to travel after their stay in Vienna. However, for further investigative measures, it would have been indispensable to inform the former employers of the allegations made and give them an opportunity to comment on the accusations. Under Austrian law, in the absence of an accused, it was not possible to conduct proceedings to determine the offences at issue.102.\u00a0\u00a0The Government concluded by saying that there had been no violation of Article 4 of the Convention, because the general obligation to take operational measures, as detailed above, did not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities, but required them to endeavour to provide for the physical safety of victims of trafficking in human beings, which they had done (the Government referred, mutatis mutandis, to Rantsev, cited above, \u00a7 287).2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles103.\u00a0\u00a0The Court refers to its relevant case-law on the general principles governing the application of Article 4 of the Convention in the specific context of trafficking in human beings and forced labour (see Rantsev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 272-289). It reiterates that Article 4 enshrines one of the fundamental values of democratic societies. The first paragraph of this Article makes no provision for exceptions, and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 \u00a7 2, even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of a nation (see C.N. v. the United Kingdom, no.\u00a04239\/08, \u00a7 65, 13 November 2012).104.\u00a0\u00a0The Court noted in Rantsev that trafficking in human beings was often described as a form of modern slavery, and it therefore took the view that it was in itself an affront to human dignity and incompatible with democratic and Convention values, and thus within the prohibition of Article 4, without needing to classify it as \u201cslavery\u201d, \u201cservitude\u201d or \u201cforced labour\u201d. The identified elements of trafficking \u2013 the treatment of human beings as commodities, close surveillance, the circumscription of movement, the use of violence and threats, poor living and working conditions, and little or no payment \u2013 cut across these three categories (see Rantsev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 279-282). The Court has held that trafficking in human beings, by its very nature and aim of exploitation, is based on the exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership. It treats human beings as commodities to be bought and sold and put to forced labour, often for little or no payment, usually in the sex industry but also elsewhere. It implies close surveillance of the activities of the victims, whose movements are often circumscribed. It involves the use of violence and threats against victims, who live and work under poor conditions (ibid., \u00a7 281; see also M. and Others v. Italy and Bulgaria, no. 40020\/03, \u00a7 151, 31\u00a0July 2012).105.\u00a0\u00a0Trafficking in human beings is a problem which is often not confined to the domestic arena. When a person is trafficked from one State to another, trafficking offences may occur in the State of origin, any State of transit and the State of destination. Relevant evidence and witnesses may be located in all States. Although the Palermo Protocol (see paragraphs 47-52 above) is silent on the question of jurisdiction, the Anti-Trafficking Convention (see paragraphs 53-59 above) explicitly requires each member State to establish jurisdiction over any trafficking offence committed in its territory. Such an approach is, in the Court\u2019s view, only logical in light of the positive obligation incumbent on all States under Article 4 of the Convention to investigate alleged trafficking offences. Member States are also subject to a duty in cross-border trafficking cases to cooperate effectively with the relevant authorities of other States concerned in the investigation of events which occurred outside their territories (see Rantsev, cited above, \u00a7 289).106.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has held that a State may be held responsible under Article 4 of the Convention not only for its direct actions, but also for its failure to effectively protect the victims of slavery, servitude, or forced or compulsory labour by virtue of its positive obligations and to conduct a comprehensive investigation (see Siliadin v. France, no. 73316\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 89 and 112, ECHR 2005\u2011VII). It follows that States are also under an obligation to put in place a legislative and administrative framework to prohibit and punish trafficking, as well as to take measures to protect victims, in order to ensure a comprehensive approach to the issue, as required by the Palermo Protocol and the Anti-Trafficking Convention (see Rantsev, cited above, \u00a7 285). States are also required to provide relevant training for law-enforcement and immigration officials (ibid., \u00a7 287).107.\u00a0\u00a0As with Articles 2 and 3, the positive obligation to investigate is triggered as soon as a matter has come to the attention of the authorities; the investigation must fulfil the requirements of independence and impartiality, promptness and reasonable expedition, and urgency where there is a possibility of removing the individual concerned from a harmful situation. The investigation must also be capable of leading to the identification and punishment of the individuals responsible \u2013 an obligation concerning the means to be employed, and not the results to be achieved (ibid., \u00a7 288). In addition, authorities must take all reasonable steps available to them to secure evidence concerning the incident (see, in relation to Article 3 of the Convention, Nikolay Dimitrov v. Bulgaria, no. 72663\/01, \u00a7 69, 27 September 2007). Finally, the positive obligation must not be interpreted in such a way as to impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities (see, mutatis mutandis and in relation to Article 2 of the Convention, Maiorano and Others v. Italy, no. 28634\/06, \u00a7 105, 15\u00a0December 2009).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of these principles to the instant case108.\u00a0\u00a0At the outset, the Court considers that the applicants\u2019 allegations fall within the ambit of Article 4 of the Convention, as established by its case-law on the subject (see, among other authorities, Siliadin, cited above, and Rantsev, cited above). The alleged treatment prohibited by Article 4 was not imputed to organs of the Austrian State, but to private individuals, namely the applicants\u2019 employers, over a period of several years in Dubai and two to three days in Austria. Therefore, the present case concerns the positive obligations arising under this provision, rather than the negative obligations.109.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the instant case essentially raises two questions: whether the Austrian authorities complied with their positive obligation to identify and support the applicants as (potential) victims of human trafficking, and whether they fulfilled their positive obligation to investigate the alleged crimes.(i)\u00a0\u00a0Whether the positive obligation to identify and support the applicants as victims of human trafficking has been complied with110.\u00a0\u00a0Concerning the first question, having regard to the applicants\u2019 statements to the police (see paragraph 25 above), the Court notes that the authorities appear to have considered their claims credible. From the point when the applicants turned to the police, they were immediately treated as (potential) victims of human trafficking. They were interviewed by specially trained police officers (see paragraphs 25 and 99 above), were granted residence and work permits in order to regularise their stay in Austria (see paragraphs 32-33 above), and a personal data disclosure ban was imposed on the Central Register so their whereabouts were untraceable by the general public (see paragraph 34 above). During the domestic proceedings, the applicants were supported by the NGO LEF\u00d6, which is funded by the Government especially to provide assistance to victims of human trafficking. According to the uncontested statements of the Government (see paragraph 98 above), the applicants were given legal representation, procedural guidance and assistance to facilitate their integration in Austria.111.\u00a0\u00a0For the purposes of Article 4 of the Convention, it is paramount that the applicants\u2019 claims as a whole were taken seriously and the applicable legal framework was applied, in accordance with the State\u2019s obligations under the Convention. From that point of view, the Court considers that the legal and administrative framework in place concerning the protection of (potential) victims of human trafficking in Austria appears to have been sufficient, and that the Austrian authorities took all steps which could reasonably have been expected in the given situation. This was not contested by the applicants. The Court is therefore satisfied that the duty to identify, protect and support the applicants as (potential) victims of human trafficking was complied with by the authorities.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Whether the positive obligation to investigate the allegations of human trafficking was complied with112.\u00a0\u00a0Concerning the second question, namely the procedural obligation incumbent on the Austrian authorities to investigate the applicants\u2019 allegations and to prosecute cases of human trafficking, the Court notes that the applicants were given the opportunity to describe in detail what had happened to them and how they had been treated by their employers. The public prosecutor\u2019s office initiated an investigation after the applicants had given their statements to the police in July and August 2011. It would not have been possible to initiate the investigation earlier, as the applicants only decided to turn to the police approximately one year after leaving their employers. However, the investigation was discontinued in November 2011, as the public prosecutor\u2019s office was of the opinion that the applicants\u2019 employers\u2019 alleged conduct on Austrian territory did not fulfil the elements of Article 104a of the CC. As far as the events abroad were concerned, the public prosecutor\u2019s office observed that the alleged crime of trafficking in human beings had been committed abroad, the accused were non-nationals, and Austrian interests were not engaged (see paragraph 27 above). The decision to discontinue the proceedings was confirmed in December 2011by the Vienna Regional Criminal Court, which added that there was no reason to prosecute if, on the basis of the results of the investigation, a conviction was no more likely than an acquittal. In its view, there was also no obligation under international law to pursue the investigation in relation to the events that had allegedly taken place abroad (see paragraph 30 above). In their observations, the Government added that requests for legal assistance had repeatedly been rejected in the past by the United Arab Emirates without discernible reason, implying that making such a request would have been of no use in the instant case (see paragraph 101 above).113.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that, in the context of Austria\u2019s positive obligations in the instant case, questions arise as to whether Austria was under a duty to investigate the crimes allegedly committed abroad, and whether the investigation into the events in Austria was sufficient.(\u03b1)\u00a0\u00a0Alleged events abroad114.\u00a0\u00a0Concerning the alleged events in the United Arab Emirates, the Court considers that Article 4 of the Convention, under its procedural limb, does not require States to provide for universal jurisdiction over trafficking offences committed abroad (compare Rantsev, cited above, \u00a7 244, in relation to Article 2 of the Convention). The Palermo Protocol is silent on the matter of jurisdiction, and the Anti-Trafficking Convention only requires States Parties to provide for jurisdiction over any trafficking offence committed on their own territory, or by or against one of their nationals (ibid., \u00a7 289 \u2013 see paragraph 105 above). The Court therefore cannot but conclude that, in the present case, under the Convention, there was no obligation incumbent on Austria to investigate the applicants\u2019 recruitment in the Philippines or their alleged exploitation in the United Arab Emirates. (\u03b2)\u00a0\u00a0Events in Austria115.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants argued that the Austrian authorities had accepted that they were victims of the crime of human trafficking by treating them as such (see paragraphs 88-91 above). However, the Court does not consider that the elements of the offence of human trafficking had been fulfilled merely because the Austrian authorities treated the applicants as (potential) victims of human trafficking (see paragraphs 110-11 above). Such special treatment did not presuppose official confirmation that the offence had been established, and was independent of the authorities\u2019 duty to investigate. Indeed, (potential) victims need support even before the offence of human trafficking is formally established; otherwise, this would run counter to the whole purpose of victim protection in trafficking cases. The question whether the elements of the crime had been fulfilled would have to have been answered in subsequent criminal proceedings.116.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the applicants were given the opportunity to provide a detailed account of the events to specially trained police officers. Over thirty pages of statements were drawn up by the police. Based on the descriptions given, the authorities concluded that the events \u2013 as reported by the applicants \u2013 which had taken place over a maximum of three days in Vienna did not in themselves amount to any of the criminal actions exhaustively listed in Article 104a of the CC (see paragraphs 29-30 above). No ill-treatment in Austria was reported by the applicants. The Court considers that, in the light of the facts of the case and the evidence the authorities had at their disposal, the assessment that the elements of Article 104a of the CC had not been fulfilled in relation to the events in Austria does not appear to be unreasonable.117.\u00a0\u00a0Next, the Court will examine the applicants\u2019 argument that the events in the Philippines, the United Arab Emirates and Austria could not be viewed in isolation (see paragraph 89 above). However, even if the alleged events were taken together, for the following reasons, the Court considers that there is no indication that the authorities failed to comply with their duty of investigation. The Austrian authorities were only alerted approximately one year after the events in Vienna, when the applicants\u2019 employers had long left Austria and had presumably returned to Dubai. Therefore, the only further steps the authorities could possibly have taken were: requesting legal assistance from the United Arab Emirates; attempting to question the applicants\u2019 employers by means of letters of request, hence giving them the opportunity to make a statement in their defence; and issuing an order to determine their whereabouts (zur Aufenthaltsbestimmung ausschreiben) under Article 197 of the CCP (see paragraph 38 above). From the information submitted, the Court considers that the authorities could not have had any reasonable expectation of even being able to confront the applicants\u2019 employers with the allegations made against them, as no mutual legal assistance agreement exists between Austria and the United Arab Emirates. In this regard, the Government referred to their experience that even simple requests for legal assistance had been refused in the past without discernible reason (see paragraph 101 above). It does not appear that the steps described above, albeit possible in theory, would have had any reasonable prospects of success and would therefore have been required. In addition, the Court emphasises that, under Austrian law, the public prosecutor\u2019s office has a certain margin of appreciation \u2013 based on the principle of proportionality \u2013 when deciding which cases to pursue and which to discontinue (Article 210 of the CCP, see paragraph 39 above). Moreover, in accordance with Article 197 of the CCP (see paragraph 38 above), it is not possible to conduct criminal proceedings in the absence of the accused. Lastly, in accordance with Article 193 \u00a7 2 of the CCP (see paragraph 37 above), the public prosecutor can \u2013 within the statute of limitations \u2013 reopen and continue the investigation into the applicants\u2019 allegations if there are legal and factual grounds to do so. The foregoing considerations enable the Court to conclude that the investigation conducted by the Austrian authorities in the applicants\u2019 case was sufficient for the purposes of Article 4 of the Convention.(iii)\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion118.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the above, the Court considers that the Austrian authorities complied with their duty to protect the applicants as (potential) victims of human trafficking. In finding that they did not have jurisdiction over the alleged offences committed abroad, and in deciding to discontinue the investigation into the applicants\u2019 case concerning the events in Austria, they did not breach their positive obligation under the procedural limb of Article 4 of the Convention.Therefore, there has been no violation of that provision.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION119.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants further submitted that the treatment they had suffered met the minimum level of severity under Article 3 of the Convention, and that there had been a breach of the respondent State\u2019s procedural obligation to duly investigate their case. Article 3 reads:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d120.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is linked to the one examined above, and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.121.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted in their observations that, strictly speaking, it would be unnecessary to consider the same set of facts under Article 3 if the Court examined the failure to investigate under Article 4 of the Convention.122.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted essentially the same observations in relation to the applicants\u2019 complaints under Articles 3 and 4 of the Convention (see paragraphs 78-102 above).123.\u00a0\u00a0In line with the applicants\u2019 submissions, the Court considers that the test of the State\u2019s positive obligations under the procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention is very similar to that under Article 4, which has been comprehensively examined above (compare, for example, Jeronovi\u010ds\u00a0v. Latvia [GC], no. 44898\/10, \u00a7 107, 5 July 2016 in relation to Articles 2 and 3, and Rantsev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 232, 288-89 and 299-300 in relation to Article\u00a04). For essentially the same reasons (see paragraphs 112\u201118 above), the Court concludes that there has been no violation of the State\u2019s positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION124.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that, even though in their specific case Austria had identified them as victims of human trafficking, the lack of a formal recognition system was in itself capable of giving rise to a breach of Article 8 of the Convention.125.\u00a0\u00a0As the Court has set out in its findings concerning Article 4 of the Convention, it is satisfied that the applicants have been treated as (potential) victims of trafficking in human beings, in line with Austria\u2019s domestic and international legal obligations (see paragraphs 110-11 above). In the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds no appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols arising from this complaint. It must therefore be declared inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 of the Convention.","29010":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION IN RESPECT OF THE APPLICANT90.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the conditions of his pre-trial detention in the SIZO, including the physical, sanitary and health-care arrangements, had been incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged poor conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in the SIZO1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility91.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies in respect of his complaints concerning some aspects of the material conditions of his detention. In particular, he could have raised with the prosecutor\u2019s office his complaints concerning the toilet, the lack of fresh air, the water supply and the humidity in the cells.92.\u00a0\u00a0When commenting on the merits of the applicant\u2019s complaint, the Government further claimed that the applicant\u2019s submissions had been vague and general and not supported by any evidence. They noted, inter alia, that the applicant had neither specified the cells in which he had been detained, nor the periods of his detention there. He had failed to mention which cells he had described in his submission and had provided no names of cellmates who could have confirmed his submissions.93.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not comment on the Government\u2019s argument and maintained his complaint.94.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes in respect of the Government\u2019s non-exhaustion argument that it has already dismissed similar objections by the Government on a number of occasions, finding the remedy referred to by them ineffective on the grounds that it had not been shown that recourse to such proceedings could have brought an improvement in the applicant\u2019s detention conditions because of the structural nature of the problems in the domestic penal system (see, for example, Logvinenko v. Ukraine, no.\u00a013448\/07, \u00a7 57, 14 October 2010, and Buglov v. Ukraine, no.\u00a028825\/02, \u00a7 74, 10 July 2014). The Court sees no reason to depart from that finding in the present case and therefore considers that this complaint cannot be rejected for failure to exhaust domestic remedies.95.\u00a0\u00a0At the same time, it agrees with the Government that some of the applicant\u2019s complaints are not specific and are not supported by evidence.96.\u00a0\u00a0Nonetheless, on the basis of the case file, the Court considers that the applicant\u2019s chief grievance \u2013 the overcrowding in the SIZO combined with the lack of daily walks \u2013 can still be regarded as having a sufficient basis in the circumstances at hand. The Court therefore dismisses the Government\u2019s objection as regards this part of the applicant\u2019s complaint.97.\u00a0\u00a0To sum up, the Court finds that the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning overcrowding in the SIZO is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. The Court rejects the remainder of the applicant\u2019s complaints concerning the poor material conditions of his detention as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits98.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged that he had been held in overcrowded cells, with no outdoor exercise provided.99.\u00a0The Government contested this view. They submitted, referring to their factual submissions, that the living space in the cells in which the applicant had been detained had been in compliance with domestic standards. They further stated that the applicant had been entitled by law to a one-hour daily walk.100.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention requires States to ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his or her human dignity and that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him or her to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention (see Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7 94, ECHR 2000-XI).101.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that a serious lack of space in a prison cell weighs heavily as a factor to be taken into account for the purpose of establishing whether the detention conditions described are \u201cdegrading\u201d within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention and may disclose a violation, both alone or taken together with other shortcomings. When the personal space available to a detainee falls below 3 sq. m of floor space in multi-occupancy accommodation in prisons, the lack of personal space is considered so severe that a strong presumption of a violation of Article 3 arises (see, amongst many authorities, Karalevi\u010dius v. Lithuania, no.\u00a053254\/99, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a039\u201140, 7\u00a0April 2005, and Ananyev and others v. Russia, nos. 42525\/07 and 60800\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 145-147 and 149, 10 January 2012, and Mur\u0161i\u0107 v. Croatia [GC], no.\u00a07334\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 136-139, 20 October 2016). This presumption will normally be capable of being rebutted only if the following factors are cumulatively met: (1) the reductions in the required minimum personal space of 3 sq. m are short, occasional and minor; (2)\u00a0such reductions are accompanied by sufficient freedom of movement outside the cell and adequate out-of-cell activities; (3) the applicant is confined in what is, when viewed generally, an appropriate detention facility, and there are no other aggravating aspects of the conditions of his or her detention (see Mur\u0161i\u0107, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0130, 133 and 134).102.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that\u00a0in the present case the available evidence indicates that during his stay in the SIZO the applicant lacked personal space. In particular, as reported by the Government, the cells in which the applicant had been detained allowed from 2.55 to 3.01 sq. m of floor space per inmate. The Government did not actually state how many inmates had occupied these cells at the relevant time.103.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, given that the cells also contained sanitary facilities, the personal space available to detainees was further reduced.104.\u00a0Even assuming that the applicant had a one-hour daily walk, as suggested by the Government, the Court further observes that for most of the day the applicant and his cellmates had no freedom of movement and were confined to their cells.105.\u00a0\u00a0Given the aforementioned and in the light of its case-law (see, among other authorities, Mur\u0161i\u0107, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0136\u00a0-\u00a0141; Gorbatenko v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 25209\/06, \u00a7 139, 28 November 2013; and Iglin v. Ukraine, no. 39908\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 51-52, 12\u00a0January 2012), the Court finds that the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in the SIZO, in particular the lack of personal space afforded to the applicant, combined with the lack of access to outdoor activities for almost four years of his detention, amounted to degrading treatment. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in this respect.B.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged inadequacy of the medical assistance provided to the applicant in the SIZO1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility106.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not comment on the issue of the admissibility of this part of the application.107.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions108.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that his state of health had sharply deteriorated in the SIZO. In particular, his chronic diseases had become active, his eyesight had worsened, and he had suffered regular hypertensive crises. He submitted that his state of health had necessitated inpatient treatment in a civil hospital as no specialists \u201cin his disease[s]\u201d had been available at the SIZO and adequate assistance could not therefore have been provided to him in that facility. He stated in this connection that the SIZO medics had made incorrect conclusions about his state of health. As a result, he had been later assigned disability status.109.\u00a0\u00a0The Government referred to the applicant\u2019s medical file and stated that from the very beginning of his detention the applicant had been under the close supervision of the medical unit of the SIZO in view of the illnesses he had contracted before his detention there. He had undergone regular medical examinations, including by civil doctors, and his numerous health complaints had been rapidly and adequately addressed. They noted that the applicant had failed to produce evidence that he had been refused treatment on a particular occasion or that the treatment had been inadequate or had led to the worsening of his state of health.110.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Government submitted that the applicant\u2019s complaints at domestic level concerning his poor state of health had not been linked to the inadequacy of his treatment but rather to the need to release him from detention.111.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaint without addressing the Government\u2019s arguments.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment112.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that in accordance with Article 3 of the Convention the State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his or her human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him or her to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his or her health and well-being are adequately secured (see Kalashnikov v. Russia, no. 47095\/99, \u00a7\u00a095, ECHR 2002\u2011VI).113.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Court has held that Article 3 of the Convention cannot be interpreted as ensuring that every detainee should receive medical care at the same level as \u201cin the best civil clinics\u201d (see Mirilashivili v.\u00a0Russia (dec.), no.\u00a06293\/04, 10 July 2007). It has further held that it is \u201cprepared to accept that, in principle, the resources of medical facilities within the [prison] system are limited compared to those of civil clinics\u201d (see Grishin v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a030983\/02, \u00a7\u00a076, 15\u00a0November 2007). On the whole, the Court takes a flexible approach in defining the required standard of health care, deciding it on a case-by-case basis. That standard should be \u201ccompatible with the human dignity\u201d of a detainee, but should also take into account \u201cthe practical demands of imprisonment\u201d (see Aleksanyan v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a046468\/06, \u00a7 140, 22 December 2008).114.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the \u201cadequacy\u201d of medical care remains a difficult element to determine. The mere fact that a detainee is seen by a doctor and prescribed a certain form of treatment cannot automatically lead to the conclusion that the medical care provided was adequate (see Hummatov v. Azerbaijan, nos. 9852\/03 and 13413\/04, \u00a7\u00a0116, 29 November 2007). The authorities must also ensure that a comprehensive record is kept of the detainee\u2019s state of health and his treatment while in detention (see, for example, Khudobin v. Russia, no.\u00a059696\/00, \u00a7 83, ECHR\u00a02006-XII), that the diagnoses and care are prompt and accurate (see Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7 115, and Melnik v.\u00a0Ukraine, no.\u00a072286\/01, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0104-106, 28 March 2006), and that \u2013 where necessitated by the nature of a medical condition \u2013 supervision is regular and systematic and involves a comprehensive therapeutic strategy aimed at curing the detainee\u2019s diseases or preventing their aggravation, rather than addressing them on a symptomatic basis (see Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0109 and 114; Sarban v.\u00a0Moldova, no. 3456\/05, \u00a7 79, 4 October 2005; and Popov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a026853\/04, \u00a7 211, 13 July 2006). The authorities must also show that the necessary conditions were created for the prescribed treatment to be actually followed through (see Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0116, and Holomiov v.\u00a0Moldova, no. 30649\/05, \u00a7 117, 7 November 2006).115.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that before being placed in detention the applicant was diagnosed with a number of illnesses which warranted medical supervision and care (see\u00a0paragraphs 56 and 57 above).116.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning a sharp deterioration of his health in detention was not specific. Accordingly, and given the long history of his illnesses and the lack of information on his part as to how and how often the diseases manifested themselves before his detention and how they were treated, the Court finds it difficult to establish whether and to what extent the applicant\u2019s health deteriorated in the SIZO and to what extent that deterioration, if any, had resulted from the inadequacy of the medical assistance in detention, rather than being the natural course of his medical conditions (see, for example, Rudenko v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 5797\/05, \u00a7 94, 25 November 2010).117.\u00a0\u00a0At the same time, it is apparent from the applicant\u2019s detailed medical record submitted by the Government that the SIZO administration expressly recognised the applicant\u2019s need for specialised treatment, in particular with regard to his hypertension (see paragraphs 57 and 61 above) and the applicant\u2019s health was continuously supervised while in detention. On numerous occasions the applicant was seen by various specialists, including a neurologist, a neurosurgeon and an ophthalmologist from civil institutions, and he underwent regular medical check-ups and tests in view of his illnesses. None of the applicant\u2019s health problems of which he had complained to the SIZO medical unit appears to have remained untreated. The applicant did not contest these submissions and did not dispute or criticise the Government\u2019s statement that he had been provided with medical treatment in accordance with the established diagnoses. Furthermore, there is no evidence and it was not persuasively argued that the SIZO doctors had acted in bad faith or that the treatment provided had been ineffective. The Court notes the speculative nature of the applicant\u2019s reference to his disability status as, according to the applicant\u2019s own submission (see paragraph 56 above), he had been advised to appear before a special medical panel to decide on his possible disability as far back as in 2001.118.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the applicant\u2019s complaints were examined by the prosecutor\u2019s office and nothing in the case file suggests that the conclusions reached were unjustified.119.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court cannot but observe that the applicant\u2019s complaint was primarily directed against the very fact of his being placed in detention and seemed to stem from his frustration over the SIZO conclusions that his state of health had been compatible with detention.120.\u00a0\u00a0Overall, given the foregoing and having regard to the material in the case file and the parties\u2019 submissions, the Court concludes that the authorities did everything that could have reasonably been expected of them in the circumstances to safeguard the applicant\u2019s health and well-being during his detention (see Komarova v. Ukraine, no. 13371\/06, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a062-70, 16\u00a0May 2013).121.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION IN RESPECT OF THE APPLICANT122.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that his rights of defence had not been respected in the criminal proceedings against him, as he had not been legally represented during the initial stage of the investigation. He also stated that his access to a lawyer while in pre-trial detention had been severely restricted because of the grossly inadequate facilities at the SIZO.123.\u00a0\u00a0These complaints fall to be examined under Article 6 \u00a7 3 (c) in conjunction with Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. Those provisions, in so far as relevant, read:Article 6\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...3.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: ...(c)\u00a0\u00a0to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Lack of access to a lawyer at the initial stage of the investigation1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility124.\u00a0\u00a0The Government have not submitted any comments concerning the admissibility of this part of the application.125.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions126.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that his lawyer had not been informed of his arrest and that from 13 to 19 September 2003 he had been prevented from meeting with his lawyer. He further stated that the lawyer had not been present during all the investigative steps.127.\u00a0\u00a0The Government pointed out that before the applicant had made his statement on 13 September 2003 he had been informed of his right to remain silent. They further submitted that the applicant had formally been questioned as a suspect for the first time on 14 September 2003. He had refused to give a statement in the absence of a lawyer. The next interview had been conducted on 19 September 2003 in the presence of the lawyer hired by the applicant\u2019s wife. They observed that no investigative steps had been taken between 14 and 19 September and that all major investigative steps thereafter had been taken in his lawyer\u2019s presence. The lawyer had been absent only when the applicant was being informed of the results of some forensic examinations which were delayed because of his refusals at the beginning of the investigation to be informed of the experts\u2019 conclusions before the investigation had been completed. He studied the relevant documents together with his lawyer after the completion of the investigation.128.\u00a0\u00a0Referring to the Court\u2019s case-law (Salduz v. Turkey [GC], no.\u00a03639\/02, 27 November 2008; Brennan v. the United Kingdom, no.\u00a039846\/98, 16 October 2001; and Trymbach v. Ukraine, no. 44385\/02, 12\u00a0January 2012), the Government further submitted that the fact that the applicant had remained unrepresented until 19 September 2003 had not influenced the fairness of the proceedings against him as he had always pleaded not guilty and none of his statements, including those given in the absence of lawyer, had been used by the trial courts to secure his conviction.129.\u00a0\u00a0They lastly observed in this connection that neither in his submissions before the Court nor at domestic level had the applicant ever specified in what way the absence of a lawyer before 19 September 2003 had affected his defence rights and the fairness of his conviction. They therefore claimed there had been no violation of Article 6 of the Convention.130.\u00a0\u00a0In his response to the Government\u2019s comments, the applicant maintained his complaint concerning the lack of legal assistance between 13\u00a0and 19 September 2003 without addressing the Government\u2019s arguments.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment131.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes at the outset that the applicant\u2019s wife hired a lawyer to represent the applicant\u2019s interests on 15 September 2003 and on 19\u00a0September 2003 the applicant requested that the lawyer be admitted to the proceeding. His request was granted on the same date (see paragraphs\u00a010, 12 and 13 above). There is no evidence in the case file in support of the applicant\u2019s statement that he had a lawyer at the time of his arrest and that that lawyer had unsuccessfully tried to gain access to the applicant. To the extent that the applicant\u2019s submissions might be understood as a complaint that he had not been provided with a lawyer at the early stage of the proceedings, the Court makes the following observations.132.\u00a0\u00a0Article 6 \u00a7 1 requires that, as a rule, access to a lawyer should be provided from the first interrogation of a suspect by the police, unless it is demonstrated in the light of the particular circumstances of each case that there are compelling reasons to restrict that right. Even where compelling reasons may exceptionally justify denial of access to a lawyer, such a restriction \u2013 whatever its justification \u2013 must not unduly prejudice the rights of the accused under Article 6. The rights of the defence will, in principle, be irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating statements made during police questioning without access to a lawyer are used for a conviction (see Salduz, cited above, \u00a7\u00a055).133.\u00a0\u00a0The above test in Salduz, for assessing whether a restriction on access to a lawyer is compatible with the right to a fair trial is composed of two stages. In the first stage, the Court must assess whether there were compelling reasons for the restriction. In the second stage, it must evaluate the prejudice caused to the rights of the defence by the restriction in the case in question. In other words, the Court must examine the impact of the restriction on the overall fairness of the proceedings and decide whether the proceedings as a whole were fair (see Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 50541\/08, 50571\/08, 50573\/08 and 40351\/09, \u00a7 257, 13\u00a0September 2016).134.\u00a0\u00a0As to the first stage of the test, the criterion of compelling reasons is a stringent one: having regard to the fundamental nature and importance of early access to legal advice, in particular when a suspect is first questioned, restrictions on access to legal advice are permitted only in exceptional circumstances, must be of a temporary nature and must be based on an individual assessment of the particular circumstances of the case. It is of relevance, when assessing whether compelling reasons have been demonstrated, whether the decision to restrict legal advice had a basis in domestic law and whether the scope and content of any restrictions on legal advice were sufficiently circumscribed by law so as to guide operational decision-making by those responsible for applying them (ibid., \u00a7 258).135.\u00a0\u00a0Where compelling reasons are established, a holistic assessment of the entirety of the proceedings must be conducted to determine whether they were \u201cfair\u201d for the purposes of Article 6 \u00a7 1 (ibid., \u00a7\u00a0264).136.\u00a0\u00a0Where compelling reasons are not established, the Court must apply a very strict scrutiny to its fairness assessment. The failure of the respondent Government to show compelling reasons weighs heavily in the balance when assessing the overall fairness of the trial and may tip the balance in favour of finding a breach of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c). The onus is on the Government to demonstrate convincingly why, exceptionally and in the specific circumstances of the case, the overall fairness of the trial was not irretrievably prejudiced by the restriction on access to legal advice (ibid., \u00a7\u00a0265).137.\u00a0\u00a0When examining the proceedings as a whole in order to assess the impact of procedural failings at the pre-trial stage on the overall fairness of the criminal proceedings, the following non-exhaustive list of factors, drawn from the Court\u2019s case\u2011law, should, where appropriate, be taken into account:(a)\u00a0\u00a0Whether the applicant was particularly vulnerable, for example, by reason of his age or mental capacity.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The legal framework governing the pre-trial proceedings and the admissibility of evidence at trial, and whether it was complied with; where an exclusionary rule applied, it is particularly unlikely that the proceedings as a whole would be considered unfair.(c)\u00a0\u00a0Whether the applicant had the opportunity to challenge the authenticity of the evidence and oppose its use.(d)\u00a0\u00a0The quality of the evidence and whether the circumstances in which it was obtained cast doubt on its reliability or accuracy, taking into account the degree and nature of any compulsion.(e)\u00a0\u00a0Where evidence was obtained unlawfully, the unlawfulness in question and, where it stems from a violation of another Convention Article, the nature of the violation found.(f)\u00a0\u00a0In the case of a statement, the nature of the statement and whether it was promptly retracted or modified.(g)\u00a0\u00a0The use to which the evidence was put, and in particular whether the evidence formed an integral or significant part of the probative evidence upon which the conviction was based, and the strength of the other evidence in the case.(h)\u00a0\u00a0Whether the assessment of guilt was performed by professional judges or lay jurors, and in the case of the latter the content of any jury directions.(i)\u00a0\u00a0The weight of the public interest in the investigation and punishment of the particular offence in issue.(j)\u00a0\u00a0Other relevant procedural safeguards afforded by domestic law and practice (ibid., 274).138.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes that the applicant was arrested at the scene of a crime and therefore the investigator had every reason to suspect him of drug transportation. However, nothing suggests that the applicant had been offered legal assistance before questions were put to him and he made his statement on 13 September 2003 following his arrest. On the facts, the Court does not find any compelling reason for the failure to respect the applicant\u2019s right to a lawyer on the first occasion on which he was questioned. The Court finds irrelevant the Government\u2019s argument that it was the applicant\u2019s own choice to explain his version of events and that he had been informed of his right not to give any explanations. It notes in this connection that the relevant documents suggest that no right to legal assistance had been explained to the applicant on that day and there is no evidence that the applicant had waived, in any way, his right to a lawyer. It therefore concludes that the applicant\u2019s defence rights were unjustifiably restricted at the initial stage of the investigation.139.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court must apply a very strict scrutiny in assessing whether the absence of a lawyer undermined the fairness of the proceedings (see Ibrahim and Others, cited above, \u00a7 265).140.\u00a0\u00a0In making the overall fairness assessment the Court is guided by the Ibrahim criteria (see paragraph 138 above), to the extent it is appropriate in the circumstances of the present case.141.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to those criteria, the Court notes that (i) the applicant was not particularly vulnerable; (ii) as to the quality of evidence, there is no evidence before the Court that would indicate that any compulsion was involved; (iii) the evidence in the case was assessed by professional judges.142.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, at no stage of the proceedings did the applicant make any self-incriminating statements. It appears that the applicant consistently maintained that he was not guilty and he did not change this position from the first time he was questioned up to the submissions made before this Court.143.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, apart from the initial explanations of 13\u00a0September 2003, no statements were given by the applicant without his lawyer present.144.\u00a0\u00a0As to the use to which that evidence was put, the Court notes that the applicant\u2019s statement of 13 September 2003 was not listed among the pieces of evidence upon which the domestic courts had based the applicant\u2019s conviction; indeed the courts did not mention or refer to it in any way (see, by contrast, Titarenko v. Ukraine, no. 31720\/02, 20 September 2012). He was found guilty on the basis of a number of pieces of evidence submitted in the case, including the statements made by his co\u2011defendants, and not through any illicit means or methods.145.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further agrees with the Government that the applicant\u2019s complaint about the lack of legal assistance is very general. Neither in his appeals before the domestic courts nor in his submissions before this Court did he point to any concrete disadvantages caused by the absence of a lawyer until 19 September 2003. Likewise, he failed to specify which investigative actions had been conducted after 19 September 2003 without his lawyer present and how, in his view, these had affected the fairness of the proceedings. He also did not take the opportunity to elaborate on this aspect of the application in the observations that he submitted in response to those of the Government.146.\u00a0\u00a0Consequently, in the circumstances of the present case, the Court finds no evidence that the absence of legal assistance at the initial stage of the proceedings irremediably affected the general fairness of the proceedings (see, mutatis mutandis, Trymbach v. Ukraine, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a062-65). It therefore concludes that there has been no violation of Article\u00a06 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3\u00a0(c) of the Convention in the present case.B.\u00a0\u00a0Lack of access to a lawyer while in the SIZO147.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant initially stated before the Court that because of the high demand and the limited number of meeting rooms in the SIZO he had often been prevented from meeting with his lawyer.148.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had not raised his complaints in his appeals before the domestic courts and therefore had not exhausted the available domestic remedies.149.\u00a0\u00a0They further submitted that the complaint was, in any event, unsubstantiated and provided detailed information, supported by documents, on the number of meetings the applicant had had with his lawyer while in pre-trial detention.150.\u00a0\u00a0In his comments in reply to the Government\u2019s observations, the applicant did not comment on the above-mentioned arguments and did not refer to his initial complaint at all.151.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, without prejudice to other possible grounds for inadmissibility, the Court agrees with the Government that the applicant failed to exhaust the domestic remedies available to him because he did not raise his complaints in his appeals against his conviction. This part of the application must thus be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION IN RESPECT OF THE APPLICANT\u2019S SON152.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained of the unlawful detention of his son at the SBU\u2019s premises between 13 and 14 September 2003 which, allegedly, gave rise to violations of his son\u2019s rights under Articles 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 17 of the Convention and Article 3 of Protocol No.7 thereto.153.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Guerra and Others v. Italy, 19 February 1998, \u00a7 44, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011I), finds that these complaints, as presented by the applicant, fall within the scope of Articles\u00a05 \u00a7\u00a01 and 8 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, read as follows:Article 5\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:(a)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;(b)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non- compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfillment of any obligation prescribed by law;(c)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;(d)\u00a0\u00a0the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority;(e)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;(f)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.\u201dArticle 8\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence ...\u201d154.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies in respect of both aspects of his complaint. They noted, referring to the separate ruling of the District Court of 25 October 2005, that the domestic authorities had acknowledged violations of the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s rights, as complained of by the applicant. Such acknowledgment had provided the applicant with an opportunity to claim compensation for damage under the general procedure provided for in Article 1174 of the Civil Code of Ukraine, which he had failed to take advantage of. In their opinion, it was for the applicant to demonstrate that the remedy would not have been effective in his case.155.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not comment on the Government\u2019s arguments.156.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds, assuming that the applicant was entitled to bring the application in his own name for an alleged violation of the rights of his son (see e.g. Tonchev v. Bulgaria, no. 18527\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 30-33, 19\u00a0November 2009; Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy [GC], nos. 39221\/98 and 41963\/98, ECHR 2000\u2011VIII), that the relevant complaints should be declared inadmissible for the reasons below.A.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the detention of his son from 13 to 14 September 2003 (Article 5 of the Convention)157.\u00a0\u00a0Even assuming that Article 5 of the Convention is applicable in the circumstances of the present case and that the authorities did acknowledge, in substance, violations of the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s rights, the Court notes that it has already considered similar arguments of the Government in comparable circumstances in the case of Lopatin and Medvedskiy v. Ukraine (nos.\u00a02278\/03 and 6222\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 76 and 77, 20 May 2010) and Savin v.\u00a0Ukraine (no. 34725\/08, \u00a7 77, 16 February 2012) and found that the remedy under the Civil Code could not be deemed effective. In particular, in the above-mentioned Lopatin and Medvedskiy case the Court found that the Government had failed to demonstrate that the Civil Code of 2003 could provide a basis for a claim for damages in connection with unlawful detention since in that case the relevant events had occurred prior to the entry into force of the Civil Code, that is to say prior to 1 January 2004.158.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that the events complained of by the applicant occurred in September 2003. As in the Lopatin and Medvedskiy case, in the present case the Government did not argue and did not demonstrate that the provisions of the Civil Code could apply retroactively to the events that had taken place prior to the entry into force of the Code.159.\u00a0\u00a0The Court points out that according to its established case-law it is incumbent on the Government claiming non-exhaustion to satisfy the Court that the remedy was an effective one available in theory and in practice at the relevant time. The Court thus considers that in this case the Government have not satisfied their burden of proof and therefore dismisses their objection.160.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, however, finds, in these circumstances and given the fact that no other effective remedies appear to be available to the applicant, that the applicant\u2019s complaint was lodged out of time (application to the Court lodged in 2006) and therefore must be dismissed in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention.B.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s complaint regarding the suffering caused to his son by his detention between 13 and 14 September 2003 (Article 8 of the Convention)161.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the Government\u2019s argument on the applicant\u2019s failure to apply for compensation under the Civil Code was raised with respect to the complaints under both Articles 5 and 8.162.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court\u2019s findings in paragraphs 157-160 above are equally pertinent to the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 8. Without prejudice to other possible reasons for inadmissibility, this complaint has to be declared inadmissible within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention as being lodged out of time.IV.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION163.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicant complained that he had been unlawfully arrested, detained and convicted and that no compensation had been provided to him in this respect; that a public hearing had been held in his case contrary to his request; that the length of the proceedings in his case had been excessive; that the conditions of his transportation between the detention facilities had been poor; that unlawful searches had been conducted of his relatives\u2019 property; that there had been negative publicity around the applicant\u2019s name before his conviction; that his car and property had been unlawfully searched and seized; and that adequate medical assistance had not been provided to him in prison.164.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to all the material in its possession, the Court finds that the evidence discloses no appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 of the Convention.V.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION165.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage166.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 130,000 euros (EUR) in total in respect of all damage suffered by him, his son and his wife.167.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested this claim.168.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that it has found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the poor conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention. Ruling on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 3,000 in compensation for the non-pecuniary damage suffered on account of the violation found.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses169.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 20,000 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and for those incurred before the Court, including postal services.170.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicant had failed to provide evidence that the expenses claimed had been incurred.171.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, given that the applicant provided no documents to substantiate the amount claimed, the Court rejects the claim for costs and expenses.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest172.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","29047":"I.\u00a0\u00a0OBSERVANCE OF ARTICLE 38 OF THE CONVENTION100.\u00a0\u00a0Although the structure of the Court\u2019s judgments traditionally reflects the numbering of the Articles of the Convention, the Court has also examined a Government\u2019s compliance with their procedural obligation under Article 38 of the Convention at the outset, especially if negative inferences are likely to be drawn from the Government\u2019s failure to submit the requested evidence (see Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, no.\u00a07511\/13, \u00a7\u00a0338, 24 July 2014).101.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the Government\u2019s failure to provide the Court with a complete file on the investigation into the applicant\u2019s abduction (see paragraphs 5, 6, 67, and 69\u201194 above), the Court considers it appropriate to begin its examination of the present case by analysing whether the Government have complied with their procedural obligation under Article\u00a038 of the Convention, which is worded as follows:\u201cThe Court shall examine the case together with the representatives of the parties and, if need be, undertake an investigation, for the effective conduct of which the High Contracting Parties concerned shall furnish all necessary facilities.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions102.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not make any submissions to answer the Court\u2019s question concerning their compliance with Article 38 of the Convention.103.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not comment on the contents of the Government\u2019s letter of 15 May 2015.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment104.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will examine the issue in the light of the general principles of its case-law concerning Article 38 of the Convention summarised, in particular, in Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0352\u201156).105.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the facts of the present case are complex. The circumstances are highly controversial and are in dispute between the parties, and could only be elucidated through genuine cooperation by the respondent Government in line with Article 38 of the Convention (see Nizomkhon Dzhurayev v. Russia, no. 31890\/11, \u00a7 163, 3\u00a0October 2013).106.\u00a0\u00a0The Court repeatedly put detailed factual questions and requested the relevant domestic documents from the respondent Government (see paragraphs 4-6 above). The Government, without advancing any reasons, chose not to comply with those requests (see paragraphs 67 and 69\u201194 above).107.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 38 of the Convention requires the respondent State to submit the requested material in its entirety, if the Court so requests, and to account for any missing elements. The Government did not comply with that obligation, thus further complicating the examination of the present case by the Court. In the Court\u2019s view, the Government\u2019s failure to cooperate on such a crucial point highlights the authorities\u2019 unwillingness to uncover the truth regarding the circumstances of the case (see, with further references, Nizomkhon Dzhurayev, cited above, \u00a7 164).108.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the aforementioned, the Court considers that the Government have fallen short of their obligation to furnish all the necessary facilities to the Court in its task of establishing the facts of the case, as required under Article 38. It will draw such inferences as it deems relevant regarding the well-foundedness of the applicant\u2019s allegations on the merits.109.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Government\u2019s failure to provide it with the relevant information and documents amounts to a disregard for its duty to cooperate with the Court under Article 38 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0ESTABLISHMENT OF ","29108":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION38.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that she had been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment and intense physical and mental suffering because, even though the domestic authorities had been aware of her serious medical condition, on 6 November 2014 she had been forced to wait eight hours for an interview at the DNA\u2019s offices without water, food or a seat. She had then been detained in an overcrowded, squalid and cold cell with smokers, without sufficient clean air, physical exercise, food or water, with no access to warm water and without being provided with bed linen or a duvet. Moreover, the detention centre\u2019s doctor had refused to provide her with the treatment needed to prevent a miscarriage. She relied on Article\u00a03 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Lack of access to food, water and seating at the DNA\u2019s officesAdmissibility(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions39.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that according to the documents produced by the domestic authorities, on 6 November 2014 the applicant had been presented with a warrant to appear at the DNA\u2019s offices at 11.30\u00a0a.m., and had been placed in police custody for twenty-four hours at 7.07\u00a0p.m. They argued that given the distance between where she had been presented with the warrant and the DNA\u2019s offices, the applicant had most probably arrived at her destination well after 12 noon. Consequently, they considered that she had remained at the offices for approximately seven hours.40.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the information contained in the extracts from the newspaper and online articles about the actual time the applicant had spent at the DNA\u2019s offices on 6 November 2014 was inaccurate. Furthermore, only one of the extracts had stated that she had remained at the DNA\u2019s offices for eight hours and the extract in question could not be regarded as irrefutable evidence.41.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contended that the applicant\u2019s interview and involvement in the investigative activities during her time at the DNA\u2019s offices had not been continuous. From 2.45 to 6.05 p.m. she had not been interviewed or involved in any investigative activities, and those she had been involved in had not been excessively lengthy. Furthermore, there had been no evidence in the case file to suggest that she or her legal representatives had asked the prosecutor to suspend her interviews temporarily because they had been excessively lengthy or tiring, and she had not brought a criminal claim against the prosecutor regarding the treatment she had allegedly been subjected to while under the authorities\u2019 control.42.\u00a0\u00a0Relying on the Court\u2019s case-law, the Government argued that the investigation concerning the applicant had been complex and had been part of a set of proceedings which had involved several other individuals and had required a large number of procedural measures which had been carried out within a short period of time.43.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that on 6 November 2014 pending her interviews the applicant, like all the other suspects, had been offered water and had been able to purchase food. Furthermore, all the offices and the corridors in the building had had water dispensers and disposable cups. In addition, the DNA\u2019s building had had a canteen which had been available to everyone, including those under investigation, and where anyone could purchase food or water and sit down. Consequently, the applicant could have bought food or water or could have asked one of her legal representatives to buy it for her as she had had plenty of time to do so.44.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the available medical documents did not fully support the applicant\u2019s claims about her medical condition. The only medical documents produced by a medical professional prior to 6\u00a0November 2014 had been a prescription by a gynaecologist for Utrogestan, a general practitioner\u2019s medical note urgently referring the applicant to hospital because of an inflammation of her uterus, and a hospital ultrasound image. These medical documents had also been the only documents presented by the applicant to the prosecutor on 31 October 2014 and prior to 6 November 2014. Given the information contained in the documents, the prosecutor investigating the case could have only acknowledged the fact that the applicant had been suffering from an inflammation of the uterus and had been prescribed Utrogestan, a medicine which could have been prescribed both before her pregnancy as well as during it. However, none of the available medical documents stated that the applicant was pregnant. Furthermore, she had never informed the investigating authorities verbally that she had been in a vulnerable state. The ultrasound image was at best an inconclusive piece of evidence, considering that the applicant herself had stated that after the gynaecological examination of 31 October 2014 (when the ultrasound image had been produced), the doctor himself had not been able to confirm whether she was pregnant. In addition, the applicant had not submitted any evidence in support of her allegation that the doctor had advised her to rest, or which could have proven that she had received any other advice in respect of her condition.45.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contended that according to the Utrogestan patient information leaflet, the medicine could cause drowsiness and dizziness, usually as a result of an overdose and only if taken orally, which the applicant had not been doing.46.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that shortly after she had arrived at the DNA\u2019s offices the applicant had been informed of the reasons for the summons, the charges brought against her and her rights. She had also had continuous legal assistance.47.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the present case differed from the case of Iustin Robertino Micu v. Romania (no. 41040\/11, 13 January 2015). In the present case, the applicant had spent less time at the DNA\u2019s offices than the applicant in the above-mentioned case and had been assisted by her chosen legal representatives during her entire time there. Furthermore, she had admitted that she had been in the corridor and had not argued that her movements had been restricted by being kept under guard in an office. In addition, she had not been suffering from a medical condition or receiving medical treatment inextricably linked to a person\u2019s diet, such as Type\u00a02 diabetes.48.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contended that by contrast to the case of Soare and Others v.\u00a0Romania (no. 24329\/02, 22 February 2011), the applicant had been a suspect and not a witness in the case, and the prosecutor had informed her of her status immediately after she had arrived at the DNA\u2019s offices.49.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to substantiate her allegation that she had not been given water or food and had never asserted in her complaint that her access to food or water had been restricted. Consequently, they considered that any other requirements than the measure that had already been made available to her by the offering of water and the supply of adequate facilities in that respect fell outside the scope of the Convention.50.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that on 6 November 2014 she had spent eight hours at the DNA\u2019s office and that her statement had been confirmed by several press articles and several television stations covering the event in question. Furthermore, the exact times mentioned in the documents produced by the DNA were not completely accurate.51.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that even if she had spent seven hours at the DNA\u2019s offices, that would still have been an unreasonably length of time given her condition. In addition, she had been complaining constantly about feeling ill because of her pregnancy and feeling dizzy and hungry as a result of the treatment required for her pregnancy.52.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contended that there had been no water dispensers in the corridors of the DNA\u2019s building and that everyone who had been summoned to appear before a prosecutor had been left waiting and standing in the corridor. Even assuming that the domestic authorities had since installed water dispensers, they had not been available on 6\u00a0November 2014. She had had some water left in a 500ml bottle which she had had no choice but to drink slowly so that it did not run out. Her doctor had advised her to drink liquids constantly to ensure a healthy pregnancy. If water dispensers had been available on the corridors of the DNA\u2019s building she would not have had any problems in refilling her bottle.53.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that between 2.45 and 6.05 p.m. she had been guarded by a police officer who had only allowed her to go to the bathroom and had accompanied her there. Furthermore, it was common sense to believe that a pregnant person who had not eaten for many hours would inform the authorities that she was hungry. She had been unaware that the DNA\u2019s offices had had a canteen. In any event, she had had no money on her because when she had been presented with the arrest warrant, the police officers had asked her to follow them to the DNA\u2019s offices and the only thing she had had time to take with her had been a half-drunk bottle of water.54.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that she had not asked the prosecutor to suspend her interviews because she had not been interviewed continuously over the eight hours she had spent at the DNA\u2019s offices. Furthermore, the fact that the case had been complex had not justified the treatment she had been subjected to. The investigative activities carried out by the prosecutor had required her presence for approximately two hours. Consequently, the rest of the time she had spent at the DNA\u2019s offices without being offered a seat, food or water had been unnecessary and had been aimed only at applying pressure on her.55.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contended that there was no evidence in the observations submitted by the Romanian Government to the Court that the prosecutor investigating her case had denied her allegations.56.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that unlike the applicant in the case of Iustin Robertino Micu, cited above, she had proven that she had informed the investigating authorities on 31 October 2014 of her pregnancy, her treatment and its side effects and her pregnancy complications. The simple fact that she had verbally notified the authorities of her pregnancy should have been sufficient for them to take preventive action, even though she had not submitted a medical file in this regard.57.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant rejected the Government\u2019s submission that she had stated that after the ultrasound examination of 31 October 2014 the doctor himself had been unable to confirm whether she was pregnant or not. She argued that her statement had referred to the doctor\u2019s inability to determine whether the foetus had stopped developing or not.58.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contended that the DNA collection practices alleged by her had also been confirmed by the large number of individuals complaining about them. Furthermore, the fact that she had been pregnant at the time of the events could not be denied, and it was common sense that she would not have hidden her pregnancy and her health problems from the authorities. In addition, she had submitted documents in support of her claims, but they had been ignored by the authorities.59.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant denied the Government\u2019s allegation that she had not been taking Utrogestan orally, and contended that it was common for the medicine to cause dizziness regardless of whether it was taken orally or not.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment60.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that according to its well-established case\u2011law, ill\u2011treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article\u00a03 of the Convention (see Jalloh v.\u00a0Germany [GC], no.\u00a054810\/00, \u00a7 67, ECHR\u00a02006-IX).61.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already held that making applicants wait for ten hours in order to be questioned as witnesses \u2012 without food and water and the opportunity to rest \u2012 amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment (see Soare and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 221-222). Moreover, in the case of Iustin\u00a0Robertino Micu (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 73-76) it considered that the authorities\u2019 failure to provide the applicant with food during his stay at the DNA\u2019s offices for approximately thirteen hours \u2012 when he was suffering from Type 2 diabetes, required insulin shots and the absence of food affected him physically \u2012 amounted to treatment which exceeded the inherent and inevitable suffering caused by the legal proceedings and questioning related to the case and breached Article\u00a03.62.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the facts of the present case were fiercely disputed by the parties (contrast Soare and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0221). Moreover, the applicant alleged that the documents drafted by the prosecutor during her interviews at the DNA\u2019s offices were somewhat inaccurate in terms of the exact timeline of events of 6\u00a0November 2014.63.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Court notes that the applicant and her legal representatives signed all the documents produced by the DNA on 6\u00a0November 2014 without making any written objections in respect of the exact time frame mentioned in them. Moreover, the applicant has not argued before the Court that she or her legal representatives had made verbal objections in respect of the above-mentioned time frame or had been coerced to withdraw them.64.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore considers that the timeline recorded in the documents produced by the DNA on 6 November 2014 is generally accurate and may be relied on.65.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances, the Court notes that according to the available evidence, the applicant was taken to the DNA\u2019s offices at 11.30\u00a0a.m. and that she arrived at the detention centre between 7.30 and 8.20\u00a0p.m. Consequently, given that between 11.30 a.m. and 7.30 or 8.20\u00a0p.m. she was also transferred from her home to the DNA\u2019s offices and from the DNA\u2019s offices to the detention centre, the Court considers it reasonable to believe that she remained at the DNA\u2019s offices for between seven to eight hours.66.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the Court notes that at the time of the events the applicant was in the first few weeks of her pregnancy and that she was experiencing some complications.67.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes, however, that none of the available evidence shows that either on 31 October or 6 November 2014 the applicant or her legal representatives informed the investigating authorities of her pregnancy, the required treatment for it, its side effects and the complications she was experiencing (contrast Iustin Robertino Micu, cited above, \u00a7\u00a070). The medical documents actually submitted by the applicant to the authorities do not contain any specific reference or information about her pregnancy or the treatment prescribed to her.68.\u00a0\u00a0Even assuming that her allegations that she informed the authorities of her condition and treatment at least verbally were true, the Court considers that the applicant\u2019s simple statement made to the investigating authorities, in the absence of any medical document substantiating her allegations, was insufficient to prove the existence of her condition.69.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that according to the applicant\u2019s own submissions, on 6 November 2014 she brought a small bottle of water from home and was able to drink from it during her stay at the DNA\u2019s offices.70.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that the applicant did not contest the Government\u2019s submission that the DNA\u2019s offices had a canteen which was accessible to everyone in the building and where anyone could purchase food or water and sit down. Even assuming that the applicant was unaware that the DNA\u2019s offices had a canteen or that she did not have any money on her, she failed to provide any explanation as to why she could not have asked one or both of her chosen legal representatives to purchase some water and food for her from elsewhere.71.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that the length of the investigation into the applicant\u2019s case may be justified in view of the fact that it could be regarded as complex \u2013 it involved eleven other suspects and related to serious criminal accusations that had been brought against her. In addition, during the seven or eight hours she spent at the DNA\u2019s offices, the applicant was repeatedly involved in procedural measures, and she did not contest the information submitted by the DNA to the Government that during the carrying out of those measures she and her legal representatives had the option to sit down.72.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court notes that there is no evidence in the file that the treatment the applicant experienced on 6 November 2014 affected her physically or had a detrimental effect on her pregnancy (contrast Iustin\u00a0Robertino Micu, cited above, \u00a7 73).73.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances, notwithstanding the applicant\u2019s medical condition at the time of the events, the Court finds that the treatment she received on 6 November 2014 prior to her remand in police custody did not exceed the inherent and inevitable suffering caused by the legal proceedings and questioning related to the case.74.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this part of the applicant\u2019s complaints is manifestly ill\u2011founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and\u00a04 of the Convention.75.\u00a0\u00a0The above conclusion dispenses the Court from examining the remaining arguments put forward by the Government in respect of the admissibility of this complaint (see paragraphs 41 and 49 above).B.\u00a0\u00a0Physical conditions of detention at the detention centre1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility76.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this part of the applicant\u2019s complaints is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It also notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions77.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that the bed assigned to her at the detention centre had had a dirty and smelly mattress without any bed linen or blankets and she had been forced to sleep with her head on a jacket fully clothed. Furthermore, the squat toilet had been unsanitary and had been separated from the rest of the cell by a plastic curtain which had not stopped the smell and noise reaching the cell. A plastic bottle had been used to plug the toilet in order to prevent rats from entering the cell. In addition, no warm water had been available during her detention and cold water had had to be used for washing.78.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that the detention centre medical service had recorded in writing that she was a non-smoker. Even though the detention centre had had cells for non-smokers she had been detained with smokers. In any event, smoking had been allowed everywhere, even in the courtyard where the air had been unbreathable. It had been no larger than five steps and the high walls and wire mesh had transformed it into room with a high ceiling where smoking had been allowed.79.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that once she had arrived at the detention centre she had asked for food. However, she had been told that the evening meal had already been served at 6 p.m. and that she could eat the following day. In the morning she had been served some unsavoury food which her cellmate had warned her not to eat.80.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contended that the Government and the domestic authorities did not deny the unsanitary conditions she had faced during her detention or the presence of rats. They had also confirmed that she had been detained together with smokers.81.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had been incarcerated at the detention centre from 8.20 p.m. on 6 November 2014 to 7.07\u00a0p.m. on 7\u00a0November 2014. She had been detained together with three other inmates in a cell which had measured 8.87 square metres, excluding the bathroom. She had been provided with her own bed, bed linen and blankets. She had had access to a bathroom from inside the cell which had been separated from the cell by a plastic curtain. The bathroom had had a sink, a squat toilet and a shower. Hot and cold drinkable water had been available throughout her time there and she had not been detained in a cell with minors, drug addicts or convicts. According to the detention centre authorities, there had been no records that the applicant had informed them that she was a non-smoker.82.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the detention centre had two courtyards, one measuring 13.97 square metres and the other measuring 19.52\u00a0square metres. Furthermore, according to the relevant rules in force at the material time, the evening meal was served from 5.30 to 6 p.m. and the applicant had not asked for food when she had arrived at the detention centre.83.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that not even the statement signed by the applicant herself for the detention centre medical service contained any information about her pregnancy. Consequently, even though the authorities had presented her with the opportunity to disclose any circumstances that might have placed her in a vulnerable situation, she had failed to do so. The Government therefore considered that the applicant\u2019s twenty\u2011four hour detention had not been incompatible with her health.84.\u00a0\u00a0The Government acknowledged that the applicant had been detained in a cell for smokers even though she had informed the detention centre medical service that she was a non-smoker. They also acknowledged that the treatment she had been subjected to should have been avoided. However, they argued that she had not been subjected to a level of stress that had gone beyond what had been inherent to detention. She had been detained in a cell for smokers for only twenty-four hours. Furthermore, the domestic authorities had not been aware of her condition, which would have rendered her detention in a room for non-smokers mandatory. In addition, the applicant had not provided any evidence in support of her allegations that the inhuman treatment she had allegedly been subjected to had affected her health or the development of her pregnancy.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment85.\u00a0\u00a0In Mur\u0161i\u0107 v. Croatia ([GC] no. 7334\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 136-141, 20\u00a0October 2016) the Court clarified and summarised its principles concerning prison overcrowding, as follows:(i)\u00a0\u00a0the Court confirmed the standard predominant in its case-law of 3\u00a0sq.\u00a0m of floor surface per detainee in multi-occupancy accommodation as the relevant minimum standard under Article 3 of the Convention;(ii)\u00a0\u00a0when the personal space available to a detainee falls below 3\u00a0sq.\u00a0m of floor surface in multi-occupancy accommodation, the lack of personal space is considered so severe that a strong presumption of a violation of Article\u00a03 arises. The burden of proof is on the respondent Government which could, however, rebut that presumption by demonstrating that there were factors capable of adequately compensating for the scarce allocation of personal space;(iii)\u00a0\u00a0the strong presumption of a violation of Article 3 will normally be capable of being rebutted only if the following factors are cumulatively met:- the reductions in the required minimum personal space of 3 sq. m are short, occasional and minor;- such reductions are accompanied by sufficient freedom of movement outside the cell and adequate out-of-cell activities;- the applicant is confined in what is, when viewed generally, an appropriate detention facility, and there are no other aggravating aspects of the conditions of his or her detention.86.\u00a0\u00a0In the instant case, the Court notes that according to the available evidence, the applicant was detained at the detention centre from 8.20\u00a0p.m. on 6\u00a0November 2014 to 7.07 p.m. on 7\u00a0November 2014. While the parties disagree on the size of the applicant\u2019s cell, they agree that the applicant had to share her cell with three other inmates. However, even taking into account the size of the cell put forward by the Government (see paragraph\u00a081 above), the applicant\u2019s living space during her detention seems to have been 2.21 sq. m.87.\u00a0\u00a0In light of the above, the Court finds that a strong presumption of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention arises in the present case on account of the fact that the applicant was detained in a cell in which she disposed of less than 3 sq. m of floor surface.88.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly the Court must have regard to other relevant factors capable of rebutting such presumption \u2013 namely the length of the period she had to endure such conditions, the possibility of sufficient freedom of movement and out-of-cell activities, and the appropriateness of the detention facility \u2013 which might have been capable of alleviating the situation created by the scarce allocation of personal space (see Mur\u0161i\u0107, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0160).89.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the length of the applicant\u2019s detention in the detention centre was very short, amounting according to the available evidence to around twenty-two hours.90.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that it is uncontested by the parties that the applicant was allowed thirty minutes of outdoor exercise during her detention. However, even though the Government have contested some of the applicant\u2019s allegations about the physical conditions of her detention, they have not contested her submission that for her thirty minutes outdoor exercise she was taken to a courtyard where the air was unbreathable because her cellmates were smoking and the walls of the courtyard were too high to allow in fresh air (see paragraph 78 above).91.\u00a0\u00a0Be that as it may, the Court notes that the Government have also not contested the applicant\u2019s submissions that the toilet was separated from the room by a simple plastic curtain and had to be plugged by a plastic bottle to prevent rats from entering the cell, that the shower was fitted above the toilet and was also used for flushing it, that she was detained with smokers even though she had specifically informed the detention centre medical service that she was a non-smoker, that she did not receive any food from 8.20\u00a0p.m. until the following morning or that the food received in the morning was unsavoury and inedible (see paragraphs 77-79 above).92.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that there is no evidence in the file that the applicant asked for food immediately after she arrived at the detention centre or that she disclosed to the detention centre authorities or medical service that she was pregnant. However, given the information provided by the detention centre coordination department to the Government \u2013 in particular, the absence of written rules setting out the procedure which needs to be followed with regard to a detainee\u2019s evening meal in the event he or she arrives at the detention centre later than 6 p.m. and that he or she would be detained according to his or her smoking preferences as far as possible \u2013 the Court is not convinced that a specific request by the applicant or full disclosure of her medical condition would have changed her situation.93.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers therefore that the fact that the applicant\u2019s detention was short and that she was allowed to walk outside her cell for thirty minute was insufficient to compensate for the scarce allocation of personal space to her, and thus to rebut the strong presumption of a breach of Article 3 of the Convention.94.\u00a0\u00a0The Court agrees with the Government that there is no evidence in the file that the physical conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention affected her health or the development of her pregnancy and it notes that the applicant has not contradicted the Government\u2019s allegation that she was not detained in a cell with minors, drug addicts or convicts.95.\u00a0\u00a0Nevertheless, having regard to the cumulative effects of the physical conditions of her detention the Court considers, irrespective of the applicant\u2019s medical condition, that even though there is no indication that there was a positive intention to humiliate or debase her, the distress and hardship she endured exceeded the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and went beyond the threshold of severity under Article 3 of the Convention.96.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has been a violation of that provision in respect of the applicant\u2019s physical conditions of detention.C.\u00a0\u00a0Lack of adequate medical treatment during the applicant\u2019s detention at the detention centreAdmissibility(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions97.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contended that according to the information provided by the detention centre, there had been no record in the medical report issued at the time of the applicant\u2019s incarceration that she had been given any form of medication during her incarceration.98.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the authorities had been aware that the applicant had been taking Utrogestan. The medication was normally prescribed for pregnancy support in certain medical circumstances. Also, according to the medical prescription, the applicant had used the medicine first preventively and possibly afterwards to ensure a healthy pregnancy. In addition, the medicine\u2019s patient information leaflet did not mention any effects in the event the treatment was discontinued. Consequently, the Government contended that given the available information, it would have been speculation to consider that by missing one day of treatment the applicant\u2019s medical condition would have been affected.99.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that the detention centre medical service had recorded in writing that she had been taking Utrogestan. Even though she had also asked the medical service if she could take her vitamins twice a day, she had not been provided with the treatment.100.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that the Government had acknowledged that she had not been provided with any medication during her detention. However, she denied the Government\u2019s claim that the discontinuance of her treatment would not have had any side effects. She contended that she had been taking her medication long before she had been pregnant and her doctors had advised her that it had been essential for her to continue taking her treatment. Even if the medicine\u2019s patient information leaflet had not listed any side effects in the event the treatment had been discontinued, it had also not mentioned that it guaranteed a pregnancy. The information in the leaflet had nothing to do with the consequences that the discontinuation of the treatment could have had on her body\u2019s ability to carry the pregnancy. For those reasons, the doctors had advised her to continue taking her treatment even after she had become pregnant and until she was thirty-two weeks pregnant.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment101.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that when assessing the adequacy of medical treatment in prison, it must reserve, in general, sufficient flexibility in defining the required standard of healthcare, which must accommodate the legitimate demands of imprisonment but remain compatible with human dignity and the due discharge of its positive obligations by the State. In this regard, it is incumbent on the relevant domestic authorities to ensure, in particular, that diagnosis and care are prompt and accurate, and that supervision by proficient medical personnel is regular and systematic and involves a comprehensive therapeutic strategy. The mere fact of a deterioration in an applicant\u2019s state of health, albeit capable of raising, at an initial stage, certain doubts concerning the adequacy of the applicant\u2019s treatment in prison, cannot suffice, by itself, for a finding of a violation of the State\u2019s positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention, if, on the other hand, it can be established that the relevant domestic authorities in a timely fashion provided all reasonably available medical care in a conscientious effort to hinder development of the disease in question (see, among many other authorities, Fedosejevs v. Latvia (dec.), no.\u00a037546\/06, \u00a7\u00a047, 19\u00a0November 2013, and Verde\u015f v. Romania, no. 6215\/14, \u00a7 52, 24\u00a0November 2015).102.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the applicant was examined by a doctor immediately after she arrived at the detention centre and that she informed him of her treatment with Utrogestan. However, she did not submit any medical documents in support of her statement, and there is no evidence in the file that she told the doctor that she was already pregnant or that she had also been prescribed treatment with vitamins and minerals.103.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that it is uncontested that the applicant was not given any form of medication during her detention. At the same time, based on the available evidence, it considers reasonable to assume that she had access to her medication both prior and immediately after her incarceration, and that her access to the medication was restricted for a very short time.104.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is willing to accept that the applicant\u2019s inability to take her medication during her detention could have caused her some distress. However, it notes that the root cause of her potential anxiety lasted very briefly and that according to the available evidence, the discontinuation of the treatment did not have any medical consequences to her general medical condition, health and the development of her pregnancy.105.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances, after an assessment of the relevant facts as a whole, the Court considers that neither the applicant\u2019s state of health, nor her potential distress generated by the brief interruption of her treatment alone, attained in the particular circumstances of the case a sufficient level of severity to amount to a breach of the right guaranteed by Article 3 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Viorel Burzo v. Romania, no.\u00a075109\/01 and 12638\/02, \u00a7 86, 30 June 2009).106.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this part of the applicant\u2019s complaints is manifestly ill\u2011founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and\u00a04 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION107.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage108.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 5,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage. She argued that although the finding of a violation constituted sufficient just satisfaction, the payment by the domestic authorities of symbolic compensation was a means of making them realise the potentially serious consequences of their actions. She submitted that her complaints were meant as a warning so that other people, particularly pregnant women, were not subjected to similar treatment and detention conditions.109.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that a finding of a violation would amount to sufficient just satisfaction in the instant case. In any event, the sum claimed by the applicant in respect of non-pecuniary damage was excessive. Also, the aim of an award was to compensate an injured party for the damage incurred. Consequently, it should not be regarded as a punishment inflicted on the respondent State, because such an approach was not the goal of awarding just satisfaction claims.110.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicant must have suffered distress as a result of the physical conditions of her detention, which cannot be made good by the mere finding of a violation. Consequently, making an assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR\u00a0600 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses111.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not claim any costs or expenses.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest112.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","29107":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION27.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained about the conditions of his detention in Ia\u015fi Prison. He complained mainly of overcrowding, the poor quality of the food, the lack of proper hygiene and the non-segregation of smokers from non\u2011smokers. He also stated that despite the fact that his medical condition required direct and constant assistance from another person, he had not been assigned a personal care assistant in Rahova and Ia\u015fi Prisons.He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility28.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies as he had not complained to the competent domestic authorities about the alleged exposure to smoke in Ia\u015fi Prison.29.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not comment on this point.30.\u00a0\u00a0The Court recalls that in other cases against Romania concerning similar complaints it has already found that, given the specific nature of this type of complaint, the legal actions suggested by the Government did not constitute an effective remedy (see, for instance, Toma Barbu v.\u00a0Romania, no.\u00a019730\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 48-53, 30 July 2013). The Court does not see any reasons to conclude otherwise in the present case.31.\u00a0\u00a0It therefore rejects the Government\u2019s plea of non\u2011exhaustion of domestic remedies.32.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the Government33.\u00a0\u00a0The Government, referring to the description of the detention conditions (see paragraphs 9-12 above), submitted that that they had been in line with the requirements of the Convention. The applicant had had an individual sleeping place and had been afforded sufficient living space. Moreover, they contended that in cells E 8.10 and E 7.5 the applicant had on occasions been afforded 4.4\u00a0sq.\u00a0m and 5.8 sq. m respectively.34.\u00a0\u00a0They argued that the conditions of detention had corresponded to the specific needs of the applicant. He had been assisted by inmates specifically assigned to him by the facility\u2019s administration for that purpose, he had received the necessary medical care and the facility\u2019s personnel had monitored his condition closely.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles35.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention requires the State to ensure that prisoners are detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method in which the measure is enforced do not subject them to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, their health and well-being are adequately secured (see Kud\u0142a\u00a0v.\u00a0Poland [GC], no.\u00a030210\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 92-94, ECHR 2000\u2011XI, and Meln\u012btis v.\u00a0Latvia, no.\u00a030779\/05, \u00a7 69, 28 February 2012).36.\u00a0\u00a0Taking into account the important role played by the minimum personal space per detainee in a multi-occupancy setting in the assessment of the detainees\u2019 conditions of detention, the Court will further refer to its principles concerning prison overcrowding.37.\u00a0\u00a0In Mur\u0161i\u0107 v. Croatia [GC] (no. 7334\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 136-141, 20\u00a0October 2016) the Court clarified and summarised these principles as follows:(i)\u00a0\u00a0the Court confirmed the standard predominant in its case-law of 3\u00a0sq.\u00a0m of floor surface per detainee in multi-occupancy accommodation as the relevant minimum standard under Article 3 of the Convention;(ii)\u00a0\u00a0when the personal space available to a detainee falls below 3\u00a0sq.\u00a0m of floor surface in multi-occupancy accommodation in prisons, the lack of personal space is considered so severe that a strong presumption of a violation of Article 3 arises. The burden of proof is on the respondent Government which could, however, rebut that presumption by demonstrating that there were factors capable of adequately compensating for the scarce allocation of personal space;(iii)\u00a0\u00a0the strong presumption of a violation of Article 3 will normally be capable of being rebutted only if the following factors are cumulatively met:- the reductions in the required minimum personal space of 3\u00a0sq.\u00a0m are short, occasional and minor;- such reductions are accompanied by sufficient freedom of movement outside the cell and adequate out-of-cell activities;- the applicant is confined in what is, when viewed generally, an appropriate detention facility, and there are no other aggravating aspects of the conditions of his or her detention.38.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the Court has considered that where the authorities decide to place and keep a disabled person in detention, they should demonstrate special care in guaranteeing such conditions as correspond to the special needs resulting from his disability (see Helhal v. France, no.\u00a010401\/12, \u00a7\u00a050, 19 February 2015; and Zarzycki v. Poland, no. 15351\/03, \u00a7\u00a0102, 12\u00a0March 2013).39.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has also held that detaining a disabled person in a prison where he could not move around and, in particular, could not leave his cell independently, amounted to degrading treatment (see Vincent v.\u00a0France, no.\u00a06253\/03, \u00a7 103, 24 October 2006). Similarly, the Court has found that leaving a person with a serious physical disability to rely on his cellmates for assistance with using the toilet, bathing and getting dressed or undressed contributed to its finding that the conditions of detention amounted to degrading treatment (see Engel v. Hungary, no. 46857\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 27 and\u00a030, 20\u00a0May 2010).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case40.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will start by examining the issue of the personal space afforded to the applicant for the period of almost ten months during which he was detained in Ia\u015fi Prison.41.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the information provided by the Government in reply to applicant\u2019s allegations of overcrowding were based on occupancy of the available beds, and not on surface area per detainee. However, the Court notes from the material at its disposal that the personal space available to detainees in Ia\u015fi Prison was consistently less than three square metres. Much of the cell areas were taken up by beds (see paragraph\u00a09 above).42.\u00a0\u00a0In light of the above considerations, the Court finds that a strong presumption of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention arises in the present case on account of the fact that the applicant was detained in cells in which he disposed of less than 3 sq. m.43.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court must have regard to other relevant factors capable of rebutting such presumption, namely the possibility of sufficient freedom of movement and out-of-cell activities, which could have alleviated the situation created by the scarce allocation of personal space (see Mur\u0161i\u0107, cited above, \u00a7 160).44.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, the Court considers that the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention cannot be assessed in isolation from his severe disability. The Court notes that according to the applicant\u2019s allegations, not contested by the Government, the premises of the facility were not adapted for visually impaired people (see paragraph 14 above).45.\u00a0\u00a0Under these circumstances the Court notes that the applicant was not able to move about freely within the detention facility, but was confined to his cell, which seriously aggravated his conditions of detention.46.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that a special commission in Rahova Prison had examined the applicant and recommended a set of measures to be taken, including the assignment of a personal care assistant (see paragraph\u00a013 above).47.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the assignment of a personal care assistant, the Court notes that the parties made conflicting submissions. While the Government submitted that the applicant had been assisted by fellow inmates assigned by the prison administration (see paragraphs 19 and 20 above), the applicant contended that those inmates had refused to carry out their tasks, asking to be paid for that additional activity (see paragraph 16 above).48.\u00a0\u00a0Even assuming that the applicant permanently benefitted from the assistance of fellow inmates especially assigned to help him, the Court is particularly concerned about the quality of their assistance, as they were neither trained nor had the necessary qualifications to provide such assistance.49.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already found a violation of Article\u00a03 of the Convention in circumstances where prison staff felt that they had been relieved of their duty to provide security and care to more vulnerable detainees by making their cellmates responsible for providing them with daily assistance or, if necessary, with first aid (see Semikhvostov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a02689\/12, \u00a7 85, 6 February 2014, Mircea\u00a0Dumitrescu v.\u00a0Romania, no.\u00a014609\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 59-65, 30 July 2013, and Kaprykowski v.\u00a0Poland, no.\u00a023052\/05, \u00a7 74, 3 February 2009). It is clear that in the present case the help offered by the applicant\u2019s fellow inmates did not form part of any organised assistance by the State to ensure that the applicant was detained in conditions compatible with respect for his human dignity. It cannot therefore be considered suitable or sufficient.50.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of all circumstances mentioned above, the Court is convinced that the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention, exacerbated by his severe sight impairment, amounted to \u201cinhuman and degrading treatment\u201d within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.51.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has been a violation of this provision.II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION52.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage53.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 480,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. He argued that the amount claimed for pecuniary damage was intended to cover the cost of the assistance he had received from his fellow inmates.54.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that there was no causal link between the alleged violations and the pecuniary damage claimed by the applicant. Moreover, the amount in respect of non-pecuniary damage was unjustified and excessive.55.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant has failed to demonstrate the existence of a causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On the other hand, having regard to all the circumstances of the present case, the Court accepts that the applicant must have suffered non-pecuniary damage, which cannot be compensated solely by the finding of a violation. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 7,500 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable thereon.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses56.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not claim the reimbursement of the costs and expenses incurred either before the domestic courts or before the Court. Therefore, the Court is not called upon to make an award in this respect.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest57.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","29147":"32.\u00a0\u00a0In their observations of 10 July 2015 the Government submitted that the applicant did not run the risk of an immediate forced transfer to Uzbekistan since his extradition to Uzbekistan was barred by the expiry of the limitation period for criminal prosecution, and no deportation or administrative removal proceedings had been initiated in respect of the applicant in Russia.33.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further contended that the applicant\u2019s failure to legalise his stay in Russia by ordinary means (through obtaining a visa, a temporary residence permit or a residence permit) amounted to non\u2011exhaustion of the domestic remedies, and a lack of financial resources could not be viewed as a valid justification for not having recourse to those remedies.34.\u00a0\u00a0In their additional comments of 10 November 2015 the Government confirmed their position and stated that they saw no need to assess the applicant\u2019s arguments about the risk of ill-treatment in the event of his forced return to Uzbekistan since no decision warranting such return has been taken.35.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaint and contended that it was only because of the interim measures indicated by the Court that no decision on his deportation or administrative removal had been taken. In support of this statement he relied on the letter from the Ivanovo Regional FMS dated 15 October 2014 (see paragraph 12 above). He also referred to the letter from the Ivanovo Regional FMS of 25 September 2015 (see paragraph 25 above) in response to the Government\u2019s objection regarding non-exhaustion of the domestic remedies.36.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that expulsion by a Contracting State may give rise to an issue under Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, if substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the individual concerned, if deported, will face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 (see Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201\/06, \u00a7 125, ECHR 2008, and Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7\u00a0July 1989, \u00a7 91, Series A no. 161).37.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that it is not disputed by the parties that the applicant has been charged with religious and politically motivated crimes in Uzbekistan and therefore belongs to a vulnerable group which runs a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention in the event of their removal to Uzbekistan (see Mamazhonov v. Russia, no. 17239\/13, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0139\u201141, 23 October 2014).38.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will now examine the Government\u2019s objection that the applicant is not at risk of an immediate forced transfer to Uzbekistan. In this regard the Court notes first and foremost that, as matters now stand, the applicant\u2019s extradition is precluded by the time-barring of his criminal prosecution under current Russian legislation, no other removal proceedings against the applicant are underway, and there is no outstanding expulsion order.39.\u00a0\u00a0In such circumstances it must be considered whether there is any substantial foundation for the applicant\u2019s fears that his expulsion or deportation will take place in the future. Turning to this question the Court observes that the Ivanovo Regional FMS letter (see paragraph 12 above) on which the applicant relies cannot be accepted as evidence of the authorities\u2019 intention to have recourse to those procedures since it is not enforceable in itself. What is more, the Court notes that the Russian authorities took no steps towards the applicant\u2019s removal during the period between 22\u00a0June\u00a02015 (the date of a final decision in the temporary asylum proceedings) and 6 July 2015 (the date of indication of an interim measure by the Court) even though nothing prevented them from doing so.40.\u00a0\u00a0The Court furthermore observes that deportation proceedings may only be opened in the event of the applicant\u2019s failure to legalise his stay in Russia. In this regard it is relevant that from 2012 to 2014 the applicant resided in Russia lawfully on the basis of his registration as a migrant and his renewable work permit. In a letter of 25 September 2015 the Ivanovo Regional FMS invited the applicant to renew his migration registration as a first step toward legalising his stay in Russia (see paragraph\u00a026 above). Given that migration registration is a prerequisite to obtaining both a work permit and a temporary residence permit, the Court considers that the actions taken so far by the domestic authorities are not indicative of their intention to have the applicant removed from Russia.41.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the Court is satisfied that the applicant does not run the risk of an immediate forced transfer to Uzbekistan. The applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 3 of the Convention is therefore manifestly ill\u2011founded.42.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 13, the Court reiterates that, according to its constant case-law, Article 13 applies only where an individual has an \u201carguable claim\u201d to be the victim of a violation of a Convention right (see Boyle and Rice v. the United Kingdom, 27 April 1988, \u00a7 52, Series A no. 131). It follows that since the applicant has no arguable claim under Article 3 of the Convention, his complaint under Article 13 is likewise inadmissible.43.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s complaints under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention must therefore be rejected pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4\u00a0of the Convention.44.\u00a0\u00a0Taking into consideration the above findings, it is appropriate to discontinue the application of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.45.\u00a0\u00a0The above findings do not prevent the applicant from lodging a new application before the Court in the future and making use of the available procedures \u2012 including the one under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court \u2012 in respect of any new circumstances.For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,Declares the application inadmissible.\u00a0Done in English and notified in writing on 23 March 2017.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Stephen PhillipsHelena J\u00e4derblomRegistrarPresident","29164":"...II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 2 AND 3 OF THE CONVENTION76.\u00a0\u00a0Relying on Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the Convention, the applicant complained that, owing to their complacency and indifference, the Italian authorities, despite having been alerted several times to her husband\u2019s violence, had not taken the necessary measures to protect her and her son\u2019s life from the \u2013 in her view real and known \u2013 risk represented by her husband, and had not prevented the commission of other domestic violence. She alleged that the authorities had thus failed to comply with their positive obligation under the Convention.77.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that since it is master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, it does not consider itself bound by the characterisation given by an applicant or a government. By virtue of the jura novit curia principle, it has, for example, considered of its own motion complaints under Articles or paragraphs not relied on by the parties. In other words, a complaint is characterised by the facts alleged in it and not merely by the legal grounds or arguments relied on (see Aksu v. Turkey [GC], nos.\u00a04149\/04 and 41029\/04, \u00a7 43, ECHR 2012). Having regard to the circumstances complained of by the applicant and the manner in which her complaints were formulated, the Court will examine them under Articles\u00a02 and 3 of the Convention (for a similar approach, see E.M. v. Romania, no.\u00a043994\/05, \u00a7 51, 30 October 2012; Valiulien\u0117 v. Lithuania, no.\u00a033234\/07, \u00a7 87, 26 March 2013; and M.G. v. Turkey, no. 646\/10, \u00a7 62, 22\u00a0March 2016).Those Articles\u00a0provide:Article 2\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone\u2019s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.Article 3\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d78.\u00a0\u00a0The Government disputed that argument.A.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s submissions79.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged that the failure by the authorities to comply with their obligation to protect her life and that of her son, who was killed by her husband, had resulted in a violation of Article 2 of the Convention. She submitted in that regard that the Italian authorities had failed to protect her son\u2019s right to life and that they had been negligent before the repeated violence, threats and injuries which she herself had endured.80.\u00a0\u00a0She argued that the Italian authorities had tolerated de facto her husband\u2019s violence. In her submission, the police had known since June 2012 that she had been a victim of violence and should have known that there was a real and serious risk that A.T. would be violent towards her. According to the applicant, there had been clear signs of a continuing threat of danger to her, but the authorities had not taken the necessary measures immediately after she had lodged her complaint and had thus left her alone and defenceless.81.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged, further, that, despite the hospital certificate of 19\u00a0August 2012 establishing that she had been beaten and threatened with a knife, that fact had not been taken seriously.82.\u00a0\u00a0In the applicant\u2019s view, the only remedy available had been a criminal complaint and this had not been effective. She stated that she had lodged a complaint on 5\u00a0September 2012 and made a statement to the police in April 2013. She added that, during the seven months between lodging the complaint and giving her statement, no investigative steps had been taken and no witnesses heard. In March 2013 the public prosecutor had again had to ask the police to investigate (see paragraph 29 above).83.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained of the authorities\u2019 complacency and stated that she had changed her version of the facts once she had been questioned by the police seven months after lodging her complaint. In her view, it was clear that the State had not protected her and that she had been abandoned by the authorities, who had not taken any measures to protect her despite her request. The applicant also stated that the Udine District Council, while aware of the difficult situation in which she found herself, had refused to help her and had stopped funding her accommodation at the shelter run by the association for the protection of battered women. In her submission, the authorities should have intervened of their own motion given the circumstances of the case and her vulnerability.84.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that, according to the Court\u2019s case-law, the positive obligations under Article 2 of the Convention imposed a primary duty on the State to secure the right to life by putting in place effective criminal-law provisions to deter the commission of offences against the person and backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and sanctioning of breaches of such provisions. She submitted that this could also imply in certain circumstances a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life was at risk from the criminal acts of another individual (she referred to Osman v. the United Kingdom, 28 October 1998, \u00a7 115, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011VIII, cited in Kontrov\u00e1 v.\u00a0Slovakia, no. 7510\/04, \u00a7 49, 31 May 2007). She concluded that in the present case the Italian State had not taken the necessary measures to protect her life and that of her son.85.\u00a0Referring to the Court\u2019s case-law (Opuz, cited above, \u00a7 159), the applicant complained that she had also been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment. She reiterated that she had lodged a complaint, supported by her medical case notes, in September 2012 and that, for seven months, the authorities had done nothing to protect her. She added that her husband had meanwhile succeeded in convincing her to come back and live with him.86.\u00a0\u00a0In conclusion, the applicant submitted that the State had failed to comply with its positive obligations under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s submissions87.\u00a0\u00a0After stating the principles established in the Court\u2019s case-law, the Government submitted that not every claimed risk to life could entail for the authorities a Convention requirement to take operational measures to prevent that risk from materialising (they referred to Opuz, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0129). In their submission, it also had to be established that the authorities had known or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual from the criminal acts of a third party and that they had failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk.88.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Government considered that the present case had to be distinguished from the case of Opuz (cited above). In their submission, in the present case the authorities had not known and could not have known that the applicant and her son\u2019s lives were at risk, as there had been no tangible evidence that their lives were in imminent danger. They pointed out that, after the two episodes of violence in June and August 2012 the applicant had found refuge in a victim support shelter and that she had subsequently found employment providing her with financial independence. In the Government\u2019s submission, the two episodes reported in June and August 2012 had appeared to be mere family rows. The Government submitted that the authorities had done everything in their power by fining A.T. for unauthorised possession of a lethal weapon, and that an investigation in respect of ill-treatment and bodily injury required that a complaint be lodged.89.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also stated that the applicant had left the shelter where she had taken refuge and that when she had been questioned by the police in April 2013 she had changed her earlier statements. They observed that the authorities, before discontinuing the complaint of ill-treatment, had checked whether her version of the facts was accurate, whether there had been other events of that type and whether the applicant had been in a vulnerable situation capable of inducing her to change her statements. According to the Government, the applicant had then stated that there had been no further incident and that A.T. had calmed down.90.\u00a0\u00a0In those circumstances the Government considered that an intervention by the authorities could have breached Article 8 of the Convention.91.\u00a0\u00a0In their view, the time that elapsed between lodging the complaint and hearing the applicant had not had the effect of leaving the applicant exposed to violence from A.T. The Government pointed out, further, that as no other request for intervention had been made, there had been no specific sign of real and immediate violence. They added that on the basis of the aforementioned factors the authorities had decided not to prosecute A.T. for ill-treatment of family members.92.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had never shown that she had suffered continual abuse or violence or that she had lived in fear of being attacked. They observed, however, that during her interview with the police in April 2013 she had asserted that she was no longer being abused.93.\u00a0\u00a0Consequently, the Government considered that the acts of violence allegedly suffered by the applicant could not be classified as inhuman or degrading treatment.94.\u00a0\u00a0From a procedural point of view, the Government submitted that they had complied with their positive obligations under the Convention. They stated that, following the investigation, as the applicant had changed her statements, the prosecution had to request that the case be discontinued. They added that the proceedings relating to the offence of causing bodily injury had continued and that A.T. had been sentenced on 1 October 2015 to pay a fine of EUR 2,000.C.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Applicable principles95.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will examine the complaints under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention in the light of the converging principles deriving from both those provisions, principles which are well-established and have been summarised, inter alia, in the judgments Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria ([GC], nos. 43577\/98 and 43579\/98, \u00a7\u00a7 110 and 112-113, ECHR 2005\u2011VII), and Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands ([GC], no. 52391\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 324-25, ECHR 2007\u2011II).96.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already stated that, in interpreting Articles 2 and 3, it must be guided by the knowledge that the object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings requires that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective.97.\u00a0\u00a0It reiterates that Article 3, like Article 2, must be regarded as one of the most fundamental provisions of the Convention and as enshrining one of the core values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe (see Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, \u00a7 88, Series A no. 161). In contrast to the other provisions in the Convention, it is cast in absolute terms, without exception or proviso, or the possibility of derogation under Article 15 of the Convention (see Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no.\u00a02346\/02, \u00a7 49, ECHR 2002\u2011III).98.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also reiterates the general principles established in its case-law concerning domestic violence as laid down in Opuz (cited above, \u00a7\u00a0159, with the case-law references mentioned therein).99.\u00a0\u00a0In that connection it reiterates that children and other vulnerable individuals \u2013 into which category fall victims of domestic violence \u2013 in particular are entitled to State protection, in the form of effective deterrence, against such serious breaches of personal integrity (see Opuz, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0159). It also observes that the positive obligations laid down in the first sentence of Article 2 of the Convention also require by implication that the State should set in place an efficient and independent judicial system by which the cause of a death can be established and the guilty parties punished. The essential purpose of such an investigation is to secure the effective implementation of the domestic laws which protect the right to life and, in those cases involving State agents or bodies, to ensure their accountability for deaths occurring under their responsibility. A requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is implicit in that context (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0150-51).100.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has also previously held that the authorities\u2019 positive obligations \u2013 in some cases under Articles 2 or 3 and in other instances under Article 8 taken alone or in combination with Article 3 of the Convention \u2013 may include a duty to put in place and apply an adequate legal framework affording protection against acts of violence by private individuals (see, among other authorities, Bevacqua and S. v.\u00a0Bulgaria, no.\u00a071127\/01, \u00a7 65, 12 June 2008; Sandra Jankovi\u0107 v.\u00a0Croatia, no.\u00a038478\/05, \u00a7 45, 5 March 2009; A. v. Croatia, no. 55164\/08, \u00a7 60, 14\u00a0October 2010; \u0110or\u0111evi\u0107 v. Croatia, no. 41526\/10, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0141-143, ECHR 2012; and M. and M. v. Croatia, no. 10161\/13, \u00a7 136, ECHR 2015 (extracts)).101.\u00a0\u00a0Article 2 of the Convention may also imply in certain well-defined circumstances a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual (see Osman, cited above, \u00a7 115; Branko\u00a0Toma\u0161i\u0107 and Others v. Croatia, no. 46598\/06, \u00a7 50, 15\u00a0January 2009; Opuz, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0128; Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, no. 22535\/93, \u00a7\u00a085, ECHR 2000\u2011III; and K\u0131l\u0131\u00e7 v. Turkey, no. 22492\/93, \u00a7 62, ECHR 2000\u2011III).Bearing in mind the difficulties involved in policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human conduct and the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources, the scope of the positive obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities. Accordingly, not every claimed risk to life can entail for the authorities a Convention requirement to take operational measures to prevent that risk from materialising. For a positive obligation to arise, it must be established that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk (see Keenan v. the United Kingdom, no. 27229\/95, \u00a7\u00a7 89-90, ECHR 2001\u2011III; Gongadze v. Ukraine, no. 34056\/02, \u00a7 165, ECHR 2005\u2011XI; and Opuz, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 129-30). Another relevant consideration is the need to ensure that the police exercise their powers to control and prevent crime in a manner which fully respects the due process and other guarantees which legitimately place restraints on the scope of their action to investigate crime and bring offenders to justice, including the guarantees contained in Articles 5 and 8 of the Convention (see Osman, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0116, and Opuz, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0129).102.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the obligation on the High Contracting Parties under Article 1 of the Convention to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, taken together with Article 3, requires States to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, even administered by private individuals.103.\u00a0\u00a0Nevertheless, it is not the Court\u2019s role to replace the national authorities and to choose in their stead from among the wide range of possible measures that could be taken to secure compliance with their positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention (see Opuz, cited above, \u00a7 165). Moreover, under Article 19 of the Convention and under the principle that the Convention is intended to guarantee not theoretical or illusory, but practical and effective rights, the Court has to ensure that a State\u2019s obligation to protect the rights of those under its jurisdiction is adequately discharged (see Sandra Jankovi\u0107, cited above, \u00a7\u00a046, and Hajduov\u00e1 v. Slovakia, no. 2660\/03, \u00a7 47, 30 November 2010). The question of the appropriateness of the authorites\u2019 response may raise a problem under the Convention (see Bevacqua and S., cited above, \u00a7\u00a079).104.\u00a0\u00a0The positive obligation to protect a person\u2019s physical integrity extends to matters concerning the effectiveness of a criminal investigation, which cannot be considered to be limited solely to cases of ill-treatment by State agents (see M.C. v. Bulgaria, no. 39272\/98, \u00a7 151, ECHR 2003\u2011XII).105.\u00a0\u00a0This aspect of the positive obligation does not necessarily require a conviction, but effective implementation of the law, particularly criminal, in order to secure the protection of the rights guaranteed by Article 3 of the Convention (see M.G. v. Turkey, cited above, \u00a7 80).106.\u00a0\u00a0A requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is implicit in the obligation to carry out an investigation. The protection machinery provided for in domestic law must operate in practice within a reasonable time such as to conclude the examination on the merits of specific cases submitted to them (see Opuz, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 150-51). The State\u2019s obligation under Article 3 of the Convention will not be deemed to be satisfied if the protection afforded by domestic law exists only in theory: above all, it must also operate effectively in practice, and that requires a prompt examination of the case without unnecessary delays.2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above-mentioned principles to the present casea)\u00a0\u00a0Article 2107.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes first of all that there is no doubt that Article\u00a02 of the Convention applies to the situation arising as a result of the death of the applicant\u2019s son.108.\u00a0\u00a0It notes subsequently that in the instant case the force used against the applicant was not in the event lethal. This does not, however, exclude in principle an examination of the complaints under Article 2, the text of which, read as a whole, demonstrates that it covers not only intentional killing but also situations where it is permitted to use force which may result, as an unintended outcome, in the deprivation of life (see Makaratzis v. Greece [GC], no. 50385\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 49-55, ECHR 2004\u2011XI). The first sentence of Article 2 \u00a7 1 enjoins the State not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction (see L.C.B. v.\u00a0the United\u00a0Kingdom, 9 June 1998, \u00a7 36, Reports 1998\u2011III).109.\u00a0\u00a0It is also necessary to bear in mind that, where the State\u2019s positive obligations to protect the right to life are concerned, it may be a question of recourse to lethal force by the police or of failure by the authorities to take protective measures to avoid a risk from the acts of third party (see, for example, Osman, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 115-22).110.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicant was the victim of inherently life-endangering conduct even though she ultimately survived her injuries (see Camekan v. Turkey, no. 54241\/08, \u00a7 38, 28 January 2014). Article 2 of the Convention therefore applies in the present case in respect of the applicant herself as well.111.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the instant case, the Court notes that, following the violent acts perpetrated against her in June and August 2012, the applicant lodged a criminal complaint in respect of the abuse inflicted by A.T. (see paragraph 21 above). It observes that the applicant appended to her complaint a medical report drawn up after the assault and describing the physical injuries visible on her body (see paragraph 16 above). At that time she expressed her fears for her life and that of her daughter and requested the benefit of protective measures. Accordingly, the conduct of the domestic authorities must be assessed from that date onwards.112.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that a judicial investigation was instituted against A.T. for ill-treatment of family members, inflicting grievous bodily harm and making threats. The police sent the applicant\u2019s complaint to the prosecution on 9 October 2012. On 15\u00a0October 2012 the prosecuting authorities, having regard to the applicant\u2019s request for protective measures, ordered urgent investigative measures to be carried out. In particular, they requested the police to check whether there had been witnesses, including the applicant\u2019s daughter. It notes that in the meantime the applicant had found refuge, through an association, in a shelter for victims of violence, where she stayed for three months.113.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that no protection order was issued, that the prosecution reiterated its request to the police in March 2013, emphasising the urgency of the situation, and that the applicant was not heard until April\u00a02013.114.\u00a0\u00a0Whilst, in the context of domestic violence, protection measures are in principle intended to avoid a dangerous situation as quickly as possible, the Court notes that seven months elapsed before the applicant was heard. Such a delay could only serve to deprive the applicant of the immediate protection required by the situation. Admittedly, as submitted by the Government, during the period in question the applicant was not subjected to further physical acts of violence by A.T. However, the Court cannot disregard the fact that the applicant, who was being harassed by telephone, was living in fear while staying at the shelter.115.\u00a0\u00a0In the view, the national authorities had a duty to take account of the unusual psychological, physical and material situation in which the applicant found herself and to assess the situation accordingly, providing her with appropriate support. That was not done in this case.116.\u00a0\u00a0While it is true that, seven months later, in April 2013, the applicant changed some of her statements, which led the authorities to discontinue the case in part, the Court notes that proceedings for grievous bodily harm were still pending on that date. Yet, the authorities failed to conduct any assessment of the risks facing the applicant, including the risk of renewed assaults.117.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that, by failing to act rapidly after the applicant had lodged her complaint, the national authorities deprived the complaint of any effectiveness, creating a situation of impunity conducive to the recurrence of A.T.\u2019s acts of violence against his wife and family (see Halime K\u0131l\u0131\u00e7 v. Turkey, no. 63034\/11, \u00a7 99, 28\u00a0June 2016).118.\u00a0\u00a0Although the Government submitted that there had been no tangible evidence of an imminent danger to the applicant\u2019s life or that of her son, the Court considers that the authorities do not appear to have assessed the risks involved for the applicant as a result of A.T.\u2019s behaviour.119.\u00a0\u00a0It notes that the context of impunity referred to above (see paragraph 117) reached its peak during the tragic night of 25\u00a0November 2013. The Court observes in that connection that the police intervened twice that night. Having been called out by the applicant, the police first found the bedroom door broken and the floor strewn with bottles of alcohol. The applicant had informed them that her husband had been drinking and that she had decided to call them because she thought he needed a doctor. She had told them that she had lodged a complaint against her husband in the past, but that she had subsequently changed her statements. The couple\u2019s son had stated that his father was not violent towards him. Lastly, neither the applicant not her son presented any traces of violence. A.T. had been taken to hospital in a state of intoxication but had subsequently checked himself out to go to an amusement arcade.The police intervened a second time the same night when they stopped and fined A.T. during an identity check in the street. According to the police report, A.T. had been in a state of intoxication, had difficulty maintaining his balance and the police had let him go after fining him.120.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that on neither occasion did the authorities take any specific measures to provide the applicant with adequate protection consonant with the seriousness of the situation, even though the violence inflicted on her by A.T. was known to the police as proceedings for inflicting grievous bodily harm on the applicant were still pending at the time (see paragraph 35 above).121.\u00a0\u00a0The Court cannot speculate as to how events would have turned out if the authorities had adopted a different approach. It reiterates, however, that a failure to take reasonable measures which might realistically have altered the outcome or mitigated the harm is sufficient to engage the State\u2019s responsibility (see E. and Others v. the United Kingdom, no.\u00a033218\/96, \u00a7\u00a099, 26 November 2002; Opuz, cited above \u00a7 136; and Bljakaj and Others v.\u00a0Croatia, no. 74448\/12, \u00a7 124, 18 September 2014).122.\u00a0\u00a0In the Court\u2019s view, the risk of a real and immediate threat (see paragraph 99 above) must be assessed taking due account of the particular context of domestic violence. In such a situation it is not only a question of an obligation to afford general protection to society (see Mastromatteo v.\u00a0Italy [GC], no. 37703\/97, \u00a7 69, ECHR 2002\u2011VIII; Maiorano and Others v.\u00a0Italy, no. 28634\/06, \u00a7 111, 15 December 2009; Choreftakis and Choreftaki v. Greece, no. 46846\/08, \u00a7 50, 17 January 2012; and Bljakaj, cited above, \u00a7 121), but above all to take account of the recurrence of successive episodes of violence within the family unit. In that context the Court reiterates that the police had to intervene twice during the night of 25\u00a0November 2013: firstly when they inspected the damaged flat, and secondly when they stopped and fined A.T., who was in a state of intoxication. Having regard also to the fact that the police had been in a position to check, in real time, A.T.\u2019s police record, the Court considers that they should have known that the applicant\u2019s husband constituted a real risk to her, the imminent materialisation of which could not be excluded. It therefore concludes that the authorities failed to use their powers to take measures which could reasonably have prevented, or at least mitigated, the materialisation of a real risk to the lives of the applicant and her son.123.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that in domestic violence cases perpetrators\u2019 rights cannot supersede victims\u2019 human rights to life and to physical and psychological integrity (see Opuz, cited above, \u00a7 147). Furthermore, the State has a positive obligation to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk.124.\u00a0\u00a0In those circumstances the Court concludes that the authorities cannot be considered to have displayed due diligence. They therefore failed in their positive obligation to protect the right to life of the applicant and her son within the meaning of Article 2 of the Convention.125.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the foregoing, the Court considers that the shortcomings observed above rendered the applicant\u2019s criminal complaint ineffective in the circumstances of the instant case. Accordingly, it rejects the preliminary objection raised by the Government on grounds of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies (see paragraph 68 above) and concludes that there has been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention.b)\u00a0\u00a0Article 3126.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicant can be regarded as belonging to the category of \u201cvulnerable\u00a0persons\u201d entitled to State protection (see A.\u00a0v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, 23 September 1998, \u00a7 22, Reports 1998\u2011VI). In that connection it takes note of the acts of violence suffered by the applicant in the past. It also notes that the violent acts perpetrated against the applicant, manifesting themselves in physical injuries and psychological pressure, are sufficiently serious to be classified as ill-treatment within the meaning of Article\u00a03 of the Convention. It must therefore be determined whether the domestic authorities acted in a manner such as to satisfy the requirements of that Article.127.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has found, under Article 2 of the Convention (see paragraph 117 above) that, by failing to act rapidly after the applicant had lodged her complaint, the national authorities deprived the complaint of any effectiveness, creating a situation of impunity conducive to the recurrence of A.T.\u2019s acts of violence against his wife and family. It also notes that A.T. was convicted on 1 October 2015 of causing grievous bodily harm following the incident in August 2012, while in the meantime he had killed his son and attempted to murder the applicant and had also been sentenced on 8 January 2015, by the Udine preliminary hearings judge to life imprisonment for the murder of his son and the attempted murder of his wife, and for the offences of ill-treatment of the applicant and her daughter. It was established that the applicant and her children had been living in a climate of violence (see paragraph 47 above).128.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates on this point that the mere passing of time can work to the detriment of the investigation, and even fatally jeopardise its chances of success (see M.B. v. Romania, no. 43982\/06, \u00a7 64, 3\u00a0November 2011). It also observes that the passing of time will inevitably erode the amount and quality of the evidence available and that the appearance of a lack of diligence will cast doubt on the good faith of the investigative efforts, as well as drag out the ordeal for the complainants (see Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, no. 46477\/99, \u00a7 86, ECHR\u00a02002\u2011II).129.\u00a0\u00a0The Court again emphasises that special diligence is required in dealing with domestic violence cases and considers that the specific nature of domestic violence as recognised in the Preamble to the Istanbul Convention (see paragraph 58 above) must be taken into account in the context of domestic proceedings.It stresses in this regard that the Istanbul Convention imposes a duty on the States Parties to take \u201cthe necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that investigations and judicial proceedings in relation to all forms of violence covered by the scope of this Convention are carried out without undue delay while taking into consideration the rights of the victim during all stages of the criminal proceedings\u201d.130.\u00a0\u00a0In that connection the Court also considers that, in judicial cases involving disputes relating to violence against women, the national authorities have a duty to examine the victim\u2019s situation of extreme psychological, physical and material insecurity and vulnerability and, with the utmost expedition, to assess the situation accordingly. In the instant case there is no explanation for the authorities\u2019 complacency for such a long period \u2013 seven months \u2013 before the instigation of criminal proceedings. Likewise, there is no explanation for why the criminal proceedings for grievous bodily harm, instituted after the applicant had lodged her complaint, lasted three years, ending on 1 October 2015.131.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the findings in the present case, the Court considers that the manner in which the domestic authorities prosecuted the case is also a manifestation of that judicial complacency and cannot be deemed to satisfy the requirements of Article\u00a03 of the Convention....III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLES 2 AND 3133.\u00a0\u00a0Relying on Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3, the applicant submitted that the omissions by the Italian authorities proved that she had been discriminated against as a woman and that the Italian legislation on domestic violence was inadequate.Article 14 of the Convention provides:\u201cThe enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions134.\u00a0\u00a0Referring to all the domestic and international legislation she considered relevant in the instant case, the applicant relied on the conclusions of the United Nations Special Rapporteur, who urged Italy to eliminate stereotypical attitudes about the roles and responsibilities of women and men in the family, society and workplace.135.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged that she had not had the benefit of adequate legislative protection and that the authorities had failed to respond appropriately to her allegations of domestic violence. In her submission, that amounted to discriminatory treatment on grounds of sex.136.\u00a0\u00a0Referring to the Court\u2019s conclusion regarding Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 3 in the case of T.M. and C.M. v.\u00a0the Republic of Moldova (no. 26608\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 49 and 62, 28 January 2014), the applicant requested the Court to conclude that there had been a violation of Article 14.137.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that there had not been discrimination on grounds of sex in the present case. Moreover, in their submission, the claim that discrimination was institutionalised by the criminal law or administrative or judicial practice did not stand up to close analysis.138.\u00a0\u00a0They pointed out that the National Council of the Judiciary had adopted two resolutions \u2013 on 11 February 2009 and 18 March 2014 \u2013 requesting the heads of the judicial offices to organise their departments and specialise in this area in such a way as to be able to deal effectively with cases of domestic violence.139.\u00a0\u00a0They added that the domestic law provided for a firm response to such acts of violence: the law on stalking ... contained provisions for combating violence against women.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility140.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, while observing that this complaint was never examined as such by the domestic courts, considers, in the light of the circumstances of the case, that it is so closely linked to the complaints examined above that the outcome must be the same and the complaint accordingly declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits141.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, according to its case-law, a State\u2019s failure to protect women against domestic violence breaches their right to equal protection before the law and that this failure does not need to be intentional (see Opuz, cited above, \u00a7 191). The Court has previously held that \u201cthe general and discriminatory judicial passivity [of the police] creating a climate that was conducive to domestic violence\u201d amounted to a violation of Article\u00a014 of the Convention (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 191 et seq.). It also found that such discriminatory treatment occurred where it could be established that the authorities\u2019 actions were not a simple failure or delay in dealing with the violence in question, but amounted to repeatedly condoning such violence and reflected a discriminatory attitude towards the complainant as a woman (see Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 3564\/11, \u00a7 89, 28 May 2013).142.\u00a0\u00a0In the instant case the Court notes that the applicant was assaulted by A.T. on several occasions (see paragraphs 10, 16, 21 and 47 above) and that the authorities had been aware of this.143.\u00a0\u00a0It observes that the authorities did not carry out any investigation in the seven months following the applicant\u2019s lodging of her complaint and that no measure of protection was implemented. Whilst, admittedly, the proceedings in respect of the applicant\u2019s complaint were discontinued approximately one year later, on account of her having changed her statements, the Court also notes that A.T. was convicted of grievous bodily harm three years later, on 1 October 2015, after killing his son and attempting to murder the applicant.144.\u00a0\u00a0The authorities\u2019 complacency in the present case is particularly striking in that the prosecution had asked the police, who had remained inactive for six months, to take immediate action having regard to the applicant\u2019s request for protective measures. The Court reiterates in this connection the findings it has reached regarding the domestic authorities\u2019 failure to provide the applicant with effective protection and the impunity enjoyed by A.T. (see paragraph 117 above).145.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court, the combined effect of the above-mentioned factors shows that, by underestimating, through their complacency, the seriousness of the violent acts in question, the Italian authorities in effect condoned them. The applicant was therefore a victim of discrimination, as a woman, in breach of Article 14 of the Convention (see T.M. and C.M. v. the Republic of Moldova, cited above, \u00a7 62; Eremia, cited above, \u00a7\u00a098; and Mudric v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 74839\/10, \u00a7 63, 16\u00a0July 2013). Furthermore, the conclusions of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, following his official visit to Italy (see 59 paragraph above), those of the CEDAW (see paragraph\u00a057 above) and those of the National Statistics Institute (see paragraph 55 above) demonstrate the extent of the problem of domestic violence in Italy and the discrimination suffered by women in this regard. The Court considers that the applicant provided prima facie evidence, backed up by undisputed statistical data, that domestic violence primarily affects women and that, despite the reforms implemented, a large number of women are murdered by their partners or former partners (femicide) and, secondly, that the socio-cultural attitudes of tolerance of domestic violence persist (see paragraph 57 and 59 above).146.\u00a0\u00a0That prima facie evidence, which is undisputed by the Government, distinguishes the present case from that of Rumor (cited above, \u00a7\u00a076), the circumstances of which were very different, and in which the Court had held that the legislative framework in Italy governing domestic violence had been effective in that case in punishing the perpetrator of the crime of which the applicant had been a victim and preventing the recurrence of violent attacks on her physical integrity and had accordingly held that there had been no violation of Article 3, taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14.147.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, having found that the criminal-law system in the present case had not had an adequate deterrent effect capable of effectively preventing the unlawful acts by A.T against the personal integrity of the applicant and of her son, it held that there had been a violation of the applicant\u2019s rights under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention.148.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to its conclusions reached above (see paragraph 145), the Court considers that the violence perpetrated against the applicant must be regarded as based on her sex and accordingly as a form of discrimination against women.149.\u00a0\u00a0Consequently, in the circumstances of the instant case, the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention....","29165":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION155.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been ill-treated by teachers of a public nursery school and that the investigation into his allegations of ill\u2011treatment had been ineffective. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility156.\u00a0\u00a0In their initial observations the Government pleaded non\u2011exhaustion of domestic remedies. They submitted that the criminal proceedings against the teachers of the nursery school who had allegedly ill\u2011treated the applicant were still pending and that the applicant\u2019s complaints were premature.157.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that after this argument was raised the criminal proceedings were discontinued (see paragraphs 110 and 111 above). Accordingly, the Court does not find it necessary to examine the Government\u2019s objection in respect of non\u2011exhaustion of domestic remedies as it has lost its rationale (see, for similar reasoning, Samoylov v. Russia, no.\u00a064398\/01, \u00a7 39, 2 October 2008, and Kopylov v. Russia, no. 3933\/04, \u00a7\u00a0119, 29 July 2010).158.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties159.\u00a0\u00a0In their initial observations the Government submitted that it was impossible to answer the question of whether the applicant had been ill\u2011treated by the teachers because the criminal proceedings were still pending.160.\u00a0\u00a0In their further observations they referred to the cases of Costello\u2011Roberts v. the United Kingdom (25 March 1993, Series A no.\u00a0247\u2011C); Stork v. Germany (no. 38033\/02, \u00a7 103, 13 July 2006); Radio\u00a0France and Others v. France ((dec.), no. 53984\/00, \u00a7 26, ECHR 2003\u2011X (extracts)); and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines v. Turkey (no.\u00a040998\/98, \u00a7 79, ECHR 2007\u2011V) and argued that the Russian State did not bear responsibility for the actions of teachers of nursery schools. Nursery schools were not \u201cgovernmental organisations\u201d because they did not exercise governmental powers. They did no more than look after children and provide basic pre\u2011school education. Moreover, the teachers in the present case had clearly abused their responsibilities. The applicant had concluded a friendly settlement agreement with them and had apparently been satisfied with its terms.161.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further submitted that the domestic authorities had conducted a thorough investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill\u2011treatment. They had commissioned several expert examinations and had questioned the applicant, the suspects and more than thirty witnesses, including the staff of the nursery school and the parents of children who had attended the school with the applicant. The Government conceded that there had been unjustified delays in the investigation that could be attributed to the authorities. They argued in this connection that the St Petersburg and Kirovskiy District prosecutors had criticised the investigator for the delays and had ordered rectifying measures. The applicant had been granted the procedural status of victim and had had full access to the criminal case file. All his complaints had been examined and many of them allowed. In particular, following his complaints the refusals to open criminal proceedings had been annulled and further investigative measures had been ordered.162.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also submitted copies of nine judgments dating from 2013 and 2014 convicting teachers at public nursery and secondary schools for cruel treatment of minors and sentencing them to fines or correctional labour.163.\u00a0\u00a0According to the applicant, it had been established on the basis of evidence collected at the domestic level that the applicant\u2019s nursery school teachers had locked him in the dark in the toilets, where he had previously seen rats, and told him that he would be eaten by rats; had made him stand in the lobby in his underwear and with his arms up for prolonged periods of time; and had once taped his mouth and hands with sellotape. They had, moreover, used force against him when giving him eye drops. The eye drops had been given without the consent of his parents and without any medical necessity therefor having first been established by a medical professional (the applicant referred to Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine, no.\u00a054825\/00, ECHR 2005\u2011II (extracts)). Indeed, neither the necessity of the treatment nor whether or not it would harm the applicant (given his state of health and medical history) had been assessed by a doctor or even a nurse. Given that the applicant had had a known allergy to antibiotics, his health had been put at unnecessary risk.164.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that his medical records showed that before November 2005 he had not suffered from any neurological disorder. In particular, even though he had been regularly examined by doctors, including the medical staff of the nursery school, his medical records dating from before November 2005 had not contained mention of nervous tics or any other neurological symptoms. The causal link between the ill-treatment and his current neurological disorder had been firmly established by medical experts. It followed that as a result of the treatment at the hands of the teachers of the nursery school to which he had been subjected from September until November 2005 the applicant had sustained serious damage to his health, from which he continued to suffer. Given his young age and vulnerability, and the long-lasting effects of the ill-treatment, that amounted to torture.165.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further argued that the Russian State bore responsibility for the ill-treatment because it had been committed by teachers of a public nursery school. Relying on the regulations for pre\u2011school educational institutions (summarised in paragraphs 135-147 above), he submitted that all decisions concerning the opening, operation and closing of public nursery schools were taken by the State authorities. In particular, the State authorities opened nursery schools, appointed their directors and certified them as meeting the formal official requirements of curriculum. Nursery schools were regularly inspected for compliance with the law and were financed from the State budget. Places in nursery schools were allocated by the local education departments, which decided which nursery school each child would attend.166.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also submitted that the State had not complied with its positive obligation to protect his health and well-being (he referred to Grzelak v. Poland, no. 7710\/02, 15 June 2010, and Ilbeyi Kemalo\u011flu and Meriye Kemalo\u011flu v. Turkey, no. 19986\/06, 10 April 2012). Firstly, the domestic law did not provide for effective measures of deterrence against the ill-treatment of children (see O\u2019Keeffe v. Ireland [GC], no. 35810\/09, ECHR 2014 (extracts)). The applicant argued that the examples of case-law submitted by the Government showed that the offence of cruel treatment of minors was punished very leniently in Russia. He considered the sentences imposed in those cases to have been disproportionate to the suffering and damage caused to the children concerned. Secondly, even after the authorities had learned about the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment by the teachers, they had not taken any measures to protect the other pupils at the nursery school from similar treatment. Nor had they informed the appropriate prosecutor\u2019s office about the allegations of ill-treatment, even though they had had an obligation under the Minors Act to do so.167.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicant complained that the investigation into his allegations of ill-treatment had been ineffective. In particular, the authorities had opened criminal proceedings three years after receiving a formal complaint about ill-treatment from the applicant\u2019s mother. As a result, the necessary investigative measures had been undertaken only after a very substantial delay, which had undermined their effectiveness. The investigation had lasted for almost ten years. The authorities had issued numerous decisions to discontinue the criminal proceedings; all of those decisions had been annulled as unlawful and three of them had been identically worded. Although the investigator\u2019s superiors had ordered additional investigative measures, those measures had never been undertaken.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0As regards whether the applicant was ill-treated168.\u00a0\u00a0As the Court has stated on many occasions, ill-treatment must attain a certain minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article\u00a03 of the Convention. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7\u00a0120, ECHR 2000\u2011IV). Treatment has been held by the Court to be \u201cinhuman\u201d because, inter alia, it had been premeditated, had been applied for hours at a stretch and had caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical and mental suffering, and also \u201cdegrading\u201d because it had been such as to arouse in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them. In order for a punishment or treatment associated with it to be \u201cinhuman\u201d or \u201cdegrading\u201d, the suffering or humiliation involved must in any event go beyond that inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment. The question of whether the purpose of the treatment was to humiliate or debase the victim is a further factor to be taken into account, but the absence of any such purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of a violation of Article\u00a03 of the Convention (see V.\u00a0v.\u00a0the\u00a0United Kingdom [GC], no. 24888\/94, \u00a7 71, ECHR 1999\u2011IX).169.\u00a0\u00a0A measure which is of therapeutic necessity from the point of view of established principles of medicine cannot in principle be regarded as inhuman and degrading. The Convention organs must nevertheless satisfy themselves that the medical necessity has been convincingly shown to exist. Furthermore, the Court must ascertain that the procedural guarantees are complied with and that the manner in which the treatment is administered does not trespass the threshold of a minimum level of severity envisaged by the Court\u2019s case law under Article\u00a03 of the Convention (see Nevmerzhitsky, cited above, \u00a7 94, with further references).170.\u00a0\u00a0Further, allegations of ill-treatment must be supported by appropriate evidence. In assessing evidence, the Court has generally applied the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7 161, Series A no. 25). However, such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see Salman v.\u00a0Turkey [GC], no. 21986\/93, \u00a7 100, ECHR 2000\u2011VII).171.\u00a0\u00a0Turning now to the present case, the Court observes that the applicant\u2019s description of the treatment to which he had allegedly been subjected at the hands of the staff of the nursery school is detailed and consistent. It is supported in part by the statements by the assistant teacher and by some of the parents of other pupils who confirmed the incident of 7\u00a0November 2005 and described some of the punishments used by the teachers against the applicant and some other pupils (see paragraphs 60 and 65 above). A panel of experts found on 14 January 2011 that the applicant had been subjected to a prolonged, psychologically traumatic experience at the nursery school between September and November 2005 that had resulted in a persistent neurological disorder (see paragraph 75 above), thereby confirming earlier findings to the same effect made by specialist doctors (see paragraphs 80 and 81 above). The domestic authorities found it established, on the basis of that evidence, that the teachers had subjected the applicant to battery and cruel treatment of minors but discontinued the criminal proceedings against them as time-barred (see paragraphs 83 and 111 above). The authorities also found it established that the teachers had caused damage of medium severity to the applicant\u2019s health but decided against prosecuting them because the investigation had failed to prove an intent to cause damage to health, such intent being an essential element of the offence of premeditated infliction of damage to health of medium severity (see paragraphs 106, 108 and 110 above). The Court finds the above elements sufficient to establish to the standard of proof required in Convention proceedings that the staff of the nursery school subjected the applicant to the treatment complained of.172.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will next examine whether the treatment complained of attained the minimum level of severity required to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention. The applicant claimed that on several occasions he had been locked in the dark in the toilets and told that he would be eaten by rats, had been forced to stand in the lobby in his underwear and with his arms up for prolonged periods of time and on one occasion had had his mouth and hands taped with sellotape. He had been told that if he complained to his parents he would be subjected to further punishment, which must have exacerbated his feelings of fear and vulnerability. The teachers had moreover used physical force (which had resulted in a bruise on his face) to administer eye drops to the applicant without his parents\u2019 consent and without any medical prescription having first been obtained or indeed any medical necessity having first been established by a medical professional. The Court has regard to the applicant\u2019s extremely young age at the time (four years). It also takes note of the fact that the applicant was subjected to such treatment for at least several weeks and that many years afterwards he continues to suffer from its consequences, in particular in the form of a post-traumatic neurological disorder (see paragraphs 124-128 above). Moreover, the above acts were perpetrated by teachers in a position of authority and control over the applicant and some of them were aimed at educating him by humiliating and debasing him. The Court considers that the cumulative effect of all the above-described acts of abuse rendered the treatment sufficiently serious as to be considered inhuman and degrading within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.(b)\u00a0\u00a0As regards whether the respondent State bore responsibility for the ill\u2011treatment173.\u00a0\u00a0To decide whether the respondent State bore responsibility for the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment by the teachers at the public nursery school the Court must determine whether the teachers acted as private persons or as State agents and, in particular, whether the impugned acts were sufficiently connected to the performance of their professional duties.174.\u00a0\u00a0A Contracting State will be responsible under the Convention for violations of human rights caused by acts of its agents carried out in the performance of their duties. The Court has held that where the behaviour of a State agent is unlawful, the question of whether the impugned acts can be imputed to the State requires an assessment of the totality of the circumstances and consideration of the nature and circumstances of the conduct in question (see Reilly v. Ireland (dec.), no. 51083\/09, \u00a7 53, 23\u00a0September 2014, with further references).175.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that whether a person is an agent of the State for the purposes of the Convention is defined on the basis of a multitude of factors, none of which is determinative on its own. The key criteria used to determine whether the State is responsible for the acts of a person, whether formally a public official or not, are as follows: manner of appointment, supervision and accountability, objectives, powers and functions of the person in question (see Kotov v. Russia [GC], no. 54522\/00, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a092 et seq., 3\u00a0April 2012).176.\u00a0\u00a0As far as the State\u2019s responsibility for the acts of school teachers is concerned, that issue was first examined in the cases of Campbell v. the United Kingdom and Cosans on behalf of Cosans v.\u00a0the United Kingdom. In that case the European Commission of Human Rights found that the State bore responsibility for the administration of corporal punishment in State schools in Scotland. It held that where the State provided for and organised compulsory education in State schools, the State was accountable under the Convention for the acts of the school authorities, including teachers, and, in particular, for the administration of corporal punishment where it formed part of State-approved educational policy (see Campbell v. the United Kingdom, no. 7511\/76, Commission (Plenary) decision of 15 December 1977, and Cosans on behalf of Cosans v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, no. 7743\/76, Commission (Plenary) decision of 15\u00a0December 1977).177.\u00a0\u00a0In another case the Court found that corporal punishment administered by the headmaster of an independent school also engaged State responsibility because a State could not absolve itself from its obligations to pupils under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention by delegating its duties to private bodies or individuals (see Costello-Roberts, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 25-28).178.\u00a0\u00a0In a more recent case the Court preferred to examine sexual abuse of a pupil by her teacher in a non-State school from the standpoint of the State\u2019s positive obligation to protect children against abuse by private individuals, by providing an effective deterrence mechanism and by taking individual protective measures if the State knew or ought to have known about the risk of abuse (see O\u2019Keeffe, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0144\u201152).179.\u00a0\u00a0In cases concerning negligent actions by school staff the Court also made its assessment as to the compliance of the State concerned with its positive obligations. In particular, it found that the State had a positive obligation under Article 2 of the Convention to safeguard the right to life and to protect the health and well-being of pupils, who were especially vulnerable and were under the exclusive control of the authorities (see Molie v. Romania (dec.), no.\u00a013754\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 29 and 39-41, 1 September 2009, which concerned the death of a fifteen-year-old teenager following an accident on his school\u2019s sports ground, and Ilbeyi Kemalo\u011flu and Meriye \u00a0Kemalo\u011flu, cited above, \u00a7 35, which concerned the negligent failure on the part of a school headmaster to inform the shuttlebus service of the early dismissal of classes due to bad weather, which resulted in a seven\u2011year-old boy freezing to death as he was trying to return home alone).180.\u00a0\u00a0Turning now to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that the applicant was ill-treated by teachers of a public nursery school on school grounds and during school hours. The Court observes at the outset that nursery schools in Russia are incorporated as separate legal entities in the form of public or municipal institutions. Such institutions have very strong institutional and economic links with the State or the municipality respectively (compare Saliyev v. Russia, no. 35016\/03, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a064-68, 21\u00a0October 2010). In particular, their real estate and equipment belong to the State or the municipality, they are bound by legal constraints attached to the use of their assets and property, and they receive State or municipal funding (see paragraphs 145\u2011146 above). It is also significant that by virtue of the law the State or the municipality respectively bears subsidiary liability for any debts and obligations of such institutions (see paragraph\u00a0147 above). The Court notes in this connection that it has already found on a number of occasions that the debts of Russian public and municipal institutions are to be regarded as State debts (see, for example, Yavorivskaya v. Russia, no.\u00a034687\/02, \u00a7 25, 21 July 2005; Gerasimova\u00a0v.\u00a0Russia (dec.) no.\u00a024669\/02, 16 September 2004; and the relevant judgment of Gerasimova v. Russia, no. 24669\/02, \u00a7 17, 13\u00a0October 2005; and Pogulyayev v. Russia, no. 34150\/04, \u00a7 19, 3 April 2008 \u2013 all three cases concerned the debts of public or municipal institutions: respectively a municipal hospital, a municipal social security service and a public institution of higher education).181.\u00a0\u00a0Further, nursery schools are undoubtedly set up to provide the basic public service of general interest of caring for and educating young children. Although nursery schools enjoy a certain freedom in determining their educational programmes, they must apply educational standards established by the State and have a set of official curricula to choose from. They are licensed, certified as meeting formal official requirements of curriculum, and are regularly assessed by the authorities (see paragraph 139-140 above). The Court also notes that the director of a nursery school is appointed by State or municipal authorities and is responsible to them for the operation and management of the nursery school (see paragraph 144 above). Most importantly within the context of the present case, the director is responsible for the health and well-being of the nursery school\u2019s pupils (see paragraphs\u00a0136 and 141 above). The director also employs the teachers and has disciplinary authority over them.182.\u00a0\u00a0To sum up, a public or municipal nursery school provides a public service and has very strong institutional and economic links with the State, and its educational and economic independence is considerably limited by State regulation and regular State inspection. Under Russian law a nursery school\u2019s liability, and through it the State\u2019s liability, is engaged by the acts or omissions of teachers committed while performing their functions. The Court considers that the above factors are sufficient to find that, while performing their functions, teachers of public or municipal nursery schools may be regarded as State agents.183.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case the applicant was ill-treated while in the exclusive custody of a public nursery school which, under State supervision, fulfilled the public service of general interest of caring for and educating young children in the spirit of respect and protecting their health and well\u2011being. The applicant was ill-treated during school hours by teachers while fulfilling their duty of care for him. The impugned acts were connected to their role as teachers. Consequently, the State bore direct responsibility for their wrongful acts against the applicant.184.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court considers that the State is responsible under Article 3 of the Convention on account of the inhuman and degrading treatment of the applicant by the nursery school teachers and that there has been a violation of the substantive aspect of that provision.(c) As regards whether the respondent State complied with its procedural obligation185.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that irrespective of whether treatment contrary to Article 3 has been inflicted through the involvement of State agents or by private individuals, the requirements as to an official investigation are similar. For the investigation to be regarded as \u201ceffective\u201d, it should in principle be capable of leading to the establishment of the facts of the case and to the identification and punishment of those responsible. This is not an obligation of result, but one of means. The authorities must have taken the reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence. Any deficiency in the investigation which seriously undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard, and a requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is implicit in this context. In cases under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention where the effectiveness of the official investigation has been at issue, the Court has often assessed whether the authorities reacted promptly to the complaints at the relevant time. Consideration has been given to the opening of investigations, delays in taking statements, the length of time taken for the initial investigation and the unjustified protraction of the criminal proceedings resulting in the expiry of the statute of limitations (see C.A.S. and C.S. v. Romania, no. 26692\/05, \u00a7 70, 20\u00a0March 2012, and S.M. v. Russia, no. 75863\/11, \u00a7 68, 22 October 2015). The victim should be able to participate effectively in the investigation in one form or another, in particular, by having access to the materials of the investigation (see Buntov v. Russia, no. 27026\/10, \u00a7 125, 5 June 2012, with further references).186.\u00a0\u00a0After examining the particulars of the Russian prosecution system \u2011 which comprises a \u201cpre-investigation inquiry\u201d followed by an investigation proper \u2013 the Court found in Lyapin v. Russia that in cases of credible allegations of treatment proscribed under Article 3 of the Convention, it was incumbent on the authorities to open a criminal case and conduct an investigation, a \u201cpre-investigation inquiry\u201d alone not being capable of meeting the requirements of effective investigation under Article\u00a03 of the Convention. It held that the mere fact of the investigating authority\u2019s refusal to open a criminal investigation into credible allegations of ill\u2011treatment was indicative of the State\u2019s failure to comply with its obligation under Article 3 to carry out an effective investigation (see Lyapin\u00a0v. Russia, no. 46956\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 133-40, 24 July 2014). In the subsequent case of Razzakov v. Russia the Court further held that a delay in commencing a criminal investigation could not but have a significant adverse impact on its effectiveness, considerably undermining the investigating authority\u2019s ability to secure the evidence concerning the alleged ill\u2011treatment (see Razzakov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 57519\/09, \u00a7 61, 5\u00a0February 2015; see also Bataliny v. Russia, no. 10060\/07, \u00a7 103, 23\u00a0July 2015; Manzhos v. Russia, no. 64752\/09, \u00a7 40, 24 May 2016; and Zakharin and Others v. Russia, no. 22458\/04, \u00a7 68, 12\u00a0November 2015).187.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the applicant\u2019s parents promptly complained about his ill-treatment by the staff of the nursery school, first to the local department of education on 16 November 2005 (see paragraph 13 above), and then to the police on 23 November 2005 (see paragraph 18 above). The local department of education, however, failed in its statutory obligation to inform the appropriate prosecutor\u2019s office of the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment, that failure being acknowledged by the district prosecutor (see paragraphs 25 and 134 above). The police did not take any action in respect of the applicant\u2019s father\u2019s complaint either. It was not until 27 October 2006, almost a year later and after a new complaint had been lodged by the applicant\u2019s parents, that the appropriate prosecutor\u2019s office opened a pre-investigation inquiry (see paragraph 25 above).188.\u00a0\u00a0Over the following two years and three months the prosecutor\u2019s office and the police department issued eight decisions refusing to open a criminal investigation, all of which were cancelled on the ground that the pre-investigation inquiry had been incomplete. It is significant that very few investigative measures were carried out within the framework of the pre\u2011investigation inquiry during that period and that there were lengthy periods of inactivity between them: in particular, the investigator questioned the applicant and several witnesses in the first week of November 2006, a witness in January 2007, several witnesses in February 2008 and a witness in August 2008. Ultimately, the police department decided to open a criminal investigation on 19 January 2009, that is more than three years after the first complaint about ill-treatment. That delay could not but have had a significant adverse impact on the effectiveness of the investigation.189.\u00a0\u00a0The most serious consequence resulting from the three-year delay in opening a criminal investigation was that the prosecution of the teachers became time-barred under domestic law which provides that the statute of limitation stops running when the conviction enters into force (see paragraph 129 above). Indeed, by the time the investigation was opened, prosecution for the offences under Articles\u00a0116 and 156 of the Criminal Code (battery or other violent acts causing physical pain and cruel treatment of minors) had already become time-barred. The investigation in respect of those offences was therefore discontinued, even though the domestic authorities found it established that the teachers had subjected the applicant to violent acts causing physical pain and cruel treatment (see paragraphs 45, 83 and 111 above). The Court has already found in a number of cases where the authorities\u2019 failure to show diligence resulted in the prosecution becoming time-barred that the effectiveness of the investigation was irreparably damaged and the purpose of effective protection against acts of ill-treatment was frustrated (see, among many other authorities, Beganovi\u0107 v.\u00a0Croatia, no.\u00a046423\/06, \u00a7 85, 25 June 2009; Nikiforov\u00a0v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a042837\/04, \u00a7 54, 1\u00a0July 2010; Ablyazov v. Russia, no.\u00a022867\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 57 and 59, 30 October 2012; Yaz\u0131c\u0131 and Others v. Turkey (no. 2), no. 45046\/05, \u00a7 27, 23 April 2013; and \u0130zci v. Turkey, no.\u00a042606\/05, \u00a7\u00a072, 23 July 2013). The Court cannot but find that in the present case too the expiry of the limitation period irreparably damaged the effectiveness of the investigation.190.\u00a0\u00a0 It is true that the authorities, in an effort to find another applicable provision, attempted to prosecute the teachers under Article 112 of the Criminal Code (premeditated infliction of damage to health of medium severity), for which the limitation period was longer. That attempt turned out to be futile because, in contrast to the offence of cruel treatment of minors, an essential element of that offence was the intent to cause damage to health. As the prosecuting authorities were unable to prove such intent, the investigation was ultimately discontinued for lack of evidence (see paragraphs 106, 108 and 110 above). It is also noteworthy that the investigation under Article\u00a0112 was remarkably slow, as acknowledged by the Government (see paragraphs 114 and 161 above), and lasted for almost six years, until October 2014, even though prosecution for that offence had also become time-barred by the end of 2011.191.\u00a0\u00a0Another important consequence of the considerable delay in opening a criminal investigation was that the passage of time affected the investigating authority\u2019s ability to secure evidence concerning the alleged ill\u2011treatment. In particular, it undermined the reliability of the applicant\u2019s testimony, thereby weakening the evidentiary basis for the prosecution. The experts found in April 2009 and then again in January 2011 that, given the applicant\u2019s young age at the material time and the time that had elapsed since the alleged ill-treatment, he could no longer remember the events accurately and his statements could not be relied upon in the criminal proceedings. The delay in opening an investigation therefore resulted in the applicant\u2019s statements being discarded as unreliable evidence (see, for example, paragraphs 83 and 106 above).192.\u00a0\u00a0 Another serious defect of the investigation was the applicant\u2019s parents\u2019 limited access to the case file and the repeated failure of the investigating authorities to notify them promptly about important procedural decisions or to provide them with copies of relevant documents from the case file (see, for example, paragraphs 85, 96, 118, 119 and 121 above). As a result, the applicant\u2019s parents were unable to contest the relevant actions of the investigative authorities in court. The applicant\u2019s parents\u2019 inability to participate effectively in the investigation also undermined its effectiveness.193.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court observes that the investigator refused, without any valid reason, the applicant\u2019s mother\u2019s request to include in the criminal case file relevant material from the civil case file (see paragraph 72 above). It considers that this decision could also have undermined the effectiveness of the investigation.194.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the authorities failed to carry out an effective criminal investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural limb.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION195.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the investigation into his allegations of ill-treatment had been ineffective, contrary to Article 13 of the Convention, which provides:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d196.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that this complaint concerns the same issues as those examined in paragraphs 185-194 above under the procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention. Therefore, the complaint should be declared admissible. However, having regard to its conclusion above under Article 3 of the Convention, the Court considers it unnecessary to examine those issues separately under Article 13 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION197.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage198.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant asked the Court to afford him redress for the non\u2011pecuniary damage sustained by him as a result of the ill-treatment, the indifference shown by the authorities towards him and the ineffective investigation. He left the amount to the determination of the Court.199.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed the following amounts in respect of pecuniary damage:\u2013 the applicant claimed 52,624 Russian roubles (RUB) (about 920 euros (EUR)) for the medical expenses he had incurred and submitted the relevant bills and invoices;\u2013 he also claimed RUB 576,288 (about EUR 10,000) for future medical expenses for treatment and rehabilitation. The cost of the future medical treatment was calculated taking into account the fact that at the moment of the submission of the just satisfaction claims a month of the treatment prescribed to the applicant cost RUB 5,819 (about EUR 100). The applicant also stated that he had not followed any medical rehabilitation courses before 2014 because he had not been able to afford a rehabilitation course, which cost RUB 54,740 a year (about EUR 950). In 2014 a charitable organisation had covered the costs of his medical rehabilitation. However, he could not expect it to pay for such courses for years to come;\u2013 lastly, the applicant claimed RUB 5,940,000 (about EUR 103,500) for the loss of income suffered by his parents, who had had to resign from their jobs to take care of him.200.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that they were not liable to compensate him for damage to his health caused by private persons. In any event, the applicant had already signed a friendly settlement agreement in respect of his claims for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage (see paragraph 23 above).1.\u00a0\u00a0Pecuniary damage201.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes at the outset that the applicant\u2019s mother indeed signed a friendly settlement agreement with the nursery school. However, the amount paid pursuant to that agreement only covered the medical expenses incurred between November 2005 and June 2006. The applicant did not receive any compensation for the medical expenses incurred after June\u00a02006 or any other related expenses.202.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the applicant still suffers from a neurological disorder caused by treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, for which the respondent State was found to be responsible. There is therefore a causal link between the violation found and the applicant\u2019s past and future medical expenses. By contrast, given that the applicant did not submit any medical documents confirming that he needed round-the-clock supervision by his parents, necessitating their resignation from their jobs, the Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the parents\u2019 loss of income.203.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further reiterates that a precise calculation of the sums necessary to make complete reparation (restitutio in integrum) in respect of the pecuniary losses suffered by an applicant may be prevented by the inherently uncertain character of the damage flowing from the violation. An award may still be made notwithstanding the large number of imponderables involved in the assessment of future losses, though the greater the lapse of time involved the more uncertain the link between the breach and the damage becomes. The question to be decided in such cases is the level of just satisfaction, in respect of either past or future pecuniary loss, which it is necessary to award to an applicant, and is to be determined by the Court at its discretion, having regard to what is equitable (see Mikheyev v. Russia, no. 77617\/01, \u00a7 158, 26 January 2006, and Denis\u00a0Vasilyev v. Russia, no. 32704\/04, \u00a7 166, 17 December 2009, with further references).204.\u00a0\u00a0Bearing in mind the uncertainties of the applicant\u2019s situation and the fact that he has suffered, and will continue to suffer, material losses as a result of the need for continuous medical treatment, the Court considers it appropriate, in the present case, to make an award in respect of pecuniary damage based on its own assessment of the situation (see Mikheyev, cited above, \u00a7 162, and Denis Vasilyev, cited above, \u00a7 169). Given the long\u2011lasting nature of the applicant\u2019s condition and the need for specialised and continuous medical treatment, and taking into account the fact that the applicant\u2019s mother has already received compensation for the medical expenses incurred before June 2006, the Court \u2013 basing its estimate for future expenses on the amount of the expenses he had incurred in the past (see paragraph 199 above) \u2013 awards him EUR\u00a03,000 in respect of pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on this amount.2.\u00a0\u00a0Non-pecuniary damage205.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates its finding that the Russian authorities were responsible for the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment by the teachers of a public nursery school and that the investigation into his allegations of ill-treatment was ineffective. Taking into account the applicant\u2019s extremely young age at the material time and the long-lasting consequences of the ill-treatment on his health, the Court awards the applicant EUR 25,000 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses206.\u00a0\u00a0Submitting the relevant bills, invoices, legal fee agreements and time-sheets, the applicant claimed RUB 212,044 (about EUR 3,695) for legal fees and postal and transport expenses incurred in the domestic proceedings; EUR\u00a012,900 as compensation to the applicant\u2019s mother, who had acted as his legal representative before the domestic authorities; and RUB\u00a030,962 (EUR\u00a0540) and EUR 25,986 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court, covering postal expenses and legal fees respectively.207.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the legal fees incurred before the Court had not been yet paid by the applicant. Moreover, the applicant had not proved that all the expenses had been necessary.208.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 8,000, covering costs under all heads.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest209.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","29176":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE QUALITY OF THE MEDICAL TRETMENT29.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that whilst in detention he had not been afforded adequate medical treatment for his brain condition. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions30.\u00a0\u00a0The Government put forward two lines of argument. Firstly, they argued that the applicant\u2019s claim should be rejected because he had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies. Secondly, they argued that the applicant had received adequate medical treatment. He had had no epileptic seizures in detention and the state of his health had not deteriorated.31.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaints. He stated that owing to the failure of the detention authorities to provide him with Benzonal, his wife had had to step in and to supply the drugs. He further argued that his health had worsened and that he had regularly had epileptic seizures, which had been disregarded by the authorities.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment32.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes the Government\u2019s plea of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, but does not consider it necessary to address it in view of its conclusion that the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 3 of the Convention is, in any event, inadmissible for the reasons stated below.33.\u00a0\u00a0The Court firstly observes that no significant changes in the applicant\u2019s medical condition were established by the doctors over the period of several years that his detention lasted (see paragraphs 15, 19, and 26 above). In the absence of any evidence challenging the accuracy or veracity of the medical entries in the applicant\u2019s file, the Court cannot accept the allegation that his epileptic seizures became increasingly frequent.34.\u00a0\u00a0Secondly, the Court notes that in detention the applicant had remained under close medical supervision, undergoing various medical tests and inpatient treatment in the prison hospital (see paragraphs 15, 19, 21 and 24 above).35.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, as regards the availability of anticonvulsants in detention, the Court observes that it is not disputed by the parties that the medical authorities offered the applicant several drugs to reduce the frequency of his epileptic seizures, but the applicant refused to follow the doctors\u2019 recommendations and continued to take Benzonal. The Court sees no legitimate grounds for such a refusal and therefore does not accept the applicant\u2019s argument about the lack of effective medication.36.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the above, and taking into account that the applicant did not submit any medical opinions suggesting any shortcomings in his treatment, the Court cannot find that he was deprived of adequate medical care (see Yepishin v. Russia, no. 591\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 52-54, 27 June 2013). Accordingly, this complaint is\u00a0manifestly\u00a0ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION ON ACCOUNT OF THE CONDITIONS OF THE APPLICANT\u2019S DETENTION37.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he was detained in conditions unfit for persons with disabilities such as himself, which amounted to degrading treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention, cited above.A.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions38.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention had been satisfactory. He had been detained in a special unit for disabled prisoners which offered better-quality living conditions. Referring to the findings of the prison hospitals\u2019 doctors, the Government stated that the applicant had been able to look after himself and therefore no nursing assistance had been required.39.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaints, referring to his inability to look after himself or to perform basic hygiene procedures. He complained of various daily inconveniences and his complete dependence on his inmates\u2019 assistance.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility40.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles41.\u00a0\u00a0The applicable general principles are set out in Mur\u0161i\u0107 v.\u00a0Croatia\u00a0[GC] (no. 7334\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 96-101, 20 October 2016), and Topekhin (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 78-81).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case42.\u00a0\u00a0To assess the adequacy of the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention, the Court must take into account the degree of nursing assistance required to the applicant. The Court reiterates that it is not its task to rule on matters lying exclusively within the field of expertise of medical specialists and to establish whether an applicant in fact required a particular treatment (see Ukhan v. Ukraine, no. 30628\/02, \u00a7 76, 18 December 2008, and Sergey Antonov v. Ukraine, no. 40512\/13, \u00a7 86, 22 October 2015). However, having regard to the vulnerability of applicants in detention, it is for the Government to provide credible and convincing evidence showing that the applicant concerned had received the required medical or nursing assistance in detention.43.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that in the present there is conflicting evidence on this issue. On the one hand, the social security medical assessment board concluded that the applicant was unable to walk without assistance or look after himself (see paragraphs 8 and 18 above). On the other hand, the prison hospital\u2019s doctors stated that he was able to walk unaided and to look after himself (see paragraphs 15 and 19 above).44.\u00a0\u00a0The assessment of the degree of a person\u2019s autonomy and his or her need in terms of nursing assistance is based on multiple factors, rather than being limited merely to the medical condition of a damaged organ, and therefore requires specific expertise in the matter, rather than general medical knowledge. This being so, the Court gives credence to the conclusion of the social security medical assessment board. Unlike the prison hospital\u2019s doctors, this board was a specialised body equipped to perform an all-round assessment and to deliver a binding decision on the degree of person\u2019s disability and the level of his or her social and physical limitations thereby implied (see paragraph 28 above). The Court therefore accepts that the applicant was in need of regular nursing assistance.45.\u00a0\u00a0The fact that no such assistance had been arranged in the remand prison or correctional colonies is not disputed by the Government.46.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it has previously found violations of Article\u00a03 of the Convention on account of the lack of professional nursing assistance available to partially paralysed prisoners (see Topekhin, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 85-88; Semikhvostov v. Russia, no. 2689\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 85-86, 6\u00a0February\u00a02014; Grimailovs v. Latvia, no. 6087\/03, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0161-62, 25\u00a0June\u00a02013; D.G. v. Poland, no. 45705\/07, \u00a7 177, 12 February\u00a02013; and Kaprykowski v. Poland, no. 23052\/05, \u00a7 74, 3 February 2009). It sees no reason to reach a different conclusion in the present case. The applicant\u2019s dependence on his inmates over a period of several years and the need to ask for their help with hygiene procedures put him in a very uncomfortable position and adversely affected his emotional well-being. The Court therefore finds that the conditions of his detention amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. There has thus been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on that account.III.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION47.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicant complained under Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention that the criminal proceedings against him and the proceedings concerning his early release had been lengthy and unfair.48.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that, in the light of all the material in its possession and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, those complaints do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. Accordingly, the Court rejects them as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION49.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d50.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum on that account.","29184":"Alleged violation of Article 3 of the Convention21.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained of ill-treatment during his arrest and time in police custody, and of the absence of an effective investigation in that respect. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d1. The parties\u2019 arguments22.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicant had not complied with the six-month time-limit since his alleged ill-treatment had occurred in October\u00a02008 whereas his application had been lodged with the Court on 1\u00a0August\u00a02013, almost five years later, without an appropriate criminal complaint with the national authorities having been lodged. As regards the allegations of ill-treatment in the applicant\u2019s constitutional complaint, the Government argued that these proceedings and the decisions of the Constitutional Court could not be the starting point for counting the six-month time-limit because the applicant had lodged his application with the Court even before the Constitutional Court had adopted a decision.23.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained further that the applicant had not properly exhausted the available domestic remedies since he had not lodged a criminal complaint with the police or the State Attorney\u2019s Office. When he had been questioned by an investigating judge of the Zagreb County Court on 31 October 2008, in the presence of two defence lawyers of his own choosing, the applicant had not made any allegations of ill-treatment during his arrest, which had occurred two days earlier.24.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also argued that the applicant\u2019s complaints were premature since the civil proceedings following his action for damages against the State were pending.25.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that the six-month time-limit should be calculated from the judgment adopted by the Supreme Court in the criminal proceedings against him.26.\u00a0\u00a0As to the exhaustion issue, the applicant maintained that he had sent numerous complaints to various national authorities concerning his ill-treatment by the police during his arrest.2. The Court\u2019s assessment27.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the six-month time-limit provided for by Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention has a number of aims. Its primary purpose is to maintain legal certainty by ensuring that cases raising issues under the Convention are examined within a reasonable time, and to prevent the authorities and other individuals concerned from being kept in a state of uncertainty for a long period of time (see Sabri G\u00fcne\u015f v. Turkey [GC], no.\u00a027396\/06, \u00a7 39, 29 June 2012, and El Masri v. \u201cthe former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\u201d [GC], no. 39630\/09, \u00a7 135, ECHR 2012).28.\u00a0\u00a0Normally, the six-month period runs from the final decision in the process of exhaustion of domestic remedies. However, where it is clear from the outset that no effective remedy is available to the applicant, the period runs from the date of the acts or measures complained of. Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 cannot be interpreted in a manner which would require an applicant to apprise the Court of his complaint before his position in connection with the matter has been finally settled at the domestic level. Where, therefore, an applicant avails himself of an apparently existing remedy and only subsequently becomes aware of circumstances which render the remedy ineffective, the Court considers that it may be appropriate for the purposes of Article 35 \u00a7 1 to take the start of the six-month period from the date on which the applicant first became or ought to have become aware of those circumstances (see Keenan v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no.\u00a027229\/95, 22\u00a0May 1998; and Edwards v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no.\u00a046477\/99, 7\u00a0June 2001; and Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], nos.\u00a010865\/09, 45886\/07 and 32431\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 259-60, ECHR 2014 (extracts)).29.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already held that, in cases concerning an investigation into ill-treatment, the obligation of diligence incumbent on applicants contains two distinct but closely linked aspects: on the one hand, the applicants must contact the domestic authorities promptly concerning progress in the investigation \u2013 which implies the need to apply to them with diligence, since any delay risks compromising the effectiveness of the investigation \u2013 and, on the other, they must lodge their application promptly with the Court as soon as they become aware or should have become aware that the investigation is not effective (see Mocanu and Others, cited above, \u00a7 264).30.\u00a0\u00a0The first aspect of the duty of diligence \u2013 that is, the obligation to apply promptly to the domestic authorities \u2013 must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case. In this regard, the Court has held that applicants\u2019 delay in lodging a complaint is not decisive where the authorities ought to have been aware that an individual could have been subjected to ill-treatment \u2013 particularly in the case of assault which occurs in the presence of police officers \u2013 as the authorities\u2019 duty to investigate arises even in the absence of an express complaint (see Velev v. Bulgaria, no. 43531\/08, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a059\u201160, 16 April 2013). Nor does such a delay affect the admissibility of the application where the applicant was in a particularly vulnerable situation, having regard to the complexity of the case and the nature of the alleged human rights violations at stake, and where it was reasonable for the applicant to wait for developments that could have resolved crucial factual or legal issues (see El Masri, cited above, \u00a7 142).31.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to the second aspect of this duty of diligence \u2013 that is, the duty on the applicant to lodge an application with the Court as soon as he or she realises, or ought to have realised, that the investigation is not effective \u2013 the Court has stated that the issue of identifying the exact point in time that this stage occurs necessarily depends on the circumstances of the case and that it is difficult to determine it with precision (see\u00a0Nasirkhayeva v. Russia (dec.), no. 1721\/07, 31 May 2011). In particular, the Court has considered it indispensable that individuals who wish to bring a complaint about the ineffectiveness or lack of an investigation before the Court do not delay unduly in lodging their application. However, so long as there is some meaningful contact with the authorities concerning complaints and requests for information, or some indication, or realistic possibility, of progress in investigative measures, considerations of undue delay by the applicants will not generally arise (see\u00a0Mocanu and Others, cited above, \u00a7 269).32.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the case at issue, the applicant alleged that he had been beaten by the police during his arrest on 29 October 2008. The applicant was treated for his injuries on 30 October and 1 November 2008 and the authorities therefore must have already become aware of a possibility of violence used against the applicant at that time. However, no investigation into the possible ill-treatment of the applicant ensued.33.\u00a0\u00a0Whereas the Court acknowledges the applicant\u2019s vulnerable position, it nevertheless notes that when the applicant was questioned by an investigating judge of the Zagreb County Court on 31 October 2008 in the presence of two defence lawyers of his own choosing, he made no complaints concerning the conduct of the police.34.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant averred that he had sent numerous complaints to various authorities about his alleged ill-treatment by the police during his arrest. However, none of the documents submitted by the applicant contains such complaints, save for the one mentioned below. The applicant waited for two years and nine months before he brought his allegations of ill-treatment by the police to the attention of the authorities. The first time he complained of it was in a letter sent to the Office of the President of the Republic on 27 July 2011. That Office informed the applicant\u2019s lawyer on 24 August 2011 that it had received his complaint.35.\u00a0\u00a0Even though the applicant must have been aware that his allegations brought to the attention of the Office of the President of the Republic had not resulted in any concrete steps, he never lodged an official criminal complaint with any of the authorities about the alleged ill-treatment by the police (contrast with Mafalani v. Croatia, no. 32325\/13, \u00a7 83, 9 July 2015). Instead he waited for a further year and seven months when he repeated his allegations in a constitutional complaint lodged in the context of the criminal proceedings against him. Before that complaint was decided by the Constitutional Court, the applicant had lodged his application with the Court.36.\u00a0In these circumstances the Court considers that the applicant, who was represented by lawyers of his own choosing from his arrest, has not shown due diligence and taken steps to keep track of whether his allegations were being properly addressed. He did not lodge his application with due expedition once he had become, or should have become, aware of the lack of any effective criminal investigation.37.\u00a0\u00a0As to the civil action for damages brought by the applicant against the State, the Court has repeatedly held that the procedural obligation of the State under Article 3 to conduct a thorough, official, effective and prompt investigation into allegations of ill-treatment cannot be substituted by payment of damages. The Court confirms that a civil action is not capable of making any findings as to the identity of the perpetrators and still less of establishing their responsibility. Furthermore, a Contracting State\u2019s obligation under Article 3 of the Convention to conduct an investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible in cases of ill-treatment might be rendered illusory if, in respect of complaints under that Article, an applicant were required to exhaust an action leading only to an award of damages (see Parlak and Others v. Turkey (dec.), nos. 24942\/94, 24943\/94 and25125\/94, 9 January 2001; Okkal\u0131 v. Turkey, no. 52067\/99, \u00a7 58, ECHR 2006\u2011XII (extracts); Taymuskhanovy v. Russia, no. 11528\/07, \u00a7 75, 16 December 2010; and V.D. v. Croatia, no. 15526\/10, \u00a7 49, 8 November 2011). Therefore, the civil proceedings instituted by the applicant do not affect the running of the six-month period (compare to Narin v. Turkey, no. 18907\/02, \u00a7 48, 15\u00a0December 2009).38.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the application has been introduced out of time and must be rejected in accordance with Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a7\u00a01 and\u00a04 of the Convention.For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,Declares the application inadmissible.\u00a0Done in English and notified in writing on 30 March 2017.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Stanley NaismithI\u015f\u0131l Karaka\u015fRegistrarPresident\u00a0","29189":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION62.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been subjected to ill-treatment at the hands of the police and that no effective investigation into his complaints had been carried out. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d63.\u00a0\u00a0The Government disputed the applicant\u2019s allegations, stating that the applicant had not provided evidence in support of his account of events. Besides, he had already had traces of ill-treatment when arrived in Moscow from Kazakhstan on 23 February 2006. They further stated that the authorities\u2019 inquiries carried out into his allegations had complied with the domestic law.64.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaint. He pointed out that the Government\u2019s version that he had been ill-treated in Kazakhstan, before his extradition, had been refused by the official statements from the administration of the remand prison certifying that on 23 February 2006 he had not had any evidence of ill-treatment at the time of his arrival in Moscow (see paragraphs 10 and 27 above). Furthermore, his allegations of ill-treatment had been confirmed by the medical examinations of 1\u00a0March and 1 June 2006 (see paragraphs 29, 26 and 39 above), his consistent complaints to the authorities (see paragraphs 31, 32, 37, 39, 40, 42 and 47\u00a0above) and the domestic court\u2019s findings of 3 October 2007 (see paragraph 41 above). He stressed that the Government neither provided a satisfactory explanation as to the origins of his injuries nor carried out an effective investigation into his complaints. The applicant further stated, in particular, that the inquiries conducted had been neither timely nor thorough; the authorities had not questioned him nor taken any steps to identify his torturers. Finally, he submitted that the ill-treatment to which he had been subjected by the police amounted to torture. In support of his allegations, the applicant referred to the documents submitted and the findings of the CPT of 13 March 2007 in respect of the human rights violations committed by the staff of the ORB-2 at the material time (see paragraph 61 above).A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The alleged ill-treatment66.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant general principles were summarised by the Court\u2019s Grand Chamber in the case of Bouyid v. Belgium ([GC], no.\u00a023380\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a081-88, ECHR 2015). The Court stressed, in particular, that where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of individuals within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention. The burden of proof is then on the Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation by producing evidence establishing facts which cast doubt on the account of events given by the victim. In the absence of such an explanation, the Court can draw inferences, which may be unfavourable for the Government. That is justified by the fact that those in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them (ibid., \u00a7 83).67.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the case at hand, the Court observes that the Government did not dispute that the applicant had arrived in Moscow from Kazakhstan on 23 February 2006 and had been immediately taken to remand prison IZ\u201177\/4 where he had undergone the medical examination which had established the absence of evidence of ill-treatment (see paragraph 10\u00a0above). However, later on the same date, 23 February 2006, the applicant had been taken from the prison in Moscow to the ORB-2 in Grozny where his medical examination established that he had abrasions and hematomas (see paragraph 17 above). The Court notes that the Government\u2019s explanation of the origin of the evidence of ill-treatment on the applicant at his arrival at the ORB-2 is in contradiction with the documents issued by the domestic authorities (see paragraph 27 above). The Government did not provide any other explanation to the applicant\u2019s injuries occurred after he had been taken into custody of the Chechen police, other than referring to their origins in Kazakhstan (see paragraphs 62 above). Given the absence of plausible explanations, the Court considers that the Government failed to discharge their burden of proof and to produce evidence capable of casting doubt on the applicant\u2019s account of events concerning his ill-treatment during the transfer from Moscow to the ORB-2.68.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that upon his arrival late at night on 23\u00a0February 2006 at the ORB-2 in Grozny, the applicant was taken for the initial medical examination and then on 6 March 2006 he had undergone another examination which had established a number of traces of ill\u2011treatment on his body (see paragraphs 30, 39 and 41 above). Given that between those dates the applicant was detained in the ORB-2 and that the Government provided no explanation for the applicant\u2019s injuries while in the police custody, the Court accepts the applicants\u2019 version of the events.69.\u00a0\u00a0On the basis of the above, and keeping in mind findings of the CPT concerning serious human rights violations committed by staff of the ORB\u20112 (see paragraphs 60 and 61 above) as well as the findings of the domestic court of 3 October 2007 (see paragraph 41 above), the Court finds that the applicant had been subjected to ill-treatment while in the police custody in the ORB-2.70.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not claim that the recourse to physical force the applicant complained of had been made strictly necessary by his own conduct; they simply denied that any force had been used. The Court finds that the acts of violence, to which the applicant was repeatedly subjected while in the police custody and were aimed at obtaining his confession, amounted to torture (see Tangiyev v. Russia, no. 27610\/05, \u00a7\u00a056, 11\u00a0December 2012; Aleksandr Novoselov v. Russia, no. 33954\/05, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a065-66, 28 November 2013 and Pomilyayko v. Ukraine, no. 60426\/11, \u00a7\u00a051, 11\u00a0February 2016).71.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has been a violation of the substantive aspect of Article 3 of the Convention.2.\u00a0\u00a0The investigation into the complaints of ill-treatment72.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant made a credible assertion that he had suffered treatment proscribed under Article 3 of the Convention at the hands of the police. His assertion was supported by forensic medical evidence and confirmed by other evidence (see, for example, paragraphs 29-31 and 39-41 above).73.\u00a0\u00a0It is not disputed by the Government that the State was under a procedural obligation, arising from Article 3 of the Convention, to carry out an effective investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill\u2011treatment.74.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has previously found that in the context of the Russian legal system in cases of credible allegations of treatment proscribed under Article 3 of the Convention, it is incumbent on the authorities to open a criminal case and conduct a proper criminal investigation in which the whole range of investigative measures are carried out and which constitutes an effective remedy for victims of police ill\u2011treatment under domestic law. The mere fact of an investigating authority\u2019s refusal to open a criminal investigation into credible allegations of serious ill\u2011treatment in police custody is indicative of the State\u2019s failure to comply with its obligation under Article 3 of the Convention to carry out an effective investigation (see Lyapin, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 129 and 132-36; see also subsequent cases in which the Government acknowledged a violation under the procedural aspect of Article 3 of the Convention, such as Razzakov v. Russia, no.\u00a057519\/09,\u00a7\u00a7\u00a057\u201161, 5\u00a0February 2015, and Aleksandr Andreyev v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a02281\/06,\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7 63-65, 23\u00a0February 2016).75.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has no reason to hold otherwise in the present case, which involves credible allegations of ill-treatment of which the authorities were promptly made aware. The investigating authority carried out a pre\u2011investigation inquiry and decided that there was nothing to show that the elements of a crime were present in respect of the actions of the police officers. On that basis they refused to open a criminal investigation. In total, they took six such decisions. The decisions were repeatedly set aside by the supervising authorities as unsubstantiated, unlawful or based on an incomplete inquiry. Those authorities noted on several occasions that the investigators responsible for dealing with the applicant\u2019s complaint had failed to comply with their previously issued instructions. This was confirmed by the domestic court\u2019s finding that the investigators had failed to take all measures necessary for establishing the relevant facts (see paragraph 41 above).76.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the Court finds that the refusal to open a criminal case into the applicant\u2019s credible allegations of ill-treatment at the hands of the police amounted to a failure to carry out an effective investigation, as required by Article 3 of the Convention.77.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural head.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION78.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article\u00a06 of the Convention that the criminal proceedings against him had been unfair. In particular, he alleged that the domestic courts had relied on a confession that he had only given under duress and that he had been deprived of the right to defend himself through legal assistance of his own choosing. Article\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:\u201cIn the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility79.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this part of the application is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions80.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant\u2019s allegations were unsubstantiated. The applicant had been advised of his right not to incriminate himself and his statements had been given by him voluntarily. The applicant\u2019s conviction had been based on his confessions to having committed the crimes in question, together with a number of other pieces of evidence obtained by the investigation. The applicant had been represented throughout the proceedings by his lawyer Mr G. Ber.; he could have always exercised his right to choose another legal counsel.81.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaint. He claimed that all his confessions, testimonies and statements had been made under torture. He had had no access to a lawyer between 23 and 26 February 2006 and lawyer Mr G. Ber. had been appointed for him by the investigators, in violation of the relevant procedure. The lawyer had signed backdated documents and had failed to provide the applicant with proper legal assistance.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment82.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in his original application and subsequent observations the applicant claimed that several aspects of the criminal proceedings against him had been unfair, contrary to Article 6 of the Convention (see paragraph 77 above). Having examined the material in its possession, the Court does not consider it necessary to examine all of those aspects; the Court will concentrate on the applicant\u2019s allegation that the domestic courts, when they convicted him, had regard to confessions that he made under duress.83.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, the Court reiterates that it is not the role of the Court to determine, as a matter of principle, whether particular types of evidence \u2013 for example, evidence obtained unlawfully in terms of domestic law \u2013 may be admissible. The question which must be answered is whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way in which the evidence was obtained, were fair (see Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 50541\/08, 50571\/08, 50573\/08 and 40351\/09, \u00a7 251, ECHR 2016). This involves an examination of the unlawfulness in question and, where the violation of another Convention right is concerned, the nature of the violation found (see, inter alia, G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no.\u00a022978\/05, \u00a7\u00a0162, ECHR 2010).84.\u00a0\u00a0Particular considerations apply in respect of the use in criminal proceedings of evidence obtained in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. The use of such evidence, secured as a result of a violation of one of the core and absolute rights guaranteed by the Convention, always raises serious issues as to the fairness of the proceedings, even if the admission of such evidence was not decisive in securing a conviction (see G\u00e4fgen, cited\u00a0above, \u00a7\u00a0165).85.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has found in earlier cases, in respect of confessions as such, that the admission of statements obtained as a result of torture (compare Tangiyev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 74-76, and Levin\u0163a v.\u00a0Moldova, no.\u00a017332\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 101 and 104-05, 16 December 2008) as evidence to establish the relevant facts in criminal proceedings rendered the proceedings as a whole unfair (see G\u00e4fgen, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0165).86.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the Court notes that the self-incriminating statements made by the applicant following his arrest and placement in police custody formed part of the evidence produced against him. The trial and appeal court did not find those statements inadmissible and referred to them when finding the applicant guilty and convicting him.87.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that it has already established that the applicant was subjected to torture whilst in police custody, that is to say at the time when he was questioned and made statements implicating himself in respect of the crimes with which he was subsequently charged (see paragraphs 18-27 and 55-56 above).88.\u00a0\u00a0In such circumstances, the Court is not convinced by the Government\u2019s argument that the applicant\u2019s confessions should be regarded as having been given voluntarily in view of the fact that during the proceedings he had been assisted by a lawyer and advised of his right not to incriminate himself. It concludes that, regardless of the impact the applicant\u2019s statements obtained under torture had on the outcome of the criminal proceedings against him, such evidence rendered the criminal proceedings unfair. There has, accordingly, been a violation of Article\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION89.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained, under Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention, that the authorities had failed to carry out an effective investigation into his complaint of ill-treatment in police custody. Article 13 of the Convention reads as follows:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d90.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had availed himself of an effective domestic remedy with respect to his complaint under Article\u00a03 of the Convention.91.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that he had been denied an effective remedy for his complaint, since the pre\u2011investigation inquiry had not secured an effective full-fledged investigation into his complaint.92.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is closely linked to the issue raised under the procedural aspect of Article 3 of the Convention and that it should therefore be declared admissible.93.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the finding of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural aspect on account of the respondent State\u2019s failure to carry out an effective investigation, the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine this complaint under Article 13 of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION94.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention of the conditions of his detention in the ORB-2 and under Article 5 of the Convention that his pre-trial detention between 23 February and 6\u00a0March 2006 and between 13 March 2006 and 22 May 2007 had been unlawful.95.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to all the material in its possession and in so far as it falls within its competence, the Court finds that the evidence discloses no appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) and 4 of the Convention.V.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION96.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage97.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 50,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.98.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that finding a violation of the applicant\u2019s rights would constitute an adequate just satisfaction.99.\u00a0\u00a0Making its assessment on an equitable basis and having regard to the nature of the violations found, the Court awards the applicant EUR\u00a045,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses100.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was represented by lawyers from SRJI\/Astreya. He claimed EUR 6,093 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court. In particular, he claimed EUR 5,448 for the work carried out by his representatives (who had spent 57 hours preparing the case), EUR\u00a0134 on postal expenses and EUR 131 for translation costs. He submitted a copy of the representation contract, as well as receipts for translation services and DHL mail.101.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the claim should be rejected as unsubstantiated.102.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has to determine whether the expenses claimed were actually and necessarily incurred and whether they were reasonable. Regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 4,500 covering costs under all heads, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, to be paid into the representatives\u2019 bank account in the Netherlands, as identified by the applicant.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest103.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","29211":"A.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s allegation that he will face conditions violating Article 3 of the Convention if returned to Malta24.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged that if the Netherlands handed him over to the Maltese immigration authorities, the latter would detain him in a\u00a0subterranean cell in the prison at Paola. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which provides as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d1.\u00a0\u00a0Scope of the case before the Court25.\u00a0\u00a0In his letter of 13 March 2012, the applicant submitted that even if he were to be placed in an open centre upon being returned to Malta, this would still constitute treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. He alleges, in particular, that the psychiatric treatment offered him there would not be sufficient to his needs.26.\u00a0\u00a0This is a new complaint. It does not appear in the original application, which suggested only that the applicant feared imprisonment.27.\u00a0\u00a0Since however it is clearly linked to the original complaint and was submitted within six months from the final decision in the case, that given by the Administrative Jurisdiction Division on 31 October 2011, the Court will consider it.2.\u00a0\u00a0The responsibility of the Netherlands under the Convention28.\u00a0\u00a0In M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 338-340, ECHR 2011, the Court held as follows (see also Tarakhel v. Switzerland [GC], no. 29217\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 88-91, ECHR 2014 (extracts)):\u201c338.\u00a0\u00a0...The Court reiterated in [Bosphorus Hava Yollar\u0131 Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim \u015eirketi v. Ireland [GC], no. 45036\/98, \u00a7 152, ECHR 2005\u2011VI] that the Convention did not prevent the Contracting Parties from transferring sovereign powers to an international organisation for the purposes of cooperation in certain fields of activity (...). The States nevertheless remain responsible under the Convention for all actions and omissions of their bodies under their domestic law or under their international legal obligations (ibid., \u00a7 153). State action taken in compliance with such legal obligations is justified as long as the relevant organisation is considered to protect fundamental rights in a manner which can be considered at least equivalent to that for which the Convention provides. However, a State would be fully responsible under the Convention for all acts falling outside its strict international legal obligations, notably where it exercised State discretion (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 155-57).The Court found that the protection of fundamental rights afforded by Community law was equivalent to that provided by the Convention system (ibid., \u00a7 165). In reaching that conclusion it attached great importance to the role and powers of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEC) \u2013 now the CJEU \u2013 in the matter, considering in practice that the effectiveness of the substantive guarantees of fundamental rights depended on the mechanisms of control set in place to ensure their observance (ibid., \u00a7 160). The Court also took care to limit the scope of the Bosphorus judgment to Community law in the strict sense \u2013 at the time the \u2018first pillar\u2019 of European Union law (\u00a7 72).339.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that Article 3 \u00a7 2 of the Dublin Regulation provides that, by derogation from the general rule set forth in Article\u00a03\u00a0\u00a7 1, each member State may examine an application for asylum lodged with it by a third-country national, even if such examination is not its responsibility under the criteria laid down in the Regulation. This is the so-called \u2018sovereignty\u2019 clause. In such a case, the State concerned becomes the member State responsible for the purposes of the Regulation and takes on the obligations associated with that responsibility.340.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes that, under the Dublin Regulation, the Belgian authorities could have refrained from transferring the applicant if they had considered that the receiving country, namely Greece, was not fulfilling its obligations under the Convention. Consequently, the Court considers that the impugned measure taken by the Belgian authorities did not strictly fall within Belgium\u2019s international legal obligations. Accordingly, the presumption of equivalent protection does not apply in this case.\u201d29.\u00a0\u00a0Identical considerations apply in the present case. The responsibility of the Netherlands is therefore in issue.3.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0The prison at Paola30.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant\u2019s claim that he would be detained without trial is entirely unsubstantiated. Indeed the applicant may be detained in a criminal context only in the event that he is prosecuted for an offence and is either denied bail or is eventually found guilty.31.\u00a0\u00a0In any event, conditions of detention in the parts of the Corradino Correctional Facility where foreigners were imprisoned were the object of Story and Others v. Malta, nos. 56854\/13, 57005\/13 and 57043\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 104-129, 29 October 2015, in which the Court found no violation of Article 3.32.\u00a0\u00a0Consequently grounds for the applicant\u2019s stated fear of imprisonment in inhuman conditions cannot be established.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The open centres33.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the expulsion of an asylum-seeker by a Contracting State may give rise to an issue under Article\u00a03, and hence engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the receiving country. In such circumstances, Article 3 implies an obligation not to expel the individual to that country (see, among many other authorities, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, cited above, \u00a7 365, and Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7 93).34.\u00a0\u00a0The presumption that a State participating in the \u201cDublin\u201d system will respect the fundamental rights laid down by the Convention is not irrebuttable. For its part, the Court of Justice of the European Union has ruled that the presumption that a Dublin State complies with its obligations under Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union is rebutted in the event of \u201csystemic flaws in the asylum procedure and reception conditions for asylum applicants in the Member State responsible, resulting in inhuman or degrading treatment, within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter, of asylum seekers transferred to the territory of that Member State\u201d. In the case of \u201cDublin\u201d returns, the presumption that a Contracting State which is also the \u201creceiving\u201d country will comply with Article 3 of the Convention can therefore validly be rebutted where \u201csubstantial grounds have been shown for believing\u201d that the person whose return is being ordered faces a \u201creal risk\u201d of being subjected to treatment contrary to that provision in the receiving country (Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 103-04).35.\u00a0\u00a0In order to fall within the scope of Article 3 the ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity. The assessment of this minimum is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment and its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim. The Court further reiterates that, as a \u201cparticularly underprivileged and vulnerable\u201d population group, asylum-seekers require \u201cspecial protection\u201d under that provision (see Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0118, and M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, cited above, \u00a7 251).36.\u00a0\u00a0In M.S.S. the Court found Belgium to have violated Article 3 of the Convention by returning the applicant to Greece, thus knowingly exposing him to a situation of extreme destitution. The applicant M.S.S. \u201callegedly spent months living in a state of the most extreme poverty, unable to cater for his most basic needs: food, hygiene and a place to live. Added to that was the ever-present fear of being attacked and robbed and the total lack of any likelihood of his situation improving\u201d (M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 254 and 366).37.\u00a0\u00a0In Tarakhel the Court found that while the structure and overall situation of the reception arrangements in Italy could not in themselves act as a bar to all removals of asylum-seekers to that country, the data and information available nevertheless raised serious doubts as to the capacities of the system at that time. Article 3 would be violated were the applicants to be returned to Italy without the Swiss authorities having first obtained individual guarantees from the Italian authorities that the applicants would be taken charge of in a manner adapted to the age of the children and that the family would be kept together (Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 115 and 122).38.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the situation the applicant would face if handed back to Malta, the Court notes the statement of the Maltese Government Agent (see\u00a0paragraph 17 above) and the policy set out in the strategy document (see paragraph 20 above) from which it appears that asylum-seekers arriving in Malta by regular means \u2013 which would include asylum-seekers whom Malta has agreed to take back in accordance with the Dublin Regulation, Malta being the State responsible for determining their asylum application will be granted residence for up to one year in an open centre.39.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that, as in Italy, the reception conditions in Malta are not in themselves such that removal of an asylum-seeker to that country would in all cases violate Article 3 of the Convention. While certainly the Court takes seriously the misgivings expressed in 2011 by the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe (see\u00a0paragraph\u00a019 above), it cannot overlook the efforts made in the years since then by the Maltese Government, using funds appropriated by the European Union (see paragraph 20 above). The Court further observes that improvements were noted already in June 2015 by the United Nations Human Rights Council\u2019s Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (see\u00a0paragraph 21 above), namely the replacement of the tents in the open centre at Hal Far by containers.40.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the Court cannot find on the information available that the conditions obtaining in Malta\u2019s open centres attain the minimum level of severity required to bring Article 3 of the Convention into play. The question is, therefore, whether any circumstances pertaining to the applicant personally can be established that ought to prevent his transfer back to Malta.41.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged that psychiatric care appropriate to his condition would not be available to him in Malta.42.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant\u2019s psychiatric condition is known to the Netherlands authorities; indeed, it is precisely because of it that they aborted the applicant\u2019s transfer to Malta on 9 November 2010 (see\u00a0paragraph 12 above).43.\u00a0\u00a0In any event, the suggestion that the applicant would not receive adequate support or care if he were returned to Malta is to a large extent speculative. Having regard, moreover, to the high threshold set by Article 3, particularly where the case does not concern the direct responsibility of the Contracting State for the infliction of harm, the Court does not find that there is a sufficiently real risk that the applicant\u2019s removal in these circumstances would be contrary to the standards of Article 3 (see Bensaid v. the United Kingdom, no. 44599\/98, \u00a7\u00a7 39-40, ECHR 2001\u2011I).(c)\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion44.\u00a0\u00a0This part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.B.\u00a0\u00a0Other complaints45.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has examined the applicant\u2019s other complaints. However, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. Accordingly, they are manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.C.\u00a0\u00a0Rule 39 of the Rules of Court46.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, it is appropriate to discontinue the application of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,Declares the application inadmissible.\u00a0Done in English and notified in writing on 6 April 2017.Fato\u015f Arac\u0131Helena J\u00e4derblomDeputy RegistrarPresident\u00a0\u00a0","29212":"","29218":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION54.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been deprived of adequate medical treatment while in Kielce Remand Centre and that his state of health had deteriorated while he had been in detention. He relied on Article\u00a03 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility55.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant56.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained that while in detention he had not received adequate medical treatment and that his health had deteriorated to such an extent that he had been released on health grounds on 8 December 2011. He further complained that while in detention he had had to use a wheelchair and had needed assistance from his fellow inmates each time he wanted to go for a walk.57.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that given his state of health he had not received sufficient medical treatment and that the Kielce Remand Centre had not been adapted to the needs of handicapped people.58.\u00a0\u00a0He further maintained that his state of health must have been known to by the Polish authorities from the moment of his detention because the whole documentation pertaining to his case \u2013 including his medical file and information about medications that had been taking \u2013 had been handed over to the Polish authorities. Given that he had known that the Polish authorities had been aware of the state of his health, he had not complained of receiving insufficient medical treatment at the beginning of his detention; he had only started to complain when he had realised that his treatment would not be continued.59.\u00a0\u00a0He also submitted that, contrary to the Government\u2019s allegations, he had had a wheelchair prescribed to him by a doctor and that providing him with a wheelchair that had been in such a state as to in fact pose a danger to the person who would be using it was another example of the inadequate medical care that had been afforded to him. The applicant did not agree with the Government that it had been his choice to use the wheelchair and that it had been his decision to make use of the assistance of his fellow inmates, who had brought him up and down the stairs to and from the exercise yard (see paragraph 62 below). He had been prescribed a wheelchair because of the state of his health. For the same reason he had also been prescribed a hard mattress \u2013 he had not received this and the lack of such a mattress had contributed to the deterioration of the state of his spine.60.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant concluded that all of the above circumstances \u2013 in particular the insufficient and inadequate medical care and the humiliation resulting from the fact that he had had to ask for assistance from his fellow inmates in order to be able to get to and from the exercise yard \u2013 amounted to degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government61.\u00a0\u00a0The Government suggested that the applicant\u2019s complaints as regards his state of health could not be considered completely reliable. In this respect they pointed to his examination of 1 June 2010, when he had complained about a pain in his left leg and had not been able to follow the physician\u2019s simple commands. Nonetheless he had been able to stand up quickly and walk with crutches.62.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the wheelchair, the Government submitted that the physicians who had examined the applicant had never found that the applicant in fact needed to use a wheelchair. It had been allowed by the prison authorities despite the lack of any medical reasons justifying it. The Government conceded that between 8 October 2010 and 18 February 2011 the applicant had had to rely on his fellow inmates\u2019 assistance. However, in their view, the period referred to above had only been of short duration and in any case the applicant had only had himself to blame because he had not had to use the wheelchair. The Government further maintained that in the period referred to above the applicant had been placed in the Kielce Remand Centre in a cell situated on the first floor and had indeed had to rely on his fellow inmates\u2019 assistance to go to the exercise yard. They considered, however, that this situation had not amounted to degrading treatment as it had not reached the required minimum of severity under Article\u00a03 of the Convention. During further periods of his detention in the Kielce Remand Centre the applicant had been detained in cells from which access to the exercise yard had been easy and possible without any assistance, irrespective of whether or not the applicant had had to use a wheelchair. Additionally, when the applicant had been detained in \u0141\u00f3d\u017a prison hospital ward \u2013 that is to say between 18 February and 21 April 2011 \u2013 he had enjoyed the assistance of qualified \u201ccarriers\u201d in accessing the exercise yard.63.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the quality of the applicant\u2019s medical care, the Government submitted that it had been constantly tailored to his state of health. At the start of his detention he had been examined by a physician, but at that time he had neither asked for any medications nor informed the doctor of any injuries that he had sustained in the past. Only after his admission to the Kielce Remand Centre had he started to complain about his health. Then he had consulted on numerous occasions the Centre\u2019s neurologist, ophthalmologist, orthopaedist and traumatologist, who had checked during each consultation whether the applicant needed to undergo surgery.64.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further maintained that between 18 February and 21\u00a0April 2011 the applicant had been admitted to (and remained at) the \u0141\u00f3d\u017a prison hospital ward, where he had undergone rehabilitation that had included various physical exercises, irradiation, and laser therapy. Moreover, each time the applicant\u2019s detention had been extended he had been examined in order to determine whether his health would stand up to further detention.65.\u00a0\u00a0The Government concluded that the applicant had received proper and adequate medical care and treatment. The deterioration in his health had not been caused by detention; that had been a process independent of the prison authorities. What is more, the applicant\u2019s health had not deteriorated irreversibly; the doctors had found that he would be able to return to the detention facility after his surgery. Taking all the above considerations into account the Government invited the Court to find no violation of Article 3 of the Convention.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles66.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, according to its case-law, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum level is, in the nature of things, relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no.\u00a030210\/96, \u00a7\u00a091, ECHR 2000-XI and Peers v. Greece, no. 28524\/95, \u00a7\u00a067, ECHR 2001-III). Although the purpose of such treatment is a factor to be taken into account, in particular whether it was intended to humiliate or debase the victim, the absence of any such purpose does not inevitably lead to a finding that there has been no violation of Article 3 (ibid., \u00a7\u00a074).67.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that the detention of a person who is ill may raise issues under Article 3 of the Convention (see Mouisel v.\u00a0France, no. 67263\/01, \u00a7 37, ECHR 2002-IX). Article 3 of the Convention cannot be interpreted as laying down a general obligation to release a detainee on health grounds or to transfer him to a civil hospital, even if he is suffering from an illness that is particularly difficult to treat. However, this provision does require the State to ensure that prisoners are detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject them to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, their health and well-being are adequately secured by, among other things, providing them with the requisite medical assistance (see Mouisel, cited above, \u00a7\u00a040).68.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, the \u201cadequacy\u201d of medical assistance remains the most difficult element to determine. The Court reiterates that the mere fact that a detainee is seen by a doctor and prescribed a certain form of treatment cannot automatically lead to the conclusion that the medical assistance was adequate (see Hummatov v. Azerbaijan, nos. 9852\/03 and 13413\/04, \u00a7\u00a0116, 29\u00a0November 2007). The authorities must also ensure that a comprehensive record is kept concerning the detainee\u2019s state of health and his or her treatment while in detention (see Khudobin v. Russia, no. 59696, \u00a7\u00a083, ECHR 2006-XII), that diagnosis and care are prompt and accurate (see Melnik v. Ukraine, no. 72286\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 104-06, 28 March 2006, and Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7 115), and that where necessitated by the nature of a medical condition supervision is regular and systematic and involves a comprehensive therapeutic strategy aimed at adequately treating the detainee\u2019s health problems or preventing their aggravation, rather than addressing them on a symptomatic basis (see Popov v. Russia, no.\u00a026853\/04, \u00a7 211, 13 July 2006; Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 109 and\u00a0114; Amirov v. Russia, no. 51857\/13, \u00a7 93, 27\u00a0November 2014; and Blokhin v. Russia [GC] no. 47152\/06, \u00a7 137, ECHR 2016).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of these principles to the present case69.\u00a0\u00a0The Court must determine whether during his detention in the Kielce Remand Centre from 13 March 2010 until 18 February 2011 and from 21\u00a0April until 8 December 2011 the applicant needed regular medical assistance, whether he was deprived of it as he claims, and, if so, whether this amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention (see Farbtuhs v. Latvia, no. 4672\/02, \u00a7 53, 2\u00a0December 2004, and Sarban v. Moldova, no. 3456\/05, \u00a7 78, 4 October 2005).70.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant in fact had not needed a wheelchair and that it had been provided to him despite the lack of medical indications that it had been necessary. It is true that the only medical document mentioning the wheelchair is a note made by a psychiatrist on 31 October 2010 (see paragraph 43 above). However, taking into consideration all the available evidence, the Court considers that the applicant must have had difficulties with mobility. In this connection the Court notes that the applicant fell to the floor three times \u2013 once on an unspecified date in cell no. 114 in the Kielce Remand Centre (see paragraph\u00a037 above), once at the police station on 17\u00a0June 2010 (see paragraph\u00a039 above), and once on 31 August 2010 in the corridor in the detention centre (see paragraph 43 above). On 23\u00a0March 2010 (that is to say 10\u00a0days after the applicant\u2019s arrest) the doctor recommended that a hard mattress be provided to him, and on 26\u00a0April 2010 (that is to say some six\u00a0weeks after his arrest and detention in the Kielce Remand Centre) the applicant was prescribed crutches (see paragraph 37 above). Moreover, the fact that the prison authorities first provided the applicant with a wheelchair which could not be safely used and subsequently agreed that another wheelchair could be given to the applicant by his wife indicates in the Court\u2019s view that the Government\u2019s argument that the applicant used the wheelchair only because of his own personal wish is not convincing. In this connection the Court further notes that in their submissions the Government admitted that between 8\u00a0October 2010 and 18 February 2011 the applicant was placed in the Kielce Remand Centre in a cell situated on the first floor and that in that period he had to rely on the assistance of his fellow inmates to be able to access the exercise yard (see paragraphs 59 and 62 above). The Court has already examined a situation in which a detainee with health problems had to rely on the assistance of other inmates and expressed its disapproval of a situation in which the staff of a remand centre feels relieved of its duty to provide security and care to more vulnerable detainees by making their cellmates responsible for providing them with daily assistance (see Kaprykowski v. Poland, no. 23052\/05, \u00a7\u00a074, 3\u00a0February 2009). The Court has also criticised schemes whereby a prisoner with a physical disability is provided routine assistance by his fellow inmates, and considered that that must have given rise to considerable anxiety on the applicant\u2019s part and placed him in a position of inferiority vis\u2011\u00e0\u2011vis the other prisoners (see, Farbtuhs, cited above, \u00a7\u00a060, 2\u00a0December 2004 and D.G. v.\u00a0Poland, no. 45705\/07, \u00a7\u00a0147, 12 February 2013).71.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the availability of medical care, the Court reiterates that the Convention does not guarantee a right to receive medical care which would exceed the standard level of health care available to the population generally (see Nitecki v. Poland (dec.), no. 65653\/01, 21 March 2002 and Kaprykowski, cited above, \u00a7\u00a075). The Court notes that in fact from the beginning of his detention the applicant consulted on regular basis doctors of various specialisations. It appears that the treatment recommended by the doctors was followed by prison authorities, although it is unclear when (or indeed whether) the applicant received the hard mattress prescribed him on 23\u00a0March 2010. The Court further observes that on 18 February 2011, that is to say 11\u00a0months after his arrest, the applicant was transported to \u0141\u00f3d\u017a prison no. 2 where he underwent treatment in the facility ward where he remained in a cell adjusted to the detainees using wheelchairs. He had the assistance of professional \u201ccarriers\u201d when he wanted to go to the exercise yard. He attended various forms of kinesiotherapy, including exercises to strengthen the muscles of his legs and various other forms of treatment. He also consulted a dermatologist, orthopaedist, neurologist and ophthalmologist.72.\u00a0\u00a0After his return to the Kielce Remand Centre on 21 April 2011 the applicant was examined in May, June and in August 2011. The Court notes that the medical opinions issued after these examinations stated that the applicant was considered eligible to be treated in detention. However, a few months later, on 16\u00a0October 2011, the doctors for the first time found that the applicant\u2019s state of health constituted an obstacle to his further detention since he needed neurological surgery (see paragraph 24 above). That conclusion was repeated almost a month later in an opinion of a neurologist of 14\u00a0November 2011 which found that the applicant\u2019s further detention and the refusal of treatment might pose a serious danger to his health or even life (see paragraph 27 above). In spite of these opinions, the applicant\u2019s detention was extended on 8\u00a0November 2011, and that extension was upheld on 22\u00a0November 2011. The applicant was released from detention in order for him to be able to undergo surgery on 8\u00a0December\u00a02011, that is to say seven weeks after the issuance of the first opinion indicating that the applicant\u2019s further detention might be harmful to his health. As can be seen from the material at the Court\u2019s disposal and is not contested by the Government, the applicant\u2019s state of health deteriorated while he was in detention.73.\u00a0\u00a0Taking into account all of the above considerations, in particular the lack of adequate medical treatment in the Kielce Remand Centre and the placing of the applicant in a position of dependency vis-\u00e0-vis his healthy cellmates, the situation in which the applicant was placed undermined his dignity and gave rise to particularly acute hardship that caused anxiety and suffering beyond that inevitably associated with any deprivation of liberty.74.\u00a0\u00a0In conclusion, the Court considers that the applicant\u2019s continued detention without adequate medical treatment and assistance constituted inhuman and degrading treatment amounting to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 3 OF THE CONVENTION75.\u00a0\u00a0Relying on Article 5\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03 of the Convention, the applicant complained that his pre-trial detention had been excessively lengthy.Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, reads:\u201cEveryone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph\u00a01\u00a0(c) of this Article shall be ... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility76.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant77.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained that the length of his pre-trial detention had been excessive and unreasonable, taking into particular account his deteriorating state of health.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government78.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that in the present case all of the criteria for the application and extension of pre-trial detention had been met. The applicant\u2019s detention had been justified throughout the whole period in question. The grounds relied on by the domestic courts had been \u201crelevant\u201d and \u201csufficient\u201d. In particular, the imposition and extension of the applicant\u2019s detention had been justified by the serious risk that the applicant might obstruct the proceedings or go into hiding, especially given that he had been hiding before which led to some of the offences with which he had been charged becoming time-barred.79.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also argued that the proceedings against the applicant had been complex. The case file had comprised thirty-three volumes of gathered evidence; ninety-five witnesses and four experts had been heard; and the courts had had to examine events dating back to 1999.80.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further submitted that the courts had examined the applicant\u2019s state of health on a regular basis and once the necessity of performing surgery outside of prison had arisen, the applicant\u2019s detention had been lifted and the applicant had been released.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0Period to be taken into consideration81.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention in Poland started on 9\u00a0March\u00a02010, when he was handed over to the Polish authorities. He was released from detention on 8\u00a0December 2011. Accordingly, the period to be taken into consideration amounts to one year and nine months.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Reasonableness of the length of detention82.\u00a0\u00a0Under the Court\u2019s case-law, the issue of whether a period of detention is reasonable cannot be assessed in the abstract. Whether it is reasonable for an accused to remain in detention must be assessed in each case according to its particular features. Continued detention can be justified in a given case only if there are specific indications of a genuine requirement of public interest which, notwithstanding the presumption of innocence, outweighs the rule of respect for individual liberty (see, as most recent authority, Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova [GC], no. 23755\/07, \u00a7\u00a090, ECHR 2016).83.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is prepared to accept that the applicant\u2019s detention may have been warranted by the the serious nature of the offences with which he had been charged, the severity of the penalty for those offences; and the need to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings in view of the risk that the applicant might attempt to abscond (see paragraph\u00a012 above). The domestic courts duly examined the particular circumstances of the applicant\u2019s case, namely the fact that the proceedings against him had had to be stayed for about ten years, because firstly he had not remained in his place of residence and it had been impossible to serve a summons on him and subsequently because he had moved to New Zealand and extradition proceedings had had to be instituted against him (see paragraphs 9 and\u00a010 above).84.\u00a0\u00a0Similarly, the Court is satisfied that the domestic authorities furnished relevant and sufficient reasons when they relied on the need to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings \u2013 particularly given the fact that the applicant did not have a permanent place of residence in Poland and in view of the fact that he had already been hiding from the police and extradition proceedings had had to be launched against him.85.\u00a0\u00a0The Court takes note of the fact that once the authorities received information from the experts that the applicant\u2019s detention might pose a danger to the applicant\u2019s health or even life, the detention was lifted and the applicant was released (see paragraphs 24-31 above).86.\u00a0\u00a0In conclusion, the Court finds that there has been no violation of Article\u00a05 \u00a7\u00a03 of the Convention. It bases its finding on the above considerations and the fact that there is no indication of a lack of \u201cspecial diligence\u201d in the conduct of the proceedings (see, Roman Petrov v. Russia, no.\u00a037311\/08, \u00a7\u00a058, 15 December 2015). In addition, the complaint under Article 5 \u00a7 3 is based essentially on the deterioration of the applicant\u2019s health while in Kielce Remand Centre. However, the issue of him not having been released immediately after the medical opinion that he faced a threat to his health or life has already been addressed by the finding of a violation of Article 3 (see paragraph 74 above).III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION87.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage88.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 50,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.89.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that should the Court establish that there had been a violation of Article 3 or Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention, such finding should be considered to constitute sufficient redress.90.\u00a0\u00a0The Court awards the applicant EUR 5,000 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses91.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicant claimed EUR 3,300 for the work of his lawyer before the Court, Ms B. S\u0142upska-Uczkiewicz, for 22 hours of work, at a rate of EUR 130 per hour. In support of that claim he presented a time-sheet. He also claimed 553.50 zlotys (PLN) in respect of costs of translation. He submitted a receipt showing payment of PLN 553.50 for translation.92.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered these claims excessive and submitted that the request for costs should be rejected since it had not been supported by any document.93.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR\u00a03,430 for the proceedings before the Court.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest94.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","29233":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION35.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that police officers had subjected him to torture in order to force him to confess to a crime. He argued that he could still claim to be a victim of a violation of Article 3 because the authorities had failed to carry out an effective investigation, and the amount of compensation was disproportionate to the suffering he had endured. Article 3 of the Convention reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions1.\u00a0\u00a0The Government36.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stated that the evidence obtained during the investigation into the applicant\u2019s complaint reliably established that on 24\u00a0May 2004 the applicant had been brought to the Sovetskiy district police station in Nizhniy Novgorod and subjected to violence by police officers. The criminal proceedings had been initiated belatedly and the identity of the individuals to be charged with the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment had not been established. The Government acknowledged with regret that the State had failed to carry out an effective investigation into the applicant\u2019s complaint.37.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also noted that in the civil proceedings against the State the domestic courts had found for the applicant, establishing that the police officers of the Sovetskiy district police had inflicted injuries on him, and partially allowing his claim for compensation. The Government argued that the authorities had therefore fully restored the applicant\u2019s rights. In view of the acknowledgment of a violation of the applicant\u2019s rights and the compensation awarded to him, he could no longer claim to be a victim of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant38.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaints.3.\u00a0\u00a0The third-party intervener39.\u00a0\u00a0Referring to international legal standards and international and domestic case-law, the human rights organisation Redress stressed that it was important that all forms of complicity or participation in torture, be it perpetration, ordering, encouraging, tolerating or aiding and abetting, even by one\u2019s mere presence in certain circumstances, were punishable. It submitted that a criminal investigation into injuries caused to an individual while in police custody should start from the premise that the police officers therewith the individual at the relevant time may be responsible for committing or complicity or participation in torture or ill-treatment. Redress further pointed out that the guiding principle in assessing whether compensation awarded by domestic courts is adequate was that it should reflect the seriousness of the violation and the harm suffered by the victim.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility40.\u00a0\u00a0The question of whether the applicant may still claim to be a victim of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of his alleged ill\u2011treatment is closely linked to the merits of his complaints under that provision. The Court therefore decides to join this matter to the merits.41.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0Whether the applicant was subjected to treatment proscribed by Article 342.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant general principles were reiterated by the Court\u2019s Grand Chamber in the case of Bouyid v. Belgium ([GC], no.\u00a023380\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 81-88, ECHR 2015). In particular, where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of individuals within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention. The burden of proof is then on the Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation by producing evidence establishing facts which cast doubt on the version of events given by the victim. In the absence of such an explanation, the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the Government. That is justified by the fact that those in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them (ibid., \u00a7 83).43.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it has considered treatment to be \u201cinhuman\u201d because, inter alia, it was premeditated, was applied for hours at a stretch and caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical and mental suffering. Treatment has been held to be \u201cdegrading\u201d when it was such as to arouse in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them and possibly breaking their physical or moral resistance, or when it was such as to drive the victim to act against his will or conscience.\u00a0In determining whether a particular form of ill-treatment should be classified as torture, consideration must be given to the distinction, embodied in Article 3, between this notion and that of inhuman or degrading treatment. As noted in previous cases, it appears that it was the intention that the Convention should, by means of such a distinction, attach a special stigma to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering. In addition to the severity of the treatment, there is a purposive element to torture, as recognised in the United Nations Convention against Torture, which in Article 1 defines torture in terms of the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering with the aim, inter alia, of obtaining information, inflicting punishment or intimidating (see G\u00e4fgen v.\u00a0Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 89-90, ECHR 2010).44.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court observes that in the civil proceedings the domestic courts found that the applicant\u2019s right not to be subjected to treatment proscribed under Article 3 of the Convention had been violated.45.\u00a0\u00a0They established that the applicant\u2019s injuries had been sustained during his detention at the Sovetskiy district police station as a result of violence used by officers of the Sovetskiy district police, and that the authorities had no evidence capable of proving that he could have received the injuries in other circumstances. They found that the State was responsible for the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment regardless of the fact that the guilt of specific individuals had not been established. The Court agrees with the domestic courts\u2019 assessment, which was based on the principles embodied in the case\u2011law under Article 3 of the Convention.46.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the legal qualification of the treatment, the Court observes that the applicant, a minor at the time, had to confront four or five police officers who, as he believed, were there to protect people like him, and in whom he therefore had trust, having accompanied them to the police station alone at their request. They subjected him to various forms of ill\u2011treatment, which included being punched and kicked, sat on and jumped on while being covered with a blanket, grabbed by the ears and forced to do the splits, and being subjected to near suffocation by being throttled with a baton and having a plastic bag put over his head. Such treatment caused him bodily injuries and physical and mental suffering, including a fear for his own life. It took him three weeks to recover. The police officers acted intentionally with the aim of humiliating him, driving him into submission and making him confess to the crime.47.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s allegations were consistent throughout the domestic proceedings and were taken as established by the Sovetskiy District Court of Nizhniy Novgorod and the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court. The Government did not dispute them either. The Court considers that the alleged facts can therefore be assumed to have been established. It also notes that the ill-treatment occurred during the applicant\u2019s arbitrary ten-hour period of detention at the police station. He was denied all the rights of a person detained on suspicion of an offence, and was entirely under the control of police officers. This made him particularly vulnerable, especially given his age.48.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the applicant\u2019s age, the gravity of the treatment to which the applicant was subjected at the hands of the police, the use of tools such as a wooden stick and a plastic bag, the physical and mental effects of the treatment and the purpose for which it was inflicted, the Court considers that such treatment amounted to torture.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Whether the authorities carried out an effective investigation49.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant made a credible assertion, supported by medical and other evidence, that he had suffered torture at the hands of the police. The State therefore had an obligation to carry out an effective investigation into his allegations.50.\u00a0\u00a0The Government have acknowledged that no such investigation took place. The Court, as with regard to the violation of Article 3 under its substantive limb, sees no reason to hold otherwise.51.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has previously found that in the context of the Russian legal system in cases of credible allegations of treatment proscribed under Article 3 of the Convention, it is incumbent on the authorities to open a criminal case and conduct a proper criminal investigation in which the whole range of investigative measures are carried out and which constitutes an effective remedy for victims of police ill\u2011treatment under domestic law The mere fact of an investigating authority\u2019s refusal to open a criminal investigation into credible allegations of serious ill\u2011treatment in police custody is indicative of the State\u2019s failure to comply with its obligation under Article 3 to carry out an effective investigation (see Lyapin v. Russia, no. 46956\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 129 and 132-36, 24 July 2014 and subsequent cases, in many of which the Government acknowledged a violation under the procedural aspect of Article 3, such as Razzakov v. Russia, no. 57519\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a057\u201161, 5 February 2015; Gorshchuk v. Russia, no. 31316\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 35-38, 6\u00a0October 2015; Turbylev v. Russia, no. 4722\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 67-72, 6 October 2015; Fartushin v. Russia, no. 38887\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 44-45, 8 October 2015; and Aleksandr Andreyev v. Russia, no. 2281\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 63-65, 23 February 2016). A delay in opening a criminal case and conducting a criminal investigation in such cases cannot but have a significant adverse impact on the investigation, considerably undermining the investigating authority\u2019s ability to secure evidence concerning the alleged ill\u2011treatment (see Razzakov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a061).52.\u00a0\u00a0The above findings are fully applicable to the present case. As a result of a delay of almost a year and nine months in opening a criminal case, the applicant was given the opportunity to identify and confront those who might have been involved in his torture two years to two years and eight months after the events (see paragraphs 17-20 and 23-24 above). The room in question was examined more than two years and seven months after the alleged ill-treatment (see paragraph 22 above).53.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also observes that several police officers were found to have been present during or carried out the applicant\u2019s interviews, which took place during his arbitrary detention at the police station and included demands to confess to the crime, accompanied by acts of torture. Despite the fact the applicant had identified some of them as the culprits, no charges were brought against them (see Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803\/94, \u00a7\u00a078, ECHR 1999\u2011V). In refusing to institute or discontinuing the criminal proceedings against the police officers, the investigating authority relied heavily on their statements denying any ill-treatment of the applicant and did not give any serious reasons for discarding his credible allegations of ill\u2011treatment and evidence supporting them. The material of the case file does not suggest that the investigation\u2019s conclusions were based on a thorough, objective and impartial analysis of all relevant elements (see Kolevi v. Bulgaria, no. 1108\/02, \u00a7 192, 5 November 2009; and Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], no. 23458\/02, \u00a7 302, ECHR 2011 (extracts)).54.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the considerable delay in opening the criminal case and commencing a full criminal investigation, as well as the way the investigation was conducted thereafter, the Court considers that the investigation was not prompt and thorough and the proceedings showed a lack of will on the part of the authorities to hold the police officers to account (contrast Myumyun v. Bulgaria, no. 67258\/13, \u00a7\u00a072, 3 November 2015). By failing in its duty to carry out an effective investigation, the State fostered the police officers\u2019 sense of impunity. The Court stresses that a proper response by the authorities in investigating serious allegations of ill\u2011treatment at the hands of the police or other similar agents of the State in compliance with the Article 3 standards is essential in maintaining public confidence in their adherence to the rule of law and in preventing any appearance of collusion or tolerance of unlawful acts (see Lyapin, cited above, \u00a7 139 with further references).(c)\u00a0\u00a0Whether the applicant lost his victim status55.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it falls first to the national authorities to redress any violation of the Convention. It welcomes the fact that the domestic courts in the civil proceedings duly examined the applicant\u2019s case, established the State\u2019s liability for his ill-treatment and awarded him compensation, regardless of the fact that the guilt of those responsible for his ill-treatment had not been established in the criminal proceedings.56.\u00a0\u00a0However, in cases of wilful ill-treatment by State agents in breach of Article\u00a03, the Court has repeatedly found that, in addition to acknowledging of the violation, two measures are necessary to provide sufficient redress. Firstly, the State authorities must have conducted a thorough and effective investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible. Secondly, an award of compensation is required where appropriate or, at least, the opportunity to apply for and obtain compensation for the damage sustained as a result of the ill-treatment (see G\u00e4fgen, cited above, \u00a7 116). In cases of wilful ill-treatment by State agents, a breach of Article 3 cannot be remedied only by an award of compensation to the victim because, if the authorities could confine their reaction to incidents of wilful ill-treatment by State agents to the mere payment of compensation, while not doing enough to prosecute and punish those responsible, it would be possible in some cases for agents of the State to abuse the rights of those within their control with virtual impunity. The general legal prohibition on torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, despite its fundamental importance, would thus be ineffective in practice (see Vladimir Romanov v. Russia, no. 41461\/02, \u00a7 78, 24 July 2008, and G\u00e4fgen, cited above, \u00a7 119). That is why awarding compensation to the applicant for the damage which he sustained as a result of the ill\u2011treatment is only part of the overall action required (see Cestaro v.\u00a0Italy, no. 6884\/11, \u00a7\u00a0231, 7 April 2015). The fact that the domestic authorities did not carry out an effective investigation (see paragraph 54 above) is decisive for the purposes of the question of whether the applicant lost his victim status (ibid., \u00a7\u00a0229).57.\u00a0\u00a0The assessment of the State authorities\u2019 response \u2013 by way of the criminal-law procedure \u2013 to the applicant\u2019s credible allegations of police ill\u2011treatment brings the Court to the conclusion that the State authorities have failed to conduct a thorough and effective investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible (see paragraphs 49-54 above).58.\u00a0\u00a0As regards an award of compensation, the Court reiterates that in the case of a breach of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, which rank as the most fundamental provisions of the Convention, compensation for the non\u2011pecuniary damage flowing from the breach should in principle be part of the range of available remedies (Z and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29392\/95, \u00a7 109, ECHR 2001\u2011V; McGlinchey and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 50390\/99, \u00a7 66, ECHR 2003\u2011V; Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no.\u00a036760\/06, \u00a7 218, ECHR 2012; and Lenev v. Bulgaria, no.\u00a041452\/07, \u00a7\u00a0128, 4 December 2012). The question of whether the applicant received compensation for the damage caused by the treatment contrary to Article 3 \u2013 comparable to just satisfaction as provided for under Article 41 of the Convention \u2013 is an important indicator for assessing whether the breach of the Convention was redressed (see Kopylov v. Russia, no.\u00a03933\/04, \u00a7 143, 29\u00a0July 2010).59.\u00a0\u00a0In assessing the amount of compensation awarded by a domestic court, the Court considers, on the basis of the material in its possession, what it would have done in the same position (see, mutatis mutandis, Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813\/97, \u00a7 211, ECHR 2006\u2011V; Sergey Vasilyev v. Russia, no. 33023\/07, \u00a7 49, 17 October 2013; Zenkov v. Russia, no.\u00a037858\/08, \u00a7 52, 30 April 2014; and Smetanko v. Russia, no.\u00a06239\/04, \u00a7\u00a041, 29 April 2010). The Court has on numerous occasions affirmed that the finding of a violation is not sufficient to constitute just satisfaction in cases of ill\u2011treatment suffered by individuals at the hands of the police or other agents of the State (see, among recent authorities in which a violation of Article 3 was found on account of torture, Al\u00a0Nashiri v. Poland, no.\u00a028761\/11, \u00a7 594, 24 July 2014; Ate\u015fo\u011flu v. Turkey, no. 53645\/10, \u00a7\u00a035, 20\u00a0January 2015; Afet S\u00fcreyya Eren v. Turkey, no. 36617\/07, \u00a7\u00a051, 20\u00a0October 2015; Zakharin and Others v. Russia, no.\u00a022458\/04, \u00a7\u00a094, 12\u00a0November 2015; and Pomilyayko v. Ukraine, no.\u00a060426\/11, \u00a7\u00a062, 11\u00a0February 2016).60.\u00a0\u00a0The factors relevant for determining the level of compensation under Article 41 of the Convention in such cases include the seriousness involved in a violation of Article 3 and the harm suffered by the victim (see, further to the cases cited in paragraph 59 above, Aksoy v. Turkey, 18 December 1996, \u00a7 113, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI; Mikheyev v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a077617\/01, \u00a7\u00a0163, 26 January 2006; Chitayev v. Russia, no.\u00a059334\/00, \u00a7 212, 18 January 2007; Belousov v. Russia, no. 1748\/02, \u00a7\u00a078, 2 October 2008; Polonskiy v. Russia, no. 30033\/05, \u00a7 184, 19 March 2009; G\u00e4fgen, cited above, \u00a7 126; Tigran Ayrapetyan v. Russia, no.\u00a075472\/01, \u00a7 92, 16 September 2010; Kopylov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0181; Tangiyev v. Russia, no. 27610\/05, \u00a7\u00a087, 11\u00a0December 2012; and Lyapin, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0148).61.\u00a0\u00a0Even if the method of calculation provided for in domestic law does not correspond exactly to the criteria established by the Court, an analysis of the case-law should enable domestic courts to award sums that are not unreasonable in comparison with the awards made by the Court in similar cases (see Scordino (no. 1), cited above, \u00a7\u00a0213).62.\u00a0\u00a0The domestic courts awarded the applicant compensation in the amount equal to about 1,450 euros, considering that it would constitute adequate redress for the harm suffered by him. There is no indication that in their assessment they had regard to awards made by the Court in similar cases. The Court observes that this amount is substantially less than what it generally awards in similar cases.63.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court would note that the applicant, while arguing before the domestic courts that the ill-treatment to which he was subjected constituted torture, claimed about 14,500 euros, noting that compensation resulting from the use of a domestic remedy could be lower than compensation to which he would be entitled in the Convention proceedings, and clearly stating his preference for accepting such lower amount rather than setting in motion the international machinery of complaint before the Court (the amount awarded to him by the domestic courts was approximately 10% of what he claimed). The Court agrees with the applicant in that it can perfectly well accept that a domestic remedy, otherwise meeting the requirements of an \u201ceffective remedy\u201d, could result in compensation lower than that awarded by the Court, providing, however, that it would not be unreasonable in comparison with the awards made by the Court in similar cases (see Scordino (no. 1), cited above, \u00a7 206).64.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes that the compensation awarded to the applicant by the domestic courts did not constitute sufficient redress.65.\u00a0\u00a0Given that the investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill\u2011treatment was ineffective and the compensation awarded to him was insufficient, the applicant may still claim to be a \u201cvictim\u201d of a breach of his rights under Article 3 of the Convention on account of torture to which he was subjected by police officers at the Sovetskiy district police station in Nizhniy Novgorod. Accordingly, the Government\u2019s objection must be dismissed.(d)\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion66.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further finds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive and procedural limbs.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION67.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contended that the domestic remedies of which he had availed himself in respect of the breach of his rights guaranteed by Article 3 had not been effective. He relied on Article 13, which reads:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d68.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument in so far as it related to the civil proceedings (see paragraphs 36 and 37 above).A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility69.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has found that the respondent State is responsible under Article 3 of the Convention for torture suffered by the applicant at the hands of police. The applicant\u2019s complaints in this regard are therefore \u201carguable\u201d for the purposes of Article 13 in connection with Article 3 of the Convention.70.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits71.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the applicant complained that he did not have an effective criminal-law remedy in respect of his allegations of torture by the police, the Court notes that this part of the complaint does not raise any separate issue from that examined under the procedural limb of Article 3 (see paragraphs 54 and 66 above) and considers that there is no need to examine it separately under Article 13.72.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the applicant complained that he did not have an effective civil-law remedy in respect of the same allegations, the Court reiterates that Article 13 of the Convention guarantees the availability at the national level of a remedy to enforce the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they might happen to be secured in the domestic legal order. Article 13 thus requires the provision of a domestic remedy to deal with the substance of an \u201carguable complaint\u201d under the Convention and to grant appropriate relief, although the Contracting States are afforded some discretion as to the manner in which they conform to their Convention obligations under this provision. The scope of the obligation under Article 13 also varies depending on the nature of the applicant\u2019s complaint under the Convention. Nevertheless, the remedy required by Article 13 must be \u201ceffective\u201d in practice as well as in law (see Z\u00a0and Others v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 108; and Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v.\u00a0Romania [GC], no.\u00a047848\/08, \u00a7 148, ECHR 2014).\u00a0The \u201ceffectiveness\u201d of a \u201cremedy\u201d within the meaning of Article 13 does not depend on the certainty of a favourable outcome for the applicant (see K. and T. v. Finland [GC], no.\u00a025702\/94, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0198-99, ECHR 2001\u2011VII; Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765\/09, \u00a7 197, ECHR 2012; and Peter v. Germany, no.\u00a068919\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 55-57, 4\u00a0September 2014).73.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that Russian law enabled the applicant to lodge a civil claim for compensation for the non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of the ill\u2011treatment. The fact that his claim was granted partially is not in itself sufficient to render the remedy ineffective. Furthermore, no other evidence has been provided by the applicant to show that the remedy at issue could be considered ineffective.74.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds that it has not been shown that the civil-law remedy was ineffective.\u00a0Accordingly, there has been no violation of Article 13 of the Convention as regards the civil proceedings.III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION75.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage76.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 50,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.77.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that claim.78.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has found that the applicant can still claim to be a victim of a violation of his rights guaranteed under Article 3 of the Convention. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, and taking into account the amount awarded by the domestic courts, it awards the applicant EUR\u00a048,550, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses79.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 1,000 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic law-enforcement authorities and EUR 3,000 for those incurred before the Court.80.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that claim.81.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court rejects the claim for costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings and considers it reasonable to award EUR 3,000 for the costs and expenses in the proceedings before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, to be paid directly to the applicant\u2019s representative, as requested by him.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest82.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","29275":"18.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained of the ill-treatment to which he had allegedly been subjected on 29 February 2012 and the lack of an effective investigation.He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions19.\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to exhaust effective domestic remedies as he had failed to challenge the chief prosecutor\u2019s decision of 14 April 2014 upholding the termination of the criminal investigation into the events of 29\u00a0February 2012. The applicant could have lodged an appeal against the decision within twenty days of the date on which the prosecutor\u2019s decision had been communicated to him on the basis of Article 340 of the CCP (see paragraph\u00a014 above).20.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that the pre-trial chamber procedure initiated by lodging a complaint against the prosecutor\u2019s decision under Article\u00a0340 of the CCP could not be considered an effective remedy for the establishment of the facts and circumstances of his ill\u2011treatment as Article\u00a0341\u00a0\u00a7\u00a05, which governs the pre-trial chamber procedure, had been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in a decision delivered on 21\u00a0October 2014 (see paragraph 15 above). In that decision the Constitutional Court had held that the new pre-trial chamber procedure had been non\u2011compliant with the principle of adversarial proceedings and equality of arms and that this had therefore exempted him from the obligation to pursue the remedy proposed by the Government.21.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed that the letter accompanying the chief prosecutor\u2019s decision had provided him with partial, confusing and misleading information. Firstly, in the letter it had been stated that his challenge to the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 21 March 2014 had been allowed. The applicant acknowledged that he had also received the chief prosecutor\u2019s decision stating that the chief prosecutor had only changed the legal basis for dismissing his criminal complaint (see paragraph 10 above). However, the applicant, given his lack of education, had not been able to understand that his criminal complaint had in fact been dismissed. Moreover, the letter had contained misleading information concerning the possible challenges to the chief prosecutor\u2019s decision of 14 April 2014. Thus, the letter had stated that the applicant could challenge the decision before a more senior prosecutor under Article 399 of the CCP (see paragraph\u00a011 above), a remedy that the applicant had already exhausted, and had not mentioned at all lodging a challenge with the judge of the pre-trial chamber under Article\u00a0340 of the CCP. The applicant concluded by pointing out that he could not be held liable for not exhausting domestic remedies given the recent coming into force of the new CCP, his vulnerability due to his incarceration, and his lack of education and financial means to hire a lawyer.B.The Court\u2019s assessment22.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that States are dispensed from answering before an international body for their acts before they have had an opportunity to put matters right through their own legal system, and those who wish to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court as concerns complaints against a State are thus obliged, first of all, to use the remedies provided by the national legal system (see Mocanu and Others v.\u00a0Romania [GC], nos.\u00a010865\/09, 45886\/07 and 32431\/08, \u00a7 221, ECHR 2014 (extracts)).23.\u00a0\u00a0The obligation to exhaust domestic remedies therefore requires applicants to make normal use of remedies which are available and sufficient in respect of their Convention grievances. The existence of the remedies in question must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness. To be effective, a remedy must be capable of remedying directly the impugned state of affairs and must offer reasonable prospects of success (see Gherghina v. Romania (dec.) [GC], no. 42219\/07, \u00a7\u00a085, 9\u00a0July 2015).24.\u00a0\u00a0On the contrary, there is no obligation to have recourse to remedies which are inadequate or ineffective (see Akdivar and Others v.\u00a0Turkey, 16\u00a0September 1996, \u00a7 67, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV). However, the existence of mere doubts as to the prospects of success of a particular remedy which is not obviously futile is not a valid reason for failing to exhaust that avenue of redress (see Vu\u010dkovi\u0107 and Others v.\u00a0Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], nos. 17153\/11 et al., \u00a7 74, 25 March 2014). On the contrary, it is in the applicant\u2019s interests to apply to the appropriate court to give it the opportunity to develop existing rights through its power of interpretation (see Ciupercescu v. Romania, no.\u00a035555\/03, \u00a7\u00a0169, 15\u00a0June 2010).25.\u00a0\u00a0In reviewing whether the rule on exhaustion has been observed, it is essential to have regard to the particular circumstances of each individual case (see Akdivar and Others, cited above, \u00a7 69, and Baumann v.\u00a0France, no.\u00a033592\/96, \u00a7 40, ECHR\u00a02001-V).26.\u00a0\u00a0In response to the Government\u2019s objection that the applicant failed to appeal to the pre-trial chamber judge against the chief prosecutor\u2019s decision of 14 April 2014 under Article 340 of the CCP, the Court observes that the remedy in question entered into force on 1 February 2014 following the adoption of a new CCP (see paragraph 12 above).27.\u00a0\u00a0Under Article 340 of the new CCP the applicant could have lodged a complaint against the chief prosecutor\u2019s decision not to institute criminal proceedings against his alleged aggressors within twenty days of the day on which that decision had been communicated to him (see paragraph\u00a014 above).28.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant did not lodge a complaint against the chief prosecutor\u2019s decision claiming that: (i) the domestic authorities had provided him with misleading information concerning the remedy he had had to pursue; (ii) he had lacked the level of education to understand that his complaint had been dismissed; and (iii) the procedure before the pre\u2011trial judge could not be considered as an effective remedy as the article of the CCP, which governs the pre-trial chamber procedure, had been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court on 21\u00a0October 2014 (see paragraphs 20 and 21 above).29.\u00a0\u00a0The lack of education or the claim that he had received misleading information about the domestic procedure he had to follow in order to challenge the chief prosecutor\u2019s decision cannot, in the eyes of the Court, discharge the applicant \u2013 a person with full legal capacity \u2013 from the obligation to pursue the domestic proceedings for the following reasons. While it is true that by simple error the chief prosecutor had informed the applicant that he could lodge a complaint against his decision with \u201ca more senior prosecutor\u201d under Article 399 of the CCP (see paragraph\u00a011 above), the Court notes that instead of trying to understand why the same legal avenue that he had already pursued had been indicated to him, the applicant preferred to remain passive and to later invoke that he was not aware of the applicable legal provisions concerning an appeal with the judge of the pre\u2011trial chamber. If he had really wished to challenge the decision he could have lodged a complaint against that decision with the chief prosecutor under Article\u00a0399 of the CCP, as indicated in the letter accompanying the decision. That undertaking would have made clear to the domestic authorities that he intended to challenge the chief prosecutor\u2019s decision. Moreover, the chief prosecutor had a legal obligation to send the complaint to the competent authority, which in the present case was the judge of the pre-trial chamber. In addition, the Court notes that the applicant was not prevented from seeking the assistance of a lawyer, who could have advised him about the procedure to follow. In his situation he could have applied for legal aid as he had done in the proceedings before the Court (see paragraph\u00a02 above).30.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the applicant\u2019s allegation that the procedure before the pre\u2011trial chamber was not an effective remedy, the Court notes that on 21\u00a0October 2014 the Constitutional Court declared Article\u00a0345\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the CCP unconstitutional on account of the fact that the procedure by which the pre\u2011trial chamber judge decided on a complaint against decisions of non\u2011prosecution or dismissal of charges infringed the right to a fair trial in terms of the adversarial and oral arguments principles (see paragraph\u00a015 above).31.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Court further notes that according to the Romanian Constitution, the Constitutional Court\u2019s decisions become binding and effective only after their publication in the Official Gazette and have effects only for the future (see paragraph 16 above). In the present case, the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision concerning the unfairness of the pre-trial chamber procedure was published in the Official Gazette on 5\u00a0December 2014, a few months after the expiry of the applicant\u2019s deadline for lodging an appeal with the pre-trial judge.32.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore considers that at the time the applicant should have lodged an appeal with the judge of the pre-trial chamber in April or beginning of May 2014, he had no reason to doubt the effectiveness of the new procedure. Accordingly, he could not claim to be certain of the lack of prospect of success of a complaint raised under these circumstances. Moreover, the Court cannot speculate as to what would have been the outcome of such an action.33.\u00a0\u00a0For these reasons, the Court concludes that the arguments put forward by the applicant to justify not challenging the decision of the chief prosecutor are unconvincing. The application must therefore be rejected under Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a01 and\u00a04 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,Declares the application inadmissible.\u00a0Done in English and notified in writing on 4 May 2017.Andrea TamiettiPaulo Pinto de Albuquerque\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Deputy RegistrarPresident","29271":"A.\u00a0\u00a0Preliminary observations94.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that in their view the sixteenth and seventeenth applicants\u2019 applications should be struck out of the list. They argued inter alia that, although the sixteenth applicant was mentioned as an applicant in the documents submitted to the Court, he had not signed a power of attorney authorising the ERRC to submit an application on his behalf to the Court. In addition, the seventeenth applicant had died on 13\u00a0February 2013 and none of her relatives had expressed a wish to continue with the application lodged before the Court on her behalf.95.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants affirmed that the sixteenth applicant did not wish to pursue his application before the Court. They did not comment in respect of the Government\u2019s submissions concerning the seventeenth applicant.96.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances and within the meaning of Article 37 \u00a7 1 (a) and (c) of the Convention, the Court considers that further examination of the sixteenth and seventeenth applicants\u2019 applications is no longer justified. Furthermore, in accordance with Article 37 \u00a7\u00a01 in\u00a0fine, the Court finds no special circumstances regarding respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and its Protocols which warrant the continued examination of their applications.97.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the sixteenth and seventeenth applicants\u2019 applications should be struck out of the list.B.\u00a0\u00a0Scope of the application98.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that in their submissions to the Court the applicants had referred to the poor living conditions they had suffered over the years, which were the result of the burning down of their homes in 1999 and by their two evictions in 2005 and 2006, followed by periods during which they had been forced to live on the street. In this respect, the Government argued that the applicants\u2019 general situation and living conditions over the years were not the focus of the case as communicated by the Court and that, furthermore, the applicants\u2019 potential complaint about the events which allegedly took place in 1999, 2005 and 2006 fell outside the six-month time-limit.99. The applicants disagreed with the Government\u2019s argument that the events of 1999, 2005 and 2006 did not form part of the present case. They argued that, although their situation since the 2006 eviction amounted in itself to a violation of the rights claimed by them, their treatment over the preceding several years was crucial in understanding and examining the seriousness of their situation, the issue of discrimination and the liability of the authorities. They further argued that part of their claim related to the evictions of 2005 and 2006, after which they had been forced to live on the street for several months. They alleged that the State\u2019s responsibility for the evictions was engaged because, even though the local authorities had been aware of the applicants\u2019 precarious situation following the destruction of their homes in 1999, they had refused to take over ownership of the building where the applicants were living and the domestic courts had failed to examine the proportionality of the evictions under Article 8.100.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that, according to the parties\u2019 submissions, the applicants\u2019 homes had burned down in 1999. The fire was accidental and there is no evidence in the file that any State agents had any involvement in the destruction of the applicants\u2019 homes or that the applicants instituted proceedings in respect of the impugned event. They had subsequently occupied a building without having any lawful right to do so. They had been briefly evicted in 2005, but had returned to the occupied building after the injunction ordering their eviction was overturned by the domestic courts. They were permanently evicted in October 2006 and there is no evidence in the file that any of the applicants appealed against the judgment dismissing their challenge against the eviction order.101.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that in their application lodged before the Court the applicants expressly stated that \u2013 whilst important by way of background \u2013 their challenges against the evictions of 2005 and 2006 were not the focus of the application (see paragraph 70 above).102.\u00a0\u00a0Given these circumstances, the Court considers that, although the events and the applicants\u2019 situation prior to the actions undertaken by the authorities for their relocation to \u201cPichet\u201d and the mobile homes located on the rubbish dump after the eviction are indeed relevant by way of background, they do not form the focus of the case at hand. Consequently, there is no need for the Court to examine the Government\u2019s objection that the applicants\u2019 complaint about the events which allegedly took place in 1999, 2005 and 2006 was lodged outside the six-month time-limit.103.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will continue, therefore, to pursue the examination of the applicants\u2019 complaints only in so far as they concern the authorities\u2019 attitude and the living conditions they were faced with during and after their relocation to \u201cPichet\u201d and the mobile homes located on the rubbish dump.C.\u00a0\u00a0Complaints under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention104.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that, following their eviction \u2012 without taking into consideration their vulnerable situation \u2012 the authorities had offered them social housing in an isolated, run-down and abandoned building and in mobile homes located on a former rubbish dump where they had been forced to live in inhuman conditions, without water or sanitary facilities, in polluted surroundings unfit for human habitation, and with their children having no access to schools, all of which amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment and a breach of their right to a home and to private and family life. They also complained that the local authorities had failed to provide them with adequate housing. They relied on Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention.105.\u00a0\u00a0Having considered the circumstances of the case and the nature of the applicants\u2019 allegations, the Court finds that the applicants\u2019 allegations fall to be examined exclusively under Article 8 of the Convention (see Costache v. Romania (dec.), no. 25615\/12, \u00a7 19, 27 March 2012), which reads:Article 8\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.2.\u00a0\u00a0There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.\u201d1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The Government106.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicants who had been parties to the general tort law proceedings which ended with the Constan\u021ba Court of Appeal\u2019s final judgment of 26\u00a0March 2014 could no longer claim to be victims of a violation of their rights guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. The aforementioned domestic court decision had acknowledged, either expressly or at least in substance, that the applicants had been victims of a violation of their rights guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. In addition, the compensation awarded to the applicants for the damage sustained had been appropriate and sufficient. Although the Constan\u021ba Court of Appeal had not ordered the Tulcea local authorities to take specific measures in order to improve the applicants\u2019 circumstances and living conditions, it must be noted that it had examined the applicants\u2019 claims within the limits of its competence and based solely on the claims raised by the applicants themselves. The domestic court could not lawfully of its own motion extend the context of the proceedings or change the action brought by the applicants which had instituted the proceedings. The Government argued that in any event the Tulcea local authorities were under an obligation to be diligent and to respect the findings of the court as stated in its extended reasoning of the judgment of 26 March 2014. Even though the operative part of the judgment did not expressly impose any obligations on the local authorities, the judicial authorities had nonetheless exerted a form of lawful \u201cpressure\u201d on them. If the local authorities had continued to disregard or failed to protect the applicants\u2019 rights, they could have found themselves facing the consequences of a new general tort law action brought by the applicants.107.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also argued that the applicants had received appropriate and sufficient compensation. They had each claimed RON\u00a03,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. Although the domestic courts had reduced the amount awarded to RON 2,000, the criteria applied by the domestic court had complied with the principle of proportionality. In respect of the question whether the aforementioned amount was comparable to amounts awarded by the Court by way of just satisfaction in similar cases, the Government submitted that the domestic courts could not have awarded the applicants an amount higher than the one they had claimed.108.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also raised a preliminary objection of non\u2011exhaustion of domestic remedies. They contended that according to the Court\u2019s finding in Costic\u0103 Moldovan and Others v. Romania ((dec.), no.\u00a08229\/04 et al., \u00a7 136, 15 February 2011) a general tort law action constituted an effective remedy for the applicants\u2019 complaint. The majority of them, namely sixty-six out of the seventy-four applicants, had instituted the aforementioned proceedings against the local authorities to obtain compensation for the damage sustained by them as a result of the restriction of their children\u2019s right to education, the inappropriate living conditions they were faced with in the social housing provided by the authorities, and the damage caused to their health and social capabilities as a result of the inaction of the authorities. However, the applicants had failed to await the outcome of the proceedings and had lodged their complaint before the Court prematurely.109.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicants who had not instituted general tort law proceedings against the local authorities had failed to exhaust the available domestic remedies.110.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the forty-second applicant\u2019s victim status, the Government contended that she was not living at \u201cPichet\u201d on the date the application was lodged before the Court. According to her own statements in the social investigation reports, she had moved there in June 2012, having previously rented an apartment at a different address.111.\u00a0\u00a0The Government pointed out that the seventy-fifth applicant had been in detention since 2010, according to the available social investigation reports. Consequently, before the Court he could only have referred to his living conditions prior to his incarceration.112.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stated that \u2012 according to the available evidence \u2012 no social investigation reports could be produced in December 2012 in respect of the sixty-seventh, sixty-eighth, fifty-sixth, fifty-seventh, twenty\u2011seventh, seventy-first, seventieth, seventy-second, nineteenth and twentieth applicants because they were no longer living at \u201cPichet\u201d or on the former rubbish dump. According to the available evidence the sixty-seventh and the nineteenth applicants had moved to different addresses in 2011. Moreover, it appeared from the information obtained by the social investigators from the applicants\u2019 neighbours that the seventy-first, seventieth, seventy-second, nineteenth and twentieth applicants had moved to Spain in September 2008. Furthermore, according to the statements given by the fifty-sixth applicant\u2019s parents, their daughter had moved to a different city in January 2009. Consequently, in the absence of any information as to the exact dates on which the aforementioned applicants had left the social housing provided by the authorities, the Government were of the view that it was not clear that they had intended to pursue their applications or that their applications had been lodged within the six-month time-limit.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants113. The applicants submitted that they continued to be victims of a violation of their rights. They argued that the domestic courts had acknowledged that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in respect of their living conditions.114.\u00a0\u00a0However, relying on the case-law concerning unlawful detention, conditions of detention and detention in a psychiatric hospital, they argued that the Court\u2019s position was that monetary compensation for damage resulting from a violation of the Convention constituted appropriate redress only in cases where the violation had ceased by the time the award was granted. In addition, in cases of treatment prohibited by Article 3 the State had to establish, over and above a compensatory remedy, an effective mechanism in order to put a rapid end to such treatment. Relying on Winterstein and Others v. France (no.\u00a027013\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 148, 17 October 2013) and on Moldovan and Others (no.2) v. Romania (nos. 41138\/98 and 64320\/01, 12 July 2005) the applicants considered that in certain cases of particularly severe violations of Article 8 the same principles applied.115.\u00a0\u00a0They further submitted that the outcome of the general tort law proceedings did not appropriately remedy their situation as it had not put an end to the ongoing poor living conditions they had suffered and continued to suffer. Although some of them were in possession of an injunction ordering the local authorities to carry out repairs at \u201cPichet\u201d, it had never been enforced. Also, although the Constan\u021ba Court of Appeal judgment of 26\u00a0March 2014 had found that the local authorities had a duty to repair the applicants\u2019 homes, it had not ordered them to do so. In addition, the compensation awarded to them had been insufficient. The domestic court granted the same amount to all the applicants irrespective of the classification, nature and severity of the violations claimed and each applicant\u2019s personal circumstances. Furthermore, the amount awarded by the domestic court had been significantly lower than the amounts awarded by the Court in similar circumstances.116.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also contradicted the Government\u2019s claim that they had failed to exhaust the available domestic remedies. They submitted that the injunction proceedings and the proceedings opened on 3 October 2007 had amounted to an exhaustion of the domestic remedies, since those proceedings had covered the substantive issues addressed in their application before the Court. The general tort law action had been a parallel procedure which did not need also to be exhausted in order to satisfy the requirements of Article 35 of the Convention.117.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants contended that the applicants identified by the Government as no longer living in the housing at \u201cPichet\u201d or on the former rubbish dump continued to be affected by the ongoing violations of their rights. The short periods of time they had spent away from \u201cPichet\u201d and the homes on the rubbish dump had been necessitated by their attempts to seek jobs and decent living conditions elsewhere. However, like the other applicants, they had suffered periods of homelessness immediately after their eviction in 2006 and had lived for many years in the substandard conditions offered by their housing before and after 2009. The subsequent changes in their circumstances did not invalidate their allegations. Although the forty-second applicant had lived elsewhere briefly before June 2012, she had been forced to return to \u201cPichet\u201d because she had no longer been able to afford the rent at the other address.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment118.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the issues of the applicants\u2019 victim status and the exhaustion of domestic remedies are intrinsically linked in the circumstances of the present case and should therefore be addressed together. 119.\u00a0\u00a0It also considers that it is not necessary to examine all the preliminary objections raised by the Government because, even assuming that some of them would be dismissed, the complaint is in any event inadmissible for the reasons given below.(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles120.\u00a0\u00a0As to the applicants\u2019 victim status, the Court reiterates that under Article 34 of the Convention it \u201cmay receive applications from any person claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto\u201d. It falls first to the national authorities to redress any alleged violation of the Convention. In this regard, the question whether an applicant can claim to be a victim of the violation alleged is relevant at all stages of the proceedings under the Convention. A decision or measure favourable to the applicant is not in principle sufficient to deprive him of his status as a \u201cvictim\u201d unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for, the breach of the Convention (see Burdov v. Russia, no. 59498\/00, \u00a7\u00a030, ECHR 2002-III, and Centro Europa 7 SRL and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433\/09, \u00a7\u00a080, ECHR 2012). Such acknowledgment and redress are usually the result of the process of exhaustion of domestic remedies (see Ko\u00e7 and Tamba\u015f v.\u00a0Turkey (dec.), no.\u00a046947\/99, 24 February 2005, and D.J. v. Croatia, no. 42418\/10, \u00a7 92, 24 July 2012).121.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further reiterates that the machinery for the protection of fundamental rights established by the Convention is subsidiary to the national systems safeguarding human rights. The Convention does not lay down for the Contracting States any given manner for ensuring within their internal law the effective implementation of the Convention. The choice as to the most appropriate means of achieving this is in principle a matter for the domestic authorities, who are in continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries and are better placed to assess the possibilities and resources afforded by their respective domestic legal systems (see Chapman v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27238\/95, \u00a7 91, ECHR 2001-I; Sisojeva and Others v. Latvia [GC], no. 60654\/00, \u00a7 90, ECHR 2007\u2011II; and Habulinec and Filipovi\u0107 v. Croatia (dec.), no. 51166\/10, \u00a7 26, 4 June 2013).122.\u00a0\u00a0As to the exhaustion of domestic remedies, the Court reiterates that, in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, it may only deal with an issue after all the domestic remedies have been exhausted. The purpose of Article 35 is to afford the Contracting States the opportunity of preventing or putting right the violations alleged against them before those allegations are submitted to the Court (see, for example, Vu\u010dkovi\u0107 and Others v. Serbia [GC], nos. 17153\/11 and 29 others, \u00a7 72, 25 March 2014, and Rummi v. Estonia, no. 63362\/09, \u00a7 65, 15\u00a0January 2015). Thus, the complaint submitted to the Court must first have been made to the appropriate national courts, at least in substance, in accordance with the formal requirements of domestic law and within the prescribed time-limits. Nevertheless, the obligation to exhaust domestic remedies requires only that an applicant make normal use of remedies which are effective, sufficient and accessible in respect of his Convention grievances (see Balogh v.\u00a0Hungary, no. 47940\/99, \u00a7 30, 20\u00a0July 2004, and Zhyzitskyy v. Ukraine, no. 57980\/11, \u00a7 57, 19\u00a0February 2015).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of these principles in the present case123.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes at the outset that only sixty-six of the applicants who lodged a complaint before the Court had instituted general tort law proceedings against the local authorities.124.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that in its judgment of 26 March 2014 the Constan\u021ba Court of Appeal acknowledged that the local authorities had been inactive and had failed to fulfil their legal and contractual duties as lessor to repair and maintain the applicants\u2019 homes and had failed to carry out any of the maintenance work or repairs ordered by the injunction of 1\u00a0October 2008. The court also admitted that, although the homes located on the rubbish dump had been intended as temporary shelter, the applicants had continued to live there even though they were in an unhealthy environment and the authorities had failed to decontaminate the area and to inform them about potential consequences for their health. Furthermore, it acknowledged that the transport problems faced by the applicants whilst housed in a remote area, although not a measure aimed directly against the Roma, had affected them disproportionately and had restricted the children\u2019s right to education. Lastly, it admitted that the inappropriate living conditions and polluted environment had affected the applicants\u2019 health and acknowledged that the poor conditions and unhealthy environment \u2012 and the impact thereof on the applicants\u2019 health \u2012 taken together with the long period of time the applicants had to live in those conditions and the general attitude of the authorities, amounted to a breach of the applicants\u2019 human dignity and of their rights guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention.125.\u00a0\u00a0Although the domestic court relied expressly only on Article 8 of the Convention, the Court will not adopt an approach of excessive formalism and considers that the wording of the Constan\u021ba Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment may be regarded as amounting, at least in substance, to an acknowledgement of a violation also of other Convention provisions relied on by the applicants, including Article 6 in part, Article 14, and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.126.\u00a0 As to the sufficiency of the redress, the Court notes that the applicants contested it, by relying among other things on the Court\u2019s case\u2011law concerning unlawful detention, conditions of detention and detention in a psychiatric hospital, although they were never in such siuations. In any event, the Court notes that none of the applicants claimed compensation in respect of pecuniary damage. Each of them claimed RON 3,500 (approximately EUR 780) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage. After examining their claim, the domestic courts awarded each of the applicants RON 2,000 (approximately EUR 450), supporting the award with the reasoning that it was aimed at striking a fair balance between the parties\u2019 rights and obligations.127.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, with regard to the applicants\u2019 argument that the Constan\u021ba Court of Appeal had failed to order the local authorities on 26\u00a0March 2014 to carry out the repairs, the Court notes that obtaining such an order had not been the object of the applicants\u2019 general tort law action, which was limited only to a claim in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage. The Court is mindful that an issue may arise in a situation in which the domestic authorities have persistently failed to honour the judgment debt, notwithstanding a compensation award, or even repeated awards made by domestic courts. That is indeed a hypothesis suggested by the facts of the present case, where the final judgment of 1 October 2008 apparently remains unenforced. However, given that the general tort law proceedings granting the applicants compensation ended on 26\u00a0March 2014 and that the most recent information from the parties dates back to May 2014, the Court does not find it appropriate to anticipate such an event, nor to decide this issue in abstracto at the present stage.128.\u00a0\u00a0Even though the Court is aware that the amount awarded to the applicants may appear small, it does not consider that it is devoid of proportionality in respect of its case-law (contrast and compare Yordanova and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 25446\/06, \u00a7 171, 24 April 2012) and taking into account the amount claimed by the applicants themselves. In this connection, the Court must take account of the fact that the domestic courts could in any event not lawfully have awarded the applicants an amount higher than that claimed.129.\u00a0\u00a0In this context, notwithstanding the parties\u2019 remaining arguments, the Court is satisfied that the redress awarded to the applicants who were parties to the general tort law proceedings was appropriate and sufficient.130.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the sixty-six applicants can no longer claim to be victims within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention in respect of this part of the complaints raised before the Court. Consequently their application is incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 and must be dismissed pursuant to Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7 4.131.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the remaining eight applicants who were not parties to the general tort law proceedings, the Court notes that they argued that the proceedings which opened on 3 October 2007 and ended with the final judgment of 28\u00a0May 2009 had been sufficient for the purposes of exhausting domestic remedies.132.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the proceedings of 3\u00a0October 2007 were instituted by the Romanian Helsinki Committee and that there is no evidence in the file that the applicants were parties to those proceedings or that they authorised the aforementioned organisation to institute the proceedings on their behalf. In the absence of any concrete evidence or express mention by the domestic courts, the Court cannot accept that the Romanian Helsinki Committee acted on the individual applicants\u2019 behalf before the domestic courts or that they could therefore claim to have been parties to those proceedings. The fact that the domestic courts did not dismiss as inadmissible the general claim for compensation made by the Romanian Helsinki Committee for the victims of the authorities\u2019 discrimination, that it examined it on the merits, and that they did not question the organisation\u2019s capacity as representative does not amount, in the Court\u2019s view, to a sufficiently strong argument that the applicants were parties to the proceedings, given that they have not advanced any objective reasons for the organisation\u2019s failure to collect signed authorisation forms from them.133.\u00a0\u00a0Consequently, the Court considers that in the particular circumstances of the present case, the said applicants should have instituted a general tort law action in order to obtain redress.134.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that, as regards the applicants who were not parties to the general tort law action, this part of their application is inadmissible for non\u2011exhaustion of domestic remedies and must be dismissed pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention.D.\u00a0\u00a0Complaints under Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention135.\u00a0\u00a0Relying on Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention, the applicants complained of a breach of their right to a fair trial in so far as the authorities had failed to enforce the final judgment of 1 October 2008 ordering them to carry out urgent repairs on the \u201cPichet\u201d building. In addition, the domestic courts examining the complaint brought by the Romanian Helsinki Committee had failed to examine the substance of the complaints, had ignored the offensive and racist statements made by the authorities, and had failed to consider all the details of the complaint and to shift the burden of proof onto the authorities once a prima facie discrimination case had been established. The applicants also argued that they lacked an effective remedy for the aforementioned breaches.136.\u00a0\u00a0Since the role of Article 6 in relation to Article 13 is that of a lex\u00a0specialis \u2013 the requirements of Article 13 being absorbed by the more stringent requirements of Article 6 \u00a7 1 \u2013 the Court considers that the applicants\u2019 complaints should be examined solely under Article 6, which in so far as relevant reads:Article 6\u201cIn the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal...\u201d1.\u00a0\u00a0Non-enforcement of the judgment of 1 October 2008(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions137.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that they had repeatedly carried out repair works at \u201cPichet\u201d between June 2007 and September 2008, as shown by the evidence provided by the domestic administrative authorities. However, the applicants had failed to inform the Court about the aforementioned repair works carried out by the local authorities.138.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also submitted that none of the applicants can still claim to be a victim within the meaning of the Convention in respect of the non-enforcement complaint. They further argued that only some of the applicants had been parties to the injunction proceedings and that even those who had been parties to the aforementioned proceedings had been deprived of their victim status following the Constan\u021ba Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment of 26 March 2014 or had failed to exhaust the available domestic remedies if they had not instituted a general tort law action.139.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicants had also had access to a further lawful remedy in order to have the \u201cPichet\u201d building repaired. According to the rules of enforcement enshrined in Law no. 114\/1996, the applicants could have made a written request to the owner of the building to have the requisite maintenance and repair works carried out. If the owner of the building had failed to reply to their letter or to act within thirty days, they could have carried out the required repair and maintenance works at the building owner\u2019s expense by subsequently deducting the costs of such repair and maintenance works from the rent payable by them to the building\u2019s owner. However, the applicants had not considered such an option, even though a substantial debt had accrued through their failure to pay their rent.140.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contended that the applicants had failed to complain about the non-enforcement of the final judgment of 1 October 2008. According to the relevant domestic legislation they could have either instituted proceedings against the public officials potentially liable for the non-enforcement of the judgment or could have claimed compensation for the damage sustained as a result of the non-enforcement of the aforementioned judgment. However, the applicants had failed to initiate any such proceedings.141.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants contended that the Constan\u021ba Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment of 26 March 2014 had no bearing on the issue raised by them under Article 6 of the Convention as it had not addressed that issue. The aforementioned judgment acknowledged only that there was a breach of Article 8 in respect of the applicants\u2019 living conditions and of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 in respect of the right to education of the children applicants.142.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that the Government did not argue that the judgment of 1 October 2008 had been enforced and that the repairs ordered by the domestic courts had been made.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment143.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that only ten of the applicants \u2012 specifically the sixth, fifteenth, twenty-first, forty-first, forty-seventh, fifty-fourth, sixty\u2011first, sixty-seventh, seventy-first and seventy-second applicants \u2013 were parties to the injunction proceedings. Consequently, the Court considers that the others cannot claim to be victims, within the meaning of the Convention, of a violation of their rights guaranteed by Article 6 and therefore their claim is incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 and must be dismissed pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7 4.144.\u00a0\u00a0At the same time, in respect of the small number of applicants who were parties to the injunction proceedings, irrespective of whether or not they had initiated general tort law proceedings, the Court notes that their complaint is closely linked to their complaints under Article 8 above. Taking into account the Court\u2019s finding above (see paragraphs 129 and 134 above), it considers that at this stage they can likewise no longer claim to be victims within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention in respect of this part of the complaints raised before the Court or to have exhausted the available domestic remedies. Consequently their application is either incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 or inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 1 and must be dismissed pursuant to Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7 4.2.\u00a0\u00a0Failure of the domestic courts properly to examine the discrimination complaint lodged by the Romanian Helsinki Committee145.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contended that the applicants could not claim to be victims of the alleged violation. They submitted that the Romanian Helsinki Committee had opened the discrimination proceedings in its capacity as a non-governmental organisation allowed by Article 28 of Government Ordinance no. 137\/2000 and not as a representative of the Roma community affected by the actions of the local authorities. None of the members of the Roma community had been party to the domestic proceedings, nor had they been summoned to appear before the courts, and the domestic courts had not been called upon to examine the particular situation of certain individuals but rather the factual circumstances focused on the Roma community\u2019s eviction. Although the organisation had asked the domestic courts to award compensation to the victims of discrimination, the first-instance and the appellate courts had dismissed its request.146.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that the Romanian Helsinki Committee had lodged the discrimination claim before the domestic courts on their behalf and that they had been named during the proceedings. In addition, the first-instance court had allowed the claim for damages. If the organisation had acted in its capacity as an applicant, the domestic courts would have been prevented by law from allowing the claim. In any event the domestic courts had not questioned the organisation\u2019s capacity as representative and the Government\u2019s objection had therefore to be dismissed.147.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants contended that the arguments raised during the domestic proceedings had included details about the treatment of individuals and family groups. The nature of the discrimination claim had been presented, however, in terms of their treatment as a group.148.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it has already established that the Romanian Helsinki Committee did not act as the applicants\u2019 representative and that they could therefore not claim to have been parties to the discrimination proceedings (see paragraph 132 above).149.\u00a0\u00a0Consequently, the Court considers that the applicants cannot claim to be victims, within the meaning of the Convention, of a violation of their rights guaranteed by Article 6 and therefore this part of their complaints is incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 and must be dismissed pursuant to Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7 4.E.\u00a0\u00a0Complaint under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention150.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained of a breach of the right to education in so far as, due to the \u201cPichet\u201d building\u2019s remote location, the children living there were unable to go to school and were expelled or had to abandon their schooling. They relied on Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which reads:\u201cNo person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.\u201d1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions151.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicants had complained of a breach of the right to education only in respect of the children living at \u201cPichet\u201d and not also with regard to the ones living in the homes located on the former rubbish dump.152.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further argued that the applicants who had been parties to the general tort law proceedings had lost their victim status in respect of their complaint following the Constan\u021ba Court of Appeal\u2019s judgment of 26 March 2014. The aforementioned judgment expressly acknowledged a breach of the right to education of the children housed at \u201cPichet\u201d and afforded them sufficient and appropriate compensation. In addition, the applicants who had not been parties to the aforementioned proceedings had failed to exhaust the available domestic remedies.153.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants accepted that a breach of the right to education of the children living at \u201cPichet\u201d had been acknowledged by the judgment of 26\u00a0March 2014. However, they contested the appropriateness and sufficiency of the compensation.154.\u00a0\u00a0The International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights (\u201cInterights\u201d) submitted that the instant case provided an opportunity for the Court to further the development of its case-law on Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 and establish clear principles on access to education particularly for children and young people subject to relocation by the State following an eviction.155.\u00a0\u00a0Interights argued that whilst States face different challenges in meeting their obligations to educate children within their jurisdiction, they must always act in accordance with the Convention and other obligations under international law. States must abide by their negative and positive obligations as outlined by the Court\u2019s case-law and several other international bodies.156.\u00a0\u00a0In terms of the State\u2019s positive obligation to prevent, identify and correct interference with the rights to education, Interights contended that the Court and domestic courts internationally considered this positive element to include inter alia financial support, facilitation of transportation, risk assessment and special temporary measures.157.\u00a0\u00a0Interights further submitted that the international and comparative legal standards required States to take into account relevant vulnerability factors when devising education policies or assessing compliance with the right to education. Children and young people subjected to housing relocation by the State following eviction were \u2013 because of their age \u2013 particularly vulnerable to breaches of their human rights. Their vulnerability was exacerbated by the presence of one or more other risk factors such as being from a minority group or living in poverty. Children in such situations were also more likely to be susceptible to previously existing disadvantages and\/or prior breaks in, or reduced support for, their education.158.\u00a0\u00a0Interights submitted that according to the Court\u2019s case-law the vulnerable position of Roma meant that special consideration should be given to their needs and different lifestyle both within the relevant regulatory framework and in terms of reaching decisions in particular cases, including ones relating to education.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment159.\u00a0\u00a0The Court accepts the Government\u2019s submission that the applicants\u2019 complaint under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention concerned only the right of the children of schooling age housed at \u201cPichet\u201d.160.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicants\u2019 complaint is closely linked to their complaint under Article 8 of the Convention. Consequently, taking into account its finding above, the Court considers that the applicants who were parties to the general tort law action can no longer claim to be victims, within the meaning of the Convention, of a violation of their rights guaranteed by Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 and therefore this part of their complaints is incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3. It also considers that those applicants who were not parties to the general tort law action cannot claim to have exhausted the available domestic remedies and their complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7 4.F.\u00a0\u00a0Complaint under Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Articles 3, 6 and 8 of the Convention and 2 of Protocol No. 1161.\u00a0\u00a0Relying on Article 14 taken in conjunction with Articles 3, 6 and 8 of the Convention and 2 of Protocol No. 1 and relying also on Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the Convention, the applicants complained of being discriminated against by local and judicial bodies on account of the authorities\u2019 biased attitude towards their ethnic origin when examining their claims in respect of social housing, by making higher education a decisive criterion for access to social housing when allocating such housing to them, and by preventing the children in the \u201cPichet\u201d building from attending school.162.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicants\u2019 complaint falls to be examined exclusively under Article 14 taken in conjunction with Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention and 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. This provision reads:\u201cThe enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other statues.\u201d163.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted amongst other things that the applicants who had been parties to the general tort law proceedings which ended on 26\u00a0March 2014 had lost their victim status in respect of their complaint. In addition, the applicants who had not been parties to the aforementioned proceedings had failed to exhaust the available domestic remedies.164.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants disagreed.165.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is linked to all the applicants\u2019 complaints examined above. Consequently, taking into account the Court\u2019s findings above, it considers that the applicants cannot claim to be victims, within the meaning of the Convention, of a violation of their rights guaranteed by Article 14 or to have exhausted the available domestic remedies and therefore this part of their complaints is incompatible ratione\u00a0personae with the provisions of the Convention or inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and must be dismissed pursuant to Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7 4.For these reasons, the Court, by a majority,\u00a0Declares the application inadmissible.\u00a0Done in English and notified in writing on 27 April 2017.Marialena TsirliGanna YudkivskaRegistrarPresident\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0ANNEXLIST OF APPLICANTS\u00a0AMARIOAREI Adrian Florentin \u2013 born in 2000AMARIOAREI Gabriela Alexandra \u2013 born in 2001AMARIOAREI Preda \u2013 born in 1977ANTON Adriana \u2013 born in 1997ANTON Bianca \u2013 born in 2000ANTON Eugenia \u2013 born in 1966ANTON Ionu\u0163 \u2013 born in 1994ANTON Liliana \u2013 born in 1985ANTON \u015etefan \u2013 born in 1966BALASOIU Pamimonte \u2013 born in 1978BRINDUSOIU Nelu Ionel \u2013 born on an unspecified dateCADAR Mihaela \u2013 born in 1977CARAMAN Daniel \u2013 born in 1993CARAMAN Georgiana \u2013 born in 1996CARAMAN Viorel \u2013 born in 1970CAZACLIU AUREL \u2013 born on an unspecified dateCEACARU Lenu\u0163a \u2013 born in 1953CEORAN Daniel \u2013 born in 1989CEORAN Mihai Dumitru \u2013 born in 1992CEORAN Vasile \u2013 born in 1987CIOBOTARU Violeta \u2013 born in 1958CIOBOTARU Cristache \u2013 born in 1981CONSTANTIN Ani\u015foara \u2013 born in 1970CONSTANTIN Viorica \u2013 born on an unspecified dateCONSTANTIN Jenica \u2013 born on an unspecified dateCOSTIN Valentin Ionu\u0163 \u2013 born in 1998CRISTIAN Adriana Vasilica \u2013 born in 1991DAINEANU Daniel Ionu\u0163 \u2013 born in 2002DAINEANU Decebal Florin \u2013 born in 1983DONCIU Adrian \u2013 born in 2003DONCIU Alexandru \u2013 born in 2003DONCIU Florentina \u2013 born in 1984DUMITRU Angela Alina \u2013 born in 1983DUMITRU Florentina Camelia \u2013 born in 2004DUMITRU Ion \u2013 born in 1981DUMITRU Valentina \u2013 born in 2000DUMITRU Daniel \u2013 born in 1972FEODOROV George \u2013 born in 2007FEODOROV Ionu\u0163 Florin \u2013 born in 2004FEODOROV Marcel \u2013 born in 1975GHEORGHE Dumitri\u0163a \u2013 born in 1965GUZGANU (now TOMEI) Daniela \u2013 born in 1987HANTZ Daniela \u2013 born in 1977HANTZ Ionu\u0163 \u2013 born in 2003ION Marian \u2013 born in 1970MIHAI Andra Cristiana \u2013 born on an unspecified dateMIHAI Angelica \u2013 born in 1962MIHAI Malina \u2013 born on an unspecified dateMIHAI Narcis \u2013 born in 1994PETREA Ciucur \u2013 born in 1966PETREA Ilie Fabian \u2013 born in 1998PETREA Vasile Remus - born in 1989POSTICA F\u0103nic\u0103 Daniela \u2013 born in 1998POSTICA Nicoleta \u2013 born in 1981POSTICA Octavian D\u0103nu\u0163 \u2013 born in 2001RADU Aurelia Maria \u2013 born in 1992RADU Marioara \u2013 born in 1971R\u0102DUCANU Cristian \u2013 born in 1990R\u0102DUCANU Daniela \u2013 born in 2002R\u0102DUCANU Fanica \u2013 born in 1986R\u0102DUCANU Florica \u2013 born in 1962R\u0102DUCANU Gheorghe \u2013 born in 1961R\u0102DUCANU Irina \u2013 born in 1983R\u0102DUCANU Irina \u2013 born in 2001R\u0102DUCANU Nicu \u2013 born in 1988R\u0102DUCANU Vasile \u2013 born in 2000ROSTA\u015e Lauren\u0163iu \u2013 born in 1981ROSTA\u015e Mariana \u2013 born in 1978STAN Monica \u2013 born in 1984TARANU Elisabeta \u2013 born in 1996TARANU Georgeta \u2013 born in 1969TARANU Maria \u2013 born in 2001TUDOR Gheorghe \u2013 born in 1997TUDOR Nita \u2013 born on an unspecified dateTUDOR Marian \u2013 born on an unspecified dateVASILE (now LAVRIC) Doina \u2013 born in 1992\u00a0","29307":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION26.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been ill-treated by the UBOP officers and that no effective investigation into his complaint had been carried out. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d27.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant\u2019s complaint was unsubstantiated and therefore no criminal proceedings had been instituted. If the pre\u2011investigation inquiry had shown that the complaint had been well\u2011founded, the investigating authorities would have opened a criminal case and carried out an investigation.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility28.\u00a0\u00a0The Government expressed doubts as to the compliance of Mr\u00a0Morgunov\u2019s application with the six-month rule, noting that it should have been dispatched before 25 April 2008.29.\u00a0\u00a0The Court recalls that where competent investigating authorities refuse to institute criminal proceedings an appeal to a court can be considered a substantial safeguard against the arbitrary exercise of powers by the investigating authority (see Trubnikov v. Russia (dec.), no. 49790\/99, 14\u00a0October 2003). Therefore, in the ordinary course of events such an appeal might be regarded as a possible remedy where the prosecution decided not to investigate the claims (see Nekrasov v. Russia, no. 8049\/07, \u00a7\u00a077, 17 May 2016).30.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case the applicant availed himself of that remedy by appealing against the investigator\u2019s refusal to open a criminal case of 27\u00a0October 2006. The six-month period can therefore be counted from the Orenburg Regional Court\u2019s decision of 25 October 2007 in which his appeal was dismissed in the final instance (see paragraph 23 above). The Court further notes that the postmark on Mr\u00a0Morgunov\u2019s application shows that it was sent to the Court on 24\u00a0April 2008, within six months of the Orenburg Regional Court\u2019s decision.31.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits32.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant general principles were summarised by the Court\u2019s Grand Chamber in the case of Bouyid v. Belgium ([GC], no.\u00a023380\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a081-88, ECHR 2015). In particular, where the events at issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of individuals within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention. The burden of proof is then on the Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation by producing evidence establishing facts which cast doubt on the version of events given by the victim. In the absence of such an explanation, the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the Government. That is justified by the fact that those in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them (ibid., \u00a7 83).1.\u00a0\u00a0Credibility of the applicant\u2019s allegations and presumption of fact33.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant was detained on remand as an accused in criminal proceedings. On 18\u00a0September 2006 he was taken to the offices of the Department for Combating Organised Crime of Orenburg regional police (\u201cthe UBOP\u201d). On his return to the detention facility he was found to have sustained injuries. According to the forensic medical experts, the haematomas were inflicted by the impact of hard, blunt objects and the hyperaemia was the result of some irritant effect, which could have included \u201cmechanical impact\u201d. The Court considers that the injuries could arguably have been received as a result of the applicant\u2019s alleged ill\u2011treatment by the police officers, in particular as a result of being physically assaulted and hit with a bat.34.\u00a0\u00a0The above factors are sufficient for the presumption in favour of the applicant\u2019s account of events to arise and to satisfy the Court that the applicant has made credible allegations of ill-treatment in police custody.35.\u00a0\u00a0The fact that the applicant, who was detained on remand as an accused, was taken to the UBOP offices and interviewed there by UBOP officers without his lawyer and without any record of that interview, that is, outside the scope of normal investigative activities, attests to the applicant\u2019s particular vulnerability vis-\u00e0-vis the UBOP officers. It weighs in favour of the applicant\u2019s account of events and makes the presumption referred to in the previous paragraph stronger.2.\u00a0\u00a0Whether an effective investigation was carried out into the applicant\u2019s allegations36.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes next that the applicant\u2019s allegations that his injuries were the result of police ill-treatment were dismissed by the domestic investigating authority, which held that they had been self\u2011inflicted. It relied on the statements of the police officers who had allegedly ill-treated the applicant. The Court also notes that the forensic medical experts\u2019 opinion, on which the investigating authority relied, was issued without examining the applicant, despite the authorities\u2019 being immediately aware of his credible allegations of ill\u2011treatment, and without assessing his version of the origin of the injuries.37.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes further that the findings of the investigating authority were based on the results of the pre-investigation inquiry, that is the initial stage in dealing with a criminal complaint under Russian law, which should normally be followed by the opening of a criminal case and an investigation if the information has disclosed elements of a criminal offence (see Lyapin v.\u00a0Russia, no. 46956\/09, \u00a7 129, 24 July 2014). The investigator\u2019s second refusal to initiate criminal proceedings was upheld by the domestic courts.38.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates its finding that merely carrying out a pre\u2011investigation inquiry under Article 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation is insufficient if the authorities are to comply with the standards established under Article 3 of the Convention for an effective investigation into credible allegations of ill\u2011treatment in police custody. It is incumbent on the authorities to institute criminal proceedings and conduct a proper criminal investigation in which the whole range of investigative measures are carried out and which constitutes an effective remedy for victims of police ill-treatment under domestic law (see Lyapin,cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 129 and 132-36; Razzakov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 57519\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a057\u201161, 5 February 2015; Gorshchuk v. Russia, no.\u00a031316\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a035\u201138, 6\u00a0October 2015; Turbylev v. Russia, no. 4722\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 67-72, 6 October 2015; and Fartushin v. Russia, no. 38887\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 44-45, 8 October 2015, in which the Government acknowledged a violation under the procedural aspect of Article 3).39.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has no reason to hold otherwise in the present case, which involves credible allegations of ill-treatment of which the authorities were promptly made aware. It finds that the investigating authorities have failed to carry out an effective investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations of the police ill-treatment, as required by Article 3 of the Convention.3.\u00a0\u00a0Whether the Government provided an explanation capable of casting doubt on the applicant\u2019s version of events40.\u00a0\u00a0The Government supported the conclusions of the investigating authority that the applicant\u2019s injuries were not attributable to the conduct of the police officers and could have been self-inflicted, notably by hitting himself against chairs and tables.41.\u00a0\u00a0Given that such an explanation was based on evidence which does not stand up to criticism and was made with reference to an inquiry falling short of the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention, the Court is of the view that it cannot be considered as satisfactory and convincing. It holds that the Government have failed to discharge their burden of proof and produce evidence capable of casting doubt on the applicant\u2019s account of events, which can therefore be assumed to have been established in relation to the allegations supported by the medical reports.4.\u00a0\u00a0Legal classification of the treatment42.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that the acts of violence to which the applicant was subjected at the UBOP offices on 18 September 2006 amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment.5.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion43.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive and procedural limbs.II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION44.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage45.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.46.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the claim.47.\u00a0\u00a0The Court awards the applicant the amount claimed in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses48.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 800 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court, notably for legal services provided by Mr\u00a0T.S.\u00a0Arslambekov, a lawyer with the legal firm Aslanyan and Partners, registered in Orenburg.49.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the claim.50.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum claimed for the proceedings before the Court.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest51.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","29345":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION68.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been physically and psychologically ill-treated by police officers and that there had been no effective investigation into his complaints in that respect. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions1.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged ill-treatment69.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant\u2019s complaint was ill\u2011founded. They pointed out that there was no evidence that any injuries had been inflicted on him while he had been in police custody. Officer G., who had taken the applicant\u2019s original confession, had testified that the applicant\u2019s statement of surrender had been voluntary. The applicant had failed to refute that testimony, in particular by refusing to participate in a formal confrontation with G. The applicant had been questioned in the presence of his lawyer L. and his parents had failed to engage another lawyer. The applicant had not raised any complaints until after he had been convicted. While the applicant had indeed received psychiatric care in detention, his psychological troubles had been caused by the stress of his having committed a crime. The content of the expert report (see paragraph 31 above), not challenged by the applicant or his lawyer, supported that conclusion. The applicant\u2019s cellmates, K. and O., had been ordinary arrestees and not police agents.70.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant insisted that his complaint was admissible. He submitted that he had been beaten and threatened by the police on 20 and 21\u00a0February 2005. In addition to beatings and threats, he had been left handcuffed and in a state of undress from 4 p.m. to 7.30 p.m. on 20\u00a0February 2005 and had been placed in a cell with adult detainees who had allegedly been police informants. He maintained that such treatment had amounted to sustained psychological pressure contrary to Article 3, as a result of which he had been forced to make his confession. According to him, physical ill-treatment and the threat that he would be raped in prison had been decisive factors in his decision to make a false confession.71.\u00a0\u00a0He explained the delay in raising his complaint before the domestic authorities by his desire to ensure that he would get a speedy investigation and trial and a light sentence, as had been promised to him by the investigating authorities.72.\u00a0\u00a0The mental troubles the applicant had suffered after transfer from police custody to the remand prison, recorded in the psychiatrists\u2019 report of 6 April 2005 (see paragraph 31 above), had been a consequence of that treatment. In his view, certain other circumstances also provided corroboration for his allegations. In particular: (i) while he had been de\u00a0facto detained on the morning of 20 February 2005, his arrest had only been documented with a report at 4 p.m. that day, (ii) he had been kept \u201cincommunicado\u201d (by which the applicant apparently meant without contact with his parents) during the first few days of the investigation, (iii) he had been kept handcuffed in a state of undress after his clothes had been taken for forensic examination, (iv) he had been detained with adults suffering from a contagious disease. His vulnerability as a minor separated from his parents had to be taken into account. According to the applicant, his sudden confession on the morning of 21 February 2005, combined with the above circumstances and the lack of an effective investigation into his allegations of ill-treatment, allowed for a presumption that he had been ill-treated.2.\u00a0\u00a0Effectiveness of the investigation73.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that his complaint had been \u201carguable\u201d given that he had provided a coherent account of the alleged ill-treatment, the irregularities in his arrest and questioning and the overall context of his detention. The authorities had made no attempt to question the officers who had seized the applicant\u2019s clothes, his cellmates, doctors, or the applicant himself. The decisions to refuse to initiate criminal proceedings had been repeatedly overruled. The applicant alleged that the authorities\u2019 conduct in his case had reflected the general pattern of the ineffectiveness of domestic investigations described in Kaverzin v. Ukraine (no.\u00a023893\/03, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0172-80, 15 May 2012).74.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the enquiries conducted by the prosecutor\u2019s office into the applicant\u2019s allegations had been effective. The prosecutor\u2019s office had relied on medical evidence which showed that the applicant had had no injuries. The effectiveness of the investigation had been undermined by the applicant\u2019s delay in raising his complaints. Accordingly, there had been no violation of the procedural limb of Article 3.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility75.\u00a0\u00a0In assessing the admissibility of the applicant\u2019s complaint the Court considers that a distinction must be made between the various elements of his allegations.(a)\u00a0\u00a0Physical ill-treatment and threats against the applicant\u2019s family76.\u00a0\u00a0As far as the applicant\u2019s allegations of physical ill-treatment or threats of \u201cproblems\u201d for his family are concerned, they are not supported by any evidence. In particular, there is no evidence that the applicant suffered any injuries in police custody: it is notable in this respect that the applicant was examined on the day of arrest by a forensic medical expert who established that his injuries predated the arrest (see paragraph 14 above). No further injuries were ever recorded. That part of the applicant\u2019s allegations is, therefore, wholly unsubstantiated. For the same reason they were not \u201carguable\u201d for the purposes of the procedural limb of Article 3.77.\u00a0\u00a0Therefore, that part of the application should be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Other elements of the alleged ill-treatment78.\u00a0\u00a0Unlike the applicant\u2019s allegations of physical ill-treatment and threats against his family, other elements of the applicant\u2019s allegations find some support in the material before the Court. In particular, the applicant alleged that: (i) he had been left handcuffed and in his underwear for several hours at the police station, (ii) he had been placed in the same cell as adult detainees, at least one of whom was suffering from a contagious disease, and (iii) he had been threatened that unless he confessed to murder he would be charged with rape, which would result in him being raped and harassed in prison by fellow inmates.79.\u00a0\u00a0While those allegations were raised before the domestic authorities after a substantial delay, the case file nevertheless contains important elements corroborating them.80.\u00a0\u00a0In particular, the relevant search and seizure records show that all of the applicant\u2019s clothes were seized from him for forensic analysis at 4 p.m. on 20 February 2005 and that the search of his home was completed at 6.20\u00a0p.m. the same day, after which he allegedly first received replacement clothes. His account of what occurred in those hours is coherent and plausible. In contrast, the Government failed to provide any alternative account of those events. In particular, neither any domestic authority in the course of the domestic investigations nor the Government before the Court stated that he had been provided with any other clothes or a covering immediately after his clothes had been seized. The Government also did not contest his allegation that throughout that time he had remained handcuffed.The applicant\u2019s placement with adults in breach of domestic law was admitted by the authorities (see paragraph 63 above).As to the threat that the applicant could be charged with rape and that this would expose him to the risk of prison rape, it can be noted that clear signs that the victim might have been subjected to some sort of sexual assault had been discovered early on and that that was eventually confirmed by the domestic courts in convicting the applicant (paragraphs 6 and 50 above). Therefore the Court cannot rule out the possibility that a sex offence charge was discussed with the applicant on 20 or 21 February 2005 (see paragraphs 8 and 22 above). Given that such a charge could have been warranted by the facts of the case, the mere discussion of such a possibility would not fall within the ambit of Article 3. However, the possibility that such a discussion may have taken place can be taken into account when assessing the likely impact on the applicant\u2019s state of mind of the other objective elements of the applicant\u2019s treatment that have been proven (see paragraph 91 below).81.\u00a0\u00a0The Government failed to provide any evidence, resulting from the domestic investigations or otherwise, to rebut the applicant\u2019s allegations other than to point out that his allegations had been raised after a substantial delay.The Court reiterates that in accordance with its case-law the scope of the obligation to apply promptly to the domestic authorities, which is part of the duty of diligence incumbent on the applicants, must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case (see, mutatis mutandis, Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], nos. 10865\/09, 45886\/07 and 32431\/08, \u00a7 265, ECHR\u00a02014 (extracts)).Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes that the applicant explained his tardiness in bringing up this complaint by referring to his hope that by cooperating with the investigating authorities he would get a more lenient sentence. On the one hand, such an explanation would appear to undermine the applicant\u2019s credibility. After all, if he believed it to be beneficial to maintain a false confession in the hope of a lenient sentence, he might also be prepared to make a false ill-treatment allegation to achieve the same result or some other goal. On the other hand, the applicant\u2019s explanation is not necessarily inconsistent with his allegations. After all, the treatment described by the applicant might well have been a \u201cstick\u201d accompanied by a \u201ccarrot\u201d in the form of an offer to plead guilty in return for favourable legal treatment in terms of the charges brought against him.Therefore, in the light of the available evidence (see paragraph 80 above), the Court cannot consider that the applicant\u2019s delay in raising his allegations is in itself decisive for determining the credibility of his allegations.82.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court finds that the applicant\u2019s complaint under the substantive and procedural limbs of Article 3 \u2013 that he was left in a state of undress for hours and placed in a cell with adults and that the domestic authorities failed to effectively investigate his allegations in that respect \u2013 raises serious issues of fact and law requiring an examination of the merits. Therefore, contrary to the Government\u2019s submissions, this part of the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7\u00a03 (a) of the Convention. It is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits83.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant general principles of the Court\u2019s case-law concerning the substantive and procedural aspects of obligations under Article 3 of the Convention are summarised in Bouyid v. Belgium ([GC], no. 23380\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a081-90 and 100-101 ECHR 201581-90), and El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ([GC], no. 39630\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 182-85, ECHR\u00a02012) respectively.(a)\u00a0\u00a0Alleged ill-treatment84.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the preceding discussion concerning admissibility, the Court finds that the two elements of the applicant\u2019s allegations \u2013 his stripping and placement with adult detainees on 20 February 2005 \u2013 have been proven to the required standard of proof.85.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that those elements are insufficient to make an arguable case that the applicant was subjected to either \u201ctorture\u201d or \u201cinhuman treatment\u201d. The question for the Court is whether those elements are sufficient to find that the applicant suffered \u201cdegrading\u201d treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.86.\u00a0\u00a0In Bouyid (cited above), the Court held that any conduct by law\u2011enforcement officers vis-\u00e0-vis an individual which diminishes human dignity constitutes a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. Treatment which arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual\u2019s moral and physical resistance may equally be characterised as degrading and fall within the prohibition set forth in Article 3 (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 101 and 87 respectively).Moreover, in Bouyid the Court also reiterated that ill\u2011treatment is liable to have a greater impact \u2013 especially in psychological terms \u2013 on a minor and emphasised that it was vital for law-enforcement officers who are in contact with minors in the exercise of their duties to take due account of the vulnerability inherent in their young age. Police behavior towards minors may be incompatible with the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention simply because they are minors, whereas it might be deemed acceptable in the case of adults. Therefore, law-enforcement officers must show greater vigilance and self-control when dealing with minors (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 109 and 110, with further references).87.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case,\u00a0the Court finds it established that the applicant was left handcuffed in just his underwear at the police station for at least two and a half hours on 20 February 2005. The authorities clearly had a valid reason for taking his clothes as they could have provided physical proof of his involvement in the crime. However, the Government have not provided any explanation to the Court as to why the authorities allowed the applicant to remain in a state of undress for at least two and a half hours afterwards.88.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the forced stripping of a person is a strong measure which often implies a certain level of distress. In certain circumstances it might fall within the ambit of Article 3 of the Convention (see, for example, Lyalyakin v. Russia, no. 31305\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 75-78, 12\u00a0March\u00a02015, which concerned the stripping of a nineteen-year-old army recruit down to his briefs).89.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, there is no conclusive evidence before the Court that the authorities\u2019 intention was to humiliate or debase the applicant. This is a relevant factor, even though the absence of such an intention is not decisive (see, among other authorities, V. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.\u00a024888\/94, \u00a7 71, ECHR 1999\u2011IX).90.\u00a0\u00a0In contrast to some other cases where the Court found the stripping of applicants \u201cdegrading\u201d, there is no indication in the present case that the applicant\u2019s situation was aggravated by the presence of persons of opposite sex (contrast Vala\u0161inas v. Lithuania, no. 44558\/98, \u00a7\u00a0116, ECHR 2001\u2011VIII, and Wiktorko v. Poland, no. 14612\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 54-55, 31 March 2009, which concerned the applicants being stripped entirely naked); the touching of his private parts (contrast Vala\u0161inas, cited above, \u00a7 117, and see Jaeger v.\u00a0Estonia, no. 1574\/13, \u00a7 42, 31 July 2014); or by being paraded in public (contrast Lyalyakin, cited above, \u00a7 76). It would appear that for the whole of the time the applicant remained in his underwear he was in a relatively enclosed space, an investigator\u2019s office at the police station. That absence of public exposure is a relevant factor, although not a decisive one (see Tyrer v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, 25 April 1978, \u00a7 32, Series A no. 26). The Court also notes that the applicant remained in a state of undress for a relatively limited period of time (contrast Van der Ven v. the Netherlands, no.\u00a050901\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 61 and 62, ECHR 2003\u2011II, and Hellig v. Germany, no.\u00a020999\/05, \u00a7 57, 7 July 2011) although that, too, is not in itself decisive (see Wieser v. Austria, no.\u00a02293\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 12 and 40, 22 February 2007).91.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Court finds that it is highly relevant that the applicant was a minor and that there is a lack of any explanation for the authorities\u2019 failure to provide him with replacement clothes or some other covering sooner and to keep him in such state handcuffed for at least two and a half hours (compare Lyalyakin, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 77 and 78, and Ilievska v.\u00a0the\u00a0former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 20136\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 61-62, 7\u00a0May 2015, concerning lack of sufficient explanations for the necessity of parading the applicant in a state of undress and for an hour-long handcuffing of a vulnerable applicant respectively). Moreover, the Court takes note of the applicant\u2019s statement (see paragraphs 8 and 51 above) that the time he spent in a state of undress left a particularly strong impression on him in view of the possibility, which was on his mind, that he might be charged with a sex offence and, therefore, exposed to the risk of prison rape.92.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the second element of the alleged ill-treatment, the applicant\u2019s placement with adult detainees, the Court notes that it lasted for a relatively short period of time, three days (contrast, for example, G\u00fcve\u00e7 v.\u00a0Turkey, no.\u00a070337\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 91 and 98, ECHR 2009 (extracts)), and the applicant did not allege that those detainees subjected him to any hostile treatment. It is true that the information about those detainees\u2019 health is contradictory: while one of them was at the time diagnosed with tuberculosis, it is not clear whether he posed a particular danger of infection. The Court also notes that both of them were suffering from drug addiction (see paragraphs 20 above). In view of the fact that his placement with adults took place shortly after his arrest and of the applicant\u2019s fragile mental state at the time, as documented by the commission of psychologists and psychiatrists (see paragraph 31 above), that detention was bound to leave a strong impression on him. Moreover, this aspect of the treatment which the applicant suffered should not be taken in isolation but should rather be seen in the context of all the circumstances of the case (see, mutatis mutandis, G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, \u00a7 88, ECHR 2010).93.\u00a0\u00a0In making an overall assessment, the Court considers that in view of the applicant, a minor facing the criminal justice system for the first time, being left handcuffed and almost without clothes for at least two and a half hours in a state of uncertainty and vulnerability, may be considered to raise on itself an issue under Article 3 (see paragraph 86 above). Moreover, the applicant\u2019s placement with adult detainees, which immediately followed and which was in violation of domestic law (see paragraph 63 above), must have contributed to creating in him feelings of fear, anguish, helplessness and inferiority, diminishing his dignity.94.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes therefore that the authorities subjected the applicant to \u201cdegrading\u201d treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention by allowing the applicant, a minor, to remain handcuffed and wearing just his underwear for at least two and a half hours on 20 February 2005 and, subsequently, by placing him in a cell with adult detainees for three days.95.\u00a0\u00a0There has, therefore, been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive limb.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Effectiveness of the investigation96.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the coherent and detailed nature of the applicant\u2019s allegations and the prima facie evidence supporting his account (paragraph\u00a080 above), the Court considers that the applicant\u2019s allegations were \u201carguable\u201d for the purposes of triggering the authorities\u2019 obligation to carry out an effective investigation.97.\u00a0\u00a0Even though the domestic authorities conducted several rounds of pre-investigation enquiries and decided not to institute criminal proceedings in connection with the applicant\u2019s allegations, there is no indication that those enquiries, conducted within the context of criminal procedure, concerned the applicant\u2019s complaint of what he considered to be forms of psychological ill-treatment, particularly being left handcuffed and in a state of undress without replacement clothing (see paragraphs 54 to 60 above). As to his placement in the same cell with adults, this issue was subject only to cursory attention, with occasional laconic statements to the effect that \u201cno irregularities were found\u201d with no reasons being given for that conclusion, which, moreover, eventually turned out to be erroneous (see paragraphs\u00a054\u201160 and 63 above).98.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that when it comes to determining the appropriate forms of response to complaints about treatment contrary to Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention inflicted by the State agents, the cases concerning allegations of unlawful use of force by such agents differ from cases concerning mere fault, omission or negligence on their part. Civil or administrative, as opposed to criminal, proceedings may constitute adequate remedies capable of providing redress for complaints based on the substantive aspect of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention in the latter cases (see, mutatis mutandis, Mocanu, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0227, where the Court emphasised the need for criminal-law remedies in cases involving unlawful use of force by State agents, as opposed to the cases of mere fault, omission or negligence).99.\u00a0\u00a0In view of those principles and its finding in paragraph 89 above that there is no conclusive evidence that the authorities had the intention of debasing the applicant, the Court considers that those of the applicants\u2019 complaints, based on which the Court has found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive limb, did not necessarily require a criminal-law response. They could be addressed, for example, in the context of an administrative investigation and\/or disciplinary proceedings against the officials involved.100.\u00a0\u00a0Still, the fact remains that in the present case the applicant sufficiently raised the entire range of his ill-treatment complaints, both concerning physical ill-treatment and concerning the other elements of his treatment on the basis of which the Court found a violation of Article\u00a03 under its substantive limb, before the prosecutor\u2019s office and the courts which examined the case against him. His complaint of physical ill-treatment was first raised on 5 August 2005, his complaint of being placed with adults on 16 January 2006 and his complaint of being kept handcuffed and in a state of undress on 14 June 2006, at the latest (see paragraphs 34, 54 and 55 above respectively). Accordingly, he sufficiently brought his complaints to the attention of the authorities (see, mutatis mutandis, Kaverzin, cited above, \u00a7 99). The Government have not suggested that the applicant had available to him an effective civil remedy in respect of his complaints which he could put in motion independently and in the absence of an effective official investigation.101.\u00a0\u00a0There is no material before the Court to show that any domestic authority has ever specifically addressed in any meaningful way, in any procedure, the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning being left handcuffed and in a state of undress without replacement clothing for hours. As to the complaint concerning being placed in a cell with adults, it was not resolved until 14 March 2011, when the domestic authorities finally concluded, as a result of an administrative inquiry, that such a placement had been in breach of domestic law but that disciplinary action was time-barred (see paragraph\u00a063 above). That, however, occurred only more than five years after the applicant first raised his complaint.102.\u00a0\u00a0That omission and delay are sufficient for the Court to conclude that the domestic investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations was not effective.103.\u00a0\u00a0There has, accordingly, been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural limb.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION104.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained of a number of violations of Article 5 of the Convention which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:...(c)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;...3.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph\u00a01\u00a0(c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial....\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violations of Article 5\u00a0\u00a7 11.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s detention on the basis of the arrest report of 20\u00a0February 2005 and on the basis of the court order of 23\u00a0February 2005(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions105.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that, as in the case of Grinenko v. Ukraine (no.\u00a033627\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 83-84, 15 November 2012), his arrest report had contained a formulaic phrase referring to unidentified \u201cwitnesses\u201d. Such wording would not have persuaded an independent observer that there had been a reasonable suspicion against him. The applicant further stated that his detention under the court order of 23 February 2005 had not been necessary as he had been a minor at the time.106.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the arrest report had complied with the requirements of domestic law and that the domestic court, in ordering the applicant\u2019s detention, had followed the procedure established by law and had given serious reasons for its decision.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessmentAdmissibility107.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the Government did not raise the issue of compliance with the six-month rule. Nonetheless, the Court has already considered that the six-month rule is a public policy rule and that, consequently, it has jurisdiction to apply it of its own motion (see Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], no. 71503\/01, \u00a7 160, ECHR 2004\u2011II).108.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant was first detained under an arrest report drawn up by the investigator on 20 February 2005 and detained on this basis until 23 February 2005 when his detention was ordered by the domestic court. This detention under the court order was then extended until the applicant\u2019s release on 17 February 2006. The applicant was re\u2011arrested on 10 May 2006. Between 17 February and 10 May 2006 the applicant was at liberty.109.\u00a0\u00a0Therefore, the period of detention which had begun on 20 February 2005 came to an end on 17 February 2006 when the applicant was released. The application was lodged more than six months after that date. Accordingly, this complaint is out of time (see Idalov v. Russia [GC], no.\u00a05826\/03, \u00a7 130, 22 May 2012, and Yaroshovets and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 74820\/10, 71\/11, 76\/11, 83\/11, and 332\/11, \u00a7 117, 3 December 2015).110.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes, therefore, that the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 5\u00a0\u00a7 1 in respect of his detention under the arrest report of 20\u00a0February and under the court order of 23 February 2005 must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention for being lodged outside the six-month time-limit.2.\u00a0\u00a0 The applicant\u2019s detention from 10 May 2006 to 25 January 2008 and from 24 July 2008 to 11 November 2009(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions111.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant, relying in particular on the Court\u2019s judgment in Kharchenko v. Ukraine (no.\u00a040107\/02, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a098 and 101, 10 February 2011), maintained that his detention in the relevant period had been in breach of Article 5\u00a0\u00a7 1 of the Convention.112.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant\u2019s detention in the above period was in compliance with domestic law.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(i)\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility113.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Merits114.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has previously found that at the material time domestic law did not set clear rules stating by what authority, on what grounds and for what term the detention of a defendant could be ordered or extended at the stage of a trial and the return of cases for further investigation. The Court has held that such a situation stemmed from a legal lacuna and was a recurrent structural problem in Ukraine (see Kharchenko, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a073\u201176 and 98, and, for a recent example of an application of that approach, see Kleutin v. Ukraine, no. 5911\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 105 and 106, 23\u00a0June 2016). No arguments have been put forward in the present case to enable the Court to reach a different conclusion.115.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention in respect of the applicant\u2019s detention from 10 May 2006 to 25\u00a0January 2008 and from 24 July 2008 to 11 November 2009.B.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violation of Article 5\u00a0\u00a7 31.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions116.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the period of pre-trial detention had been reasonable in the circumstances of the case.117.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that he had been detained for more than five years and that the reasoning of the judicial decisions concerning his detention never evolved from that given in the original detention order.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility118.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning his detention from 20 February 2005 to 17 February 2006 has been lodged out of time (see Idalov v. Russia [GC], no. 5826\/03, \u00a7 130, 22 May 2012) and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention.119.\u00a0\u00a0At the same time, the applicant\u2019s complaint in respect of his detention after 10 May 2006 is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Merits120.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant general principles of the Court\u2019s case-law are summarised in Idalov (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 139-41).121.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes that the applicant was re-arrested on 10 May 2006 and then continuously detained until 11 November 2009, when he was convicted at first instance. Deducting the period from 25 January to 24 July 2008, when he was detained after conviction for the purposes of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (a) of the Convention, the overall period of detention to be assessed for compliance with Article 5\u00a0\u00a7 3 is three years. However, in assessing the reasonableness of that period the Court is also conscious of the fact that the applicant had already spent time in custody pending trial (see Idalov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0130).122.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has often found a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention in cases against Ukraine on the basis that even for lengthy periods of detention the domestic courts referred to the same set of grounds, if there were any, throughout the period of the applicant\u2019s detention (see Kharchenko, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 80-81 and 99).123.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, too, the seriousness of the charges against the applicant and the risk of his absconding or interfering with the investigation had been given in the initial order for his detention. However, that reasoning did not evolve with the passage of time. Moreover, on several occasions the domestic courts failed to give any reasons whatsoever for their decisions extending detention (see paragraphs 41 to 48 above).124.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the length of the applicant\u2019s detention, the foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION125.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained of a number of violations of Article 6 of the Convention which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal .......3.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:...(c)\u00a0\u00a0to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require;...\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant126.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the criminal proceedings against him had been unfair in that:(i)\u00a0\u00a0no lawyer had been present during the applicant\u2019s questioning on the morning of 20 February 2005 prior to his official arrest;(ii)\u00a0\u00a0L.\u2019s services had been ineffective because he had behaved passively in the course of the applicant\u2019s questioning on 20-22 February 2005 and had failed to request a confidential consultation with the applicant prior to or after those interviews;(iii)\u00a0\u00a0confessions given under duress were used for his conviction;(iv)\u00a0\u00a0the applicants\u2019 parents had been prevented from appointing a lawyer and the investigator had appointed L. without following the procedure required by domestic law, namely he had not asked a bar association. The applicant and his parents had not been given the possibility to appoint a lawyer themselves, because they had not been informed of the applicant\u2019s arrest and because they had not been advised of that right. The applicant had been faced with a fait accompli by the investigator who had appointed L. as the applicant\u2019s lawyer and presented him to the applicant as such. In accepting that lawyer, the applicant had been under the mistaken impression that L. had been appointed by his parents;(v)\u00a0\u00a0the applicant\u2019s lawyer had been absent when the applicant had written his statement of surrender to the police on the morning of 21 February 2005;(vi)\u00a0\u00a0the applicant\u2019s lawyer had been absent during the seizure of the applicant\u2019s clothes and the identification parade.127.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the applicant submitted that there had been a violation of Article 6\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Government128.\u00a0\u00a0As to admissibility, the Government, referring to their position under Article 3, submitted that the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 6 concerning the use of confessions allegedly obtained through ill-treatment was ill-founded.129.\u00a0\u00a0As to the merits, the Government submitted that during the questioning on 20 and 21 February 2005 the applicant had been represented by a lawyer and that neither he nor his parents had expressed a wish to appoint a different lawyer at the time. Prior to the questioning, the applicant had been told of his right not to incriminate himself. The Government stressed that the applicant had repeated his initial confessions in several interviews in the presence of counsel chosen by his parents, in the presence of his parents themselves, and in the course of the first trial.130.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Government submitted that there had been no violation of Article 6\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention.B.\u00a0\u00a0Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles(a)\u00a0\u00a0General approach to Article 6 in its criminal aspect131.\u00a0\u00a0The protections afforded by Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 apply to a person subject to a \u201ccriminal charge\u201d, within the autonomous Convention meaning of that term. A \u201ccriminal charge\u201d exists from the moment that an individual is officially notified by the competent authority of an allegation that he has committed a criminal offence, or from the point at which his situation has been substantially affected by actions taken by the authorities as a result of a suspicion against him (see Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 50541\/08, 50571\/08, 50573\/08 and 40351\/09, \u00a7 249, 13 September 2016, here and below the relevant paragraphs of Ibrahim and Others contain further references).132.\u00a0\u00a0The right to a fair trial under Article 6 \u00a7 1 is an unqualified right. However, what constitutes a fair trial cannot be the subject of a single unvarying rule but must depend on the circumstances of the particular case. The Court\u2019s primary concern under Article 6 \u00a7 1 is to evaluate the overall fairness of the criminal proceedings (ibid., \u00a7 250).133.\u00a0\u00a0The primary purpose of Article 6 as far as criminal matters are concerned is to ensure a fair trial by a \u201ctribunal\u201d competent to determine \u201cany criminal charge\u201d. However, as noted above, the guarantees of Article 6 are applicable from the moment that a \u201ccriminal charge\u201d exists within the meaning of this Court\u2019s case-law and may therefore be relevant during pre-trial proceedings if and in so far as the fairness of the trial is likely to be seriously prejudiced by an initial failure to comply with them. The manner in which Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 are to be applied during the investigation stage depends on the special features of the proceedings involved and on the circumstances of the case (ibid., \u00a7\u00a0253).134.\u00a0\u00a0Complaints under Article 6 about the investigation stage tend to crystallise at the trial itself when an application is made by the prosecution to admit evidence obtained during the pre-trial proceedings and the defence opposes the application. As the Court has explained on numerous occasions, it is not its role to determine, as a matter of principle, whether particular types of evidence, including evidence obtained unlawfully in terms of domestic law, may be admissible. The question which must be answered is whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way in which the evidence was obtained, were fair (see Bykov v. Russia [GC], no. 4378\/02, \u00a7\u00a089, 10 March 2009). In determining the latter question, regard must be had to whether the rights of the defence were respected. It must be established, in particular, whether the applicant was given the opportunity of challenging the authenticity of the evidence and of opposing its use. In addition, the quality of the evidence must be taken into consideration, including whether the circumstances in which it was obtained cast doubt on its reliability or accuracy (see, for example, Prade v. Germany, no. 7215\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 33 and 34, 3\u00a0March 2016, with further references). However, an exception to this approach applies in the case of confessions obtained as a result of torture or of other ill-treatment in breach of Article 3: the Court has stated that the admission of such statements as evidence to establish the relevant facts in criminal proceedings renders the proceedings as a whole unfair, irrespective of the probative value of the statements and irrespective of whether their use was decisive in securing the defendant\u2019s conviction (see, for example, G\u00e4fgen, cited above, \u00a7 166).135.\u00a0\u00a0In its case-law on Article 6 the Court has held that when criminal charges are brought against a child, it is essential that he be dealt with in a manner which takes full account of his age, level of maturity and intellectual and emotional capacities, and that steps are taken to promote his ability to understand and participate in the proceedings. The right of an accused minor to effective participation in his or her criminal trial requires that he be dealt with due regard to his vulnerability and capacities from the first stages of his involvement in a criminal investigation and, in particular, during any questioning by the police. The authorities must take steps to reduce as far as possible his feelings of intimidation and inhibition and ensure that the accused minor has a broad understanding of the nature of the investigation, of what is at stake for him or her, including the significance of any penalty which may be imposed as well as of his rights of defence and, in particular, of his right to remain silent (see Panovits v. Cyprus, no.\u00a04268\/04, \u00a7 67, 11\u00a0December 2008, with further references).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Access to a lawyer136.\u00a0\u00a0Article 6 \u00a7 1 requires that, as a rule, access to a lawyer should be provided as from the first interrogation of a suspect by the police, unless it is demonstrated in the light of the particular circumstances of each case that there are compelling reasons to restrict this right. Even where compelling reasons may exceptionally justify denial of access to a lawyer, such a restriction \u2013 whatever its justification \u2013 must not unduly prejudice the rights of the accused under Article 6. The rights of the defence will in principle be irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating statements made during police interrogation without access to a lawyer are used for a conviction. (see Salduz v. Turkey [GC], no. 36391\/02, \u00a7 55, 27 November 2008).137.\u00a0\u00a0As clarified by the Court in Ibrahim (cited above), in applying the Salduz test the Court must first assess whether there were compelling reasons for the restriction on access to a lawyer. In the second stage, it must evaluate the prejudice caused to the rights of the defence by the restriction (see Ibrahim and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0257).\u00a0Where compelling reasons are established, a holistic assessment of the entirety of the proceedings must be conducted to determine whether they were \u201cfair\u201d for the purposes of Article\u00a06 \u00a7 1 (ibid., \u00a7\u00a0264).\u00a0Where compelling reasons are not established, the Court must apply a very strict scrutiny to its fairness assessment, with the onus shifting to the Government to demonstrate convincingly why, exceptionally and in the specific circumstances of the case, the overall fairness of the trial was not irretrievably prejudiced by the restriction on access to legal advice (ibid., \u00a7\u00a0265).138.\u00a0\u00a0Where the applicant was afforded access to a lawyer from his first interrogation, but not \u2013 according to his complaint \u2013 a lawyer of his own choosing, the first step should be to assess whether it has been demonstrated in the light of the particular circumstances of each case that there were relevant and sufficient grounds for overriding or obstructing the defendant\u2019s wish as to his or her choice of legal representation. Where no such reasons exist, the Court should proceed to evaluate the overall fairness of the criminal proceedings in the light of the factors set out in Dvorski v. Croatia ([GC], no. 25703\/11, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a081-82, ECHR 2015).(c)\u00a0\u00a0Factors to be taken into account in assessing overall fairness of proceedings139.\u00a0\u00a0When examining the proceedings as a whole in order to assess the impact of procedural failings at the pre-trial stage on the overall fairness of the criminal proceedings, the following non-exhaustive list of factors, drawn from the Court\u2019s case\u2011law, should, where appropriate, be taken into account:(a)\u00a0\u00a0Whether the applicant was particularly vulnerable, for example, by reason of his age or mental capacity.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The legal framework governing the pre-trial proceedings and the admissibility of evidence at trial, and whether it was complied with; where an exclusionary rule applied, it is particularly unlikely that the proceedings as a whole would be considered unfair.(c)\u00a0\u00a0Whether the applicant had the opportunity to challenge the authenticity of the evidence and oppose its use.(d)\u00a0\u00a0The quality of the evidence and whether the circumstances in which it was obtained cast doubt on its reliability or accuracy, taking into account the degree and nature of any compulsion.(e)\u00a0\u00a0Where evidence was obtained unlawfully, the unlawfulness in question and, where it stems from a violation of another Convention Article, the nature of the violation found.(f)\u00a0\u00a0In the case of a statement, the nature of the statement and whether it was promptly retracted or modified.(g)\u00a0\u00a0The use to which the evidence was put, and in particular whether the evidence formed an integral or significant part of the probative evidence upon which the conviction was based, and the strength of the other evidence in the case.(h)\u00a0\u00a0Whether the assessment of guilt was performed by professional judges or lay jurors, and in the case of the latter the content of any jury directions.(i)\u00a0\u00a0The weight of the public interest in the investigation and punishment of the particular offence in issue.(j)\u00a0\u00a0Other relevant procedural safeguards afforded by domestic law and practice (see Ibrahim and Others, cited above, \u00a7 274).(d)\u00a0\u00a0Waiver of rights140.\u00a0\u00a0Neither the letter nor the spirit of Article 6 of the Convention prevents a person from waiving of his own free will, either expressly or tacitly, his entitlement to the guarantees of a fair trial. However, if it is to be effective for Convention purposes, a waiver of the right to take part in the trial must be established in an unequivocal manner and be attended by minimum safeguards commensurate with its importance. Furthermore, it must not run counter to any important public interest (see Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no. 56581\/00, \u00a7 86, ECHR 2006\u2011II). In particular, for a waiver to be effective it must be shown that the applicant could reasonably have foreseen the consequences of his conduct (see, mutatis mutandis, Idalov v. Russia [GC], no. 5826\/03, \u00a7 173, 22 May 2012). The right to counsel, being a fundamental right among those which constitute the notion of a fair trial and ensuring the effectiveness of the rest of the guarantees set forth in Article 6 of the Convention, is a prime example of those rights which require the special protection of the \u201cknowing and intelligent waiver\u201d standard established in the Court\u2019s case-law (see Dvorski, cited above, \u00a7 101).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case141.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will assess the applicant\u2019s complaints in full awareness of his particular vulnerability as a minor, which is an important consideration for the Court (see Ibrahim and Others, cited above, \u00a7 274). However, this vulnerability does not exempt the applicant\u2019s allegations from scrutiny in the light of the case file material.(a)\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility(i)\u00a0\u00a0Absence of a lawyer during the seizure of the applicant\u2019s clothes on 20\u00a0February 2005 and during the identification parade on 21 February 2005142.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that the absence of a defence lawyer from the seizure of the applicant\u2019s clothing on 20 February 2005 and from the identification parade on 21 February 2005 was contrary to domestic law and breached his rights under Article 6\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention. The Court considers that it is not necessary to decide whether these complaints fall to be examined under Article 6\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention only or under Article 6\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention taken together since they are in any case inadmissible for the following reasons.143.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the seizure of clothes did not result in any specific incriminating evidence against the applicant and therefore no arguable case can be made that it prejudiced the fairness of the proceedings against him.144.\u00a0\u00a0By contrast, it is not open to doubt that the identification parade resulted in incriminating evidence against the applicant: Y. identified him as the person she had seen near the crime scene.145.\u00a0\u00a0The Court accepts that the applicant\u2019s lawyer was not summoned to and was not present during the identification parade. The provision of domestic law which entitled defence counsel to be present at all investigative actions (see paragraph 65 above) was therefore clearly breached. Moreover, there is no indication that the applicant waived his right to have a lawyer present at that investigative action, either explicitly or implicitly.146.\u00a0\u00a0However, the applicant had ample opportunity to challenge the authenticity of the results of that identification and oppose its use: his objections were examined in the course of the retrials and on appeal. It is notable in this respect that Y. was examined at the trial in the course of which she moderated her identification of the applicant (see paragraph 25 above). The trial court subjected the results of that pre-trial identification to considerable scrutiny and found that it was consistent with a range of other evidence in the file, including the evidence of another witness and the presence of the applicant\u2019s fingerprint on the crime scene (see paragraphs 50 (b) and (d) above). Finally, the Court notes that there is no suggestion of any compulsion in the course of the identification parade or of a specific procedural irregularity in its organisation which would be capable of tainting its results.147.\u00a0\u00a0Therefore, no arguable case can be made that the authorities\u2019 failure, contrary to domestic law, to ensure the defence lawyer\u2019s presence at the identification parade and the admission of the result of that parade in evidence against the applicant prejudiced the fairness of the proceedings against him.148.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Absence of a lawyer from the first questioning of the applicant on the morning of 20 February 2005149.\u00a0\u00a0There is no indication in the case file that on the morning of 20\u00a0February 2005 the applicant made any statements which played any role in his conviction. It is true that in convicting the applicant the trial court relied on the applicant\u2019s statements made in the capacity of a \u201csuspect\u201d (see paragraph 50 (b) above). However, the applicant was first questioned in that procedural status at 3.20 p.m. on 20 February 2005 when he already had a lawyer, so all the incriminating statements used for his conviction were made in the presence of a lawyer.150.\u00a0\u00a0While it appears, and the Government did not deny this, that an informal interview with the applicant had indeed taken place at the police station on the morning of 20 February 2005, there is no precise information in the case file as to the tenor of any statements the applicant may have made on that occasion. Moreover, on the morning of 20 February 2005 the situation developed rapidly, with the authorities apparently interviewing several witnesses and gathering various pieces of evidence. There is no information in the case file which would allow the Court to ascertain at what particular hour the first informal interview with the applicant took place and, accordingly, whether by that time the authorities had sufficient incriminating material to consider the applicant a \u201csuspect\u201d and bring Article\u00a06 guarantees into play. Accordingly, the Court considers that this complaint is not sufficiently developed and substantiated.151.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.(iii)\u00a0\u00a0Alleged ineffectiveness of L.\u2019s services152.\u00a0\u00a0Given the applicant\u2019s allegations about his deliberate decision not to inform his lawyer about the alleged ill-treatment he had suffered and the falsity of his confessions (see paragraph 34 above), the applicant has failed to demonstrate how L. could have been more effective in his defence at the interviews on 20-22 February 2005 where he was present.L.\u2019s absence during the seizure of the applicant\u2019s clothes and the identification parade on 20 and 21 February 2005 respectively is more readily explained by the authorities\u2019 failure to summon him (which will be examined under the merits below) rather than any omission on his part.Moreover, there is no suggestion that the applicant attempted to refuse L.\u2019s services or expressed any dissatisfaction with them at the time or that the applicant or his parents sought the appointment of any other lawyer as soon as the latter became aware of his arrest on 20 February 2005 (see paragraph 158 below). Therefore, there was no indication that L.\u2019s alleged failings were manifest in themselves or brought to the attention of the authorities (contrast Pavlenko v. Russia, no. 42371\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 106, 107, 109 and\u00a0113, 1 April 2010, and see Daud v. Portugal, 21 April 1998, \u00a7 38, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011II, for relevant principles).153.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the applicant\u2019s complaint, to the extent that it concerns the alleged ineffectiveness of L.\u2019s services in connection with the interviews with the applicant on 20-22 February 2005 at which L. was present, is wholly unsubstantiated and manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.(iv)\u00a0\u00a0Rest of the applicant\u2019s complaints under Article 6\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c)154.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the rest of the applicant\u2019s complaints under Article 6\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c), set out in paragraph 126 (iii)-(v) above, are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Merits(i)\u00a0\u00a0Admission of the applicant\u2019s confessions in evidence155.\u00a0\u00a0There is no evidence that the applicant\u2019s confessions resulted from that treatment forming the basis for the finding of a violation of Article 3 in the present case. It is relevant in this respect that the applicant consistently repeated his initial confessions throughout the investigation and at his first trial, even though he did not allege that he was subjected to continuing intimidation or feared reprisals during that later period.156.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes therefore that it cannot establish to the required standard of proof that the applicant\u2019s confessions were obtained as a result of the degrading treatment he suffered.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Access to a lawyer157.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will examine the applicant\u2019s complaints concerning access to legal assistance by first resolving factual matters raised by the applicant\u2019s various allegations (see paragraph 126 above, other than his complaints under (i), (ii) and (vi) of that paragraph which are inadmissible) and legal matters specific to each particular allegation. The Court will then proceed to a global fairness assessment.(\u03b1)\u00a0\u00a0Alleged failure to respect the applicant\u2019s free choice of legal representation158.\u00a0\u00a0The Court accepts that the investigator failed to observe the requirements of domestic law when appointing L. as the applicant\u2019s defence lawyer (see paragraph 12 above). By contrast, there is no material in the case file which would allow the Court to establish to the required standard that the applicants\u2019 parents were in any way prevented from appointing a lawyer for the applicant or that the applicant mistakenly believed or was led to believe that L. had been appointed by his parents rather than by the investigator (contrast, for example, Lopata v. Russia, no. 72250\/01, \u00a7\u00a0137, 13 July 2010, and Dvorski, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0102). In particular, the applicant\u2019s submission that his parents were unaware of his arrest and, therefore, unaware of his need for a lawyer, do not appear credible given the sequence of events which occurred on 20 February 2005, in particular the father\u2019s close involvement in key investigative activities which took place that day.159.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there is no indication that the applicant\u2019s wish as to his choice of legal representation was overridden or obstructed and there is, therefore, no call to examine this situation in the light of the Dvorski criteria (see paragraph 138 above). As to the impact of the statements he made at the time his appointed lawyer represented him on the overall fairness of the proceedings, the Court refers to its findings in paragraphs 165 to 169 below.(\u03b2)\u00a0\u00a0Absence of a lawyer on the morning of 21 February 2005 when the applicant made his statement of surrender160.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds it established that (i) the applicant made his statement of surrender after being advised of his right to remain silent and have a lawyer present and after having seen a lawyer appointed for him and (ii) the domestic courts, in convicting the applicant, did not rely on his statement of surrender, having relied on a plentiful other evidence instead, most importantly the applicant\u2019s repeated consistent confessions all in the course of the first investigation and trial. The parties disagree as to whether the statement resulted in the applicant spontaneously volunteering information to the authorities (the Government) or from police unofficial interrogation (the applicant). However, the Court, in view of its findings in paragraphs 164 to 169 below regarding the limited role the statement played in the overall context of criminal proceedings against the applicant, does not find it necessary to definitively resolve this dispute. It is prepared to assume, for the sake of argument and in the applicant\u2019s favour, that the authorities were under an obligation to ensure the defence lawyer\u2019s presence at the taking of the statement on the morning of 21 February 2005. The impact of this assumed omission on the overall fairness of the proceedings is examined below.(\u03b3)\u00a0\u00a0 Overall fairness assessment161.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the above findings, it remains for the Court to now examine whether the fairness of the proceedings as a whole was prejudiced by:(i)\u00a0\u00a0the authorities\u2019 failure, contrary to domestic law, to involve a bar association in appointing L. as the applicant\u2019s lawyer; and(ii)\u00a0\u00a0the defence lawyer\u2019s absence on the morning of 21 February 2005.162.\u00a0\u00a0In making this assessment the Court is guided by the Ibrahim criteria (see paragraph 139 above), to the extent it is appropriate in the circumstances of the present case.163.\u00a0\u00a0On the one hand, the applicant, a minor, was particularly vulnerable. The domestic law was breached by the appointment of L. without the involvement of a bar association. On the other hand, the evidence in the case was assessed by professional judges and the public interest in the prosecution of the offence imputed to the applicant, aggravated murder, was very strong (see Ibrahim criteria \u201ca\u201d, \u201cb\u201d, \u201ch\u201d and \u201cj\u201d).164.\u00a0\u00a0Turning now to the Ibrahim criteria concerning specifically evidentiary matters (criteria \u201cc\u201d to \u201cg\u201d), the Court is not convinced, in the light of its findings above concerning the alleged ineffectiveness of L.\u2019s services (see paragraph 152 above) and the lack of proof that L.\u2019s appointment involved a restriction of the applicant\u2019s choice of lawyer (see paragraph 158 above), that the breach of domestic law in question tainted the evidence produced with L.\u2019s participation, namely the results of the interviews with the applicant on 20-22 February 2005. However, even assuming, in the applicant\u2019s favour, that this breach of domestic law could have tainted the results of the interviews, that has to be seen in the context of the proceedings as a whole.The absence of the applicant lawyer\u2019s on the morning of 21\u00a0February 2001 did not taint the body of evidence against the applicant since the statement of surrender the applicant made on that occasion was not relied upon in convicting the applicant.165.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant had ample opportunity to challenge the authenticity of all the incriminating evidence and oppose its use: his objections were examined in the course of the numerous retrials and on appeal. It is notable that on an application by the defence the domestic courts ruled certain incriminating expert evidence inadmissible (see paragraph 50 (e) above).166.\u00a0\u00a0As to the quality of the evidence, the applicant alleged that his statements on 20-22 February 2005 had been tainted by compulsion. However, the domestic courts rejected his allegations and the Court has found no reason to disagree with that assessment (see paragraphs 155 and\u00a0156 above).167.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s statements on 20-22 February 2005 were not promptly retracted. In fact, the applicant maintained them throughout the initial investigation and at his first trial.168.\u00a0\u00a0The results of the interviews of 20-22 February 2005 (other than the applicant\u2019s statement made on the morning of 21 February 2005) formed at least a \u201csignificant\u201d part of the evidence on which his conviction was based. However, the Court finds decisive the strength of the other evidence in the case. The key elements of that evidence were the applicant\u2019s own admissions made in the course of the first investigation in the presence of a lawyer of his own choice and in the course of his first trial, at which he was not only represented by professional counsel of his choice but also by his mother. In addition, the applicant\u2019s conviction was supported by other probative evidence, in particular witness evidence and the presence of the applicant\u2019s fingerprint at the crime scene (see paragraph 50 (b) above).169.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds the weight of this other incriminating evidence and, in particular, the applicant\u2019s position in the course of his first trial, to be decisive in its assessment and finds that the proceedings as a whole were fair, in spite of the procedural violations at the early stage of the investigation.(iii)\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion170.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above considerations, the Court concludes that there has been no violation of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION171.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicant complained under Article 5 of the Convention that his detention for various periods between 23 February 2005 and 17\u00a0February 2006 had been unlawful. Without referring to any specific provisions of the Convention, he further complained that lawyer B. had engaged in malpractice.172.\u00a0\u00a0Having considered the applicant\u2019s submissions in the light of all the material in its possession, the Court finds that, in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill\u2011founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and\u00a04 of the Convention.V.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION173.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage174.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 25,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.175.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that claim excessive.176.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, making its assessment on an equitable basis, awards the applicant EUR 8,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage (compare Rudnichenko v. Ukraine, no. 2775\/07, \u00a7 130, 11 July 2013, and Khamroev and Others v. Ukraine, no. 41651\/10, \u00a7 106, 15 September 2016).B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses177.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 300 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic authorities and EUR 4,650 for those incurred before the Court. He requested that the latter amount be transferred to his lawyer\u2019s account.178.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that claim unsubstantiated.179.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court rejects the claim for costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings and considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 2,150 (which is equal to EUR 3,000 less EUR 850, the sum paid by way of legal aid) for the proceedings before the Court. This award is to be paid into the bank account of the applicant\u2019s lawyer, Mr\u00a0Markov, as indicated by the applicant.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest180.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","29357":"I.\u00a0\u00a0JOINDER OF APPLICATIONS69.\u00a0\u00a0Given that the applications at hand concern similar complaints and raise identical issues under the Convention, the Court decides to join them pursuant to Rule 42 \u00a7 1 of the Rules of Court.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION70.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that after their arrest on suspicion of having committed criminal offences they had been subjected to ill\u2011treatment by police officers in order to force them to confess to the crimes and that no effective investigation had been carried out into their complaints. They relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d71.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stated that the applicants\u2019 interviews at the police stations had been part of the normal operational-search activities carried out by the police officers in accordance with the Operational-Search Activities Act. The Government submitted that there had been no violation of the applicants\u2019 rights guaranteed by Article 3. Effective and thorough inquiries had been carried out into their allegations of ill-treatment, which at the present time remained unconfirmed.72.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants considered the pre-investigation inquiries flawed and the official versions of the origin of their injuries, which were based on the police officers\u2019 statements, inconsistent with other evidence.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility73.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applications are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits74.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant general principles were recently reiterated by the Court\u2019s Grand Chamber in the case of Bouyid v. Belgium ([GC], no.\u00a023380\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a081-88, ECHR 2015). In particular, where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of individuals within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention. The burden of proof is then on the Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation by producing evidence establishing facts which cast doubt on the version of events given by the victim. In the absence of such an explanation, the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the Government. That is justified by the fact that those in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them (ibid., \u00a7 83).1.\u00a0\u00a0Credibility of the applicants\u2019 allegations of ill-treatment in police custody and the presumption of fact75.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicants were in police custody for sixteen hours, twelve hours and ten hours respectively, without their arrest being recorded. Although they were not formally recognised as suspects, the evidentiary material before the Court, in particular statements by the police officers, leaves little doubt in respect of their actual status as persons arrested on suspicion of having committed criminal offences and no other reason for holding them in police custody was suggested by the parties (see paragraphs 6, 17, 21, 24, 25, 28, 40, 44, 50, 56 and 61 above). During that time they were interviewed by the police in relation to the crimes of which they were suspected. One of them (Mr\u00a0Zontov) confessed to having committed the crime by signing the \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d (\u044f\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0441 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439), which he retracted as having been made under coercion as soon as he had access to a lawyer of his choice (see paragraph 53 above) but which was used as evidence against him at his trial (see paragraph\u00a057 above).76.\u00a0\u00a0After the respective periods of time spent in police custody the applicants were found to have sustained injuries (see paragraphs 10, 12-13, 15, 31-33, 48-49 and 51 above). According to the forensic medical experts, the injuries were the result of impacts from hard blunt objects or, in the case of Mr\u00a0Olisov\u2019s fracture of the vertebra, an impact resulting from a traumatic force along the axes of the spine. The Court considers that they could arguably have resulted from the applicants\u2019 alleged ill\u2011treatment by police officers, in particular as a result of being punched (all three applicants), kicked (Mr\u00a0Olisov and Mr Danishkin), tied, lifted and dropped (Mr Olisov and Mr Danishkin), subjected to near-suffocation (Mr Danishkin), handcuffed and hit with a rubber truncheon (Mr\u00a0Zontov).77.\u00a0\u00a0The above factors are sufficient to give rise to a presumption in favour of the applicants\u2019 account of events and to satisfy the Court that the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment in police custody were credible.78.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes the Government\u2019s contention that the applicants\u2019 interviews (\u043e\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0441\u044b) were part of normal police practice carried out in accordance with the Operational\u2011Search Activities Act (see paragraph\u00a067 above). The Court reiterates that it has dealt with many applications against Russia concerning ill\u2011treatment in police custody that have exposed a systemic problem of delay in documenting the arrest and the status of detained individuals as suspects, during which time detainees were interviewed without access to a lawyer, were denied other rights of suspects, and fell victim to police abuse (see, among other authorities, Razzakov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a057519\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 66-73, 5 February 2015, Fartushin v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a038887\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 52-54, 8\u00a0October 2015, and Ovakimyan v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a052796\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 54-58, 21 February 2017 (not final), in which cases the Government acknowledged a violation of Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention; Aleksandr Andreyev v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a02281\/06, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a048-51, 23\u00a0February 2016, in which the Government acknowledged a violation of Article 5 of the Convention; Leonid Petrov v. Russia, no. 52783\/08, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a052\u201155 and 58-60, 11\u00a0October 2016; see also Turbylev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 94-95, assessing the situation under Article 6 of the Convention).79.\u00a0\u00a0The fact that during the periods of alleged ill-treatment the applicants were held at the police stations without records of their arrest having been drawn up (the unlawfulness of Mr Olisov\u2019s detention was acknowledged by the domestic court, see paragraph 21 above) and were interviewed by police officers without being able to avail themselves of access to a lawyer and other rights of suspects in criminal proceedings, attests to the applicants\u2019 particular vulnerability vis-\u00e0-vis the police officers. It weighs heavily in favour of the applicants\u2019 accounts of events and makes the presumption referred to in paragraph 77 above stronger (see Lyapin v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a046956\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0116\u201117, 24 July 2014, and Turbylev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a065).2.\u00a0\u00a0Whether an effective investigation was carried out into the applicants\u2019 allegations of police ill-treatment80.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes further that the applicants\u2019 allegations of their injuries being the result of police ill-treatment were dismissed by the domestic investigating authorities. The investigators based their findings on the results of the pre-investigation inquiry, which is the initial stage in dealing with a criminal complaint under Russian law and should normally be followed by the opening of a criminal case and the carrying out of an investigation if the information gathered has disclosed elements of a criminal offence (see Lyapin, cited above, \u00a7 129). The investigators\u2019 decisions refusing to open a criminal case (four decisions in Mr Olisov\u2019s case, six decisions in Mr\u00a0Danishkin\u2019s case and eighteen decisions in Mr\u00a0Zontov\u2019s case) were each time annulled by the investigating authorities for having been based on an incomplete inquiry and a new round of inquiry was ordered, the last one in May 2015. The investigator\u2019s one decision to open a criminal case in Mr\u00a0Zontov\u2019s case was quashed next day by the prosecutor (see paragraphs 60-61 above). The prosecutor\u2019s decision and the investigators\u2019 refusals to initiate criminal proceedings were upheld by the domestic courts (see paragraphs 62, 22 and 41 above).81.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates its finding that the mere carrying out of a pre\u2011investigation inquiry under Article 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation is insufficient if the authorities are to comply with the standards established under Article 3 of the Convention for an effective investigation into credible allegations of ill\u2011treatment in police custody. It is incumbent on the authorities to institute criminal proceedings and conduct a proper criminal investigation in which a full range of investigative measures are carried out and which constitutes an effective remedy for victims of police ill-treatment under domestic law (see Lyapin, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0129 and 132-36; Razzakov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a057-61; Gorshchuk v. Russia, no.\u00a031316\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a035\u201138, 6 October 2015; Turbylev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 67-72; and Fartushin, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 44-45, in which the Government acknowledged a violation under the procedural aspect of Article 3).82.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has no reason to hold otherwise in the present case, which involves credible allegations of ill-treatment of which the authorities were promptly made aware. It finds that the investigating authorities have failed to carry out effective investigations into the applicants\u2019 allegations of police ill-treatment, as required by Article 3 of the Convention.3.\u00a0\u00a0Whether the Government provided explanations capable of casting doubt on the applicants\u2019 versions of events83.\u00a0\u00a0The Government supported the conclusions of the investigating authorities to the effect that the applicants\u2019 injuries were not attributable to the conduct of the police officers and could have been sustained in other circumstances, such as the applicant\u2019s hitting himself accidentally against blunt objects in Mr\u00a0Olisov\u2019s case, and the other two applicants\u2019 resisting arrest.84.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes further that the explanation of Mr\u00a0Olisov\u2019s injuries (multiple bruises and abrasions on the head, body and the upper and lower extremities and the fracture of a vertebra) was not based on any evidence of the applicant\u2019s having committed self-harm, and that the explanations of how the other two applicants\u2019 injuries had been caused was based on the statements of the police officers who had allegedly ill-treated the applicants.\u00a0The explanation of Mr\u00a0Danishkin\u2019s injuries (multiple bruises on the face, in particular the abrasion in the temple area on the right side, the bruise under the right eye, the abrasion on the chin on the right side, and the smashed lip on the left side, multiple bruises on the neck, the bruise on the right part of the abdomen and the bruise in the left axillary region) was based on the police officers\u2019 statements that the applicant had allegedly tried to run away from them when being conveyed to another police station and that one of them had tripped him up and kept him on the ground by \u201cusing force\u201d until the arrival of the other policeman (see paragraphs 29 and 40 above), and that one of them had twisted the applicant\u2019s hand behind his back (see paragraph 37 above).\u00a0Lastly, the explanation of Mr Zontov\u2019s injuries (in particular, the abrasion on the face, the bruises on the chest and both feet, numerous abrasions around the waist, and numerous abrasions and bruises on the wrists) was based on the police officers\u2019 statements that, when running away from them during his arrest, the applicant had fallen over several times, and that in order to stop him they had knocked him to the ground and handcuffed his hands behind his back (see paragraph 55 above). The Court finds that such explanations cannot be considered satisfactory or convincing.85.\u00a0\u00a0Given that those explanations were provided as a result of the inquiries\u2019 falling short of the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention (see paragraph 82 above), the Court holds that the Government have failed to discharge their burden of proof and produce evidence capable of casting doubt on a part of the applicants\u2019 account of events that is supported by medical evidence, and which it therefore finds established.4.\u00a0\u00a0Legal classification of the treatment86.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it has deemed treatment to be \u201cinhuman\u201d because it was premeditated, was applied for hours at a stretch and caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical and mental suffering. Treatment has been held to be \u201cdegrading\u201d when it was such as to arouse in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them and possibly breaking their physical or moral resistance, or when it was such as to drive the victim to act against his will or conscience.\u00a0In determining whether a particular form of ill-treatment should be classified as torture, consideration must be given to the distinction, embodied in Article 3, between this notion and that of inhuman or degrading treatment. As noted in previous cases, it appears that it was the intention that the Convention should, by means of such a distinction, attach a special stigma to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering. In addition to the severity of the treatment, there is a purposive element to torture, as recognised in the United Nations Convention against Torture, which in Article 1 defines torture in terms of the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering with the aim of obtaining information, inflicting punishment or intimidating (see G\u00e4fgen v.\u00a0Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 89-90, ECHR 2010).87.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that the acts of violence to which the applicants were subjected during the police interviews, given their severity and the aim of obtaining confessions, amounted to torture.5.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion88.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive and procedural limbs.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION89.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that they had no effective domestic remedies in relation to their ill-treatment by the police, as the authorities had failed to carry out an effective investigation into their complaints. They relied on Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d90.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.91.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is linked to the issue raised under the procedural aspect of Article 3 of the Convention and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.92.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the finding of a violation of Article 3 under its procedural aspect on account of the respondent State\u2019s failure to carry out an effective investigation, the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine this complaint under Article 13.IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION93.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage94.\u00a0\u00a0Mr Olisov and Mr Danishkin claimed 30,000 and 20,000 euros (EUR), respectively, in respect of non-pecuniary damage. Relying on the case-law under Article 3 of the Convention, Mr Zontov left the determination of the amount in respect of non-pecuniary damage to the discretion of the Court. He stated that he was still suffering from the consequences of the police ill\u2011treatment (see paragraph 65 above). If the State had carried out an effective investigation and those who had assaulted and tortured him had been brought to justice and punished, this would have partially restored his moral condition. This had not happened, aggravating his suffering.95.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the claims.96.\u00a0\u00a0The Court awards Mr Olisov and Mr Danishkin the amounts claimed, and Mr Zontov EUR\u00a045,000, in respect of non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses97.\u00a0\u00a0Mr Olisov and Mr Danishkin claimed EUR 2,400 and EUR\u00a04,975.50 respectively for costs and expenses incurred before the Court.98.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered Mr Danishkin\u2019s claim excessive and noted that any award should be made in compliance with the case-law.99.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession (indicating that Mr Olisov\u2019s application form had been lodged before Mr Gladkikh was authorised to represent him, and that the agreement for Mr Danishkin\u2019s representation provided for a rate of EUR 50 per hour for the purpose of calculating legal costs) and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award Mr Olisov and Mr Danishkin the sums of EUR\u00a01,600 and EUR\u00a01,659 respectively for the proceedings before the Court. The amount awarded to Mr Danishkin is to be paid to the account of his representative, as requested by him.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest100.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","29358":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION28.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that after his arrest on suspicion of having committed the crime he had been ill-treated by police officers and that no effective investigation had been carried out into his complaint. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d29.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained the results of the domestic inquiry and submitted that the applicant\u2019s rights under Article 3 had not been violated.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility30.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits31.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant general principles were summarised by the Court\u2019s Grand Chamber in the case of Bouyid v. Belgium ([GC], no.\u00a023380\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a081-88, ECHR 2015). In particular, where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of individuals within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention. The burden of proof is then on the Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation by producing evidence establishing facts which cast doubt on the version of events given by the victim. In the absence of such an explanation, the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the Government. That is justified by the fact that those in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them (ibid., \u00a7 83).1.\u00a0\u00a0Credibility of the applicant\u2019s allegations and presumption of fact32.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant spent about twelve hours in police custody without his arrest being recorded. Although he was not formally recognised as a suspect, the material before the Court leaves little doubt in respect of his actual status as a person arrested on suspicion of having committed a criminal offence and no other reason for holding him at the police station was suggested by the parties. During that time he was interviewed in relation to the crime which he was suspected of having committed. He signed a \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d (\u044f\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0441 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439), which he retracted at the trial as having been given under coercion and which was nevertheless used as evidence for his conviction.33.\u00a0\u00a0At the end of the period spent in police custody the applicant was found to have sustained injuries. According to the forensic medical expert, the bruise and abrasions on the applicant\u2019s face could have been sustained as a result of his alleged ill\u2011treatment by the police officers, in particular by his face being hit against the wall.34.\u00a0\u00a0The above factors are sufficient for a presumption in favour of the applicant\u2019s account of events to arise, and to satisfy the Court that the applicant made credible allegations of ill-treatment in police custody.35.\u00a0\u00a0The fact that during the time of his alleged ill-treatment the applicant was held at the police station without his arrest being recorded and interviewed without being able to avail himself of access to a lawyer or of the other rights of a suspect in criminal proceedings attests to the applicant\u2019s particular vulnerability vis-\u00e0-vis the law-enforcement officers. It weighs in favour of the applicant\u2019s account of events and makes the presumption referred to in the previous paragraph stronger.2.\u00a0\u00a0Whether an effective investigation was carried out into the applicant\u2019s allegations36.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes next that the applicant\u2019s allegations that his injuries were the result of police ill-treatment were dismissed by the domestic investigating authority, which declared that the injuries had been the result of the applicant\u2019s self-harm. In so deciding it relied on the police officers\u2019 and the investigator\u2019s statements. The Court finds it problematic that decisive weight was given to the statements of those who had allegedly ill-treated the applicant. The Court notes that their account of the applicant\u2019s self\u2011harm \u2013 namely that he banged his head repeatedly against the bars of a cell and then against the wall while shouting threats against the police officers \u2013 was not based on any medical opinion as regards either its probability or the number of traumatic impacts from which the injuries including the fracture of the nose might have originated. Nor was it based on an examination of the scene of the alleged incident. Furthermore, the crucial evidence \u2013 namely the video recording from the camera installed at the scene of the alleged incident \u2013 was never obtained and examined by the investigating authority and was lost. Finally, investigator N.\u2019s statements denying signs of injury on the applicant \u2013 even though N. had seen the applicant immediately after the forensic medical expert had reported the visible injuries on the applicant\u2019s face \u2212 were not subjected to any critical assessment on the part of the investigating authority. The deficiencies in the inquiry identified by the Komi Supreme Court (see paragraph 20 above) were never rectified and the refusal to open a criminal case based on that inquiry was upheld by the domestic courts and relied on as grounds for rejecting the applicant\u2019s request to exclude his \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d from evidence at his trial.37.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes further that the findings of the investigating authority were based on the results of the pre-investigation inquiry, that is to say the initial stage in dealing with a criminal complaint under Russian law, which should normally be followed by the opening of a criminal case and an investigation into whether or not the information gathered has disclosed the elements of a criminal offence (see Lyapin v. Russia, no. 46956\/09, \u00a7 129, 24\u00a0July 2014).38.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates its finding that merely carrying out a pre\u2011investigation inquiry under Article 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation is insufficient if the authorities are to comply with the standards established under Article 3 of the Convention for an effective investigation into credible allegations of ill\u2011treatment in police custody. It is incumbent on the authorities to institute criminal proceedings and conduct a proper criminal investigation in which the whole range of investigative measures are carried out and which constitutes an effective remedy for victims of police ill-treatment under domestic law (see Lyapin, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 129 and 132-36; Razzakov v. Russia, no. 57519\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a057\u201161, 5 February 2015; Gorshchuk v. Russia, no.\u00a031316\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a035\u201138, 6\u00a0October 2015; Turbylev v. Russia, no. 4722\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 67-72, 6 October 2015; and Fartushin v. Russia, no. 38887\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 44-45, 8 October 2015, in which the Government acknowledged a violation under the procedural aspect of Article 3).39.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has no reason to hold otherwise in the present case, which involves credible allegations of ill-treatment of which the authorities were promptly made aware. It finds that the investigating authorities have failed to carry out an effective investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations of the police ill-treatment, as required by Article 3 of the Convention.3.\u00a0\u00a0Whether the Government provided an explanation capable of casting doubt on the applicant\u2019s version of events40.\u00a0\u00a0The Government supported the conclusions of the investigating authority, namely that the applicant\u2019s injuries were not attributable to the conduct of the police officers and could have been sustained as a result of the applicant\u2019s self-harm, in particular banging his head repeatedly against the bars of a cell and the wall at the police station.41.\u00a0\u00a0Given that such an explanation was based on evidence which does not stand up to criticism and was made as a result of the inquiry falling short of the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention, the Court is of the view that it cannot be considered satisfactory and convincing. It holds that the Government failed to discharge their burden of proof and produce evidence capable of casting doubt on the applicant\u2019s account of events, which can therefore be assumed to have been established in relation to the allegations supported by the medical evidence.4.\u00a0\u00a0Legal classification of the treatment42.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that the acts of violence to which the applicant was subjected at the Syktyvdinskiy district police station on 16 August 2007 amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment.5.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion43.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive and procedural limbs.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION44.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the authorities had failed to carry out an effective investigation into his complaint of ill-treatment in police custody, thereby depriving him of effective domestic remedies. He relied on Article 13 of the Convention which reads as follows:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d45.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.46.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is closely linked to the issue raised under the procedural aspect of Article 3 of the Convention and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.47.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the finding of a violation of Article 3 under its procedural aspect on account of the respondent State\u2019s failure to carry out an effective investigation, the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine this complaint under Article 13.III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION48.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage49.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.50.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the claim.51.\u00a0\u00a0The Court awards the applicant the amount claimed in respect of non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses52.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 2,000 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court, representing work by Mr Mezak on the preparation of the observations in reply to those by the Government after communication of the application.53.\u00a0\u00a0The Government noted that the claim should be examined in accordance with the Court\u2019s case-law.54.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that Mr Mezak did not seek leave to represent the applicant after the notification of the case to the Government, in accordance with Rule 36 \u00a7\u00a7 2 and 4 (a) of the Rules of Court. The Court therefore rejects the claim for costs and expenses.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest55.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","29361":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION23.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that after his arrest on suspicion of having committed the crime he had been ill-treated by police officers and that no effective investigation had been carried out into his complaint. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d24.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained the conclusions of the domestic investigating authority and submitted that there had been no violation of the applicant\u2019s rights under Article 3.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility25.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits26.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant general principles were summarised by the Court\u2019s Grand Chamber in the case of Bouyid v. Belgium ([GC], no.\u00a023380\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a081-88, ECHR 2015). In particular, where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of individuals within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention. The burden of proof is then on the Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation by producing evidence establishing facts which cast doubt on the version of events given by the victim. In the absence of such an explanation, the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the Government. That is justified by the fact that those in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them (ibid., \u00a7 83).1.\u00a0\u00a0Credibility of the applicant\u2019s allegations and presumption of fact27.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant spent more than eight hours in police custody without his arrest being recorded. Although he was not formally recognised as a suspect, the material before the Court leaves little doubt in respect of his actual status as a person arrested on suspicion of having committed a criminal offence (in particular, the applicant\u2019s confession statements given before being taken to the police station and the police officers\u2019 statements, see paragraphs 7 and 20 above), and no other reason for holding him at the police station was suggested by the parties. During that time he was interviewed in relation to the crime which he was suspected to have committed and gave incriminating statements against his brother, which he later retracted as having been given under coercion.28.\u00a0\u00a0At the end of the period spent in police custody, the applicant was found to have sustained injuries. According to the forensic medical expert, the applicant\u2019s multiple abrasions and haematomas could have come about as a result of blows from hard, blunt objects or collisions with such objects. They could therefore arguably have been a result of his alleged ill\u2011treatment by the police officers, in particular by his being punched, kicked and hit with a rubber truncheon.29.\u00a0\u00a0The above factors are sufficient for a presumption in favour of the applicant\u2019s account of events to arise, and to satisfy the Court that the applicant made credible allegations of his ill-treatment in police custody.30.\u00a0\u00a0The fact that during the time of his alleged ill-treatment the applicant was held at the police station without his arrest being recorded and interviewed without being able to avail himself of access to a lawyer or any of the other rights of a suspect in criminal proceedings attests to the applicant\u2019s particular vulnerability vis-\u00e0-vis the police officers. It weighs in favour of the applicant\u2019s account of events and makes the presumption referred to in the previous paragraph stronger.2.\u00a0\u00a0Whether an effective investigation was carried out into the applicant\u2019s allegations31.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes next that the applicant\u2019s allegations that his injuries were the result of police ill-treatment were dismissed by the domestic investigating authority, which declared that the injuries had been the result of the applicant\u2019s self-harm, in particular falling down a flight of stairs before his arrest. In so deciding, it relied on the applicant\u2019s statement to that effect given during his examination as a suspect after his alleged ill\u2011treatment on 18 April 2009 and on the police officers\u2019 statements denying the applicant\u2019s ill\u2011treatment. The Court finds it problematic that the investigating authority disregarded the fact that the applicant had retracted the above statement as having been given under coercion (see paragraph 14 above), and that decisive weight was given to the statements of the police officers who had allegedly ill-treated the applicant. Furthermore, the applicant was not examined by the forensic medical expert until more than two weeks after the alleged ill-treatment, by which time most of the traces of that alleged ill-treatment had disappeared. The forensic medical expert was not asked to assess the possibility of the injuries being the result of a single fall down a flight of stairs and the scene of the alleged incident was never examined.32.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes further that the findings of the investigating authority were based on the results of the pre-investigation inquiry, that is to say the initial stage in dealing with a criminal complaint under the Russian law which should normally be followed by the opening of a criminal case and carrying out an investigation if the information gathered has disclosed elements of a criminal offence (Lyapin v. Russia, no. 46956\/09, \u00a7 129, 24\u00a0July 2014).33.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates its finding that the mere carrying out of a pre\u2011investigation inquiry under Article 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation is insufficient if the authorities are to comply with the standards established under Article 3 of the Convention for an effective investigation into credible allegations of ill\u2011treatment in police custody. It is incumbent on the authorities to institute criminal proceedings and conduct a proper criminal investigation in which the whole range of investigative measures are carried out and which constitutes an effective remedy for victims of police ill-treatment under domestic law (see Lyapin, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 129 and 132-36; Razzakov v. Russia, no. 57519\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a057\u201161, 5 February 2015; Gorshchuk v. Russia, no.\u00a031316\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a035\u201138, 6\u00a0October 2015; Turbylev v. Russia, no. 4722\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 67-72, 6 October 2015; and Fartushin v. Russia, no. 38887\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 44-45, 8 October 2015, in which the Government acknowledged a violation under the procedural aspect of Article 3).34.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has no reason to hold otherwise in the present case, which involves credible allegations of ill-treatment of which the authorities were promptly made aware. It finds that the investigating authorities have failed to carry out an effective investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations of the police ill-treatment, as required by Article 3 of the Convention.3.\u00a0\u00a0Whether the Government provided an explanation capable of casting doubt on the applicant\u2019s version of events35.\u00a0\u00a0The Government supported the conclusions of the investigating authorities to the effect that the applicant\u2019s injuries were not attributable to the conduct of the police officers and could have been sustained as a result of the applicant\u2019s self-harm, in particular falling down a flight of stairs before his arrest.36.\u00a0\u00a0Given that such explanation was based on evidence which does not stand up to criticism and was made as a result of the inquiry falling short of the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention, the Court is of the view that it cannot be considered satisfactory and convincing. It holds that the Government failed to discharge their burden of proof and produce evidence capable of casting doubt on the applicant\u2019s account of events, which can therefore be assumed to have been established in relation to the allegations supported by the medical evidence (see paragraph 28 above).4.\u00a0\u00a0Legal classification of the treatment37.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that the acts of violence to which the applicant was subjected at the Krasnoarmeyskiy district police station of Volgograd on 18\u00a0April 2009 amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment.5.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion38.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive and procedural limbs.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION39.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention that the State had failed to conduct an effective investigation into his allegations of police ill-treatment, and that he had had no effective domestic remedy. Article 13 of the Convention reads as follows:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d40.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.41.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is closely linked to the issue raised under the procedural aspect of Article 3 of the Convention and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.42.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the finding of a violation of Article 3 under its procedural aspect on account of the respondent State\u2019s failure to carry out an effective investigation, the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine this complaint under Article 13.III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION43.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage44.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 110,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.45.\u00a0\u00a0The Government noted that any award should be made in compliance with the case-law.46.\u00a0\u00a0The Court awards the applicant EUR 20,000 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest47.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","29402":"I.\u00a0\u00a0SCOPE OF THE GRAND CHAMBER\u2019S JURISDICTION81.\u00a0\u00a0In his memorial submitted to the Grand Chamber and in the course of the hearing, the applicant asked the Grand Chamber to reverse the decision given on 23 August 2011 by the Chamber declaring inadmissible his complaint under Article 3 of the Convention relating to his whole-life sentence.82.\u00a0\u00a0The Government opposed that request. They submitted that it was contrary to the Court\u2019s case-law to the effect that the case which was referred to the Grand Chamber was the application as declared admissible by the Chamber.83.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the content and scope of the \u201ccase\u201d referred to the Grand Chamber are delimited by the Chamber\u2019s decision on admissibility (see, in particular, K. and T. v. Finland [GC], no. 25702\/94, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0140 and 141, ECHR 2001\u2011VII; Azinas v. Cyprus [GC], no. 56679\/00, \u00a7\u00a032, ECHR 2004\u2011III; Kuri\u0107 and Others v. Slovenia [GC], no. 26828\/06, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0235 and 236, ECHR 2012 (extracts); and Murray v. the Netherlands [GC], no.\u00a010511\/10, \u00a7 86, ECHR 2016). This means that the Grand Chamber cannot examine those parts of the application which have been declared inadmissible by the Chamber. The Court sees no reason to depart from that principle in the present case.84.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, in the framework of the present case, the Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate on the complaint raised under Article 3 of the Convention concerning the imposition of a whole-life sentence on the applicant.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION85.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained of the physical conditions of his detention and of the prison regime in the Burgas Investigation Detention Facility and in Burgas and Sofia Prisons. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions86.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant invited the Grand Chamber to endorse the Chamber\u2019s conclusion that there had been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.87.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted no observations on this complaint before the Grand Chamber. However, they pointed out that a wide-ranging programme to reform the Bulgarian prison system was currently being implemented. The programme would ultimately facilitate the application of the European standards on prisoner treatment, including in terms of conditions of detention.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment88.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the Chamber found that there had been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention (see paragraphs 88-95 of the Chamber judgment). The Chamber stated in particular:\u201c89.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant has been incarcerated since October 1999. Since that date he has been held in three different establishments: the Burgas Investigation Detention Facility, Burgas Prison and Sofia Prison.90.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the parties agree on the inadequacy of the material conditions which prevailed in the Burgas Investigation Detention Facility between October 1999 and April 2000, when the applicant was held there ... The report on the 1999 CPT visit corroborates this finding ...91.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was subsequently transferred to Burgas Prison, where he remained from 2000 to 2004 ... In the report on its 2002 visit the CPT delegation stated that the wing for life prisoners in Burgas Prison where the applicant\u2019s cell was located had recently been refurbished, that the individual cells had an area of 6 m2 each and had adequate ventilation and lighting. The main problem noted by the CPT delegation had been the restricted access to the shared sanitary facilities and the use of buckets as toilets by the prisoners ...92.\u00a0\u00a0On 25 February 2004 the applicant was transferred to Sofia Prison, where he continued to serve his sentence. According to the reports of the 2006, 2008 and 2014 CPT visits to that prison, all the cells in the prison\u2019s high-security wing had in-cell sanitary facilities ... According to information presented by the Government, this section of the prison was renovated in 2005 and 2006, and the applicant benefited from a decent-sized individual cell ... However, the report of the CPT\u2019s visit in 2014 once again singles out the general dilapidation of the area of Sofia Prison reserved for prisoners serving life sentences, and the lack of daylight and insufficient hygiene in the premises ...93.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that throughout his years in prison the manner and method of executing the applicant\u2019s life sentence, as determined by the prison regime assigned to him, were highly restrictive. The applicant had initially been assigned a so-called special prison regime: he had spent twenty-three hours a day locked up in his cell, mostly on his bed; his access to the prison library had been limited to the few minutes it took to choose and borrow a book; he had been allowed to attend the prison chapel twice a year, with a ban on meeting other prisoners ... In 2008 his prison regime was relaxed ... However, like all prisoners in his category, he was still kept separate from the rest of the prison population and his cell was kept locked during the day (ibid.). The successive CPT reports show that the prisoners in the high-security wing of Sofia Prison have very few out-of-cell activities and are kept separated from the other prisoners ...94.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing facts and as it noted in the recent judgment in the case of Harakchiev and Tolumov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 203-214, the Court considers that the applicant\u2019s poor conditions of detention taken in conjunction with the restrictive regime under which he is serving his life sentence and the length of the prison term in question, subjected the applicant to an ordeal far exceeding the suffering inherent in the execution of a prison sentence. The Court therefore finds that the severity threshold required for the application of Article 3 of the Convention was exceeded in the present case. The applicant was placed in an ongoing situation of infringement of his right not to be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment.95.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.\u201d89.\u00a0\u00a0The Court sees no reason to depart from the Chamber\u2019s conclusions. Moreover, it observes that the report of the CPT\u2019s last visit to Bulgaria and its public statement of 2015 mention that the poor conditions of detention noted in Sofia Prison persist (see paragraphs 79 and 80 above).90.\u00a0\u00a0Like the Chamber, the Court considers that the applicant\u2019s conditions of detention taken in conjunction with the restrictive regime under which he is serving his life sentence and the length of the prison term (since 1999), have subjected him to an ordeal exceeding the suffering inherent in the execution of a prison sentence and amount to inhuman and degrading treatment.91.\u00a0\u00a0There was therefore a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 AND 3 (c) OF THE CONVENTION92.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged that he had not been assisted by a lawyer for the first few days of his detention. He relied on Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c), which reads as follows:Article 6\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0In the determination ... of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by a ... tribunal ...3.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:...(c)\u00a0\u00a0to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require ...\u201d93.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.A.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber judgment94.\u00a0\u00a0Having reiterated the principles emerging from the Court\u2019s case-law concerning legal assistance,\u00a0the Chamber considered that a distinction should be made between the present case and that of Dayanan v. Turkey (no.\u00a07377\/03, 13 October 2009) inasmuch as, unlike Turkish legislation at the material time, the relevant Bulgarian legislation did not restrict the right of detainees to be assisted by lawyers of their choosing from the time of their arrest.\u00a0However, the Chamber noted that the applicant had not actually benefited from this legal safeguard for the first three days of his detention, but stated that it was unable to determine whether that situation had been due to the authorities\u2019 acting mala fide or the applicant\u2019s own passivity.95.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber lastly concluded that the fairness of the proceedings had not been infringed, for the following reasons: (i) there was no indication in the file that the applicant had been questioned during the first three days of his detention; (ii) all his interrogations had taken place after he had been formally charged on 6 October 1999, in the presence of a lawyer; (iii) no other investigative measure involving the applicant had been implemented during that initial period of detention; (iv) the applicant had confessed to the offences a few days later, when he had been assisted by a lawyer of his choosing and had known that that confession could be used in evidence against him in support of a possible conviction; (v) his conviction had been based not solely on that confession but on a whole body of consistent evidence; (vi) the applicant had amply benefited from his right to defend himself with a lawyer\u2019s assistance and the domestic courts had delivered reasoned judgments (see paragraphs 113-116 of the Chamber judgment).B.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant96.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant invited the Grand Chamber to conclude that there had been a violation of Article 6 on the grounds that he had not been assisted by a lawyer while in police custody from 3 to 6 October 1999 at noon.97.\u00a0\u00a0He submitted that he had made several requests between 3 and 6\u00a0October 1999 to consult a lawyer but that the authorities had rejected them. He stated that he had been questioned during that time, and maintained that his allegations were not ill-founded. He alleged that it would have been quite illogical for the authorities not to attempt to question him during that time, and the lack of any written trace of those interrogations corroborated his allegation that he had been pressured by the investigators to confess.98.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that the fact that he had remained silent when questioned on 6 and 12 October 1999 could not be deemed decisive. He explained that he had not had an opportunity to consult the lawyers before the questioning or to obtain guidance from them. That was also why the fact that he had been assisted by a lawyer of his choosing when he had confessed on 21 October 1999 could not be held against him. The lawyers\u2019 presence during those interrogations did not mean that they had provided him with any effective assistance.99.\u00a0\u00a0Finally, the applicant affirmed that the right to legal assistance laid down in Article 6 \u00a7 3 (c) was autonomous from the requirement of a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 \u00a7 1. A finding of a violation or no violation of that autonomous right in the present case depended solely on the answer to the following question: were there any reasons justifying the restriction of his access to a lawyer while in police custody? If there were no such reasons, the fact that the conviction had not been exclusively based on the applicant\u2019s confession and the fact that he had had the effective assistance of one or more lawyers for the rest of the criminal proceedings were of no consequence in relation to Article 6 \u00a7 3 (c).2.\u00a0\u00a0The Government100.\u00a0\u00a0The Government invited the Grand Chamber to follow the Chamber\u2019s example by declaring that in the instant case there had been no violation of the relevant provisions of the Convention.101.\u00a0\u00a0They observed that under domestic legislation the applicant had been entitled to legal assistance as of the time of his arrest, and that it had been the police officers\u2019 legal duty to inform him of that right. The Government affirmed that in the absence of any proof to the contrary, that obligation had been honoured. In any event the applicant\u2019s allegations themselves indicated that he had been aware that domestic legislation entitled him to legal assistance.102.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, there was no evidence to corroborate the applicant\u2019s allegations that while in police custody he had asked to speak to a lawyer and his request had been refused by the authorities. Domestic legislation at the material time had not provided for the preparation of written documents recording the detainee\u2019s wish to consult a lawyer or his waiver of that right. Furthermore, the applicant had not, at any stage in the criminal proceedings before the domestic courts, raised his complaint concerning the absence of a lawyer during his time in police custody.103.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further submitted that there was no evidence to support the applicant\u2019s allegation that he had been questioned in police custody before being charged. At the hearing before the Grand Chamber the Government added that even supposing such a conversation or interrogation had taken place while the applicant was in police custody, it would have been conducted informally and could not have had any impact on the course of the criminal proceedings. At no stage in the proceedings had the authorities referred to any statements given by the applicant between 3 and 6\u00a0October 1999 at noon. Furthermore, his conduct during that period had not been taken into account in the ensuing criminal proceedings. During that time the applicant had been arrested, transferred to Burgas, taken to the Burgas detention facility and been subjected to medical examinations. At no stage in the domestic proceedings had he alleged that he had been questioned in police custody, and his observations on the subject before the Court had been inconsistent, contradictory and lacking in detail.104.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Government observed that the right to legal assistance as secured under Article 6 \u00a7 3 (c) was one of the aspects of the right to a fair criminal trial guaranteed by Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. They therefore submitted that the Court should seek to establish whether the overall fairness of the criminal proceedings in the present case had been affected by the fact that the applicant had not had the assistance of a lawyer while in police custody. The Government invited the Grand Chamber to uphold the Chamber\u2019s finding that the criminal proceedings in the applicant\u2019s case had generally been fair. He had been assisted by lawyers of his choosing, a body of evidence had been gathered and the case had been scrutinised by courts at three levels of jurisdiction, which had addressed the arguments put forward by the defence. No statement by the applicant or other piece of evidence that might have been used as a basis for his conviction had been gathered during his time in police custody without a lawyer.3.\u00a0\u00a0Third-party submissions105.\u00a0\u00a0In its observations to the Grand Chamber, the Association for the Prevention of Torture emphasised that making legal assistance available as soon as a suspect was detained was one of the fundamental safeguards for the fairness of criminal proceedings. In its case-law the Court had found violations of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c) where confessions obtained during detention in the absence of a lawyer had subsequently been used to convict the person in question (citing Salduz v. Turkey [GC], no. 36391\/02, ECHR\u00a02008), but also where the detainees had opted to remain silent (citing Dayanan v. Turkey, cited above) or to deny their involvement in the offences with which they were charged (citing Ye\u015filkaya v. Turkey, no.\u00a059780\/00, 8 December 2009). The bodies responsible for human rights protection within the United Nations system had also emphasised the importance of legal assistance from the first few hours of detention.106.\u00a0\u00a0Legal assistance at that early stage in criminal proceedings, even before the initial questioning, was essential in order to safeguard an arrested suspect\u2019s right not to incriminate himself where he had not been informed of the charges against him. Legal assistance also helped guarantee the exercise of the other fundamental rights of the accused, such as those secured under Article 5 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 of the Convention. Thus, even if the detainee made no statement, the mere absence of a lawyer during the first few hours of detention was detrimental to the fairness of proceedings. That was particularly true in cases where the allegations were extremely serious and where the detainee was in a particularly vulnerable position.107.\u00a0\u00a0With reference to various European, national and international legal instruments, the third party pointed out that it was widely accepted that an effective right of access to a lawyer required the following: the accused had to be informed in advance of his right to speak to a defence lawyer; access to the lawyer had to be provided as soon as the person was arrested, and at all events before the initial police questioning; the lawyer had to be able to perform all the services necessary for his work, such as being able to hold private talks with his client, discuss all the facts of the case, be present during questioning, put questions and ask for clarifications.108.\u00a0\u00a0The third party reminded the Grand Chamber of the approach used by the Chamber in the case of Leonid Lazarenko v. Ukraine (no. 22313\/04, \u00a7\u00a057, 28 October 2010), in which the right to a fair trial had been found to have been irretrievably prejudiced by the fact that a confession obtained without access to a lawyer had been used for a conviction, even if they had not been the sole basis for it.109.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the third party observed that even if a refusal by the authorities to allow the suspect to speak to a lawyer at the beginning of his detention had not impaired the overall fairness of the proceedings, such a situation could nevertheless amount to a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 3 (c).C.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles(a)\u00a0\u00a0Applicability of Article 6 in its criminal aspect110.\u00a0\u00a0The protections afforded by Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 apply to a person subject to a \u201ccriminal charge\u201d, within the autonomous Convention meaning of that term. A \u201ccriminal charge\u201d exists from the moment that an individual is officially notified by the competent authority of an allegation that he has committed a criminal offence, or from the point at which his situation has been substantially affected by actions taken by the authorities as a result of a suspicion against him (see Deweer v. Belgium, 27 February 1980, \u00a7\u00a7 42-46, Series A no. 35; Eckle v. Germany, 15 July 1982, \u00a7 73, Series A no. 51; McFarlane v. Ireland [GC], no. 31333\/06, \u00a7 143, 10 September 2010; and, more recently, Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos.\u00a050541\/08 and 3 others, \u00a7 249, ECHR 2016).111.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, for example, a person arrested on suspicion of having committed a criminal offence (see, among other authorities, Heaney and McGuinness v. Ireland, no. 34720\/97, \u00a7 42, ECHR 2000\u2011XII, and Brusco v.\u00a0France, no. 1466\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 47-50, 14 October 2010), a suspect questioned about his involvement in acts constituting a criminal offence (see Aleksandr Zaichenko v. Russia, no. 39660\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 41-43, 18 February 2010; Yankov and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 4570\/05, \u00a7 23, 23 September 2010; and Ibrahim and Others, cited above, \u00a7 296) and a person who has been formally charged, under a procedure set out in domestic law, with a criminal offence (see, among many other authorities, P\u00e9lissier and Sassi v. France [GC], no.\u00a025444\/94, \u00a7 66, ECHR 1999\u2011II, and Pedersen and Baadsgaard v.\u00a0Denmark [GC], no. 49017\/99, \u00a7 44, ECHR 2004\u2011XI) can all be regarded as being \u201ccharged with a criminal offence\u201d and claim the protection of Article 6 of the Convention. It is the actual occurrence of the first of the aforementioned events, regardless of their chronological order, which triggers the application of Article 6 in its criminal aspect.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The right to legal assistance and the overall fairness of the criminal proceedings112.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the right of everyone charged with a criminal offence to be effectively defended by a lawyer, assigned officially if need be, as guaranteed by Article 6 \u00a7 3 (c), is one of the fundamental features of a fair trial (see Salduz, cited above, \u00a7 51, and Dvorski v. Croatia [GC], no. 25703\/11, \u00a7 76, ECHR 2015). Prompt access to a lawyer constitutes an important counterweight to the vulnerability of suspects in police custody, provides a fundamental safeguard against coercion and ill-treatment of suspects by the police, and contributes to the prevention of miscarriages of justice and the fulfilment of the aims of Article 6, notably equality of arms between the investigating or prosecuting authorities and the accused (see Salduz, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 53\u201154, and Ibrahim and Others, cited above, \u00a7 255).113.\u00a0\u00a0Article 6 \u00a7 3 (c) does not therefore secure an autonomous right but must be read and interpreted in the light of the broader requirement of fairness of criminal proceedings, considered as a whole, as guaranteed by Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. In particular, compliance with the requirements of a fair trial must be examined in each case with regard to the development of the proceedings as a whole and not on the basis of an isolated consideration of one particular aspect or one particular incident, although it cannot be ruled out that a specific factor may be so decisive as to enable the fairness of the trial to be assessed at an earlier stage in the proceedings (see Ibrahim and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 250 and 251). Article\u00a06 \u00a7 3 (c) leaves to the Contracting States the choice of the means of ensuring that it is secured in their judicial system, the Court\u2019s task being only to ascertain whether the method they have chosen is consistent with the requirements of a fair trial (see Salduz, cited above, \u00a7 51).114.\u00a0\u00a0Like the other guarantees of Article 6, the right to legal assistance is applicable from the moment that a \u201ccriminal charge\u201d exists within the meaning of this Court\u2019s case-law (see paragraphs 110 and 111 above) and may therefore be relevant during pre-trial proceedings if and in so far as the fairness of the trial is likely to be seriously prejudiced by an initial failure to observe it (see Imbrioscia v. Switzerland, 24 November 1993, \u00a7 36, Series\u00a0A no.\u00a0275; Dvorski, cited above, \u00a7 76; and Ibrahim and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0253).(c)\u00a0\u00a0Waiver of the right to legal assistance115.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that neither the letter nor the spirit of Article\u00a06 of the Convention prevents a person from waiving of his own free will, either expressly or tacitly, the entitlement to the guarantees of a fair trial. That also applies to the right to legal assistance (see, among other authorities, Dvorski, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 100 and 101, and Sakhnovskiy v.\u00a0Russia [GC], no.\u00a021272\/03, \u00a7 90, 2 November 2010). However, if it is to be effective for Convention purposes, such a waiver must be established in an unequivocal manner and be attended by minimum safeguards commensurate to its importance. Such a waiver need not be explicit, but it must be voluntary and constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of a right (see Pishchalnikov v. Russia, no. 7025\/04, \u00a7 77, 24 September 2009, and paragraph 119 below). Before an accused can be said to have implicitly, through his conduct, waived an important right under Article 6, it must be shown that he could reasonably have foreseen what the consequences of his conduct would be (Pishchalnikov, cited above, \u00a7 77 in fine). Moreover, the waiver must not run counter to any important public interest (see H\u00e5kansson and Sturesson v. Sweden, 21 February 1990, \u00a7 66, Series A no. 171-A, and Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no. 56581\/00, \u00a7 86, ECHR\u00a02006\u2011II).(d)\u00a0\u00a0Temporary restriction of the access to a lawyer for \u201ccompelling reasons\u201d116.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also reiterates that access to a lawyer during the investigation phase may be temporarily restricted where there are \u201ccompelling reasons\u201d for doing so. In paragraph 55 of its Salduz judgment (cited above), the Court held as follows concerning the restriction of the access to a lawyer for \u201ccompelling reasons\u201d during detention in police custody:\u201c... the Court finds that in order for the right to a fair trial to remain sufficiently \u2018practical and effective\u2019 ... Article 6 \u00a7 1 requires that, as a rule, access to a lawyer should be provided as from the first interrogation of a suspect by the police, unless it is demonstrated in the light of the particular circumstances of each case that there are compelling reasons to restrict this right. Even where compelling reasons may exceptionally justify denial of access to a lawyer, such restriction \u2013 whatever its justification \u2013 must not unduly prejudice the rights of the accused under Article 6 ... The rights of the defence will in principle be irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating statements made during police interrogation without access to a lawyer are used for a conviction.\u201d117.\u00a0\u00a0In its recent judgment in the case of Ibrahim and Others (cited above), the Court specified and fleshed out the criteria laid down in the Salduz judgment. It stated, in particular, that restrictions on access to legal advice were permitted only in exceptional circumstances, must be of a temporary nature and must be based on an individual assessment of the particular circumstances of the case. Where a respondent Government have convincingly demonstrated the existence of an urgent need to avert serious adverse consequences for life, liberty or physical integrity in a given case, this can amount to compelling reasons to restrict access to legal advice for the purposes of Article 6 of the Convention. In such circumstances, there is a pressing duty on the authorities to protect the rights of potential or actual victims under Articles 2 and 3 and Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention in particular. When assessing whether compelling reasons have been demonstrated, it is important to ascertain whether the decision to restrict legal advice had a basis in domestic law and whether the scope and content of any restrictions on legal advice were sufficiently circumscribed by law so as to guide operational decision-making by those responsible for applying them (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 258 and 259).118.\u00a0\u00a0The Court went on to point out that the absence of \u201ccompelling reasons\u201d for restricting access to a lawyer did not lead in itself to a finding of a violation of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention (ibid., \u00a7 262). In the absence of \u201ccompelling\u00a0reasons\u201d, the Court must apply a very strict scrutiny to its fairness assessment: the Government\u2019s failure to point to any compelling reasons weighs heavily in the balance when assessing the overall fairness of the trial and may tip the balance in favour of finding a breach of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c). The onus will then be on the Government to demonstrate convincingly why, exceptionally and in the specific circumstances of the case, the overall fairness of the trial was not irretrievably prejudiced by the restriction on access to legal advice (ibid., \u00a7\u00a0265). Where, on the contrary, compelling reasons for restricting access to a lawyer have been established, a holistic assessment of the entirety of the proceedings must be conducted to determine whether they were \u201cfair\u201d for the purposes of Article 6 \u00a7 1 (ibid., \u00a7 264).(e)\u00a0\u00a0The right to be informed of the right to legal assistance119.\u00a0\u00a0In Ibrahim and Others (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 272-273), the Court also found that it was inherent in the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to silence and the right to legal assistance that a person \u201ccharged with a criminal offence\u201d for the purposes of Article 6 had the right to be notified of these rights. Consequently, Article 6 \u00a7 3 (c) of the Convention must be interpreted as also safeguarding the right of persons charged with an offence to be informed immediately of their right to legal assistance, irrespective of their age or specific situation and regardless of whether they are represented by an officially assigned lawyer or a lawyer of their own choosing. Moreover, respect for that right may well influence the validity of any waiver of the right to legal assistance (see paragraph 115 above).(f)\u00a0\u00a0Relevant factors for the assessment of the overall fairness of proceedings120.\u00a0\u00a0Since the fairness of criminal proceedings is assessed in each case with regard to the conduct of the proceedings as a whole, the Court set out a non-exhaustive list in Ibrahim and Others, cited above, \u00a7 274, of factors to be taken into account, where appropriate, in order to assess the impact of procedural failings at the pre-trial stage on the overall fairness of the criminal proceedings. Those factors are as follows:(a)\u00a0\u00a0whether the applicant was particularly vulnerable, for example by reason of his age or mental capacity;(b)\u00a0\u00a0the legal framework governing the pre-trial proceedings and the admissibility of evidence at trial, and whether it was complied with; where an exclusionary rule applied, it is particularly unlikely that the proceedings as a whole would be considered unfair;(c)\u00a0\u00a0whether the applicant had the opportunity to challenge the authenticity of the evidence and oppose its use;(d)\u00a0\u00a0the quality of the evidence and whether the circumstances in which it was obtained cast doubt on its reliability or accuracy, taking into account the degree and nature of any compulsion;(e)\u00a0\u00a0where evidence was obtained unlawfully, the unlawfulness in question and, where it stems from a violation of another Convention Article, the nature of the violation found;(f)\u00a0\u00a0in the case of a statement, the nature of the statement and whether it was promptly retracted or modified;(g)\u00a0\u00a0the use to which the evidence was put, and in particular whether the evidence formed an integral or significant part of the probative evidence upon which the conviction was based, and the strength of the other evidence in the case;(h)\u00a0\u00a0whether the assessment of guilt was performed by professional judges or lay jurors, and in the case of the latter the content of any jury directions;(i)\u00a0\u00a0the weight of the public interest in the investigation and punishment of the particular offence in issue; and(j)\u00a0\u00a0other relevant procedural safeguards afforded by domestic law and practice.2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles to the instant case(a)\u00a0\u00a0Starting-point for the application of Article 6 in the present case121.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court observes that the applicant had been wanted by the investigating authorities and the police since the beginning of July 1999, when his arrest had been ordered on the grounds that he was suspected of having committed armed robbery and two murders and that he had been on the run for almost three months (see paragraph 13 above). The Court, however, considers that the date of the applicant\u2019s arrest by the police on 3 October 1999 should be taken as the starting-point for the application of the safeguards set out in Article 6 of the Convention. The arrest was based on suspicions that the applicant had committed criminal offences, and substantially affected the applicant\u2019s situation by enabling the authorities to conduct investigative measures in which he participated. It was therefore on 3 October 1999 that the right to legal assistance provided for in Article 6 \u00a7 3 (c) became applicable in the present case.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Whether the applicant waived his right to legal assistance122.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the lack of legal assistance for the applicant while in police custody was a limitation which did not follow from domestic law, since Bulgarian legislation authorised him to have access to a lawyer as of the time of his arrest, on 3 October 1999 (see paragraph 59 above). Thus, if the applicant had asked for leave to speak to a lawyer on 3, 4, 5 and 6\u00a0October 1999 (before 12 noon), the authorities would have been under a legal obligation to grant that request.123.\u00a0\u00a0The parties disagree on whether the applicant requested contact with a lawyer (see paragraphs 97 and 102 above). There is nothing in the file to corroborate the applicant\u2019s assertion that he submitted such a request. At the material time Bulgarian legislation did not yet require a detainee\u2019s request to consult a lawyer or his waiver of that right to be recorded in writing (see paragraphs 60-62 above).124.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that in order to assess this evidence, it adopts the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d, but adds that such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see, among many other authorities, Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7\u00a0161 in\u00a0fine, Series A no. 25). The Court finds it unfortunate that the applicant\u2019s first three days of detention were not properly documented so as to avoid any doubts as to whether the applicant did ask for a lawyer or not (see, mutatis mutandis, Dvorski, cited above, \u00a7 105 in fine). Consequently, several years on from the events at issue and in the absence of any prima facie evidence, the Court is not in a position to ascertain whether the applicant did in fact request a consultation with a lawyer.125.\u00a0\u00a0The Court must nevertheless seek to establish whether in the particular circumstances of the case, the lack of objective evidence that the applicant requested legal assistance while in police custody might point to an implicit waiver of that right.126.\u00a0\u00a0In that regard the Court observes that in a legal system such as that which was in force in Bulgaria at the material time, in which the assistance of a lawyer during detention in police custody requires an express request from the suspect, it is essential that the latter be promptly informed of that right so as to enable him to rely on it (see paragraph 119 above). This is especially important where, as in the present case, the accused is suspected of serious offences and is liable to a heavy penalty. It is in the face of the heaviest penalties that respect for the right to a fair trial must be ensured to the highest possible degree by democratic societies (see Salduz, cited above, \u00a7\u00a054). That raises the question whether the applicant was duly informed of his right to legal assistance as of the time of his arrest, as domestic law in fact provided (see paragraph 59 above).127.\u00a0\u00a0In their observations and at the hearing, the Government, with reference to the relevant provisions of domestic law requiring the authorities to inform persons charged with a criminal offence of their rights (see paragraph 101 above), submitted that the applicant had received that information just after his arrest. Yet the case file contains no written trace of such a measure and the Government have not supported their allegation with any further evidence. The Court can only note that the order for the applicant\u2019s detention, which mentioned his right to legal assistance, had not been signed by him and that there is no evidence to show that he was issued with a copy of the order after his arrest (see paragraphs 13 and 14 above). It must therefore be assumed that he was never properly served with the order. As a result, the applicant was not verifiably informed of his procedural rights before the date on which he was charged, that is to say 6 October 1999 (see paragraph 21 above).128.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the receipt of such information by the accused person is one of the guarantees enabling him to exercise his defence rights and allowing the authorities to ensure, in particular, that any waiver by the accused of the right to legal assistance is voluntary, knowing and intelligent. That information therefore guarantees the effective possibility of exercising that right and \u2013 moreover \u2013 the validity of any waiver under the Convention (see paragraphs 115 and 119 above). Accordingly, even supposing that the applicant did not expressly request the assistance of a lawyer while in police custody, as provided in Bulgarian law at the material time, he cannot be deemed to have implicitly waived his right to legal assistance, since he had not promptly received such information after his arrest. His right to legal assistance was therefore restricted.(c)\u00a0\u00a0Whether there were \u201ccompelling reasons\u201d to restrict access to a lawyer129.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that restrictions on access to a lawyer for \u201ccompelling\u00a0reasons\u201d are permitted only in exceptional circumstances, must be of a temporary nature and must be based on an individual assessment of the particular circumstances of the case (see paragraph 117 above).130.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Government mentioned no such exceptional circumstances, and it is not the Court\u2019s task to assess of its own motion whether they existed in the present case. It therefore sees no \u201ccompelling\u00a0reason\u201d which could have justified restricting the applicant\u2019s access to a lawyer while he was in police custody: there were no allegations of imminent danger to the lives, physical integrity or security of other persons (see, to converse effect, Ibrahim and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0276). Furthermore, domestic legislation on access to a lawyer during detention in police custody did not explicitly lay down any exceptions to the application of that right (see paragraphs 59 and 64 above). It would appear that the events in the instant case correspond to a practice on the part of the authorities which has also been severely criticised by the CPT (see the CPT\u2019s 2015 public statement, paragraph 80 above).131.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes in that connection that such a practice on the part of the authorities would be difficult to reconcile with the rule of law, which is expressly mentioned in the Preamble to the Convention and is inherent in all its Articles (see Stafford v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.\u00a046295\/99, \u00a763, ECHR 2002-IV).(d)\u00a0\u00a0Whether the overall fairness of the proceedings was ensured132.\u00a0\u00a0The Court must seek to ascertain whether the absence of a lawyer while the applicant was in police custody had the effect of irretrievably prejudicing the overall fairness of the criminal proceedings against him. The lack of \u201ccompelling reasons\u201d in the present case requires the Court to conduct a very strict scrutiny of the fairness of the proceedings. It is incumbent on the Government to demonstrate convincingly that the applicant nonetheless had a fair trial (see paragraph 118 above).133.\u00a0\u00a0In that connection, the Government referred to the following circumstances: the applicant had not been formally questioned in the absence of a lawyer during his time in police custody; no statement that the applicant might have made during that time had been taken into account or subsequently used in evidence against him; his conduct while in police custody had not been taken into account by the prosecuting authorities or the relevant courts; he had at no stage complained to the authorities of having been forced to confess while in police custody; he had benefited from a wide range of procedural safeguards during criminal proceedings which had had all the attributes of a fair trial (see paragraph 103 above).134.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the parties disagree on whether the applicant was questioned in the absence of a lawyer over the period from 3 to 6\u00a0October 1999. Drawing on the absence of any document mentioning this point, the Government submitted that even supposing a conversation or interrogation had taken place while the applicant was in police custody, it would have been conducted informally and could not have had any impact on the course of the criminal proceedings (see paragraph 103 above). The applicant, for his part, stated before the Grand Chamber that he had been questioned and that it would have been illogical for the authorities to have missed such an opportunity to obtain further evidence (see paragraph\u00a097 above).135.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes in that connection that the version of events set out by the applicant during the proceedings before it has changed as the case had unfolded. In his application to the Court the applicant was very vague on this subject. It was not until he submitted his memorial before the Grand Chamber that he provided a number of more specific details, affirming, for example, that he had made statements while in police custody, and disclosing the content of those statements and the name of the lawyer whom he had asked to contact. The Court also observes that the applicant did not mention his lack of legal assistance while in police custody in the proceedings before the Burgas Court of Appeal (see paragraph 34 above) and that his appeal on points of law referred only marginally to the absence of a lawyer on 4 October 1999 in the context of a separate plea relating to the exclusion of evidence obtained in the presence of his officially assigned lawyer (see paragraph 42 above). Moreover, whereas the handwritten statement of his presumed accomplice, A.S., dated 3 October 1999, was included in the case file (see paragraph 20 above), there is no prima facie evidence for the Court to conclude that the applicant was formally or informally questioned while in police custody.136.\u00a0\u00a0Be that as it may, the Court attaches decisive importance to the fact that during that period of about three days no evidence capable of being used against the applicant was obtained and included in the case file. No statement was taken from the applicant. No evidence in the file indicates that the applicant was involved in any other investigative measures over that period, such as an identification parade or biological sampling. Furthermore, the applicant did not personally allege before the Court that the domestic courts had possessed evidence presented during that period and used it at the trial in order to secure his conviction.137.\u00a0\u00a0It should be emphasised here that the domestic law and the domestic courts\u2019 case-law provided for the exclusion of evidence obtained in a manner incompatible with the rules of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 68 above). In the applicant\u2019s case, because he was liable to a life sentence, legal assistance during questioning was also a sine qua non for the admissibility in evidence at the trial of any statement on his part (see paragraph 65 above).138.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, unlike in the cases of John Murray v. the United Kingdom (8 February 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011I) and Averill v. the United Kingdom (no. 36408\/97, ECHR 2000\u2011VI) the failure of the accused to make any statement would have had no impact on the ensuing stages of the criminal proceedings. The applicant could even have benefited from remaining silent if he had not opted to confess at a subsequent stage in the proceedings, when he had already secured the assistance of a lawyer of his choosing.139.\u00a0\u00a0On 21 October 1999, two weeks after he had been formally charged, the applicant voluntarily confessed (see paragraphs 21 and\u00a024 above). In assessing the voluntary nature of that confession, the Court has regard to the fact that the applicant had already been questioned on two occasions, on 6 and 12 October 1999, with the assistance of a lawyer, and that he had remained silent on both those occasions (see paragraphs 21 and 23\u00a0above). During both these interrogations, and when he confessed on 21\u00a0October 1999, he had already been informed of his procedural rights, particularly the right not to incriminate himself (see paragraph 21 above). At that time, moreover, he was in receipt of the advice and assistance of a lawyer of his choosing (see paragraphs 23 and 24 above).140.\u00a0\u00a0It is not disputed that only the confession made by the applicant on 21\u00a0October 1999 was used in order to convict him. No causal link was ever posited, either before the domestic courts or before the Court, between the absence of a lawyer from 3 to 6 October 1999 and the applicant\u2019s confession two weeks after the end of that period in the presence of a lawyer of his choosing (see, mutatis mutandis, G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no.\u00a022978\/05, \u00a7\u00a0180, ECHR 2010). Consequently, the absence of a lawyer during the applicant\u2019s time in police custody in no way prejudiced his right not to incriminate himself.141.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the applicant actively participated at all stages in the criminal proceedings: he subsequently retracted his initial statements, presenting a different version of events, and his defence lawyers obtained exculpatory evidence and contested the incriminating evidence (see paragraphs 27, 29, 31, 35 and 42 above).142.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the applicant\u2019s conviction was not based exclusively on his confession of 21 October 1999, which he made in the presence of the lawyer of his choosing, but on a whole body of consistent evidence, including the statements of a large number of witnesses who had been questioned during the assessment of the case, the results of ballistic, technical and accountants\u2019 reports and medical and psychiatric opinions, and also on the physical and documentary evidence gathered (see paragraphs\u00a026, 33, 36-41 and 43 above).143.\u00a0\u00a0The case was examined at three levels of jurisdiction, by a regional court, a court of appeal and the Supreme Court of Cassation. All these courts gave due consideration to the evidence available, including the statements of the many witnesses questioned during the assessment of the case, the results of the ballistic, technical and accountants\u2019 reports and the medical and psychiatric opinions, as well as the physical and documentary evidence gathered. Their decisions, which were properly reasoned in factual and legal terms, also duly assessed whether the applicant\u2019s procedural rights had been respected (see paragraphs 31-44 above).144.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of these findings, the Court considers that the Government provided relevant and sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the overall fairness of the criminal proceedings against the applicant had not been irretrievably prejudiced by the absence of legal assistance while he had been in police custody, from 3 to 6 October 1999.(e)\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion145.\u00a0\u00a0In conclusion, there has been no violation of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3\u00a0(c) of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 46 OF THE CONVENTION146.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant invited the Court to indicate to the Government, as it had done in the case of Harakchiev and Tolumov (cited above, \u00a7 280), measures for the execution of a finding of violation of Article 3 of the Convention owing to the material conditions of detention and the regime applicable to life prisoners.147.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not state a position on that matter.148.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant part of Article 46 of the Convention reads as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.2.\u00a0\u00a0The final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution ...\u201d149.\u00a0\u00a0Under Article 46 the Contracting Parties have undertaken to abide by the final judgments of the Court in cases to which they are parties, execution being supervised by the Committee of Ministers. It follows, inter alia, that a judgment in which the Court finds a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto imposes on the respondent State the legal obligation not just to pay those concerned the sums awarded by way of just satisfaction pursuant to Article 41 of the Convention but also to choose, subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the general and\/or, if appropriate, individual measures which it considers appropriate to incorporate into domestic law in order to put an end to the violation found by the Court and to redress as far as possible the effects. It is primarily for the State concerned to choose, subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the means to be used under its domestic law to comply with that obligation. However, with a view to helping the respondent State in that task, the Court may seek to indicate the type of individual and\/or general measures that might be taken in order to put an end to the situation it has found to exist (see, among other authorities, Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no.\u00a036760\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 254-255, ECHR 2012).150.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it set out the following recommendations in its Harakchiev and Tolumov judgment (cited above, \u00a7 280):\u201cThe breach of Article 3 of the Convention found in the present case in relation to the regime and conditions of the applicants\u2019 detention flows in large part from the relevant provisions of the 2009 Execution of Punishments and Pre-Trial Detention Act and its implementing regulations ... It discloses a systemic problem that has already given rise to similar applications (see Chervenkov [v. Bulgaria, no.\u00a045358\/04], \u00a7\u00a7 50 and 69-70[, 27 November 2012], and Sabev [v. Bulgaria, no.\u00a027887\/06], \u00a7\u00a7 72 and 98\u201199[, 28 May 2013]), and may give rise to more such applications. The nature of the breach suggests that to execute this judgment properly, the respondent State would be required to reform, preferably by means of legislation, the legal framework governing the prison regime applicable to persons sentenced to life imprisonment with or without parole. That reform, invariably recommended by the CPT since 1999 ..., should entail (a) removing the automatic application of the highly restrictive prison regime currently applicable to all life prisoners for an initial period of at least five years, and (b) putting in place provisions envisaging that a special security regime can only be imposed \u2013 and maintained \u2013 on the basis of an individual risk assessment of each life prisoner, and applied for no longer than strictly necessary.\u201d151.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that in the present case it found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the applicant\u2019s conditions of detention taken in conjunction with his restrictive prison regime and the length of his period of imprisonment (see paragraphs 90 and 91 above). Those circumstances, as well as the applicable domestic legislation, are identical to those which led the Court to find a violation of Article 3 on account of the material conditions of detention and the prison regime in the Harakchiev and Tolumov judgment, cited above. It therefore considers it appropriate to reiterate the recommendations which it set out in paragraph\u00a0280 of that judgment concerning: (a) removing the automatic application of the special prison regime to life prisoners, and (b) putting in place provisions permitting the imposition of that regime on the basis of an individual risk assessment.V.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION152.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage153.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant clamed 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage sustained owing to his prison regime and his conditions of detention.154.\u00a0\u00a0The Government made no observations before the Grand Chamber on that matter.155.\u00a0\u00a0In its judgment of 20 October 2015 the Chamber awarded the applicant EUR 8,000 under this head.156.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicant sustained non-pecuniary damage owing to the poor conditions to which he was exposed in the custodial facilities in which he was held and the restrictive prison regime to which he was subject. Like the Chamber, the Court considers that he should be awarded EUR 8,000 under this head.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses157.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed EUR 2,160 in respect of lawyer\u2019s fees and 767\u00a0Bulgarian levs (BGN) in respect of the other costs and expenses incurred during the proceedings before the Chamber, as well as EUR 6,420 in respect of lawyer\u2019s fees, EUR 927.27 in respect of travel expenses and BGN\u00a01,929 in respect of other costs and expenses incurred during the proceedings before the Grand Chamber.158.\u00a0\u00a0The Government made no observations on that point.159.\u00a0\u00a0In its judgment the Chamber awarded the applicant EUR\u00a02,589.50 in respect of costs and expenses.160.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case-law, the Court considers the sum of EUR\u00a08,000 reasonable in respect of all the expenses incurred during the proceedings before the Chamber and the Grand Chamber, less EUR 2,952.52 received from the Council of Europe in respect of legal aid, and awards that sum to the applicant.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest161.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","29429":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION47.\u00a0\u00a0Relying on Article 6 of the Convention, the applicant complained that the domestic authorities had failed to protect her from repeated acts of domestic violence and to hold the perpetrator accountable.48.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it is master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case and it does not consider itself bound by the characterisation given by an applicant. A complaint is characterised by the facts alleged in it and not merely by the legal grounds or arguments relied on (see Guerra and Others v. Italy [GC], 19 February 1998, \u00a7 44, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-I). Therefore, having regard to the nature and the substance of the applicant\u2019s complaints in this particular case, the Court finds that they fall to be examined under Article 3 of the\u00a0Convention (see E.M. v. Romania, no. 43994\/05, \u00a7 51, 30 October 2012; and M.G. v. Turkey, no. 646\/10, \u00a7 62, 22 March 2016).Article 3 of the Convention reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility49.\u00a0\u00a0At the outset the Government maintained that the treatment to which the applicant had been subjected by N.C. had not attained the minimum level of severity necessary to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention. As regards the seriousness of the injuries sustained by the applicant and the effects of the treatment to which she had been subjected, the Government noted that forensic experts had established that the applicant had suffered minor bodily harm that had not constituted serious psychological or physical violence (contrast B. v. the Republic of Moldova, no.\u00a061382\/09, \u00a7 47, 16 July 2013) or repeated acts of violence over a short period of time (contrast Valiulien\u0117 v. Lithuania, no. 33234\/07, \u00a7 68, 26 March 2013). When assessing the severity of the violence inflicted upon the applicant in the current case, they asked the Court to take into account the fact that the domestic courts had established that the applicant herself had provoked the violent incidents and had considered that the acts complained about had not attained the minimum level of severity to be classed as criminal.50.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further contended that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. Firstly, she had failed to make use of the provisions of Law no. 217\/2003, which provided adequate protection for victims of domestic violence, since she had omitted to request the application of protective measures. Secondly, she had not filed a complaint with the courts against the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 29 September 2008, as provided by the Code of Criminal Procedure.51.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contested the above arguments and argued that domestic remedies had proven to be ineffective given the failure of the authorities to protect her and prevent her husband from inflicting further ill-treatment on her.52.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the arguments raised above are linked to the merits of the current case. The main issue with regard to the question of exhaustion of domestic remedies is inextricably linked to the question of their effectiveness in providing sufficient safeguards for the applicant against domestic violence. Accordingly, the Court joins these questions to the merits and will examine them under Article 3 of the Convention (see Opuz v. Turkey, no. 33401\/02, \u00a7 116, 9 June 2009).53.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds and must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant54. The applicant argued that the State had failed to put in place adequate measures to protect her from domestic violence and to prevent the recurrence of such violence. The authorities had been informed of N.C.\u2019s actions and her allegations had been supported by medical evidence. However, they had only sanctioned him with an administrative fine, which had had no effect on his behaviour. Therefore, the authorities\u2019 failure to respond adequately to her complaints, to conduct an effective investigation and apply sanctions with an actual deterrent effect, had put her at a constant risk of further ill-treatment. The tolerance shown by the authorities in the face of domestic violence had made her feel debased and helpless.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government55.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the domestic legal system had provided adequate protection for victims of domestic violence such as the applicant.56.\u00a0\u00a0They also stressed that the investigation of the applicant\u2019s complaints had been prompt, thorough and had been finalised by sanctioning the perpetrator with an administrative fine. Even if that type of fine was not considered a criminal sanction by the domestic law, it had been, however, put on the perpetrator\u2019s criminal record. Therefore, it could be concluded that the investigation in the current case had been in compliance with the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles57.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 1 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 3, imposes on the States positive obligations to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are protected against all forms of ill-treatment prohibited under Article 3, including where such treatment is administered by private individuals. The Court has also acknowledged the particular vulnerability of the victims of domestic violence and the need for active State involvement in their protection. Those positive obligations, which often overlap, consist of: (a) the obligation to take reasonable measures designed to prevent ill-treatment of which the authorities knew or ought to have known and (b) the (procedural) obligation to conduct effective official investigation where an individual raises an arguable claim of ill-treatment. For a positive obligation to arise, it must be established that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk of ill-treatment of an identified individual from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk (see \u0110or\u0111evi\u0107 v. Croatia, no.\u00a041526\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 138 and 139, ECHR 2012; and M. and M. v. Croatia, no.\u00a010161\/13, \u00a7 136, 3 September 2015). In addition,\u00a0the Court has held that States have a positive obligation to establish and apply effectively a system punishing all forms of domestic violence and to provide sufficient safeguards for the victims (see Opuz, cited above, \u00a7 145).58.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, under Article 19 of the Convention and under the principle that the Convention is intended to guarantee not theoretical or illusory, but practical and effective rights, the Court has to ensure that a State\u2019s obligation to protect the rights of those under its jurisdiction is adequately discharged (see Opuz, cited above, \u00a7 165).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the case59.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the instant case, the Court notes that the physical violence suffered by the applicant was documented in forensic medical reports as well as in police reports. The medical documents recorded that the applicant had sustained injuries on three occasions, requiring medical care for periods ranging from two to five days to a maximum of nine to ten days.60. The Government argued that the treatment to which the applicant had been subjected had not attained the minimum level of severity necessary to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention. However, the Court considers that the ill-treatment of the applicant, which on three occasions caused her physical injuries, combined with her feelings of fear and helplessness, was sufficiently serious to reach the required level of severity under Article 3 of the Convention and thus impose a positive obligation on the Government under this provision (see E.M. v. Romania, cited above, \u00a7\u00a057; and Milena Felicia Dumitrescu v. Romania, no. 28440\/07, \u00a7 54, 24\u00a0March\u00a02015).61.\u00a0\u00a0Therefore, the Court must next determine whether the national authorities have taken all reasonable measures to prevent the recurrence of the assaults against the applicant\u2019s physical integrity.62.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the authorities were well aware of N.C.\u2019s violent behaviour because the applicant, for over a period of almost one year \u2013 from 24 June 2007 to 11 April 2008 \u2013 had asked for their assistance by way of emergency calls to the police, formal criminal complaints and even petitions to the head of police. The complaints made by the applicant were always accompanied by medical documents proving the extent of the violence against her. Moreover, the findings of the medical documents have never been contested. The Court thus concludes that the Romanian authorities were under an obligation to act upon the applicant\u2019s complaints.63.\u00a0\u00a0 The criminal law in force at the relevant time in Romania punished the infliction of bodily harm and, moreover, provided for a harsher sentence for bodily harm committed against family members. Criminal investigations in such cases could be opened at the victim\u2019s request or of the authorities\u2019 own motion (see paragraph 35 above). In addition, Law no. 217\/2003 had additional regulations to ensure a minimum of protection for victims of domestic violence (see paragraph 36 above). The Court therefore considers that the applicant had at her disposal a legal framework allowing her to complain about the domestic violence and to seek the authorities\u2019 protection (see E.M. v. Romania, cited above, \u00a7 62).64.\u00a0The Court will now examine whether or not the domestic authorities\u2019 compliance with the relevant procedural rules, as well as the manner in which the criminal-law mechanisms were implemented in the instant case, were defective to the point of constituting a violation of the respondent State\u2019s positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention.65.\u00a0\u00a0On 3 August 2007 the applicant lodged an initial criminal complaint of bodily harm against N.C. but the investigation started with significant delays. More than one month later, after she had been assaulted again by her husband on two occasions, it was the applicant who was called in first by the police for questioning. Although she stressed in her statement of 11\u00a0September 2007 that her husband had also threatened to kill her, N.C. was questioned by the police only on 19 November 2007. The investigation concluded one month later that the crime of bodily harm had indeed been committed. However, since it had been provoked by the applicant, it had not been serious enough to require criminal sanctions, only an administrative fine.66.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the applicant\u2019s complaint against that decision was dismissed by the domestic courts. The Petro\u015fani District Court decided to acquit N.C. of all the charges of bodily harm, considering, along with the prosecutor, that he had been provoked by the applicant and that his acts were not so dangerous to society. The fact that one of the applicant\u2019s daughters had withdrawn her statement to the prosecutor, explaining that it had been given after threats by N.C., was not taken into consideration by the court. Despite the Government\u2019s statements to the contrary (see paragraph 50 above), the applicant also asked the domestic courts to order protective measures for her, specifically, to forbid N.C. from entering their apartment or coming near her (see paragraph 21 above). However, the courts did not respond to that request. Lastly, the only sanction imposed on N.C. was a slightly increased administrative fine. The Court observes that that measure did not have the deterrent effect necessary to be considered as a sufficient safeguard against further ill-treatment of the applicant in the current case because N.C. continued to assault her even after the adoption of such a measure by the prosecutor.67.\u00a0Regarding the criminal proceedings in the current case taken as a whole, the Court concludes with concern that both at the investigation level and before the courts the national authorities considered the acts of domestic violence as being provoked and regarded them as not being serious enough to fall within the scope of the criminal law. Moreover, the applicant was denied the services of a court\u2011appointed lawyer because the courts considered that legal representation for the victim was not necessary in such cases (see paragraph 22 above). On this point, the Court has held that in certain circumstances the State\u2019s procedural obligations to ensure the effective participation of the victims in the investigation of their complaints of ill-treatment may extend to the issues of providing effective access to free legal representation (see Savitskyy v. Ukraine, no. 38773\/05, \u00a7 117, 26 July 2012). The Court reiterates that it is not its task to take the place of the domestic courts and that it is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to resolve problems of interpretation of domestic legislation (see S\u00f6derman v. Sweden, no. 5786\/08, \u00a7 102, 12 November 2013). However, an approach such as the one taken by the authorities in the current case \u2013 where the existence of acts of domestic violence had not been contested \u2013 deprived the national legal framework of its purpose and was inconsistent with international standards with respect to violence against women and domestic violence in particular.68.\u00a0\u00a0The Government criticised the applicant for not making use of the provisions of Law no. 217\/2003. The Court notes that the applicant made use of the provisions of this law, but to no avail (see paragraph 27 above). However, the Court considers that what is at the heart of this case is the question of impunity for the acts of domestic violence, which is a matter to be addressed by the criminal courts (see Valiulien\u0117, cited above, \u00a7 71). The applicant made full use of the remedy provided by criminal procedure but the national authorities, although aware of her situation, failed to take appropriate measures to punish the offender and prevent further assaults.69.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court notes that the violence suffered by the applicant continued throughout 2008 and that the authorities continued to be inactive. In this connection, the Court points out that six more criminal complaints and requests for protection were lodged by the applicant with the competent authorities in the first part of 2008. Some of these attacks were documented in medical reports. However, no concrete measures were taken by the authorities and the applicant\u2019s complaints were dismissed for lack of evidence against N.C. or, again, for not reaching the level of severity required for criminal sanctions to be imposed.70.\u00a0\u00a0Therefore, having regard to the above findings as to the overall ineffectiveness of the remedies suggested by the Government in the current case, the Court also dismisses the Government\u2019s objection of non\u2011exhaustion of domestic remedies.71.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the manner in which the applicant\u2019s complaints were dealt with by the State\u2019s authorities did not provide her adequate protection against the acts of violence by her husband.There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 372.\u00a0Having regard to the particular circumstances of this case and the nature and substance of the applicant\u2019s complaints, the Court considered it appropriate to communicate of its own motion a complaint under Article\u00a014 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 3.Article 14 of the Convention reads as follows:\u201cThe enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility73.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint, which is linked to the one examined above, is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible (see M.G. v.\u00a0Turkey, cited above, \u00a7 111).B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions74.\u00a0In her observations on the admissibility and merits of the complaint the applicant submitted that she had been discriminated against on the basis of her gender and that the respondent State\u2019s domestic law failed to provide proper protection for the real victims of domestic violence.75.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contended that the applicant had failed to prove to the Court that the domestic authorities had discriminated against her because of her gender.76.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the general context of the issue of domestic violence in Romania, the Government submitted that a national strategy for preventing and combating domestic violence had been adopted and was periodically updated and that victims of domestic violence could find information on the website of the National Agency for Equal Opportunities for Women and Men. In addition, three booklets for professionals dealing with domestic violence had been published and one of them had been available on the website of the highest prosecutor\u2019s office since 2008. In addition, training had been provided for judges, prosecutors and police officers as part a project that took place between June 2014 and April 2016 to reinforce their capacity to prevent and combat domestic violence. The Government further noted that as of 2013 Romania had twenty centres for preventing and combating domestic violence nationwide, fifty-nine shelters for victims and three centres offering social services for the perpetrators of such violence. The Government also submitted that the number of incidents of domestic violence reported to the police had steadily increased in recent years, a trend which might imply that victims had more confidence in the authorities. The number of people indicted for crimes connected to domestic violence (homicide, bodily harm, abandoning the family and so forth) had increased from 1,080 in 2003 to 1,368 in 2015. In addition, training had been provided for judges, prosecutors and police officers as part of a project that took place between June 2014 and April 2016 to reinforce their capacity to prevent and combat domestic violence.77.\u00a0\u00a0The Government concluded by stating that the legal framework existing at the time of the events of the current case and the way it had developed subsequently, showed that national mechanisms for the protection of women from domestic violence were sufficient and that the domestic authorities were fulfilling their obligation to ensure effective protection for victims.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment78.\u00a0\u00a0 The Court has already held that failure by a State to protect women against domestic violence breaches their right to equal protection under the law and that this failure does not need to be intentional (see, for recent examples, T.M. and C.M. v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26608\/11, \u00a7 57, 28 January 2014, and M.G. v. Turkey, cited above, \u00a7 115).79.\u00a0When considering the definition and scope of discrimination against women, the Court has also found that it must have regard, in addition to the more general meaning of discrimination as determined in its case-law, to the provisions of more specialised legal instruments and the decisions of international legal bodies on the question of violence against women (see Opuz, cited above, \u00a7 185). In that context it must be stressed that the Istanbul Convention defines for its purposes violence against women as a form of discrimination against women (see paragraph 42 above).80.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the current case, the Court notes that the applicant\u2019s husband repeatedly subjected her to violence and allegedly threatened to kill her (see paragraphs 8, 9, 17 and 30 above) and that the authorities were well aware of what was going on (see paragraph 62 above).81.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also reiterates that it has concluded that the domestic authorities have deprived the national legal framework of its purpose by their finding that the applicant provoked the domestic violence against her, that the violence did not present a danger to society and therefore was not severe enough to require criminal sanctions, and by denying the applicant\u2019s request for a court-appointed lawyer. In doing so, the domestic authorities have also acted in a way that was inconsistent with international standards on violence against women and domestic violence in particular (see paragraph 67 above).82.\u00a0\u00a0The authorities\u2019 passivity in the present case is also apparent from their failure to consider any protective measures for the applicant, despite her repeated requests to the police, the prosecutor (see paragraphs 17 and 31 above) and the courts (see paragraph 21 above). Bearing in mind the particular vulnerability of victims of domestic violence, the Court considers that the authorities should have looked into the applicant\u2019s situation more thoroughly (compare T.M. and C.M. v. the Republic of Moldova, cited above, \u00a7 60).83.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the general approach to domestic violence in Romania, the Court notes that official statistics show that that type of violence is tolerated and perceived as normal by a majority of people and that a rather small number of reported incidents are followed by criminal investigations (see paragraph 37 above). Moreover, the number of victims of such violence has increased every year, the vast majority of them being women (see paragraphs 37 and 46 above). Official data shows that as of 2017 a limited number of shelters was available nationwide for victims but that eight counties had no such shelter at all (see paragraph 38 above). The Court notes that these considerations are in line with previous findings by the CEDAW Committee, which found in 2006 that the general population might not be sufficiently aware of the extensive legal and policy framework developed by Romania for the elimination of discrimination against women and that women themselves might not be aware of their rights. The Committee also expressed concern about the limited availability of protection and support services for victims, in particular in rural areas, about the limited information the Romanian Government was able to provide about the prevalence of domestic violence as well as about the insufficient implementation of the legislative and other measures adopted in the field (see paragraph 41 above).84.\u00a0The Government argued that the legal framework in the field of domestic violence provided effective protection for victims. However, the Court has already observed in the current case that the authorities failed to apply the relevant legal provisions (see paragraphs 66 and 68 above). The lack of effective implementation of the above-mentioned legal framework was also pointed out by the Court in E.M. v. Romania (cited above, \u00a7 70), a similar case to this one. Moreover, besides police statistics and a description of various activities, the Government failed to submit any data on monitoring the impact of those activities or the effects of implementing Law no. 217\/2003 on preventing and combating domestic violence or the national strategy for preventing and combating domestic violence.85.\u00a0\u00a0In the Court\u2019s opinion, the combination of the above factors demonstrates that the authorities did not fully appreciate the seriousness and extent of the problem of domestic violence in Romania and that their actions reflected a discriminatory attitude towards the applicant as a woman (see T.M. and C.M. v. the Republic of Moldova, cited above, \u00a7 62).86.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that there is prima facie evidence that domestic violence mainly affected women and that the general and discriminatory passivity of the authorities created a climate that was conducive to domestic violence (compare Opuz, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0198).87.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has established that the criminal-law system, as operated in the instant case, did not have an adequate deterrent effect capable of ensuring the effective prevention of unlawful acts by N.C. against the personal integrity of the applicant and thus violated her rights under Article 3 of the Convention (see paragraph 71 above).88.\u00a0\u00a0Bearing its above findings in mind (see paragraph 85 above), the Court considers that the violence suffered by the applicant can be regarded as gender-based violence, which is a form of discrimination against women. Despite the adoption by the Government of a law and a national strategy on preventing and combating domestic violence, which the Court appreciates, the overall unresponsiveness of the judicial system and the impunity enjoyed by aggressors, as found in the instant case (see also E.M. v.\u00a0Romania, cited above, \u00a7 69), indicated that there was an insufficient commitment to take appropriate action to address domestic violence.89.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention, read in conjunction with Article\u00a03 in the instant case.III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION90.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage91.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 50,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage. She stated that the continual acts of violence perpetrated by her husband had caused her physical and psychological trauma.92.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the claim, arguing that it was excessive and unsubstantiated.93.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant has undoubtedly suffered anguish and distress on account of the authorities\u2019 failure to take sufficient measures to prevent the acts of domestic violence perpetrated by her husband and to give him a deterrent punishment (see Opuz, cited above, \u00a7 210). Ruling on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 9,800 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses94.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not claim costs or expenses. Accordingly, the Court does not make any award under this head.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest95.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","29483":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION26.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the authorities had failed to provide him with adequate medical assistance. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties27.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that, as had been confirmed by the domestic courts, the applicant had been provided with adequate medical care. They stated that he had been under the supervision of various doctors, that he had regularly undergone necessary medical tests and had received the requisite medical treatment in full.28.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his claim. He submitted a medical report prepared on 26 October 2015 by the urologist who had been treating him for several years before his arrest. The report was based on the entire medical file submitted by the Government. The urologist concluded that the medical aid in detention had been deficient. Firstly he noted that, although the applicant\u2019s urinary condition had been worsening from the first weeks of his detention, it was not until December\u00a02008 that a urologist examined him for the first time. That examination, however, had not been thorough, as no endoscopy of the urinary bladder was performed. The treatment prescribed had been inadequate. Secondly, the doctor noted that the urinary inflammation developed by the applicant showed up shortcomings in the medical care, such as delays in changing the catheter. Lastly, the doctor also noted the lack of adequate post-operative care in December 2010 and the applicant\u2019s belated admission to the Urology Institute, which followed a massive blood loss.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility29.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles30.\u00a0\u00a0The applicable general principles are set out in the cases of Blokhin v.\u00a0Russia [GC] (no. 47152\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 135-40, ECHR 2016); Wenner v.\u00a0Germany (no. 62303\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 54-58, 1 September 2016); and Ivko (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a091\u201195).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case31.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes that the applicant\u2019s main contention was that he did not receive adequate medical treatment in respect of his urinary condition. The Government disagreed. Referring to the findings of the domestic courts, they insisted that the applicant had received proper medical assistance in detention.32.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it is not its task to rule on matters lying exclusively within the field of expertise of medical specialists and to establish whether an applicant in fact required a particular treatment or whether the choice of treatment methods appropriately reflected the applicant\u2019s needs (see Wenner, cited above \u00a7 58, Ukhan v. Ukraine, no.\u00a030628\/02, \u00a7 76, 18 December 2008; and Sergey Antonov, no. 40512\/13, \u00a7\u00a086, 22 October 2015). Being mindful of the vulnerability of applicants in detention, it is for the Government to provide credible and convincing evidence showing that the applicant concerned had received comprehensive and adequate medical care in detention (see Sergey Antonov, ibid.).33.\u00a0\u00a0The Court cannot subscribe to the conclusions of the domestic courts as regards the quality of the applicant\u2019s medical treatment, as their examination appears to have been limited in scope and rather formalistic. Essentially it was focused on one issue: whether or not there had been any refusals on the part of the authorities to provide the applicant with the prescribed treatment. The relevance of the doctors\u2019 decisions and the promptness thereof were not assessed. No expert opinions on the issue were taken into consideration.34.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that the events of December 2010 surrounding the applicant\u2019s profuse post-operative bleeding were not looked at by the domestic courts, as they occurred after the decision in the case had been delivered.35.\u00a0\u00a0Given these circumstances, the Court gives credence to the evidence from medical professionals submitted by the applicant, including the expert report of 12\u00a0October 2009 and the medical opinion of 26 October 2015. They contain a thorough in-depth analysis of the medical assistance rendered in detention and cover the entire period under examination. The medical professionals unanimously concluded that the patient\u2019s urinary problem had not been adequately addressed by the authorities. The Government failed to refute the experts\u2019 statements or even offer any meaningful comments on them.36.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the particular seriousness of the applicant\u2019s medical condition, the Court considers that the failure to subject him to an examination by a urologist between August 2007 and December 2008, and the inadequate post-operative care in December 2010 exposed him to prolonged mental and physical suffering that diminished his human dignity. The authorities\u2019 failure to provide him with the medical care he needed amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment for the purposes of Article\u00a03 of the Convention.37.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION38.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed that he had not had at his disposal an effective remedy whereby to complain about the lack of adequate medical assistance, as required under Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u00a0\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties39.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had had effective domestic remedies and that he had made use of them by raising his grievances before the national courts.40.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaint.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility41.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles42.\u00a0\u00a0For a summary of the relevant general principles see Litvinov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 32863\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 73-77, 22 March 2016.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case43.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has on many occasions found there to be a lack of effective domestic remedies in Russia through which to complain about the poor quality of medical treatment in detention (see, among many other authorities, Urazov v. Russia, no. 42147\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 66-70, 14\u00a0June 2016; Makshakov v. Russia, no. 52526\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 86-89, 24 May 2016; Litvinov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 78-81; Navalnyy and Yashin v. Russia, no.\u00a076204\/11, \u00a7 106, 4\u00a0December 2014; Gorbulya v. Russia, no. 31535\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 56-58, 6\u00a0March\u00a02014; Reshetnyak v. Russia, no. 56027\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 65-73, 8\u00a0January\u00a02013; and Koryak v. Russia, no. 24677\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 86-93, 13\u00a0November 2012). In the aforementioned cases the Court established that none of the legal avenues suggested by the Government, including a complaint to a court, constituted an effective remedy by means of which to prevent the alleged violations or halt their continuance, or to provide the applicant with adequate and sufficient redress for his or her complaints under Article 3 of the Convention.44.\u00a0\u00a0In the absence of any new arguments from the Government as regards the existence of effective remedies satisfying the requirements of Article 13 of the Convention in the present case, the Court cannot depart from its well-established case-law on the issue. It sees no legal avenues that would constitute an effective remedy for the applicant\u2019s complaints under Article 3 of the Convention. Accordingly, the Court finds that the applicant did not have at his disposal an effective domestic remedy, in breach of Article 13 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION45.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage46.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 100,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.47.\u00a0\u00a0The Government insisted that the applicant\u2019s rights had not been violated and submitted that, in any event, the claim was excessive.48.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, making its assessment on an equitable basis, awards the applicant EUR 15,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses49.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 15,000 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and the Court.50.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the claim was unsubstantiated.51.\u00a0\u00a0Taking into account the absence of any supporting documents, the Court rejects the claim in full.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest52.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","29595":"I.\u00a0\u00a0THE APPLICANT\u2019S ILL-TREATMENT BY ANOTHER INMATE51.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the prison authorities had not done enough to protect him from another prisoner who had assaulted him on 21\u00a0February 2012. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which provides as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions52.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had failed properly to exhaust domestic remedies as he had lodged his application with the Court before the conclusion of the criminal proceedings against the prisoner who had assaulted him.53.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that his complaint did not concern the criminal proceedings against that prisoner, but the prison authorities\u2019 failure to protect him from the assault by that prisoner. He had asked the prosecuting authorities to investigate that as well, but they had refused to open criminal proceedings in relation to any omissions by prison staff.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment54.\u00a0\u00a0The criminal proceedings against the other prisoner were not a remedy relating to the prison authorities\u2019 alleged failure to take adequate measures to protect the applicant. With respect to the latter complaint, the applicant used an available remedy: he complained to the prosecuting authorities, which refused to open criminal proceedings against prison staff, finding that none of them had committed a culpable omission in relation to the incident (see paragraph 34 above). The Government\u2019s objection that domestic remedies have not been exhausted must therefore be rejected.55.\u00a0\u00a0The complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article\u00a035 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on other grounds either. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions56.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the prison authorities had taken all reasonable steps to prevent violence between the applicant and the other prisoner. After the incident on 15 February 2012, a social worker had talked with both of them, and with the other inmates from their group, and the prison administration had moved the applicant to another group. As the prison authorities had known that both prisoners were prone to conflict and were aggressive, they had sent a guard to accompany the applicant when he had gone to fetch his belongings from his old cell and they had considered one guard to be enough. That guard could not have foreseen that the two inmates would get into a fight so quickly, and had not been in a position to prevent the incident, which had unfolded in seconds and had consisted of a single punch. The guard had intervened immediately, prevented a further exchange of blows and taken the applicant to the prison\u2019s medical centre. Guards in Varna Prison underwent both initial and on-going training on how to manage violent prisoners.57.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant noted that when he had gone to his old wing on 21\u00a0February 2012 he had been accompanied by a single guard, with no one else to control the other prisoner. That guard had done nothing to prevent the verbal exchange between the two from escalating into physical violence. He had only intervened after the other prisoner had hit the applicant. It was unclear who had decided that only one guard was to accompany the applicant, or whether that guard had been properly briefed. The prison authorities had not taken any other steps to prevent the fight. They had known that both prisoners were volatile and involved in an escalating feud, but had confined their reaction to the earlier incident to talking with them. There were apparently no clear rules or procedures on how to manage the risk of inter-prisoner violence or report incidents to the prosecuting authorities. Varna Prison\u2019s head of security had himself admitted that such problems were dealt with on an ad hoc basis. In recent years, no prison staff had been disciplined for failing to prevent such violence, even though 103 incidents had been reported in 2012, 92 in 2013, and 42 in 2014. Overcrowding, the absence of productive activities for prisoners, the low ratio of staff to inmates, and the lack of suitable training for prison staff also contributed to such incidents.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles in the Court\u2019s case-law58.\u00a0\u00a0It is well-settled that the authorities have an obligation under Article\u00a03 of the Convention, read in conjunction with Article 1, to protect detainees from inhuman and degrading treatment by other detainees (see, among other authorities, Stasi v. France, no. 25001\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 77-78, 20\u00a0October 2011; D.F. v. Latvia, no. 11160\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 83-84, 29 October 2013; and M.C.\u00a0v.\u00a0Poland, no. 23692\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 87-88, 3 March 2015).59.\u00a0\u00a0The obligation is to take all steps which could reasonably be expected to prevent a real and immediate risk to the detainee\u2019s physical integrity of which the authorities had or ought to have had knowledge. Its precise extent depends on the circumstances of each case, and it must be interpreted so as not to impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities (see Stasi, \u00a7 78-79, and M.C. v. Poland, \u00a7\u00a7 88-89, both cited above). In discharging this obligation, the authorities must also take into account the need to respect the rights of the presumed attacker; this may sometimes fetter their freedom of action (see, mutatis mutandis, Osman v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, 28 October 1998, \u00a7 116 and 121, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VIII; Opuz v. Turkey, no. 33401\/02, \u00a7 129, ECHR 2009; and Bljakaj and Others v. Croatia, no. 74448\/12, \u00a7 122, 18\u00a0September 2014, where this limitation was noted in relation to the concomitant obligation under Article 2 of the Convention).60.\u00a0\u00a0The fact that an incident takes place in a custodial context does not in itself lower the threshold for determining whether the authorities\u2019 obligation has been met (see, mutatis mutandis, Van Colle v. the United Kingdom, no. 7678\/09, \u00a7 91, 13 November 2012). However, the assessment of whether the authorities have acted reasonably must take into account that in the detention context both attacker and victim are under the control of the authorities, unlike cases in which they are both at liberty.61.\u00a0\u00a0Another important factor in this assessment is whether the detainee is particularly vulnerable, for instance because he or she is suffering from a mental disorder (see Pantea v. Romania, no. 33343\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 189-92, 3\u00a0June 2003, and Korpachyova-Hofbauer v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 56668\/12, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a04 and 35, 1 September 2015), is young (see Premininy v. Russia, no.\u00a044973\/04, \u00a7 86, 10 February 2011) or belongs to a category at heightened risk of abuse (see Rodi\u0107 and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, no.\u00a022893\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 69-70, 27 May 2008 (detainees convicted of war crimes and kept unsegregated); Stasi, cited above, \u00a7 91 (homosexuals); J.L.\u00a0v.\u00a0Latvia, no. 23893\/06, \u00a7 68, 17\u00a0April 2012 (police collaborators); Aleksejeva v. Latvia (dec.), no.\u00a021780\/07, \u00a7\u00a034, 3 July 2012 (relatives of prison guards); Starovoitovs v.Latvia (dec.), no. 27343\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 35-38, 27\u00a0November 2012 (private security guards); Sizarev v. Ukraine, no.\u00a017116\/04, \u00a7 114, 17 January 2013 (court employees); D.F. v.\u00a0Latvia, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 81 and 84 (sexual offenders); Totolici v. Romania, no.\u00a026576\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 48-49, 14 January 2014 (police officers); and M.C.\u00a0v.\u00a0Poland, cited above, \u00a7 90 (persons accused of sexually abusing minors)).62.\u00a0\u00a0It also matters whether the other detainees appear especially prone to violence (see, for example, Oshurko v. Ukraine, no. 33108\/05, \u00a7\u00a072, 8\u00a0September 2011).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles63.\u00a0\u00a0In the instant case, the attack perpetrated on the applicant by a co-detainee was not systematic or long-lasting (compare the abuse suffered in Premininy, \u00a7 86; Oshurko, \u00a7 72; J.L. v. Latvia, \u00a7 18; and M.C. v. Poland, \u00a7\u00a086, all cited above). Immediately after the alleged incident on 15 February 2012 the applicant was kept apart from the other prisoner, precisely to avoid further clashes between the two (see paragraphs 7-11 above). The present case concerns only a brief incident which took place on 21 February 2012, when the applicant was taken back to his old group to fetch his belongings and the two prisoners got into an argument, and the other one punched the applicant on the jaw (see paragraph 16 above).64.\u00a0\u00a0At that point, the prison authorities plainly knew that he was at some risk from the other inmate. Both were emotionally unstable, violent offenders who had already shown hostility towards each other shortly beforehand (see paragraphs 7-13 above). As a result, the prison administration had decided to keep them apart, and the social worker in charge of their group had tried to calm their conflict by talking to both of them (see paragraphs 13-15 above).65.\u00a0\u00a0The mere fact that the guard did not react quickly enough to prevent the other prisoner from hitting the applicant cannot lead to the conclusion that the authorities failed in their obligation to take reasonable measures to protect him. There is evidence both that the applicant provoked the other prisoner, and that the whole situation unfolded very quickly, with the other inmate apparently acting on the spur of the moment (compare with Tautkus v.\u00a0Lithuania, no. 29474\/09, \u00a7 58, 27 November 2012). There is no concrete evidence that the guard\u2019s actions, which cannot simply be judged in hindsight, were unreasonable or due to his not being trained well enough or because he had not been briefed about the situation.66.\u00a0\u00a0It is true that if arrangements had been made for the other prisoner to be away from the wing when the applicant returned, the incident would not have taken place. It could perhaps have also been avoided if more guards had been present. But it is not apparent that the only reasonable course of action open to the prison authorities was to opt for one of those measures. Though they could have expected some tension between the two prisoners, the applicant was supposed to return to his old wing for just a short while, and it was not obvious that the other prisoner, who had been admonished after the earlier alleged incident, would turn so violent so quickly.67.\u00a0\u00a0Nor can it be said that anxiety on the part of the applicant caused by a risk of further attacks by the other prisoner reached a level of severity that brought it within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention (compare with Aleksejeva, \u00a7 40, and Korpachyova-Hofbauer, \u00a7 36, both cited above, and contrast Alexandru Marius Radu v. Romania, no. 34022\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 48-49, 21\u00a0July 2009). The prison authorities took measures to keep him apart from the other inmate after the incident on 21 February 2012, and indeed preventive measures had already been taken prior to that date with a view to his protection (see paragraphs 13-15 above)68.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the above considerations, there has been no breach of Article\u00a03 of the Convention with respect to the alleged failure of the authorities to take all steps which could have reasonably been expected to protect the applicant from the inmate who assaulted him.II.\u00a0\u00a0MEDICAL CARE FOR THE APPLICANT\u2019S INJURIES69.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also complained under Article 3 of the Convention that he had not received adequate medical care for the injuries which he sustained at the hands of the prisoner who assaulted him. He again relied on Article\u00a03 of the Convention, the text of which has been set out in paragraph\u00a051 above.A.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions70.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that, by not pursuing to a conclusion a claim for damages under section 1(1) of the State and Municipalities Liability for Damage Act 1988 in relation to the alleged omission of the prison authorities to provide him with proper medical care, the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. The Bulgarian courts dealt with such claims on the merits. Indeed, in 2014 the applicant had brought such a claim, but had later withdrawn it for unknown reasons.71.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that, since he had still not been given surgery for his fractured jaw, the prison authorities\u2019 failure to provide him with adequate medical care was a continuing situation. A claim for damages was therefore not an effective remedy in his case.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment72.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, to be regarded as effective, remedies with respect to allegedly inhuman or degrading conditions of detention must have both a preventive and a compensatory character: they must be capable of both rapidly bringing an ongoing breach to an end and of resulting in redress for any past breach (see Neshkov and Others, cited above, \u00a7 181). The same applies to remedies with respect to inhuman or degrading treatment allegedly resulting from a failure to provide a detainee with adequate medical care.73.\u00a0\u00a0From the perspective of Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, however, the position changes once the situation of which the detainee complains has ended. The Court has already held that, to comply with the requirement to have exhausted domestic remedies, detainees who complain of the conditions of their detention and have been released must use any compensatory remedies (see Ignats v. Latvia (dec.), no. 38494\/05, \u00a7\u00a0112, 24\u00a0September 2013, with further references). The underlying rationale is that once the situation alleged to constitute a breach of Article 3 of the Convention has ended, the only conceivable form of redress is some form of reparation for the injury resulting from the past breach. There is no reason why the same should not apply to complaints relating to the provision of adequate medical care in detention.74.\u00a0\u00a0In the applicant\u2019s case, the alleged breach of Article 3 of the Convention consisted in a failure to provide him with timely and adequate medical care for the jaw fracture that he suffered on 21 February 2012 at the hands of his co-detainee. But that situation came to an end when around three months later the applicant was examined by a maxillofacial surgeon and given an X-ray, and then, about two months after that, received treatment for his jaw injury in Sofia Prison Hospital (see paragraphs\u00a028 and\u00a030 above). According to the available medical evidence, at that point his jaw fracture could no longer be operated on (ibid.). The applicant\u2019s assertion to the contrary was not supported by any medical evidence. His not having been given surgery for the fracture cannot therefore in itself be regarded as a continuing breach of Article 3 of the Convention.75.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was thus required to resort to a domestic remedy that could have resulted in redress for the alleged past breach of Article 3. In 2014 he brought a claim for damages against the prison authorities in relation to their alleged failure to provide him with adequate medical care for, among other conditions, his fractured jaw (see paragraph 37 above). His claim was based on section 1(1) of the State and Municipalities Liability for Damage Act 1988 (see paragraph 48 above). According to the available information, the Bulgarian administrative courts have regularly examined such claims on the merits (see paragraph 49 above), and the Varna Administrative Court started examining the one made by the applicant (see paragraph\u00a038 above). It is true that very few of the recent cases have resulted in awards of compensation (see paragraph 49 above). But that does not in itself mean that the applicant\u2019s claim lacked a reasonable prospect of succeeding. Each case turns on its own merits, and it would be speculative to say how the Varna Administrative Court and, on appeal, the Supreme Administrative Court would have disposed of the applicant\u2019s claim had it been pursued to conclusion. The very fact that the applicant brought it shows that he himself thought it would be an effective remedy (see Ignats, cited above, \u00a7 114). By later withdrawing it, he deprived the Bulgarian courts of the opportunity to deal with it (see paragraph 38 above). He did not explain what prompted his decision to do so, and there is no evidence that it was due to pressure or fear of reprisals (see, mutatis mutandis, Ignats, cited above, \u00a7 109). It must therefore be considered to have been voluntary (see Borghi v. Italy (dec.), no. 54767\/00, ECHR 2002-V (extracts)).76.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, doubts about the prospects of a remedy which appears to offer a reasonable possibility of redress are not a sufficient reason to eschew it (see, among other authorities, Vu\u010dkovi\u0107 and\u00a0Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], nos. 17153\/11 and 29\u00a0others, \u00a7\u00a7 74 and 84 in fine, 25 March 2014; Avoti\u0146\u0161 v. Latvia [GC], no.\u00a017502\/07, \u00a7 122, ECHR 2016; and Posevini v. Bulgaria, no. 63638\/14, \u00a7\u00a054, 19\u00a0January 2017). Applicants who in such circumstances withdraw their claims or appeals deprive the national courts of the High Contracting States of the opportunity which Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention offers them of addressing and so preventing or putting right the breaches alleged against them (see Azinas v. Cyprus [GC], no. 56679\/00, \u00a7\u00a7 40-41, ECHR\u00a02004-III; Milo\u0161evi\u0107 v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 77631\/01, 19\u00a0March 2002; Borghi, cited above; and Ignats, cited above, \u00a7 114). The Court does not discern in the present case any particular circumstances capable of absolving the applicant from the obligation to exhaust domestic remedies.77.\u00a0\u00a0This complaint must therefore be rejected under Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a7\u00a01 and\u00a04 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.","29619":"I.\u00a0\u00a0SCOPE OF THE CASE76.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that, after the communication of the case to the respondent Government, the applicant lodged new complaints. In particular, in his submissions dated 10 July 2014 the applicant complained under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention about the length of the criminal proceedings against him, under Article 8 of the unlawfulness of the search of his home in the course of those proceedings, and under Article 9 that he had not been allowed to keep religious texts or to meet with a priest during his pre-trial detention.77.\u00a0\u00a0In the Court\u2019s view, the applicant\u2019s new complaints are not an elaboration of his original complaints to the Court on which the parties have commented. The Court considers, therefore, that it is not appropriate to take these matters up in the context of the present case (see Piryanik v. Ukraine, no.\u00a075788\/01, \u00a7 20, 19 April 2005).II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION78.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been ill-treated by the police in June and December 2004, by a prosecutor on 30 August 2004 and by the guards escorting the applicant to court hearings during his trial. The applicant alleged that his complaints at the domestic level had not been duly examined.79.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further complained of inadequate medical assistance in detention and the prosecutor\u2019s office\u2019s inaction in that regard.80.\u00a0\u00a0He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:Article 3\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged ill-treatment during the criminal proceedings81.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that parts of the applicant\u2019s complaints under Article\u00a03 of the Convention, specifically those of him being subjected to electric shocks, suffocation using a gas mask, insertion of needles under his nails, hanging him over a metal bar and sexual abuse between 11 and 12\u00a0June 2004 (see paragraph 10 above), are not supported by any evidence. Nor is there any evidence for the applicant\u2019s complaints of ill-treatment by the police after 12 June 2004, by a prosecutor on 30 August 2004 and by the guards escorting him to court hearings (see paragraphs 13, 17, 21 and 22 above). Also, it should be noted that the applicant did not demonstrate that he had raised those complaints in a meaningful way before the domestic authorities. Thus, the Court considers that they are not \u201carguable\u201d for the purposes of Article 3 of the Convention and that the domestic authorities were not required to carry out an effective investigation into the alleged events. Accordingly, the Court finds that this part of the applicant\u2019s complaints of ill-treatment, under both the substantive and the procedural limbs of Article 3, should be rejected as manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.82.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the applicant can be understood as having complained of his alleged ill-treatment by inmates on account of his past service in the police (see paragraph 23 above), the Court finds that that complaint is entirely unsubstantiated and rejects it as manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.83.\u00a0\u00a0In contrast, the Court notes that the applicant\u2019s allegation that he was beaten up by the police between 11 and 12 June 2004 is supported by a medical report (see paragraph 12 above). Accordingly, that complaint was prima facie arguable and, given the Court\u2019s settled case-law on the matter, the authorities were required to conduct an effective official investigation (see, for instance, Kaverzin v. Ukraine, no. 23893\/03, \u00a7 106, 15 May 2012).84.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the applicant\u2019s complaints under Article 3 of the Convention of having been beaten by the police between 11 and 12 June 2004 and the authorities\u2019 failure to conduct an effective investigation in that regard are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03 (a) of the Convention. The Court further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Allegedly inadequate medical assistance85.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that, while in detention, the applicant suffered from various medical issues (see paragraph 25 above). According to the detailed information submitted by the Government, the applicant\u2019s complaints of specific health problems were dealt with by the authorities (see paragraph 27 above). On the whole, it cannot be argued that they addressed them inadequately. The applicant was examined by a number of doctors, including some from civilian medical institutions. He remained under their supervision throughout the entire period of his detention. They were best placed to determine the applicant\u2019s treatment and he was provided with the prescribed therapies. There is no evidence and it was not persuasively argued that the doctors had acted in bad faith or that the treatment provided had been ineffective. Nor did the applicant demonstrate that the domestic examination of his complaints of inadequate medical treatment had been deficient (see paragraph 26 above). Moreover, the shortcomings in the medical assistance provided to the applicant in the SIZO, identified by the prosecutor\u2019s office, were eventually adequately addressed and resolved (ibid.).86.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the applicant\u2019s complaints of inadequate medical assistance and the authorities\u2019 failure to conduct an effective investigation in that regard should be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions87.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been beaten up by the police between 11 and 12 June 2004 and that there had been no effective investigation into that incident.88.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contended that the applicant had failed to demonstrate that he had been ill-treated by the police after his arrest on 11\u00a0June 2004. According to them, the applicant had received the injuries, which had been discovered during a medical examination on 12 June 2004, during his arrest as the police had had to use force to subdue him. The Government argued that the use of force by the police had been lawful and that the authorities\u2019 examination of the incident had been prompt and accurate.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment89.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant\u2019s complaints under consideration concern both the substantive and the procedural aspects of Article\u00a03 of the Convention. As regards the former aspect, the Court notes that it is now common ground between the parties that the police had been responsible for the applicant\u2019s injuries. The medical report of 12 June 2004 also confirmed that the applicant had been injured during the time he had been at the hands of the police (see paragraph 12 above). The parties however disagreed as to whether those injuries had been inflicted during or after the applicant\u2019s arrest on 11\u00a0June 2004 and whether they were the result of the use of proportionate force.90.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its task and recognises that it must be cautious in taking on the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact where this is not rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case. Therefore, the Court considers it appropriate to examine first whether the applicant\u2019s complaint of ill-treatment between 11 and 12\u00a0June 2004 was adequately investigated by the authorities (see, for example, El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no.\u00a039630\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 155 and 181, ECHR 2012; Kaverzin, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0107; Baklanov v. Ukraine, no. 44425\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 70, 71 and 91, 24 October 2013; Dzhulay v. Ukraine, no. 24439\/06, \u00a7 69, 3 April 2014; Chinez v. Romania, no.\u00a02040\/12, \u00a7 57, 17 March 2015; and Yaroshovets and Others v. Ukraine, nos.\u00a074820\/10, 71\/11, 76\/11, 83\/11, and 332\/11, \u00a7 77, 3 December 2015). It will then turn to the question of whether the alleged ill-treatment took place, bearing in mind the relevant domestic findings.(a)\u00a0\u00a0Alleged failure to investigate the applicant\u2019s complaint of ill-treatment by the police91.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that where an individual makes a credible assertion that he or she has suffered treatment infringing Article 3 at the hands of the police or other agents of the State, that provision, read in conjunction with the State\u2019s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to \u201csecure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in ... [the] Convention\u201d, requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation. As with an investigation under Article\u00a02, such an investigation should be capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible. Otherwise, the general legal prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment would, despite its fundamental importance, be ineffective in practice and it would be possible in some cases for agents of the State to abuse the rights of those within their control with virtual impunity (see, among other authorities, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 131, ECHR 2000\u2011IV).92.\u00a0\u00a0The investigation into serious allegations of ill-treatment must be thorough. That means that the authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill\u2011founded conclusions to close their investigation or as the basis of their decisions (see, for example, El-Masri, cited above, \u00a7 183). They must take all reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence (see Tanr\u0131kulu v. Turkey [GC], no. 23763\/94, \u00a7\u00a7 104 et seq., ECHR 1999\u2011IV, and G\u00fcl v. Turkey, no. 22676\/93, \u00a7 89, 14 December 2000). Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of those responsible will risk falling foul of this standard.93.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court notes that a pre-investigation inquiry into the applicant\u2019s complaints of ill-treatment between 11 and 12\u00a0June 2004 was launched and relevant medical evidence was secured shortly after the alleged events. Although the matter was reconsidered on a number of occasions, the prosecutor\u2019s office maintained its finding that the applicant had been injured during his arrest on 11 June 2004. That finding was based, principally, on the police report of 17 August 2004 into the applicant\u2019s arrest (see paragraphs 9 and 19 above).94.\u00a0\u00a0Although it is in the first place for the national authorities, in this case for the public prosecutor, to assess the relevant evidence and to draw conclusions on the basis of such assessment, the Court cannot disregard the fact that the prosecutor\u2019s office\u2019s findings lacked important details and relevant substantiation.95.\u00a0\u00a0First, neither the police report of 17 August 2004 nor the prosecutor\u2019s office\u2019s decision of 11 February 2006 contained any details as to how the injuries had been inflicted on the applicant. Both documents referred to vague and unspecified \u201chand-to-hand combat techniques\u201d which the police had used to subdue him, whereas the medical report of 12 June 2004 suggested that the applicant might have been punched and kicked in the head and on the body (see paragraph 12 above).96.\u00a0\u00a0Secondly, even assuming that the applicant was injured because the police had tried to subdue him in order to arrest him and because, as the Government submitted, he had tried to escape (ibid.), no attempt was made to look into the questions of the lawfulness and proportionality of the force used against the applicant.97.\u00a0\u00a0Thirdly, it remains unclear why the prosecutor\u2019s office relied, in its decision of 11 February 2006, on the applicant\u2019s statements of 29 and 30\u00a0June 2004 denying any ill-treatment (see paragraph 19 above), in spite of his more recent submissions to the contrary (see paragraphs 16 and 17 above).98.\u00a0\u00a0Although the domestic courts dealing with the applicant\u2019s criminal case eventually addressed his repeated complaints of ill-treatment by the police between 11 and 12 June 2004, the shortcomings in the pre\u2011investigation inquiry noted above were not remedied. Ultimately, the courts rejected the complaints as unsubstantiated, fully relying on the prosecutor\u2019s office\u2019s decision of 11 February 2006 (see paragraphs 54, 61 and 64 above).99.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the domestic authorities did not fulfil their obligation to investigate the applicant\u2019s complaints of ill-treatment by the police between 11 and 12 June 2004. Accordingly, there has been a procedural violation of Article 3 of the Convention in that regard.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Alleged ill-treatment by the police100.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the substantive aspect of the applicant\u2019s complaints of ill-treatment by the police, the Court notes that in assessing evidence in a claim of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d must be applied (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7 161, Series A no. 25, and Av\u015far v. Turkey, no.\u00a025657\/94, \u00a7 282, ECHR 2001\u2011VII (extracts)). Such proof may, however, follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see Labita, cited above, \u00a7 121). Where the events at issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention. Indeed, the burden of proof may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation (see Ribitsch v. Austria, 4 December 1995, \u00a7 34, Series A no. 336, and Salman v.\u00a0Turkey [GC], no. 21986\/93, \u00a7 100, ECHR 2000-VII).101.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, having regard to the parties\u2019 submissions and the relevant medical evidence, it is uncontested that the applicant\u2019s injuries were sustained when under the control of the police, either during his arrest or thereafter when he was being questioned at the police station (see paragraphs 12, 87 and 88 above). Although no conclusive evidence is available concerning the time and other circumstances in which the applicant was injured, the exact nature and degree of force used against him and whether, in the circumstances, that force was proportionate, mainly because of the shortcomings in the domestic investigation (see paragraphs 95-99 above), the applicant\u2019s version of events, which he changed on several occasions during the proceedings (see paragraphs 12, 14, 15 and 17\u00a0above), cannot be accepted as presented. However, given the burden on the State to provide a plausible explanation for injuries sustained by a person under control of the police, the Court concludes that the Government have not satisfactorily established that the use of force against the applicant was lawful and absolutely necessary and that the applicant\u2019s injuries were wholly caused otherwise than by ill-treatment by the police (see Sylenok and Tekhnoservis-Plus v. Ukraine, no. 20988\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 69-70, 9 December 2010). Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in that the applicant was subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment by the police between 11 and 12 June 2004.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION102.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been arrested on 11 June 2004 for the purpose of prosecuting him, although there had been no decision warranting his arrest.103.\u00a0\u00a0He further complained of the unlawfulness of his detention between 4 March 2005 and 18 April 2006, stating in particular that the decisions of the Court of Appeal authorising his detention during part of that period had been taken in violation of procedural norms and had contained no justification for his continued detention. He also contended that his detention between 10 and 15 May 2005 had not been covered by any decision.104.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the courts had failed to consider thoroughly and without delay his complaints concerning the unlawfulness of his detention during the abovementioned periods.105.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant relied on Article 5 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows: \u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:...(c)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;...4.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful....\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility106.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention of the unlawfulness of his arrest on 11 June 2004 and his detention between 11 and 24 June 2004 should be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. In particular, he should have brought a compensation claim on the basis of the judgment of 30 March 2007, by which the Appeal Court found that he had been unlawfully deprived of his liberty during the period at issue (see paragraph 52 above).107.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it accepted the Government\u2019s objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies in similar circumstances in a number of cases against Ukraine (see, for a recent authority, Tikhonov v. Ukraine, no.\u00a017969\/09, \u00a7 39, 10 December 2015). It finds no grounds to decide otherwise in the present case. Accordingly, the applicant\u2019s complaint of the unlawfulness of his arrest on 11 June 2004 and his detention between 11\u00a0and 24 June 2004 should be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention.108.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further finds that part of the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention, in so far as it concerns the period between 11 and 24 June 2004 which had ended more than six months before the date on which the present application was lodged (2 June 2005), must accordingly be rejected as lodged out of time pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7\u00a01\u00a0and 4 of the Convention.109.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the applicant\u2019s complaints under Article 5 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention concern his detention between 4 March 2005 and 18 April 2006, the Court notes that they are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a). The Court further notes that those complaints are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits110.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention had been in compliance with Article 5 \u00a7 1 (c) of the Convention and that there had been no violation of Article 5 \u00a7 4, as the applicant had failed to appeal against the decisions authorising his detention and had not requested that the courts release him.111.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaints under Article 5 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention.112.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this part of the application concerns the applicant\u2019s detention between 4 March 2005 and 18 April 2006. During that period he was detained on the basis of court decisions which could not be appealed further. The impugned decisions relied essentially on the seriousness of the charges against the applicant and used stereotyped formulae without addressing specific facts or considering alternative preventive measures (see paragraph 32 above). In particular, the courts did not give any further details as regards their findings that, if released, the applicant might evade investigation and trial and obstruct the establishment of the truth in the case. Nor did they make reference to any facts in that regard. This left the applicant in a state of uncertainty as to the grounds for his detention during that period. The Court further notes that the applicant\u2019s detention from 10 May to 3 June and from 4 to 16 December 2005 was not covered by any decision at all (see paragraph 33 above).113.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has frequently found violations of Article 5 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and\u00a04 of the Convention in similar situations (see, for recent authorities, Yaroshovets and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 74820\/10, 71\/11, 76\/11, 83\/11, and 332\/11, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0122-28, 3 December 2015, and Zakshevskiy v. Ukraine, no.\u00a07193\/04, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a094-96, 17 March 2016, with further references).114.\u00a0\u00a0Assessing the applicant\u2019s situation in the present case in the light of the principles developed in its case-law, the Court considers that there is no reason to depart from its previous approach. The Government did not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.115.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore concludes that there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention as regards the applicant\u2019s detention between 4 March 2005 and 18 April 2006.IV.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 AND 3 (c) OF THE CONVENTION116.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the proceedings against him had been unfair mainly for the reasons that during the initial stage of the investigation, notably between 12 and 24 June 2004, he had not been given access to a lawyer and had been forced to make self-incriminating statements. He relied on Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c), which read, in so far as relevant, as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ......3.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:...(c)\u00a0\u00a0to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require;...\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility117.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stated that the applicant\u2019s complaints were to be rejected as manifestly ill-founded. In particular, the Government argued that there was no evidence of duress; that the applicant had been informed of his procedural rights, including the right not to incriminate himself; that he had been assisted by a lawyer for almost the entire duration of the proceedings; that the applicant had not complained of the inadequacy of the legal assistance with which he had been provided; that he had not sought to have the lawyer replaced; that the applicant had voluntarily participated in some investigative procedures without being assisted by a lawyer; that the Appeal Court had expressly found that the verbatim records of the investigative procedures carried out between 12 and 24 June 2004 could not be used as evidence in the case and accordingly had excluded them from the body of evidence; and that the applicant\u2019s conviction had been based on other evidence.118.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaints.119.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, having regard to the material before it, considers that the applicant\u2019s complaints under Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c) are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.120.\u00a0\u00a0When examining the merits of this part of the application, the Court will take into consideration the Government\u2019s specific submissions as to those complaints (see paragraph 117 above).B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles121.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has consistently viewed early access to a lawyer as a procedural guarantee of the privilege against self-incrimination and a fundamental safeguard against ill-treatment, noting the particular vulnerability of an accused in the early stages of proceedings when he or she is confronted with both the stress of the situation and the increasingly complex criminal legislation involved. Any exception to the enjoyment of this right should be clearly circumscribed and its application strictly limited in time. These principles are particularly called for in the case of serious charges, for it is in the face of the heaviest penalties that respect for the right to a fair trial is to be ensured to the highest possible degree by democratic societies (see Salduz v. Turkey [GC], no. 36391\/02, \u00a7 54, ECHR 2008).122.\u00a0\u00a0Article 6 \u00a7 1 requires that, as a rule, access to a lawyer should be provided from the first interrogation of a suspect by the police, unless it is demonstrated in the light of the particular circumstances of each case that there are compelling reasons to restrict that right. Even where compelling reasons may exceptionally justify denial of access to a lawyer, such a restriction \u2013 whatever its justification \u2013 must not unduly prejudice the rights of the accused under Article 6. The rights of the defence will, in principle, be irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating statements made during police questioning without access to a lawyer are used for a conviction. (see\u00a0Salduz, cited above, \u00a7 55).123.\u00a0\u00a0The above test in Salduz (cited above) for assessing whether a restriction on access to a lawyer is compatible with the right to a fair trial is composed of two stages. In the first stage, the Court must assess whether there were compelling reasons for the restriction. In the second stage, it must evaluate the prejudice caused to the rights of the defence by the restriction in the case in question. In other words, the Court must examine the impact of the restriction on the overall fairness of the proceedings and decide whether the proceedings as a whole were fair (see Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 50541\/08, 50571\/08, 50573\/08 and 40351\/09, \u00a7\u00a0257, 13 September 2016).124.\u00a0\u00a0As to the first stage of the test, the criterion of compelling reasons is a stringent one: having regard to the fundamental nature and importance of early access to legal advice, in particular when a suspect is first questioned, restrictions on access to legal advice are permitted only in exceptional circumstances, must be of a temporary nature and must be based on an individual assessment of the particular circumstances of the case. It is of relevance, when assessing whether compelling reasons have been demonstrated, whether the decision to restrict legal advice had a basis in domestic law and whether the scope and content of any restrictions on legal advice were sufficiently circumscribed by law so as to guide operational decision-making by those responsible for applying them (ibid., \u00a7 258).125.\u00a0\u00a0Where compelling reasons are established, a holistic assessment of the entirety of the proceedings must be conducted to determine whether they were \u201cfair\u201d for the purposes of Article 6 \u00a7 1 (ibid., \u00a7 264).126.\u00a0\u00a0Where compelling reasons are not established, the Court must apply a very strict scrutiny to its fairness assessment. The failure of the respondent Government to show compelling reasons weighs heavily in the balance when assessing the overall fairness of the trial and may tip the balance in favour of finding a breach of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c). The onus is on the Government to demonstrate convincingly why, exceptionally and in the specific circumstances of the case, the overall fairness of the trial was not irretrievably prejudiced by the restriction on access to legal advice (ibid., \u00a7\u00a0265).127.\u00a0\u00a0When examining the proceedings as a whole in order to assess the impact of procedural failings at the pre-trial stage on the overall fairness of the criminal proceedings, the following non-exhaustive list of factors, drawn from the Court\u2019s case\u2011law, should, where appropriate, be taken into account:(a)\u00a0\u00a0Whether the applicant was particularly vulnerable, for example, by reason of his age or mental capacity.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The legal framework governing the pre-trial proceedings and the admissibility of evidence at trial, and whether it was complied with; where an exclusionary rule applied, it is particularly unlikely that the proceedings as a whole would be considered unfair.(c)\u00a0\u00a0Whether the applicant had the opportunity to challenge the authenticity of the evidence and oppose its use.(d)\u00a0\u00a0The quality of the evidence and whether the circumstances in which it was obtained cast doubt on its reliability or accuracy, taking into account the degree and nature of any compulsion.(e)\u00a0\u00a0Where evidence was obtained unlawfully, the unlawfulness in question and, where it stems from a violation of another Convention Article, the nature of the violation found.(f)\u00a0\u00a0In the case of a statement, the nature of the statement and whether it was promptly retracted or modified.(g)\u00a0\u00a0The use to which the evidence was put, and in particular whether the evidence formed an integral or significant part of the probative evidence upon which the conviction was based, and the strength of the other evidence in the case.(h)\u00a0\u00a0Whether the assessment of guilt was performed by professional judges or lay jurors, and in the case of the latter the content of any jury directions.(i)\u00a0\u00a0The weight of the public interest in the investigation and punishment of the particular offence in issue.(j)\u00a0\u00a0Other relevant procedural safeguards afforded by domestic law and practice (ibid., 274).128.\u00a0\u00a0Neither the letter nor the spirit of Article 6 of the Convention prevents a person from waiving of his own free will, either expressly or tacitly, his entitlement to the guarantees of a fair trial. However, if it is to be effective for Convention purposes, a waiver of the right to take part in the trial must be established in an unequivocal manner and be attended by minimum safeguards commensurate with its importance. Furthermore, it must not run counter to any important public interest (see Sejdovic v. Italy [GC], no. 56581\/00, \u00a7 86, ECHR 2006\u2011II). For a waiver to be effective it must be shown that the applicant could reasonably have foreseen the consequences of his conduct (see, mutatis mutandis, Idalov v. Russia [GC], no.\u00a05826\/03, \u00a7 173, 22 May 2012). The right to counsel, being a fundamental right among those which constitute the notion of a fair trial and ensuring the effectiveness of the rest of the guarantees set forth in Article 6 of the Convention, is a prime example of those rights which require the special protection of the \u201cknowing and intelligent waiver\u201d standard established in the Court\u2019s case-law (see Dvorski v. Croatia [GC], no.\u00a025703\/11, \u00a7 101, ECHR 2015).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case(a)\u00a0\u00a0Conviction for robbery and related crimes129.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court notes that at the initial stage of investigation, notably between 11 and 24 June 2004, the applicant, who was formally serving his twelve-day administrative arrest, took part in different investigative actions. In particular he was questioned as a witness, without a lawyer present, concerning most charges against him and gave self-incriminating statements in that regard (see paragraphs 35 and 37 above). Eventually, those statements were excluded as evidence by the Appeal Court, which found that they had been obtained in violation of the applicant\u2019s defence rights, and the applicant\u2019s conviction was based on other evidence (see paragraphs 51, 52 and 60 above). Even though the Supreme Court in its decision of 16 December 2008 on the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal against his conviction noted that the applicant had confessed to some of the crimes at a particular stage of the investigation (see paragraph 63 above), it did not refer to the applicant\u2019s statements made before 24 June 2004 and generally carried out no reassessment of the evidence or facts relied upon by the Appeal Court in its decision of 11\u00a0August 2008.130.\u00a0\u00a0Further, the Court sees no evidence that the impugned statements played a role in the domestic courts\u2019 assessment of the relevant facts and the finding of guilt. It notes that the domestic courts substantiated the applicant\u2019s conviction for robbery and related crimes by the testimony of the applicant\u2019s co-defendants and that of a number of witnesses and victims of the crimes and also by the conclusions of several forensic examinations (see paragraphs 51 and 60 above). There is no basis to conclude that the applicant, who took part in the trial personally and was also represented by a legal counsel, was in any way restricted in adopting a defence strategy at variance with his statements made between 11 and 24 June 2004, which indeed he did (see paragraph 49 above). Nor was he restricted in his rights to state his case, question witnesses or challenge the evidence concerning this part of the case during the trial.131.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the forgoing, the Court finds that, although there were no compelling reasons to restrict the applicant\u2019s right of access to a lawyer during his questioning between 11 and 24 June 2004, which had implications for his privilege against self-incrimination, the overall fairness of the applicant\u2019s trial on charges of multiple counts of robbery and related crimes of unlawful possession of firearms was not irretrievably prejudiced. In this case, the courts\u2019 decisions concerning the above charges convincingly demonstrate that the applicant\u2019s conviction on those charges was not contrary to the guarantees of a fair hearing. Accordingly, there has been no violation of Article 6 of the Convention in that regard.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Conviction for murder132.\u00a0\u00a0The situation is different in so far as the applicant\u2019s conviction for murder is concerned. In particular, during the aforementioned period between 11 and 24 June 2004 the applicant was questioned as a suspect concerning the murder charge and confessed to having committed that crime (see paragraph 36 above). The applicant\u2019s self-incriminating statements in that regard, notably those of 15 June 2004, were eventually relied upon by the Appeal Court in its judgment of 30 March 2007. That judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court on 4 December 2007, which in its turn did not refer to the applicant\u2019s self-incriminating statements, but mentioned other pieces of evidence (see paragraphs 53 and 56 above).133.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in the judgment of 30 March 2007 it was held that the applicant had been assisted by a lawyer during his questioning on 15\u00a0June 2004. However, the applicant denied this and stated that he had not been given access to a lawyer before 24 June 2004.134.\u00a0\u00a0Although the Government did not address the applicant\u2019s specific submissions in this regard, the Court finds that there is no sufficient basis to put into doubt the domestic court\u2019s finding that the applicant had been questioned with the assistance of a lawyer, which was ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court.135.\u00a0\u00a0In the circumstances, it is not for the Court to take the role of a first-instance court and to establish the facts of the case itself, in particular where it was not demonstrated that the finding in question can be regarded as arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable.136.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Court recalls that, while it has found that the applicant had been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment while at the hands of the police between 11 and 12 June 2004 (see paragraph\u00a0101 above), there is no conclusive evidence that he was subjected to the ill\u2011treatment with a view to obtaining self-incriminating statements during that period (ibid.) and there is no evidence in support of his complaints of ill-treatment by the police after 12 June 2004 (see paragraph 81 above).137.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that the applicant did not retract the statements of 15 June 2004 when questioned later undisputedly in the presence of a lawyer and maintained them for some time during the proceedings (see paragraphs 38-39 above). The statements in question were not the sole basis for the applicant\u2019s conviction for murder in the judgment of 30 March 2007 and it does not transpire from that judgment that the Appeal Court gave them decisive weight. Moreover, the Supreme Court, while upholding the judgment of the Appeal Court, made no reference to the applicant\u2019s self-incriminating statements and relied on other pieces of evidence regarding the murder charges (see paragraphs 56 and 132 above).138.\u00a0\u00a0In making its overall fairness assessment of this part of the case and taking into account all the above circumstances and arguments, the Court finds that it was not demonstrated convincingly that the applicant\u2019s right of access to a lawyer or his privilege against self-incrimination were restricted during his questioning on 15 June 2004 and that the use of his self\u2011incriminating statements of that date as a basis for convicting him of murder prejudiced the overall fairness of the trial. The above considerations are sufficient for the Court to conclude that there has been no violation of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention in that regard.V.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED interference with the applicant\u2019s right of individual APPLICATION139.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the authorities had failed to provide him with copies of the documents from his case file which he had wished to submit to the Court in substantiation of his application. The applicant also complained that the authorities had blocked his correspondence with the Court. He relied on Article\u00a034 of the Convention, which provides as follows:\u201cThe Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.\u201d140.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant\u2019s complaints under Article 34 of the Convention essentially concern two distinct issues, namely, the alleged refusal to provide the applicant with copies of documents for his application to the Court and the alleged blocking of his letters to the Court. The Court will deal with these issues separately.A.\u00a0\u00a0Refusal to provide the applicant with copies of documents for his application to the Court141.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicant and the lawyer who had represented him in the domestic proceedings had had full access to the case file in the course of those proceedings and that they could have made copies of the relevant documents for the applicant\u2019s application to the Court.142.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not make further submissions in that regard.The Court notes that, although the applicant did not have access to the domestic case file at the time when the Court requested him to submit copies of certain documents in August 2005, less than a month later, that is in September 2005, the applicant was given full access to the case file and was eventually provided copies of some documents from it (see paragraphs\u00a040 and 70 above).143.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not demonstrate that he had been prevented from making copies of any other documents from the case file which he had deemed necessary to substantiate his application before the Court during the times he had had access to the case file on several subsequent occasions during the investigation and at the trial stage (see paragraph 46 above). Nor did he argue that he had been prevented from keeping copies of his own complaints and appeals, which he had made in the domestic proceedings after 2 June 2005 (the date on which he had lodged the present application with the Court), in order to send them to the Strasbourg Court (see paragraph 55 and 62 above).144.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court does not consider that the applicant was effectively prevented from substantiating his application, even though there were periods during which the applicant\u2019s access to the domestic case file was restricted (see paragraphs 68 and 71 above). It does not escape the Court\u2019s attention that there were delays in the applicant\u2019s receiving copies of certain documents from his case file and that after his trial had been completed he could no longer avail himself of the procedural right to study the case file (see paragraphs 58 and 65 above). However, the Court finds the situation at issue was not of a kind where the applicant had no practical opportunity to obtain copies of the necessary documents for his case (compare and contrast with, for instance, Vasiliy Ivashchenko v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 760\/03, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0107-10, 26 July 2012).B.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged interference with the applicant\u2019s correspondence with the Court145.\u00a0\u00a0The Government denied any interference with the applicant\u2019s correspondence with the Court.146.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not make further submissions in that regard.147.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it may not be excluded that the letter which the applicant sent to the Court in August 2009 (see paragraph 73 above) was lost due to a technical error at some stage of dispatch or delivery. In any event, the Court finds that there is an insufficient factual basis to conclude that the Ukrainian authorities deliberately stopped the applicant\u2019s letter or failed to ensure that it was duly dispatched (see Vasiliy Ivashchenko, cited above, \u00a7 115).C.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion148.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court finds that the respondent State has not failed to comply with its obligations under Article 34 of the Convention.VI.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION149.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage150.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 6,000,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage, principally relating to his alleged loss of earnings and deteriorating health during the time he had been imprisoned, and non\u2011pecuniary damage.151.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that claim.152.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not discern any causal link between the violations found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects the claim in so far as it concerns the alleged pecuniary damage. Deciding in equity, it awards the applicant EUR 8,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses153.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted no claim for costs and expenses.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest154.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","29682":"[I.\u00a0\u00a0ADMISSIBILITYA.\u00a0\u00a0 Submissions of the parties56.\u00a0\u00a0The Government raised a preliminary objection based on the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies by the applicant. In order to complain about the conditions of his preventive detention, the applicant ought firstly to have requested, in application of Article 584 of the Judicial Code, an urgent measure from the president of the court of first instance, sitting as the urgent applications judge, who had jurisdiction to ensure that each person\u2019s subjective rights were respected. Although the order of 12 May 2010 by the President of the Li\u00e8ge Court of First Instance had dismissed the applicant\u2019s claims, this was explained by the fact that that court did not have jurisdiction in the area of applications for release. The order of 10\u00a0October 2014 by the president of the French-language Brussels Court of First Instance demonstrated the effectiveness of the urgent applications procedure. Secondly, the applicant could have brought an action for damages on the basis of Article 1382 of the Civil Code. The Government submitted examples from the case-law showing that the Belgian State had already been ordered, through this procedure, to pay compensation to persons detained in psychiatric units or to provide specialist treatment.57.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant considered that it was not necessary to exhaust the remedies referred to by the Government before applying to the Court. He pointed out, firstly, that in 2010 he had applied to the President of the Li\u00e8ge Court of First Instance but that the latter had found that he did not have jurisdiction (see paragraph\u00a030 above). He had then brought proceedings against the Belgian State before the president of the French-language Brussels Court of First Instance in 2014; in those proceedings the Belgian State had argued that his case was inadmissible and that his claim had no merits. The applicant argued that the latter position contradicted the Government\u2019s position before the Court. In any event, he pointed out that the Court had already examined a similar plea of inadmissibility and dismissed it in, among other judgments, Van Meroye v. Belgium (no.\u00a0330\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0106-108, 9\u00a0January 2014). Furthermore, the applicant explained that he had filed a claim for compensation on the basis of Article\u00a01382 of the Civil Code, which was currently pending before the domestic courts.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment58.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the first limb of the Government\u2019s preliminary objection, the Court observes that the applicant had instituted and brought to a conclusion the procedure before the bodies that had jurisdiction under the Social Protection Act to review the lawfulness of his preventive detention and to order, as necessary, his release or his transfer to an appropriate establishment. Following the negative decision by the CDS, he brought his complaints before the CSDS, then before the Court of Cassation, which dismissed his appeal on points of law in a judgment of 8\u00a0September 2010 (see paragraphs\u00a024 and 31-34 above). In addition, before applying to the Court the applicant had also applied to the President of the Li\u00e8ge Court of First Instance, who held in an order of 12\u00a0May 2010 that he did not have jurisdiction (see paragraphs 29-30 above). The applicant did not appeal against that order.59.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that in the case of Claes v. Belgium (no.\u00a043418\/09, \u00a7\u00a079, 10 January 2013) it had noted that persons in preventive detention, whether applying to the social [protection] bodies or the courts, were pursuing the same aim, which was to complain of the inappropriate nature of the detention in a psychiatric wing and to have the State ordered to find an adequate solution. It had also noted that both the social protection bodies and the courts could, in principle, put an end to the situation complained of by those detainees.60.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, for the same reasons as those set out in the above-mentioned judgment (Claes, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 79-83; see also Oukili v. Belgium, no.\u00a043663\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 29-33, 9 January 2014; Moreels v. Belgium, no.\u00a043717\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a029-33, 9\u00a0January 2014; Gelaude v. Belgium, no.\u00a043733\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 26-30, 9\u00a0January 2014; and Saadouni v. Belgium, no.\u00a050658\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 37-41, 9\u00a0January 2014), the Court considers that the applicant has done everything that could reasonably be expected of him to raise his complaints before the domestic courts prior to applying to the Court.61.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to the Government\u2019s objection of non-exhaustion of the compensatory remedy, the Court notes that the applicant filed a negligence claim against the Belgian State after his application had been lodged with the Court. That claim led to the judgment of 9 September 2016, delivered by the French-language Brussels Court of First Instance, which held that the lack of treatment provided to the applicant between 2010 and 2014 had been negligent and had caused him mental suffering; it ordered the State to pay him EUR 75,000 in compensation (see paragraph 49 above). The applicant has apparently appealed against that judgment (see paragraph 51 above).62.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that a remedy that is solely compensatory cannot be regarded as sufficient when dealing with assertions of conditions of preventive or other forms of detention that are allegedly contrary to Article\u00a03, in that such a remedy does not have \u201cpreventive\u201d effect, since it is incapable of preventing the continuation of the alleged violation or enabling detainees to secure an improvement in their conditions of detention (see Torreggiani and Others v. Italy, nos.\u00a043517\/09 and 6\u00a0others, \u00a7 50, 8\u00a0January 2013, and the cases referred to therein).63.\u00a0\u00a0Similarly, the Court reiterates that, in principle, with regard to complaints under Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, only remedies aimed at securing an end to the deprivation of liberty in respect of which a violation is alleged under this provision are to be used for that purpose. Equally, an action whose aim is to secure compensation for the damage resulting from the impugned deprivation of liberty or punishment of the individual(s) responsible for it does not constitute a domestic remedy to be exhausted in respect of such a complaint (see De Donder and De Clippel v. Belgium, no.\u00a08595\/06, \u00a7\u00a0100, 6 December 2011).64.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the above considerations, the plea of inadmissibility must be rejected.65.\u00a0\u00a0Nevertheless, the Court considers, having regard to the favourable outcome obtained by the applicant at first instance (see paragraph 49 above), that the question arises whether the applicant may still claim to be the victim of a possible violation of the Convention.66.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it falls first to the national authorities to redress any alleged violation of the Convention and that the question whether an applicant continues to have victim status falls to be determined at the time of the Court\u2019s examination of the case, taking into account not only the position at the time when the application was lodged with the Court but of all the circumstances of the case, including any developments prior to the date of the examination of the case by the Court (see T\u0103nase v. Moldova [GC], no.\u00a07\/08, \u00a7 105, ECHR 2010).67.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, it also notes that in addition to the award of financial compensation referred to above, the president of the French-language Brussels Court of First Instance had previously, by an order of 10\u00a0October 2014, ordered the Belgian State to appoint a German-speaking psychiatrist and medical auxiliary, subject to a penalty in the event of non-compliance, and to put in place the care routinely provided to French-speaking detainees suffering from a mental illness similar to that of the applicant (see paragraph 46 above). In addition, the court noted that the applicant\u2019s situation amounted to a violation of Articles 3 and 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention (see paragraph 49 above).68.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that a favourable decision or measure is not in principle sufficient to deprive applicants of their victim status for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for the breach of the Convention (see Scordino v. Italy (no.\u00a01) [GC], no.\u00a036813\/97, \u00a7\u00a7 179-180, ECHR 2006-V, and G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no.\u00a022978\/05, \u00a7 115, ECHR\u00a02010). Only where both these conditions have been satisfied does the subsidiary nature of the protective mechanism of the Convention preclude examination of the application.69.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in the present case the domestic courts explicitly recognised that there had been a violation of the Convention. As to whether there has been redress which is \u201cappropriate\u201d and \u201csufficient\u201d, it notes that the national authorities, following the communication of the application, admittedly took decisions in the applicant\u2019s favour, by ordering that German-speaking professionals be made available and awarding him financial compensation for the prejudice sustained. However, the Court cannot overlook the fact that this availability lasted for only a few months, or that the situation giving rise to the application dates back to the beginning of the applicant\u2019s preventive detention and had been formally noted by the CDS since 2006 (see, mutatis mutandis Y.Y. v. Turkey, no.\u00a014793\/08,\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a052\u201155, ECHR\u00a02015 (extracts)). Furthermore, the financial compensation awarded at first instance covers only the period from January 2010 to October 2014. This cannot therefore be regarded as full reparation, especially as the judgment of 9\u00a0September 2016 was delivered at first instance and is not final (see paragraph 51 above).70.\u00a0\u00a0It is accordingly appropriate to consider that the applicant has not lost his victim status.71.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the complaints under Articles 3 and 5\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further finds that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION72.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that his detention without psychological and psychiatric treatment in the social protection facility where he had been placed in preventive detention, and the total lack of any prospects of improvement in his situation on account of this absence of treatment, amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment prohibited by Article\u00a03 of the Convention, which reads:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d73.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.A.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions of the parties1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant74.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that his mental health had deteriorated on account of the total absence of treatment, as confirmed by several psychiatrists, who had indeed alerted the authorities to the lack of prospects for positive developments in his situation. However, only therapy could legitimise the applicant\u2019s deprivation of freedom. Without it, his detention amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment, contrary to human dignity. In short, the applicant was in limbo: he was detained on account of his dangerousness and his mental-health condition; in order to stop being dangerous, he needed to receive treatment; however, the applicant had not been provided with any treatment since being placed in preventive detention; as the social protection bodies had found that they did not have power to oblige the executive to offer him therapy, the applicant would therefore be detained for life.75.\u00a0\u00a0According to the applicant, the Belgian State had been at fault from the outset of his preventive detention in 2003, in that he had been left without the treatment required by his mental-health condition. Indeed, the Government could not deny that the Paifve EDS employed no care staff who could speak German; in consequence, it was impossible to put in place any form of therapy for the applicant. With regard to the German-speaking social worker, the applicant had met her on only two or three occasions\u00a0\u2013and not thirteen times as claimed by the Government\u00a0\u2013\u00a0and she had stopped seeing the applicant because she had not been paid for doing so, and because the applicant had no longer requested her services. The Dutch-language nurse who spoke German had left the Paifve EDS in 2012. In any event, what the applicant needed was to meet a German-speaking psychologist and psychiatrist, as the CSDS had acknowledged in its decision of 22 July 2014.76.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, it was incorrect to state that the applicant had refused care, given that he had never been offered treatment or therapy sessions. This reality had been confirmed by the CSDS in its decision of 22 July 2014. The persons he had met in Verviers Prison in 2007 had been entrusted only with a fact-finding task, and there had therefore been no therapeutic aspect to those meetings. In addition, it was for the State to put in place the necessary treatment, and not for the applicant himself to indicate what treatment he required. The authorities had been aware of the applicant\u2019s situation since the beginning of his preventive detention, and they had taken no action since that time.77.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicant considered that there was nothing in the case file to support the assertion that, in practice, his dangerous behaviour had persisted and that his continued detention was justified. On the contrary, his good behaviour had been confirmed in various reports by the psychosocial service in the Paifve EDS; he had never had any problems with the staff or the other detainees and had never been the subject of a report or a disciplinary proceedings. He worked peacefully in the Paifve EDS and had made progress in terms of social life and conviviality. Thus, the applicant had confirmed to his lawyer on 25 July 2014 that he was willing to meet people who were able to examine and help him.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Government78.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the Paifve EDS was the establishment designated by the CDS for the applicant\u2019s detention. He received treatment there, in particular medical treatment for diabetes-related problems. According to the Government, and as noted by the CSDS and the Court of Cassation, the fact that there existed a language problem in no way implied that the necessary treatment could not be provided. Indeed, the CDS had accepted that position in its decision of 24\u00a0January 2014.79.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, the Government pointed out that the applicant refused to collaborate with the members of the care team and that he had not indicated what specific treatment had not been proposed or provided to him. The applicant had submitted no request for psychological counselling, and he had not complained or asked for psychotropic drugs. The problem lay instead in the applicant\u2019s pathology, in a refusal to accept his situation and the fact that he did not always accept treatment.80.\u00a0\u00a0Admittedly, the Government acknowledged that the circumstance of the applicant being German-speaking made the provision of care in a French-language environment difficult. However, the authorities had made every possible effort to address the applicant\u2019s problems and were continuing to seek solutions.\u00a0In this connection, the Government noted that the applicant had been regularly seen (once a month on average) by a social worker who was fluent in German. Thus, the applicant had met a psychologist in the presence of this social worker, who had provided interpretation. Furthermore, between May and November 2010 the applicant had been able to meet a German-speaking psychologist thirteen times. The authorities had taken steps to find a solution to the situation, especially by looking for German-language institutions in a position to take in the applicant. A German-speaking employee had also been made available to the applicant, so that he could go on accompanied outings once every three months.81.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Government observed that, according to a report by the Paifve EDS\u2019s psychosocial service of 13 January 2014, the applicant\u2019s condition had improved: in particular, he was communicating more with members of staff. This improvement resulted, according to the Government, from the beneficial effect of the institution\u2019s reassuring setting.\u00a0In conclusion, the Government considered that the authorities had done their utmost, bearing in mind the applicant\u2019s high-risk profile and the language problem. In their view, the level of severity for Article 3 of the Convention to apply had thus not been attained.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0General applicable principles82.\u00a0\u00a0The Court refers to the general principles concerning the responsibility of States vis-\u00e0-vis the provision of health care to detainees in general and to detainees suffering from mental disorders in particular, as set forth in its judgments in the cases of Bamouhammad v. Belgium (no.\u00a047687\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 115-123, 17 November 2015) and Murray v. the Netherlands ([GC], no.\u00a010511\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 105-106, ECHR 2016) respectively.2.\u00a0\u00a0Application to the present case83.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the existence of the mental-health problems at the origin of the applicant\u2019s preventive detention is not disputed. He was placed in preventive detention on the basis of several medical reports finding that he had a narcissistic and paranoid personality and suffered from a severe mental disturbance rendering him incapable of controlling his actions. In consequence, the applicant has been detained continuously in the Paifve EDS since 21\u00a0January 2004.84.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant explained that, throughout his detention, he had not received any therapeutic care for his mental-health problems. The Court noted that, in contrast to other cases raising similar complaints that it has already had to decide (see, for example, Claes, cited above, and Lankester v.\u00a0Belgium, no.\u00a022283\/10, 9 January 2014), the applicant in the present case did not complain that the Paifve facility as such was inappropriate for his mental-health condition and his profile. He complained that he alone has not received treatment because the institution in which he was detained, situated in the French-language region of Belgium, has no members of staff who speak German, one of Belgium\u2019s official languages and the only language in which he is fluent. As a result, and in the absence of any prospect of progress in the situation, the applicant alleged that his mental health has deteriorated.85.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not dispute the absence of German-speaking medical staff within the Paifve facility, nor the difficulty in providing therapeutic treatment for the applicant\u2019s mental-health problems. However, they submitted that there was no causal link between these two aspects. In their view, the reasons for the latter problem lay in the type of illness from which the applicant suffered, his lack of collaboration with the medical team and his failure to take a proactive approach with the institution\u2019s psychosocial service. They also emphasised that the language problems had not prevented the necessary treatment being provided for the applicant\u2019s physical health. In addition, the applicant had not been deprived of any form of communication nor left without any consultations, since he met regularly with a German-speaking nurse and social worker.86.\u00a0\u00a0The Court cannot accept the Government\u2019s argument. All the evidence before it tends to show that the main, if not the only, reason for the failure to provide therapeutic care for the applicant\u2019s mental-health problems was that communication between the medical staff and the applicant was impossible. On several occasions the applicant\u2019s applications for release were postponed by the CDS on account of the difficulty in beginning therapy as a result of the language problem (see paragraphs 13 and 16 above). Furthermore, attempts have been made since 2006 to find therapeutic support, to be provided in German outside the Paifve facility (see paragraphs\u00a013, 18-19 and 23 above). In several reports the Social Protection Board and the professionals who met the applicant confirmed that the provision of therapy was impeded by the language barrier and that the applicant\u2019s failure to make progress resulted from the absence of such care. The president of the French-language Brussels Court of First Instance and the court itself also found that it was the lack of therapy in German that restricted practical access to the care that was normally available (see paragraphs 45 and 49 above).87.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant was certainly able to meet qualified German-speaking staff. However, as emphasised by the CDS itself, these contacts, whether with the experts from Verviers Prison or with the German-speaking nurse and social worker in Paifve, were in a non-therapeutic context (see paragraphs 17-18 and 26 above). Only the visits by an external German\u2011speaking psychologist between May and November 2010 (see paragraph 45 above) corresponded to the Government\u2019s line of argument; however, apart from the fact that, set against the overall duration of the detention, these visits cannot be considered as a genuine course of treatment, the Court notes that they came to an end as a result of the State\u2019s failure to pay the attendant costs and expenses.88.\u00a0\u00a0The Government then claimed that the applicant failed to produce any real evidence to substantiate his allegations and did not indicate what treatment had not been provided or offered to him.89.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not agree with this analysis of the situation. It notes that the applicant referred before the social-protection bodies to the failure to prove treatment and to the impact on his health of the lack of any prospect of a change in his situation (see paragraph 24 above). It further reiterates that it has already repeatedly rejected such a formalistic approach and emphasised that the assessment of whether the treatment or punishment concerned is incompatible with the standards of Article 3 has, in the case of mentally ill persons, to take into consideration their vulnerability and their inability, in some cases, to complain coherently or at all about how they are being affected by any particular treatment (see Claes, cited above, \u00a7\u00a093; Murray, cited above, \u00a7 106; and W.D. v. Belgium, no.\u00a073548\/13, \u00a7 105, 6\u00a0September 2016).90.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not underestimate the efforts made by the social protection bodies to find a solution in the applicant\u2019s particular case (see paragraphs 21 and 23 above). However, those efforts were thwarted by the authorities\u2019 failure to take appropriate measures to bring about a change in his situation. It was not until the CSDS decision and the order by the president of the French-language Brussels Court of First Instance in 2014 (see paragraphs 40 and 45 above) that practical measures, which had been recommended for years, were taken through the provision of a German-speaking psychologist. However, it appears that this arrangement ceased towards the end of 2015 (see paragraph 47 above).91.\u00a0\u00a0In those circumstances, and taking into account the fact that German is one of the three official languages in Belgium, the Court finds that the national authorities did not provide adequate treatment for the applicant\u2019s health condition. The fact that he was continuously detained in the Paifve EDS for thirteen years without appropriate medical support or any realistic prospect of change thus subjected him to particularly acute hardship, causing him distress of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention.92.\u00a0\u00a0Whatever obstacles the applicant may have created by his own conduct \u2013 as pointed out by the Government \u2013 the Court considers that this did not dispense the State from fulfilling its obligations towards him.93.\u00a0\u00a0In those circumstances, and as the president of the French-language Brussels Court of First Instance and that court itself also noted in the order of 10 October 2014 and the judgment of 9 September 2016 respectively (see paragraphs\u00a045 and 49 above), the Court concludes that the applicant was subjected to degrading treatment on account of his continued detention in the conditions examined above, in the period from his admission to the Paifve EDS on 21 January 2004 until now, with the exception of two periods when he had access to a German-speaking psychologist, from May to November 2010 and from July 2014 to the end of 2015. There has accordingly been a violation of Article\u00a03 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION94.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleges that his detention is not lawful, given that he is not receiving the psychological and psychiatric treatment necessitated by his mental health. He relies on Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.95.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the fact that the applicant has been detained since 20\u00a0February 2004 solely on the basis of the decision of 16 June 2003 of the Committals Division of the Li\u00e8ge Court of First Instance, upheld by the judgment of 1 August 2003 of the Indictments Division of the Li\u00e8ge Court of Appeal applying section 7 of the Social Protection Act, and of the ministerial decision of 15 January 2004 applying section 21 of the Social Protection Act, it is paragraph (e) of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention which is applicable (see, inter alia, L.B. v. Belgium, no.\u00a022831\/08, \u00a7 89, 2\u00a0October 2012). The relevant part of Article 5 \u00a7 1 provides:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:...(e)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;...\u201d96.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.A.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions of the parties97.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that his detention was not \u201clawful\u201d within the meaning of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (e) of the Convention given that, as a result of a language problem, he was not receiving the required treatment for his mental health. In his opinion, his detention ought to provide an opportunity to ensure that he received the treatment necessitated by his condition, with a view to his re-integration into society. Thus, according to the applicant, preventive detention ought to be accompanied by appropriate treatment. In the present case, however, nobody was capable of providing care to the applicant in German, the only language that he understood and spoke and, furthermore, one of the three official languages in Belgium. Indeed, the unlawfulness of the applicant\u2019s detention had been noted on several occasions by the CDS itself, in particular in its decision of 29 April 2010. The CDS had also noted that the absence of treatment resulted from the authorities\u2019 inertia.98.\u00a0\u00a0The Government referred to their arguments with regard to Article 3 of the Convention. They submitted that the present application resembled the case of De Schepper v. Belgium, in which the Court had found that the Belgian authorities had not failed in their obligation to seek to provide the applicant with treatment adapted to his condition that might help him recover his freedom, but that their lack of success could be explained mainly by the evolution in the applicant\u2019s condition and the fact that it was therapeutically impossible for the institutions approached to treat him (they referred to De Schepper v. Belgium, no.\u00a027428\/07, \u00a7 48, 13 October 2009). They asserted that there had been no violation of Article 5 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment99.\u00a0\u00a0The Court refers to the four leading judgments adopted by it with regard to the situation in Belgium in respect of the preventive detention of offenders with mental disorders, in which it set out the general principles enshrined in its case-law on which to assess the lawfulness of the deprivation of liberty and the continued detention of an individual suffering from mental-health problems (see L.B. v. Belgium, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a091-94; Claes, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 112-115; Dufoort v. Belgium, no.\u00a043653\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a076,\u00a077\u00a0and 79, 10 January 2013; and Swennen v. Belgium, no.\u00a053448\/10, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a069-72, 10\u00a0January 2013; see also Papillo v. Switzerland, no.\u00a043368\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 41-43, 27\u00a0January 2015).100.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the Court notes that it is not in dispute that the preventive detention was decided \u201cin accordance with a procedure prescribed by law\u201d within the meaning of Article\u00a05 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention.101.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, for detention to be considered \u201clawful\u201d, there must be some relationship between the ground of permitted deprivation of liberty relied on and the place and conditions of detention (see Ashingdane v. the United Kingdom, 28\u00a0May 1985, \u00a7 44, Series A no.\u00a093; Aerts v. Belgium, 30 July 1998, \u00a7 46, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-V; Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.\u00a013229\/03, \u00a7 69, ECHR 2008; and Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no.\u00a036760\/06, \u00a7\u00a0147, ECHR 2012).102.\u00a0\u00a0It further notes that, in contrast to the leading cases cited above (see paragraph 99), the applicant is detained in a social-protection institution that is in principle appropriate to his mental health condition and his degree of dangerousness (see paragraph 52 above).103.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has also found, under Article 3 of the Convention, that he has not been provided with appropriate care in that institution and has been held in unsuitable conditions for thirteen years, in breach of Article\u00a03 (see paragraph 93 above).\u00a0That being stated, the Court also reiterates its established case-law to the effect that, as long as a person\u2019s detention as a mental health patient takes place in a hospital, clinic or other appropriate institution, the adequacy of the treatment or regime is not a matter for examination under Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention (see Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, 24 October 1979, \u00a7 51, Series A no.\u00a033; Ashingdane, cited above, \u00a7 44; and Stanev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0147). In the present case, there has at all times been a link between the reason for the applicant\u2019s detention and his mental illness. The failure to provide appropriate care, for reasons unconnected with the actual nature of the institution in which the applicant was held, did not break that link and did not render his detention unlawful (see Ashingdane, cited above, \u00a7 49).104.\u00a0\u00a0In conclusion, there has been no violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1.IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION105.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage106.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 800,000 euros (EUR) in respect of the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage he had allegedly sustained. He argued that, had he been at liberty, he could have been employed. This loss of earnings was to be assessed together with the non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of the unjust and unwarranted detention. Thus, the applicant considered that the damages ought to be calculated on the basis of compensation for each day of detention since the decision issued by the Committals Division on 16 June 2003. On the basis of EUR\u00a0200 per day of detention, he calculated a total amount of EUR 800,000 at the date of submitting his observations, that is, on 29 July 2014. However, he left it to the discretion of the Court to determine the daily sum and the total amount. Lastly, the applicant asked that the Court explicitly state that the damage sustained would continue until his effective release.107.\u00a0\u00a0The Government noted that, in calculating damages, the applicant had used the compensation system intended cases of unwarranted detention. However, this comparison was irrelevant in the present case, since the decision to place the applicant in preventive detention had been lawful. Referring to the Court\u2019s existing case-law in this area, the Government suggested that any sum awarded did not exceed EUR\u00a015,000.108.\u00a0\u00a0In the absence of any demonstrated causal link between the violation of Article 3 of the Convention and the pecuniary damage, the Court dismisses the applicant\u2019s claims under this head.109.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Court finds that the applicant undoubtedly sustained damage of a non-pecuniary nature on account of his continued detention without appropriate treatment for his health condition. Ruling in equity, as required under Article 41, the Court awards him EUR 15,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage (see, mutatis mutandis, W.D v. Belgium, cited above, \u00a7 177).B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses110.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed, without submitting any supporting documents, a single lump sum of EUR 100,000 in respect of the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and before the Court.111.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that this claim ought to be rejected. Firstly, the applicant had been granted legal aid for his defence in the domestic proceedings, which also covered legal fees. Secondly, the applicant had not provided evidence that the fees in question had been genuinely incurred; moreover, some of those fees concerned proceedings that were still pending, the outcome of which was still unknown.112.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, the applicant has not submitted any invoice or any fee note or expenses claim which would confirm that the costs are real, or any breakdown of fees on the basis of the proceedings and the time spent on them. The applicant\u2019s claim is therefore dismissed.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest113.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","29768":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION16.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the conditions of his detention and the overcrowding in \u0141owicz Prison, where he had been held between 27\u00a0January 2007 and 19\u00a0April 2009 (for almost 2 years and 3 months) had amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility17.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant could no longer be considered a victim of the alleged violation because by virtue of the domestic court\u2019s judgment of 1\u00a0March 2013 he had been awarded compensation of PLN\u00a07,000 (approximately EUR 1,750) plus interest. Additionally, the domestic courts had relied on Article 3 of the Convention and had thus acknowledged a breach of the Convention. Moreover, the domestic courts had taken into account the fact that overcrowding alone had not contributed to the deterioration of the applicant\u2019s health. The Government invoked the inadmissibility decisions in the cases of B.G.\u00a0v.\u00a0Poland ((dec.), no.\u00a061403\/10 of 27\u00a0August 20013) and Dubjakov\u00e1 v.\u00a0Slovakia ((dec.), no. 67299\/01 of 19 October 2004) and argued that since in those cases the amount of compensation awarded at national level had resulted in a finding that the applicants could no longer claim to be victims of a violation of the Convention, the same reasoning should be applied in the case at hand.18.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted in substance that he still had victim status within the meaning of the Convention.19.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that a decision or measure favourable to the applicant is not, in principle, sufficient to deprive him of his status as a \u201cvictim\u201d for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for the breach of the Convention (see G\u00e4fgen v.\u00a0Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, \u00a7 115, ECHR 2010).20.\u00a0\u00a0The Court accepts the Government\u2019s statement that a breach of the Convention was acknowledged by the national authorities. Nevertheless, it reiterates that the redress afforded must be appropriate and sufficient. This will depend on all the circumstances of the case, with particular regard to the nature of the Convention violation in issue (see G\u00e4fgen, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0115). An applicant\u2019s victim status may depend also on the level of compensation awarded at the domestic level on the basis of the facts about which he or she has complained to the Court (see Scordino v. Italy (no.\u00a01) [GC], no. 36813\/97, \u00a7 202, ECHR 2006\u2011V)21.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic societies and persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them (see Orchowski, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 119-122). For that reason, despite acknowledgement of a breach of the Convention, the fact that an applicant has been awarded a sum of money in compensation in the domestic proceedings is not decisive when it comes to determining an applicant\u2019s victim status (see Norbert Sikorski, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a096\u201199).22.\u00a0\u00a0The Government invokes the case of B.G. v. Poland concerning Article 8 of the Convention and Dubjakov\u00e1 v. Slovakia (both cited above) concerning Article 6 and argues that the amount awarded was adequate. However, the Court is of the opinion that the findings in the aforementioned cases cannot be relied on in the case at hand because of the different nature of the alleged violation. In consequence, the amount of compensation awarded at national level in cases related to different violations of the Convention cannot be regarded as decisive in cases raising issues under Article\u00a03. Additionally, the Polish national system does not provide for any alternative form of redress for a violation of a prisoner\u2019s rights on the grounds of detention in inadequate, overcrowded conditions. Financial compensation is the only post-violation measure available to victims but national law does not limit the amount of compensation (see, a contrario, Stella v. Italy (dec.), no. 49169\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 59-63).23.\u00a0\u00a0The Court acknowledges the fact that the amount of compensation is not a decisive factor and that solely because the sum awarded at national level was lower than that fixed by the Court does not automatically mean the remedy was not effective (see Stella, cited above, \u00a7\u00a062). However, taking into account the Court\u2019s case-law regarding the amount of compensation awarded in cases concerning prison conditions where the Court has found a violation of an applicant\u2019s rights protected by Article\u00a03, the compensation awarded to this applicant by the domestic authorities of EUR 1,750 is insufficient and the applicant can still claim to be a victim (see Janusz Wojciechowski v. Poland, no.\u00a054511\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 42-49, 28\u00a0June 2016, and Olszewski v. Poland, no.\u00a021880\/03, \u00a7\u00a0124, 2 April 2013).24.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the application is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits25.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained that the overcrowding and sanitary conditions of his incarceration had had an adverse effect on his health and had caused him humiliation and suffering. He submitted that the conditions of his detention had fallen short of standards compatible with Article 3 of the Convention.26.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not make any submissions as to the merits of the application.27.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that in the circumstances of the instant case, as the applicant was detained in \u0141owicz Prison from 27 January 2007 to 19\u00a0April 2009, the applicant was detained in overcrowded conditions even after the systemic problem was considered to have been resolved (Orchowski (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 119-131 and Norbert Sikorski cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0126-141).28.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes in that regard that the domestic courts established, in a finding that was uncontested by the applicant or the Government, that the applicant\u2019s detention in \u0141owicz Prison was marked by serious overcrowding for a period of 802 days. Additionally, he was kept in a solitary confinement cell where the toilet was not separated from the living area (see paragraph 13 above).29.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the circumstances of the case and their cumulative effect on the applicant, the Court considers that the distress and hardship endured by him exceeded the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and went beyond the threshold of severity under Article\u00a03 of the Convention.There has accordingly been a violation of that Article.II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION30.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage31.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 25,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.32.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the amount sought was exorbitant.33.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicant suffered damage of a non\u2011pecuniary nature as a result of his detention in conditions contrary to Article 3 of the Convention (see paragraphs 27- above). Making an assessment on an equitable basis, as required by Article 41 of the Convention, and in view of the award which has been already made by the domestic courts, the Court awards the applicant EUR 3,700 under this head.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses34.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not make any claim for costs and expenses for the Convention or domestic proceedings.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest35.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","29860":"15.\u00a0\u00a0In their first round of observations, relying on Abdi Ahmed and Others v. Malta ((dec.), no. 43985\/13, 16 September 2014), the Government submitted that the application should be struck out as the applicant had not transmitted the information that he had left Malta. This would show that he was no longer interested in pursuing the application. In the second round of observations the Government noted that they did not have information as to his whereabouts. They opined that the case was being pushed by an NGO to succeed in obtaining a declaration from the Court that the facts constituted a repetitive case and asked the Court to strike the application out of its list.16.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s representatives\u2019 observations of 10 March 2015 made no comment on the above. In their letter of 24 July 2017 the applicant\u2019s legal representatives confirmed that the applicant had left Malta without informing them and that they had tried to contact him several times to no avail (see paragraph 14 above). However, they argued that there were special circumstances relating to the respect for human rights which justified the continuation of the examination of the case. In particular, they noted that the case concerned the treatment and conditions of the detention of a minor, thus a judgment in this respect had broader implications on vulnerable minors in the same situation.17.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to these circumstances, the Court considers it necessary first to examine the need to continue the examination of the application according to the criteria set forth in Article 37 of the Convention. This provision reads as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0The Court may at any stage of the proceedings decide to strike an application out of its list of cases where the circumstances lead to the conclusion that(a)\u00a0\u00a0the applicant does not intend to pursue his application; or(b)\u00a0\u00a0the matter has been resolved; or(c)\u00a0\u00a0for any other reason established by the Court, it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application.However, the Court shall continue the examination of the application if respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto so requires.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court may decide to restore an application to its list of cases if it considers that the circumstances justify such a course.\u201d18.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that an applicant\u2019s representative must not only supply a power of attorney or written authority (Rule 45 \u00a7 3 of the Rules of Court) but that it is also important that contact between the applicant and his or her representative be maintained throughout the proceedings. Such contact is essential both in order to learn more about the applicant\u2019s particular situation and to confirm the applicant\u2019s continuing interest in pursuing the examination of his or her application (see V.M. and Others v.\u00a0Belgium [GC], no. 60125\/11, \u00a7 35, 17 November 2016, and Sharifi and Others v.\u00a0Italy and Greece, no. 16643\/09, \u00a7 124, 21 October 2014).19.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case the Court observes that the applicant did not maintain contact with his lawyers and failed to keep them informed of his place of residence or to provide them with another means of contacting him. Accordingly, it considers that it can conclude on that basis that the applicant has lost interest in the proceedings and no longer intends to pursue the application, within the meaning of Article 37 \u00a7 1 (a) of the Convention (see, for example and mutatis mutandis, V.M. and Others v. Belgium, cited above, \u00a7 36; Ibrahim Hayd v. the Netherlands (dec.), no.\u00a030880\/10, \u00a7\u00a010, 29\u00a0November 2011; Kadzoev v. Bulgaria (dec.), no.\u00a056437\/07, \u00a7\u00a07, 1\u00a0October 2013; M.H. and Others v. Cyprus (dec.), no.\u00a041744\/10, \u00a7\u00a014, 14\u00a0January 2014; and M.Is. v.\u00a0Cyprus (dec.), no.\u00a041805\/10, \u00a7\u00a020, 10\u00a0February 2015).20.\u00a0\u00a0Whilst it is true that the applicant\u2019s representatives have power to represent him throughout the entire proceedings before the Court, that power does not by itself justify pursuing the examination of the case (see V.M. and Others v. Belgium, cited above, \u00a7 37, and Ramzy v.\u00a0the\u00a0Netherlands (striking out), no.\u00a025424\/05, \u00a7 64, 20 July 2010). It would appear in the present case that the last time the applicant and his lawyers were in contact was prior to the Government\u2019s submission of observations, thus also prior to the legal representatives\u2019 submissions on just satisfaction. In these circumstances the Court considers that the applicant\u2019s representatives cannot now meaningfully pursue the proceedings before it, in the absence of instructions from their client, particularly regarding the matter of just satisfaction (see Ali v. Switzerland, 5 August 1998, \u00a7 32, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-V; and, mutatis mutandis, V.M.\u00a0and Others v. Belgium, cited above, \u00a7\u00a037).21.\u00a0\u00a0Regarding the submission by the applicant\u2019s representatives that there were special circumstances in the present case relating to the respect for human rights which justified the continuation of the examination of the case, specifically the fact that the case concerns the detention of minors (see paragraph 16 above), the Court notes that it has already dealt with a very similar case, in respect of detention of minors in Malta, where it found violations of Articles 3 and 5 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention and declared inadmissible the complaint under Article 5\u00a0\u00a7 2 (see Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v. Malta, nos. 25794\/13 and 28151\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 64-154, 22\u00a0November 2016). There is therefore no special circumstance justifying the examination of similar complaints, in the absence of any interest from the applicant. The Court would observe, moreover, that if the circumstances justify such a course the applicant can request that the application be restored to the list of cases under Article 37 \u00a7\u00a02 of the Convention.22.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the foregoing and in accordance with Article\u00a037\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(a) of the Convention, the Court has to conclude that the applicant does not intend to pursue his application. It also considers that no particular circumstance relating to respect for the rights guaranteed by the Convention or its Protocols requires it to continue the examination of the application pursuant to Article 37 \u00a7 1 in fine.23.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the case should be struck out of the list.For these reasons, the Court, by a majority,Decides to strike the application out of its list of cases.\u00a0Done in English and notified in writing on 26 October 2017.Marialena TsirliGanna YudkivskaRegistrarPresident","29843":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION36.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the authorities (the police, the prosecutor\u2019s office and the courts) had failed to investigate promptly and effectively the allegations of ill-treatment inflicted on him, despite the evidence brought before them. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility37.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 observations38.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that the proceeding had been excessively long and that the authorities had protracted the investigation and had failed to take into account that he had been a vulnerable person, a minor subject to domestic abuse.39.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that in the light of the serious and sensitive subject matter of the case, specifically accusations of ill-treatment of the applicant by his father, D.D., the effectiveness of the investigation had required an in-depth analysis of the evidence in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice, in particular as the parties had presented diverging and subjective representations of the situation which had rendered more difficult the establishment of facts. In their view, there had been no periods of inactivity imputable to the authorities, whereas the applicant\u2019s representative had contributed to the general length by making use of every appeal at her disposal.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles40.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant principles concerning the State\u2019s positive obligation inherent in Article 3 of the Convention to investigate cases of ill-treatment, and in particular domestic abuse committed by private individuals, are set out in M.C. and A.C. v. Romania (no. 12060\/12, 12 April 2016), whose paragraphs\u00a0107-12 read as follows:\u201c107.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates at the outset that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, its duration, its physical and mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, for example, Bouyid v.\u00a0Belgium [GC], no. 23380\/09, \u00a7 86, ECHR 2015; M. and M. v.\u00a0Croatia, no.\u00a010161\/13, \u00a7 131, 3 September 2015; A. v. the United Kingdom, 23\u00a0September\u00a01998, \u00a7 20, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011VI; and Costello\u2011Roberts v. the United Kingdom, 25 March 1993, \u00a7 30, Series A no. 247\u2011C).108.\u00a0\u00a0Treatment has been held by the Court to be \u2018degrading \u2012 and thus to fall within the scope of the prohibition set out in Article 3 of the Convention \u2012 if it causes in its victim feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority (see, for example, Ireland v. the\u00a0United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7 167, Series A no. 25, and Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no.\u00a036760\/06, \u00a7 203, ECHR 2012), if it humiliates or debases an individual (humiliation in the victim\u2019s own eyes, see Raninen v. Finland, 16\u00a0December\u00a01997, \u00a7\u00a032, Reports 1997\u2011VIII, and\/or in other people\u2019s eyes, see Gutsanovi v.\u00a0Bulgaria, no.\u00a034529\/10, \u00a7 136, ECHR 2013 (extracts)), whether or not that was the aim (see Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 120, ECHR 2000\u2011IV), if it breaks the person\u2019s physical or moral resistance or drives him or her to act against his or her will or conscience (see Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no. 54810\/00, \u00a7 68, ECHR 2006\u2011IX), or if it shows a lack of respect for, or diminishes, human dignity (see Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], nos. 32541\/08 and 43441\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 118 and 138, 17 July 2014).109.\u00a0\u00a0The obligation of the High Contracting Parties under Article 1 of the Convention to secure for everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, taken together with Article 3, requires States to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to ill-treatment, including ill-treatment administered by private individuals (see M.C. v.\u00a0Bulgaria, no. 39272\/98, \u00a7 149, ECHR 2003\u2011XII, confirmed more recently in O\u2019Keeffe v. Ireland [GC], no. 35810\/09, \u00a7 144, ECHR 2014 (extracts)).110.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the absence of any direct State responsibility for acts of violence of such severity as to engage Article 3 of the Convention does not absolve the State from all obligations under this provision. In such cases, Article 3 requires that the authorities conduct an effective official investigation into the alleged ill-treatment, even if such treatment has been inflicted by private individuals (see M.C., cited above, \u00a7\u00a0151; C.A.S. and C.S. v. Romania, no. 26692\/05, \u00a7 69, 20 March 2012; and Denis Vasilyev v. Russia, no. 32704\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 98-99, 17 December 2009).111.\u00a0\u00a0Even though the scope of the State\u2019s positive obligations might differ between cases where treatment contrary to Article 3 has been inflicted through the involvement of State agents and cases where violence has been inflicted by private individuals, the requirements regarding an official investigation are similar. For the investigation to be regarded as \u2018effective\u2019, it should in principle be capable of leading to the establishment of the facts of the case and to the identification and punishment of those responsible. This is not an obligation as to the results to be achieved but as to the means to be employed. The authorities must have taken the steps reasonably available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter\u00a0alia, eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence, and so on. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard, and a requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is implicit in this context. In cases under Article 3 of the Convention where the effectiveness of the official investigation has been at issue, the Court has often assessed whether the authorities reacted promptly to the complaints at the relevant time. Consideration has been given to the opening of investigations, delays in taking statements and the length of time taken for the preliminary investigation (see Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 119-23; Mocanu and Others, cited above, \u00a7 322; Identoba and Others, cited above, \u00a7 66; Begheluri and Others, cited above, \u00a7 99; Denis Vasilyev, cited above, \u00a7 100 with further references; and Stoica v. Romania, no. 42722\/02, \u00a7 67, 4 March 2008). A prompt response by the authorities in investigating allegations of ill-treatment may generally be regarded as essential in maintaining public confidence in their maintenance of the rule of law and in preventing any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts. Tolerance by the authorities towards such acts cannot but undermine public confidence in the principle of lawfulness and the State\u2019s maintenance of the rule of law (see Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses and Others v.\u00a0Georgia, no.\u00a071156\/01, \u00a7 97, 3 May 2007).112.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, when the official investigation has led to the institution of proceedings in the national courts, the proceedings as a whole, including the trial stage, must satisfy the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention. In this respect the Court has already held that the protection mechanisms available under domestic law should operate in practice in a manner that allows for the examination of the merits of a particular case within a reasonable time (see, for example, W. v.\u00a0Slovenia, no.\u00a024125\/06, \u00a7 65, 23 January 2014).\u201d41.\u00a0\u00a0Concerning children or other vulnerable individuals, the Court stated as follows in M. and M. v. Croatia (no. 10161\/13, \u00a7 136, ECHR\u00a02015 (extracts); see also, mutatis mutandis, C.A.S. and C.S. v.\u00a0Romania, no.\u00a026692\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 68-70 and 82, 20 March 2012, and Z and Others v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, [GC], no.\u00a029392\/95, \u00a7 73, ECHR 2001-V):\u201c136.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further reiterates that Article 1 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 3, imposes on States positive obligations to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are protected against all forms of ill-treatment prohibited under Article 3, including where such treatment is administered by private individuals. Children and other vulnerable individuals, in particular, are entitled to State protection, in the form of effective deterrence, against such serious breaches of personal integrity (see, for example, A. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 22, and Opuz v. Turkey, no. 33401\/02, \u00a7 159, ECHR 2009, as well as the Council of Europe Recommendation on integrated national strategies for the protection of children from violence, cited in paragraph 103 above). The Court has also acknowledged the particular vulnerability of victims of domestic violence and the need for active State involvement in their protection (see Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria, no. 71127\/01, \u00a7\u00a065, 12\u00a0June\u00a02008, and Opuz, cited above, \u00a7 132). Those positive obligations, which often overlap, consist of: (a) the obligation to prevent ill-treatment of which the authorities knew or ought to have known (see, for example, \u0110or\u0111evi\u0107 v. Croatia, no.\u00a041526\/10, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0138-139, ECHR 2012), and (b) the (procedural) obligation to conduct an effective official investigation where an individual raises an arguable claim of ill-treatment (see, for example, Dimitar Shopov v. Bulgaria, no. 17253\/07, \u00a7 47, 16 April 2013).\u201d(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of these principles to the present case42.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes that the authorities became aware of the applicant\u2019s situation on 27\u00a0February\u00a02004, when the applicant\u2019s mother (C.I.) called the hotline of the Child Protection Authority to report the abuse (see paragraph 5 above). There is however no indication that anything concrete was done to verify the information or transmit it to the police for investigation or in any way to protect the victims from the alleged abuse, despite the legal obligation to do so (see paragraph\u00a022 above). Moreover, no action was taken by the authorities in respect of the first four criminal complaints lodged by C.I. against D.D., from March to June 2004 (see paragraph 6 above).43.\u00a0\u00a0As for the proceedings, the Court notes that they started on 1\u00a0July\u00a02004 (see paragraph 6 above) and ended on 1 November 2012 (see paragraph\u00a020 above). They thus lasted eight years and four months at three\u00a0levels of jurisdiction. Moreover, the investigation lasted until 27\u00a0December\u00a02007, that is, for almost three years and six months, and little seems to have been done during this period besides hearing evidence from six witnesses and examining reports (see paragraphs 6 to 8 above). The Government could not point to any investigative act that would have taken place other that the ones mentioned previously, nor to any particular difficulty encountered by the police and the prosecutor during the investigation (see paragraph 39 above). Moreover, the domestic courts themselves acknowledged that there had been significant periods of inactivity caused by the investigators and the Forensic Medicine Institute (see paragraph 15 above). Under these circumstances, it is difficult to account for the significant length of this phase of the proceedings. In addition, the court proceedings were dominated by repeated quashing of decisions caused by the lower courts\u2019 omissions (see paragraphs 9 in\u00a0fine and 12 above). The applicant cannot be blamed for any excessive protraction of the proceedings and cannot be deemed to have abused his procedural rights.44.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that, in and of itself, the length of the investigation and the trial was excessive according to the Court\u2019s standards under Article 6. However, the purpose of its analysis under Article 3 is different. As pointed out in its case-law, albeit from the standpoint of Article\u00a02, the requirement of promptness should not be examined in isolation and irrespective of the other parameters, the combination of which makes an investigation effective (see, mutatis\u00a0mutandis, Sarbyanova\u2011Pashaliyska and Pashaliyska v. Bulgaria, no. 3524\/14, \u00a7\u00a041, 12\u00a0January\u00a02017).45.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Court observes that at the end of the proceedings in the instant case the authorities may be considered to have achieved the essential purpose pursued with the investigation, in so far as D.D., the person responsible for the abuse, was convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment (see paragraph 18 above).46.\u00a0\u00a0Notwithstanding this, the Court considers that several shortcomings were apparent in the proceedings which undermine the overall effectiveness of the investigation.47.\u00a0\u00a0Firstly, the Court observes that while the domestic courts took into account the excessive length of the proceedings to grant redress to D.D. by reducing his prison sentence (see paragraph 18 above), they failed to offer any comparable compensation to the applicant himself. However, he also suffered the consequences of the extensive length of the case as he was a party to the proceedings and the victim of the domestic abuse under investigation.48.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Court notes that the applicant received no compensation for the abuse (compare and contrast with Sarbyanova\u2011Pashaliyska and Pashaliyska, cited above, \u00a7 42).49.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the District Court in the first round of the proceedings acquitted D.D., having found no crime in \u201chis occasionally inappropriate behaviour towards the applicant\u201d (see paragraph 9 above). Along this vein, the County Court later seemed to consider that \u201cisolated and random\u201d acts of violence could be tolerated within the family sphere (see paragraph\u00a013 above). The Court fails to see how this statement fits in with the relevant provisions of domestic law prohibiting in absolute terms domestic corporal punishment (see paragraph 21 above). Moreover, the Court notes that the Council of Europe recognises that the best interests of the children, which unquestionably include the respect for their rights and dignity, are the cornerstone of the protection afforded to children from corporal punishment (see paragraphs 25 to 29 above).50.\u00a0\u00a0It is also to be noted that the overriding concern in the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (see paragraph 30 above) is dignity. Such a value is consistent with both evolving international law on human rights and the developing psychological perspective in jurisprudence. Respect for the dignity of children is consonant with provision of those elements important to their growth as full members of the community. Assuring basic dignity to the child means that there can be no compromise in condemning violence against children, whether accepted as \u201ctradition\u201d or disguised as \u201cdiscipline\u201d. Children\u2019s uniqueness \u2013 their potential and vulnerability, their dependence on adults \u2013 makes it imperative that they have more, not less, protection from violence, including from domestic corporal punishment, the latter being invariably degrading (see General Comment No. 13 (2011) cited at paragraph 32 above).51.\u00a0\u00a0It is thus clear that respect for children\u2019s dignity cannot be ensured if the domestic courts were to accept any form of justification of acts of ill\u2011treatment, including corporal punishment, prohibited under Article 3. In this context, the Court considers that Member States should strive to expressly and comprehensively protect children\u2019s dignity which in turn requires in practice an adequate legal framework affording protection of children against domestic violence falling within the scope of Article\u00a03, including a) effective deterrence against such serious breaches of personal integrity, b) reasonable steps to prevent ill-treatment of which the authorities had, or ought to have had, knowledge, and c) effective official investigations where an individual raises an arguable claim of ill-treatment (see M. and M. v. Croatia, cited above, \u00a7 136, and S\u00f6derman v.\u00a0Sweden [GC], no. 5786\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 80 and 81, ECHR 2013).52.\u00a0\u00a0For these reasons, bearing in mind what was at stake for the applicant in the proceedings, the length and pace of the proceedings, and the difference in treatment between the applicant and the perpetrator in respect of that length, as well as the manner in which the courts dealt with the issue of domestic abuse, the Court concludes that the investigation into the allegations of ill-treatment was ineffective as it lasted too long and was marred by several serious shortcomings. It follows that the domestic authorities did not comply with their procedural obligations under Article\u00a03 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, W. v. Slovenia, no.\u00a024125\/06, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a066-70, 23 January 2014; P.M. v. Bulgaria, no. 49669\/07, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a065-66, 24\u00a0January\u00a02012; and M.C. and A.C., cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 120-125).53.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has been a violation of the procedural limb of Article\u00a03 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION54.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further complained about the length of the criminal proceedings against D.D. and about the failure of the courts to award him damages. He relied on Article 6 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cIn the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...\u201d55.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is twofold. Firstly, the applicant complained about the alleged lack of fairness of the proceedings, and implicitly about the lack of access to a court. Secondly, the applicant complained about the length of the criminal proceedings against his father. The Court will examine these aspects separately.A.\u00a0\u00a0Fairness of the proceedings1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility56.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies available. On the one hand, he had not sought damages during the criminal proceedings, thus remaining essentially passive in this respect. On the other hand, he had not lodged a separate civil claim before the domestic courts, based on the relevant provisions of the Civil Code applicable at that time.57.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contested that argument and stressed that the State authorities, notably the Child Protection Authority, the prosecutor and the judge had had a legal obligation to protect his interests as he had been a minor victim of domestic abuse at the time of the relevant criminal proceedings.58.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this objection is closely linked to the merits of the complaint. It therefore joins the preliminary issue to the merits. It further observes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It is also not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 observations59.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant reiterated that the domestic court had had an obligation to award damages on its own motion as he had been a minor at the relevant time. He also pointed out that both he and the prosecutor had complained in their appeals about the County Court having omitted to award compensation.60.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stressed the applicant\u2019s passivity throughout the first-instance court proceedings concerning the right to receive compensation and considered that the courts had provided sensible reasons for not making such an award. They argued that in so far as \u201cthe constant position of the applicant\u2019s representative was that \u2018she does not request moral damage\u2019 from the defendant\u201d, and leaving aside the alleged lack of application of Article 17 of the CCP, it would not have been reasonable to award compensation against the applicant\u2019s will.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles61.\u00a0\u00a0The Court refers to the general principles articulated in its case-law, and in particular in its judgment in the case of Bochan v. Ukraine (no.\u00a02) ([GC], no. 22251\/08, ECHR 2015), where it explained under what circumstances the domestic court\u2019s appreciation of the facts of a particular case may be considered to be \u201carbitrary\u201d. Paragraph 62 of that judgment reads as follows:\u201c62.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, in Dulaurans the Court found a violation of the right to a fair trial because the sole reason why the French Court of Cassation had arrived at its contested decision rejecting the applicant\u2019s cassation appeal as inadmissible was the result of une erreur manifeste d\u2019appr\u00e9ciation (\u2018a manifest error of assessment\u2019) (see Dulaurans, cited above). The thinking underlying this notion of erreur manifeste d\u2019appr\u00e9ciation (a concept of French administrative law), as used in the context of Article\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention, is doubtless that if the error of law or fact by the national court is so evident as to be characterised as a \u2018manifest error\u2019 \u2013 that is to say, is an error that no reasonable court could ever have made \u2013, it may be such as to disturb the fairness of the proceedings. In Khamidov, the unreasonableness of the domestic courts\u2019 conclusion as to the facts was \u201cso striking and palpable on the face\u201d that the Court held that the proceedings complained of had to be regarded as \u201cgrossly arbitrary\u201d (see Khamidov, cited above, \u00a7 174). In An\u0111elkovi\u0107, the Court found that the arbitrariness of the domestic court\u2019s decision, which principally had had no legal basis in domestic law and had not contained any connection between the established facts, the applicable law and the outcome of the proceedings, amounted to a \u2018denial of justice\u2019 (see An\u0111elkovi\u0107, cited above, \u00a7 27).\u201d(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application to the present case62.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds at the outset that the present case concerns a dispute (contestation in the French text) over a \u201cright\u201d which can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law (see Bochan, cited above, \u00a7 42; see also, mutatis mutandis, An\u0111elkovi\u0107 v. Serbia, no.\u00a01401\/08, \u00a7\u00a025, 9 April 2013). Domestic law provided for the right to receive compensation (see paragraph 23 above) and the applicant\u2019s complaint with the Court of Appeal constituted a genuine and serious dispute (see paragraph\u00a017 above). The proceedings were directly decisive for the right in question and the decision rendered by the Court of Appeal represented the final resolution of the matter (see respectively paragraphs 19 and 20 above).63.\u00a0\u00a0Further, the Court notes that according to the applicable law, the courts were under an obligation to rule on the matter of compensation even without a formal request to that end from the applicant, who was a minor and therefore a person without legal capacity at the relevant time. Moreover, both the courts and the prosecutor had to actively seek information from the victim about the extent of the damage incurred (see paragraph 24 above). The law thus afforded reinforced protection to the vulnerable persons, such as the applicant, by placing an extended responsibility on the authorities to take an active role in this respect (see, mutatis mutandis, Lamarche v.\u00a0Romania, no. 21472\/03, \u00a7 34, 16 September 2008). For this reason and in the light of the object of the investigation, the proceedings went beyond mere litigation between private individuals, thus engaging the State\u2019s responsibility with respect to Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.64.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, the Court considers that the case is to be examined form the stand point of the courts\u2019 obligation to secure the applicant\u2019s rights in the concrete and exceptional circumstances of the case. Whether the applicant expressly requested compensation or not is irrelevant, as the courts had an obligation to examine on their own initiative the question of damages.65.\u00a0\u00a0In particular, despite the express provisions of Article 17 of the CCP (see paragraph 24 above), only the first domestic court which convicted D.D. examined the matter of compensation (see paragraph 11 above). In its decision of 26 April 2012 rendered in the last set of proceedings, the County Court did not award compensation to the applicant and failed to give any reasons for its choice (see paragraphs 13 and 16 above).66.\u00a0\u00a0In turn, the Court of Appeal did not examine the merits of the complaint brought before it by the applicant concerning the lower court\u2019s omission to award damages (see paragraph 19 above). It did no more than observe that neither the applicant nor the prosecutor requested compensation before the lower court, thus precluding the court from examining that issue. In doing so, the Court of Appeal refrained from examining the extent of the domestic courts\u2019 own role or that of the prosecutor in securing the applicant\u2019s best interests, in particular with regard to the provisions of Article 17 of the CCP.67.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the Court of Appeal\u2019s reasoning had no legal foundation (see, mutatis mutandis, An\u0111elkovi\u0107, cited above, \u00a7 27, with further references). In the light of the unequivocal wording of the obligation enshrined in Article 17 of the CCP, the Court of Appeal should have examined on the merits the right to compensation, deciding whether or not the applicant was entitled to an award.68.\u00a0\u00a0In conclusion, the Court considers that the omission on behalf of the domestic courts to apply Article 17 of the CCP in favour of the applicant and thus examine whether compensation should have been awarded to him amounted to a denial of justice (see, mutatis mutandis, An\u0111elkovi\u0107, cited above, \u00a7 27, and Bochan (no.\u00a02), cited above, \u00a7 64).69.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. Consequently, the Court dismisses the objection raised by the Government concerning the alleged non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.B.\u00a0\u00a0Length of the proceedings70.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the finding that a breach of the procedural aspect of Article\u00a03 occurred notably because of the length of the criminal proceedings (see paragraph\u00a052 above), the Court considers that there is no need to give a separate ruling on the admissibility and merits of the complaint concerning the alleged violation of the \u201creasonable time\u201d requirement enshrined in Article\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention (see, among other authorities, Dimitrov and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 77938\/11, \u00a7 171, 1 July 2014, and, mutatis mutandis, Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v.\u00a0Romania [GC], no. 47848\/08, \u00a7 156, ECHR 2014).]III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION71.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage72.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 25,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.73.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the amount sought.74.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to all the circumstances of the present case, the Court accepts that the applicant must have suffered non-pecuniary damage which cannot be compensated solely by the finding of a violation. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR\u00a010,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable thereon.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses75.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed EUR 1,326.69 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts. He also claimed EUR 3,497.50 for the costs incurred before the Court, legal fees and secretarial costs; the applicant asked that the relevant sums be paid directly to his counsel (EUR 3,197.50) and to the Association for the Defence of Human Rights in Romania \u2013 the Helsinki Committee (\u201cthe APADOR-CH\u201d) (EUR 300).76.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the claim.77.\u00a0\u00a0In line with its consistent case-law (see, notably, Serban Marinescu v.\u00a0Romania, no. 68842\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 78-80, 15 December 2015, and Dr\u0103gan v.\u00a0Romania, no. 65158\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 99-102, 2 February 2016), the Court rejects the claim made by the APADOR-CH, as this association did not represent the applicant in the current proceedings. Regard being had to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum claimed for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts, that is, EUR\u00a01,326.69. It also considers it reasonable to award the sum claimed for the representation of the applicant before it, namely EUR 3,197.50, less the sum already received under this head in legal aid (EUR 850), making a total of EUR 2,347.50, to be paid directly into the bank account of the applicant\u2019s representative (see, mutatis mutandis, Oleksandr Volkov v.\u00a0Ukraine, no.\u00a021722\/11, \u00a7 219, ECHR 2013).C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest78.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","29865":"I.\u00a0\u00a0JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS36.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that, in accordance with Rule 42 \u00a7 1 of the Rules of Court, the applications should be joined, given their similar factual and legal background.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION37.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant, who is mute and deaf since birth, complained that conditions of detention cells nos. 301, 303 and 203 in Brasa Prison had been inadequate.38.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will examine his complaint under Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d39.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties40.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicant had failed to use the remedies established by the Administrative Procedure Law. While the Prisons Administration had examined the applicant\u2019s complaints about conditions of detention and found them to be adequate, the applicant had not pursued those complaints before the administrative courts. Referring to the Court\u2019s case-law (they referred to Ignats v. Latvia (dec.), no. 38494\/05, \u00a7\u00a0110, 24\u00a0September 2013; I\u013cjins v. Latvia (dec.), no. 1179\/10, \u00a7 39, 5\u00a0November 2013; Jegorovs v. Latvia (dec.), no. 53281\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 110 and 119, 1\u00a0July 2014; Ko\u010degarovs and Others v. Latvia (dec.), nos. 14516\/10, 26544\/10; and 44939\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 110-123, 18 November 2014), they considered that that avenue had been available to the applicant.41.\u00a0\u00a0The Government were of the view that the applicant\u2019s complaints before the administrative courts had chiefly concerned his transfer to another prison (see paragraphs 24-28 above). Those complaints had not concerned conditions of detention, save for one specific aspect, in relation to which the applicant had been given time to provide more details, which he had failed to do (see paragraph 27 above).42.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the applicant had never complained to the Health Inspectorate concerning medical care in prison. They considered that it had been an effective preventive remedy. In this connection, they referred to the Court\u2019s decisions in the cases of Antonovs v. Latvia ((dec.) no. 19437\/05, \u00a7\u00a0111, 11\u00a0February 2014) and Jegorovs (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 155-56) and argued that the administrative courts had also had the competence to review the Health Inspectorate\u2019s decisions or, more generally, complaints pertaining to the quality of medical care in prison.43.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant disagreed. No one in Brasa Prison could fully understand him. It was for this reason that he had not been able to properly lodge complaints with the prison authorities. Nor had he received any assistance from a sign-language interpreter or a social worker who could fully understand him. As concerns his complaints to the administrative courts, he had not been able to explain them concisely. Nor had he understood the court\u2019s procedural decisions. No legal aid had been available.44.\u00a0\u00a0In short, there had been no effective remedies for the applicant because he could not express his complaints or understand directions issued by the State authorities.45.\u00a0\u00a0In their additional observations, the Government disagreed. They referred to the applicant\u2019s complaints to the prison authorities to argue that he had been able to express his complaints in writing sufficiently clearly to be understood. He had also been able to understand written instructions. Furthermore, there had been two social workers and three psychologists in Brasa Prison. A sign-language interpreter had assisted the applicant during the evaluation panel meetings (see, for example, paragraph 29 above). The prison staff used writing and gestures as a communication tool with the applicant in daily situations. Lastly, the Government pointed out that the Prisons Administration in its lengthy decisions had reiterated the applicant\u2019s complaints word for word and had explained their understanding of each particular complaint.46.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant provided no further comment.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment47.\u00a0\u00a0In the area of complaints of inhuman or degrading conditions of detention, the Court has already observed that two types of relief are possible: an improvement in the material conditions of detention; and compensation for the damage or loss sustained on account of such conditions. If an applicant has been held in conditions that are in breach of Article 3, a domestic remedy capable of putting an end to the ongoing violation of his or her right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment is of the greatest value. Once, however, the applicant has left the facility in which he or she endured the inadequate conditions, he or she should have an enforceable right to compensation for the violation that has already occurred (see Meln\u012btis v. Latvia, no. 30779\/05, \u00a7 47, 28\u00a0February 2012 and the case-law cited therein).48.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that there is a fundamental difference between the cases relied on by the Government (Ignats, I\u013cjins, Jegorovs and Ko\u010degarovs and Others, all cited above) and the present case. The present applicant, at the moment of lodging his applications with the Court, was still held in the detention facility in question \u2013 Brasa Prison. The present applicant, in contrast to the applicants in the cases cited by the Government, continued to be held in conditions which he alleged to be in violation of Article 3 of the Convention. The Court\u2019s conclusions reached in those cases cannot, therefore, be applicable in the present case.49.\u00a0\u00a0In cases which concerned persons who continued to be kept in allegedly poor conditions of detention, the Court has dismissed non\u2011exhaustion objections based on their failure to bring or prosecute to a conclusion claims for damages against the State. It has held that such claims could result only in awards of compensation and could not lead to an improvement of the status quo, they were not a remedy capable of providing adequate redress. The Court has explained that remedies for conditions of detention which are of a purely compensatory nature may be regarded as effective only in respect of applicants who have been either released or placed in conditions which meet Convention standards (see Iliev and Others v. Bulgaria, nos. 4473\/02 and 34138\/04, \u00a7 55, 10 February 2011, and the case\u2011law cited therein).50.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, in principle, the assessment of whether domestic remedies have been exhausted is normally carried out with reference to the date on which the application was lodged with the Court (see Orchowski v. Poland, no.\u00a017885\/04, \u00a7 109, 22 October 2009, and Norbert Sikorski v. Poland, no. 17599\/05, \u00a7 108, 22 October 2009). It has not been disputed that on 12\u00a0September and 24 October 2012, when the present applicant lodged his applications with the Court, he continued to be detained in Brasa Prison in allegedly poor detention conditions (see paragraphs 8-9 and 11 above).51.\u00a0\u00a0The above considerations are sufficient for the Court to conclude that, at the relevant time, an application before the administrative courts would not have constituted an effective remedy for the present applicant by itself. The Government have not referred to any remedy that might have been available to him in order to obtain the improvement of his conditions of detention at the relevant time. The Government\u2019s objection must therefore be dismissed.52.\u00a0\u00a0Given that the applicant remained in allegedly poor detention conditions at the time of lodging the present applications and that a purely compensatory remedy was insufficient in that regard, the Court does not consider it necessary to examine the applicant\u2019s further argument that the remedies under the Administrative Procedure Law were not effective for him on account of him being a person with special needs (see paragraphs 43-44 above).53.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 3 of the Convention is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties54.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that the conditions of detention in Brasa Prison had been inadequate in view of his state of health. He had been held in dormitory-type cells nos.\u00a0301, 303 and 203 (see paragraphs 11-12 above for more details of the applicant\u2019s description of the conditions in those cells). The applicable domestic standard for personal space at the relevant time had been 2.5 sq. m. per male inmate. Placement together with many inmates who had no hearing impairment and who had been in good health and with whom the applicant could not communicate had put him in a highly vulnerable position and had exposed him to harassment.55.\u00a0\u00a0While in theory the prison management could ensure educational, work and other activities for inmates, there were no activities offered for deaf and mute persons or for those with special needs. Although on 11\u00a0April 2016 a hearing aid had been arranged for the applicant, it had not functioned properly (noises and interference). These issues could only be resolved in the premises of the relevant organisation, not in the prison. There was no proof that the prison management had ever used sign-language interpreter when communicating with the applicant save for one occasion (see paragraph 29 above). The prison management mainly communicated with the applicant in writing. Lastly, the applicant referred to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (see paragraphs 32\u201133 above) and submitted that the prison management had not even attempted to provide a \u201creasonable accommodation\u201d to the applicant\u2019s needs arising from his disability.56.\u00a0\u00a0The Government disagreed. In addition to their submissions summarised above (paragraphs 13-16), they pointed to a number of cases concerning prisoners\u2019 state of health or special needs where the Court had found no violation (they referred to Kostju\u010denkovs v. Latvia (dec.), no.\u00a019826\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 40-51, 8 March 2011; Van Deilena v. Latvia (dec.), no.\u00a050950\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 59-97, 15 May 2012; Buks v. Latvia (dec.), no. 18605\/03, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a039-44, 4 September 2002; and Rudevits v. Latvia (dec.), no. 47590\/06, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a050-52, 26 June 2012).57.\u00a0\u00a0As concerns the present applicant, they explained that he had been aided by a sign-language interpreter on at least three occasions in 2015\u201116. As concerns the applicant\u2019s daily life in prison, the prison officials, doctors and other staff had used writing and gestures as a communication tool. Moreover, they referred to various letters by the Prisons Administration demonstrating that the latter had paid utmost attention \u2013 to the point of directly quoting the applicant\u2019s complaint and providing their understanding as to its contents before providing its reply (see paragraphs 20-23 and\u00a045 above).58.\u00a0\u00a0In sum the domestic authorities had taken all available measures to ensure that the applicant had been understood and had received social assistance and counselling, and that his state of mental and physical health had been regularly monitored. They also pointed out that the applicant\u2019s application to be transferred to a more lenient prison regime had recently been granted (see paragraphs 29-31 above).2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles59.\u00a0\u00a0The Court refers to its recent recapitulation of the relevant principles in cases concerning conditions of detention (see Mur\u0161i\u0107 v. Croatia [GC], no.\u00a07334\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 96-101, 20 October 2016).60.\u00a0\u00a0As concerns prison overcrowding, in the case of Mur\u0161i\u0107 the Court confirmed \u201cthe standard predominant in its case-law of 3 sq. m of floor surface per detainee in multi-occupancy accommodation as the relevant minimum standard under Article 3 of the Convention\u201d (ibid., \u00a7\u00a0136). In that case the Court distinguished three situations with personal space below 3\u00a0sq.\u00a0m (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0137-38), between 3 and 4 sq. m (ibid., \u00a7\u00a0139) and more than 4\u00a0sq. m (ibid., \u00a7 140).61.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the Court has considered that where the authorities decide to place and keep a disabled person in continued detention, they should demonstrate special care in guaranteeing such conditions as correspond to the special needs resulting from his or her disability (see Farbtuhs v. Latvia, no.\u00a04672\/02, \u00a7 56, 2 December 2004; Jasinskis v. Latvia, no. 45744\/08, \u00a7\u00a059, 21 December 2010; Z.H. v. Hungary, no. 28973\/11, \u00a7 29, 8\u00a0November 2012; and the international law material in paragraphs 32-33 above).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application to the present case62.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes at the outset that the crux of the applicant\u2019s complaint concerns material conditions of his detention in multi-occupancy cells nos.\u00a0301, 303 and 203 in Brasa Prison in view of his disability. The Court notes that the applicant\u2019s complaint in principle does not relate to the medical assistance provided to him or deterioration of his state of health in detention (compare and contrast with Krivo\u0161ejs v. Latvia, no. 45517\/04, \u00a7\u00a061, 17\u00a0January 2012). Nor does it concern his continued detention in view of his state of health (compare and contrast with the above-cited Farbtuhs case). Nor does the applicant raise an arguable complaint about inter\u2011prisoner violence (compare and contrast with J.L. v. Latvia, no.\u00a023893\/06, \u00a7\u00a075, 17\u00a0April 2012).63.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will accordingly examine material conditions in cells nos.\u00a0301, 303 and 203 in Brasa Prison as it is their cumulative effects, as well as the particular allegations advanced by the applicant, which have to be taken into consideration when assessing the State\u2019s compliance with Article 3 of the Convention (see Dougoz v. Greece, no. 40907\/98, \u00a7\u00a046, ECHR 2001\u2011II). The length of the period during which a person is detained in the particular conditions also has to be considered (see, among many other authorities, Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525\/07 and 60800\/08, \u00a7\u00a0142, 10\u00a0January 2012). Another important factor to be taken into account is the applicant\u2019s vulnerable position due to his disability and the fact that the authorities are required to demonstrate special care in guaranteeing conditions corresponding to his disability (see paragraph 61 above with further references).64.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the relevant test enunciated above (see paragraph\u00a060 above), the Court will address the applicant\u2019s complaints separately with regard to the period in which he disposed of less than 3 sq. m of personal space, and the period in which he was allocated between 3 and 4 sq. m of personal space in Brasa Prison.(i)\u00a0\u00a0Period in which the applicant disposed of less than 3 sq. m of personal space65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant was held in cell no. 301 from 1\u00a0January 2012 to 26 February 2013 (one year, one month and twenty\u2011six days). According to the Government, the applicant had 2.74 sq. m of personal space in that cell. While the applicant submitted that at times the number of inmates in cell no. 301 had been higher than pointed out by the Government, implying that the personal space available to him had been even more reduced, his submissions in this connection were not supported by any evidence.66.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that a strong presumption of a violation of Article\u00a03 arises in the present case as concerns cell no. 301 (see Mur\u0161i\u0107, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0137). Accordingly, the question to be answered is whether there were factors capable of rebutting that presumption (ibid., \u00a7 138). As to the first of those factors, which need to be cumulatively met, the Court notes that the reduction in the applicant\u2019s personal space to below 3 sq. m was of a considerably long duration (more than one year). Such a period cannot be regarded as \u201cshort, occasional and minor\u201d and cannot therefore be used to rebut the presumption of a violation of Article 3 in the circumstances of the present case (see Mur\u0161i\u0107, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0151-52, where even a significantly shorter period of twenty-seven days could not be used to rebut the presumption). It follows that there is no need to examine the remaining factors.67.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court finds that from 1 January 2012 to 26\u00a0February 2013, when he disposed of less than 3 sq. m of personal space, the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in cell no. 301 in Brasa Prison subjected him to hardship going beyond the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and thus amounted to degrading treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Period in which the applicant was allocated between 3 and 4 sq. m of personal space68.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also complained of conditions in cells nos.\u00a0303 and\u00a0203 in Brasa Prison, where he was held from 26 February 2013 to 16\u00a0February 2015. According to the Government, in those cells the applicant disposed of personal space ranging from 3.09 to 3.28 sq. m. While the applicant submitted that at times the number of inmates in cell no. 303 had been higher than indicated by the Government, implying that the personal space available to him had been even more reduced, his submissions in this respect were not supported by any evidence.69.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that the space element remains a weighty factor in its assessment of conditions of detention in cells no. 303 and 203 in Brasa Prison. However, the Court also has to examine whether the space factor was coupled with other aspects of inappropriate physical conditions of detention such as access to outdoor exercise, natural light or air, availability of ventilation, adequacy of room temperature, the possibility of using the toilet in private, and compliance with basic sanitary and hygienic requirements (see Mur\u0161i\u0107, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0139). According to the Latvian Ombudsman complaints about overcrowding in Brasa Prison were common at the material time (see paragraph 35 above). It is the applicant\u2019s allegation in the present case that the reduced personal space afforded to him coupled with his disability made him particularly vulnerable. He even requested to be transferred to the most restrictive prison regime as that appeared to be a possibility for him to share a cell with fewer inmates and not to be exposed to the alleged harassment (see paragraphs 21 and 24 above).70.\u00a0\u00a0In addition to the reduced personal space afforded to him, the applicant took issue with two particular aspects of his detention conditions. He alleged that he had not been able to engage in any meaningful activities due to his disability and that he had not been properly understood either by the prison staff or by other inmates. He had felt socially isolated. Apart from allegedly insufficient heating \u2013 a submission the Court considers unsubstantiated in light of the detailed information provided by the Government (see paragraphs 14 and 23 above) \u2013 the applicant did not complain about any other material conditions of detention.71.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that while the applicant could leave cell no.\u00a0303, where he was held for some eight months, during the day and use the common area, the same did not hold true for cell no. 203, where he was held for twice as long a period (one year and four months). Throughout the latter period the applicant could only leave his cell for the daily walk, once a week to take a shower (see Jegorovs, cited above, \u00a7\u00a072) or if he had an appointment with a doctor, a prison chaplain, a social worker (see paragraph\u00a015 above). Thus for most of the time the applicant had to spend about twenty-three hours per day in his cell, where \u2011 in view of his disability \u2011 he was unable to communicate with other inmates.72.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that provision of a hearing aid to the applicant, when such equipment appears to have been available in Latvia, was arranged only on 11 April 2016, after the applicant had already spent more than four years in detention. By that time he was no longer being held in cells with reduced personal space (see paragraph 10 above). Furthermore, when the hearing aid was eventually made available to the applicant, it did not function properly. It appears that this technical problem remained unresolved in Brasa Prison. While the Convention does not go as far as to require that a hearing aid be provided to every prisoner with a hearing impairment, the Court notes that the availability of a functioning hearing aid at an earlier stage could have at least partly alleviated the suffering related to the applicant\u2019s hearing impairment in a prison setting, in view of the relatively high number of the inmates sharing the cells with the applicant (see paragraph 13 above).73.\u00a0\u00a0As to the applicant\u2019s communication with the prison staff, the Government submitted that they used writing and gestures in communicating with the applicant. Although the Government argued that the applicant had been aided by a sign-language interpreter on three occasions, they provided evidence of only one meeting on 31\u00a0August 2016 (see paragraph 29 above), which took place at a time when he was no longer being held in cells with reduced personal space. It is true that a range of activities and services was provided in the Brasa Prison (see paragraphs\u00a014\u201116, 29 above), however it appears that the applicant was subject to the same regime, the same treatment and the same range of activities and services which was available for the prison population in general. In the relevant period, no particular attempts were made to overcome the obvious communication problems of the applicant with the prison staff.74.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the weighty factor of the reduced personal space made available to the applicant, ranging from 3.09 to 3.28 sq. m, which remains very close to the minimum standard of 3 sq.m of floor surface per detainee, for a period of almost two years, together with the inevitable feeling of isolation and helplessness in the absence of adequate attempts to overcome the applicant\u2019s communication problems flowing from his disability must have caused the applicant to experience anguish and feelings of inferiority attaining the threshold of inhuman and degrading treatment.75.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the cumulative effects of the above-mentioned considerations, the Court considers that there has been a violation of Article\u00a03 of the Convention on account of the applicant\u2019s conditions in cells nos.\u00a0303 and\u00a0203 in Brasa Prison, where he was held from 26\u00a0February 2013 to 16\u00a0February 2015.(iii) Conclusion76.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court finds a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in cells nos.\u00a0301, 303 and 203 in Brasa Prison from 1 January 2012 to 16 February 2015.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION77.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged that his complaints about conditions of detention had not been examined. The Court will examine his complaint under Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d78.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility79.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits80.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the finding relating to Article 3 (see paragraph\u00a076 above), the Court considers that there is no need to examine this complaint under Article 13 of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION81.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage82.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant, without invoking a specific sum, claimed non\u2011pecuniary damage.83.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that claim and invited the Court to dismiss it as being manifestly ill-founded.84.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has recently reiterated that, in particular as regards just satisfaction on account of non-pecuniary damage, the Court\u2019s guiding principle is equity, which involves flexibility and an objective consideration of what is just, fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case, including not only the position of the applicant but the overall context in which the breach occurred. The Court\u2019s awards in respect of non-pecuniary damage serve to give recognition to the fact that non-material damage occurred as a result of a breach of a fundamental human right and reflect in the broadest of terms the severity of the damage (see Nagmetov v. Russia [GC], no.\u00a035589\/08, \u00a7 73, 30\u00a0March 2017 with further references).85.\u00a0\u00a0Although he did not refer to any specific sum, the applicant in the present case did make \u201cclaim\u201d for just satisfaction on account of non-pecuniary damage during the communication procedure in accordance with Rule\u00a060 of the Rules of Court (see, for example, Frumkin v. Russia, no.\u00a074568\/12, \u00a7 180, 5 January 2016; Svetlana Vasilyeva v. Russia, no.\u00a010775\/09, \u00a7 43, 5 April 2016; and S\u00fcrer v. Turkey, no. 20184\/06, \u00a7\u00a049, 31 May 2016). The Court is not prevented from applying a degree of flexibility, essentially in respect of non-pecuniary damage, as in a number of cases the Court has examined claims for which applicants did not quantify the amount, \u201cleaving it to the Court\u2019s discretion\u201d (see Nagmetov, cited above, \u00a7 72 with further references and also Seagal v. Cyprus, no.\u00a050756\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 165-67, 26 April 2016).86.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it undeniable that the applicant sustained non-pecuniary damage on account of the violation of Article 3 of the Convention. Having regard to the particular circumstances of the case and making its assessment on an equitable basis as required by Article 41 of the Convention, the Court awards the applicant 7,500\u00a0euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses87.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not submit a claim for the costs and expenses. Accordingly, the Court will not award him any sum on that account.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest88.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","29867":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION54.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article\u00a03 of the Convention that he had been ill-treated by the detainee escort officers on 20,\u00a021,\u00a024 and 25\u00a0May\u00a02010 and that the inquiry and criminal investigation in this regard had not been effective. He also invoked Article\u00a013 of the Convention.55.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that these complaints fall to be examined under Article\u00a03 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions56.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the application should be declared inadmissible on account of the applicant\u2019s failure to comply with the six\u2011month time-limit. According to the Government, the applicant submitted his complaints to the Court more than six months after the decision of 20\u00a0July 2012 terminating the criminal proceedings. By lodging an appeal against that decision outside the statutory time-limit of ten days he had attempted to restart the running of the six-month time-limit.57.\u00a0\u00a0In reply, the applicant argued that the chief prosecutor\u2019s reply of 12\u00a0December 2012 constituted the final procedural document in the domestic proceedings.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment58.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, as a rule, the six-month period runs from the date of the final decision in the process of exhaustion of domestic remedies. Where no effective remedy is available to the applicant, the period runs from the date of the acts or measures complained of, or from the date of knowledge of that act or its effect on or prejudice to the applicant. Moreover, Article 35 \u00a7 1 cannot be interpreted in a manner which would require an applicant to seize the Court of his complaint before his position in connection with the matter has been finally settled at the domestic level. Where, therefore, an applicant avails himself of an apparently existing remedy and only subsequently becomes aware of circumstances which render the remedy ineffective, it may be appropriate for the purposes of Article 35 \u00a7 1 to take the start of the six-month period from the date when the applicant first became or ought to have become aware of those circumstances (see Blokhin v. Russia [GC], no. 47152\/06, \u00a7 106, ECHR\u00a02016 with further references).59.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court has to ascertain whether the applicant had an effective remedy available to him and, if so, whether he made use of it and then seized the Court within the required time-limit. The Court notes that the Government did not argue that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies in respect of his allegations of assault.60.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes at the outset that the applicant\u2019s mother lodged two appeals on his behalf against the decision of 20 July 2012 to terminate the criminal proceedings with the prosecution service (see paragraphs 39 and 42 above); they were examined on the merits (see paragraphs 41 and 43 above). Even though the higher prosecutor considered that she did not have the right to lodge appeals on behalf of the applicant given that he had reached the age of majority, he examined it nevertheless (see paragraph 43 above). The applicant himself then lodged the last appeal with the chief prosecutor, but the latter did not examine it on the merits (see paragraphs 44 and 45 above). It is notable that the chief prosecutor informed the applicant that he could not lodge any further appeals pursuant to domestic law (see paragraph\u00a045 in fine above). Accordingly, it is on that date \u2013 12 December 2012 \u2013 that the applicant became aware of the fact that his complaints in this regard have been finally settled at the domestic level. Subsequently, on 30\u00a0January 2013 the prosecution \u2013 in the criminal proceedings against the applicant \u2013 also informed the appellate court that the decision to terminate criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant\u2019s allegations of assault had taken effect.61.\u00a0\u00a0The Court cannot hold against the applicant that he complained to the chief prosecutor. Taking into account the response given to his mother on 24 October 2012 that she could not lodge further complaints, the applicant continued to defend his interests himself. In view of previous procedural misgivings, it was not clear, until 12 December 2012, whether or not the prosecution service would examine a complaint lodged by the applicant. Therefore, the applicant exhausted a remedy, which did not appear ineffective in the situation created by the actions of the prosecution service. The fact that his complaint turned out not to be successful is of no importance (compare Schmidt v. Latvia, no. 22493\/05, \u00a7 67, 27 April 2017). The decision of 12\u00a0December 2012 was not amenable to further appeal by the applicant and is, accordingly, the starting point of the running of the six\u2011month time-limit in the present case.62.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the applicant, having introduced the application on 24\u00a0May 2013, must be regarded as having complied with the six-month rule.63.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35\u00a0\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged failure to carry out an effective investigation(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(i)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant64.\u00a0\u00a0In his application to the Court the applicant argued that the investigation into the alleged ill-treatment had not been effective. The inquiry had lasted a year and seven months before the prosecution service had instituted the criminal proceedings. There had been no objective circumstances preventing the investigating authorities from establishing in a timely manner how the applicant\u2019s injuries had been caused. In support of his claim, the applicant referred to the report of the Ombudsman.65.\u00a0\u00a0The State\u2019s positive obligation to ensure an effective investigation into the alleged ill-treatment could not be complied with by providing for the possibility for the applicant to seek compensation for the damage caused by the detainee escort officers in the civil courts. Furthermore, the civil courts would not be in a position to decide on such a claim unless the criminal courts established that an offence had been committed.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0The Government66.\u00a0\u00a0The Government drew a distinction between the present case and the case of Labita v. Italy ([GC], no.\u00a026772\/95, ECHR\u00a02000\u2011IV). Unlike in Labita, the detainee holding facilities in question had not been the focus of attention from the media or other organisations in connection with any ill\u2011treatment there. Paragraph 11 of a report entitled \u201cReport to the Latvian Government on the visit to Latvia carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 5 to 15\u00a0September 2011\u201d stated that no allegations of physical ill-treatment had been received in respect of police officers performing custodial tasks in police detention facilities.67.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment had lacked credibility as they had contradicted the witnesses\u2019 statements and the medical records. He had failed to lay the basis of an arguable complaint that he had been ill-treated as alleged (referring to Igars v. Latvia (dec.), no.\u00a011682\/03, \u00a7\u00a072, 5\u00a0February 2013).68.\u00a0\u00a0Even though the applicant, his mother and lawyer had given contradictory descriptions of his injuries, their complaints had been forwarded to the Internal Security Office, which then had promptly opened an inquiry, examined the applicant\u2019s medical records, and obtained statements from everyone who had had any contact with the applicant or his co-accused. In the course of the subsequent inquiry conducted under the close supervision of the prosecution service the Internal Security Office had obtained additional evidence. The investigation had been thorough because the investigating authorities had promptly gathered and examined all available evidence.69.\u00a0\u00a0The complaints had been examined by a body \u2013 the Internal Security Office \u2013 separate from that which had performed the detainee escort during the applicant\u2019s trial. In addition, the Internal Security Office had been supervised by the prosecution service. Therefore, the investigation had been independent.70.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, under sections 1635 and 1779 of the Civil Law, the applicant had had the right to seek compensation for any damage caused by the detainee escort officers. Referring to the cases of Blumberga v. Latvia (no.\u00a070930\/01, \u00a7\u00a068, 14\u00a0October 2008) and Y v. Latvia (no.\u00a061183\/08, \u00a7\u00a071, 21\u00a0October 2014), the Government argued that the outcome of criminal proceedings did not determine the success of compensation proceedings. They noted the examples of domestic case-law provided to the Court in the case of Y v. Latvia (cited above).(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles71.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that where an individual raises an arguable claim that he has been ill-treated by the State authorities, in breach of Article\u00a03, that provision \u2012 read in conjunction with the State\u2019s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention \u2012 requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation (see Labita, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0131, and Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 28\u00a0October\u00a01998, \u00a7\u00a0102, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011VIII).72.\u00a0\u00a0An obligation to investigate \u201cis not an obligation as to result, but as to means\u201d: not every investigation should necessarily come to a conclusion which coincides with the applicant\u2019s account of events. However, it should in principle be capable of leading to the establishment of the facts of the case and, if the allegations prove to be true, to the identification and punishment of those responsible (see Mikheyev v. Russia, no.\u00a077617\/01, \u00a7\u00a0107, 26\u00a0January 2006).73.\u00a0\u00a0Any investigation into allegations of ill-treatment must be thorough. This means that the authorities must make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation (see Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], nos.\u00a010865\/09, 45886\/07 and 32431\/08, \u00a7\u00a0325, ECHR\u00a02014 (extracts)). Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of the applicable standard (see Bouyid\u00a0v. Belgium [GC], no.\u00a023380\/09, \u00a7\u00a0120, ECHR\u00a02015).74.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the investigation must be expeditious. In cases under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, where the effectiveness of the official investigation was at issue, the Court assessed whether the authorities reacted promptly to the complaints at the relevant time (see Labita, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0133 et seq.).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application in the present case75.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant raised the alleged assaults at a hearing on 28\u00a0May 2010, which was shortly after the events in dispute (contrast with Igars, cited above, \u00a7\u00a070, where the first hint of any wrongdoing was made after more than five months). Prior to that, on 26\u00a0and\u00a027\u00a0May 2010 he had informed his mother and lawyer and the employees of the Ombudsman\u2019s Office of the alleged assaults; those people all brought this to the attention of the domestic authorities, noting that the applicant had shown them injuries (see paragraphs 8-10 above). The medical certificate from Riga Central Prison, issued shortly after the events in dispute, stated that he had injuries on his lower legs, hand, forearm and right side (see paragraph 12 above) (compare and contrast with Igars, cited above, \u00a7\u00a068, where a small wound above the applicant\u2019s eyebrow had been noted in the forensic psychiatric report issued more than five months after the alleged ill-treatment).76.\u00a0\u00a0Therefore, the applicant\u2019s allegations against the detainee escort officers, when assessed together with the medical evidence, were \u201carguable\u201d and the domestic authorities were under an obligation to conduct an effective investigation satisfying the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention (see Manzhos v. Russia, no.\u00a064752\/09, \u00a7\u00a036, 24\u00a0May 2016). However, the Court finds that they failed to carry out promptly important investigative measures, which undermined their ability to establish what had happened to the applicant.77.\u00a0\u00a0In particular, they failed to secure the video recordings made by the security cameras of the courthouse. The prosecution service learned of the alleged ill-treatment on 27\u00a0May\u00a02010, which was shortly after the events in dispute (see paragraph 8 above). The Court does not see any reason why the investigating authorities failed to examine those video recordings within the two months following the incident, when they were still available (see paragraph 35 above and paragraph 87 below) (see Mustafa Hajili v.\u00a0Azerbaijan, no.\u00a042119\/12, \u00a7\u00a051, 24\u00a0November 2016).78.\u00a0\u00a0Most importantly, the investigating authorities did not promptly order an expert medical report in respect of the applicant\u2019s injuries. When nearly one year later they did do so, it was too late as the expert could not determine precisely what injuries the applicant had sustained or when and how they had been inflicted (see paragraph 36 above). Moreover, they failed to conduct an interview with an important witness \u2013 the doctor who had examined the applicant in Riga Central Prison on 26\u00a0May 2010 (see\u00a0paragraph 12 above). Lastly, no identity parade was organised.79.\u00a0\u00a0Such deficiencies on the part of the authorities caused, in the Court\u2019s view, precious time to be lost and made any further investigation of the applicant\u2019s allegations complicated, if not impossible (see, for similar reasoning, Bobrov v. Russia, no.\u00a033856\/05, \u00a7\u00a051, 23\u00a0October 2014).80.\u00a0\u00a0There were also other deficiencies. In particular, the Court notes that the statements of all detainee escort officers, except one, were broadly the same in their wording (see paragraph 28 above). Despite the fact that their statements clearly conflicted with the applicant\u2019s statement, the investigating authorities did not order a face-to-face confrontation between the applicant and the escort officers (see Mustafa Hajili, cited above, \u00a7\u00a052).81.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the investigation of the applicant\u2019s claim of ill-treatment was ineffective. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural limb.2.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged ill-treatment of the applicant(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(i)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant82.\u00a0\u00a0In his application to the Court the applicant, referring to Ribitsch v.\u00a0Austria (4\u00a0December 1995, \u00a7\u00a034, Series\u00a0A no.\u00a0336) and Mikheyev (cited above, \u00a7\u00a0127), contended that it should be presumed that he had been ill\u2011treated by the detainee escort officers because he had sustained the injuries while he had been in custody and the State had not explained their origin.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0The Government83.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the assertion that the applicant had been subjected to ill-treatment, contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.84.\u00a0\u00a0The Government noted that the alleged ill-treatment had not been raised for the first time by the applicant himself but by his lawyer in support of his application for an adjournment of the trial.85.\u00a0\u00a0The extent of the injuries alleged by him and the applicant had not been supported by the applicant\u2019s medical examination. Furthermore, both haematomas had not been fresh injuries as they had been \u201cin the phase of absorption\u201d. Moreover, given their size and type and the fact that the injuries had been covered with scabs, they could not have been caused by the alleged beatings. In any event, they had not reached the minimum level of severity for Article\u00a03 of the Convention to apply (referring to Y v. Latvia, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a052-57).86.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, none of the applicant\u2019s co-accused had been eye\u2011witnesses to the alleged ill-treatment. While P.V. and F.\u010c. had stated that they had been beaten, no injuries had been found on them.87.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, there had been factors that had served as a deterrent to the kind of ill-treatment alleged. The premises of the courthouse had been equipped with a video surveillance system and the employees of the Ombudsman\u2019s Office had visited the detainee holding area there. This had undermined the credibility of the applicant\u2019s allegations.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles88.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of a democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (see Labita, cited above, \u00a7 119).89.\u00a0\u00a0Ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim. In respect of a person deprived of his liberty, recourse to physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by his own conduct diminishes human dignity and is an infringement of the right set forth in Article 3 (ibid., \u00a7\u00a0120, and Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0101).90.\u00a0\u00a0In assessing evidence, the Court has generally applied the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18\u00a0January 1978, \u00a7\u00a0161, Series\u00a0A no.\u00a025). However, such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. On this latter point the Court has explained that where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention. The burden of proof is then on the Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation by producing evidence establishing facts which cast doubt on the account of events given by the victim. In the absence of such explanation, the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the Government. That is justified by the fact that persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them (see Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a082 and 83, with further case-law references).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application in the present case91.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes at the outset that at the time of the events at issue the applicant was under the control of the detainee escort officers. It further observes that his allegation of ill-treatment was corroborated by some medical evidence. As can be seen from the case file he was found to have sustained a number of injuries subsequent to the events in dispute \u2013 in particular, injuries on his lower legs, hand, forearm and right side (see paragraph 12 above).92.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, the Court notes that shortly after the alleged assaults the applicant informed his mother and lawyer and the employees of the Ombudsman\u2019s Office of those assaults; those people all brought this to the attention of the domestic authorities, noting that the applicant had shown them injuries (see paragraphs 8-10 above). Moreover, the applicant\u2019s cellmate, A.D., stated that the applicant had told him about the alleged assaults and had shown him marks left by the beatings (see paragraph 25 above). Similarly, the escort officer, M.S., gave evidence that he had seen bruises on the applicant (see paragraph 28 above). The applicant\u2019s co\u2011accused, V.P., stated that the escort officers had beaten the applicant (see paragraph 30 above), and another of the co-accused, P.V., gave evidence that he had heard the applicant screaming (see paragraph 32 above).93.\u00a0\u00a0In that light, the Court considers that the applicant has been able to produce sufficiently strong evidence in support of his claim of ill-treatment. In so far as the Government argued that the extent of the injuries alleged had not been supported by the applicant\u2019s medical examination or that those had been old injuries (see paragraph 85 above), the Court notes that according to the expert medical report the description of the injuries had been incomplete; at the same time, it could not be excluded that they had appeared between 20 and 25\u00a0May 2010 in the circumstances stated by the applicant (see paragraph 36 above).94.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also cannot overlook the fact that the investigating authorities did not give in the reasoning for their decisions any explanation of how the injuries found on the applicant had been caused. Given these circumstances, the Court considers that the respondent Government have failed to discharge their burden of proof and to submit a plausible explanation refuting the applicant\u2019s account of events (see Balajevs v.\u00a0Latvia, no. 8347\/07, \u00a7 94, 28\u00a0April\u00a02016, which also concerned ill\u2011treatment by the detainee escort officers in the premises of the Riga Regional Court). The statements provided by the detainee escort officers were all, except one, drafted in broadly the same manner, despite the officers having been questioned separately, and no face-to-face confrontation was organised between the applicant and those officers (see paragraph 28 above). Therefore, the Court has no reason to doubt the applicant\u2019s account of events and finds that the injuries found on his body were sustained as a result of assaults by the detainee escort officers on 20, 21, 24 and 25\u00a0May 2010 (see Mustafa\u00a0Hajili, cited above, \u00a7 41).95.\u00a0\u00a0Neither has it been shown that the recourse to physical force against the applicant was rendered strictly necessary by his own conduct, nor that there were any other reasons justifying the use of force against him. The Court considers that the injuries sustained by the applicant must have caused him physical pain and suffering, even if they did not require an important medical intervention, given that according to the medical certificate, dated 14\u00a0June 2010, the applicant\u2019s state of health was satisfactory (see paragraph 12 above). Moreover, the ill-treatment inflicted by the detainee escort officers on the applicant, who was a minor and entirely under their control, must also have caused him considerable mental suffering, diminishing his human dignity.96.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances, the Court considers the ill-treatment complained of as inhuman and degrading within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article\u00a03 of the Convention under its substantive limb.II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION97.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage98.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 15,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.99.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested this claim.100.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, deciding on an equitable basis, awards the applicant EUR\u00a08,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses101.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 1,210 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court.102.\u00a0\u00a0The Government noted that the only piece of evidence which the applicant had submitted in support of this claim was an invoice totalling EUR\u00a01,210 issued by his lawyer. There was no detailed break-down in respect of each service rendered, indication of the number of hours spent or evidence that the applicant had paid the invoice.103.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,210 to cover costs and expenses for the proceedings before it.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest104.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","29907":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION30.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that she had been ill\u2011treated by the police and that the investigation into her allegations had been neither thorough nor effective. She relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility31.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles32.\u00a0\u00a0In cases involving the substantive aspect of Article 3 concerning, in particular, allegations of ill-treatment by State agents, the relevant general principles were articulated by the Grand Chamber in Bouyid v. Belgium ([GC], no. 23380\/09, \u00a7 81-90, ECHR 2015).33.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates, in particular, that in respect of a person who is deprived of his liberty, or, more generally, is confronted with law \u2011 enforcement officers, any recourse to physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by his own conduct diminishes human dignity and is an infringement of the right set forth in Article 3 (ibid., \u00a7 88).34.\u00a0\u00a0Allegations of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 must be supported by appropriate evidence. To assess this evidence, the Court adopts the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d but adds that such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (ibid., \u00a7 82).35.\u00a0\u00a0On this latter point the Court has explained that where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention. The burden of proof is then on the Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation by producing evidence establishing facts which cast doubt on the account of events given by the applicant. In the absence of such explanation, the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the Government. That is justified by the fact that persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them. In Bouyid the Court found that the same principle held true in the context of an identity check in a police station or a mere interview on such premises (ibid., \u00a7 84).36.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also pointed out in El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC] (no. 39630\/09, \u00a7 155, ECHR 2012) that although it recognised that it must be cautious in taking on the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact where this was not made unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case (see McKerr v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 28883\/95, 4 April 2000), it had to apply a \u201cparticularly thorough scrutiny\u201d where allegations were made under Article 3 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Ribitsch v. Austria, 4 December 1995, \u00a7 32, Series\u00a0A no. 336, and Georgiy Bykov v. Russia, no. 24271\/03, \u00a7 51, 14\u00a0October 2010), even if certain domestic proceedings and investigations had already taken place (see Cobzaru v. Romania, no. 48254\/99, \u00a7 65, 26\u00a0July 2007).37.\u00a0\u00a0In cases involving the investigation of allegations of ill-treatment, the general principles which apply in determining whether such an investigation was effective for the purposes of Article 3 were restated by the Grand Chamber, inter alia\u00b8 in Mocanu and Others v. Romania ([GC], nos.\u00a010865\/09, 45886\/07 and 32431\/08, \u00a7 316-326 ECHR 2014 (extracts)).38.\u00a0\u00a0In particular, any investigation of serious allegations of ill-treatment must be thorough. That means that the authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation or to use as the basis of their decisions (see Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, \u00a7\u00a0103, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011VIII, and Bat\u0131 and Others v.\u00a0Turkey, nos. 33097\/96 and 57834\/00, \u00a7 136, ECHR 2004\u2011IV). They must take all reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence (see Tanr\u0131kulu v. Turkey [GC], no.\u00a023763\/94, \u00a7 104, ECHR\u00a01999\u2011IV, and G\u00fcl v. Turkey, no. 22676\/93, \u00a7\u00a089, 14 December 2000). Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard (see Boicenco v. Moldova, no. 41088\/05, \u00a7\u00a0123, 11 July 2006).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application to the present case39.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes at the outset that the parties agree that the police used force against the applicant and that she sustained certain injuries as a result, namely contusions and a fractured finger. The Court also notes that the presence of certain injuries is supported by medical evidence (see paragraphs 26 - 28 above). The applicant contended that the finger had been fractured while she was at the municipal police station.40.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the essence of the disagreement between the parties concerns the exact circumstances in which the applicant sustained her injuries and whether recourse to physical force had been strictly necessary.41.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that during the period the applicant spent at the police station the applicant can be viewed as having been under the control of the authorities. Thus, in contrast to cases in which it could not be established that the applicant had been under the control of the authorities, in the present case the Court concludes that the burden rests on the Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation as to the circumstances in which the injuries were sustained and whether the force was made strictly necessary by the applicant\u2019s own conduct (see Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 83-84).42.\u00a0\u00a0In their observations the Government argued that all the injuries, including the fractured finger, could plausibly and convincingly be explained by the applicant\u2019s resistance to actions the police had taken to contain her incrementally agitated \u2013 and at times aggressive \u2013 behaviour. In their view therefore the force used against the applicant by the police officers had been made strictly necessary by her own conduct.43.\u00a0\u00a0In support of their position they cited several elements attesting to the applicant\u2019s agitated and altered state. First, they observed that witness statements about the applicant\u2019s being sober prior to being stopped in the street did not exclude the possibility that she was intoxicated at the time she got behind the wheel of her vehicle. Second, they relied on the psychological report by the expert appointed by the applicant in the context of the criminal proceedings against her and highlighted the part stating that she had been taking medication which could have the same effect as excessive alcohol consumption when combined with even a very small amount of alcohol (see paragraph 29 above). They added that the report had been added to the investigation file and had been examined closely by the prosecutor and investigating judge. They also cited the report drawn up by the officer on duty at the Benevento police station where the applicant had attempted to file her criminal complaint, which described her as being extremely agitated (see paragraph\u00a016 above). The Government further pointed out that the applicant\u2019s aggressiveness was corroborated by the fact that one of the agents at the municipal police station had been pushed by the applicant and injured as a result. Moreover, the Government reiterated that criminal proceedings had been initiated against the applicant for offences against the police officers, including insulting a public official, and that the proceedings had ended with a plea agreement.44.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stressed that the domestic investigation, which had been carried out in an effective and thorough manner, had not established that the events had occurred in the way described by the applicant, thus casting doubt on her account of what had happened.\u00a0According to the Government, the information gathered from interviews with the individuals identified by the applicant during the course of the investigation had been insufficient to confirm her accusations against the municipal police officers, as confirmed by the investigating judge\u2019s decision to discontinue the proceedings. Even if the witnesses had confirmed certain facts described by the applicant, her account had not been corroborated overall, as the witness statements had referred to ancillary matters.\u00a0The Government also highlighted the coherence of the police officers\u2019 account as opposed to the inconsistencies characterising the applicant\u2019s account. In that regard, they pointed out that the police reports had provided a plausible explanation for the injuries sustained by the applicant, whereas the applicant\u2019s account had not explained the police officer\u2019s injuries and was, in their view, riddled with lacunae and contradictions.45.\u00a0\u00a0In the circumstances of the present case, before examining the Government\u2019s submissions, the Court wishes to reiterate that\u00a0persons who are held in police custody or are even simply taken or summoned to a police station for an identity check or questioning, and more broadly all persons under the control of the police or a similar authority, are in a situation of vulnerability and the authorities are consequently under a duty to protect them (see Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7 107). In that regard, the Court recalls that Article 3 of the Convention establishes, as does Article 2, a positive obligation on the State to train its law-enforcement officials in such a manner as to ensure a high level of competence in their professional conduct so that no one is subjected to treatment that runs contrary to that provision (see Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7 108).46.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the arguments put forward by the Government, the Court notes that they hinge on a general reliance on the applicant\u2019s agitated state and general statements about the need to use force as a reaction to such conduct. The Government have not provided specific details about how the events at the municipal police station unfolded, but referred in general terms to the account provided by the police officers, which they accepted as being plausible and coherent. No concrete attempt was made to explain, let alone substantiate, what may have led to the fracture of the applicant\u2019s finger, despite the Government\u2019s acknowledgement that the injury had occurred as a consequence of the use of force by the officers on the applicant.47.\u00a0\u00a0Against this backdrop, the Court will next examine whether some substantiation of the Government\u2019s submissions emerges from the domestic investigation. In that connection, on the facts of the present case the Court considers that the provision of a satisfactory and convincing explanation as to the necessity of the use of force is closely related to the question of whether the national authorities have conducted an effective investigation capable of establishing the circumstances and the nature of the force used (see, mutatis mutandis, Mihhailov v. Estonia, no. 64418\/10, \u00a7\u00a0112, 30\u00a0August 2016; Hilal Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, no. 81553\/12, \u00a7\u00a083, 4\u00a0February 2016; Balajevs v. Latvia, no. 8347\/07, \u00a7 95, 28 April 2016; and Cemal Y\u0131lmaz v.\u00a0Turkey, no. 31298\/05, \u00a7 32, 7\u00a0February 2012).48.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contended that the investigation authorities had not made a serious attempt to find out what had happened in order to identify the origin of her injuries and the persons responsible for them. The Government submitted that the investigation had been conducted diligently, independently, and in a thorough manner.49.\u00a0\u00a0For the reasons set out below, the Court is not persuaded that the investigation complied with the requirement of thoroughness as dictated by Article 3, in the sense that the authorities used their best endeavours to find out what happened or did not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation or as the basis of their decisions (see, amongst other authorities, Alberti v. Italy, no. 15397\/11, \u00a7 62, 24 June 2014).50.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes at the outset that the investigation file shows no evidence of any investigative efforts directed towards the events that occurred in the municipal police station, although that is where the applicant alleged that the most important injuries had been inflicted. The Court further notes that the applicant explicitly complained about the lack of investigative measures concerning the events that had taken place at the station to the domestic authorities (see paragraph 20 above).\u00a0The only documents which relate to the events at the municipal police station are reports by the municipal police officers (see paragraph 14 above). All the other documents contained in the investigation concern the events that took place in the street after the applicant had been stopped on suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol.51.\u00a0\u00a0The focus of the investigation on the latter events, as opposed to the events at the station, is also reflected in the fact that the interviews with witnesses were limited to the individuals identified by the applicant in her criminal complaint, as is also conceded by the Government in their observations. With the exception of the person who lent his telephone to the applicant after she had left the hospital, the individuals identified by the applicant were connected either to the events in the street or attested to the applicant\u2019s being sober and her personal circumstances (see para 18 above). In addition, the Court notes that neither the police officers involved in the impugned events, nor the applicant, were interviewed.52.\u00a0\u00a0Another aspect which the Court finds to be problematic in so far as the thoroughness of the investigation is concerned is the extremely succinct reasoning in the prosecutor\u2019s request to discontinue the proceedings and the investigating judge\u2019s decision to that effect (see paragraphs 19 and 22 above). The Court underlines in this respect that the prosecutor\u2019s request appears to be drafted in a standardised manner. The investigating judge\u2019s decision is similarly laconic. It contains generic formulations to the effect that the evidence gathered during the preliminary investigation was not sufficient to warrant indicting the officers and that the victim\u2019s allegations have not been corroborated. No information can be gleaned from the request and the decision regarding the reconstruction of the facts, the possible causes of the applicant\u2019s injuries, the nature of the force used, or the elements relied on by the prosecutor and investigating judge to request and order the discontinuance of the proceedings.53.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes further that the investigating judge gave no reasons for denying the applicant\u2019s request for additional acts of investigation. The decision contains a generic dismissal to the effect that the further measures would have \u201cno influence whatsoever\u201d.54.\u00a0\u00a0Those considerations are sufficient for the Court to conclude that the investigating authorities failed to devote the requisite attention to the applicants\u2019 allegations concerning the events that occurred at the municipal police station despite the nature of the alleged acts, involving law-enforcement officers using force and causing injuries to a person under their control. The effect of the shortcomings identified above entailed, in practice, a failure to shed light on important aspects of the impugned events, the circumstances surrounding the use of force by the police against the applicant and, consequently, on the necessity of the use of such force.55.\u00a0\u00a0Concerning the substantive limb of Article 3, the Court is not persuaded that the Government have provided a satisfactory and convincing explanation as to how the applicant\u2019s injuries, namely the fractured finger, could have been caused. In conclusion, it cannot consider that the Government have discharged their burden of proof by demonstrating that the use of force was strictly necessary.56.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that there has been a violation of Article 3 under both its substantive and procedural head.57.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the latter findings, the Court does not consider it necessary to carry out a separate assessment of the events preceding the period the applicant spent at the police station, or to address the applicant\u2019s other complaints relating to the effectiveness of the investigation.II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION58.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage59.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 50,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage for loss of earnings and EUR 30,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.60.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the pecuniary damage claim was based on a highly speculative contention that there was a causal link between the violation and the loss of earnings.61.\u00a0\u00a0As to the applicant\u2019s claim for loss of earnings, the Court agrees with the Government that no direct causal link has been sufficiently established between the alleged loss and the violation it has found of Article\u00a03 of the Convention; it therefore rejects this claim.62.\u00a0\u00a0On the other hand, ruling on an equitable basis, it awards the applicant EUR 12,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses63.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 2,660 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and EUR 11,400 for those incurred before the Court.64.\u00a0\u00a0The Government described the applicant\u2019s claim as excessive.65.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 8,000 covering costs under all heads.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest66.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","29982":"I.\u00a0\u00a0JOINDER OF THE CASES60.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applications should be joined, given their related factual and legal background (Rule 42 \u00a7 1 of the Rules of Court).II.\u00a0\u00a0PRELIMINARY ISSUE61.\u00a0\u00a0Following the second applicant\u2019s death on 10 January 2017, his daughter, Ms Gretel Renne, informed the Court of her wish to pursue the application in her father\u2019s stead (see paragraph 1 above).62.\u00a0\u00a0In cases in which an applicant has died after lodging an application, the Court has on previous occasions taken into account statements made by the applicant\u2019s heirs or close family members expressing their wish to pursue the proceedings before the Court. For the Court\u2019s assessment of the person\u2019s standing to maintain the application on behalf of a deceased, what is important is not whether the rights at issue are transferable to the heirs but whether the heirs could in principle claim a legitimate interest in requesting the Court to deal with the case on the basis of the applicant\u2019s wish to exercise his or her individual and personal right to lodge an application with the Court (see Ergezen v. Turkey, no. 73359\/10, \u00a7 29, 8 April 2014). The Court has accepted that a next of kin or an heir may in principle pursue the application, provided that he or she has sufficient interest in the case (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848\/08, \u00a7 97, ECHR 2014). In this connection, the Court reiterates that human rights cases before it generally have a moral dimension and persons close to an applicant may thus have a legitimate interest in ensuring that justice is done, even after the applicant\u2019s death (see Malhous v.\u00a0the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 33071\/96, ECHR 2000\u2011XII).63.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, and taking into account the circumstances of the present case, the Court accepts that the second applicant\u2019s daughter has a legitimate interest in pursuing the application. It\u00a0will therefore \u2013 at her request \u2013 continue dealing with the case. For\u00a0convenience, it will, however, continue to refer to Mr Renne as the second applicant in the present judgment.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION IN ITS SUBSTANTIVE ASPECT64.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that during their detention in the Asti Correctional facility in December 2004, they had suffered acts of violence and ill-treatment which they considered as amounting to torture. They relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which provides:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants66.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that they had been subjected to various forms of ill-treatment during their detention in the Asti correctional facility in December 2004.67.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant reiterated the assertion that he had been kept in solitary confinement for more than twenty days, had been stripped of his clothes and detained in a cell with no window panes in winter, in Northern Italy, and that there had been no sink and neither covers nor a mattress on the bed. He further stated that he had been subjected to sleep, food and water deprivation as well as physical violence and verbal abuse.68.\u00a0\u00a0He argued that the intention underlying the treatment was to punish and intimidate him, as the treatment went well beyond security needs. This latter point was reinforced, in the first applicant\u2019s view, as the treatment was carried out against a background of systemic ill-treatment existing in the correctional facility, whereby detainees would be subjected to various forms of ill-treatment that prison authorities and staff knew about but about which they remained indifferent.69.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, he submitted that even though many years had elapsed since the impugned events, he still suffered from anxiety and depression and had to take medication.70.\u00a0\u00a0The second applicant, drawing on the reconstruction of events set out in the first-instance decision, described the ill-treatment inflicted on him, which consisted of repeated physical violence, including beatings and his hair being ripped out, as well as detention in a solitary confinement cell without clothing for a number of days and with his food being rationed.71.\u00a0\u00a0As to the legal classification of the treatment, both applicants reiterated that they had suffered acts of torture within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government72.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not submit specific observations on the substantive aspect of the complaint under Article 3.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles73.\u00a0\u00a0The Court refers to the general principles concerning the substantive limb of Article 3 as set out in Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380\/09, \u00a7\u00a081\u201190, ECHR 2015 and, recently, in Bartesaghi Gallo and Others v. Italy, nos.\u00a012131\/13 and 43390\/13, \u00a7 111-113, 22 June 2017.74.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates, in particular, that in determining whether a given form of ill-treatment should be classified as torture, consideration must be given to the distinction, embodied in Article 3, between this notion and that of inhuman or degrading treatment. As noted in previous cases, it appears that it was the intention that the Convention should, by means of such a distinction, attach a special stigma to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering (see, amongst many other authorities, G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, \u00a7 90, ECHR 2010). In addition to the severity of the treatment, there is a purposive element to torture, as recognised in the United Nations Convention against Torture, which in Article 1 defines torture in terms of the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering with the aim, inter alia, of obtaining information, inflicting punishment or intimidating (see, amongst many other authorities, El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no.\u00a039630\/09, \u00a7 197, ECHR 2012).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the general principles to the present case(i)\u00a0\u00a0Establishment of the facts75.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes at the outset that the Asti District Court found that the impugned events occurred in the manner described by the applicants during the course of the domestic proceedings (see paragraphs 25-31 above). The Court sees no cogent reasons to call such findings into question.76.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that the Government did not contest the applicants\u2019 factual submissions or deny that the events as described by the applicants had occurred.77.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the foregoing, and in the light of all the documentary material in its possession, the Court finds it established that the applicants were subjected to the treatment complained of.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Classification of the treatment inflicted on the applicants78.\u00a0\u00a0It remains to be determined whether the impugned treatment can be said to have attained the minimum level of severity to bring it within the scope of Article 3 and, if so, how it is to be classified.79.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will begin by assessing the severity of the treatment to which the applicants were subjected. The Court reiterates that, according to the findings of the domestic court, the first applicant was subjected to repeated physical violence for nineteen days and the second applicant for six days (see paragraph 27 above).\u00a0With specific regard to the second applicant, his medical records reveal that he sustained injuries and complained about being in pain, and he was ultimately admitted to the hospital with a fractured rib and widespread bruising (see paragraphs 28 and 51 above).80.\u00a0\u00a0In addition to the physical suffering the applicants must have endured as a consequence of the physical abuse, the Court considers that the treatment may be regarded as having caused them considerable fear, anguish and mental suffering.\u00a0As an overarching consideration, the Court is mindful of the fact that the treatment was inflicted in the context of the applicants being in the custody of prison officers, and thus already in a situation of vulnerability (see Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7 107). The applicants\u2019 state of further isolation due to their placement in the solitary confinement wing must have intensified their fear, anxiety, and feelings of helplessness.81.\u00a0\u00a0The Court once again notes that the applicants were subjected to physical abuse at all hours of the day and night for many consecutive days (see paragraph 27 above).\u00a0Moreover, the physical abuse was coupled with extremely serious \u201cmaterial\u201d deprivations, which must have inevitably accentuated their suffering. In this latter respect, the applicants were subjected to deprivations and rationing of food and water, and were detained in cells with limited or no access to sanitary facilities, appropriate bedding, or heating. The applicants were further subjected to additional gratuitous acts, such as depriving them of their clothing, which must have entailed elements of humiliation and debasement (see, mutatis mutandis, Hellig v.\u00a0Germany, no.\u00a020999\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 52-57, 7 July 2011).82.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the treatment sustained by the applicants may be characterised as \u201cinhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering\u201d for the purposes of Article 3 (see Al Nashiri v. Poland, no. 28761\/11, \u00a7 515, 24 July 2014).83.\u00a0\u00a0In the Court\u2019s view, the treatment was deliberate and carried out in a premeditated and organised manner. In this connection, the Court notes that the impugned treatment was not confined to one particular moment, namely immediately following the fight between the applicants and the prison officers. It has been clearly established that the applicants endured repeated and sustained assaults and other forms of abuse and deprivations over a number of days. In this connection, note should also be taken of the conclusions reached by the domestic court, which found that the applicants had been subjected not just to isolated acts of harassment and abuse, but to what it defined as measures which had been put into practice in a systematic manner (see paragraph 26 above).84.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further considers that, for the purposes of its assessment as to the deliberate nature of the treatment, the context in which the treatment was inflicted is worthy of particular scrutiny. The domestic court found evidence of the existence of a broader pattern of abuse in the correctional facility at issue, which it labelled a \u201cgeneralised practice of ill\u2011treatment\u201d (see paragraph 29 above). It emerges from the domestic court\u2019s findings that \u201cproblematic\u201d detainees were routinely exposed to punitive measures that exceeded the bounds of permitted disciplinary or security measures, consisting of placement in solitary confinement cells which in themselves were in a deplorable condition, and where they would be subjected to physical violence and material deprivations. The domestic court highlighted the existence of such a situation in the Asti prison beyond the events concerning the applicants, and provided an account of the practices described above in the text of the judgment (see paragraphs 29 - 31 above).85.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing considerations also indicate the existence of a purposive element underlying the impugned treatment, namely to punish the detainees, to enforce discipline and to deter future disorderly behaviour in the correctional facility (see paragraphs 29 and 34 above).(iii)\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion86.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the Court is persuaded that the treatment to which the applicants were subjected attained the level of severity required to bring the impugned conduct within the scope of Article 3, and that it amounted to torture.87.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in its substantive aspect.IV.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION IN ITS PROCEDURAL ASPECT88.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that they had suffered a further violation of Article 3 in that the penalty imposed on those responsible for the acts of which they were complaining had been inadequate owing, in particular, to the time-barring in the course of the criminal proceedings. They emphasised that by failing to introduce the offence of torture into the Italian legal framework and to provide for an appropriate penalty for that offence, the State had failed to take the necessary steps to prevent the ill-treatment which they had suffered.89.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the alleged shortcomings in the investigation deriving, in particular, from the absence of an offence of torture in the Italian legal system, the applicants also relied on Article 13 of the Convention, alone and in conjunction with Article 3. However, the Court considers that it should examine the issue of the lack of an effective investigation into the alleged ill-treatment solely under the procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility90.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants91.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that, following the criminal proceedings, the first-instance court had recognised the seriousness of the ill-treatment to which they had been subjected, but that those responsible for that ill\u2011treatment had not been punished. This occurred because the offences with which the prison officers had been charged pursuant to the Italian Criminal Code had become time-barred during the criminal proceedings.92.\u00a0\u00a0They submitted that the Italian legal framework had proved to be inadequate for the purposes of punishing acts of torture and providing the necessary deterrent effect to prevent similar violations from occurring in the future. They contended that Italy must establish a legal framework capable of protecting the rights enshrined in Article 3 of the Convention, and criticised the Italian State for having failed to classify as offences all forms of ill\u2011treatment which constitute torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. This was, moreover, contrary to Italy\u2019s international commitments, in particular those arising from the ratification of the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.93.\u00a0\u00a0They thus concluded that the State had not taken the necessary steps to prevent the acts of torture which they had suffered and to criminalise them in an appropriate manner.94.\u00a0\u00a0The second applicant observed, in particular, that the impossibility of punishing those responsible for acts of torture as a result of the shortcomings in the Italian system runs the risk of supporting a practices that are widespread and nurturing a system that tolerates impunity.95.\u00a0\u00a0As regards disciplinary proceedings against the prison officers, the applicants acknowledged that disciplinary measures had been taken against them. However, they observed that the evidentiary material submitted by the Government reveals that the officers were not suspended from duty during the investigation and the criminal proceedings.96.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the applicants alleged that the Italian State had failed to comply with the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention, namely to conduct an effective investigation into the acts of torture to which they had been subjected and to mete out adequate punishment to the perpetrators.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government97.\u00a0\u00a0The Government observed that the impugned conduct had been closely examined by the Asti District Court, which had recognised the responsibility of the prison officers.98.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that both the judicial and disciplinary proceedings against the officers, which had been aimed at uncovering the full extent of the treatment inflicted on the applicants during their detention, had demonstrated the Italian authorities\u2019 willingness to identify and punish the officers responsible for the impugned acts notwithstanding the time\u2011barring of the criminal proceedings.99.\u00a0\u00a0They contested the applicants\u2019 contentions regarding disciplinary sanctions. In this respect, the Government stated that the imposition of disciplinary sanctions occurs via proceedings which are subject to procedural guarantees that are comparable to those applied in criminal proceedings. The Government further observed that in the event of criminal proceedings being conducted in parallel with disciplinary proceedings, any final assessment as to the application of disciplinary sanctions and the choice of the sanction concerned must be postponed until the conclusion of the criminal proceedings. The Government pointed out that, in order to answer for the acts perpetrated against the applicants, the prison officers had been held to account before domestic criminal courts and administrative bodies that are known for their seriousness and impartiality, and their responsibility for the impugned events had been established in both sets of proceedings.(c)\u00a0\u00a0The third-party interveners: the Nonviolent Radical Party, Transnational and Transparty, the association \u201cNon c\u2019\u00e8 pace senza giustizia\u201d, and the Italian Radicals (the former \u201cItalian Radical\u00a0Party\u201d)100.\u00a0\u00a0The third parties took the view that Italy had failed to comply with the international obligations arising from the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. They invited the Court to take account of the fact that Italy had ratified the latter instrument in 1989, thereby undertaking to introduce the offence of torture into the Italian legal system. Notwithstanding this undertaking, twenty-five years following the ratification, no legislation criminalising torture had been adopted.101.\u00a0\u00a0They also provided a comparative overview of the criminalisation of torture in a number of European systems.102.\u00a0\u00a0The third parties submitted that, in the absence of a specific offence under Italian domestic law, the offences included in the Criminal Code did not enable acts of torture to be adequately criminalised, thereby precluding the imposition of appropriate penalties proportionate to the seriousness of the acts in question.103.\u00a0\u00a0The third parties further underlined that the Cestaro judgment (cited above) had urged Italy to adopt general measures to address a structural deficiency. They consequently stressed the need to fill a legislative void insofar as the criminalisation of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment is concerned.104.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, as regards the disciplinary proceedings, the third parties reiterated, with reference, to the Court\u2019s judgments G\u00e4fgen v. Germany, cited above, and Saba v. Italy, no. 36629\/10, 1 July 2014, that where State agents have been charged with offences involving ill-treatment, they should be suspended from duty while being investigated or tried.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles105.\u00a0\u00a0Where an individual makes an arguable claim that he has been ill-treated by the State authorities, in breach of Article 3, that provision, read in conjunction with the State\u2019s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention, requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation. The general principles which apply in determining whether such an investigation was effective for the purposes of Article 3 were restated by the Court in Cestaro (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 205-212).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the general principles to the present case106.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes at the outset that five prison officers were prosecuted and tried in connection with the impugned events, although ultimately no one was convicted on the grounds of the ill-treatment inflicted on the applicants (see paragraphs 24 to 35 above). One officer was acquitted of all charges and the offences for which the remaining officers were prosecuted were all declared statute-barred in the course of the first-instance proceedings (see paragraph 35 above).107.\u00a0\u00a0In the Court\u2019s view, and having considered all the material available to it, the latter outcome cannot be attributable to delays or negligence on the part of the domestic judicial authorities. While the Court expresses some concern over the duration of the criminal investigation, it notes that the applicants neither complained about nor provided any evidence indicating unjustified delays on the part of the investigation authorities. In any event, due to its findings set out in paragraph 111 below, the Court does not find it necessary to enquire whether the investigation can be considered as having been conducted with reasonable expedition.108.\u00a0\u00a0As to the conduct of the domestic proceedings, the Court takes the view that the domestic court cannot be criticised for having wrongly assessed the seriousness of the charges against the accused (see, in contrast, Saba, cited above, \u00a7 80) or for having used the legislative and punitive provisions of domestic law to prevent the conviction of the prosecuted State agents (see, in contrast, Zeynep \u00d6zcan v. Turkey, no. 45906\/99, \u00a7\u00a043, 20\u00a0February 2007).109.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers, rather, that the domestic court took a very firm stance and in no way sought to justify or downplay the impugned conduct. The domestic court made a genuine effort to establish the facts and to identify the individuals responsible for the treatment inflicted on the applicants. It cannot therefore be denied that the court at issue submitted the case before it to a \u201cscrupulous examination\u201d, as required under Article 3 of the Convention (see Cestaro, cited above, \u00a7 206).110.\u00a0\u00a0However, the domestic court concluded that, under Italian law, at the time of the decision there existed no legal provision that would allow it to classify the impugned treatment as torture (see paragraph 33 above). The court thus had to turn to other, existing offences, namely the provisions of the Criminal Code relating to abuse of authority against detained persons and the infliction of bodily harm (see paragraph 35 above). The latter offences appear, in the Court\u2019s view, incapable of addressing the full range of issues ensuing from the acts of torture which the applicants suffered (see Myumyun v. Bulgaria, no. 67258\/13, \u00a7 77, 3 November 2015). Moreover, they were also subject to statutory limitation periods, a circumstance which in itself sits uneasily with the Court\u2019s case\u2011law concerning torture or ill\u2011treatment inflicted by state agents (see Cestaro, cited above, \u00a7 208 and Abd\u00fclsamet Yaman v. Turkey, no. 32446\/96, \u00a7 55, 2\u00a0November 2004).111.\u00a0\u00a0Based on the foregoing considerations, the Court considers that the core of the problem resides not in the conduct of the domestic judicial authorities but rather in a systemic deficiency which was characteristic of the Italian criminal law framework at the material time, as had already been identified in Cestaro (cited above, \u00a7\u00a0225). In the present case, this lacuna in the legal system, and in particular the absence of provisions penalising the practices referred to in Article 3 and, where appropriate, providing for the imposition of adequate penalties, rendered the domestic courts ill-equipped to perform an essential function, namely that of ensuring that treatment contrary to Article 3 perpetrated by State agents does not go unpunished. This, in turn, may be viewed as having had the broader effect of weakening the deterrent power of the judicial system and the vital role it ought to be able to play in upholding the prohibition of torture.112.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is therefore led to the conclusion that the criminal legislation which was applied in the instant case proved, as it did in Cestaro (cited above, \u00a7 225), both inadequate in terms of its capacity to punish the acts of torture in issue and devoid of any deterrent effect capable of preventing similar future violations of Article 3.113.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the issue of disciplinary measures, the Court acknowledges the Government\u2019s observations to the effect that disciplinary proceedings were conducted against four prison officers following the conclusion of the criminal proceedings. In this respect, the Court does not question the serious scrutiny to which the prison officers\u2019 actions were subjected to by the disciplinary bodies and notes that disciplinary measures were imposed as a consequence (see paragraph 44 above).114.\u00a0\u00a0Whilst acknowledging the importance of disciplinary measures \u2013 as it has often recognised in its case\u2011law (see G\u00e4fgen, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0121, and Saba, cited above, \u00a7 76) \u2013 the Court nevertheless considers that the imposition of disciplinary sanctions alone cannot be considered an adequate response by the authorities in cases involving acts in breach of one of the core rights of the Convention as serious as the present ones. In this respect, it reiterates that only a criminal prosecution is capable of providing the preventive effect and dissuasive force required to fulfil the requirements of Article 3.115.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, it is apparent from the material in the case file that the officers were not suspended from duty during the investigation or trial (see paragraph 45 above). The Court has frequently held that, in cases where State agents have been charged with offences involving ill\u2011treatment, they should be suspended from duty while being investigated or tried (see Cestaro, cited above, \u00a7 210).\u00a0The Court stresses the particular significance of such measures in a correctional context. In this connection, it emphasises the importance of safeguards ensuring that persons who may have been the victims of ill-treatment by State officials in custody \u2012 who are already in a state of particular vulnerability \u2012 are not discouraged, whether directly or indirectly, from lodging complaints or reporting ill-treatment.116.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the foregoing findings, the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 3 in its procedural limb.V.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION117.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage118.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of non-pecuniary damage each applicant claimed 100,000 euros (EUR) or any other amount the Court should find appropriate.119.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that amount.120.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the seriousness of the violations of the Convention of which the applicants were victims, and ruling on an equitable basis, the Court finds it appropriate to award each applicant EUR 80,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses121.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also claimed EUR 16,000 each for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court.122.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that amount.123.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR\u00a08,000 each.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest124.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","29997":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION31.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been ill-treated by the police and that the authorities had failed to conduct an effective investigation into the ill-treatment, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, which provides:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility32.\u00a0\u00a0The Government noted that although the applicant had made use of the private prosecution procedure, he had not ultimately appealed against the judgment of 28 November 2012. In their view, the proper pursuit of this procedure would have constituted an effective remedy that should have been exhausted.33.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant stressed that the substitute private prosecution was an exceptional legal avenue, with little prospect of success: notably, the victim had no means of collecting evidence. This procedure did not provide an opportunity for the victim to remedy the failures of the investigation. Moreover, the substitute private prosecutor would have run the risk of being prosecuted for the offence of false accusation in the event that the court had acquitted the accused. If a substitute private prosecution was not an effective remedy, as he argued, then an appeal under that procedure was even less so. The applicant presented statistics demonstrating that the chances of a successful application to bring a substitute private prosecution were very limited in Hungary, in particular in respect of criminal complaints against public officers.34.\u00a0\u00a0The Court points out that the general principles concerning the exhaustion of domestic remedies have recently been set out in Chiragov and Others v.\u00a0Armenia [GC] (no. 13216\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 115-116, ECHR 2015). The Court observes in particular that it is for the applicant to select which legal remedy to pursue for the purpose of obtaining redress for the alleged breaches where there is a choice of remedies available to the applicant in respect of redress for an alleged violation of the Convention. Article\u00a035 of the Convention must be applied in a manner corresponding to the reality of the applicant\u2019s situation in order to guarantee the effective protection of the rights and freedoms in the Convention (see B.K.M. Lojistik Tasimacilik Ticaret Limited Sirketi v. Slovenia, no. 42079\/12, \u00a7 25, 17\u00a0January 2017, with further references). The Court has already held that where an applicant has lodged a criminal complaint concerning acts of violence and alleging discriminatory motives behind the attack, that person is not required to pursue the matter by instituting a subsidiary prosecution (see R.B. v.\u00a0Hungary, no.\u00a064602\/12, \u00a7 62, 12 April 2016).35.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against the presumed perpetrators and subsequently lodged a further complaint against the discontinuation order obtained at first instance. These proceedings were capable of leading to the identification and, if appropriate, punishment of those responsible. The Court is therefore satisfied that the applicant was not required in addition to pursue the matter by way of an appeal in the course of a substitute private prosecution concerning the same event, which would have had the same objective as his criminal complaint (see, mutatis mutandis, Borb\u00e1la Kiss v. Hungary, no.\u00a059214\/11, \u00a7\u00a026, 26\u00a0June 2012, and Matko v. Slovenia, no.\u00a043393\/98, \u00a7 95, 2\u00a0November 2006).36.\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s preliminary objection as to non\u2011exhaustion of domestic remedies must thus be dismissed.37.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions38.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant emphasised that he had suffered physical ill\u2011treatment and that this had been even admitted by the Government. In line with the Court\u2019s case-law, the burden of proof rested on the Government as to how and when the injuries of an individual \u2013 taken into police custody in good health but found to be injured at the time of release \u2013 were sustained. The Government, however, failed plausibly to explain how, when and where the injuries had occurred if not at the police station.39.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further submitted that the investigation into his allegations had not been adequate for the purpose of Article\u00a03. Most importantly, the investigating authorities had not obtained evidence from his brother and his friend, who could have testified that he had had injuries on being released from the police station.40.\u00a0\u00a0The Government emphasised that if reasonable doubt emerged concerning the applicant\u2019s claims as to when and how the defendants had caused those injuries, then there could be no criminal sanctions against the latter. Dr C.S. had recorded no injuries when inspecting the applicant shortly after the alleged incident \u2013 a fact raising reasonable doubts as to the time of the occurrence of the injuries.41.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further argued that the investigation into the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment had been adequate, speedy and thorough. In the course of the investigation, the authorities had heard all witnesses who were able to supply substantive and relevant information about the events.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0Concerning the alleged ill-treatment42.\u00a0\u00a0Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic societies. Indeed the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is a value of civilisation closely bound up with respect for human dignity. Unlike most of the substantive clauses of the Convention, Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions, and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 \u00a7\u00a02 even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation (ibid.). Even in the most difficult circumstances, such as the fight against terrorism and organised crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the conduct of the person concerned (see, among other authorities, Bouyid v.\u00a0Belgium [GC], no. 23380\/09, \u00a7 81, ECHR 2015, with further references).43.\u00a0\u00a0Allegations of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 must be supported by appropriate evidence. To assess this evidence, the Court adopts the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d but adds that such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see, among other authorities, Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7\u00a082).44.\u00a0\u00a0On this latter point the Court has explained that where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention. The burden of proof is then on the Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation by producing evidence establishing facts which cast doubt on the account of events given by the victim. That is justified by the fact that persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them (see, among other authorities, Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7\u00a083).45.\u00a0\u00a0Ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim. Further factors include the purpose for which the ill\u2011treatment was inflicted, together with the intention or motivation behind it, although the absence of an intention to humiliate or debase the victim cannot conclusively rule out a finding of a violation of Article 3. Regard must also be had to the context in which the ill-treatment was inflicted, such as an atmosphere of heightened tension and emotions (see, among other authorities, Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7 86).46.\u00a0\u00a0In the instant case the applicant complained that during his arrest he was subjected to acts of police brutality. It is true that the local general practitioner who examined the applicant soon after his release did not identify any external marks of injury on him; nevertheless, she found his ribs to be sore and suggested that he go to hospital to obtain a medical certificate. However, according to the medical certificate issued by Bug\u00e1t P\u00e1l Hospital shortly afterwards, the applicant bore several injuries, the existence of which was later confirmed by Albert Schweitzer Hospital.47.\u00a0\u00a0The Court cannot share the Government\u2019s view that the fact that the local general practitioner did not record any external injuries alone casts doubt on the applicant\u2019s version of the events, especially since she only examined the applicant\u2019s upper body (see paragraph 12 above). Dr C.S. did not produce any written record on her visit to the applicant\u2019s home or the details of the examination, whose particulars could be reconstructed only in retrospect. Given that the applicant sought medical assistance very shortly after the alleged incident, including a car trip to another town, the Court is reluctant to attribute any decisive importance to this issue, which, in any event, cannot be considered so significant as to undermine the applicant\u2019s case under Article 3 (see, mutatis mutandis, Balogh v.\u00a0Hungary, no.\u00a047940\/99, \u00a7 49, 20 July 2004). To hold the opposite would be tantamount to assuming that the applicant self-inflicted his injuries, or else got involved in an undocumented quarrel with other persons in the very limited period of time between the visit of Dr C.S. and his reporting at Bug\u00e1t P\u00e1l Hospital \u2013 a proposition which is quite implausible.48.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the Court notes that the applicant was released from the police station at about 2 p.m., and three individuals testified in court saying that he had already had the injuries at that moment. The Government have not refuted the applicant\u2019s submission that those persons were then continuously with him until his examination at Bug\u00e1t P\u00e1l Hospital, being thus in a position to testify that no injuries were suffered by the applicant once he had left the police station. Furthermore, on the very same day the applicant approached Bug\u00e1t P\u00e1l and Albert Schweitzer Hospitals so as to obtain medical certificates; as the Court has already noted, the certificates obtained corroborated the existence of those injuries. Lastly, the Court notes that the forensic expert ultimately found that the medical certificates received were compatible with the applicant\u2019s version of the events.49.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances, the Court cannot but conclude that the authorities have not provided any plausible explanation for the cause of the applicant\u2019s injuries. On the basis of all the material before it, the Court finds that the Government have not satisfactorily established that the applicant\u2019s injuries were caused otherwise than by the treatment meted out to him in police custody.50.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a breach of Article 3 of the Convention in this regard.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Concerning the alleged inadequacy of the investigation51.\u00a0\u00a0The Court refers to the general principles set out inter alia in El\u2011Masri v.\u00a0the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC] (no.\u00a039630\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0182-185, ECHR 2012) and Mocanu and Others v.\u00a0Romania [GC] (nos.\u00a010865\/09 and 2 others, \u00a7\u00a7 316-326, ECHR\u00a02014 (extracts)). Those principles indicate that the general prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment by agents of the State in particular would be ineffective in practice if no procedure existed for the investigation of allegations of ill-treatment of persons held by them. Thus, having regard to the general duty on the State under Article 1 of the Convention to \u201csecure to everyone within [its] jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention\u201d, the provisions of Article 3 require by implication that there should be some form of effective official investigation where an individual makes a credible assertion that he has suffered treatment infringing Article\u00a03 at the hands of, inter alia, the police or other similar authorities. The essential purpose of such an investigation is to secure the effective implementation of the domestic laws prohibiting torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in cases involving State agents or bodies, and to ensure their accountability for ill-treatment occurring under their responsibility (see Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0114-117).52.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds at the outset that the prosecutor\u2019s office made no genuine efforts to establish the chronology of the incident alleged by the applicant. In particular, the prosecutor was satisfied that three defendants, Gy.K., F.I. and H.A., had alibis for the questioning that took place between 5.51 a.m. and 6.33 a.m. and had discontinued the case against them for this reason. It is true that the record which the applicant had been made to sign indicated that the questioning had taken place between 5.51 and 6.33 a.m. However, the prosecutor did not address the applicant\u2019s grievance in respect of having been detained, and allegedly repeatedly beaten, over a much longer period spanning that night and morning. If that was true, the alibis of those officers should have been seen at best as incomplete.53.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further considers that another key element in the present case was whether or not the applicant already had the impugned injuries upon his release from policy custody. Since domestic practice does not seem to require that detainees be seen by a doctor before leaving such a facility, the only viable means of the investigating authorities obtaining certainty on this crucial element would have been to obtain testimony from the applicant\u2019s mother, brother and friend. Moreover, the same persons appear to have been continuously in the applicant\u2019s company from the moment of his release until his examination at Bug\u00e1t P\u00e1l Hospital, and were thus in a position to give evidence to the effect that he did not sustain any injuries once outside the police premises.54.\u00a0\u00a0However, of these witnesses the investigating authorities obtained testimony only from the applicant\u2019s mother. Although her statements apparently carried no weight in the authorities\u2019 eyes, they did not attempt to corroborate them by way of hearing the other two witnesses \u2013 the applicant\u2019s brother and the applicant\u2019s friend. For the Court, this reluctance significantly tainted the official investigation being pursued by the State authorities; it cannot be regarded as having been redressed by the fact that the three witnesses were ultimately heard in the ensuing substitute private prosecution.55.\u00a0\u00a0The authorities mostly relied on the statements of the alleged perpetrators and other police officers and on the internal records of the police. For the Court, this course of action was unlikely to shed light on the veracity of the central element of the applicant\u2019s grievance, namely, that he was ill-treated by State agents while in their custody.56.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances, having regard to the lack of an effective investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations, the Court holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in this respect.II.\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION57.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the ill-treatment he had suffered, along with the subsequent lack of an effective investigation into the incident, had been in part due to his Roma ethnic origin. He alleged a violation of Article 14 of the Convention, which provides:\u201cThe enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility58.\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had not made any formal allegations to the Hungarian authorities about racist motives behind his ill\u2011treatment \u2013 that is to say he had not exhausted the domestic remedies. Although he had mentioned in his criminal complaint and afterwards that abusive remarks had been made concerning his origin during the ill\u2011treatment suffered, he had never actually claimed that he had been beaten because he was a Roma.59.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that his criminal complaint of coercive interrogation \u2013 in which he had mentioned racist abuse \u2013 had to be understood to have implied that he had been beaten because he was a Roma. He referred to Prosecuting hate crimes \u2013 a practical guide, published by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (see paragraph\u00a029 above), and to the Hungarian public prosecutors\u2019 protocol on bias\u2011motivated crimes (see paragraph 30 above), which confirmed that remarks on a victim\u2019s origin were to be considered as indicator of racial motivation. Such motivation should have been investigated on the authorities\u2019 own motion.60.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant was consistent in stating to the authorities (see paragraphs 16 and 21 above) repeatedly that he had been the target of abusive racial remarks throughout the alleged ill\u2011treatment. The Court is therefore satisfied that he brought the matter to the attention of the domestic authorities, thus affording them an opportunity to redress the matter. Therefore, the Government\u2019s preliminary objection as to non\u2011exhaustion of domestic remedies must be dismissed.61.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions62.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged that during the ill-treatment the officers had made repeated references to his Roma origin, which clearly indicated a racial motivation for the act. Despite his consistent allegations of racial abuse, the investigation had not covered the question of possible racist motivation for the crime and the prosecutor\u2019s decision had not even mentioned this aspect. The applicant argued that racist motivation could have been considered by the authorities as an aggravating circumstance in respect of coercive interrogation \u2013 yet another reason why the prosecutor should have examined it during the investigation.63.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Government, since it was not proven that a criminal offence had been committed at all, its alleged racist motives were completely irrelevant to the investigation. Accordingly, there was no need to assess this aspect of the evidence in the instant case. Other than that, the prosecution authorities generally paid paramount attention to the investigation of racist motives: procedures to follow in criminal proceedings initiated on charges of hate crimes were guided by the relevant public prosecutors\u2019 protocol (which was itself based on recommendations of the 2010 working paper of OSCE\/ODIHR), which was made available to all public prosecutors and formed part of the training material provided by the Hungarian Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office.64.\u00a0\u00a0The third-party intervener, the European Roma Rights Centre, viewed the issue in the present case through the lens of \u201canti\u2011Gypsyism\u201d and maintained that there had been an increase in anti-Roma rhetoric, racism and physical violence against the Roma in Hungary. It further argued that vulnerable victims alleging racially-motivated violence were unlikely to prove beyond reasonable doubt that they were subjected to discrimination, especially when they were also victims of a failure on the part of the domestic authorities to carry out an effective investigation. It maintained that the Court\u2019s analysis under Article 14, read in conjunction with the procedural limb of Article 2 or Article 3 (see, for example, Nachova and Others v.\u00a0Bulgaria [GC], nos.\u00a043577\/98 and 43579\/98, 6 July 2005, and \u0160e\u010di\u0107 v.\u00a0Croatia, no.\u00a040116\/02, 31 May 2007), was limited in that it had not addressed the question of whether the failure to carry out an effective investigation in general had been a result of institutional racism.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0Whether the respondent State is liable for degrading treatment on the basis of the victims\u2019 race or ethnic origin65.\u00a0\u00a0Discrimination is treating differently, without an objective and reasonable justification, persons in relevantly similar situations (see Willis v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, no.\u00a036042\/97, \u00a7 48, ECHR 2002\u2011IV). Racial violence is a particular affront to human dignity and, in view of its perilous consequences, requires from the authorities special vigilance and a vigorous reaction. It is for this reason that the authorities must use all available means to combat racism and racist violence, thereby reinforcing democracy\u2019s vision of a society in which diversity is not perceived as a threat but as a source of its enrichment (see Nachova and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0145).66.\u00a0\u00a0Faced with the applicant\u2019s complaint of a violation of Article\u00a014, as formulated, the Court\u2019s task is to establish whether or not racism was a causal factor in the impugned conduct of the police officers, thus giving rise to a breach of Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 3.67.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that in assessing evidence it has adopted the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d (see paragraph 43 above); nonetheless, it has not excluded the possibility that in certain cases of alleged discrimination it may require the respondent Government to disprove an arguable allegation of discrimination and \u2013 if they fail to do so \u2013 find a violation of Article 14 of the Convention on that basis. However, where it is alleged \u2013 as in the present case \u2013 that a violent act was motivated by racial prejudice, such an approach would amount to requiring the respondent Government to prove the absence of a particular subjective attitude on the part of the person concerned. While in the legal systems of many countries proof of the discriminatory effect of a policy or decision will dispense with the need to prove intent in respect of alleged discrimination in employment or the provision of services, that approach is difficult to transpose to a case where it is alleged that an act of violence was racially motivated (see Nachova and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0157).68.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds no reason to doubt in the present case that the applicant\u2019s apprehension and questioning were instituted lawfully since he was arrested just after he had committed a crime and was still in possession of the proceeds of that crime. Although the Court considers that the police officers\u2019 conduct during the applicant\u2019s ensuing detention calls for serious criticism, that behaviour is of itself an insufficient basis for concluding that the treatment inflicted on the applicant by the police was racially motivated. Further, the Court does not consider that the failure of the authorities to carry out an effective investigation into the alleged racist motive for the incident should shift the burden of proof to the respondent Government with regard to the alleged violation of Article 14, in conjunction with the substantive aspect of Article 3 of the Convention. The question of the authorities\u2019 compliance with their procedural obligation is a separate issue, which the Court will address below (see Nachova and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0157).69.\u00a0\u00a0In sum, having assessed all relevant elements, the Court does not consider that it has been established beyond reasonable doubt that racist attitudes played a role in the applicant\u2019s treatment by the police.70.\u00a0\u00a0It thus finds that there has been no violation of Article 14 of the Convention, taken together with Article 3 in its substantive aspect.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Whether the respondent State complied with its obligation to investigate possible racist motives71.\u00a0\u00a0The Court refers to the well-established principles of its case\u2011law on Articles\u00a03 and 14 of the Convention concerning the State\u2019s obligations when confronted with cases of violent incidents triggered by suspected racist attitudes, in particular related to the Roma origin of a victim (see \u0160e\u010di\u0107, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 50-54; Abdu v. Bulgaria, no. 26827\/08, \u00a7 \u00a7\u00a7\u00a040\u201146, 11\u00a0March 2014; Bal\u00e1zs v. Hungary, no. 15529\/12, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a047-54, 20\u00a0October 2015; and R.B. v. Hungary, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 39-45).72.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that when investigating violent incidents, State authorities have the additional duty to take all reasonable steps to unmask any racist motive and to establish whether or not ethnic hatred or prejudice may have played a role in the events. Admittedly, proving racial motivation will often be extremely difficult in practice. The respondent State\u2019s obligation to investigate possible racist overtones to a violent act is an obligation to use best endeavours and not absolute. The authorities must do what is reasonable in the circumstances to collect and secure the evidence, explore all practical means of discovering the truth and deliver fully reasoned, impartial and objective decisions, without omitting suspicious facts that may be indicative of a racially induced violence (see, mutatis mutandis, Nachova and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0158-159, and Bekos and Koutropoulos v. Greece, no. 15250\/02, \u00a7 69, ECHR 2005\u2011XIII (extracts)).73.\u00a0\u00a0In particular, the Court would reiterate that when investigating violent incidents triggered by suspected racist attitudes, the State authorities are required to take all reasonable action to ascertain whether there were racist motives and to establish whether feelings of hatred or prejudices based on a person\u2019s ethnic origin played a role in the events. Treating racially motivated violence and brutality on an equal footing with cases lacking any racist overtones would be tantamount to turning a blind eye to the specific nature of acts which are particularly destructive of fundamental human rights. A failure to make a distinction in the way in which situations which are essentially different are handled may constitute unjustified treatment irreconcilable with Article 14 of the Convention (see \u0160korjanec v.\u00a0Croatia, no.\u00a025536\/14, \u00a7 53, ECHR 2017 (extracts)).74.\u00a0\u00a0In the instant case the Court has already found that the Hungarian authorities violated Article 3 of the Convention in that they failed to conduct an effective investigation into the incident (see paragraph\u00a056 above). It considers that it must examine separately the complaint that there was also a failure to investigate a possible causal link between alleged racist attitudes and the abuse suffered by the applicant at the hands of the police.75.\u00a0\u00a0The authorities investigating the alleged ill-treatment obtained consistent testimony from the applicant according to which, in addition to having been the victim of serious assaults, he had been subjected to racial abuse by the officers. The Court notes that the procedures to follow in such cases form part of the training syllabus of Hungarian prosecutors (see paragraph\u00a030 above).76.\u00a0\u00a0However, despite the applicant\u2019s consistent allegations, there is no evidence that the authorities carried out any examination into the question of possible racial motives. In particular, nothing was done to verify the statements of the applicant that he had been racially abused.77.\u00a0\u00a0The Court thus finds that the authorities failed in their duty under Article 14 of the Convention, taken together with Article 3, to take all possible steps to investigate whether or not discrimination may have played a role in the events. It follows that there has been a violation of Article\u00a014 of the Convention, taken together with Article 3 in its procedural aspect.III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION78.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage79.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.80.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested this claim.81.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicant must have suffered considerable distress on account of the violations found and awards him the full sum claimed.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses82.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 4,724, plus VAT, for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court. This amount corresponded to 60 hours of legal work billable by his lawyer at an hourly rate of EUR\u00a078.70, plus VAT.83.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested this claim.84.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the full sum claimed.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest85.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","30002":"11.\u00a0\u00a0In accordance with Rule 42 \u00a7 1 of the Rules of Court, the Court decides to join the applications, given that they concern similar facts and raise identical legal issues under the Convention.I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION12.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained under Article 3 of the Convention that the national authorities had failed to consider their claims that they could be at risk of ill-treatment in the event of their removal to Uzbekistan and that extradition would expose them to that risk if it were to take place. Article\u00a03 of the Convention reads:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d13.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.14.\u00a0\u00a0In their third party intervention in the case of S.U. v. Russia, no.\u00a055625\/15 submitted to the Court on 19 September 2016 the International Commission of Jurists argued that assurances issued by the authorities of Central Asian states are insufficient to protect individuals from ill\u2011treatment in their countries of origin and that their monitoring mechanism falls short of the established standard, while the Russian courts routinely rely on them. They further argued that in practice Russian courts reviewing allegations of a real risk of ill-treatment defer to the position of the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office and rarely exercise their power to carry out an independent assessment of risks.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility15.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention.16.\u00a0\u00a0In the cases of B.S. v. Russia (no. 38250\/16) and K.R. v. Russia (no.\u00a040014\/16) the Government argued that the applicants had failed to exhaust the available domestic remedies by pursuing refugee status or temporary asylum proceedings. In this respect the Court notes that the applicants raised their complaints under Article 3 of the Convention before the domestic courts that reviewed the lawfulness of their expulsion, but that these arguments were dismissed by the domestic courts (see the appended table). The Court reiterates that, in the event of there being a number of domestic remedies which an individual can pursue, that person is entitled to choose a remedy which addresses his or her essential grievance. In other words, when a remedy has been pursued, the use of another remedy which has essentially the same objective is not required (see Jasinskis v. Latvia, no.\u00a045744\/08, \u00a7 50, 21 December 2010 with further references). The Court is satisfied that the applicants had exhausted the domestic remedies by raising the relevant Article 3 claims in expulsion proceedings.17.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the applicants\u2019 complaints are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles18.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant general principles concerning the application of Article\u00a03 have been summarised recently by the Court in the judgment in the case of F.G.\u00a0v. Sweden ([GC], no. 43611\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 111-27, ECHR 2016) and in the context of removals from Russia to Uzbekistan in Mamazhonov v.\u00a0Russia (no. 17239\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 127-35, 23 October 2014).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles to the present case(a)\u00a0\u00a0Existence of substantial grounds for believing that the applicant faces a real risk of ill-treatment19.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has previously established that the individuals whose extradition was sought by either Uzbek authorities on charges of religiously or politically motivated crimes constituted a vulnerable group facing a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention in the event of their removal to Uzbekistan (see Mamazhonov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0141).20.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present cases, it is apparent that in the course of the extradition and expulsion proceedings the applicants consistently and specifically argued that they had been prosecuted for religious extremism and faced a risk of ill\u2011treatment. The extradition request submitted by the Uzbek authorities were clear as to their basis, namely that the applicants were accused of religiously and politically motivated crimes. The Uzbek authorities thus directly identified them with the groups whose members have previously been found to be at real risk of being subjected to proscribed treatment.21.\u00a0\u00a0In such circumstances, the Court considers that the Russian authorities had at their disposal a sufficiently substantiated complaints pointing to a real risk of ill-treatment.22. The Court is therefore satisfied that the applicants presented the Russian authorities with substantial grounds for believing that they faced a real risk of ill-treatment in Uzbekistan.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Duty to assess claims of a real risk of ill-treatment through reliance on sufficient relevant material23.\u00a0\u00a0Having concluded that the applicants had advanced at national level valid claims based on substantial grounds for believing that they faced a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, the Court must examine whether the authorities discharged their obligation to assess these claim adequately through reliance on sufficient relevant material.24.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present cases, the Court considers that in the extradition and expulsion proceedings the domestic authorities did not carry out a rigorous scrutiny of the applicants\u2019 claim that they faced a risk of ill\u2011treatment in their home country. The Court reaches this conclusion having considered the national courts\u2019 simplistic rejections of the applicants\u2019 claims. Moreover, the domestic courts\u2019 reliance on the assurances of the Uzbek authorities, despite their formulation in standard terms, appears tenuous, given that similar assurances have consistently been considered unsatisfactory by the Court in the past (see, for example, Abdulkhakov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 14743\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 149-50, 2 October 2012, and Tadzhibayev v.\u00a0Russia, no. 17724\/14, \u00a7 46, 1 December 2015).25.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that the Russian legal system \u2013 in theory, at least \u2013 offers several avenues whereby the applicants\u2019 removal to Uzbekistan could be prevented, given the risk of ill-treatment they face there. However, the facts of the present cases demonstrate that the applicants\u2019 claims were not adequately considered in any relevant proceedings, despite being consistently raised.26.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes that, although the applicants had sufficiently substantiated the claims that they would risk ill-treatment in Uzbekistan, the Russian authorities failed to assess their claims adequately through reliance on sufficient relevant material. This failure opened the way for the applicants\u2019 extraditions to Uzbekistan.(c)\u00a0\u00a0Existence of a real risk of ill-treatment or danger to life27.\u00a0\u00a0Given the failure of the domestic authorities to adequately assess the alleged real risk of ill-treatment through reliance on sufficient relevant material, the Court finds itself compelled to examine independently whether or not the applicants would be exposed to such a risk in the event of their removal to Uzbekistan.28.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that nothing in the parties\u2019 submissions, nor available relevant material from independent international sources (see paragraph 9 above and also Human Rights Watch World Report 2016, Amnesty International report Fast-track to Torture: Abductions and Forcible Returns from Russia to Uzbekistan, 21 April 2016), nor previously adopted judgments and decisions (see recently Kholmurodov, cited above, and Mukhitdinov, cited above), indicate that there has been any improvement in either the criminal justice system of Uzbekistan in general or in the specific treatment of those prosecuted for religiously and politically motivated crimes.29.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has given due consideration to the available material disclosing a real risk of ill-treatment to individuals accused, like the applicants, of religiously and politically motivated crimes, and concludes that authorising the applicants\u2019 removal to Uzbekistan exposed them to a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.(d)\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion30.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that there would be a violation of Article 3 of the Convention if the applicants were to be removed to Uzbekistan.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION31.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant in the case F.N. v. Russia, no. 54813\/15 complained under Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f) of the Convention that his detention pending extradition and expulsion had been arbitrary. The relevant provisions of the Convention read as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law......(f)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.\u201d32.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument and argued that the applicant\u2019s detention was in full compliance with the national law.33.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the exception in sub-paragraph (f) of Article\u00a05 \u00a7 1 of the Convention requires only that \u201caction is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition\u201d without any further justification (see among others Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, \u00a7\u00a0112, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011V) and that deprivation of liberty will be justified as long as deportation or extradition proceedings are in progress (see A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.\u00a03455\/05, \u00a7\u00a0164, ECHR 2009).34.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that first the applicant had been detained pending extradition and immediately after pending expulsion. His detention lasted at least for two years. Apparently, during the first year of his detention pending extradition no apparent progress had been achieved in the proceedings. On 26 October 2015 immediately after his release due to expiry of the maximum time-limit for detentions pending extradition, the applicant was detained pending expulsion. In a similar manner, nothing in the available materials or the parties\u2019 submissions indicates what kind of progress was achieved in the proceedings or what steps were taken by the authorities at reasonable intervals to justify continuing detention.35.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes that it had not been demonstrated that the length of the applicant\u2019s detention pending extradition and subsequent detention pending expulsion was compliant with what was reasonably required for the purpose pursued. Accordingly, there had been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION36.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants further complained under Article 13 of the Convention of a lack of effective domestic remedies in Russia in respect of their complaints under Article 3 of the Convention. Article 13 reads:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d37.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that these complaints are intrinsically linked to those examined above and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.38.\u00a0\u00a0 In view of the findings made under Article 3 of the Convention, the Court does not consider it necessary to deal with the complaints under Article 13 of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION39.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant in the case K.R. v. Russia, no. 40014\/16 also complained under Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f) of the Convention about his detention pending expulsion. Having regard to all the material in its possession, the Court finds that this complaint did not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this complaint must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 of the Convention.V.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF AN INTERIM MEASURE UNDER RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT40.\u00a0\u00a0On various dates the Court indicated to the respondent Government, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that the applicants should not be extradited, expelled or otherwise involuntarily removed from Russia to Uzbekistan for the duration of the proceedings before the Court.41.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection the Court reiterates that, in accordance with Article\u00a028 \u00a7 2 of the Convention, the present judgment is final.42.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court considers that the measures indicated to the Government under Rule\u00a039 of the Rules of Court should be discontinued.VI.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION43.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage44.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants claimed non-pecuniary damage, but left the amount of award at the discretion of the Court.45.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not advance any specific argument in this respect and was generally of the view that any award should be made in compliance with the Court\u2019s established case-law.46.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the nature of the established violations of Article\u00a03 of the Convention and the specific facts of the present case, the Court considers that finding that there would be a violation of Article 3 of the Convention if the applicants were to be removed to Uzbekistan constitutes sufficient just satisfaction in respect of any non-pecuniary damage suffered (see, to similar effect, J.K. and Others v. Sweden [GC], no.\u00a059166\/12, \u00a7\u00a0127, ECHR 2016).47.\u00a0\u00a0At the same time having regard to its conclusions under Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention in the case F.N. v. Russia, no. 54813\/15 and acting on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant in that case 5,000\u00a0euros\u00a0(EUR)\u00a0in respect of non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses48.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also claimed between EUR 3,200 and EUR 7,286 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and the Court.49.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not advance any specific argument in this respect and was of the view that any award should be made in compliance with the Court\u2019s established case-law.50.\u00a0\u00a0Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case\u2011law, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR\u00a01,500 covering costs under all heads to each of the applicants.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest51.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","30029":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION29.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that the national authorities had failed to consider his claim that he could be at risk of ill\u2011treatment if removed to Tajikistan. Article 3 of the Convention reads:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d30.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility31.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles32.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant general principles concerning the application of Article\u00a03 have been summarised recently by the Court in the judgment in F.G.\u00a0v. Sweden ([GC], no. 43611\/11, \u00a7 111-27, ECHR 2016) and in the context of removals from Russia to Central Asian states in Mamazhonov v.\u00a0Russia (no.17239\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 127-35, 23 October 2014).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles to the present case(a)\u00a0\u00a0Existence of substantial grounds for believing that the applicant faces a real risk of ill-treatment, and the assessment of those grounds by the national authorities33.\u00a0\u00a0At the outset, the Court notes that for more than a decade reputable international governmental and non-governmental agencies and organisations (see paragraph 25 above) have been issuing alarming reports concerning the dire situation of the criminal justice system in Tajikistan, the use of torture and ill-treatment techniques by law-enforcement agencies, severe conditions in detention facilities, the systemic persecution of the political opposition, and the harsh treatment of certain religious groups.34.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has previously been confronted with other cases concerning removals from the Russian Federation to Tajikistan of those accused by the Tajik authorities of criminal, religious and political activities (see, among other authorities, Gaforov, cited above; Savriddin Dzhurayev, cited above; and Nizomkhon Dzhurayev v. Russia, no. 31890\/11, 3 October 2013). In these and other similar cases, the Court has systematically found that the removal of applicants to Tajikistan in the face of their prosecution for extremism would run contrary to Article 3 of the Convention by exposing them to a risk of ill-treatment at the hands of the law-enforcement agencies.35.\u00a0\u00a0In an analogous context, the Court previously established that individuals whose extradition was sought by the Uzbek authorities on the basis of charges of religiously or politically motivated crimes constituted a vulnerable group who would face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article\u00a03 of the Convention if removed (see Mamazhonov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0141).36.\u00a0\u00a0Similarly, having regard to the above-mentioned international reports and its case-law, the Court has established that individuals whose extradition is sought by the Tajik authorities on the basis of charges of religiously or politically motivated crimes constitute a vulnerable group who would run a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention if transferred to Tajikistan.37.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, it is apparent that, in the course of the extradition, expulsion and refugee status proceedings, the applicant consistently and specifically argued that he was being prosecuted for extremism and faced a risk of ill\u2011treatment. The international search and arrest warrant and extradition request submitted by the Tajik authorities were clear as to their basis, namely that he was accused of religiously and politically motivated crimes. The Tajik authorities thus directly linked him to groups whose members have previously been found to be at real risk of being subjected to proscribed treatment.38.\u00a0\u00a0In such circumstances, the Court considers that the Russian authorities had at their disposal a sufficiently substantiated complaint pointing to a real risk of ill-treatment.39.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is therefore satisfied that the applicant presented the Russian authorities with substantial grounds for believing that he faced a real risk of ill-treatment in Tajikistan.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Duty to assess claims of a real risk of ill-treatment through reliance on sufficient relevant material40.\u00a0\u00a0Having concluded that the applicant had advanced at national level a valid claim based on substantial grounds for believing that he faced a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, the Court must examine whether the authorities discharged their obligation to assess this claim adequately through reliance on sufficient relevant material.41.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court considers that, in the extradition, expulsion and refugee status proceedings, the domestic authorities did not carry out rigorous scrutiny of the applicant\u2019s claim that he faced a risk of ill-treatment in his home country. The Court reaches this conclusion having considered the cursory rejections by the migration authorities and the national courts of the applicant\u2019s claims as hypothetical and lacking specific indications as to the level of risk, rejections which lacked reference to evidentiary material.42.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that the Russian legal system \u2013 in theory, at least \u2013 offers several avenues whereby the applicant\u2019s removal to Tajikistan could be prevented, given the risk of ill-treatment he faces there. However, the facts of the present case demonstrate that the applicant\u2019s claims were not adequately considered in any relevant proceedings, despite being consistently raised.43.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes that, although the applicant had sufficiently substantiated the claim that he would risk ill-treatment in Tajikistan, the Russian authorities failed to assess his claims adequately through reliance on sufficient relevant material. That failure opened the way for the applicant\u2019s removal to Tajikistan.(c)\u00a0\u00a0Existence of a real risk of ill-treatment or danger to life44.\u00a0\u00a0Given the failure of the domestic authorities to adequately assess the alleged real risk of ill-treatment through reliance on sufficient relevant material, the Court will examine independently whether or not the applicant would be exposed to such a risk if removed to Tajikistan.45.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that nothing in the parties\u2019 submissions or the available relevant material from independent international sources (see paragraph 25 above) indicates that there has been any improvement in either the criminal justice system of Tajikistan in general or the specific treatment of those prosecuted for religiously and politically motivated crimes.46.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is mindful that the applicant\u2019s extradition to Tajikistan was refused by the Russian prosecution authorities. However, that refusal did not eliminate the real risk of ill-treatment, since administrative removal from Russia is final and enforceable. If the applicant were expelled to Tajikistan then nothing would prevent the local authorities from pursuing their preferred charges of extremism.47.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has given due consideration to the available material disclosing a real risk of ill-treatment to individuals accused of religiously and politically motivated crimes, like the applicant, and concludes that authorising his removal to Tajikistan exposed him to a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.(d)\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion48.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that there would be a violation of Article 3 of the Convention if the applicant were removed to Tajikistan.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION49.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 13 of the Convention of a lack of effective domestic remedies in Russia in respect of his complaint under Article 3 of the Convention. Article 13 reads:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d50.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.51.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the findings made under Article 3 of the Convention, the Court declares the complaint admissible but does not consider it necessary to examine separately the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION52.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further complained that his detention pending extradition between 12 December 2013 and 3 August 2014 had been unlawful and devoid of purpose. He relied on Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law......(f)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention ... of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.\u201d53.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument and argued that the detention had been lawful for the purposes of the applicant\u2019s extradition.54.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.55.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the exception in sub-paragraph (f) of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention requires only that \u201caction is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition\u201d, without any further justification (see, among others, Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, \u00a7 112, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011V), and that deprivation of liberty will be justified as long as deportation or extradition proceedings are in progress (see A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 3455\/05, \u00a7 164, ECHR 2009). To avoid being arbitrary, detention under Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f) must be carried out in good faith; it must be closely connected to the grounds of detention relied on by the Government, the place and conditions of detention must be appropriate, and the length of the detention must not exceed that reasonably required for the purpose pursued (see Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.13229\/03, \u00a7 74, ECHR 2008, and Rustamov v.\u00a0Russia, no.11209\/10, \u00a7 150, 3 July 2012, with further references).56.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court observes that the applicant\u2019s detention lasted less than eight months, and during this period the authorities were taking genuine steps to decide on his extradition. The domestic authorities diligently pursued the relevant proceedings, there were no periods of inaction or unjustified delays, and the applicant was released following the Deputy Prosecutor General\u2019s decision to refuse his extradition.57.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, having regard to all of the material in its possession, the facts and arguments as presented by the parties, the above considerations as well as the principles firmly established in its case-law, the Court considers that there has been no violation of Article\u00a05 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention as regards the applicant\u2019s detention pending extradition between 12\u00a0December 2013 and 3 August 2014.IV.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 4 OF THE CONVENTION58.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further complained that the appeal courts had not pronounced \u201cspeedily\u201d on the lawfulness of his detention ordered by the District Court on 12 December 2013 and 29 April 2014. He relied on Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201c4.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.\u201d59.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument. They acknowledged that it had taken the City Court forty-nine and seventy-nine days respectively to pronounce on the relevant appeals. However, in their opinion, the duration of those proceedings was not attributable to the national courts, which had decided on the appeals speedily, but to a translation agency, T Ltd., which had taken thirty-five and seventy days respectively to translate the material into Tajik for the applicant. Further, they argued that, once the delays had been observed, the domestic courts had taken relevant steps to urge the above agency to complete the translations.60.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.61.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 5 \u00a7 4, in guaranteeing to arrested or detained persons a right to initiate proceedings to challenge the lawfulness of their detention, also proclaims their right, following the institution of such proceedings, to a speedy judicial decision concerning the lawfulness of such detention and ordering its termination if it proves unlawful. Although it does not compel the Contracting States to set up a second level of jurisdiction for the examination of the lawfulness of detention, a State which institutes such a system must in principle accord to the detainees the same guarantees on appeal as at first instance (see Navarra v. France, judgment of 23 November 1993, Series A no. 273\u2011B, \u00a7 28, and Toth v.\u00a0Austria, judgment of 12 December 1991, Series A no. 224, \u00a7 84). The requirement that a decision be given \u201cspeedily\u201d is undeniably one such guarantee, and Article 5 \u00a7 4, concerning issues of liberty, requires particular expedition (see Hutchison Reid v. the United Kingdom, no.50272\/99, \u00a7\u00a079, ECHR 2003\u2011IV).62.\u00a0\u00a0At the same time, the Court highlights that, although the duration of relevant proceedings is obviously an important element, it is not necessarily in itself decisive for the question of whether a decision has been given with the requisite speed (see Merie v. the Netherlands (dec.), no.\u00a0664\/05, 20\u00a0September 2007). What is to be taken into account is diligence shown by the authorities, any delay attributable to the applicant, and any factors causing delay for which the State cannot be held responsible (see Jablonski v.\u00a0Poland, no.33492\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 91-94, 21 December 2000).63.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court acknowledges the Government\u2019s argument that the delay in the above appeal proceedings was not directly attributable to the national courts, which, save for the translation delays, took fifteen and nine days respectively to consider the applicant\u2019s appeals against the detention orders. Nothing in the material available to the Court runs counter this argument.64.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Court cannot accept the Government\u2019s claim that the State cannot be held responsible for those delays. Beyond doubt it was the domestic courts which entrusted the agency T Ltd. with the translation of the relevant material for the applicant. The courts, in entering into a contractual relationship with T Ltd., should have taken appropriate care to ensure that the translation requests would be processed diligently and without unjustified delays. Even if the initial delay of thirty-five days caused by the agency during the first set of appeal proceedings could have been attributed to certain unavoidable circumstances, the second delay of seventy days caused by the same agency processing essentially a similar translation request demonstrates that the domestic courts failed to ensure the diligent and \u201cspeedy\u201d conduct of the appeal proceedings.65.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court considers that, in the present case, there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention.V.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF AN INTERIM MEASURE UNDER RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT66.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, in accordance with Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention, the present judgment will not become final until (a) the parties declare that they will not request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber; or (b) three months after the date of the judgment, if reference of the case to the Grand Chamber has not been requested; or (c) the Panel of the Grand Chamber rejects any request to refer under Article 43 of the Convention.67.\u00a0\u00a0It considers that the indication made to the Government under Rule\u00a039 of the Rules of Court must continue in force until the present judgment becomes final or until the Court takes a further decision in this connection.VI.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION68.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage69.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant left the amount of any award in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage to the discretion of the Court.70.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that, if the Court concluded that the applicant\u2019s removal to Tajikistan would be contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, this finding would in itself constitute sufficient just satisfaction.71.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the nature of the established violation of Article\u00a03 of the Convention and the specific facts of the present case, the Court considers that the finding that there would be a violation of Article 3 of the Convention if the applicant were removed to Tajikistan constitutes sufficient just satisfaction in respect of any non-pecuniary damage suffered (see, to similar effect, J.K. and Others v. Sweden [GC], no. 59166\/12, \u00a7\u00a0127, ECHR 2016).72.\u00a0\u00a0However, in respect of the violation of the applicant\u2019s rights under Article\u00a05 \u00a7 4 of the Convention, the Court, acting on an equitable basis, awards the applicant 2,500 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses73.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 3,200 for costs and expenses incurred before the Court.74.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the amount.75.\u00a0\u00a0Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case-law, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,500 to cover costs for the proceedings before the Court.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest76.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","30059":"I.\u00a0\u00a0THE GOVERNMENT\u2019S OBJECTION TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPLICATION70.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted \u2013 in respect of both complaints lodged by the applicant under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention (see paragraphs\u00a074 and 102 below) \u2013 that he had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies. After the public prosecutor had decided to discontinue the criminal investigation into Y.C.\u2019s death, the applicant\u2019s counsel had been informed in writing that the applicant had the possibility to take over the prosecution as a subsidiary prosecutor (Subsidi\u00e4rankl\u00e4ger), in accordance with Article 48 \u00a7 1 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This legal remedy had been accessible, suitable and sufficient for the alleged violations of the Convention to be redressed. However, the applicant had not made use of this possibility, and had thus failed to comply with the admissibility requirement stipulated in Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.71.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contested this argument. While admitting that he had not made use of this remedy, he explained firstly that to conduct criminal proceedings as a subsidiary prosecutor, he would have had to accept the risk of having to bear the full costs of such proceedings. Secondly, he submitted that at that time he had already raised all relevant arguments in relation to Y.C.\u2019s death during the proceedings before the IAP, and that a positive decision in those proceedings would, in his view, necessarily have led to the reopening of the criminal investigation. Thirdly, the applicant argued that by requiring him to act as a prosecutor in the investigation into his brother\u2019s death, the Government\u2019s obligation to investigate and prosecute criminal acts ex officio in all possible directions would have been shifted to him. He concluded that the remedy of taking over the prosecution as a subsidiary prosecutor had not been one that he could have reasonably been expected to take.72.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is not convinced that requesting a preliminary investigation under Article 48 \u00a7 1 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure would have constituted an effective remedy in the circumstances of the instant case. The Government has not brought forward any convincing arguments in that respect or quoted domestic case-law to demonstrate that in a comparable case this remedy has proven to be effective. In the light of the fact that the public prosecutor did not find any reason to continue the preliminary investigation, and given that there were not even any concrete suspects (since the investigation was directed against \u201cunknown persons\u201d), it appears unlikely that a request to continue the proceedings would have had any prospect of success. The Court agrees in any event with the applicant that requesting him to pursue this remedy would have inappropriately shifted the duty stipulated by Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention to conduct an effective investigation from the Government to the applicant. The procedural obligation to investigate alleged ill-treatment and a death in police custody under these provisions clearly lies with the authorities, who must act of their own motion once the matter has come to their attention. The authorities cannot leave it to the initiative of the next-of-kin either to lodge a formal complaint or to request particular lines of inquiry or investigative procedures (see, mutatis mutandis, Nachova and Others v.\u00a0Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577\/98 and 43579\/98, \u00a7 111, ECHR 2005\u2011VII). The Court therefore dismisses the Government\u2019s objection regarding the admissibility of the application in respect of the exhaustion of domestic remedies.73.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds, and must therefore be declared admissible.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION74.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under the procedural limb of Articles\u00a02 and 3 of the Convention that there had not been an effective and comprehensive investigation into his brother\u2019s death, and that the causes of Y.C.\u2019s death thus far remained unclear.The Court considers it appropriate to assess this complaint under the procedural limb of Article\u00a02 of the Convention alone. Article 2 reads as follows in its relevant parts:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone\u2019s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally ....\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant75.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that, contrary to what the forensic expert report commissioned by the IAP had stated, his brother had not died as a result of dehydration combined with the fact that he had been a carrier of sickle cell trail, but because the doctor at the detention centre had inaccurately calculated Y.C.\u2019s critical weight. The applicant relied in this respect on Dr\u00a0W.G.\u2019s statement, which he had submitted as evidence to the IAP in the course of the public hearing on 13\u00a0February 2006 (see paragraphs 38 and 44 above). The applicant complained that Dr W.G.\u2019s findings had not been taken into account. The applicant concluded from W.G.\u2019s statement that if the police doctor had not made a mistake in the calculation of Y.C.\u2019s critical weight, his brother would still be alive.76.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant concluded that the outcome of the investigation into Y.C.\u2019s death had been neither correct nor thorough, in violation of Article 2 of the Convention.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Government77.\u00a0\u00a0The Government took the view that the criminal investigation into Y.C.\u2019s death had been conducted expeditiously and effectively, in accordance with the Court\u2019s case-law. To secure evidence regarding the circumstances of Y.C.\u2019s death, the investigating judge had ordered an autopsy, as requested by the public prosecutor, on 4 October 2005 (the very day of Y.C.\u2019s death). On the following day the blood sample from Y.C. and the related examination report had been seized and the OIA had been asked to investigate the facts. Shortly thereafter, the persons directly involved had been questioned extensively. The taking of evidence had been supplemented by the obtaining of an independent expert report on the results of the autopsy. The expert had informed the public prosecutor on 12 October 2005 of the results of the autopsy.78.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stated that the criminal investigation had, moreover, been independent, as it had been subject to the supervision of an investigating judge, who had been independent not only of the public prosecutor, but also the administration in general.79.\u00a0\u00a0As to the participation of relatives in the investigation, the Government submitted that the applicant had been able to join the criminal proceedings at the investigative stage as a private party, in accordance with Article 47 of the Code of Criminal Proceedings. This status had given him the right to lodge requests to be permitted to inspect the files and to participate in the criminal investigation and the establishment of facts, and that evidence be gathered.80.\u00a0\u00a0In sum, the Government considered that there had been an efficient, independent and transparent investigation aimed at determining criminal liability in connection with Y.C.\u2019s death.81.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the circumstances of Y.C.\u2019s death had also been the subject of ensuing administrative proceedings, namely to examine the question of whether Y.C.\u2019s death had been caused by a lack of adequate medical treatment while in detention pending expulsion. The IAP had based its decision on findings which had relied on the results of two oral hearings during which the police officers concerned, a further medical expert and the detainee sharing a cell with Y.C. had been questioned extensively about the course of Y.C.\u2019s hunger strike and his medical treatment. Moreover, the Human Rights Advisory Board had carried out an independent review of the police investigation and published the results in a report (see paragraph 27 above).B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles82.\u00a0\u00a0The first sentence of Article 2 \u00a7 1 enjoins the State not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction (see L.C.B. v. the United Kingdom, 9 June 1998, \u00a7 36, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011III).83.\u00a0\u00a0Persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848\/08, \u00a7 131, ECHR 2014). Where an individual is taken into custody in good health but later dies, it is incumbent on the State to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation of the events leading to his death (see Carabulea v. Romania, no. 45661\/99, \u00a7 108, 13 July 2010) and to produce evidence casting doubt on the veracity of the victim\u2019s allegations, particularly if those allegations are backed up by medical reports (see Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803\/94, \u00a7 87, ECHR\u00a01999\u2011V, and Abd\u00fclsamet Yaman v. Turkey, no. 32446\/96, \u00a7 43, 2\u00a0November 2004).84.\u00a0\u00a0The State\u2019s duty to safeguard the right to life must be considered to involve not only the taking of reasonable measures to ensure the safety of individuals in public places but also, in the event of serious injury or death, having in place an effective independent judicial system securing the availability of legal means capable of promptly establishing the facts, holding accountable those at fault and providing appropriate redress to the victim (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0132).85.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to its fundamental character, Article 2 of the Convention contains a procedural obligation \u2013 as described below \u2013 to carry out an effective investigation into alleged breaches of its substantive limb (see Mastromatteo v. Italy [GC], no. 37703\/97, \u00a7 89, ECHR 2002\u2011VIII, and Giuliani and Gaggio, [GC], no. 23458\/02, \u00a7 298, ECHR 2011).86.\u00a0\u00a0The State\u2019s obligation to carry out an effective investigation has in the Court\u2019s case-law been considered as an obligation inherent in Article 2, which requires, inter alia, that the right to life be \u201cprotected by law\u201d. Although the failure to comply with such an obligation may have consequences for the right protected under Article 13, the procedural obligation of Article 2 is seen as a distinct obligation (see, inter alia, \u0160ilih v.\u00a0Slovenia [GC], no. 71463\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 153\u2011154, 9 April 2009). It can give rise to a finding of a separate and independent \u201cinterference\u201d. This conclusion derives from the fact that the Court has consistently examined the question of procedural obligations separately from the question of compliance with the substantive obligation (and, where appropriate, has found a separate violation of Article 2 on that account) and the fact that on several occasions a breach of a procedural obligation under Article 2 has been alleged in the absence of any complaint as to its substantive aspect (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 158-159).87.\u00a0\u00a0The question of whether an investigation has been sufficiently effective must be assessed on the basis of all relevant facts and with regard to the practical realities of investigation work (see Dobriyeva and Others v.\u00a0Russia, no. 18407\/10, \u00a7 72, 19 December 2013; and Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0147).88.\u00a0\u00a0In order to be \u201ceffective\u201d as this expression is to be understood within the context of Article 2 of the Convention, an investigation must firstly be adequate (see Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], no.\u00a052391\/99, \u00a7 324, ECHR 2007\u2011II). That is to say it must be capable of leading to the establishment of the facts and, where appropriate, the identification and punishment of those responsible. The obligation to conduct an effective investigation is an obligation not of result but of means: the authorities must take the reasonable measures available to them to secure evidence concerning the incident at issue (see Jaloud v.\u00a0the\u00a0Netherlands [GC], no. 47708\/08, \u00a7 186, ECHR 2014, and Nachova and Others, cited above, \u00a7 160).89.\u00a0\u00a0In any event, the authorities must take whatever reasonable steps they can to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter\u00a0alia, eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence and, where appropriate, an autopsy which provides, among other things, an objective analysis of clinical findings, including the cause of death. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of death or the person responsible will risk falling foul of this standard (see Giuliani\u00a0and Gaggio, cited above, \u00a7 301).90.\u00a0\u00a0In particular, the investigation\u2019s conclusions must be based on a thorough, objective and impartial analysis of all relevant elements. Failing to follow an obvious line of inquiry undermines to a decisive extent the investigation\u2019s ability to establish the circumstances of the case and, where appropriate, the identity of those responsible (see Kolevi v. Bulgaria, no.\u00a01108\/02, \u00a7 201, 5 November 2009).91.\u00a0\u00a0Nevertheless, the nature and degree of scrutiny which satisfy the minimum threshold of the investigation\u2019s effectiveness depend on the circumstances of the particular case. It is not possible to reduce the variety of situations which might occur to a bare check-list of acts of investigation or other simplified criteria (see Tanr\u0131kulu v. Turkey [GC], no. 23763\/94, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0101-110, ECHR 1999-IV, and Velikova v. Bulgaria, no. 41488\/98, \u00a7 80, ECHR 2000\u2011VI).92.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the persons responsible for the investigation should be independent of anyone implicated or likely to be implicated in the events. This means not only a lack of hierarchical or institutional connection but also a practical independence (see Anguelova v. Bulgaria, no. 38361\/97, \u00a7\u00a0138, ECHR 2002\u2011IV).93.\u00a0\u00a0A requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is implicit within this context (see Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 55721\/07, \u00a7 167, ECHR 2011).94.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, the investigation must be accessible to the victim\u2019s family to the extent necessary to safeguard their legitimate interests. There must also be a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation, the degree of which may vary from case to case (see Hugh Jordan v. the United Kingdom, no. 24746\/94, \u00a7 109, ECHR 2001\u2011III). The requisite access of the public or the victim\u2019s relatives may, however, be provided for at other stages of the procedure (see, among other authorities, Giuliani and Gaggio, cited above, \u00a7 304, and McKerr v. the United Kingdom, no. 28883\/95, \u00a7\u00a0129, ECHR 2001\u2011III). In addition, Article 2 does not impose a duty on the investigating authorities to satisfy every request for a particular investigative measure made by a relative in the course of the investigation (see Ramsahai and Others, cited above, \u00a7 348, and Velcea and Maz\u0103re v. Romania, no.\u00a064301\/01, \u00a7 113, 1\u00a0December 2009).95.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court considers it useful to reiterate that, when it comes to establishing the facts, and sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role, it must be cautious in taking on the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact, where this is not rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case (see Ataykaya v. Turkey, no. 50275\/08, \u00a7 47, 22 July 2014, and Leyla\u00a0Alp and Others v. Turkey, no. 29675\/02, \u00a7 76, 10 December 2013). Where domestic proceedings have taken place, it is not the Court\u2019s task to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the domestic courts and it is for the latter to establish the facts on the basis of the evidence before them (see, among other authorities, Edwards v. the United Kingdom, 16\u00a0December 1992, \u00a7 34, Series A no 247-B). Although the Court is not bound by the findings of domestic courts and remains free to make its own appreciation in the light of all the material before it, in normal circumstances it requires cogent elements to lead it to depart from the findings of fact reached by the domestic courts (see Giuliani and Gaggio, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0180, and Aydan v. Turkey, no. 16281\/10, \u00a7 69, 12\u00a0March\u00a02013).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application to the present case96.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes at the outset that under Article 2 of the Convention, the applicant did not allege that Y.C. had died as a result of the use of force by the authorities. He complained of an insufficient investigation into his brother\u2019s death. The Court\u2019s task therefore consists of examining whether the guarantees under the procedural limb of Article 2 of the Convention have been respected \u2013 namely whether the authorities have complied with their duty to carry out an effective and comprehensive investigation in respect of Y.C.\u2019s case (see also paragraph 74 above). The Court considers that the complaint raised by the applicant regarding the allegedly inaccurate calculation of Y.C.\u2019s critical weight \u2013 and, more generally, the medical treatment afforded to Y.C. during his hunger strike \u2013 fall to be examined under the substantive limb of Article 3 of the Convention (see paragraphs\u00a0115-123 below).97.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that a criminal investigation was opened by the public prosecutor on the day of Y.C.\u2019s death. The Court finds that the steps taken by the public prosecutor were carried out promptly and without unnecessary delays. All relevant witnesses were questioned, evidence was immediately secured and seized, and an expert report concerning the cause of death was ordered. It was not disputed by the applicant that the expert Dr\u00a0H. had been independent. The applicant, as a member of Y.C.\u2019s family, was able to join the proceedings as a private party. The Court cannot discern any indication of shortcomings in the public prosecutor\u2019s investigation. The criminal investigation was ultimately closed by the public prosecutor as no sufficient evidence was found to indicate misconduct on the part of the persons in charge. The public prosecutor thereby relied on the comprehensive autopsy report and expert report issued by Dr H. (see paragraphs 30-33 above), which clearly stated that death through the use of force could be excluded, and that Y.C. had in fact died of dehydration, combined with the fact that he had been a carrier of sickle cell trait (see paragraph 33 above).98.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also instituted administrative proceedings before the IAP for a review of the lawfulness of Y.C.\u2019s detention and lodged a complaint about the conditions of his detention. In the course of these proceedings, several witnesses and two experts were questioned. The IAP examined the evidence and delivered three decisions, two of which were quashed by the Administrative Court. While the IAP found that the authorities should have known that Y.C. came from a country whose inhabitants bore a high likelihood of being a carrier of sickle cell disease and therefore should have informed Y.C. of this potential risk after he had embarked upon his hunger strike, the Administrative Court found that the mere fact that a person came from a country with a high rate of sickle cell disease did not mean that the State had a duty to test every person from a certain area for this genetic predisposition. After obtaining a second expert report, the IAP eventually acted in accordance with the legal opinion of the Administrative Court and dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaints.99.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes in relation to the administrative proceedings that they were equally comprehensive as the criminal proceedings. Relevant witnesses were heard, an additional expert report was obtained, and the applicant played an active role in those proceedings, was able to lodge requests, and had access to the case file. Again, the independence of the court-appointed expert was at no point called into question by the applicant. However, he did submit as evidence a statement which focused on the calculation of Y.C.\u2019s critical weight and possible mistakes which allegedly were made in that respect. The Court, contrary to the applicant\u2019s allegation in that respect (see paragraph 75 above), sees no indication from the documents at hand that the IAP did not take into account the statement. The applicant was able to submit it as evidence in the course of the IAP proceedings, and the question of Y.C.\u2019s critical weight was discussed with the expert Dr L. during the hearing of 21 June 2012 (see paragraph 55 above). In addition, the expert Dr H. concluded that the cause of Y.C.\u2019s death had been dehydration, combined with the fact that he had been a carrier of sickle cell trait, and his death could therefore only have been prevented if he had been tested earlier for sickle cell trait, or if he had been aware that he was a carrier thereof. The expert Dr L. equally found that the calculation of the critical weight had had no bearing on Y.C.\u2019s death. In its subsequent decision, the IAP ultimately decided to follow Dr L.\u2019s expert report rather than the statement of Dr W.G. (see paragraph 44 above). The Court sees no reason to question the domestic courts\u2019 decision to ascribe decisive importance to these findings, rather than relying on the statement of Dr W.G. The Court recalls within this context that it is not its task to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the domestic courts and it is for the latter to establish the facts on the basis of the evidence before them (see, among other authorities, Edwards, cited above, \u00a7 34).100.\u00a0\u00a0As to the applicant\u2019s argument that the domestic authorities erred in finding that they had not been under a duty to test Y.C. for sickle cell disease merely because he came from a high-risk area, the Court notes first of all that apparently not even Y.C. had been aware of his being a carrier of sickle cell trait, and secondly finds no ground for disagreeing with the Administrative Court that the authorities had not been under an obligation to conduct medical tests without there being a clear indication or necessity to that end (see paragraph 48 above).101.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore concludes that the manner in which the investigation into Y.C.\u2019s death was carried out by the domestic authorities does not give rise to a violation of Article 2 of the Convention under its procedural limb.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION102.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the medical assistance to his brother during his hunger strike had not been in accordance with the law (section\u00a010(1) and (4) of the Detention Ordinance). Furthermore, because (i) Y.C. had been kept in detention even though he had no longer been fit to be so held, and (ii) had been placed just before his death in a security cell without a water outlet, his brother had been subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment.The applicant relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d103.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that these complaints fall to be examined under the substantive limb of Article 3 of the Convention alone.A.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant104.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted observations concerning Y.C.\u2019s medical care in relation to his complaint under Article 3 of the Convention that were similar to those that he submitted in relation to his Article 2 complaint (see paragraph 75 above). He added that the police had not recognised that Y.C. had already been on hunger strike for several days before he had announced it. Therefore, during these days the authorities had not followed the applicable regulations. Intensive medical care should have been provided in the days before Y.C.\u2019s death, as he had been in a life-threatening condition because of the inaccurate calculation of his critical body weight. Instead, he had been placed alone in a security cell. The applicant concluded that Article\u00a03 of the Convention had been violated because of the inhuman situation that Y.C. had been in.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Government105.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contended that the medical care afforded to Y.C. between 28 September and 4 October 2005 had been adequate. This could be seen from the fact that the first examination had been carried out by the police doctor directly after Y.C.\u2019s announcement of his hunger strike and that the ensuing daily medical check-ups had continued until his death (contrast Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine, no. 54825\/00, \u00a7\u00a7 103-104, ECHR\u00a02005\u2011II (extracts)). The clinical examinations carried out within this context were based on the ordinance issued by the Ministry of the Interior regarding the medical measures to be taken in the event of a hunger strike (contrast Palushi v. Austria, no. 27900\/04, \u00a7 72, 22 December 2009). The doctors treating Y.C. had been able to communicate with him in English without problems. When Y.C. had refused to be examined by the police doctor on 4 October 2005, he had immediately been transferred to a public hospital for a complete clinical evaluation (contrast Aleksanyan v. Russia, no.\u00a046468\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 151-158, 22 December 2008).106.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that Y.C. had therefore been subject to an extensive medical examination at a public hospital only a few hours before his death. According to the report issued by the clinic, Y.C. had by no means been in grave danger at the time of his examination there, and there had been no indication of a life-threatening situation. There had therefore been no indication that Y.C. should have been admitted by the hospital as an in-patient. As the autopsy report had shown, Y.C. had ultimately died as a result of dehydration, combined with the fact that he had been a carrier of sickle cell disease; the fact that he had been a carrier of sickle cell trait had been known neither to him nor the authorities. Until Y.C.\u2019s death, the Austrian authorities had had no experience regarding the health risk emanating from this anomaly of the blood cells within the context of a hunger strike.107.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stated that the IAP had conducted a detailed and thorough investigation with the assistance of sworn medical experts. The Administrative Court had considered it an established fact that under the given circumstances, the competent authorities had not been required to know about the direct danger to Y.C.\u2019s life and health posed by sickle cell disease, and that the need for a prophylactic blood test for the detection of this anomaly had not been medically indicated at any time.108.\u00a0\u00a0When it came to the applicant\u2019s complaint that Y.C. had been placed in a security cell, the Government submitted that the applicant had not presented any arguments concerning the condition of the cell, but had merely stated that there had been no legal basis for that measure. The Government stated that the legal basis could be found in section 5 of the Detention Ordinance as Y.C. had been endangering his own health and that of others by violence. He had also been a significant burden on other detainees as he had already exhibited very aggressive behaviour during his examination in hospital (see paragraph 17 above). Moreover, Y.C. could have requested a water bottle at any time, there had been a mattress on the floor, and natural light had entered through two barred windows. Given the adequacy of the equipment in the cell and the short duration (less than two hours) of Y.C.\u2019s detention there, the intensity of the separation measure had not attained such a level of severity as to bring his detention in the security cell within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Vala\u0161inas v. Lithuania, no. 44558\/98, \u00a7 112, ECHR 2001\u2011VIII).109.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that the fact that Y.C. had been on hunger strike at that time could not change this assessment. The present case differed in several aspects from the facts underlying the case of Palushi (cited above), as adequate measures had been taken to supervise Y.C.\u2019s stay in the security cell by carrying out checks at short (fifteen- to thirty-minute) intervals.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles110.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim\u2019s behaviour (see, for example, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000\u2011IV).111.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, ill\u2011treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among other authorities, Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 36760\/06, \u00a7 202, ECHR 2012).112.\u00a0\u00a0Conditions of detention may sometimes amount to inhuman or degrading treatment (see Peers v. Greece, no. 28524\/95, \u00a7 75, ECHR\u00a02001\u2011III). When assessing conditions of detention, account has to be taken of the cumulative effects of those conditions, as well as the specific allegations made by the applicant (see Dougoz v. Greece, no. 40907\/98, \u00a7\u00a046, ECHR 2001-II).113.\u00a0\u00a0The authorities are under an obligation to protect the health of persons deprived of their liberty. A lack of appropriate medical care may amount to treatment contrary to Article 3 (see Keenan v.\u00a0the\u00a0United\u00a0Kingdom, no. 27229\/95, \u00a7 111, ECHR 2001\u2011III). Moreover, the Court has found problematic from the point of view of Article 3 the placement in solitary confinement of a detainee who is at an advanced stage of a hunger strike and may present an increased risk of losing consciousness, unless appropriate arrangements are made in order to supervise his state of health (see Palushi, cited above, \u00a7 72).114.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has previously held that complete sensory isolation, coupled with total social isolation, can destroy the personality and constitutes a form of inhuman treatment which cannot be justified by the requirements of security or any other reason. On the other hand, removal from association with other prisoners for security, disciplinary or protective reasons does not in itself amount to inhuman treatment or degrading punishment (see Messina v. Italy (no. 2) (dec.), no. 25498\/94, ECHR\u00a01999\u2011V). In assessing whether such a measure may fall within the ambit of Article 3 in a given case, regard must be had to the particular conditions, the stringency of the measure and its duration, the objective pursued and the effects of the measure on the person concerned (see Van\u00a0der Ven v. the Netherlands, no. 50901\/99, \u00a7 51, ECHR 2003\u2011II; and Lors\u00e9 and Others v. the Netherlands, no. 52750\/99, \u00a7 63, 4 February 2003). Furthermore the Court has emphasised that the positive obligation to protect persons in custody must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities (see, in the context of Article\u00a03, Pantea v. Romania, n\uf0b0 33343\/96, \u00a7 189, 3 June 2003; Premininy v. Russia, no.\u00a044973\/04, \u00a7 83, 10 February 2011; Tautkus v.\u00a0Lithuania, no. 29474\/09, \u00a7 52, 27 November 2012; in the context of Article\u00a02 see Ketreb\u00a0v.\u00a0France, no. 38447\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 71-72, 19 July 2012, with further references).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application to the present case115.\u00a0\u00a0In relation to the applicant\u2019s complaint that the medical treatment of Y.C. during his hunger strike was not in accordance with the relevant laws and ordinances, the Court notes in general that with regard to the steps to be taken in the event of a hunger strike, clear instructions were issued by the Ministry of the Interior to the authorities, which had been prepared after consultations with its medical service and various NGOs (see paragraphs 63-66 above). The Court sees no indication that these instructions were in themselves insufficient or unclear, or that overall in the instant case they were not sufficiently followed. When Y.C. announced his hunger strike to the authorities, he was handed an information sheet in his mother tongue detailing the risks associated with a hunger strike, and he was examined by a medical doctor without delay. A hunger strike form was filled out and certain medical measures were taken on a daily basis by the police doctor on duty (see paragraphs 12-14 above). There is no indication that any legal provision, internal order, recommendation or international material concerning medical care for detainees on hunger strike was disregarded. Furthermore there were no indications that Y.C. suffered from sickle cell disease and he was not aware of it himself. At the time, even hospitals did not conduct standardised tests for that blood anomaly (see paragraph 52 above). The Court therefore cannot blame the authorities for not having given appropriate instructions at the outset to conduct such a test for the applicant.116.\u00a0\u00a0When it comes to the question of whether the authorities should have noticed Y.C.\u2019s worsening state of health at an earlier stage and taken appropriate measures, the Court reiterates that on 28 September 2005, the day of Y.C.\u2019s initial hunger-strike examination, the police doctor described Y.C.\u2019s appearance as \u201cvital, overall\u201d, \u201chis musculature in a good, well\u2011trained state\u201d with \u201cpronounced muscles of the upper arm, six-pack like someone who practices athletic sports\u201d (see paragraph 12 above). During the administrative proceedings, all except one of the witnesses stated that even shortly before his death, Y.C. had still appeared to be athletic and strong (see paragraph 40 above). The police doctor Dr F.G. stated that on 3\u00a0October 2005 Y.C. had walked into the examination room without support, which is why he had not assumed that Y.C. was in a life\u2011threatening situation. However, because on 4 October 2005 it was noticed that Y.C. had a dry tongue and barky lips and had arrived at the examination room while being supported by two detainees (see paragraph\u00a016), Dr F.G. ordered the examination that day to be carried out at the hospital (see paragraph 41 above). During the examination at Linz General Hospital on the day of his death, he used a great deal of physical force, resisting the examination and kicking out at the hospital staff (see paragraphs 17 and 19 above). The treating doctor, an experienced emergency doctor, observed Y.C.\u2019s dry lips, but after a further examination he could not find other symptoms of dehydration or other abnormalities (see paragraph 19 above). Nevertheless, a blood test was ordered to address that question.117.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore concludes that on the morning of 4\u00a0October 2005 Y.C.\u2019s external appearance was that of a physically fit man who was aggressive because he did not want to be examined. Even though the applicant\u2019s behaviour might, with hindsight, be considered as a sign of already advanced dehydration and a consequent disintegration of his blood cells owing to sickle cell disease (see paragraph 34 above), that was not foreseeable at the time of the events. That impression is confirmed by both experts\u2019 description of Y.C.\u2019s physical condition after his death. Dr H., who drew up the autopsy report, found no signs of classic dehydration in Y.C.\u00b4s body and, moreover, no malnutrition and no long-term abstinence from food (see paragraph 31).118.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the calculation and registration of Y.C.\u2019s weight, the Court observes that, according to the information available to it, prior to the hunger strike, on 12 September 2005, it was recorded as 76.5 kg which went down to 70 kg on 26 September. When he informed the authorities of his hunger strike on 28 September 2005, Y.C.\u2019s weight was recorded as 67 kg, which was taken as the basis for calculation of his critical weight at 54 kg. When he died, Y.C. weighed 59 kg (see paragraphs 10-13 and 18 above). Based on the extensive investigation conducted at domestic level, there were no indications that Y.C.\u2019s weight had ever been wrongly calculated and that he had possibly reached his critical weight before he died on 4\u00a0October 2005. Dr L., appointed by the IAP to deal extensively with that issue, did not support the assumptions of Dr W.G., whom the applicant had engaged and who contended that Y.C. had started his hunger strike earlier than 27 September 2005 and had already fallen below his critical weight before his death (see paragraph 44 above). Dr L. found it likely that Y.C. had always been weighed properly and stated that the relatively high weight of 76.5 kg recorded on 12 September must have been an incorrect recording (see paragraph 55 above). The Court considers this possible mistake particularly regrettable because the correct recording of a detainee\u2019s weight may be critical for determining when and what medical care is made available during detention and the course of a hunger strike (see paragraphs\u00a064-65 above). Given the protocol in place in Austria for the treatment of detainees on hunger strike, it falls to the competent authorities to follow the instructions it contains with due diligence. However, on the basis of the experts\u2019 reports, which were examined in detail by the domestic investigative authorities, the Court cannot discern any causal link between the possible mistake in recording Y.C.\u2019s weight on 12\u00a0September, the calculation of his critical weight on 28 September and his death on 4\u00a0October 2005. As has been convincingly established in medical terms, the cause of Y.C.\u2019s death was dehydration whose effects were rapidly and unforeseeably exacerbated by the fact that he was a carrier of sickle cell disease (see paragraphs 32, 33 and 54). Neither Y.C.\u2019s appearance nor his behaviour at the hospital gave rise to an assumption that he could be suffering from acute, life-threatening dehydration. The fact that Y.C. was a carrier of sickle cell disease was only discovered through a blood test, of which the result only became available after his death. In addition, although Y.C. was returned to the detention centre before the result of the blood test was available, this was following a medical assessment of his condition.119.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of those facts and the witness and expert statements, the Court sees no reason to question the domestic courts\u2019 conclusion that the authorities could not have been aware that Y.C. was in a life-threatening situation requiring urgent medical attention. It was not foreseeable that, if his health declined, the rate of decline would be precipitous due to the undetected sickle cell disease.120.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the applicant\u2019s complaint that the measure of placing Y.C. alone in a security cell without any legal basis after he had returned from Linz General Hospital on 4 October 2005 had constituted inhuman or degrading treatment, the Court notes at the outset that the decision was based on section 5 of the Detention Ordinance and was due to his aggressive behaviour in hospital (see paragraphs 42 and 108 above).121.\u00a0\u00a0The present case must furthermore be distinguished from Palushi (cited above, \u00a7 74). In the latter case the Court found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention because the applicant had been placed in solitary confinement without access to appropriate medical care, had had no access to a doctor for several weeks (ibid., \u00a7\u00a072) and was therefore at the time of the critical events already at an advanced stage of a hunger strike with an increased risk of losing consciousness. In the present case, the applicant\u2019s brother had access to medical care throughout his detention, care which was even provided on a daily basis after he had announced his hunger strike, only six days before his death. This constant medical care was based on a developed domestic practice concerning the treatment of hunger strikers and was in compliance with international standards (see paragraphs 63\u201366 and\u00a0115 above). Moreover, the applicant\u2019s brother was examined in hospital a few hours before his death (see paragraph 17 above).122.\u00a0\u00a0In that context, the Court observes that while it is true that Y.C. could have requested a water bottle at any time, it would clearly have been advisable given the situation to provide him with direct access to water in the cell and to advise him to take in fluids. However, as it was not possible either for the hospital or the authorities at the detention centre to detect the critical state of the applicant\u2019s health and the fact that he might go into rapid decline due to the sickle cell disease, the failure to take such measures cannot, under the circumstances, be considered as inhuman or degrading.123.\u00a0\u00a0For the above reasons, the Court concludes that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention.","30060":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION48.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained of a violation of their relative\u2019s right to life on account of the intervention by the police. They relied on Article 2 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone\u2019s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally ... .2.\u00a0\u00a0Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:(a)\u00a0\u00a0in defence of any person from unlawful violence;(b)\u00a0\u00a0in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;(c)\u00a0\u00a0in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.\u201d49.\u00a0\u00a0The Government disputed that contention....B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions of the partiesa)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants51.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that the police officers, who had been informed about M.B.\u2019s psychiatric disorders, had not in any way exercised the requisite vigilance and had been negligent in many respects resulting in the death of their relative. They did not deny that their relative had been suffering from asymptomatic stenosis on a heart artery as revealed by the autopsy, and had been predisposed towards rhythmic cardiac disorders, but they observed that those disorders had been caused by severe emotional and physical stress that had been prolonged as a result of the intervention by the police. They referred, first of all, to the decision to take M.B. out of the pharmacy when he had been calm and there had been no imminent danger and no physical conflict with the pharmacist or his employees. In their submission, the use of coercion and force had inevitably exacerbated M.B.\u2019s psychiatric disorder. The applicants stated that the police, who were inadequately trained in interventions involving vulnerable people, had been the cause of the stress experienced by their relative which had continued as the increasingly coercive measures were applied. They also complained about the blows administered to their relative\u2019s abdomen and of the inappropriate immobilisation techniques used, which had continued to increase, abnormally, the pressure endured by M.B. The applicants submitted that \u201cthis intense and prolonged emotional and physical stress\u201d, as observed by the experts, was undeniably among the factors that had caused decompensation of their relative\u2019s pre-existing morbid condition.b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government52.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the use of force by the police officers had been absolutely necessary and strictly proportionate. They argued that the intervention by the police officers had been justified by the need to protect the physical integrity of everyone present at the scene in view of the dangerous behaviour of M.B., who suffered from psychological disorders. They submitted that the police officers had attempted to restore calm and had requested M.B. to leave the pharmacy, but he had vehemently refused to do so and had then become extremely agitated.53.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained that the various expert reports and second opinions had stated that there had been no causal link between M.B.\u2019s death and the force used, had ruled out mechanical asphyxia and concluded that there had been heart failure. Lastly, the Government submitted that the police officers had complied with the positive obligation to protect M.B.\u2019s life and adjusted their intervention to his behaviour by requesting, less than five minutes after they had arrived on the scene, the assistance of the emergency services (fire brigade and emergency medical service), while informing them that M.B. was in a highly agitated state. The officers, after unsuccessfully attempting to reason with M.B., and faced with his highly agitated state and his mental disorder, had attempted to restrain him by using techniques they had been taught and had followed the recommendations issued by the National Police Inspectorate in a note of 8 October 2008 on the legal rules and professional ethics governing the use of force.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessmenta)\u00a0\u00a0General principles54.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 2 of the Convention, which safeguards the right to life, ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in the Convention. Together with Article 3 of the Convention, it enshrines one of the basic values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe. The object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings requires that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective (see, among other authorities, McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, 27 September 1995, \u00a7\u00a7 146-47, Series A no. 324; Ta\u00efs v. France, no.\u00a039922\/03, \u00a7 82, 1 June 2006; and Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], no.\u00a023458\/02, \u00a7 174 and 177, ECHR 2011 (extracts)).55.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the importance of of the protection afforded by Article 2, the Court must subject to the most careful scrutiny complaints about deprivation of life, taking into consideration not only the actions of the agents of the State who actually administer the force but also all the surrounding circumstances including such matters as the planning and control of the actions under examination (see, for example, McCann and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0150, and Scavuzzo-Hager and Others v.\u00a0Switzerland, no. 41773\/98, \u00a7 89, 7 February 2006).56.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the exceptions delineated in paragraph 2 indicate that Article 2 extends to, but is not concerned exclusively with, intentional killing. The text of Article 2, read as a whole, demonstrates that paragraph 2 does not primarily define instances where it is permitted intentionally to kill an individual, but describes the situations where it is permitted to \u201cuse force\u201d which may result, as an unintended outcome, in the deprivation of life. The use of force, however, must be no more than \u201cabsolutely necessary\u201d for the achievement of one of the purposes set out in sub-paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) (see McCann and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0148, and Saoud v. France, no. 9375\/02, 9 October 2007).57.\u00a0\u00a0In assessing evidence, the Court adopts the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d. However, such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of unrebutted presumptions of fact (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848\/08, \u00a7 131, ECHR 2014).b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles to the present case58.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate to examine the issue whether the police officers\u2019 actions satisfied the requirements of Article 2 under two separate headings: i) the alleged causal link between the force used by the police officers and the death of M.B., and ii) the question whether the police officers violated the positive obligation to protect the life of M.B., who was in a vulnerable position and under their control (see Saoud, cited above, \u00a7\u00a096).i)\u00a0\u00a0Alleged causal link between the force used by the police officers and the death of M.B. and the foreseeability of the possible consequences59.\u00a0\u00a0With regard first of all to the causal link between the force used by the police officers and M.B.\u2019s death, having regard to the evidence before the Court, particularly the autopsy report by the forensic doctor, the second forensic medical report produced by two experts, the anatomopathological expert report by the psychiatric doctor (see, respectively, paragraphs\u00a027, 34, 35 and 38 above), it appears that the police officers did not use intrinsically lethal force against M.B. The Court notes, like the domestic courts, that all the forensic medical reports ruled out death by chest compression, while noting that M.B. had suffered, unbeknown to him, from atherosclerotic coronary heart disease with approximately 70% stenosis. According to the experts, M.B. died suddenly of cardiac rhythm disorders owing to a coronary spasm triggered by a context of intense and prolonged emotional and physical stress in a subject suffering from an atheromatous attack on an artery of the heart. The Court observes that whilst the police operation created additional tension, M.B. had already been highly overwrought on his arrival at the pharmacy, long before the police had intervened. The Court notes that, according to the psychiatric expert, the victim had suffered from a serious psychiatric pathology, that is to say, a delusional psychosis, which explained both the initial altercation with the pharmacist and his state of extreme agitation when the police officers attempted to induce him to leave the pharmacy, as their intervention could have been interpreted \u201cin a delusional manner\u201d, to quote the psychiatric expert.60.\u00a0\u00a0A separate question is whether the force used by the police officers, even if not intrinsically lethal, was nonetheless likely, given M.B.\u2019s weak condition, to cause, or at least hasten, his death. The Court considers that in so far as M.B. died while the officers were attempting to immobilise him, it cannot be ruled out that the force inflicted to that end did cause the fatal outcome (see Scavuzzo-Hager and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 58 and 60).61.\u00a0\u00a0With regard next to the foreseeability of the consequences of the use of force in the present case, even supposing that the struggle between M.B. and the police officers did exacerbate his health problems, the Court reiterates that in order for the respondent State\u2019s international responsibility to be engaged, the officers must also have been reasonably expected to know that the victim was in a vulnerable state requiring a high degree of care in the choice of \u201cnormal\u201d arrest techniques (see Scavuzzo-Hager and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 58 and 60 and, in another context, mutatis mutandis, Keenan v. the United Kingdom, no. 27229\/95, \u00a7 93, ECHR 2001\u2011III). The police officers had certainly been aware that M.B. was receiving psychiatric treatment, but they did not know that he was suffering from a heart disease. Accordingly, they could not envisage the existence of any danger incurred by the combination of those two factors \u2013 stress and heart disease \u2013 liable to present a risk for the victim.62.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the foregoing, considering that there are no grounds for calling into question the concurring conclusions of the experts, upheld by the national authorities, the Court finds that even if there is some causal link between the force used by the police officers and M.B.\u2019s death, that consequence was not foreseeable in the circumstances of the present case.ii)\u00a0\u00a0Positive obligation for the authorities to protect M.B.\u2019s life63.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the authorities have an obligation to protect the health of persons who are in detention or police custody or who, as in the case of M.B, have just been arrested and whose relationship with the State authorities is therefore one of dependence. That entails providing prompt medical care where the person\u2019s state of health so requires in order to prevent a fatal outcome (see Saoud, cited above, \u00a7\u00a098, and Ketreb v. France, no.\u00a038447\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 73-74 and 93, 19 July 2012).64.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also reiterates that such an obligation must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities. In other words, for a positive obligation to arise, it must be established that the authorities failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid a real and immediate risk to life (see Osman v. the United Kingdom, 28 October 1998, \u00a7 116, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011VIII, Scavuzzo-Hager and Others, cited above, \u00a7 66, and Saoud, cited above, \u00a7\u00a099).65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that, in the light of the circumstances of the case, regard must be had to whether the police took account of M.B.\u2019s psychiatric disorder. It observes that the police could not have been unaware of M.B.\u2019s vulnerability as a result of that disorder, having received a call from Ms R., assistant pharmacist, and then their incident room, to intervene in a pharmacy where a person receiving psychiatric treatment was threatening to \u201csmash everything up\u201d and refusing to leave the premises. On account of his psychiatric illness, M.B. was in a vulnerable state and the police officers had a duty to protect his health, as he had been forcibly placed under their responsibility.66.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes in this connection that the chronology of events can be accurately determined from the communications log: the police officers arrived on the scene at 4.53 p.m. and requested the assistance of the fire brigade and the emergency medical services promptly at 4.58 p.m., that is, just five minutes after they had arrived. The fire brigade arrived at 5.07\u00a0p.m. At 5.20 p.m. their superiors were informed that M.B. was suffering from heart failure. Lastly, the emergency medical services\u2019 arrival was confirmed at 5.40 p.m. In the light of those factors, established by the domestic courts and undisputed by the parties, the Court considers that, having regard to the police officers\u2019 swift request for assistance and the rapid arrival of the emergency medical services on the scene (see paragraphs\u00a016\u201119 above), the authorities cannot be found to have failed in their obligation to protect M.B.\u2019s life.67.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the foregoing, the Court holds that there has been no violation of Article 2 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION68.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained of the inhuman and degrading treatment suffered by their relative. They relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which provides:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d69.\u00a0\u00a0The Government disputed that submission....B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissionsa)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants71.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that the two punches to the abdomen received by their relative, the violence of which had been recorded in the autopsy report, had been neither necessary nor proportionate to the aim sought to be achieved. They argued that, in any event, it had in no circumstances been necessary to handcuff M.B. as he had not posed any danger to himself or others, having sought merely to free himself from the control of the police officers, which he did not understand.72.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants referred to the witness evidence that their relative had suffered violent blows inflicted on him while he had been on the floor of the police van. They submitted that the injury observed on M.B.\u2019s eyebrow corroborated that evidence.73.\u00a0\u00a0They also complained of the immobilisation techniques used in the police van, M.B. having been handcuffed for many minutes to a fixed point, while being held face down by one police officer straddled astride his shoulders and a second and third officer standing on his legs and buttocks respectively. The applicants submitted that those techniques were unacceptable and humiliating and infringed human dignity. They observed that the various authorities that had examined the case had, moreover, acknowledged that that conduct had been inappropriate. The applicants pointed out that alternative techniques could have been used to calm M.B. down, especially as his conduct had not been dangerous per se.b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government74.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that in the light of the circumstances and information known to the police officers, who had been faced with an extremely agitated and violent individual, their intervention had been appropriate, as had been noted by the French courts. They observed that the blows administered to the abdomen had been a technique taught to police officers with a view to facilitating handcuffing by using a surprise effect. With regard to M.B.\u2019s immobilisation on the ground, the Government stated that the position of the police officers, one standing on M.B.\u2019s buttocks and the other on his legs, was admittedly unusual, but that they had had to adjust their technique in the light of their own knowledge, the urgency of the situation, and their physical ability to immobilise M.B. without injuring him, in order to avoid endangering not only the police officers but also M.B. himself.75.\u00a0\u00a0The Government pointed out that France had an up-to-date legal basis and code of professional ethics regarding intervention techniques, their safety and regulating the use of force: the note of 8 October 2008 issued by the National Police Inspectorate, and recently updated in a note of 4 November 2015 setting out the principles governing the use of force or coercion to restrain a person in a highly agitated state; the Code of Professional Ethics of 16 March 1986; and the Practical Guide to Professional Ethics revised in 2001.76.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, training in the relevant techniques had been undergone by the officers who had arrested M.B.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessmenta)\u00a0\u00a0General principles77.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic societies. Even in the most difficult circumstances, such as the fight against terrorism and organised crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Unlike most of the substantive clauses of the Convention and of Protocols Nos. 1 and 4, Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 \u00a7 2 even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation (see, for example, Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803\/94, \u00a7 95, ECHR 1999\u2011V, and Ghedir and Others v. France, no. 20579\/12, \u00a7 108, 16 July 2015).78.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also reiterates that according to its case-law, ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is, in the nature of things, relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see Ketreb, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0108, and Ghedir, cited above, \u00a7 109).79.\u00a0\u00a0Further factors to be taken into consideration include the purpose for which the ill-treatment was inflicted, together with the intention or motivation behind it Whilst the question whether the purpose of the treatment was to humiliate or debase the victim is a factor to be taken into account, the absence of any such purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of violation of Article 3 (see, among other authorities, V. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24888\/94, \u00a7 71, ECHR 1999\u2011IX, and Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC], nos. 32541\/08 and 43441\/08, \u00a7 114, ECHR 2014 (extracts)). Regard must also be had to the context in which the ill\u2011treatment was inflicted, such as an atmosphere of heightened tension and emotions (see Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380\/09, \u00a7 86, ECHR 2015).80.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of a person who is deprived of his liberty any recourse to physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by his own conduct diminishes human dignity and is, in principle, an infringement of the right set forth in Article 3 (see Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7 88). Similarly, treatment of a mentally ill person may be incompatible with the standards imposed by Article 3 in the protection of fundamental human dignity, even though that person may not be able, or capable of, pointing to any specific ill-effects (see Keenan, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 111-13).81.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, Article 3 of the Convention establishes a positive obligation on the State to train its law-enforcement officials in such a manner as to ensure their high level of competence in their professional conduct so that no one is subjected to torture or treatment that runs counter to that provision (see Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0108).b)\u00a0\u00a0Application to the present casei)\u00a0\u00a0Establishment of the facts82.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the internal investigation established the facts of the case fairly clearly, the Government conceding that the injuries to M.B.\u2019s body as noted by the medical experts were caused by the police officers during his arrest on 12 November 2009.83.\u00a0\u00a0The Court agrees with the domestic courts that the evidence of Ms S. and her minor son, who stated that they had witnessed M.B. being deliberately and violently kicked and punched while being held down in the police van and on the doorstep to the pharmacy are unreliable. Indeed, it observes that the investigating judges and the public prosecutor noted that the reconstruction had made it possible to establish that in view of the cloudy weather, the lack of light at the material time, the lack of street lighting and the distance, Ms S. and her son could not have seen the gestures described. Moreover, the judicial investigation established that the evidence given my Ms S.\u2019s son about the episode on the doorstep to the pharmacy and the use of a truncheon did not in any way tally with the other evidence. Lastly, the violence described by those witnesses does not correspond to the findings of the medical experts either.84.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Court observes that the injuries established by the forensic reports (see paragraph 27 above) correspond to the techniques described by the police officers: those visible in the lower part of the chest and in the abdominal cavity consistent with two punches in the solar plexus; those to the face consistent with close contact on the rough surface of the police van; an injury to the eyebrow consistent with M.B. falling onto the shelf in the van and the wrist injuries characteristic of handcuffing. Over and above the medical findings, the Court notes that the police officers acknowledged having employed techniques against M.B. that raise an issue of compatibility with Article 3.ii)\u00a0\u00a0Classification of the treatment inflicted on the applicants\u2019 relative85.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes first of all that, whilst M.B. did have a fit of anger regarding medicine he wanted to exchange, he subsequently sat on a chair and no witness described him as particularly agitated when the police arrived. It also observes that whilst the police officers did indeed ask him to leave the pharmacy a number of times, they subsequently \u2013 when he refused \u2013 decided to move directly to coercive mode by attempting to forcibly remove him from the pharmacy even there had been no obligation to restrain a person threatening the life or physical integrity of another or himself (see Tek\u0131n and Arslan v. Belgium, no.\u00a037795\/13, \u00a7 101, 5 September 2017). Owing to the difficulties encountered in removing M.B. [from the pharmacy] and handcuffing him, the police officers punched him twice in the solar plexus. With regard to that action, the Court is not convinced by the Government\u2019s explanation that the punches, which corresponded to a technique taught to police officers with the aim of creating a diversion and facilitating handcuffing, were necessary in the circumstances of the case. Indeed, it notes that the violence of that technique only intensified M.B.\u2019s agitation and resistance, reinforcing his feeling of exasperation and, at the very least, his incomprehension as to the course of events. The Court also notes the undisputed witness evidence that M.B. appealed for help, requesting the intervention of the police, which led one of the officers to show him his insignia. It notes the expert psychiatrist\u2019s explanation that M.B., who was suffering from a serious psychiatric disorder, could have interpreted those gestures as a form of persecution. In the circumstances of the instant case the Court considers that the punches, inflicted on a vulnerable person who clearly did not understand what the police officers were doing, amount to treatment that was neither justified nor strictly necessary.86.\u00a0\u00a0The Court must also examine the treatment inflicted on M.B. inside the police van. He was kept face downwards, handcuffed to a fixed point and with three police officers standing with their full weight on various parts of his body, the first squatting on his shoulders, the second standing on his buttocks and the third standing on his legs. Furthermore, it observes that the statements of the firemen and the police officers themselves reflect the violence of the situation. The domestic courts stressed the unusual, or even objectionable, nature of those gestures. The Court notes that M.B., despite his vulnerable situation owing both to his psychiatric illness and to his status as a person deprived of his liberty, was literally trampled underfoot by the police inside the van. The latter clearly appeared unable to manage the situation, which got out of hand.87.\u00a0\u00a0The Court points out that there was nothing to suggest that the violence inflicted on M.B had stemmed from any intention on the police officers\u2019 part to humiliate him or make him suffer, but could be explained \u2013 as appeared to have been suggested by the Ombudsman when he recommended reinforcing the training of police officers with regard to dealing with persons suffering from a mental disorder (see paragraph 39 above) \u2013 by a lack of preparedness, appropriate training or equipment. The police officers do not appear to have given careful thought to the best way to approach M.B. and potentially how to react if faced with a negative or aggressive reaction on his part, whereas it is clear from the case file that they knew about his psychiatric disorder (see Tekin and Arslan, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0104). Furthermore, the Court considers that the repeated and inefficacious violent acts against a vulnerable person constitute an infringement of human dignity and attain a severity threshold rendering them incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention.88.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention....","30100":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION30.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been subjected to treatment proscribed by Article 3 of the Convention by officers of the Severnyy and Sovetskiy police departments, and that no effective investigation had been carried out into his complaints. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d31.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument, maintaining the conclusions of the domestic pre-investigation inquiries, which they said had been effective.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility32.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits33.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant general principles were reiterated by the Court\u2019s Grand Chamber in the case of Bouyid v. Belgium ([GC], no.\u00a023380\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a081-88, ECHR 2015). In particular, where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of individuals within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention. The burden of proof is then on the Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation by producing evidence establishing facts which cast doubt on the version of events given by the victim. In the absence of such an explanation, the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the Government. That is justified by the fact that those in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them (ibid., \u00a7 83).1.\u00a0\u00a0Credibility of the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment in police custody and the presumption of fact34.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that it is not disputed by the parties that the applicant had been continuously under the control of the police, at least between his actual arrest at 9 p.m. on 17\u00a0June 2006 in the administrative proceedings, when no injuries were recorded on him according to the investigating authority (see paragraph 20 above), and his forensic medical examination on 20 June 2006, when he was found to have sustained injuries. According to the forensic medical expert, the injuries were the result of impact from a blunt object. The Court considers that they could arguably have resulted from blows allegedly delivered to the applicant\u2019s body by police officers (see paragraph 15 above).35.\u00a0\u00a0The above factors are sufficient to give rise to a presumption in favour of the applicant\u2019s account of events and to satisfy the Court that the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment in police custody were credible. The State was therefore obliged to carry out an effective official investigation (see, among other authorities, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 131, ECHR 2000\u2011IV).2.\u00a0\u00a0Whether an effective investigation was carried out into the applicant\u2019s allegations of police ill-treatment36.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that the applicant\u2019s allegations of his injuries being the result of police ill-treatment were dismissed by the domestic investigating authorities. The investigators based their findings on the results of several rounds of pre-investigation inquiry, which is the initial stage in dealing with a criminal complaint under Russian law and should normally be followed by the opening of a criminal case and the carrying out of an investigation if the information gathered has disclosed elements of a criminal offence (see Lyapin v. Russia, no. 46956\/09, \u00a7 129, 24 July 2014).37.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates its finding that the mere carrying out of a pre\u2011investigation inquiry under Article 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation is insufficient if the authorities are to comply with the standards established under Article 3 of the Convention for an effective investigation into credible allegations of ill\u2011treatment in police custody. It is incumbent on the authorities to institute criminal proceedings and conduct a proper criminal investigation in which a full range of investigative measures are carried out (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0129 and 132-36).38.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has no reason to hold otherwise in the present case, which involves credible allegations of ill-treatment of which the authorities were promptly made aware. It finds that the investigating authorities failed to carry out an effective investigation into the applicants\u2019 allegations of police ill-treatment, as required by Article 3 of the Convention.3.\u00a0\u00a0Whether the Government provided explanations capable of casting doubt on the applicant\u2019s versions of events39.\u00a0\u00a0The Government supported the conclusions of the investigating authorities to the effect that the applicant\u2019s injuries could not be attributed to the conduct of the police officers.40.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the investigating authorities based those conclusions on the statements of police officers. The explanations that the injuries could have been inflicted by a third party outside the police premises were not based on any evidence and were contradicted by the investigator\u2019s conclusion that the applicant had no injuries when he was taken into police custody (see paragraphs 20 above).41.\u00a0\u00a0Given that those explanations were provided as a result of an inquiry falling short of the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention (see paragraph 38 above), the Court finds that the Government have failed to discharge their burden of proof and produce evidence capable of casting doubt on a part of the applicant\u2019s account of events. To the extent that the applicant\u2019s account is supported by medical evidence, the Court finds it established.4.\u00a0\u00a0Legal classification of the treatment42.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that the police subjected the applicant to inhuman and degrading treatment.5.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion43.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive and procedural limbs.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION44.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been detained unlawfully from the time of his actual arrest on the morning of 17 June 2006 until his formal arrest as a suspect at 12.50\u00a0a.m. on 20\u00a0June 2006, in breach of the guarantees of Article\u00a05 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:(a)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;(b)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non- compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law;(c)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;(d)\u00a0\u00a0the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority;(e)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;(f)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.2.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him.3.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph\u00a01\u00a0(c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.4.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.5.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.\u201d45.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument, relying on the facts as established by the domestic investigating authorities.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility46.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits47.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the Government did not dispute that following his detention at the Severnyy police department, which lasted until 10.40 a.m. on 19 June 2010, the applicant had been taken to the Sovetskiy police department, where he had confessed to the murder of I. and then disclosed the location of the body. Nor did they dispute that he had been arrested as a suspect at 12.50 a.m. on 20 June 2006, displaying injuries allegedly sustained in police custody.48.\u00a0\u00a0In such circumstances the Court is not convinced by the Government\u2019s argument that during that fourteen-hour period the applicant had not been detained, having allegedly agreed to go to the Sovetskiy police department voluntarily. It is of the view that the applicant\u2019s unrecorded detention during that period was unlawful (see Fartushin v. Russia, no.\u00a038887\/09, \u00a7 54, 8 October 2015).49.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing considerations are sufficient for the Court to conclude that there has been a violation of Article 5 of the Convention in the present case. This finding makes it unnecessary to examine the remainder of the applicant\u2019s complaints under the same provision of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION50.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicant complained that his conviction had been based on his confession statements received as a result of his ill-treatment and in the absence of a lawyer of his choice. He relied on Article 6 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ......3.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:...(c)\u00a0\u00a0to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require ...\u201d51.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument, referring to the findings of the investigating and judicial authorities. They pointed out that the disputed evidence was not the sole evidence on which the applicant\u2019s conviction had been based, and that he had not rejected the services of the State-appointed counsel in whose presence he had given the impugned evidence, the admissibility of which had been thoroughly examined in the adversarial proceedings.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility52.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits53.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the admission of confession statements obtained in violation of Article 3 renders the criminal proceedings as a whole automatically unfair, irrespective of the probative value of those statements and irrespective of whether their use was decisive in securing the defendant\u2019s conviction (see G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no.\u00a022978\/05, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0166 and 173, ECHR 2010, and, among recent authorities, Turbylev v. Russia, no.\u00a04722\/09, \u00a7\u00a090, 6 October 2015).54.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has found that the applicant was subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment in police custody (see paragraph 42 above). It observes that on 19 June 2006 the applicant made a confession statement, which he reiterated on 20 and 21 June 2006. Those statements formed part of the evidence adduced against him. The District Court did not find them inadmissible and referred to them when finding him guilty and convicting him. The court failed to carry out its own independent assessment of the relevant medical and other evidence with a view to ascertaining whether there were reasons to exclude from evidence those statements, allegedly \u201ctainted\u201d by a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, so as to ensure the fairness of the trial. Instead, it relied on the investigating authorities\u2019 decisions, which the Court has found to have been based on an inquiry which did not meet Article 3 requirements. This lack of a careful assessment of the quality of the impugned evidence and the circumstances in which it was obtained was not remedied by the Regional Court.55.\u00a0\u00a0In such circumstances, the Court is not convinced by the Government\u2019s argument that the applicant\u2019s confessions should be regarded as having been given voluntarily. It concludes that, regardless of the impact the applicant\u2019s statements obtained under duress had on the outcome of the criminal proceedings against him, their use in evidence rendered the applicant\u2019s trial unfair. This finding makes it unnecessary to examine separately the applicant\u2019s complaint that the legal assistance provided to him by P. had made his trial unfair.56.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing considerations are sufficient for the Court to conclude that there has been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention in the present case.IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION57.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage58.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 25,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.59.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the claim.60.\u00a0\u00a0The Court awards the applicant EUR 20,000 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses61.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 500 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic authorities and EUR 4,100 for those incurred before the Court, to be paid directly to his representative\u2019s bank account.62.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the claim.63.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court rejects the claim for costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings and considers the sum claimed for the proceedings before the Court reasonable. Bearing in mind EUR\u00a0850 received from the Council of Europe in respect of legal aid, it awards the applicant EUR 3,250, to be paid into the bank account of the applicant\u2019s representative, Mr E. Markov, as indicated by the applicant.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest64.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","30130":"I.\u00a0\u00a0 PRELIMINARY QUESTION37.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant died on 24 December 2013 and that the deceased\u2019s son, Mr Mircea Dorneanu, expressed the wish to continue the proceedings before it (see paragraph 3 above).38.\u00a0\u00a0The Court normally permits next-of-kin to pursue an application, provided he or she has sufficient interest, if the original applicant has died after the introduction of the application before the Court (see Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 33071\/96, ECHR\u00a02000-XII; Larionovs and Tess v. Latvia (dec.), nos. 45520\/04 and 19363\/05, \u00a7 172, 25\u00a0November 2014; and Paposhvili v. Belgium [GC], no. 41738\/10, \u00a7 126, ECHR 2016). Having regard to the subject matter of the application and all the elements in its possession, the Court considers that the applicant\u2019s son has a legitimate interest in pursuing the application and that he thus has the requisite locus standi under Article 34 of the Convention (see, for example, Carrella v. Italy, no.\u00a033955\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 48-51, 9\u00a0September 2014, and Murray v. the Netherlands [GC], no.\u00a010511\/10, \u00a7 79, ECHR 2016).39.\u00a0\u00a0For practical reasons, the present judgment will continue to refer to the late Mr\u00a0Florin\u00a0Liviu\u00a0Dorneanu as \u201cthe applicant\u201d.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION40.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the authorities had failed to provide him with the medical care necessitated by his state of health, thus endangering his life. He relied on Article 2 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which provide:Article 2\u201cEveryone\u2019s right to life shall be protected by law.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions41.\u00a0\u00a0The Government objected that the applicant had failed to bring an action under Law no. 275\/2006 to complain of the authorities\u2019 failures in this regard. They added that the applicant\u2019s relatives could have brought criminal or civil proceedings in order to establish whether the prison authorities had been responsible for the applicant\u2019s worsening state of health and his death.42.\u00a0\u00a0In any event, the Government considered that there was nothing in the applicant\u2019s medical file to suggest that the deterioration in his state of health during his imprisonment had been attributable to the domestic authorities. While acknowledging a number of shortcomings in the administration of treatment, they stated that the problems had been minimal and had neither endangered the applicant\u2019s life nor affected his life expectancy.43.\u00a0\u00a0The Government concluded that the requirements set out by the Court as regards treatment for prisoners with health problems had been observed, and that the applicant\u2019s state of health had therefore been appropriately monitored and dealt with by qualified medical staff.44.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s son submitted that his father had been so physically diminished that he had been unable to draw up a complaint to the delegated judge under Law no. 275\/2006. He argued that in his submissions to the domestic authorities his father had provided sufficient evidence for those authorities to initiate an investigation into the shortcomings in the provision of medical treatment.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment45.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it has previously held, in connection with alleged failures to provide prisoners with appropriate medical assistance, that a complaint based on the provisions of Law no. 275\/2006 was an effective remedy for the purposes of Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention (see, among many other authorities, Szemkovics v. Romania (dec.), no. 27117\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 25 and 26, 17\u00a0December 2013, and Matei v. Romania (dec.), no. 26244\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 36 and 37, 20\u00a0May 2014).46.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant lodged with the national courts a request to interrupt the enforcement of his sentence for medical reasons and made several submissions for the same purpose (see paragraphs 11, 24 and 26 above). However, those submissions had not directly concerned the lack of medical treatment, but rather the incompatibility of the applicant\u2019s state of health with his detention (see, mutatis mutandis, Matei, decision cited above, \u00a7\u00a038, and \u015eop\u00e2rl\u0103 v. Romania (dec.), no. 76884\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 47 and 48, 2\u00a0February 2016).47.\u00a0\u00a0Nevertheless, in the circumstances of the present case, the Court considers it unnecessary to ascertain whether the actions indicated by the Government (see paragraph 41 above) amounted to effective remedies or whether, by exclusively requesting an interruption of his sentence enforcement, the applicant had duly exhausted available domestic remedies in respect of his complaint under Article 2 of the Convention. Even supposing that that was so, the applicant\u2019s case does not appear to have comprised any breach of that provision, for the following reasons.48.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the obligation to protect the lives of prisoners entails providing them with proper medical care such as to prevent any fatal outcome (see Ta\u00efs v. France, no. 39922\/03, \u00a7 98, 1\u00a0June 2006, and Angelova v.\u00a0Bulgaria, no.\u00a038361\/97, \u00a7\u00a7 125-130, ECHR 2002-IV). The obligation to provide appropriate medical care is not confined to prescribing adequate\u00a0treatment: the prison authorities must also ensure that such treatment is properly administered and followed up (see Jasi\u0144ska v. Poland, no. 28326\/05, \u00a7\u00a078, 1\u00a0June 2010).49.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant was mainly provided with medical assistance in the cancer ward of the Bacau hospital. He was admitted to that ward eighteen times, including several fairly long stays, and benefited from fifteen or so chemotherapy sessions (see paragraph\u00a029 above). On a recommendation from the hospital cancer department, the applicant underwent additional examinations and radiotherapy and chemotherapy in the Bucharest and Ia\u0219i Institutes of Oncology (see paragraphs 31 and 32 above).50.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the report drawn up by the senior medical officer of the Bac\u0103u hospital oncology department (see paragraph 30 above) mentions three instances of shortcomings in the administration of the prescribed treatment.51.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Court notes that none of the medical documents available to it establishes that those shortcomings, however regrettable they may have been, were such as to jeopardise the effectiveness of the treatment and\/or the implementation of the protocol for its administration. For the rest, the other chemotherapy and radiotherapy sessions had taken place as scheduled (see paragraphs 31 and 32 above).52.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also attaches importance to the fact that the applicant was affected not by the sequelae of any disease contracted during his time in prison, but by the metastases of his cancer which had predated his imprisonment (see, mutatis mutandis, Gengoux v.\u00a0Belgium, no.\u00a076512\/11, \u00a7 56, 13 December 2016).53.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the number of hospital stays and the complexity of the treatment administered to the applicant, the Court does not consider that that it has been established that the domestic authorities are responsible for the applicant\u2019s death or that they failed in their positive obligation to protect his health in a manner appropriate to the circumstances.54.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION55.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that his immobilisation in a hospital bed had amounted to inhuman treatment and that his state of health had been incompatible with detention. He relied, in that regard, on Article 3 of the Convention, which provides:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d56.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the compliance of two different situations with Article 3 of the Convention, namely the applicant\u2019s immobilisation in hospital, and the compatibility of his state of health with detention, should be assessed separately.A.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s immobilisation in hospital57.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that that complaint was inadmissible on the grounds of non\u2011exhaustion of domestic remedies. They argued that the applicant had at no stage complained to the judge delegated to Bac\u0103u Prison about this measure, which breached the provisions of Law no. 275\/2006.58.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s son submitted that his father had drawn the authorities\u2019 attention to his living conditions in the Bac\u0103u hospital, where he had been immobilised in bed with handcuffs.59.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the only remedies which Article 35 \u00a7 1 requires to be exhausted are those that relate to the breach alleged and are available and sufficient. The existence of such remedies must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but also in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness (see Akdivar and Others v.\u00a0Turkey, 16 September 1996, \u00a7 66, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011IV, and McFarlane v. Ireland [GC], no. 31333\/06, \u00a7 107, 10 September 2010). It also reiterates that the existence of mere doubts as to the prospects of success of a particular remedy which is not obviously futile is not a valid reason for failing to exhaust domestic remedies (Akdivar and Others, cited above, \u00a7 71, and Brusco v.\u00a0Italy (dec.), no. 69789\/01, ECHR 2001-IX).60.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that at the material time the use of handcuffs to immobilise prisoners in hospital was formally forbidden by the implementing regulations of Law no. 275\/2006 (see paragraph 36 above; see also, to converse effect, T\u0103nase v. Romania, no.\u00a05269\/02, \u00a7\u00a084, 12\u00a0May 2009, and Stoleriu v. Romania, no. 5002\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 80 and 81, 16 July 2013).61.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the Court notes that neither the applicant nor his relatives, who could have acted on his behalf on account of his state of physical and psychological vulnerability, availed themselves of the remedy set out in Law no. 275\/2006. It considers that a complaint to the judge delegated to the prison could well have led to a finding against the prison authorities for a breach of the legal provisions concerning the use of handcuffs.62.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this complaint must be rejected for non\u2011exhaustion of domestic remedies, pursuant to Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a01 and\u00a04 of the Convention.B.\u00a0\u00a0Whether the applicant\u2019s state of health was compatible with detention1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions63.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that, as in the case of Ceku v. Germany ((dec.), no. 41559\/06, 13\u00a0March 2007), the complaint concerning the applicant\u2019s continued detention despite his worsening state of health should be declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies on the grounds that the applicant had failed to submit a further request for the interruption of his sentence.64.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s son pointed out that in view of the rapid deterioration in his father\u2019s state of health he should have been provided with constant emergency care. In view of the length of time required to examine a fresh request for interruption of sentence, which he argued would have been similar to the period required for the first request, which had taken several months to process, he considered that it would have been illusory to submit another request for interruption of sentence.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant used the only remedy available in domestic law, namely a request for interruption of sentence on health grounds (see paragraph 11 above). In the framework of that remedy he had mentioned the incompatibility which he saw between his illness and the constraints of imprisonment, thus giving the domestic courts an opportunity to prevent or remedy the alleged violation of the Convention.66.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that the situation in the present case is different from that in the case of Ceku relied upon by the Government (see paragraph 63 above). In the latter case the applicant had failed to produce before the German Constitutional Court a number of documents on which the regional court had grounded its decision rejecting his request for the interruption of enforcement of his sentence. However, in the instant case, the fact cannot be overlooked that the applicant\u2019s state of health, which was already extremely poor, had been very well-known to the court of appeal which considered the prosecution appeal (see paragraph 17 above).67.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, having regard to the time required to process the first request, namely from the beginning of March 2013 to the end of August 2013 (see paragraphs 11 and 17 above), the Court considers that it would have been excessive to require the applicant to submit a second request at a time when the likelihood of a fatal outcome had seemed increasingly imminent after the discontinuation of his chemotherapy in October\u00a02013, replaced by palliative care (see paragraph 20 above). Indeed, the applicant was indubitably in an extremely vulnerable situation, and could not have been expected once again to ask the authorities to address a problem to which he had already drawn their attention. It had been incumbent on those authorities to monitor his situation, if only on humanitarian grounds (see, mutatis mutandis, G\u00fclay \u00c7etin v. Turkey, no.\u00a044084\/10, \u00a7\u00a0113, 5\u00a0March 2013, and paragraphs 95 and 99 below).68.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the Court holds that the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 3 of the Convention concerning the compatibility of his state of health with detention had been appropriately brought to the attention of the domestic courts.69.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, it rejects the Government\u2019s objection in respect of the complaint.70.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, noting that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds, the Court declares it admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0The merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions71.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant considered that he had suffered treatment contrary to Article\u00a03 of the Convention owing to the incompatibility of his state of health with imprisonment. He alleged that his detention while suffering from life-threatening cancer had reduced his chances of survival.72.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant considered that the court of appeal had decided to continue his detention without having regard to his actual conditions of detention. He described those conditions as \u201cinhuman\u201d, pointing out that his recurrent stays in hospital had entailed a large number of transfers and delays in the provision of treatment. He added that that situation had persisted until the terminal phase of the disease, and that it had placed him and his family in a situation of powerlessness and profound distress.73.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not consider that Article 3 of the Convention had been breached. They pointed out that on his arrival in prison on 4 March 2013 the applicant had already been suffering from a disease which would have fatal outcome in the short term owing to the metastases spreading to his skeleton. They further submitted that neither the Institute of Forensic Medicine nor the doctors had imposed on the authorities any obligation to place the applicant permanently in a civilian hospital (see paragraph 14 above).74.\u00a0\u00a0The Government affirmed that the applicant had been hospitalised whenever his state of health so required. Furthermore, they stated that outside the periods in hospital, the applicant had been housed mainly in the Rahova and T\u00e2rgu Ocna Prison hospitals, where he had received the appropriate treatment.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessmenti.\u00a0\u00a0General principles75.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum level of severity is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the applicant\u2019s sex, age and state of health (see, among other authorities, Price v. the United Kingdom, no. 33394\/96, \u00a7\u00a024, ECHR 2001\u2011VII, and Mouisel v. France, no. 67263\/01, \u00a7 37, ECHR\u00a02002-IX).76.\u00a0\u00a0As regards, in particular, persons deprived of their liberty, Article\u00a03 of the Convention imposes on the State the positive obligation to ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention. The suffering which flows from natural illness, whether physical or mental, may fall foul of Article 3, where it is, or risks being, exacerbated by conditions of detention for which the authorities can be held responsible. The prisoner\u2019s health and well-being must be adequately secured by, among other things, providing him with the requisite medical assistance. Thus the detention of a person who is ill in inappropriate material and medical conditions may, in principle, amount to treatment contrary to Article 3 (see G\u00fclay \u00c7etin, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0101, with the references therein).77.\u00a0\u00a0In order to determine whether the detention of a person who is ill complies with Article 3 of the Convention, the Court considers three different factors (see, for example, Sakkopoulos v. Greece, no. 61828\/00, \u00a7 39, 15\u00a0January 2004; G\u00fclay \u00c7etin, cited above, \u00a7 102; Bamouhammad v. Belgium, no.\u00a047687\/13, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0120-123, 17\u00a0November\u00a02015; and Rywin v. Poland, nos. 6091\/06, 4047\/07 and 4070\/07, \u00a7\u00a0139, 18 February 2016, with the references therein).78.\u00a0\u00a0The first factor is the applicant\u2019s state of health and the effect on the latter of the manner of his imprisonment. Conditions of detention may under no circumstances subject a person deprived of his liberty to feelings of fear, anxiety or inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them and possibly breaking their physical or moral resistance. Thus, the detention of a person who is ill under inappropriate material and medical conditions can, in principle, amount to treatment incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention.79.\u00a0\u00a0The second factor to be considered is the adequacy or inadequacy of the medical care and treatment provided in detention. It is not sufficient for the prisoner to be examined and a diagnosis to be made; it is vital that treatment suited to the diagnosis be provided, together with appropriate medical after-care.80.\u00a0\u00a0The third and last factor is the decision whether or not to continue the person\u2019s detention in view of his state of health. Clearly, the Convention does not lay down any \u201cgeneral\u00a0obligation\u201d to release a prisoner for health reasons, even if he is suffering from a disease which is particularly difficult to treat. Nevertheless, the Court cannot rule out the possibility that in particularly serious cases, situations may arise where the proper administration of criminal justice requires remedies in the form of humanitarian measures.ii.\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles in the present case81.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes, first of all, that the applicant provided no precise details concerning his material conditions of detention. However, he described those conditions as \u201cinhuman\u201d and complained that the authorities had constantly transferred him to various places of detention, even during the terminal phase of his illness. The Government submitted that in both the civilian and prison hospitals the applicant had enjoyed conditions of detention satisfying the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention. They argued that the transfers had taken place for medical reasons.82.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it transpires from the documents supplied by the prison authorities that the applicant had suffered the effects of a problem of severe overcrowding in Vaslui Prison, where his personal living area had measured under 3 m\u00b2 (see paragraph\u00a033 above).83.\u00a0\u00a0In that regard, the Court reiterates that the requirement of 3 m\u00b2 of floor space per prisoner in multi-occupancy accommodation in prisons is the relevant minimum standard for assessing conditions of detention under Article 3 of the Convention. Where the personal space falls below this minimum standard, the situation is considered so severe that a strong presumption of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention arises (see Mur\u0161i\u0107 v. Croatia [GC], no. 7334\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 110 and 124, ECHR\u00a02016).84.\u00a0\u00a0That presumption may be rebutted if the reductions in the required minimum personal space of 3 sq. m are short, occasional and minor, if they are accompanied by sufficient freedom of movement and if the applicant is not subjected to other aggravating aspects of the conditions of his or her detention (see Mur\u0161i\u0107, cited above, \u00a7 138).85.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, given that the applicant\u2019s detention in Vaslui Prison lasted eight days in all (see paragraph 33 above), the Court is prepared to consider that period short, occasional and minor for the purposes of its case-law. However, it emphasises that the lack of sufficient personal space at Vaslui Prison had been exacerbated by detention in ordinary cells unsuited to the applicant\u2019s state of health, at a time when his physical capacities had been in constant decline, such that towards the end of his time in prison he had become blind and deaf and was suffering excruciating bone pain. Moreover, the Court reiterates that the unacceptable conditions of detention and overcrowding in Vaslui Prison have already induced it to find a violation of Article 3 of the Convention (see, for example, Todireasa v. Romania (no. 2), no.\u00a018616\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 56-63, 21 April 2015).86.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore reaches the conclusion that despite the short time during which the applicant was detained in a personal space of under 3 m\u00b2, he was subjected to circumstances which exacerbated the poor conditions of detention. It further notes that the Government have put forward no cogent arguments to rebut the strong presumption of a violation of Article 3 concerning the applicant\u2019s detention in Vaslui Prison.87.\u00a0\u00a0As regards Ia\u0219i Prison, where the applicant allegedly had a personal space of between 3 and 4 m\u00b2 (see paragraph 33 above), even though that area does not lead to a strong presumption of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention the Court cannot overlook the fact that the ordinary cells in that prison were unsuited to the applicant\u2019s severe disability. Furthermore, the poor conditions of hygiene in that prison, which the Court has noted in past cases (see, for example, Mazalu v.\u00a0Romania, no.\u00a024009\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 52-54, 12 June 2012; Olariu v.\u00a0Romania, no.\u00a012845\/08, \u00a7\u00a031, 17 September 2013; and Axinte v. Romania, no.\u00a024044\/12, \u00a7\u00a049, 22\u00a0April 2014), amount, in the present case, to an exacerbating circumstance, given the applicant\u2019s state of health.Therefore, the Court holds that the conditions of detention in Ia\u0219i Prison also subjected the applicant to an ordeal of a severity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention.88.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that from 4 March to 25 June 2013 and from 31 August to 24\u00a0December 2013, the date of the applicant\u2019s death at Bac\u0103u Hospital, he had been transferred seventeen times between prisons and seven times to the medical establishments in Bac\u0103u, Ia\u015fi and Bucharest (see paragraphs 12, 18, 21, 22, 24 and\u00a028 above).89.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that although most of those transfers were justified on medical grounds, it cannot overlook the fact that those establishments were located far apart, some of them at distances of several hundred kilometres.90.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the applicant\u2019s ever-worsening state of health, the Court considers that the repeated changes of hospital imposed on the applicant had disastrous consequences for his well-being. It holds that those transfers were such as to create and exacerbate his feelings of anxiety regarding his adaptation to the different places of detention, the implementation of the medical treatment protocol and his continued contact with his family.91.\u00a0\u00a0The Court accepts that in the instant case there was no suggestion of intent to humiliate or debase the applicant. However, the absence of such intent cannot conclusively rule out a finding of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention (see, among other authorities, V.\u00a0v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.\u00a024888\/94, \u00a7 71, ECHR 1999\u2011IX; Peers v.\u00a0Greece, no. 28524\/95, \u00a7\u00a7 68 and 74, ECHR 2001\u2011III; and Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 16483\/12, \u00a7 160, ECHR 2016).92.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the particular circumstances of the present case, the Court, reiterating that it has already ruled that it would be better to avoid imposing very long, arduous journeys on prisoners who are ill (see Viorel Burzo v. Romania, nos. 75109\/01 and 12639\/02, \u00a7 102, 30 June 2009, and Flam\u00eenzeanu v. Romania, no.\u00a056664\/08, \u00a7 96, 12 April 2011), considers that the frequent transfers of the applicant could not fail to subject him to an ordeal of a severity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention.93.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the quality of the medical care and assistance provided, the Court first of all reiterates that no one disputes the seriousness of the applicant\u2019s illness or the fact that his state of health constantly worsened over time. As the Government in fact noted in their observations, on his arrival in prison on 4 March 2013 the applicant was already suffering from a disease which would be fatal in the short term because of its spread to his skeleton (see paragraphs 9 and 73 above). The Court has already found that, apart from the shortcomings pointed out by the senior medical officer of the oncology department of Bac\u0103u Hospital, the applicant had been treated in accordance with the doctors\u2019 prescriptions (see paragraph 53 above). However, it does not transpire from the case file that the domestic authorities ever considered the possibility of providing all the different types of treatment in the same place, which would have spared the applicant some of the transfers, or at least limited their number and reduced the harmful consequences for the patient\u2019s well-being. Furthermore, the Court has already expressed the view that during the final stages of the illness when there is no further hope of remission, the stress inherent in prison life can have repercussions on the prisoner\u2019s life expectancy and state of health (see, mutatis mutandis, G\u00fclay \u00c7etin, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0110).94.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that a time came when the applicant had become very severely weakened and diminished, both physically and mentally (see paragraphs 19, 20, 21 and 24 above), such that he could no longer perform basic everyday activities without assistance, and a fellow prisoner was appointed to assist him (see paragraph\u00a019 above). The Court reiterates that it has already voiced doubts as to the adequacy of assigning unqualified persons responsibility for looking after an individual suffering from a serious illness (see G\u00fclay \u00c7etin, cited above, \u00a7 112, with the references therein). In the present case, it cannot be ascertained whether the prisoner who agreed to assist the applicant was qualified to provide support for an end-of-life patient or whether the applicant actually received proper moral or social support. Nor does it transpire from the case-file that the applicant received appropriate psychological support during his periods in hospital or prison, given that he was displaying symptoms of depression (see paragraphs 20 and 21 above).95.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes therefore that as his illness progressed, the applicant could no longer cope with it in prison. The national authorities should consequently have taken specific action based on humanitarian considerations (see G\u00fclay \u00c7etin, cited above, \u00a7 113).96.\u00a0\u00a0In connection with the latter aspect, and more specifically with the appropriateness of continuing the applicant\u2019s detention, the Court cannot substitute its views for those of the domestic courts. However, it cannot be overlooked that the court of appeal, in rejecting the request for an interruption of the sentence, put forward no arguments concerning a possible threat posed to law and order by the applicant\u2019s release, having regard to his state of health (see paragraph 17 above; see also, mutatis mutandis, G\u00fclay \u00c7etin, cited above, \u00a7 122). Moreover, the Court notes that the applicant had at first been sentenced to a fairly short prison term, a third of which he had served (see paragraph 15 above). It also observes that the applicant had displayed good behaviour during the trial, that he had been afforded the most favourable detention regime (see paragraphs 15 and 23 above) and that because of his state of health the risk of reoffending could only have been minimal.97.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also reiterates that the prisoner\u2019s clinical picture is now one of the aspects to be taken into account in the procedure for enforcing a prison sentence, particularly as regards the continued detention of individuals suffering from a life-threatening pathology or persons whose condition is incompatible in the long term with prison life (see G\u00fclay \u00c7etin, cited above, \u00a7 102, and the references therein). According to the case file, however, in the present case the authorities called upon to act did not have proper regard to the realities imposed by the applicant\u2019s individual case and failed to consider his real capacity for remaining in prison under the impugned conditions of detention. Even though in its judgment of 29 August 2013 the court of appeal found that the applicant could be provided with the prescribed treatment in detention (see paragraph 17 above), it did not consider the practical conditions and methods for administering the complicated treatment in the applicant\u2019s specific situation. It failed to assess the material conditions under which the applicant was being held or to ascertain whether, in view of his state of health, those conditions were satisfactory in the light of his specific needs. Nor did it have regard to the conditions of the transfers to the various prisons and hospitals, the distances to be covered between these establishments or the number of hospitals attended by the applicant in order to receive his treatment, nor again the combined effect of all these elements on his already precarious state of health. The fact is that under such exceptional circumstances as those encountered in the present case, the said elements should, if only on humanitarian grounds, have been examined by the court of appeal in order to evaluate the compatibility of the applicant\u2019s state of health with his conditions of detention. It was never argued that the national authorities could not have coped with those exceptional circumstances by taking due account of the serious humanitarian considerations at issue in the case. On the other hand, the Court considers that the decisions reached by the domestic authorities show that the impugned proceedings were conducted with the emphasis on formalities rather than on humanitarian considerations, thus preventing the dying applicant to live out his last few days in dignity (see, mutatis mutandis, G\u00fclay \u00c7etin, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0120-124).98.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the Court has already noted that the length of the proceedings brought by the applicant seeking an interruption of the enforcement of his sentence on medical grounds had been excessive in the light of the applicant\u2019s terminal illness (see paragraph 67 above). Similarly, it notes that the answers provided by the prison authorities, from whom the applicant had requested help in seeking his release, were characterised by their scant consideration of the applicant\u2019s specific situation (see paragraphs 25 and 27 above).99.\u00a0\u00a0Finally, the Court reiterates that the increasingly high standard required in the area of the protection of human rights and fundamental liberties necessitates greater firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values of democratic societies (see, mutatis mutandis, Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803\/94, \u00a7 101, ECHR 1999\u2011V). In the instant case, the applicant had been imprisoned despite his end-of-life situation and the effects of serious medical treatment in difficult prison conditions. The Court takes the view that in such a context, lack of diligence on the authorities\u2019 part renders the person even more vulnerable and robs him of his dignity in the face of the fatal outcome towards which his illness is ineluctably progressing (see, mutatis mutandis, G\u00fclay\u00a0\u00c7etin, cited above, \u00a7 122).100.\u00a0\u00a0Having conducted an overall assessment of the relevant facts on the basis of the evidence presented before it, the Court finds that the national authorities failed to provide the applicant with treatment compatible with the provisions of Article 3 of the Convention, and that they inflicted inhuman treatment on someone who was suffering from a terminal illness, owing to his detention under the conditions described above.There was therefore a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in that regard.IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION101.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage102.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s son claimed 3,000 euros (EUR) in respect of the pecuniary damage which he considers that he sustained. That amount corresponded, in his view, to the loss of the financial support which his father would have provided to him had he remained alive, and to the funeral expenses. He further claimed EUR 500,000 in respect of the non-pecuniary damage caused by his father\u2019s suffering during his detention.103.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that the claim in respect of pecuniary damage had not been substantiated. At all events, they submitted that the causal link between the alleged violations of the Convention and the pecuniary damage had not been proved. As regards the claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage, they deemed the amount claimed excessive.104.\u00a0\u00a0As regards pecuniary damage, the Court does not discern a sufficient causal link between the applicant\u2019s death and the violation found. It therefore rejects the applicant\u2019s son\u2019s claim in that respect.105.\u00a0\u00a0On the other hand, the Court considers that the applicant sustained substantial non-pecuniary damage from his subjection to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention during his detention. Consequently, making its assessment on an equitable basis, it finds it appropriate to award the applicant\u2019s son, Mr Mircea Dorneanu, EUR 9,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses106.\u00a0\u00a0Since the applicant\u2019s son made no claim in this respect, the Court is not called upon to rule on this point.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest107.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","30175":"ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 2 AND 3 OF THE CONVENTION38.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention that he would run risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or even death if he were extradited to Kosovo, as the Kosovo authorities were not willing or able to afford him protection from S.Lu. and his clan. Furthermore, he alleged that the detention conditions in Kosovo prisons fell short of Article\u00a03 standards, and that he could be subject to police violence. Articles\u00a02 and 3 read as follows in their relevant parts:Article 2\u201c1. Everyone\u2019s right to life shall be protected by law. ...\u201dArticle 3\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d39.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that the issues raised in the present case under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention are indissociable and will therefore examine them together (see F.H.\u00a0v. Sweden, no. 32621\/06, \u00a7 72, 20\u00a0January 2009, and, mutatis mutandis, F.G. v. Sweden [GC], no.\u00a043611\/11, \u00a7\u00a0110, ECHR\u00a02016).A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility40.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant41.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that all sworn declarations submitted by him in the course of the domestic proceedings had been consistent in stating that he would be at great risk if extradited to Kosovo. These declarations just as much as L.Q.\u2019s sworn statement that his confession had been made to the Kosovo police under duress were in fact quite adequate to prove that his life was in danger. There was no reason not to believe these statements, nor did the authorities present any arguments as to why the evidential value of these documents should be disputed. The applicant took the view that he had sufficiently substantiated that the Kosovo authorities were not able to provide sufficient protection from private parties, as evidenced by the international reports he had submitted. As an example, in its 2015 Human Rights report on Kosovo, the US Department of State found that violence between inmates still constituted a significant problem, and that corruption and political interference had led to the authorities not always having actual control over prisons and inmates.42.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant stated that the conviction of S.Lu. by a court in Kosovo did not allow the conclusion that the courts and the authorities there were generally in a position to adequately react to the threats posed by a clan. Apart from this, the Kosovo authorities themselves posed a threat, as the case of the ill-treatment of L.Q. when making his statement to the police demonstrated.43.\u00a0\u00a0Concerning the fact that Kosovo was considered a safe country of origin by Austria, the applicant considered that it might be correct that the general situation in the country was not an argument against extradition. However, certain circumstances and evidence provided by the party concerned could still justify the conclusion that an individual would be persecuted there \u2013 such as in the present case.44.\u00a0\u00a0In relation to the CPT report following the 2015 visit to Kosovo, the applicant submitted that the Committee had still expressed concerns over the large number of accusations regarding the exertion of physical violence by the police in the form of beatings and kicks, in particular for the purpose of obtaining confessions or other relevant information. The CPT\u2019s observations in that connection corroborated the statements made by the immediate perpetrator, L.Q., specifically that he had only identified the applicant as the one who ordered the murder in order to avoid violence by the police.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government45.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicant had failed to sufficiently substantiate that if expelled, he would face a real risk of ill-treatment (see Findikoglu v. Germany (dec.), no. 20672\/15, \u00a7 31, 7 June 2016). The Austrian courts and the Federal Minister of Justice had comprehensively examined in proceedings before several instances adhering to the rule of law whether, if extradited to Kosovo, the applicant would be subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. Taking into account specific information and the applicant\u2019s submissions, they answered this question in the negative. The applicant referred to former attacks by the Lu. clan to corroborate the alleged danger to his life if extradited. However, at the same time it was evident that the Kosovo authorities had been able to react to these threats appropriately themselves, for example, by the criminal conviction of S.Lu. for issuing a threat against the applicant. Repeated convictions of members of the Lu. clan in Kosovo demonstrate that the authorities were indeed capable of removing risks for the applicant\u2019s life by taking measures in accordance with the rule of law.46.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that there had been no recent international reports about violence among prisoners in Kosovo prisons. The 2016 CPT report in particular demonstrated that the Kosovo authorities had examined and prosecuted attacks in prisons, and that inter-prisoner violence had decreased compared to the previous visit in 2010, which further demonstrated the successful efforts by Kosovo to comply with international requirements (see paragraphs 31-32 above). The Government pointed out that the latest CPT report had also included Mitrovica Detention Centre, where the applicant \u2013 according to his own statements \u2013 would probably be held.47.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Government pointed out that Kosovo was considered a \u201csafe country of origin\u201d under Austrian law (see paragraph 29 above).(c)\u00a0\u00a0The third party48.\u00a0\u00a0In relation to the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 2 of the Convention, the Serbian Government considered that the applicant had adduced sufficient evidence that there was a real risk of being murdered by S.Lu. and his clan in Kosovo, in particular because S.Lu. had already tried to kill the applicant, had threatened to kill his sister and her family, and because the applicant had allegedly ordered L.Q. to murder S.Lu. In addition, blood feuds were a centuries-old tradition in Kosovo.49.\u00a0\u00a0The Serbian Government asserted that several reports, those issued for example by the OSCE and the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, clearly indicated that the Kosovo authorities were not able to provide sufficient protection against acts of violence or even murder.50.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the complaint under Article 3, the Serbian Government considered that the Austrian authorities had failed to thoroughly examine the applicant\u2019s claim under that provision, as evidenced by the wrong assumption of the Criminal Court that Kosovo was a party to the Convention. Moreover, that court\u2019s argument that the fact of S.Lu.\u2019s cousin\u2019s actual killing called into question the applicant\u2019s theory that S.Lu. intended to take revenge on him was logically incorrect. If the applicant had really ordered L.Q. to murder S.Lu., then this fact would have constituted a motive for S.Lu. to avenge his cousin\u2019s death, especially considering the prevalence of blood feuds in Kosovo.51.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, the Serbian Government noted that the Austrian Government had failed to obtain diplomatic assurances from the Kosovo authorities in respect of the applicant. However, the Serbian Government alleged that even potential assurances would not suffice to ensure adequate protection from ill-treatment, given the circumstances of the case.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles52.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates at the outset that the Convention does not guarantee a right not to be extradited as such (see Soering v. United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, \u00a7 85, Series A no. 161). Likewise, the Convention does not prevent cooperation between States, within the framework of extradition treaties or in matters of deportation, for the purpose of bringing fugitive offenders to justice, provided that it does not interfere with any specific rights recognised in the Convention (see \u00d6calan v. Turkey [GC], no.\u00a046221\/99, \u00a7 86, ECHR 2005\u2011IV). Inherent in the whole of the Convention is the search for a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual\u2019s fundamental rights. As movement about the world becomes easier and crime takes on a larger international dimension, it is increasingly in the interest of all nations that suspected offenders who flee abroad should be brought to justice (see ibid., \u00a7 88, and Soering, cited above, \u00a7 89).53.\u00a0\u00a0The Convention contains no provisions concerning the circumstances in which extradition may be granted, or the procedure to be followed before extradition may be granted. Subject to its being the result of cooperation between the States concerned and provided that the legal basis for the order for the fugitive\u2019s arrest is an arrest warrant issued by the authorities of the fugitive\u2019s State of origin, even an atypical extradition cannot as such be regarded as being contrary to the Convention (see \u00d6calan, cited above, \u00a7\u00a089).54.\u00a0\u00a0Notwithstanding the above considerations, the protection against the treatment prohibited under Article 3 is absolute, and as a result the extradition of a person by a Contracting State can raise problems under this provision and therefore engage the responsibility of the State in question under the Convention, where there are serious grounds to believe that if the person were extradited to the requesting country he or she would run the real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 (see Soering, cited above, \u00a7 88). If the extradition is likely to have consequences in the requesting country which are incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention, the Contracting State must not extradite. It is a matter of ensuring the effectiveness of the safeguard provided by Article 3 in view of the serious and irreparable nature of the alleged suffering risked (ibid., \u00a7 90).55.\u00a0\u00a0The fact that the ill-treatment is inflicted by a non-Convention State is beside the point (see Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201\/06, \u00a7 138, ECHR\u00a02008). In such cases Article 3 implies an obligation not to remove the person in question to the said country, even if it is a non-Convention State. The Court draws no distinction in terms of the legal basis for removal; it adopts the same approach in cases of both expulsion and extradition (see Harkins and Edwards v. the United Kingdom, nos. 9146\/07 and 32650\/07, \u00a7\u00a0120, 17 January 2012, and Babar Ahmad and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 24027\/07 and 4 others, \u00a7 168, 10 April 2012).56.\u00a0\u00a0Owing to the absolute character of the right guaranteed, the Court does not rule out the possibility that Article 3 of the Convention may also apply where the danger emanates from individuals or groups of people who are not public officials. However, it must be shown that the risk is real and that the authorities of the receiving State are not able to obviate the risk by providing appropriate protection (see J.K. and Others v. Sweden [GC], no.\u00a059166\/12, \u00a7 80, ECHR 2016; H.L.R. v. France, 29 April 1997, \u00a7 40, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997\u2011III).57.\u00a0\u00a0The assessment of the existence of a real risk under Article 3 must necessarily be a rigorous one (see Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15\u00a0November 1996, \u00a7 96, Reports 1996-V, and Saadi, cited above, \u00a7 128). It is in principle for the applicant to adduce evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if the measure complained of were to be implemented, he or she would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 (see, for example, Saadi, cited above, \u00a7 129, and N. v. Finland, no. 38885\/02, \u00a7 167, 26 July 2005). Where such evidence is adduced, it is for the Government to dispel any doubts raised by it (see Saadi, cited above, \u00a7 129).58.\u00a0\u00a0If the applicant has not already been deported, the material point in time for the assessment must be that of the Court\u2019s consideration of the case (see Chahal, cited above, \u00a7 86). A full and ex nunc evaluation is required where it is necessary to take into account information that has come to light after the final decision by the domestic authorities was taken (see F.G.\u00a0v.\u00a0Sweden [GC], no. 43611\/11, \u00a7 115, ECHR 2016 with further references). This situation typically arises when, as in the present case, the extradition is delayed as a result of the indication by the Court of an interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Since the nature of the Contracting States\u2019 responsibility under Article 3 in cases of this kind lies in the act of exposing an individual to the risk of ill\u2011treatment, the existence of the risk must be assessed primarily with reference to those facts which were known or ought to have been known by the Contracting State at the time of the expulsion. The assessment must focus on the foreseeable consequences of the applicant\u2019s removal to the country of destination, in the light of the general situation there and of his or her personal circumstances (see, for example, Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, no. 1948\/04, \u00a7 136, 11\u00a0January\u00a02007, and Vilvarajah and Others v. the United Kingdom, 30\u00a0October 1991, \u00a7\u00a7 107 and\u00a0108, Series A no. 215).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application to the present case(i)\u00a0\u00a0Individual risk assessment59.\u00a0\u00a0At the outset, the Court must agree with the applicant that as concerns his individual case, it was irrelevant whether Kosovo was declared a \u201csafe country of origin\u201d by law. Such a declaration does not relieve the extraditing State from conducting an individual risk assessment. The question of whether this has been done in the instant case will be assessed in the following paragraphs.60.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the question of the permissibility of the applicant\u2019s extradition was the subject of three rounds of proceedings, namely the initial extradition proceedings, the proceedings following the applicant\u2019s application for their reopening, and the proceedings before the Supreme Court concerning his application for their renewal. In the initial extradition proceedings, the domestic courts comprehensively examined the question of the alleged influence of the Lu. clan and any risks contrary to Articles 2 and\u00a03 the applicant might face if extradited. In the reopening proceedings, they examined whether the sworn statement by L.Q. was capable of immediately dispelling the suspicion against the applicant, as well as taking into account the latest Kosovo country reports relating to the applicant\u2019s allegations. In the renewal proceedings, the Supreme Court equally assessed the alleged threats of violations of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention.61.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that in all three sets of proceedings, the domestic courts comprehensively examined the applicant\u2019s claims and extensively gave reasons as to why they believed that his extradition was permissible. The Court is therefore satisfied that they have complied with their duty to conduct an individual risk assessment in his case.62.\u00a0\u00a0Concerning the substance of this risk assessment, the Court reiterates that there are essentially two complaints to be examined, namely (ii) the applicant\u2019s claim that his life and limb were in danger in Kosovo because of the alleged threat emanating from a blood feud with the Lu. clan, which the Kosovo authorities were not willing or able to protect him from, and (iii) the allegation that the detention conditions in Kosovo fell short of Article 3 standards, in particular that ill-treatment by the police and prison officers, inter-prisoner violence and corruption were prevalent in places of detention and prisons in Kosovo. The Court will consider them separately below.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Protection from alleged blood feuds63.\u00a0\u00a0When it comes to the substance of the applicant\u2019s allegations that his life and limb were in danger in Kosovo because of the alleged threat emanating from a blood feud with the Lu. clan, the Court notes that there is only little information available on the phenomenon of blood feuds in Kosovo, and that there seem to be no official statistics on violence resulting from their occurrence (see paragraphs 36-37 above). What can be said from the available material is that blood feuds still exist in Kosovo and persons at liberty who are affected by blood feuds appear to have little State protection, as they would have to be constantly monitored, which is not considered feasible. However, firstly, even if one assumed that there was an ongoing blood feud involving the applicant in Kosovo, his situation is different from that of individuals in liberty, as he would be in a prison, where he would be monitored by the authorities twenty-four hours a day. Contrary to what the applicant alleged, the international reports on Kosovo do not indicate that the issue of corruption among detention officers was so widespread and systematic that third parties could exert any amount of influence there. The issue rather arises in the context of favouritism, concerning the use of mobile phones and other contraband, or unwarranted privileges, but none of the international reports consulted (see paragraphs\u00a031-35 above) mention any instance of a prison officer being bribed into allowing a blood-feud killing to be carried out in prison (contrary to what the applicant suggested could be the case with him and the Lu. clan). In this respect the Court observes that, from the material before it, it appears that Sm. Lu., to whom the applicant referred to in particular in his appeal of 24\u00a0March 2016, was no longer detained in prison in Kosovo. There is no further indication that a member of the Lu. clan was detained in prison in Kosovo, in Mitrovica prison in particular or that the Kosovo authorities were not able to protect the applicant against such person.64.\u00a0\u00a0Secondly, the Court notes that the Kosovo authorities have already demonstrated \u2013 even specifically with regards to the applicant \u2013 that they were indeed capable of responding to threats against him, specifically by convicting S.Lu. of aggravated threat (see paragraph 15 above). The Court therefore finds it safe to conclude that the Kosovo authorities would be willing and able to equally respond to any new threats against the applicant while in prison.65.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, the Court concludes that, regarding the complaint of a lack of State protection from a blood feud, the applicant has not substantiated a further threat concerning Article 2 or 3 of the Convention if returned to Kosovo.(iii)\u00a0\u00a0Detention conditions66.\u00a0\u00a0According to the latest international reports (see paragraphs 31-35 above), the Court notes that incidents of ill-treatment of detainees and prisoners by the police and, to a lesser extent, prison officers remain a concern, and that the Kosovo authorities have yet to bring the problem of favouritism and corruption under control, in particular at Dubrava Prison (see paragraph 31 above). No allegations of ill-treatment were however reported at Mitrovica Detention Centre, where the applicant alleged he would most likely be held if extradited.67.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore it appears that the overall situation has improved, as noted by the CPT in its report on the 2015 Kosovo visit. Inter-prisoner violence did not appear to be a major problem anymore at any of the visited facilities, and those prisons where material deficiencies had previously been found were in the course of being closed down and replaced by new facilities. The Court therefore cannot deduce from the information available that there was a situation of widespread or systematic violence against prisoners in Kosovo prisons which would render any extradition to Kosovo incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention.68.\u00a0\u00a0The Court must therefore examine whether the applicant\u2019s personal situation and circumstances are such that his extradition to Kosovo would contravene Article 3 of the Convention (compare, for example, Tershiyev v.\u00a0Azerbaijan, no. 10226\/13, \u00a7 55, 31 July 2014). In his submissions to the Court, the applicant relied on international reports. He did not allege that he had ever experienced ill-treatment by the Kosovo authorities himself before, nor were his allegations that he personally would be at a specific risk if imprisoned in Kosovo sufficiently substantiated. The Court considers therefore that the applicant has failed to substantiate that he was under any kind of particular, individual threat to be subjected to treatment contrary to Articles 2 or 3 of the Convention.(iv)\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion69.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes that the applicant has failed to show substantial grounds for believing that he would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 2 or 3 of the Convention if extradited to Kosovo. This being so, the Court deems it irrelevant that Austria has not requested diplomatic assurances from Kosovo in his case (compare, mutatis mutandis, Oshlakov v. Russia, no. 56662\/09, \u00a7 90, 3\u00a0April 2014). Accordingly, the implementation of the decision to extradite the applicant to Kosovo would not give rise to a violation of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT70.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, in accordance with Article 44 \u00a7 2 of the Convention, the present judgment will not become final until (a) the parties declare that they will not request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber; or (b) three months after the date of the judgment, if reference of the case to the Grand Chamber has not been requested; or (c) the Panel of the Grand Chamber rejects any request to refer under Article 43 of the Convention.71.\u00a0\u00a0It considers that the indication made to the Government under Rule\u00a039 of the Rules of Court must remain in force until the present judgment becomes final or until the Panel of the Grand Chamber of the Court accepts any request by one or both of the parties to refer the case to the Grand Chamber under Article 43 of the Convention (see F.H.\u00a0v.\u00a0Sweden, no.\u00a032621\/06, \u00a7 107, 20 January 2009).","30174":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION42.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants alleged that the conditions of their immigration detention had subjected the three minors \u2013 the third, fourth and fifth applicants \u2013 to inhuman and degrading treatment. They relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which provides:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Scope of the complaint43.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicants had not complained in relation to the conditions in the immigration detention facility in Sofia, and that their complaint only concerned the conditions in the border police\u2019s detention facility in Vidin.44.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants replied that their complaint concerned the time from about 5 p.m. on 17 August 2015, when they had been arrested, until about 11 a.m. on 19 August 2015, when they had left the border police\u2019s detention facility in Vidin.45.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the parties\u2019 submissions, the Court finds that the complaint only concerns the conditions in the border police\u2019s detention facility in Vidin.B.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0Exhaustion of domestic remedies(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions46.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that aliens held in immigration detention could obtain damages under section 1(1) of the 1988 Act (see paragraph 34 above) with respect to the conditions of that detention. That remedy was capable of offering sufficient redress to those no longer in custody. The Government were, however, not aware of any such claims. Detained aliens preferred to claim damages with respect to alleged delays in the processing by the State Agency for Refugees of their applications for international protection. The Government quoted extensively the first-instance judgment mentioned in paragraph 38 above, and on that basis argued that it was clear that a claim relating to the conditions in which the third, fourth and fifth applicant had been kept would have been examined in line with Convention standards. Another argument in that respect was that following the case of Neshkov and Others v. Bulgaria (nos. 36925\/10 and 5 others, 27 January 2015), the Bulgarian courts\u2019 case-law had evolved, affording a greater efficacy to the remedy specified under section 1(1) of the 1988 Act. The applicants, who had had access to interpreters and lawyers from a non\u2011governmental organisation during their stay in the immigration detention facility in Sofia, had been in practice capable of resorting to that remedy. Yet, they had not done so.47.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants did not comment on that point.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment48.\u00a0\u00a0It is not in doubt that the applicants could have brought a claim for damages under section 1(1) of the 1988 Act (see paragraph 34 above) in relation to the conditions in which the three minors \u2013 the third, fourth and fifth applicants \u2013 had been kept in the border police\u2019s detention facility in Vidin. The practical difficulties owing to their being foreigners who do not speak Bulgarian does not exempt them from the requirement of Article 35 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention to exhaust domestic remedies (see Choban v.\u00a0Bulgaria (dec.), no. 48737\/99, 23 June 2005; Demopoulos and Others v.\u00a0Turkey (dec.) [GC], nos. 46113\/99 and 7 others, \u00a7 101, ECHR 2010; and Djalti v. Bulgaria, no. 31206\/05, \u00a7 75, 12 March 2013).49.\u00a0\u00a0Nor is it open to question that, after the end of the applicants\u2019 detention \u2013 which came more than five months before they lodged their application (see paragraphs 1 and 30 above) \u2013 the damages which they could have obtained as a result of such a claim would have amounted to adequate redress for their grievance (see A.F. v. Greece, no. 53709\/11, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a053-54, 13\u00a0June 2013; Housein v. Greece, no. 71825\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 55-56, 24\u00a0October 2013; de los Santos and de la Cruz v. Greece, nos. 2134\/12 and\u00a02161\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 32-33, 26 June 2014; and Mohamad v. Greece, no.\u00a070586\/11, \u00a7 50, 11 December 2014).50.\u00a0\u00a0The only point at issue is whether such a claim would have been reasonably likely to succeed at the time when the applicants lodged their application \u2013 February 2016 (see paragraph 1 above).51.\u00a0\u00a0Since about 2003, claims under section 1(1) of the 1988 Act have been the usual way in Bulgaria to seek damages with respect to poor conditions in correctional and pre-trial detention facilities (see Neshkov and\u00a0Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 127-31). In several decisions and judgments given in 2008-10, the Court found that they were an effective ex post facto remedy with respect to complaints under Article 3 of the Convention in such cases (ibid., \u00a7 192, with further references).52.\u00a0\u00a0Inasmuch as section 1(1) of the 1988 Act lays down a general rule governing the liability of the authorities in relation to administrative action, there is no reason why it could not also apply with respect to conditions in immigration detention facilities (compare, mutatis mutandis, the statutory provisions at issue in A.F. v. Greece, \u00a7\u00a7 55-61; Housein, \u00a7\u00a7 57-62; and de\u00a0los Santos and de la Cruz, \u00a7\u00a7 34-36, all cited above; also contrast the provisions at issue in Rahimi v. Greece, no. 8687\/08, \u00a7 76, 5 April 2011). However, with one exception in 2010-11 \u2013 a case in which the claim, though admitted for examination, failed on its facts (see paragraph 36 above) \u2013 aliens kept in immigration detention in Bulgaria do not appear to have resorted to claims under that provision to seek redress for poor conditions of detention. Even so, in 2013 the Court noted that, although the Bulgarian courts\u2019 case-law regarding conditions of detention under that provision had initially developed in relation to correctional and pre-trial detention facilities, it had, as demonstrated by that case, also been applied in relation to immigration detention facilities. The Court went on to say that if there was doubt regarding whether a remedy was likely to succeed, it had to be attempted, and on that basis concluded that by not bringing such a claim an alien aggrieved by the conditions in which he had been kept in an immigration detention facility in Sofia had failed to exhaust domestic remedies (see Djalti, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 73, 74 and 76).53.\u00a0\u00a0However, in 2015, in the light of information that \u2013 owing to the way in which the Bulgarian administrative courts approached conditions\u2011of\u2011detention claims lodged by convicts and pre-trial detainees under section 1(1) of the 1988 Act \u2013 that remedy was not operating well in practice, the Court found that it was not effective or offering a reasonable prospect of success in such cases (see Neshkov and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0194-206). It went on to hold that Bulgaria had to make available effective compensatory and preventive remedies in respect of allegedly inhuman and degrading conditions in correctional and pre-trial detention facilities (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 279-89).54.\u00a0\u00a0As a result, at the proposal of the Government, in early 2017 the Bulgarian Parliament amended the Execution of Punishments and Pre-Trial Detention Act 2009, introducing preventive and compensatory remedies specifically designed to provide redress in respect of inhuman or degrading conditions in correctional and pre-trial detention facilities (see paragraph 37 above). In June 2017 the Court held that those remedies could be seen as effective (see Atanasov and Apostolov v. Bulgaria (dec.), nos. 65540\/16 and\u00a022368\/17, \u00a7\u00a7 44-68, 27 June 2017).55.\u00a0\u00a0The question now facing the Court is whether its findings in Neshkov and Others (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 130-36, 194-206), which highlighted emerging problems in the operation of the remedy under section 1(1) of the 1988 Act, should prompt it to revisit its earlier ruling in Djalti (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 73, 74 and 76) and hold that, at the time when the applicants lodged this application \u2013 February 2016 (see paragraph 1 above) \u2013 a claim for damages under that provision was not a remedy offering a reasonable prospect of success with respect to aliens complaining of the conditions of their immigration detention.56.\u00a0\u00a0It appears that, since the Court\u2019s judgment in the case of Djalti (cited above) in 2013, no aliens have brought such claims. There is thus no direct evidence on the point \u2013 a state of affairs for which the Government cannot be blamed (see Mahamed Jama v. Malta, no. 10290\/13, \u00a7 63, 26 November 2015; Moxamed Ismaaciil and Abdirahman Warsame v. Malta, nos.\u00a052160\/13 and 52165\/13, \u00a7 48, 12 January 2016; and Abdi Mahamud v.\u00a0Malta, no. 56796\/13, \u00a7 52, 3 May 2016). There are, however, three reasons which, in this case, compel the conclusion that in February 2016 such a claim would not have been reasonably likely to succeed.57.\u00a0\u00a0First, some of the issues noted in Neshkov and Others (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 194-206) \u2013 (a) that in such cases the Bulgarian administrative courts applied the rule that the burden of proof lies on the party making an allegation in a very strict way; (b) that they often did not take into account the general prohibition on inhuman or degrading treatment but only had regard to the concrete statutory or regulatory provisions governing conditions of detention; and (c) that they often failed to recognise that inhuman or degrading conditions of detention must be presumed to cause non-pecuniary damage \u2013 are not exclusive to cases relating to conditions in correctional and pre-trial detention facilities; they can also affect cases concerning conditions in immigration detention facilities.58.\u00a0\u00a0Secondly, the Government\u2019s assertion that the evolution of the Bulgarian administrative courts\u2019 case-law in conditions-of-detention cases between the Court\u2019s judgment in Neshkov and Others (cited above) in January 2015 and February 2016 had again rendered the remedy under section 1(1) of the 1988 Act effective is \u2013 quite apart from its not being supported by any examples \u2013 hard to reconcile with their opting in October\u00a02016 to propose the introduction of a dedicated remedy in that respect, which was put in place by way of a special legislative amendment (see paragraph 37 above).59.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the example whereby the Government sought to substantiate their assertion that the Bulgarian administrative courts generally examined claims by aliens under section 1(1) of the 1988 Act in relation to their immigration detention in a manner that was in line with Convention standards does not stand up to scrutiny. It cannot be overlooked that the first-instance judgment cited by them had been quashed on appeal, with the Supreme Administrative Court, in line with its settled case-law on the point, criticising the lower court for having disregarded the strictures of domestic evidentiary rules by reference to rulings of this Court (see paragraph 38 above, and contrast, mutatis mutandis, Posevini v. Bulgaria, no. 63638\/14, \u00a7\u00a055, 19 January 2017).60.\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s objection cannot therefore be allowed.2.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged abuse of the right of individual application(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions61.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicants \u2013 by failing to mention in their application to the Court the applications for international protection which they had made in Bulgaria, or to inform the Court of the unfolding of the proceedings pursuant to their applications for international protection in Switzerland \u2013 had attempted to mislead the Court and had thus abused their right to an individual application. It could be presumed that they had used their application to the Court to support their legal challenges against the Swiss authorities\u2019 decision to transfer them back to Bulgaria.62.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants did not make submissions in respect of that point.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment63.\u00a0\u00a0The submission by applicants of incomplete information may amount to \u201can abuse of the right of individual application\u201d within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention, especially if the information concerns the core of the case or essential evidence, and the failure to disclose it has not been sufficiently explained. A failure on the applicant\u2019s part to bring to the Court\u2019s attention important developments taking place during the proceedings may also constitute such abuse (see S.A.S. v. France [GC], no.\u00a043835\/11, \u00a7 67, 1 July 2014, and Gross v.\u00a0Switzerland [GC], no.\u00a067810\/10, \u00a7 28, ECHR 2014, with further references).64.\u00a0\u00a0In this case, the only relevant complaint was under Article 3 of the Convention in respect of Bulgaria of the conditions of the third, fourth and fifth applicants\u2019 detention. In their application, they gave a detailed description of the facts relating to that complaint. The information about their applications for international protection in Bulgaria and Switzerland and the way in which these had been dealt with (see paragraphs 30 and 31 above) does not relate to it. That information would have been relevant if the applicants had also complained in respect of Bulgaria of their possible removal to their country of origin, or in respect of Switzerland of the Swiss authorities\u2019 intention to transfer them back to Bulgaria under the Dublin III Regulation. But they did not (contrast M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no.\u00a030696\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 362-68, ECHR 2011; Tarakhel v. Switzerland [GC], no.\u00a029217\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 53-122, ECHR 2014 (extracts); and A.S. v. Switzerland, no. 39350\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 15-38, 30 June 2015). Their alleged failure to keep the Court fully apprised of those developments does not therefore raise an issue under Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention.65.\u00a0\u00a0Even if the applicants applied to the Court not just in order to vindicate their rights under Article 3 of the Convention but also with a view to using the proceedings to bolster their applications for international protection in Switzerland, that does not mean that their application was abusive (see, mutatis mutandis, Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), 23 March 1995, \u00a7 45, Series A no. 310; Foti and Others v. Italy, nos.\u00a07604\/76 and 3 others, Commission decision of 11 May 1978, Decisions and Reports (DR) c14, p. 140, at p. 143; and McFeeley and Others v.\u00a0the\u00a0United Kingdom, no. 8317\/78, Commission decision of 15 May 1980 DR\u00a020, p. 44, at p. 70). The term \u201cabuse of [a] right\u201d, as used in Article 35 \u00a7\u00a03 (a) of the Convention, must be understood in its ordinary meaning \u2013 namely, the harmful exercise of a right by its holder in a manner inconsistent with the purpose for which it has been granted (see S.A.S. v.\u00a0France, cited above, \u00a7 66, which cites Miro\u013cubovs and Others v. Latvia, no. 798\/05, \u00a7 62, 15 September 2009). There is nothing to suggest that the applicants have sought to deflect the proceedings before the Court towards an end inconsistent with their real purpose.66.\u00a0\u00a0There are therefore no grounds to find the application abusive under Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention.3.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion as to the admissibility of the complaint67.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that since the applicants had been treated in a manner fully in line with the applicable rules and since the authorities had taken into account their heightened vulnerability, the complaint was manifestly ill-founded.68.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants maintained their allegations.69.\u00a0\u00a0The Court cannot agree with the Government that the complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. Nor is it inadmissible on other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.C.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The video evidence submitted by the applicants(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions70.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the video submitted by the applicants, which would not be admissible in domestic proceedings, could not serve as proper evidence in these proceedings either. It was impossible to establish the precise date and time when it had been shot, and its quality was very poor. It had obviously been created with a view to being used as evidence, and it was well known that video footage could easily be manipulated. One could not hear Bulgarian being spoken on it, see any objects featuring the Cyrillic script, or be certain that the premises featuring in it were in fact those of the border police\u2019s detention facility in Vidin. Indeed, it was unclear whether it had even been shot in Bulgaria.71.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants gave explanations about the circumstances in which they had recorded and then copied the video (see paragraph 17 above).(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment72.\u00a0\u00a0According to its settled case-law, the Court is free to assess not only the admissibility and relevance but also the probative value of each item of evidence before it (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, \u00a7\u00a0210, Series A no. 25, and Janowiec and Others v. Russia [GC], nos.\u00a055508\/07 and 29520\/09, \u00a7 208, ECHR 2013). It is not bound by procedural barriers to the admissibility of evidence, and adopts the conclusions supported by the free evaluation of all evidence, including such inferences as may flow from the facts and the parties\u2019 submissions (see Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577\/98 and 43579\/98, \u00a7 147, ECHR 2005-VII, and, in relation specifically to the detention of minors migrants, Rahimi, cited above, \u00a7 64). These points reflect the well\u2011established principle of international law that international courts are not bound by domestic evidentiary rules (see, in relation specifically to the Court, Al Nashiri v. Poland, no. 28761\/11, \u00a7 23, 24 July 2014, and Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, no. 7511\/13, \u00a7 21, 24 July 2014).73.\u00a0\u00a0Indeed, the Court has already relied on video evidence, not only in other contexts (see, for example, Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy [GC], nos.\u00a039221\/98 and 41963\/98, \u00a7\u00a7 10, 91 and 176, ECHR 2000-VIII; Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], no. 23458\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 9, 139 and 185, ECHR 2011 (extracts); and Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], no. 40167\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 11, 56, 61, 70 and 133, ECHR 2015), but also specifically with a view to establishing the conditions of detention of minor migrants (see Mahmundi and Others v.\u00a0Greece, no. 14902\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 60 and 64, 31 July 2012). It has even asked respondent Governments to provide video evidence in cases concerning conditions of detention (see Alimov v. Turkey, no. 14344\/13, \u00a7 76, 6\u00a0September 2016), and has drawn inferences from their failure to do so (see Davydov and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 17674\/02 and 39081\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 172 and\u00a0175, 1 July 2010) or from the applicants\u2019 failure to rebut photographic evidence submitted by the respondent Government in cases relating to conditions of immigration detention (see Tehrani and Others v. Turkey, nos.\u00a032940\/08 and 2 others, \u00a7 89, 13 April 2010, and Erkenov v. Turkey, no.\u00a018152\/11, \u00a7 38, 6 September 2016). It therefore finds that it can take into account the video evidence submitted by the applicants in this case.74.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the reliability of that evidence, it should be noted that the two video files submitted by the applicants bore time stamps which dated from not long after the time of their detention in Bulgaria (see paragraph 16 above). In view of the applicants\u2019 explanations on that point (see paragraph\u00a017 above), and since it is well known that electronic files can be automatically re-dated when copied from one device to another, the Court finds that the time stamps on the two video files do not throw doubt on their authenticity. The footage is, for its part, sufficiently clear, and there are no signs that it has been manipulated. Indeed, the Bulgarian authorities confirmed that the people featuring on it were the applicants (see paragraph\u00a018 above). It is true that there are no elements in the video \u2013 such as text written in Cyrillic or words spoken in Bulgarian \u2013 which could enable the Court positively to ascertain that it was recorded inside the border police\u2019s detention facility in Vidin where the applicants were held. At the same time, there are no elements which suggest otherwise. In these circumstances, the mere expression of misapprehensions by the Government on that point cannot cause the Court to doubt that the video depicts, as asserted by the applicants, that facility. Although it was open to the Government to submit visual material \u2013 such as photographs or a video recording of the premises where the applicants had been kept according to official records \u2013 or other evidence casting doubt in that respect, they did not back their assertions with such evidence (see paragraph 19 above). According to the Court\u2019s case-law, when applicants produce prima facie credible accounts or evidence that the conditions in which they were detained were inhuman or degrading, it is for the respondent Government to come up with explanations or evidence which can cast doubt in that respect, failing which the Court may find the applicants\u2019 allegations proven (see, among other authorities, Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525\/07 and\u00a060800\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 122-23, 10 January 2012).75.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will therefore take into account the video submitted by the applicants in establishing the conditions of their detention.2.\u00a0\u00a0Examination of the merits of the complaint(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions76.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that neither the conditions in the border police\u2019s detention facility in Vidin nor the manner in which the applicants had been provided there with food and drink had been in breach of Article\u00a03 of the Convention, especially in view of the presence of both their parents and the limited amount of time which they had spent there \u2013 especially the fifth applicant, who had been out of the facility for several hours when taken to a hospital in Vidin on 18 August 2015. There was no requirement under Bulgarian law to detain minor migrants in specially adapted facilities.77.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants maintained their allegations regarding the conditions in the border police\u2019s detention facility in Vidin, and submitted that they matched the findings of a number of monitoring reports about the conditions in which migrants were being detained in Bulgaria. They pointed out that owing to such problems some States had in the past refused to send asylum\u2011seekers back to Bulgaria under the Dublin Regulations.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(i)\u00a0\u00a0Relevant principles and case-law78.\u00a0\u00a0The general principles applicable to the treatment of people held in immigration detention were recently set out in detail in Khlaifia and Others v. Italy ([GC], no. 16483\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 158-67, ECHR 2016 (extracts)), and there is no need to repeat them here.79.\u00a0\u00a0It should, however, be noted that the immigration detention of minors, whether accompanied or not, raises particular issues in that regard, since, as recognised by the Court, children, whether accompanied or not, are extremely vulnerable and have specific needs (see, as a recent authority, Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v. Malta, nos. 25794\/13 and 28151\/13, \u00a7 103, 22 November 2016). Indeed, the child\u2019s extreme vulnerability is the decisive factor and takes precedence over considerations relating to the status of illegal immigrant. Article 22 \u00a7 1 of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (1577 UNTS 3) encourages States to take appropriate measures to ensure that children seeking refugee status, whether or not accompanied by their parents or others, receive appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance (see Popov v. France, nos. 39472\/07 and 39474\/07, \u00a7 91, 19 January 2012). In recent years, the Court has in several cases examined the conditions in which accompanied minors had been kept in immigration detention.80.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants in Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v. Belgium (no.\u00a041442\/07, 19 January 2010) had been respectively seven months, three and a half years, five years and seven years old, and had been detained for one month. Noting their age, the length of their detention, the fact that the detention facility had not been adapted for minors, and the medical evidence that they had undergone serious psychological problems while in custody, the Court found a breach of Article 3 (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 57-63).81.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants in Kanagaratnam v. Belgium (no. 15297\/09, 13\u00a0December 2011) had been respectively thirteen, eleven, and eight years old, and had been detained for about four months. The Court noted that they had been older than those in the above-mentioned case and that there was no medical evidence of mental distress having been experienced by them in custody. Even so, noting that (a) the detention facility had not been adapted to minors, (b) the applicants had been particularly vulnerable owing to the fact that before arriving in Belgium, they had been separated from their father on account of his arrest in Sri Lanka and had fled the civil war there, (c) their mother, although with them in the facility, had been unable to take proper care of them, and (d) their detention had lasted a much longer period of time than that in the case of Muskhadzhiyeva and Others (cited above), the Court found a breach of Article 3 (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 64-69).82.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants in Popov v. France (nos. 39472\/07 and 39474\/07, 19\u00a0January 2012) had been respectively five months and three years old, and had been detained for fifteen days. Although designated for receiving families, the detention facility had been, according to several reports and domestic judicial decisions, not properly suited for that purpose, both in terms of material conditions and in terms of the lack of privacy and the hostile psychological environment prevailing there. That led the Court to find that, (a) despite the lack of medical evidence to that effect, the applicants, who had been very young, had suffered stress and anxiety, and that (b) in spite of the relatively short period of detention, there had been a breach of Article 3 (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 92-103).83.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants in five recent cases against France \u2013 R.M. and Others v.\u00a0France (no. 33201\/11, 12 July 2016), A.B. and Others v. France (no.\u00a011593\/12, 12 July 2016), A.M. and Others v. France (no. 24587\/12, 12\u00a0July 2016), R.K. and Others v. France (no. 68264\/14, 12 July 2016) and R.C. and V.C. v. France (no. 76491\/14, 12 July 2016) \u2013 had been between four months and four years old, and had been detained for periods ranging between seven and eighteen days. The Court noted that unlike the detention facility at issue in Popov (cited above), the material conditions in the two detention facilities concerned in those five cases had not been problematic. They had been adapted for families that had been kept apart from other detainees and provided with specially fitted rooms and child-care materials. However, one of the facilities had been situated right next to the runways of an airport, and so had exposed the applicants to particularly high noise levels. In the other facility, the internal yard had been separated from the zone for male detainees by only a net, and the noise levels had also been significant. That had affected the children considerably. Another source of anxiety had been the constraints inherent in a place of detention and the conditions in which the facilities had been organised. Although over a short period of time those factors had not been sufficient to attain the threshold of severity engaging Article 3 of the Convention, over a longer period their effects would necessarily have affected a young child to the point of exceeding that threshold. Since the periods of detention had been, in the Court\u2019s view, long enough in all five cases, it found breaches of Article 3 in each of them (see R.M. and Others v. France, \u00a7\u00a7 72-76; A.B. and Others v.\u00a0France, \u00a7\u00a7 111-15; A.M. and Others v. France, \u00a7\u00a7 48-53; R.K. and Others v. France, \u00a7\u00a7 68-72; and R.C. and V.C. v. France, \u00a7\u00a7 36-40, all cited above).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application in this case84.\u00a0\u00a0In this case, the period under consideration was, according to the Government\u2019s calculations, about thirty-two hours. According to the applicants\u2019 calculations, it was about forty-one hours (see paragraphs 11 and\u00a029 above). Whichever of the two versions is taken as correct, it is clear that this amount of time was considerably shorter than the periods at issue in the cases mentioned in the previous paragraphs. However, the conditions in the border police\u2019s detention facility in Vidin, as described by the applicants (without being contradicted by the Government), and as revealed by the video submitted by them, were considerably worse than those in all those cases. The cell in which the applicants were kept, though relatively well ventilated and lit, was extremely run-down, with paint peeling off the walls and ceiling, dirty and worn out bunk beds, mattresses and bed linen, and litter and damp cardboard on the floor (see paragraph 15 above). It can hardly be said that those were suitable conditions in which to keep a sixteen-year old, an eleven-year old, and especially a one-and-a-half-year old, even for such a short period of time.85.\u00a0\u00a0To this should be added the limited possibilities for accessing the toilet, which \u2013 as asserted by the applicants and as revealed by the video which they submitted (see paragraphs 15, 20, 24 and 27 above) \u2013 forced them to urinate onto the floor of the cell in which they were kept. Since the Government did not dispute that assertion or submit any evidence to disprove it, it must be regarded as proven.86.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has many times held, in relation to prisons and pre-trial detention facilities, that subjecting a detainee to the humiliation of having to relieve himself or herself in a bucket in the presence of other inmates can have no justification, except in specific situations where allowing visits to the sanitary facilities would pose a concrete and serious safety risk (see the cases cited in Harakchiev and Tolumov v. Bulgaria, nos. 15018\/11 and\u00a061199\/12, \u00a7 211, ECHR 2014 (extracts)). That must be seen as equally, if not more, applicable to detained minor migrants.87.\u00a0\u00a0The final element to be taken into account is the authorities\u2019 alleged failure to provide the applicants with food and drink for more than twenty\u2011four hours after taking them into custody (see paragraphs 20, 25 and\u00a026 above, and see, also as regards the adequate provision of food to people in detention, Kadi\u0137is v. Latvia (no. 2), no. 62393\/00, \u00a7 55, 4 May 2006; Stepuleac v. Moldova, no. 8207\/06, \u00a7 55, 6 November 2007; and Korneykova and Korneykov v. Ukraine, no. 56660\/12, \u00a7 141, 24 March 2016). The applicants\u2019 allegations in that respect must likewise be seen as proven, given that the Government only stated that they had been provided with quantities of food amounting to the prescribed daily rations, without commenting on the specific allegations about the serious delay in the provision of food and the manner in which it had in fact been provided (see paragraph\u00a026 above).88.\u00a0\u00a0Nor did the Government dispute the allegation that the second applicant had only been given access to the baby bottle and the milk of the toddler (the fifth applicant) about nineteen hours after they had been taken into custody (see paragraph 23 above). The small shoulder bag which can be seen in the video submitted by the applicants (see paragraph 15 above) does not appear to contain such items. In any event, a facility in which a one\u2011and\u2011a-half-year-old child is kept in custody, even for a brief period of time, must be suitably equipped for that purpose, which does not appear to have been the case with the border police\u2019s detention facility in Vidin.89.\u00a0\u00a0The combination of the above-mentioned factors must have affected considerably the third, fourth and fifth applicants, both physically and psychologically, and must have had particularly nefarious effects on the fifth applicant in view of his very young age. Those effects were hardly offset by the few hours that he spent in the hospital in Vidin in the afternoon and evening of 18 August 2015 (see paragraph 25 above).90.\u00a0\u00a0By keeping those three applicants in such conditions, even for a brief period of time, the Bulgarian authorities subjected them to inhuman and degrading treatment.91.\u00a0\u00a0It is true that in recent years the High Contracting States that sit on the European Union\u2019s external borders have had difficulties in coping with the massive influx of migrants (see M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, cited above, \u00a7 223). But a perusal of the relevant statistics shows that although the numbers are not negligible, in recent years Bulgaria has by no means been the worst affected country (see paragraphs 8 and 39-41 above). Indeed, the number of third-country nationals found illegally present on its territory in the course of 2015 was about twenty times lower than in Greece and about forty-four times lower than in Hungary (ibid.). It cannot therefore be said that at the relevant time Bulgaria was facing an emergency of such proportions that it was practically impossible for its authorities to ensure minimally decent conditions in the short-term holding facilities in which they decided to place minor migrants immediately after their interception and arrest (contrast, mutatis mutandis, Khlaifia and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0178-83).92.\u00a0\u00a0In any event, in view of the absolute character of Article 3 of the Convention, an increasing influx of migrants cannot absolve a High Contracting State of its obligations under that provision, which requires that people deprived of their liberty be guaranteed conditions compatible with respect for their human dignity. A situation of extreme difficulty confronting the authorities is, however, one of the factors in the assessment whether or not there has been a breach of that Article in relation to the conditions in which such people are kept in custody (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 184-85).93.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above considerations, the Court concludes that there has been a breach of Article 3 of the Convention with respect to the third, fourth and fifth applicants.II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION94.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage95.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants claimed 12,000 euros (EUR) in respect of the distress and humiliation which they had endured as a result of the conditions in which the third, fourth and fifth applicants had been detained. They submitted that those feelings had been exacerbated by their extreme vulnerability at the time.96.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the claim was exorbitant and surpassed by several times the awards made in previous similar cases in respect of Bulgaria. In their view, the finding of a breach would constitute sufficient just satisfaction in respect of any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicants.97.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that the third, fourth and fifth applicants must have suffered non-pecuniary damage as a result of the inhuman and degrading conditions in which they were kept in the border police\u2019s detention facility in Vidin. Ruling in equity, as required under Article 41 of the Convention, it awards each of them EUR 600, plus any tax that may be chargeable on those sums.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses98.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants sought EUR 2,731 (the equivalent, according to them, of 2,995 Swiss francs (CHF)) in respect of the fees of their representative and those of an interpreter from Arabic into French. They explained that the interpreter, who had facilitated their communication with their representative, was employed by the SAJE on a monthly salary; that was why his services had not been billed separately. In support of their claim, the applicants submitted a bill of costs drawn up by their representative. According to that bill the representative had worked a total of twelve and a half hours on the case, at the hourly rate of CHF 200, and the interpreter had worked three hours on the case, at the hourly rate of CHF 65.99.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the sum claimed in respect of the work done by the applicants\u2019 representative was exorbitant, and noted that the applicants had not claimed the reimbursement of other expenses.100.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, applicants are entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. Having regard to these principles and the materials in its possession, in this case the Court awards jointly to all applicants a total of EUR 1,000, plus any tax that may be chargeable to them, in respect of all heads of costs.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest101.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","30181":"I.\u00a0\u00a0JOINDER OF APPLICATIONS84.\u00a0\u00a0Given that the applications at hand concern similar complaints and raise identical issues under Article 3 of the Convention, the Court decides to join them pursuant to Rule 42 \u00a7 1 of the Rules of Court.II.\u00a0\u00a0AS TO LOCUS STANDI OF MS IVANOVA85.\u00a0\u00a0Following Mr Ivanov\u2019s death, his widow Ms Ivanova expressed the wish to pursue the application. The Government left the issue as to Ms\u00a0Ivanova\u2019s standing to the Court\u2019s discretion.86.\u00a0\u00a0In the cases in which an applicant died after having lodged an application, the Court has taken into account the statements of the applicant\u2019s heirs or of close family members expressing the wish to pursue the proceedings before the Court. For the Court\u2019s assessment of the person\u2019s standing to maintain the application on behalf of a deceased, what is important is not whether the rights at issue are transferable to the heirs but whether the victim made a choice to exercise his or her right of individual application under Article 34 of the Convention by activating the Convention mechanism (see Ergezen v. Turkey, no. 73359\/10, \u00a7 29, 8\u00a0April 2014). The Court has accepted that the next-of-kin or heir may in principle pursue the application, provided that he or she has sufficient interest in the case (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v.\u00a0Romania [GC], no. 47848\/08, \u00a7 97, ECHR 2014). In this connection, the Court reiterates that human rights cases before it generally have a moral dimension and persons near to an applicant may thus have a legitimate interest in ensuring that justice is done, even after the applicant\u2019s death (see Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no.\u00a033071\/96, ECHR 2000\u2011XII).87.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above and having regard to the circumstances of the present case, the Court accepts that Ms Ivanova has a legitimate interest in pursuing the application in the late applicant\u2019s stead. It will therefore continue dealing with the case at her request. For convenience, it will, however, continue to refer to Mr Ivanov as the applicant in the present judgment.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION88.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that the police had used physical force against them, and that no effective investigation had been carried out into their complaints. They relied on Article 3 of the Convention, and some of them also on Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention. The Court will examine their complaints under Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d89.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested those arguments, maintaining the conclusions of the domestic inquiries. They stated that, despite the numerous annulments of the investigators\u2019 refusals to institute criminal proceedings and a resultant delay in carrying out the inquiry in Mr Ivanov\u2019s case, the inquiry had been thorough and comprehensive. They submitted that all the applications were manifestly ill-founded. They also argued that Mr\u00a0Korolev and Mr\u00a0Kolistratov, who had not brought a civil claim for damages, had failed to exhaust domestic remedies.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility90.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the Government\u2019s plea of non-exhaustion, the Court reiterates that civil remedies against unlawful actions attributable to the State or its agents cannot be regarded as sufficient for a Contracting State\u2019s obligations under Article 3 of the Convention in cases like the present concerning alleged ill-treatment in police custody, as they are aimed at awarding damages rather than identifying and punishing those responsible (see Gladyshev v. Russia, no. 2807\/04, \u00a7 49, 30 July 2009). The requirement for compensation to remedy a breach of Article 3 at national level is in addition to the requirement of a thorough and effective investigation; it is not an alternative (see Sapo\u017ekovs v. Latvia, no. 8550\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 54-55, 11\u00a0February 2014).91.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore finds that the question of whether a civil claim for damages could have been considered an effective remedy is closely linked to the question of whether the investigations into the events in question were effective. That issue relates to the merits of Mr Korolev\u2019s and Mr\u00a0Kolistratov\u2019s complaints. The Court therefore decides to join this issue to the merits (see Vladimir Fedorov v. Russia, no. 19223\/04, \u00a7 55, 30 July 2009).92.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits93.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant general principles were recently reiterated by the Court\u2019s Grand Chamber in the case of Bouyid v. Belgium ([GC], no.\u00a023380\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 81-88, ECHR 2015). In particular, where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of individuals within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention. The burden of proof is then on the Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation by producing evidence establishing facts which cast doubt on the version of events given by the victim. In the absence of such an explanation, the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the Government. That is justified by the fact that those in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them (ibid., \u00a7 83).94.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further reiterates its established case-law that the use of force by the police in the course of arrest operations will only not be in breach of Article 3 of the Convention if indispensable and not excessive. The burden to prove this rests on the Government (see Rehbock v. Slovenia, no. 29462\/95, \u00a7\u00a7 72-78, ECHR 2000-XII, and, among recent authorities, Boris Kostadinov v. Bulgaria, no. 61701\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 52-54, 21 January 2016).1.\u00a0\u00a0Credibility of the applicants\u2019 allegations of ill-treatment in police custody and the presumption of fact95.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicants were detained by the police for various reasons, such as using foul language (Mr Ksenz, Mr\u00a0Korolev and Mr\u00a0Sergeyev) or violating traffic regulations (Mr Lebedev, Mr\u00a0Ivanov and Mr\u00a0Kolistratov). They all disputed the reasons for their detention and presented accounts of events which differed from those of the police.96.\u00a0\u00a0After spending different periods of time in police custody the applicants were found to have sustained injuries. According to the relevant forensic-medical experts, the injuries were the result of impacts from hard blunt objects. The expert who examined Mr Ksenz specified that those objects could have been fists and feet. Mr\u00a0Kolistratov\u2019s injuries could have been sustained as a result of hitting a wall. The Court considers that the injuries could arguably have resulted from the applicants\u2019 alleged ill\u2011treatment by police officers, in particular as a result of being punched and kicked, or, in the case of Mr\u00a0Kolistratov, his face being struck against a wall.97.\u00a0\u00a0The above factors are sufficient to give rise to a presumption in favour of the applicants\u2019 account of events and to satisfy the Court that the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment in police custody were credible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Whether an effective investigation was carried out into the applicants\u2019 allegations of police ill-treatment98.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes further that the applicants\u2019 allegations of their injuries being the result of police ill-treatment were dismissed by the domestic investigating authorities. The investigators based their findings on the results of the pre-investigation inquiry, which is the initial stage in dealing with a criminal complaint under Russian law and should normally be followed by the opening of a criminal case and the carrying out of an investigation if the information gathered has disclosed elements of a criminal offence (see Lyapin v. Russia, no. 46956\/09, \u00a7 129, 24 July 2014). The investigators\u2019 decisions refusing to open a criminal case (two decisions in Mr Ksenz\u2019s case, three decisions in Mr Lebedev\u2019s case, five decisions in Mr Korolev\u2019s case, more than twenty decisions in Mr Ivanov\u2019s case, fourteen decisions in Mr Kolistratov\u2019s case and three decisions in Mr\u00a0Sergeyev\u2019s case) were each time annulled by the investigating authorities for having been based on an incomplete inquiry and a fresh inquiry was ordered. The investigators\u2019 most recent refusals to initiate criminal proceedings were upheld by the domestic courts. In 2013 the investigator\u2019s decision in Mr Lebedev\u2019s case was again annulled and an additional inquiry ordered.99.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates its finding that the mere carrying out of a pre\u2011investigation inquiry under Article 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation is insufficient if the authorities are to comply with the standards established under Article 3 of the Convention for an effective investigation into credible allegations of ill\u2011treatment in police custody. It is incumbent on the authorities to institute criminal proceedings and conduct a proper criminal investigation in which a full range of investigative measures are carried out (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 129 and 132-36).100.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has no reason to hold otherwise in the present case, which involves credible allegations of ill-treatment of which the authorities were promptly made aware. It finds that the investigating authorities have failed to carry out effective investigations into the applicants\u2019 allegations of police ill-treatment, as required by Article 3 of the Convention.101.\u00a0\u00a0In the absence of an effective investigation, a civil claim would not have offered Mr Korolev and Mr Kolistratov sufficient redress. The Court therefore dismisses the Government\u2019s objections as to the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies by those applicants.3.\u00a0\u00a0Whether the Government provided explanations capable of casting doubt on the applicants\u2019 versions of events102.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained the conclusions of the investigating authorities to the effect that the applicants\u2019 injuries had not been attributable to the conduct of the police officers and had been either self-inflicted (Mr\u00a0Kolistratov and Mr Sergeyev) or sustained in other circumstances (Mr\u00a0Ksenz and Mr\u00a0Korolev), or that the injuries had been the result of the lawful use of force by the police in arresting the applicants (Mr\u00a0Lebedev and Mr Ivanov).103.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes further that the investigating authorities based their conclusions almost exclusively on the statements of those same police officers who had allegedly ill-treated the applicants. The explanation that Mr Ksenz could have received injuries in \u201cother circumstances\u201d was not based on any specific facts. The explanation that Mr\u00a0Korolev had received the injuries when getting into the police car was also purely speculative and lacked the assessment of the expert\u2019s opinion that the injuries were the result of at least five traumatic impacts. The explanation of Mr Sergeyev\u2019s injuries was similarly of a speculative nature. It did not address even such obvious discrepancies as the lack of any injuries on the applicant \u2013 according to the record of his administrative detention \u2013 and the presence of some injuries \u2013 according to a report by the addiction-clinic doctor who had examined the applicant shortly after the time spent by him at the hands of the police. In explaining Mr\u00a0Lebedev\u2019s injuries the investigating authority referred to the police officers\u2019 general statements that they had used force lawfully, without establishing any specific acts of the police officers in using force and any actions on the part of the applicant which could have justified the use of force, that is without assessing whether the use of force was indispensable and not excessive. That assessment was also lacking in the explanation of Mr Ivanov\u2019s injuries, which did not, moreover, explain how his multiple injuries could have resulted from a single fall.104.\u00a0\u00a0Given that those explanations were provided as a result of the superficial domestic inquiries\u2019 falling short of the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention, the Court finds that they cannot be considered satisfactory or convincing. It holds that the Government have failed to discharge their burden of proof and produce evidence capable of casting doubt on the applicants\u2019 account of events, and which it therefore finds established.4.\u00a0\u00a0Legal classification of the treatment105.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it has deemed treatment to be \u201cinhuman\u201d because it was premeditated, was applied for hours at a stretch and caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical and mental suffering. Treatment has been held to be \u201cdegrading\u201d when it was such as to arouse in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them and possibly breaking their physical or moral resistance, or when it was such as to drive the victim to act against his will or conscience (see G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 89-90, ECHR 2010). The Court finds that the police subjected the applicants to inhuman and degrading treatment.5.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion106.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive and procedural limbs.IV.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION107.\u00a0\u00a0Mr Ksenz and Mr Lebedev complained that the police had detained them unlawfully, in breach of Article 5 of the Convention. The Court will examine this complaint under Article 5 \u00a7 1, which reads as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:(a)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;(b)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non- compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law;(c)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;(d)\u00a0\u00a0the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority;(e)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;(f)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.\u201d108.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the police had acted lawfully in detaining the applicants, who had committed administrative offences, and in taking them to the police stations, in particular for the purpose of drawing up administrative-offence records.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility109.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes the domestic authorities\u2019 findings concerning the applicants\u2019 detention (see paragraphs 17, 19, 33 and 34 above). It considers that the complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention, and that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits110.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that Mr\u00a0Ksenz and Mr Lebedev spent about three hours each in police custody on 17 August 2005 and 31 March 2007, respectively. According to the findings of the domestic inquiry, Mr\u00a0Ksenz was informed by the police that he had been arrested for having committed the criminal offence of insult of a public official (see paragraphs 14 and 17 above). However, no record of his arrest as a suspect was drawn up, and no criminal proceedings were brought against him. Furthermore, no record of his detention as an administrative offender was drawn up, and no administrative proceedings were brought against him either.\u00a0As regards Mr\u00a0Lebedev, he was detained for having driven a car without a licence plate. Those facts were the basis for the administrative proceedings against him. According to the domestic inquiry, however, those proceedings were not brought against him on the day of his detention as a result of negligence on the part of the police officers (see paragraph 33 above). Those proceedings were instituted only on 8 May 2007, more than a month later. The same facts were also the basis for the inquiry which ended with the non\u2011institution of criminal proceedings against the applicant, whose arrest as a suspect had never been recorded either. Hence, both applicants\u2019 periods of detention went unrecorded.111.\u00a0\u00a0The Court emphasises the fundamental importance of the guarantees contained in Article 5 of the Convention for securing the right of individuals in a democracy to be free from arbitrary detention by the authorities. It has reiterated in that connection that any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and procedural rules of national law, but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness (see Kurt v. Turkey, 25 May 1998, \u00a7\u00a7 122\u201123, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011III; Fatma Akaltun F\u0131rat v. Turkey, no.\u00a034010\/06, \u00a7 29, 10 September 2013; and Fartushin v. Russia, no.\u00a038887\/09, \u00a7 50, 8 October 2015). What is at stake is both the protection of the physical liberty of individuals and their personal security in a context which, in the absence of safeguards, could result in subversion of the rule of law and place detainees beyond the reach of the most rudimentary forms of legal protection (see Kurt, cited above, \u00a7 123).112.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes that the applicants\u2019 detention was unlawful and amounted to a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.V.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION113.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has examined the remainder of the applications, as submitted by the applicants. However, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that this part of the applications does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.\u00a0Accordingly, it must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.VI.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION114.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage115.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants claimed the following sums in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage: Mr Ksenz claimed 40,000 euros (EUR); Mr\u00a0Lebedev claimed EUR 50,000; Mr Korolev claimed EUR 10,000; Mr\u00a0Ivanov claimed EUR 6,000; Mr Kolistratov claimed EUR 7,000; and Mr\u00a0Sergeyev claimed EUR 20,000.116.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that, if the Court were to find a violation of the applicants\u2019 rights under the Convention, the finding of a violation would constitute sufficient just satisfaction, and that in any event the sums claimed were excessive. The Government considered that, in the circumstances of the case, no compensation should be awarded to Ms\u00a0Ivanova.117.\u00a0\u00a0Making its assessment on an equitable basis and having regard to the nature of the violation found in respect of each applicant, the Court awards Mr Ksenz EUR 26,000, Mr Lebedev EUR 30,000, and Mr Korolev, Ms Ivanova, Mr Kolistratov and Mr Sergeyev the sums claimed by the applicants, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses118.\u00a0\u00a0Mr Lebedev also claimed EUR 1,000 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic law-enforcement authorities and EUR\u00a02,000 for those incurred before the Court. Mr Korolev claimed EUR\u00a05,657.62 and RUB 1,238.69 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court.119.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the claims as excessive or unsupported by documents.120.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court rejects Mr Lebedev\u2019s claim for costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings and considers it reasonable to award him the sum claimed for the proceedings before it, plus any tax that may be chargeable. The Court considers it reasonable to award Mr\u00a0Korolev the sum of EUR 3,300 for the proceedings before the Court. The sums awarded should be paid directly to the applicants\u2019 representatives\u2019 bank accounts, as requested by the applicants.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest121.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","30230":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE\u00a03 OF THE CONVENTION51.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the authorities had failed to conduct an effective investigation into his allegations of ill-treatment by police officers during his arrest and detention. He relied on Article\u00a03 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0Temporal jurisdiction(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions52.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that according to Court\u2019s well-established case-law the Court did not have jurisdiction ratione temporis in cases where an event happened before 3\u00a0March\u00a02004, when the Convention entered into force in respect of the respondent State in question. They argued that those principles were set out in the Grand Chamber judgment Ble\u010di\u0107 v.\u00a0Croatia ([GC], no.\u00a059532\/00, \u00a7\u00a077-82, ECHR 2006\u2011III) and were applicable to this case.53.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that the obligation imposed on the respondent Government was set out in Stanimirovi\u0107 v.\u00a0Serbia (no.\u00a026088\/06, 18\u00a0October\u00a02011), which made it clear that failures of a respondent Government to provide an effective investigation were not affected by temporal jurisdiction for events and facts before ratification.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment54.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has consistently held that the procedural obligation to investigate under Articles\u00a02 and\u00a03 of the Convention is not a procedure of redress in respect of an alleged violation that may have occurred before the entry into force of the Convention with respect to the State concerned. On the contrary, an obligation to carry out an effective investigation has its own distinct scope of application and operates independently from the substantive limb of Articles\u00a02 and\u00a03 (see Varnava and Others v.\u00a0Turkey [GC], nos.\u00a016064\/90 and 8 others, \u00a7\u00a0136, ECHR 2009). Throughout the Court\u2019s case-law, that obligation has evolved into a separate and autonomous duty, capable of binding the State even when the death or ill-treatment took place before ratification (see \u0160ilih v.\u00a0Slovenia [GC], no.\u00a071463\/01, \u00a7\u00a0159, 9\u00a0April\u00a02009; Stanimirovi\u0107, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a028-29; and Ota\u0161evi\u0107 v.\u00a0Serbia, no.\u00a032198\/07, \u00a7\u00a024, 5\u00a0February\u00a02013). The obligation is of a continuing nature, in the sense that it binds the State throughout the period in which the authorities can reasonably be expected to take measures with the aim of elucidating the circumstances of the death or ill-treatment and establishing responsibility for them (see \u0160ilih, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0157).55.\u00a0\u00a0However, having regard to the principle of legal certainty, the Court\u2019s temporal jurisdiction as regards compliance with the procedural obligation under Articles\u00a02 and\u00a03 in respect of death or ill-treatment that occurred before ratification is not open-ended (ibid., \u00a7\u00a0161). Where the impugned events occurred before ratification, only procedural acts and\/or omissions occurring after that date can fall within the Court\u2019s temporal jurisdiction (ibid., \u00a7\u00a0162). Furthermore, there must be a genuine connection between the death or ill-treatment and the entry into force of the Convention in respect of the respondent State for the procedural obligations imposed by Articles\u00a02 and\u00a03 to come into effect. For that connection to be established, two cumulative criteria must be met: firstly, the lapse of time between the death or ill-treatment and the entry into force of the Convention must have been reasonably short (not exceeding ten years) and secondly, it must be established that a significant proportion of the procedural steps that were decisive for the course of the investigation were or ought to have been carried out after the ratification of the Convention by the State concerned (see Janowiec and Others v.\u00a0Russia [GC], nos.\u00a055508\/07 and\u00a029520\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0145-148, ECHR 2013).56.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, it is to be noted that no significant time elapsed between the alleged ill-treatment of the applicant and the ratification of the Convention by the State. In addition, although no investigation into applicant\u2019s allegations was ever initiated by the competent authorities, all of the pre-investigative steps were conducted after the Convention came into force. As both criteria have been satisfied, the Court dismisses the Government\u2019s objection ratione temporis.2.\u00a0\u00a0Six-month time-limit(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions57.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contended that the applicant\u2019s complaint had been lodged out of time. In particular, they argued that a constitutional appeal had not been an effective legal remedy in his case. He should therefore have lodged an application with the Court no later than 13\u00a0November\u00a02010, six months after the decision of the Belgrade Appellate Court was served on him.58.\u00a0\u00a0In the alternative, the Government claimed that the applicant had also failed to comply with the six-month rule because he had omitted to promptly inform the domestic authorities of the alleged ill-treatment and so act diligently. He should have lodged the application with the Court as soon as he had become aware that the investigation at domestic level was not effective.59.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contested these arguments, claiming that he had acted diligently and that at the time when he had lodged his complaints with the Constitutional Court, a constitutional appeal had been an effective legal remedy.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment60.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the purpose of the six-month rule is to promote security of the law. It should ensure that it is possible to ascertain the facts of a case before that possibility fades away, making a fair examination of the question in issue next to impossible (see Stanimirovi\u0107, cited above, \u00a7\u00a030).61.\u00a0\u00a0The six-month period runs from the date of the final decision in the process of exhaustion of domestic remedies. The Court has already held that a constitutional appeal should, in principle, be considered an effective domestic remedy within the meaning of Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention in respect of all applications introduced against Serbia after 7\u00a0August\u00a02008 (see Vu\u010dkovi\u0107 and Others v.\u00a0Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], nos.\u00a017153\/11 and 29 others, \u00a7\u00a084, 25\u00a0March\u00a02014, and Vin\u010di\u0107 and Others v.\u00a0Serbia, nos.\u00a044698\/06 and others, \u00a7\u00a051, 1\u00a0December\u00a02009). It sees no reason to depart from this practice in the present case. If the applicant had raised a substantive complaint under Article 3 concerning the events in 2003, the complaint would have been (as the Constitutional Court also established) incompatible with the provisions of the Convention ratione temporis. However, the applicant\u2019s complaint concerns the procedural obligation to conduct an effective investigation. The applicant raised this complaint in his appeal to the Constitutional Court but the reply he received did not deal with the specific complaint. The Government\u2019s contention, that the remedy was not capable of addressing the issues because of the temporal limitation on the Constitutional Court\u2019s jurisdiction, is therefore not convincing. No other argument has been made which would suggest that the applicant could not reasonably have expected that the Constitutional Court was able to consider a complaint concerning the procedural obligation, and so the Court accepts that the six month period should be calculated from the moment when the applicant received the decision of the Constitutional Court.62.\u00a0\u00a0As for the Government\u2019s objection that the applicant had failed to act diligently at domestic level, and that he should have lodged his application with the Court as soon as he had become or ought to have become aware that the criminal investigation into his ill-treatment was not effective, the Court reiterates that in cases concerning an investigation into ill-treatment, as in those concerning an investigation into the suspicious death of a relative, applicants are expected to take steps to keep track of the investigation\u2019s progress, or lack thereof, and to lodge their applications with due expedition once they are or should have become aware of the lack of an effective criminal investigation (see Mocanu and Others v.\u00a0Romania [GC], nos.\u00a010865\/09, 45886\/07 and\u00a032431\/08, \u00a7\u00a0263, ECHR 2014 (extracts); Bulut and Yavuz (dec.), cited above; Bayram and Y\u0131ld\u0131r\u0131m (dec.), cited above; and Atallah v.\u00a0France (dec.), no.\u00a051987\/07, 30\u00a0August\u00a02011).63.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already clarified that the obligation of diligence incumbent on applicants contains two distinct but closely linked aspects: on the one hand, applicants must contact the domestic authorities promptly concerning progress in the investigation and, on the other, they must lodge their application promptly with the Court as soon as they become or should have become aware that the investigation is not effective (see Mocanu and Others, \u00a7\u00a0264, cited above; Nasirkhayeva v.\u00a0Russia (dec.), no.\u00a01721\/07, 31\u00a0May\u00a02011; Akhvlediani and Others v.\u00a0Georgia (dec.), no.\u00a022026\/10, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a023-29, 9\u00a0April\u00a02013; and Gusar v.\u00a0Moldova (dec.), no.\u00a037204\/02, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a014-17, 30\u00a0April\u00a02013).64.\u00a0\u00a0The first aspect of the duty of diligence \u2013 that is, the obligation to apply promptly to the domestic authorities \u2013 must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case. In this regard, the Court has held that an applicant\u2019s delay in lodging a complaint is not decisive where the authorities ought to have been aware that an individual could have been subjected to ill-treatment \u2013 particularly in the case of an assault which occurred in the presence of police officers \u2013 as the authorities\u2019 duty to investigate arises even in the absence of an express complaint (see Velev v.\u00a0Bulgaria, no.\u00a043531\/08, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a059-60, 16\u00a0April\u00a02013). Nor does such a delay affect the admissibility of the application where the applicant was in a particularly vulnerable situation, having regard to the complexity of the case and the nature of the alleged human rights violations at stake, and where it was reasonable for him or her to wait for developments that could have resolved crucial factual or legal issues (see El-Masri v.\u00a0the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no.\u00a039630\/09, \u00a7\u00a0142, ECHR 2012).65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant was kept in solitary confinement, at least until 12\u00a0June\u00a02003, during which time he had no contact with anyone apart from the doctors monitoring his state of health. He was released from detention on 25\u00a0June\u00a02004, by which time a complaint of ill-treatment had been submitted by his mother (see paragraphs\u00a023 and\u00a024 above).66.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to the second aspect of this duty of diligence \u2013 that is, the duty on an applicant to lodge an application with the Court as soon as he or she realises or ought to realise that an investigation is not effective \u2013 the Court has stated that the issue of identifying the exact point in time that that stage occurs necessarily depends on the circumstances of the case, and that it is difficult to determine it with precision (see Nasirkhayeva, cited above). The Court has rejected as out of time applications where there were excessive or unexplained delays on the part of applicants once they became or ought to have become aware that no investigation had been instigated or that the investigation had lapsed into inaction or become ineffective and, in any of those eventualities, there was no immediate, realistic prospect of an effective investigation being provided in the future (see, among other authorities, Narin v.\u00a0Turkey, no.\u00a018907\/02, \u00a7\u00a051, 15\u00a0December\u00a02009, and Aydinlar and Others v.\u00a0Turkey (dec.), no.\u00a03575\/05, 9\u00a0March\u00a02010).67.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that in 2007, after his mother\u2019s complaint had been rejected (see paragraph\u00a030 above), the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the prosecutor\u2019s office (see paragraph\u00a031 above). After his criminal complaint was dismissed (see paragraph 33 above), he took over the criminal proceedings as a subsidiary prosecutor (see paragraph 35 above). According to the Court\u2019s well established case-law, where a national system allows a victim of ill-treatment to take over the prosecution of the case him or herself in the capacity of a \u201csubsidiary prosecutor\u201d, such post-ratification proceedings must also be taken into account (see Ota\u0161evi\u0107, cited above, \u00a7\u00a025, and Butolen v.\u00a0Slovenia, no.\u00a041356\/08, \u00a7\u00a070, 26\u00a0April\u00a02012). The applicant thus appropriately pursued the legal remedies available to him in challenging the decisions of the judicial bodies regarding his subsidiary criminal prosecution.68.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the above considerations, the Court finds that by lodging his application within six months of 11\u00a0September\u00a02013 (see paragraph\u00a038 above), the date of service of the Constitutional Court\u2019s decision, the applicant complied with the six-month time-limit provided for in Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention. The Government\u2019s objection is therefore dismissed.3.\u00a0\u00a0ConclusionThe Court notes that the complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a03 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties69.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the respondent Government had failed to conduct an independent, effective and thorough investigation into his ill-treatment during his arrest and while in detention. He complained that the State authorities had been inefficient and that his complaint had been dismissed on the grounds that the offenders could not be identified. In the applicant\u2019s view, the people responsible for his ill-treatment were easily identifiable to the respondent Government.70.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contended that the investigation carried out in the present case had met the procedural requirements of Article\u00a03 of the Convention and had been thorough and effective. They submitted that the allegations raised by the applicant\u2019s mother in her initial complaint could not be considered credible as she had learned of them from the applicant\u2019s friends and the applicant\u2019s wife failed to reaffirm them. They, also, submitted that the effectiveness of a remedy did not depend on the certainty of a favourable outcome for the applicant and that the domestic authorities had carried out all the necessary steps to examine the complaint raised by the applicant\u2019s mother; that is: they had examined all the relevant forensic evidence, collected medical documentation and related reports, and conducted interviews with the applicant, his mother, his wife and other witnesses.71.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also indicated that in 2007, after the applicant had lodged his criminal complaint, the relevant authorities had once again examined all the allegations.72.\u00a0\u00a0They lastly submitted that the positive obligation under the procedural limb of Article\u00a03 of the Convention was not an obligation of result, but of means. Their decisions to dismiss the complaints raised by the applicant and his mother had been based on findings that no excessive force had been used against the applicant and that the members of the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit had acted lawfully.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles73.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that where an individual raises an arguable claim that he or she has been seriously ill-treated by the police or other such agents of the State in breach of Article\u00a03, that provision, read in conjunction with the State\u2019s general duty under Article\u00a01 of the Convention to \u201csecure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in ... [the] Convention\u201d, requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation (see Assenov and Others v.\u00a0Bulgaria, 28\u00a0October\u00a01998, \u00a7\u00a0102, Reports of Judgments and Decisions, 1998\u2011VIII, and Labita v.\u00a0Italy [GC], no.\u00a026772\/95, \u00a7\u00a0131, ECHR 2000\u2011IV). Whatever the method of investigation, the authorities must act as soon as an official complaint has been lodged. Besides, the authorities must take into account the particularly vulnerable situation of victims and the fact that people who have been subjected to serious ill-treatment will often be less ready or willing to make a complaint (see Stanimirovi\u0107, cited above, \u00a7\u00a039, and Bat\u0131 and Others v.\u00a0Turkey, nos.\u00a033097\/96 and\u00a057834\/00, \u00a7\u00a0133, ECHR 2004-IV).74.\u00a0\u00a0Even though the obligation to investigate is not an obligation of result, but of means, there are several criteria an investigation has to satisfy for the purposes of the procedural obligation under Articles\u00a02 and\u00a03 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Ramsahai and Others v.\u00a0the Netherlands [GC], no.\u00a052391\/99, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0323-346, ECHR 2007\u2011II). Firstly, an effective investigation is one which is adequate, that is an investigation which is capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible (see Labita [GC], cited above, \u00a7\u00a0131; Boicenco v.\u00a0Moldova, no.\u00a041088\/05, \u00a7\u00a0120, 11\u00a0July\u00a02006; and Stanimirovi\u0107, cited above, \u00a7\u00a040). Secondly, for an investigation to be considered effective it may generally be regarded as necessary for the persons responsible for and carrying out the investigation to be independent from those implicated in the events, which means not only a lack of hierarchical or institutional connection but also a practical independence (see Ramsahai and Others [GC], cited above, \u00a7\u00a0325; see also \u0110ur\u0111evi\u0107 v.\u00a0Croatia, no.\u00a052442\/09, \u00a7\u00a085, ECHR 2011 (extracts), and the authorities citied therein). Thirdly, the investigation has to be thorough, which means that the authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation or as the basis of their decisions (see Assenov and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0103; see also Stanimirovi\u0107, cited above, \u00a7\u00a040). Fourthly, there is an obligation to react promptly and take action as soon as an official complaint has been lodged. Even when strictly speaking no complaint has been made, an investigation must be started if there are sufficiently clear indications that ill-treatment has been used (see Stanimirovi\u0107, cited above, \u00a7\u00a039). Fifthly, an effective investigation is one which affords a sufficient element of public scrutiny to secure accountability. While the degree of public scrutiny may vary, the complainant must be afforded effective access to the investigatory procedure in all cases (see \u0110eki\u0107 and Others v.\u00a0Serbia, no.\u00a032277\/07, \u00a7\u00a033, 29\u00a0April\u00a02014).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles to the present case75.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court is mindful that the alleged ill-treatment of the applicant happened in a state of emergency following the assassination of the Serbian Prime Minister in 2003. The Court is aware that the applicant was arrested and detained in the context of Operation Sabre, when a large number of people were arrested and placed in pre-trial detention.76.\u00a0\u00a0When a person raises a credible assertion for the purposes of the positive obligation to investigate under Article\u00a03, a prompt response by the authorities is vital in maintaining public confidence in their adherence to the rule of law and in preventing any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts (see \u0160ilih, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0195, and Bouyid v.\u00a0Belgium [GC], no.\u00a023380\/09, \u00a7\u00a0121, ECHR 2015).77.\u00a0\u00a0As to the question whether such an assertion was raised in the present case, the Court notes that the applicant and his mother lodged complaints with the relevant domestic authorities. The complaints were sufficiently detailed, containing precise dates, locations and the possible perpetrators.The medical certificate in which numerous injuries on the applicant\u2019s body were recorded was also at the disposal of the authorities (see paragraph 20 above).In addition, there was a video broadcast on national television which showed the applicant with visible bruises on his face (see paragraph 12 above).78.\u00a0\u00a0The complaints submitted by the applicant and his mother, the medical evidence and the video in question justified an \u201carguable claim\u201d within the meaning of Article\u00a03 of the Convention that the applicant had been subjected to ill-treatment during his arrest and while in detention. That being so, the Serbian authorities were under an obligation to conduct an effective investigation.79.\u00a0\u00a0It has not been disputed by the parties that certain investigative steps into the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment were carried out by three different authorities \u2013 the Inspector General\u2019s Service, the prosecutor\u2019s office and an investigative judge.80.\u00a0\u00a0However, all three investigations terminated because of an alleged absence of evidence, either of the ill-treatment or of someone\u2019s guilt. The Court notes that the investigations were mainly confined to interviews with several police officers involved in the incident. The applicant and his mother were not allowed to participate effectively in those investigations or to have the police officers questioned and corroborate their allegations. Besides, little attention was given to the applicant\u2019s allegations despite their being substantiated by the medical certificate, and their allegations were not seriously assessed.81.\u00a0\u00a0Whilst it is true that the domestic authorities were presented with sufficient evidence of the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment, they failed to identify those involved. The mere fact that no possible eyewitnesses to the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment were ever identified amounts to a significant shortcoming in the adequacy of each investigation and all three investigations together. In the Court\u2019s view, after being alerted to the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment, the investigative authorities should have conducted interviews with the other people present during his arrest or in the detention facility or corroborated his statement with the statements of those interviewed. However, they failed to do so.82.\u00a0\u00a0The specific measures aimed at establishing the potential perpetrators\u2019 identities in all three investigations were carried out by police officers answering to the same chain of command as the officers under investigation.83.\u00a0\u00a0In the final analysis, the fact that the investigations conducted by the State authorities proved incapable of even identifying the State agents who abused the applicant \u2013 even though it had been proven that the applicant was subjected to ill-treatment while under the control of the police (see paragraphs\u00a020 and\u00a034 above) \u2013 reinforces the Court\u2019s doubts as to the effectiveness of the investigation.84.\u00a0\u00a0These findings are enough for the Court to consider that the applicant did not have the benefit of an effective investigation. There has accordingly been a violation of the procedural obligation under Article 3 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE\u00a06 OF THE CONVENTION85.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also complained that the investigation into his alleged ill-treatment had been unfair and lengthy, and that because of that the people responsible had remained unpunished. He relied on Article\u00a06 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read:Article\u00a06\u201cIn the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.\u201d86.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the Convention does not guarantee the right to have third parties prosecuted, save in certain circumstances not relevant to the present case (compare and contrast Perez v.\u00a0France [GC], no.\u00a047287\/99, \u00a7\u00a070, ECHR 2004\u2011I). The applicant\u2019s complaint under Article\u00a06 \u00a7\u00a01 is, therefore, ratione materiae incompatible with the Convention and must accordingly be declared inadmissible.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE\u00a013 OF THE CONVENTION87.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had not had an effective remedy at his disposal. He relied on Article\u00a013 of the Convention, which reads as follows:Article\u00a013\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d88.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is linked to the one examined above and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.89.\u00a0\u00a0Since the applicant\u2019s complaint relating to Article\u00a013 amounts to a repetition of his complaint under Article\u00a03 and having regard to the finding relating to Article\u00a03 (in paragraph\u00a084 above), it is not necessary to examine whether there has also been a violation of Article\u00a013 in this case.IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE\u00a041 OF THE CONVENTION90.\u00a0\u00a0Article\u00a041 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage91.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 20,000\u00a0euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage.92.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that claim.93.\u00a0\u00a0The Court awards the applicant EUR\u00a04,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses94.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR\u00a04,200 for costs and expenses.95.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not comment.96.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR\u00a04,200 covering costs and expenses.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest97.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","30381":"A.\u00a0\u00a0The complaint about the authorities\u2019 failure to carry out an effective investigation into the ill-treatment inflicted on the applicant by unidentified individualsThe applicant complained that there had been no effective investigation into the ill-treatment inflicted on him by unidentified individuals on 12\u00a0February 2005. He relied on Article 6 of the Convention. The Court, being the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of a case, considers it more appropriate to examine the complaint from the standpoint of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissionsThe Government submitted that the police had intervened immediately after being informed of the attack on the applicant. The inquiry into the applicant\u2019s complaint about the events of 12 February 2005 was still pending. Therefore, it would be premature to make any conclusions about a violation of the applicant\u2019s rights under Article 3 of the Convention.The applicant submitted that on 12 February 2005 he had complained of the injuries inflicted on him by unidentified individuals to the police officer who had arrived at the scene. However, between 2005 and 2008 \u2013 that is to say before he had lodged the application to the Court \u2013 the authorities had several times issued decisions refusing to open criminal proceedings. Each time their decisions had been quashed because of the incomplete nature of the inquiry. Because of the inaction of the authorities it was no longer possible to investigate the attack on him as it had become time-barred.The applicant also submitted that the decisions refusing to initiate criminal proceedings and the decisions quashing them had not been served on him in due time. He had obtained copies of those decisions only during the court proceedings against the prosecutor\u2019s inaction. Therefore, he had been unable to effectively take part in the inquiry into the ill-treatment inflicted on him.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0General principlesAccording to its case-law, it is not open to the Court to set aside the application of the six-month rule solely because a Government has not made a preliminary objection to that effect. The Court therefore has jurisdiction to apply this rule of its own motion, even if the Government have not raised that objection (see F\u00e1bi\u00e1n v. Hungary [GC], no. 78117\/13, \u00a7 90, 5\u00a0September 2017).The six-month time-limit provided by Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention has a number of aims. Its primary purpose is to maintain legal certainty by ensuring that cases raising issues under the Convention are examined within a reasonable time, and to prevent the authorities and other persons concerned from being kept in a state of uncertainty for a long period of time (see Sabri G\u00fcne\u015f v. Turkey [GC], no. 27396\/06, \u00a7 39, 29\u00a0June\u00a02012). Normally, the six-month period runs from the date of the final decision in the process of the exhaustion of domestic remedies. However, where it is clear from the outset that no effective remedy is available to the applicant, the period runs from the date of the acts or measures complained of, or from the date of the applicant gaining knowledge of that act or its effect on or prejudice to the applicant (see Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos.\u00a016064\/90 and 8 others, \u00a7 157, ECHR 2009). Where an applicant avails himself of an apparently existing remedy and only subsequently becomes aware of circumstances which render the remedy ineffective, it may be appropriate for the purposes of Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention to calculate the start of the six-month period from the date on which the applicant first became or ought to have become aware of those circumstances (see Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], nos. 10865\/09 and 2 others, \u00a7 260, ECHR 2014 (extracts)).The Court has already held that, in cases concerning an investigation into ill-treatment, the obligation of diligence incumbent on applicants contains two distinct but closely linked aspects: on the one hand, the applicants must contact the domestic authorities promptly concerning progress in the investigation \u2013 which implies the need to apply to them with diligence, since any delay risks compromising the effectiveness of the investigation \u2013 and, on the other, they must lodge their application promptly with the Court as soon as they become aware or should have become aware that the investigation is not effective (see Mocanu and Others, cited above, \u00a7 264).The first aspect of the duty of diligence \u2013 that is to say the obligation to apply promptly to the domestic authorities \u2013 must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case. In this regard, the Court has held that applicants\u2019 delay in lodging a complaint is not decisive where the authorities ought to have been aware that an individual could have been subjected to ill-treatment \u2013 particularly in the case of an assault which occurs in the presence of police officers \u2013 as the authorities\u2019 duty to investigate arises even in the absence of an express complaint (see Velev v.\u00a0Bulgaria, no. 43531\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 59-60, 16 April 2013). Nor does such a delay affect the admissibility of the application where the applicant was in a particularly vulnerable situation, having regard to the complexity of the case and the nature of the alleged human rights violations at stake, and where it was reasonable for the applicant to wait for developments that could have resolved crucial factual or legal issues (see El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630\/09, \u00a7 142, ECHR 2012).With regard to the second aspect of this duty of diligence \u2013 that is to say the duty of an applicant to lodge an application with the Court as soon as he realises, or ought to have realised, that the investigation is not effective \u2013 the Court has stated that the issue of identifying the exact point in time that this stage occurs necessarily depends on the circumstances of the case and that it is difficult to determine it with precision (see Nasirkhayeva v. Russia (dec.), no. 1721\/07, 31 May 2011). In particular, the Court has considered it indispensable that persons who wish to bring a complaint about the ineffectiveness or lack of an investigation before the Court do not delay unduly in lodging their application. However, so long as there is some meaningful contact with the authorities concerning complaints and requests for information, or some indication, or realistic possibility, of progress in investigative measures, considerations of undue delay by the applicants will not generally arise (see Mocanu and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0269). (b)\u00a0Application of the principles to the present caseThe Court observes that on 30 October 2009 the applicant complained before it of the lack of an effective investigation into the ill-treatment allegedly inflicted on him by unknown individuals at his flat on 12\u00a0February\u00a02005.As to the first aspect of the obligation of diligence, the Court notes that it was common ground that the applicant\u2019s wife called the police on 12\u00a0February 2005 and reported the attack on her and her husband. On the same date the police opened an inquiry into the incident.The Court furthermore notes that between February 2005 and November\u00a02006 the investigating authorities issued six decisions refusing to open criminal proceedings for lack of the elements of a crime. All of them were quashed by the district prosecutor on the basis of the fact that the inquiry had been incomplete. In September 2006 the district prosecutor asked that disciplinary measures be taken against the officers concerned for procrastination and procedural violations committed during the inquiry.The applicant alleged that the authorities had not provided him in due time with copies of the decisions refusing to initiate criminal proceedings and the decisions quashing them, and had thus deprived him of the possibility to effectively participate in the inquiry. According to him, he had only obtained those copies on an unspecified date during the proceedings against the district prosecutor.In that respect the Court observes that for more than two years from the opening of the inquiry the applicant did not seek information from the authorities about its progress. It was the applicant\u2019s mother who complained in March and then in October 2006 to the General Prosecutor\u2019s Office about the prosecutor\u2019s alleged inaction in the applicant\u2019s case. The applicant has provided no explanation as to why he took the initiative only in May 2007 \u2013 more than two years after the opening of the inquiry.The Court further observes that by a final decision of 15\u00a0October\u00a02007 the St Petersburg City Court dismissed the applicant\u2019s complaint of 2\u00a0May\u00a02007 as having been lodged against the wrong defendant. The court observed that the applicant had never complained to the district prosecutor about the length of the inquiry and had never asked to be kept informed of its findings.In such circumstances, the Court considers that the applicant \u2013 who was at liberty throughout the inquiry into his complaint and was thus unrestricted in his actions \u2013 had ample opportunity to diligently contact the investigating authorities and the domestic courts. However, as can be seen from the materials of the case he did not take any steps until May 2007 and thus could not be said to have complied with the first aspect of the duty of diligence.As to the second aspect of the duty of diligence, the Court observes that in the complaint that he lodged with the Smolninskiy District Court on 2\u00a0May 2007 the applicant referred to the content of the district prosecutor\u2019s decision of 3 October 2005 to quash the decision refusing to initiate criminal proceedings and, in particular, the indications given by the district prosecutor to the inquiry officer. He also referred to the reply addressed to his mother by the St Petersburg prosecutor\u2019s office on 30 October 2006 in which she had been informed that the decision of 27 September 2006 refusing to initiate criminal proceedings had been quashed and that the district prosecutor had asked that disciplinary measures be taken against the officers concerned for procrastination and procedural violations committed during the inquiry. Those elements allow the Court to conclude that by 2\u00a0May 2007 at the latest the applicant had become aware that no criminal proceedings had been instituted into his complaint. Having regard to the fact that by that date the applicant had not been informed of the measures taken to fill in the gaps in the inquiry\u2019s findings resulting from the procrastination and procedural violations committed during the inquiry, he should also have become aware that there was neither sufficiently tangible indication nor a realistic possibility of progress being made in the investigative measures.Accordingly, the Court is convinced that in the circumstances of the present case, the applicant must have become aware of the ineffectiveness of the investigation into the alleged attack on him more than six months before he lodged his application with the Court on 30 October 2009.The Court considers that the inquiry reopened in 2011, after the communication of the present case to the Government; that inquiry, which is currently pending, has been unable to establish the circumstances of the attack on the applicant or to identify the perpetrators of the impugned act in view of the passage of considerable time since the event in question. In particular, it does not appear that the gaps in the inquiry\u2019s findings resulting from the absence of the most basic investigative steps at the initial stages of the proceedings could be filled in at that point. Nor does it appear that at this stage the applicant has submitted any new information that could have warranted a different conclusion. In such circumstances the Court does not consider that this round of proceedings constituted a new development which could have revived the procedural obligation under Article 3 and therefore bring the complaint within the scope of the Court\u2019s temporal jurisdiction.In the light of the foregoing the Court considers that the applicant has failed to comply with the six-month rule in respect of his complaint under Article 3 of the Convention. This part of the application must therefore be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention.B.\u00a0\u00a0Other complaintsLastly, the Court has examined the other complaints submitted by the applicant. Having regard to all the material in its possession and in so far as these complaints fall within the Court\u2019s competence, it finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,Declares the application inadmissible.\u00a0Done in English and notified in writing on 22 February 2018.Fato\u015f Arac\u0131Branko Lubarda\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Deputy RegistrarPresident\u00a0\u00a0","30385":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ADMISSIBILITY57.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicant no longer had victim status. The authorities had taken all the necessary measures to protect the applicant by placing her in a specialist institution, where she had remained for one year. The criminal proceedings against her assailants had been concluded and her parents had been joined to the proceedings as civil parties.58.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further submitted that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies, as the domestic proceedings had still been pending when the application was lodged.59.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contested the Government\u2019s argument. She submitted, in particular, that the authorities\u2019 action had been ineffective and that her complaints did not relate to the criminal proceedings against the individuals prosecuted for rape and living on the earnings of prostitution.60.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers at the outset, like the applicant, that her complaints do not relate to the criminal proceedings for sexual exploitation and rape. Next, as regards the Government\u2019s preliminary objection alleging a lack of victim status, the Court reiterates that a decision or measure favourable to the applicant is not in principle sufficient to deprive him of his status as a \u201cvictim\u201d unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for, the breach of the Convention\u00a0(see Eckle v. Germany, 15 July 1982, \u00a7\u00a7 69 et seq., Series A no. 51; Amuur v. France, 25\u00a0June 1996, \u00a7\u00a036, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-III; Dalban v. Romania [GC], no. 28114\/95, \u00a7 44, ECHR\u00a01999\u2011VI; and Jensen v. Denmark (dec.), no. 48470\/99, ECHR\u00a02001\u2011X). That rule applies even if the applicant obtains satisfaction after the proceedings before the Court have commenced, in accordance with the subsidiary nature of the Convention system of safeguards (see, in particular, Mikheyeva v. Latvia (dec.), no.\u00a050029\/99, 12\u00a0September 2002). The issue as to whether a person may still claim to be the victim of an alleged violation of the Convention essentially entails on the part of the Court an ex post facto examination of his or her situation (see Scordino v.\u00a0Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813\/97, \u00a7 181, ECHR 2006\u2011V).61.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court considers that there has been neither implicit acknowledgement of the existence of a Convention violation nor any compensation for the period during which the applicant was in a vulnerable situation while she waited for the authorities to take practical steps to protect her.62.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the applicant may still claim to be the victim of a violation of Articles 3, 8 and 13 of the Convention. It therefore dismisses the Government\u2019s preliminary objection in that regard.63.\u00a0\u00a0As to the objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies, the Court notes at the outset that the applicant lodged her application on 23 July 2014, while she was placed in a specialist institution, that her placement ended in September 2015 and that the proceedings were terminated in January 2017 (see paragraph 44 above). It observes that the proceedings in question, which were provided for by Royal Decree no. 1404 of 20 July 1934, were not capable of affording redress in respect of the applicant\u2019s complaints concerning the failure of the social services to act and the delay in implementing protective measures. The Court also notes that the criminal proceedings for sexual exploitation and rape, which ended in 2016 and 2015 respectively, are not the subject of the present application. Accordingly, the Court considers that the application should not be rejected for failure to exhaust domestic remedies, despite the fact that the proceedings provided for by Royal Decree no. 1404 of 20 July 1934 were pending when the application was lodged. It follows that the Government\u2019s preliminary objection must be dismissed.64.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It therefore declares it admissible.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 3 AND 8 OF THE CONVENTION65.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged that, despite the fact that she had been a minor and the victim of a prostitution ring, the Italian authorities had not taken all the necessary measures to protect her. She relied on Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, which provide:Article 3\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dArticle 8\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life ...\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s submissions66.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that, although she had been a vulnerable minor, the State had not taken the necessary measures to protect her. The authorities had not acted with the requisite diligence and had not taken account of the risks that she faced. She had been left in a vulnerable situation, without protection, from 20 April 2013 until her placement in the Karisma treatment centre on 14 April 2014.67.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that her protection had been of paramount importance and that the Youth Court and the competent social services had left her alone and defenceless for some time. During the period in which she had been in the care of the social services, the latter had not monitored her properly and she had been raped. In her submission, the risk of sexual assault had been foreseeable.68.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant pointed out that her parents had requested that protective measures be taken in July 2013, that the case had been set down for hearing before the Youth Court in October 2013 and that the order for her placement and care had been made in December 2013. In her view, this was a very long period of time.She added that she had been the victim of sexual exploitation between August and December 2013 and had been raped in January 2014.69.\u00a0\u00a0In the applicant\u2019s submission, the authorities had not done all that could reasonably be expected of them to avoid a real and immediate risk to her life of which they had or ought to have had knowledge.70.\u00a0\u00a0In that connection the applicant argued that the authorities had adopted a passive attitude. The Youth Court had ordered her placement ten months after her parents had made a request to that effect and, once the decision had been adopted, the social services had not taken the necessary steps to have her placed promptly in a specialist institution. The judge had had to ask the social services twice to indicate what measures had been taken to protect her (see paragraphs 28 and 29 above).71.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged that the social services had taken no further interest in her case after she had been placed in the specialist institution. Her return to live with her family had thus been decided solely by the staff in the treatment centre; the social services had never expressed a view on the subject and had not followed up on her case after she had returned to the family home.72.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that the authorities should have taken urgent action in accordance with the positive obligations arising out of Article 8 of the Convention. On the contrary, they had left her in a vulnerable situation despite being aware of the danger she faced. The initial inaction of the authorities and the subsequent inaction of the social services had thus deprived her of the protection she needed.73.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the applicant was of the view that the authorities had not complied with their positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s submissions74.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stated that they had adopted all the necessary measures in order to find a solution in the present case. Given the complexity of the applicant\u2019s situation, linked to a variety of problems including her drug addiction, it had not been easy to find an appropriate specialist institution capable of taking care of her.75.\u00a0\u00a0Once the Youth Court had been alerted by the applicant\u2019s parents to the risks which she faced, including the risk of being caught up in a child prostitution ring, a criminal investigation had been opened and the perpetrators had been arrested in 2014.The authorities had therefore taken all the necessary measures to protect the applicant and prevent ill-treatment.76.\u00a0\u00a0As to the sexual assault on the applicant, the Government submitted that it could not have been foreseen by the authorities, especially since the applicant had not been under the sole supervision of the State at the time of the offence, but had been living with her family.77.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, in the Government\u2019s submission, the sexual assault on the applicant could not be regarded as a consequence of the delay by the authorities in implementing the Youth Court\u2019s decision.78.\u00a0\u00a0In the Government\u2019s view, the sexual assault had resulted from unforeseeable conduct. Moreover, the authorities had done everything in their power to identify the perpetrators and bring them to trial.79.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, placing a child in the care of the social services was not in itself a protective measure but was to be regarded as assistance to the family, given the need to obtain the minor\u2019s consent before placing him or her in an institution and arranging therapeutic support. The Government drew the Court\u2019s attention in particular to the dual aim pursued by the measure laid down in Royal Decree no. 1404 of 1934, which later became Law no. 835 of 1935. That measure was designed, firstly, to secure the right to education to children in difficulty and, secondly, to prevent juvenile offending.80.\u00a0\u00a0As to the complaint under Article 8 of the Convention, the Government maintained that the authorities had taken all the necessary measures to protect the applicant as soon as they had become aware of the risks that she faced.81.\u00a0\u00a0The authorities had heard evidence from the applicant and her parents on several occasions in an attempt to find the most appropriate facility to take care of her; several of the facilities that were approached had been unable to admit her.82.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the authorities had taken all the necessary measures, as they had immediately opened an investigation into sexual exploitation and had convicted the perpetrators of that offence and identified the perpetrators of the sexual assault on the applicant. Referring to the Court\u2019s judgment in the case of O\u2019Keeffe v. Ireland ([GC], no.\u00a035810\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 191-92, ECHR 2014 (extracts)), they argued that the complaint under Article 8 of the Convention did not raise a separate issue from that raised under Article 3 of the Convention.C.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Applicability of Article 3 of the Convention83.\u00a0\u00a0 In order for ill-treatment to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention it must attain a minimum level of severity. The assessment of this minimum depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim. The absence of an intention to humiliate or debase the victim cannot conclusively rule out a finding of a violation of Article 3 (see, among other authorities, V. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24888\/94, \u00a7 71, ECHR 1999\u2011IX). Regard must also be had to the context in which the ill-treatment was inflicted, such as an atmosphere of heightened tension and emotions (compare, for instance, Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803\/94, \u00a7 104, ECHR 1999\u2011V; see also, among other authorities, G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, \u00a7 88, ECHR 2010) and whether the victim was in a vulnerable situation (see Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 16483\/12, \u00a7 160, 15 December 2016).84.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case the Court observes that it is not disputed that the applicant was in a vulnerable situation. It therefore considers that the applicant may be regarded as falling into the category of \u201cvulnerable individuals\u201d who are entitled to State protection (see A. v. the United Kingdom, 23 September 1998, \u00a7\u00a022, Reports 1998\u2011VI). It takes note in that regard of the abuse to which the applicant was subjected, as the victim of sexual exploitation between late August and December 2013 and of rape in January 2014. It further observes that the abuse to which the applicant was subjected, and which took the form of physical assaults and psychological duress, was sufficiently serious to attain the degree of severity necessary to bring it within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention. Accordingly, that provision is applicable in the present case.2.\u00a0\u00a0Applicability of Article 8 of the Convention85.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicability of Article 8 of the Convention is not disputed between the parties. It considers it beyond doubt that the abuse to which the applicant was subjected, and which interfered with her right to respect for her physical integrity (see M.P. and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 22457\/08, \u00a7 110, 15 November 2011), caused disruption to her daily life and had an adverse effect on her private life. The Court has previously found that the physical and moral integrity of an individual is covered by the concept of private life. The concept of private life extends also to the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves. There appears, furthermore, to be no reason in principle why the notion of \u201cprivate life\u201d should be taken to exclude attacks on one\u2019s physical integrity (see M.C. v.\u00a0Bulgaria, no. 39272\/98, \u00a7 150, ECHR 2003\u2011XII).86.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this provision is applicable to the circumstances of the present case.3.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion87.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the foregoing considerations and of the nature and substance of the complaints raised by the applicant in the present case, the Court considers that they should be examined from the standpoint of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention.4.\u00a0\u00a0Violation of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention(a)\u00a0\u00a0Applicable principles88.\u00a0\u00a0The Court would reiterate at the outset that the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment is a fundamental value in democratic societies (see, among many other authorities, Selmouni, cited above, \u00a7 95; G\u00e4fgen, cited above, \u00a7 87; El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630\/09, \u00a7 195, ECHR 2012; and Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], nos. 10865\/09, 45886\/07 and 32431\/08, \u00a7 315, ECHR 2014 (extracts)). It is also a value of civilisation closely bound up with respect for human dignity, part of the very essence of the Convention (see Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 81 and 89-90, ECHR 2015). The prohibition in question is absolute, for no derogation from it is permissible even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation or in the most difficult circumstances, such as the fight against terrorism and organised crime, irrespective of the conduct of the person concerned (see, among other authorities, Georgia v. Russia (I) [GC], no.\u00a013255\/07, \u00a7 192, ECHR 2014 (extracts); Svinarenko and Slyadnev v.\u00a0Russia [GC], nos. 32541\/08 and 43441\/08, \u00a7 113, ECHR 2014 (extracts); and Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7 81).89.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the obligation of the High Contracting Parties under Article 1 of the Convention to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, taken together with Article 3, requires States to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to ill-treatment, including ill-treatment administered by private individuals (see\u00a0A. v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 22;\u00a0Z and Others v. the United Kingdom\u00a0[GC], no.\u00a029392\/95, \u00a7\u00a7 73-75, ECHR 2001-V; E. and Others v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, no.\u00a033218\/96, 26 November 2002; and M.C. v.\u00a0Bulgaria, cited above, \u00a7 149). These measures must provide effective protection, in particular of children, who are particularly vulnerable to various forms of violence, and include reasonable steps to prevent ill\u2011treatment of which the authorities had or ought to have had knowledge, as well as effective deterrence protecting minors against such serious breaches of personal integrity (see, mutatis mutandis, Osman v. the United Kingdom, 28 October 1998, \u00a7 116, Reports 1998-VIII; E. and Others v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 88; Z and Others v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 73; and M.P. and Others, cited above, \u00a7 108). Such measures must be aimed at ensuring respect for human dignity and protecting the best interests of the child (see C.A.S. and C.S. v. Romania, no. 26692\/05, \u00a7 82, 20 March 2012, and Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346\/02, \u00a7 65, ECHR 2002-III).90.\u00a0\u00a0Bearing in mind the difficulties in policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human conduct and the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources, the scope of this positive obligation must, however, be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities. Not every claimed risk to life can entail for the authorities a Convention requirement to take operational measures to prevent that risk from materialising. For a positive obligation to arise, it must be established that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk of ill-treatment of an identified individual from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk. Another relevant consideration is the need to ensure that the police exercise their powers to control and prevent crime in a manner which fully respects the due process and other guarantees which legitimately place restraints on the scope of their action to investigate crime and bring offenders to justice, including the guarantees contained in Article 8 of the Convention\u00a0(see \u0110or\u0111evi\u0107 v. Croatia, no.\u00a041526\/10, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0139, ECHR 2012, and the case-law cited therein).91.\u00a0\u00a0Regarding the protection of the physical and psychological integrity of an individual from other persons, the Court has previously held that the authorities\u2019 positive obligations \u2013 in some cases under Articles 2 or 3 and in other instances under Article 8 taken alone or in combination with Article 3 of the Convention \u2013 may include a duty to maintain and apply in practice an adequate legal framework affording protection against acts of violence by private individuals (see, among other authorities, Osman, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0128-30; Bevacqua and S. v. Bulgaria, no. 71127\/01, \u00a7 65, 12 June 2008; Sandra Jankovi\u0107 v. Croatia, no. 38478\/05, \u00a7 45, 5 March 2009; A v.\u00a0Croatia, no. 55164\/08, \u00a7 60, 14 October 2010; and \u0110or\u0111evi\u0107, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7141-43).92.\u00a0\u00a0Nevertheless, it is not the Court\u2019s role to replace the national authorities and to choose in their stead from among the wide range of possible measures that could be taken to secure compliance with their positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention (see Opuz v. Turkey, no. 33401\/02, \u00a7 165, ECHR 2009). Moreover, under Article 19 of the Convention and under the principle that the Convention is intended to guarantee not theoretical or illusory, but practical and effective rights, the Court has to ensure that a State\u2019s obligation to protect the rights of those under its jurisdiction is adequately discharged (see Sandra Jankovi\u0107, cited above, \u00a7 46, and Hajduov\u00e1 v. Slovakia, no. 2660\/03, \u00a7 47, 30 November 2010). The question of the appropriateness of the authorities\u2019 response may raise a problem under the Convention (see Bevacqua and S., cited above, \u00a7\u00a079).93.\u00a0\u00a0The positive obligation to protect a person\u2019s physical integrity extends to matters concerning the effectiveness of a criminal investigation, which cannot be considered to be limited solely to cases of ill-treatment by State agents (see M.C. v. Bulgaria, cited above, \u00a7 151).94.\u00a0\u00a0This aspect of the positive obligation does not necessarily require a conviction, but effective implementation of the law, particularly criminal, in order to secure the protection of the rights guaranteed by Article 3 of the Convention (see M.G. v. Turkey, no. 646\/10, \u00a7 80, 22 March 2016).95.\u00a0\u00a0A requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is implicit in the obligation to carry out an investigation. The protection machinery provided for in domestic law must operate in practice within a reasonable time such as to conclude the examination on the merits of specific cases submitted to the authorities (see Opuz, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 150-51). The State\u2019s obligation under Article 3 of the Convention will not be deemed to be satisfied if the protection afforded by domestic law exists only in theory: above all, it must also operate effectively in practice, and that requires a prompt examination of the case without unnecessary delays.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above-mentioned principles to the present case96.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case there is no doubt that the abuse to which the applicant was subjected falls within the scope of application of Article 3 of the Convention and constitutes interference with her right to respect for her physical integrity as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention.97.\u00a0\u00a0The Court must ascertain whether the legislation and the manner in which it was implemented in the instant case, coupled with the alleged failure of the social services to take action, were defective to the point of constituting a violation of the respondent State\u2019s positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention.98.\u00a0\u00a0The main issue which arises in the present case is therefore whether the authorities took all the necessary measures to prevent the abuse to which the applicant was subjected and to protect her physical integrity.99.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will examine first of all whether the competent authorities were or should have been aware of the vulnerable situation of the applicant.100.\u00a0\u00a0In that connection the Court notes that it is clear from the case file that the authorities were aware as of April 2013 of the erratic behaviour displayed by the applicant, who had been found in possession of alcohol and drugs, since the public prosecutor at the Youth Court had been alerted to the situation.101.\u00a0\u00a0It also notes that in May and June 2013 the minor\u2019s parents informed the authorities of the state of distress of their daughter, who had a bipolar disorder and an attention deficit disorder and also showed signs of a borderline and anti-social personality (see paragraph 8 above). They also mentioned the risk, supported by documentary evidence, of her becoming caught up in a prostitution ring.102.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above considerations, the Court is satisfied that the domestic authorities were aware of the applicant\u2019s vulnerable situation and of the real and immediate risk that she faced. It will therefore examine whether, regard being had to the circumstances of the case, those authorities took all reasonable measures to protect the applicant as soon as they became aware of the risks facing her.103.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the authorities immediately instituted a criminal investigation but that no measures were put in place to protect the applicant, who was aged 15 at the time. Although the public prosecutor requested on 2 July 2013 (see paragraph 12 above) that urgent proceedings be instituted and that the applicant be placed in a specialist institution and in the care of the social services, the Youth Court took more than four months to reach a decision.104.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that it emerged from the criminal proceedings concerning the prostitution ring that the applicant had been the victim of sexual exploitation during the period in question (see paragraph 52 above). The applicant was thus engaged in prostitution and part of her earnings stemmed from the actions of the two members of the prostitution ring.105.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that it took the social services more than four months following the Youth Court\u2019s decision of December 2013 to implement the order for the applicant\u2019s placement, notwithstanding the requests to that effect made by the applicant\u2019s parents and two urgent requests for information from the Youth Court (see paragraphs 28 and 29 above).106.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that, in the meantime, the applicant was the victim of rape (see paragraph 25 above), that criminal proceedings for gang rape were instituted in that regard, that the alleged perpetrators were identified and that the proceedings are pending before the Rome District Court (see paragraph 54 above).107.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that in assessing the State\u2019s compliance with its positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, considerable weight should be attached to the social services\u2019 and\/or child protection authorities\u2019 efforts to protect the minor in question (see, mutatis mutandis, M.P. and Others v. Bulgaria, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0114).108.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case the Court observes that it took the Youth Court four months, from the date on which it became aware of the applicant\u2019s difficult and dangerous situation (see paragraph 12 above), to adopt the protective measures provided for by law and requested by the public prosecutor, despite the fact that the applicant faced a known risk of sexual exploitation, given that a criminal investigation was under way and her parents had informed the authorities.109.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is not persuaded by the Government\u2019s argument that, in the absence of her consent, the applicant\u2019s placement in an institution, as ordered by the Youth Court in its decision of 9 December 2013 (see paragraph 17 above), was not possible. Even assuming this to have been the case, the Court notes in that connection that, while the applicant had refused such a placement in December 2013 (see paragraph 22 above), she gave her consent in January 2014 (see paragraph 23 above), that is, three months before she was admitted to the Karisma centre (see paragraph 35 above). The Court therefore concludes that the fact that at one point in time the applicant did not give her consent did not in itself exempt the State from acting rapidly to take appropriate and sufficient measures to protect a minor in such a way as to ensure compliance with the positive obligations imposed by Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention.In addition \u2013 and despite the urgent nature of the request made by the President of the Youth Court regarding the measures taken to assist the applicant, who was in a difficult situation \u2013 the Court finds that the conduct of the social services indicates a lack of real commitment on their part to implementing the Youth Court\u2019s decision, in view of their failure to attend the hearings (see paragraphs 14 and 15 above) and the time they took to select an institution to admit the applicant.110.\u00a0\u00a0In the Court\u2019s view, the national authorities had a duty to take account of the applicant\u2019s particular psychological and physical vulnerability and to assess the situation accordingly by taking immediate and appropriate protective measures. That did not happen in the present case.111.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that, unlike the criminal courts, which acted rapidly, the competent authorities (the Youth Court and the social services) did not actually take any immediate protective measures, despite being aware that the applicant was vulnerable, that proceedings concerning her sexual exploitation were still pending and that an investigation into gang rape was ongoing. Accordingly, the authorities did not carry out any assessment of the risks faced by the applicant.112.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances the Court considers that the authorities cannot be said to have acted with the requisite diligence. It therefore finds that they did not take, in a timely manner, all reasonable measures to prevent the abuse of which the applicant was a victim.113.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court finds a violation of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION114.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant alleged that she had not had a remedy in domestic law by which to complain of the violations of her rights. She relied on Article 13 of the Convention, which provides: \u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d115.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.116.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to its finding of a violation of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention (see paragraph 113 above), the Court considers that it has examined the main legal question raised in the present case. In view of all the facts of the case and the parties\u2019 submissions, it considers that there is no need to examine the same facts under Article 13 of the Convention (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848\/08, \u00a7 156, ECHR 2014, and the case-law cited therein).IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION117.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage118.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 150,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.119.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that claim.120.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate to award the applicant EUR\u00a030,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses121.\u00a0\u00a0Submitting documentary evidence, the applicant also claimed EUR\u00a04,152.10 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and EUR 19,153.65 for costs and expenses before the Court.122.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the applicant\u2019s claims, arguing that she had not demonstrated that she had incurred the costs and expenses claimed.123.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these were actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and its case-law, the Court rejects the claim for costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings and considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 10,000 for the proceedings before the Court.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest124.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","30478":"","30490":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION26.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been ill-treated by the police and that the authorities had failed to conduct an effective investigation into the ill-treatment, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, which provides:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The Government27.\u00a0\u00a0The Government first objected that the application was inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. They submitted that the applicant should have pursued substitute private prosecution proceedings, which could have remedied the alleged violation of the State\u2019s procedural obligations \u2013 and in particular the obligation incumbent on the prosecution authorities to take the necessary steps to establish the criminal responsibility of alleged perpetrators. They added that if the applicant\u2019s motion for private prosecution proceedings had been dismissed by the first-instance court, he could have either appealed against this decision or lodged a constitutional complaint.28.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also submitted that the Court\u2019s findings in Borb\u00e1la\u00a0Kiss v. Hungary (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 25-26) and Gubacsi v.\u00a0Hungary (no.\u00a044686\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 31-32, 28 June 2011) were not applicable in the present case, since in those cases the reason for dismissing the Government\u2019s preliminary objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies had been the apparent legal uncertainty concerning substitute private prosecution proceedings. The Government further suggested that the Court should take the same approach as it had in the case of Horv\u00e1th and Vad\u00e1szi v.\u00a0Hungary ((dec.) no. 2351\/06, 9 November 2010), which was declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.29.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also argued that the admittedly low success rate of substitute private prosecution proceedings did not mean that this procedure was inefficient, since the dismissal of such applications was mainly due to non-compliance with the relevant formal requirements.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant30.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant, for his part, submitted that the Government had not produced any evidence to show that substitute private prosecution proceedings had been an effective remedy in cases similar to his and would therefore constitute a remedy to be exhausted in the circumstances. He argued that he had sought redress through the available national channels by lodging a criminal complaint. The mere fact that his attention had been drawn to the possibility of acting as a substitute private prosecutor had not in itself rendered this legal avenue an effective remedy to be exhausted. He lodged a criminal complaint by which the responsibility to pursue the prosecution of officers accused of ill-treatment lay with the public prosecutor, and there was no reason to require him to have pursued the prosecution of the accused officers of his own motion.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment31.\u00a0\u00a0The rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies referred to in Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention obliges applicants to use first the remedies that are normally available and sufficient in the domestic legal system to enable them to obtain redress for alleged breaches alleged to have taken place (see Pyrantien\u0117 v.\u00a0Lithuania, no. 45092\/07, \u00a7 26, 12 November 2013). An applicant who has used a remedy which is apparently effective and sufficient cannot be required also to have tried other remedies that were available but probably no more likely to be successful (see Hristovi v.\u00a0Bulgaria, no.\u00a042697\/05, \u00a7 52, 11 October 2011 and the cases cited therein).32.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in the present case during his first medical examination the applicant declared that he had been ill-treated by the police (see paragraph 8 above). His statements were qualified as criminal complaints by the investigating authorities (see paragraph 13 above). Subsequently, a criminal investigation was opened against unknown perpetrators for ill\u2011treatment in the course of official proceedings. Following the first\u2011instance decision discontinuing proceedings, the applicant lodged a complaint seeking continuation of the investigations (see paragraph 24 above). There is nothing to indicate that the ensuing proceedings would not in principle have been capable of leading to the identification and, if appropriate, punishment of those responsible.33.\u00a0\u00a0In the Court\u2019s view, by virtue of that remedy the State had been afforded an opportunity to put matters right. The applicant must therefore be regarded as having brought the substance of his complaint to the notice of the national authorities and as having sought redress for his complaint through the domestic channels. He was thus not required additionally to pursue the matter by instituting substitute private prosecution proceedings, which would have had the same objective as his appeal against the discontinuation of the investigation (see, for similar reasoning, R.B.\u00a0v.\u00a0Hungary, no. 64602\/12, \u00a7 62, 12 April 2016).34.\u00a0\u00a0In particular, the Court cannot subscribe to the Government\u2019s view (see paragraph 28 above) that in the cases of Borb\u00e1la Kiss and Gubacsi (both cited above) the applicants were not required to pursue private prosecution proceedings only because of the uncertainty prevailing at that time concerning the effectiveness of that legal avenue. Indeed, an additional important consideration was the fact that the applicants had already lodged a criminal complaint concerning the alleged ill-treatment so that that they could not be expected to have lodged a second, virtually identical complaint mentioning particular individuals by name (see Borb\u00e1la Kiss, cited above, \u00a7\u00a026, and Gubacsi, cited above, \u00a7 32). As to the Government\u2019s reference to the Horv\u00e1th and Vad\u00e1szi decision (cited above), the Court considers that the related conclusions reached in that case are not applicable to the present circumstances, since in that case the Court found that the applicants had not raised the essence of their claim \u2012 which was racial discrimination \u2012 in their private bill of indictment, which was concerned with endangering minors.35.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the Government\u2019s preliminary objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies must be dismissed. Furthermore, the Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded, within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention, and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant36.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained that he had suffered physical ill-treatment during his interrogation. He further submitted that he could not have inflicted the injuries on himself, since he had been held in a waist restraint belt during his transportation in the special vehicle and had otherwise been held under constant supervision. He argued that the investigating authorities should have obtained evidence in this respect. Furthermore, the domestic authorities had no basis for arriving at the conclusion that his injuries had been caused by his own conduct. He also submitted that in line with the procedural rules concerning readmission to prison, he had undergone a medical check-up for a third time on 19 July 2012 (see paragraph 10 above), but the report drawn up during this examination had not formed part of the investigation carried out by the domestic authorities.37.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant emphasised that in line with the Court\u2019s case-law, the burden of proof rested on the Government to show how and when the injuries of an individual taken into police custody in good health but found to be injured at the time of release had been sustained. The Government, however, had failed plausibly to explain how, when and where the injuries had occurred if not at the police station. He questioned the authority of the witness testimonies, which had been taken more than a year after the incident, concerning the origin of his injuries.38.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further submitted that the investigation into his allegations had not been adequate for the purpose of Article 3. Most importantly, the investigating authorities had not obtained evidence from the witnesses in due time and the investigation file had not contained all the medical documentation, which could have substantiated his allegation of ill\u2011treatment. They had also failed to question the police officer besides A. who had been present for a brief period during the applicant\u2019s interrogation. Moreover, the domestic authorities had based their finding solely on the forensic medical expert opinion, which had not provided a plausible explanation for the cause of the injuries, and had not taken any further investigative steps.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government39.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that it could not be established beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant had been ill-treated by the police officer. First, they highlighted the contradictions between the applicant\u2019s account of events \u2012 namely that he had been beaten for several minutes with great force \u2012 and the findings of the forensic expert opinion, according to which the applicant\u2019s injuries had been of a minor severity. Furthermore, according to the prosecutor\u2019s office the applicant had not been constantly monitored, thus he could have inflicted the injuries on himself. In this respect the Government also emphasised that there was no evidence that the applicant had been restrained during his transportation and the witness testimonies had not shed light on this question either. Moreover, the applicant had only complained of ill-treatment following his transfer back to Budapest Prison and not immediately after his handover from the police to the prison escort officers. The Government lastly pointed to the witness testimony of one of the medical staff who had commented when examining the photograph of the applicant that she could not be certain whether he actually had an injury on his face or merely pronounced cheekbones (see paragraph 21 above).2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0Concerning the alleged ill-treatment40.\u00a0\u00a0As the Court has stated on many occasions, Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of a democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances or the conduct of the person concerned (see Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380\/09, \u00a7\u00a081, ECHR 2015, with further references). Ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see Khlaifia and Others v.\u00a0Italy [GC], no. 16483\/12, \u00a7 159, ECHR 2016 (extracts)).41.\u00a0\u00a0Allegations of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 must be supported by appropriate evidence. To assess this evidence, the Court adopts the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d but adds that such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see, among other authorities, Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7 82).42.\u00a0\u00a0On this latter point the Court has explained that where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention. The burden of proof then rests with the Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation by producing evidence establishing facts which cast doubt on the account of events given by the victim. In the absence of such explanation, the Court can draw interferences which may be unfavourable for the Government. That is justified by the fact that persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them (see, among other authorities, Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7 83).43.\u00a0\u00a0In the instant case the applicant complained that during his interrogation he was subjected to acts of police brutality.\u00a0The Court notes that medical reports confirmed that the applicant had suffered bleeding on the lower lip, bruises on the ribs, and sensitivity at his jaw (see paragraph\u00a09 above). The Court considers that in the instant case the injury suffered by the applicant was sufficiently serious to amount to ill-treatment within the scope of Article 3.44.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the parties\u2019 submissions, the witness testimonies and the relevant medical evidence, it is uncontested that the applicant\u2019s injuries were sustained while under the control of the state authorities, either during his questioning at the police station or thereafter when he was being transferred or readmitted to the prison (see paragraphs 9 and 15-22 above).The disagreement between the parties concerned the exact nature and causes of the applicant\u2019s injuries.45.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the investigation into forced interrogation was discontinued on the grounds that the applicant\u2019s statements could not be corroborated by any testimony, in the absence of eye witnesses during questioning (see paragraph 24 above). Moreover, the forensic expert opinion did not confirm the applicant\u2019s account of the incident, stating that the nature of the injuries excluded that they could have been caused by the mechanism described by the applicant. That opinion even assumed, based on the location of the injuries, that they could have been self-inflicted (see paragraph 23 above). This conclusion was also supported by the Government in their submissions (see paragraph\u00a039 above).46.\u00a0\u00a0It is true that no conclusive evidence is available concerning the time at which the injuries occurred and the other circumstances surrounding the incident. In particular, the Court finds no elements which could indicate with sufficient certainty that the injuries sustained by the applicant were inflicted by use of force by the police. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the case file which could call into question the findings of the medical report or could add probative weight to the applicant\u2019s allegations.47.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court cannot consider it established beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant was subjected to ill\u2011treatment during his time in police custody.48.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive aspect.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Concerning the alleged inadequacy of the investigation49.\u00a0\u00a0The Court refers to the general principles set out, among other judgments, in El\u2011Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ([GC] no. 39630\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 182-185, ECHR 2012) and Mocanu and Others v.\u00a0Romania ([GC] nos.\u00a010865\/09 and 2 others, \u00a7\u00a7 316-326, ECHR 2014 (extracts)), among other judgments. Those principles indicate, in particular, that the investigation into serious allegations of ill-treatment must be both prompt and thorough, and authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what happened and take all reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard.50.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the Court finds that the applicant\u2019s injuries were serious enough (see paragraphs 9 and 43 above) and that his complaint of ill\u2011treatment was \u201carguable\u201d for the purposes of Article 3, thus requiring the domestic authorities to carry out an effective investigation.51.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that in the present case it was established that the applicant had no injuries before the interrogation and that the key element of consideration for the investigation authorities was whether the applicant could have inflicted the injuries on himself, a possibility suggested by the forensic expert opinion (see paragraph 23 above). The only viable means for the Central Investigation Office to obtain certainty on this point would have been to hear the testimony of the police officers present during his questioning (A and B), of the escort officers accompanying the applicant during his transfer in an outside the prison facilities (C, D, E, G, H and I), and of the medical staff who examined the applicant before his readmission (F, the three members of the medical staff mentioned in paragraph 21 above and the prison doctor).52.\u00a0\u00a0However, the investigating authorities obtained such testimony from the prison escort officers and medical staff only after a certain period of time had lapsed, in some cases more than a year after the incident (see paragraphs\u00a015 to 22 above). At this point most of the witnesses no longer had any recollection whatsoever of the events and could not even recognise the applicant from a photo. Even those officers on duty who had been with the applicant for an extended time could not recall the exact details of his transfer. This was mainly so, according to the witnesses\u2019 own assessment, because they had been responsible for the admission, transfer and examination of a large number of detainees on a daily basis, making it impossible to distinguish cases after a certain lapse of time. The witnesses could therefore only reply to the investigation authorities\u2019 questions in a general manner or theoretically, without an actual link to the present case. For the Court, the delay in questioning the witnesses significantly tainted the official investigation being pursued by the State authorities, which was not redressed by the fact that they were ultimately heard in the course of the investigations.53.\u00a0\u00a0On the other hand, the Court observes that the names of the persons on duty on the day of the incident must have been easily accessible to the investigation authorities. Moreover, there is nothing in the case file \u2012 and the Government did not provide any elements either \u2012 indicating that the investigation authorities had been prevented from questioning the witnesses in due time. In the Court\u2019s view, the prosecutor\u2019s office made no genuine efforts for a considerable length of time to establish how the applicant\u2019s injuries could have occurred.54.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that the applicant alleged that he had been ill-treated by police officer A. However, neither he nor B, the other police officer present during the questioning according to the police report (see paragraphs 6 and 11 above) was questioned during the investigation. The unsatisfactory course of action followed by the domestic authorities was unlikely to shed light on the central element of their inquiry, namely whether the police officer used force against the applicant during interrogation.55.\u00a0\u00a0Similarly, no further measures were taken with a view to resolving the discrepancy between the version of events documented in the police report and the allegations of the applicant. A possible investigative measure in this respect could have been to organise a face-to-face confrontation (see, mutatis mutandis, Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7 128) in order to assess the credibility of each side\u2019s statements as regards the facts.56.\u00a0\u00a0Given the above, the Court finds that the authorities did not do all that could have been reasonably expected of them to investigate the incident.57.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court finds that the domestic authorities failed to carry out an effective investigation into the applicant\u2019s complaint and that there has therefore been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in its procedural limb.II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION58.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage59.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.60.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested this claim.61.\u00a0\u00a0Taking into account all the circumstances of the present case, the Court accepts that the applicant has suffered non-pecuniary damage which cannot be compensated for solely by the finding of a violation. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR\u00a06,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses62.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 6,400, plus VAT, for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court. This amount corresponded to thirty-two hours of legal work billable by his lawyer at an hourly rate of EUR\u00a0200, plus VAT.63.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested this claim.64.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award EUR 2,000 for the proceedings before the Court.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","30561":"A.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions26.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the investigation carried out by the domestic authorities had complied with the procedural requirements of Article\u00a03 of the Convention, and that the applicant\u2019s complaint should be dismissed as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention.27.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaint, drawing the Court\u2019s attention to the fact that the case had been repeatedly remitted for additional pre-investigation inquiry and to the failure of the investigating authorities to rectify the omissions pointed out by the domestic court, the absence of any activity on the part of the investigating authorities until communication of the application to the Russian Government, and to the fact that the domestic authorities had lost the material pertaining to the applicant\u2019s complaint of ill-treatment.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles28.\u00a0\u00a0According to its case-law, it is not open to the Court to dispense with the application of the six-month rule solely because a Government have not made a preliminary objection to that effect. The Court therefore has jurisdiction to apply this rule of its own motion, even if the Government have not raised that objection (see F\u00e1bi\u00e1n v. Hungary [GC], no.\u00a078117\/13, \u00a7\u00a090, 5\u00a0September 2017).29.\u00a0\u00a0Normally, the six-month period runs from the final decision in the process of exhaustion of domestic remedies. However, where it is clear from the outset that no effective remedy is available to the applicant, the period runs from the date of the acts or measures complained of, or from the date of knowledge of that act or its effect on or prejudice to the applicant (see Varnava and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 16064\/90 and 8 others, \u00a7\u00a0157, ECHR 2009). Where an applicant avails himself of an apparently existing remedy and only subsequently becomes aware of circumstances which render the remedy ineffective, it may be appropriate for the purposes of Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention to take the start of the six-month period from the date on which the applicant first became or ought to have become aware of those circumstances (see Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], nos. 10865\/09 and 2 others, \u00a7\u00a0260, ECHR 2014 (extracts)).30.\u00a0\u00a0In cases concerning an investigation into ill\u2011treatment, the obligation of diligence incumbent on applicants contains two distinct but closely linked aspects: on the one hand, applicants must contact the domestic authorities promptly \u2013 which implies the need to apply to them with diligence, since any delay risks compromising the effectiveness of the investigation \u2013 and, on the other, they must lodge their application promptly with the Court as soon as they become aware or should have become aware that the investigation is not effective (see Mocanu and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0264).31.\u00a0\u00a0The first aspect of the duty of diligence \u2013 that is, the obligation to apply promptly to the domestic authorities \u2013 must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case. In this regard, the Court has held that a delay on the part of an applicant in lodging a complaint is not decisive where the authorities ought to have been aware that an individual could have been subjected to ill-treatment \u2013 particularly in the case of assault which occurs in the presence of police officers \u2013 as the authorities\u2019 duty to investigate arises even in the absence of an express complaint (see Velev v. Bulgaria, no. 43531\/08, \u00a7 59-60, 16\u00a0April 2013). Nor does such a delay affect the admissibility of the application where the applicant was in a particularly vulnerable situation, having regard to the complexity of the case and the nature of the alleged human rights violations at stake, and where it was reasonable for the applicant to wait for developments that could have resolved crucial factual or legal issues (see El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no.\u00a039630\/09, \u00a7\u00a0142, ECHR 2012). Nevertheless, this does not relieve an applicant of his own individual obligation to undertake elementary steps and seek information from the relevant authorities about the investigation\u2019s progress or the lack thereof (see Raush v. Russia (dec.), no.\u00a017767\/06, \u00a7\u00a056, 22\u00a0March 2016, with further references).32.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to the second aspect of this duty of diligence \u2013 that is, the applicant\u2019s duty to lodge an application with the Court as soon as he or she realises, or ought to have realised, that the investigation is not effective \u2013 the Court has stated that the issue of identifying the exact point in time where this stage occurs necessarily depends on the circumstances of the case and that it is difficult to determine it with precision (see Nasirkhayeva v. Russia (dec.), no.\u00a01721\/07, 31\u00a0May 2011). In particular, the Court has considered it indispensable that persons who wish to bring a complaint concerning the ineffectiveness or lack of an investigation before the Court do not delay unduly in lodging their application. However, so long as there is some meaningful contact with the authorities concerning complaints and requests for information, or some indication, or realistic possibility, of progress in investigative measures, considerations of undue delay by the applicants will not generally arise (see Mocanu and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0269).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of the general principles to the present case33.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that on 14 November 2008 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Court as regards the failure of the domestic authorities to carry out an effective investigation of the ill-treatment to which he had allegedly been subjected on 2 September 2002 by a private individual, I., and a police officer, P.34.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the alleged ill-treatment took place on 2\u00a0September 2002, and that it was eight months and three weeks later, on 23\u00a0May 2003, that the applicant brought his complaint of ill-treatment before the domestic authorities. The Court cannot discern any objective reasons which could have prevented the applicant from bringing his complaint promptly before the domestic authorities: he remained at liberty and was unrestricted in his actions. The applicant did not advance any such reasons either.35.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that between July 2003 and May 2006 three decisions were taken by the Deputy Prosecutor of the Kalininskiy District of St Petersburg refusing to institute criminal proceedings \u2012 on 1\u00a0July 2003, 11\u00a0May 2005 and 30\u00a0May 2006. It further observes that following the applicant\u2019s complaints, the District Court found the above-mentioned decisions unsubstantiated \u2012 on 25\u00a0August 2004, 12\u00a0September 2005 and 15\u00a0January 2007 respectively \u2013 and ordered an additional inquiry. The Court notes the significant lapse of time between the refusals of the prosecutor\u2019s office to open an investigation \u2012 over one year and ten months between the first and second decisions and over one year between the second and third decisions. It further notes the significant lapse of time before the applicant challenged those decisions before the District Court. It has not been alleged by the applicant that he had received the copies of the refusals of the prosecutor\u2019s office belatedly or, had that been the case, that he had been precluded from obtaining those copies earlier.36.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that as there had been no progress in the inquiry since 15\u00a0January 2007, the applicant challenged, in December 2007, the inactivity of the prosecutor\u2019s office before the District Court. Regardless of the District Court\u2019s decision of 15\u00a0May 2008 finding the inactivity of the prosecutor\u2019s office unlawful, the inquiry was not resumed until 2014 following the communication of the applicant\u2019s complaint to the Government. According to information contained in the case file, the inquiry was still pending in 2015.37.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that, given the substantial delay in bringing the complaint of ill-treatment before the domestic authorities, the repetitive nature of the decisions of the district prosecutor\u2019s office refusing the institution of criminal proceedings issued in the course of 2003-06, and the considerable lapse of time between those decisions, it ought to have become clear to the applicant that no progress was being made and that no other steps would be taken to investigate the allegations. Given that, in view of the considerable lapse of time, the gaps resulting from the absence of the most basic investigative steps, which should have been taken shortly after the events complained of in order to secure evidence, could hardly be filled (see, mutatis mutandis, Finozhenok v. Russia (dec.), no.\u00a03025\/06, 31\u00a0March 2011), the repeated refusals to open an investigation into the alleged ill\u2011treatment contained neither a sufficiently tangible indication nor a realistic possibility of progress in the investigative measures (see, by contrast, Mafalani v. Croatia, no.\u00a032325\/13, \u00a7\u00a083, 9\u00a0July 2015). Accordingly, the Court considers that, in the circumstances of the present case, the applicant must have become aware of the ineffectiveness of the investigation at least in December 2007 when he challenged the inactivity of the prosecutor\u2019s office before the District Court, which is more than six months before he lodged the application with the Court on 14\u00a0November 2008. The decision of the District Court of 15\u00a0May 2018 finding unlawful the inactivity of the prosecutor\u2019s office and the subsequent inquiry carried out in 2014 cannot be regarded as new developments which could revive the procedural obligation under Article 3 and therefore bring the complaint within the scope of the Court\u2019s temporal jurisdiction.38.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court holds that the complaint under Article 3 of the Convention concerning the lack of an effective investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment should be rejected for non-compliance with the six-month time-limit within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention.For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,Declares the application inadmissible.Done in English and notified in writing on 19 April 2018.Fato\u015f Arac\u0131Helen Keller\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Deputy RegistrarPresident\u00a0\u00a0","30673":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION57.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that on 8, 22 and 28 June 2004 he had been subjected to violence by officers from the ORB police unit. He had then been transferred to correctional colony IK\u201114 and during his detention there from July to November 2004 had been subjected to further violence by the police and prisoners acting on their instructions with the connivance of the prison administration. He argued that the violence had been used to make him confess to crimes, and had amounted to torture. Furthermore, no effective investigation had been carried out into his complaints. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d58.\u00a0\u00a0The Government disagreed.\u00a0In their view, the applicant had failed to submit evidence in support of his allegations concerning the events of 8\u00a0June 2004, to comply with the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d. They pointed out that no injuries had been recorded at SIZO-1 when he had been placed there on 9\u00a0June 2004, or on 22 and 28 June 2004.59.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stated that IK-14 held prisoners serving post\u2011conviction sentences, but also had a unit functioning as a remand centre. They argued that as a person remanded in custody the applicant could have only been detained in that particular unit. Therefore, convicted prisoners could not possibly have inflicted injuries on him. Had the applicant sustained any bodily injuries, these would have been described in the unit medical records.60.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the injuries found on the applicant during his medical examination on 29 June 2004, the Government submitted that a pre\u2011investigation inquiry had been carried out into the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment and the related material had been destroyed after the expiry of the relevant storage period. During the pre\u2011investigation inquiry into an alleged crime the investigating authorities had at their disposal certain investigative activities and also a wide range of operational-search techniques provided for by the Operational-Search Activities Act (see paragraph 56 above). Those techniques were sufficient for establishing facts to indicate that the elements of a crime had been made out before the institution of criminal proceedings. As regards the identification of persons who had committed a crime and their prosecution, that was only possible within criminal proceedings instituted after a pre-investigation inquiry.61.\u00a0\u00a0The Government pointed out that from the time of the applicant\u2019s arrest as a suspect all investigative activities had been carried out lawfully.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility62.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits63.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that in assessing the evidence on which to base the decision as to whether there has been a violation of Article 3, it adopts the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d. However, such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see Jalloh v.\u00a0Germany [GC], no. 54810\/00, \u00a7 67, ECHR 2006\u2011IX). Where an individual is taken into police custody in good health and is found to be injured on release, it is incumbent on the State to provide a plausible explanation of how those injuries were caused, failing which a clear issue arises under Article 3 (see Ribitsch v. Austria, 4 December 1995, \u00a7\u00a034, Series\u00a0A no. 336, and Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803\/94, \u00a7 87, ECHR 1999\u2011V). Where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of individuals within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention. The burden of proof is then on the Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation by producing evidence establishing facts which cast doubt on the version of events given by the victim. In the absence of such an explanation, the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the Government. That is justified by the fact that those in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them (Bouyid v. Belgium ([GC], no.\u00a023380\/09, \u00a7 83, ECHR 2015).1.\u00a0\u00a0Substantive aspect64.\u00a0\u00a0The thrust of the Government\u2019s submissions concerns the lack of any injuries on the applicant according to the records from remand centre SIZO\u20111 relating to 9, 22 and 28 June 2004 and those from correctional colony IK-14.65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that it is disputed between the parties whether the applicant was actually placed in SIZO-1 on 9 June 2004. According to the applicant, he was placed there on 14 June 2004 after being held in the temporary detention facility of the Nizhniy Novgorod regional police department from 8 to 9 June 2004, and in the temporary detention facility of the Privolzhskiy Federal Circuit police department from 9 to 14 June 2004. These facts were not clarified by the investigating authorities. The Government have not submitted any records from SIZO-1 to reliably show that the applicant\u2019s detention there commenced on 9 June 2004. Nor have they submitted records from the above-mentioned temporary detention facilities as to whether or not the applicant was detained there.66.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the applicant\u2019s medical records submitted by the Government, both extracts described in paragraph 33 above are dated 9\u00a0June 2004, even though one of them concerns a medical examination carried out several years later, on 9 April 2007. In the absence of any explanation by the Government, it cannot reliably be concluded that the applicant\u2019s medical examination in SIZO-1 took place on 9 June 2004. Even assuming that it did, the records contain no details of the examination, such as the parts of the applicant\u2019s body that were examined to allow for the conclusion that the \u201ccutaneous coverings\u201d were \u201cclean\u201d. Furthermore, the Government have submitted no medical records to show that the applicant was examined on 22\u00a0and 28 June 2004, when he was placed in SIZO-1 after being taken to the police station by officers from the ORB police unit. The Court notes that his request to the staff of SIZO-1 to record his injuries was noted in his complaints to the domestic authorities of 29 and 30 June 2004.67.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant, who had complained of contusions to the chest and abrasions and requested that his injuries be recorded, was examined by a doctor, Ch., at SIZO-1 on 29 June 2004. The doctor recorded circular abrasions on the lower third of both shins with a brown \u201cwet\u201d surface, 1.5 to 2\u00a0centimetres wide, and concluded that they had been inflicted the previous day. According to the applicant, the injuries had been inflicted on him as a result of the ill-treatment by officers from the ORB police unit. By the time the injuries were found on the applicant he had been held in detention uninterruptedly for twenty-one days. The Court considers that the injuries could arguably have resulted from the applicant\u2019s alleged ill\u2011treatment by the police.68.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the applicant\u2019s injuries were not recorded when he was placed in SIZO-1 the previous day after being taken to the police station by officers from the ORB police unit. In the absence of any explanation from the Government regarding such a serious failing, this weakens their key argument about the lack of any injuries on the applicant according to the records from remand centre SIZO-1 relating to 9, 22 and 28\u00a0June 2004.69.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the other evidence produced by the applicant, the Court observes that his allegations of ill\u2011treatment at the police station on 8\u00a0June 2004 are supported by the coherent statements of his wife and sons who had seen him at the court hearing on 9 June 2004 (see paragraphs 32 (iii) to (iv) and 49 above).70.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that at the time of the alleged ill\u2011treatment on 8\u00a0June 2004, that is between the search of the applicant\u2019s flat (ordered as a result of his suspected involvement in the robbery) and his official arrest by the investigator, the applicant was being held in police custody, was interviewed by officers in the absence of a lawyer and confessed to the robbery. His confession was recorded by the police in the form of a \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d, allegedly given voluntarily after he had reported himself to the police station, whereas in reality he had been taken there by police officers after the search. The Court has previously found that obtaining a voluntary \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d from a de facto suspect without a lawyer needing to be present is a violation of the suspect\u2019s right to legal assistance, and the use of such a statement as evidence renders a trial unfair (see Turbylev v. Russia, no. 4722\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a094\u201195, 6 October 2015). As in Turbylev, at the time of his confession the applicant was being held in police custody for the sole reason that he was suspected of committing the robbery (see paragraphs 6 and 7 above). Therefore, he should have been provided with access to a lawyer along with the other rights of a suspect.71.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that at the time of the alleged ill\u2011treatment on 22 and 28\u00a0June 2004 the applicant, an accused at that stage, was being held in police custody and was taken from his detention facility to the police station by officers from that unit. There is no indication that any investigative activities were carried out with him on those days and the purpose of those transfers remains unknown.72.\u00a0\u00a0It can therefore be concluded that the applicant\u2019s alleged ill\u2011treatment took place in the context of arbitrary actions on the part of the police. This not only tends to favour the applicant\u2019s account of the events of 8,\u00a022 and 28\u00a0June 2004, but also taints the police officers\u2019 subsequent involvement in the case, given that no criminal or disciplinary proceedings were opened to investigate the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment and that the same police unit and even the same police officers were involved in the case until the end of the preliminary investigation.73.\u00a0\u00a0As for the allegations of further ill-treatment of the applicant in IK\u201114, the Court is mindful of the fact that his transfer there was initiated by officers from the ORB police unit and ordered by S., and that the alleged intimidation of his co-accused, which served as grounds for the transfer, was not subject to any proceedings in which he could challenge it.74.\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s conclusion that the applicant\u2019s allegations were unfounded was based on the lack of any injuries in the medical records from IK-14. The Court notes that the ill\u2011treatment allegedly took place with the connivance and participation of the administration of IK-14 (see paragraph\u00a044 above). The lack of any medical records of injuries at IK-14 cannot therefore serve as grounds for dismissing the applicant\u2019s allegations, and other evidence should be thoroughly examined.75.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant\u2019s allegations of being regularly beaten up and threatened by police officers and the convicts of IK-14 to make him confess to crimes are supported by the coherent statements of his wife, son, I.K. and G., which, inter alia, describe the applicant\u2019s condition and injuries, in particular abrasions and bruises on the visible parts of his body (his face, head and wrists), the difficulties he faced in moving on his own and his depressed state (see paragraphs 32 and 49 above). Noting that I.K. did not repeat all the initial statements he had given in February 2006 before the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court (as summarised in the judgment of 8 June 2006), the Court pays attention to the fears initially expressed by I.K. in relation to an eventual testimony in court. His latter testimony, however, corroborated the applicant\u2019s allegations.76.\u00a0\u00a0The Government have not produced records from IK-14 concerning units or cells the applicant was held in and the details of all visits he received. The applicant\u2019s allegations that he was held together with convicted prisoners and received visits from officers of the ORB police unit are supported by the statements of his wife, G. and I.K. The Court also notes that the stamped envelopes of the letters sent by him to his family from IK-14 have written on them \u201cunit no. 14\u201d, in which convicted prisoners were allegedly held, as the place of his detention (see paragraph\u00a031 above).77.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, during his detention in IK-14 the applicant, an accused at that stage, gave statements of surrender and confession in relation to six crimes (see paragraph 46 above). The records of those statements have not been submitted to the Court and it remains unclear whether they were collected during an interview by officers from the ORB police unit, as on 8\u00a0June 2004 (see paragraph 70 above). However, given the nature of those statements under domestic law, that is to say a voluntary confession to a crime collected by a law-enforcement official without a lawyer needing to be present (ibid.), the fact that, after pleading his innocence when officially questioned as a suspect and accused in the presence of his lawyer, the applicant made such confession statements at IK-14 in the absence of his lawyer and outside of an official interview with the investigator adds credibility to his account of events.78.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court has sufficient grounds to consider that the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment by the police and prisoners acting on their instructions were credible.79.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that the repeated acts of violence during the applicant\u2019s detention between 8 June 2004 and 3 November 2004, to which he was subjected by the police and prisoners acting on their instructions, given their severity and the aim of obtaining confessions, amounted to torture (see Selmouni, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 96-105, and G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, \u00a7 90, ECHR 2010).2.\u00a0\u00a0Procedural aspect80.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes further that the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill\u2011treatment by the police and prisoners acting on their instructions were dismissed by the domestic investigating authorities, which relied largely on the statements of the police officers and prisoners in question denying any wrongdoing and never ordered the applicant\u2019s forensic medical expert examination. The investigators based their findings on the results of the pre\u2011investigation inquiry, which is the initial stage in dealing with a criminal complaint under Russian law and should normally be followed by the opening of a criminal case and the carrying out of an investigation if the information gathered has disclosed elements of a criminal offence (see Lyapin v. Russia, no.\u00a046956\/09, \u00a7 129, 24 July 2014).81.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates its finding that the mere carrying out of a pre\u2011investigation inquiry under Article 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation is insufficient if the authorities are to comply with the standards established under Article 3 of the Convention for an effective investigation into credible allegations of ill\u2011treatment in police custody. It is incumbent on the authorities to institute criminal proceedings and conduct a proper criminal investigation in which a full range of investigative measures are carried out (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 129 and 132-36).82.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the Government, which relied on the superficial domestic pre\u2011investigation inquiries, have failed to discharge their burden of proof and produce evidence capable of casting doubt on the applicant\u2019s account of events (see Olisov and Others v. Russia, nos.\u00a010825\/09 and 2 others, \u00a7 85, 2 May 2017).83.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that the authorities failed to carry out effective investigations into the applicants\u2019 credible allegations of ill\u2011treatment, as required by Article 3 of the Convention.3.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion84.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive limb in that the applicant was subjected to torture, and under its procedural limb on account of the lack of an effective investigation into his allegations.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION85.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that his conviction had been based on confession statements obtained from him as a result of torture. He relied on Article 6\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention, which reads in the relevant part as follows:\u201cIn the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...\u201d86.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument, referring to the findings of the domestic investigating and judicial authorities. In particular, they doubted that the impugned statements had \u201cconstituted the basis\u201d for the judgment, noting that the applicant had been tried by jury and therefore the impugned statements, which had been presented to the jury along with the other evidence, had not been referred to in the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court\u2019s judgment.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility87.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits88.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the admission of confession statements obtained in violation of Article 3 renders the criminal proceedings as a whole automatically unfair, irrespective of the probative value of those statements and irrespective of whether their use was decisive in securing the defendant\u2019s conviction (see G\u00e4fgen, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0166 and 173, and, among recent authorities, Turbylev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a090).89.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has found above that the applicant was subjected to torture by police officers and prisoners acting on their instructions to force him to make confession statements. It observes that on 8 June 2004 and on an unspecified date during his detention in IK-14 the applicant made statements of \u201csurrender and confession\u201d, which he reiterated on 3\u00a0November 2004 during his questioning as an accused. Those statements formed part of the evidence adduced against him, which follows from the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court\u2019s decision of 19 October 2005 rejecting the applicant\u2019s request for the records of his questioning as an accused to be declared inadmissible evidence, and the judgment of 8 June 2006 sentencing the applicant to a less severe punishment on the grounds of his having given a \u201cstatement of surrender and confession\u201d (see paragraphs 48\u201152 above).90.\u00a0\u00a0In rejecting the applicant\u2019s request for his confession statements to be declared inadmissible on the grounds that they had been obtained under duress the Regional Court failed to carry out a proper independent assessment of the relevant medical, witness and other evidence with a view to ascertaining whether there were reasons to exclude those statements, allegedly \u201ctainted\u201d by the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment, so as to ensure the fairness of the trial. Instead, it relied on the investigating authority\u2019s decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings into the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment, which the Court has found to have been based on a pre-investigation inquiry which did not meet Article 3 requirements. The Regional Court\u2019s conclusion that the applicant\u2019s condition as a result of his alleged ill\u2011treatment, notably headaches and pain in his back and legs, was explained by his medical history was not based on any medical expert opinion. This lack of a careful assessment of the quality of the impugned evidence and the circumstances in which it was obtained was not remedied by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.91.\u00a0\u00a0In such circumstances, the Court concludes that, regardless of the impact the statements obtained under duress had on the outcome of the criminal proceedings against the applicant, their use as evidence rendered the applicant\u2019s trial unfair.92.\u00a0\u00a0There has, accordingly, been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION93.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the applicant\u2019s remaining complaints under the Convention, having regard to all the material in its possession and in so far as they fall within the Court\u2019s competence, it finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION94.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage95.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 100,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage suffered as a result of repeated acts of torture by the police and convicts, which had diminished his human dignity and caused him acute physical pain and moral suffering.96.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered the claims excessive and unsubstantiated.97.\u00a0\u00a0The Court awards the applicant EUR 50,000, plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.98.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Court refers to its settled case-law to the effect that when an applicant has suffered an infringement of his rights guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention, he should, as far as possible, be put in the position in which he would have been had the requirements of that provision not been disregarded, and that the most appropriate form of redress would, in principle, be the reopening of the proceedings, if requested (see, mutatis mutandis, \u00d6calan v. Turkey [GC], no. 46221\/99, \u00a7 210 in fine, ECHR 2005-IV, and Popov v. Russia, no. 26853\/04, \u00a7 264, 13 July 2006). The Court notes, in this connection, that Article 413 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation provides a basis for the reopening of the proceedings if the Court finds a violation of the Convention.B.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest99.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","30676":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION26.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained, relying on Articles 3, 6 and 13 of the Convention, that he had been subjected to ill-treatment while in police custody and that no effective investigation into his complaint had been carried out. The Court will examine the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article\u00a03 of the Convention, which reads as follows:Article 3\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d27.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument. They noted discrepancies between the applicant\u2019s account of the alleged ill-treatment and the medical evidence, which had only confirmed the bruising on the applicant\u2019s forehead but had recorded no injuries to the applicant\u2019s chest or abdomen. They therefore considered that there were no reasons to assert \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d that the applicant had been subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment. The Government further considered that the investigation carried out into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment had fully complied with the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention. There had been no procrastination or abuse of office on the part of the investigator in charge of the applicant\u2019s case. The pre-investigation inquiry (see paragraph 13 above) into the circumstances under which the applicant had been allegedly subjected to ill-treatment had been carried out by an independent body. The applicant\u2019s allegations had been subsequently subjected to examination by domestic courts at two levels of jurisdiction, which had undertaken a proper assessment of the applicant\u2019s arguments and delivered lawful and well-reasoned decisions.28.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaint. He argued that while he had had no injuries when he had been taken to the police station at 11 p.m. on 9\u00a0April 2007 (as confirmed by concordant evidence, including written submissions by eyewitnesses I., A. and Pan., and not contested by the Government), he had been discovered to have an injury on his head when he had been released from the police station on the afternoon of 10 April 2017 (which was also not contested by the Government). The applicant promptly brought an arguable claim of ill-treatment before the domestic authorities. However, no effective investigation had followed. In particular, although the pre-investigation inquiry had concluded that there had been no objective data confirming the fact that the injuries had been inflicted under the circumstances indicated by the applicant, no explanation had been provided by the domestic authorities as to how the applicant had sustained his injuries.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility29.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits30.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant general principles were reiterated by the Court\u2019s Grand Chamber in the case of Bouyid v. Belgium ([GC], no. 23380\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a081-88, ECHR 2015). In particular, where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of individuals within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention. The burden of proof is then on the Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation by producing evidence establishing facts which cast doubt on the version of events given by the victim. In the absence of such an explanation, the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the Government. That is justified by the fact that those in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them (ibid., \u00a7\u00a083). The same principle applies to all cases in which a person is under the control of the police or a similar authority (ibid., \u00a7\u00a084).1.\u00a0\u00a0Credibility of the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment and the presumption of fact31.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that on 9 April 2007 the applicant was brought to the police station for an identity check. On his release in the afternoon of 10\u00a0April 2007 he was found to have sustained injuries. The medical certificate issued by the traumatology centre on 10 April 2007 attests to bruising on the forehead, and the results of the expert medical examination that followed on 11\u00a0April 2007 confirmed the presence of several bruises on the applicant\u2019s face and neck and an abrasion behind his ear. According to the latter report, the injuries in question could have originated in impact from a hard, blunt object, possibly at the time and under the circumstances indicated by the applicant. The Court considers that the injuries could arguably have been sustained as a result of the applicant\u2019s alleged ill\u2011treatment, and in particular as a result of his being physically assaulted.32.\u00a0\u00a0The above-mentioned factors are sufficient to justify a presumption in favour of the applicant\u2019s account of events and to satisfy the Court that the applicant has made credible allegations of ill-treatment in police custody.2.\u00a0\u00a0Whether an effective investigation was carried out into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment33.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant\u2019s allegations that his injuries were the result of police ill-treatment were dismissed by the domestic investigating authorities. The investigator based his findings on the results of the pre-investigation inquiry, which is the initial stage in dealing with a criminal complaint under Russian law and should normally be followed by the opening of a criminal case and the carrying out of an investigation if the information gathered has disclosed elements of a criminal offence (see Lyapin, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0129). The investigator\u2019s refusal to initiate criminal proceedings was upheld by the domestic courts.34.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates its finding that the mere carrying out of a pre\u2011investigation inquiry under Article 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation is insufficient if the authorities are to comply with the standards established under Article 3 of the Convention for an effective investigation into credible allegations of ill\u2011treatment in police custody. It is incumbent on the authorities to institute criminal proceedings and conduct a proper criminal investigation in which a full range of investigative measures are carried out and which constitutes an effective remedy for victims of police ill-treatment under domestic law (see Lyapin, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 129 and 132-36, and Olisov and Others v. Russia, nos.\u00a010825\/09 and 2 others, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a080-82, 2\u00a0May 2017, with further extensive references).35.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has no reason to hold otherwise in the present case, which involves credible allegations of ill-treatment of which the authorities were promptly made aware. It finds that the investigating authorities failed to carry out an effective investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations of police ill-treatment, as required by Article 3 of the Convention.3.\u00a0\u00a0Whether the Government provided explanations capable of casting doubt on the applicant\u2019s version of events36.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that neither the authorities at the domestic level nor the Government in the proceedings before the Court advanced any explanation as to the origin of the applicant\u2019s injuries.37.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore concludes that the Government have failed to discharge their burden of proof and produce evidence capable of casting doubt on the applicant\u2019s account of events, which it therefore finds established (see Olisov and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a085).4.\u00a0\u00a0Legal classification of the treatment38.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that the police subjected the applicant to inhuman and degrading treatment.5.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion39.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive limb and a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural limb.II.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION40.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicant complained under Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention about the length and unfairness of the proceedings before the domestic courts, the partiality of the domestic court, and the absence of effective domestic remedies for his complaints.41.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to all the material in its possession and in so far as it falls within its competence, the Court finds that there is no appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION42.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage43.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 15,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.44.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that if the Court were to find a violation of the Convention, the Court\u2019s judgment in this respect should in itself constitute sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage suffered by the applicant.45.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it has found a violation under both the substantive and procedural heads of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment by the police and the failure of the domestic authorities to carry out an effective investigation into the matter. In these circumstances, the Court considers that the suffering and frustration caused to the applicant cannot be compensated for by the mere finding of a violation. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 15,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses46.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 2,000 for the costs of his legal representation before the Court.47.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that in view of the relative simplicity of the case the sum claimed by the applicant was excessive.48.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant EUR 1,000 for costs and expenses in the proceedings before the Court.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest49.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","30699":"15.\u00a0\u00a0Article 3 of the Convention reads:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d16.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained that the Court, in its case-law subsequent to Tarakhel v. Switzerland ([GC], no. 29217\/12, ECHR 2014 (extracts)), had repeatedly found it compatible with Article 3 of the Convention that States intending to transfer vulnerable asylum-seekers to Italy relied on the assurances given by the Italian authorities and had not doubted that the Italian authorities, upon proper notification about the special needs of vulnerable applicants, would honour their obligations and adequately accommodate those needs. The assurances given by the Italian authorities on 4 October 2016 that the applicants would be placed in a SPRAR reception centre for families were comparable to those accepted by the Court in similar cases. Furthermore, the state of health of the second applicant was stable and not of such severity as to reach the threshold of Article 3 of the Convention. The medical treatment which she required was not complex and she could take the prescribed medication in Italy without interruption, not least because the Swiss authorities would give her a sufficient quantity of the necessary medication prior to the transfer. In their email of 30 March 2017 the Italian authorities had explicitly stated that the necessary medical treatment would be available to the applicants. The Swiss authorities would inform their Italian counterparts of her condition and needs, as well as of those of the fourth applicant, shortly before the transfer.17.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates the relevant principles of Article 3 of the Convention, as set out in Tarakhel (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 93-99 and \u00a7\u00a7 101-104), which include the need for the ill-treatment to attain a minimum level of severity to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention. The assessment of this minimum is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment and its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim. The material date for this assessment is the actual date of expulsion. However, if an applicant has not yet been removed when the Court examines the case, the relevant time for assessing the existence of the risk contrary to Article 3 of the Convention will be that of the proceedings before the Court (see J.K. and Others v. Sweden [GC], no. 59166\/12, \u00a7 106, ECHR 2016).18.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants are to be considered as asylum-seekers in Italy. It thus has to be determined whether the situation in which the applicants are likely to find themselves in Italy can be regarded as incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention, taking into account the family\u2019s situation as asylum-seekers with young children and serious health problems, and also that they belong to a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special protection (see Tarakhel, cited above, \u00a7 97; and M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696\/09, \u00a7 251, ECHR 2011).19.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the situation in Italy for asylum-seekers cannot be compared to the situation in Greece at the time of the M.S.S. v.\u00a0Belgium and Greece judgment (cited above) and that the structure and overall situation of the reception arrangements in Italy cannot in themselves act as a bar to all removals of asylum-seekers to that country (see Ali and Others v. Switzerland and Italy (dec.), no. 30474\/14, \u00a7 33, 4 October 2016).20.\u00a0\u00a0The Italian authorities provided assurances to their Swiss counterparts that the applicants would be accommodated in a SPRAR reception centre designed for families with minor children (see paragraph 8 above). These assurances are similar to those in the case of Ali and Others (cited above, \u00a7 34). The Court has previously also accepted that for efficiency reasons, the Italian authorities cannot be expected to keep open and unoccupied for an extended period of time places in specific reception and accommodation centres reserved for asylum-seekers awaiting transfer to Italy in accordance with the Dublin III Regulation (see M.A.-M. and Others v. Finland (dec.), no. 32275\/15, \u00a7 26, 4 October 2016).21.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that the report of the Swiss and Danish Refugee Councils of February 2017 showed that the assurances given by the Italian authorities with regard to the placement of families or individuals with minor children transferred from Switzerland were not always complied with in practice. Observing that the report documents six cases (see paragraph 13 above), the Court considers that this number is not insignificant, but at the same time not so high as to suggest that the assurances provided by the Italian authorities were per se unreliable.22.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not see any indication that the Italian authorities would fail to honour their assurance to accommodate the applicants in a SPRAR reception centre designed for families with minor children. Rather, they were made aware of the applicants\u2019 particular needs by their Swiss counterparts and confirmed, on 30 March 2017, that they would take their particular needs into account when identifying accommodation suitable for them (see paragraph 11 above), following notification by the Swiss authorities shortly before the transfer.23.\u00a0\u00a0The Court furthermore observes that the second applicant\u2019s health is stable (see paragraph 12 above), that the necessary medical treatment is not complex and that the Swiss authorities will give her a sufficient quantity of the medication she needs (see paragraph 16 above), that the Italian authorities have already been informed about her state of health and medical needs and confirmed the availability of the necessary treatment (see paragraph 11 above), which includes the required periodic examinations for the second and fourth applicants. The Court also takes note that the second applicant\u2019s HIV is not at an advanced stage and that her state of health is not such as to bar her transfer to Italy in accordance with the criteria set out in the case of Paposhvili v. Belgium ([GC], no. 41738\/10, ECHR 2016). Under these circumstances, the Court sees no reasons to depart from its conclusions in other cases concerning Dublin transfers to Italy of persons who were not critically ill, but required medical treatment for HIV (see A.T.H. v. the Netherlands (dec.), no. 54000\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 38 and 40, 17 November 2015), post-traumatic stress disorder or depression (see A.M. v. Switzerland (dec.), no. 37466\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 6, 20-21, 3 November 2015).24.\u00a0\u00a0It follows from the above that the application is manifestly ill\u2011founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.25.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, it is appropriate to discontinue the application of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,Declares the application inadmissible.Done in English and notified in writing on 7 June 2018.Fato\u015f Arac\u0131Pere Pastor Vilanova\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Deputy RegistrarPresident","30705":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION42.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that the conditions of their detention in the Prison Hospital had violated their right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment as provided in Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0Non-exhaustion of domestic remedies(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 arguments43.\u00a0\u00a0The Government invited the Court to reject the application on the grounds of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies in so far as some of the applicants were concerned. In particular, they argued that the second, fifth sixth, seventh, eighth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth applicants had failed to apply for release on the basis of Article\u00a0110A of the Criminal Code, which allowed for the early release of those who suffered from acquired immune deficiency syndrome (Aids). In the Government\u2019s view, the effectiveness of this remedy was proved by the fact that the first, fourth, ninth, sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth applicants had used it and had been released after having lodged the present application with the Court.44.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to the fifteenth applicant, the Government contended that he had been released on the date of the introduction of the application to the Court. Therefore, he should have instituted civil proceedings under Article\u00a0105 of the Introductory Law to the Civil Code, in conjunction with the Penal Code and Article 3 of the Convention, which was directly applicable to the national legal order. That domestic remedy was capable of affording that applicant adequate redress in the form of monetary compensation for any damage caused to him in respect of that period. As regards the second period of the applicant\u2019s detention in the Prison Hospital after the lodging of the application \u2013 from 11 February 2015 until 20\u00a0October 2015 \u2013 the Government submitted that it should be rejected as the applicant could not possibly have known when he lodged his application that he would be again detained under the same conditions.45.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants contended that an application to get released on the basis of Article 110A was not an effective remedy that could be used by them for various reasons. Firstly, Article 110A of the Criminal Code as in force at the time the application was lodged had only concerned those who had been suffering from acquired immune deficiency syndrome, and not those who were HIV-infected, as had been the case of the applicants. The provision had been amended by Law no. 4322\/2015 and under the new version, a certain degree of disability could justify early release of a detainee. The applicants mentioned by the Government as having made use of that remedy had been able to do so on the basis of the amended version and according to the degree of disability of each one with the exception of the sixteenth applicant who had made use of that provision as he suffered from tuberculosis, which was explicitly mentioned in the law. Secondly, the early release scheme provided for by Article 110A could only be availed of once and the relevant procedure lasted several months; therefore, it was only natural that the applicants preferred the early release schemes based on non-medical grounds. Thirdly, Article 110A was applicable under certain conditions and did not concern those in pre-trial detention or those who were serving a sentence of more than ten years. Among the applicants, the second, fifth, twelfth and eighteenth of them were in pre-trial detention, while another ten of them were serving a sentence of more than ten years; therefore, they could not make use of that remedy even in its amended form.46.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also claimed that the remedy provided for by Article\u00a0110A of the Criminal Code was not meant to improve the conditions of the applicants\u2019 detention but to put an end to their detention. Therefore it could only be considered as an effective remedy with regard to Article 5 of the Convention and not Article 3.47.\u00a0\u00a0The fifteenth applicant argued that his application should be considered admissible for both periods of his detention in the Prison Hospital. As regards the first period of his detention, he had been detained from 22 January 2013 until 24 December 2014, that is to say until the day the application had been lodged with the Court. According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an action under Article 105 of the Introductory Law to the Civil Code was effective only when the detainee had already been released and not when he was still detained in the conditions of which he or she complained. As regards the second period of his detention, from 11\u00a0February until 20 October 2015, it should be considered as a continuing situation with the first period of his detention taking into account that he had been again detained under the same conditions within six months of the day of his release.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment48.\u00a0\u00a0Regarding the general principles concerning the application of the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies within the meaning of Article 35\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention, the Court refers to its relevant case-law (see, in particular, Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a065-69, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011IV, and Vu\u010dkovi\u0107 and Others v.\u00a0Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC], nos. 17153\/11 and 29 others, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a069\u201177, 25\u00a0March 2014). In addition, the issue as to whether domestic remedies have been exhausted is normally determined by reference to the date on which the application was lodged with the Court (see Baumann v.\u00a0France, no.\u00a033592\/96, \u00a7 47, ECHR 2001-V (extracts), and Koutalidis v.\u00a0Greece, no.\u00a018785\/13, \u00a7 61, 27 November 2014).49.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that in cases where the fundamental right to protection against torture, inhuman and degrading treatment is concerned, preventive and compensatory remedies have to be complementary in order to be considered effective (see Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525\/07 and 60800\/08, \u00a7 98, 10 January 2012).50.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the exhaustion of domestic remedies, the situation of a person who was detained under circumstances which he or she deemed contrary to Article 3 of the Convention and who apprised the Court after his or her release is different from the situation of an individual who is still in detention under the circumstances of which he or she complains (see Koutalidis, cited above, \u00a7 61). In particular as regards Greece, an action under Article 105 of the Introductory Law to the Civil Code constitutes a purely compensatory remedy which allows the person concerned to seek and obtain redress for his or her conditions of detention in prison following release. However, that remedy does not provide a way to improve a person\u2019s conditions of detention and thus lacks the preventive element referred to in the judgment in Ananyev and Others (cited above, \u00a7 98. See also Papadakis and Others v. Greece, no. 34083\/13, \u00a7 50, 25 February 2016).51.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that in A.F. v. Greece (no. 53709\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 59-60, 13 June 2013), it considered it appropriate to examine whether the provisions of a law or regulation which might be relied upon for the purpose of an action under Article 105 of the Introductory Law to the Civil Code were drafted in sufficient detail and guaranteed \u201cjusticiable\u201d rights (ibid., \u00a7\u00a060).52.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that it has previously ruled that Article 110A of the Criminal Code can be invoked by people who suffer from Aids in order to obtain their immediate release; however, that provision, as in force at the time the application was lodged, did not allow for the release on medical grounds of people who were simply HIV-infected (see Martzaklis and Others v. Greece, no.\u00a020378\/13, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a053 -54, 9 July 2015). From the document prepared by the prison hospital\u2019s doctor and adduced to the Court by the Government it is apparent that the applicants are all HIV-infected apart from the third applicant who suffers from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. Therefore, they could not make use of the remedy referred to by the Government.53.\u00a0\u00a0The Court takes note of the Government\u2019s argument that some of the applicants made use of that remedy after having lodged the present application with the Court and that that proved its effectiveness. In this regard it reiterates that the issue as to whether domestic remedies have been exhausted is normally determined by reference to the date when the application was lodged with the Court (see Baumann, cited above, \u00a7 47). In any event, the Court notes that the applicants who were released in accordance with Article 110A of the Criminal Code only did so after that provision had been amended by Law no. 4322\/2015 so as to include certain degrees of disability among the medical reasons on the basis of which a detainee could apply for his or her early release \u2014 with the exception of the sixteenth applicant who was able to benefit from it as he suffered from tuberculosis. In the absence of any convincing argument from the Government that the applicants could have made use of that remedy prior to its amendment and particularly prior to the lodging of the present application, the Court considers that the applicants could not have had recourse to the remedy provided for by Article 110A of the Criminal Code. It, therefore, dismisses the Government\u2019s objection.54.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the fifteenth applicant, the Court observes that his first period of detention ended the day the application was introduced to the Court. It is apparent that when he lodged his application with the Court on 24\u00a0December 2014 he did not seek to put an end to an ongoing violation of his right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment in the Prison Hospital, but to obtain a subsequent ruling on an alleged past violation of Article 3 on account of the conditions of his detention in that prison and, if appropriate, to receive just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage.55.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that the applicant was incarcerated in the Prison Hospital and was thus subject to the provisions of the Penal Code. The applicant\u2019s principal complaints before the Court concern overcrowding and sanitary conditions. In the Court\u2019s view, Articles 21, 25 and 26 of the Penal Code guarantee justiciable rights which can be relied on before the national courts (see Chatzivasiliadis, cited above, \u00a7 34). An action under Article 105 of the Introductory Law to the Civil Code, in conjunction with the above\u2011mentioned Articles of the Penal Code and Article 3 of the Convention therefore constituted a domestic remedy which should have been used by the fifteenth applicant as regards the first period of his detention.56.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the second period of the fifteenth applicant\u2019s detention, the Court notes that he raised his complaint about the allegedly poor conditions during that period for the first time in his observations dated 21\u00a0April 2016. However, the applicant\u2019s detention in that facility ended on 20\u00a0October 2015, which is more than six months before the date of introduction of this complaint (see, for example, Ashot Harutyunyan v.\u00a0Armenia, no. 34334\/04, \u00a7\u00a099, 15 June 2010). The Court notes that the two periods of the applicant\u2019s detention cannot be considered as a \u201ccontinuing situation\u201d within the meaning of the Court\u2019s case-law which could bring the events complained of by the applicant within the Court\u2019s competence, as in the meantime the applicant was released (see Ananyev and Others, cited above, \u00a7 78). It follows that this complaint was lodged out of time and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention.57.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention the application should be rejected on the grounds of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies in so far as the fifteenth applicant\u2019s first period of detention is concerned and owing to non-respect of the six-month time-limit as far as the second period of his detention is concerned.2.\u00a0\u00a0Application substantially the same58.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the application was inadmissible in so far as the tenth applicant was concerned, as under Article 35 \u00a7 2 (b) the Court could not deal with an application which was substantially the same as a matter that had already been examined by the Court or which had already been submitted to another procedure of international investigation or settlement and contained no relevant new information. The tenth applicant had in fact lodged application no. 20378\/13 with the Court, in which he complained of the conditions of his detention in the Prison Hospital for the same period as in the present application. On 9 July 2015 the Court\u2019s judgment was published by which the tenth applicant was awarded 10,000\u00a0euros. Therefore, the present application should be rejected for the tenth applicant.59.\u00a0\u00a0The tenth applicant acknowledged that he had participated in application no. 20378\/13, in which the Court had found a violation of Article\u00a03 on account of the conditions of his detention in the Prison Hospital. He therefore requested that his application be examined for the period after the publication of that judgment, that is to say from 9 July until 3 August 2015, the date on which he had been released.60.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the admissibility criterion under the first limb of Article 35 \u00a7 2 (b) of the Convention is intended to ensure the finality of the Court\u2019s decisions and to prevent applicants from seeking, through the lodging of a fresh application, to appeal against previous judgments or decisions of the Court (see Lowe v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 12486\/07, 8\u00a0September 2009, and Kafkaris v. Cyprus (dec.), no.\u00a09644\/09, \u00a7 67, 21 June 2011).61.\u00a0\u00a0An application will generally fall foul of the first limb of Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a02\u00a0(b) where an applicant has previously brought an application which related essentially to the same person, the same facts and raised the same complaints (see Vojnovic v. Croatia (dec.), no. 4819\/10, \u00a7 28, 26 June 2012; Anthony Aquilina v. Malta, no. 3851\/12, \u00a7 34, 11 December 2014; and X.\u00a0v.\u00a0Slovenia (dec.), no. 4473\/14, \u00a7 40, 12 May 2015). It is insufficient for an applicant to allege relevant new information where he or she has merely sought to support his or her past complaints with new legal argument (see, for example, I.J.L. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no.\u00a039029\/97, 6 July 1999, and Kafkaris, cited above, \u00a7 68). In order for the Court to consider an application which relates to the same facts as a previous application, the applicant must genuinely advance a new complaint or submit new information which has not previously been considered by the Court, within the six-month time-limit set out in Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention (see Lowe and Kafkaris, \u00a7 68, both cited above; and Harkins v.\u00a0the United Kingdom (dec.) [GC], no. 71537\/14, \u00a7\u00a7 50-56, ECHR 2017).62.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that, following the Government\u2019s objection, the tenth applicant by his observations requested the withdrawal of his application in so far as it concerns the period of his detention until 9 July 2015. The Court takes note of the applicant\u2019s request. Having regard to Article 37 of the Convention, it finds that the tenth applicant does not intend to pursue his application in so far as it concerns the period of his detention up to 9 July 2015, within the meaning of Article 37 \u00a7\u00a01 (a) of the Convention. The Court also finds no reasons of a general character, affecting respect for human rights as defined in the Convention, which require further examination of his complaints by virtue of Article 37 \u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention in fine. It therefore strikes out the part of the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the period of his detention up to 9 July 2015.3.\u00a0\u00a0Lack of power of attorney63.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also claimed that the fifth applicant had failed to provide an appropriate power of attorney for his representative, as the one submitted had contained only his name in the relevant box where the signature should be. Even assuming that the applicant was illiterate, then the application should be rejected for lack of authenticity as this would probably mean that it had not been him but somebody else who had signed with his name.64.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant stressed that he was illiterate and therefore writing down his name was the only possible way for him to sign the power of attorney.65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in the present case the Government do not allege in express terms that the application was made without the applicant\u2019s consent. Their objection appears to be centred on the question whether the power of attorney is legally valid. In this regard, the Court reiterates that it has previously found that it is essential for representatives to demonstrate that they have received specific and explicit instructions, within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention, from alleged victims on whose behalf they purport to act (see Safaii v. Austria, no. 44689\/09, \u00a7 32, 7\u00a0May 2014).66.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes as regards the fifth applicant that it received a power of attorney which in the place reserved for the applicant\u2019s signature had just his name. In the absence of any indication that the application was lodged without the fifteenth applicant\u2019s consent and agreement or that the applicant did not intend to lodge a complaint, the Court dismisses the Government\u2019s objection.4.\u00a0\u00a0Six-month time-limit67.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Government submitted that the application should be rejected in so far as the first period of detention of the second applicant is concerned as having been lodged out of time. In particular, the second applicant had been detained in the Prison Hospital during two, separate periods, the first extending from 6 October 2010 until 21 January 2011 and the other from 7 February 2012 until 1 July 2015. As the application had been introduced on 24 December 2014, the applicants\u2019 complaints concerning the first period of detention should be rejected.68.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained that he had complained only for the second period of his detention and therefore, the Government\u2019s objection should be rejected.69.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the second applicant did not mention in his application the first period of his detention and therefore, his complaints concerned solely the second period, that is to say from 7 February 2012 until 1 July 2015. It therefore, rejects the Government\u2019s objection.70.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes the rest of this complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions71.\u00a0\u00a0Referring to their description of facts, the applicants complained that the conditions of their detention in the Prison Hospital had violated their right not be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment. They mainly drew the Court\u2019s attention to overcrowding and poor hygiene conditions. They referred to many reports of NGOs and independent bodies that had visited the Prison Hospital on various dates between 2012 and 2016, arguing that the lack of personal space, recreational facilities and medical staff, as well as the poor sanitary conditions, had persisted throughout their detention, at least from February 2012, when the second applicant had been detained, up to the date they submitted their observations to the Court. The applicants maintained that the conditions of their detention had been in violation of their rights under Article 3 of the Convention.72.\u00a0\u00a0They also disagreed with the method of calculation advanced by the Greek Government, according to which each one had had at his disposal 3.5\u00a0sq. m on average. In particular, they asserted that in a situation of detainees in hospital, as was their case, the space occupied by beds and other furniture should be deducted from the overall surface area of the ward, as the amount of furniture seriously diminished the space available for anyone to move around. They added that in the case of detainees in hospital, bunk beds were not used and extra furniture was required; therefore, half of the ward had been occupied by furniture and only 22 sq. m had been available for them to move around in. Lastly, they referred to a document prepared by the Prison Hospital and adduced by the Government, in which it was stated that the current conditions were far better than the conditions prevailing in 2014. In their view, that document proved their allegations concerning the conditions of detention for the period between 2012 and 2015.73.\u00a0\u00a0The Government referred to their description of the conditions of the applicants\u2019 detention and maintained that even if they had not been ideal, they had not been such as to breach Article 3 of the Convention. They drew the Court\u2019s attention mainly to the improvements that had taken place in 2015 and 2016, insisting, however, that even before these improvements the conditions of the applicants\u2019 detention had been appropriate. Lastly, they claimed that the applicants\u2019 allegations were general and that a simple reference to the CPT\u2019s reports could not substantiate their claims, as those reports had concerned previous periods other than the applicants\u2019 detention.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General Principles74.\u00a0\u00a0The applicable general principles are set out in Mur\u0161i\u0107 v. Croatia ([GC] no. 7334\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 96-141, 20 October 2016).75.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention cannot be interpreted as laying down a general obligation to release a detainee on health grounds or to transfer him or her to a public hospital, even if he or she is suffering from an illness that is particularly difficult to treat. However, this provision does require the State to ensure that prisoners are detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject them to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, their health and well-being are adequately secured (see Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7\u00a7 92 - 94, ECHR 2000\u2011XI; Meln\u012btis v. Latvia, no. 30779\/05, \u00a7 69, 28 February 2012; and Savi\u010ds v. Latvia, no.\u00a017892\/03, \u00a7\u00a0130, 27 November 2012).76.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly the Court reiterates that information about conditions of detention, including the issue of medical care, falls within the knowledge of the domestic authorities. Accordingly, applicants might experience difficulties in procuring evidence to substantiate a complaint in that connection (see Vladimir Vasilyev v. Russia, no. 28370\/05, \u00a7 66, 10 January 2012). What is expected from applicants in such cases is to submit at least a detailed account of the facts complained of (see Visloguzov v. Ukraine, no.\u00a032362\/02, \u00a7 45, 20 May 2010). The burden of proof is then shifted to the Government to provide explanations and supporting documents (see Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine, no. 28005\/08, \u00a7 132, 14 March 2013).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application to the present case77.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes at the outset that, apart from the complaints on the material conditions of their detention, the applicants also complained that the Prison Hospital was understaffed, that the medical care received was inadequate and that there was no microbiological laboratory there. In this connection, the Court reiterates that an unsubstantiated allegation that medical care has been non-existent, delayed or otherwise unsatisfactory is normally insufficient to disclose an issue under Article 3 of the Convention. A credible complaint should normally include, among other things, sufficient reference to the medical condition in question, medical prescriptions that were sought, made or refused, and some evidence \u2013 for instance, expert reports \u2013 capable of disclosing serious failings in the applicant\u2019s medical care (see Valeriy Samoylov v. Russia, no. 57541\/09, \u00a7\u00a080, 24 January 2012). In the absence of any such concrete allegations on the applicants\u2019 part, the Court will not take into account in the overall assessment this part of the applicants\u2019 complaint.78.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the material conditions of the applicants\u2019 detention, the Court notes that the parties provide conflicting accounts and they also differ on factual elements such as the number of detainees in the wards or whether some of the applicants were detained in cells apart from wards. The circumstances in the Prison Hospital have also been commented on by the CPT (see paragraph 41 above) and national and international bodies (see paragraphs 38-40 above). Bearing in mind this discordance, the Court\u2019s considerations will be based on the material before it, taking into account its relevant principles concerning assessment of evidence under Article 3 (see Ananyev and Others, cited above \u00a7\u00a7 121-23).79.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the personal space available to the applicants, the Court notes that, according to their allegations, the personal space available to them for the period 2012 to 2015 was 3.66 sq. m, as each ward measuring 44\u00a0sq. m. was occupied on average by twelve detainees. Specifically as regards the first, fourth, fifth, eighth, ninth, twelfth, fourteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth applicants the personal space available to them from December 2014 until July 2016 was 2.93 sq. m owing to the fact that wards 7 and 8 in which they were detained held fifteen\u00a0inmates during that period. In addition, at the time the applications were lodged and for a non-specified period of time, the sixth, seventh, eleventh and thirteenth applicants had at their disposal 2.32 sq. m as they were detained in ward 6 which accommodated in total nineteen detainees (for the Court\u2019s methodology in calculating the minimum personal space available to a detainee in multi\u2011occupancy accommodation for its assessment under Article 3 see Mur\u0161i\u0107, cited above, \u00a7 114). As regards the second and third detainees who were detained in a cell measuring 17 sq. m. which accommodated four inmates, they had at their disposal a personal space of 4.25\u00a0sq. m. They further maintained that the wards and cells had been cramped to the extent that they had not been able to move freely between the furniture owing to the large amount of extra furniture needed in a hospital.80.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Government\u2019s submissions, all detainees were held in wards measuring 44 sq. m and holding eight to thirteen detainees. The sanitary facilities were situated outside the wards and therefore, the personal space available to each prisoner varied from 3.38 sq. m to 5.5 sq. m. The Court notes, however, that the Government\u2019s statement in that regard is vague. In particular, they did not provide precise details about the number of days the applicants had spent in each ward or the number of detainees they had shared them with on a daily basis.81.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that all national and international bodies which visited the Prison Hospital commented on the fact that it was overcrowded and that it held 180-220 detainees despite an official capacity of sixty, according to the parties, or eighty, according to the CPT. It further notes that the CPT visited the Prison Hospital four months after the lodging of the application; in its report, it stressed that the Prison Hospital was overcrowded, that each ward accommodated ten or eleven detainees and that the beds were all too close together leaving the wards cramped. Based on the numbers provided by the CPT in its report, it would appear that the inmates detained in the wards had personal space varying from 4 sq. m to 4.4 sq. m and a question would arise in respect of the free space the detainees had to move around.82.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the Court is unable to verify the accuracy of the parties\u2019 submissions and the exact space available to the applicants. As a result, it cannot establish whether the applicants had sufficient personal space at the Prison Hospital throughout their detention. In view of that difficulty, the Court will turn to examine other factors relevant to the applicants\u2019 detention.83.\u00a0\u00a0In this regard, the Court notes that both parties acknowledged that, irrespective of the personal space available to each detainee, the population by far exceeded the Prison Hospital\u2019s capacity. It also notes that according to the applicants\u2019 allegations, the wards were filthy and insufficiently heated and ventilated and that the sanitary conditions were poor, which, along with the fact that inmates were not separated by disease, increased the risk of infection. They further complained of the lack of any recreational activities. According to the applicants, these conditions persisted throughout their detention, that is to say from 2012 until mid-2016, when they improved following various legislative measures taken by the Government in order to decrease overcrowding in prisons.84.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicants\u2019 allegations were corroborated at national level by the findings of the Ombudsman, and at international level by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the CPT. It additionally notes that it has previously found a violation of Article 3 on account of the conditions of detention in the Prison Hospital, coupled with inadequate medical care (see Martzaklis and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 67 and\u00a075). In the Court\u2019s view, the Government, apart from some general remarks, did not adduce any detailed arguments capable of rebutting the applicants\u2019\u00a0allegations and of persuading it to reach a different conclusion than in the above-mentioned case. The measures highlighted by the Government, such as the operation of the second-chance school or the legislative measures which led to the release of detainees, were only implemented after April\u00a02015, that is to say after the present application had been lodged and when the majority of the applicants had already been released. It is further noted that in the documents adduced by the Government, the prison authorities acknowledged that the conditions of detention in the Prison Hospital had improved after 2015. In view of the above and keeping in mind that all the services and activities within a prison will be adversely affected if it is required to cater for more prisoners than it was designed to accommodate, the Court is not convinced by the Government\u2019s assertion, which is not supported by conclusive documentary evidence, that the applicants\u2019 wards remained unaffected by the existing overcrowding and that the conditions of detention which the applicants had been afforded complied with Convention standards.85.\u00a0\u00a0In the circumstances, the Court finds established the inadequate physical conditions and sanitation facilities for the applicants detained in the Prison Hospital, which increased the risk of their contracting contagious diseases. In the Court\u2019s view, the above-mentioned conditions coupled with the applicants\u2019 vulnerability and the duration of their detention, ranging from seven to fifty-two months, went beyond the unavoidable level of hardship inherent in detention and reached the threshold of severity required by Article\u00a03 of the Convention. Therefore, in so far as the applicants might be said to have had sufficient space, the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 3 on the basis of the rest of the conditions of the applicants\u2019\u00a0detention.86.\u00a0\u00a0However, as regards the tenth applicant and notwithstanding the above-mentioned considerations, the Court considers that his detention for short periods should not automatically lead to a finding of violation of Article\u00a03 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Chazaryan and Others v.\u00a0Greece, no 76951\/12, 16 July 2015; Ciocan and others v. Greece (dec.) no.\u00a041806\/13, 6 October 2015; and Preci v. Greece (dec.) no. 9387\/15, 17\u00a0November 2015). Taking into account the general conditions of the applicants\u2019 detention as described above, the Court considers that the tenth applicant\u2019s detention in the Prison Hospital for twenty-four days did not reach the required level of severity. This part of the complaint is therefore manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7\u00a03 and 4 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION87.\u00a0\u00a0Relying on Article 13 of the Convention, the applicants complained of a violation of their right to an effective domestic remedy in respect of their complaints under Article 3.88.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument and referred to a series of remedies that in their view were effective. In particular, they argued that the applicants could have made use of the remedy provided by Article 110A of the Criminal Code or of the early release schemes provided by Article\u00a0497 \u00a7\u00a07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, by Law no. 4322\/2015 and by Law no. 4274\/2014. They also referred to the opportunity the applicant had to submit complaints to the Prison Board under Article 6 of the Penal Code and to the public prosecutor under Article 572 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Lastly, the applicants could have complained to the Greek Ombudsman.89.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that, as far as all but the tenth and fifteenth applicants are concerned, this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.In the light of this conclusion, the above applicants\u2019 complaint must be considered \u201carguable\u201d for the purposes of Article 13 of the Convention.90.\u00a0\u00a0In that regard, the Court would reiterate that Article 13 of the Convention guarantees the availability at national level of a remedy to enforce the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they may happen to be secured in the domestic legal order. The effect of Article 13 is thus to require the provision of a domestic remedy to deal with the substance of an \u201carguable complaint\u201d under the Convention and to grant appropriate relief (see, among many other authorities, Kaja, cited above, \u00a7\u00a063). The scope of the Contracting States\u2019 obligations under Article\u00a013 varies depending on the nature of the applicant\u2019s complaint; however, the remedy required by Article 13 must be \u201ceffective\u201d in practice as well as in law (see, for example, Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7\u00a0157, ECHR\u00a02000\u2011XI).91.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court reiterates that regarding conditions of detention, the Court has ruled in some cases (see Vaden v. Greece, no. 35115\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 30-33, 29 March 2007, and Tsivis v.\u00a0Greece, no. 11553\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 18-20, 6 December 2007) that the applicants had not exhausted domestic remedies owing to a failure to make use of the remedies provided by Article 572 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 6 of the Penal Code (Law No. 2776\/1999). In those cases, the applicants complained of particular circumstances which had affected them personally as individuals and to which the prison authorities could have put an end by taking the appropriate measures. On the other hand, the Court has ruled on many occasions that when applicants claim to have been personally affected by the conditions prevailing in a prison, the remedies provided by Article 572 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and by Article 6 of the Penal Code are not effective (see among other authorities, Papakonstantinou v.\u00a0Greece, no. 50765\/11, \u00a7 51, 13 November 2014). In the present case, the applicants lodged a complaint with the Prison Board under to Article 6 of the Penal Code but to no avail.92.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the remedy provided by Article 110A of the Criminal Code, the Court, for the same reasons as those which have led to the dismissal of the Government\u2019s objection concerning the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies (see paragraphs 52-53 above) considers that it was not an effective remedy in the circumstances of the present case. In addition, the Court notes that the remedies provided by Article 497 \u00a7 7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and by Laws no. 4322\/2015 and 4274\/2014 referred to early release schemes and concerned solely those who fulfilled certain conditions, such as having been sentenced to a maximum ten years and to have served a certain part of their sentence. On the contrary the conditions of detention do not figure among the grounds on which a detainee could be granted early release, nor did the Government adduce any examples of past court rulings capable of demonstrating convincingly that the lodging by the applicants of the complaints provided for by Article 497 \u00a7 7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and by Laws no. 4322\/2015 and 4274\/2014 could have remedied their complaints under Article 3 of the Convention. Lastly, concerning the petition lodged with the Ombudsman, the Court notes that in the circumstances of the present case, it cannot be considered an effective remedy within the meaning of the Court\u2019s case-law in view of the fact that its recommendations do not bind the domestic authorities (see Memlika v.\u00a0Greece, no. 37991\/12, \u00a7 39, 6 October 2015).93.\u00a0\u00a0In sum, the Court considers that the Government have failed to demonstrate that the applicants had at their disposal an effective remedy that could have provided sufficient redress for their complaints under Article 3 of the Convention. As in the context of exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, a State relying on a particular remedy must demonstrate that it was adequate and effective (see Soto Sanchez v. Spain, no.\u00a066990\/01, \u00a7 34, 25\u00a0November 2003; L. v. Lithuania, no. 27527\/03, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a035\u201136, ECHR 2007\u2011IV; and Sampanis and Others v.\u00a0Greece, no.\u00a032526\/05, \u00a7 58, 5 June 2008; see also paragraphs 50-57 above).94.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore concludes that there has been a violation of Article 13 owing to the absence of any effective remedies in respect of the applicants\u2019 complaints concerning the conditions of their detention in the Prison Hospital.95.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the fifteenth applicant the Court notes that it has already dismissed the application owing to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. Turning to the tenth applicant, the Court reiterates that, in accordance with its case-law, Article 13 applies only where an individual has an \u201carguable claim\u201d to be the victim of a violation of a Convention right. Having regard to its considerations above under Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the tenth applicant (see paragraph 86 above), the Court finds that he did not have an arguable claim for the purposes of Article 13 of the Convention and, therefore, rejects this part of the complaint as manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Articles 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 a) and 4 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION96.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage97.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants claimed sums ranging from 3,000 to 20,000 euros (EUR), depending on the length of their detention, in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage. Relying on the judgments of the Court in Stoica v.\u00a0Romania (no. 42722\/02, 4 March 2008), Galotskin v. Greece (no.\u00a02945\/07, 14 January 2010) and Taggatidis and Others v. Greece (no.\u00a02889\/09, 11\u00a0October 2011), the applicants requested that the sums awarded to them be paid into a bank account indicated by their representatives owing to the number of applicants and the complexity of the logistical issues involved.98.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested those claims. They argued that the sums claimed by the applicants were excessive. In the Government\u2019s view, the mere finding of a violation would constitute sufficient just satisfaction. In any event, if the Court wished to award a sum of money to the applicants, it should take into account the current financial situation of Greece and the fact that the conditions of detention in the Prison Hospital had clearly improved in the last two years.99.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the finding of a violation may in itself constitute sufficient just satisfaction for a breach of Article 13 of the Convention flowing from the lack of effective domestic remedies in respect of such conditions (see Ananyev and Others, cited above, \u00a7 173). By contrast, it finds that the applicants must have experienced suffering and frustration as a result of the breaches of their rights under Article 3. Ruling in equity, as required under Article 41 of the Convention, it awards the sixteenth applicant EUR\u00a03,000, the thirteenth applicant EUR 4,000, the first and sixth applicants EUR 5,000, the third, fourth, fifth, seventh, eighth, twelfth, fourteenth and eighteenth applicants EUR 8,000 and the second, ninth, eleventh and seventeenth applicants EUR 12,000.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses100.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also claimed EUR 2,500 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court, attaching the receipt of payment to their lawyer. They asked for this sum to be paid directly into the bank account indicated by their representatives.101.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that that the amount requested was not justified, and asked that the relevant claim be rejected in its entirety.102.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum (see Stoica v. Romania, no. 42722\/02, \u00a7 141, 4 March 2008). In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR\u00a02,000 to cover all the applicants\u2019 costs and expenses. This sum is to be paid to a bank account indicated by the applicants\u2019 representatives.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest103.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","30741":"1.\u00a0\u00a0Article 3 of the Convention142.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the conditions of his detention ran contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, which reads:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d143.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that the length of his solitary confinement viewed in conjunction with the strict security regime and his mental vulnerability amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In that respect he also argued that, while he could lodge administrative complaints against the commitment to a maximum security department, he could not lodge such complaints against the contents of that commitment, in particular the solitary confinement. In the alternative, the applicant argued, there had been a violation of Article 3 due to the high number of body searches.144.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic societies. Even in the most difficult of circumstances, such as the fight against terrorism or crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim. In order for a punishment or treatment associated with it to be \u201cinhuman\u201d or \u201cdegrading\u201d, the suffering or humiliation involved must in any event go beyond that inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment (see Ramirez Sanchez, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 115-119, ECHR\u00a02006\u2011IX).145.\u00a0\u00a0When assessing conditions of detention, account has to be taken of the cumulative effects of those conditions, as well as the specific allegations made by the applicant (see, for example, A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 3455\/05, \u00a7 128, ECHR 2009; and Ramirez Sanchez, cited above, \u00a7 119). Besides the extent to which he has been subject to body searches, the applicant\u2019s allegations in the present case concern, specifically, his being subject to solitary confinement and lack of judicial safeguards in that respect. The Court has held that, although the prohibition of contact with other prisoners for security, disciplinary or protective reasons can in certain circumstances be justified, solitary confinement, even in cases entailing only relative isolation, cannot be imposed on a prisoner indefinitely. Moreover, it is essential that the prisoner should be able to have an independent judicial authority review the merits of and reasons for a prolonged measure of solitary confinement. Indeed, solitary confinement, which is a form of \u201cimprisonment within the prison\u201d, should be resorted to only exceptionally and after every precaution has been taken, as specified in paragraph 53.1 of the European Prison Rules adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 11\u00a0January 2006 (see, for example, Ramirez Sanchez, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0120\u2011124 and \u00a7 145, ECHR 2006\u2011IX; and \u00d6calan v. Turkey (no.\u00a02), nos. 24069\/03 and 3 others, \u00a7\u00a7 104-107, 18 March 2014).146.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the instant case, the Court does not call into question that the applicant\u2019s detention posed significant challenges for the domestic authorities and that those authorities considered it necessary to combine his detention with extraordinary security measures.147.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant has not as such complained of the physical conditions in which he has been held. The Court still notes that as he has had access to three cells with, inter alia, a television, shower, toilet, refrigerator, video game console and exercise equipment (see paragraphs paragraphs 44 and 133 above), in addition to the option of going outside for one hour every day (see paragraphs 45 and 133 above), the physical conditions appear proper (see, similarly, Ramirez Sanchez, cited above, \u00a7 129; and, in contrast, for example Mathew v. the Netherlands, no. 24919\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 209-216, ECHR\u00a02005\u2011IX).148.\u00a0\u00a0With respect to the nature of the applicant\u2019s solitary confinement, the Court observes that he has had access to university studies, in which context he has received documents and sometimes recorded lectures (see paragraphs 45 and 133 above). He has also had access to television and a daily newspaper (ibid.). He has, in principle, been entitled to write and receive letters, though there has been control of his correspondence. Furthermore, he has in principle been entitled to monitored visits, though he has had few visitors, and monitored telephone calls (see, in particular, paragraphs 83-90 above).149.\u00a0\u00a0In summary, the applicant has not been subject to \u201ccomplete sensory\u201d or \u201ctotal social\u201d isolation, but one that has been \u201cpartial and relative\u201d (see Ramirez Sanchez, cite above, \u00a7 135). In view of the length of the period for which the applicant has been subject to that type of solitary confinement, a rigorous examination is nonetheless called for in order to determine whether it was justified, whether the measures taken were necessary and proportionate compared to the available alternatives, what safeguards were afforded to the applicant and what measures were taken by the authorities to ensure that the applicant\u2019s physical and mental condition was compatible with his continued solitary confinement.150.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the conditions in question were implemented for the purpose of safeguarding critical security concerns as well as the applicant\u2019s health and dignity. Moreover, as stated by the High Court, the degree of isolation was based on verifiable professional assessments (see paragraph 135 above).151.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Court observes that the domestic authorities had established a number of measures to remedy the solitary confinement. In addition to daily contact with prison staff, the applicant had been offered contact with a priest, nurses and a volunteer prison visitor (see, for example, paragraphs 48-51, 59-68, 87 and 108 above). He had also had contact with a psychologist, but, prior to the domestic proceedings, he had refused psychological counselling (see paragraphs 37 and 51 above). With regard to the applicant\u2019s submission concerning mental vulnerability, the Court finds that the domestic courts made a reasonable assessment of the facts when reaching the conclusion that he did not have any particular mental vulnerability (see paragraphs 41, 122 and 125 above). The applicant had been monitored closely by the prisons\u2019 health services and the High Court noted that no clear signs of harm due to his solitary confinement had been observed (see paragraphs 42 and 102 above).152.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the conclusions drawn by the domestic courts were based on acceptable assessments of the relevant facts. As to the application of Article 3 of the Convention on those facts, the High Court meticulously scrutinised the balance between the degree of the applicant\u2019s relative isolation on the one hand, and the degree of compensating measures on the other, as struck by the correctional services authorities. It examined in that respect the necessity of confining the applicant to relative isolation and the effect that the security measures had on the applicant and his health, based on extensive written evidence and witness testimony, including from experts and professionals (see, in particular, paragraphs 10 and 14-68 above). The Court, having carefully examined all the material available to it, finds no grounds for reaching a different conclusion to that of the domestic courts with respect to the applicant\u2019s confinement to relative isolation not having implied treatment or punishment exceeding the threshold of what is \u201cinhuman or degrading\u201d and hence contrary to Article\u00a03.153.\u00a0\u00a0As to body searches, the Court finds that there are no reasons to criticise the domestic authorities for searches carried out in connection with, for example, transport, and it has otherwise noted that the number of searches has gradually been reduced considerably, in line with the continuous risk assessments (see paragraph 70-71 and 77 above). As to the random searches at Ila specifically, the Court has noted the High Court\u2019s finding that the number of such searches appeared to have been high during a part of the applicant\u2019s stay there, insofar as other security measures introduced at Ila had reduced his possibilities to carry hidden weapons or items that could be used as such (see paragraph 76 above). Taking into account that the totality of the security regime has to be examined in conjunction and bearing in mind that that regime will necessarily depend on assessments of risk based on the information at the relevant time, the Court sees no grounds for finding a violation of Article 3 of the Convention because of the body searches that have been carried out.154.\u00a0\u00a0Concerning legal safeguards, the Court notes that in addition to the option of complaining about confinement to maximum security departments as such, as well as against decisions on specific security measures (see, inter alia, paragraphs 5, 95 and 132 above), the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention have been carefully examined by three levels of domestic courts.155.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the above, and viewing the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention as a whole, the Court finds that his complaint under Article 3 of the Convention does not disclose any appearance of a violation.2.\u00a0\u00a0Article 8 of the Convention156.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that the control of his correspondence and the lack of treatment for mental vulnerability entailed a disproportionate interference with his rights as set out in Article 8 of the Convention, which reads:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.2.\u00a0\u00a0There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.\u201d157.\u00a0\u00a0Under Article 8 of the Convention the applicant maintained that the control of his correspondence had lasted for too long and become too invasive. The applicant submitted, moreover, that Article 8 had been breached because of the lack of treatment for his alleged mental vulnerability.158.\u00a0\u00a0As to the control of the applicant\u2019s correspondence, the Court concurs with the High Court\u2019s considerations that there had been a strong societal interest in hindering the applicant from sending letters containing direct or indirect appeals for violence or contributing to the establishment of extremist networks. Individual assessments of each letter had been carried out and the control of his correspondence had not prevented his contact with family, close friends or other social relations established prior to his detention (see paragraph 118 above). Noting, further, that relatively detailed rules and guidelines for the filtering had been developed, and that the applicant had had the option of requiring administrative reviews of decisions when letters were stopped (see paragraphs 114 to 119 above), an option of which he has largely availed himself, the Court finds no reason for further examination on the merits, namely whether the control of the applicant\u2019s correspondence was unlawful, did not pursue a legitimate aim or was disproportionate.159.\u00a0\u00a0With respect to the lack of treatment for the applicant\u2019s alleged mental vulnerability the Court, as stated above in connection with Article 3 of the Convention, finds that the domestic court relied on a reasonable assessment of the facts when finding that he did not suffer from such vulnerability (see paragraph 151 above). There is no appearance of a violation of Article 8, either, due to lack of treatment.3.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion160.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the above, the Court finds that the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a03 (a) and 4 of the Convention.For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,Declares the application inadmissible.Done in English and notified in writing on 21 June 2018.Milan Bla\u0161koYonko Grozev Deputy RegistrarPresident","30735":"38.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained regarding their inhuman conditions of detention (Article 3 of the Convention), the excessive length of the civil proceedings in which they claimed damages (Article 6 \u00a7 1) and a lack of effective remedies in respect of these complaints (Article 13 taken in conjunction with Articles 3 and 6 \u00a7 1).I.\u00a0\u00a0ADMISSIBILITY39.\u00a0\u00a0The Moldovan Government submitted that the applicants\u2019 complaints at the time of lodging their application had been premature since, at that time, the civil action which they had lodged with the domestic courts was still being examined. The applicants had thus failed to properly exhaust available domestic remedies in the Republic of Moldova. The Moldovan Government also argued that, following the adoption of a final judgment expressly acknowledging the breach of Articles 3 and 6 of the Convention and awarding compensation, the applicants could no longer claim to be victims of a breach by the Republic of Moldova of their Convention rights. The Moldovan Government did not contest that the Republic of Moldova retained jurisdiction over the territory controlled by the \u201cMRT\u201d.40.\u00a0\u00a0The Russian Government argued that the applicants did not come within their jurisdiction and that, consequently, the applications should be declared inadmissible in respect of the Russian Federation. They also submitted that the application should be dismissed as inadmissible ratione temporis, without giving any further details.A.\u00a0\u00a0Jurisdiction41.\u00a0\u00a0The Moldovan Government did not contest that the Republic of Moldova retained jurisdiction over the territory controlled by the \u201cMRT\u201d.42.\u00a0\u00a0For their part, the Russian Government argued that the applicants did not come within their jurisdiction. Consequently, the application should be declared inadmissible ratione personae and ratione loci in respect of the Russian Federation. Moreover, they challenged the Court\u2019s jurisdiction ratione temporis, without any details being given.43.\u00a0\u00a0The Court recalls that the general principles concerning the issue of jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention in respect of actions and facts pertaining to the Transdniestrian region of Moldova were set out in Ila\u015fcu and Others (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0311-19), Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia ([GC], nos. 43370\/04 and 2 others, \u00a7\u00a7 103-07, ECHR 2012 (extracts)) and, more recently, Mozer (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a097-98).44.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the Republic of Moldova is concerned, the Court notes that in Ila\u015fcu, Catan and Mozer it found that although Moldova had no effective control over the Transdniestrian region, it followed from the fact that Moldova was the territorial State that persons within that territory fell within its jurisdiction. However, its obligation, under Article 1 of the Convention, to secure to everyone within its jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, was limited to that of taking the diplomatic, economic, judicial and other measures that were both in its power and in accordance with international law (see Ila\u015fcu and Others, cited above, \u00a7 333; Catan and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0109; and Mozer, cited above, \u00a7 100). Moldova\u2019s obligations under Article 1 of the Convention were found to be positive obligations (see Ila\u015fcu and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0322 and 330-31; Catan and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0109-10; and Mozer, cited above, \u00a7 99).45.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the applicants complain about the disconnection of prison no. 8 from the public utilities by the local authorities of the \u201cMRT\u201d, the Court sees no reason to distinguish the present case from the above-mentioned cases. Besides, it notes that the Moldovan Government do not object to applying a similar approach in the present case. Therefore, it finds that Moldova has jurisdiction for the purposes of Article\u00a01 of the Convention, but that its responsibility for the acts complained of is to be assessed in the light of the above-mentioned positive obligations (see Ila\u015fcu and Others, cited above, \u00a7 335).46.\u00a0\u00a0However, unlike in previous cases concerning alleged breaches of the Convention by the \u201cMRT\u201d, the Moldovan authorities in the present case were not limited to only fulfilling their positive obligations as mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. The case is different in that, while not having control over the local authorities in Bender which disconnected prison no.\u00a08 from the utilities, the Moldovan authorities had full control over that prison itself and the detainees there throughout the relevant period. They could have taken measures in the prison itself to cope with the effects of the disconnection from the utilities or they could have transferred the prisoners to other prisons at any time. By choosing to continue to detain the applicants in prison no. 8 without immediate action taken to ensure basic conditions of detention, the Moldovan authorities knowingly exposed them to the conditions which prevailed there after the disconnection from all utilities. In addition to the above-mentioned positive obligations, it was therefore also the direct responsibility of the Moldovan authorities to prevent or redress the alleged violation of the applicants\u2019 rights in that prison.47.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the Russian Federation is concerned, the Court would normally have to examine in the first place whether the facts fell within the jurisdiction of that State. However, in the particular circumstances of the present case, it considers it unnecessary to determine this issue, since the application must in any event be declared inadmissible insofar as directed against that State, for the reasons mentioned in paragraphs 48-50 below.B.\u00a0\u00a0Compliance with the six-month period for lodging the application in respect of the Russian Federation48.\u00a0\u00a0The Court needs to verify whether the applicants complied with the six-month time-limit for lodging their application, in accordance with Article\u00a035 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. It reiterates that the six-month rule stipulated in that provision is intended to promote legal certainty and to ensure that cases raising issues under the Convention are dealt with within a reasonable time. It protects the authorities and other persons concerned from uncertainty for a prolonged period of time. Finally, it ensures that, in so far as possible, matters are examined while they are still fresh, before the passage of time makes it difficult to ascertain the pertinent facts and renders a fair examination of the question at issue almost impossible (see Jeronovi\u010ds v.\u00a0Latvia [GC], no. 44898\/10, \u00a7 74, ECHR 2016).49.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the situation in the \u201cMRT\u201d, the Court notes that in the past it has found a violation of Article 13 of the Convention in respect of the Russian Federation, precisely because it could not establish the existence of effective remedies in that country in respect of Convention breaches committed by the authorities of the \u201cMRT\u201d (see Mozer, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0211 and 218). In the same vein, the Court does not consider the lodging of a complaint in Moldovan courts against another country without the latter\u2019s consent to be involved as a defendant (see paragraph 30 above) to be a remedy. It therefore finds that, in the absence of any effective remedy in Russia, any complaints against that country must be lodged with the Court within six months of the date of the alleged violation or the date when such a violation ended.50.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the applicants were transferred to other prisons on 1\u00a0March 2004 and 15 September 2004 respectively (see paragraph\u00a011 above) and were thus from these dates on no longer held in allegedly inhuman conditions. However, they lodged their application on 19\u00a0December 2008. Therefore, regardless of whether or not the applicants came under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation, the complaints against that respondent State were lodged outside the time-limit set down by Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, and must be rejected as inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7 4 of the Convention.C.\u00a0\u00a0Exhaustion of domestic remedies and the applicants\u2019 victim status concerning the application in respect of the Republic Moldova51.\u00a0\u00a0The Moldovan Government submitted that the applicants had not exhausted the remedies available to them in the Republic of Moldova, since they had lodged their application prematurely while domestic proceedings concerning the recognition of the violation of their rights and their claims for compensation were ongoing.52.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that although, in principle, an applicant is required to have recourse to domestic remedies before applying to the Court and compliance with that requirement is assessed on the date the application was lodged (see Baumann v.\u00a0France, no. 33592\/96, \u00a7 47, ECHR 2001\u2011V), it can accept the fact that the last stage of such remedies may be reached after the lodging of the application but before it is called upon to pronounce on its admissibility (see Karoussiotis v. Portugal, no.\u00a023205\/08, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a057 and 87-92, ECHR 2011; Rafaa v. France, no. 25393\/10, \u00a7 33, 30 May 2013; and Cestaro v. Italy, no. 6884\/11, \u00a7 146, 7 April 2015). It notes that, by the time the present application was examined, the applicants had fully exhausted the domestic remedies available to them in the Republic of Moldova (see paragraph 35 above). Accordingly, this objection is dismissed.53.\u00a0\u00a0The Moldovan Government also submitted that the applicants could no longer claim to be victims of breaches by the Republic of Moldova of their Convention rights, after the domestic courts had expressly acknowledged a breach of Articles 3 and 6 of the Convention and awarded them compensation. The Court considers that this objection is closely linked to the substance of the complaints raised by the applicants. Accordingly, it joins this objection to the merits of the application.D.\u00a0\u00a0Withdrawal of complaint54.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that, in their initial application, the applicants complained of a breach of Article 34 of the Convention. However, in their observations they asked the Court not to examine this complaint, because in fact it related to other people who were in the same situation as the applicants but who were not parties in the present case.55.\u00a0\u00a0The Court takes note of the withdrawal of this complaint.E.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion on admissibility56.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicants\u2019 complaints against the Republic of Moldova under Articles 3, 6 and 13 raise questions of fact and law which are sufficiently serious that their determination should depend on an examination of the merits. No other grounds for declaring them inadmissible have been established. The Court therefore declares this part of the application admissible.II.\u00a0\u00a0MERITSA.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violation of Article 3 of the Convention57.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained regarding the inhuman conditions of detention at prison no. 8 in Tighina\/Bender, contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, which reads:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d58.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants referred to the prison\u2019s disconnection from the utilities as causing standards to drop to a level which should be considered inhuman treatment, notably due to the lack of hygiene, the poor quality of the food and their inability to have their diseases properly treated (both applicants were ill with tuberculosis at the relevant time). They submitted that in total they had spent twenty-four and seventeen months respectively in inhuman conditions in prison no. 8.59.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that, despite the difficulties created by the disconnection from the utilities, the prison authorities and the Penal Institutions Department had taken immediate action to ensure that the detainees were provided with the minimum necessities such as water, food and heating, which had all been brought in by trucks. Electricity had been produced in situ by four electric generators, and heating had been ensured by thirty-five heaters. Five toilets not requiring connection to the city\u2019s waste disposal system had been built, and the prison\u2019s showers had been rebuilt to function without electricity from the grid or water from the pipeline. All these efforts had been made possible by almost doubling the State\u2019s budget for the running costs of that prison during 2002-2008.60.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, following its visits on 18 March 2006 and 14\u201124\u00a0September 2007, the Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) had found that, from February 2004 onwards, the Moldovan authorities had taken action to improve the detainees\u2019 situation as much as possible. The Government further submitted that each detainee was warned about the conditions of detention in prison no. 8 and agreed to them before being transferred there, some of them preferring to be held there since it was closer to their homes and relatives, while all those who refused were not placed in that prison. The Government lastly argued that the Moldovan authorities had taken all reasonable measures and had incurred great public expense in order to fulfil their positive obligations under the Convention to ensure that the rights of detainees in prison no. 8 were observed as much as possible, given the hostile actions of the Bender local administration.61.\u00a0\u00a0Insofar as the Government submitted that the applicants were warned about the conditions of detention in prison no. 8 and agreed to them before being transferred there, the Court reiterates at the outset that Article\u00a03 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim\u2019s behaviour (Mur\u0161i\u0107 v. Croatia [GC], no. 7334\/13, \u00a7 96, ECHR 2016). The Government\u2019s submission could raise the question whether a waiver of the right under Article 3 is possible, notwithstanding the absolute nature of the prohibition. However, even assuming that such a waiver might be possible, the circumstances of the present case do not permit the conclusion that there has been any valid waiver. Indeed, the applicants were deprived of their liberty, and thus within the power of the authorities (see, mutatis mutandis, M.S. v. Belgium, no. 50012\/08, \u00a7 124, 31 January 2012). As the Court has held with respect to the waiver of certain procedural rights, a waiver must be of the applicant\u2019s own free will and must be established in an unequivocal manner and attended by minimum safeguards commensurate to its importance (see, among others, Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) [GC], no.\u00a010249\/03, \u00a7 135, 17 September 2009). However, the Government did not clarify the nature of the guarantees which would assure a free decision by the applicants.62.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the conditions of detention during September 2002-April 2004 were considered by the domestic courts to be inhuman (see paragraph 34 above). Even though the Moldovan Government suggested that the authorities had taken action to improve the conditions of detention, their arguments refer to actions taken after February 2004 (see paragraph\u00a059 above), that is, close to the end of the applicants\u2019 detention in prison no.\u00a08. The Court has no reason to depart from the domestic courts\u2019 assessment of the conditions of detention and finds, as did those courts, that prolonged detention in conditions where access to water, electricity, food, warmth and medication is severely limited amounts to inhuman treatment under Article\u00a03 of the Convention.63.\u00a0\u00a0What remains to be verified is whether, following the express acknowledgment of a violation of Article 3 and the award of compensation, the applicants can still claim to be victims of that violation by the Republic of Moldova.64.\u00a0\u00a0It notes that the applicants complained only regarding the conditions of detention during the prison\u2019s disconnection from the utilities. The Court will take into account only the periods during which they were held in these conditions. There were two such periods: 23\u00a0September 2002-23\u00a0February 2003 (see paragraphs 8 and 10 above), and 10 July 2003 until the dates of the applicants\u2019 transfer to other prisons (15 September 2004 and 1\u00a0March 2004 respectively, see paragraph\u00a011 above). Accordingly, the applicants were held in inhuman conditions for approximately nineteen and thirteen months respectively.65.\u00a0\u00a0Where, as in the present case, the victim status and therefore, the existence of a violation, is linked with the monetary redress afforded at domestic level, the Court\u2019s assessment necessarily involves comparison between the actual award and the amount that the Court would award in similar cases (see, mutatis mutandis, Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no.\u00a036813\/97, \u00a7\u00a7 181 and 202, ECHR 2006\u2011V; see also Holzinger v. Austria (no. 1), no. 23459\/94, \u00a7 21, ECHR\u00a02001\u2011I).66.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, the Court notes that the domestic courts awarded the applicants the equivalent of EUR\u00a01,266 in respect of the breach of Article 3 (see paragraphs 34 and 35 above). The Court considers that the sum awarded by the domestic courts is considerably below that generally awarded by the Court in cases in which it has found a violation of Article 3 in respect of the Republic of Moldova concerning conditions of detention, especially considering the particularly harsh conditions of the applicants\u2019 detention and the relatively long period during which they were held in such conditions (see, by way of comparison, Shishanov v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 11353\/06, \u00a7 143, 15 September 2015, Savca v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 17963\/08, \u00a7 58, 15 March 2016, and Cristioglo v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 24163\/11, \u00a7 31, 26 April 2016).67.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the applicants can still claim to be victims of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. Accordingly, the Moldovan Government\u2019s objection concerning the applicants\u2019 victim status (see paragraph 39 above) is dismissed.68.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 by the Republic of Moldova in the present case.B.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention69.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also complained of the excessive length of the civil proceedings which they had initiated against the State authorities. They relied on Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads:\u201cIn the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...\u201d70.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicants could no longer claim to be victims of a breach of their right to a hearing within a reasonable time, in view of the express acknowledgment of such a violation by the Supreme Court of Justice and the award made to compensate them for that violation (see paragraph 35 above). In any event, the case had been quite complex given the number of plaintiffs at domestic level, the background of actions by the \u201cMRT\u201d and the applicants\u2019 application to involve Russia as a defendant. Moreover, the applicants\u2019 representatives had contributed to approximately 20% of the delays and had even accepted the defendant\u2019s application for the initial claim to be struck from the court\u2019s docket because they had already prepared a new court action to replace the old one. This had resulted in a new delay in order for the defendants to study the new claim.71.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that by 15 March 2004 when the domestic court action was lodged the second applicant was no longer detained in the conditions complained of. The first applicant was detained in such conditions during six more months. Thereafter, their court action did not concern any urgent matter since the courts could only find a breach of the applicants\u2019 rights and award compensation.At the same time, as found by the Supreme Court of Justice (see paragraph 35 above), the applicants\u2019 representatives contributed to approximately 20% of the delay in examining the court action.72.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to all the material in its possession, and even assuming that the entire period of approximately six years is to be taken into consideration despite the apparent lodging of a new claim on 6 March 2008 (see paragraph 30 above), taking into consideration the award made in this respect by the Supreme Court of Justice (see paragraph 35 above), as well as the complexity of the case and the CHDOM\u2019s contribution to the overall length of the proceedings, the Court finds that this complaint does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.C.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violation of Article 13 of the Convention73.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also argued that they had no effective remedies in respect of their complaint regarding the conditions of detention. They relied on Article 13 of the Convention, which reads:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d74.\u00a0\u00a0The Moldovan Government argued that the applicants had at their disposal domestic remedies in the form of civil court actions to establish detention in inhuman or degrading conditions and claim compensation. They submitted copies of several judgments from cases in which detainees had been successful in obtaining compensation in similar circumstances. Moreover, the applicants\u2019 own court actions had been successful, each having been awarded MDL 20,000, which proved once more the effectiveness of the remedy.75.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants argued that, in order to be effective, the remedies referred to by the Moldovan Government also had to ensure that those responsible for the breaches of their Convention rights (individuals in the \u201cMRT\u201d local administration) were prosecuted. Moreover, they had not obtained an improvement in their conditions of detention while it still mattered.76.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that it found violations of Article 13 of the Convention in Malai v. Moldova (no. 7101\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 45-46, 13 November 2008), I.D. v. Moldova (no. 47203\/06, \u00a7 50, 30 November 2010) and Rotaru v.\u00a0Moldova (no. 51216\/06, \u00a7 47, 15 February 2011) on account of the lack of effective remedies in the Republic of Moldova in respect of inhuman and degrading conditions of detention. It has underlined that the remedy of a court action in the form suggested by the Moldovan Government does not have a preventive effect in the sense of improving the conditions of an applicant\u2019s detention, only a compensatory effect (see, for instance, Holomiov v. Moldova, no. 30649\/05, \u00a7 107, 7 November 2006; and Shishanov v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 11353\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 124-139, 15\u00a0September 2015). The remedy is therefore not effective in cases where people are still detained in such conditions at the time of lodging their application with the Court (see, for instance, Oprea v. Moldova, no.\u00a038055\/06, \u00a7 33, 21\u00a0December 2010).77.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the fact that the first applicant was still detained in prison no. 8 at the time of lodging his claim with the domestic courts on 15 March 2004 (see paragraphs 11 and 22 above), the remedy referred to by the Moldovan Government was not an effective one, since it did not allow for an immediate improvement in the first applicant\u2019s conditions of detention (see the preceding paragraph).78.\u00a0\u00a0There has thus been a violation by the Republic of Moldova of Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the first applicant (see Shishanov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 123-139).79.\u00a0\u00a0As for the second applicant, the Court notes that he was transferred from prison no. 8 to another prison on 1 March 2004 (see paragraph\u00a011 above), before he lodged his claim before the domestic courts on 15 March 2004 (see paragraph 22 above). Accordingly, at the time when he initiated his civil action he could not ask for an improvement in his conditions of detention in that prison, but only an acknowledgment of a breach of his rights and compensation. Since domestic law allowed him to seek both, and since he was able to obtain these things in final court judgments, the Court finds that the second applicant had at his disposal available effective remedies.80.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore finds that there has been no violation by the Republic of Moldova of Article\u00a013 taken in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the second applicant.81.\u00a0\u00a0As for the applicants\u2019 complaint that the Moldovan authorities failed to properly investigate the actions of the \u201cMRT\u201d officials who disconnected prison no. 8 from the utilities, the Court notes that \u00a0although the Moldovan courts ordered the prosecutor\u2019s office to initiate criminal proceedings against those responsible for disconnecting the prison (see paragraphs 15 and 20 above), it seems that no further action was undertaken by that office, because of lack of effective possibilities to bring any \u201cMRT\u201d official to justice (see paragraph 21 above). The Court notes, however, that already on 18 November 2003 the Bender Prosecutor\u2019s Office had contacted the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities with a view to prosecuting those responsible, and that on 20 December 2003 the \u201cMRT\u201d prosecutor had refused to open a criminal investigation on the ground that no crime had been committed (see paragraph 16 above).82.\u00a0\u00a0In light of the above, the Court considers that the Republic of Moldova has fulfilled its positive obligation in this respect. There has therefore been no violation of Article 13 in this respect.III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION83.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage84.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant claimed EUR 100,000 from the Moldovan Government and EUR 90,000 from the Russian Government in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The second applicant claimed EUR 80,000 from the Moldovan Government and EUR 70,000 from the Russian Government in respect of non-pecuniary damage. They referred to the suffering and anxiety which they had experienced as a result of the inhuman conditions of detention. They also referred to their fear for their lives, given their inability to have their tuberculosis treated during the relevant time and the fact that the mortality rate among detainees suffering from that disease in prison no.\u00a08 had increased during the relevant period due to the harsh conditions.85.\u00a0\u00a0The Moldovan Government submitted that the applicants had failed to specify the basis for their claim, and that the recognition by the domestic courts of a breach of their rights constituted sufficient just satisfaction. In any event, the sum claimed was excessive in comparison with previous cases against the Republic of Moldova concerning conditions of detention.86.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes firstly that it has declared all the complaints against the Russian Federation in the present case inadmissible. Accordingly, no award can be made in respect of that State.87.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of the claims against the Republic of Moldova, the Court refers to its finding (see paragraph 66 above) that the award made by the domestic courts was well below that which it would award in similar cases. In the light of all the circumstances, in particular the relatively long period of detention in particularly harsh conditions with a risk to the applicants\u2019 health, and taking into account the sums already awarded by the domestic courts, the Court awards the first applicant EUR 3,000 and the second applicant EUR 1,800 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses88.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also claimed EUR 5,160 for costs and expenses incurred before the Court. They annexed a list of hours which their lawyers had spent working on the case (eighty-six hours at an hourly rate of EUR\u00a060).89.\u00a0\u00a0The Moldovan Government submitted that the applicants had presented inconsistent claims regarding legal representation before the domestic courts and this Court. Moreover, they had failed to produce a contract with their lawyers. In addition, during the proceedings, the applicants\u2019 lawyers, being members of a human rights non-governmental organisation (NGO), had submitted to the domestic courts that they were financed by foreign funds, which could be interpreted as saying that they were paid by foreign donors to represent socially vulnerable individuals like the applicants. They should therefore not be able to claim payment for that representation once more from the Government. There was no evidence that the applicants had actually paid any sum of money to their representatives. In any event, the sum claimed was excessive, particularly in view of the fact that the domestic courts had already awarded MDL 5,000 for legal costs. Lastly, the number of hours which the lawyers had spent working on the case was also excessive.90.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law (see for a recent example Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], no. 72508\/13, \u00a7 370, ECHR 2017 (extracts)), an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,500 jointly to cover costs under all heads.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest91.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","30753":"","30754":"","30757":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION100.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been subjected to treatment in violation of Article 3 of the Convention during his detention at the police station on 27 February 2011 and that no effective investigation had been carried out in this connection. Article 3 reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d101.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility102.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant(i)\u00a0\u00a0Substantive aspect of the complaint103.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that there had been sufficient evidence establishing that he had been tortured by the police in violation of Article 3 of the Convention. All the medical evidence indicated that he had had very serious injuries, a fact that had been corroborated by the Canadian Consul. The applicant submitted that in Cyprus there was general solidarity between the doctors in State-run hospitals and the police concerning detainees taken for treatment in connection with injuries resulting from ill-treatment inflicted by the police. Unfortunately, there had been no independent witnesses during his ill-treatment.104.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant noted that where an individual was taken into police custody in good health but was found to be injured at the time of release, it was incumbent on the State to provide a plausible explanation of how these injuries had been caused, failing which a clear issue arose under Article 3 of the Convention. In this case no such explanation had been given.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Procedural aspect of the complaint105.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that the investigation carried out into his complaint failed to comply with the standards established under Article 3 of the Convention and hence, that there had been also been a violation of the procedural limb of that provision.106.\u00a0\u00a0At the outset, the applicant pointed out that there had been significant delay in commencing the investigation despite the fact that the applicant had complained of ill-treatment through his first lawyer on the day of his arrest and there had been enough evidence to corroborate his account. This included the medical report prepared by the general surgeon Dr C.T. which had recorded injuries on the applicant\u2019s chest and face caused by blows; the medical report prepared by the pathologist Dr\u00a0A.K., who had first examined the applicant and the relevant injuries recorded therein; the medical report prepared by the private practitioner, Dr S.J.; and, lastly, the testimonies of the Canadian Consul and her assistant, who had witnessed the applicant\u2019s injuries and bruises when they had visited him at the hospital. The authorities, however, had remained inactive until the applicant\u2019s second lawyer had sent a letter of complaint on 14 June 2011 to the Attorney General.107.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, both in the first and second IAIACAP investigations, the investigators had failed to attach the appropriate importance to the statements of the Canadian Consul and her assistant and had ignored the fact that the head of the ECID had admitted that the applicant had been ill\u2011treated. Instead they had focused on the alleged lack of credibility of the applicant.108.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the first investigation carried out by the IAIACAP was concerned, the applicant submitted that the investigator had failed to enquire into the causes of the applicant\u2019s injuries by seeking the opinion of a forensic expert or other medical practitioners, and had failed to provide a plausible explanation for the injuries. Furthermore, the investigator had admitted himself that he had not investigated the case fully as he had not ordered an identity parade and had not conducted further interviews, instead confining himself to collecting the statements of certain police officers and the statement provided by the applicant. He had failed to interview the applicant\u2019s second lawyer, L.L., who had referred the case to the IAIACAP, as well as the Canadian Consul and her assistant who had visited the applicant in hospital. Most importantly, he had failed to interview the applicant himself. In this connection the applicant submitted that the Government\u2019s claim that the applicant had refused to be interviewed had been false. In addition, although the investigator had claimed that the applicant\u2019s first lawyer, C.H., had refused to cooperate, he had not explored other means of securing his testimony.109.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that the IAIACAP in its first investigation had relied on unconvincing evidence and based itself on the statements given by the officers denying ill-treatment in order to counter the applicant\u2019s claims, turning a blind eye to the medical evidence recording the applicant\u2019s injuries. However, the applicant emphasised that some of the officers\u2019 statements had been contradictory: some officers had stated that upon arrival at the station the applicant had had red marks or that his face had been red whereas others had stated that at the time he had had injuries on his face. According to the applicant, the police officers, upon realising their mistake had tried to correct their statements by changing their description of the applicant\u2019s appearance, either by stating that they could not remember what kind of injuries the applicant had had, by trying to lessen the extent of the injuries by claiming they had been merely red marks, or by changing the description of the injuries to match other accounts that the applicant had hit his face on the floor.110.\u00a0\u00a0The reasoning in the investigator A.S.\u2019s report had been unclear and problematic. Furthermore both the investigator and the president of the IAIACAP had concluded that the applicant\u2019s injuries had been caused during his arrest, without substantiating their views by medical or other evidence. Despite this, they had concluded that the applicant\u2019s injuries should not lead to the conclusion that the force used during arrest had been excessive. It was therefore clear that the IAIACAP did not wish to incriminate the police.111.\u00a0\u00a0With reference to the second investigation by the IAIACAP, the applicant submitted that it had been conducted with the exclusive aim of remedying the shortcomings of the first investigation following communication of the case by the Court in order to avoid a finding of a violation. The applicant had already given a full account of his ill-treatment and had answered all questions put to him. He had also been available for further interviews while in prison in Cyprus but had never been asked to provide further clarifications. Following his return to Canada he had been available to return to Cyprus for the needs of the investigation as long as his travel expenses had been paid. The Government, however, had sought instead to obtain the applicant\u2019s statement through the Canadian authorities, who had had no competence over the case and had not been bound by the Cypriot courts or the Convention. Furthermore, seeking the advice of a forensic expert two years after the ill-treatment complaint had been futile as the forensic expert had no longer been able to establish the cause of the injuries. This should have been done on the day the injuries had been caused.112.\u00a0\u00a0It was the applicant\u2019s view that the second investigation had also lacked the required independence. The Attorney General, who had taken the final decision following the investigators\u2019 report, had previously been a Supreme Court judge and had already examined and decided on the case as he had been one of the judges on the appeal bench that had dismissed the applicant\u2019s appeal against the judgment of the District Court of Limassol. The Attorney General in his concluding decision not to take action against any of the officers had heavily relied on the findings of the domestic courts as to the applicant\u2019s credibility. The applicant maintained that the Attorney General\u2019s reasoning in his decision had been flawed. In this connection, he noted that the applicant had not been given the opportunity to identify the officers responsible. In any event, the authorities had been responsible for the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment regardless of whether the offenders could be identified. Furthermore, on the basis of the case file the applicant had been taken to hospital with injuries that had been caused during his time in custody.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government(i)\u00a0\u00a0Substantive aspect of the complaint113.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that it had not been established beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant had been subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention or that the force that had been used against him had been excessive.114.\u00a0\u00a0The various statements and reports in the investigation file regarding the applicant\u2019s condition upon arrival at the police station had been inconclusive. It was not clear whether the injuries had been the result of ill-treatment by the police or whether they could have been caused upon arrest and\/or during his detention. None of the medical reports, including that of the private practitioner, had concluded that the applicant\u2019s injuries had been caused by ill-treatment or that they could have been inflicted in the manner alleged by the applicant. This left open the possibility that the applicant\u2019s injuries had been caused during arrest or even when the applicant had fallen to the ground and in circumstances in which the force used had been reasonable. This had indeed been the conclusion drawn by the president of the IAIACAP in his report of 16 November 2011. It would therefore be presumptive to conclude that the injuries had been the result of ill-treatment or the use of disproportionate force (referring to Dzeladinov and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 13252\/02, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a067-68, 10 April 2008). Moreover, apart from the applicant\u2019s statement and the medical report recording that the applicant had a broken tooth, none of the witnesses had been able to state whether the applicant\u2019s tooth had already been broken on arrival at the police station. In this regard, the Government observed that Special Constable G.S. had stated that the applicant had fallen and hit his face on the ground in his attempt to flee arrest; therefore the possibility that the applicant\u2019s tooth had broken when he had fallen could not be excluded.115.\u00a0\u00a0The Government observed that on the basis of the medical evidence available it could not be said that the applicant\u2019s treatment had attained the level of severity required for a breach of Article 3 of the Convention. In this connection, they also pointed out that the applicant, after having been examined in the hospital at 5 p.m., had been discharged a few hours later, at 11.20 p.m. Special Constable G.S. had also gone to hospital and had been given sick leave for nine days.116.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stressed that it was vital to also have regard to the applicant\u2019s unsubstantiated claims concerning his alleged ill-treatment, inter alia, that he had been taken to the station in a brown jeep, he had been beaten with a wooden object, and his referral to certain individuals as \u201cthe perpetrators\u201d. In addition, the applicant had refused to be interviewed. His allegations were not supported by appropriate evidence and there were no sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or unrebutted presumptions of fact.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Procedural aspect of the complaint117.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that they had conducted an effective, thorough and prompt investigation into the applicants\u2019 allegations in compliance with Article 3 of the Convention. Both investigations had been capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible.118.\u00a0\u00a0With reference to the first investigation of the IAIACAP, the Government submitted it had been carried out by an independent officer supervised by that body. It had been thorough; the investigator had taken statements from everyone who had come into contact with the applicant on 27 February 2011. In total statements had been taken from numerous witnesses, including the four officers the investigator had singled out as suspects, the two doctors who had examined the applicant on 27 February 2011 at the hospital, Dr A.K. and Dr C.T., as well as the private practitioner, Dr.\u00a0S.J., who had examined the applicant on 7 March 2011. The investigation had examined the medical reports, the police diaries, the applicant\u2019s prisoner record, and both the files of the administrative investigation and of the criminal investigation concerning the applicant\u2019s alleged criminal activities.119.\u00a0\u00a0The investigator had taken all possible steps to ascertain whether the applicant\u2019s allegations were true by questioning witnesses and verifying the details provided by the applicant. This had been a difficult task as the applicant had refused to be interviewed and to reply to questions. He had merely endorsed a written statement which he had prepared beforehand describing his alleged ill-treatment. With reference to the specific allegations of the applicant about having been transferred to the station in a brown jeep, that he had been beaten with a wooden stick and the names of the officers he had given as those who had allegedly ill-treated him or witnessed his ill-treatment, the investigator managed to collect testimony which rebutted the applicant\u2019s allegations casting doubt on his credibility.120.\u00a0\u00a0The second IAIACAP investigation had been carried out by two independent criminal investigators, who had taken all reasonable steps to secure evidence concerning the incident, including eyewitness statements, CCTV footage and medical reports. They had taken statements from all witnesses in the case in order to determine exactly what had happened and they also had had regard to the case file before the domestic courts. Furthermore, they had sought the opinion of forensic experts concerning the applicant\u2019s injuries and had prepared a request for legal assistance for the Canadian authorities in order to obtain clarifications concerning certain of the applicant\u2019s allegations and inconsistencies therein. The applicant, however, had refused to cooperate. Although the criminal investigators had suggested that there had been enough evidence to prosecute two of the officers on the basis of the presumption under Law no. 235\/1990, they had also observed that in deciding whether or not a prosecution should have taken place and whether the applicant should have been called to testify in such proceedings, the fact that the applicant\u2019s testimony had been considered as not credible and false by the Limassol District Court had been a serious factor to be taken into account.121.\u00a0\u00a0The Attorney General\u2019s decision not to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant\u2019s complaints had been based on a number of grounds. First, the Attorney General had disagreed with the investigators\u2019 suggestion that the presumption of ill-treatment as expressed in the law had applied in the present case. Second, the Attorney General had considered it almost impossible to support a criminal case before a court of law given that the applicant had already been declared \u201cutterly unreliable\u201d by the Limassol District Court, to which he had already complained of ill\u2011treatment for the same events. Third, the quality of evidence at hand had been insufficient for the purposes of prosecution given that it had been unclear which individuals had been allegedly implicated in the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment and whether the injuries had been caused during arrest owing to his resistance. During the second investigation the witnesses had been unable to say whether the applicant had had any injuries upon arrival at the police station, or to describe them. Inspector I.S. had denied making any admission of ill-treatment and the statement of the third person, the investigator A.S., had been vague and had not given any particulars or details as to who had ill-treated the applicant, when and where.122.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stressed that the procedural obligation to investigate under Article 3 was not an obligation of result, but of means: not every investigation should necessarily be successful or come to a conclusion which coincided with the claimant\u2019s account of events (relying on Yerli\u00a0v.\u00a0Turkey, no. 59177\/10, \u00a7 57, 8 July 2014 and Stoian v. Romania, no.\u00a033038\/04, \u00a7 75, 8 July 2014). Similarly, not every investigation should necessarily lead to a prosecution irrespective of the evidence which was available (relying on G\u00fcrtekin and Others v. Cyprus, (dec.) nos. 60441\/13 et al., \u00a7 29, 11 March 2014 and Brecknell v. the United Kingdom, no.\u00a032457\/04, \u00a7 66, 27 November 2007).123.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, as to the criminal proceedings against the applicant, the Government emphasised that when examining the applicant\u2019s appeal the Supreme Court had not made any findings as to the applicant\u2019s credibility. The Attorney General had not been bound by that court\u2019s findings. The criminal investigation file in the case had been gathered well before the judgment of the Supreme Court and had not overlapped or constituted part of the evidence before the domestic courts. They had been two completely separate procedures. The fact, however, that the District Court of Limassol had declared the applicant utterly unreliable in respect of the same complaint had become relevant for the purposes of deciding whether to prosecute or not. The Attorney General\u2019s decision had been based on an objective assessment of the evidence gathered and on the duty to prosecute the right person for the right offence. It had been taken with the utmost care and there had been nothing to suggest that his decision had been arbitrary, unjustified or partial or that it had been based on hasty or ill-founded conclusions.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles124.\u00a0\u00a0Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic societies. Indeed the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is a value of civilisation closely bound up with respect for human dignity (Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380\/09, \u00a7 81, ECHR 2015, with further references). It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim\u2019s behaviour (ibid., \u00a7 81).125.\u00a0\u00a0The Court refers to the general principles with respect to the obligation of the High Contracting Parties under Article 3 of the Convention not to submit persons under their jurisdiction to inhuman or degrading treatment or torture in the course of encounters with the police which have been set out in detail in paragraphs 82-90 of its judgment in the case of Bouyid (ibid.).126.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates, in particular, that allegations of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 must be supported by appropriate evidence. To assess this evidence, the Court adopts the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d but adds that such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (ibid., \u00a7 82).127.\u00a0\u00a0On this latter point the Court has explained that where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention. The burden of proof is then on the Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation by producing evidence establishing facts which cast doubt on the account of events given by the applicant. In the absence of such explanation, the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the Government. That is justified by the fact that persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them (ibid., \u00a7 83).128.\u00a0\u00a0Ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (ibid., \u00a7 86).129.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of a person who is deprived of his liberty, or, more generally, is confronted with law-enforcement officers, any recourse to physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by his or her own conduct diminishes human dignity and is an infringement of the right set forth in Article 3 (ibid., \u00a7 88).130.\u00a0\u00a0Where an individual raises an arguable claim that he or she has suffered treatment infringing Article 3 at the hands of the police or other similar agents of the State, that provision, read in conjunction with the State\u2019s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to \u201csecure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in ... [the] Convention\u201d, requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation. The minimum standards of effectiveness, as defined in the Court\u2019s case-law were recapitulated by the Grand Chamber in, inter alia\u00b8 Mocanu and Others v. Romania ([GC], nos. 10865\/09 and 2 others, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0316-26, ECHR 2014) and El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ([GC], no. 39630\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 182-85, ECHR 2012, both with further references).131.\u00a0\u00a0Generally speaking, for an investigation to be effective, the persons responsible for carrying it out must be independent from those targeted by it. This means not only a lack of hierarchical or institutional connection but also a practical independence (see Mocanu, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0320).132.\u00a0\u00a0The investigation must be both prompt and thorough. That means that the authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation or to use as the basis of their decisions (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0323 and 325, and El-Masri, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0184). They must take all reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence (see El-Masri, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0184.). Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard (ibid., \u00a7\u00a0183).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application to the present case133.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that on 27 February 2011 the applicant was arrested and then taken to Limassol police station for questioning. The parties agree that the police used force against the applicant during his arrest. It is also undisputed that the applicant sustained certain injuries which are supported by medical evidence. The applicant was examined by two doctors at Limassol General Hospital, Dr A.K. and Dr C.T., approximately seven hours after his arrest (see paragraphs 23 and 24 above). The medical examination by Dr A.K. detected a cephalohaematoma in the right temporal region; abrasions in the parietal area; abrasions and mild oedema on the nose; bruising of his lower lip; a broken upper incisor; a bruise on the left hemithorax with sensitivity and a few abrasions; oedema and abrasions on both wrists; a few abrasions on the knees and loss of neck curve. The applicant complained of pain during the examination of the movement of his right knee; and sensitivity in the upper thoracic vertebra and the upper lumbar spine (see paragraph 23 above). Dr C.T. ascertained that the applicant had marks from blows mainly on his chest and face (see\u00a0paragraph 24 above).134.\u00a0\u00a0Neither the Government nor the applicant have contested the findings of those medical examinations. It is also noted that the Government have not questioned the report by the private practitioner, Dr S.J., who had examined the applicant eight days after his arrest (see paragraph 27 above).135.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that the applicant\u2019s injuries are sufficiently serious to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention.136.\u00a0\u00a0The parties, however, disagree as to the timing of the injuries and the exact circumstances in which the applicant sustained them.137.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Government, on the basis of the evidence in the file, the applicant attacked Special Constable G.S., ran away but fell in the process, hitting his head. A struggle ensued as the applicant resisted arrest. The police used force and the applicant was injured as a result. All the officers denied ill-treatment. There is no evidence that the force used to arrest the applicant was excessive or that the applicant was ill-treated upon arrest or while in custody.138.\u00a0\u00a0According to the applicant, he defended himself at the ATM as he thought he was being attacked. He did not therefore deny that there had been a scuffle with the police. His injuries were sustained owing to beatings and torture by the officers. Although in his application form he complained that this had occurred at the station, in his allegations to the domestic authorities he claimed that he had been subjected to such treatment during his arrest, in the car going to and at the police station.139.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the fact that neither the use of force by the police officers nor the applicant\u2019s resulting injuries are disputed by the domestic authorities, it is incumbent on the respondent Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation as to how the applicant\u2019s injuries could have been caused and whether they were caused by an illegal use of force, in violation of Article 3 of the Convention.140.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the Government\u2019s position regarding the disputed issues is based on the findings of the domestic investigation. The Court accepts that the explanation required from the Government can be said to have been provided when it is proved to the Court\u2019s satisfaction by the Government that their national authorities have conducted an effective investigation capable of establishing the circumstances and the nature of the force used.141.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will thus first examine whether the investigation carried out by the national authorities was effective in the sense that it was capable of showing that the use of force against the applicant had been made strictly necessary by the applicant\u2019s conduct and that he had not been subject to ill\u2011treatment afterwards on his way to the police station and at the police station.142.\u00a0\u00a0The authorities carried out three investigations into the applicant\u2019s complaint. An administrative investigation by the police itself was launched promptly following the applicant\u2019s complaint. Then two investigations were carried out by the IAIACAP.143.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the first two investigations suffered from a number of significant shortcomings. In fact, the authorities themselves were aware of a number of these shortcomings and it appears that, following communication of the application by the Court, a fresh investigation by the IAIACAP was ordered aiming to remedy these shortcomings (see\u00a0paragraph\u00a071 above).144.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that the authorities omitted to take all reasonable measures from the very beginning in order to secure the necessary evidence concerning the applicant\u2019s allegation of ill treatment. Most importantly, they did not order a forensic medical examination of the applicant in person to determine the exact nature and causes of his injuries. The Court emphasises in this connection that a forensic medical examination would have given an independent view of the injuries which were still fresh at the time. Although they eventually sought the assessment of the applicant\u2019s medical records by forensic medical experts in the context of the second investigation by the IAIACAP, this was a year and nine months after the events (see\u00a0paragraph\u00a090 above). By then the experts were no longer able to establish the possible causes of the injuries (see paragraph 91 above).145.\u00a0\u00a0In both the first and second investigations, the investigators failed to interview witnesses who could have had relevant information without giving any reasons for this. These were in particular the Canadian Consul and her assistant, who had visited the applicant in hospital on 1 March 2011.146.\u00a0\u00a0With regard specifically to the administrative investigation, the Court has repeatedly stressed that the procedural obligation under Article 3 requires an investigation to be independent and impartial, both in law and in practice (see paragraph 131 above). The administrative investigation was an internal police investigation ordered by the Limassol divisional police headquarters which appointed a police officer from another police station in Limassol to carry out enquiries into the applicant\u2019s complaint (see\u00a0paragraph 31 above). The officer was therefore part of the same substructure of the police force as the suspects and other police officers implicated in the events. In essence, he was investigating the activities of his colleagues. The final decisions on the case came from the Limassol divisional police headquarters and the Chief of Police (see\u00a0paragraph\u00a039\u00a0above). The investigation therefore lacked the necessary appearance of independence (see, for example, Mihhailov v. Estonia, no.\u00a064418\/10, \u00a7 128, 30 August 2016 with further references). Indeed, the investigators in the second IAIACAP investigation observed in their report that this was problematic and complaints should from the very beginning be transferred to the IAIACAP, which was an independent authority (see\u00a0paragraph 79 above).147.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, although this investigation was meant to look into the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment complaint, it was very limited in scope as it was based on statements mainly given for the purposes of the criminal proceedings with no steps being taken to investigate the allegations per se. This was also noted by the investigators in the second IAIACAP investigation (see paragraph 79 above). The investigator failed to ask the officers about the applicant\u2019s injuries and how they had happened. Thus certain officers made no mention of the state of the applicant or his injuries (see paragraph 36 above). He did not take statements from the interpreter or any of the doctors and did not take into account the relevant medical reports concerning the applicant. In his report, he only mentioned the report of Dr\u00a0V.D. concerning the injuries suffered by special constable G.S. (see\u00a0paragraph 37 above).148.\u00a0\u00a0When the first investigation by the IAIACAP was launched, five months had passed since the events (see paragraphs 41-42 above). The Court takes note of the omissions mentioned by the investigators in the second investigation which tainted and undermined that process; these included, inter alia, the failure of the investigator A.S. to elucidate significant inconsistencies in the applicant\u2019s allegations and statements, to examine the CCTV footage and to conduct an identity parade (see\u00a0paragraphs 80-82 above). In connection with the latter, even though the applicant in his written statement of June 2011 had claimed that he could identify the officers who had ill-treated him (see paragraph 45 and 47 above), no identity parade was organised to verify his claim in that regard.149.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that no face-to-face confrontations were held between the police officers in question and the applicant with a view to specifically addressing the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment (see, for example, Thuo, cited above, \u00a7 131).150.\u00a0\u00a0The second investigation by the IAIACAP was launched following communication of the application by the Court on 9 April 2013 (see\u00a0paragraph 71 above). However, by that time, more than two years had passed since the events in question. Even though this was a more thorough investigation, the passage of time had undermined its effectiveness and certain essential omissions could no longer be remedied. It was more difficult to gather evidence: many of the witnesses were not able to remember the relevant events and details or had become uncooperative, whereas the applicant had already left the country (see paragraphs 70, 75 and 92 above). The forensic experts were no longer able to establish the possible causes of the injuries (see paragraph 91 above). Nor would an identity parade have served any purpose at this stage as the applicant had already seen many of the officers in the context of the criminal proceedings against him.151.\u00a0\u00a0Although the common finding in all of the investigations was that the force used by Special Constable G.S. had not been excessive (see\u00a0paragraphs 37, 53, 56, 84, and 93 above), the overall conclusions were tenuous and were based largely on the applicant\u2019s lack of credibility. Due to all the shortcomings identified above and the insufficient evidence gathered as result, none of the three investigations managed to shed light on the exact circumstances in which the applicant\u2019s injuries were caused.152.\u00a0\u00a0Consequently, the domestic authorities\u2019 investigation fell short of the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention.153.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above the Court does not need to examine the remaining allegations made by the applicant in his observations concerning other deficiencies in the investigation of his complaint.154.\u00a0\u00a0As to the substantive element of Article 3, the Court has taken note of the inconsistencies in his statements highlighted by the domestic authorities in their investigation. Amongst other things, the CCTV footage contradicts his version of events when he was approached at the ATM by Senior Constable G.S., who was in police uniform. Furthermore, the Court is not convinced that the alleged beatings, which according to the applicant were inflicted on him by a number of officers for about four hours, and included hitting him with a metal chair and a wooden bat as well as punching and kicking, would not have left more serious injuries than those described in the medical reports. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the applicant did indeed suffer a number of injuries the existence of which was not denied by the Government and which were sufficiently serious as to amount to ill-treatment (see paragraphs 133 and 135 above).155.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the deficiencies in the domestic investigation, the Government have not been able to show that the applicant\u2019s injuries were actually sustained during his arrest and as a result of his own conduct or the intensity of his resistance. Thus, the Court finds that the Government have failed to discharge their burden of providing a satisfactory and convincing explanation (see paragraphs 139-140 above).156.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, the Court observes that upon his arrival at the police station the applicant was not taken for a medical examination before being taken into custody. Such an examination would have been appropriate, particularly bearing in mind that there had been a scuffle during the applicant\u2019s arrest. This would not only have ensured that he would have been fit for questioning in police custody but would also have enabled the respondent Government to discharge their burden of providing a plausible explanation for those injuries (see, inter alia, Parnov v. Moldova, no.\u00a035208\/06, \u00a7 30, 13 July 2010, and T\u00fcrkan v. Turkey, no. 33086\/04, \u00a7 42, 18 September 2008). In this connection, the Court notes that a medical examination, together with the right of access to a lawyer and the right to inform a third party of the detention, constitute fundamental safeguards against the ill-treatment of detained persons which should apply from the very outset of deprivation of liberty (see the 2nd General Report of the European Committee for Prevention of Torture, CPT\/Inf\/E (2002) 1 - Rev.\u00a02006, \u00a7 36). The Court also points out that the investigators in the second investigation in their report reproached Inspector I.S for not having ordered photographs to be taken of the applicant\u2019s injuries upon his arrival at the station (see paragraph 78 above). Indeed, this would have constituted evidence showing whether the injuries had happened before the applicant had been brought to the police station and would have assisted the investigators in examining the veracity of the applicant\u2019s allegation that he had also been ill-treated on the way to and at the police station.157.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, in view of the foregoing the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention both in its procedural and substantive aspects.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION158.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant invoked Article 5 of the Convention.159.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds no appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols arising from this complaint.160.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this complaint must be rejected as manifestly ill\u2011founded, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION161.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage162.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not make a claim in respect of pecuniary damage. He claimed EUR 40,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage for the injuries he had suffered, the circumstances under which these injuries had been caused, the time during which he had remained in detention and had suffered treatment contrary to Article 3 while in the hands of the police and the inadequacy of the investigation that had been conducted into his complaint.163.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the applicant\u2019s claim, submitting that it was excessive.164.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to all the circumstances of the present case, the Court accepts that the applicant has suffered non-pecuniary damage which cannot be compensated for solely by the finding of a violation. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR\u00a025,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable to him.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses165.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed EUR 17,700 for his lawyer\u2019s fees. The applicant submitted an invoice dated 15 April 2013 according to which the above-mentioned amount was broken down as follows: (a) EUR 15,000 as fees incurred for correspondence with the Attorney General concerning the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment and its investigation as well as those costs in respect of the proceedings before the Court; (b) EUR 2,700 for value-added tax\u00a0(VAT).166.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant should not recover this amount as it was excessive and not reasonable as to quantum.167.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. Rule 60 of the Rules of Court further requires that an applicant submit itemised particulars of all claims, together with any relevant supporting documents. If the applicant fails to comply with the requirements set out in the preceding paragraphs the Chamber may reject the claims in whole or in part.168.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the Court notes that the invoice submitted by the applicant does not contain an itemised breakdown of his claim. That being said, regard being had to Rule 60, the submissions of the applicant\u2019s lawyer and the documents in the case-file, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 3,000 under this head.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest169.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","30938":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION49.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that they had been subjected to ill\u2011treatment at the hands of the police and that no effective investigation into their complaints had been carried out. They relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d50.\u00a0\u00a0The Government denied the applicants\u2019 allegations of ill-treatment and considered them unsubstantiated, referring to the findings of the inquiry conducted by the prosecutor in response to the applicants\u2019 complaints and to the conclusions reached in this regard by the trial and appellate courts. The Government further submitted that the investigation conducted by the Russian authorities had complied with the procedural requirements of Article 3 of the Convention.51.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that agents of the State had subjected them to torture while in custody to make them confess to the crimes they had been accused of committing. They also argued that the investigation in response to their complaints had fallen short of the standards set forth in Article 3 of the Convention. The authorities had limited themselves to a superficial pre-investigation inquiry and had never instituted a fully-fledged investigation into their credible allegations.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility52.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits53.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant general principles were reiterated by the Court\u2019s Grand Chamber in the case of Bouyid v. Belgium ([GC], no. 23380\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a081-88, ECHR 2015). In particular, where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of individuals within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention. The burden of proof is then on the Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation by producing evidence establishing facts which cast doubt on the version of events given by the victim. In the absence of such an explanation, the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the Government. That is justified by the fact that those in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them (ibid., \u00a7\u00a083).1.\u00a0\u00a0Credibility of the applicants\u2019 allegations of ill-treatment and the presumption of fact54.\u00a0\u00a0The Court first observes that the applicants were remanded in ORB\u20112 for several days without their arrest being recorded (see paragraphs 7 and 24 above). Although they were not formally recognised as suspects, the material in the case file leaves little doubt in respect of their actual status as persons arrested on suspicion of having committed a criminal offence, and no other reason for holding them at the police station was suggested by the parties.55.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is concerned about the length of the applicants\u2019 unrecorded detention \u2013 five days each. During that time they remained on the premises of ORB-2 in the absence of the essential safeguards against ill\u2011treatment such as a medical examination, the right of access to a lawyer, and the right to inform a third party of the detention (see Minikayev v.\u00a0Russia, no. 630\/08, \u00a7\u00a052, 5\u00a0January 2016, with further references).56.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that during the applicants\u2019 unrecorded detention they were allegedly subjected to violence by officers of ORB-2. They provided a detailed and consistent account of the circumstances of the alleged ill-treatment, which involved severe beatings, electric shocks, gas masks, threats and so forth (see paragraph\u00a09 above). It also notes that following their unrecorded detention both applicants signed confession statements, which they later challenged at trial as having been given under coercion and which were nevertheless used as evidence for their conviction for several particularly serious crimes.57.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the case file contains no documentary evidence recording the injuries allegedly sustained by the applicants at the hands of the police. Despite an explicit request by the Court, the Government failed to submit medical documents attesting to their state of health in the period between September and December 2002, explaining that they must have been destroyed upon the expiry of their storage time-limit (see paragraph\u00a013 above).58.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the Government submitted a copy of a register of medical examinations of persons admitted to IZ-20\/2 in the period between 26\u00a0November 2002 and 4 October 2003, with the entries for both applicants stating \u201cno bodily injuries\u201d (see paragraph\u00a014 above). The Court is not convinced, however, that this document can in itself disprove their allegations of ill-treatment. The ill-treatment allegedly took place in September 2002, while the document in question refers to the period of time when the applicants were admitted to the remand prison in December 2002, by which time the injuries allegedly sustained by them would have already healed (see\u00a0paragraph 12 above).59.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that, although the case file does not contain any medical records supporting the applicants\u2019 allegations of ill-treatment, it contains a statement by the second applicant\u2019s legal aid lawyer D., who saw that his back was covered in bruises during his interview as a suspect on 24\u00a0September 2002 (see paragraphs 11 and 25 above).60.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicants\u2019 alleged ill-treatment took place in ORB-2 of Grozny, a facility which the CPT said stood out in terms of frequency and gravity of ill-treatment (see paragraphs 47 and 48 above).61.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that it has previously examined similar complaints of ill-treatment occurring on the premises of ORB-2 in 2003 and 2006, and found violations of Article\u00a03 of the Convention on account of torture (see Tangiyev v. Russia, no.\u00a027610\/05, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a034-63, 11\u00a0December 2012, and Mukayev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a062-77). The torture suffered by the applicants in those cases was similar to the treatment described by the applicants in the present case, involving beatings, electric shocks and gas masks.62.\u00a0\u00a0Taking into account the Government\u2019s failure to provide the medical records attesting to the applicants\u2019 state of health in the period immediately following their alleged ill-treatment, combined with contextual factors (see Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], no.\u00a072508\/13, \u00a7\u00a0312, 28\u00a0November 2017) such as the length of their unrecorded detention in ORB-2 in the absence of any safeguards against ill-treatment, the confession statements made at the end of their unrecorded detention and challenged later during the trial as given under coercion, the statement by the second applicant\u2019s legal aid lawyer D., the observations made by the CPT at ORB-2 during their visit there in May 2003, as well as the Court\u2019s case-law concerning similar allegations of ill-treatment at the facility at around the same time as the events at issue in the present case, the Court has sufficient grounds to consider that the applicants\u2019 allegations of ill-treatment by officers from ORB-2 were credible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Whether an effective investigation was carried out into the applicants\u2019 allegations of ill-treatment63.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that, in response to the applicants\u2019 allegations of ill-treatment in police custody, the domestic authorities conducted a pre\u2011investigation inquiry, which is the initial stage in dealing with a criminal complaint under Russian law and should normally be followed by the opening of a criminal case and an investigation if the information has disclosed elements of a criminal offence (see Lyapin, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0129).64.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates its finding that the mere carrying out of a pre\u2011investigation inquiry under Article 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation is insufficient if the authorities are to comply with the standards established under Article 3 of the Convention for an effective investigation into credible allegations of ill\u2011treatment in police custody. It is incumbent on the authorities to institute criminal proceedings and conduct a proper criminal investigation in which a full range of investigative measures are carried out (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 129 and 132-36).65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has no reason to hold otherwise in the present case, which involves credible allegations of ill-treatment of which the authorities were promptly made aware. It finds that the authorities failed to carry out an effective investigation into the applicants\u2019 allegations of ill-treatment in police custody, as required by Article 3 of the Convention.66.\u00a0\u00a0There has, accordingly, been a violation of Article\u00a03 of the Convention under its procedural limb.3.\u00a0\u00a0Whether the Government provided explanations capable of casting doubt on the applicants\u2019 versions of events67.\u00a0\u00a0The Government referred to the conclusions of the pre-investigation inquiry, asserting that the applicants\u2019 allegations were unfounded. Given that they were provided as a result of a domestic pre-investigation inquiry falling short of the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention, which was later quashed by the supervising prosecutor as unlawful and unsubstantiated (see paragraph 28 above), the Court finds that they cannot be considered as satisfactory or convincing explanations.68.\u00a0\u00a0It holds that the Government have failed to discharge their burden of proof and produce evidence capable of casting doubt on the applicants\u2019 account of events, which it therefore finds established (see Olisov and Others v. Russia, nos. 10825\/09 and 2 others, \u00a7\u00a085, 2\u00a0May 2017).4.\u00a0\u00a0Legal classification of the treatment69.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it has deemed treatment to be \u201cinhuman\u201d because it was premeditated, was applied for hours at a stretch and caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical and mental suffering. Treatment has been held to be \u201cdegrading\u201d when it was such as to arouse in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them and possibly breaking their physical or moral resistance, or when it was such as to drive the victim to act against his will or conscience. In determining whether a particular form of ill-treatment should be classified as torture, consideration must be given to the distinction, embodied in Article 3 of the Convention, between this notion and that of inhuman or degrading treatment. As noted in previous cases, it appears that it was the intention that the Convention should, by means of such a distinction, attach a special stigma to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering. In addition to the severity of the treatment, there is a purposive element to torture, as recognised in the United Nations Convention against Torture, which in Article 1 defines torture in terms of the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering with the aim of obtaining information, inflicting punishment or intimidating (see G\u00e4fgen v.\u00a0Germany [GC], no.\u00a022978\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 89-90, ECHR 2010).70.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that the repeated acts of violence to which the applicants were subjected by police officers of ORB-2, given their severity and the aim of obtaining confessions, amounted to torture.5.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion71.\u00a0\u00a0There has, accordingly, been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive limb in that the applicants were subjected to torture, and under its procedural limb on account of the lack of an effective investigation into their allegations.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION72.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that the criminal proceedings against them had been unfair. In particular, they complained that their conviction had been based on evidence obtained as a result of torture, and that they had not been afforded an opportunity to examine a number of prosecution witnesses. They relied on Article\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a01\u00a0and 3 (d) of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ......3.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:(d)\u00a0\u00a0to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him ...\u201d73.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered the applicants\u2019 complaint to be unsubstantiated. The pre-investigation inquiry had established that the applicants\u2019 allegations of ill-treatment were unfounded and, therefore, the trial court had reasonably refused to exclude the contested evidence. It had taken all the necessary measures to secure the attendance of prosecution witnesses, which had proved unsuccessful owing to the difficult situation in the Chechen Republic hindering entrance and departure from the region. The trial court had therefore allowed the prosecutor\u2019s request for the pre\u2011trial statements of absent witnesses to be read out, to which the applicants had not objected. In any event, the information provided by the absent witnesses had not in itself been sufficient for the applicants\u2019 conviction.74.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants maintained their complaint. They claimed that their confession statements, records of confrontations between the parties, transcripts of their interviews as suspects and reports of crime scene examinations they had participated in had been obtained as a result of torture while they had been on the premises of ORB-2, and that it had been mainly on the basis of this evidence that the domestic courts had found them guilty. They further submitted that they had not been afforded an opportunity to examine witnesses, in particular,\u00a0Ts., L. and K., at any stage of the proceedings.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility75.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this part of the application is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits76.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicants claimed that the criminal proceedings against them had been unfair, contrary to Article 6 of the Convention, for two reasons (see paragraph 72 above). Having examined the material in its possession, the Court does not consider it necessary to examine both aspects; it will concentrate on the applicants\u2019 complaint that the domestic courts, when convicting them, had regard to confessions that they had made under duress.77.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, the Court reiterates that the admission of confession statements obtained in violation of Article 3 renders the criminal proceedings as a whole automatically unfair, irrespective of the probative value of those statements and irrespective of whether their use was decisive in securing the defendant\u2019s conviction (see G\u00e4fgen, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0166 and\u00a0173, and Turbylev v. Russia, no. 4722\/09, \u00a7\u00a090, 6\u00a0October 2015).78.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has found above that the applicants were subjected to torture by police officers of ORB-2 and forced into confessing to the crimes with which they were subsequently charged. It observes that the applicants reiterated their confession statements during their questioning as suspects and during further investigative actions carried out between September and December 2002 while they had been held on the premises of ORB-2 where torture had taken place (see paragraphs 10 and 24 above). The records of those investigative actions, which the trial and appellate courts refused to declare inadmissible evidence, formed part of the evidence adduced against the applicants.79.\u00a0\u00a0In rejecting the applicants\u2019 requests for their confession statements to be declared inadmissible on the grounds that they had been obtained under duress the Regional Court failed to carry out a proper independent assessment with a view to ascertaining whether there were reasons to exclude those statements, allegedly \u201ctainted\u201d by the applicants\u2019 ill\u2011treatment, so as to ensure the fairness of the trial. Instead, it relied on the investigating authority\u2019s decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings into the applicants\u2019 alleged ill-treatment, which the Court has found to have been based on a pre-investigation inquiry which did not meet Article\u00a03 requirements. This lack of careful assessment of the quality of the impugned evidence and the circumstances in which it was obtained was not remedied by the national courts.80.\u00a0\u00a0In such circumstances, the Court concludes that, regardless of the impact the statements obtained under duress had on the outcome of the criminal proceedings against them, their use as evidence rendered the trial unfair.81.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION82.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants further complained that their allocation to remote penal facilities to serve their sentences of imprisonment had violated their right to respect for family life on account of the lack of practical opportunities for prison visits. They relied on Article\u00a08 of the Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life ...2.\u00a0\u00a0There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.\u201d83.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that it had been open to the applicants to complain to the courts about their allocation to penal facilities located outside their home region, in accordance with the provisions contained in Chapter\u00a025 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Since they had not had recourse to the above remedy, their complaint had to be dismissed for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. In the alternative, the Government argued that the applicants had failed to comply with the six-month requirement for lodging their complaint. They considered that the applicants\u2019 allocation to penal facilities had been a \u201csingle moment\u201d decision and did not give rise to a continuous situation for the purposes of calculating the six-month rule under Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. The Government further submitted on the merits of the complaint that the applicants\u2019 allocation to remote penal facilities had amounted to an interference with their rights under Article 8 of the Convention. However, despite the fact that the legal grounds for allocating persons convicted, as the applicants, under Articles 208 (membership of an illegal armed group) and 317 (attempt on the life of a law-enforcement officer) of the Criminal Code to penal facilities determined by the FSIN (Article 73 \u00a7 4 of the CES), had been introduced several months after the applicants\u2019 actual transfer, the interference had nevertheless been in accordance with the law, had been necessary and had not amounted to a violation of Article\u00a08 of the Convention. The applicants had been given long prison sentences, to be served in strict-regime penal facilities. However, at the relevant time there had been no such penal facilities in the Chechen Republic, which was why the applicants had been allocated to penal facilities in other regions. Furthermore, had the applicants remained in the Chechen Republic to serve their sentences, it would have created a serious risk to public order and safety in view of the criminal situation in the region at the material time.84.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants argued that since the domestic law did not define any clear criteria and procedure for allocating a convicted person to a penal facility by the federal penal authority, which was left completely to the discretion of the latter, no court action under Chapter\u00a025 of the Code of Civil Procedure had offered them any prospects of success. Therefore, they had not had any domestic remedies to exhaust. The applicants considered that their allocation to penal facilities far from home constituted a continuing situation, because they continued to suffer the negative consequences of the interference with their rights under Article 8 of the Convention, and that the six-month time-limit for lodging their complaint with the Court had been complied with. The applicants submitted on the merits of the case that their placement in penal facilities far from their home region had amounted to an interference with their right to respect for their family life. The interference had not been in accordance with the law, since the law did not satisfy the \u201cquality of law\u201d requirement, and had not pursued a legitimate aim. Even if there had been no appropriate penal facilities in the Chechen Republic there should have been such facilities in the adjacent regions. The applicants pointed to the existence of at least one facility in the Chechen Republic, IK-2, which, although a normal-security prison, had a high-security wing. Furthermore, it was unclear how their allocation to remote penal facilities could have served to protect public safety in the Chechen Republic. Even assuming that the interference had pursued a legitimate aim, it had been disproportionate as it had unnecessarily limited their opportunity to preserve family and social ties after their conviction.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0Exhaustion of domestic remedies85.\u00a0\u00a0The rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention obliges applicants to use first the remedies which are available and sufficient in the domestic legal system to enable them to obtain redress for the breaches alleged. The existence of the remedies must be sufficiently certain both in theory and in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness. It is incumbent on the respondent Government claiming non-exhaustion to indicate to the Court with sufficient clarity the remedies to which the applicants have not had recourse and to satisfy the Court that the remedies in question were effective and available in theory and in practice at the relevant time, that is to say that they were accessible, were capable of providing redress in respect of the applicants\u2019 complaints and offered reasonable prospects of success (see Guliyev v. Russia, no.\u00a024650\/02, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a051-52, 19\u00a0June 2008, with further references).86.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the Government claimed that it had been incumbent on the applicants to challenge before the courts the FSIN\u2019s decisions to allocate them to remote penal facilities in accordance with the procedure, in force at the material time, provided by Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure. They failed, however, to explain by providing any example from domestic practice how the suggested remedy could have prevented the alleged violation or its continuation or afforded the applicants adequate redress. In such circumstances, the Court considers that the Government have not substantiated their claim as to the availability to the applicants of an effective domestic remedy for their complaint under Article\u00a08 of the Convention. Accordingly, the Court rejects their objection.2.\u00a0\u00a0Compliance with the six-month rule87.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already established that a prisoner\u2019s detention under unvaried conditions and\/or regime constitutes a \u201ccontinuous situation\u201d and that a complaint under Article 8 of the Convention concerning the effective impossibility of maintaining family and social ties during imprisonment in a remote penal facility must (unless an effective remedy was available) be submitted within six months of the end of the detention in that facility (see Polyakova and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a063-67, with further references).88.\u00a0\u00a0Considering that the applicants lodged their complaint under Article\u00a08 of the Convention while they were serving their sentences in the remote penal facilities, the Government\u2019s objection must be dismissed.3.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion89.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that this part of the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits90.\u00a0\u00a0The principles as regards prisoners\u2019 right to private and family life are well-established in the Court\u2019s case-law and are summarised, inter alia, in the case of Polyakova (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a084-89, with further references).91.\u00a0\u00a0The Court accepts, and it is not disputed by the parties, that in the circumstances of the case the authorities\u2019 decisions to allocate the applicants to remote penal facilities to serve their prison sentences amounted to an interference with their right to respect for their family life.92.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has to next determine whether the interference was justified under Article 8 \u00a7 2 of the Convention, that is, whether it was \u201cin accordance with the law\u201d, pursued one or more of the legitimate aims set out in that paragraph and was \u201cnecessary in a democratic society\u201d to achieve that aim or those aims.93.\u00a0\u00a0The wording \u201cin accordance with the law\u201d requires the impugned measure both to have some basis in domestic law and to be compatible with the rule of law, which is expressly mentioned in the Preamble to the Convention and inherent in the object and purpose of Article 8 of the Convention. The law must thus meet quality requirements: it must be accessible to the person concerned and foreseeable as to its effects (see Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], no. 47143\/06, \u00a7\u00a0228, ECHR 2015).94.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the decisions of the FSIN to allocate the applicants to penal facilities and their subsequent refusals to transfer them to other penal facilities on the grounds of respect for their family life were based on Article\u00a073\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a02 and 4 and Article\u00a081 of the CES respectively (see paragraph 42 above).95.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that is has already found in the case of Polyakova and Others (cited above) that provisions contained in Article\u00a073\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7 2 and 4 and Article 81 of the CES did not satisfy the \u201cquality of law\u201d requirement. The Court held, in particular, that Article 73 \u00a7\u00a7 2 and 4 did not provide for the weighing of the competing individual and public interests and assessment of the proportionality of a restriction of the relevant Article 8 of the Convention right in the context of allocation of prisoners as a matter of exception to the general distribution rule, and that Article 81 of the CES did not provide the applicants with any safeguards against its arbitrary application by the FSIN irrespective of considerations pertaining to their right to respect for family life (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7\u00a094-107, and \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0116-18).96.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above finding, which is fully applicable to the present case, it follows that the interference with the applicants\u2019 right to respect for their family life was not \u201cin accordance with the law\u201d within the meaning of Article 8 \u00a7 2 of the Convention. Consequently, there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in respect of each applicant.97.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the foregoing conclusion, the Court does not consider it necessary to examine whether the other requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Convention were complied with in the present case.IV.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION98.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicants complained under Article\u00a03 of the Convention about the conditions of their detention in the IVS, under Article\u00a05 of the Convention of the unlawfulness of their unrecorded detention, and under Article\u00a06 of the Convention of further procedural irregularities in the criminal proceedings against them.99.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to all the material in its possession and in so far as it falls within its competence, the Court finds that there is no appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.V.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION100.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage101.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant claimed 855,000 euros (EUR) and the second applicant EUR\u00a0342,000 in respect of pecuniary damage for violation of their rights under Article 3 of the Convention, representing their families\u2019 alleged expenses and their loss of income. They further claimed EUR\u00a037,000 each in respect of non-pecuniary damage, broken down as follows: EUR\u00a012,000, EUR\u00a015,000 and EUR 10,000 for the breaches of Articles 3, 6 and 8 of the Convention respectively.102.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that the amounts of the pecuniary damage claimed by the applicants were unsubstantiated and speculative. As regards the non-pecuniary damage, the Government considered that if the Court were to find a violation, the finding of such a violation would constitute in itself sufficient just satisfaction. They further considered that should the Court find a violation of Article 6 of the Convention, it should dismiss the applicants\u2019 claim for non-pecuniary damage in this part, given that the criminal proceedings against the applicants could be reopened if the Court found a violation (see paragraph\u00a046 above).103.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it has found violations of Articles 3, 6 and\u00a08 of the Convention in the present case: the applicants were subjected to torture whilst in police custody, the investigation into their allegations of ill\u2011treatment was ineffective, the criminal proceedings against them were unfair, and they were allocated to penal facilities far from their home region in violation of their right to respect for family life.104.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the applicants\u2019 claims for pecuniary damage are unsubstantiated. Consequently, it finds no reason to award the applicants any sum under this head.105.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the non-pecuniary damage, the Court considers that the applicants\u2019 suffering and anguish cannot be compensated for by a mere finding of a violation. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicants EUR 37,000 each in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount. The Court further notes that Article 413 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that criminal proceedings may be reopened if the Court finds a violation of the Convention.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses106.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also claimed EUR\u00a09,600 for the work carried out by their representatives, who spent seventy-eight hours preparing the case, with forty-two hours at a rate of EUR\u00a0100 per hour and thirty-six hours at a rate of EUR\u00a0150 per hour.107.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicants\u2019 claim was excessive.108.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, and taking note of the fact that the applicants have benefited from legal aid which has already been paid to their representatives in the amount of EUR 850, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR\u00a04,150, for the proceedings before the Court, to be paid directly to the bank account of the applicants\u2019 representatives, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants on that amount.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest109.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","30959":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION18.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the conditions of his detention and the overcrowding in Mys\u0142owice Remand Centre and Wojkowice Prison, where he had been held from 20 April 2010 to 9 March 2012 had amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d19.\u00a0\u00a0The Government, in their observations, acknowledged that on 20\u00a0April, 18 and 19 May 2009 the applicant had been detained in overcrowded cells where the space per person was below the statutory minimum. As regards the remainder of the impugned period, the Government submitted that the applicant had been detained in cells where the space per person had been more than 3 m\u00b2. However, they failed to provide the Court with any evidence supporting their submissions.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0Incompatibility ratione personae20.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant could no longer be considered a victim of the alleged violation because, by virtue of the domestic court\u2019s judgment of 27 June 2013 he had been awarded compensation of PLN\u00a01,000 plus interest. Additionally, the domestic court relied on Article 3 of the Convention and thus acknowledged a breach of the Convention. Moreover, it took into account the fact that the breach of the statutory minimum standard of 3 m\u00b2 had not been significant. The Government relied, inter alia, on the inadmissibility decisions in the cases of B.G. v. Poland ((dec.), no. 61403\/10 of 27 August 20013), and Dubjakov\u00e1 v.\u00a0Slovakia ((dec.), no. 67299\/01 of 19 October 2004) and argued that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim of a violation of the Convention, as the compensation of PLN 1,000 was sufficient to compensate for his detention in overcrowded cells for three days.21.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant refrained from taking position in this respect.22.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that a decision or measure favourable to the applicant is not, in principle, sufficient to deprive him of his status as a \u201cvictim\u201d for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for the breach of the Convention (see G\u00e4fgen v.\u00a0Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, \u00a7 115, ECHR 2010).23.\u00a0\u00a0The Court accepts the Government\u2019s statement that a breach of the Convention was acknowledged by the national authorities. Nevertheless, it reiterates that the redress afforded must be appropriate and sufficient. This will depend on all circumstances of the case, with particular regard to the nature of the Convention violation in issue (see G\u00e4fgen, cited above, \u00a7 115). An applicant\u2019s victim status may depend also on the level of compensation awarded at the domestic level on the basis of the facts about which he or she has complained to the Court (see Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no.\u00a036813\/97, \u00a7 202, ECHR 2006\u2011V).24.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 3 enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic societies. Persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them (see Orchowski, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 119-122). For that reason, despite acknowledgement of a breach of the Convention, the fact that an applicant has been awarded a sum of money in compensation in the domestic proceedings is not decisive when it comes to determining an applicant\u2019s victim status (see Norbert Sikorski, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 96\u201199).25.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in the present case the applicant sued the State, submitting that the defendant had failed to ensure adequate conditions during his detention in Mys\u0142owice Remand Centre and Wojkowice Prison and the Katowice Court of Appeal found that his detention in overcrowded cells had lasted from 20 April 2010 to 9 March 2012 (see paragraph\u00a016 above).26.\u00a0\u00a0Taking into account the domestic court\u2019s findings in respect of the length of the applicant\u2019s detention in overcrowded cells and the Court\u2019s case-law regarding the amount of compensation awarded in cases concerning prison conditions where the Court has found a violation of an applicant\u2019s rights protected by Article 3, the Court finds that the compensation awarded to the applicant by the domestic court is insufficient to deprive him of his victim status.27.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the applicant can still claim to be a victim of a violation of the substantive aspect of Article 3 on account of overcrowding and the resulting inadequate conditions of his detention. It therefore dismisses the Government\u2019s preliminary objection in that regard.2.\u00a0\u00a0No significant disadvantage28.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further argued that the applicant\u2019s complaint should be declared inadmissible because he had not suffered a significant disadvantage within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (b) of the Convention since the alleged violation did not attain the minimum level of severity required to warrant consideration by an international court.29.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not comment on the Government\u2019s objection.30.\u00a0\u00a0At the outset, the Court notes that the application of this criterion is not limited to complaints relating to specific Articles of the Convention. However, the Court finds it difficult to envisage a situation in which a complaint under Article 3 of the Convention which would not be inadmissible on any other grounds and which would fall within the scope of Article 3 (which means that the minimum level of severity test would be fulfilled) might be declared inadmissible because the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage (see Y v. Latvia no. 61183\/08, \u00a7\u00a074, 21\u00a0October 2014). As indicated above, in view of the Government\u2019s failure to support their submission with any relevant evidence, the Court must rely on the findings made by the domestic courts according to which the applicant spent almost 1 year and 11 months in overcrowded cells. Given the length of that period, it finds that the situation complained of cannot be characterised as \u201cnon-significant disadvantage\u201d. It follows that the Government\u2019s objection must be dismissed.3.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion as regards admissibility31.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant\u2019s complaint is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits32.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained that the conditions of his detention from 20\u00a0April 2010 to 9 March 2012 had fallen short of standards compatible with Article 3 of the Convention.33.\u00a0\u00a0In their observations the Government refrained from taking position on the merits of the application.34.\u00a0\u00a0A restatement of the general principles concerning the examination of conditions of detention under Article 3 may be found in the Court\u2019s pilot judgments in Orchowski (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 119-131) and Norbert Sikorski (also cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 126-141), and in Mur\u0161i\u0107 v. Croatia [GC], no. 7334\/13, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a096-141, ECHR 2016.35.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has already found that a strong presumption of a violation of Article 3 arises when the personal space available to a detainee falls below 3 m\u00b2 multi-occupancy accommodation, a presumption which can be rebutted only where the following requirements are cumulatively met: where short, occasional and minor reductions of personal space are accompanied by sufficient freedom of movement outside the cell, and adequate out-of-cell activities and confinement is in, viewed generally, an appropriate detention facility (see, Mur\u0161i\u0107, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 137-138).36.\u00a0\u00a0Referring to the Government\u2019s failure to provide any supporting evidence in relation to their submissions (see paragraph 19 above), the Court notes that it has held on many occasions that cases concerning allegations of inadequate conditions of detention do not lend themselves to a rigorous application of the principle affirmanti incumbit probatio (he who alleges something must prove that allegation), because in such instances the respondent Government alone have access to information capable of corroborating or refuting those allegations. It follows that, after the Court has given notice of the applicant\u2019s complaint to the Government, the burden is on the latter to collect and produce relevant documents. A failure on their part to submit convincing evidence on material conditions of detention may give rise to the drawing of inferences as to the well\u2011foundedness of the applicant\u2019s allegations (see Olszewski v. Poland, no. 21880\/03, \u00a7 94, 2 April 2013).37.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, as established by the domestic court, from 20\u00a0April 2010 to 9 March 2012 the applicant had been detained in overcrowded cells, below 3 m\u00b2 of personal space (see paragraph 16 above).38.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the fact that the Government failed to provide any evidence to the contrary or confirming compliance with the standards set in Mur\u0161i\u0107 (cited above), the Court finds that in these circumstances the reduction of the required personal space cannot be considered as \u201cshort, occasional and minor\u201d within the meaning of the Court\u2019s case-law (see Mur\u0161i\u0107, cited above, \u00a7 130). It follows that in the present case the strong presumption of a violation of Article 3 cannot be rebutted.39.\u00a0\u00a0Taking into account all the above circumstances the Court finds that in the present case there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION40.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d41.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum on that account.","30966":"19.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that they had been arrested and detained unlawfully, contrary to Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. They further complained under Article 5 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 of the Convention that they had not been brought before a judge in order for the lawfulness of their arrest to be decided upon and therefore could not appeal against a non-existent decision to detain them. The applicants also complained under Article 3 of the Convention that they had been held in inhuman conditions of detention, ill\u2011treated and refused medical assistance. They lastly complained of a violation of Article 13 of the Convention since they had not had a remedy before the Moldovan or Russian courts.I.\u00a0\u00a0JURISDICTION20.\u00a0\u00a0The Court must first determine whether the applicants fell within the jurisdiction of the respondent States for the purposes of the matters complained of, within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention.A.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions21.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that both respondent Governments had jurisdiction.22.\u00a0\u00a0The Moldovan Government submitted that they had positive obligations to secure the applicants\u2019 rights.23.\u00a0\u00a0For their part, the Russian Government argued that the applicants did not fall within their jurisdiction and that, consequently, the application should be declared inadmissible ratione personae and ratione loci in respect of the Russian Federation. As they did in Mozer (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 92-94), the Russian Government expressed the view that the approach to the issue of jurisdiction taken by the Court in Ila\u015fcu and Others (cited above); Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia ([GC], nos.\u00a043370\/04 and 2 others, ECHR 2012 (extracts); and Ivan\u0163oc and Others v. Moldova and Russia (no. 23687\/05, 15 November 2011) was wrong and at variance with public international law.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment24.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the parties in the present case have positions concerning the matter of jurisdiction which are similar to those expressed by the parties in Catan and Others (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 83-101) and in Mozer (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a081-95). Namely, the applicants and the Moldovan Government submitted that both respondent Governments had jurisdiction, while the Russian Government submitted that they had no jurisdiction.25.\u00a0\u00a0The Court recalls that the general principles concerning the issue of jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention in respect of actions and facts pertaining to the Transdniestrian region of Moldova were set out in Ila\u015fcu and Others (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 311-19), Catan and Others (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0103-07) and, more recently, Mozer (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 97-98).26.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the Republic of Moldova is concerned, the Court notes that in Ila\u015fcu and Others, Catan and Others and Mozer it found that although Moldova had no effective control over the Transdniestrian region, it followed from the fact that Moldova was the territorial State that persons within that territory fell within its jurisdiction. However, its obligation, under Article 1 of the Convention, to secure to everyone within its jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention was limited to that of taking the diplomatic, economic, judicial and other measures that were both in its power and in accordance with international law (see Ila\u015fcu and Others, cited above, \u00a7 333; Catan and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0109; and Mozer, cited above, \u00a7 100). Moldova\u2019s obligations under Article 1 of the Convention were found to be positive obligations (see Ila\u015fcu and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 322 and 330-31; Catan and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0109-10; and Mozer, cited above, \u00a7 99).27.\u00a0\u00a0The Court sees no reason to distinguish the present case from the above-mentioned cases. Besides, it notes that the Moldovan Government do not object to applying a similar approach in the present case. Therefore, it finds that Moldova has jurisdiction for the purposes of Article\u00a01 of the Convention, but that its responsibility for the acts complained of is to be assessed in the light of the above-mentioned positive obligations (see Ila\u015fcu and Others, cited above, \u00a7 335).28.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the Russian Federation is concerned, the Court notes that in Ila\u0219cu and Others it found that the Russian Federation contributed both militarily and politically to the creation of a separatist regime in the region of Transdniestria in 1991-1992 (see Ila\u0219cu and Others, cited above, \u00a7 382). The Court also found in subsequent cases concerning the Transdniestrian region that up until July 2010, the \u201cMRT\u201d was only able to continue to exist, and to resist Moldovan and international efforts to resolve the conflict and bring democracy and the rule of law to the region, because of Russian military, economic and political support (see Ivan\u0163oc and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 116-20; Catan and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 121-22; and Mozer, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 108 and 110). The Court concluded in Mozer that the \u201cMRT\u201d\u2018s high level of dependency on Russian support provided a strong indication that the Russian Federation continued to exercise effective control and a decisive influence over the Transdniestrian authorities and that, therefore, the applicant fell within that State\u2019s jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention (see Mozer, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 110-11).29.\u00a0\u00a0The Court sees no grounds on which to distinguish the present case from Ila\u0219cu and Others, Ivan\u0163oc and Others, Catan and Others, and Mozer (all cited above).30.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the applicants in the present case fell within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation under Article 1 of the Convention. Consequently, the Court dismisses the Russian Government\u2019s objections ratione personae and ratione loci.31.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will hereafter determine whether there has been any violation of the applicants\u2019 rights under the Convention such as to engage the responsibility of either respondent State (see Mozer, cited above, \u00a7 112).II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7\u00a7 1, 3 AND 4 OF THE CONVENTION32.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that their arrest and detention had been unlawful and contrary to Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. They also submitted that their rights, as guaranteed by Article 5 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 of the Convention, had been breached. The relevant parts of Article 5 read as follows:Article 5\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:...(c)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; ...\u201d\u201c3.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph\u00a01\u00a0(c) of this Article shall be ... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.\u201d\u201c4.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility33.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that these complaints are not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention, and that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. The Court therefore declares them admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits34.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that neither their arrest nor their detention had been ordered and carried out in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law, as required by Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.35.\u00a0\u00a0The respondent Governments did not make any submissions on the merits of this complaint.36.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it is well established in its case-law on Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention that any deprivation of liberty must not only be based on one of the exceptions listed in sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) but must also be \u201clawful\u201d. Where the \u201clawfulness\u201d of detention is in issue, including the question of whether \u201ca procedure prescribed by law\u201d has been followed, the Convention refers essentially to national law and lays down the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules of national law. This primarily requires any arrest or detention to have a legal basis in domestic law; it also relates to the quality of the law, requiring it to be compatible with the rule of law, a concept inherent in all the Articles of the Convention (see, for example, Del R\u00edo Prada v. Spain [GC], no. 42750\/09, \u00a7 125, ECHR 2013; and Mozer, cited above, \u00a7 134).37.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that in Mozer it held that the judicial system of the \u201cMRT\u201d was not a system reflecting a judicial tradition compatible with the Convention (see Mozer, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 148-49). For that reason it held that the \u201cMRT\u201d courts and, by implication, any other \u201cMRT\u201d authority, could not order the applicant\u2019s \u201clawful\u201d arrest or detention, within the meaning of Article\u00a05 \u00a7\u00a01\u00a0of the Convention (see Mozer, cited above, \u00a7 150).38.\u00a0\u00a0In the absence of any new and pertinent information proving the contrary, the Court considers that the conclusion reached in Mozer is valid in the present case too. It therefore considers that there has been a breach of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention in the present case.39.\u00a0\u00a0The Court must next determine whether the Republic of Moldova fulfilled its positive obligation to take appropriate and sufficient measures to secure the applicants\u2019 rights under Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention (see paragraph 27 above). In Mozer, the Court held that Moldova\u2019s positive obligations related both to measures needed to re-establish its control over the Transdniestrian territory, as an expression of its jurisdiction, and to measures to ensure respect for individual applicants\u2019 rights (see Mozer, cited above, \u00a7 151).40.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the first aspect of Moldova\u2019s obligation, to re-establish control, the Court found in Mozer that, from the onset of the hostilities in 1991-1992 until July 2010, Moldova had taken all the measures in its power (Mozer, cited above, \u00a7 152). Since the events complained of in the present case took place before the latter date, the Court sees no reason to reach a different conclusion (ibid.).41.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the second part of the positive obligations, namely to ensure respect for the applicants\u2019 rights, the Court notes that the Moldovan authorities made efforts to secure the applicants\u2019 rights. In particular, a criminal investigation was initiated in respect of the applicants\u2019 detention by the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities (see paragraph 16 above).42.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the Republic of Moldova did not fail to fulfil its positive obligations in respect of the applicants and finds that there has been no violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention by that State. For the same reasons, the Court finds that there has been no violation of Article 5 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 of the Convention by the Republic of Moldova.43. In so far as the responsibility of the Russian Federation is concerned, the Court has established that Russia exercised effective control over the \u201cMRT\u201d during the period in question (see paragraphs 28-29 above). In the light of this conclusion, and in accordance with its case-law, it is not necessary to determine whether or not Russia exercised detailed control over the policies and actions of the subordinate local administration (see Mozer, cited above, \u00a7 157). By virtue of its continued military, economic and political support for the \u201cMRT\u201d, without which the latter could not otherwise survive, Russia\u2019s responsibility under the Convention is engaged as regards the violation of the applicants\u2019 rights (ibid.).44.\u00a0\u00a0In conclusion, and having found that the applicants\u2019 detention was unlawful under Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention (see paragraph 38 above), the Court holds that there has been a violation of that provision by the Russian Federation.45.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the above, the Court does not consider it necessary to examine separately the applicants\u2019 respective complaints under Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a03 and 4 of the Convention in respect of the Russian Federation.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION46.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that they had been held in inhuman conditions of detention and had not been given the requisite medical assistance. They also complained of being subjected to ill-treatment and torture at the hands of the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities. They relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:Article\u00a03\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility47.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained under Article 3 of the Convention that they had been subjected to ill-treatment while in detention. However, only Mr Mang\u00eer adduced medical evidence proving that he had been diagnosed with concussion after his release from detention. The other applicants failed to adduce any evidence, such as medical documents or witness statements, in support of their allegations. The Court therefore considers that this part of the complaint under Article 3, in respect of the four other applicants, is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and must be declared inadmissible, in accordance with Article\u00a035 \u00a7 4 of the Convention.48.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants further complained that they had not received adequate medical care while in detention. However, the Court notes that none of the applicants adduced any evidence that they had been in need of any urgent medical care during their detention. The Court therefore considers that this part of the complaint under Article 3 of the Convention, in respect of all of the applicants, is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and must be declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7 4 of the Convention.49.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the rest of the complaint under Article 3 of the Convention, namely the parts pertaining to the material conditions of detention of all five applicants and the ill-treatment of Mr Mang\u00eer, is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention, and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. The Court therefore declares it admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits50.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained in the first place that their cells had been in the basement and had not afforded them any access to natural light. There had been no ventilation and the cells had been overcrowded. Moreover, the applicants had not had daily exercise or access to a shower.51.\u00a0\u00a0The respondent Governments did not make any submissions on the merits of this complaint.52.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure of deprivation of liberty do not subject him or her to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his or her health and well\u2011being are adequately secured (see Mozer, cited above, \u00a7 178; Khlaifia and Others v.\u00a0Italy [GC], no. 16483\/12, \u00a7 160 (c), ECHR 2016 (extracts); and Mur\u0161i\u0107 v.\u00a0Croatia [GC], no. 7334\/13, \u00a7 99, ECHR 2016.53.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case the Court notes that the respondent Governments did not comment on the applicants\u2019 description of the conditions of their detention. However, the Court has already reviewed the material conditions in the \u201cMRT\u201d prisons in Mozer (cited above, \u00a7 181, with further references, notably to visits to the region by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment) and found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of inhuman conditions of detention (ibid., \u00a7 182). The Court notes in particular that the Special Rapporteur\u2019s visit took place in July 2008 \u2013 that is to say after the time when the applicants were in detention.54.\u00a0\u00a0On the basis of the material before it and in the absence of any material contradicting the applicants\u2019 submissions, the Court finds it established that the conditions of the applicants\u2019 detention amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.55.\u00a0\u00a0Mr Mang\u00eer further complained about ill-treatment during his detention.56.\u00a0\u00a0The respondent Governments did not make any submissions on the merits of this complaint.57.\u00a0\u00a0Where an individual is taken into police custody in good health but is found to be injured at the time of release, it is incumbent on the State to provide a plausible explanation of how those injuries were caused, failing which a clear issue arises under Article 3 of the Convention. In addition, where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention. The burden of proof is then on the Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation by producing evidence establishing facts which cast doubt on the account of events given by the victim. In the absence of any such explanation, the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the Government. This is justified by the fact that persons in the hands of the police or a comparable authority are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them (see Blokhin v. Russia [GC], no.\u00a047152\/06, \u00a7\u00a0140, ECHR 2016; Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380\/09, \u00a7\u00a083, ECHR 2015; and Khlaifia and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0205).58.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the medical evidence according to which the applicant suffered the consequences of a head concussion after his release from the \u201cMRT\u201d prison and of the lack of a plausible explanation as to how the injury was caused, the Court finds that the applicant was subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.59.\u00a0\u00a0For the same reasons as those given in respect of the complaint under Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention (see paragraphs 40-41 above), the Court finds that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention by the Republic of Moldova.60.\u00a0\u00a0For the same reasons as those given in the same context (see paragraph 43 above), the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention by the Russian Federation.IV.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLES 3 AND 561.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants furthermore complained that they had no effective remedies in respect of their respective complaints under Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention. They relied on Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility62.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention, is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits63.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that they had had no means of asserting their rights in the face of the actions of the \u201cMRT\u201d authorities, and that the respondent Governments had not indicated any remedies which they should have exhausted.64.\u00a0\u00a0The respondent Governments did not make any submissions on the merits of this complaint.65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 13 of the Convention guarantees the availability at national level of a remedy by which to complain of a breach of the Convention rights and freedoms. Therefore, although Contracting States are afforded some discretion as to the manner in which they conform to their obligations under this provision, there must be a domestic remedy allowing the competent national authority both to deal with the substance of the relevant Convention complaint and to grant appropriate relief. The scope of the obligation under Article 13 varies depending on the nature of the applicant\u2019s complaint under the Convention, but the remedy must in any event be \u201ceffective\u201d in practice as well as in law, in particular in the sense that its exercise must not be unjustifiably hindered by the acts or omissions of the authorities of the State (Mozer, cited above, \u00a7 207; Khlaifia and Others, cited above, \u00a7 268; and De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], no. 43395\/09, \u00a7\u00a0179, ECHR 2017 (extracts)). However, Article 13 of the Convention requires that a remedy be available in domestic law only in respect of grievances which can be regarded as \u201carguable\u201d in terms of the Convention (Mozer, cited above, \u00a7 207; and De Tommaso, cited above, \u00a7 180).66.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicants\u2019 complaints under Article 3 of the Convention, concerning the conditions of their detention and the ill\u2011treatment of Mr Mang\u00eer, were arguable. However, as regards the applicants\u2019 complaint under Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, the Court observes that Article 5 \u00a7 4 is the lex specialis in relation to Article 13, and recalls that, with respect to the Russian Federation, it did not consider it necessary to examine that complaint separately, given the circumstances of the case (see paragraph 45 above).67.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court will examine only whether a domestic remedy was available to the applicants in respect of their complaints under Article 3 of the Convention.68.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the applicants complained against Moldova, the Court notes that the Moldovan Government did not point to the existence of any effective remedy under Moldovan domestic law.69.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the applicants complain against Russia, the Court also notes that there is no indication in the file, and the Russian Government have not claimed, that any effective remedies were available to the applicants in the \u201cMRT\u201d in respect of the above-mentioned complaints.70.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore concludes that the applicants did not have an effective remedy in respect of their respective complaints under Article 3 of the Convention. Consequently, the Court must decide whether any violation of Article 13 can be attributed to either of the respondent States.71.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the responsibility of Moldova is concerned, the Court recalls that it found that the \u201cremedies\u201d which this State must offer to applicants consisted of enabling them to inform the Moldovan authorities of the details of their situation and to be kept informed of the various legal and diplomatic actions taken by these authorities (Mozer, cited above, \u00a7 214). In Mozer, it concluded among other things that Moldova had made procedures available to the applicant commensurate with its limited ability to protect the applicant\u2019s rights and that it had thus fulfilled its positive obligations (ibid., \u00a7 216). In the present case, the Court sees no reason to reach a different conclusion. Accordingly, it finds that there has been no violation of Article 13 of the Convention by Moldova.72.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the responsibility of the Russian Federation is concerned, for the same reasons as those given in respect of the complaint under Article\u00a05 \u00a7 1 of the Convention (see paragraph 43 above) and in the absence of any submission by the Russian Government as to any remedies available to the applicants, the Court concludes that there has been a violation by the Russian Federation of Article 13 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention (see Mozer, cited above, \u00a7 218).V.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION73.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage74.\u00a0\u00a0Mr Mang\u00eer and Mr Condrea claimed 25,000 euros (EUR) each in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and the rest of the applicants claimed EUR 15,000 each.75.\u00a0\u00a0The Governments asked the Court to dismiss the applicants\u2019 claims for non-pecuniary damage.76.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it has not found any violation of the Convention by Moldova in the present case. Accordingly, no award of compensation is to be made with regard to this respondent State.77.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the violations by the Russian Federation found above, the Court considers that an award in respect of non-pecuniary damage is justified in this case. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards EUR\u00a025,000 to Mr Mang\u00eer and EUR 20,000 to Mr\u00a0Condrea and EUR 15,000 to each of the remaining applicants.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses78.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also claimed EUR 3,000 for costs and expenses.79.\u00a0\u00a0The respondent Governments asked the Court to dismiss the applicants\u2019 claims.80.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it has found that Moldova, having fulfilled its positive obligations, was not responsible for any violation of the Convention in the present case. Accordingly, no award of compensation for costs and expenses is to be made with regard to this respondent State.81.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that in order for costs and expenses to be included in an award under Article 41 of the Convention, it must be established that they were actually and necessarily incurred and were reasonable as to quantum (see, for example, Mozer, cited above, \u00a7 240). Having regard to all the relevant factors and to Rule 60 \u00a7 2 of the Rules of Court, the Court awards the entire amount claimed for costs and expenses, to be paid by the Russian Federation.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest82.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","30967":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION31.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been subjected to ill-treatment during his arrest and while in police custody by the police officers with a view to obtaining his confession to a crime. He further complained under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention that no effective investigation into his complaint had been carried out.\u00a032.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will examine both aspects of the complaint under Article\u00a03 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u00a0\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d\u00a033.\u00a0\u00a0The Government pleaded non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, arguing that the applicant had not appealed against the investigator\u2019s decision of 26 October 2006. They also submitted that the documents relating to the domestic inquiry into the applicant\u2019s allegations of police ill\u2011treatment had been destroyed on 15 December 2011. Furthermore, the Government stated that it was impossible to establish the place of the applicant\u2019s detention from the moment of his arrest at 4.05 a.m. on 11 July 2005 until the delivery of the detention order on the next day because the IVS of the Ruza district police department had been closed down in 2010.34.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaints and noted that he had appealed against two decisions refusing to open a criminal case against police officers. Both decisions had been annulled, either by a prosecutor or by a court. The applicant also submitted that he had not been served with a copy of the last decision (of 26 October 2006). Hence, he had not been able to appeal against it.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility35.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the Government\u2019s plea of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, the Court notes that the applicant appealed against the investigator\u2019s decisions of 21 July and 23 August 2005 to the domestic courts. Both decisions were subsequently annulled. The last decision (that is to say the decision of 23 August 2005) supported the same findings as those set out in the decision of 21 July 2005 and did not address the defects indicated by the prosecutor when annulling the earlier one. In these circumstances, the Court is not convinced that an appeal to a court by the applicant against the investigator\u2019s decision of 26 October 2006, which could only have had the same effect \u2013 that is to say the annulment of the decision \u2013 would have offered the applicant any redress (see Mikhail Nikolayev v. Russia, no. 40192\/06, \u00a7 76, 6 December 2016).36.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, in the present case the Court is unable to establish whether it was possible for the applicant to challenge the investigator\u2019s decision of 26 October 2006. Neither party produced a copy of that decision; the applicant argued that he had never received such a copy. The Court cannot therefore accept that the appeal against the investigator\u2019s decision was readily available or accessible to the applicant (see Mostipan v.\u00a0Russia, no. 12042\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 39-40, 16 October 2014). It finds that the applicant was not obliged to pursue that remedy, and that the Government\u2019s objection should therefore be dismissed.37.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits38.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant general principles were reiterated by the Court in the case of Bouyid v. Belgium ([GC], no.\u00a023380\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a081-88, ECHR 2015). In particular, where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention. The burden of proof is then on the Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation by producing evidence establishing facts which cast doubt on the version of events given by the victim. In the absence of such an explanation, the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the Government. That is justified by the fact that those in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them (ibid., \u00a7 83).39.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further reiterates its established case-law that the use of force by the police in the course of arrest operations will not be in breach of Article 3 of the Convention if such force is indispensable and not excessive. The burden of proving this rests on the Government (see Rehbock v.\u00a0Slovenia, no. 29462\/95, \u00a7\u00a7 72-78, ECHR 2000\u2011XII, and, among recent authorities, Boris Kostadinov v. Bulgaria, no. 61701\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 52-54, 21\u00a0January 2016).1.\u00a0\u00a0Credibility of the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment in police custody and the presumption of fact40.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant was arrested as a suspect in criminal proceedings on 11 July 2005 in the morning and brought to the temporary detention facility. Although there is no official record confirming his admission to the IVS of the Ruza District Police Department, the officers on duty did not deny that the applicant had been detained in that facility on 11 July 2005 (see paragraph 16 above). Moreover, according to the results of the internal inquiry at the Ruza district police department, at some point the applicant was taken by two unidentified police officers out of his IVS cell and subjected to ill-treatment (see paragraph 19 above). The forensic medical expert found that the applicant had multiple injuries which could have been inflicted on 11 July 2005 with a hard blunt object; the bruises could have been the result of impact with a hard blunt object of an elongated shape. The Court considers that these injuries could arguably have resulted from blows allegedly delivered to the applicant\u2019s body by police officers (see paragraph 15 above).41.\u00a0\u00a0The fact that victim B. was a police driver with the Ruza District police department at the time that he was killed (see paragraph 6 above) indicates that the applicant was vulnerable vis-\u00e0-vis police officers.42.\u00a0\u00a0The above-mentioned factors are sufficient to give rise to a presumption in favour of the applicant\u2019s account of events and to satisfy the Court that the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment in police custody were credible. The State was therefore obliged to carry out an effective official investigation (see, among other authorities, Labita v. Italy [GC], no.\u00a026772\/95, \u00a7 131, ECHR 2000\u2011IV).2.\u00a0\u00a0Whether an effective investigation was carried out into the applicant\u2019s allegations of police ill-treatment43.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that the applicant\u2019s allegations of his injuries being the result of police ill-treatment were dismissed by the domestic investigating authorities. The investigators based their findings on the results of the pre-investigation inquiry, which is the initial stage in dealing with a criminal complaint under Russian law and should normally be followed by the opening of a criminal case and the carrying out of an investigation if the information gathered has disclosed elements of a criminal offence (see Lyapin v. Russia, no. 46956\/09, \u00a7 129, 24 July 2014). Two investigator\u2019s decisions refusing to open a criminal case were each time annulled by either a higher prosecutor or following a court\u2019s decision for having been based on an incomplete inquiry, and a fresh inquiry was ordered. The third and last investigator\u2019s decision, also refusing to open a criminal case, has apparently never been communicated to the applicant.44.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates its finding that the mere carrying out of a pre\u2011investigation inquiry under Article 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation is insufficient if the authorities are to comply with the standards established under Article 3 of the Convention for an effective investigation into credible allegations of ill\u2011treatment in police custody. It is incumbent on the authorities to institute criminal proceedings and conduct a fully fledged criminal investigation in which a full range of investigative measures are carried out (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 129 and 132-36).45.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has no reason to hold otherwise in the present case, which involves credible allegations of ill-treatment of which the authorities were promptly made aware. It finds that the investigating authorities failed to carry out an effective investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations of police ill-treatment, as required by Article 3 of the Convention.3.\u00a0\u00a0Whether the Government provided explanations capable of casting doubt on the applicant\u2019s version of events46.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained the conclusions of the investigating authorities to the effect that all of the applicant\u2019s injuries had been the result of the lawful use of force by the police in arresting the applicant, owing to his active resistance.47.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the investigating authorities based their conclusions almost exclusively on the general statements made by police officers that they had used force lawfully. The investigators did not establish any specific acts undertaken by the police officers when using force or any actions on the part of the applicant which could have justified the use of force \u2013 that is to say they did not assess whether such force had been indispensable and not excessive. Moreover, the police officers\u2019 explanation that they had laid the applicant down on the floor and pressed their knees into his back during his arrest sits ill with the number and the nature of injuries recorded by the forensic medical expert (thirty-three bruises and three abrasions on the face, back, chest, stomach and left leg).48.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, it was acknowledged in the internal inquiry by the head of the Ruza district police department that on 11\u00a0July 2005 two police officers had subjected the applicant to ill-treatment (see paragraph 19 above).49.\u00a0\u00a0Given that the Government\u2019s explanations were provided as a result of the superficial domestic inquiry which fell short of the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention (see paragraph 45 above), the Court finds that they cannot be considered satisfactory or convincing. It holds that the Government have failed to discharge their burden of proof and produce evidence capable of casting doubt on a part of the applicant\u2019s account of events that is supported by medical evidence, and which it therefore finds established.4.\u00a0\u00a0Legal classification of the treatment50.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it has deemed \u201cinhuman\u201d any treatment that was premeditated, was applied for hours at a stretch and caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical and mental suffering. Treatment has been held to be \u201cdegrading\u201d when it was such as to arouse in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them and possibly breaking their physical or moral resistance, or when it was such as to drive the victim to act against his will or conscience (see G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 89-90, ECHR 2010, and the cases cited therein).51.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the level of violence and the type of injuries that the applicant had, the Court finds that the police subjected him to inhuman and degrading treatment.5.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion52.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive and procedural limbs.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION53.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that his conviction had been based on the self-incriminating statements he had made as a result of his ill-treatment, and in the absence of a lawyer of his choice. He relied on Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:\u00a0\u201c1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal...\u201d\u00a054.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument, referring to the findings of the judicial authorities. They pointed out that the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment had been unconfirmed and that his injuries had been the result of the lawful use of force by the police in the course of his apprehension. The applicant had been interviewed as a suspect in the presence of a State\u2011appointed lawyer, whose services he had not declined. The disputed evidence had not been the sole evidence on which the applicant\u2019s conviction had been based. The Government therefore considered that the complaint was manifestly ill\u2011founded.55.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaint. He claimed that the State\u2011appointed lawyer had not acted in his best interests, and that in particular, he had not noticed the applicant\u2019s multiple bruises and abrasions, and that his presence during the applicant\u2019s interview as a suspect could not be regarded as constituting a sufficient safeguard against the violation of his rights.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility56.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It furthermore notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits57.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the admission of confession statements obtained as a result of torture or of other ill-treatment in breach of Article 3 as evidence to establish the relevant facts in criminal proceedings renders the proceedings, as a whole, unfair. This finding applies irrespective of the probative value of the statements and irrespective of whether their use was decisive in securing the defendant\u2019s conviction (see G\u00e4fgen, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0166, with further references, and, among recent authorities, Turbylev v.\u00a0Russia, no. 4722\/09, \u00a7 90, 6 October 2015).58.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has found that the applicant was subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment in police custody (see paragraph 51 above). It observes that on 11 July 2005 the applicant gave self-incriminating statements in the course of his interview as a suspect. Those statements formed part of the evidence adduced against him. The Moscow Regional Court did not find them inadmissible, and the jury took them into account when finding the applicant guilty. The court failed to carry out its own independent assessment of the relevant medical and other evidence with a view to ascertaining whether there were reasons to exclude from evidence those statements, which had allegedly been obtained in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. Instead, it relied on the investigating authorities\u2019 decision, which the Court has found to have been based on an inquiry falling short of Article 3 requirements. This lack of a careful assessment of the quality of the impugned evidence and the circumstances in which it was obtained was not remedied by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation.59.\u00a0\u00a0In such circumstances, the Court is not convinced by the Government\u2019s argument that the applicant\u2019s self-incriminating statements should be regarded as having been given voluntarily. It concludes that, regardless of the possible impact of the applicant\u2019s statements, which were obtained under duress, on the outcome of the criminal proceedings against him, their use in evidence rendered the applicant\u2019s trial unfair (see, for similar reasoning, Tangiyev v. Russia, no. 27610\/05, \u00a7 76, 11 December 2012, and Zamferesko v. Ukraine, no. 30075\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 70-71, 15 November 2012). This finding makes it unnecessary to examine separately the applicant\u2019s complaint that the legal assistance provided to him by K., the State-appointed lawyer, had rendered his trial unfair (see Aleksandr Konovalov v. Russia, no. 39708\/07, \u00a7 55, 28 November 2017).60.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.III.\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION61.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant raised additional complaints under Article 6 of the Convention. However, having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as these complaints fall within the Court\u2019s competence, it finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.IV.\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION62.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage63.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage in the event that the State quashed his conviction and started a new trial, excluding from the body of evidence his self\u2011incriminating statements given after arrest. In the event that the State refused to start a new trial, the applicant claimed EUR 150,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The applicant also asked that the domestic authorities be obliged to carry out an effective investigation into his complaints of ill-treatment by the police.64.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the claims as unsubstantiated, pointing out that they are linked to the alleged unlawfulness of the applicant\u2019s conviction. In their view, the satisfaction of the applicant\u2019s claims would amount to setting aside the judgment in respect of the applicant and acquitting him of all criminal charges, which falls beyond the Court\u2019s competence.65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it has found violations of Articles 3 and 6 of the Convention in the present case. In those circumstances, the Court considers that the applicant\u2019s suffering and frustration cannot be compensated for by the mere finding of a violation. Having regard to its well-established case\u2011law and making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 10,000, plus any tax that may be chargeable.66.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Court refers to its settled case-law to the effect that when an applicant has suffered an infringement of his rights guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention, he should, as far as possible, be put in the position in which he would have been had the requirements of that provision not been disregarded. The most appropriate form of redress would, in principle, be the reopening of the proceedings, if requested (see, mutatis mutandis, \u00d6calan v. Turkey [GC], no. 46221\/99, \u00a7 210 in fine, ECHR 2005\u2011IV, and Sakhnovskiy v. Russia [GC], no. 21272\/03, \u00a7 112, 2\u00a0November 2010). This applies to the applicant in the present case. The Court notes, in this connection, that Article 413 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides a basis for the reopening of the proceedings if the Court finds a violation of the Convention (see paragraph 30 above).B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses67.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed 150,000 Russian roubles for the legal costs incurred at the preliminary investigation, before the domestic courts in the criminal proceedings against him, and before the Court.68.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the claims on the ground that there was no proof that they had actually been incurred.69.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. The Court is satisfied that the contract for legal services (in respect of the domestic proceedings and those before the Court) concluded with the applicant\u2019s lawyer created legally enforceable obligations to pay the amounts indicated therein. The Court also notes that not all of the complaints submitted by the applicant were declared admissible. Regard being had to these considerations, the documents in its possession, and the above-mentioned criteria the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 2,000 for the domestic proceedings and the proceedings before it, plus any tax that may be chargeable.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest70.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","31153":"A.\u00a0\u00a0Complaints under Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention and Article\u00a01 of Protocol No. 157.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of their complaint concerning the proportionality of orders for the demolition of the houses in which they lived and their enforcement, the applicants relied on Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which provide, so far as relevant:Article 8 of the Convention\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life [and] his home\u00a0...2.\u00a0\u00a0There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.\u201dArticle 1 of Protocol No. 1\u201cEvery natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.\u201d58.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of their complaint concerning the alleged lack of an effective remedy in that respect, the applicants relied on Article 13 of the Convention, which provides:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The Government59.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicants had not exhausted domestic remedies. Although Mr Stoyan Aydarov had sought judicial review of the order to demolish the house in which his family lived, he had not appealed against the first-instance judgment of 20 October 2011 dismissing his claim. As for Mr Krasimir Iliev, he had not sought judicial review of the order to demolish the house in which his family lived at all. It had been open to them to challenge the orders on two grounds: (a) that the houses were not liable to be demolished under the 2001 Act\u2019s transitional provisions, and (b) that the demolition of the houses would be disproportionate, given the applicants\u2019 individual circumstances. It was true that the Bulgarian administrative courts normally refused to quash demolition orders on the latter basis. However, those courts were capable of dealing with such cases in the light of Article 8 of the Convention, as noted by the Court with reference to the way in which the Supreme Administrative Court in 2015 had examined a claim for damages against the building control authorities by a woman whose house had been demolished on their orders. The principle of subsidiarity demanded that the courts be given an opportunity to do so. The fact that the applicants were poorly educated and did not know the law did not exempt them from the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies.60.\u00a0\u00a0The Government alternatively submitted that the complaint was out of time. If judicial review of the orders was not an effective remedy, then the six-month time-limit under Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention had started to run in 2011, when the orders, which were instantaneous acts, had become final. Their proportionality could not be properly reviewed in the course of the proceedings for enforcement of the orders. Nor was it possible to challenge them by way of a claim for a judicial declaration under Article\u00a0292 of the Code of Administrative Procedure, because such a claim was only possible if new circumstances had emerged since the orders had been issued, which did not appear to be the case.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The applicants61.\u00a0\u00a0With respect to the first point made by the Government, the applicants submitted that claims for judicial review of the demolition orders would have been bound to fail, since the 2001 Act clearly provided that demolition was the only way to deal with unlawful construction and did not enable the courts to assess the individual proportionality of such measures. Mr Stoyan Aydarov had argued that the house in which his family lived was not liable to be demolished under the Act\u2019s transitional provisions, but the Blagoevgrad Administrative Court had found that the house did not meet those requirements, and that it was not bound by the certificate issued by the Garmen Municipality to that effect. Moreover, at the time when the demolition orders had been issued, the applicants had not received any information about possible avenues of redress, or legal aid. A claim for a judicial declaration under Article 292 of the 2006 Code of Administrative Procedure could only be based on newly emerged facts relating to the legality of a construction, and would not have helped the applicants either. They had properly resorted to claims for judicial review under Article 294 the Code instead.62.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants went on to say that the complaint was not out of time. They pointed out that they did not complain of the demolition orders themselves, but of the enforcement of the orders, which was the real interference with their rights under Article 8 of the Convention. The Bulgarian courts could have examined the compatibility of the enforcement with that provision in the proceedings under Article 294 of the 2006 Code of Administrative Procedure, which had been concluded after the application with the Court had been lodged.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment63.\u00a0\u00a0The first point to be considered is whether the complaints were raised within the six-month time-limit laid down in Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.64.\u00a0\u00a0By the terms of that provision, this time-limit runs from the date of the \u201cfinal decision\u201d. As a rule, this means the final decision resulting from the exhaustion of all domestic remedies according to the generally recognised rules of international law. The remedies to be taken into account for this purpose are those capable of effectively redressing or preventing the wrong alleged to amount to a breach of the Convention or its Protocols (see, among other authorities, Berdzenishvili v. Russia (dec.), no. 31697\/03, ECHR 2004-II (extracts); Tarbuk v. Croatia, no. 31360\/10, \u00a7 28, 11\u00a0December 2012; and Dzhabarov and Others v. Bulgaria, nos. 6095\/11 and 2 others, \u00a7 57, 31 March 2016). Exceptionally, however, when applicants attempt an apparently existing remedy which turns out to be ineffective, the time-limit runs from the point when they became or ought to have become aware of that (see, among other authorities, Varnava and\u00a0Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 16064\/90 and 8 others, \u00a7 157, ECHR 2009; El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no.\u00a039630\/09, \u00a7 136, ECHR 2012; and Yordan Ivanov and Others v.\u00a0Bulgaria, no. 70502\/13, \u00a7 31, 11 January 2018).65.\u00a0\u00a0In this case, the demolition orders amounted to an interference with the applicants\u2019 rights under Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (assuming this latter provision applies, which does not need to be resolved here) even before they were enforced (see Pauli\u0107 v. Croatia, no. 3572\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 35-38, 22 October 2009; Gladysheva v. Russia, no.\u00a07097\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 70 and 91, 6 December 2011; Winterstein and Others v.\u00a0France, no. 27013\/07, \u00a7 143, 17 October 2013; and Vrzi\u0107 v. Croatia, no.\u00a043777\/13, \u00a7 59, 12 July 2016). They were issued on 22 March 2011 in the case of the Ilievi family and on 22 June 2011 in the case of the Aydarovi family (see paragraphs 14 and 16 above).66.\u00a0\u00a0The orders could be challenged by way of a claim for judicial review (see paragraph 41 above). Mr Krasimir Iliev did not bring such a claim, and the order relating to the house inhabited by his family became final on\u00a029\u00a0December 2011 (see paragraph 15 above). By contrast, Mr Stoyan Aydarov sought judicial review of the order relating to the house in which his family lived. But when his claim was dismissed by the Blagoevgrad Administrative court on the basis that the house had been built illegally, that there was no pending procedure for its legalisation, that it did not fall within the 2001 Act\u2019s transitional provisions as no zoning plan existed with respect to the relevant area, and that the toleration certificate issued by the municipality had no value in those proceedings, Mr Stoyan Aydarov did not appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court. The first-instance judgment in his case thus became final on 11 November 2011 (see paragraphs 18-20 above).67.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants argued that in their situation an appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court would have been bound to fail, just like the claim for judicial review brought by Mr Stoyan Aydarov. This is confirmed by several factors. First, in a series of parallel cases, also relating to orders to demolish houses in the Kremikovtsi settlement, the Blagoevgrad Administrative Court found that the houses were not tolerable under the 2001 Act\u2019s transitional provisions since no relevant zoning plan with respect to the area had ever existed (see paragraph 21 above). Secondly, under the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019s settled case-law in such cases all illegal buildings are subject to demolition, regardless of whether this is proportionate in the individual circumstances of the people affected by that (see Ivanova and Cherkezov v. Bulgaria, no. 46577\/15, \u00a7\u00a7 26-27, 21 April 2016, and paragraphs 42 and 61 above). Lastly, it is the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019s established position that toleration certificates issued by municipalities are no bar to demolition (see paragraph 46 above).68.\u00a0\u00a0It could be accepted that the ineffectiveness of this remedy was not apparent to the applicants when the demolition orders were issued, but only transpired later in 2011, when the Blagoevgrad Administrative Court dismissed Mr Stoyan Aydarov\u2019s claim and a raft of similar claims (see paragraphs 19 and 21 above). The fact that Mr Stoyan Aydarov did not appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court tends to confirm this. But the six-month time-limit must then be calculated from the point in 2011 when the applicants realised or ought to have realised the remedy\u2019s ineffectiveness.69.\u00a0\u00a0There is, in this case, no reason to calculate this time-limit by reference to a different date owing to the existence of another remedy which the applicants attempted because at the material time they had reason to believe that it would be effective.70.\u00a0\u00a0In principle, they had at their disposal two further remedies: a claim under Article 294 of the 2006 Code of Administrative Procedure for judicial review of the demolition orders\u2019 enforcement, and a claim under Article 292 of the same Code for a judicial declaration that enforcement should not proceed owing to newly emerged facts (see paragraph 42 above). A remedy capable of leading to an examination of the proportionality of the measure at the stage of its enforcement can in principle be effective in cases such as this one (see J.L. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 66387\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 44-46, 30\u00a0September 2014, and Ivanova and Cherkezov, cited above, \u00a7 58). But a perusal of the Blagoevgrad Administrative Court\u2019s and the Supreme Administrative Court\u2019s case-law under Articles 292 and 294 of the Code shows that between 2011 and 10 July 2015 neither of those remedies offered a reasonable prospect of success in cases such as those of the applicants (see paragraphs 42 in fine and 43 above). It appears that the Blagoevgrad Administrative Court \u2013 and indeed other first-instance administrative courts \u2013 only began reviewing the proportionality of intended demolitions in view of the individual circumstances of the people affected by them in late 2015.71.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants did not attempt a claim under Article 292 of the Code, and there is hence no reason to take this remedy into account for the purpose of calculating the six-month time-limit.72.\u00a0\u00a0By contrast, they brought claims under Article 294 of the Code. On\u00a08\u00a0July 2015, two days before applying to the Court, they sought judicial review of the orders\u2019 enforcement by reference to that provision (see paragraph 30 above). But, as noted above, at that time this remedy did not offer a reasonable prospect of success; this is confirmed by the fact that when the Blagoevgrad Administrative Court examined Mr Stoyan Aydarov\u2019s claim on the merits in March 2016, it dismissed it, saying that the individual circumstances of the people affected by the intended demolition had no bearing on its lawfulness (see paragraph 35 above). It follows that those proceedings cannot be taken into account for the purpose of calculating the six-month time-limit either.73.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, between 2011 and the time when they applied to the Court the applicants had no further recourse against the intended demolition of the houses inhabited by them (see, mutatis mutandis, Gladysheva, cited above, \u00a7\u00a091). There is hence no reason, in this case, to calculate the six-month time-limit with reference to another date than the time in 2011 when the applicants realised or ought to have realised the ineffectiveness of the claims for judicial review of the orders themselves. At that point in time, they could have introduced their application before the Court, the obligation to exhaust having been displaced by the absence of an effective domestic remedy.74.\u00a0\u00a0These complaints have therefore been introduced out of time and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention.B.\u00a0\u00a0Complaints under Article 14 of the Convention75.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of their complaints that the measures against them had been discriminatory, the applicants relied on Article 14 of the Convention, which provides:\u201cThe enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.\u201d1.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties and the third-party intervener76.\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicants had not brought proceedings under the Protection Against Discrimination Act 2003, and had thus failed to exhaust domestic remedies with respect to this complaint. They made no submissions on the merits of the complaint.77.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that Roma in Bulgaria were being discriminated against in relation to housing, since their only homes were being targeted for demolition without the provision of alternative accommodation, even for minors and other vulnerable members of their families. The manner in which those demolitions were being carried out amounted to racial harassment. Thus, the Aydarovi family, including three children, two of whom with disabilities, had been removed from their house without being provided with another place to live. The Ilievi family had remained in uncertainty in that respect for about two years and were constantly awaiting the demolition of their house. Many other Roma who lived in undocumented houses in segregated communities throughout the country were being treated in the same way. They were the only ethnic group subjected to such treatment. There were currently 6,080 demolition orders in Bulgaria; 514 of them concerned dwellings, and Roma lived in\u00a0500 of those dwellings. A survey carried out by a non-governmental organisation in 162 of the 265 municipalities in Bulgaria in early 2016 showed that mayors had issued 2,000 orders to demolish unlawful buildings; 444 of those orders concerned dwellings, 399 of which belonged to Roma. Demolitions in Roma neighbourhoods were conducted en masse and were meant to demonstrate the authorities\u2019 firm stance on unlawful construction. Those concerned were often not effectively notified of those measures, and did not even have time to gather their personal belongings before the demolition.78.\u00a0\u00a0The third-party intervener, the European Roma Rights Centre, made two points. The first was that there was a crisis of forced evictions of Roma throughout Europe, which was linked to their residential exclusion and segregation and was symptomatic of widespread anti-Gypsyism. The Centre pointed to evidence of the extent of Romani poverty in Europe and in particular Eastern Europe, with a view to showing that the fact that many Roma lived in informal housing, which exposed them to eviction, was not a\u00a0natural state of affairs but one of the clearest current manifestations of anti-Gypsyism in Europe. For the Centre, this was the result of Roma being excluded for generations, an exclusion either promoted or ignored by the authorities, and the threat of eviction was simply the most prominent among the tools used by the authorities to intimidate and control Roma communities. The Centre urged the Court to acknowledge the forced eviction of Roma as a manifestation of anti-Gypsyism.79.\u00a0\u00a0The European Roma Rights Centre\u2019s second point was that the Court should adopt a special approach to allegations of racial discrimination relating to forced evictions. In their view, that approach should be based on three principles stemming from the Court\u2019s case-law and anti-discrimination law in Europe: (a) that when an eviction only concerned Roma, it was for the respondent State to show that it did not constitute racial harassment; (b)\u00a0that when an eviction only concerned Roma, this automatically triggered the application of the notion of indirect discrimination, again with the result that the burden of proof fell on the respondent State; and (c) that discriminatory statements by anyone connected to an eviction \u2013 in particular public officials and local residents \u2013 was evidence of direct discrimination.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment80.\u00a0\u00a0Article 14 complements the other substantive provisions of the Convention and its Protocols. It has no independent existence since it has effect solely in relation to \u201cthe enjoyment of the rights and freedoms\u201d safeguarded by those provisions (see, among other authorities, Konstantin Markin v. Russia [GC], no. 30078\/06, \u00a7 124, ECHR 2012 (extracts)). In this case, the applicants\u2019 complaint, which chiefly concerns matters relating to the enjoyment of their right to respect for their home, falls to be examined under Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention.81.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the findings in paragraphs 65-74 above, the grievances summarised in points (b) to (e) of paragraph 55 above \u2013 which are closely linked with the complaints under Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, and are based on the same facts \u2013 are also out of time, and must be rejected under Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 4 of the Convention.82.\u00a0\u00a0For its part, the complaint summarised in point (a) of paragraph 55 above\u00a0\u2013 that the steps taken by the authorities to enforce the demolition orders were spurred by the anti-Roma protests in May 2015 (see paragraphs\u00a023 and 24 above) \u2013 is based on slightly different facts, and calls for separate analysis. It is, however, inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, for the following reasons.83.\u00a0\u00a0As pointed out by the Government, there is in Bulgaria a dedicated mechanism for dealing with such discrimination claims, in the form of proceedings under the Protection Against Discrimination Act 2003. Under this Act, people who are of the view that they have fallen victim to discrimination can (a) complain to the Commission for Protection Against Discrimination \u2013 and then, in the case of a favourable outcome of the proceedings before the Commission, seek damages \u2013 or (b) directly bring court proceedings and seek declaratory or injunctive relief or damages (see paragraphs 47-51 above). Nothing suggests that these remedies would not have been effective in relation to the applicants\u2019 grievance (see, mutatis mutandis, Yordanova and Others, cited above, \u00a7 160, and Dimitrova and Others v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 39084\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 66-76, 11 July 2017). Yet, none of them appears to have attempted such proceedings.84.\u00a0\u00a0This complaint must therefore be rejected under Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and\u00a04 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.C.\u00a0\u00a0Complaints under Article 3 of the Convention85.\u00a0\u00a0In respect of their complaints of (a) the manner in which the proceedings meant to result in the demolition of the houses in which they lived had unfolded, and (b) the actual demolition of the house in which the Aydarovi family had lived, the applicants relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which provides:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions86.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that neither the demolition orders nor their enforcement had amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment. They pointed out that the applicants had not suffered any physical damage as a result of those measures. It was true that the measures had caused them anxiety, but this had not been sufficient to reach the threshold of severity under Article 3 of the Convention, especially bearing in mind that the applicants had not remained without shelter and had been offered assistance from social services. In so far as the applicants complained that the enforcement of the orders had taken place against the backdrop of anti-Roma tensions, it had been open to them to bring proceedings under the Protection Against Discrimination Act 2003. In any event, the authorities had repeatedly tried to calm those tensions and resolve the applicants\u2019 housing problem.87.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants emphasised the discomfort experienced by the Aydarovi family as a result of the demolition of their house. They also submitted that the sudden manner in which that demolition had been carried out had shocked them and caused them \u2013 especially the children, two of whom were seriously ill \u2013 grave psychological damage. The situation of the Ilievi family, who had already witnessed the demolition of several houses in their neighbourhood and lived in constant fear that their house would be demolished as well, was similar. The deliberate taking of such measures resulting in the homelessness of families with children was out of place in a modern democratic society.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment88.\u00a0\u00a0It is not necessary to decide whether the applicants have exhausted domestic remedies with respect to this complaint since it is in any event inadmissible for the following reasons.89.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the initial complaint \u2013 that the proceedings to enforce the demolition orders had themselves amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment \u2013 it should be noted that the building control authorities, though insisting throughout that the orders had to be enforced, repeatedly adjourned that enforcement in recognition of the fact that it would have serious consequences for the applicants (see paragraphs 22, 36 and 38 above). It cannot therefore be said that the anxiety and discomfort that these proceedings provoked in the applicants in themselves reached the threshold of severity bringing them within the ambit of Article 3 of the Convention.90.\u00a0\u00a0The follow-up complaint \u2013 that the sudden demolition of the house in which the Aydarovi family had lived had shocked and traumatised them \u2013 was not lodged within the six-month time-limit under Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. Although related to the original complaint, it was not simply a further aspect or a further argument in support of that original complaint. It was based on fresh developments and raises different issues in terms of Article 3 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, F\u00e1bi\u00e1n v. Hungary [GC], no. 78117\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 95-97, 5 September 2017, and contrast Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], no. 72508\/13, \u00a7 250, 28 November 2017). Assuming, as implied by the applicants, that no effective domestic remedy existed with respect to that complaint, it should have been raised not more than six months after the date on which the house was demolished \u2013 7 September 2015 (see paragraph 39 above). It was, however, lodged over a year after that, on 29 November 2016 (see paragraph 56 in fine above).91.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that these complaints are inadmissible and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 1, 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.For these reasons, the Court, by a majority,Declares the application inadmissible.Done in English and notified in writing on 25 October 2018.Claudia WesterdiekAngelika Nu\u00dfbergerRegistrarPresident","31175":"I.\u00a0\u00a0JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS71.\u00a0\u00a0Given the similar factual and legal background, the Court decides that the two applications should be joined pursuant to Rule 42 \u00a7 1 of the Rules of Court.[1]II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION72.\u00a0\u00a0The second applicant complained that he had been unlawfully deprived of his liberty from the time of his actual arrest on 26 January 2005 until that of his formal arrest on 27 January 2005. He relied on Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, which reads in the relevant part as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:...(c)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; ...\u201d73.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument. They submitted that at 1\u00a0p.m. on 27\u00a0January 2005 the applicant had come voluntarily to the police station to confess to the crime and had then been arrested, in accordance with the law. They further submitted that the applicant\u2019s and his mother\u2019s complaints concerning the lawfulness of his detention had been dismissed in the Tikhoretsk Town Court\u2019s decisions of 6 July and 22 July 2005, against which they had not appealed.74.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaint.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility75.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the Government can be understood as pleading non\u2011exhaustion of domestic remedies, the Court notes that apart from the complaints lodged with and dismissed by the Tikhoretsk Town Court (to which the Government pointed), on 17 March 2005 the applicant lodged the complaint concerning the lawfulness of his detention with the inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office. He received no reply. He again raised this complaint at the preliminary hearing in his criminal case on 29\u00a0June 2005 and reiterated it on 14 July 2005, when the Tikhoretsk Town Court ordered an inquiry, as a result of which the inter-district prosecutor\u2019s office refused on 23 July 2005 to institute criminal proceedings. Relying on the decision of 23 July 2005 (subsequently annulled as unlawful and based on an incomplete inquiry) and on the official record of the applicant\u2019s arrest of 27 January 2005, the Town Court dismissed, in its decision of 2\u00a0August 2005 (underpinning its judgment of 5 August 2005 upheld on appeal on 29 March 2006)[2], the applicant\u2019s allegation that he had been unlawfully detained by the police.76.\u00a0\u00a0The authorities were thus made aware of the alleged unlawfulness of the applicant\u2019s detention by way of the criminal-law complaint that prompted the inquiry by the investigative authorities, the outcome of which was reviewed by the domestic courts at the applicants\u2019 trial[3]. The Government\u2019s non-exhaustion objection should therefore be dismissed (see Leonid Petrov v. Russia, no.\u00a052783\/08, \u00a7 50, 11 October 2016).77.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits78.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the Government\u2019s assertion that the applicant had voluntarily reported to the police station at 1\u00a0p.m. on 27\u00a0January 2005 to confess to a crime is contradicted by the evidence in the case.79.\u00a0\u00a0Officers K. and R. (while denying the applicant\u2019s allegations) clearly indicated the sequence of the events pertaining to the applicant\u2019s arrest \u2013 namely that they had arrested the applicant on suspicion of his having committed the crime in question against S. and had taken him to the police station, where he had given a statement of surrender and confession, after which his arrest had been recorded by O., the investigator (see paragraph\u00a069 above). This is further confirmed by the record of the applicant\u2019s statement of surrender and confession (\u044f\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0441 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439) drawn up by Officer K. at 1\u00a0p.m. on 27 January 2005 and the record of the applicant\u2019s arrest drawn up by the investigator, O., at 2.30 p.m. on 27 January 2005.\u00a0It can therefore be concluded that the applicant did not come to the police station voluntarily to confess to a crime, but was arrested on suspicion of having committed the crime against S. and was taken to the police station by Officers K. and R.80.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the time of the applicant\u2019s arrest, the Court notes that the official record of the applicant\u2019s arrest drawn up by O., the investigator, indicates that the applicant was arrested at 2.30 p.m. on 27 January 2005. This contradicts Officers K.\u2019s and R.\u2019s above-mentioned acknowledgment that they had arrested the applicant on suspicion of his having committed the crime against S. at some point before he gave the statement of surrender and confession \u2013 that is to say before 1 p.m. on 27 January 2005.81.\u00a0\u00a0The Court furthermore notes that statements by witnesses indicate that the applicant was taken away from his place of work at around 8\u00a0a.m. on 26\u00a0January 2005 by two men matching the description of Officers K. and R. (see paragraphs 50, 58 and 59 above, which refer to the statements by G., V.Yu. and the second applicant\u2019s mother). From that day until 28 January 2005 the applicant\u2019s mother and girlfriend, S.A., made unsuccessful enquiries with the Tikhoretsk Police Department about the applicant\u2019s whereabouts (see paragraph 59 above, which refers to their statements).82.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s complaint that he had been unlawfully kept at the police station from 26 until 27 January 2005 was dismissed by the Tikhoretsk Town Court merely on the basis of the refusal to institute criminal proceedings in respect of his complaints which did not explicitly address that complaint (subsequently annulled as unlawful and based on an incomplete inquiry \u2013 see paragraphs 47 and 57 above) and the official record of his arrest, which is contradicted by the evidence in the case (see paragraphs 74, 79 and 80 above). There is no indication that this deficiency was remedied in the subsequent inquiries or by the domestic courts.83.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the second applicant was arrested at around 8 a.m. on 26 January 2005 by police officers and unlawfully detained at the Tikhoretsk Police Department until his arrest was officially recorded at 2.30\u00a0p.m. on 27\u00a0January 2005. His unrecorded detention left him completely at the mercy of those holding him, putting his personal security at stake, and rendering him vulnerable to ill\u2011treatment (see Fartushin v. Russia, no. 38887\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 50, 53 and 54, 8 October 2015).84.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention in respect of the second applicant.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION85.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that they had been subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention by the Tikhoretsk Police Department officers and that the State had failed to carry out an effective investigation into those allegations. Article 3 of the Convention reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d86.\u00a0\u00a0The Government disagreed, arguing that the facts of the applicants\u2019 alleged ill-treatment by the police had not been proven in the domestic proceedings, which had complied with the procedural requirements of Article 3 of the Convention. The first applicant\u2019s injuries could have been caused by a third person in the course of a fight prior to the applicant\u2019s arrest, and there had been no medical evidence of the second applicant having suffered any injuries.87.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants maintained their complaints.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility88.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It furthermore notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits89.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that in assessing the evidence on which to base a decision as to whether there has been a violation of Article 3, it adopts the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d. However, such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see Jalloh v.\u00a0Germany [GC], no.\u00a054810\/00, \u00a7 67, ECHR 2006\u2011IX). Where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of individuals within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention. The burden of proof is then on the Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation by producing evidence establishing facts which cast doubt on the version of events given by the victim (Bouyid v.\u00a0Belgium ([GC], no.\u00a023380\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 81-88, ECHR 2015).90.\u00a0\u00a0Where an individual raises an arguable claim that he has suffered treatment infringing Article 3 at the hands of the police or other similar agents of the State, that provision, read in conjunction with the State\u2019s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to \u201csecure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in ... [the] Convention\u201d, requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation. Such investigation should be capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible (see Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, \u00a7 102, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011VIII). The investigation into serious allegations of ill-treatment must be prompt and thorough. The authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill\u2011founded conclusions to close their investigation or to otherwise use such conclusions as the basis of their decisions (see, for example, Kopylov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a03933\/04, \u00a7 133, 29\u00a0July 2010).1.\u00a0\u00a0First applicant (Mr Golubyatnikov)91.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that on 21 January 2005 the first applicant was arrested by police officers on suspicion of having committed the crime against S., taken to the police station and interviewed. He was then seen by Sh., the investigator, who drew up a record of his arrest. The witness statements suggest that the applicant had no injuries before his arrest (see paragraphs 50 and 69 above).\u00a0An hour and a half after the recorded time of his arrest, when he was brought by police officers to the IVS, an ambulance was called and the applicant was found to be in a grave condition characterised by multiple injuries, weakness and difficulty breathing. He was diagnosed with a fracture of the ribs, multiple contusions and traumatic shock. After his immediate transfer to the local hospital the diagnosis of a rib fracture was confirmed. The forensic medical experts concluded that the applicant had sustained fractures to two ribs, and that the fractures could have been caused by blunt objects on 21 January 2005 in the circumstances alleged by him \u2013 that is to say as a result of being punched, kicked or hit with a rubber truncheon. Those fractures, complicated by traumatic shock, had led to a health disorder that lasted for a period exceeding 21\u00a0days.92.\u00a0\u00a0In the Court\u2019s view the injuries could arguably have resulted from the applicant\u2019s alleged ill\u2011treatment by police officers. The above\u2011mentioned factors are sufficient to give rise to a presumption in favour of the applicant\u2019s version of events and satisfy the Court that the applicant\u2019s allegations were credible.93.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes further that the applicant\u2019s allegations were dismissed by the domestic investigating authorities. At least nine refusals to institute criminal proceedings were issued between 23 July 2005 and 6\u00a0January 2008 as a result of pre-investigation inquiries. The investigation in respect of the criminal proceedings regarding the applicant\u2019s injuries (which were instituted on 5 March 2008) was marred by the inaction of the investigating authority and its failure to take lawful and reasoned decisions (see paragraph 61 above). Moreover, the investigation was eventually transferred to the Tikhoretsk Police Department, whose officers had allegedly subjected the applicant to ill\u2011treatment, for the reason that their involvement had not been established. Subsequently, new pre\u2011investigation inquiries were carried out into the applicant\u2019s allegations of police ill\u2011treatment, and fresh refusals to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers were issued \u2013 most recently on 24\u00a0February 2016.94.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that in the context of the Russian legal system the mere carrying out of a pre\u2011investigation inquiry is insufficient if the authorities are to comply with the standards established under Article 3 of the Convention for an effective investigation into credible allegations of ill\u2011treatment in police custody. It is incumbent on the authorities to institute criminal proceedings and conduct a fully fledged criminal investigation in which the whole range of investigative measures are carried out (see Lyapin v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a046956\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 129 and 132-36, 24 July 2014). A delay in instituting criminal proceedings will have an adverse impact on such an investigation, considerably undermining the investigative authority\u2019s ability to secure evidence concerning the alleged ill-treatment (see Razzakov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a057519\/09, \u00a7 61, 5 February 2015). The investigation\u2019s conclusions must be based on a thorough, objective and impartial analysis of all relevant elements (ibid., \u00a7 63).95.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the authorities\u2019 examination of the applicant\u2019s credible allegations of police ill\u2011treatment by way of the pre-investigation inquiries, as well as to the delay in opening and the way the criminal investigation in relation to the applicant\u2019s injuries was carried out, the Court concludes that those factors are sufficient to find that the authorities failed to carry out an effective investigation into the applicant\u2019s alleged ill\u2011treatment by the police. There has therefore been a violation of Article\u00a03, in its procedural limb.96.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained the conclusions of the domestic investigation authorities. Their explanation of the applicant\u2019s injuries is only supported by the police officers\u2019 statements that they had heard the applicant saying that he had had a pain in the chest because of a fight with someone two days before his arrest. Apart from the fact that this version is inherently weak in so far as it is based on the hearsay evidence of the alleged perpetrators of the ill\u2011treatment in question, it also sits ill with the evidence indicating a lack of injuries before the applicant\u2019s arrest and the condition in which he was found after the time spent in police custody \u2013 which was more serious than the condition described by the police officers. It does not offer any explanation as to why the ambulance was not called immediately after the applicant\u2019s arrest either by the police officers (who instead took him to the police station and interviewed him), or by the investigator who drew up the record of the applicant\u2019s arrest. Furthermore, the version that the injuries were inflicted two days before the arrest is not based on any medical evidence and was not investigated properly (see paragraph 64 above).97.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above considerations, this explanation cannot be considered satisfactory or convincing. The Court concludes that the Government failed to discharge their burden of proof and to produce evidence capable of casting doubt on the applicant\u2019s account of events, which it therefore finds established.98.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that the acts of violence to which the first applicant was subjected in police custody amounted to treatment proscribed by Article\u00a03.\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of Article 3, in its substantive limb.2.\u00a0\u00a0Second applicant (Mr Zhuchkov)99.\u00a0\u00a0As the Court has found above, from about 8 a.m. on 26 January 2005 until 2.30 p.m. on the following day the applicant was held unlawfully at the police station without a record of his detention having been drawn up, which left him completely at the mercy of those holding him, putting his personal security at stake and rendering him vulnerable to ill\u2011treatment by the police (see paragraph 82 above). This weighs heavily in favour of the applicant\u2019s account of events (see Olisov and Others v. Russia, nos.\u00a010825\/09 and 2 others, \u00a7 79, 2 May 2017). As Officers K. and R. stated, the reason for their apprehending the applicant and bringing him to the police station was a suspicion that he had committed the above\u2011mentioned crime against S. According to the applicant, during his unlawful detention at the police station on 26 and 27 January 2005 he was subjected to violence by police officers (included being beaten with a rubber truncheon and having his access to air blocked with a gas mask) in order to force him to give a statement of surrender and confession in relation to the crime against S.100.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that at 1 p.m. on 27 January 2005 Officer K. recorded the applicant\u2019s statement of surrender and confession (\u044f\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0441 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439) incriminating himself and the first applicant, as well as B. and V., in the infliction of head injuries on S. The applicant reiterated those statements on 28\u00a0January 2005 during his questioning as a suspect, and confirmed them during the on-site verification of his statements on 1\u00a0February 2005, in the presence of an officially assigned lawyer. According to the applicant, he did so out of fear for his life, under threats made by investigator O. and the police officers (see paragraph 45 above). As soon as the applicant gained access to a lawyer of his choice, who was retained by his mother on 3 February 2005 (D., who had previously acted as his officially assigned lawyer), he stopped giving confession statements and pleaded not guilty. From February 2005 numerous complaints were lodged by the applicant\u2019s mother, the applicant\u2019s lawyer and the applicant himself concerning the applicant having allegedly been ill\u2011treated with a view to extracting a confession, and the applicant asked to be further examined as an accused. During the additional examination as an accused, which was carried out on 16 May 2005, he retracted his confession statements on the grounds that they had been given under coercion exercised by police officers. He maintained that position at the trial, pleading not guilty.101.\u00a0\u00a0The Court furthermore observes that V.Yu., the second applicant\u2019s colleague, who saw the applicant immediately before his arrest, stated that the applicant had had no visible injuries and had not complained about his health. The applicant\u2019s mother and grandmother, who saw the applicant on 1\u00a0and 2 February 2005 respectively, that is after the time spent in police custody, stated that the applicant had had a bruise on the face and had been limping (see paragraph 58 above). Similarly, S.A., the applicant\u2019s girlfriend, stated that she had seen, while watching the video recording of the verification of the applicant\u2019s statements at the crime scene on 1\u00a0February 2005, that the applicant had been limping and that his face had been bruised and swollen (see paragraph 59 above). The Court notes that the Government offered no explanation for their failure to submit the video recording of the verification of the applicant\u2019s statements at the crime scene on 1\u00a0February 2005, as was requested by the Court.102.\u00a0\u00a0It should also be noted that credible assertions of ill\u2011treatment, involving the same police officers, were made by the applicant\u2019s co\u2011accused (see paragraph 91 above).103.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the foregoing, the Court considers that the second applicant\u2019s allegations of the police violence were credible.104.\u00a0\u00a0This conclusion is not altered by other elements in the case file, such as (i) the records of the IVS stating that the applicant did not complain about his health when he was placed there on 27 January 2005, since there is no indication that the applicant underwent a medical examination at the IVS, or at any other detention facility in which he was placed thereafter, or (ii) D.\u2019s statements that he had noticed no injuries on the applicant during the investigative actions on 28 January and 1\u00a0February 2005. D. acted as the applicant\u2019s appointed lawyer during those investigative actions. On 3\u00a0February 2005, in his capacity as the applicant\u2019s retained lawyer, he learned of the applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment by police officers and on 15\u00a0February 2005 lodged the complaint regarding the applicant\u2019s alleged ill\u2011treatment (see paragraphs 28 and 30 above). It remains unclear, inter alia, why no requests for the applicant to undergo a medical examination were lodged promptly and at least immediately after the applicant\u2019s mother\u2019s complaint about his alleged ill-treatment on 7 February 2005 (see paragraphs 28-30 above), and whether the applicant received effective legal aid, which casts doubt on the credibility of D.\u2019s statements.105.\u00a0\u00a0The Court furthermore observes that no inquiry was carried out and no forensic medical examination was ordered in response to the numerous complaints lodged between February and May 2005 concerning the applicant\u2019s alleged ill\u2011treatment by the police (see paragraphs 40 and 47 above).106.\u00a0\u00a0A pre-investigation inquiry was only ordered on 14 July 2005 by the Tikhoretsk Town Court and was carried out by an investigator from the inter\u2011district prosecutor\u2019s office, which refused to institute criminal proceedings on 23\u00a0July 2005, relying on the police officers\u2019 denial that the applicant had been ill\u2011treated. That decision was subsequently annulled as unlawful and based on an incomplete inquiry. Over the nine years which followed, additional inquiries were carried out, and new decisions declining to institute criminal proceedings were issued and then annulled as unlawful and based on an incomplete inquiry. The most recent refusal to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant\u2019s alleged ill\u2011treatment by the police officers, issued in 2016, was essentially the same as the previous refusals.107.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the case-law reiterated in paragraph 92 above, the Court concludes that by refusing to institute criminal proceedings and to conduct a fully fledged criminal investigation in which the whole range of investigative measures would be carried out, the authorities failed to conduct an effective investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations of police ill\u2011treatment.\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural limb.108.\u00a0\u00a0Given that the Government\u2019s denial of the applicant\u2019s credible allegations of his ill-treatment by the police are based on superficial domestic inquiries which fell short of the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention, the Court finds that the applicant was subjected to treatment proscribed by Article 3 in police custody on 26 and 27\u00a0January 2005 (see Ksenz and Others v.\u00a0Russia, nos. 45044\/06 and 5 others, \u00a7\u00a0104, 12\u00a0December 2017). There has therefore been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive limb.IV.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION109.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants further complained that the use of the second applicant\u2019s confession incriminating himself and the first applicant, obtained under coercion by the police officers, had rendered their trial unfair. They relied on Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, provides:\u201c1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...\u201d110.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument, stating that the trial court had thoroughly examined the applicants\u2019 allegations of ill-treatment and rejected them as unconfirmed; moreover, apart from the pre-trial statements, the applicants\u2019 guilt had been sufficiently proven by other evidence in the case.111.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants maintained their complaints.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility112.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits113.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the admission of confessions obtained in violation of Article 3 renders the criminal proceedings in question as a whole automatically unfair, irrespective of the probative value of those statements and irrespective of whether their use was decisive in securing the defendant\u2019s conviction (see G\u00e4fgen, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0166 and 173, and, more recently, Aleksandr Konovalov v. Russia, no. 39708\/07, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a053-56, 28\u00a0November 2017). This principle applies not only where the victim of treatment contrary to Article 3 is the actual defendant in the case in question but also where the person from whom the confession was thus extracted is a third party (see El Haski v. Belgium, no. 649\/08, \u00a7 85, 25 September 2012, and Ka\u00e7iu and Kotorri v. Albania, nos.\u00a033192\/07 and 33194\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 122 and 128-130, 25\u00a0June 2013).114.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has found that the second applicant was subjected to treatment infringing Article 3 in police custody on 26 and 27 January 2005 (see paragraphs 98-107 above). In view of the circumstances of the case it considers that the applicant\u2019s statement of surrender and confession (\u044f\u0432\u043a\u0430 \u0441 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0438\u043d\u043d\u043e\u0439) of 27\u00a0January 2005, the record dated 28 January 2005 of the applicant\u2019s questioning as a suspect, and the record of the on-site verification of his statements of 1\u00a0February 2005 were all tainted by the applicant\u2019s ill\u2011treatment by the police. In refusing the applicant\u2019s request for the exclusion of the above\u2011mentioned records of the investigative actions of 28\u00a0January 2005 and 1 February 2005 the Tikhoretsk Town Court failed to carry out its own independent assessment with a view to ascertaining whether there were reasons to exclude from evidence those records containing the applicant\u2019s confession statements, which had allegedly been tainted by a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, so as to ensure the fairness of the trial. Instead of exercising the utmost care by subjecting those repeated statements to very strict scrutiny (especially after declaring the initial confession statement of 27\u00a0January 2005 to constitute inadmissible evidence on the grounds that it had been adduced in the absence of a lawyer), the Town Court relied on the investigating authorities\u2019 decisions, which the Court has found to have been based on an inquiry which did not meet the Article 3 requirements (see paragraph 106 above). This lack of a careful assessment of the quality of the impugned evidence and the circumstances in which it was obtained was not remedied by the higher courts (see paragraphs 53-54 above).115.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that, regardless of their impact on the outcome of the criminal proceedings against the applicants, the use of the second applicant\u2019s confession statements (together with the lack of appropriate safeguards at the trial) rendered the applicants\u2019 trial unfair (see Mindadze and Nemsitsveridze v. Georgia, no. 21571\/05, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0140-142, 1 June 2017).116.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention in respect of both applicants.V.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION117.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the applicants\u2019 remaining complaints under the Convention, having regard to all the material in its possession and in so far as they fall within the Court\u2019s competence, it finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.VI.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION118.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage119.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant claimed approximately 283,000 euros (EUR) and the second applicant claimed approximately EUR 259,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage which they had allegedly suffered as a result of, inter alia, their arrest and treatment infringing Article 3 in police custody and the lack of an effective investigation thereof, together with their lengthy imprisonment and its impact on their private life, their lack of adequate medical assistance, the deterioration in their health, and the unfairness of the court proceedings.120.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the claims as lacking any connection with the alleged violations of the Convention and as excessive.121.\u00a0\u00a0Making its assessment on an equitable basis and having regard to the nature of the violations found, the Court awards EUR\u00a025,000 to each applicant in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.122.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Court refers to its settled case-law to the effect that when an applicant has suffered an infringement of his rights guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention, he should, as far as possible, be put in the position in which he would have been had the requirements of that provision not been disregarded. The most appropriate form of redress would, in principle, be the reopening of the proceedings, if requested (see, mutatis mutandis, \u00d6calan v. Turkey [GC], no. 46221\/99, \u00a7 210 in fine, ECHR 2005\u2011IV, and Sakhnovskiy v. Russia [GC], no. 21272\/03, \u00a7 112, 2\u00a0November 2010). This applies to the applicants in the present case. The Court notes, in this connection, that Article 413 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides a basis for the reopening of the proceedings if the Court finds a violation of the Convention (see paragraph 70 above).B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses123.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant claimed approximately EUR 3,350 and the second applicant claimed EUR 386 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic authorities and the Court.124.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that there was no causal link between the applicants\u2019 claims and the alleged violations of the Convention.125.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the first applicant the sum of EUR 142 and the second applicant the sum of EUR 313 covering costs under all heads.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest126.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","31226":"12.\u00a0\u00a0In accordance with Rule 42 \u00a7 1 of the Rules of Court, the Court decides to join the applications, given that they concern similar facts and raise identical legal issues under the Convention.I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION13.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants in the cases A.N. v. Russia, no.\u00a061689\/16, Z.S.\u00a0v.\u00a0Russia, no. 20421\/17, and Z.A. v. Russia, no. 23188\/17 complained under Article 3 of the Convention that the national authorities had failed to consider their claims that they could be at risk of ill-treatment in the event of their removal to their respective countries of origin and that the removal would expose them to that risk if it were to take place. Article\u00a03 of the Convention reads:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d14.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility15.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles16.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant general principles concerning the application of Article\u00a03 have been summarised recently by the Court in the judgment in the case of F.G.\u00a0v. Sweden ([GC], no. 43611\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 111-27, ECHR 2016).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles to the present case(a)\u00a0\u00a0Existence of substantial grounds for believing that the applicant faces a real risk of ill-treatment17.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has previously established that the individuals whose extradition was sought by either Uzbek or Tajik authorities on charges of religiously or politically motivated crimes constituted vulnerable groups facing a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention in the event of their removal to their respective countries of origin (see Mamazhonov v. Russia, no. 17239\/13, \u00a7 141, 23 October 2014, and K.I.\u00a0v.\u00a0Russia, cited above, \u00a7 36).18.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present cases, it is apparent that in the course of the extradition and expulsion proceedings the applicants consistently and specifically argued that they had been prosecuted for religious extremism and faced a risk of ill\u2011treatment. The materials pertinent to the charges preferred by the Tajik and Uzbek authorities were clear as to their basis, namely that the applicants were accused of religiously and politically motivated crimes. The Tajik and Uzbek authorities thus directly identified them with the groups whose members have previously been found to be at real risk of being subjected to proscribed treatment.19.\u00a0\u00a0In such circumstances, the Court considers that the Russian authorities had at their disposal sufficiently substantiated complaints pointing to a real risk of ill-treatment.20. The Court is therefore satisfied that the applicants presented the Russian authorities with substantial grounds for believing that they faced a real risk of ill-treatment in their countries of origin.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Duty to assess claims of a real risk of ill-treatment through reliance on sufficient relevant material21.\u00a0\u00a0Having concluded that the applicants had advanced at national level valid claims based on substantial grounds for believing that they faced a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, the Court must examine whether the authorities discharged their obligation to assess these claim adequately through reliance on sufficient relevant material.22.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present cases, the Court considers that in the extradition and expulsion proceedings the domestic authorities did not carry out a rigorous scrutiny of the applicants\u2019 claims that they faced a risk of ill\u2011treatment in their home country. The Court reaches this conclusion having considered the national courts\u2019 simplistic rejections of the applicants\u2019 claims. Moreover, the domestic courts\u2019 reliance on the assurances of the Tajik and Uzbek authorities, despite their formulation in standard terms, appears tenuous, given that similar assurances have consistently been considered unsatisfactory by the Court in the past (see, for example, Abdulkhakov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 14743\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 149-50, 2 October 2012, and Tadzhibayev v.\u00a0Russia, no. 17724\/14, \u00a7 46, 1 December 2015).23.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that the Russian legal system, in principle, offers several avenues whereby the applicants\u2019 removal to their countries of origin could be prevented, given the risk of ill-treatment they face there. However, the facts of the present cases demonstrate that the applicants\u2019 claims were not adequately considered in any relevant proceedings, despite being consistently raised.24.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes that, although the applicants had sufficiently substantiated the claims that they would risk ill-treatment in their countries of origin, the Russian authorities failed to assess their claims adequately through reliance on sufficient relevant material. This failure opened the way for the applicants\u2019 removals.(c)\u00a0\u00a0Existence of a real risk of ill-treatment or danger to life25.\u00a0\u00a0Given the failure of the domestic authorities to adequately assess the alleged real risk of ill-treatment through reliance on sufficient relevant material, the Court finds itself compelled to examine independently whether or not the applicants would be exposed to such a risk in the event of their removal to their countries of origin.26.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that nothing in the parties\u2019 submissions, nor previously examined relevant material from independent international sources (see paragraph 10 above) provides a basis for a conclusion that the criminal justice system of Tajikistan or Uzbekistan or the specific treatment of those prosecuted for religiously and politically motivated crimes had improved.27.\u00a0\u00a0The Court having given due consideration to the available material concludes that authorising the applicants\u2019 removal to their countries of origin exposed them to a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.(d)\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion28.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that there would be a violation of Article 3 of the Convention if the applicants in the cases A.N. v. Russia, no. 61689\/16, Z.S. v. Russia, no.\u00a020421\/17, and Z.A. v. Russia, no. 23188\/17 were to be removed to their respective countries of origin.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 OF THE CONVENTION29.\u00a0\u00a0In application B.A. v. Russia, no. 37702\/17 the applicant complained under Article 5\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(f) of the Convention of the unlawfulness of his detention pending expulsion and of lack of foreseeability regarding its length. The relevant provisions of the Convention read as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law......(f)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.\u201d30.\u00a0\u00a0The Government provided no specific arguments in this regard and stated that the available material is sufficient for the Court to take decision on the merits of this complaint.31.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the exception in sub-paragraph (f) of Article\u00a05 \u00a7 1 of the Convention requires only that \u201caction is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition\u201d without any further justification (see, among others, Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, \u00a7\u00a0112, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011V) and that deprivation of liberty will be justified as long as deportation or extradition proceedings are in progress (see A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.\u00a03455\/05, \u00a7\u00a0164, ECHR 2009). In asking whether \u201caction is being taken with a view to deportation\u201d, this Court has found that removal must be a realistic prospect (A. and Others v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 167, and Amie and\u00a0Others v. Bulgaria, no.\u00a058149\/08, \u00a7 144, 12 February 2013). While an interim measure indicated under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court might at times be the only actual barrier to an applicant\u2019s expulsion, its indication does not necessarily create a presumption that the expulsion is not possible or that the subsequent detention is arbitrary. A detention period subject to review at regular intervals, as long as expulsion remains a realistic possibility, might be reasonable given the authorities\u2019 decisions to maintain that detention awaiting the outcome of this Court\u2019s judgment (see Ahmed v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, no. 59727\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 45-59, 2 March 2017).32.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that prior to his detention pending expulsion the applicant was detained pending extradition between 12 May 2016 and 10\u00a0May 2017. On the day of his release from detention pending extradition he was immediately rearrested for violation of migration rules. On 12 May 2017 his detention pending expulsion was ordered by the Meshchanskiy District Court of Moscow, this order was subsequently upheld in substance on 2 June 2017 and 10 November 2017 by the Moscow City Court reaffirming the expulsion order and suspending its enforcement respectively. It needs to be highlighted that the above decisions of the Moscow City Court were adopted after 30\u00a0May 2017, the date on which Court stayed the applicant\u2019s removal to Uzbekistan by indicating to the Russian Government an interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33.\u00a0\u00a0At the same time the Court is also mindful that the applicant\u2019s expulsion had been previously ordered in 2014 by the Odintsovskiy Town Court of Moscow Region and that he had defied that order by going into hiding and residing in Russia illegally. It also does not lose sight of the fact that on 12\u00a0May 2017 after his expulsion was repeatedly ordered by the Meshchanskiy District Court of Moscow the applicant escaped from the courthouse and was rearrested on 16 May 2017.34.\u00a0\u00a0The domestic judicial decisions of 12 May, 2 June and 10 November 2017 ordering the applicant\u2019s detention pending expulsion contained no reasons justifying the need for detention, no analysis of the particularities of the case in this regard and no estimation of how realistic the applicant\u2019s expulsion was in the light of the Rule 39 measure. Neither had these decisions set any time-limits for review of the continued validity of the applicant\u2019s detention. In absence of the scrutiny by the domestic court of these decisive elements the Court must conclude that it had not been demonstrated that the length of the applicant\u2019s detention pending expulsion was compliant with what was reasonably required for the purpose pursued.35.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there had been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f) of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04 OF THE CONVENTION36.\u00a0\u00a0In application Z.S. v. Russia, no. 20421\/17, the applicant complained under Article 5\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04 of the Convention that the length of the appeal proceedings in Moscow Regional Court, by which the applicant sought to challenge the lawfulness of the prolongation of his detention ordered by the Khamovnicheskiy District Court of Moscow on 22 September 2016, did not comply with the \u201cspeediness\u201d requirement of Article 5\u00a0\u00a7\u00a04 of the Convention. The relevant provisions of the Convention read as follows:\u201cEveryone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.\u201d37.\u00a0\u00a0The Government provided no specific arguments in this regard and stated that the available material is sufficient for the Court to take decision on the merits of this complaint.38.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that in the present case the decision to prolong the applicant\u2019s detention of 22 September 2016 was appealed by the applicant on 26\u00a0September 2016 and reviewed by the appeal court on 17\u00a0October 2016, that is 21 days later. Having regard to its case-law on the matter and all of the circumstances of the present case the Court does not find the above period of appeal review unreasonable in the light of the \u201cspeediness\u201d requirement under Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention. It therefore concludes that this complaint must be rejected as inadmissible under Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION39.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant in the case B.A. v. Russia, no. 37702\/17 further complained under Article 5 \u00a7 4 about an alleged lack of an effective procedure by which he could challenge the lawfulness of his detention pending expulsion and the length of the appeal review for one of the detention orders.40.\u00a0\u00a0 However, having regard to the facts of the case, the submissions of the parties and its findings under Article 5 of the Convention, the Court considers that it has examined the main legal questions raised in the present application and that there is no need to give a separate ruling on the remaining complaints (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v. Romania [GC], no.\u00a047848\/08, \u00a7 156, ECHR 2014, with further references).V.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF THE INTERIM MEASURES UNDER RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT41.\u00a0\u00a0On various dates the Court indicated to the respondent Government, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that the applicants should not be removed from Russia to their respective countries of origin for the duration of the proceedings before the Court.42.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection the Court reiterates that, in accordance with Article\u00a028 \u00a7 2 of the Convention, the present judgment is final.43.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court considers that the measures indicated to the Government under Rule\u00a039 of the Rules of Court come to an end.VI.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION44.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage45.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants claimed between 5,000 and 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The applicant in the case Z.A. v. Russia, no. 23188\/17 left the amount of award at the Court\u2019s discretion.46.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stated that in case of finding of a violation such finding in itself would constitute a sufficient just satisfaction.47.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the nature of the established violations of Article\u00a03 of the Convention and the specific facts of the present case, the Court considers that finding that there would be a violation of Article 3 of the Convention if the applicants were to be removed to their respective countries of origin constitutes sufficient just satisfaction in respect of any non-pecuniary damage suffered (see, to similar effect, J.K. and Others v.\u00a0Sweden [GC], no. 59166\/12, \u00a7\u00a0127, ECHR 2016).48.\u00a0\u00a0At the same time having regard to its conclusions under Article 5 of the Convention in the case B.A. v. Russia, no. 37702\/17 (see paragraph 35 above) and acting on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 5,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses49.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also claimed between EUR 3,500 and 5,680 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and the Court.50.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not provide specific comments in this regard.51.\u00a0\u00a0Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case\u2011law, the Court considers it reasonable that the sums indicated in the appended table be awarded and that these sums should be payable directly to the applicants\u2019 representatives.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest52.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","31276":"A.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violation of Article 8 of the Convention53.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention of inadequate sanitary conditions in his cell, cell no. 346.54.\u00a0\u00a0By a letter of 11 July 2017, the Government informed the Court that they proposed to make a unilateral declaration with a view to resolving the issue raised by this part of the application. They further requested that the Court strike out the application in accordance with Article 37 of the Convention.55.\u00a0\u00a0The declaration provided as follows:\u201cThe Government thereby wish to express \u2013 by way of the unilateral declaration \u2011 their acknowledgment of [a] violation of Article 8 \u00a7 1 of the Convention as regards the installation of toilet facilities in cell no. 346 of the Kielce Prison where the applicant [was serving] his sentence from 19 August until 23 September 2010.... the Government declare that they are ready to pay the applicant the sum of the PLN 800 which they consider to be reasonable in the light of the Court\u2019s case-law ... The sum referred to above, which is to cover any pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, as well as costs and expenses, will be free of any taxes that may be applicable. It will be payable within three months from the date of notification of the decision taken by the Court pursuant to Article 37 \u00a7 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In the event of failure to pay this sum within the said three-month period, the Government undertake to pay simple interest on it, from expiry of that period until settlement, as a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default periods plus three percentage points...\u201d56.\u00a0\u00a0By a letter dated 16 October 2017, the applicant indicated that he was not satisfied with the terms of the unilateral declaration, on account of the amount offered.57.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 37 of the Convention provides that it may at any stage of the proceedings decide to strike an application out of its list of cases where the circumstances lead to one of the conclusions specified under (a), (b) or (c) of paragraph 1 of that Article. In particular, Article 37 \u00a7 1 (c) enables the Court to strike a case out of its list if:\u201cfor any other reason established by the Court, it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application\u201d.58.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also reiterates that, in certain circumstances, it may strike out an application under Article 37 \u00a7 1 (c) on the basis of a unilateral declaration by a respondent Government, even if the applicant wishes the examination of the case to be continued.59.\u00a0\u00a0To this end, the Court has examined the declaration in the light of the principles emerging from its case-law, in particular the Tahsin Acar judgment (see Tahsin Acar v. Turkey (preliminary objections) [GC], no.\u00a026307\/95, \u00a7\u00a7 75-77, ECHR 2003-VI; WAZA Sp. z o.o. v. Poland (dec.), no.\u00a011602\/02, 26 June 2007; and Sulwi\u0144ska v. Poland (dec.), no. 28953\/03, 18\u00a0September 2007).60.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the nature of the admissions contained in the Government\u2019s declaration, as well as the amount of compensation proposed, which is consistent with the amount awarded in a similar leading case against Poland (see Szafra\u0144ski v. Poland, no. 17249\/12, 15 December 2015), the Court considers that it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application (Article 37 \u00a7 1 (c)).61.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, in the light of the above considerations, and in particular given the clear and extensive case-law on the topic (see, mutatis mutandis, Belevitskiy v. Russia, no. 72967\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 73-79, 1 March 2007; Vala\u0161inas v.\u00a0Lithuania, no. 44558\/98, \u00a7 104, ECHR 2001\u2011VIII; and Khudoyorov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 6847\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 63, 106-107, ECHR 2005\u2011X (extracts)), the Court is satisfied that respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto does not require it to continue the examination of the application (Article 37 \u00a7 1 in fine).62.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court emphasises that, should the Government fail to comply with the terms of their unilateral declaration, the application could be restored to the list in accordance with Article 37 \u00a7 2 of the Convention (Josipovi\u0107 v. Serbia (dec.), no. 18369\/07, 4 March 2008).63.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, it is appropriate to strike the case out of the list in so far as it relates to the above complaint.B.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violation of Article 3 of the Convention64.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also complained under Article 3 of the Convention in relation to the two occasions when he had received disciplinary punishments by being placed in an isolation cell and subjected to restraining measures. The relevant provision reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d65.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicant\u2019s disciplinary punishment had not been degrading, in that each time, the restraining force used and the duration of the measure had been necessary and proportionate to his conduct. More specifically, they essentially observed that the applicant had not suffered any injuries, and that the redness around his wrists, recorded on 30\u00a0April and 1 May 2009, had been a natural result of the restraining force used. They also acknowledged that the applicant had wet himself on 30\u00a0April 2009. The Government stressed, however, that the incident had occurred despite the fact that the officer who had been monitoring the applicant had offered to accompany him to the toilet, and that the applicant could have signalled his need to go to the toilet either during or in between the regular checks. In conclusion, the Government argued that this part of the application was inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded.66.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant mainly complained that he had not been able to get any rest because the prison officers had made frequent checks on him and his mattress had been taken away from him during the day. He also stated that he had urinated on himself and had been left in wet clothes for a long time. His last grievance was that the use of the protective helmet during his second punishment had been unnecessary.67.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see Ramirez Sanchez v. France [GC], no.\u00a059450\/00, \u00a7 117, ECHR 2006\u2011IX).68.\u00a0\u00a0Treatment has been considered \u201cdegrading\u201d when it was such as to arouse in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them and possibly breaking their physical or moral resistance (see Hurtado v. Switzerland, 28 January 1994, opinion of the Commission, \u00a7 67, Series A no. 280), or when it was such as to drive the victim to act against his will or conscience (see, for example, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v. Greece (the \u201cGreek case\u201d), nos.\u00a03321\/67, 3322\/67, 3323\/67 and 3344\/67, Commission\u2019s report of 5\u00a0November 1969, Yearbook 12, p. 186, and Keenan v. the United Kingdom, no. 27229\/95, \u00a7 110, ECHR 2001-III). Furthermore, in considering whether treatment is \u201cdegrading\u201d within the meaning of Article\u00a03, one of the factors which the Court will take into account is the question of whether its object was to humiliate and debase the person concerned, although the absence of any such purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of a violation of Article 3 (see Raninen v. Finland, 16\u00a0December 1997, \u00a7 55, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997\u2011VIII; Peers v.\u00a0Greece, no. 28524\/95, \u00a7\u00a7 68 and 74, ECHR 2001-III; and Price v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, no. 33394\/96, \u00a7 24, ECHR 2001\u2011VII).69.\u00a0\u00a0In order for a punishment or treatment associated with it to be \u201cinhuman\u201d or \u201cdegrading\u201d, the suffering or humiliation involved must in any event go beyond that inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment (see\u00a0Ramirez Sanchez, cited above, \u00a7 1 19 with further references).70.\u00a0\u00a0Allegations of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 must be supported by appropriate evidence. To assess this evidence, the Court adopts the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d but adds that such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see, among other authorities, Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380\/09, \u00a7 82, ECHR 2015).71.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to these general principles, the Court notes that, in the case at hand, it is an established fact that on both occasions when the applicant was in an isolation cell prison officers checked on him at regular one or two-hour intervals, including during the night (see paragraph\u00a016 and\u00a029 above). The Court accepts that such a practice might have caused a degree of nuisance to the applicant, who was inevitably woken up at each check. It must nevertheless be reiterated that he was partly immobilised throughout most of his isolation (see paragraphs 14, 18, 27 and 33 above), and that he had a medical condition (see paragraph 5 above). For these reasons, the Court finds that the monitoring protocol applied in the applicant\u2019s case was justified by the need to protect his health and life. It was also not disproportionate, since the applicant was not deprived of sleep.72.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that the mattress was available to the applicant for twelve hours during each occasion that he was placed in isolation (see\u00a0paragraphs 17 and 30 above). Having to lie on the bare floor for the rest of the time during each period of disciplinary punishment must have necessarily caused the applicant some physical discomfort or even backache (see paragraph\u00a020 above), especially when his arms were restrained by the straightjacket or the belt. The Court is nevertheless of the opinion that, since no injuries were caused on account of such conditions, the applicant\u2019s suffering must be considered mild and inherent in the disciplinary measure, the legitimacy of which the applicant does not contest (see paragraph\u00a051\u00a0above).73.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the case material, the Court also considers that the use of the protective helmet for twenty-seven hours during the applicant\u2019s second period of detention in an isolation cell (see paragraph 32 above), albeit for a long period, was necessary in view of the continued risk of self\u2011harm (see paragraphs 26, 28 and 31 above). Moreover, that measure did not restrain the applicant\u2019s movements or cause him any physical discomfort.74.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will leave aside the issue of the continued use of other measures of force such as the straightjacket, the restraining belt and possibly handcuffs, because the applicant has not made any complaint in this regard.75.\u00a0\u00a0On the other hand, the Court notes with concern the applicant\u2019s grievance that, while lying immobilised, he urinated on himself and was left in such a state for some hours.76.\u00a0\u00a0The findings of fact made by the domestic court, the documents in the case file, and the applicant\u2019s own submissions, which are very confused as to the actual date of the incident, trigger the conclusion that the first alleged urination incident (on 16 or 17 March 2009) is, as found by the domestic court, unsubstantiated by evidence (see paragraphs 22-25 above).77.\u00a0\u00a0Conversely, the incident of 30 April 2009 is well acknowledged and documented (see paragraphs 38 and 65 above).78.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant material which has been produced before the Court consists of: the applicant\u2019s unclear description of the incident in question (see paragraphs 36 and 51 above); the official notes in the 30 April report recording that the applicant declined to use the toilet at 12.52 p.m. and did not signal his need to go to the bathroom when a prison officer and his supervisor subsequently checked on him five times (see paragraphs\u00a028 and\u00a037 above); and the domestic court\u2019s finding that the applicant actually used the toilet at 12.52 p.m., having declined such an opportunity earlier that day, and did not signal any need to use the toilet between 2.20\u00a0p.m. and\u00a04.45\u00a0p.m. (see paragraph 38 above). Despite these somewhat contradictory elements, the Court can nevertheless conclude that shortly before the incident the applicant was indeed given an opportunity to use the toilet, and if he had an urge to go to the toilet afterwards, he did not ask one of the officers monitoring him to take him. That casts serious doubt on the credibility of the applicant\u2019s submission that he had no choice but to urinate on himself.79.\u00a0\u00a0Irrespective of the applicant\u2019s perceived motivation for doing so, the fact remains that he did indeed wet himself, following which he was allowed to change his dirty clothes.80.\u00a0\u00a0There is a lack of clarity as to the crucial element of the case, namely how soon after the urination incident the authorities allowed the applicant to change his clothes.81.\u00a0\u00a0According to the 30 April report, when a guard checked on the applicant at 1.30 p.m., 2.15 p.m., 3.30 p.m. and 4.15 p.m., and when the applicant had a talk with his supervisor and a prison psychologist at 2.47\u00a0p.m., he did not indicate that he had urinated on himself and was not observed to have urinated on himself (see paragraphs 28 and 37 above). Then, at 4.37 p.m he was allowed to change his wet clothes (see\u00a0paragraph\u00a037 above).82.\u00a0\u00a0The report does not make any mention of the conversation described by the domestic court on the basis of the video-recording of the cell. In the domestic court\u2019s account, at 4.45 p.m. the applicant, who had clearly asked to be allowed to wash himself and change his clothes, was given a sort of ultimatum about firstly improving his behaviour (see paragraph 38 above).83.\u00a0\u00a0This Court has always condemned the practice of gratuitously imposing potentially debasing measures on applicants who, like the applicant in the instant case, find themselves in a particularly helpless situation (see, mutatis mutandis, Wieser v. Austria, no. 2293\/03, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a039 and\u00a040, 22 February 2007, with further references in the context of strip searches). A prisoner who is being subjected to a disciplinary punishment by means of isolation and being made to wear a restraining belt is already in a very vulnerable position. Pressuring him to improve his conduct by additionally not allowing him to change his clothes soaked with urine could not, under most circumstances, be considered justified by any compelling reason.84.\u00a0\u00a0In the instant case, however, the Court does not find it established to the required standard of beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant was subjected to such treatment. To this end, the Court observes firstly that it is impossible to determine when the applicant wet himself. It is highly unlikely, however, that the incident occurred before 2.47 p.m., when the applicant talked to his supervisor and the psychologist. Secondly, if the applicant urinated on himself prior to 4.15 p.m., when he was last checked on by a prison officer, it does not appear that he immediately signalled the problem. Thirdly, the description of the tense conversation between the applicant and the prison guard recorded at 4.45 p.m. reveals that the latter, admittedly somewhat evasively and provocatively, told the applicant that if he calmed down then he would be able to leave the isolation cell altogether. However, that does not lead to an unequivocal conclusion that the applicant\u2019s request for clean clothes was firmly denied at that moment. Whether the applicant got to change his dirty clothes at 4.37 p.m. precisely, or only after the unfortunate conversation with the guard at 4.45 p.m., there is no evidence that the authorities disregarded his condition for a long time, and certainly not for several hours, as claimed by the applicant (see\u00a0paragraph 36 above).85.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the foregoing, the Court considers that in the particular circumstances of the present case, the complaint under the substantive limb of Article 3 of the Convention is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,Takes note of the terms of the respondent Government\u2019s declaration under Article 8 of the Convention and of the modalities for ensuring compliance with the undertakings referred to therein;Decides to strike the application out of its list of cases in so far as it relates to the above complaint, in accordance with Article 37 \u00a7 1 (c) of the Convention;Declares the complaint under Article 3 of the Convention inadmissible.Done in English and notified in writing on 29 November 2018.Abel CamposKsenija Turkovi\u0107RegistrarPresident","31273":"I.\u00a0\u00a0PRELIMINARY MATTERSA.\u00a0\u00a0Death of two applicants63.\u00a0\u00a0The seventeenth and the eighteenth applicants died after this application had been lodged (see paragraph 5 above).1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions64.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants\u2019 representatives initially informed the Court of that fact in their letter of 23 February 2018. They stated that the seventeenth applicant\u2019s wife and son and the eighteenth applicant\u2019s wife and granddaughters wished to pursue the application in their stead. On that occasion they furthermore stated that the nineteenth applicant had also died and named certain individuals who wished to pursue the application in his stead.65.\u00a0\u00a0In response to the Court\u2019s invitation to provide evidence, the applicants\u2019 representatives stated that in fact the nineteenth applicant had not died. On that occasion they also submitted that Ms\u00a0Raisa Mikitovna Tsynya and Ms Lyubov Leontivna Tsynya \u2013 respectively, the wives of the seventeenth and eighteenth applicants \u2013 as well as Ms\u00a0Ramina Nikolaevna Tsynya, Lyubov Nikolaevna Tsynya and Evgenya Tsynya \u2013 the eighteenth applicant\u2019s granddaughters, had expressed their wish to pursue the application on behalf of the respective applicants. They submitted authority forms signed by those individuals and death certificates.66.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the individuals purporting to pursue the application on behalf of the deceased had \u201cfailed to provide any supporting documents related to their relationship or consanguinity with the deceased, such as birth certificate, marriage certificate and more important (sic) inheritance certificates\u201d. They invited the Court to refuse those individuals\u2019 requests that they be allowed to pursue the application on behalf of the deceased.67.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants\u2019 representatives responded by submitting a copy of the marriage certificate showing that Lyubov Tsynya was the eighteenth applicant\u2019s wife. As to Raisa Tsynya, they submitted that she had only been the seventeenth applicant\u2019s partner (that is to say they had not been married to each other) and that she was therefore in no position to provide a marriage certificate. They pointed out that in the case of Velikova\u00a0v.\u00a0Bulgaria ((dec.), no.\u00a041488\/98, ECHR 1999\u2011V (extracts)) the Court had allowed an unmarried partner to pursue a complaint following the death of the applicant. The applicants\u2019 representatives submitted that the individuals in question were vulnerable and poor and could not be expected to provide certificates of inheritance.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment68.\u00a0\u00a0The Court firstly notes that the applicants died after they had lodged the application, a situation which according to its case-law is viewed differently from those instances where the applicant has died beforehand. Where the applicant has died after the application was lodged, the Court has accepted that the next of kin or heir may in principle pursue the application, provided that he or she has sufficient interest in the case (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v. Romania [GC], no.\u00a047848\/08, \u00a7 97, ECHR 2014, with further references). In such cases, the decisive point is not whether the rights in question are or are not transferable to the heirs wishing to pursue the procedure, but whether the heirs can in principle claim a legitimate interest in requesting the Court to deal with the case on the basis of the applicant\u2019s wish to exercise his or her individual and personal right to lodge an application with the Court (see Singh and Others v. Greece, no. 60041\/13, \u00a7\u00a026, 19 January 2017).69.\u00a0\u00a0It is not contested that the individuals wishing to pursue the application on behalf of the deceased applicants have no formal status as their heirs. However, this in itself is not decisive as long as they can lay a claim to be their next of kin (contrast Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no.\u00a0 33071\/96, ECHR 2000\u2011XII \u2013 where the Court accepted that a relative who had not finalised his status as a heir nevertheless had such standing \u2011 with Th\u00e9venon v. France (dec.), no.\u00a02476\/02, ECHR\u00a02006\u2011III, \u2011 where it did not recognise the locus standi of an individual who was not the applicant\u2019s relative, even though he was his friend and universal legatee).70.\u00a0\u00a0As far as the seventeenth applicant is concerned, there is no evidence before the Court which would show that the individuals purporting to pursue the application on his behalf are his next of kin, and the individuals in question have not explained why they could not provide such evidence.71.\u00a0\u00a0While initially the seventeenth applicant\u2019s son was mentioned by the applicants\u2019 representatives as wishing to pursue the application, there was no follow-up and the applicants\u2019 representatives made no reference to him again after the Court\u2019s request for evidence (see paragraphs 64 and 65 above).72.\u00a0\u00a0As to the seventeenth applicant\u2019s unmarried partner, she did not pursue any domestic proceedings on his behalf and was not recognised as such either by any domestic authority or the Government (contrast, for example, Velikova (dec.), cited above, Vogrin\u010di\u010d and Others\u00a0v.\u00a0Slovenia\u00a0(dec.), nos. 15829\/05 and 18618\/06, 28 June 2011, and Ivko\u00a0v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a030575\/08, \u00a7\u00a066, 15 December 2015). Even after clarifying her status as his unmarried partner, she has not described her relationship with the applicant in any detail, such as the period of their cohabitation, common children, etc. (contrast, for example, Velikova (dec.), cited above, and Pisarkiewicz v. Poland, no. 18967\/02, \u00a7 29, 22 January 2008).73.\u00a0\u00a0Given these circumstances, the Court concludes that it has not been shown that the individuals purporting to pursue the application in the seventeenth applicant\u2019s stead have a legitimate interest in doing so. Accordingly, they do not have standing to pursue the proceedings.74.\u00a0\u00a0Given that the Court will continue to examine the other applicants\u2019 complaints, which are based entirely on the same facts, no particular circumstance relating to respect for the rights guaranteed by the Convention or its Protocols requires the Court to continue the examination of the application in respect of the seventeenth applicant (see, for example, Grigoryan and Sergeyeva v. Ukraine, no. 63409\/11, \u00a7 45, 28 March 2017).75.\u00a0\u00a0The Court accordingly finds that, as far as that applicant is concerned, the conditions in which a case may be struck out of its list, as provided in Article 37 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, are satisfied and decides to strike the application in respect of the seventeenth applicant out of its list.76.\u00a0\u00a0As far as the eighteenth applicant is concerned, the application is being pursued by his wife. The Court has no reason to doubt that she may pursue the application in his stead. By contrast, the individuals claiming to be that applicant\u2019s granddaughters did not submit any evidence in support of that claim and, therefore, have not demonstrated that they have the requisite standing to pursue the application in his stead.77.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court holds that the eighteenth applicant\u2019s wife has standing to continue the present proceedings in his stead.78.\u00a0\u00a0However, reference will still be made to \u201cthe eighteenth applicant\u201d throughout the ensuing text.B.\u00a0\u00a0Victim status of some applicants1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions79.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the second, fourth, eighth, fourteenth, sixteenth and nineteenth applicants had not been recognised as victims in the domestic criminal proceedings (see the Appendix) and had not submitted any evidence to show that they had been affected by the events in issue in the case. Moreover, in the course of the domestic investigation the police did not examine the houses of the fifth, thirteenth, fourteenth and nineteenth applicants. The Government considered this to constitute evidence that their houses had not been damaged in the attack. Accordingly, they could not claim to be victims of the alleged violations of the Convention.80.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants responded that what was important in this context was the ineffectiveness of the domestic investigation, not those applicants\u2019 formal status in those proceedings. Moreover, they pointed out that they had complained about the authorities\u2019 failure to confer on some of them the formal status of aggrieved parties in the domestic proceedings (see\u00a0paragraph 50 above). The applicants furthermore submitted that the fact that the houses of the fifth, thirteenth, fourteenth and nineteenth applicants and the damage done to them had not been examined by the police was attributable to the ineffectiveness of the investigation rather than to any fault on the applicants\u2019 part.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment81.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in her letter to the regional prosecutor\u2019s office of 27 February 2005 (see paragraph 36 above) an official of the Romani Zbora NGO, acting on behalf of all the applicants other than the sixteenth (Ms Tsykolan), identified them as victims of the attack, enclosing their statements to that effect. In its response, the regional prosecutor\u2019s office did not contest their situation as victims; on the contrary, it apparently implied that all of them had been granted formal status in the investigation (see\u00a0paragraph 37 above). In view of the Government\u2019s observations, the latter assessment by the prosecutor\u2019s office appears to have been incorrect as no formal decision to grant the status of aggrieved parties to the second, fourth, eighth, fourteenth, sixteenth and nineteenth applicants was ever taken. However, neither does it appear that any formal decision was taken refusing them that status, even though the domestic law appears to have required such a formal decision (see paragraphs 53 and 54 above). In fact, there is no indication that there has been any decision-making or assessment of facts in respect of those applicants on the part of the domestic authorities.82.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates, in this respect, that according to the Court\u2019s long-established case-law, the concept of \u201cvictim\u201d must be interpreted autonomously and irrespective of domestic concepts such as those concerning an interest or capacity (see, for example, Vallianatos and Others v. Greece [GC], nos. 29381\/09 and 32684\/09, \u00a7 47, ECHR 2013 (extracts)). Therefore, a lack of recognition of applicants at the domestic level does not, in and of itself, prevent them being considered to be \u201cvictims\u201d within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention, which denotes the person or persons directly or indirectly affected by the alleged violation at issue (ibid.).83.\u00a0\u00a0As to the Government\u2019s argument that the houses of the fifth, thirteenth, fourteenth and nineteenth applicants had not been examined by the police \u2013 which, in the Government\u2019s opinion, signified that those houses had not been damaged \u2013 the Court is unable to perceive any specific basis for this conclusion in the domestic investigation material made available to it. Moreover, as far as fifth and thirteenth applicants are concerned, this argument would appear to contradict the formal decision of the domestic authorities to grant them the status of aggrieved parties.84.\u00a0\u00a0Given that the Government did not submit specific evidence \u2013 in particular any reasoned domestic decision \u2013 to rebut the applicants\u2019 account that they had been displaced from their homes and that their homes had been damaged in the course of the events of 7 to 10 September 2002, the Court considers that all the applicants, except the sixteenth, can claim to be victims of the violations of the Convention alleged by them.85.\u00a0\u00a0As far as the sixteenth applicant is concerned, the Court notes that she has not submitted any evidence (beyond the applicants\u2019 own assertion) to show that she was affected by the events in issue in the present application. She was granted no formal status at the domestic level and her name was not mentioned either in the Romani Zbora NGO\u2019s complaint of 27\u00a0February 2005 (see paragraph 36 above) or in the lawyer\u2019s complaints concerning the failure to recognise some of the other applicants as aggrieved parties (see paragraph 50 above). Therefore, the sixteenth applicant has not laid out an arguable case that she is a victim of the alleged violations of the Convention.86.\u00a0\u00a0Therefore the Court, upholding the Government\u2019s objection, considers that the application has to be rejected, pursuant to Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) and 4 of the Convention, in so far as it concerns the sixteenth applicant.87.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, in the following discussion, unless otherwise specified, the first to fifteenth and eighteenth to nineteenth applicants are collectively referred to as \u201cthe applicants\u201d.C.\u00a0\u00a0Question of an abuse of the right of individual application88.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not consider the letter of 13 July 2009 addressed to Mr\u00a0Stoyanov and indicating that the investigation had been renewed briefly in 2009, which the applicants had submitted (see paragraph\u00a044 above), to be genuine. In particular it did not bear the appropriate police letterhead, did not bear the appropriate stamp, and was in Russian (even though normally it should have been in Ukrainian), and no record of it having been sent could be found in the district police department\u2019s register of outgoing correspondence. The letter, therefore, appeared to have been forged. The Government accordingly invited the Court to consider the production of that letter to constitute abuse of the right of application and to reject the application on that ground.89.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants insisted that the letter of 13 July 2009 was genuine. The fact that it was in Russian was not unusual since that language was widely used in the region. It bore a letterhead and a stamp. They provided a written statement from their representative Mr Stoyanov confirming that the letter was genuine. According to him, he had also visited Ivanivka police station on 7 November 2016 and the registrar there had confirmed to him that the 2009 letter had indeed been sent. The applicants also provided a new letter dated 21 October 2016 and signed by the deputy head of the investigation department at Ivanivka police station and confirming, in essence, that the 2009 letter was genuine.90.\u00a0\u00a0As to the letter of 21 October 2016, the Government submitted that the police were investigating the circumstances under which it had been issued. Moreover, the grounds for the issuance of this letter were doubtful since the police department\u2019s register of outgoing correspondence had been stored for five years and then destroyed in 2014, so it was impossible to verify whether the letter of 13 July 2009 had been issued.91.\u00a0\u00a0On the basis of the material in its possession, the Court is unable to conclude that the letter of 13 July 2009 was forged and that the applicants committed an abuse. In fact, the key objection to its genuineness raised by the Government \u2013 namely that it could not be found in the police department\u2019s register of outgoing correspondence \u2013 appears to contradict the Government\u2019s own submission that that register had been destroyed in 2014 before this application was communicated (compare paragraphs\u00a088\u00a0and 90 above). Moreover, the issuance of that 2009 letter was reconfirmed by the police as recently as 21 October 2016, after the Government had submitted their observations. Accordingly, this objection must be rejected.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION, TAKEN ALONE AND IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION92.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained under Article 3 of the Convention that the attack on their houses and their destruction had amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment, for which the State was responsible on the grounds that the authorities had been complicit in the attack and had failed to protect them from it and to investigate it effectively. They furthermore argued that the State was responsible for the degrading living conditions that they had experienced following their displacement. In addition, they complained that on account of the above they had suffered discrimination owing to their Roma ethnic origin, contrary to Article 14, taken in conjunction with Article\u00a03.93.\u00a0\u00a0The invoked provisions read:Article 3\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dArticle 14\u201cThe enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Two groups of applicants94.\u00a0\u00a0In examining the above complaints the Court finds it appropriate to distinguish between two groups of applicants:Group I applicants \u2013 applicants who were present in the village in the run-up to the attack of the night of 9-10 September 2002 and had to flee their homes in the village under the threat of that attack \u2013 namely, the second, third, sixth to ninth, eleventh, thirteenth to fifteenth, eighteenth and nineteenth applicants;Group II applicants \u2013 the applicants who, by their own admission, were away from their homes at the time of the events in question (see the Appendix for references to the relevant statements), and so had no knowledge of the imminent attack, having only learned about the damage done to them afterwards \u2013 namely the first, fourth, fifth, tenth and twelfth applicants.B.\u00a0\u00a0Group I applicants1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility(a)\u00a0\u00a0Exhaustion of domestic remedies(i)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions95.\u00a0\u00a0In the Government\u2019s opinion, the applicants should have realised that the criminal investigation was incapable of establishing with sufficient clarity any given person\u2019s criminal responsibility for violence committed by a mob. Instead, a claim for damages against the local council or the police department was the only effective remedy available to them. In fact, the applicants had lodged a claim for damages against the council on 23\u00a0December 2005 seeking damages in respect of their expulsion (see\u00a0paragraph 46 above). By using this remedy they had forfeited the right to assert that it had not been effective. However, they had then failed to appeal against the first-instance court\u2019s decision dismissing their claim (see\u00a0paragraph 47 above). They had also failed to lodge an administrative claim for damages against the police. The Government provided examples of the domestic courts\u2019 case-law according to which such claims for damages could be considered effective.96.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also pointed out that the applicants had failed to challenge before a more senior prosecutor the decisions to suspend criminal proceedings.97.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants pointed out that the Court had found violations of the Convention where States had failed to conduct an effective criminal investigation into mob violence (see Ouranio Toxo and Others v. Greece, no. 74989\/01, \u00a7 43, ECHR 2005\u2011X (extracts); Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses and Others v. Georgia, no.\u00a071156\/01, \u00a7 124, 3 May 2007; and Identoba and Others v. Georgia, no.\u00a073235\/12, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a075-78, 12 May 2015). For them, this was a clear indication that they could have expected an effective criminal investigation into the attack. They had sought to initiate such a criminal investigation and had thus complied with the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies. It had only been after it had become clear that the investigation was ineffective that they had applied to the Court.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment98.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant principles of the Court\u2019s case-law concerning the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies are set out in\u00a0Mocanu and Others\u00a0v.\u00a0Romania, [GC], nos.\u00a010865\/09 and 2 others, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0120-127, ECHR 2014 (extracts).99.\u00a0\u00a0In response to the Government\u2019s submission that the applicants had to lodge civil claims for damages, the Court observes that, in fact, a criminal investigation was initiated in connection with the attack on the applicants\u2019 houses, and the applicants played an active role in it (see paragraphs\u00a030\u201144\u00a0above and 109 below). Accordingly, the applicants made use of a domestic remedy which, according to the Court\u2019s case-law, constitutes an effective domestic remedy for such complaints (see, for example, M.C. and A.C.\u00a0v.\u00a0Romania, no. 12060\/12, \u00a7\u00a061, 12 April 2016). Since the investigation concerned the attack in general, its outcome was important for all applicants, regardless of whether or not they had been granted formal status in the domestic proceedings (see, mutatis mutandis, D.H. and Others\u00a0v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 57325\/00, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0120-22, ECHR 2007\u2011IV).100.\u00a0\u00a0As to the Government\u2019s argument that the applicants could have appealed to a more senior prosecutor against the decision to suspend the investigation, the Court notes that the applicants\u2019 representatives did in fact raise arguments before the Prosecutor General questioning the validity of the suspension \u2013 namely the failure to identify the perpetrators; and the regional prosecutor\u2019s office examined that complaint on the merits, having left in force the decision to suspend the investigation (see paragraphs 38 and 39 above). Given that the applicants did not have access to the case file (see\u00a0paragraph 43 above), the Court is not convinced that they could have presented more detailed arguments in this respect (compare Betayev and Betayeva v. Russia, no. 37315\/03, \u00a7 89, 29 May 2008).101.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the application cannot be rejected for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. The Government\u2019s objection must therefore be dismissed.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Compliance with the six-month rule(i)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions102.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicants\u2019 complaints had been lodged outside of the six-month period. They presented two arguments in this respect.103.\u00a0\u00a0Firstly, the Government argued that the criminal proceedings instituted in respect of the attack had been definitively suspended on 5\u00a0April 2006; this decision had been notified to the applicants on 25\u00a0September 2008 at the latest, and the investigation had remained dormant ever since. The Government did not consider as genuine the letter of 13 July 2009 addressed to Mr\u00a0Stoyanov and indicating that the investigation had been renewed briefly in 2009 (see paragraphs 44 and 91 above). Moreover, in the applicants\u2019 claim lodged in 2007 with the administrative court the applicants had stated that they already considered the investigation to be ineffective. Thus, the applicants must have realised at the very latest by 25\u00a0September 2008 that the criminal investigation was ineffective and should then have applied to the Court. However, the applicants had actually applied to the Court more than six months after that date.104.\u00a0\u00a0Secondly, the Government also argued that the village council\u2019s decision concerning the expulsion of the Roma from the village had been quashed with effect from 21 April 2003, when the domestic court\u2019s judgment of 21 March 2003 (see paragraph 45 above) had become final and enforceable. Accordingly, the council\u2019s decisions \u201ccould not serve as the basis for any actions\u201d as of the former date. The applicants had lodged their application more than six years after that date.105.\u00a0\u00a0Referring to the Court\u2019s judgment in Chiragov and Others\u00a0v.\u00a0Armenia ([GC], no. 13216\/05, \u00a7 137, ECHR 2015), the applicants submitted that the requirement for applicants to display due diligence in pursuing their claims was less pressing in cases concerning loss of property than in cases concerning violent loss of life, given that in the former the evidence was less likely to deteriorate over time. They referred to their arguments concerning the letter of 13 July 2009, which indicated that the investigation had been restarted in 2009 (see paragraphs 44 and 89 above).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment106.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant principles of the Court\u2019s case-law concerning the six-month rule period are set out in\u00a0Mocanu and Others (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0259\u201166). In accordance with those principles in cases concerning an investigation into ill-treatment, applicants are expected to take steps to keep track of the investigation\u2019s progress, or lack thereof, and to lodge their applications with due expedition once they are, or should have become, aware of the lack of any effective criminal investigation (ibid., \u00a7 263).\u00a0That obligation of diligence incumbent on applicants contains two distinct but closely linked aspects: on the one hand, applicants must contact the domestic authorities promptly concerning progress in the investigation in question \u2013 which implies the need to complain to them in a diligent manner, since any delay risks compromising the effectiveness of the investigation; on the other hand, they must lodge their application with the Court promptly as soon as they become aware or should have become aware that the investigation is not effective (ibid., \u00a7 264).107.\u00a0\u00a0The Court agrees with the Government that had the applicants complained about the village council\u2019s resolution of 9 September 2002 as such, it would have had to hold that such a complaint had been lodged outside the six-month period. The Court considers, however, that the applicants referred to the village council\u2019s resolution as mere evidence of the authorities\u2019 implication in the attack on their homes which was the subject of the subsequent criminal investigation.108.\u00a0\u00a0As far as the criminal investigation and the applicants\u2019 compliance with the obligation of diligence in that respect are concerned, the Court notes that the applicants\u2019 compliance with the first aspect of that obligation is not contested (see paragraph 95 above).109.\u00a0\u00a0As to the second aspect (see paragraph 106 in fine above), the Court notes that throughout the investigation the applicants maintained regular contact with the authorities, displaying active interest in the proceedings (compare M.C. and A.C. v. Romania, cited above, \u00a7 78; also contrast Narin v. Turkey, no. 18907\/02, \u00a7 46, 15 December 2009, and Frande\u015f v. Romania (dec.), no. 35802\/05, \u00a7 21, 17 May 2011). The suspension of proceedings was neither triggered nor influenced in any manner by the applicants\u2019 activity or lack thereof (see M.C. and A.C.\u00a0v.\u00a0Romania, cited above, \u00a7 75).110.\u00a0\u00a0Following its initial suspension in 2003, the criminal investigation was briefly renewed in 2006 (see paragraphs 35 and 41 above). Moreover, the applicants were assured that measures to identify the perpetrators were ongoing even in the period during which the formal investigation was suspended (see paragraph 37 above). Given the secrecy which characterised this stage of the proceedings, it was reasonable for the applicants to put their trust in such assurances (ibid., \u00a7 77; see also paragraph 56 above). Finally, on 13\u00a0July 2009 \u2013 that is to say less than six month before this application was lodged with the Court \u2013 the applicants were informed that the investigation had again been renewed (see paragraph 44 above). As the Court found above, it has no sufficient grounds to doubt that the letter in question is genuine (see paragraph 91 above).111.\u00a0\u00a0Under such circumstances the Court cannot fault the applicants for having put their trust in the system (ibid., \u00a7 77), giving the authorities the benefit of the doubt and awaiting further progress before applying to the Court, so long as there was a realistic possibility, on the basis of the information the applicants were receiving from the authorities, that the investigative measures could be advancing (compare Mocanu and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0280).112.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the application has not been lodged out of time. The Government\u2019s objection must therefore be dismissed.(c)\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion as to admissibility113.\u00a0\u00a0The Court accordingly concludes that the complaints of the Group I applicants under Article\u00a03 of the Convention (taken both alone and in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention) are not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. No other grounds for declaring them inadmissible have been established. They must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions114.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants maintained that there had been a violation of Article\u00a03 on account of the authorities\u2019 acquiescence in the attack (most notably on the part of the village council and of the police), their failure to prevent and effectively investigate it, and the applicants\u2019 degrading post\u2011displacement living conditions.115.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants submitted that the village council\u2019s resolution had constituted incitement to violence. In this respect they referred to Ouranio Toxo and Others (cited above, \u00a7 42). The applicants may not have feared for their lives upon returning to inspect their properties but it would be unreasonable to expect them to continue living in a place where the only protection they could expect was advance warning to flee. The fact that most of the applicants had not witnessed the attack on their homes did not preclude the applicability of Article 3, since \u2013 according to the Court\u2019s judgment in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece ([GC], no. 30696\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0249-64, ECHR 2011) \u2013 Article 3 could be engaged in the event that members of a particularly vulnerable group were made homeless in aggravated circumstances.116.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the threshold of severity required to bring Article 3 into play had not been reached. Relying, in particular, on the Court\u2019s judgments in Sel\u00e7uk and Asker v. Turkey (24\u00a0April 1998, \u00a7\u00a077, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011II), and Ayder and Others v.\u00a0Turkey (no. 23656\/94, \u00a7 109, 8 January 2004), they argued that according to the Court\u2019s case-law two factors were decisive for the triggering of the application of Article 3 in respect of the destruction of a home, namely (i)\u00a0the factor of surprise and (ii) the applicant personally observing the destruction of his or her home. Neither of those had been present in the instant case since the Roma (i) had been warned by the village mayor and the police of the possibility of a pogrom, and (ii) had left; moreover, none of them had observed the attack. This also applied to the ninth applicant, who had not mentioned in her early statements that she had personally witnessed the attack (see paragraph 18 above).117.\u00a0\u00a0There was no evidence that the authorities had instigated, the less so carried out, the destruction of the applicants\u2019 property. On the contrary, the village mayor and police officers had warned the applicants of the possible pogrom and had asked them to leave their houses. Apparently there had been some police officers present during the \u201cpogrom\u201d, but there was no evidence that they instigated the violence, let alone participated in it. It appears that the police first contained the mob and then, when it became feasible, dispersed it. The local council\u2019s decision regarding expulsion was quickly quashed. In short, there was no evidence that expulsion of the applicants had been part of State policy (see also paragraph 154 below).118.\u00a0\u00a0Neither was there evidence that the applicants\u2019 houses had been burned, which had been a factor in finding a violation in the cases of Sel\u00e7uk and Asker and Ayder (both cited above) and Moldovan and Others v.\u00a0Romania (no. 2), nos. 41138\/98 and 64320\/01, ECHR\u00a02005\u2011VII (extracts)). Only the home of the first applicant had burned down and there was no conclusive evidence that this had been due to arson rather than to an accident (see paragraph 12 above). The other homes were damaged but not destroyed, as evidenced by the fact that the applicants and other Roma residents had been able to visit their homes and to sell them afterwards. The applicants had not provided evidence concerning either the exact extent of damage to their homes or of the allegedly harsh living conditions they had experienced following their displacement.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(i)\u00a0\u00a0Relevant general principles(\u03b1)\u00a0\u00a0Attribution of responsibility119.\u00a0\u00a0A Contracting State will be responsible under the Convention for violations of human rights caused by acts of its agents carried out in the performance of their duties (see, for example, V.K. v. Russia, no.\u00a068059\/13, \u00a7 174, 7 March 2017). However, a State may also be held responsible even where its agents are acting ultra vires or contrary to instructions (see Moldovan and Others, cited above, \u00a7 94). The acquiescence or connivance of the authorities of a Contracting State in the acts of private individuals which violate the Convention rights of other individuals within its jurisdiction may also engage that State\u2019s responsibility under the Convention (see Cyprus\u00a0v.\u00a0Turkey [GC], no.\u00a025781\/94, \u00a7\u00a081, ECHR\u00a02001\u2011IV).(\u03b2)\u00a0\u00a0Minimum level of severity120.\u00a0\u00a0Ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim. Further factors include the purpose for which the ill\u2011treatment was inflicted, together with the intention or motivation behind it, although the absence of any intention to humiliate or debase the victim cannot conclusively rule out the finding of a violation of Article 3. Regard must also be had to the context in which the ill-treatment was inflicted, such as an atmosphere of heightened tension and emotions. Ill-treatment that attains such a minimum level of severity usually involves actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering. However, even in the absence of these aspects, where treatment humiliates or debases an individual \u2011 showing a lack of respect for or diminishing his or her human dignity \u2013 or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual\u2019s moral and physical resistance, it may be characterised as degrading and also fall within the prohibition set forth in Article 3 (see Bouyid v. Belgium ([GC], no.\u00a023380\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 86 and 87, ECHR\u00a02015, with further references therein).121.\u00a0\u00a0It should also be emphasised that Article 3 cannot be limited to acts of physical ill-treatment; it also covers the infliction of psychological suffering (see R.B. v. Hungary, no. 64602\/12, \u00a7 45, 12 April 2016). The Court has thus held that a mere threat of torture can constitute inhuman treatment (see G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, \u00a7 108, ECHR 2010). The Court has reached the same conclusion in respect of a fear of future assaults where there had already been a history of domestic violence (see Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 3564\/11, \u00a7 54, 28 May 2013). The Court also found Article 3 to be applicable in a case where armed and masked police officers had entered the applicants\u2019 home (where an infant had been present), pointed guns at the applicants and shouted death threats (see Hristovi v.\u00a0Bulgaria, no.\u00a042697\/05, \u00a7 80, 11 October 2011).In East African Asians v. United Kingdom (Commission\u2019s report of 14\u00a0December 1973, Decisions and Reports 78-A, p. 62, \u00a7 207) the European Commission on Human Rights considered the meaning of degrading treatment under Article 3 of the Convention and stated that \u201ctreatment of an individual may be said to be \u201cdegrading\u201d in the sense of Article 3 \u201cif it grossly humiliates him before others or drives him to act against his will or conscience\u201d (paragraph 195 of the Commission\u2019s opinion). It further held that \u201c... discrimination based on race could, in certain circumstances, of itself amount to degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. ...[P]ublicly to single out a group of persons for differential treatment on the basis of race might, in certain circumstances, constitute a special form of affront to human dignity...\u201d (ibid., paragraph 207).122.\u00a0\u00a0Not every form of threatening behaviour, however, even if it involves a large group of individuals, will bring Article 3 into play (see, for example, Karaahmed v. Bulgaria, no. 30587\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 74-77, 24 February 2015, which involved mostly verbal intimidation of Muslim worshippers by a crowd of protesters), even though where threats reach a certain level of seriousness and target victims as members of a particular ethnic or racial group, they may bring Article 8 into play (see Kir\u00e1ly and D\u00f6m\u00f6t\u00f6r\u00a0v.\u00a0Hungary, no.\u00a010851\/13, \u00a7 43, 17 January 2017, where the applicants, Roma residents of a village, were in their houses and had to observe a threatening demonstration, which involved anti-Roma speeches and the throwing of objects at their houses, and which was overseen and contained but not dispersed by the police).123.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has further held that in the event of threatening actions on the part of third parties, a significant police presence protecting the applicants has a role in attenuating its effect so as to make Article\u00a03 inapplicable while Article 8 was still engaged (see R.B. v. Hungary, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 51 and 52). By contrast, in Identoba and Others (cited above, \u00a7\u00a070), the Court, in categorising the treatment suffered by the applicants at the hands of private protestors as falling within the ambit of Article 3, found relevant the inadequacy of police protection provided to the applicants. In a different context, the Court, in finding the treatment suffered by applicants to be contrary to Article 3 and even to constitute torture, found it relevant that they had been detained in a place where there had been no rule of law (\u201czone de non-droit\u201d) and the most elementary guarantees of rights had been suspended and where, therefore, they had had no protection from abuse (see Azzolina and Others v. Italy (nos. 28923\/09 and 67599\/10, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0134 and 137, 26 October 2017).(\u03b3)\u00a0\u00a0Positive obligations124.\u00a0\u00a0The obligation on High Contracting Parties under Article 1 of the Convention to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article\u00a03, requires States to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, including such ill-treatment administered by private individuals. This positive obligation to protect is to be interpreted in such a way as not to impose an excessive burden on the authorities, bearing in mind, in particular, the unpredictability of human conduct and the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources. Accordingly, not every risk of ill-treatment could entail for the authorities a Convention requirement to take measures to prevent that risk from materialising. However, the required measures should, at least, provide effective protection in particular of children and other vulnerable persons and should include reasonable steps to prevent ill\u2011treatment of which the authorities had or ought to have had knowledge (see O\u2019Keeffe v. Ireland [GC], no. 35810\/09, \u00a7 144, ECHR 2014 (extracts)).125.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, Article 3 requires that the authorities conduct an effective official investigation into the alleged ill\u2011treatment, even if such treatment has been inflicted by private individuals (see T.M. and C.M. v. the Republic of Moldova, no. 26608\/11, \u00a7 38, 28 January 2014).126.\u00a0\u00a0An investigation into serious allegations of ill-treatment must be both prompt and thorough. That means that the authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation or for use as the basis of their decisions. They must take all reasonable steps available to them to secure evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence (see El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 183 and 184, ECHR 2012, with further reference therein).127.\u00a0\u00a0Generally speaking, for an investigation to be effective, the institutions and persons responsible for carrying it out must be independent of those targeted by it. This means not only a lack of any hierarchical or institutional connection but also practical independence. Whatever mode is employed, the authorities must act of their own motion. In addition, in order to be effective the investigation must be capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible. It should also be broad enough to permit the investigating authorities to take into consideration not only the actions of the State agents who directly used force but also all the surrounding circumstances. Although this is not an obligation of results to be achieved but of means to be employed, any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of the required standard of effectiveness (see Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 118-20).128.\u00a0\u00a0When investigating violent incidents such as acts of ill\u2011treatment, State authorities have a duty to take all reasonable steps to unmask any racist motive and to establish whether or not ethnic hatred or prejudice may have played a role in the events at hand. Proving racial motivation will admittedly often be difficult in practice. The respondent State\u2019s obligation to investigate possible racist overtones to a violent act is an obligation to use its best endeavours and is not absolute. The authorities must do what is reasonable in the circumstances to collect and secure the evidence, explore all practical means of discovering the truth and deliver fully reasoned, impartial and objective decisions, without omitting suspicious facts that may be indicative of racially motivated violence (see, mutatis mutandis, Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577\/98 and 43579\/98, \u00a7\u00a0160, ECHR 2005\u2011VII). Treating violence and brutality with a discriminatory intent on an equal footing with cases that have no such overtones would be turning a blind eye to the specific nature of acts that are particularly destructive of fundamental rights. A failure to make a distinction in the way situations that are essentially different are handled may constitute unjustified treatment irreconcilable with Article 14 of the Convention (see\u00a0Identoba and Others, cited above, \u00a7 67).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above-mentioned principles to the present case(\u03b1)\u00a0\u00a0Substantive aspect of Article 3, taken in conjunction with Article 14129.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it necessary, at this juncture, to (i)\u00a0comment on the motives behind the attack on the applicants\u2019 homes and (ii) to assess the authorities\u2019 role in the applicants\u2019 displacement.130.\u00a0\u00a0As to the former matter, it is sufficient for the Court to note that it has never been substantively in dispute either domestically or before this Court that the attack on the applicants\u2019 houses was motivated by anti-Roma sentiment among the villagers. Admittedly, the mob appears to have been motivated in part by desire for revenge against the families of those involved in the murder which had triggered the events (compare Fedorchenko and Lozenko v. Ukraine, no. 387\/03, \u00a7 68, 20 September 2012, where Roma houses were burned in an attack allegedly targeting houses of drug dealers).131.\u00a0\u00a0As to the role of the authorities in respect of the attack, it appears that not only local police in the village but also police at the district level knew about the pogrom being prepared sufficiently ahead of time to call Roma residents to a meeting and to warn them to leave (see paragraph\u00a029\u00a0above). That being so, there is no information as to why they did not intervene to protect the applicants\u2019 homes. In particular, it has not been argued in any of the domestic decisions that the violence erupted so abruptly or so overwhelmed the police resources as to justify a decision to limit police intervention and merely attempt to minimise the damage by advising the applicants to flee (contrast Kir\u00e1ly and D\u00f6m\u00f6t\u00f6r, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a063-69, and P.F. and E.F.\u00a0v.\u00a0the United Kingdom (dec.), no.\u00a028326\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a040-47, 23\u00a0November 2010).132.\u00a0\u00a0The case-file material shows that State agents explicitly urged the applicants to leave the village because they were either unwilling or considered themselves unable to protect them from mob violence. The Court also considers it established that police officers were present at the ransacking of the applicants\u2019 houses but made no intervention worthy of note. This presence, coupled with the decision of the village council of 9\u00a0September 2002 appearing to endorse the expulsion of \u201csocially dangerous individuals\u201d from the village (see paragraph 11 above), created the appearance of official approval for the attackers\u2019 actions.133.\u00a0\u00a0While it is a positive fact that the council\u2019s decision was quashed several months later (see paragraph 45 above), this is immaterial for the assessment of the gravity of the attack and its impact on the applicants at the time that it occurred and in its immediate aftermath. Also, while the council\u2019s decision of 9 September 2002 did not refer to the ethnicity of individuals to be expelled, there could be no doubt, given the context and its previous decision of 8 September 2002, that Roma residents were targeted by it.134.\u00a0\u00a0Therefore, the applicants who had been warned about the attack were put in a situation where they had to conclude that, because of their family relations and their ethnicity, they could not count on the protection of the law in the place where they had lived in regular accommodation for a substantial period of time (see the Appendix). The decision to leave their homes before the attack was thus not a result of the exercise of their free will but their way of protecting their physical integrity. Their feelings of fear, anguish, helplessness and inferiority were further exacerbated by understanding that their homes would likely be plundered, but that they were unable to protect them without putting their lives at risk. All in all, it grossly diminished their dignity. The Court concludes that the role of the police, which chose not to protect the applicants but advise them to leave before the \u201cpogrom\u201d (see paragraph 12 above) \u2013 and the fact that those events involved the invasion and ransacking of the applicants\u2019 homes by a large mob that was driven by sentiment aimed at them as Roma (that is to say members of a vulnerable group) \u2013 was such as to constitute an affront to the applicants\u2019 dignity sufficiently serious as to be categorised as \u201cdegrading\u201d treatment. This assessment renders it unnecessary for the Court to resolve the dispute between the parties as to whether the ninth applicant was at home at the time of the attack and had to confront the attackers (see\u00a0paragraph 18 above).135.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, accordingly, does not agree with the Government\u2019s assessment (see paragraph 118 above) that for Article\u00a03 to be found applicable within the context of damage to property it is essential for the applicants to have watched his or her house being destroyed. The relevance of the presence or absence of any given circumstance should not be taken in isolation but should rather be seen in the context of all the circumstances of the case (see, mutatis mutandis, G\u00e4fgen, cited above, \u00a7\u00a088). In view of the above findings, the Court does not find this factor decisive in the present case.136.\u00a0\u00a0As follows from the above discussion, the Court considers it established that:(i) the attack on the applicants\u2019 homes was motivated by anti-Roma sentiment;(ii) the police failed to take any measures to protect the applicants\u2019 homes from the attack and no objective reason was given for their inaction;(iii) the village council\u2019s resolution and in particular the police presence and passivity at the scene of the attack created an appearance of official endorsement for the attack; and(iv) the attack constituted degrading treatment, in particular on account of the attitude of the authorities.137.\u00a0\u00a0There has, accordingly, been a violation of the substantive aspect of Article 3, taken together with Article 14 of the Convention, in respect of the Group I applicants.(\u03b2)\u00a0\u00a0Procedural aspect of Article 3, taken in conjunction with Article 14138.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the domestic investigation into the attack was characterised by a number of serious omissions.139.\u00a0\u00a0To start with, the Court notes that there was abundant evidence before the investigating authorities that the local authorities, including the local police, knew that the attack was being prepared, did not take any steps to prevent it and stood by as it unfolded, apparently limiting themselves to avoiding human casualties (see, for example, the police officers\u2019 statements in paragraph 31 above). However, no steps whatsoever were apparently taken to investigate this aspect of the case. To cite but one example, the offence which was being investigated, hooliganism (that is unmotivated violence), did not appear to cover any involvement of the State actors in the events, although there were other provisions in the Criminal Code of Ukraine which could have constituted a more appropriate ground for launching a criminal investigation into the events (see, for example, Articles\u00a0365 and 367 of the Criminal Code, paragraph 52 above, and compare Identoba and Others, cited above, \u00a7 76).140.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, despite the presence of abundant information indicating that the local police and the mayor knew about the attack being prepared (see, for example, paragraphs 13 and 29 above), no effort was made to clarify how much and when they knew, what the source of their information was, whether they knew any organisers of the attack, whether they were in contact with them, and why they limited their role to warning the applicants to leave rather than taking any steps to avert the attack.141.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that the local police, who clearly played a role in the events being investigated, took an active part in the investigation itself. Thus, the district police played an active role in the examination of the damaged houses and collecting statements in the early stage of the investigation (see\u00a0paragraphs 23 and 26 above) and then had formal control over the investigation after its active phase was over and it had been suspended (see\u00a0paragraph 41 above). It is true that the person in charge of the key, active part of the investigation was a senior investigator of the regional police. However, that investigator was assisted by a team which included officers from the local police (see paragraph 24 above).142.\u00a0\u00a0Circumscribing the investigation in such a fashion and the failure to explore such a clearly required line of inquiry \u2013 apparently without reasonable justification \u2013 indicates not only inadequacy and lack of thoroughness in the investigation (compare Identoba and Others, cited above, \u00a7 75) but also a lack of independence (see, mutatis mutandis, Mustafa Tun\u00e7 and Fecire Tun\u00e7\u00a0v.\u00a0Turkey [GC], no. 24014\/05, \u00a7\u00a0222, 14\u00a0April 2015).143.\u00a0\u00a0Even leaving aside the role of the authorities in the events, the steps taken to identify perpetrators who were private individuals were also insufficient. Of three individuals specifically identified as instigators of the pogrom \u2013 O.M., P.M. and I.D. (see paragraph 36 above) \u2013 apparently only two\u00a0\u2013 O.M. and P.M. \u2013 were questioned. According to the summary of their statements provided by the Government, they denied any personal involvement in the attacks on the Roma houses. However, there is no indication as to whether they were questioned about their alleged role in the instigation of the attacks. Moreover, it appears that while witnesses uniformly denied that they had personally taken part in the attack on Roma houses, it appears that no witnesses \u2013 not even O.M. and P.M. \u2013 were questioned as to whether they knew any of the attackers. This is particularly striking in the case of the police officers who were present on the scene and who personally observed the attack and the attackers (see paragraph\u00a031\u00a0above).144.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, despite clear evidence to the effect that the attack targeted members of a specific ethnic group, it was investigated as an ordinary disturbance, and the relevant provision of the Criminal Code \u2013 which is specifically aimed at supressing violence based on racial and other prejudice (Article 161 of the Code, paragraph 52 above) \u2013 was never invoked. Even considering the hooliganism offence, the only one invoked by the authorities, no attention was apparently given to anti-Roma prejudice as a possible aggravating circumstance (see Article 67 of the Criminal Code, at paragraph 52 above). In short, there is no evidence that the authorities have conducted any investigation into anti-Roma prejudice as a likely motive of the crime (compare Fedorchenko and Lozenko, cited above, \u00a7 69).145.\u00a0\u00a0The above findings in this particular case should also be seen against the background of international reports describing a pattern of persistent anti-Roma prejudice, in particular on the part of certain law-enforcement officers, in Ukraine (see paragraphs 59-62 above; see also Fedorchenko and Lozenko, cited above \u2013 in particular \u00a7\u00a7\u00a033 and 68).146.\u00a0\u00a0The above-mentioned considerations are sufficient for the Court to find that the investigation into the incident cannot be considered as having been effective.147.\u00a0\u00a0There has, accordingly, been a violation of the procedural aspect of Article 3, taken in conjunction with Article 14, in respect of the Group I applicants.(\u03b3)\u00a0\u00a0Remaining complaints148.\u00a0\u00a0In view of its findings above, the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine the remaining aspects of the Group I applicants\u2019 complaints under Article 3 of the Convention, either taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14, because those aspects are subsumed by the already examined complaints under those provisions.C.\u00a0\u00a0Group II applicantsAdmissibility149.\u00a0\u00a0The Group II applicants (see paragraph 94 above and the Appendix) were, by their own admission, away from their homes at the time of the events in question and so had no knowledge of the imminent attack and were not prompted to flee their homes, having only learned about the damage done to them afterwards (see, mutatis mutandis, Kolyadenko and Others v. Russia, nos. 17423\/05 and 5\u00a0others, \u00a7 152, 28 February 2012). Having regard to its analysis and conclusions above concerning the Group I applicants, the Court finds that the situation of the Group II applicants does not fall within the ambit of Article 3 and can be sufficiently addressed under Article 8 of the Convention (see below).150.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that the first, fourth, fifth, tenth and twelfth applicants\u2019 complaints under Article 3, taken alone or in conjunction with Article\u00a014, are incompatible with the Convention ratione materiae and should be rejected, pursuant to Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) and 4 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION, TAKEN ALONE AND IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION151.\u00a0\u00a0Under Article 8 of the Convention the applicants (both Groups I and II) complained that the respondent State had been responsible for the attack on their homes, had failed to protect them from it and to investigate it effectively and that the State was responsible for the inadequate living conditions that they had experienced following their displacement. They also complained that on account of the above they had suffered discrimination owning to their Roma origin, contrary to Article 14, taken in conjunction with Article 8.152.\u00a0\u00a0Article 8 of the Convention reads:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.2.\u00a0\u00a0There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions1.\u00a0\u00a0The Government153.\u00a0\u00a0On the basis of the same arguments as those presented in respect of the Article\u00a03 complaints, the Government argued that the applicants had failed to exhaust the available domestic remedies and to comply with the six-month rule (see paragraphs 95, 96, 103 and 104 above). The applicants disagreed.154.\u00a0\u00a0The Government furthermore submitted that there was no evidence that the removal of the Roma from the village had been part of the State\u2019s policy. In particular, the village council\u2019s resolution had been adopted under pressure from the mob and had then immediately been challenged by the prosecutor and quashed, so it had in no way reflected State policy. There was no evidence of any threat to the Roma in the village after 9 September 2002, even though a certain resentment towards them might still remain. Many of them had been able to safely return and reside in their houses until they had sold them. They had not provided sufficient proof that they had sold their houses for less than their market price or that the proceeds had been insufficient to obtain new housing elsewhere. The Government considered this factor, together with the fact that they had been able to sell and move, decisive in the assessment of the applicants\u2019 Article 8 complaint. In this respect they compared the Court\u2019s findings in (i) Fadeyeva v. Russia (no. 55723\/00, \u00a7 121, ECHR 2005\u2011IV) (where the applicant was unable to move and this was a factor in finding of a violation) and (ii) Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no.\u00a036022\/97, \u00a7 127, ECHR 2003\u2011VIII) (where the house prices in the applicants\u2019 area and, accordingly, their ability to move, were not affected by aircraft noise). In the Government\u2019s opinion, that case-law was relevant because the applicants in the present case had essentially exercised their right to relocate from an environment (in the village) that they had found oppressive. Furthermore, there was no evidence that the applicants\u2019 living conditions had deteriorated after they had moved from the village, and nor had they sought any help in improving them.155.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Government considered that the applicants\u2019 complaint was manifestly ill-founded and, alternatively, that there had been no violation of the provisions invoked by the applicants.2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants156.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants considered that the fact that the village council resolution had been adopted under the pressure of the mob did not rule out State responsibility. They cited in this respect the case of Sampanis and Others v. Greece (no. 32526\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 82-83, 5 June 2008), where non-Roma parents\u2019 violent opposition to the enrolment of Roma children in school did not dispense the State of the responsibility to ensure equal study conditions for those children.157.\u00a0\u00a0The fact that some of the applicants had been reduced to living in their destroyed homes while they worked out what to do in no way diminished the fact that they should not have been expected to remain in their homes in such conditions. The comparison made by the Government between the applicants\u2019 situation and a mere decline in house prices showed a continuing failure to grasp the seriousness of the trauma they had suffered.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility158.\u00a0\u00a0Above, the Court has examined and dismissed the Government\u2019s objections related to the exhaustion of domestic remedies and compliance with the six-month rule. It considers that those objections should likewise be dismissed as far as they relate to the applicants\u2019 complaints under Article\u00a08, taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14.159.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, contrary to the Government\u2019s submissions, the above-mentioned complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. They are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0Relevant general principles160.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that although the object of Article 8 is essentially that of protecting the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference: in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for private or family life. These obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves (see X and Y v. the Netherlands, judgment of 26 March 1985, \u00a7 23, Series A no. 91).161.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the Court has not excluded the possibility that the State\u2019s positive obligation under Article 8 to safeguard an individual\u2019s physical integrity may extend to questions relating to the effectiveness of a criminal investigation (see Moldovan and Others, cited above, \u00a7 96, which cites Osman\u00a0v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 October 1998, \u00a7\u00a0128 Reports 1998-VIII).162.\u00a0\u00a0Whether a case be analysed in terms of (i) a positive duty on the State to take reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the applicants\u2019 rights under paragraph 1 of Article 8 or (ii) an \u201cinterference by a public authority\u201d to be justified in accordance with paragraph 2, the applicable principles are broadly similar. In both contexts, regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole; and in both contexts the State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation in determining the steps to be taken to ensure compliance with the Convention. Furthermore, even in relation to the positive obligations flowing from the first paragraph of Article 8, in striking the required balance the aims mentioned in the second paragraph may be of a certain relevance (see Powell and Rayner v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1990, \u00a7 41, Series A no. 172).163.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has dealt with cases of harassment motivated by racism which involved no physical violence. It found that the manner in which the criminal-law mechanisms had been implemented was a relevant factor for its assessment of whether the protection of the applicants\u2019 rights had been defective to the point of constituting a violation of the respondent State\u2019s positive obligations under Article 8 of the Convention (see Kir\u00e1ly and D\u00f6m\u00f6t\u00f6r, cited above, \u00a7 72).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above-mentioned principles to the present case164.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has found it established that there were grave failures on the part of the domestic authorities to protect the Group I applicants from the attack on their homes, which led it to find a violation of Article 3, taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention.165.\u00a0\u00a0The same conclusions are also valid for the Group II applicants because the only difference between them and the former group was that they were absent from the village at the time of events of 7-10 September 2002 and only returned to the village later to find their homes damaged. That factor was decisive for the Court in finding that the level of seriousness needed to bring Article 3 into play was not reached in respect of those applicants. However, that does not prevent Article 8 from being engaged (see Wainwright v. the United Kingdom, no.\u00a012350\/04, \u00a7\u00a043, ECHR\u00a02006\u2011X).166.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds it established that the homes of all applicants other than the sixteenth were targeted in the attack (see paragraph 84 above) and they suffered displacement from their homes as a result.167.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is not convinced by the Government\u2019s argument that the attack only led to the applicants being displaced for a brief period of time since they were able to return to the village afterwards and later freely chose to sell their houses and move. It acknowledges that in the present case, unlike in the case of Moldovan and Others (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 22, 25 and 26), there are no particular facts showing that the applicants were actively prevented from returning to the village. In fact, the applicants appear to implicitly admit that some of them were in fact able to return and live in their houses until they sold them. At the same time, the Court finds that it would have been unreasonable to expect the applicants to permanently live in damaged houses in a locality where the authorities had clearly communicated to them that they would have no protection against mob violence \u2013 particularly in circumstances where no investigation has been conducted and no person has been held responsible for the attack.168.\u00a0\u00a0There can be no doubt, therefore, that the damage caused to the applicants\u2019 houses constituted grave and unjustified interferences with the applicants\u2019 right to respect for their private and family life and home.169.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates its findings above concerning:(i)\u00a0\u00a0the lack of any objective reason for the authorities\u2019 failure to protect the applicants;(ii)\u00a0\u00a0the authorities\u2019 role in the attack;(iii)\u00a0\u00a0the absence of an effective domestic investigation; and(iv)\u00a0\u00a0the general background of prejudice against Roma in Ukraine at the material time \u2013 in particular that manifested by certain law enforcement officers (see paragraphs 59-62 above).170.\u00a0\u00a0Those considerations are sufficient for the Court to find that there has been a violation of Article 8, taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention, on account of the role the authorities played prior to and in the course of the attack on the applicants\u2019 homes and their failure to conduct an effective investigation into the attack.171.\u00a0\u00a0In view of its findings above, the Court considers that it is not necessary to examine the remaining aspects of the applicants\u2019 complaints under the aforementioned provisions of the Convention because those aspects are subsumed by the already examined complaints under those provisions.IV.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No.\u00a01, TAKEN ALONE AND IN CONJUCTION WITH ARTICLE 14172.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants (both Groups I and II) complained of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, taken alone and in conjunction with Article\u00a014 of the Convention on account of the damage done to their houses and the destruction of their household items. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 reads:Article 1 of Protocol No. 1\u201cEvery natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions173.\u00a0\u00a0On the basis of the same arguments as those presented in respect of the Article\u00a03 and 8 complaints, the Government argued that the applicants had failed to exhaust the available domestic remedies and to comply with the six-month rule (see paragraphs 95, 96, 103, 104 and 153 above). The applicants disagreed.174.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also submitted that the applicants had failed to substantiate their arguments. In this context they referred to the Court\u2019s decision in Lisnyy and Others v. Ukraine and Russia ((dec.), nos. \u00a05355\/15, 44913\/15 and 50853\/15, 5 July 2016). The Government argued that the applicants\u2019 explanation that they had supposedly lost their title documents owing to the attack on their homes was not convincing since (i) the applicants had been warned ahead of time of the attack, (ii) some houses had been sold (so it follows that the owners did have the relevant title documents), (iii) copies of title documents could be obtained from State registries and archives, and (iv) in their civil claims lodged in the criminal case some applicants claimed very specific amounts (suggesting that they must have had some documents on which to base those claims). Accordingly, the Government considered that the applicants\u2019 complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was manifestly ill-founded.175.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants disagreed with the Government concerning the degree of damage to their homes, relying on photographs that they provided (see paragraph 15 above) and their own statements. They considered a comparison with the Lisnyy and Others case misguided since, unlike in that case, the very fact that their homes had been damaged was not in dispute; it was only the extent of that damage that was in dispute. Moreover, they belonged to a particularly vulnerable group by virtue of their Roma ethnicity and being in a situation tantamount to that of internally displaced persons. Referring in particular to the statements of the thirteenth and sixteenth applicants (see paragraph 14 above), they stated that only \u201csome\u201d of them had sold their houses for \u201ca small amount of money\u201d. They considered that it was for the Government to search the registers and archives for proof of the applicants\u2019 ownership. They furthermore considered the Government\u2019s conclusion (that their complaint was manifestly ill-founded for lack of proof) to have been based on racist stereotypes about the Roma as being rootless.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment176.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the Government also raised objections as to the applicants\u2019 failure to exhaust domestic remedies and to comply with the six-month rule. However, it does not consider it necessary to examine these objections, given that this part of the application is, in any event, inadmissible for the following reasons.177.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicants have failed to provide any evidence in support of their claims (see Lisnyy and Others (dec.), cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a028-32, and contrast Kerimova and Others v. Russia, nos.\u00a017170\/04 and 5\u00a0others, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0292-93, 3 May 2011). The applicants have not refuted the Government\u2019s submission, supported by statements by some of the applicants made in the domestic proceedings (see paragraph\u00a014\u00a0above), that the former Roma residents of Petrivka were able to sell their homes in that village after the attack, strongly suggesting that they had had proof of title.178.\u00a0\u00a0However, the applicants did not provide any details of those deals or any relevant documentation. Neither have they provided detailed descriptions of the property they lost, including the houses and the household items, or specified which of the applicants were the owners. They did not refer to any specific efforts by them or their representatives to obtain evidence from any public records which may remain available even if the Court is prepared to accept their assertion that their documents were lost as a result of their displacement. The latter also concerns the first applicant. It is true that it is undisputed that the house where he used to live was seriously damaged by fire (see paragraph 118 above) and so likely could not be sold. However, it remains the case that he has not provided any evidence of the title or any effort to obtain such evidence from public records, or even a detailed description of his property.179.\u00a0\u00a0In such circumstances the Court considers that the applicants have failed to develop and substantiate their complaint or to provide a cogent explanation for their inability to do so. Accordingly, their complaint under Article 14, taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is likewise unsubstantiated.180.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected, in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.V.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION181.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants complained that they had no effective remedy in respect of their other complaints. They relied on Article 13 of the Convention, which provides:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d182.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument.183.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, having declared inadmissible certain complaints under Article 3 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14, see paragraphs 150 and 180 above) concludes that there is no arguable claim for the purposes of Article 13 in respect of those complaints (see, for example, Valeriy Fuklev v. Ukraine, no. 6318\/03, \u00a7\u00a098, 16 January 2014); therefore, the complaint under Article 13 in that part must be rejected as being incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention, pursuant to Article\u00a035\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7\u00a03\u00a0(a) and 4.184.\u00a0\u00a0The remainder of the complaint under Article\u00a013 is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.185.\u00a0\u00a0However, in view of its findings above, the Court does not find it necessary to examine it separately because it is subsumed by the already examined complaints under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Sergey Savenko\u00a0v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 59731\/09, \u00a7 48, 24 October 2013).VI.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION186.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage187.\u00a0\u00a0The first three, the fifth to fifteenth, the eighteenth and nineteenth applicants claimed 85,984.52 euros (EUR) each in respect of non-pecuniary damage. Their claims in respect of pecuniary damage are set out in the Appendix. The fourth applicant claimed EUR 36,684 for non-pecuniary damage but submitted no claim for pecuniary damage.188.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that there was no causal link between the damage claimed and the violations found. In any event they considered the claims excessive.189.\u00a0In view of its findings above concerning the applicants\u2019 complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court rejects the applicants\u2019 claim in respect of pecuniary damage. On the other hand,\u00a0ruling on an equitable basis, the Court considers it reasonable to award the following amounts in respect of non-pecuniary damage:(i)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 11,000 to the second, third, sixth to ninth, eleventh, thirteenth to fifteenth, eighteenth and nineteenth applicants each, plus any tax that may be chargeable on those amounts; and(ii)\u00a0\u00a0EUR 9,000 to the first, fourth, fifth, tenth and twelfth applicants each, plus any tax that may be chargeable on those amounts.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses190.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants made no claim for costs and expenses. Accordingly, the Court makes no award under this head.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest191.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","31335":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION42.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been subjected to ill\u2011treatment by police officers and that the State had failed to conduct an effective investigation into the matter. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d43.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument. They submitted that the applicant had actively resisted arrest and had tried to abscond, and that in order to prevent him from absconding the police had used physical force by \u201cknocking him down, laying him face down on the asphalt and handcuffing him\u201d. They stated that he had sustained the following injuries as a result of that use of force: a haematoma on his forehead, abrasions on his right elbow and abrasions on his knee joints. The Government argued that the applicant\u2019s attempt to flee had been confirmed by witnesses to his arrest; the fact that the official records of the procedural activities carried out on 4\u00a0and 5\u00a0July 2013 made no mention of his complaints of ill-treatment, and that witnesses to those procedural activities had stated that no threats or force had been used against him by the police and had not noticed any injuries on him (the attesting witnesses and the owner of the apartment rented by him), as well as the delay in lodging an official criminal complaint against the police officers, refuted the applicant\u2019s allegations. The Government further asserted that the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment were inconsistent with his actual injuries and that he would have suffered more serious injuries. They concluded that the force used against the applicant had been made necessary by his own behaviour and had not been excessive. It had not resulted in any \u201clong-term or even light negative effects on his health\u201d. It could not be considered inhuman or degrading treatment. The delay in lodging the criminal complaint against the police officers had significantly reduced the effectiveness of any measures that the authorities had been able to take in response. For example, the forensic medical expert had been unable to establish a precise reason or time in relation to the applicant\u2019s injuries in the report of 18 September 2013. The authorities had taken all necessary procedural action in the course of the pre-investigation inquiry and had rightly refused to initiate criminal proceedings into the applicant\u2019s allegations which had not been supported by evidence. The Government referred to the case of Goryachkin v. Russia (no. 34636\/09, 15\u00a0November 2016).44.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s representative submitted that even if some of the injuries could have been received during the applicant\u2019s arrest (the haematoma on his forehead and the abrasions on his right elbow and knee joints), his other injuries could not possibly have originated from his being \u201claid\u201d face down on the ground. The applicant pointed out that the Government\u2019s allegation of his having actively resisted arrest and attempted to flee was unfounded. Their reference to statements by eyewitnesses to his arrest was not supported by any evidence, such as records of interviews with those witnesses. The attesting witnesses\u2019 statements that they had not noticed injuries on him only supported his complaint concerning his ill\u2011treatment after the procedural activities carried out with their participation. The applicant explained that he had not complained about his ill-treatment to the attesting witnesses, the owner of the apartment rented by him, the doctors at the hospital or the court which had remanded him in custody because he had been depressed \u2013 he had been under the control of the police officers who had ill-treated him, experiencing pressure and receiving threats, and being afraid that the ill-treatment would continue. Therefore, the official records of the procedural activities carried out on 4\u00a0and 5 July 2013 had made no mention of his complaints. Furthermore, the record of his arrest had been drawn up without his lawyer being present; his family and the consulate of Belarus had not been informed of his arrest. His questioning as a suspect on 5 July 2013 had been held in the presence of a State-appointed lawyer invited by the investigator. That lawyer had acted in accordance with the investigator\u2019s instructions and not in the applicant\u2019s interests and his presence had been a pure formality. The applicant also submitted that the Government\u2019s allegation that he would have suffered more serious injuries than those he had received was totally speculative.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility45.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles46.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim\u2019s behaviour (see Kud\u0142a v.\u00a0Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7 90, ECHR 2000\u2011XI).47.\u00a0\u00a0In assessing the evidence on which to base the decision as to whether there has been a violation of Article 3, the Court adopts the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d. However, such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see Jalloh v. Germany [GC], no.\u00a054810\/00, \u00a7 67, ECHR 2006\u2011IX). Where an individual is taken into police custody in good health and is found to be injured on release, it is incumbent on the State to provide a plausible explanation of how those injuries were caused, failing which a clear issue arises under Article 3 (see Ribitsch v. Austria, 4 December 1995, \u00a7 34, Series A no. 336, and Selmouni v.\u00a0France [GC], no. 25803\/94, \u00a7 87, ECHR 1999\u2011V). Where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of individuals within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention. The burden of proof is then on the Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation by producing evidence establishing facts which cast doubt on the version of events given by the victim. In the absence of such an explanation, the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the Government. That is justified by the fact that those in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them (see Bouyid v. Belgium ([GC], no. 23380\/09, \u00a7 83, ECHR 2015).48.\u00a0\u00a0Where an individual makes a credible assertion that he has suffered treatment infringing Article 3 at the hands of the police or other similar agents of the State, that provision, read in conjunction with the State\u2019s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to \u201csecure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in ... [the] Convention\u201d, requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation. That investigation should be capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible (see Labita v. Italy [GC], no.\u00a026772\/95, \u00a7 131, ECHR 2000\u2011IV). Otherwise, the general legal prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment would, despite its fundamental importance, be ineffective in practice and it would be possible in some cases for agents of the State to abuse the rights of those within their control with virtual impunity (see Assenov and Others v.\u00a0Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, \u00a7 102, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011VIII).49.\u00a0\u00a0The investigation into serious allegations of ill-treatment must be both prompt and thorough. The authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill\u2011founded conclusions to close their investigation or as the basis of their decisions. They must take all reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard (see, for example, Kopylov v. Russia, no. 3933\/04, \u00a7 133, 29 July 2010). Thus, the mere fact that appropriate steps were not taken to reduce the risk of collusion between alleged perpetrators amounts to a significant shortcoming in the adequacy of the investigation (see, mutatis mutandis, Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 52391\/99, \u00a7 330, ECHR 2007\u2011II, and Turluyeva v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a063638\/09, \u00a7 107, 20 June 2013). Furthermore, the investigation must be independent, impartial and subject to public scrutiny (see Mesut Deniz v. Turkey, no. 36716\/07, \u00a7 52, 5 November 2013). It should result in a reasoned decision to reassure a concerned public that the rule of law had been respected (see, mutatis mutandis, Kelly and Others v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, no. 30054\/96, \u00a7 118, 4 May 2001).50.\u00a0\u00a0It falls to the State to have recourse to a procedure which would enable it to take all measures necessary for it to comply with its positive obligation of effective investigation imposed by Article 3 (see, mutatis mutandis, Sashov and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 14383\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 64, 68 and 69, 7\u00a0January 2010; see also Vanfuli v. Russia, no. 24885\/05, \u00a7 79, 3 November 2011; Nechto v. Russia, no. 24893\/05, \u00a7 87, 24 January 2012; and Nitsov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 35389\/04, \u00a7 60, 3 May 2012).51.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has found in its judgment in the case of Lyapin (cited above) that the mere carrying out of a pre-investigation inquiry under Article 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation (\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043a\u0430 \u043f\u043e \u0437\u0430\u044f\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044e \u043e \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0438) is insufficient if the authorities are to comply with the standards established under Article 3 of the Convention for an effective investigation into credible allegations of ill\u2011treatment in police custody. The pre-investigation inquiry is the initial stage in dealing with a criminal complaint under Russian law, to be followed by the opening of a criminal case and the carrying out of an investigation proper if the information gathered has disclosed elements of a criminal offence. It is therefore incumbent on the authorities to institute criminal proceedings and conduct a \u201cpreliminary investigation\u201d regulated by Section VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation, that is a fully fledged criminal investigation in which the whole range of investigative measures can be carried out (ibid., \u00a7\u00a7 129 and 132-36).52.\u00a0\u00a0Confronted with numerous cases against Russia concerning the lack of an effective investigation \u2013 cases in which the reaction of investigating authorities to credible allegations of police ill-treatment had been limited to carrying out a pre-investigation inquiry and refusing to institute criminal proceedings \u2013 the Court was bound to draw stronger inferences. The mere fact of the investigative authority\u2019s refusal to open a criminal investigation into credible allegations of police ill-treatment has been considered indicative of the State\u2019s failure to comply with its obligation under Article\u00a03 to carry out an effective investigation (see Lyapin, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 129 and 132-36 and follow-up cases, in which the Government acknowledged a violation under the procedural aspect of Article 3, such as Gorshchuk v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a031316\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 35-38, 6 October 2015; Turbylev v. Russia, no.\u00a04722\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 67-72, 6\u00a0October 2015; Fartushin v. Russia, no. 38887\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a044-45, 8\u00a0October 2015; and Ovakimyan v. Russia, no. 52796\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 42, 49-53, 21\u00a0February 2017; and also many other authorities, in which a violation of Article 3 under its procedural limb was found, including Leonid Petrov v. Russia, no.\u00a052783\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 78-81, 11 October 2016; Morgunov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a032546\/08, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a038-39, 11 April 2017; Kondakov v. Russia, no.\u00a031632\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 33-34, 2\u00a0May 2017; Sitnikov v. Russia, no. 14769\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a038\u201139, 2 May 2017; Olisov and Others v. Russia, nos. 10825\/09 and 2\u00a0others, \u00a7\u00a7 81-82, 2\u00a0May 2017; Aleksandr Konovalov v. Russia, no.\u00a039708\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 37-38, 28\u00a0November 2017; and Sergey Ivanov v. Russia, no.\u00a014416\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 81-83, 15 May 2018).53.\u00a0\u00a0The impact of the approach set out in Lyapin on the substantive aspect of Article 3 was explained in the case of Olisov and Others (cited above) and follow-up cases, in which the Court found that superficial domestic pre-investigation inquiries were an improper basis for discharging the Government\u2019s burden of proof and producing evidence capable of casting doubt on applicants\u2019 credible assertions of police ill\u2011treatment. It therefore rejected the Government\u2019s explanations in which they denied the State\u2019s responsibility for alleged police ill\u2011treatment relying on the results of pre-investigation inquiries (see Olisov and Others, cited above, \u00a7\u00a082; Aleksandr Konovalov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a041; Ksenz and Others v. Russia, nos.\u00a045044\/06 and 5 others, \u00a7 104, 12\u00a0December 2017; and Sergey Ivanov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a082).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application to the present case54.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes at the outset that the facts of the present case took place after the introduction of amendments by a Federal Law of 4\u00a0March 2013 to provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation regulating pre\u2011investigation inquiries (see paragraphs 40-41 above). As a result of those amendments additional investigative measures, such as a forensic examination and receipt of samples for a comparative examination, may be carried out before a criminal case is opened. A prompt forensic medical examination of victims of alleged police ill\u2011treatment is an important element of an effective investigation (see paragraph 49 above). Furthermore, the Lyapin approach (see paragraphs 51\u201152 above) should not be read as an obligation to open a full-fledged criminal investigation in all cases when there is a complaint of ill-treatment. The pre-investigation inquiry may serve the legitimate purpose of filtering out ill\u2011founded or even bogus complaints, saving the resources of the investigating authorities (see Goryachkin, cited above, \u00a7 68). However, if the information gathered has disclosed elements of a criminal offence, that is to say that the alleged ill\u2011treatment may have been committed, the pre\u2011investigation inquiry no longer suffices and the authorities should initiate an investigation proper, in which the whole range of investigative measures may be carried out, including the questioning of witnesses, confrontations and identification parades (see Lyapin, cited above, \u00a7 134). The framework of the pre\u2011investigation inquiry alone (if it is not followed by a criminal investigation) does not allow the identity of the alleged perpetrators of ill\u2011treatment to be established and is not capable of leading to their punishment, since the opening of a criminal case and a criminal investigation are prerequisites for bringing charges against them, which may then be examined by a court (ibid., \u00a7 135).55.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court observes that after his time spent in police custody the applicant was found to have sustained injuries (see paragraphs 16-18 above). He complained (for the first time on 5 July 2013 and in his official criminal complaint of 7 August 2013, see paragraphs 13 and 23 above) that he had been ill-treated by police officers after his arrest, on 4 and 5 July 2013. According to the forensic medical expert, the injuries could have been caused as a result of blows from hard blunt objects on 4 July 2013. The injuries to the applicant\u2019s abdomen could have been caused by being kicked in that area one or more times (see paragraphs 19-22 above). Though the contusion of the applicant\u2019s kidney was not the subject of a forensic medical assessment, the diagnosis was made by doctors at the Aleksandrovskaya Hospital urology unit where the applicant received inpatient treatment from 5 to 9 July 2013. The Court considers that the injuries, at least partly, could arguably have resulted from the applicant\u2019s alleged ill\u2011treatment by police officers, most likely as a result of being punched and kicked.56.\u00a0\u00a0The above factors are sufficient to give rise to a presumption in favour of the applicant\u2019s version of events and to satisfy the Court that his assertions of ill-treatment in police custody were credible. The State therefore had an obligation to carry out an effective investigation into his allegations.57.\u00a0\u00a0The State\u2019s reaction to the applicant\u2019s complaint was limited to carrying out the pre-investigation inquiry, as a result of which they decided that there was nothing to show that the actions of the police officers disclosed elements of a criminal offence and refused to institute criminal proceedings and to carry out a criminal investigation. In total, they took five such decisions.\u00a0The refusals to open a criminal case were so poorly reasoned that the higher investigating authorities repeatedly set them aside as unlawful, unsubstantiated or based on an incomplete inquiry. However, the inquiry was concluded three years later by the domestic courts, finding in the proceedings under Article 125 of the CCrP that the refusal to open a criminal case of 5 September 2015 was lawful and well founded (see paragraph 38 above).58.\u00a0\u00a0The Court cannot but note that the statements by the police officers from the special rapid response unit who carried out the arrest gave no reason to conclude that the applicant had been \u201cknocked down\u201d and had \u201cfallen\u201d face down onto the ground. Nevertheless, this was the version presented to the forensic medical expert for his additional assessment (in which he attributed some of the injuries to the applicant\u2019s fall to the ground), and the official explanation for the applicant\u2019s injuries. Furthermore, the forensic medical assessment was carried out in the absence of the applicant, more than two months after his alleged ill-treatment, and on the basis of either an incomplete description of his alleged ill-treatment (see paragraphs 19 and 23 above) or a distorted description of the material collected during the pre-investigation inquiry (see paragraphs 21-22 and 27\u00a0above).59.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the foregoing, and having regard to its previous well\u2011established case-law in respect of the State\u2019s procedural obligation under Article 3 (see paragraphs 51-52 above), the Court sees no reason to hold otherwise in the present case. It finds that the refusal to open a criminal case into the applicant\u2019s credible allegations of ill-treatment at the hands of the police, of which the authorities were promptly made aware, amounted to a failure to carry out an effective investigation as required by Article 3 of the Convention.60.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural limb.61.\u00a0\u00a0Given that the Government\u2019s denial of the applicant\u2019s police ill\u2011treatment was based on the pre\u2011investigation inquiry, which did not comply with the requirements for an effective investigation under Article 3 (see paragraphs 53, 57 and 59\u201160 above), the Court further finds that the Government failed to discharge their burden of proof and produce evidence capable of casting doubt on the applicant\u2019s credible assertions of police ill\u2011treatment.62.\u00a0\u00a0The authorities should therefore bear responsibility for the ill\u2011treatment complained of, which was serious enough to amount to inhuman and degrading treatment (see G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no.\u00a022978\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 87-93, ECHR 2010, and Gorshchuk, cited above, \u00a7 33).63.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly also been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive limb.II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION64.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage65.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 100,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.66.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stated that should the Court find a violation of the Convention and decide to award just satisfaction, this should be done in compliance with the Court\u2019s well-established case-law.67.\u00a0\u00a0The Court awards the applicant EUR 20,000 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses68.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 2,000 in respect of legal fees for his representation by Mr A.B. Tsarev in the proceedings before the Court, as well as translation expenses.69.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained their position (see paragraph 66 above).70.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,944 for the proceedings before the Court.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest71.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","31337":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLES 3 AND 8 OF THE CONVENTION42.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the State had failed to properly investigate the alleged rape. The Court considers that the complaint falls to be examined under Articles\u00a03 and 8 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, read as follows:Article\u00a03\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dArticle\u00a08\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to respect for his private ... life ... . \u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility43.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It furthermore notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0Parties\u2019 submissions44.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that the preliminary inquiry and the ensuing investigation conducted by domestic authorities had been in compliance with the standards established in the Court\u2019s case-law. The investigators had identified and arrested eight alleged perpetrators. When questioned, all of them had denied the applicant\u2019s allegations. They had maintained their innocence in the applicant\u2019s presence. Neither the results of the genetic forensic examination nor the relevant mobile-telephone communications history had confirmed the applicant\u2019s allegations and the suspects had been released. In 2014, after the applicant had identified A.P. as another perpetrator, he had been questioned and had undergone a polygraph test, which had confirmed that A.P. had had sexual relations with the applicant. He had been charged with rape. However, once the genetic forensic expert examination had excluded the possibility of the sperm found on the wipe towels being A.P.\u2019s, the investigator had rightfully discontinued the criminal investigation against him. The Government furthermore pointed out that the applicant\u2019s behaviour had had an impact on the effectiveness of the investigation. She had only belatedly reported the alleged rape to the authorities. As a result, it had been impossible to find, collect and preserve traces of the crime. Nevertheless, the investigators had carried out a complete range of actions aimed at establishing the circumstances of the crime: they had (1)\u00a0commissioned a forensic medical examination to determine any possible traces of violence on the applicant\u2019s body; (2) inspected the crime scenes in the applicant\u2019s presence; (3) taken all necessary measures to collect physical evidence, (4) carried out other forensic examinations; (5) held a confrontation between the applicant and the alleged perpetrators; and (6)\u00a0obtained information concerning the history of mobile-telephone communications between the applicant and the alleged perpetrators. In the Government\u2019s opinion, there was nothing in the material contained in the case file to substantiate the applicant\u2019s allegation that the authorities had failed to comply with their positive obligations, as set out in Articles\u00a03 and\u00a08 of the Convention.45.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained her complaint. In her opinion, the State had failed to discharge its positive obligation to investigate effectively her allegations of rape. Relying on her application form and the attachments thereto, the applicant pointed out the following omissions on the part of the investigators: (1) the authorities had failed to question T.Mus. (one of the alleged perpetrators), (2) they had not inspected all the mobile telephones of the alleged perpetrators; (3) they had not obtained the history of the mobile telephone communications between the applicant and the alleged perpetrators; (4) they had not examined the flash memory drives of the mobile telephones; (5) only eight out of the eleven alleged perpetrators had been arrested; (6) the investigators had collected information about the private life of the applicant\u2019s parents in order to discredit them; (7) they had not obtained or examined genetic material from all the alleged perpetrators; and (8) they had not identified or examined the cars that the alleged perpetrators had used. The investigation in her case had not been prompt. A fully-fledged criminal investigation had only been opened some five months after the authorities had been informed of the applicant\u2019s allegations. On numerous occasions the investigators\u2019 decisions to discontinue the investigation had been quashed by the courts after they had found that investigation to have been incomplete and perfunctory. However, no effort had been made by the investigators to comply with the courts\u2019 orders. As regards the video recording, the applicant considered the investigator\u2019s conclusion that she had performed oral sex voluntarily to be unsubstantiated and erroneous. She also pointed out that the authorities had ascribed paramount importance to the fact that the alleged perpetrators had denied her allegations and had considered that fact to constitute exculpatory evidence. The investigators had failed to attach any weight to her vulnerability, the applicant being a minor living in a community with certain cultural norms regarding the desired behaviour of women and girls. The applicant had been questioned by male investigators in the presence of male teachers. She had been forced to confront the alleged perpetrators. She had not been offered any trauma counselling or psychological assistance during the investigation or her questioning. The investigators had failed to employ a context-sensitive and gender-based approach. They had focused on the lack of physical injury rather than her lack of consent. The investigators had appeared to blame the applicant and to focus on her behaviour and that of her family.2.\u00a0\u00a0Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles46.\u00a0\u00a0The general principles concerning the existence of a positive obligation to punish rape and to investigate rape cases are well-established in the Court\u2019s case-law and have been summarised in the case of M.C. v.\u00a0Bulgaria (no. 39272\/98, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0149-153, ECHR 2003\u2011XII).(b)\u00a0\u00a0The scope of the Court\u2019s review in the instant case47.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that, in the instant case, the applicant did not allege that Russian law, as such, did not provide effective protection against rape. Rather, she maintained that the State had not discharged its obligation to carry out an effective investigation of the circumstances of her rape and to identify and punish the perpetrators. The Court\u2019s task is accordingly to ascertain whether the domestic authorities applied the relevant criminal-law provisions in practice through effective investigation and prosecution.3.\u00a0\u00a0Application of the principles48.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, even though the scope of the State\u2019s positive obligations might differ between cases where treatment contrary to Article 3 has been inflicted through the involvement of State agents and cases where violence is inflicted by private individuals (see Beganovi\u0107 v.\u00a0Croatia, no. 46423\/06, \u00a7\u00a069, 25 June 2009), the requirements as to an official investigation are similar. For the investigation to be regarded as \u201ceffective\u201d, it should in principle be capable of leading to the establishment of the facts of the case and to the identification and punishment of those responsible. This is not an obligation of result, but one of means. The authorities must have taken the reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard, and a requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is implicit in this context (see, among many authorities, Mikheyev v.\u00a0Russia, no. 77617\/01, \u00a7\u00a0107 et seq., 26\u00a0January 2006, and Assenov and Others v.\u00a0Bulgaria, judgment of 28\u00a0October 1998, Reports 1998-VIII, \u00a7\u00a7 102 et seq.). In cases under Articles\u00a02 and\u00a03 of the Convention where the effectiveness of the official investigation has been at issue, the Court has often assessed whether the authorities reacted promptly to the complaints at the relevant time (see Labita v. Italy [GC], no.\u00a026772\/95, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0133 et seq., ECHR 2000\u2011IV). Consideration has been given to the opening of investigations, delays in taking statements (see Timurta\u015f v. Turkey, no.\u00a023531\/94, \u00a7\u00a089, ECHR\u00a02000\u2011VI, and Tekin v. Turkey, 9\u00a0June 1998, \u00a7 67, Reports 1998\u2011IV) and the length of time taken for the initial investigation (see Indelicato v.\u00a0Italy, no.\u00a031143\/96, \u00a7 37, 18 October 2001).49.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the facts of the instant case, the Court observes that the authorities did respond to the applicant\u2019s allegations of rape. They conducted an initial inquiry to verify her allegations and then opened an official criminal investigation. The Court is not convinced, however, that the measures taken by the authorities met the requirements of Articles\u00a03 and 8 of the Convention.50.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes from the outset that the official investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations was opened five months after the applicant reported the alleged crimes. Admittedly, the authorities required a certain time to conduct a preliminary inquiry in response to the applicant\u2019s complaint. Nevertheless, it appears from the material in the case file that the investigator\u2019s efforts during the initial inquiry, when time was of essence to secure the evidence effectively, were aimed at dismissing her case rather than establishing what had really happened. It appears that the initial inquiry lasted about a month. During that time the investigator questioned the applicant and some of the alleged perpetrators, examined the crime scenes and commissioned forensic examinations. Having examined the evidence collected, the investigator dismissed the applicant\u2019s allegations as unsubstantiated. In the next four months of the inquiry the investigator did nothing but repeatedly duplicate his original decision dismissing the applicant\u2019s complaint; each time the decision was quashed by the investigator\u2019s superior on account of the investigator\u2019s failure to complete the inquiry.51.\u00a0\u00a0The criminal investigation opened in November 2012 did not remedy the above-mentioned omissions. Little was done by the investigators to follow up on the leads provided by the applicant. The investigators did not identify or seize all the mobile telephones used by the applicant and the alleged perpetrators. Nothing was done to verify the information provided by the applicant concerning the cars used by the alleged perpetrators. The results of the polygraph test to which M.G. was subjected were not analysed or taken into consideration. No effort was made to verify the alibis furnished by Sh.D. and M.M. or to resolve the contradictions in the statements made by M.G., M.Kh. and T.Mus. (see the annex below). No effort was made to obtain information as to whether the recovery of the flash memory drives of the mobile telephones was possible and if any laboratory in Russia had the equipment adequate for that task. No explanation was provided by the investigator or the Government as to why it had been impossible to obtain the information in question from the relevant mobile-telephone service providers. Without delving into the issue of the validity of the statement made by the investigator, the Court observes that the documents submitted by the Government contain no material supporting the investigator\u2019s findings.52.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not lose sight of the difficulties that the authorities face when investigating sex crimes, owing to the particularly sensitive nature of the experiences sustained by victims. In the instant case, there were no eyewitnesses, and nobody volunteered any information. Some of the applicant\u2019s accusations related to events which took place some two years prior to her complaint. In such circumstances, the investigators were confronted with a difficult task. Nevertheless, despite the measures carried out by the authorities, the Court considers that the delays in the investigation and the omissions on the part of the investigating authorities raise doubts as to the effectiveness of the authorities\u2019 response to the applicant\u2019s allegations of rape and leave the criminal proceedings in the case devoid of meaning.53.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes that the respondent State has failed to meet its positive obligations to conduct an effective investigation and to ensure adequate protection of the applicant\u2019s private life. There has accordingly been a violation of Articles\u00a03 and 8 of the Convention.II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION54.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage55.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage, leaving the amount of the award to the Court\u2019s discretion.56.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that no award should be made to the applicant for her failure to make her claim \u201cin a proper manner\u201d.57.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that it has found a serious violation in the present case. The authorities failed to comply with their positive obligation to effectively investigate and punish rape. In such circumstances, the Court considers that the applicant\u2019s suffering and frustration cannot be compensated for by merely finding a violation. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant 18,000 euros (EUR), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses58.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed the following amounts in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and the Court, to be paid into the bank account of the European Human Rights Advocacy Centre:Type of workNumber of hours spentCosts\/expensesServices performed by the Memorial Human Rights Centre\u2019s lawyerReceiving instructions from the applicant2EUR\u00a0300Perusing the case file8EUR\u00a01,200Time spent en route to\/from Makhachkala48EUR\u00a02,400Flights to\/from Makhachkala-140,112\u00a0Russian roublesParticipating in court hearings19EUR\u00a02,850Drafting appeals in the domestic proceedings6EUR\u00a0900Drafting the application12EUR\u00a01,800Drafting an update on the domestic proceedings4EUR\u00a0600Perusing the material submitted by the Government and drafting the observations24EUR\u00a03,600Services provided by European Human Rights Advocacy CentreReading the case documents and the draft application; researching case-law and drafting advice to the Memorial Human Rights Centre81,200 pounds sterling (GBP)Reviewing the evidence and the application form and drafting advice4GBP\u00a0600Reviewing the Government\u2019s observations and evidence; reviewing and drafting observations in reply11GBP\u00a01,650Stationery, faxes, postage-GBP\u00a0203.50Translating documents; arranging for translation of documents; compiling list of documents; faxing; filing3GBP\u00a090Translating documents from Russian into English-GBP\u00a01,807.40EUR\u00a01.921.0359.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that the applicant had not substantiated her claims and that no award should be made to her under this head.60.\u00a0\u00a0Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case\u2011law, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR\u00a012,585 covering costs and expenses under all heads, to be paid into the bank account of the European Human Rights Advocacy Centre.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest61.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","31352":"40.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that his removal to Sudan would be contrary to his rights under Article 3 of the Convention. This provision reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions1.\u00a0\u00a0The Government41.\u00a0\u00a0The Government, referring to the applicable general principles under the Court\u2019s case-law under Article 3, contested the argument that the applicant, if expelled, would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3. According to the Government, the general security situation in Sudan and in Khartoum in particular is not so poor that returning the applicant to Sudan would in itself constitute a violation of Article\u00a03. They further pointed out that the applicant had not raised a claim to this effect in his application to the Court.42.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the applicant\u2019s personal situation, an assessment must be made on the basis of the applicant\u2019s asylum statement against the backdrop of the general situation in Sudan. On this point the Government emphasised that it is for the applicant to adduce evidence capable of demonstrating that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if the measure complained of were to be implemented, he would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3.43.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contended that the applicant had failed to establish in a plausible manner that he will be subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3, not only taking into account his failure to provide any documents in support of his identity, nationality and travel route, but also his failure to provide any documents in support of his asylum statement, his inability to give detailed, coherent and verifiable statements about his journey from Sudan to the Netherlands and his vague, cursory and implausible statements about his arrest, detention, ill-treatment and absconding. Consequently, the Government considered it implausible that the applicant would have fled Sudan due to fear of treatment contrary to Article 3. As regards the MOG report of 27 January 2012, the Government submitted that this report is not enough to make the applicant\u2019s asylum statement plausible and it does not give strong indications that the applicant\u2019s scars and injuries were caused by ill-treatment or torture. On this point, they emphasise that it is significant that the scale of gradations used in this report to assess the degree of consistency between the applicant\u2019s medical complaints and his asylum statement about the causes thereof leave scope for many other causes rather than torture or ill-treatment. This report did not warrant a further investigation by the Government into the applicant\u2019s scars and injuries since he had not made a prima facie case with respect to the possible causes of those scars and injuries.44.\u00a0\u00a0The Government were therefore of the opinion that the applicant had not demonstrated the existence of a real and foreseeable risk that he, if removed to Sudan, would be subjected to treatment in breach of Article\u00a03 either on grounds of individual circumstances or as a member of a vulnerable minority.2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant45.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that he risked treatment in breach of Article\u00a03 in Sudan for belonging to the ethnic group of non-Arab Gimr from Darfur and explained that he had been born in an illegal settlement in the vicinity of Khartoum of parents originating from West-Darfur. The Sudanese Government had destroyed this settlement around 2004\/2005, using bulldozers. However, its residents \u2013 including the applicant and his nuclear\/extended family \u2013 had returned later. He claimed that the mere fact of his Darfur origin was already sufficient for running the risk of being arrested and persecuted.46.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further submitted that he had given an extensive and detailed statement about his arrest, torture and interrogation as a suspect of being a member of the rebel group which the Sudanese authorities held responsible for the attack in Omdurman in May 2010. He considered the position adopted by the Netherlands authorities about the credibility of his asylum statement \u2013 which found support in various general reports covering the period at issue \u2013 inexplicable and incomprehensible. In the applicant\u2019s opinion, his asylum statement had been incorrectly found to lack credibility and the Dutch authorities had unjustly failed to give weight to the MOG report. According to the applicant, it followed from the Court\u2019s judgment in the case of R.C. v. Sweden (no. 41827\/07, 9 March 2010) that it is not required that there is a very high degree of consistency between a person\u2019s overall pattern of lesions and the attribution given by that person before a medical report can be given probative value. As the medical report at least provided strong indications that the applicant\u2019s scars and injuries may have been caused by ill-treatment or torture, the Netherlands immigration authorities ought to have directed that an expert opinion be obtained.47.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant lastly submitted that, although his statements were modest in nature as befits his origins, his complete lack of schooling and his inability to read and write, they were per se consistent and coherent and matched publicly available sources. He argued that, in these circumstances, he should be given the benefit of the doubt.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles48.\u00a0\u00a0The applicable general principles are set out in, inter alia, Saadi v.\u00a0Italy ([GC], no. 37201\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 128\u201133, ECHR 2008); R.C. v. Sweden (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 48-51 with further references); F.G. v. Sweden ([GC], no.\u00a043611\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 117-27 with further references, 23 March 2016); J.K. and Others v. Sweden ([GC], no. 59166\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 79-90 with further references, 23\u00a0August 2016); N.A. v. Switzerland (no. 50364\/14, \u00a7\u00a7 41\u201142 with further references, 30 May 2017); and A.I. v. Switzerland (no. 23378\/15, \u00a7\u00a7 48-49 with further references, 30 May 2017).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of the general principles to the present case49.\u00a0\u00a0The issue before the Court is whether the applicant, upon return to his country of origin, would face a real risk of being tortured or subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment as prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention.50.\u00a0\u00a0Since the applicant in the instant case has not been deported \u2013 as a result of the indication by the Court of an interim measure under Rule\u00a039 of the Rules of Court (see paragraph 22 above) \u2013 the material point in time for the assessment of the claimed Article 3 risk is that of the Court\u2019s consideration of the case (see Saadi, cited above, \u00a7 133). The Court will make a full and ex nunc evaluation where it is necessary to take into account information that has come to light after the final decision by the domestic authorities was taken (see, for example, Maslov v. Austria [GC], no.\u00a01638\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 87-95, ECHR 2008, and Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom, nos. 8319\/07 and 11449\/07, \u00a7 215, 28 June 2011).51.\u00a0\u00a0In examining this matter, the Court would reiterate at the outset its considerations in respect of the general situation in Sudan as set out in the recent judgments of N.A. v. Switzerland (cited above, \u00a7 43) and A.I.\u00a0v.\u00a0Switzerland (cited above, \u00a7 50).52.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, the Court observes that it appears from various international reports that, directly after the attack on Omdurman in May 2008 attributed to the JEM, the Sudanese authorities arrested hundreds of persons most of whom of ethnic Darfuri origin. Several reports also mention that many of these persons were ill-treated during detention and that, in the course of 2009, special anti-terrorism courts tried and convicted several hundred suspects in connection with the May 2008 attack on Omdurman. The Court further notes that, in the context of the cease-fire agreement concluded between the JEM and the Sudanese government in the spring of 2010, many detained JEM suspects were released (see paragraphs 31-32 above). On the basis of the materials before it, the Court finds that the general situation in Sudan, in particular in Khartoum, is not of such an extreme violent nature as to entail, on its own, that any removal to it of a Sudanese national would necessarily be in breach of the Convention. The Court therefore has to establish whether the applicant\u2019s personal situation is such that his return would contravene Article 3 of the Convention.53.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the applicant claims a risk of treatment prohibited by Article 3 on account of his non-Arab ethnic origin, the Court observes \u2013 having regard to various recent international reports on the situation in the Khartoum region for persons having a non-Arab origin (see paragraphs 35\u201138 above) \u2013 that the situation for such persons is certainly not ideal and that they may risk falling victim to social discrimination. However, the Court cannot find that this situation must be regarded as being so harrowing that it must be concluded that people of non-Arab origin are at risk of persecution or serious harm in Khartoum, solely on the ground of their ethnicity. It must therefore be established whether also other risk factors are at stake.54.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s claims of having been arrested, detained and convicted on the basis of suspected involvement with the JEM, his escape from prison and the manner in which he fled from Sudan to the Netherlands were disbelieved by the domestic administrative and judicial authorities after an extensive investigation and on rational grounds that the Court has no reason to doubt. In this respect the Court notes that the applicant\u2019s case was examined on the merits by the Minister for Immigration, Integration and Asylum Policy, on whose behalf two interviews were conducted with the applicant, and by the Regional Court, which held an oral hearing. Moreover, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division considered the applicant\u2019s further appeal but found no grounds to overturn the judgment of the Regional Court of The Hague. The Court also notes that the applicant was assisted by a lawyer throughout the proceedings.55.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further has found no concrete indication in the contents of the case file indicating a negative interest of the authorities of Sudan in the applicant, either at the material time or currently. There is nothing indicating that these authorities have ever taken any concrete steps aimed at finding out the applicant\u2019s whereabouts after he had allegedly escaped from prison.56.\u00a0\u00a0Finally, the Court notes that, unlike the situation in the cases of N.A.\u00a0v.\u00a0Switzerland and A.I. v. Switzerland (both cited above), there is no evidence before the Court that the applicant would have been involved in any Sudanese political opposition activities or group abroad and for this reason would have to fear ill-treatment upon his return to Sudan.57.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances, the Court cannot but conclude that the applicant failed to adduce evidence capable of demonstrating that there are substantial grounds for believing that he, if removed to Sudan, would face a real risk being subjected to treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.58.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a03 (a) of the Convention and must be rejected pursuant to Article\u00a035 \u00a7\u00a04 of the Convention.59.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further complained under Article 13, arguing that he did not have an effective remedy for his complaint under Article 3. Article\u00a013 reads as follows:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201d60.\u00a0\u00a0It is the Court\u2019s constant case-law that Article 13 requires a remedy in domestic law to be available in respect only of such grievances as are \u201carguable\u201d in terms of the Convention (see, for instance, Boyle and Rice v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, judgment of 27 April 1988, Series A no. 131, \u00a7 52, and Ali and Others v. Switzerland (dec.), no 30474\/14, \u00a7 49 with further references, 4 October 2016). In view of its findings above, the Court does not consider that an arguable claim has been established under Article 3 of the Convention.61.\u00a0\u00a0Consequently this complaint too is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.62.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, it is appropriate to discontinue the application of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,Declares the application inadmissible.Done in English and notified in writing on 13 December 2018.Fato\u015f Arac\u0131Dmitry DedovDeputy RegistrarPresident","31382":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION38.\u00a0\u00a0Relying on Article 6 of the Convention, the applicant complained that the State had failed to hold those responsible for the incident accountable. She also complained about the length of the domestic proceedings.39.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it is master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case and is not bound by the characterisation given by the applicant or the Government (see, for instance, Scoppola v.\u00a0Italy (No. 2) [GC], no. 10249\/03, \u00a7 54, 17 September 2009; Aksu v.\u00a0Turkey [GC], nos.\u00a04149\/04 and 41029\/04, \u00a7 43, ECHR 2012; and S\u00f6derman v. Sweden [GC], no.\u00a05786\/08, \u00a7 57, ECHR 2013). In the present case, it finds that while the part of the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the length of the domestic proceedings is to be examined under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, the issue of the alleged failure to identify and hold accountable those responsible for the incident of 2 April 1998 falls to be examined under Article 3 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Tautkus v.\u00a0Lithuania, no. 29474\/09, \u00a7 62, 27 November 2012).The latter provision reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment\u201d.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility40.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the domestic decisions delivered in the applicant\u2019s favour (see paragraphs 15 and 24 above), the question arises as to whether she has lost her victim status for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention. In the Court\u2019s view, this issue is closely linked to the merits of the complaint under Article 3 of the Convention. The Court will therefore have regard to it in determining whether there has been a violation of that provision.41.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant42.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant asserted that the State had failed to hold those responsible for the incident accountable and provide proper redress to her.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Government43.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that statement.\u00a0They pointed out that, according to the Court\u2019s case-law, damage to personal integrity did not necessarily require a criminal-law remedy, especially where the harm had been inflicted as a result of negligence. Hence, a lack of criminal-law remedies in itself could not constitute a breach of the State\u2019s positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention.44.\u00a0\u00a0At the same time, the Government pointed out that the applicant had availed herself of the available civil-law remedies by virtue of which the fault of the asylum employees had been established and had been compensated for both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. Thus, according to the Government, those remedies had proved to be effective in practice, so the State had met its positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment45.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes at the outset that on 2\u00a0April 1998 the applicant was severely beaten by a private individual, B., and suffered grievous bodily harm. Her injuries included concussion, a fractured jaw and nose, numerous cuts on her face and, at a later stage, a loss of sight in her right eye (see\u00a0paragraph 6 above). The situation therefore attains the threshold of severity required for it to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention.(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles46.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the obligation on High Contracting Parties under Article 1 of the Convention to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, taken together with Article 3, requires States to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, including such ill-treatment administered by private individuals (see A. v. the United Kingdom, 23\u00a0September 1998, \u00a7 22, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011VI, and Valiulien\u0117 v. Lithuania, no. 33234\/07, \u00a7 74, 26 March 2013).47.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, Article 3 of the Convention requires that the authorities conduct an effective official investigation into alleged ill-treatment, even if such treatment has been inflicted by private individuals (see Muta v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 37246\/06, \u00a7 59, 31 July 2012, and O\u2019Keeffe v.\u00a0Ireland [GC], no. 35810\/09, \u00a7 172, ECHR 2014 (extracts)). The investigation should in principle be capable of leading to the establishment of the facts of the case and to the identification and punishment of those responsible for an offence. This is not an obligation of result, but one of means. The authorities must take the reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, such as by taking witness statements and gathering forensic evidence, and a requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is implicit in this context (see\u00a0N.D. v.\u00a0Slovenia, no. 16605\/09, \u00a7\u00a057, 15 January 2015, and Kraulaidis v.\u00a0Lithuania, no. 76805\/11, \u00a7 57, 8\u00a0November 2016, with further references).48.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has previously found on numerous occasions, when examining complaints related to the deaths of patients in the care of the medical profession, that States are required to make regulations compelling asylums, whether public or private, to adopt appropriate measures for the protection of their patients\u2019 lives and to set up an effective independent judicial system so that the cause of death of patients, whether in the public or the private sector, can be determined and those responsible made accountable (see Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy [GC], no. 32967\/96, \u00a7 49, ECHR 2002\u2011I, and Dodov v. Bulgaria, no. 59548\/00, \u00a7 80, 17\u00a0January 2008). The same conclusions were reached by the Court in respect of securing the well-being of detainees or other persons under the control of the State authorities (see Gorgiev v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 26984\/05, \u00a7 69, 19 April 2012; Mosendz v. Ukraine, no.\u00a052013\/08, \u00a7 92, 17 January 2013; and Yuri Illarionovitch Shchokin v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 4299\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 35-37, 3 October 2013). The Court also pointed out that in the case of mentally ill patients, consideration had to be given to their particular vulnerability (see Keenan v. the United Kingdom, no.\u00a027229\/95, \u00a7 111, ECHR 2001\u2011III; Rivi\u00e8re v. France, no.\u00a033834\/03, \u00a7 63, 11 July 2006; and Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848\/08, \u00a7\u00a0131, ECHR 2014).49.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, however, reiterates that in cases where the infringement of the right to life or to personal integrity is not caused intentionally, the procedural obligation imposed by the Convention to set up an effective and independent judicial system does not necessarily require the provision of a criminal-law remedy. The choice of means for ensuring the positive obligations under the Convention is in principle a matter that falls within the Contracting State\u2019s margin of appreciation. There are different avenues for ensuring Convention rights, and even if the State has failed to apply one particular measure provided by domestic law, it may still fulfil its positive duty by other means. However, for this obligation to be satisfied, such proceedings must not only exist in theory but also operate effectively in practice (see, mutatis mutandis and in the ambit of Article 2 of the Convention, Calvelli and Ciglio, cited above, \u00a7 51; Byrzykowski v. Poland, no.\u00a011562\/05, \u00a7 105, 27 June 2006; Dodov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a087; and Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal [GC], no. 56080\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 215-216, ECHR 2017, with further references).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of these principles to the present case50.\u00a0\u00a0The Court must examine, therefore, whether in the present case the available legal remedies, taken together, as provided by law and applied in practice, could be said to have secured legal means capable of establishing the facts, holding those at fault accountable and providing appropriate redress to the victim (see, mutatis mutandis, Dodov, cited above, \u00a7 83).51.\u00a0\u00a0As already mentioned (see paragraph 45 above), the applicant suffered grievous bodily harm at the hands of another patient while in a State-run mental institution. The relevant domestic law provided that criminal, disciplinary and civil proceedings could be used to determine who should be held accountable. The Court will examine whether those remedies, taken separately or jointly, satisfied the above requirements under Article 3 of the Convention.(i)\u00a0\u00a0Criminal-law remedies52.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in the instant case it is not in dispute that the injuries in question were inflicted on the applicant by a private individual, B. However, it is unclear whether B., who at the material time was confined with the applicant in a State-owned mental health asylum, was mentally fit at the time of the incident and at any other time before her death to understand the consequences of her actions and be held liable for them. As a result, the question whether B.\u2019s actual discharge from criminal liability by prosecution authorities was lawful (see paragraph 8 above), remains uncertain.53.\u00a0\u00a0Be as it may, B. had died on 16 September 1998 (see paragraph\u00a07 above), little more than four months after the refusal to institute criminal proceedings in 1998; thus her prosecution would not have had any prospects of success anyway.54.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, according to the prosecutor\u2019s decision of 8 May 1998 not to institute criminal proceedings (see paragraph 8 above), the incident apparently happened owing to the orderlies\u2019 negligent performance of their duties. The same conclusion was reached on 30 June 2013 following the investigation initiated on 26 December 2012 (see paragraph 10 above).55.\u00a0\u00a0The decisions not to institute or pursue criminal proceedings were taken because the orderlies could not be considered to be \u201cofficials\u201d within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code in force at the material time.\u00a0Therefore, the absence of legislation establishing the orderlies\u2019 liability in negligence and the objective fact of B.\u2019s death rendered all attempts on behalf of the applicant to institute criminal proceedings futile in this particular case.56.\u00a0\u00a0However, given that the Court\u2019s relevant case-law provides that an effective judicial system does not necessarily require the provision of a criminal-law remedy if, as in the case of the orderlies, the infringement of the right to personal integrity is not caused intentionally (see the case-law quoted in paragraph 49 above), the Court must also examine whether the respondent State made available other legal remedies that satisfied the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Disciplinary remedies57.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the asylum did not react in time to the alleged negligence of its employees as it was supposed to (see the relevant provisions of the Labour Code, quoted in paragraphs 33 and 34 above). According to the prosecutor\u2019s demand of 13 December 2006 (see\u00a0paragraph\u00a017 above), the asylum was requested to conduct an internal investigation into the incident.58.\u00a0\u00a0It appears that the prosecutor\u2019s demand was not complied with and that a disciplinary investigation was not conducted. In any event, the statutory time-limit as to the imposition of disciplinary measures expired six months after the misdeed (see paragraph 34 above), in October 1998, which made it impossible to impose disciplinary measures on the orderlies supposedly responsible for the incident.59.\u00a0\u00a0The failure to conduct a disciplinary investigation into the circumstances of the incident, as required by law, also made it impossible to establish the circumstances of the incident (including those responsible for it) and identify any errors in management, training or control over the asylum employees that may have made the incident in question possible.60.\u00a0\u00a0In view of this, the Court concludes that no disciplinary remedies were used to ensure that the facts were established and that those responsible for the incident were held accountable.(iii)\u00a0\u00a0Civil-law remedies61.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant also claimed compensation for non-pecuniary and pecuniary damage under the civil procedure. Those claims were allowed by the domestic courts in part (see paragraphs 15 and 24-25 above).62.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the first set of proceedings lasted for more than seven years and seven months at one level of jurisdiction (from 10\u00a0February 1999 until 3 October 2006 \u2013 see paragraphs 11\u201316 above). They were terminated by a court decision finding that harm had been inflicted on the applicant solely as a result of negligence by the asylum employees. Although the applicant withdrew her appeal against that decision (see paragraph 25 above), it was not appealed against by the asylum either.63.\u00a0\u00a0The next set of proceedings for compensation for pecuniary damage instituted by the applicant on 18\u00a0February 2008 (see paragraph 21 above), after the court decision of 3 October\u00a02006 (see paragraph 15 above), lasted for six years (until 17\u00a0February 2014) at three levels of jurisdiction and ended with a slightly different conclusion, namely that the extent of the asylum employees\u2019 responsibility for the incident reached 80 % while the remainder of the fault (20%) was put on B. (see paragraphs 24-25 above).64.\u00a0\u00a0As a result, although the applicant was awarded compensation, it took her fifteen years (from 10 February 1999 until 17 February 2014) to obtain court decisions on her civil claims. However, firstly, the length could be partially attributed to the applicant since she had lodged her claims for pecuniary damages in two subsequent sets of proceedings. Moreover, the lengthy consideration of the applicant\u2019s claims does not, in itself, automatically entail a breach of the State\u2019s positive obligation under Article\u00a03 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis and in respect of procedural obligations under Article 2, Mustafa Tun\u00e7 and Fecire Tun\u00e7 v.\u00a0Turkey [GC], no. 24014\/05, \u00a7 225, 14 April 2015, and Sarbyanova Pashaliyska and Pashaliyska v. Bulgaria, no. 3524\/14, \u00a7 37, 12 January 2017).65.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, bearing in mind the minimum standards of effectiveness laid down by its case-law in respect of investigation in criminal cases (see\u00a0Muta, cited above, \u00a7 61), reiterates that the essence of such an obligation is for the State to ensure existence of legal means capable of establishing the facts of the incident, holding those at fault accountable and providing appropriate redress to the victim (see the case-law quoted in paragraph 47 above). In the present case, having examined the evidence before them, the civil courts established the facts surrounding the infliction of the grievous bodily harm upon the applicant and awarded her compensation, the amount of which (approximately a total of EUR 8,640 at the material time, plus a monthly contribution of approximately EUR 71 \u2013 see paragraphs 15 and 24 above) she does not question.66.\u00a0\u00a0That, in the Court\u2019s view, is sufficient to enable it to conclude that the civil proceedings brought about the result desired by Article 3 of the Convention \u2013 establishing and holding accountable those responsible in an effective manner.67.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been no violation of this provision.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION68.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also complained that the proceedings for damages had been unreasonably long, in breach of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, the relevant part of which reads as follows:\u201cIn the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. ...\u201d69.\u00a0\u00a0On 8 April 2013 the Government submitted a unilateral declaration stating that they were prepared to acknowledge a violation of the applicant\u2019s rights under Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention as a result of the unreasonable length of the civil proceedings in which she had been involved. They also offered to pay her EUR 1,080 as just satisfaction. That amount would be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable on the date of payment, and would be payable within three months from the date of notification of the Court\u2019s decision. In the event of failure to pay this amount within the above-mentioned three-month period, the Government undertook to pay simple interest on it, from the expiry of that period until settlement, at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points.The payment will constitute the final resolution of the case.70.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not accept the terms of the declaration.71.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that Article\u00a037 \u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(c) enables it to strike a case out of its list if:\u201c... for any other reason established by the Court, it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application\u201d.72.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, it may strike out applications under Article\u00a037 \u00a7\u00a01 (c) on the basis of a unilateral declaration by a respondent Government even if the applicant wishes the examination of the cases to be continued (see the principles emerging from the Court\u2019s case-law, and in particular the Tahsin Acar v. Turkey judgment (preliminary objections) [GC], no.\u00a026307\/95, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a075\u201177, ECHR 2003-VI).73.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has established clear and extensive case-law concerning complaints relating to the excessive length of civil proceedings (see, for example, Krasnoshapka v. Ukraine, no. 23786\/02, 30 November 2006).74.\u00a0\u00a0Noting the admissions contained in the Government\u2019s declaration as well as the amount of compensation proposed \u2013 which is consistent with the amounts awarded in similar cases (see, for example, Dulskiy v. Ukraine, no.\u00a061679\/00, 1 June 2006, and Yuryeva and Yuryev v. Ukraine, no.\u00a03431\/03, 31 July 2012) \u2013 the Court considers that it is no longer justified to continue the examination of this part of the application (Article\u00a037 \u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(c)).75.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the above considerations, the Court is satisfied that respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto does not require it to continue the examination of this part of the application (Article\u00a037\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 in fine).76.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court emphasises that, should the Government fail to comply with the terms of their unilateral declaration, the application may be restored to the list in accordance with Article\u00a037 \u00a7\u00a02 of the Convention (see\u00a0Josipovi\u0107 v.\u00a0Serbia (dec.), no.\u00a018369\/07, 4\u00a0March 2008).77.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, it is appropriate to strike this part of the application out of the Court\u2019s list of cases under Article 37 \u00a7 1 (c) of the Convention.","31387":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION64.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the police officers had ill-treated her on 14 November 2004 to extract her confession and that the authorities had failed to conduct an effective investigation into the alleged ill-treatment. She relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant65.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that all self-incriminating statements made by her in police custody had resulted from her ill-treatment in the absence of a lawyer. She furthermore stated that, after the ill-treatment, a number of bodily injuries on her had been recorded, the origin of which had never been explained by the authorities. Moreover, her persistent reference to the relevant evidence had been deliberately ignored by both the prosecutor and the courts. She alleged in this respect that the investigation into the allegations of her ill-treatment had been inadequate.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Government66.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained that the applicant\u2019s allegation that the police officers had ill-treated her with a view to obtaining her confession was unsubstantiated. Firstly, according to the expert report of 22 November 2004 (see paragraph 52 above), no injuries on the applicant\u2019s body had been found and no complaints had been made by her to the expert or with respect to the expert\u2019s conclusion. Secondly, the attesting witnesses who had been present during the reconstructions of the crimes on 17 and 23 November 2004 had not mentioned any injuries on the applicant. Thirdly, no injuries had been found on the applicant\u2019s body during her examination by N., the surgeon, on 25\u00a0November 2004 (see paragraph 55 above). Furthermore, when withdrawing her confessions on 24\u00a0November 2004, the applicant had not complained of any ill-treatment by the police (see paragraph 28 above).67.\u00a0\u00a0The Government furthermore submitted that the domestic authorities had investigated the applicant\u2019s allegations during an inquiry and in the criminal proceedings against her and had dismissed them as unfounded. They submitted in this respect that in the course of the prosecutor\u2019s inquiry a forensic medical examination of the applicant had been conducted and the police officers questioned. The courts had also interviewed the police officers, as well as the forensic expert and N., who had examined the applicant on 22 November 2004 and 25 November 2004, respectively. They noted that neither the applicant nor her lawyer had ever appealed against the prosecutor\u2019s refusal to initiate a criminal investigation into their allegations.68.\u00a0\u00a0The Government therefore invited the Court to reject as unfounded the applicant\u2019s complaint about her ill-treatment in police custody. They furthermore claimed that there had been no violation of the procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility69.\u00a0\u00a0The Court first observes that although the decision not to institute criminal proceedings has apparently been taken by the Orzhytsya prosecutor\u2019s office on 20 January 2005 (see paragraph 62 above), the applicant has taken other, sufficient steps at the domestic level to bring her complaints of ill-treatment at the hands of the police to the attention of the national authorities. The Court also notes that the fact that the complaints were rejected by the prosecutor on 20 January 2005 did not prevent the domestic courts from examining them on the merits in the course of the applicant\u2019s trial (see paragraphs 40-49 and 63 above). In these circumstances, the applicant cannot be reproached for having waited for the completion of the trial to raise the complaints before the Court and accordingly complied with the six-month rule provided for in Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Kaverzin v. Ukraine, no.\u00a023893\/03, \u00a7 99, 15 May 2012).70.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that the complaints under the substantive and procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention are not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It furthermore notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a) Alleged ill-treatment of the applicant71.\u00a0\u00a0As the Court has stated on many occasions, Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the core values of democratic societies. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances or the victim\u2019s behaviour (see,\u00a0among many other references, Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803\/94, \u00a7 95, ECHR 1999\u2011V).72.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role and recognises that it must be cautious in taking on the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact, where this is not rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case. Nevertheless, where allegations are made under Article\u00a03 of the Convention, the Court must conduct a particularly thorough scrutiny and will do so on the basis of all the evidential material submitted by the parties (see inter alia, Kulyk v. Ukraine, no. 30760\/06, \u00a7 75, 30\u00a0January 2017, with further references, and Matyar v.\u00a0Turkey, no.\u00a023423\/94, \u00a7 109, 21 February 2002).73.\u00a0\u00a0In assessing evidence, the Court has adopted the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d. According to its established case-law, proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Furthermore, it is to be recalled that Convention proceedings do not in all cases lend themselves to a strict application of the principle affirmanti incumbit probatio. Where the events in issue lie within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons under their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during that detention. In such a case, the burden of proof may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation (see El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\u00a0[GC], no. 39630\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 151 and 152, ECHR 2012, with further case-law references), and any recourse to physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by the person\u2019s own conduct is, in principle, an infringement of the right set forth in Article 3 (see Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380\/09, \u00a7 88, 28 September 2015).74.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court notes that it was not contested by the Government that some injuries were observed on the applicant on 17\u00a0November 2004 during her admission to the Lubny ITT and that, according to the register, these injuries had been sustained three days earlier (see\u00a0paragraph 21 above) \u2013 that is to say on the day of the applicant\u2019s arrest (on 14 November 2004 at 8.30 a.m. she had been taken by the police to the police station, see paragraph 9 above). However, the origin of those injuries has never been established by the authorities, despite the applicant\u2019s and her lawyer\u2019s repeated complaints of ill-treatment after her arrest and in police custody.75.\u00a0\u00a0Likewise, in the proceedings before this Court, the Government also remained silent on the matter and did not advance any alternative explanation regarding the origin of the injuries referred to by the applicant. Rather, they limited themselves to stating that no injuries had been recorded on the applicant during her medical examinations on 22 and 25 November 2004 (see paragraph 66 above).76.\u00a0\u00a0The Court furthermore observes that there is nothing in the case file to indicate that the applicant had any injuries prior to her contact with the police. The Court also notes that no medical examination of the applicant was performed in the first three days after her arrest.77.\u00a0\u00a0In such circumstances, and given the onus on the State to provide a plausible explanation for injuries sustained by a person under the control of the police, the Court concludes that the Government have not satisfactorily established that the applicant\u2019s injuries were caused otherwise than by ill\u2011treatment while in police custody on 14 November 2004, as alleged by her (see, mutatis mutandis, Adnaralov v. Ukraine, no. 10493\/12, \u00a7 45, 27\u00a0November 2014).78.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 under its substantive limb.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Effectiveness of the investigation79.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates its settled case-law to the effect that where an individual raises an arguable claim that he has been seriously ill-treated in breach of Article 3, that provision, read in conjunction with the State\u2019s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to \u201csecure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in ... [the] Convention\u201d, requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation. An obligation to investigate \u201cis not an obligation of result but of means\u201d: not every investigation should necessarily be successful or come to a conclusion which coincides with the claimant\u2019s account of events; however, it should in principle be capable of leading to the establishment of the facts of the case and, if the allegations prove to be true, to the identification and punishment of those responsible (Mikheyev v.\u00a0Russia, no. 77617\/01, \u00a7 107, 26 January 2006).80.\u00a0\u00a0The investigation of arguable allegations of ill-treatment must be thorough. That means that the authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill\u2011founded conclusions to close their investigation or as the basis of their decisions. They must take all reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including a detailed statement concerning the allegations from the alleged victim, eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence and, where appropriate, additional medical certificates apt to provide a full and accurate record of the injuries and an objective analysis of the medical findings, in particular as regards the cause of the injuries. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard. The investigation into the alleged ill-treatment must be prompt. Lastly, there must be a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results; in particular, in all cases, the complainant must be afforded effective access to the investigatory procedure (see, among many other authorities, Mikheyev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 108-109, and Petropoulou\u2011Tsakiris v. Greece, no. 44803\/04, \u00a7 50, 6 December 2007).81.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case the Court finds that the applicant\u2019s complaint of ill-treatment was arguable for the purpose of Article 3. The authorities therefore had an obligation to investigate it, in accordance with the aforementioned effectiveness standards.82.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s lawyer complained to the prosecutor\u2019s office of the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment on a number of occasions from 16 November 2004 onwards (see paragraphs 50, 58 and 60 above).83.\u00a0\u00a0It appears from the case file that the prosecutor\u2019s investigation was conducted within the framework of pre-investigation enquiries, which eventually ended in the decision of 20 January 2005 not to institute criminal proceedings (see paragraph 62 above). Neither this decision nor the material gathered within the framework of the enquiry (with the exception of a copy of the forensic expert\u2019s report of 22 November 2004 \u2013 see paragraph 52 above) has been submitted to the Court. Thus it is not clear when the enquiry commenced and what investigative steps were taken by the prosecutor, apart from the forensic medical examinations ordered six and nine days after the first complaint of the lawyer had been lodged (see paragraphs 52 and 55 above). The reason for the Government\u2019s failure to provide the relevant documents is unclear. In any event, this failure has deprived the Court of a full opportunity to review steps taken by the authorities to investigate the applicants\u2019 allegations (see, mutatis mutandis,\u00a0Davydov and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 17674\/02 and 39081\/02, \u00a7\u00a0281, 1\u00a0July 2010).84.\u00a0\u00a0However, it appears from the decision of the Poltava prosecutor\u2019s office of 10 January 2005 that there were a number of omissions in the prosecutor\u2019s enquiry, which undermined the reliability of the prosecutor\u2019s findings (see paragraph 61 above). The Government provided no evidence that the shortcomings identified in the above-mentioned decision of 10\u00a0January 2005 were remedied or that, in particular, any assessment was ever made by the prosecutor of the results of the applicant\u2019s medical examination upon her admission to the Lubny ITT on 17 November 2004 (see\u00a0paragraph 21 above).85.\u00a0\u00a0The Court furthermore notes that the applicant\u2019s allegation of ill\u2011treatment was also rejected by the courts when they examined the applicant\u2019s criminal case on the merits. It observes in this respect that also the domestic courts were silent on the applicant\u2019s persistent reference to the injuries recorded at the Lubny SIZO. Instead, they relied on testimony given by police officers, including the alleged offenders, and the outcome of the applicant\u2019s medical examinations conducted some eight and ten days after the alleged ill\u2011treatment. Such a selective approach to the examination of evidence was criticised by the Court of Appeal in its decision quashing the applicant\u2019s initial conviction and remitting the case to the first instance court for fresh examination (see paragraph 42 above). However, notwithstanding the instruction given by the Court of Appeal in this respect, the reasoning given by the trial court in its new judgment against the applicant remained nearly the same (see paragraphs 45 and 47 above).86.\u00a0\u00a0It furthermore appears that no assessment was made by the trial court of other relevant arguments submitted by the applicant \u2013 including regarding the objectiveness of two attesting witnesses whose testimony had also been referred to by the courts when dismissing the applicant\u2019s complaint (see paragraph 46 above).87.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances, the Court cannot but conclude that the authorities\u2019 investigation of the allegations of ill-treatment was not thorough and thus fell short of the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention.88.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of the said provision under its procedural limb.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 AND 3 (c) OF THE CONVENTION89.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention that self-incriminating statements obtained from her under duress and without the presence of a lawyer had been used for her conviction. The provisions she relied on read as follows in the relevant parts:\u201c1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:...(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Submissions by the parties90.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained that the proceedings had been unfair. She submitted that her initial confessions of 14 November 2004 had been the result of her ill-treatment by the police at a time when she had had no access to a lawyer. She also submitted that she had maintained her confessions during the subsequent investigative measures, including the reconstructions of the crime on 17 and 23 November 2004, while still psychologically remaining under the effects of her ill-treatment and fearing that it would be repeated. She furthermore submitted that her lawyer had been deliberately denied access to her until all evidence for the prosecution had been obtained.91.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant observed that the domestic courts had relied on those self-incriminating statements to secure her conviction without due verification of her allegations of ill-treatment and the violation of her defence rights.92.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that on 14, 17 and 23 November 2004 the applicant had confessed of her own free will to a number of thefts and that it had been her own choice to give evidence in the absence of a lawyer; the authorities could not be found liable for this.93.\u00a0\u00a0They furthermore submitted that on 17 November 2004 the lawyer engaged by the applicant\u2019s mother had been admitted to the proceedings and had been granted permission to have a meeting with the applicant. The Government claimed in this respect that the authorities could not be held responsible for the lawyer\u2019s failure to meet the applicant.94.\u00a0\u00a0The Government also drew the Court\u2019s attention to the fact that when retracting her confessions on 24 November 2004, the applicant had not complained of any ill-treatment by the police.95.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, they submitted that the applicant\u2019s allegations that she had given her evidence under duress at the hands of the police and in violation of her defence rights had been duly examined by the domestic courts and dismissed as unsubstantiated.96.\u00a0\u00a0The Government concluded that the applicant\u2019s complaint about the initial lack of legal assistance was to be rejected as manifestly ill-founded and that there had been no violation of the Convention in respect of her complaint about her self-incrimination under duress.B.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility97.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It furthermore notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0General principles98.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has consistently viewed early access to a lawyer as a procedural guarantee of the privilege against self-incrimination and a fundamental safeguard against ill-treatment, noting the particular vulnerability of an accused in the early stages of proceedings, when he is confronted with both the stress of the situation and the increasingly complex criminal legislation involved. Any exception to the enjoyment of this right should be clearly circumscribed and its application strictly limited in time. These principles are particularly called for in the case of serious charges, for it is in the face of the heaviest penalties that respect for the right to a fair trial is to be ensured to the highest possible degree by democratic societies (see\u00a0Salduz v. Turkey [GC], no. 36391\/02, \u00a7 54, ECHR 2008).99.\u00a0\u00a0As a rule, access to a lawyer should be provided from the very first interrogation of a suspect by the police, unless it is demonstrated in the light of the particular circumstances of a case that there are compelling reasons to restrict this right. The right to defence will in principle be irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating statements are made during police interrogation (see\u00a0Salduz, cited above, \u00a7 55).100.\u00a0\u00a0As clarified by the Court in the judgment of Ibrahim and Others v.\u00a0the United Kingdom ([GC], nos. 50541\/08, 50571\/08, 50573\/08 and 40351\/09, \u00a7 257, ECHR 2016), in applying the Salduz test the Court must first assess whether there were compelling reasons for the restriction of access to a lawyer. In the second stage, it must evaluate the prejudice caused to the rights of the defence by the restriction in the case in question.\u00a0Where compelling reasons are established, a holistic assessment of the entirety of the proceedings must be conducted to determine whether they were \u201cfair\u201d for the purposes of Article 6 \u00a7 1 (ibid., \u00a7\u00a0264).\u00a0Where there are no compelling reasons for restricting access to legal advice, the Court must apply a very strict scrutiny to its fairness assessment, with the onus shifting to the Government to demonstrate convincingly why, exceptionally and in the specific circumstances of the case, the overall fairness of the trial was not irretrievably prejudiced by the restriction on access to legal advice (ibid., \u00a7\u00a0265).101.\u00a0\u00a0When examining the proceedings as a whole in order to assess the impact of procedural failings at the pre-trial stage on the overall fairness of the criminal proceedings, the following non-exhaustive list of factors, drawn from the Court\u2019s case\u2011law, should, where appropriate, be taken into account:(a)\u00a0\u00a0Whether the applicant was particularly vulnerable, for example, by reason of his age or mental capacity.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The legal framework governing the pre-trial proceedings and the admissibility of evidence at trial, and whether it was complied with; where an exclusionary rule applied, it is particularly unlikely that the proceedings as a whole would be considered unfair.(c)\u00a0\u00a0Whether the applicant had the opportunity to challenge the authenticity of the evidence and oppose its use.(d)\u00a0\u00a0The quality of the evidence and whether the circumstances in which it was obtained cast doubt on its reliability or accuracy, taking into account the degree and nature of any compulsion.(e)\u00a0\u00a0Where evidence was obtained unlawfully, the unlawfulness in question and, where it stems from a violation of another Convention Article, the nature of the violation found.(f)\u00a0\u00a0In the case of a statement, the nature of the statement and whether it was promptly retracted or modified.(g)\u00a0\u00a0The use to which the evidence was put, and in particular whether the evidence formed an integral or significant part of the probative evidence upon which the conviction was based, and the strength of the other evidence in the case.(h)\u00a0\u00a0Whether the assessment of guilt was performed by professional judges or lay jurors, and in the case of the latter the content of any jury directions.(i)\u00a0\u00a0The weight of the public interest in the investigation and punishment of the particular offence in issue.(j)\u00a0\u00a0Other relevant procedural safeguards afforded by domestic law and practice (see Ibrahim and Others, cited above, \u00a7 274).102.\u00a0\u00a0 Neither the letter nor the spirit of Article 6 of the Convention prevents a person from waiving of his own free will, either expressly or tacitly, the entitlement to the guarantees of a fair trial. That also applies to the right to legal assistance. However, if it is to be effective for Convention purposes, such a waiver must be established in an unequivocal manner and be attended by minimum safeguards commensurate to its importance. Such a waiver need not be explicit, but it must be voluntary and constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of a right. Before an accused can be said to have implicitly, through his conduct, waived an important right under Article 6, it must be shown that he could reasonably have foreseen what the consequences of his conduct would be. Moreover, the waiver must not run counter to any important public interest (see Simeonovi v.\u00a0Bulgaria\u00a0[GC], no. 21980\/04, \u00a7 115, CEDH 2017 (extracts), with further reference).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Application of the above principles to the present case103.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that, as can be seen from the available evidence, on 14 November 2004 the police had information about the applicant\u2019s involvement in a theft. It was with a view to verifying that information that they apprehended the applicant on that date and took her to the police station (see paragraphs 6\u20139 above). Thus, by virtue of the Court\u2019s case-law principles, the applicant was entitled to be assisted by a lawyer from the time that she was first questioned by the police. However, there is no indication that until her questioning by the investigator on the evening of that date she was in any form or manner informed of her right to legal assistance. In the meantime, she drafted \u201cstatements of surrender and confession\u201d to the police (in which she confessed to several counts of theft), and certain \u201cexplanations\u201d were taken from her with respect to those statements (see paragraph 12 above).104.\u00a0\u00a0The Court takes note of the Government\u2019s argument that the applicant, having waived her right to a lawyer, maintained her confessions during her first official questioning as a criminal suspect on 14 November 2004 (see paragraph 14 above) and during the reconstructions of the crime on 17 and 23 November 2004 (see paragraphs 18 and 26 above). It is noteworthy, however, that her original confessions formed part of the case file. It thus affected the investigation strategy and set the framework within which the applicant\u2019s further defence had to be mounted.105.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, on the basis of the case file, the Court is not ready to find beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant\u2019s waivers of her right to legal assistance were free and genuine.106.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, given that the applicant was formally questioned by the investigator for the first time shortly after her alleged ill-treatment by the police, the Court does not consider it unlikely that, as suggested by the applicant, she was still suffering the effects of that ill-treatment. This could explain the fact that she waived her right to a lawyer and maintained her confessions on that day.107.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the applicant waiving her right to a lawyer before the reconstruction of 17 November 2004, the Court observes that while the verbatim record of the reconstruction states that the applicant waived her right to legal assistance in the presence of a lawyer (see paragraph 17 above), there is no evidence to indicate that this was indeed the case and that any lawyer was actually present when the applicant waived that right.108.\u00a0\u00a0Another relevant and important factor in these circumstances is the delay as regards the applicant\u2019s access to V., the lawyer hired by the applicant\u2019s mother to represent her. While the Government may be understood as blaming V. for not meeting the applicant (see paragraph 93 above), the evidence in the case file clearly suggests that since 16\u00a0November 2004 he had been trying to obtain access to the applicant on a daily basis. He was, however, prevented by the authorities from having a meeting with her until the main investigative steps (with her participation) had been taken and her self-incriminating statements had been made (see paragraphs 15, 20 and 22\u201124 above). From the day of his appointment, V. raised a number of complaints with the prosecutor\u2019s office regarding the breach of the applicant\u2019s defence rights in this respect. The response of the prosecutor\u2019s office to his complaints, although positive, was given no earlier than on 9 December 2004 (see paragraph 30 above), more than twenty days after the applicant\u2019s first interrogation as a suspect. Moreover, even after this decision, on 17 and 23 December 2004, V. was denied meetings with the applicant (see paragraphs 31 and 33 above).109.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the applicant\u2019s right to mount a defence was restricted in the present case. The Court does not discern from the material in the case file that there were any compelling reasons for such a restriction.110.\u00a0\u00a0It remains for the Court to examine whether the fairness of the proceedings as a whole was prejudiced by the defence lawyer\u2019s absence at the initial stage of the investigation.111.\u00a0\u00a0In making this assessment the Court is guided by the Ibrahim criteria (see paragraph 101 above), to the extent that it is appropriate given the circumstances of the present case. Due to the lack of compelling reasons for restricting the applicant\u2019s right to a lawyer, the Court will apply a very strict scrutiny, keeping in mind that is incumbent on the Government to demonstrate convincingly why, exceptionally and in the specific circumstances of the case, the overall fairness of the trial was not irretrievably prejudiced by the restriction on access to legal advice (see paragraph 100 above).112.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to those criteria, the Court will firstly list those factors which tend to argue in favour of considering the proceedings fair: (i) the applicant was not particularly vulnerable; (ii) the applicant had the opportunity to challenge the authenticity of the evidence and oppose its use; and (iii) the evidence in the case was assessed by professional judges (see paragraph 101 letters (a), (c) and (h) above).113.\u00a0\u00a0However, other factors tend to militate in favour of the finding that the fairness of the proceedings was irretrievably prejudiced.114.\u00a0\u00a0In this respect, the Court observes that when finding the applicant guilty and convicting her, the trial courts primarily relied on her \u201cstatements of surrender to the police\u201d, on the self-incriminating statements she had made during her questioning as a suspect on 14 November 2004 and during the reconstructions of the crime, and on the material evidence adduced following the reconstruction of 17\u00a0November 2004 (see paragraphs 44 and 47 above). It is true that the courts viewed her statements in the light of other evidence before them. However, none of that evidence, including the confessions made by the applicant\u2019s co-accused during the investigation stage, constituted direct evidence.115.\u00a0\u00a0The Court recalls its finding of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the applicant\u2019s complaint of ill-treatment (see\u00a0paragraphs 77 and 78 above). It therefore considers that the initial confessions that the applicant made to the police on 14 November 2004 in the absence of a lawyer cannot be regarded as having been given in a cognisant and voluntary manner.116.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, during the reconstruction of 17 November 2004, in the lawyers\u2019 absence, the applicant not only confirmed that she had participated in the cattle theft but also showed the crime scene to the police \u2013 specifically, the place where the stolen animals had been slaughtered by her. The immediate inspection of the place revealed two detached cattle heads and two respective identification tags which were used as evidence in the case (see paragraphs 17 and 18 above). The Court accepts that after the applicant became legally represented by a lawyer, it was open for her in principle to say \u2013 and she did so \u2013 that she had not committed the crime; however, it is difficult to see how it would be possible to effectively retract the statement concerning the place of the crime after remains of animals had actually been found and inspected by the police. The Court is thus of the opinion that the statements which the applicant made without a lawyer during the reconstruction on 17 November 2004 predetermined all the statements which she could make later in respect of that episode of theft.117.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the above, the Court is of the opinion that the evidence collected while the applicant was unassisted by a lawyer was not only obtained during the period in which the suspect had suffered a breach of the absolute right guaranteed by Article\u00a03 of the Convention, but also formed an essential part of the probative evidence on which the conviction was based. Moreover, taking into account the degree and nature of the compulsion suffered by the applicant at the hands of the police, the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained cast doubt on its reliability and accuracy (see paragraph 101 letters (d), (e) and (g) above).118.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that shortly after the applicant was granted access to lawyer V., she retracted her self-incriminatory statements and opposed their use as evidence during the trial, claiming that they had been obtained under duress and in breach of her defence rights (see paragraphs 34 and 101 letter (f) above). The domestic courts, however, rejected the applicant\u2019s arguments without establishing in a convincing manner that the applicant\u2019s allegations had been ill-founded.119.\u00a0\u00a0Likewise, the Supreme Court dealt with the applicant\u2019s complaints in only a formalistic manner (see paragraph 49 above).120.\u00a0\u00a0In the Court\u2019s opinion, the above elements overweight those, mentioned in paragraph 112 above, which could militate in favour of considering the proceedings fair.121.\u00a0\u00a0The Court thus concludes that the Government have failed to demonstrate convincingly why \u2013 exceptionally and in the specific circumstances of the case \u2013 the overall fairness of the applicant\u2019s trial was not irretrievably prejudiced by the restriction, without compelling reasons, on the applicant\u2019s access to legal advice during the initial stage of the criminal proceedings against her.122.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that there has been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION123.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage124.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 500,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.125.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested this claim as unsubstantiated and exorbitant.126.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that it has found violations of Articles 3, and\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a7 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention in the present case. As regards the violation of this last provision, the Court cannot speculate as to the outcome of the proceedings against the applicant. The finding of a violation of Article 6 \u00a7\u00a7\u00a01 and 3 (c) in the present case does not imply that the applicant was wrongly convicted. The Court notes that Article 445 of the CCP and Section 10 of the Law on the Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights allow for the possibility of a reopening of proceedings and considers that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction (see Zakhshevskiy v. Ukraine, no. 7193\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 50-51 and 133, 17 March 2016). As regards the violation of Articles 3 of the Convention, ruling on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 4,500 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses127.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant made no claim for costs and expenses. Accordingly, the Court makes no award.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest128.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","31512":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION35.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant, relying on Article 3 of the Convention, complained that he had been severely beaten by warders on 2 October 2007 and that the ensuing investigation had been ineffective. Article 3 of the Convention reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d36.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the complaint was premature because the preliminary investigation had been reopened on 14 November 2013, the proceedings were still pending. In their additional observations they stated that the criminal investigation had been closed on 28 February 2014. It had established that on 2 October 2007 the warders had lawfully used force against the applicant. The investigation had been thorough and had involved cross-examinations, expert reports and witnesses\u2019 testimonies. The Government also argued that the warders could not have been brought to trial on the sole basis of the jury verdict of 2 September 2008.37.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant disagreed. He submitted that despite the fact that the judgment of 2 September 2008 contained a description of the beatings and the names of the possible perpetrators, the criminal investigation had failed to establish their identity and had eventually been closed.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility38.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged ill-treatment and establishment of the facts39.\u00a0\u00a0As the Court has reiterated on many occasions, Article 3 of the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the victim\u2019s behaviour (see Balogh v. Hungary, no. 47940\/99, \u00a7 44, 20 July 2004, and Labita v. Italy [GC], no.\u00a026772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000-IV).40.\u00a0\u00a0In the context of detainees, the Court has emphasised that persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and that the authorities are under a duty to protect their physical well-being (see Tarariyeva v. Russia, no.\u00a04353\/03, \u00a7 73, ECHR 2006\u2011XV (extracts); Sarban v. Moldova, no. 3456\/05, \u00a7 77, 4\u00a0October 2005; and Mouisel v. France, no. 67263\/01, \u00a7 40, ECHR 2002\u2011IX). In respect of a person deprived of his liberty, any recourse to physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by his own conduct diminishes human dignity and is in principle an infringement of the right set forth in Article 3 of the Convention (see Sheydayev v. Russia, no.\u00a065859\/01, \u00a7 59, 7 December 2006).41.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court first notes that the parties did not dispute the fact that on 2 October 2007 warders of the prison hospital had used physical force against the applicant and had hit him with rubber truncheons. The Government alleged that the force had been used lawfully in response to the applicant\u2019s unruly conduct and had not exceeded what was reasonable and necessary in the circumstances of the case.42.\u00a0\u00a0As shown by the medical reports referred to in the criminal case against the warders (see paragraph 8 above), the applicant\u2019s hematomas had been caused by the use of force by warders on 2 October 2007. In particular, a prison doctor who examined the applicant immediately after the incident in question recorded hematomas on his buttocks. Moreover, the judgment of 2 September 2008 issued in criminal proceedings initiated against the applicant on account of his disobedience to warders, contains a description of the applicant\u2019s beatings. In particular, it says that, as established by jurors in their verdict, after the applicant had hit one of the warders, he had been hit back \u201cat least ten times\u201d by means of punches, kicks and blows with truncheons. It has therefore been established \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d that the applicant was hit several times with rubber truncheons by the warders.43.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that it is clear that the acts of violence against the applicant were committed by warders in the performance of their duties. The Court notes the Government\u2019s argument that the force was used lawfully in response to the applicant\u2019s unruly conduct and that the applicant did not deny that he had demonstrated a defiant attitude towards the warders.44.\u00a0\u00a0The Court accepts that the use of force may be necessary on occasion in order to ensure prison security, to maintain order or prevent crime in penal facilities. Nevertheless, such force may be used only if indispensable and must not be excessive (see Ivan Vasilev v. Bulgaria, no.\u00a048130\/99, \u00a7 63, 12 April 2007, with further references).45.\u00a0\u00a0In the instant case, the Court accepts \u2013 and this conclusion is supported by the findings of the domestic authorities \u2013 that the warders used truncheons to put an end to the applicant\u2019s refusal to comply with their orders in accordance with the law. However, the manner in which the domestic law regulates the use of force against detainees does not absolve Russia from its responsibilities under the Convention. The Court must scrutinise the alleged breach of Article 3 with heightened vigilance, irrespective of the applicant\u2019s conduct (see Vladimir Romanov v. Russia, no.\u00a041461\/02, \u00a7 64, 24 July 2008 with further references).46.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it was established in the domestic proceedings that the applicant had disobeyed warders\u2019 orders and had hit one of them. In those circumstances, the warders may have needed to resort to physical force in order to protect themselves. However, the Court is not convinced that hitting a detainee with a truncheon was conducive to the desired result.47.\u00a0\u00a0The Court does not discern any necessity which might have prompted the use of rubber truncheons against the applicant. On the contrary, the warders\u2019 actions were disproportionate to the applicant\u2019s imputed transgressions, and were manifestly inconsistent with the goals they sought to achieve. The Government did not provide any plausible explanation as to why several warders confronting only one prisoner could not have settled the conflict without recourse to truncheons. In the Court\u2019s eyes, the use of truncheons in those circumstances amounted to a form of reprisal or corporal punishment.48.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further considers that the number and location of the injuries the applicant sustained indicate that the beatings to which the warders had subjected him were sufficiently serious to be considered of a nature amounting to inhuman treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention.49.\u00a0\u00a0Regard being had to the above, the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive limb.2.\u00a0\u00a0Effectiveness of the investigation50.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that where an individual raises an arguable claim that he or she has been seriously ill-treated by the police in breach of Article 3, that provision requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation. This investigation should be capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible (see Labita, cited above, \u00a7 131). The minimum standards as to effectiveness defined by the Court\u2019s case-law also include the requirements that the investigation must be independent, impartial and subject to public scrutiny, and that the competent authorities must act with exemplary diligence and promptness (see Isayeva and Others v. Russia, nos.\u00a057947\/00, 57948\/00 and 57949\/00, \u00a7\u00a7 208-13, 24 February 2005, and Chitayev v. Russia, no.\u00a059334\/00, \u00a7\u00a7 163-66, 18 January 2007).51.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the events of which the applicant complained had unfolded under the control of the authorities and with their full knowledge. On the day the applicant had been beaten up by the warders for refusing a body search, he was taken to a prison medical officer, who recorded some hematomas. The applicant brought the incident to the prison administration\u2019s attention. Against that background, the Court concludes that the above considerations raised a reasonable suspicion that his injuries could have been caused by representatives of the State and that the matter was duly brought before the competent authorities. The latter were therefore under an obligation to conduct an effective investigation satisfying the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention.52.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that on 28 January 2009, criminal proceedings were initiated against the warders on suspicion of abuse of power. Thereafter, the proceedings were suspended several times, and the investigators\u2019 decisions were reversed by their superiors or the courts on the grounds of various deficiencies. In these circumstances, the Court cannot conclude that the investigation was prompt and thorough.53.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that the authorities have failed to carry out an effective investigation into the applicant\u2019s allegations of ill-treatment, as required by Article 3 of the Convention. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural limb.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION54.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that his right to a fair hearing under Article\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 of the Convention had been breached on account of the domestic courts\u2019 refusal to ensure his effective participation in compensation proceedings to which he was a party. The relevant part of Article\u00a06\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 reads as follows:\u201cIn the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair and public ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...\u201d55.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had been duly notified of the hearing dates and that the nature of the legal dispute did not call for his personal attendance. Moreover, the applicant had asked the first-instance court to consider the case in his and his lawyer\u2019s absence. The applicant and his lawyer had been duly informed of the appeal hearing and could therefore have attended the hearing. As there was no absolute right to be present at a civil court hearing, the applicant\u2019s right to effective participation in the proceedings to which he had been a party had not been breached.56.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained his complaint.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility57.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that neither the letter nor the spirit of Article 6 of the Convention prevents a person from waiving of his own free will, either expressly or tacitly, the entitlement to the guarantees of a fair trial. However, such a waiver must, if it is to be effective for Convention purposes, be established in an unequivocal manner and be attended by minimum safeguards commensurate with its importance (see Hermi v. Italy [GC], no. 18114\/02, \u00a7 73, ECHR 2006-XII).58.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that on 10 August 2011 the applicant and his lawyer asked the Tsentralnyy District Court of Chelyabinsk to consider the case in their absence. Therefore, the applicant waived in an unequivocal manner his right to be present at the first-instance court hearing on 11 August 2011 (see Gladkiy v. Russia, no. 3242\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 105-09, 21 December 2010, and Belan v.\u00a0Russia (dec.), no. 56786\/00, 2\u00a0September 2004).59.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4 of the Convention.60.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further considers that the applicant\u2019s complaint about his absence from the appeal hearing on 6 February 2012 is not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits61.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the general principles regarding the right to present one\u2019s case effectively before a court and to enjoy equality of arms with the opposing side, as guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention, have been stated in a number of its previous judgments (see, among many other authorities, Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, no. 68416\/01, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a059\u201160, ECHR 2005-II). The Court\u2019s analysis of alleged violations of the right to a fair trial in respect of cases where incarcerated applicants have complained about their absence from hearings in civil proceedings includes the following elements: examination of the manner in which the domestic courts assessed the question of whether the nature of the dispute required the applicants\u2019 personal presence, and determination of whether the domestic courts put in place any procedural arrangements aimed at guaranteeing their effective participation in the proceedings (see Yevdokimov and Others v. Russia, nos. 27236\/05 and 10 others, \u00a7 48, 16\u00a0February 2016).62.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the civil proceedings in question concerned the applicant\u2019s claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage, which involved his personal experience. Therefore, his presence at the hearing was necessary.63.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, however, observes that neither the applicant, nor his lawyer attended the appeal hearing on 6 February 2012. The Government did not provide any confirmation that the applicant and his lawyer had been properly notified of the appeal hearing. The appellate court did not verify whether the nature of the case was such as to require the applicant\u2019s personal testimony, did not provide an explanation as to why it considered that his absence would not be prejudicial to the fairness of the proceedings as a whole, and did not make any appropriate procedural arrangements enabling the applicant to be heard.64.\u00a0\u00a0In the leading case of Yevdokimov and Others, cited above, the Court found a violation in respect of issues similar to those in the present case.65.\u00a0\u00a0Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court has not found any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. The Court considers that, in the instant case, the authorities deprived the applicant of the opportunity to present his case effectively at the appellate court, and failed to meet their obligation to ensure respect for the principle of a fair trial.66.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of Article 6 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION67.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage68.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 50,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.69.\u00a0\u00a0The Government found that claim excessive.70.\u00a0\u00a0The Court awards the applicant EUR 15,000 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable to him.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses71.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not claim any costs or expenses. Accordingly, there is no call to make an award under this head.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest72.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","31515":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION24.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been wounded as a result of the negligence of convoy officers and that the authorities had not carried out an effective investigation into the incident. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected ... to inhuman or degrading treatment ...\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility25.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that as the applicant had not joined the criminal proceedings against the detainees who had attempted to escape as a civil party, or sought damages from them, he had not exhausted domestic remedies.26.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the applicant\u2019s complaint does not concern criminal or civil proceedings against the perpetrators of the escape attempt but the State\u2019s alleged responsibility for the incident and its duty to carry out an effective investigation (compare Sa\u0161o Gorgiev v.\u00a0the\u00a0former\u00a0Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 49382\/06, \u00a7 53, ECHR\u00a02012 (extracts)). By lodging a criminal complaint with a prosecutor and challenging the refusal of the investigators to institute criminal proceedings before a court, the applicant has given the Russian authorities an adequate opportunity to remedy the alleged violation at the domestic level (see Gerasimenko and Others v.\u00a0Russia, nos. 5821\/10 and 65523\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 82-84, 1 December 2016). The Court therefore dismisses the Government\u2019s objection.27.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits28.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the capacity of the prison van had only been insignificantly exceeded, by just two people. In their view, it was impossible to predict how the failed escape attempt might have affected the applicant had he been travelling in a cell together with other prisoners rather than with the police officers. His wound had not been a serious one and had been inflicted by accident, in the course of a legitimate attempt to prevent prisoners from escaping. The police had carried out a pre-investigation inquiry into the incident and had taken a lawful and well-founded decision not to open criminal proceedings. The senior officer had been disciplined for breaching the prisoner transfer regulations and the prisoners concerned had been convicted of attempting to escape and given custodial sentences.29.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that the reason he had found himself embroiled in a shoot-out between police and escaping detainees was the incompetent and criminal conduct of the convoy officers. The officers had not placed him in an isolated cell inside the prison van as they should have done in accordance with the regulations. He alleged that he had been wounded by a stray bullet which Officer V. had fired. The domestic authorities had not instituted criminal proceedings, granted him the status of an injured party or conducted a forensic assessment of the gravity of his injury. The applicant emphasised that the incident had left him disabled for life, in considerable pain, and unable to walk without a crutch or cane.30.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that Article 1 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 3, imposes on the States a positive obligation to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are protected against inhuman and degrading treatment, irrespective of whether that treatment is inflicted by State officials or by private actors. This obligation involves, in particular, the protection of the physical integrity and well-being of persons who are in custody under the exclusive control of the authorities, as well as taking all steps which could reasonably be expected to prevent a real and immediate risk of ill-treatment of which the authorities had or ought to have had knowledge (see Z and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.\u00a029392\/95, \u00a7\u00a073, ECHR 2001\u2011V; Pantea v. Romania, no.\u00a033343\/96, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0189-90, ECHR 2003-VI (extracts); J.L. v.\u00a0Latvia, no.\u00a023893\/06, \u00a7 64, 17\u00a0April 2012; and M.C. v. Poland, no. 23692\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 87-88, 3 March 2015).31.\u00a0\u00a0A further element relevant to the present case is the State\u2019s positive obligation to carry out an effective investigation into an arguable claim of ill-treatment, which applies equally in cases of ill-treatment by State agents or by private parties who are under State control. To be effective, the investigation must be prompt and thorough. The authorities should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation and they must take all reasonable steps to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, in particular, forensic evidence. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard (see Denis Vasilyev v.\u00a0Russia, no. 32704\/04, \u00a7 100, 17 December 2009; Kopylov v. Russia, no.\u00a03933\/04, \u00a7 133, 29 July 2010; and Mocanu and Others v.\u00a0Romania\u00a0[GC], nos. 10865\/09 and 2 others, \u00a7 322, ECHR\u00a02014 (extracts)).32.\u00a0\u00a0In the instant case the applicant received a gunshot wound to his lower leg. The Court finds this injury sufficiently serious to amount to inhuman treatment falling within the scope of Article 3 (compare Necdet\u00a0Bulut v. Turkey, no.\u00a077092\/01, \u00a7\u00a024, 20 November 2007).33.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant filed a complaint of a serious breach of the prisoner transfer regulations that had led to his being injured, shortly after the incident in December 2013 (see paragraph 14 above). The matter was thus duly brought before the competent authorities at a time when they could reasonably have been expected to investigate the incident in question. His complaint amounted to an arguable claim of the State\u2019s failure to protect him from ill-treatment, triggering the obligation to carry out an investigation satisfying the requirements of Article 3.34.\u00a0\u00a0A \u201cpre\u2011investigation inquiry\u201d into the complaint was followed, less than a month later, by a decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings (see paragraph 15 above). Over the next two years, further decisions concluding the pre-investigation inquiries were repeatedly set aside and additional checks were requested (see paragraphs 18 and 20 above). Nevertheless, the \u201cpre-investigation inquiry\u201d never progressed to the stage of a criminal investigation.35.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has found in many previous Russian cases that the authorities, when confronted with credible allegations of ill-treatment, have a duty to open a criminal case and conduct an investigation; a \u201cpre\u2011investigation inquiry\u201d alone not being capable of meeting the requirements for an effective investigation under Article 3. That preliminary stage has too restricted a scope and cannot lead to the identification and punishment of the perpetrators of the alleged ill-treatment, since the opening of a criminal case and a criminal investigation are no more than prerequisites for bringing charges against alleged perpetrators, which may then be examined by a court. The Court has held that a refusal to open a criminal investigation into credible allegations of serious ill\u2011treatment is indicative of the State\u2019s failure to comply with its procedural obligation under Article 3 (see Lyapin v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a046956\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 134-40, 24 July 2014; Olisov and Others v.\u00a0Russia, nos.\u00a010825\/09 and 2\u00a0others, \u00a7\u00a7 81-82, 2\u00a0May 2017; and Sergey Ivanov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 14416\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 81-83, 15\u00a0May 2018).36.\u00a0\u00a0As in those cases, the investigators\u2019 reluctance to open a criminal investigation in a prompt and diligent fashion led to the loss of precious time and undermined their ability to secure and to analyse the evidence concerning the ill-treatment. A forensic firearm examination was carried out many months after the events and was neither able to link the bullets or cartridges used to the handgun from which the shot had been fired, nor to link the handgun to the individual who had wielded it (see paragraph 18 above). An assessment of the extent of the applicant\u2019s injuries and the resulting disability was not ordered until two years after the incident, and proved to be impossible because his medical record had been misplaced in the meantime (see paragraph 20 above). Thus, in addition to the structural defects of the format of a \u201cpre-investigation inquiry\u201d, which the Court has highlighted in previous cases, the inquiry in the instant case fell short of the requirements of Article 3 because it was both belated and of insufficient scope. The investigators did not make a serious attempt to establish all the circumstances of the incident and to attribute responsibility for firing the shot that had wounded the applicant. The Court finds that the refusal to open a criminal case into the applicant\u2019s credible allegations of the failure to protect his physical integrity, of which the authorities were promptly made aware, amounted to a failure to carry out an effective investigation as required by Article 3 of the Convention.37.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will turn next to the issue whether or not the State may be held responsible for the applicant\u2019s injury. Different versions of how he actually sustained the injury were put forward during the proceedings. As noted above, the \u201cpre-investigation inquiry\u201d failed to elucidate the most important aspects of the incident. In particular, it was unable to establish from which handgun the shot concerned had been fired or the identity of the person who had pulled the trigger. However, while these aspects would have been of paramount importance in other cases, they are of lesser relevance in the circumstances of the present case. There is nothing to indicate that anyone took aim at the applicant or meant to harm him. The applicant was a casualty in the melee and haphazard shooting that followed an abortive escape from prison, in which he played no part. It is undisputed that he was hit in the leg by chance rather than intention.38.\u00a0\u00a0Even though the applicant\u2019s injury was accidental, his presence in the non-secure area of the prison van was not. It was the result of the convoy officers\u2019 decision to transport more detainees than the prison van should have accommodated. As a consequence, there was no separate cell available for the applicant and he had to ride with the guards. That arrangement was in breach of the general regulation which prohibited convoys from exceeding the design capacity of the prison van. It also violated the specific regulation relating to the placement of particularly vulnerable categories of prisoners, such as former law-enforcement officers, like the applicant, in separate cells (see paragraph 22 above). The applicant would not have been injured had he been placed in a secure area as required by the applicable regulations.39.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the State has an obligation to take all steps which could reasonably be expected to prevent a real and immediate risk to a detainee\u2019s physical integrity of which the authorities had, or ought to have had, knowledge. Owing to the absolute character of the right guaranteed, Article 3 may also apply where the danger emanates from persons or groups of persons who are not public officials. The assessment of whether the authorities have provided adequate protection must take into account that in the detention context both attacker and victim are under the control of the authorities, unlike cases in which they are both at liberty (see H.L.R. v.\u00a0France, 29 April 1997, \u00a7 40, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997\u2011III; Stasi v. France, no. 25001\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 78-79, 20\u00a0October 2011; M.C. v.\u00a0Poland, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 88-89; and Dimcho Dimov v. Bulgaria (no. 2), no. 77248\/12, \u00a7 60, 29 June 2017).40.\u00a0\u00a0The prisoner transfer regulations were designed with the objective of preventing security incidents such as the one at issue in the present case. They limit the number of prisoners that can be transported together to reduce the risk of a concerted attempt on their part to overpower convoy officers. They also seek to avoid cases of inter-prisoner violence by requiring separation of vulnerable detainees. In the instant case, the convoy officers gave no consideration to the security risks entailed by transporting more prisoners than permitted by the van\u2019s capacity. Irrespective of whether they sought to save fuel or the effort of an extra journey, they acted with disregard for the regulations which had been put in place to protect the well\u2011being and physical integrity of detainees during transfers. It follows that the State must be held responsible for their failure to provide adequate protection to the applicant\u2019s physical integrity during the transfer.41.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive and procedural limbs.II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION42.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201d43.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 500,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage which was estimated on the basis of his life-time dependence on painkillers and rehabilitation. He further claimed the same amount in respect of non-pecuniary damage and 2,000,000 Russian roubles for costs and expenses.44.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that Article 41 should be applied in accordance with the established case-law.45.\u00a0\u00a0The Court rejects the applicant\u2019s claims in respect of pecuniary damage and costs and expenses, which were not corroborated by any documentary evidence. On the other hand, it awards the applicant EUR\u00a020,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.46.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","31517":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION51.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained of having been ill-treated by his cellmates while in detention pending the outcome of the investigation into his case and the failure of the domestic authorities to protect him, and of the absence of an effective response on the part of the domestic authorities in that regard. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s victim status as regards the alleged ill-treatment by his cellmates(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions52.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim, given the reasonable and realistic assessment by the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeal of his compensation for non\u2011pecuniary damage.53.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant contested those arguments, stating that the amount of compensation awarded to him had not been sufficient.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment54.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the word \u201cvictim\u201d in the context of Article\u00a034 of the Convention denotes the person directly affected by the act or omission in issue, the existence of a violation of the Convention being conceivable even in the absence of prejudice. Consequently, a decision or measure favourable to an applicant is not in principle sufficient to deprive him of his status as a \u201cvictim\u201d. In respect of complaints under Article 3, the national authorities have to: acknowledge the breach of the Convention, either expressly or in substance (see, among other authorities, Murray v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 10511\/10, \u00a7 83, ECHR 2016, and authorities cited therein); and\u00a0afford redress, or at least provide a person with the possibility of applying for and obtaining compensation for damage sustained as a result of the ill-treatment (see Shestopalov v. Russia, no. 46248\/07, \u00a7 56, 28\u00a0March\u00a02017).55.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, in finding a causal link between the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment and his mental and physical suffering, the national authorities established the State\u2019s responsibility in respect of events in prison. However, the award in the amount of RSD 250,000 (approximately EUR\u00a02,350, see paragraphs 38 and 39 above), in view of the principles set out in the case of Shestopalov (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 58-63, and more recently in Artur Ivanov v. Russia, no. 62798\/09, \u00a7 19, 5 June 2018), appears to be substantially less than the award the Court itself would have made consequent on a finding of a violation of the magnitude claimed (see, for example, Antropov v. Russia, no. 22107\/03, 29\u00a0January 2009, and also Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813\/97, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0202-216, ECHR 2006\u2011V).56.\u00a0\u00a0Therefore, the applicant may still claim to be a \u201cvictim\u201d of a breach of his rights under the substantive limb of Article 3 of the Convention. The Government\u2019s objection in this regard is thus dismissed.2.\u00a0\u00a0Non-exhaustion of domestic remedies(a)\u00a0\u00a0Failure to make proper use of a constitutional appeal(i)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submission57.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to properly use a constitutional remedy. In particular, they maintained that although he had complained to the Constitutional Court and invoked Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia that corresponded to Article 3 of the Convention, he had failed to substantiate his complaints, and accordingly had failed to complain properly.58.\u00a0\u00a0Relying on the case of Vu\u010dkovi\u0107 and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [GC] (nos. 17153\/11 and 29 others, \u00a7\u00a7 35 and 82, 25\u00a0March\u00a02014), the Government emphasised that the Constitutional Court could not examine the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 3 of the Convention, as it was \u201cbound\u201d by the request formulated in a constitutional appeal, and could only consider the complaint within the limits of the formulated request. Had the applicant complained properly, the constitutional remedy would have offered him a reasonable prospect of success.59.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not comment on this point.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment60.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies referred to in Article 35 of the Convention obliges those seeking to bring a case against a State before the Court to firstly use the remedies provided by the national legal system. Consequently, States are dispensed from answering for their acts before an international body before they have had an opportunity to put matters right through their own legal system (see Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803\/94, \u00a7 74, ECHR 1999\u2011V).61.\u00a0\u00a0As regards legal systems which provide constitutional protection for fundamental human rights and freedoms, such as the one in Serbia, the Court reiterates that it is incumbent on the aggrieved individual to test the extent of that protection (see, inter alia, Vin\u010di\u0107 and Others v. Serbia, nos. 44698\/06 and 30 others, \u00a7 51, 1 December 2009). An applicant\u2019s failure to make use of an available domestic remedy or to make proper use of it (that is, by bringing a complaint at least in substance and in compliance with the formal requirements and time-limits laid down in domestic law) will result in an application being declared inadmissible before this Court (see G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978\/05, \u00a7 142, ECHR 2010).62.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that, in the present case, the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal complaining under, inter alia, Articles 21, 23, and 25 of the Constitution of ill-treatment in Sremska Mitrovica Prison that had taken place \u201cwith the silent approval of officials who had known which cell they had put the claimant in, and who knew or ought to have known about everything that happened to him\u201d (see paragraph 40 above). The applicant lodged those complaints in a form and within the time-limits prescribed in domestic law, and supported them with the relevant documents and decisions of domestic authorities.63.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that the terms in which the applicant formulated his constitutional complaints were such as to enable the Constitutional Court to afford him redress in the terms sought, or at least to address them (see paragraph 41 above). The Court therefore rejects the Government\u2019s objection to the effect that the applicant failed to make proper use of the constitutional appeal.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s failure to make proper use of available domestic remedies as regards his complaint concerning the respondent State\u2019s alleged failure to investigate(i)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions64.\u00a0\u00a0The Government claimed that the applicant had failed to exhaust available and effective domestic remedies in respect of his complaint that there was no effective response on the part of the respondent State. Specifically, they claimed that the applicant had failed to lodge a criminal complaint against the persons who had allegedly ill-treated him.65.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant stated that the domestic authorities had been under a duty to conduct an investigation. He insisted that he could not have initiated criminal proceedings, as they were supposed to be carried out by the public prosecutor ex officio.66.\u00a0\u00a0In their additional written observations, the Government disputed those claims adding that the applicant had been legally obliged to lodge a criminal complaint (see paragraph 46 above).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment67.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that this objection goes to the heart of the question of whether the State fulfilled its obligation under the procedural aspect of Article 3 of the Convention, and is closely linked to the substance of the applicant\u2019s complaint that the State failed to conduct an investigation. It would thus be more appropriately examined at the merits stage (see Tahirova v. Azerbaijan, no. 47137\/07, \u00a7 50, 3 October 2013, and Mikheyev v. Russia, no. 77617\/01, \u00a7 88, 26 January 2006).3.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion68.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant\u2019s complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0Obligation of the State to prevent ill-treatment or to mitigate its harm(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions69.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant maintained that he had been ill-treated by his cellmates while in detention in Sremska Mitrovica Prison. He also claimed that the respondent State had failed to protect him, even though it had been aware that, as a Croatian national of Albanian origin, he would be treated terribly in any penal institution in Serbia.70.\u00a0\u00a0The Government disputed that the applicant had been subjected to ill-treatment by his cellmates in Sremska Mitrovica Prison. They also argued that the applicant had failed to submit sufficient evidence to prove otherwise. In particular, they stated that the applicant had failed to submit medical records or call any eyewitness who could confirm and corroborate his allegations of ill-treatment.71.\u00a0\u00a0Whilst acknowledging that Article 3 encompasses a positive obligation on State authorities to take preventive measures and protect persons whose physical well-being is at risk from private individuals, the Government maintained that, in the instant case, the prison authorities had not been and could not have been aware of any real and immediate risk to the applicant. In that respect, the Government noted that, as the applicant had neither informed the prison authorities that he had been subjected to ill\u2011treatment nor lodged a complaint against his cellmates, the prison authorities could not protect him.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles72.\u00a0\u00a0Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic societies (see, among other authorities, Selmouni [GC],\u00a0cited above, \u00a7 95; Labita v Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 119, ECHR 2000\u2011IV; and Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380\/09, \u00a7 81, ECHR\u00a02015). Unlike most of the substantive clauses of the Convention, Article 3 makes no provision for exceptions, and no derogation from it is permissible. On the contrary, Article 3 of the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim\u2019s behaviour (see Rodi\u0107 and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, no. 22893\/05, \u00a7 66, 27\u00a0May 2008, and the authorities cited therein).73.\u00a0\u00a0For ill-treatment to fall within the scope of Article 3, it must attain a minimum level of severity. The Court has considered treatment to be \u201cinhuman\u201d where it was premeditated, applied for hours at a stretch and caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering (see M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696\/09, \u00a7 220, ECHR 2011, and other authorities cited therein). The Court has considered treatment to be degrading where it humiliated or debased an individual, showing a lack of respect for, or diminishing, his or her human dignity, or aroused feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual\u2019s moral and physical resistance and debasing them (V. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.\u00a024888\/94, \u00a7 71, ECHR 1999\u2011IX).74.\u00a0\u00a0Where allegations are made under Article 3 of the Convention, the Court must apply particularly thorough scrutiny and those allegations must be supported by appropriate evidence (see Matko v. Slovenia, no.\u00a043393\/98, \u00a7 100, 2 November 2006, and Vladimir Romanov v. Russia, no.\u00a041461\/02, \u00a7\u00a059, 24 July 2008). To assess this evidence, the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d has been adopted. A reasonable doubt \u201cmeans ... a doubt for which reasons can be given drawn from the facts presented\u201d (The Greek Case \u2013 Denmark v Greece; Norway v. Greece; Sweden v. Greece, Netherlands v. Greece; Yearbook of the Convention, p. 196, \u00a7 30), whereas the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d follows from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of facts (see Simeonovi v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 21980\/04, \u00a7 124, 12 May 2017).75.\u00a0\u00a0While many of the cases with which the Court has dealt show that persons who have allegedly been ill-treated usually provide medical certificates to prove their allegations (see Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], cited above, \u00a7 92), in cases where domestic proceedings have taken place and the domestic courts have established that a person has experienced suffering, such decisions provide strong support for the allegations raised. It is not the Court\u2019s task to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the domestic courts and, as a general rule, it is for those courts to assess the evidence before them (see G\u00e4fgen [GC], cited above, \u00a7\u00a093). Although the Court is not bound by the findings of domestic courts, in normal circumstances, it requires cogent elements to lead it to depart from the findings of fact reached by those courts (ibid.).76.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s settled case-law, it is particularly important to secure Article 3 safeguards in respect of persons who are deprived of their liberty. In this connexion, the Court reiterates that, under Article 1 of the Convention, the High Contracting Parties are under an obligation to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention. Taken in conjunction with Article 3, Article 1 requires the States to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, including ill-treatment administered by private individuals (see A. v. the United Kingdom, 23 September 1998, \u00a7 22, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011VI).77.\u00a0\u00a0In such circumstances, the absence of any direct State involvement in acts of violence that meet the condition of severity such as to engage Article 3 of the Convention does not absolve the State from its obligations under this provision (see Premininy v. Russia, no. 44973\/04, \u00a7 71, 10\u00a0February 2011). This positive obligation is to be interpreted in such a way as to not impose an excessive burden on the authorities to guarantee, through the legal system, that inhuman or degrading treatment is never inflicted by one individual on another (see Premininy, cited above, \u00a7 73). Yet, the State is obliged to at least provide effective protection of persons within its jurisdiction, including reasonable steps to prevent ill\u2011treatment of which State authorities had or ought to have had knowledge (see O\u2019Keeffe v.\u00a0Ireland [GC], no. 35810\/09, \u00a7 144, ECHR 2014 (extracts)).78.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, the Court refers to the relevant principles concerning State responsibility, supervision and control in relation to detention, as well as the obligation to protect an individual from inter\u2011prisoner violence, which are set out in the case of Premininy (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 82-88).79.\u00a0\u00a0In particular, the Court refers to Articles 1 and 3 of the Convention which, taken together, place a number of positive obligations on the High Contracting Parties such as to prevent and provide redress for torture and other forms of ill-treatment (see Premininy, cited above, \u00a7 71-72). By virtue of the said two provisions, States are required to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, including ill-treatment administered by private individuals (see M.C. v. Bulgaria, no. 39272\/98, \u00a7 149, ECHR\u00a02003\u2011XII, and Premininy, cited above, \u00a7 72).80.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the importance of the protection afforded by Article 3, a State must ensure that persons under the control of authorities and placed in detention are kept in conditions which are compatible with respect for their human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject them to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention, and that, given the practical demands of imprisonments, their health and well-being are adequately secured (see Rodi\u0107 and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, cited above, \u00a7 67).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Establishment of the facts and assessment of the severity of the ill-treatment81.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, at the outset, the Court observes that the parties are in dispute as to whether the applicant was ill-treated at all by his cellmates in Sremska Mitrovica Prison.82.\u00a0\u00a0In the civil proceedings which the applicant brought, the domestic courts found that, as a result of his suffering in detention, the applicant had lost 10% of his general vital activity. They also confirmed the causal link between his suffering and the events in prison (see paragraph 38 above), and awarded him RSD 200,000 (approximately EUR 1,900) in respect of the damage he had sustained, and a further RSD 50,000 (approximately EUR\u00a0450) in respect of continuing distress after his release. Whilst no detailed findings of dates or facts were made, those domestic decisions established that the applicant had indeed sustained damage in the early days of his detention, and had suffered post-traumatic stress.83.\u00a0\u00a0In the Court\u2019s view, the domestic finding that the applicant lost 10% of his general vital activity admits of no other conclusion than that he was the victim in the early days of his imprisonment of an event or a sequence of events that seriously impaired his health. That being so, the Court accepts the general credibility of the applicant\u2019s domestic claims. It thus finds that it has been established that the applicant suffered ill-treatment at the hands of his cellmates, and that that ill-treatment was of such severity that Article 3 applies.(iii)\u00a0\u00a0State responsibility for the events84.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that, in the present case, the Government declined to take any responsibility for the ill-treatment alleged by the applicant, denying any failure or omission on the part of the prison authorities. In their view, as no official complaint had been lodged by the applicant, the prison authorities could not be expected to protect him.85.\u00a0\u00a0The Court, however, notes that in the CPT reports inter-prisoner violence in Sremska Mitrovica Prison has repeatedly been pointed out as a serious problem, both before and after the events in the present case (see paragraphs 48-50 above). In those reports, the CPT noted a high number of cases concerning inter-prisoner violence and observes that no action whatsoever has been taken by the prison or state authorities to correct such behaviour or reduce it. The CPT also criticised the failures of medical personnel in Sremska Mitrovica Prison to properly record injuries consequent on inter-prisoner violence (see paragraph 48 above).86.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the circumstances of the present case the Court notes that the prison staff in Sremska Mitrovica Prison must have noticed that the applicant\u2019s eyebrows had been shaved, that he had a strange haircut, and that his skin had been damaged (see paragraph 28 above). They also must or ought to have heard the applicant\u2019s screams and singing of nationalist songs at night (see paragraph 32 above).87.\u00a0\u00a0Applying the principles set out in paragraph 78 to the present case, the Court finds that the prison authorities failed to notice or react to any of the signs of violence listed above; they further failed to secure a safe environment for the applicant and, also, failed to detect, prevent or monitor the violence he was subjected to.88.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has been violation of Article 3 of the Convention in this respect.2.\u00a0\u00a0Failure to investigate(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions89.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained that they could not conduct an effective investigation, as no arguable claim had ever been raised by the applicant concerning his ill-treatment in Sremska Mitrovica Prison. In their view, the reason why there had been no investigation into the circumstances of the applicant\u2019s case was because he had failed to lodge his complaints with the relevant domestic authorities. Besides, the Government claimed that the circumstantial evidence established in the civil proceedings would not have been sufficient to trigger or prompt a criminal investigation on the part of the State.90.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that the State had been under an obligation to conduct an investigation, and that its failure to take any effective step had violated his rights guaranteed under Article 3 of the Convention.91.\u00a0\u00a0In their additional observations, the Government claimed that complaints to various domestic authorities, including ombudspersons, could not be considered effective. Accordingly, no violation of Article 3 in this respect could be attributed to the State.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles92.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, under the procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention, respondent States have an obligation to put in place effective criminal-law provisions and deter the commission of offences against personal integrity. Those provisions have to be backed up by law\u2011enforcement machinery capable of providing practical and effective protection of the rights guaranteed (see M.S. v. Croatia (no. 2), no.\u00a075450\/12, \u00a7 74, 19 February 2015), so that when a person raises an arguable complaint of ill-treatment under Article 3 of Convention, the authorities can conduct an effective investigation (see Selmouni [GC], cited above, \u00a7 79, and Filip v. Romania, no. 41124\/02, \u00a7 47, 14\u00a0December 2006), even if the ill-treatment has been inflicted by private individuals (see,\u00a0mutatis mutandis, M.C. v. Bulgaria , cited above, \u00a7 151).93.\u00a0\u00a0Article 3 of the Convention additionally requires that an official investigation be conducted even in the absence of an express complaint, if there are sufficiently clear indications that ill-treatment might have occurred (see, for example, Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah\u2019s Witnesses and Others v. Georgia, no. 71156\/01, \u00a7 97, 3 May 2007; and also Bat\u0131 and Others v. Turkey, nos. 33097\/96 and 57834\/00, \u00a7 133, ECHR 2004\u2011IV (extracts)).94.\u00a0\u00a0In previous cases, such an obligation has arisen on the basis of various explicit or implicit indications, such as: facts implied in complaints made by an applicant during criminal proceedings against him (see J.L.\u00a0v.\u00a0Latvia, no. 23893\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 11-13 and 73-75, 17 April 2012); a letter from an applicant to a county court in relation to civil proceedings concerning his involuntary admission to a psychiatric hospital (see M.S.\u00a0v.\u00a0Croatia (no. 2), cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 82-83); the presentation of evidence of ill-treatment by an applicant in civil proceedings (see Muradova v.\u00a0Azerbaijan, no. 22684\/05, \u00a7\u00a7 122-126, 2\u00a0April\u00a02009); and an allegation of ill-treatment in an applicant\u2019s appeal against a first-instance judgment and in his constitutional complaint (see Ma\u0111er v. Croatia, no. 56185\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 88-89, 21\u00a0June 2011). Besides, o<nce the matter has come to the attention of the authorities an obligation to lodge a formal complaint cannot be left exclusively to the applicant\u2019s initiative. For the purposes of the procedural obligation under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, the domestic authorities are, at least, those under an obligation to react (see, mutatis mutandis, Gongadze v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 34056\/02, \u00a7 175, ECHR 2005\u2011XI, see also Muradova, cited above, \u00a7 123).95.\u00a0\u00a0For an official investigation to satisfy the requirements of an effective investigation under Article 3, it has to be: capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible for the ill-treatment; independent from those implicated in the events; thorough, meaning that the authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what happened, and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation or as the basis of their decisions; prompt and initiated as soon as an official complaint has been lodged \u2013 and even when, strictly speaking, no complaint has been made, the investigation must start if there are sufficiently clear indications that there has been ill-treatment; and able to provide the complainant with effective access to the investigatory procedure at all stages (see Krsmanovi\u0107 v. Serbia, no. 19796\/14, \u00a7 74, 19\u00a0December\u00a02017, and the authorities cited therein).(ii)\u00a0\u00a0Application of these principles to the present case96.\u00a0\u00a0It is true, as the Government observe, that the applicant never lodged a formal criminal complaint with the relevant authorities (that is, the police or the public prosecutor\u2019s office), or complained to the prison administration about the specific acts of ill-treatment he was subjected to in Sremska Mitrovica Prison.97.\u00a0\u00a0However, it is uncontested that after the applicant\u2019s lawyer complained to the prison authorities about his ill-treatment after several days, the applicant was moved to another cell (see paragraph 20 above).98.\u00a0\u00a0Further, on 25\u00a0December 2009 the applicant lodged his civil complaint with the civil court in Belgrade, complaining, inter alia, of his ill\u2011treatment in Sremska Mitrovica Prison, and seeking compensation for it. The applicant continued to complain, throughout 2008, 2009 and 2010, to various domestic authorities \u2013 including the President of the Republic, the Ministry of Justice and ombudspersons \u2013 about the ill-treatment he had suffered (see paragraphs 23-24 and 42-44 above).99.\u00a0\u00a0It is uncontested that no investigation was ever conducted into the applicant\u2019s allegations concerning his ill-treatment by his cellmates in Sremska Mitrovica Prison. It is, thus, not for the Court to establish whether the investigation into applicant\u2019s allegations was effective, because there was no such investigation. The question is rather whether the applicant\u2019s failure to lodge a formal criminal complaint either prevented the State authorities from carrying out the investigation or relieved them of their general duty to do so (compare and contrast Tahirova, cited above, \u00a7 54).100.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes in this respect that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time about the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment (see paragraph 86 above), in addition, he raised the matter on a number of occasions thereafter. There was therefore no formal or factual element which stood in the way of an investigation.101.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, there was nothing in the domestic law to prevent the prison authorities from reacting or to prevent other authorities from initiating a criminal investigation. On the contrary, the Serbian legal framework, and in particular the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, are explicit in imposing an obligation on all public authorities to report criminal offences subject to public prosecution of which they are informed (see paragraph 46 above).102.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the above, the Court observes that the absence of a criminal complaint by the applicant did not prevent the public prosecutor from initiating criminal proceedings or preclude other domestic authorities from informing the public prosecutor about the allegations of ill-treatment.103.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, in the absence of an effective official investigation, the Court dismisses the Government\u2019s objection as to the applicant\u2019s failure to exhaust domestic remedies by making use of the criminal-complaint procedure, and concludes that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural limb.II.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION104.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage105.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 100,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.106.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested this claim. They considered it excessive and groundless.107.\u00a0\u00a0The Court accepts that the applicant suffered humiliation and distress on account of the ill-treatment inflicted on him by his cellmates. In addition, as a person in a vulnerable position, the Government failed to protect him, and he did not have the benefit of an effective investigation into his complaints of ill-treatment. In these circumstances, the Court considers that the applicant\u2019s suffering and frustration cannot be compensated for by a mere finding of a violation. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, and bearing in mind that the applicant received EUR 2,350 in the civil proceedings instituted against the State, it awards the applicant EUR 25,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount (see paragraph 55 above).B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses108.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 2,000 for costs and expenses incurred before the Court.109.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested this claim, arguing that the applicant had failed to substantiate it.110.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents submitted by the parties and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 2,000 for costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before the Court.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest111.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","31538":"\u00a0THE SCOPE OF THE CASE58.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the application was lodged by the adoptive parents of the three minor applicants, on the children\u2019s behalf but also on their own behalf. On 5 September 2016 the President of the Section decided to give notice to the respondent Government of the complaints of the three minor applicants relating to the sexual abuse of which they claimed to have been the victims and to the allegedly ineffective nature of the investigation in that regard. The President of the Section, sitting as a single judge (Rule\u00a054 \u00a7 3 of the Rules of Court), also declared inadmissible the remaining complaints raised in the application, namely those made by the parents on their own behalf. Under Rule 54 \u00a7 3 of the Rules of Court, that decision is final. Accordingly, the Court will not take account of those arguments in the parties\u2019 observations which concern the complaints that were declared inadmissible.\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 3 AND 8 OF THE CONVENTION59.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants alleged that they had been the victims of sexual abuse while they were living in the orphanage and that the Bulgarian authorities had failed in their positive obligation to protect them against that treatment and in their obligation to conduct an effective investigation into the allegations. They relied on Articles 3, 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention. The Court considers that the complaints raised should be examined from the standpoint of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention alone. The relevant parts of those Articles provide:Article 3\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dArticle 8\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to respect for his private ... life ...\u201dAdmissibilityAlleged abuse of the right of individual application60.\u00a0\u00a0The Government requested the Court to declare the application inadmissible for abuse of the right of application. They argued, firstly, that the applicants\u2019 legal representatives had knowingly presented imaginary facts which were not corroborated by any evidence such as medical certificates, and, secondly, that they had used disrespectful and insulting language regarding the Bulgarian authorities and the individuals whom they were accusing.61.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants did not comment on this issue.62.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an application is an abuse of the right of application if it is knowingly based on untrue facts with a view to deceiving the Court (see Gross v. Switzerland [GC], no. 67810\/10, \u00a7 28, ECHR 2014). In the present case, irrespective of whether the accusations of sexual abuse of the applicants are well founded, there is no basis for the Court to conclude that their representatives knowingly presented facts which they knew to be untrue.63.\u00a0\u00a0An application may also be regarded as an abuse of the right of application where the applicant, in his or her correspondence with the Court, uses particularly vexatious, insulting, threatening or provocative language \u2013 whether this be against the respondent Government, its Agent, the authorities of the respondent State, the Court itself, its judges, its Registry or members thereof (see \u0158eh\u00e1k v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 67208\/01, 18\u00a0May 2004). However, rejection of an application on grounds of abuse of the right of application is an exceptional measure, and the applicant must have exceeded the bounds of normal, civil and legitimate criticism (see Di\u00a0Salvo v.\u00a0Italy (dec.), no. 16098\/05, 11 January 2007). In the present case the Court notes that, in their observations, the applicants\u2019 legal representatives made accusations against identified individuals, referring to them as \u201cpaedophiles\u201d, and accused the Bulgarian authorities, including the Government Agents, of covering up criminal acts. It observes that the language used in the applicants\u2019 observations was undoubtedly disrespectful, but considers, in view of the background to the present case and the fact that it concerns the rights of under-age children who are not responsible for the remarks made by their representatives, that those remarks did not overstep acceptable limits to an extent that would justify rejecting the application on that ground.64.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the foregoing, the Government\u2019s objection of an abuse of the right of individual application must be dismissed.Compliance with the six-month time-limit65.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further submitted that the application was out of time. The order of the district prosecutor\u2019s office of 18 November 2013 refusing the institution of criminal proceedings had been transmitted by the Bulgarian authorities to the Italian authorities on 23 January 2015. The application had been lodged over one year later, on 16 April 2016, and the applicants had not demonstrated that the Italian authorities had delayed to such an extent in notifying them of the decision.66.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants replied that the Bulgarian authorities had at no stage kept them duly informed of the progress of the investigation or the decisions taken.67.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the order of 18 November 2013 was not formally served on the applicants\u2019 parents by the Bulgarian authorities. It emerges from the case file that the Italian Ministry of Justice sent them a copy of that document, accompanied by a translation into Italian, on 1\u00a0February 2016, and there is no indication that the parents knew of the decision prior to that date. The application was lodged within six months after the sending of that document. Moreover, the Court observes that after the present application had been lodged the order of 18 November 2013 was reviewed by the higher-ranking prosecuting authorities, who issued several fresh decisions during 2016.68.\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s objection of failure to comply with the six-month time-limit must therefore be dismissed.Conclusion as to admissibility69.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention and that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.MeritsThe parties\u2019 submissions(a)\u00a0\u00a0 The applicants70.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants contended that they had been the victims of sexual abuse during their time in the orphanage, when they had been under the responsibility of the Bulgarian authorities. They alleged that their accounts had been deemed credible by the psychologists who had treated them in Italy, and by the Italian public prosecutor and the Italian Youth Court. The first applicant had reported the incidents to the director of the orphanage, who had done nothing to put a stop to the acts complained of. Other children, including a young girl named M., had complained of similar abuse, a fact of which the director must have been aware. The applicants also stated that they had been in telephone contact with other Italian parents who had adopted children from the same orphanage, including D.\u2019s parents, and that those children too had displayed symptoms typical of victims of abuse.71.\u00a0\u00a0According to the applicants, the orphanage had been far from the model institution described in the Government\u2019s reports and observations. In particular, the children had not been supervised around the clock, male workers had had access to the children, and some of the occupants had exceeded the statutory age limit for that type of institution.72.\u00a0\u00a0In the applicants\u2019 submission, following the disclosures made after their adoption, the competent authorities of the respondent State had not conducted an effective investigation capable of shedding light on the events and of holding the persons involved to account.73.\u00a0\u00a0First of all, the Bulgarian authorities had displayed a lack of diligence in conducting the investigation and had not kept the applicants\u2019 parents informed of the investigation\u2019s findings until January 2015, when an official request had been made by the Italian authorities.74.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the investigation had cut corners, with the prosecuting authorities concluding very rapidly that there had been no offence, solely on the basis of the Agency\u2019s findings. In the applicants\u2019 submission, that institution could not be considered sufficiently independent, since any problems identified would have called its own work into question. The inspection conducted by the Agency had alerted those responsible to the fact that an investigation was in progress, thereby compromising the outcome. The investigation should have been conducted discreetly, making use of measures such as telephone tapping, undercover agents and searches, and separating the children from the director and the employees involved.75.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants contended that the aim of the Bulgarian authorities had been to prove that no paedophile ring existed. Similar complaints made by other children, notably by M., the young girl referred to above, had been the subject of criminal proceedings but had not been linked to the investigation in the applicants\u2019 case (see paragraph 52 above).(b)\u00a0\u00a0 The Government76.\u00a0\u00a0Regarding the allegation that the applicants had been subjected to physical and sexual violence in the orphanage, the Government stated that the investigation carried out by the Bulgarian authorities had not brought to light any evidence that the acts in question had in fact occurred, whether involving the applicants or other children in the orphanage. The allegations were based solely on the applicants\u2019 statements, which had to be treated with caution given their ages and the possibility that the statements had been influenced by adults. Moreover, no medical certificate corroborating the allegations of rape had been produced.77.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the necessary child safety measures had been taken in the orphanage. Under the internal rules, access to the institution by outside visitors had been subject to checks, and the children had to be accompanied by a female staff member when leaving the establishment. The staff had a responsibility to report violent incidents to the mayor or the police, and the children had available to them a telephone with the number of the national helpline for children in danger, and had access to the orphanage\u2019s psychologist.78.\u00a0\u00a0In the Government\u2019s view, had the very serious allegations of violence made by the applicants been true, the general practitioner, who came from outside the orphanage, would inevitably have noticed signs of the violence when conducting check-ups.79.\u00a0\u00a0As to the procedural obligations potentially flowing from Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, the competent Bulgarian authorities had acted swiftly after being informed of the alleged incidents and had undertaken various investigative measures. The investigation had been independent, objective and thorough. In particular, the fact that the Agency had carried out an inspection in the orphanage did not cast doubt on the effectiveness of the investigation, as the Agency\u2019s role was precisely to conduct inspections, to ensure respect for the rights of children placed in institutions and to take steps to protect them.80.\u00a0\u00a0The checks and the investigative measures carried out had not confirmed the applicants\u2019 statements but rather had established the inaccurate nature of some of their allegations concerning the identity of the persons who had been accused. In the absence of evidence corroborating the allegations, the prosecuting authorities had decided to discontinue the case; that fact did not call into question the effective and thorough nature of the investigation.81.\u00a0\u00a0As to the information provided to the applicants, the Government submitted that the proceedings in Bulgaria had not been instituted at the request of the applicants\u2019 adoptive parents, who had therefore not been required to be formally notified of the public prosecutor\u2019s decisions. The Bulgarian authorities had kept the Italian authorities informed of the investigation whenever such information had been requested.The Court\u2019s assessment(a)\u00a0\u00a0 Applicability of Article 3 and Article 8 of the Convention82.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention. The assessment of this minimum is, in the nature of things, relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among other authorities, A. v. the United Kingdom, 23 September 1998, \u00a7 20, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011VI). In the present case the applicants, owing to their youth and their status as children left without parental care and placed in an institution, were in a particularly vulnerable situation. Against this background, the sexual abuse and violence to which they were allegedly subjected, if established, are sufficiently serious to come within the scope of application of Article 3 of the Convention.83.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further reiterates that the notion of \u201cprivate life\u201d within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person (see X and Y v. the Netherlands, 26\u00a0March 1985, \u00a7 22, Series A no. 91; M.P. and Others v. Bulgaria, no.\u00a022457\/08, \u00a7 110, 15 November 2011; and V.C. v. Italy, no. 54227\/14, \u00a7\u00a085, 1 February 2018). Accordingly, the abuse of which the applicants complained also falls within the sphere of protection of Article 8 of the Convention.(b)\u00a0\u00a0 Applicable general principles84.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the obligation of the High Contracting Parties under Article 1 of the Convention to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention, taken together with Article 3, requires States to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to ill-treatment, including ill-treatment administered by private individuals (see A. v.\u00a0the\u00a0United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 22, and M.C. v. Bulgaria, no.\u00a039272\/98, \u00a7 149, ECHR 2003\u2011XII). Furthermore, the positive obligations inherent in the right to respect for private life under Article 8 of the Convention may involve the adoption of measures even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves\u00a0(see M.C.\u00a0v. Bulgaria, cited above, \u00a7 150, and V.C. v. Italy, cited above, \u00a7 91).85.\u00a0\u00a0Children and other vulnerable individuals, in particular, are entitled to State protection, in\u00a0the\u00a0form of effective deterrence, against such serious breaches of personal integrity (see A.\u00a0v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7\u00a022; Z and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29392\/95, \u00a7 73, ECHR\u00a02001\u2011V; and M.C. v. Bulgaria, cited above, \u00a7 150).86.\u00a0\u00a0The positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention to protect individuals\u2019 physical and psychological integrity necessitate in particular establishing a legislative framework to shield individuals adequately from breaches of their integrity, particularly, in the most serious cases, through the enactment of criminal-law provisions and their effective application in practice (see M.C. v. Bulgaria, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 150-53, and S.Z. v. Bulgaria, no. 29263\/12, \u00a7 43, 3 March 2015).87.\u00a0\u00a0These positive obligations may sometimes require the authorities to take reasonable practical steps to prevent ill\u2011treatment of which they had or ought to have had knowledge, as well as effective deterrence protecting minors against such serious breaches of personal integrity (see Z and Others v. the United Kingdom, cited above, \u00a7 73; M.P. and Others v. Bulgaria, cited above, \u00a7 108; and V.C. v. Italy, cited above, \u00a7\u00a089). The scope of this positive obligation must, however, be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities. For a positive obligation to arise, it must be established that the authorities knew or ought to have known of the existence of a real and immediate risk of ill\u2011treatment of an identified individual from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk (see \u0110or\u0111evi\u0107 v. Croatia, no.\u00a041526\/10, \u00a7\u00a0139, ECHR 2012, and V.C. v. Italy, cited above, \u00a7 90).88.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, where an individual claims on arguable grounds to have suffered acts contrary to Article 3, that Article requires the national authorities to conduct an effective official investigation to establish the facts of the case and identify and punish those responsible. These obligations apply whatever the status of the persons charged (see M.C. v. Bulgaria, cited above, \u00a7 153; S.Z.\u00a0v. Bulgaria, cited above, \u00a7 44; and B.V. v. Belgium, no. 61030\/08, \u00a7 56, 2\u00a0May 2017). The Court has also held that the State\u2019s positive obligation under Article 8 of the Convention to safeguard the individual\u2019s physical integrity may extend to questions relating to the effectiveness of a criminal investigation\u00a0(see M.C. v. Bulgaria, cited above, \u00a7 153).89.\u00a0\u00a0The obligation to conduct an effective investigation is an obligation not of result but of means. Whilst this requirement does not impose an obligation for all prosecutions to result in conviction, or indeed in a particular sentence, the national courts must not under any circumstances be prepared to allow grave attacks on physical and psychological integrity to go unpunished.90.\u00a0\u00a0Generally speaking, for an investigation to be effective, the institutions and persons responsible for carrying it out must be independent from those targeted by it (see Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380\/09, \u00a7 118, ECHR 2015).91.\u00a0\u00a0The investigation must be sufficiently thorough. The authorities must take reasonable measures available to them to obtain evidence relating to the offence in question (see M.C. v. Bulgaria, cited above, \u00a7 151; S.Z. v.\u00a0Bulgaria, cited above, \u00a7 45; and B.V. v. Belgium, cited above, \u00a7 60). Any serious deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the persons responsible will risk falling foul of the Convention standard. However, the Court is not concerned with allegations of errors or isolated omissions in the investigation; it cannot replace the domestic authorities in the assessment of the facts of the case, nor can it decide on the alleged perpetrators\u2019 criminal responsibility (see M. and C. v. Romania, no.\u00a029032\/04, \u00a7 113, 27 September 2011, and B.V. v. Belgium, cited above, \u00a7 61).92.\u00a0\u00a0A requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is also implicit in this context. In this connection the Court has considered it an essential requirement that investigations be promptly instituted and carried out (see S.Z. v. Bulgaria, cited above, \u00a7 47, and V.C. v. Italy, cited above, \u00a7\u00a095).93.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the victim should be able to participate effectively in the investigation (see Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7 122, and B.V. v. Belgium, cited above, \u00a7 59).(c)\u00a0\u00a0 Application in the present case94.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes at the outset that the applicants did not call into question the legal framework of protection established by domestic law. Rather, they complained of the inability of the Bulgarian authorities to prevent the abuse of which they claimed to have been the victims, and of the alleged ineffectiveness of the investigation into their allegations.(i)\u00a0 The effectiveness of the investigation95.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that an initial inspection on the premises of the orphanage was ordered by the Agency, an administrative authority specialising in child protection, as soon as it became aware through the Bulgarian media of the article published in L\u2019Espresso in January 2013. It notes that the Agency informed the prosecuting authorities swiftly of the disclosures made by the Italian weekly magazine and of the findings of its inspections.96.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that, following the second report transmitted to the public prosecutor\u2019s office by the Agency in February 2013, a police investigation was conducted, as well as a further inspection by the child protection services. The two sets of proceedings that had been instituted were closed in November and June 2013 respectively by means of discontinuance decisions, as the district prosecutor considered that none of the evidence gathered led to the conclusion that any offences had been committed.97.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that, after the Bulgarian authorities had been formally approached by the Italian Ministry of Justice in January 2014, the Veliko Tarnovo regional prosecutor\u2019s office, observing that several sets of proceedings had been opened, ordered on 4 June 2014 that they be joined. The new documents and the appeal by the applicants\u2019 adoptive father forwarded in June 2016 were examined by the regional prosecutor\u2019s office, which on 30 September 2016 upheld the discontinuance order. In the following months the order was upheld by the higher-ranking prosecuting authorities in the context of a review performed of their own motion.98.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances, the Court cannot fail to observe that the competent Bulgarian authorities acted with promptness and diligence as soon as they became aware of the allegations, despite not having received a formal complaint from the applicants. They also cooperated fully with the Italian authorities, keeping them abreast of the findings of the investigation and taking into account the new documentation sent by those authorities. Whilst delays of several months sometimes occurred in communicating with the Italian Ministry of Justice (see paragraphs 39-41 above), these do not seem excessive in a context of intergovernmental cooperation and do not appear to have jeopardised the investigation, which had already been completed by that stage.99.\u00a0\u00a0As to the Agency\u2019s alleged lack of independence and objectivity, the Court notes that this body is an administrative authority specialised in child protection and that one of its tasks is to conduct inspections in children\u2019s residential facilities (see paragraph 56 above). The Court considers that, contrary to the applicants\u2019 assertions, neither the Agency nor its employees were implicated in the case in a manner capable of casting doubt on their independence or objectivity.100.\u00a0\u00a0As to whether the investigation was full and thorough, the Court notes that the competent Bulgarian authorities, namely the child protection and police services, visited the orphanage and carried out a number of investigative acts. They checked the files, including the medical files, of the children in the orphanage and questioned the staff, the children and other persons concerned such as the mayor and the persons mentioned in the applicants\u2019 statements. The children present in the orphanage were questioned by means of an anonymous questionnaire relating both to their lives in the orphanage and to possible abuse, and one of the children, who had been mentioned in the applicants\u2019 statements, was questioned by a police officer with the help of the psychologist.101.\u00a0\u00a0In so far as the applicants argued that the authorities should have begun by taking more discreet investigative measures such as telephone tapping or using undercover agents, and that by omitting to do so they had undermined the effectiveness of the investigation, the Court notes that it was the applicants\u2019 parents themselves who made the case public. Hence, even before the case had come before the Bulgarian authorities, the journalist whom the parents had contacted had been in touch with the persons involved and the article published in the Italian press had been taken up by the Bulgarian media.102.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants further submitted that other investigative acts, such as searches and seizures, should have been carried out. The Court reiterates in that regard that it is not concerned with allegations of errors or isolated omissions in the investigation (see paragraph 91 above). Furthermore, the applicants\u2019 representatives do not appear to have requested additional investigative acts, in particular in their appeal against the discontinuance order.103.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the prosecuting authorities, on the basis of the evidence gathered, took the view that the applicants\u2019 allegations had not been confirmed. It is not for the Court to draw its own conclusions from the evidence obtained by the domestic authorities or to take their place in assessing, in particular, the credibility of the various witness statements (see M.P. and Others v. Bulgaria, cited above, \u00a7 112). The Court notes that in the present case the prosecuting authorities were faced with two contradictory versions: on the one hand, that of the applicants\u2019 parents, and on the other hand that of the orphanage staff and the other persons questioned in the course of the investigation, including the children living in the orphanage. While the genuineness of the applicants\u2019 testimony, which the Italian psychologists and prosecuting authorities deemed credible, cannot be called into question, the fact remains that their statements, which were the only direct evidence available to the Bulgarian authorities, were succinctly worded and contained few factual details, in particular owing to the applicants\u2019 young age and their weak command of Italian at the time the statements were taken (see paragraphs 7-11 above). The Court further notes that the Bulgarian authorities did not have an opportunity to question the applicants (see paragraph 36 above). Furthermore, the applicants\u2019 allegations of violence were not corroborated by any medical certificate. In these circumstances, the Bulgarian authorities\u2019 conclusion that the investigative measures carried out had not disclosed sufficient evidence to establish that any abuse had occurred does not appear arbitrary or unreasonable.104.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the present case does not disclose any culpable failure or lack of will on the part of the competent authorities to shed light on the events or to identify and prosecute those potentially responsible (see Szula v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no.\u00a018727\/06, 4 January 2007, and M.P.\u00a0and Others v. Bulgaria, cited above, \u00a7 113).105.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the applicants criticised the Bulgarian authorities for not keeping their legal representatives adequately informed of the progress of the investigation. In that connection the Court notes that the initial investigations conducted by the Agency and the public prosecutor\u2019s office were carried out following information published in the media, without the applicants\u2019 parents having lodged a complaint or otherwise contacted the investigating authorities; this explains the fact that they were not informed of the decisions taken. As regards the third investigation, which was opened following the request made by the Italian authorities in January 2014, the Court notes that the latter were informed of the investigation\u2019s findings. It is true that the information was transmitted after several months\u2019 delay and only after the Italian authorities had made a fresh request for information in January 2015. Nevertheless, the Court considers that this fact does not constitute grounds for finding that the applicants\u2019 parents were deprived of the possibility of participating in the investigation. It notes that, under domestic law, it was open to the parents to appeal against the discontinuance order. Moreover, the letter which they wrote and which was transmitted by the Italian Ministry of Justice was treated as an appeal and was duly examined by the higher\u2011ranking prosecutor\u2019s office (see paragraphs 43-49 above).106.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing considerations, it cannot be concluded that the Bulgarian authorities breached their procedural obligation to conduct an effective investigation into the applicants\u2019 allegations. Accordingly, there has been no violation of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention in this regard.(ii)\u00a0 The duty to take measures to protect the applicants107.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the applicants\u2019 allegation that the Bulgarian authorities had failed to protect them from the alleged abuse although they had been under the responsibility of those authorities, the Court observes that the reports drawn up by the competent departments which carried out checks at the Strahilovo orphanage show that a number of general measures were taken to ensure the safety of the children living there. In particular, the reports noted that access to the orphanage by outside visitors was subject to checks; that outsiders and male employees could enter the parts of the premises reserved for the children only where necessary and when accompanied by a female member of staff; that the children were seen regularly by an outside general practitioner and by the orphanage\u2019s psychologist; and that they had access to a telephone and to the number of a helpline for children in danger.108.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, as regards the authorities\u2019 duty to take steps to prevent ill-treatment in a specific case, the Court observes that the investigations carried out in the present case did not reveal that the director or any of the orphanage employees had been aware of the abuse alleged by the applicants. As regards the allegation that the first applicant had told the director and that the latter had failed to take action, the investigation established that, contrary to the applicants\u2019 statements, the director of the orphanage was not called E., and that another employee who had that forename denied having been informed of any incidents of that nature. Likewise, the children\u2019s files and the statements made by the general practitioner and the orphanage\u2019s psychologist did not disclose any evidence of such abuse. In view of the investigators\u2019 findings, the Court is not in a position to draw a different conclusion in this regard. Moreover, it is clear from the documents in the case file that, contrary to the applicants\u2019 assertions, the criminal investigation instituted following complaints made by other children from the orphanage, notably by M., did not concern similar facts to those complained of by the applicants (see paragraph 52 above). As to the situation regarding other children adopted in Italy (see paragraph 70 above in fine), even assuming it to be proven, there is nothing to indicate that the Bulgarian authorities were aware of any acts of abuse committed against other children at the material time.109.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, while reiterating States\u2019 obligation to protect vulnerable persons under their exclusive authority from ill-treatment (see paragraphs 85-87 above), the Court considers, having regard to the information available to it in the present case, that it has not been established that the Bulgarian authorities failed in their obligation to take preventive measures to protect the applicants from a risk of ill-treatment of which they had or ought to have had knowledge.110.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has likewise been no violation of Articles 3 and 8 in this regard.\u00a0","31547":"12.\u00a0\u00a0In accordance with Rule 42 \u00a7 1 of the Rules of Court, the Court decides to join the applications, given that they concern similar facts and raise identical legal issues under the Convention.I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION13.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants in the cases B.U. v. Russia, no. 59609\/17 and A.S.\u00a0v.\u00a0Russia, no. 74677\/17 complained under Article 3 of the Convention that the national authorities had failed to consider their claims that they could be at risk of ill-treatment in the event of their removal to their respective countries of origin and that their removal would expose them to that risk if it were to take place. Article\u00a03 of the Convention reads:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d14.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the applicants\u2019 claims.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility15.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles16.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant general principles concerning the application of Article\u00a03 have been summarised by the Court in the judgment in the case of F.G.\u00a0v. Sweden ([GC], no. 43611\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 111-27, ECHR 2016).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles to the present case(a)\u00a0\u00a0Existence of substantial grounds for believing that the applicant faces a real risk of ill-treatment17.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has previously established that individuals whose extradition was sought by either Uzbek or Tajik authorities on charges of religiously or politically motivated crimes constituted a vulnerable group facing a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention in the event of their removal to their respective countries of origin (see Mamazhonov v. Russia, no. 17239\/13, \u00a7 141, 23 October 2014, and K.I.\u00a0v.\u00a0Russia, cited above, \u00a7 36).18.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present cases, it is apparent that in the course of the extradition and expulsion proceedings the applicants consistently and specifically argued that they were being prosecuted for religious extremism and faced a risk of ill\u2011treatment. The material relating to the charges made by the Tajik and Uzbek authorities was clear as to its basis, namely that the applicants were accused of religiously and politically motivated crimes. The Tajik and Uzbek authorities thus directly identified the applicants with groups whose members have previously been found to be at real risk of being subjected to treatment proscribed by the Convention.19.\u00a0\u00a0In such circumstances, the Court considers that the Russian authorities had at their disposal sufficiently substantiated complaints pointing to a real risk of ill-treatment.20. The Court is therefore satisfied that the applicants presented the Russian authorities with substantial grounds for believing that they faced a real risk of ill-treatment in their countries of origin.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Duty to assess claims of a real risk of ill-treatment through reliance on sufficient relevant material21.\u00a0\u00a0Having concluded that the applicants had advanced at national level valid claims based on substantial grounds for believing that they faced a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, the Court must examine whether the authorities discharged their obligation to assess those claims adequately through reliance on sufficient relevant material.22.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present cases, the Court considers that in the extradition and expulsion proceedings the domestic authorities did not carry out a rigorous scrutiny of the applicants\u2019 claims that they faced a risk of ill\u2011treatment in their home country. The Court reaches this conclusion having considered the national courts\u2019 simplistic rejections of the applicants\u2019 claims. Moreover, the domestic courts\u2019 reliance on the assurances of the Tajik and Uzbek authorities, despite their formulation in standard terms, appears tenuous, given that similar assurances have consistently been considered unsatisfactory by the Court in the past (see, for example, Abdulkhakov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 14743\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 149-50, 2 October 2012, and Tadzhibayev v.\u00a0Russia, no. 17724\/14, \u00a7 46, 1 December 2015).23.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that the Russian legal system, in principle, offers several avenues whereby the removal of applicants to their countries of origin could be prevented, given the risk of ill-treatment they face there. However, the facts of the present cases demonstrate that the applicants\u2019 claims were not adequately considered in any relevant proceedings, despite being consistently raised (see appendix for details of the proceedings).24.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes that, although the applicants had sufficiently substantiated their claims that they would risk ill-treatment in their countries of origin, the Russian authorities failed to assess their claims adequately through reliance on sufficient relevant material. This failure opened the way for the applicants\u2019 removal.(c)\u00a0\u00a0Existence of a real risk of ill-treatment or danger to life25.\u00a0\u00a0Given the failure of the domestic authorities to adequately assess the alleged real risk of ill-treatment through reliance on sufficient relevant material, the Court finds itself compelled to examine independently whether or not the applicants would be exposed to such a risk in the event of their removal to their countries of origin.26.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that nothing in the parties\u2019 submissions, nor any previously examined relevant material from independent international sources (see paragraph 11 above) provides a basis for concluding that the criminal justice system of Tajikistan or Uzbekistan, or the specific treatment of those prosecuted for religiously and politically motivated crimes, has improved.27.\u00a0\u00a0Having given due consideration to the available material, the Court concludes that authorising the applicants\u2019 removal to their countries of origin would expose them to a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.(d)\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion28.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that there would be a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in the cases B.U. v. Russia, no. 59609\/17 and A.S. v. Russia, no. 74677\/17 if the applicants were to be removed to their respective countries of origin.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION29.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants in the cases B.U. v. Russia (no. 59609\/17) and I.N.\u00a0v.\u00a0Russia no. 76379\/17) complained that their detention pending administrative expulsion had been unreasonably long and had been ordered without any indication of time-limits or prospects of release. The applicant in the case A.S. v. Russia (no. 74677\/17) complained that he had been kept in detention between 12 noon on 29 August 2017 and 9 a.m. on 30 August 2017 without the relevant arrest records being drawn up. They relied on Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which read as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:...(f)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention ... of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition ...\u201d30.\u00a0\u00a0In their observations of 11 June 2018 in the cases B.U. v. Russia (no.\u00a059609\/17) and I.N. v. Russia (no. 76379\/17), the Government limited their submissions to general claims about the interrelation of Article 5 \u00a7\u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(f) and 4 standards, as well as the general principles pertaining to detentions pending removal. They presented no arguments focusing directly on the applicants\u2019 situations or the particularities of the relevant facts or proceedings.31.\u00a0\u00a0In their observations of 11 June 2018 in the case A.S. v. Russia (no.\u00a074677\/17) the Government reserved their right to delay the submission of their position and documents until \u201cthe further stages of the proceedings\u201d, but finally never submitted any subsequent observations on the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 5 of the Convention.32.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that these complaint are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.33.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the applicants\u2019 complaints in the cases B.U. v. Russia, (no. 59609\/17) and I.N. v. Russia (no. 76379\/17), the Court reiterates that the exception in sub-paragraph (f) of Article\u00a05 \u00a7 1 of the Convention requires only that \u201caction is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition\u201d without any further justification (see, among others, Chahal v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, \u00a7\u00a0112, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011V) and that deprivation of liberty will be justified as long as deportation or extradition proceedings are in progress (see A. and Others v.\u00a0the United Kingdom [GC], no.\u00a03455\/05, \u00a7\u00a0164, ECHR 2009). In asking whether \u201caction is being taken with a view to deportation\u201d, this Court has found that removal must be a realistic prospect (see A. and Others, cited above, \u00a7 167, and Amie and Others v. Bulgaria, no.\u00a058149\/08, \u00a7 144, 12\u00a0February 2013). While an interim measure indicated under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court might at times be the only actual barrier to an applicant\u2019s expulsion, its indication does not necessarily create a presumption that the expulsion is not possible or that the subsequent detention is arbitrary. A detention period subject to review at regular intervals, as long as expulsion remains a realistic possibility, might be reasonable given the authorities\u2019 decisions to maintain that detention awaiting the outcome of this Court\u2019s judgment (see Ahmed v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, no. 59727\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 45-59, 2\u00a0March 2017).34.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that prior to their detention pending expulsion the applicants had been detained pending extradition for approximately one year. On the day of their release from detention pending extradition they were immediately re-arrested for violation of migration rules. They were found guilty by the district courts (see the appendix), which ordered their administrative removal and placed them in detention pending expulsion without indicating any time-limits. Those judgments were subsequently upheld in full by the Moscow City Court after the Court had indicated the interim measures.35.\u00a0\u00a0The domestic judicial decisions ordering the applicants\u2019 detention pending expulsion contained no analysis of the particularities of the cases as regards the need for detention, and no estimation of how realistic the applicants\u2019 removal was in the light of the Rule 39 measure. Nor did those decisions set any time-limits for review of the continued validity of the applicants\u2019 detention. In the absence of scrutiny by the domestic courts of those decisive elements, the Court must conclude that it has not been demonstrated that the length of the applicants\u2019 detention pending expulsion was compliant with what was reasonably required for the purpose pursued.36.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (f) of the Convention in the cases B.U. v. Russia (no. 59609\/17) and I.N. v.\u00a0Russia (no.\u00a076379\/17).37.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the complaint in the case A.S. v. Russia (no. 74677\/17) about the absence of the relevant arrest records for the detention between 12\u00a0noon on 29 August 2017 and 9 a.m. on 30 August 2017, the Court notes that the Government in their observations provided no arguments or documents relevant to the issue, nor advanced an inadmissibility plea. It must be further observed that according to the prosecutor\u2019s letter of 1 June 2018, the applicant was indeed arrested and detained without the police drawing up the relevant arrest records.38.\u00a0\u00a0In the absence of any arguments or material capable of dispelling the applicant\u2019s allegations and having regard to its case-law on the matter, the Court finds that the applicant\u2019s detention between 12\u00a0noon on 29 August 2017 and 9 a.m. on 30 August 2017 without the relevant arrest records was incompatible with Article 5 of the Convention.39.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention in the case A.S. v. Russia.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 4 OF THE CONVENTION40.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants in the cases B.U. v. Russia (no. 59609\/17) and I.N.\u00a0v.\u00a0Russia (no.\u00a076379\/17) further complained that the length of the appeal proceedings in their cases against the detention orders of 12 January 2017 before the Nagatinskiy District Court of Moscow and of 1 June 2017 before the Chertanovskiy District Court of Moscow, respectively, had not complied with the \u201cspeediness\u201d requirement of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention. They also complained that they had not had at their disposal an effective procedure by which they could have challenged their continued detention. The relevant provisions of the Convention read as follows:\u201cEveryone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.\u201d41.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stated that those matters were the subject of the well-established case-law of the Court and that the documents submitted by the applicants were sufficient for a decision on the matter. They did not provide any further comments.42.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.43.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that in the case B.U. v. Russia the detention order of 12 January 2017 issued by the Nagatinskiy District Court of Moscow was upheld on appeal by the Moscow City Court on 14 June 2017, that is five months later. It further observes that in the case I.N. v. Russia the detention order of 1 June 2017 issued by the Chertanovskiy District Court of Moscow was upheld on appeal by the Moscow City Court on 27 June 2017, that is twenty-six days later.44.\u00a0\u00a0In the absence of any arguments capable of justifying the time taken to review the appeals and given that the applicants\u2019 liberty was at stake in the above-mentioned proceedings, the Court finds that the time taken to review the applicants\u2019 appeals against the detention orders was unreasonable in the light of the \u201cspeediness\u201d requirement under the Convention.45.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention in this regard.46.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the complaints concerning the absence of an effective procedure by which the applicants could have challenged their continued detention, the Court notes that these complaints were couched in general and abstract terms. At the same time, the Government in their observations did not provide any specific comments on the matter and considered it to be the subject of the Court\u2019s well-established case-law.47.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, having regard to the judgment in the case Azimov v.\u00a0Russia (no. 67474\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 150-55 and \u00a7\u00a7 160-74, 18\u00a0April 2013), the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention in this regard.IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF THE INTERIM MEASURES UNDER RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT48.\u00a0\u00a0On various dates the Court indicated to the respondent Government, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that the applicants should not be removed from Russia to their respective countries of origin for the duration of the proceedings before the Court.49.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, the Court reiterates that, in accordance with Article\u00a028 \u00a7 2 of the Convention, the present judgment is final.50.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court considers that the measures indicated to the Government under Rule\u00a039 of the Rules of Court in the cases B.U. v.\u00a0Russia, no. 59609\/17 and A.S. v. Russia, no. 74677\/17 come to an end.V.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION51.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage52.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) each in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.53.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stated that in the event of the Court finding a violation, any just satisfaction awarded to the applicants should be in compliance with the Court\u2019s well-established case-law.54.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the nature of the established violations of Article\u00a03 of the Convention in the cases B.U. v. Russia, no. 59609\/17 and A.S. v. Russia, no. 74677\/17 and the specific facts of the present case, the Court considers that its finding that there would be a violation of Article 3 of the Convention if the applicants were to be removed to their respective countries of origin constitutes sufficient just satisfaction in respect of any non-pecuniary damage suffered (see, to similar effect, J.K. and Others v.\u00a0Sweden [GC], no.\u00a059166\/12, \u00a7\u00a0127, ECHR 2016).55.\u00a0\u00a0At the same time, having regard to its conclusions under Article 5 of the Convention (see paragraphs 36, 39, 45 and 47 above) and acting on an equitable basis, the Court awards each applicant EUR 5,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses56.\u00a0\u00a0The applicants also claimed between EUR 2,520 and 2,880 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court.57.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not provide specific comments in this regard.58.\u00a0\u00a0Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case\u2011law, the Court considers it reasonable that the sums indicated in the appended table be awarded and that these sums should be payable directly to the applicants\u2019 representatives.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest59.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","31546":"I.\u00a0\u00a0THE GOVERNMENT\u2019S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION14.\u00a0\u00a0In their observations the Government noted that the representatives had failed to provide properly executed forms of authority at the moment of lodging the application with the Court and that raised doubts as to the applicant\u2019s awareness of the institution of proceedings on his behalf.15.\u00a0\u00a0The Government highlighted that the representatives failed to provide forms of authority when they requested an interim measure in their first letter to the Court. The representatives commented in their observations on behalf of the applicant that the arguments of the Government were unsubstantiated. The first letter concerned the applicant\u2019s imminent deportation on the same day, and in this letter the representatives specifically mentioned that under the circumstances it was impossible to provide forms of authority at that moment.16.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Rule 45 \u00a7 3 of the Rules of Court an applicant\u2019s representative should supply a duly completed and signed authority form at the moment of initiating proceedings at the Court. Further, in a number of cases in which the applicant had not been in contact with the Court directly, the Court has held that it is essential for representatives to demonstrate that they have received specific and explicit instructions from the alleged victims within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention on whose behalf they purport to act (see V.M. and Others v.\u00a0Belgium (striking out) [GC], no.\u00a060125\/11, \u00a7 35, 17 November 2016; Kaur v.\u00a0the Netherlands (dec.), no.\u00a035864\/11, \u00a7 14, 15 May 2012; K.M. and Others v.\u00a0Russia (dec.), no.\u00a046086\/07, 29\u00a0April 2010; and \u00c7etin v. Turkey (dec.), no.\u00a010449\/08, 13\u00a0September 2011).17.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the representatives failed to submit properly completed and signed forms of authority as required by the Rule\u00a045\u00a0\u00a7 3 of the Rules of Court in the application in respect of both representatives. However, the Court further notes that the representatives duly informed the Court of the instantaneous difficulties with submitting the forms in their first letter to the Court.18.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that a close cooperation between the representatives and the applicant has been demonstrated in the course of the proceedings. This fact has been manifested in the manner the representatives provided pertinent information, updates and documents on behalf of the applicant. The Court further observes that the Government have not disputed the subsequent contact of the representatives with the applicant either. The Court considers that the shortcomings linked with submission of proper forms of authority at the moment of lodging of the application can be accounted for by the urgency required for requesting interim measures as stipulated in Rule\u00a047 \u00a7 5.1 (a) and (b) of the Rules of Court.19.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the above, the Court dismisses the Russian Government\u2019s preliminary objection.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION20.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that the national authorities had failed to consider his claims that he could be at risk of ill-treatment in the event of his removal to Uzbekistan and that his removal would expose him to that risk. Article\u00a03 of the Convention reads:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201d21.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested those arguments. In particular they referred to the steps that Uzbek authorities took for improving the situation in respect of human rights in the country and to the assurances provided to the Russian authorities that the applicant would not be subject to torture or ill\u2011treatment.A.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility22.\u00a0\u00a0The Government argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust the available domestic remedies by pursuing refugee status or temporary asylum proceedings. In this respect the Court notes that the applicant raised his complaints under Article 3 of the Convention before the domestic courts that reviewed the lawfulness of his expulsion, but that these arguments were dismissed by the domestic courts (see the appended table). The Court is satisfied that the applicant had exhausted the domestic remedies by raising the relevant Article 3 claims in expulsion proceedings.23.\u00a0\u00a0 The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention.24.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. The application must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0General principles25.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant general principles concerning the application of Article\u00a03 have been summarised recently by the Court in the judgment in the case of F.G.\u00a0v. Sweden ([GC], no. 43611\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 111-27, ECHR 2016) and in the context of removals from Russia to Uzbekistan in Mamazhonov v.\u00a0Russia (no.\u00a017239\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 127-35, 23 October 2014).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of those principles to the present case(a)\u00a0\u00a0Existence of substantial grounds for believing that the applicant faces a real risk of ill-treatment26.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has previously established that the individuals whose extradition was sought by Uzbek authorities on charges of religiously or politically motivated crimes constituted a vulnerable group facing a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention in the event of their removal to Uzbekistan (see Mamazhonov, cited above, \u00a7 141).27.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present application, it is not disputed that in the course of the deportation proceedings the applicant consistently and specifically argued that he had been prosecuted for religious extremism and faced a risk of ill\u2011treatment. The extradition request submitted by the Uzbek authorities was clear as to its basis, namely that the applicant was accused of religiously and politically motivated crimes. The Uzbek authorities thus directly identified the applicant with the groups whose members have previously been found to be at real risk of being subjected to proscribed treatment.28.\u00a0\u00a0In such circumstances, the Court considers that the Russian authorities had at their disposal a sufficiently substantiated complaints pointing to a real risk of ill-treatment.29.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is therefore satisfied that the applicant presented the Russian authorities with substantial grounds for believing that he faced a real risk of ill-treatment in Uzbekistan.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Duty to assess claims of a real risk of ill-treatment through reliance on sufficient relevant material30.\u00a0\u00a0Having concluded that the applicant had advanced at national level valid claims based on substantial grounds for believing that he faced a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, the Court must examine whether the authorities discharged their obligation to assess these claims adequately through reliance on sufficient relevant material.31.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the present case, the Court considers that in the deportation proceedings the domestic authorities did not carry out a rigorous scrutiny of the applicant\u2019s claims that he faced a risk of ill\u2011treatment in his home country. The Court reaches this conclusion having considered the national courts\u2019 simplistic rejections of the applicant\u2019s claims.32.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that the Russian legal system \u2013 in theory, at least \u2013 offers several avenues whereby the applicant\u2019s removal to Uzbekistan could be prevented, given the risk of ill-treatment he faces there. However, the facts of the present application demonstrate that the applicant\u2019s claims were not adequately considered in any relevant proceedings, despite being consistently raised.33.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes that, although the applicant had sufficiently substantiated the claims that he would risk ill-treatment in Uzbekistan, the Russian authorities failed to assess these claims adequately through reliance on sufficient relevant material. This failure opened the way for the applicant\u2019s removal to Uzbekistan.(c)\u00a0\u00a0Existence of a real risk of ill-treatment or danger to life34.\u00a0\u00a0Given the failure of the domestic authorities to adequately assess the alleged real risk of ill-treatment through reliance on sufficient relevant material, the Court finds itself compelled to examine independently whether or not the applicant would be exposed to such a risk in the event of his removal to Uzbekistan.35.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that nothing in the parties\u2019 submissions, nor available relevant material from independent international sources such as recent Human Rights Watch World Report 2016 and Amnesty International\u2019s Submissions to the Council of Europe Committee Of Ministers: Garabayev v.\u00a0Russian Federation (No.38411\/02) Group of Cases, nor previously adopted judgments and decisions (see recently Kholmurodov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a058923\/14, 1 March 2016, and Mukhitdinov v. Russia, no.\u00a020999\/14, 19\u00a0October 2015), indicate that there has been any improvement in either the criminal justice system of Uzbekistan in general or in the specific treatment of those prosecuted for religiously and politically motivated crimes.36.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has given due consideration to the available material disclosing a real risk of ill-treatment to individuals accused, like the applicant, of religiously and politically motivated crimes, and concludes that by authorising the applicant\u2019s deportation the Russian authorities exposed his to a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.(d)\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion37.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that there would be a violation of Article 3 of the Convention if the applicant were to be removed to Uzbekistan.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 OF THE CONVENTION38.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further complained under Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(f) of the Convention of the unlawfulness of his detention pending deportation and of lack of foreseeability regarding its length. The relevant provisions of the Convention read as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law......(f)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.\u201d39.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested that argument and insisted that the applicant\u2019s detention was in full compliance with the national law.40.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the exception in sub-paragraph (f) of Article\u00a05 \u00a7 1 of the Convention requires only that \u201caction is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition\u201d without any further justification (see, among others, Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, \u00a7\u00a0112, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011V) and that deprivation of liberty will be justified as long as deportation or extradition proceedings are in progress (see A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no.\u00a03455\/05, \u00a7\u00a0164, ECHR 2009).41.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant\u2019s detention lasted at least a year. The applicant was placed in a temporary detention centre for aliens on 2\u00a0March 2016 and his detention was extended several times pending extradition. The applicant was released only on 13 March 2017. Nothing in the available materials or the parties\u2019 submissions indicates that the authorities pursued the proceedings with requisite diligence, what kind of progress was achieved in the proceedings or what steps were taken by the authorities at reasonable intervals to justify continuing detention.42.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes that it had not been demonstrated that the length of the applicant\u2019s detention pending deportation was compliant with what was reasonably required for the purpose pursued. Accordingly, there had been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION RIGHTS43.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant further complained under Article 13 of the Convention of a lack of effective domestic remedies in Russia in respect of his complaint under Article 3 of the Convention. The applicant also complained of a violation of his right to family life under Article 8 of the Convention.44.\u00a0\u00a0 However, having regard to the facts of the case, the submissions of the parties and its findings under Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention, the Court considers that it has examined the main legal questions raised in the present application and that there is no need to give a separate ruling on the remaining complaints (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v. Romania [GC], no.\u00a047848\/08, \u00a7 156, ECHR 2014 with further references).V.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF AN INTERIM MEASURE UNDER RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT45.\u00a0\u00a0On 2 March 2016 the Court indicated to the respondent Government, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that the applicant should not be extradited, expelled or otherwise involuntarily removed from Russia to Uzbekistan for the duration of the proceedings before the Court.46.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection the Court reiterates that, in accordance with Article\u00a028 \u00a7 2 of the Convention, the present judgment is final.47.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, the Court considers that the measures indicated to the Government under Rule\u00a039 of the Rules of Court come to an end.VI.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION48.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage49.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 5,000 euros (EUR) of non-pecuniary damage.50.\u00a0\u00a0The Government noted that finding a violation in the present application would in itself constitute sufficient just satisfaction for any non\u2011pecuniary damage allegedly suffered by the applicants.51.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the nature of the established violations of Article\u00a03 of the Convention and the specific facts of the present case, the Court considers that finding that there would be a violation of Article 3 of the Convention if the applicant were to be removed to Uzbekistan constitutes sufficient just satisfaction in respect of any non-pecuniary damage suffered (see, to similar effect, J.K. and Others v. Sweden [GC], no. 59166\/12, \u00a7\u00a0127, ECHR 2016).52.\u00a0\u00a0At the same time having regard to its conclusions under Article 5 of the Convention (see paragraph 42 above) and acting on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 5,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses53.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 5,200 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and the Court.54.\u00a0\u00a0The Government noted that no supporting documents were provided for the amount claimed for the costs and expenses and suggested the requested amount to be reduced.55.\u00a0\u00a0Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case\u2011law, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant the sum of EUR\u00a02,500 covering costs under all heads.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest56.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","31599":"I.\u00a0\u00a0SCOPE OF THE CASE\u00a0121.\u00a0\u00a0In addition to his complaints under Articles 3 and 5 \u00a7 1, the applicant alleged in his submissions to the Grand Chamber that he had had no effective legal remedy, in that the domestic courts had either held that they did not have jurisdiction to rule on his applications for discharge, or had refused to find that his detention was unlawful and had ordered that he remain in compulsory confinement. He considered that this amounted to a breach of Article 5 \u00a7 4 of the Convention.122.\u00a0\u00a0It is the Court\u2019s long-standing case-law that the scope of a case referred to the Grand Chamber under Article 43 of the Convention is determined by the Chamber\u2019s decision on admissibility (see, among many other authorities, Garib v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 43494\/09, \u00a7\u00a0100, 6\u00a0November 2017, with further references).123.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the complaint under Article 5 \u00a7 4 is a new complaint, raised for the first time before the Grand Chamber. It is thus not included in the Chamber\u2019s decision with regard to admissibility. It follows that the Court cannot examine it at this stage.II.\u00a0\u00a0WHETHER THE APPLICANT WAS A VICTIMA.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber judgment124.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the favourable outcome obtained by the applicant at first instance in the proceedings on the action for damages brought by him (see paragraph 55 above), the Chamber examined whether the applicant could still claim to be the victim of a possible violation of the Convention. It concluded that he could, for the reasons set out in paragraphs 65 to 70 of its judgment.B.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions125.\u00a0\u00a0Questioned by the Grand Chamber on whether the applicant had victim status, the parties set out their arguments on this point, particularly in the light of the treatment measures adopted after the Chamber judgment of 18 July 2017.126.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant considered, in particular, that the Chamber\u2019s findings remained valid. He added two further elements. Firstly, the efforts made to provide him with treatment were only temporary and amounted to statements of intent by the authorities. The rare periods when it had theoretically been possible to administer the treatment did not change the fact that he had been a victim during the much longer periods when he was effectively denied treatment. Secondly, the Belgian State had lodged an appeal against the Brussels Court of First Instance\u2019s decision of 9\u00a0September 2016 awarding him compensation, with the result that that decision could no longer have judicial effect.127.\u00a0\u00a0For their part, the Government stated that it was appropriate to consider that the applicant could no longer claim to be the victim of a violation of Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention. They argued, in particular, that the applicant\u2019s situation had developed favourably, as evidenced by the domestic court decisions delivered subsequent to the Chamber judgment of 18\u00a0July 2017. They did not dispute that it had been established by the domestic authorities that the applicant\u2019s conditions of detention during the periods in which he had not been cared for by German-speaking medical staff had been in breach of Article 3 of the Convention; however, they claimed that this violation had ended with the presence, since August 2017, of German-speaking professionals who provided psychological and psychiatric treatment and welfare assistance, and with the intervention of an interpreter on every occasion that this was necessary. They added that although it was not final, the Brussels Court of First Instance\u2019s judgment of 9 September 2016 had awarded compensation to the applicant. As to the allegations under Article 5, even supposing that the Grand Chamber found that the applicant\u2019s detention was unlawful, it should also be considered that this unlawfulness had come to an end following the introduction of the measures in question.C.\u00a0\u00a0The Grand Chamber\u2019s assessment128.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it falls first to the national authorities to redress any violation of the Convention and that in assessing whether an applicant can claim to be a genuine victim of an alleged violation, account should be taken not only of the formal position at the time when the application was lodged with the Court but of all the circumstances of the case in question, including any developments prior to the date of the examination of the case by the Court (see T\u0103nase v.\u00a0Moldova\u00a0[GC], no.\u00a07\/08, \u00a7 105, ECHR 2010).129.\u00a0\u00a0A decision or measure favourable to the applicant is not, in principle, sufficient to deprive him of his status as a \u201cvictim\u201d for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for the breach of the Convention (see Scordino v. Italy (no.\u00a01) [GC], no.\u00a036813\/97, \u00a7\u00a7 179-80, ECHR 2006\u2011V, and G\u00e4fgen v. Germany [GC], no.\u00a022978\/05, \u00a7 115, ECHR\u00a02010). Only where both these conditions have been satisfied does the subsidiary nature of the protective mechanism of the Convention preclude examination of the application.130.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the Court notes firstly that, by an order of 10\u00a0October 2014, the president of the French-language Brussels Court of First Instance held that the Belgian State was to appoint a German-speaking psychiatrist and medical auxiliary, subject to a penalty in the event of non\u2011compliance, and to provide the applicant with the treatment routinely provided to French-speaking detainees suffering from a similar mental disorder (see paragraph 52 above). It further notes that the same court awarded the applicant financial compensation, having noted in its judgment of 9\u00a0September 2016 that the failure to provide treatment commensurate to the applicant\u2019s mental condition amounted to negligence. It had added that the mere fact of having been detained for an indeterminate period without appropriate treatment amounted to a violation of Articles 3 and 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention (see paragraphs 55 and 56 above). The finding of a breach of Article 3 was repeated in the CPS\u2019s judgment of 27 December 2017 with regard to the periods prior to August 2017 when no treatment in the German language was available (see paragraph 64 above).131.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore considers that in the present case the domestic courts have explicitly recognised that there was a violation of Article 3 in respect of the period before August 2017, and that there was a violation of Article 5 in respect of the period until 9 September 2016. With regard to the remainder of the period in issue, there has been no explicit acknowledgement of a violation of the Convention.132.\u00a0\u00a0As to whether there has been \u201cappropriate\u201d and \u201csufficient\u201d redress, the Court notes that it is true that, following communication of the application and then the Chamber judgment, the national courts adopted decisions favourable to the applicant, by ordering that German-speaking professionals be made available and by awarding him, at first instance, financial compensation. However, the Court cannot ignore the fact that this availability took tangible form for only a few months in 2010, then in 2014\u20112015, and at the end of 2017-beginning of 2018, nor that the situation giving rise to the application dates back to the beginning of the applicant\u2019s compulsory confinement and had been noted by the CDS as early as 2006 (see, mutatis mutandis, Y.Y. v. Turkey, no. 14793\/08, \u00a7\u00a7 52-55, ECHR\u00a02015 (extracts)). In addition, the financial compensation awarded covers only the period from January 2010 to October 2014. It cannot therefore be considered as complete, especially since the first-instance judgment of 9\u00a0September 2016 is not final, an appeal has been lodged against it, and the proceedings were still pending before the Brussels Court of Appeal on the date of adoption of the present judgment (see paragraphs 58-59 above).133.\u00a0\u00a0In consequence, the Court concludes that the applicant has not lost his victim status in respect of the alleged violations of Articles\u00a03\u00a0and\u00a05, within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION134.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that his compulsory confinement without psychological and psychiatric treatment in the social protection facility in which he had been placed, and the total lack of any prospects of improvement in his situation on account of this absence of treatment, amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention, which reads:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber judgment135.\u00a0\u00a0In its judgment, the Chamber reasoned as follows (paragraphs\u00a091\u201193):\u201c91.\u00a0\u00a0... taking into account the fact that German is one of the three official languages in Belgium, the Court finds that the national authorities did not provide adequate treatment for the applicant\u2019s health condition. The fact that he was continuously detained in the Paifve EDS for thirteen years without appropriate medical support or any realistic prospect of change thus subjected him to particularly acute hardship, causing him distress of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention.92.\u00a0\u00a0Whatever obstacles the applicant may have created by his own conduct \u2013 as pointed out by the Government \u2013 the Court considers that this did not dispense the State from fulfilling its obligations towards him.93.\u00a0\u00a0In those circumstances, and as the president of the French-language Brussels Court of First Instance and that court itself also noted in the order of 10 October 2014 and the judgment of 9 September 2016 respectively ..., the Court concludes that the applicant was subjected to degrading treatment on account of his continued detention ... in the period from his admission to the Paifve EDS on 21 January 2004 until now, with the exception of two periods when he had access to a German-speaking psychologist, from May to November 2010 and from July 2014 to the end of 2015.\u201dB.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant136.\u00a0\u00a0Before the Grand Chamber, the applicant alleged that there was nothing to justify departing from the Chamber\u2019s assessment that he had been subjected to degrading treatment. He added that the authorities\u2019 failure to provide him with adequate therapeutic care for his mental health concerned the entirety of his period in compulsory confinement and was still continuing on the day of the hearing before the Court. He also submitted that the treatment offered to him had been ineffective even during the period in which he had had access to German-speaking staff, that is, from May to November 2010, from July 2014 to the end of 2015, and following the Chamber judgment. Lastly, he claimed that the therapeutic measures envisaged for him after 18 July 2017 were merely a statement of intent by the authorities and had not become a tangible reality.137.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant did not complain that the Paifve facility as such was unsuited to his mental health condition and his profile. He alleged that he, as an individual, did not receive any treatment on the grounds that the institution in which he was detained, located as it was in the French\u2011speaking region of Belgium, did not employ any medical personnel who spoke German, one of the official languages in Belgium and the only language in which he could communicate with ease. He considered that, as a result, and in the absence of any prospect of an improvement in his situation, his mental health had deteriorated. In his view, the measures taken for his care after August 2017 amounted only to expressions of intent and were not therefore effective (see paragraphs 126 and 136 above).2.\u00a0\u00a0The Government138.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not dispute the lack of German-speaking medical personnel within the Paifve facility, nor the difficulty in providing therapeutic support for the applicant\u2019s mental-health problems. However, they submitted that there was no causal link between these two elements, and that the difficulties in treating the applicant were due to the form of illness from which he suffered and his lack of cooperation with the care team. Before the Grand Chamber, they argued that, since his admission to the Paifve EDS, the applicant had received treatment corresponding to his needs and adapted to his condition. Moreover, he had not been deprived of all form of communication, since he had regular meetings with a German\u2011speaking nurse and welfare officer. Relying on the findings of the CSDS and the Court of Cassation (see paragraphs 34-37 above), they argued that the language problem on no account meant that the necessary treatment had not been administered. In this connection, they emphasised that the CDS itself, in its decision of 24 January 2014, had reached the same conclusion. In fact, the applicant refused to collaborate with the care team. Moreover, he had failed to indicate what treatment had not been offered or administered to him. The applicant had not made any request for psychological care, complained to his doctors or requested psychotropic medication. It was apparent, especially from the psychiatric reports, that there was no causal link between the lack of German-speaking staff in the Paifve EDS and the fact that there had been no progress in the applicant\u2019s mental health.139.\u00a0\u00a0The Government added that following the Chamber judgment, that is, since August 2017, fresh efforts had been made to provide the applicant with individualised medical treatment in German.140.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, the applicant had adduced no evidence of deterioration in his health. On the contrary, his condition was very stable.C.\u00a0\u00a0The Grand Chamber\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Recapitulation of the relevant principles141.\u00a0\u00a0As the Court has repeatedly stated, Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic society (see Bouyid\u00a0v.\u00a0Belgium [GC], no 23380\/09, \u00a7 81, ECHR 2015). It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim\u2019s behaviour. In order for treatment to fall within the scope of that provision it must attain a minimum level of severity. The assessment of this minimum is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim. Treatment is considered to be \u201cdegrading\u201d when it arouses in the victim feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking his or her moral and physical resistance, or when it is such as to drive the victim to act against his or her will or conscience. Although the question whether the purpose of the treatment is to humiliate or debase the victim is a factor to be taken into account, the absence of any such purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of violation of Article\u00a03 (see\u00a0Stanev\u00a0v.\u00a0Bulgaria [GC], no. 36760\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 201-03, ECHR 2012, with further references).142.\u00a0\u00a0Measures depriving persons of their liberty inevitably involve an element of suffering and humiliation.143.\u00a0\u00a0That being stated, Article 3 requires the State to ensure that all prisoners are detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for their human dignity, that the manner of their detention does not subject them to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in such a measure and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, their health and well-being are adequately secured by, among other things, providing them with the requisite medical assistance (see Stanev, cited above, \u00a7 204). The Court has emphasised that persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and that the authorities are under a duty to protect them (see Enache v. Romania, no. 10662\/06, \u00a7\u00a049, 1\u00a0April 2014; M.C. v. Poland, no. 23692\/09, \u00a7 88, 3 March 2015; and A.\u015e.\u00a0v.\u00a0Turkey, no. 58271\/10, \u00a7 66, 13 September 2016).144.\u00a0\u00a0The Convention does not contain any provision relating specifically to the situation of persons deprived of their liberty, let alone where they are ill, but it cannot be ruled out that the detention of a person who is ill may raise issues under Article 3 (see Matencio v. France, no. 58749\/00, \u00a7\u00a076, 15\u00a0January 2004). In particular, the Court has held that the suffering which flows from naturally occurring illness, whether physical or mental, may in itself be covered by Article 3, where it is, or risks being, exacerbated by conditions of detention for which the authorities can be held responsible (see, in particular, H\u00fcseyin Y\u0131ld\u0131r\u0131m v. Turkey, no. 2778\/02, \u00a7 73, 3\u00a0May 2007, and G\u00fclay \u00c7etin v. Turkey, no. 44084\/10, \u00a7 101, 5 March 2013). Hence, the detention of a person who is ill in inappropriate physical and medical conditions may in principle amount to treatment contrary to Article\u00a03 (see Kud\u0142a v. Poland [GC], no. 30210\/96, \u00a7 94, ECHR 2000\u2011XI; Rivi\u00e8re\u00a0v.\u00a0France, no. 33834\/03, \u00a7 74, 11 July 2006; and Claes, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a094\u201197).145.\u00a0\u00a0In determining whether the detention of an ill person is compatible with Article 3 of the Convention, the Court takes into consideration the individual\u2019s health and the effect of the manner of execution of his or her detention on it (see, among other authorities, Matencio, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a076\u201177, and G\u00fclay \u00c7etin, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 102 and 105). It has held that the conditions of detention must under no circumstances arouse in the person\u00a0 deprived of his liberty feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing him and possibly breaking his physical and moral resistance (see Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803\/94, \u00a7\u00a099, ECHR\u00a01999\u2011V). On this point, it has recognised that detainees with mental disorders are more vulnerable than ordinary detainees, and that certain requirements of prison life pose a greater risk that their health will suffer, exacerbating the risk that they suffer from a feeling of inferiority, and are necessarily a source of stress and anxiety. It considers that such a situation calls for an increased vigilance in reviewing whether the Convention has been complied with (see S\u0142awomir Musia\u0142 v. Poland, no. 28300\/06, \u00a7\u00a096, 20\u00a0January 2009; see also Claes, cited above, \u00a7 101). In addition to their vulnerability, the assessment of the situation of these particular individuals has to take into consideration, in certain cases, the vulnerability of those persons and, in some cases, their inability to complain coherently or at all about how they are being affected by any particular treatment (see, for example, Herczegfalvy v. Austria, 24 September 1992, \u00a7\u00a082, Series\u00a0A\u00a0no.\u00a0244; Aerts v. Belgium, 30 July 1998, \u00a7 66, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-V; and Murray v. the Netherlands [GC], no.\u00a010511\/10, \u00a7 106, 26 April 2016).146.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also takes account of the adequacy of the medical assistance and care provided in detention (see Stanev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0204; Rivi\u00e8re, cited above, \u00a7 63; and S\u0142awomir Musia\u0142, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a085\u201188). A lack of appropriate medical care for persons in custody is therefore capable of engaging a State\u2019s responsibility under Article 3 (see Naoumenko v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 42023\/98, \u00a7 112, 10 February 2004, and Murray, cited above, \u00a7 105). In addition, it is not enough for such detainees to be examined and a diagnosis made; instead, it is essential that proper treatment for the problem diagnosed should also be provided (see Claes, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a094-97, and Murray, cited above, \u00a7 106), by qualified staff (see Keenan v.\u00a0the\u00a0United Kingdom, no. 27229\/95, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0115\u201116, ECHR\u00a02001\u2011III, and G\u00fclay \u00c7etin, cited above, \u00a7 112).147.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, the \u201cadequacy\u201d of medical assistance remains the most difficult element to determine. The Court reiterates that the mere fact that a detainee has been seen by a doctor and prescribed a certain form of treatment cannot automatically lead to the conclusion that the medical assistance was adequate. The authorities must also ensure that a comprehensive record is kept concerning the detainee\u2019s state of health and his or her treatment while in detention, that diagnosis and care are prompt and accurate, and that where necessitated by the nature of a medical condition supervision is regular and systematic and involves a comprehensive therapeutic strategy aimed at adequately treating the detainee\u2019s health problems or preventing their aggravation, rather than addressing them on a symptomatic basis. The authorities must also show that the necessary conditions were created for the prescribed treatment to be actually followed through. Furthermore, medical treatment provided within prison facilities must be appropriate, that is, at a level comparable to that which the State authorities have committed themselves to provide to the population as a whole. Nevertheless, this does not mean that every detainee must be guaranteed the same level of medical treatment that is available in the best health establishments outside prison facilities (see Blokhin\u00a0v.\u00a0Russia\u00a0[GC], no. 47152\/06, \u00a7 137, 23 March 2016, with further references).148.\u00a0\u00a0Where the treatment cannot be provided in the place of detention, it must be possible to transfer the detainee to hospital or to a specialised unit (see Raffray Taddei v. France, no. 36435\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 58-59, 21 December 2010; see also, conversely, Kud\u0142a, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 82-100, and Cocaign v.\u00a0France, no.\u00a032010\/07, 3 November 2011).2.\u00a0\u00a0Application of these principles to the present case149.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes, firstly, that the existence of the mental-health problems at the origin of the applicant\u2019s compulsory confinement has not been disputed. He was placed in compulsory confinement on the basis of several medical reports certifying that he had a narcissistic and paranoid personality and that he suffered from a severe mental disorder making him incapable of controlling his actions. It is for this reason that the applicant has been detained on a continuous basis in the Paifve EDS since 21\u00a0January 2004.150.\u00a0\u00a0Further, in contrast to other applicants who raised similar complaints in previous cases against Belgium (see, for example, Claes, cited above, and Lankester v. Belgium, no. 22283\/10, 9 January 2014), the applicant does not complain that the Paifve facility is inappropriate for persons placed in compulsory confinement, but alleges that, as a result of a language problem, he was not receiving the treatment that ought to have been provided to him (see paragraph\u00a0137 above).151.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes at the outset that the possibility for a patient to be treated by staff who speak his or her language, even where it is an official language of the State, is not an established ingredient of the right enshrined in Article\u00a03, or in any other Convention provision, particularly with regard to the provision of appropriate care to individuals who have been deprived of their liberty. Taking into account the language difficulties encountered by the medical authorities, the Court must examine whether, in parallel with other factors, necessary and reasonable steps were taken to guarantee communication that would facilitate the effective administration of appropriate treatment. In the area of psychiatric treatment in relation to Article 3, the purely linguistic element could prove to be decisive as to the availability or the administration of appropriate treatment, but only where other factors do not make it possible to offset the lack of communication and, in particular, subject to cooperation by the individual concerned (see, mutatis mutandis, Dhoest v. Belgium, no. 10448\/83, Commission report of 14\u00a0May 1987, Decisions and Reports (DR), \u00a7 124, a case in which the applicant spoke Dutch, one of the official languages of the State, and was placed in a social-protection facility in the French-speaking region of Belgium).152.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will now examine the applicant\u2019s complaint in two stages, taking account of the therapeutic package which, according to the Government, has been in place since August 2017.(a)\u00a0\u00a0The treatment situation from the beginning of 2004 to August 2017153.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the Government\u2019s argument to the effect that the applicant received care corresponding to his needs is not factually correct. On the contrary, all the evidence in the case file would indicate a failure to provide therapeutic treatment resulting from the fact that it was impossible for the medical staff and the applicant to communicate. Thus, contrary to the Government\u2019s affirmations in their observations before the Grand Chamber, namely that the applicant had been provided with sufficient psychiatric treatment (see paragraphs 68 and 138 above), it appears clearly from the case file that both the psychiatrists who were in contact with the applicant and the judicial authorities acknowledged the lack of treatment. They made it sufficiently clear from September 2005 onwards that the applicant was in particular need of long-term psycho\u2011pharmacological and psycho-therapeutic treatment, to be administered in German, the only language that he spoke and understood (see paragraph 14 above). The language barrier was the sole factor limiting the applicant\u2019s effective access to the treatment that was normally available (see paragraphs 18, 23, 25, 29, 40, 51 and 55 above). The Court further notes that attempts were made from 2006 onwards to find therapeutic support, in German, outside the Paifve facility (see paragraphs\u00a016,\u00a021\u201122 and 25-26 above). On several occasions the applicant\u2019s applications for discharge were postponed by the CDS on account of the difficulty in beginning therapy as a result of the language problem (see paragraphs\u00a016, 19, 22 and 26 above). The report of 27\u00a0March 2015 stated that the applicant\u2019s neuropsychological condition was practically identical to what it had been in 2009 (see paragraph 44 above). In its report of 12 January 2017, the Paifve EDS\u2019s psychosocial team stated that this language barrier had prevented clinical observation aimed at assessing the applicant\u2019s dangerousness (see paragraph 60 above). Lastly, the CPS acknowledged that there had been a violation of Article 3 during those periods when he was not being treated by German-speaking medical staff (see paragraph\u00a064 above).154.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the applicant was admittedly able to meet qualified German-speaking staff during the period in question. However, as emphasised by the CDS itself, that contact, whether with the experts at Verviers Prison or with the German-speaking nurse and welfare officer in Paifve, was not in a therapeutic context (see paragraphs 20, 21 and 25\u201129 above). Only the contact with an external German-speaking psychologist between May and November 2010 (see paragraph 51 above) corresponds to the treatment referred to by the Government; however, viewed in relation to the overall duration of the applicant\u2019s deprivation of liberty, these consultations cannot be regarded as a real provision of treatment, especially since they came to an end as a result of the State\u2019s failure to pay the relevant fees and expenses. In addition, there is nothing in the case file to suggest that psychiatric treatment or individualised care was provided during this period, particularly in the light of the indefinite duration of the applicant\u2019s placement.155.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, with regard to the Government\u2019s statement that the applicant had failed to produce any real evidence to substantiate his allegations or to indicate what treatment had not been provided or offered to him (see paragraph 138 above), the Court notes that the applicant complained to the social-protection bodies about the failure to provide treatment and about the impact on his health of the lack of any prospect of a change in his situation (see paragraph 27 above). The Court has already repeatedly rejected such a formalistic approach and emphasised that the assessment of whether the treatment or punishment concerned is incompatible with the standards of Article 3 has, in the case of mentally ill persons, to take into consideration their vulnerability and their inability, in some cases, to complain coherently or at all about how they are being affected by any particular treatment (see Claes, cited above, \u00a7 93; Murray, cited above, \u00a7 106; and W.D., cited above, \u00a7 105).156.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the social protection bodies took measures to find a solution to the problem raised in the applicant\u2019s particular case (see paragraphs 24 and 26 above). However, those sporadic efforts were thwarted by the authorities\u2019 failure to take appropriate measures to bring about a change in the situation with regard to communication. It was not until the CSDS\u2019s decision and the order by the president of the French\u2011language Brussels Court of First Instance in 2014 that practical measures, which had nonetheless been recommended for years, were taken, such as the provision of a German-speaking psychologist (see paragraphs\u00a043 and 51 above). However, it appears that this arrangement ceased towards the end of 2015 (see paragraph 53 above), and only resumed in August 2017 (see paragraph 64 above). It is clear that the delay in putting in place measures that would facilitate communication with the applicant had the effect of depriving him of the treatment required by his health condition. Moreover, the Government have not argued that other elements in the applicant\u2019s medical care compensated for the absence of communication in German, and the Court is unable to identify any measure to that effect in the case file. In particular, it considers that the contact with the welfare assistant and the meetings with the nurse cannot be considered as a compensatory measure for that purpose: the role played by these individuals, while important in terms of providing support to the applicant, did not take place in the context of psychotherapeutic treatment. In the Court\u2019s view, the only methods envisaged by the authorities to remedy the problem of communication with the applicant consisted in seeking out either care staff who themselves spoke German, or another facility, and both of these approaches were unsuccessful (see paragraph 40 above). Indeed, the authorities themselves noted that neither of these two solutions was achievable, since, on the one hand, they considered that no German\u2011speaking staff were available, and, on the other, the applicant\u2019s dangerousness ruled out his placement in a less secure German-speaking facility. Thus, it seems that throughout this entire period the authorities responsible for the applicant were content with the excuse that there were no German-speaking specialists in the Paifve facility to justify the fact that he was not receiving appropriate treatment.157.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that these elements are sufficient to demonstrate that the national authorities failed to provide treatment for the applicant\u2019s health condition. His continued detention in the Paifve EDS without a realistic hope of change and without appropriate medical support for a period of about thirteen years must accordingly \u2013 in spite of the few consultations organised over a few short periods throughout this entire period \u2013 be viewed as particularly acute hardship, causing him distress of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention.158.\u00a0\u00a0Whatever the obstacles, mentioned by the Government, which the applicant might himself have created through his behaviour, the Court considers that these did not dispense the State from its obligations towards the applicant over such a lengthy period of deprivation of liberty. Furthermore, the Court cannot overlook the worrying findings reached more generally by the Paifve Supervisory Board and the CPT, both of which found profound shortcomings in the care system in the Paifve EDS (see paragraphs 115 and 120 above).159.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore concludes that there was a violation of Article\u00a03 of the Convention in respect of the period from the beginning of 2004 to August 2017.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The treatment situation since August 2017160.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to the development of the situation from August 2017 onwards, the Court takes note of several elements.161.\u00a0\u00a0To begin with, regarding the monthly meetings with a German-speaking psychologist (see paragraphs 67 and 74 above), the Court notes that the parties have submitted different factual accounts. At the hearing before the Grand Chamber, the applicant\u2019s representatives stated that the last meeting with this psychologist had taken place in February 2018 and that in any event these meetings did not take place in a therapeutic context. The Government disputed those statements. Neither party submitted written evidence in support of their allegations on this point. Even supposing that the applicant did not meet with the psychologist between March and May 2018 the Court considers that the interval of ten months between the start of implementation of the new measures in August 2017 and the hearing before the Court of 6 June 2018 is not sufficient to allow the conclusion that the psychological treatment undertaken was not appropriate in the applicant\u2019s case.162.\u00a0\u00a0Furthermore, a German-speaking psychiatrist has apparently been contacted and has expressed her willingness to provide treatment at any time. Arrangements have been made to ensure the presence of an interpreter for the monthly meetings with a general practitioner and for all the other treatment measures where this is considered necessary. Lastly, a multidisciplinary meeting of the care team, attended by the applicant and an interpreter, was held on 25 November 2017. These measures may be considered as corresponding, in principle, to the concept of \u201cappropriate treatment\u201d (see paragraph 146 above).163.\u00a0\u00a0Concerning psychiatric care in particular, it would admittedly appear that a German-speaking psychiatrist was merely made available, and the lack of more advanced initiatives by the authorities to propose a therapeutic schedule may be considered regrettable. However, neither the material in the case file nor the applicant\u2019s statements indicate that he asked to take advantage of the proposed psychiatric consultation and that the medical authorities refused to give effect to such a request.164.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is mindful of the fact that the applicant is a vulnerable individual on account of his health condition and his detention, that his cooperation is only one factor to be taken into account in assessing the effectiveness of the required treatment and that the duty to provide suitable care on the basis of individualised treatment lies primarily with the relevant authorities. Nonetheless, he enjoyed, all through the proceedings, effective legal assistance and his allegations have been made both before the Court and in the multiple domestic proceedings in which he has requested, over many years, access to German-speaking health professionals. Thus, in the particular circumstances of this case, the applicant, assisted by a lawyer throughout the domestic proceedings, could have shown himself open to the attempts by the Belgian authorities to respond to the Chamber\u2019s finding of a violation by proposing therapeutic measures in his language.165.\u00a0\u00a0It therefore appears to the Court that the applicant has clearly understood the need to submit to psychiatric treatment in order to secure his release, and he has argued before the Grand Chamber that he is open to treatment provided that it is administered in German; at the same time, however, he has not explained in what way the proposed treatment is not effective, but has merely stated that the psychiatrist has only made herself \u201cavailable\u201d. In the absence of specific allegations in this regard, the Court therefore considers that the applicant has not cooperated sufficiently and has not been receptive to the proposed treatment. In this connection, it considers it appropriate to reiterate that the applicant is admittedly entitled to refuse to accept the treatment proposed to him, as is also made clear in Recommendation Rec(2004)10 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to the member States concerning the protection of human rights and the dignity of persons with mental disorders (see paragraph\u00a0119 above; see, in particular, the explanatory memorandum concerning Article\u00a017, point 133), but that, by refusing to cooperate, he risks reducing the prospects of an improvement in his health and, in consequence, of discharge, since he will only be able to benefit from such a decision if the assessments show that he no longer poses a danger to society.166.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, although the authorities can be criticised for a considerable delay in taking measures to ensure that the applicant was provided with adequate treatment, a delay which has led the Court to find a violation of Article 3 for the period from the beginning of 2004 to August 2017 (see paragraphs 153-159 above), it seems that they have nonetheless shown a real willingness to remedy the situation since the Chamber judgment, by undertaking tangible measures. In this context, the applicant\u2019s lack of receptivity to the proposed arrangements for psychiatric treatment cannot be imputed to the authorities, regard being had also to the fact that the short period which has elapsed since this change makes it impossible to evaluate the impact of these arrangements. The Court therefore concludes that, although there exist certain organisational shortcomings in the proposed package of measures, the threshold of severity required to bring Article 3 into play has not been reached in respect of the applicant\u2019s allegations concerning the period subsequent to August 2017.167.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of all these considerations, the Court finds that there has been no violation of Article 3 under this head.168.\u00a0\u00a0It wishes to stress, however, that this finding does not release the Government from their obligation to continue to take all the necessary steps in order to put in place, without delay, the indicated medical support, on the basis of individualised and appropriate therapeutic care (see, mutatis mutandis, De Schepper v. Belgium, no. 27428\/07, \u00a7 48, 13 October 2009).IV.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION169.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also alleged that his detention was not lawful in that he was not receiving the psychological and psychiatric treatment necessitated by his mental condition. He relied on Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, the relevant parts of which provide:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:...(e)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;...\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber judgment170.\u00a0\u00a0In this regard, the Chamber held:\u201c102.\u00a0\u00a0[The Court] ... notes that, in contrast to the leading cases ... the applicant is detained in a social-protection institution that is in principle appropriate to his mental health condition and his degree of dangerousness...103.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has also found, under Article 3 of the Convention, that he has not been provided with appropriate care in that institution and has been held in unsuitable conditions for thirteen years, in breach of Article 3 ...\u00a0That being stated, the Court also reiterates its established case-law to the effect that, as long as a person\u2019s detention as a mental health patient takes place in a hospital, clinic or other appropriate institution, the adequacy of the treatment or regime is not a matter for examination under Article\u00a05 \u00a7 1 (e) of the Convention (see Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, 24\u00a0October 1979, \u00a7\u00a051, Series A no. 33; Ashingdane, cited above, \u00a7 44; and Stanev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0147). In the present case, there has at all times been a link between the reason for the applicant\u2019s detention and his mental illness. The failure to provide appropriate care, for reasons unconnected with the actual nature of the institution in which the applicant was held, did not break that link and did not render his detention unlawful (see\u00a0Ashingdane, cited above, \u00a7 49).104.\u00a0\u00a0In conclusion, there has been no violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1.\u201dB.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions1.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant171.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant considered that the Court was called upon to resolve a \u201cserious question\u201d with regard to the consistency of its case-law, posed, in his view, by a discrepancy between the Chamber judgment adopted in his case and the judgment delivered in the Lorenz v. Austria case (no. 11537\/11, judgment of 20 July 2017). In particular, he claimed that the finding adopted in the present case was at odds not only with that in the Lorenz case, but also with previous case-law to the effect that detention that was ordered and extended because of an alleged risk of reoffending was incompatible with Article 5 \u00a7 1 if, as part of that detention, the individual concerned did not receive any treatment or undergo psychiatric assessments to determine and reduce his dangerousness (he referred to Osterm\u00fcnchner v.\u00a0Germany, no. 36035\/04, \u00a7 74, 22 March 2012; H.W. v.\u00a0Germany, no.\u00a017167\/11, \u00a7 112, 19 September 2013; and Klinkenbu\u00df v.\u00a0Germany, no.\u00a053157\/11, \u00a7 47, 25 February 2016). He submitted that, as interpreted by the Court in these judgments, Article 5 \u00a7 1 (e) placed an obligation on the authorities to put in place a regime and\/or treatment for the effective administration of appropriate medical care, intended in particular to improve the psychiatric health of the person concerned, reduce his or her dangerousness to society, and give tangible form to a hope of release. He noted that without such an obligation, he would undoubtedly find himself in an inextricable situation, doomed to remain in compulsory confinement until his dying day.172.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to his individual situation, the applicant complained of a total absence of treatment, as evidenced by several psychiatric reports, and a resultant deterioration in his mental health. In his view, the deprivation of liberty to which he was subjected could be justified only by the fact of receiving therapy, and yet he was not receiving any treatment on account of a language barrier.173.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to the treatment described by the Government, the applicant specified that he had met the German-speaking welfare officer on only two or three occasions, and that she had stopped meeting him because she did not receive payment for this. As for the Dutch-language nurse who spoke German, he had left the Paifve EDS in 2012. The applicant added that, in any event, he needed to see a German-speaking psychologist and psychiatrist, as the CSDS had acknowledged in its decision of 22 July 2014.174.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also submitted that it was incorrect to state that he had refused treatment: in reality, he had never been offered therapeutic treatment or meetings, as confirmed by the CSDS\u2019s findings in its decision of 22 July 2014. The individuals he had met in Verviers Prison in 2007 were only responsible for preparing an expert report, and there had thus been no therapeutic dimension to these meetings. The authorities had been aware of the applicant\u2019s situation since the start of his compulsory confinement, and yet they had never done anything to remedy it.175.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, the applicant considered that the Paifve facility was not fulfilling its duty towards him, since no one was able to provide him with treatment in German, the only language he understood and spoke and which was, furthermore, one of the three official languages in Belgium. He concluded that the Paifve EDS was not therefore an \u201cappropriate institution\u201d, contrary to the Chamber\u2019s finding.176.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that, in the light of the Court\u2019s case-law, his situation ought to be regarded as \u201cunlawful\u201d detention for the purposes of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (e). His compulsory confinement ought to have the dual purpose of putting in place therapeutic treatment to reduce his dangerousness and of permitting his reintegration into society. Compulsory confinement had necessarily to be accompanied by appropriate treatment; in the absence of such treatment, the health condition of the individual in compulsory confinement could never improve, nor, in consequence, could he or she apply for discharge under Belgian law.177.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant argued that, contrary to the conclusions in the decision by the CPS at the court responsible for the execution of sentences of 27 December 2017 and in the Court of Cassation\u2019s judgment of 28\u00a0February 2018 (see paragraphs 64 and 65 above), the fact that the authorities had expressed an intention to provide him with appropriate treatment did not suffice to compensate for the shortcomings in treatment throughout his detention since the beginning of 2004, which had been noted on several occasions by the relevant authorities. At the hearing on 6 June 2018, the applicant\u2019s lawyers had stated that, contrary to the Government\u2019s submissions (see paragraph 69 above), the monthly meetings with the psychologist had not taken place since February 2018 and the applicant had had no news from her since that time. No proposals for treatment had been presented or explained to the applicant, and given his mental health, it was for the Belgian State to provide him with the necessary care rather than to impose on him responsibility for organising that care. In fulfilling the obligations arising under Article 5 \u00a7 1 (e), it was not sufficient simply to make a psychiatrist available to the applicant and suggest to him that he contact her when he wished.178.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, there was nothing in the case file to support the assertion that, in practice, the applicant\u2019s dangerous behaviour had persisted and that his continued placement in compulsory confinement was justified. On the contrary, the various reports by the Paifve EDS\u2019s psychological and welfare service had noted his good conduct; he had never had problems with the staff or the other detainees and had never been the subject of a report or disciplinary proceedings. He worked calmly in the Paifve EDS and had made progress in terms of social interaction and conviviality. The applicant had also confirmed to his lawyer on 25 July 2014 that he was willing to meet persons who were qualified to assess and help him.179.\u00a0\u00a0In conclusion, the Belgian State had not fulfilled its obligation under Article 5 \u00a7 1 (e) to the applicant, who had been left since the beginning of his compulsory confinement in the Paifve EDS, where his case had been ignored in such a way that the necessary link between the purpose of the compulsory confinement and the grounds for the long-term deprivation of liberty had been severed.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Government180.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stated that the Paifve EDS was an institution specialising in treating persons in compulsory confinement, including those suffering from the applicant\u2019s pathology, and that he had never challenged the actual quality of the care provided in it. The applicant was not being treated with any particular medicinal drug, as it was acknowledged that there was no pharmacological treatment for his condition. In contrast, the medical professionals stressed the need for a structured environment such as that in Paifve, in order to avoid any upsets or risk of psychological decompensation. Furthermore, the appropriate nature of the Paifve EDS was demonstrated by the fact that the applicant\u2019s health had remained stable, and by the beneficial effect on his behaviour of the structure provided in it.181.\u00a0\u00a0Relying on Dr B.\u2019s findings of 28 August 2014, the Government emphasised that the fact that treatment had been provided essentially in French did not mean that the link between the reasons for the applicant\u2019s compulsory confinement and his illness had been severed, given that a positive outcome had been unrealistic (see paragraph 50 above). The German-speaking nurse had provided dedicated support to the applicant throughout his compulsory confinement, even after the former\u2019s retirement, and this therapeutic relationship had been facilitated by the Belgian State.182.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, the Government recognised that Article\u00a05 required that compulsory confinement serve a therapeutic purpose in addition to that of the protection of society. However, they argued that the obligation to provide care contained in that provision was not an obligation to produce a particular result, since other factors, such as the nature of the disorders and the cooperation of the individuals concerned, had to be taken into account. They invited the Court to consider the present case in the same manner as the De Schepper case, in which it had concluded that the Belgian authorities had not failed to comply with their obligation to provide suitable treatment, since the efforts made by them had proved unsuccessful on account of the evolution in the applicant\u2019s condition and the fact that it was impossible for the institutions approached to treat him (they referred to De\u00a0Schepper, cited above, \u00a7 48). In this connection, they stressed that the problem at the origin of the present case stemmed from the fact that the applicant was a German speaker and had a \u201chigh-risk\u201d profile, and that no German-speaking institution in Belgium was able to accept individuals with that profile.183.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of those considerations, the Government invited the Court to distinguish between the present case and that of Lorenz, referred to by the applicant (see paragraph 171 above).184.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to the issue of continued compulsory confinement, the Government submitted that the numerous expert assessments carried out had unanimously concluded that the lack of progress in the applicant\u2019s situation did not permit his release. Nonetheless, they specified that the prospect of discharge had never been ruled out, provided that the applicant could propose a suitable project and there was no contraindication to his release. In this connection, they added that the applicant was not cooperating with the health services, which was making it impossible to conduct an expert assessment to determine the prospects for his reintegration. For example, he had refused to permit the German-speaking psychologist from outside the Paifve EDS, with whom he had been meeting regularly since August 2017, to transmit information to the psychosocial team responsible for carrying out this assessment (see paragraph 73 above).185.\u00a0\u00a0The Government added that, in any event, even assuming that the absence of treatment in German had severed the link between the compulsory confinement and the illness at its origin, which had not been the case here, there was still reason to consider, as the CPS at the Li\u00e8ge Court responsible for the execution of sentences had done in its judgment of 27\u00a0December 2017, that the deprivation of liberty was no longer unlawful, since measures for treatment in German had been put in place since August 2017. In their view, the measures put in place (see paragraphs\u00a067\u00a0to\u00a074 above) could be considered sufficient. They stated that the monthly meetings with the German-speaking psychologist, initiated in August 2017, had not ceased, contrary to the allegations made before the Grand Chamber by the applicant\u2019s representatives. They also stated that since no known psychotropic medicine was indicated for the applicant\u2019s pathology, it was not absolutely necessary for a psychiatrist to be involved in his case. They specified, however, that if the applicant so wished, he could meet the German-speaking psychiatrist, who was \u201cat his disposal\u201d.186.\u00a0\u00a0In those circumstances, the Government invited the Court to take into consideration the fact that the applicant was refusing to cooperate, both with regard to meeting this German-speaking psychiatrist and to authorising the results of the psychological treatment to be integrated into the work of the psychosocial team (see paragraph 73 above). The relevant authorities were making considerable efforts to progress with the project to improve the applicant\u2019s health and ensure his reintegration, but they found themselves in a stalemate as a result of the applicant\u2019s refusal to grant consent; they could not impose medical obligations on him, as he was considered to be capable of discernment.C.\u00a0\u00a0The Grand Chamber\u2019s assessment1.\u00a0\u00a0Preliminary remarks and the approach taken187.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant, who has been held in compulsory confinement in a social protection facility since January 2004, has submitted his complaints \u2013 concerning the fact that he did not receive psychological or psychiatric treatment in that facility as a result of a language problem \u2013 under both Article 3 and Article 5 of the Convention. The Grand Chamber, like the Chamber, has found a violation of Article 3 on account of the lack of adequate treatment for the applicant\u2019s condition for the period between January 2004 and August 2017 (see paragraphs 135 and 159 above). With regard to Article 5, however, the Chamber held that there had been no violation, and found that the link between the reason for the compulsory confinement and the applicant\u2019s mental illness had never been severed (see paragraph 170 above).188.\u00a0\u00a0In the context of its examination of the complaint under Article\u00a05, the question before the Grand Chamber is twofold. Firstly, it is required to clarify whether Article 5 \u00a7 1 (e), in parallel to its role in ensuring the protection of society, contains a therapeutic aspect in order for the purpose of compulsory confinement to be fulfilled. In other words, it must determine whether or not the authorities are under an obligation to provide psychiatric and psychological treatment to an individual in compulsory confinement, and, if so, to define the scope of the Court\u2019s review of the suitability of the treatment in question. Equally, the Grand Chamber is called upon to clarify the relationship between Articles 3 and 5 as regards its scrutiny of compliance with those provisions in the event that both complaints concern the absence of appropriate medical treatment and could thus be regarded as practically identical.189.\u00a0\u00a0In so doing, the Court will consider below, firstly, the applicable case-law principles under Article 5 \u00a7\u00a01 (e), and how these have developed over time as the Court has examined the cases submitted for its review. It will then clarify these principles in order to specify the content of the authorities\u2019 obligations under this provision. It will also describe the interaction between Articles 3 and 5 in a situation such as that in the present case. Lastly, it will examine the circumstances pertaining to the applicant\u2019s complaint under Article 5, having particular regard to those principles as clarified by it.2.\u00a0\u00a0The applicable principles(a)\u00a0\u00a0The general principles with regard to the deprivation of liberty of persons of unsound mind190.\u00a0\u00a0It is well-established in the Court\u2019s case-law that in order to comply with Article 5 \u00a7 1, the detention in issue must first of all be \u201clawful\u201d, including the observance of a procedure prescribed by law. In addition to being in conformity with domestic law, that provision requires that any deprivation of liberty should be in keeping with the purpose of protecting the individual from arbitrariness. For arbitrariness to be excluded, conformity with the purpose of the restrictions permitted by the relevant sub-paragraph of Article 5 \u00a7 1 is required in respect of both the ordering and the execution of the measures involving deprivation of liberty (see\u00a0Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, 24 October 1979, \u00a7 39, Series A no.\u00a033; Bouamar v. Belgium, 29 February 1988, \u00a7 50, Series A no.\u00a0129; O\u2019Hara\u00a0v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, no. 37555\/97, \u00a7 34, ECHR 2001\u2011X; Saadi\u00a0v.\u00a0the\u00a0United Kingdom [GC], no. 13229\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 67 and 69, ECHR\u00a02008; and Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], no. 72508\/13, \u00a7\u00a0186, 28\u00a0November\u00a02017. In addition, there must be some relationship between the ground relied on for the permitted deprivation of liberty and the place and conditions of detention (see Stanev, cited above, \u00a7 147).191.\u00a0\u00a0Though only sub-paragraphs (c) and (d), in their English version, refer to the \u201cpurpose\u201d of the types of deprivation of liberty which they cover, it is clear from their wording and the overall structure of Article 5\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 that this requirement is implicit in all the sub-paragraphs (see Merabishvili, cited above, \u00a7 299).192.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the deprivation of liberty of persons suffering from mental disorders, an individual cannot be considered to be of \u201cunsound mind\u201d and deprived of his liberty unless the following three minimum conditions are satisfied: firstly, he must reliably be shown to be of unsound mind; secondly, the mental disorder must be of a kind or degree warranting compulsory confinement; thirdly, the validity of continued confinement depends upon the persistence of such a disorder (see Winterwerp, cited above, \u00a7 39, and Stanev, cited above, \u00a7 145, with the cases cited therein).193.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to the second of the above conditions, concerning in particular the detention of a mentally disordered person, this indicates that detention may be necessary not only where the person needs therapy, medication or other clinical treatment to cure or alleviate his condition, but also where the person needs control and supervision to prevent him, for example, causing harm to himself or other persons (see Hutchison\u00a0Reid\u00a0v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, no. 50272\/99, \u00a7 52, ECHR 2003-IV, and Stanev, cited above, \u00a7 146). As pointed out above, a certain link must exist between the ground relied on for the detention and the conditions in which it takes place (see Stanev, cited above, \u00a7 147, and paragraph\u00a0190 above). It follows that the \u201cdetention\u201d of a person as a mental-health patient will be \u201clawful\u201d for the purposes of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (e) only if effected in a hospital, clinic or other appropriate institution authorised for that purpose (see Ashingdane, cited above, \u00a7 44; Pankiewicz v. Poland, no. 34151\/04, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a042-45, 12 February 2008; and Stanev, cited above, \u00a7 147). Furthermore, the Court has had occasion to state that this rule applies even where the illness or condition is not curable or where the person concerned is not amenable to treatment (see Hutchison Reid, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 52 and 55). Subject to the foregoing, Article 5 \u00a7 1 (e) is not in principle concerned with suitable treatment or conditions (see Ashingdane, cited above, \u00a7\u00a044; Hutchison Reid, cited above, \u00a7 49; and Stanev, cited above, \u00a7 147).(b)\u00a0\u00a0Interpretation of the concept of \u201cappropriateness\u201d of facilities designated to house persons suffering from mental illness194.\u00a0\u00a0That being said, the Court would emphasise that, in its case-law, the conditions in which a person suffering from a mental disorder receives treatment are not without significance in assessing the lawfulness of his or her detention. In this respect, it has developed its analysis since its first decisions in this area, cited above (especially those delivered in the above\u2011cited Winterwerp and Ashingdane cases), by attaching increasing weight to the need to provide appropriate treatment to persons who have been deprived of their liberty for the purpose of relieving their illness or reducing their dangerousness.195.\u00a0In the Winterwerp case, which gave rise to the above-cited leading judgment, both the Commission and the Court considered that a mental patient\u2019s right to treatment appropriate to his condition could not as such be derived from Article 5 \u00a7 1 (see Winterwerp, cited above, \u00a7 51). The Commission specifically stated that it was true that compulsory admission to a psychiatric hospital should fulfil a dual function, therapeutic and social, but that the Convention dealt only with the social function of protection in authorising the deprivation of liberty of a person of unsound mind under certain conditions (see Winterwerp v. the Netherlands, no.\u00a06301\/73, Commission Report of 15 December 1977, (DR), \u00a7 84; see also Ashingdane\u00a0v.\u00a0the United Kingdom, no. 8225\/78, Commission Report of 12\u00a0May 1983, \u00a7 77, and Dhoest, Report, cited above, \u00a7 145). In the above\u2011cited Ashingdane case, the Court held that although the regime in a normal hospital was more liberal and, in view of the improvement in the applicant\u2019s mental state, more conducive to his ultimate recovery, the place and conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in a special secure hospital did not cease to be those capable of accompanying \u201cthe lawful detention of a person of unsound mind\u201d, in spite of his prolonged detention there. His right to liberty and security of person had not therefore been limited to a greater extent than that provided for under Article 5 \u00a7 1 (e). It also held that, although the cause of the delay in his transfer (from a high security hospital to one with a more liberal environment) had to do with labour relations rather than therapeutic, it was clear that the delay had not been in conscious disregard of the applicant\u2019s mental welfare and the authorities had made efforts to find a solution as soon as possible. The evidence in the case file suggested that the authorities had probably taken the only practicable course of action (see Ashingdane, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 47 and 48). 196.\u00a0\u00a0The approach to the interpretation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (e) had developed significantly\u00a0by the Aerts judgment. In that judgment, the Court found a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1, on the grounds that the applicant had not received regular medical attention or benefitted from a therapeutic environment in the psychiatric wing of the prison in which he was detained. It considered that the proper relationship between the aim of the detention and the conditions in which it took place was therefore deficient, as a result, in particular, of the lack of treatment required by the condition that had given rise to the applicant\u2019s compulsory confinement (see Aerts, cited above, \u00a7 49).197.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has subsequently had occasion to specify that, generally speaking, it seems prima facie unacceptable not to detain a mentally ill person in a suitable therapeutic environment, even if the illness is considered incurable. The person concerned could derive benefit from the hospital environment, while his or her symptoms could become worse outside a supportive structure (see Hutchison Reid, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a052\u00a0and\u00a055).198.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has accepted that the mere fact that an individual was not placed in an appropriate facility did not automatically render his or her detention unlawful under Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. A certain delay in admission to a clinic or hospital is acceptable if it is related to a disparity between the available and required capacity of mental institutions. However, a significant delay in admission to such institutions and thus in treatment of the person concerned will obviously affect the prospects of the treatment\u2019s success, and may entail a breach of Article 5 (see Morsink v.\u00a0the\u00a0Netherlands, no. 48865\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 66-69, 11 May 2004; Brand v.\u00a0the\u00a0Netherlands, no. 49902\/99, \u00a7\u00a7 62-66, 11 May 2004; see also Pankiewicz, cited above, \u00a7 45, where the Court held that a delay of two months and twenty-five days was excessive, given the harmful effects on the applicant\u2019s health of his compulsory confinement in an ordinary detention centre).199.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the Court has held, in the context of \u201cretroactive\u201d preventive detention, that a person\u2019s conditions of detention can change in the course of his or her deprivation of liberty, even though it is based on one and the same detention order. The detention of a person of unsound mind on the basis of the same detention order may, in the Court\u2019s view, become lawful and thus comply with Article 5 \u00a7 1 once that person is transferred to a suitable institution. Under this interpretation of the term \u201clawfulness\u201d, there is indeed an intrinsic link between the lawfulness of a deprivation of liberty and its conditions of execution. This stance is further comparable to the approach taken in the assessment of the compliance of conditions of detention with Article 3, where a change in the conditions of detention is also determinative for assessing compliance with the prohibition on degrading treatment. It follows that the point in time, or period, for assessing whether a person was detained in a suitable institution for mental\u2011health patients is the period of detention at issue in the proceedings before the Court, and not the time when the detention order was made (see Ilnseher\u00a0v.\u00a0Germany [GC], nos. 10211\/12 and 27505\/14, \u00a7\u00a7 139 and 141, 4\u00a0December 2018).200.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, where it has examined cases concerning the detention of perpetrators of criminal acts who suffer from mental disorders, in assessing the appropriateness of the institution in question the Court has not taken account so much of the facility\u2019s primary aim, but rather the specific conditions of the detention and the possibility for the individuals concerned to receive suitable treatment therein (see Bergmann v.\u00a0Germany, no.\u00a023279\/14, \u00a7 124, 7 January 2016; W.P. v. Germany, no.\u00a055594\/13, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a065-66, 6 October 2016; Lorenz, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 61 and 64; and Kadusic\u00a0v.\u00a0Switzerland, no. 43977\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 56 and 59, 9 January 2018). Furthermore, although psychiatric hospitals are by definition appropriate institutions for the detention of mentally ill individuals, the Court has stressed the need to accompany any such placement by efficient and consistent therapy measures, in order not to deprive the individuals in question of a prospect of release (see Frank v. Germany (dec.), no.\u00a032705\/06, 28 September 2010).201.\u00a0\u00a0In several cases against Belgium, the Court concluded that the psychiatric wings of Belgian prisons were not appropriate places for the lengthy detention of mentally ill persons within the meaning of Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(e) of the Convention, in that the detainees did not receive appropriate care and treatment for their condition and were thus deprived of any realistic prospect of rehabilitation. It considered that this situation had the effect of severing the link between the purpose of detention and conditions in which it took place. It held that the violations found in those cases resulted from a structural problem arising essentially from a shortage of places in external psychiatric facilities or the refusal by those facilities to admit individuals regarded as undesirable (see the four leading judgments of L.B., Claes, Dufoort, and Swennen, cited above; eight judgments of 9\u00a0January 2014 - Van Meroye v. Belgium, no. 330\/09; Oukili v. Belgium, no.\u00a043663\/09, Caryn v. Belgium, no. 43687\/09; Moreels v. Belgium, no.\u00a043717\/09; Gelaude v. Belgium, no. 43733\/09; Saadouni v. Belgium, no.\u00a050658\/09; Plaisier v. Belgium, no. 28785\/11; and Lankester, cited above; and more recently the pilot judgment in the W.D. case, cited above).202.\u00a0\u00a0In assessing whether the applicant has been provided with appropriate psychiatric care, the Court takes into account the opinions of health professionals and the decisions reached by the domestic authorities in the individual case, as well as more general findings at national and international level on the unsuitability of prison psychiatric wings for the detention of persons with mental health problems (see, for example, L.B.,\u00a0\u00a7\u00a096, and Claes, \u00a7 98, cited above; see also Had\u017ei\u0107 and Sulji\u0107 v.\u00a0Bosnia\u00a0and Herzegovina, nos. 39446\/06 and 33849\/08, \u00a7 41, 7 June 2011, where the Court held, on the basis of the findings by the Constitutional Court and the CPT, that the psychiatric annex of a prison was not an appropriate institution for the detention of mental health patients, and, mutatis mutandis, O.H., cited above, \u00a7 88, where the Court took into consideration the views of the Federal Constitutional Court on the appropriate institutions for persons placed in preventive detention).203.\u00a0\u00a0In the context of the concept of \u201cappropriate treatment\u201d for the purposes of Article 5, the Court verifies, on the basis of the information available in the case file, whether an individualised and specialised approach has been adopted for the treatment of the psychological disorders in question. It considers that information indicating that applicants had access to health professionals and to medication may show that they were not clearly abandoned, but that this does not suffice to allow it to assess the therapeutic arrangements that have been put in place (see Oukili, cited above, \u00a7 50; Moreels, cited above, \u00a7 52; and Plaisier, cited above, \u00a7 50; for examples of findings of \u201cappropriate care\u201d, see also, mutatis mutandis, Bergmann, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 125-28, concerning a preventive detention centre, and Papillo v. Switzerland, no. 43368\/08, \u00a7 48, 27 January 2015, concerning an ordinary prison). Moreover, although the persistent attitude of a person deprived of his or her liberty may contribute to preventing a change in their detention regime, this does not dispense the authorities from taking the appropriate initiatives with a view to providing this person with treatment that is suitable for his or her condition and that would help him or her to regain liberty (see De Schepper, cited above, \u00a7 48; mutatis mutandis, O.H., cited above, \u00a7 89; and Swennen, cited above, \u00a7 80).204.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court has also stated that when dealing with mentally ill offenders, the authorities are under an obligation to work towards the goal of preparing the persons concerned for their release, for example by providing incentives for further therapy, such as transfer to an institution where they can actually receive the necessary treatment, or by granting certain privileges if the situation permits (see Lorenz, cited above, \u00a7 61).(c)\u00a0\u00a0Refining the case-law principles and clarification of the meaning of the obligation on the authorities to provide treatment205.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers, having regard to the parties\u2019 observations (see\u00a0paragraphs 171-186 above) and to the current case-law (see\u00a0paragraphs\u00a0190\u2011204 above), that it is appropriate to clarify and refine the principles in its case-law in order to be able to take account of the particular circumstances in which an individual is placed in compulsory confinement. It considers that, in the light of the developments in its case-law and the current international standards which attach significant weight to the need to provide treatment for the mental health of persons in compulsory confinement (see paragraphs 116-119 above), it is necessary to acknowledge expressly, in addition to the function of social protection, the therapeutic aspect of the aim referred to in Article 5 \u00a7 1 (e), and thus to recognise explicitly that there exists an obligation on the authorities to ensure appropriate and individualised therapy, based on the specific features of the compulsory confinement, such as the conditions of the detention regime, the treatment proposed or the duration of the detention. On the other hand, the Court considers that Article 5, as currently interpreted, does not contain a prohibition on detention on the basis of impairment, in contrast to what is proposed by the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in points 6-9 of its 2015 Guidelines concerning Article 14 of the CRPD (see paragraph 117 above).206.\u00a0\u00a0When examining the first applications brought before it on this matter, the Court, as noted above, considered the issue of principle as to whether and, if so, to what extent the expression \u201clawful detention of a person of unsound mind\u201d could be construed as including a reference not simply to the actual deprivation of liberty of mental health patients but also to matters relating to execution of the detention, such as the place, environment and conditions of detention. It has considered that the \u201cdetention\u201d of a person as a mental health patient will be \u201clawful\u201d for the purposes of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (e) only if effected in a hospital, clinic or other appropriate institution authorised for that purpose, but that the suitable treatment or regime is not, in principle, covered by this provision. It has concluded that the existence of a right for a mental patient to receive treatment appropriate to his or condition cannot as such be derived from it (see paragraphs 193 and 195 above). In these initial cases, however, it expressed a proviso with regard to this analysis by using the term \u201cin principle\u201d. This wording shows that the Court did not rule out the possibility that specific situations might exist in which the aim of the measure in respect of which the Convention authorises the restriction of the right to liberty, namely the protection of society and the administration of treatment, is no longer being genuinely pursued, and in which the link between the stated aim and the conditions of detention is therefore severed.207.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has thus gradually, through its case-law, expanded the scope of Article 5 \u00a7\u00a01 (e) (see paragraphs 196-204 above). In this area there has been, not a departure from the case-law, but a gradual development, over time, of an interpretation of the meaning to be given to the obligations contained in this provision.208.\u00a0\u00a0Analysis of the Court\u2019s case-law, particularly as developed over the past fifteen years, shows clearly that it should now be considered that there exists a close link between the \u201clawfulness\u201d of the detention of persons suffering from mental disorders and the appropriateness of the treatment provided for their mental condition. While this requirement was not yet set out in the first judgments delivered in this area (see Winterwerp, \u00a7 51, and Ashingdane, \u00a7\u00a7 47 and 48, cited above), from which it appeared that the therapeutic function of compulsory confinement was not as such guaranteed under Article 5, the current case-law clearly indicates that the administration of suitable therapy has become a requirement in the context of the wider concept of the \u201clawfulness\u201d of the deprivation of liberty. Any detention of mentally ill persons must have a therapeutic purpose, aimed specifically, and in so far as possible, at curing or alleviating their mental-health condition, including, where appropriate, bringing about a reduction in or control over their dangerousness. The Court has stressed that, irrespective of the facility in which those persons are placed, they are entitled to be provided with a suitable medical environment accompanied by real therapeutic measures, with a view to preparing them for their eventual release (see paragraphs 199 and 201 above).209.\u00a0\u00a0As to the scope of the treatment provided, the Court considers that the level of care required for this category of detainees must go beyond basic care. Mere access to health professionals, consultations and the provision of medication cannot suffice for a treatment to be considered appropriate and thus satisfactory under Article 5. However, the Court\u2019s role is not to analyse the content of the treatment that is offered and administered. What is important is that the Court is able to verify whether an individualised programme has been put in place, taking account of the specific details of the detainee\u2019s mental health with a view to preparing him or her for possible future reintegration into society (see paragraph\u00a0203 above). In this area, the Court affords the authorities a certain latitude with regard both to the form and the content of the therapeutic care or of the medical programme in question.210.\u00a0\u00a0Further, the assessment of whether a specific facility is \u201cappropriate\u201d must include an examination of the specific conditions of detention prevailing in it, and particularly of the treatment provided to individuals suffering from psychological disorders. Thus, the cases examined in the case-law illustrate that it is possible that an institution which is a priori inappropriate, such as a prison structure, may nevertheless be considered satisfactory if it provides adequate care (see paragraph\u00a0203 above), and conversely, that a specialised psychiatric institution which, by definition, ought to be appropriate may prove incapable of providing the necessary treatment (see paragraph 199 above). These examples make it possible to conclude that appropriate and individualised treatment is an essential part of the notion of \u201cappropriate institution\u201d.\u00a0This conclusion stems from the now inevitable finding that the deprivation of liberty contemplated by Article 5 \u00a7 1 (e) has a dual function: on the one hand, the social function of protection, and on the other a therapeutic function that is related to the individual interest of the person of unsound mind in receiving an appropriate and individualised form of therapy or course of treatment. The need to ensure the first function should not, a priori, justify the absence of measures aimed at discharging the second. It follows that, under Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 (e), a decision refusing to release an individual in compulsory confinement may become incompatible with the initial objective of preventive detention contained in the conviction judgment if the person concerned is detained due to the risk that he or she may reoffend, but at the same time is deprived of the measures \u2013 such as appropriate therapy \u2013 that are necessary in order to demonstrate that he or she is no longer dangerous (see Lorenz, cited above, \u00a7 58; see also, mutatis mutandis, with regard to Article 5\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01 (a), Osterm\u00fcnchner, cited above, \u00a7 74; H.W., cited above, \u00a7\u00a0112; and Klinkenbu\u00df, cited above, \u00a7 47).211.\u00a0\u00a0Lastly, the Court considers that potential negative consequences for the prospects of change in an applicant\u2019s personal situation would not necessarily lead to a finding of a breach of Article 5 \u00a7 1, provided that the authorities have taken sufficient steps to overcome any problem that was hampering the applicant\u2019s treatment.(d)\u00a0\u00a0Interaction in the analysis of complaints based on an alleged absence of \u201cappropriate treatment\u201d submitted under both Article 3 and Article 5 \u00a7 1212.\u00a0\u00a0In three of the above-mentioned Belgian cases (see paragraph\u00a0201 above), the applicants had formulated complaints under both Article 3 and Article 5 \u00a7 1, alleging an absence of treatment that was adapted to their health, and the Court found a violation of Article 3 on the basis that the conditions of detention without such medical care amounted to degrading treatment (see Claes, cited above, \u00a7 100; Lankester, cited above, \u00a7 68; and W.D., cited above, \u00a7 116). In examining the complaints under Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01, the Court drew a parallel with its analysis of the allegations in terms of the two provisions of the Convention. It concluded that the compulsory confinement of the applicants for long periods, in an environment that was inappropriate in terms of medical treatment for the purposes of Article\u00a03, had also had the consequence of severing the link between the purpose of the detention and the conditions in which it should take place (see Claes, cited above, \u00a7 120; Lankester, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 93-95; and W.D., cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0132-34). Furthermore, in a series of cases against Germany, the Court found that separate wings of prisons did not amount to appropriate institutions for the purposes of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (e), in view of the lack of the necessary medical and therapeutic environment. The Court reached that conclusion after assessing, in particular, the conditions of detention in those prison wings and noting the lack of treatment that was appropriate for the prisoners\u2019 mental health, without, however, complaints having been submitted to it under Article 3 (see, for example, O.H. v.\u00a0Germany, no.\u00a04646\/08, \u00a788-91, 24 November 2011; B. v. Germany, no. 61272\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a082-84, 19 April 2012; S. v. Germany, no.\u00a03300\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 97-99, 28 June 2012; and Glien v. Germany, no. 7345\/12, \u00a7\u00a7 93-96, 28 November 2013).213.\u00a0\u00a0In this context, the Court considers that, in verifying the provision of medical therapy, the intensity of the Court\u2019s scrutiny may differ depending on whether the allegations are submitted under Article 3 or Article 5 \u00a7 1. The question of a continued link between the purpose of detention and the conditions in which it is carried out, and the question of whether those conditions attain a particular threshold of gravity, are of differing intensity. This implies that there may be situations in which a care path may correspond to the requirements of Article 3 but be insufficient with regard to the need to maintain the purpose of the compulsory confinement, and thus lead to a finding that there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1. In consequence, a finding that there has been no violation of Article\u00a03 does not automatically lead to a finding that there has been no violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1, although a finding of a violation of Article\u00a03 on account of a lack of appropriate treatment may also result in a finding that there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 on the same grounds.214.\u00a0\u00a0This interaction in the assessment of complaints which are similar but are examined under one or other provision arises naturally from the very essence of the protected rights. The assessment of a threshold for Article\u00a03, guaranteeing an absolute right, to come into play is relative, and depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see paragraph 141 above). With regard to Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(e), the deprivation of liberty is ordered, inter alia, on account of the existence of a mental disorder. In order to ensure that the link between this deprivation of liberty and the conditions of execution of this measure is preserved, the Court assesses the appropriateness of the institution, including its capacity to provide the patient with the treatment that he or she requires (see paragraphs 194-204 above).3.\u00a0\u00a0Application of these principles to the present case215.\u00a0\u00a0It should first of all be noted that the applicant\u2019s situation resembles those set out in the four leading judgments (L.B., Claes, Dufoort, and Swennen, cited above), in the W.D. judgment and in the eight other judgments against Belgium cited above (see paragraph\u00a0201 above). It differs in a single aspect, namely the fact that the applicant is not detained in the psychiatric wing of a prison, but has been placed in compulsory confinement in a social protection facility. The applicants in the above-cited cases were waiting to be transferred to this type of social protection facility or to other structures that were, on the face of it, suited to their psychiatric health. However, the decisive issue in those cases was whether the persons concerned had been placed in an environment allowing for the administration of adequate treatment, suited to their state of health and individualised in each case to the extent required to provide them with realistic prospects of release. The Court considers that the question which arises in the present case is a comparable one. It will therefore examine the present case in the light of the above-cited case-law, as clarified, and in the context disclosed by the above-mentioned Belgian cases. It notes, however, that the applicant\u2019s situation does not arise from the structural problem identified in the above-cited Belgian cases and which formed the subject\u2011matter of the W.D. pilot judgment, also cited above.216.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the applicant in fact complains about an absence of treatment and psychiatric therapy that are adapted to his situation, arguing that the main obstacle to their provision is the language barrier. He is German-speaking, and the Paifve EDS in which he is confined did not offer psychiatric treatment administered by German-speaking doctors. In this respect, his complaint under Article 5 contains similarities to that under Article 3, in that it also concerns a failure to provide treatment. The Court will therefore refer in its examination of this complaint to its analysis above of the complaint under Article 3.217.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes first that it is undisputed in the present case that the applicant\u2019s placement in the Paifve EDS amounts to a deprivation of liberty and that Article 5 is applicable.218.\u00a0\u00a0That measure, implemented since 21 January 2004, is based on the decision to impose compulsory confinement issued by the Committals Division of the Court of First Instance on 16 June 2003 and upheld by the Li\u00e8ge Court of Appeal on 1 August 2003, and on a decision of the Minister of Justice dated 15 January 2004. These decisions were based on the applicant\u2019s dangerousness and mental disorders; he had been convicted of theft and sexual violence and further proceedings had also been brought against him for offences committed while in prison (see paragraphs\u00a09,\u00a010, 12 and 13 above). The applicant has been held in compulsory confinement on a continuous basis, given that his applications for discharge were all rejected and his placement has been extended (see paragraphs 21, 30\u201137, 46 and 65 above).219.\u00a0\u00a0It is not in dispute between the parties that the applicant\u2019s detention is a measure covered by Article 5 \u00a7 1 (e) of the Convention. The Court notes that the compulsory confinement order was adopted by the Committals Division of the Court of First Instance, on the basis of the legislation on social protection, a few months before the end of the prison term to which the applicant had been sentenced by the Li\u00e8ge Court of Appeal and the Eupen Criminal Court. As specified in the ministerial decision, this compulsory confinement replaced continued serving of the prison terms to which he had been sentenced (see paragraphs 10 and 12 above). In consequence, the applicant\u2019s placement in the Paifve EDS falls under Article 5 \u00a7 1 (e) of the Convention (see, among other authorities, L.B., cited above, \u00a7 89). In addition, the Court notes that this deprivation of liberty amounts to a continuous situation, since the applicant has been held in compulsory confinement since 15 January 2004.220.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that it is also not in dispute that the applicant\u2019s compulsory confinement was decided \u201cin accordance with a procedure prescribed by law\u201d within the meaning of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.221.\u00a0\u00a0Regarding the lawfulness of the confinement measure, the Court observes that, at first sight, the three conditions set out in the Winterwerp\u00a0case-law (see paragraph 192 above) have been met in the present case. The applicant suffers from disorders related to paranoid psychosis, as has been medically attested since 2001. The medical reports drawn up throughout the period of compulsory confinement indicate a psychotic and paranoid personality, representing a danger to society (see paragraph\u00a0149 above). The most recent assessment of the applicant\u2019s health, dated 12 January 2017, confirmed the need to maintain the applicant in compulsory confinement in view, among other factors, of his dangerousness and the risk that he would reoffend (see paragraphs 12, 14, 21, 23 and\u00a039 above). Furthermore, no evidence has been adduced that could call into question the domestic authorities\u2019 conclusions as to his dangerousness.222.\u00a0\u00a0That being stated, the Court considers, in the light of the clarified case-law principles in relation to Article 5 \u00a7 1 (e), that the assessment of lawfulness also requires an examination of whether, throughout the period of compulsory confinement, the purpose for which it was imposed has persisted. More specifically, it is essential to verify whether a link has been maintained between the initial aim of detaining the applicant and the appropriateness of the treatment provided to him: only if this condition is fulfilled can the deprivation of liberty be considered lawful. In the present case, having regard to the applicant\u2019s allegations that he has not received appropriate medical treatment, the Court will examine the appropriateness of the institution in question and, in this context, the constituent elements of the treatment offered to the applicant. It will ascertain whether the care provided was such as to bring about an improvement in the applicant\u2019s health and a reduction in the degree of danger posed by him, and to promote the prospects of release.223.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that, given his profile, the applicant was detained in an appropriate institution and that, in spite of the language barrier impeding communication between him and the care staff in Paifve, he had always been provided with adequate treatment since his placement in 2004.224.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that it is not its role to rule in abstracto on the capacity of the Paifve EDS to ensure a quality environment for the persons detained therein. The appropriateness of that institution must be examined in the light of the particular circumstances of the present case. The Paifve EDS is a high-security unit dedicated exclusively to treating persons of unsound mind; it employs psychiatric and psychological medical staff, and has, by definition, the task of ensuring supervision of the patients\u2019 mental health. Nonetheless, it is also an institution that has been subject to criticism, expressed by the Paifve Supervisory Board in November 2016, in relation to alleged shortcomings in its provision of medical care (see paragraph\u00a0115 above). That analysis was recently confirmed by the CPT, which expressed sharp criticism in its report of March 2018 with regard, inter alia, to the lack of adequate therapeutic treatment. According to the CPT, the identified shortcomings are similar to those in the psychiatric wings of prisons which had been examined in the above-cited Belgian cases (see paragraph 120 above).225.\u00a0\u00a0The Court cannot speculate as to whether this criticised aspect of the general manner in which patients were treated in the Paifve EDS could have had an impact in the specific case of the applicant, who has not complained about the treatment administered in general in this facility.226.\u00a0\u00a0In any event, the applicant\u2019s tangible complaints in his specific case are that the authorities delayed and continue to delay in taking the adequate measures that are required by his situation \u2013 that is, providing him with access to psychiatric and psychological treatment \u2013, on the pretext that there are no care professionals available who could communicate in German. In addressing the question of the appropriateness of the Paifve EDS in this case, it is appropriate to verify whether the Belgian authorities made all reasonable efforts to ensure suitable and tailor-made therapeutic treatment for the applicant, whom they consider to pose a high risk (see De Schepper, cited above, \u00a7 48).227.\u00a0\u00a0As with the complaint alleging a violation of Article 3, the Court considers that the impugned situation must be divided into two distinct periods, having regard to recent events and to the allegations made by the applicant in this connection in his submissions to the Grand Chamber.(a)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s deprivation of liberty from the beginning of 2004 until August 2017228.\u00a0\u00a0The Court cannot agree with the Government\u2019s analysis that, notwithstanding the language problem, the applicant benefitted from the treatment available in the Paifve EDS. It refers to the reasoning that has led it to find a violation of Article 3 on the grounds that the applicant did not receive treatment adapted to his health condition throughout those thirteen years of detention (see paragraphs 149-159 above). It is also clear that the failure to provide treatment in the present case results from a language problem (see paragraphs 153-156 above).229.\u00a0\u00a0It is not for the Court to rule in a general manner on the types of solutions which could have been considered sufficient to respond to the applicant\u2019s particular linguistic need in order to enable him to receive treatment that was consistent with his mental-health condition. The domestic authorities enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in this area, allowing them to choose the arrangements for communication.230.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it necessary to specify further that Article\u00a05\u00a0\u00a7\u00a01\u00a0(e) does not guarantee to an individual in compulsory confinement the right to receive treatment in his or her own language (see also paragraph 151 above). It notes in the present case that although German has the status of an official language in Belgium, it is not often spoken in the region in which the Paifve EDS is located, namely the French-language region. Furthermore, the applicable legislation does not require this type of institution to employ staff members who are bilingual in French and German (see paragraph 107 above). However, the Court cannot but note that the applicant\u2019s right to speak, to be understood and to receive treatment in this language was expressly acknowledged by the CDS in a decision of 13\u00a0October 2009 (see paragraph 26 above). In those circumstances, it expresses its surprise at the Government\u2019s allegation that it was impossible to secure treatment for the applicant in this language. It is true that the CDS noted on 26 January 2007 that there was no institution in Belgium which could meet the applicant\u2019s linguistic need and simultaneously respond to the degree of danger posed by him (see paragraphs 21 and 22 above), and the Court does not challenge that finding \u2013 which, moreover, it is still valid, in that the applicant\u2019s situation has remained unchanged throughout his detention and given the manner in which the network of psychiatric treatment is organised (see paragraphs 29, 60 and 106-114 above). It would also appear from the case file that efforts were made to explore the possibility of treatment in Germany (see paragraph 25 above). However, there is no information in the file about the results of these efforts.231.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is also not indifferent to the fact that, in spite of these organisational constraints, the CDS emphasised the pressing need for treatment in German throughout the proceedings brought by the applicant over the years and recommended that German-speaking psychiatrists and therapists be seconded (see paragraphs 18, 23, 25, 26 and 28 above).232.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Court cannot but conclude that these recommendations and conclusions remained to all intents and purposes a dead letter. Thus, on 13 January 2010 the CDS stated that there was no hope of obtaining appropriate treatment for the applicant, whether in a secure facility or elsewhere. On 29 April 2010 it noted that the Minister of Justice had failed to respond to its requests that he intervene and make an \u201cofficial report\u201d on the applicant\u2019s situation (see paragraphs 28 and 29 above). Lastly, the CDS seemed to resign itself in 2014 to the idea that the absence of therapy in German was not decisive for positive change and held that it did not have jurisdiction to issue orders to the authorities or to reprimand them for actions or shortcomings in their dealings with the applicant (see paragraphs\u00a040 and 41 above).233.\u00a0\u00a0It was only in September 2014 that it proved possible to provide treatment involving communication in German. However, it appears that this was not extended beyond the end of 2015 (see paragraphs 44, 51, 53 and 55 above).234.\u00a0\u00a0The Government have attributed the lack of progress in the applicant\u2019s state of health and the failure in his treatment programme to the applicant\u2019s own attitude and the type of illness from which he suffers; in their view, the failure to provide treatment in German was not the decisive factor.235.\u00a0\u00a0The Court will not speculate on what results might have been obtained from treatment had it been administered over the period in issue, in German, as recommended in the psychiatric report of 2005 (see paragraph\u00a014 above). It must limit itself to noting the absence of such treatment.236.\u00a0\u00a0With regard to the applicant\u2019s attitude, the Court is not convinced that the applicant\u2019s conduct was such as to prevent any progress in his situation. Although, admittedly, he refused any treatment in 2007 (see paragraph\u00a021 above), it should be noted that, since his second application for conditional discharge in 2009, he has expressed a wish to engage in measures aimed at bringing about an improvement in his condition. Thus, he asked that the relevant authorities be required to provide him with treatment in his own language (see paragraphs 23 and 27 above). The Court considers that this request was reasonable and appropriate, given the acknowledged language problem in this case, and seems to correspond prima facie to \u201cappropriate treatment\u201d in the applicant\u2019s case, having regard to the multiple recommendations to this effect by psychiatrists, and to the applicant\u2019s personality disorders and his poor understanding of the problems that they posed (see, mutatis mutandis, W.D., cited above, \u00a7\u00a0131). Accordingly, taking account of the applicant\u2019s requests for treatment and discharge, it was for the authorities to find a way to overcome the deadlock arising from the communication issue between him and his health\u2011care providers (see, mutatis mutandis, Lorenz, cited above, \u00a7 64).237.\u00a0\u00a0In this regard, the Court is concerned by the fact that, in the circumstances of the present case, the authorities responsible for the applicant\u2019s case disregarded, if not ignored, the clear role played in the area of mental health by dialogue between a patient and his or her therapist, in a language that is common to them both. This role was emphasised in the psychiatric report of 2014 (see paragraph 50 above), and the applicant\u2019s linguistic needs were clearly identified in the decisions reached by the national authorities. As the authorities did not give the applicant an opportunity to receive such treatment, the Court has difficulties in accepting the argument that there was no prospect of a positive change in his condition, especially as the Government themselves had not completely excluded the possibility of such a development (see paragraph 184 above). It also notes that the obligation to provide treatment is just as important in situations where the condition of the individuals concerned may be considered incurable (see paragraph 197 above).238.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, the Court notes the growing importance which international instruments for the protection of people with mental disorders are now attaching to the need for persons placed in compulsory confinement to be able to benefit from personalised and appropriate treatment to fulfil the therapeutic aim of detention. In this connection the Court refers to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities of 13\u00a0December 2006 and to Recommendation REC (2004) 10 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe concerning the protection of the human rights and dignity of persons with mental disorders. It accepts that it is natural to expect that persons in compulsory confinement should, in so far as possible, receive all necessary information on the individualised treatment proposals being offered to them. Thus, the Court notes, in particular, that the explanatory memorandum to this Recommendation, in its comments on Article 7, draws attention to the language factor as a means of communicating information related to treatment. Failure to take account of this aspect could place the individuals concerned in a situation of vulnerability (see paragraphs 116-118 above).239.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that since 1 October 2016 the new Compulsory Confinement Act has imposed an obligation to offer persons in compulsory confinement a care path.240.\u00a0\u00a0Moreover, the Court cannot accept the Government\u2019s claim that the situation in the present case is similar to that in the De Schepper case (judgment cited above). Mr De Schepper had also been found to be in a condition of \u201cpersistent dangerousness\u201d. However, on the advice of specialists the authorities had begun a course of preliminary therapy in prison, with a view to his admission to a specialised institution which could then provide the necessary treatment. The grounds for not admitting him to such an institution were the lack of progress in his condition, despite the preliminary therapy, and the fact that it was therapeutically impossible for the institutions approached to treat him at the time the request was made. In contrast, in the present case, although there is no institution in Belgium corresponding to the applicant\u2019s degree of dangerousness in which therapy could be provided to him in German, it must be noted that, with the exception of a short period between September 2014 and the end of 2015, no treatment has been put in place to reduce this level of dangerousness in the facility chosen for him, on the pretext that the facility has no German\u2011speaking members of staff. 241.\u00a0\u00a0This leads to the inevitable conclusion that, in spite of the repeated findings by the medical and social protection authorities to the effect that it was essential for the applicant to receive psychiatric treatment in German in order for him to have a chance of progressing and reintegrating into society, no measures were taken to introduce such treatment. It can only be observed that the failure to provide individualised therapy, adapted to the applicant\u2019s condition, over a period of about thirteen years amounted to significant negligence, which impeded the applicant\u2019s potential for positive change, assuming it existed (see, mutatis mutandis, O.H., cited above, \u00a7 89). The Court considers, in view, firstly, of the indefinite nature of the length of the confinement measure and, secondly, of the applicant\u2019s state of health and the requests that he made to obtain appropriate psychiatric and psychological treatment that would allow him a hope of release, that the measures taken by the authorities were inadequate in terms of providing therapeutic treatment (see paragraph 226 above). The Government have not adduced sufficient arguments to justify the delay in putting treatment in place before 2014, nor for the interruption in treatment at the end of 2015. The Belgian authorities took sporadic steps to remedy the applicant\u2019s situation, but these efforts were not an integral part of any therapeutic care or treatment path. In addition, the failure to provide the applicant with treatment appears all the more unjustifiable in that he was capable of communicating in a language that is one of the official languages of Belgium: overcoming a problem related to the use of that language does not therefore seem unrealistic.242.\u00a0\u00a0In conclusion, in the particular circumstances of the case, the lack of treatment suited to the applicant\u2019s state of health and the absence of effective action by the authorities from the beginning of 2004 to August 2017 in order to guarantee such treatment had the effect of severing the link between the aim of the detention of liberty and the conditions in which it took place in the Paifve EDS, an institution that cannot therefore be regarded as appropriate.243.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 on account of the manner in which the compulsory confinement order was executed from the beginning of 2004 until August 2017.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The applicant\u2019s deprivation of liberty since August 2017244.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that, with regard to this second period, the assessment of compliance with Article 5 must be carried out in the light of the changes which have occurred in the applicant\u2019s situation, as described in the context of Article 3. Having regard to the principles reiterated and clarified above, it is of the opinion that the main question which arises is whether the treatment package offered to the applicant amounts to an individualised and specialised therapeutic approach for treatment of the psychological disorders from which he suffers (see paragraphs\u00a0205\u2011210 above).245.\u00a0\u00a0The Court refers to its analysis under Article\u00a03 of the parties\u2019 submissions concerning the treatment period which began in August 2017 (see paragraphs 160-166 above). It reiterates that the information in the case file indicates that the authorities have shown a willingness to achieve progress in the applicant\u2019s situation by putting in place a structure for psychiatric, psychological and welfare treatment in a linguistic context that corresponds to his communication abilities, and that this situation complies with the requirements of Article 3 (see paragraph 167 above).246.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is prepared to accept the Government\u2019s argument that, given that the applicant has been held to be capable of reaching his own decisions, the domestic law prohibits a therapeutic measure being imposed on him against his will. The explanatory memorandum to Article 17 of Recommendation Rec (2004) 10 of the Committee of Ministers also sets out the right of persons in compulsory confinement not to accept offers of treatment (see paragraph 119 above). However, it is also acknowledged that the applicant presents psychological disorders, which have given rise to his compulsory confinement, and that accordingly, by definition, his discernment is weakened. The Court considers that these circumstances may make the applicant vulnerable, even if he has capacity to grant or withhold consent to his treatment (ibid.; see, in particular, the explanatory memorandum concerning Article 7, point 56, of the Recommendation). Bearing this aspect in mind, the authorities are still obliged to attempt to include the applicant, as much as possible, in an individualised medical care package capable of bringing about an improvement in his health. On this point, the Court refers to Article 12 of the same Recommendation, which advises that an appropriate individually prescribed treatment plan be drawn up, whenever possible after consultation with the person concerned (see paragraph 118 above). That being stated, it must also be accepted that the applicant\u2019s personal advocate or his legal representative, where appropriate, has an active role to play in assisting him to exercise his rights to consent and benefit from a treatment plan (see the explanatory memorandum to the Recommendation, particularly with regard to Article\u00a017, point 134, at paragraph 119 above).247.\u00a0\u00a0The Court attaches weight to the refusal by the applicant \u2013 who was legally represented before both it and the domestic authorities \u2013 to accept collaboration between the external psychologist and the team tasked with assessing his prospects of reintegration, given that this refusal inevitably created a serious obstacle for the relevant authorities with responsibility for his situation.248.\u00a0\u00a0Throughout his placement in the Paifve EDS, the applicant has complained about the absence of treatment in German, and not about the treatment as such offered in that facility. It was therefore for the authorities to provide him with an individualised treatment programme, taking account, in particular, of the particular elements arising from the difficulties in communication between him and the care team. However, this cannot imply imposing medical treatment on the applicant, who is capable of giving consent, but rather proposing a range of therapeutic and rehabilitation measures which are appropriate to his individual situation. In the present case, the Court notes that a series of activities in German, intended to guarantee treatment corresponding to the disorders from which the applicant suffers, has been proposed to him since August 2017. These include making available a German-speaking psychiatrist, psychologist and welfare officer. It considers that these proposals represent a response by the authorities to the applicant\u2019s specific request. In the Court\u2019s view, the steps taken are such as to facilitate communication and the construction of a relationship of trust. They can therefore be considered as prima facie sufficient for appropriate treatment, having regard also to the short period under examination. The applicant, assisted by his representatives, has thus not been left without a choice of treatment, so that it cannot be concluded that his placement did not pursue a therapeutic aim during this period (see the explanatory memorandum to Recommendation REC (2004) 10 of the Committee of Ministers, particularly with regard to Article 17, point 133, at paragraph\u00a0119 above). 249.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant would appear to maintain his previous claims alleging a lack of treatment, but without taking up the possibilities that are currently being offered to him. The Court notes in this regard that a personal advocate or a legal representative of an individual in compulsory confinement can play a constructive role in drawing up the treatment plan (ibid., point\u00a0134). However, it does not appear from the case file that the applicant cooperated with the medical staff in drawing up a care path. In such a situation, and in the absence of information \u2013 such as, for example, a refusal by the German-speaking psychiatrist to meet the applicant and to draw up with him a therapeutic project in line with his needs \u2013 indicating that the treatment proposed by the Paifve EDS is not effective, and having regard to the applicant\u2019s refusal to authorise communications from the external German-speaking psychologist to the in-house psychosocial team, it is difficult to conclude at this stage that the State has not introduced the necessary measures to guarantee appropriate treatment for the applicant. On the contrary, reiterating that it is not its role to assess the content of the particular treatment proposed and having regard to the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the States in this area (see paragraph 209 above), the Court is of the view that the therapeutic structure put in place, which includes both medical and welfare aspects with a view to preparing, in the language spoken by him, the applicant\u2019s reintegration into society, indicates that sufficient measures have, at this stage, been taken by the authorities. For the same reasons, it finds that the authorities have put considerable efforts, in so far as possible and in accordance with Article\u00a012 of Recommendation REC (2004) 10 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, into consulting with the applicant in drawing up the treatment plan and obtaining his opinion (see paragraphs\u00a0118 and 246 above).250.\u00a0\u00a0It thus appears that, in accordance with the requirement to provide appropriate therapeutic care, the authorities have adopted a multidisciplinary and \u2013 on the face of it \u2013 coherent approach, making efforts to emphasise cooperation between the various players, and seeking to ensure that the applicant\u2019s \u201ccare path\u201d is tailor-made to his specific communication needs and pathology.251.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing and taking particular account of the attitude shown by the applicant, assisted by his representatives, with regard to all of the treatment offered, the Court concludes that the State\u2019s obligation as to means has been fulfilled.252.\u00a0\u00a0Thus, having particular regard to the significant efforts made by the authorities to provide the applicant with access to treatment which is, on the face of it, coherent and adapted to his situation, to the short period during which they have had an opportunity to implement these treatment measures, and to the fact that the applicant is not always receptive to them, the Court is able to conclude that the medical treatment now available corresponds to the therapeutic aim of the applicant\u2019s compulsory confinement. It follows, in the Court\u2019s view, that for this period of the applicant\u2019s compulsory confinement in the Paifve EDS, there exists a link between the purpose of the deprivation of liberty and the conditions in which it took place.253.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has been no violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention with regard to the period after August 2017.4.\u00a0\u00a0Conclusion254.\u00a0\u00a0The Court concludes that the applicant\u2019s deprivation of liberty from the beginning of 2004 to August 2017 did not take place, as required by Article 5 \u00a7 1, in an appropriate institution that was capable of providing him with suitable treatment for his health condition.255.\u00a0\u00a0In contrast, it appears to the Court that the relevant authorities have drawn the conclusions from the Chamber judgment of 18 July 2017 and have put in place a comprehensive treatment package, leading it to conclude that there has been no violation of this provision in respect of the period since August 2017.However, it considers it appropriate to emphasise that the authorities must ensure, having due regard to the applicant\u2019s vulnerability and his diminished ability to take decisions, notwithstanding the fact that under domestic law he is formally considered capable of reaching his own decisions, that all the necessary initiatives are taken, in the medium and long term, to secure effective care, including psychiatric and psychological treatment and welfare assistance in accordance with the requirements of Article 5 \u00a7 1 (e) of the Convention, so as to provide him with the prospect of release. V.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION256.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage1.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber\u2019s findings257.\u00a0\u00a0Before the Chamber, the applicant claimed 800,000 euros (EUR) in respect of the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage he had allegedly sustained. He also claimed a single lump sum of EUR 100,000 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and before the Court.258.\u00a0\u00a0The Chamber dismissed the claim for compensation in respect of pecuniary damage as regards the violation of Article 3 of the Convention, holding that there was no causal link between the violation found and the alleged damage. However, it awarded the applicant EUR 15,000 in respect of the non-pecuniary damage caused by the violation of Article 3. As regards costs and expenses, it dismissed the applicant\u2019s claims, noting that he had not submitted any invoice or any fee note or expenses claim which would confirm that the costs were real, or any breakdown of fees on the basis of the proceedings and the time spent on them.2.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions before the Grand Chamber259.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant continued to claim EUR 800,000 in respect of the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage that he considered he had sustained. He argued that, had he been at liberty, he could have been employed. In his view, this loss of earnings was to be assessed together with the non\u2011pecuniary damage allegedly sustained as a result of an unjust and unwarranted deprivation of liberty. Thus, the applicant considered that the damages payable to him ought to be calculated on the basis of compensation for each day of detention since the order issued by the Committals Division on 16 June 2003. On the basis of EUR 200 per day of detention, he calculated a total amount of EUR 800,000 at the date of submitting his observations to the Chamber on 29 July 2014. However, he left it to the discretion of the Court to determine the daily sum and the total amount. Lastly, he asked that the Court explicitly state that the damage sustained would continue until his effective release.260.\u00a0\u00a0The Government noted that, in calculating damages, the applicant had used the Belgian compensation system intended for cases of unwarranted detention. They considered that this comparison was irrelevant in the present case, since the decision to place the applicant in compulsory confinement had been lawful. Referring to the Court\u2019s case-law in the matter, they argued that the sum to be awarded should not exceed EUR\u00a015,000.3.\u00a0\u00a0The Grand Chamber\u2019s assessment261.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that it has not been shown in the present case that there exists a causal link between the violation found of Articles\u00a03\u00a0and\u00a05 of the Convention and the pecuniary damage alleged by the applicant. It therefore rejects his claims under this head.262.\u00a0\u00a0However, it finds that the applicant undoubtedly sustained damage of a non-pecuniary nature on account of his continued compulsory confinement without appropriate treatment for his health condition, in violation of Articles 3 and 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. Ruling in equity as required under Article 41, the Court awards him EUR 32,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses263.\u00a0\u00a0As he had before the Chamber, the applicant claimed, without submitting any supporting documents, a single lump sum of EUR 100,000 in respect of the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and before the Court.264.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that this claim ought to be rejected. On the one hand, they emphasised that the applicant had received legal aid for his defence in the domestic proceedings and that those proceedings had therefore been without charge for him, including with regard to lawyers\u2019 fees. Equally, they argued that the applicant had not provided evidence that the fees in question had been actually incurred; moreover, some of those fees concerned proceedings that were still pending, the outcome of which was still unknown.265.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that, as was the case in the proceedings before the Chamber, the applicant has not submitted any invoice or any fee note or expenses claim which would establish that the costs claimed for the proceedings before the Grand Chamber are real, nor has he provided any breakdown of fees on the basis of the proceedings and the time spent on them. The Court therefore rejects his claim.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest266.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","31645":"I.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION76.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been ill-treated by the police and that no effective investigation into his complaints had been carried out. He further complained that he had had no access to adequate medical treatment in detention and that the material conditions of his detention had been poor. Lastly, he complained that he had not been provided with food and water on hearing days. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged ill-treatment by the police and alleged ineffectiveness of the ensuing investigation77.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had been ill-treated by the police and that no effective investigation into his complaints had been carried out.1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility78.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits79.\u00a0\u00a0The relevant general principles of the Court\u2019s case-law concerning Article 3 of the Convention and the State\u2019s obligations stemming from that provision are summarised in particular in El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ([GC] no.\u00a039630\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 182-185 and 195-198, ECHR 2012) and Bouyid v.\u00a0Belgium ([GC] no. 23380\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a081-90 and 100-101 ECHR 2015).(a)\u00a0\u00a0Substantive aspect of Article 3 of the Conventioni.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions80.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that police officers had beaten him in order to extract a confession from him. In particular, he stated that Officer G., the first deputy head of the Kyiv Shevchenkivskyy district police station, had kicked him in the face and abdomen and injured the area where he had had an operation for his umbilical hernia. He added that the ITT and SIZO doctors had seen the injuries which he had sustained; however they had been forced not to register them. No detailed record of his injuries or condition had been made upon his admission to the SIZO on 26 February 2008. He further stated that the police and the ITT and SIZO administrations had ignored his numerous complaints regarding the ill-treatment and the deterioration in his health.81.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that there was no evidence of the applicant being ill-treated in the material relating to the inquiries and the investigation, and that the applicant had failed to present any evidence in support of his allegation. They further stated that the applicant had complained of ill-treatment for the first time four months after the events in question had taken place. Upon his admission to the SIZO he had been examined by medical staff and no injuries had been found on his body. He had not expressed any complaints in this regard. The absence of physical injuries had been confirmed by the forensic medical examination which had been conducted at the applicant\u2019s request on 24 June 2008 (see paragraph 14 above).ii.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment82.\u00a0\u00a0The Courts reiterates that where events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention. The burden of proof is then on the Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation by producing evidence establishing facts which cast doubt on the account of events given by the victim. In the absence of such an explanation, the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the Government (see, among other authorities, El-Masri, cited above, \u00a7 152, and Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7 83).83.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that although the parties disagreed as to the date of the applicant\u2019s arrest (see paragraphs 7 and 8 above), it is undisputed that he remained under the control of the police from 10 to 16\u00a0February 2008.84.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the applicant had the following injuries:- a bruise under his right eye, according to the results of the medical examination carried out upon his arrival at the ITT on 16 February 2008 (see paragraph 10 above);- contusion to the abdomen and facial tissue, according to the certificate issued by the Emergency Hospital following the applicant\u2019s treatment there from 20 to 25 February 2008 (see paragraph 11 above). Upon his admission to the SIZO on 26\u00a0February 2008, a doctor examined the applicant and classified the above injuries as \u201ca post-operative condition\u201d following an operation on his umbilical hernia in 2007 (see\u00a0paragraph 12 above).85.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that it has not been disputed that the applicant did not have any marks on his face or body when he entered the Shevchenkivskyy district police station on 9 or 10 February 2008.86.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, and in the absence of explanations from the Government as to the origin of the applicant\u2019s injuries, the Court deems it sufficiently established that the injuries described in the certificates produced by the ITT and the Emergency Hospital occurred while he was under police control in the Shevchenkivskyy district police station. The Court further notes that the above injuries correspond to the kind of traces that would originate from kicks in the face and the abdomen such as those that he described (see paragraph 9 above).87.\u00a0\u00a0It remains to be established whether the applicant is justified in claiming that the treatment of which he complained was in breach of Article\u00a03 of the Convention.88.\u00a0\u00a0In this regard, the Court reiterates that, in respect of a person who is deprived of his or her liberty, or, more generally, confronted with law\u2011enforcement officers, any recourse to physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by his or her own conduct diminishes human dignity and is an infringement of the right set forth in Article 3 (see, among other authorities, Bouyid, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 88 and 101).89.\u00a0\u00a0In the present case, the Government denied that police officers had used physical force on the applicant (see paragraph 81 above). They did not submit any arguments providing a basis for an explanation or justification of the force used against him that resulted in the above-mentioned injuries. In the absence of explanations from the Government, the Court must conclude that the physical force had been used against the applicant and had not been made necessary by his own conduct.90.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of the substantive limb of this provision.(b)\u00a0\u00a0Procedural aspect of Article 3 of the Conventioni.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions91.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant stated that the authorities had failed to carry out an effective and prompt investigation into his ill-treatment complaints. He submitted that the investigating officer had questioned him for the first time in August 2010, more than two years after he had complained of being ill\u2011treated. He further stated that the courts and superior prosecutors, when quashing the decisions of the investigating officer refusing to initiate criminal proceedings into his ill-treatment complaints, had consistently noted similar investigative defects. Lastly, referring to the Court\u2019s case law, the applicant stated that the investigation into his ill-treatment complaints, a pre-investigation inquiry rather than a full-scale investigation, could not be considered effective.92.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained that the domestic authorities had conducted all necessary investigative actions and carried out an effective investigation into the applicant\u2019s complaints. They further stated that the repeated quashing of the decisions refusing to initiate criminal proceedings, as well as the instructions given by the court and superior prosecutors to the investigating officer, indicated that the domestic authorities had intended to carry out an effective investigation into the applicant\u2019s complaints.ii.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment93.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that, in the present case, the applicant had an arguable claim that he had been subjected to treatment prohibited by Article\u00a03 of the Convention by the police. The authorities therefore had an obligation to investigate it, in accordance with the effectiveness standards established in the Court\u2019s case-law (see, amongst many other authorities, Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, \u00a7 102, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998\u2011VIII).94.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that between 16 May 2008 and 21 May 2013 the applicant\u2019s complaint was handled in the form of a pre-investigation inquiry under the 1960 Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraphs 13-32 above). Within that procedure, the inquiring officer could only take a limited number of steps and the victim had no formal status and could not effectively participate in the procedure (see, for example, Savitskyy v.\u00a0Ukraine, no.\u00a038773\/05, \u00a7 105, 26 July 2012).95.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that, during the above-mentioned period of time, the investigating officer dealing with the applicant\u2019s case refused to institute criminal proceedings concerning his ill-treatment complaints eight times. All the decisions in this respect were subsequently quashed, mostly for non-compliance with the instructions given by either the local court on 18 November 2008 (see paragraph 19 above) or a superior prosecutor. Moreover, as the applicant pointed out in his submissions, the investigating officer questioned him for the first time in August 2010 (see paragraph 24 above), more than two years after he had complained of ill-treatment. The Government did not explain the delay in questioning the applicant, who, while detained, had been under the control of the State at all times and thus easily accessible for the investigating authority.96.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that from 21 May 2013 onwards the investigation into the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment complaint was conducted in accordance with the 2012 Code of Criminal Procedure. However, it did not prove to be fruitful. The Court observes in this respect that the decisions of the investigating authority on terminating the criminal proceedings concerning the applicant\u2019s ill-treatment complaints were quashed twice on the basis of reasons similar to those set out previously \u2013 failure to comply with the instructions of the local court (see paragraphs 34 and 37 above).97.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that, as the case-file material indicates, the investigation did not inquire into the origin of the bruise under the applicant\u2019s right eye identified by the ITT staff on 16 February 2008 (see paragraph 10 above). Similarly, the investigation did not attempt to establish the origin of the injuries registered by the Emergency Hospital during the applicant\u2019s stay there from 20 to 25 February 2008 (\u201ccontusion to the abdomen and facial tissue\u201d \u2013 see paragraph 11 above). According to the material in the case-file, the investigating authorities considered that those injuries were the result of an operation on the applicant\u2019s abdomen performed in April 2007 (the \u201cpost-operative condition\u201d). However, the case file does not contain any evidence that the applicant had a \u201cpost-operative condition\u201d before his arrest. It appears that the investigating authorities never tried to examine the applicant\u2019s \u201cpost-operative\u201d medical history prior to his arrest, in order to verify the existence of such a condition.98.\u00a0\u00a0Overall, it appears that the manner in which the authorities approached the investigation of the applicant\u2019s complaints was largely aimed at exonerating the officers suspected of having ill-treated him, rather than establishing the actual circumstances in which his injuries had been sustained (see, for instance and mutatis mutandis, Pomilyayko v. Ukraine, no. 60426\/11, \u00a7 56, 11\u00a0February 2016).99.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it has already condemned patterns of investigation similar to those in the present case in a number of other cases against Ukraine (see, for example, Drozd v. Ukraine, no. 12174\/03, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a063\u201171, 30 July 2009; Savitskyy, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 121-122; Grinenko v.\u00a0Ukraine, no.\u00a033627\/06, \u00a7 62, 15 November 2012; and Zhyzitskyy v.\u00a0Ukraine, no.\u00a057980\/11, \u00a7\u00a7 49-53, 19 February 2015). Moreover, in the case of Kaverzin v. Ukraine (no. 23893\/03, \u00a7\u00a7 173-180, 15 May 2012), the Court found that the reluctance of the authorities to ensure a prompt and thorough investigation of ill\u2011treatment complaints by criminal suspects constituted a systemic problem within the meaning of Article 46 of the Convention.100.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the circumstances of the present case and its earlier case\u2011law, the Court concludes that, in the present case, no serious effort was made to investigate the allegations of ill-treatment made by the applicant.101.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, the Court notes that the inquiries and investigations into the applicant\u2019s case lasted five years and eleven months and, according to the information submitted to the Court, were still ongoing in April 2014 at least (see paragraphs 37 and 38 above). There is no valid explanation for the length of the domestic proceedings. Thus, the requirement of promptness and expedition under Article 3 of the Convention was not complied with.102.\u00a0\u00a0It follows that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural limb in respect of the investigation into the applicant\u2019s complaints concerning his ill-treatment by the police.B.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the medical assistance provided to the applicant in detention103.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he that he had had no access to adequate medical treatment in detention.1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility104.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions105.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that despite numerous complaints to the SIZO administration regarding his medical condition, he had had no medical assistance between 26 February and 21 March 2008. On 21 March 2008 he had been examined by a SIZO general practitioner for the first time, yet the doctor had only given him an anaesthetic. The applicant further maintained that during his detention in the SIZO he had suffered from severe pains, but had only been provided with treatment for his symptoms. In response to the Government\u2019s observations, he submitted that he had refused to be treated at the Emergency Hospital on 4 November 2009 (see paragraph 56 above) because he had not trusted the hospital doctors, having previously had a negative experience of treatment there. After the operation performed in January 2010 (see paragraph 68 above), his rehabilitation had been difficult and lengthy, since his navel area had been purulent all the time. Lastly, the applicant noted that the Government\u2019s failure to provide medical documentation for the period after 26 February 2010 relating to his medical rehabilitation (see paragraph 69 above) was another reason to find a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.106.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the medical assistance provided to the applicant had been adequate and full, and had been in accordance with the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention. They further contended that the applicant had refused the treatment at the Emergency Hospital offered to him on 4 November 2009 (see paragraph 56 above).(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessmenti.\u00a0\u00a0General principles107.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that, in accordance with Article 3 of the Convention, the State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his or her human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him or her to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention, and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his or her health and well-being are adequately secured (see,\u00a0for instance,\u00a0Kalashnikov v. Russia, no. 47095\/99, \u00a7 95, ECHR 2002\u2011VI).108.\u00a0\u00a0However, the Court has held that Article 3 of the Convention cannot be interpreted as ensuring that every detainee should receive medical care at the same level as \u201cin the best civilian clinics\u201d (see Mirilashivili v.\u00a0Russia (dec.), no. 6293\/04, 10 July 2007). It has further held that it is \u201cprepared to accept that, in principle, the resources of medical facilities within the [prison] system are limited compared to those of civil clinics\u201d (see Grishin v. Russia, no. 30983\/02, \u00a7 76, 15 November 2007). On the whole, the Court takes a flexible approach in defining the required standard of health care, deciding it on a case-by-case basis. That standard should be \u201ccompatible with the human dignity\u201d of a detainee, but should also take into account \u201cthe practical demands of imprisonment\u201d (see Aleksanyan v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a046468\/06, \u00a7 140, 22 December 2008).109.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the \u201cadequacy\u201d of medical care remains a difficult element to determine. The mere fact that a detainee is seen by a doctor and prescribed a certain form of treatment cannot automatically lead to the conclusion that the medical care provided was adequate (see Hummatov v. Azerbaijan, nos. 9852\/03 and 13413\/04, \u00a7 116, 29 November 2007). The authorities must also ensure that a comprehensive record is kept of the detainee\u2019s state of health and his treatment while in detention (see, for example, Khudobin v. Russia, no. 59696\/00, \u00a7 83, ECHR 2006-XII), that the diagnoses and care are prompt and accurate (see\u00a0Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7 115, and Melnik v. Ukraine, no. 72286\/01, \u00a7\u00a7 104-106, 28 March 2006), and that \u2013 where necessitated by the nature of a medical condition \u2013 supervision is regular and systematic and involves a comprehensive therapeutic strategy aimed at curing the detainee\u2019s diseases or preventing their aggravation, rather than addressing them on a symptomatic basis (see Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 109 and 114; Sarban v.\u00a0Moldova, no. 3456\/05, \u00a7\u00a079, 4 October 2005; and Popov v. Russia, no.\u00a026853\/04, \u00a7 211, 13 July 2006). The authorities must also show that the necessary conditions were created for the prescribed treatment to be actually followed through (see\u00a0Hummatov, cited above, \u00a7 116, and Holomiov v.\u00a0Moldova, no.\u00a030649\/05, \u00a7\u00a0117, 7 November 2006).ii.\u00a0\u00a0Application of these principles to the present case110.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that the applicant\u2019s principal \u201cmedical\u201d grievance concerned the authorities\u2019 failure to provide him with adequate treatment for his navel fistula, in particular their failure to perform an operation on his navel fistula which had first been recommended by a surgeon on 5 December 2008 (see\u00a0paragraph 46 above).111.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes in this connection that throughout his detention in the SIZO the applicant systematically complained of severe pain in his abdomen. The Government did not contest this fact, which was also supported by medical documents.112.\u00a0\u00a0The Government\u2019s submissions indicate that the applicant received treatment after complaining of a deterioration in his health (see paragraph\u00a0106 above). In this connection, the Court notes that the medical care provided to him cannot be assessed as systematic and comprehensive.113.\u00a0\u00a0The Court is not in a position to analyse the effectiveness of the treatment provided to the applicant while in detention. However, it must note that he received mainly anaesthetics and antibiotics until his operation on 20 January 2010 (see paragraph 68 above).114.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, the Court reiterates that at the end of 2008, following his stay at the Emergency Hospital, it was recommended that the applicant have elective surgery on his navel fistula. This was also recommended three times in 2009 (see paragraphs\u00a046, 49 and 60 above). However, such surgery was only performed on 20 January 2010. The Government did not explain the reasons for the delay in performing that operation, a delay which lasted more than a year, merely referring to the fact that the applicant had refused the medical treatment at the Emergency Hospital offered to him on 4\u00a0November 2009 (see paragraph\u00a0106 above).115.\u00a0\u00a0As regards this last point, the Court takes into account the applicant\u2019s assertion that his refusal of the treatment offered was due to his lack of trust in the medical staff at the Emergency Hospital (see paragraph\u00a0105 above). Having merely received treatment for his symptoms at that hospital on a number of previous occasions, he could reasonably have believed that further treatment there might not be successful.116.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the medical care provided to the applicant was not adequate and was not followed by a comprehensive therapeutic strategy. As a result of the inadequacy of the medical care provided to him, the applicant endured distress or hardship exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention, and his dignity was undermined.117.\u00a0\u00a0There has therefore been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in this respect.C.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the material conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in the SIZO118.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that the material conditions of his detention had been poor.1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility119.\u00a0\u00a0The Government claimed that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, as he had not complained of his detention conditions in the SIZO to a prosecutor or an administrative court. In the Government\u2019s view, such actions could have been effective and constituted an accessible remedy in the applicant\u2019s situation.120.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that he had made a number of complaints to the SIZO administration regarding the insufficiency of the conditions of his detention, but to no avail. He could not present any documentary proof, in view of those complaints having been lost. In any event, the applicant considered that the Government had failed to substantiate their objection. He added that similar objections had already been rejected by the Court in cases against Ukraine, as the problems arising from complaints of conditions of detention in Ukrainian penal institutions were of a structural nature.121.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it has already dismissed similar objections by the Government on a number of occasions, finding the remedies they referred to ineffective on the grounds that it had not been shown that recourse to such proceedings could have brought an improvement in an applicant\u2019s detention conditions (see, for example, Rodzevillo v. Ukraine, no. 38771\/05, \u00a7 41, 14 January 2016, and Kleutin v. Ukraine, no.\u00a05911\/05, \u00a7\u00a078, 23 June 2016). The Court sees no reason to depart from that finding in the present case, and therefore considers that this complaint cannot be rejected for failure to exhaust domestic remedies.122.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the complaint is neither manifestly ill\u2011founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention nor inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions123.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant noted that the conditions of detention in the SIZO had not met the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (hereinafter, \u201cthe CPT\u201d) standards as regards the minimum living space per person. He added in particular that the sanitation, ventilation, lighting conditions, food and sleeping arrangements in the SIZO had not corresponded to what the Government had described (see paragraph 124 below). In particular, the cells in which he had been kept in the SIZO had lacked natural light, the electric light had been dim and constantly on, and the inmates had slept on beds without mattresses or bed linen. The food had been unsatisfactory in terms of quality and quantity. The prisoners had been given tea and bread in the morning, porridge in the afternoon and boiled water in the evening. The applicant referred to the relevant CPT reports and the Court\u2019s case law concerning the conditions of detention in the Kyiv SIZO (see, for example, Gavula v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 52652\/07, 16 May 2013; Koval v.\u00a0Ukraine, no.\u00a065550\/01, 19\u00a0October 2006; and Kharchenko v.\u00a0Ukraine, no.\u00a040107\/02, 10\u00a0February 2011).124.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in the SIZO had been in compliance with domestic prison rules. During his detention in the SIZO the applicant had been held in different cells of varying sizes containing different numbers (from 4 to 19) of inmates. According to the Government, each inmate had had between 2.5 and 2.8 sq. m of personal space.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment125.\u00a0\u00a0As indicated paragraph 107 above, Article 3 of the Convention requires States to ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity, and that the manner and method of the execution of such a measure do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention.126.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that a serious lack of space in a prison cell weighs heavily as a factor to be taken into account for the purposes of establishing whether the detention conditions described are \u201cdegrading\u201d within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention, and may disclose a violation, either alone or taken together with other shortcomings. When the personal space available to a detainee falls below 3 sq. m. of floor space in multi-occupancy accommodation in prisons, the lack of personal space is considered so severe that a strong presumption of a violation of Article 3 arises (see Mur\u0161i\u0107 v. Croatia [GC], no. 7334\/13, \u00a7\u00a7 136-137, ECHR 2016). This presumption will normally be capable of being rebutted only if the following factors are cumulatively met: (1) the reductions in the required minimum personal space of 3 sq. m. are short, occasional and minor; (2)\u00a0such reductions are accompanied by sufficient freedom of movement outside the cell and adequate out-of-cell activities; (3) the applicant is confined in what is, when viewed generally, an appropriate detention facility, and there are no other aggravating aspects of the conditions of his or her detention (see Mur\u0161i\u0107, cited above, \u00a7 138).127.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that, in the present case, the Government acknowledged that during his stay in the Kyiv SIZO the applicant had at his disposal less than 3 sq. m of personal space. In particular, as reported by the Government (see paragraph 124 above), the cells in which the applicant had been detained had allowed between approximately 2.5 sq. m. and 2.8 sq. m. of floor space per inmate, with the average number of inmates varying from 4 to 19 persons.128.\u00a0\u00a0As regards other elements relevant to the assessment of the conditions of detention, the Court notes that the applicant\u2019s submissions as regards an unsanitary environment and a lack of respect for hygiene are well detailed. Moreover, on a number of occasions the Court has found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of overcrowding and an unsanitary environment in the same pre-trial detention centre during the same period of time \u2013 see Gavula (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 70-75 and concerning the period 26\u00a0February 2003-August 2010), and Kharchenko (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a052-55 and concerning the period 20 April 2001-4 August 2003). It therefore accepts the applicant\u2019s description of the material conditions of his detention.129.\u00a0\u00a0In addition, although neither of the parties specified the amount of time the applicant had spent locked up in his cell each day, given the regulations concerning the SIZO regime in Ukraine, the Court observes that the applicant and his cellmates had to spend most of each day in such conditions (see, mutatis mutandis, Gavula, cited above, \u00a7 71, and Zakshevskiy v. Ukraine, no. 7193\/04, \u00a7 67, 17 March 2016).130.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances, the Court finds that the conditions of the applicant\u2019s detention in the Kyiv SIZO, in particular the lack of personal space afforded to him, combined with his state of health and the unsanitary environment as regards personal hygiene and the lack of outdoor exercise, over the course of approximately five years, amounted to a treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention. Accordingly, there has been a violation of that provision in this respect.D.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the lack of provision of food and water to the applicant on hearing days131.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had not been provided with food and water on hearing days.1.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility132.\u00a0\u00a0The Government maintained that the applicant should have lodged a complaint with the prosecutor\u2019s office or a court denouncing the failure to provide him with food and water on hearing days.133.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that he had done so, having raised that issue at the hearing before the trial court, but to no avail. He could not, however, present any documentary proof in this respect.134.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that the rule on exhaustion of domestic remedies, referred to in Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, obliges applicants to firstly use the remedies that are normally available and sufficient in the domestic legal system to enable them to obtain redress for the breaches alleged. The existence of the remedies must be sufficiently certain, in practice as well as in theory, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness. Article 35 \u00a7 1 also requires that complaints intended to be brought subsequently before the Court should have been made to the appropriate domestic body, at least in substance and in compliance with the formal requirements laid down in domestic law, but there is no obligation to have recourse to remedies which are inadequate or ineffective (see Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a065\u201167, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996\u2011IV).135.\u00a0\u00a0It is incumbent on the Government claiming non-exhaustion to satisfy the Court that the remedy they refer to was an effective one, available in theory and in practice at the relevant time (see Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], nos. 10865\/09 and 2 others, \u00a7 225, ECHR 2014 (extracts)).136.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that the Government merely referred to the theoretical possibility of the applicant lodging a complaint with the prosecutor\u2019s office or court denouncing the failure to provide him with food and water on hearing days; they did not show that that remedy was available in practice. In particular, the Government failed to produce any examples of cases in which such a complaint had been ruled on. While it is not for the Court to give a ruling on an issue of domestic law that is as yet unsettled, the absence of any case-law indicates the uncertainty of that remedy in practice (see, mutatis mutandis, \u0160trucl and others v. Slovenia, nos. 5903\/10, 6003\/10 and 6544\/10, \u00a7 127, 20 October 2011).137.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the foregoing, in the absence of evidence that the remedy suggested by the respondent Government in respect of the applicant\u2019s complaint concerning the provision of food and water was effective, the Court considers that the applicant was not required to exhaust that remedy, and that the Government\u2019s related objection should be dismissed.138.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that this complaint is not neither manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention nor inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.2.\u00a0\u00a0Merits(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions139.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant submitted that between February 2008 and June 2011 he had been transported between the SIZO and the trial court on more than a hundred occasions. He noted that he had been transported along with other SIZO detainees who had had hearings in their cases on those days. He had had to spend whole days at the trial court, waiting for the end of the hearings in the other detainees\u2019 cases. The process of being escorted had usually commenced in the early morning and had ended in the evening, so he had missed meals scheduled to be served in the SIZO. The applicant criticised the Government\u2019s argument concerning destroying of the documentation on the catering arrangements pointing out that the present case had been communicated in 2013 and by that time the above-mentioned documentation related to the period of time from 2010 to 2011 should have been available to the Government.140.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the documentation on the catering arrangements for the applicant on hearing days had been destroyed upon the three-year time-limit for storing such documentation expiring. At the same time, they contended that the applicant had been provided with dry rations on the hearing days, in accordance with the domestic law. The Government also suggested that the applicant had been allowed to take his own food to the court (food either bought at the SIZO shop or given to him by his relatives).(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment141.\u00a0\u00a0As already mentioned in paragraphs 82 and 107 above, the State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity, that the manner and method of execution of the measure of detention do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention, and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well\u2011being are adequately secured. Where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of persons within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring during such detention. The burden of proof is then on the Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation by producing evidence establishing facts which cast doubt on the account of events given by the victim. In the absence of such explanation, the Court can draw inferences which may be unfavourable for the Government. That is justified by the fact that persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and the authorities are under a duty to protect them. These principles also apply to detainees\u2019 confinement in a court and during their transportation, and include providing proper nutrition (see Yevgeniy Bogdanov v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a022405\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 101-105, 26 February 2015; Romanova v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a023215\/02, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a088\u201192, 11 October 2011; Kovaleva v.\u00a0Russia, no.\u00a07782\/04, \u00a7\u00a7 62-65, 2 December 2010; and Yakovenko v.\u00a0Ukraine, no.\u00a015825\/06, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0103-113, 25 October 2007).142.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also reiterates that giving somebody permission to provide his or her own food cannot be a substitute for providing appropriate catering arrangements, because it is primarily the State that is responsible for the well-being of persons deprived of their liberty (see Vlasov v. Russia, no. 78146\/01, \u00a7 96, 12 June 2008).143.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that the Government did not contest the assertion that on the days when there had been court hearings the applicant had left the SIZO before breakfast and had not returned until after dinner (see, mutatis mutandis, Vlasov, cited above, \u00a7\u00a096; compare Starokadomskiy v.\u00a0Russia, no. 42239\/02, \u00a7 58, 31 July 2008; see, by contrast, Bagel\u00a0v.\u00a0Russia, no. 37810\/03, \u00a7 69, 15\u00a0November 2007). Moreover, the Court is not convinced by the Government\u2019s unsupported assertion that the applicant was provided with dry rations on the days when he was transported to the court (see paragraph\u00a0140 above and, mutatis mutandis, Denisenko and Bogdanchikov v.\u00a0Russia, no. 3811\/02, \u00a7\u00a0108, 12 February 2009). It notes that the Government did not comment on the applicant\u2019s argument that the documentation on the catering arrangements related to the period of time from 2010 to 2011 should have been available to them. The Court would have expected the Government to provide such documentation in order to discharge the burden of proof in this respect. In the absence of any such information submitted by the Government, the Court considers that on hearing days the applicant was left without adequate food and water. In connection with its above findings, the Court would emphasise that it finds it unacceptable for a person to be detained in conditions where no provision is made for meeting his or her basic needs (see Riad and Idiab v. Belgium, nos. 29787\/03 and 29810\/03, \u00a7\u00a0106, 24 January 2008, and Denisenko and Bogdanchikov v.\u00a0Russia, cited above, \u00a7\u00a0108).144.\u00a0\u00a0Having regard to the nature and duration of the situation in which the applicant was placed, the Court considers that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the applicant not being provided with food and water on hearing days.II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION145.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained that he had not had at his disposal an effective domestic remedy for his complaints under Article 3 of the Convention. He relied on Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201cEveryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility146.\u00a0\u00a0The Court finds that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded or indeed inadmissible on any other ground listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged lack of domestic remedies for the complaints concerning the material conditions of detention, the insufficiency of medical treatment, and the provision of food and water to the applicant on hearing days147.\u00a0\u00a0The Government restated the arguments set out above (paragraphs\u00a0119 and 132) and concluded by stating that the applicant had had an effective domestic remedy in respect of his complaints concerning his conditions of detention and the provision of food and water on hearing days. However, he had not pursued that remedy.148.\u00a0\u00a0The Court points out that Article 13 of the Convention guarantees the availability at national level of a remedy to enforce the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they might happen to be secured in the domestic legal order. The effect of Article 13 is thus to require the provision of a domestic remedy to deal with the substance of an \u201carguable complaint\u201d under the Convention and to grant appropriate relief, although Contracting States are afforded some discretion as to the manner in which they conform to their Convention obligations under this provision. The scope of the obligation under Article 13 varies depending on the nature of the applicant\u2019s complaint under the Convention. Nevertheless, the remedy required by Article 13 must be \u201ceffective\u201d in practice as well as in law. In particular, its exercise must not be unjustifiably hindered by the acts or omissions of the authorities of the respondent State (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848\/08, \u00a7 148, ECHR 2014).149.\u00a0\u00a0The Court reiterates that it has already found a violation of Article\u00a013 in cases against Ukraine on the grounds that there were no effective domestic remedies in respect of complaints concerning conditions of detention and a lack of medical treatment (see, among other authorities, Melnik, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0113-16; Dvoynykh v. Ukraine, no. 72277\/01, \u00a7 72, 12 October 2006; Ukhan v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 30628\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 91-92, 18 December 2008; Iglin v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 39908\/05, \u00a7 77, 12 January 2012; and Barilo v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 9607\/06, \u00a7\u00a7 104-105, 16 May 2013). Referring also to its above findings on the exhaustion of domestic remedies as regards the applicant\u2019s complaint regarding the material conditions of his detention (paragraph 121 above), the Court sees no reason to decide otherwise in the present case.150.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the applicant\u2019s complaint that he had no effective domestic remedy in respect of his complaint regarding the provision of food and water on hearing days, the Court refers to its finding above (paragraphs\u00a0136-137) that the remedies relied on by the Government were not effective within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 1 of the Convention. Having regard to the close affinity between Article 35 \u00a7 1 and Article 13 of the Convention (see, for instance, Akdivar and Others v.\u00a0Turkey, cited above, \u00a7 65), the Court sees no reason to conclude otherwise under Article\u00a013 of the Convention.151.\u00a0\u00a0The Court therefore concludes that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention on account of the lack of an effective and accessible remedy under domestic law for the applicant\u2019s complaints in respect of the conditions of his detention, the lack of medical treatment, and the lack of provision of food and water on hearing days.2.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged lack of remedies for the complaint that the investigation into the alleged ill-treatment was ineffective152.\u00a0\u00a0The Government stated that the applicant had had an effective domestic remedy, since his ill-treatment complaints had been duly investigated.153.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that this complaint concerns the same issues as those examined in paragraphs 93 to 101 above under the procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention. Having regard to its conclusion in paragraph\u00a0102 above, the Court considers it unnecessary to examine those issues separately under Article 13 of the Convention (see\u00a0Polonskiy\u00a0v.\u00a0Russia, no. 30033\/05, \u00a7 127, 19 March 2009).III.\u00a0\u00a0OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION154.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant complained under Article 5 \u00a7\u00a7 1 (c) and 3 of the Convention that his detention had not been lawful and that the courts which reviewed his detention had not taken into consideration some of his arguments. He further invoked Article 14 of the Convention without any substantiation. Lastly, he complained that the respondent Government failed to comply with the Court\u2019s decision of 30 October 2009 under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (see paragraph 55 above).155.\u00a0\u00a0As to the applicant\u2019s complaints under Article 5 of the Convention, the Court notes that the applicant failed to provide documents in support of the above claims. The Court further notes that on 4 December 2009 it has lifted the interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court on the basis of the information provided by the parties (see paragraph 64 above). Having considered the applicant\u2019s submissions in the light of all the material in its possession, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill\u2011founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 \u00a7\u00a7 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION156.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage157.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant claimed 25,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.158.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered that claim excessive.159.\u00a0\u00a0Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 11,700 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses160.\u00a0\u00a0The applicant also claimed EUR 1,000 for costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts, and EUR 4,800 for those incurred before the Court.161.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered the amount claimed excessive and unsubstantiated.162.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, and the fact that the applicant was granted legal aid (see paragraph 2 above), the Court makes no award under this head.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest163.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.","31657":"I.\u00a0\u00a0PRELIMINARY ISSUE79.\u00a0\u00a0The Court at the outset notes that the first applicant, Mr Novruzali Mammadov, died after lodging the application of 13 August 2007 and that his wife (the second applicant) and his son (the third applicant) have expressed their wish to continue the proceedings before the Court (see paragraph 4 above). Furthermore, the third applicant, Mr Emil Mammadov, died after lodging the application of 11 May 2010. The Court notes that his mother (the second applicant) has expressed her wish to continue the proceedings before the Court (see paragraph 7 above). The Government did not dispute the second applicant\u2019s standing to pursue the application in the first and third applicants\u2019 stead.80.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in various cases in which an applicant has died in the course of the Convention proceedings, it has taken into account the statements of the applicant\u2019s heirs or of close family members expressing the wish to pursue the proceedings before the Court (see, among other authorities, J\u0117\u010dius v. Lithuania, no. 34578\/97, \u00a7 41, ECHR 2000\u2011IX; Pisarkiewicz v. Poland, no. 18967\/02, \u00a7\u00a7 30-33, 22 January 2008; and Ergezen v. Turkey, no. 73359\/10, \u00a7\u00a7 27-30, 8 April 2014). The Court has accepted that the next-of-kin or heir may in principle pursue the application, provided that he or she has sufficient interest in the case (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin C\u00e2mpeanu v.\u00a0Romania [GC], no.\u00a047848\/08, \u00a7 97, ECHR 2014, and Ksenz and Others v. Russia, nos.\u00a045044\/06 and 5 others, \u00a7 86, 12 December 2017). In view of the above and having regard to the circumstances of the present case, the Court accepts that the second applicant has a legitimate interest in pursuing the application in the late applicants\u2019 stead. However, for reasons of convenience, the text of this judgment will continue to refer to Mr\u00a0Novruzali Mammadov as \u201cthe first applicant\u201d and Mr Emil Mammadov as \u201cthe third applicant\u201d, even though only the second applicant is today to be regarded as having the status of applicant before the Court (see Gulub Atanasov v. Bulgaria, no. 73281\/01, \u00a7 42, 6\u00a0November 2008, and Isayeva v.\u00a0Azerbaijan, no. 36229\/11, \u00a7 62, 25 June 2015).II.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 1 OF THE CONVENTION81.\u00a0\u00a0Relying on Articles 5 and 13 of the Convention, the first applicant complained that his detention between 2 and 3 February 2007 on the premises of the MNS had been unlawful and that he had had no effective remedy in this connection. The Court considers that the present complaint falls to be examined solely under Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201c1.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:(a)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;(b)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law;(c)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;(d)\u00a0\u00a0the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority;(e)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;(f)\u00a0\u00a0the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility82.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions83.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant maintained his complaint, submitting that there had been no legal basis for his detention between 2 and 3 February 2007 on the premises of the MNS.84.\u00a0\u00a0The Government did not make any submission in respect of this complaint.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment85.\u00a0\u00a0The Court refers to the general principles established in its case-law set out in the judgment Nagiyev v. Azerbaijan (no. 16499\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 54-57, 23\u00a0April 2015), which are equally pertinent to the present case.86.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in the present case while the first applicant maintained that he had been in detention on the premises of the MNS between 2\u00a0and 3 February 2007, the Government did not make any submission. The Court notes that the first applicant raised the same complaint before the domestic courts, within the framework of various court proceedings, reiterating that he had been unlawfully detained between 2 and 3 February 2007 on the premises of the MNS (see paragraphs 16, 26 and 41 above). However, the domestic courts never addressed this complaint in their decisions.87.\u00a0\u00a0In that connection, the Court also observes that although a judge at the Assize Court asked the MNS to inform the court whether the first applicant had been on its premises between 2 and 3 February 2007, the MNS failed to reply to the judge\u2019s information request on this point (see paragraphs 43-44 above). Moreover, despite the Court\u2019s explicit request to the Government to submit copies of all the documents relating to the domestic proceedings, the Government failed to provide the Court with any document relating to the first applicant\u2019s present complaint, such as the extracts from the logbook of the premises of the MNS between 2 and 3\u00a0February 2007.88.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances, in view of the Government\u2019s silence and inability to provide any evidence capable of rebutting the first applicant\u2019s version of events and given the consistent and plausible nature of the first applicant\u2019s submissions, the Court accepts the first applicant\u2019s version of events concluding that he had been in detention on the premises of the MNS between 2 and 3 February 2007.89.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the question of whether the first applicant\u2019s detention during this period was \u201clawful\u201d within the meaning of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention, the Court notes that the first applicant\u2019s deprivation of liberty \u2013 from 2 to 3 February \u2013 was not documented at all. The Court reiterates in this connection that the unrecorded detention of an individual is a complete negation of the fundamentally important guarantees contained in Article 5 of the Convention, and discloses a grave violation of that provision (see Anguelova v. Bulgaria, no. 38361\/97, \u00a7 154, ECHR 2002\u2011IV, and Nagiyev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a064).90.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 1 of the Convention.III.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 \u00a7 3 OF THE CONVENTION91.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant complained under Article 5 of the Convention that the domestic courts had failed to justify the need for his pre-trial detention, to provide reasons for his continued detention and to examine the arguments he had put forward in favour of his release. The Court considers that these complaints fall to be examined under Article\u00a05 \u00a7 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:\u201c3.\u00a0\u00a0Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph\u00a01\u00a0(c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility92.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions93.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant maintained his complaint.94.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the first applicant\u2019s submissions, pointing out that the domestic courts had given sufficient and relevant reasons for the first applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention.2.\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment95.\u00a0\u00a0The Court refers to the general principles established in its case-law set out in the judgment Buzadji v. the Republic of Moldova [GC] (no.\u00a023755\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 84-91, 5 July 2016), which are equally pertinent to the present case.96.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the period to be taken into consideration for the purposes of Article 5 \u00a7 3, in the present case, this period commenced on 17 February 2007, when the first applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention was ordered within the framework of the criminal proceedings instituted against him, and ended on 24 June 2008, when the first-instance court convicted him. Thus, the first applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention lasted one year, four months and seven days in total.97.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the first applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention was first ordered for a period of three months when he was brought before the judge at the Sabail District Court on 17 February 2007. That decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal on 1 March 2007. His detention was subsequently extended by the Sabail District Court\u2019s decision of 12 May 2007 until 3 August 2007. That decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal\u2019s decision of 31\u00a0May 2007. On 28 July 2007 the Sabail District Court again extended the first applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention until 3\u00a0December 2007 and that decision was upheld by the Baku Court of Appeal on 3 August 2007. On 7 December 2007 the Assize Court held at its preliminary hearing that the preventive measure of remand in custody in respect of the first applicant should remain \u201cunchanged\u201d.98.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that both the first-instance courts and the appellate courts used a standard template when ordering and extending the first applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention (see paragraphs 31-40 above). In particular, the Court notes that the domestic courts limited themselves to repeating a number of grounds for detention in an abstract and stereotyped way, without giving any reasons why they considered those grounds relevant to the first applicant\u2019s case. They failed to mention any case-specific facts relevant to those grounds and to substantiate them with relevant and sufficient reasons (see Farhad Aliyev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a0191-94, and Muradverdiyev, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a087-91).99.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that the domestic courts also relied on irrelevant grounds when they extended the first applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention. In particular, they substantiated their decisions by stating that more time was needed to complete the investigation (see paragraphs 34 and 37 above). However, the Court reiterates that, under Article 5 \u00a7 3, grounds such as the need to implement further investigative measures, or the fact that proceedings have not yet been completed, do not correspond to any of the acceptable reasons for detaining a person pending trial (see Allahverdiyev, cited above, \u00a7 60).100.\u00a0\u00a0In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court concludes that, by using a standard formula merely listing the grounds for detention without addressing the specific facts of the first applicant\u2019s case, and by relying on irrelevant grounds, the authorities failed to give \u201crelevant\u201d and \u201csufficient\u201d reasons to justify the need for the first applicant\u2019s pre-trial detention.101.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 5 \u00a7 3 of the Convention.IV.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION102.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant complained that he had been ill-treated by agents of the MNS between 2 and 17 February 2007 and that the domestic authorities had failed to investigate his allegation of ill-treatment. Article 3 of the Convention reads:\u201cNo one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility103.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged ill-treatment of the first applicant(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions104.\u00a0\u00a0The first applicant maintained his complaint, reiterating that he had been ill-treated by agents of the MNS on its premises between 2 and 17\u00a0February 2007. In particular, he averred that the fingers of his right hand had been squashed with a door several times and he had suffered injuries to his left shoulder as a result of his treatment. His physical ill-treatment had been stopped only owing to his high blood pressure. During this period, although he had suffered from hypertension, prostatitis and hyperthyroidism, he had not been provided with the adequate medical care and the relevant medication. He had been questioned in general at night and had been kept awake. During these undocumented interviews, as the investigator knew that the first applicant had suffered from prostatitis, he had constantly refused to allow him to use the toilet and obliged him to urinate in his pants. The first applicant had been kept in the dirty and urine-smelling clothing during this period and had not been provided with clean clothing. He had been given false information about his family according to which his two sons had also been arrested and detained in the next cells and that his wife had been hospitalised and had been suffering from a serious disease. His family had not been informed of his place of detention.105.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that they had been unable to make submissions about the treatment to which the first applicant had been subjected because the case files concerning his arrest and detention during this period had been destroyed owing to the expiration of their term of storage. They further submitted that the first applicant\u2019s ill-treatment allegation had been examined by the domestic courts, which had dismissed it as unsubstantiated.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment(i)\u00a0\u00a0General principles and the first applicant\u2019s allegation of detention on the premises of the MNS between 2 and 17 February 2007106.\u00a0\u00a0The Court refers to the general principles established in its case-law set out in the judgments Emin Huseynov v. Azerbaijan (no. 59135\/09, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a054\u201157, 7 May 2015) and Mustafa Hajili v. Azerbaijan (no. 42119\/12, \u00a7\u00a7\u00a034-37, 24\u00a0November 2016), which are equally pertinent to the present case.107.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that in the present case while the first applicant maintained that he had been ill-treated on the premises of the MNS between 2 and 17 February 2007, the Government submitted that they had been unable to make submissions about the treatment to which the first applicant had been subjected because the case files concerning his arrest and detention during this period had been destroyed owing to the expiration of their term of storage.108.\u00a0\u00a0In that connection, the Court firstly refers to its finding that the first applicant was detained on the premises of the MNS from 2 to 3 February 2007 (see paragraph 88 above). As regards the period between 3 and 17\u00a0February 2007, the Court observes that the Government failed to give any information about the first applicant\u2019s place of detention between 3 and 17\u00a0February 2007 in their observations lodged with the Court. Moreover, despite numerous requests from the first applicant\u2019s lawyer and family members to the relevant law-enforcement authorities and the domestic courts, they were never informed of the first applicant\u2019s place of detention following his administrative conviction by the Yasamal District Court on 3\u00a0February 2007. The relevant domestic authorities, in particular the MNS in a letter dated 9 February 2007, informed them that the first applicant had not been arrested and detained on their premises, without giving any information about his place of detention (see paragraph 22 above). However, it appears from the documents in the case file that on the same day \u2013 9 February 2007 \u2013 the first applicant was questioned by an investigator on the premises of the MNS (see paragraph 19 above).109.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances, on the basis of the material before it and given the consistent and plausible nature of the first applicant\u2019s submissions, the Court accepts the first applicant\u2019s version of events, concluding that following his administrative conviction on 3 February 2007 he was again returned to the premises of the MNS and was detained there between 3 and 17 February 2007.(ii)\u00a0\u00a0As regards the alleged ill-treatment of the first applicant110.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the first applicant presented a detailed description of his ill-treatment by agents of the MNS during the period between 2 and 17 February 2007. It notes that while the consequences of the ill-treatment allegedly happening on 2 February 2007 could lead to visible consequences (squashing of the fingers with a door and injuring the shoulder), the same is not true for the ill-treatment allegedly happening between 3 and 17 February 2007 (no provision of medical care and medication for hypertension, prostatitis and hyperthyroidism (see paragraphs 119-21 below), questioning at night, alarming, but false information about the family).111.\u00a0\u00a0The Court has consistently held that the standard of proof \u201cbeyond reasonable doubt\u201d may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see, among other authorities, Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18\u00a0January 1978, \u00a7 161 in fine, Series A no. 25, and Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772\/95, \u00a7 121, ECHR 2000\u2011IV). Where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of people within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries, death or disappearances occurring during such detention. The burden of proof may then be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation by producing evidence establishing facts which cast doubt on the account of events given by the victim (see Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986\/93, \u00a7\u00a0100, ECHR 2000\u2011VII, and Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no. 23380\/09, \u00a7 83, ECHR 2015).112.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes at the outset that, the first applicant in the present case has not presented any medical evidence in support of his allegations of the ill-treatment with potentially visible consequences. While the Court has underlined the importance of medical evidence on many occasions, the Court has accepted, albeit in exceptional circumstances, that the applicant has made a prima facie case of a violation of Article 3 in light of all the evidence before the Court. In such cases the Court emphasized the importance of the applicant\u2019s detailed statements about the incidents, which consistently support his allegations of ill-treatment as well as the reaction of the authorities (see Tsakoyevy v. Russia, no. 16397\/07, \u00a7\u00a7 118-19, 2\u00a0October 2018).113.\u00a0\u00a0The Court points out at the outset that it has already established that the first applicant had been detained from 2 to 17 February 2007 on the premises of the MNS and that his detention from 2 to 3 February 2007 had been unlawful. The first applicant\u2019s family and lawyer had not been informed of his place of detention between 2 and 17 February 2007 and they could see him only once on 3 February 2007, when he was taken to the Yasamal District Court within the framework of the administrative proceedings. In these circumstances, the Court considers that the first applicant could not have obtained any medical evidence in support of his allegation of ill-treatment during this period when he had been detained on the premises of the MNS without any access to the outside world.114.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further notes that the statements of the first applicant are supported by his lawyer and family, who observed bruises on his hand. The first applicant\u2019s own version of the events happening between 2 and 17\u00a0February 2007 has been consistent and plausible as far as essential elements are concerned. While there appear to be a contradiction between the description of the injuries given by the first applicant and his lawyer, in particular as to whether the injury was on the first applicant\u2019s right or left hand, or whether the first applicant\u2019s right or left shoulder was injuried (see paragraphs 12, 16, 25 and 42 above), such inconsistency is not in itself sufficient to discredit the statements of the first applicant and his lawyer, taking into account the overall circumstances of the case.115.\u00a0\u00a0In that connection, the Court draws attention to the fact that, while the first applicant\u2019s lawyer immediately complained of the first applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment in his appeal lodged on 5 February 2007, the Court of Appeal ignored that complaint in its decision of 9 February 2007, without ordering the first applicant\u2019s forensic examination (see paragraphs 16-17 above). Furthermore, although on 20 February 2007 the Prosecutor General\u2019s Office informed the second applicant that her complaint concerning the first applicant\u2019s alleged ill-treatment had been transferred to the Baku City Prosecutor\u2019s Office (see paragraph 24 above), the investigator in charge of the case ordered the first applicant\u2019s forensic examination only on 7 April 2007, which was carried out on 12 April 2007. No explanation for this delay was given by the Government. Moreover, despite the Court\u2019s explicit request to the Government to submit copies of all the documents relating to the domestic proceedings, the Government failed to provide the Court with a copy of forensic report no. 32\/TM. The Court also cannot overlook the fact that medical record no. 353, which did not contain references to any injury on the first applicant\u2019s body during his initial examination upon his arrival at the MNS pre-trial detention facility, was not correctly dated and signed in its part concerning the first applicant\u2019s initial examination.116.\u00a0\u00a0In the instant case, having regard to the fact that there was witness evidence about injuries (even if it came from the first applicant\u2019s lawyer and family members), that the first applicant was detained by the authorities in an undisclosed location at the time when the alleged acts of ill-treatment took place, that the events complained of lied wholly within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, and that the first applicant\u2019s version of events has been consistent and plausible as far as essential elements are concerned and that the Government have failed to submit sufficient information or evidence calling into question the first applicant\u2019s version of events, the Court must thus accept the first applicant\u2019s account of events and concludes that he was subjected to ill-treatment when detained on the premises of the MNS between 2 and 17 February 2007.117.\u00a0\u00a0As to the seriousness of the act of ill-treatment, the Court considers that the first applicant\u2019s ill\u2011treatment must have caused him physical pain and suffering. The ill-treatment in question and its consequences must have also caused the first applicant considerable mental suffering, diminishing his human dignity. In these circumstances, the Court considers that the ill-treatment complained of was sufficiently serious to attain a minimum level of severity falling within the scope of Article 3 and to be considered as inhuman and degrading treatment.118.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive limb on account of the first applicant\u2019s ill\u2011treatment between 2 and 17 February 2007.(iii)\u00a0\u00a0As regards the alleged deprivation of the medical care of the first applicant119.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that it is undisputed by the parties that at the time of his detention on the premises of the MNS between 2 and 17 February 2017 the first applicant suffered from hypertension, prostatitis and hyperthyroidism and, in view of the nature of his illnesses, he had to regularly take medication and should have been provided with the adequate medical care. However, it is clear from the documents in the case file that his lawyer and family members were not informed of his place of detention during this period and were thus unable to provide him with the necessary medication. Moreover, the Government failed to submit any information or evidence that the first applicant had been provided with the adequate medical care and the relevant medication between 2 and 17 February 2017. The Court thus accepts the first applicant\u2019s version of events that he was not provided with the adequate medical care and the relevant medication during that period despite the fact that he suffered from hypertension, prostatitis and hyperthyroidism.120.\u00a0\u00a0As to the seriousness of the act of ill-treatment, the Court considers that although the first applicant\u2019s deprivation of medical care lasted only fifteen days, given the first applicant\u2019s advanced age and his vulnerable state of health, this ill-treatment must have caused him physical pain and suffering. The ill-treatment in question and its consequences, exacerbated by the absence of any access to the outside world between 3\u00a0and 17\u00a0February 2007, must have also caused the first applicant considerable mental suffering, diminishing his human dignity. In these circumstances, the Court considers that the ill-treatment complained of was sufficiently serious to attain a minimum level of severity falling within the scope of Article 3 and to be considered as inhuman and degrading treatment.121.\u00a0\u00a0Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its substantive limb on account of the first applicant\u2019s deprivation of the medical care between 2 and 17 February 2007.2.\u00a0\u00a0Alleged failure to carry out an effective investigation122.\u00a0\u00a0The parties did not make any specific observations on this point.123.\u00a0\u00a0The Court refers to the general principles established in its case-law set out in the judgment Bouyid v. Belgium [GC] (no. 23380\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 114-123, ECHR 2015), which are equally pertinent to the present case.124.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court considers that the first applicant\u2019s complaint made before the domestic authorities contained enough specific information \u2013 the date, place and nature of the alleged ill-treatment when detained on the premises of the MNS \u2013 (see paragraphs 21-29 above) to constitute an arguable claim in respect of which those authorities were under an obligation to conduct an effective investigation. However, no criminal investigation was carried out in the instant case into the first applicant\u2019s allegation of ill-treatment.125.\u00a0\u00a0In this connection, the Court notes that it is true that the first applicant was examined by a forensic expert following a complaint from his lawyer and family members. However, even though the first applicant\u2019s claim of ill-treatment was brought to the domestic authorities in a prompt manner, the authorities failed to order a forensic examination until two months after the incident. The Court reiterates that a failure to secure the forensic evidence in a timely manner is one of the most important factors in assessing the overall effectiveness of an investigation into allegations of ill\u2011treatment (see Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, no. 34445\/04, \u00a7 74, 11\u00a0January\u00a02007). As stated above, in the present case, prompt forensic examination was crucial as signs of injury might have disappeared rather quickly, resulting in the complete or partial loss of evidence before the forensic examination was carried out. A timely medical examination could have enabled a medical expert to reach a definitive conclusion as to the existence and time the injuries had been inflicted (see Rizvanov v.\u00a0Azerbaijan, no. 31805\/06, \u00a7 59, 17 April 2012).126.\u00a0\u00a0In any event, the Court notes that the forensic examination is only one of the means for the investigation to secure the evidence during the examination of an ill\u2011treatment allegation. The Court notes that in the present case as there was no criminal investigation in respect of the first applicant\u2019s allegation of ill-treatment, the first applicant, alleged perpetrators of the ill-treatment, the first applicant\u2019s lawyer and family members or any other possible witness were not interviewed by the investigator. No explanation was given by the Government as to the domestic authorities\u2019 failure to conduct an investigation in this connection (see Jannatov v. Azerbaijan, no. 32132\/07, \u00a7 53, 31 July 2014).127.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that the first applicant raised the same complaint before the domestic courts which had ordered his remand in custody. However, they ignored his allegation of ill-treatment and their decisions made no mention of it (see paragraphs 16-17 above). As to the separate proceedings instituted by the first applicant in respect of his alleged ill\u2011treatment, the Court notes that in these proceedings the domestic courts merely dismissed his allegation of ill-treatment as unsubstantiated without conducting an effective judicial investigation (see paragraphs 26-29 above). In particular, the domestic courts failed to hear evidence from the first applicant, the alleged perpetrators of the ill\u2011treatment, or any other possible witness (see Igbal Hasanov v. Azerbaijan, no. 46505\/08, \u00a7 39, 15 January 2015).128.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that there was no effective investigation of the first applicant\u2019s claim of ill-treatment.129.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under its procedural limb.V.\u00a0\u00a0ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION130.\u00a0\u00a0The second and third applicants alleged that the first applicant had died in detention owing to a lack of adequate medical assistance and that there had been no effective investigation of his death. Article 2 of the Convention provides in so far as relevant:\u201c1.\u00a0Everyone\u2019s right to life shall be protected by law. ...\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Admissibility131.\u00a0\u00a0The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 \u00a7 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.B.\u00a0\u00a0Merits1.\u00a0\u00a0Substantive aspect of Article 2 of the Convention(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions132.\u00a0\u00a0The second and third applicants maintained their complaint that the first applicant had died as result of a lack of adequate medical treatment in detention. In particular, they argued that the domestic authorities had failed to execute the Nizami District Court\u2019s judgment of 6 March 2009, which had ordered the prison to provide the first applicant with adequate medical care, as he had been transferred to the medical facility only on 28 July 2009. According to them, the first applicant\u2019s medical treatment in the medical facility with the involvement of various specialists had been only of a symptomatic nature as it had been tardily conducted at a point when the first applicant had already fallen into in a critical condition.133.\u00a0\u00a0As regards the first applicant\u2019s refusal to be transferred to the medical facility, the second and third applicants submitted that on 30 March and 7 July 2009 the first applicant had refused such a transfer because money had been demanded for his medical treatment and he had not been sure that the latter would have been adequate. They further contested the authenticity of various records compiled by the doctors confirming that the first applicant had refused to follow his medical treatment. In that connection, they noted that these records had not been signed by the first applicant.134.\u00a0\u00a0The Government contested the second and the third applicants\u2019 submissions. They submitted that the first applicant had remained under dynamic medical supervision and had been provided with the appropriate medical care. The first applicant\u2019s state of health had always been characterised as relatively satisfactory and he had not been a bedridden patient. On 17 August 2009 his state of health had sharply worsened and he had died despite the intervention of specialist doctors.135.\u00a0\u00a0The Government further referred to the first applicant\u2019s refusal of 30 March 2009, submitting that he had refused the transfer, as he had stated that he would not have been provided with the relevant medical care in the medical facility. Moreover, he had refused to take the prescribed medicines, except those for regulating his blood pressure and urination.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment136.\u00a0\u00a0The Court refers to the general principles established in its case-law set out in the judgment Mustafayev v. Azerbaijan (no. 47095\/09, \u00a7\u00a7 52-54, 4\u00a0May 2017), which are equally pertinent to the present case.137.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that in the present case it is undisputed by the parties that the first applicant died from an ischemic cerebral infarction in detention under the authorities\u2019 control. In order to establish whether or not the respondent State complied with its obligation to protect life under Article 2 of the Convention, the Court must examine whether the domestic authorities did everything reasonably possible, in good faith and in a timely manner, to try to avert the fatal outcome of this case (see Karpylenko v.\u00a0Ukraine, no. 15509\/12, \u00a7 81, 11 February 2016, and Karakhanyan v.\u00a0Russia, no. 24421\/11, \u00a7 45, 14 February 2017).138.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes at the outset that, although the first applicant had suffered from a number of medical conditions, he had not suffered from any potentially life-threatening disease. It further notes that whereas on 6\u00a0March 2009 the Nizami District Court ordered prison no. 15 to provide the first applicant with adequate medical care, it did not order his transfer to a specialised medical establishment. However, it appears from the documents in the case file that in the course of the proceedings before the above-mentioned court the head of the medical department of prison no. 15 confirmed the necessity of the first applicant\u2019s transfer to a specialised medical establishment (see paragraph 56 above). The first applicant was transferred to the medical facility on 28 July 2009.139.\u00a0\u00a0In these circumstances, without speculating on any link between the first applicant\u2019s death and his tardy transfer to the medical facility and bearing in mind that the object of its examination is whether or not the domestic authorities did everything reasonably possible in order to safeguard the first applicant\u2019s life, the Court considers it necessary to examine whether the first applicant\u2019s tardy transfer to the medical facility is attributable to the Government. Taking into account that the circumstances of the first applicant\u2019s death lie wholly within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, the Court considers that the burden of proof is on the Government to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation of their version (see Karsakova v. Russia, no. 1157\/10, \u00a7 49, 27 November 2014).140.\u00a0\u00a0The Court observes that the Government relied mainly on the first applicant\u2019s refusal on 30 March 2009 to be transferred to the medical facility and various records drawn up by the doctors concerning his refusal to take the prescribed medicines, except those for regulating his blood pressure and urination. The Court notes that it is undisputed by the second and third applicants that the first applicant refused to be transferred to the medical facility at least on two occasions between 6 March and 28 July 2009 (see paragraphs 59-60 above). It further appears from the submissions of the head of the medical department of prison no. 15 at the hearing of 6\u00a0March 2009 before the Nizami District Court that, although the first applicant had already been informed of the necessity of his transfer to a specialised medical establishment, the first applicant had rejected that suggestion (see paragraph 56 above). In that connection, the Court cannot accept the argument put forward by the second and third applicants that the first applicant had refused such a transfer because of his financial situation and the quality of medical care in the medical facility, as under domestic law prisoners were provided with medical care free of charge and there is no evidence in the case file that money was demanded for his transfer or the quality of medical care in the medical facility was not adequate. Moreover, the present case should be distinguished from the cases in which the applicants, suffering from a potentially life-threatening disease, interrupted their medical treatment and were consequently deprived of life-saving treatment without sufficient grounds (compare Karakhanyan, cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 45-50). However, in the present case the first applicant had not suffered from any potentially life-threatening disease and had continued to take the medicines for regulating his blood pressure and urination.141.\u00a0\u00a0In the light of the above, the Court considers that the delay in the first applicant\u2019s transfer to the medical facility is not attributable to the domestic authorities. Therefore, the Court concludes that the domestic authorities did everything reasonably possible, in good faith and in a timely manner, to try to avert the fatal outcome of this case.142.\u00a0\u00a0There has accordingly been no violation of Article 2 of the Convention under its substantive aspect.2.\u00a0\u00a0Procedural aspect of Article 2 of the Convention(a)\u00a0\u00a0The parties\u2019 submissions143.\u00a0\u00a0The second and third applicants maintained that the criminal inquiry into the death of the first applicant had been ineffective. In particular, they submitted that the domestic authorities had not examined the reason for the failure to execute the Nizami District Court\u2019s judgment of 6\u00a0March 2009 and to provide the first applicant with the relevant medical assistance.144.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the investigation had been effective and had complied with the procedural guarantees provided for by Article 2 of the Convention.(b)\u00a0\u00a0The Court\u2019s assessment145.\u00a0\u00a0The Court refers to the general principles established in its case-law set out in the Mustafayev judgment (cited above, \u00a7\u00a7 71-73), which are equally pertinent to the present case.146.\u00a0\u00a0Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that the second and third applicants complained of the inadequacy of the investigation into the first applicant\u2019s death carried out by the domestic authorities.147.\u00a0\u00a0A criminal inquiry was launched by the prosecuting authorities immediately after the first applicant\u2019s death and on 28 September 2009 the Nizami District Prosecutor\u2019s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings in connection with the death of the first applicant. That decision was upheld by the domestic courts. It remains to be assessed whether the criminal inquiry was effective, as required by Article\u00a02.148.\u00a0\u00a0In that connection, the Court notes that, although the investigation established that the first applicant had been tardily transferred to the medical facility, the two expert reports on which the prosecuting authorities\u2019 decision was based concerned only the cause of the death and the first applicant\u2019s medical treatment following his transfer to the medical facility on 28 July 2009, and did not concern the consequences of his tardy transfer to the medical facility (see paragraphs 66 and 70 above). The latter question was not addressed by the expert reports.149.\u00a0\u00a0The Court also notes that, although it had been established during the investigation that the first applicant had refused to be transferred to the medical facility, the prosecuting authorities failed to examine the circumstances surrounding his refusals. Furthermore, they failed to clarify if there was a causal link between the first applicant\u2019s placement in a punishment cell found to be illegal by the Nizami District Court and his death as alleged by the second and third applicants (see paragraph 67 above).150.\u00a0\u00a0The Court further observes that the prosecuting authorities failed to inform the second and third applicants of the progress of the investigation and to involve them in the investigation by providing them in a timely manner with the relevant decisions taken within the framework of the criminal proceedings. In particular, it appears from the documents in the case file that they obtained a copy of the expert reports carried out during the investigation for the first time in the court proceedings instituted against the prosecuting authorities\u2019 decision (see paragraph 72 above).151.\u00a0\u00a0The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the domestic authorities failed to carry out an adequate and effective investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of the first applicant. It accordingly holds that there has been a violation of Article\u00a02 under its procedural limb.VI.\u00a0\u00a0APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION152.\u00a0\u00a0Article 41 of the Convention provides:\u201cIf the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.\u201dA.\u00a0\u00a0Damage153.\u00a0\u00a0The second applicant claimed EUR 500,000 in respect of non\u2011pecuniary damage.154.\u00a0\u00a0The Government submitted that the second applicant\u2019s claim was unsubstantiated.155.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers that the second applicant has suffered non\u2011pecuniary damage which cannot be compensated for solely by the finding of a violation and that compensation should thus be awarded. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, as required by Article 41 of the Convention, the Court awards the second applicant the sum of EUR 20,000 under this head, plus any tax that may be chargeable on this amount (see Mustafayev, cited above, \u00a7 90).B.\u00a0\u00a0Costs and expenses156.\u00a0\u00a0The second applicant claimed EUR 7,000 for costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and the Court. In support of her claim, she submitted two contracts concluded between the applicants and their representative before the Court and one contract concluded between their representative and another lawyer who undertook to provide the representative with legal assistance during the examination of the case by the Court.157.\u00a0\u00a0The second applicant also claimed a further EUR 2,691 and EUR\u00a02,195 for translation and postage costs. In support of her claim, she submitted various contracts concluded with a company providing translation services and numerous invoices and receipts for postage costs.158.\u00a0\u00a0The Government considered the claim unsubstantiated and excessive. In particular, they submitted that the contract between the representative and another lawyer could not be considered relevant as the latter did not represent the applicants before the Court. The Government also disputed the relevance of the translation costs claimed by the second applicant. As regards postage costs, the Government submitted that it is not clear whether all the invoices and receipts in question relate to the present case.159.\u00a0\u00a0According to the Court\u2019s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In that connection, the Court cannot accept the contract submitted by the second applicant concerning the legal cooperation between the applicants\u2019 representative and another lawyer as a basis for legal services in the proceedings before the Court. The Court further observes that the applicants submitted translations of their applications and other documents relating to the domestic proceedings. The Court does not, however, consider that the translation of those documents was necessary for its proceedings (see Allahverdiyev, cited above, \u00a7 71, and Sakit Zahidov v.\u00a0Azerbaijan, no.\u00a051164\/07, \u00a7 70, 12 November 2015). Having regard to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 4,000 covering costs under all heads.C.\u00a0\u00a0Default interest160.\u00a0\u00a0The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points."},"vulnerable":{"28470":1,"28507":1,"28527":0,"28546":0,"28548":0,"28591":0,"28592":1,"28596":1,"28598":1,"28639":1,"28670":1,"28671":0,"28680":0,"28790":1,"28835":1,"28866":1,"28858":0,"28853":1,"28893":1,"28895":0,"28910":0,"28924":1,"28935":0,"28936":1,"28948":1,"29007":0,"29010":0,"29047":1,"29108":0,"29107":1,"29147":1,"29164":1,"29165":1,"29176":1,"29184":1,"29189":1,"29211":1,"29212":1,"29218":1,"29233":1,"29275":0,"29271":0,"29307":1,"29345":1,"29357":1,"29358":1,"29361":1,"29402":0,"29429":1,"29483":1,"29595":1,"29619":0,"29682":1,"29768":1,"29860":0,"29843":1,"29865":1,"29867":1,"29907":1,"29982":1,"29997":1,"30002":0,"30029":1,"30059":0,"30060":1,"30100":1,"30130":1,"30175":0,"30174":1,"30181":0,"30230":1,"30381":0,"30385":1,"30478":1,"30490":1,"30561":0,"30673":1,"30676":1,"30699":0,"30705":1,"30741":1,"30735":0,"30753":1,"30754":1,"30757":1,"30938":1,"30959":1,"30966":1,"30967":1,"31153":0,"31175":1,"31226":0,"31276":1,"31273":1,"31335":1,"31337":0,"31352":0,"31382":0,"31387":0,"31512":1,"31515":1,"31517":1,"31538":1,"31547":0,"31546":1,"31599":1,"31645":1,"31657":1},"decisiondate":{"28470":0,"28507":1473724800000,"28527":0,"28546":1474329600000,"28548":0,"28591":0,"28592":0,"28596":1475539200000,"28598":1475539200000,"28639":0,"28670":0,"28671":0,"28680":0,"28790":0,"28835":0,"28866":1480982400000,"28858":1480982400000,"28853":0,"28893":0,"28895":0,"28910":1481587200000,"28924":0,"28935":0,"28936":0,"28948":0,"29007":0,"29010":0,"29047":0,"29108":0,"29107":0,"29147":1488240000000,"29164":0,"29165":0,"29176":0,"29184":1488844800000,"29189":0,"29211":1489449600000,"29212":0,"29218":0,"29233":0,"29275":1491264000000,"29271":1491264000000,"29307":0,"29345":0,"29357":0,"29358":0,"29361":0,"29402":0,"29429":0,"29483":0,"29595":0,"29619":0,"29682":0,"29768":0,"29860":1506988800000,"29843":0,"29865":0,"29867":0,"29907":0,"29982":0,"29997":0,"30002":0,"30029":0,"30059":0,"30060":0,"30100":0,"30130":0,"30175":0,"30174":0,"30181":0,"30230":0,"30381":1517270400000,"30385":0,"30478":0,"30490":0,"30561":1522108800000,"30673":0,"30676":0,"30699":1526342400000,"30705":0,"30741":1527552000000,"30735":0,"30753":0,"30754":0,"30757":0,"30938":0,"30959":0,"30966":0,"30967":0,"31153":1538438400000,"31175":0,"31226":0,"31276":1541462400000,"31273":0,"31335":0,"31337":0,"31352":1542672000000,"31382":0,"31387":0,"31512":0,"31515":0,"31517":0,"31538":0,"31547":0,"31546":0,"31599":0,"31645":0,"31657":0},"resolutiondate":{"28470":0,"28507":0,"28527":0,"28546":0,"28548":0,"28591":0,"28592":0,"28596":0,"28598":0,"28639":0,"28670":0,"28671":0,"28680":0,"28790":0,"28835":0,"28866":0,"28858":0,"28853":0,"28893":0,"28895":0,"28910":0,"28924":0,"28935":0,"28936":0,"28948":0,"29007":0,"29010":0,"29047":0,"29108":0,"29107":0,"29147":0,"29164":0,"29165":0,"29176":0,"29184":0,"29189":0,"29211":0,"29212":0,"29218":0,"29233":0,"29275":0,"29271":0,"29307":0,"29345":0,"29357":0,"29358":0,"29361":0,"29402":0,"29429":0,"29483":0,"29595":0,"29619":0,"29682":0,"29768":0,"29860":0,"29843":0,"29865":0,"29867":0,"29907":0,"29982":0,"29997":0,"30002":0,"30029":0,"30059":0,"30060":0,"30100":0,"30130":0,"30175":0,"30174":0,"30181":0,"30230":0,"30381":0,"30385":0,"30478":0,"30490":0,"30561":0,"30673":0,"30676":0,"30699":0,"30705":0,"30741":0,"30735":0,"30753":0,"30754":0,"30757":0,"30938":0,"30959":0,"30966":0,"30967":0,"31153":0,"31175":0,"31226":0,"31276":0,"31273":0,"31335":0,"31337":0,"31352":0,"31382":0,"31387":0,"31512":0,"31515":0,"31517":0,"31538":0,"31547":0,"31546":0,"31599":0,"31645":0,"31657":0},"annotated":{"28470":true,"28507":true,"28527":false,"28546":false,"28548":false,"28591":false,"28592":true,"28596":true,"28598":true,"28639":true,"28670":true,"28671":false,"28680":false,"28790":true,"28835":true,"28866":true,"28858":false,"28853":true,"28893":true,"28895":false,"28910":false,"28924":true,"28935":false,"28936":true,"28948":true,"29007":false,"29010":false,"29047":true,"29108":false,"29107":true,"29147":true,"29164":true,"29165":true,"29176":true,"29184":true,"29189":true,"29211":true,"29212":true,"29218":true,"29233":true,"29275":false,"29271":false,"29307":true,"29345":true,"29357":true,"29358":true,"29361":true,"29402":false,"29429":true,"29483":true,"29595":true,"29619":false,"29682":true,"29768":true,"29860":false,"29843":true,"29865":true,"29867":true,"29907":true,"29982":true,"29997":true,"30002":false,"30029":true,"30059":false,"30060":true,"30100":true,"30130":true,"30175":false,"30174":true,"30181":false,"30230":true,"30381":true,"30385":true,"30478":true,"30490":true,"30561":true,"30673":true,"30676":true,"30699":false,"30705":true,"30741":true,"30735":false,"30753":true,"30754":true,"30757":true,"30938":true,"30959":true,"30966":true,"30967":true,"31153":false,"31175":true,"31226":false,"31276":true,"31273":true,"31335":true,"31337":false,"31352":false,"31382":false,"31387":false,"31512":true,"31515":true,"31517":true,"31538":true,"31547":false,"31546":true,"31599":true,"31645":true,"31657":true},"date":{"28470":1472688000000,"28507":1473724800000,"28527":1474329600000,"28546":1474329600000,"28548":1474502400000,"28591":1475539200000,"28592":1475539200000,"28596":1475539200000,"28598":1475539200000,"28639":1476144000000,"28670":1476316800000,"28671":1476316800000,"28680":1476316800000,"28790":1479772800000,"28835":1479945600000,"28866":1480982400000,"28858":1480982400000,"28853":1480982400000,"28893":1481587200000,"28895":1481587200000,"28910":1481587200000,"28924":1481760000000,"28935":1482192000000,"28936":1482192000000,"28948":1484006400000,"29007":1484611200000,"29010":1484784000000,"29047":1485388800000,"29108":1487030400000,"29107":1487030400000,"29147":1488240000000,"29164":1488412800000,"29165":1488844800000,"29176":1488844800000,"29184":1488844800000,"29189":1489449600000,"29211":1489449600000,"29212":1489449600000,"29218":1490054400000,"29233":1490659200000,"29275":1491264000000,"29271":1491264000000,"29307":1491868800000,"29345":1493251200000,"29357":1493683200000,"29358":1493683200000,"29361":1493683200000,"29402":1494547200000,"29429":1495497600000,"29483":1496707200000,"29595":1498694400000,"29619":1499299200000,"29682":1500336000000,"29768":1504742400000,"29860":1506988800000,"29843":1506988800000,"29865":1507161600000,"29867":1507161600000,"29907":1507766400000,"29982":1508976000000,"29997":1509408000000,"30002":1510012800000,"30029":1510012800000,"30059":1510790400000,"30060":1510790400000,"30100":1511827200000,"30130":1511827200000,"30175":1512604800000,"30174":1512604800000,"30181":1513036800000,"30230":1513641600000,"30381":1517270400000,"30385":1517443200000,"30478":1519689600000,"30490":1519689600000,"30561":1522108800000,"30673":1526342400000,"30676":1526342400000,"30699":1526342400000,"30705":1526515200000,"30741":1527552000000,"30735":1527552000000,"30753":1527724800000,"30754":1527724800000,"30757":1528156800000,"30938":1531180800000,"30959":1531353600000,"30966":1531785600000,"30967":1531785600000,"31153":1538438400000,"31175":1539043200000,"31226":1540252800000,"31276":1541462400000,"31273":1541462400000,"31335":1542672000000,"31337":1542672000000,"31352":1542672000000,"31382":1543881600000,"31387":1543881600000,"31512":1547510400000,"31515":1547510400000,"31517":1547510400000,"31538":1547683200000,"31547":1548115200000,"31546":1548115200000,"31599":1548892800000,"31645":1550534400000,"31657":1550707200000},"dependency":{"28470":1,"28507":1,"28527":0,"28546":0,"28548":0,"28591":0,"28592":1,"28596":0,"28598":1,"28639":0,"28670":1,"28671":0,"28680":0,"28790":1,"28835":0,"28866":0,"28858":0,"28853":0,"28893":1,"28895":0,"28910":0,"28924":0,"28935":0,"28936":1,"28948":0,"29007":0,"29010":0,"29047":0,"29108":0,"29107":1,"29147":0,"29164":0,"29165":1,"29176":1,"29184":0,"29189":0,"29211":0,"29212":0,"29218":1,"29233":1,"29275":0,"29271":0,"29307":0,"29345":1,"29357":0,"29358":0,"29361":0,"29402":0,"29429":0,"29483":1,"29595":0,"29619":0,"29682":1,"29768":0,"29860":0,"29843":1,"29865":1,"29867":0,"29907":0,"29982":0,"29997":0,"30002":0,"30029":0,"30059":0,"30060":1,"30100":0,"30130":1,"30175":0,"30174":1,"30181":0,"30230":0,"30381":0,"30385":1,"30478":1,"30490":0,"30561":0,"30673":0,"30676":0,"30699":0,"30705":1,"30741":1,"30735":0,"30753":1,"30754":1,"30757":0,"30938":0,"30959":0,"30966":0,"30967":0,"31153":0,"31175":0,"31226":0,"31276":0,"31273":1,"31335":0,"31337":0,"31352":0,"31382":0,"31387":0,"31512":0,"31515":0,"31517":0,"31538":1,"31547":0,"31546":0,"31599":1,"31645":0,"31657":1},"statecontrol":{"28470":1,"28507":0,"28527":0,"28546":0,"28548":0,"28591":0,"28592":1,"28596":0,"28598":0,"28639":1,"28670":0,"28671":0,"28680":0,"28790":1,"28835":1,"28866":1,"28858":0,"28853":1,"28893":1,"28895":0,"28910":0,"28924":1,"28935":0,"28936":1,"28948":1,"29007":0,"29010":0,"29047":1,"29108":0,"29107":1,"29147":1,"29164":0,"29165":1,"29176":1,"29184":0,"29189":1,"29211":0,"29212":1,"29218":1,"29233":1,"29275":0,"29271":0,"29307":1,"29345":1,"29357":1,"29358":1,"29361":1,"29402":0,"29429":0,"29483":1,"29595":1,"29619":0,"29682":1,"29768":1,"29860":0,"29843":0,"29865":1,"29867":1,"29907":1,"29982":1,"29997":1,"30002":0,"30029":1,"30059":0,"30060":1,"30100":1,"30130":1,"30175":0,"30174":0,"30181":0,"30230":1,"30381":0,"30385":0,"30478":1,"30490":1,"30561":0,"30673":1,"30676":1,"30699":0,"30705":1,"30741":1,"30735":0,"30753":1,"30754":1,"30757":1,"30938":1,"30959":1,"30966":1,"30967":1,"31153":0,"31175":1,"31226":0,"31276":1,"31273":0,"31335":1,"31337":0,"31352":0,"31382":0,"31387":0,"31512":1,"31515":1,"31517":1,"31538":1,"31547":0,"31546":1,"31599":1,"31645":1,"31657":1},"victimisation":{"28470":0,"28507":0,"28527":0,"28546":0,"28548":0,"28591":0,"28592":0,"28596":0,"28598":0,"28639":0,"28670":1,"28671":0,"28680":0,"28790":0,"28835":0,"28866":1,"28858":0,"28853":0,"28893":0,"28895":0,"28910":0,"28924":0,"28935":0,"28936":0,"28948":0,"29007":0,"29010":0,"29047":0,"29108":0,"29107":0,"29147":0,"29164":1,"29165":0,"29176":0,"29184":0,"29189":0,"29211":0,"29212":0,"29218":0,"29233":0,"29275":0,"29271":0,"29307":0,"29345":0,"29357":0,"29358":0,"29361":0,"29402":0,"29429":1,"29483":0,"29595":0,"29619":0,"29682":0,"29768":0,"29860":0,"29843":1,"29865":0,"29867":0,"29907":0,"29982":0,"29997":0,"30002":0,"30029":0,"30059":0,"30060":0,"30100":0,"30130":0,"30175":0,"30174":0,"30181":0,"30230":1,"30381":0,"30385":1,"30478":0,"30490":0,"30561":0,"30673":0,"30676":0,"30699":0,"30705":0,"30741":0,"30735":0,"30753":1,"30754":1,"30757":0,"30938":0,"30959":0,"30966":0,"30967":0,"31153":0,"31175":0,"31226":0,"31276":0,"31273":0,"31335":0,"31337":0,"31352":0,"31382":0,"31387":0,"31512":0,"31515":0,"31517":0,"31538":1,"31547":0,"31546":0,"31599":0,"31645":0,"31657":0},"migration":{"28470":0,"28507":1,"28527":0,"28546":0,"28548":0,"28591":0,"28592":0,"28596":1,"28598":1,"28639":0,"28670":0,"28671":0,"28680":0,"28790":1,"28835":0,"28866":0,"28858":0,"28853":0,"28893":0,"28895":0,"28910":0,"28924":1,"28935":0,"28936":1,"28948":0,"29007":0,"29010":0,"29047":0,"29108":0,"29107":0,"29147":0,"29164":0,"29165":0,"29176":0,"29184":0,"29189":0,"29211":1,"29212":1,"29218":0,"29233":0,"29275":0,"29271":0,"29307":0,"29345":0,"29357":0,"29358":0,"29361":0,"29402":0,"29429":0,"29483":0,"29595":0,"29619":0,"29682":0,"29768":0,"29860":0,"29843":0,"29865":0,"29867":0,"29907":0,"29982":0,"29997":0,"30002":0,"30029":0,"30059":0,"30060":0,"30100":0,"30130":0,"30175":0,"30174":1,"30181":0,"30230":0,"30381":0,"30385":0,"30478":0,"30490":0,"30561":0,"30673":0,"30676":0,"30699":0,"30705":0,"30741":0,"30735":0,"30753":0,"30754":0,"30757":0,"30938":0,"30959":0,"30966":0,"30967":0,"31153":0,"31175":0,"31226":0,"31276":0,"31273":0,"31335":0,"31337":0,"31352":0,"31382":0,"31387":0,"31512":0,"31515":0,"31517":0,"31538":0,"31547":0,"31546":0,"31599":0,"31645":0,"31657":0},"discrimination":{"28470":0,"28507":0,"28527":0,"28546":0,"28548":0,"28591":0,"28592":0,"28596":0,"28598":0,"28639":0,"28670":0,"28671":0,"28680":0,"28790":0,"28835":0,"28866":0,"28858":0,"28853":0,"28893":0,"28895":0,"28910":0,"28924":0,"28935":0,"28936":0,"28948":1,"29007":0,"29010":0,"29047":0,"29108":0,"29107":0,"29147":0,"29164":0,"29165":0,"29176":0,"29184":0,"29189":0,"29211":0,"29212":0,"29218":0,"29233":0,"29275":0,"29271":0,"29307":0,"29345":0,"29357":0,"29358":0,"29361":0,"29402":0,"29429":0,"29483":0,"29595":0,"29619":0,"29682":0,"29768":0,"29860":0,"29843":0,"29865":0,"29867":0,"29907":0,"29982":0,"29997":0,"30002":0,"30029":1,"30059":0,"30060":0,"30100":0,"30130":0,"30175":0,"30174":0,"30181":0,"30230":0,"30381":0,"30385":0,"30478":0,"30490":0,"30561":0,"30673":0,"30676":0,"30699":0,"30705":0,"30741":0,"30735":0,"30753":0,"30754":0,"30757":0,"30938":0,"30959":0,"30966":0,"30967":0,"31153":0,"31175":0,"31226":0,"31276":0,"31273":1,"31335":0,"31337":0,"31352":0,"31382":0,"31387":0,"31512":0,"31515":0,"31517":0,"31538":0,"31547":0,"31546":0,"31599":0,"31645":0,"31657":0},"reproductivehealth":{"28470":0,"28507":0,"28527":0,"28546":0,"28548":0,"28591":0,"28592":0,"28596":0,"28598":0,"28639":0,"28670":0,"28671":0,"28680":0,"28790":0,"28835":0,"28866":0,"28858":0,"28853":0,"28893":0,"28895":0,"28910":0,"28924":0,"28935":0,"28936":1,"28948":0,"29007":0,"29010":0,"29047":0,"29108":0,"29107":0,"29147":0,"29164":0,"29165":0,"29176":0,"29184":0,"29189":0,"29211":0,"29212":0,"29218":0,"29233":0,"29275":0,"29271":0,"29307":0,"29345":0,"29357":0,"29358":0,"29361":0,"29402":0,"29429":0,"29483":0,"29595":0,"29619":0,"29682":0,"29768":0,"29860":0,"29843":0,"29865":0,"29867":0,"29907":0,"29982":0,"29997":0,"30002":0,"30029":0,"30059":0,"30060":0,"30100":0,"30130":0,"30175":0,"30174":0,"30181":0,"30230":0,"30381":0,"30385":0,"30478":0,"30490":0,"30561":0,"30673":0,"30676":0,"30699":0,"30705":0,"30741":0,"30735":0,"30753":0,"30754":0,"30757":0,"30938":0,"30959":0,"30966":0,"30967":0,"31153":0,"31175":0,"31226":0,"31276":0,"31273":0,"31335":0,"31337":0,"31352":0,"31382":0,"31387":0,"31512":0,"31515":0,"31517":0,"31538":0,"31547":0,"31546":0,"31599":0,"31645":0,"31657":0},"unpopularviews":{"28470":0,"28507":0,"28527":0,"28546":0,"28548":0,"28591":0,"28592":0,"28596":0,"28598":0,"28639":0,"28670":0,"28671":0,"28680":0,"28790":0,"28835":0,"28866":0,"28858":0,"28853":0,"28893":0,"28895":0,"28910":0,"28924":0,"28935":0,"28936":0,"28948":1,"29007":0,"29010":0,"29047":1,"29108":0,"29107":0,"29147":1,"29164":0,"29165":0,"29176":0,"29184":0,"29189":0,"29211":0,"29212":0,"29218":0,"29233":0,"29275":0,"29271":0,"29307":0,"29345":0,"29357":0,"29358":0,"29361":0,"29402":0,"29429":0,"29483":0,"29595":0,"29619":0,"29682":0,"29768":0,"29860":0,"29843":0,"29865":0,"29867":0,"29907":0,"29982":0,"29997":0,"30002":0,"30029":1,"30059":0,"30060":0,"30100":0,"30130":0,"30175":0,"30174":0,"30181":0,"30230":0,"30381":0,"30385":0,"30478":0,"30490":0,"30561":0,"30673":0,"30676":0,"30699":0,"30705":0,"30741":0,"30735":0,"30753":0,"30754":0,"30757":0,"30938":0,"30959":0,"30966":0,"30967":0,"31153":0,"31175":0,"31226":0,"31276":0,"31273":0,"31335":0,"31337":0,"31352":0,"31382":0,"31387":0,"31512":0,"31515":0,"31517":0,"31538":0,"31547":0,"31546":1,"31599":0,"31645":0,"31657":0},"intersectionality":{"28470":1,"28507":0,"28527":0,"28546":0,"28548":0,"28591":0,"28592":0,"28596":0,"28598":0,"28639":0,"28670":0,"28671":0,"28680":0,"28790":0,"28835":0,"28866":0,"28858":0,"28853":0,"28893":0,"28895":0,"28910":0,"28924":0,"28935":0,"28936":0,"28948":1,"29007":0,"29010":0,"29047":1,"29108":0,"29107":0,"29147":1,"29164":0,"29165":0,"29176":0,"29184":1,"29189":0,"29211":0,"29212":0,"29218":0,"29233":0,"29275":0,"29271":0,"29307":0,"29345":0,"29357":0,"29358":0,"29361":0,"29402":0,"29429":0,"29483":0,"29595":0,"29619":0,"29682":1,"29768":0,"29860":0,"29843":0,"29865":0,"29867":0,"29907":0,"29982":0,"29997":0,"30002":0,"30029":1,"30059":0,"30060":0,"30100":0,"30130":0,"30175":0,"30174":0,"30181":0,"30230":0,"30381":0,"30385":0,"30478":0,"30490":0,"30561":0,"30673":0,"30676":0,"30699":0,"30705":0,"30741":0,"30735":0,"30753":1,"30754":1,"30757":0,"30938":0,"30959":0,"30966":0,"30967":0,"31153":0,"31175":0,"31226":0,"31276":0,"31273":0,"31335":0,"31337":0,"31352":0,"31382":0,"31387":0,"31512":0,"31515":1,"31517":0,"31538":0,"31547":0,"31546":0,"31599":1,"31645":0,"31657":0},"vulnerable_text":{"28470":true,"28507":true,"28527":true,"28546":true,"28548":true,"28591":true,"28592":true,"28596":true,"28598":true,"28639":true,"28670":true,"28671":true,"28680":true,"28790":true,"28835":true,"28866":true,"28858":true,"28853":true,"28893":true,"28895":true,"28910":true,"28924":true,"28935":true,"28936":true,"28948":true,"29007":true,"29010":true,"29047":true,"29108":true,"29107":true,"29147":true,"29164":true,"29165":true,"29176":true,"29184":true,"29189":true,"29211":true,"29212":false,"29218":true,"29233":true,"29275":true,"29271":true,"29307":true,"29345":true,"29357":true,"29358":true,"29361":true,"29402":true,"29429":true,"29483":true,"29595":true,"29619":true,"29682":true,"29768":true,"29860":true,"29843":true,"29865":true,"29867":true,"29907":true,"29982":true,"29997":true,"30002":true,"30029":true,"30059":true,"30060":true,"30100":true,"30130":true,"30175":true,"30174":true,"30181":true,"30230":true,"30381":true,"30385":true,"30478":false,"30490":true,"30561":true,"30673":true,"30676":true,"30699":true,"30705":true,"30741":true,"30735":true,"30753":false,"30754":false,"30757":true,"30938":true,"30959":true,"30966":true,"30967":true,"31153":true,"31175":true,"31226":true,"31276":true,"31273":true,"31335":true,"31337":true,"31352":true,"31382":true,"31387":true,"31512":true,"31515":true,"31517":true,"31538":true,"31547":true,"31546":true,"31599":true,"31645":true,"31657":true},"vulnerable_law":{"28470":true,"28507":true,"28527":true,"28546":true,"28548":true,"28591":true,"28592":true,"28596":true,"28598":true,"28639":true,"28670":true,"28671":true,"28680":true,"28790":true,"28835":true,"28866":true,"28858":false,"28853":true,"28893":true,"28895":true,"28910":false,"28924":true,"28935":true,"28936":true,"28948":true,"29007":false,"29010":true,"29047":false,"29108":true,"29107":true,"29147":true,"29164":true,"29165":true,"29176":true,"29184":true,"29189":true,"29211":true,"29212":false,"29218":true,"29233":true,"29275":true,"29271":true,"29307":true,"29345":true,"29357":true,"29358":true,"29361":true,"29402":true,"29429":true,"29483":true,"29595":true,"29619":true,"29682":true,"29768":true,"29860":true,"29843":true,"29865":true,"29867":true,"29907":true,"29982":true,"29997":true,"30002":true,"30029":true,"30059":true,"30060":true,"30100":true,"30130":true,"30175":false,"30174":true,"30181":true,"30230":true,"30381":true,"30385":true,"30478":false,"30490":true,"30561":true,"30673":true,"30676":true,"30699":true,"30705":true,"30741":true,"30735":true,"30753":false,"30754":false,"30757":true,"30938":true,"30959":true,"30966":true,"30967":true,"31153":true,"31175":true,"31226":true,"31276":true,"31273":true,"31335":true,"31337":true,"31352":true,"31382":true,"31387":true,"31512":true,"31515":true,"31517":true,"31538":true,"31547":true,"31546":true,"31599":true,"31645":true,"31657":true},"vulnerable_fact":{"28470":false,"28507":true,"28527":false,"28546":false,"28548":false,"28591":false,"28592":false,"28596":false,"28598":true,"28639":false,"28670":false,"28671":false,"28680":false,"28790":false,"28835":false,"28866":false,"28858":true,"28853":false,"28893":false,"28895":false,"28910":true,"28924":true,"28935":false,"28936":false,"28948":true,"29007":true,"29010":false,"29047":true,"29108":false,"29107":false,"29147":false,"29164":false,"29165":false,"29176":false,"29184":false,"29189":false,"29211":true,"29212":false,"29218":false,"29233":false,"29275":false,"29271":true,"29307":false,"29345":true,"29357":false,"29358":false,"29361":false,"29402":false,"29429":false,"29483":false,"29595":false,"29619":false,"29682":true,"29768":false,"29860":false,"29843":false,"29865":false,"29867":false,"29907":false,"29982":false,"29997":false,"30002":false,"30029":false,"30059":false,"30060":false,"30100":false,"30130":false,"30175":true,"30174":false,"30181":false,"30230":false,"30381":false,"30385":false,"30478":false,"30490":false,"30561":false,"30673":false,"30676":false,"30699":true,"30705":false,"30741":true,"30735":false,"30753":false,"30754":false,"30757":false,"30938":false,"30959":false,"30966":false,"30967":false,"31153":false,"31175":false,"31226":false,"31276":false,"31273":false,"31335":false,"31337":false,"31352":false,"31382":false,"31387":false,"31512":false,"31515":false,"31517":false,"31538":false,"31547":false,"31546":false,"31599":true,"31645":false,"31657":false},"fact_len":{"28470":49,"28507":36,"28527":25,"28546":3,"28548":92,"28591":39,"28592":21,"28596":37,"28598":19,"28639":46,"28670":56,"28671":43,"28680":15,"28790":126,"28835":26,"28866":95,"28858":99,"28853":82,"28893":45,"28895":142,"28910":28,"28924":115,"28935":35,"28936":42,"28948":17,"29007":46,"29010":94,"29047":147,"29108":36,"29107":31,"29147":36,"29164":53,"29165":152,"29176":23,"29184":22,"29189":147,"29211":56,"29212":155,"29218":64,"29233":33,"29275":18,"29271":165,"29307":22,"29345":74,"29357":65,"29358":24,"29361":18,"29402":103,"29429":39,"29483":22,"29595":56,"29619":78,"29682":83,"29768":14,"29860":18,"29843":82,"29865":80,"29867":51,"29907":32,"29982":62,"29997":54,"30002":4,"30029":20,"30059":60,"30060":59,"30100":28,"30130":31,"30175":17,"30174":33,"30181":84,"30230":47,"30381":43,"30385":56,"30478":19,"30490":21,"30561":28,"30673":67,"30676":20,"30699":18,"30705":48,"30741":192,"30735":37,"30753":152,"30754":131,"30757":159,"30938":52,"30959":15,"30966":16,"30967":28,"31153":65,"31175":92,"31226":4,"31276":62,"31273":70,"31335":49,"31337":45,"31352":138,"31382":26,"31387":62,"31512":40,"31515":18,"31517":50,"31538":53,"31547":4,"31546":9,"31599":123,"31645":78,"31657":78}}
\ No newline at end of file