# Black Hat 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "XML External Entity: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Yuki Nguyen, Principal Security Researcher

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through XXE attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes file paths without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found XXE in 53% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. disable external entity processing
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing XML External Entity (XXE). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# ShmooCon 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Server-Side Request Forgery: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Elizabeth Johnson, CISO

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through SSRF attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes URL parameters without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found SSRF in 55% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. URL allowlists
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Insecure Direct Object Reference Prevention

## What is Insecure Direct Object Reference?
Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical IDOR payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-100
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-6824
**Product**: CloudSuite v8.14
**Type**: Local File Inclusion (LFI)
**CVSS**: 7.6
**Status**: FIXED in v4.10.1

## Summary
A LFI vulnerability was discovered in the search endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to execute arbitrary commands.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2021-08-06
- Acknowledged: 2025-02-15
- Patched: 2020-12-28
- Disclosed: 2023-05-24

## Remediation Applied
Path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Local File Inclusion (LFI). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Remote Code Execution Prevention

## What is Remote Code Execution?
Remote Code Execution (RCE) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical RCE payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-365
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Remote Code Execution (RCE). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# OWASP AppSec 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Server-Side Template Injection: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Robert Hill, Staff Red Team

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through SSTI attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes URL parameters without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found SSTI in 57% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. sandboxed template engines
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# OWASP ZAP — User Guide: CSRF Testing

## Overview
OWASP ZAP can be used to test for Cross-Site Request Forgery vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install owasp-zap
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for CSRF Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the csrf scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed CSRF with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible CSRF, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When CSRF is confirmed, recommend: anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking.

## Legal Notice
Only use OWASP ZAP against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# CTF Writeup: PicoCTF — Insecure Direct Object Reference Challenge
**Author**: Maria Johnson | **Date**: 2021-10-05 | **Difficulty**: Hard

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a idor vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Burp Suite against the target
2. Identified IDOR vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed IDOR via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{5acfffc83b618f9846f3b9e47fc59eed}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper authorization checks
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Remote Code Execution Prevention

## What is Remote Code Execution?
Remote Code Execution (RCE) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical RCE payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-204
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-8063
**Product**: APIGateway v8.10
**Type**: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
**CVSS**: 7.4
**Status**: FIXED in v6.0.2

## Summary
A XSS vulnerability was discovered in the profile endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to bypass authentication.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2021-04-16
- Acknowledged: 2021-01-05
- Patched: 2024-03-05
- Disclosed: 2021-02-20

## Remediation Applied
Output encoding, content security policy, input validation.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# CTF Writeup: TryHackMe — Remote Code Execution Challenge
**Author**: Maria Miller | **Date**: 2026-02-08 | **Difficulty**: Hard

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a rce vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran John the Ripper against the target
2. Identified RCE vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed RCE via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{31c63d64307adb3143f8408032cc92ab}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper input sanitization
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Bugcrowd
**Program**: Acme Corp VDP
**Reporter**: Michael Lopez (@yuki2)
**Severity**: Medium
**Bounty**: $4,835

## Title
Insecure Direct Object Reference in /webhook/callback

## Description
The endpoint fails to sanitize user-supplied input, allowing IDOR.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the error response

## Recommended Fix
Authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Nmap — User Guide: RCE Testing

## Overview
Nmap can be used to test for Remote Code Execution vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install nmap
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for RCE Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the rce scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed RCE with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible RCE, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When RCE is confirmed, recommend: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

## Legal Notice
Only use Nmap against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: XML External Entity Prevention

## What is XML External Entity?
XML External Entity (XXE) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical XXE payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-280
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# OWASP ZAP — User Guide: IDOR Testing

## Overview
OWASP ZAP can be used to test for Insecure Direct Object Reference vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install owasp-zap
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for IDOR Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the idor scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed IDOR with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible IDOR, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When IDOR is confirmed, recommend: authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

## Legal Notice
Only use OWASP ZAP against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Server-Side Template Injection: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Emily Rodriguez, Linda Brown, Sophia Williams
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 21, 2024
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2024.1977196

## Abstract
Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 52% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 54 recent SSTI attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 19 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 41% of SSTI attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 56% of novel SSTI payloads
- Most effective defense: sandboxed template engines, input validation

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining sandboxed template engines, input validation provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# CTF Writeup: WebGoat — Insecure Direct Object Reference Challenge
**Author**: Emily Jones | **Date**: 2024-02-25 | **Difficulty**: Hard

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a idor vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Burp Suite against the target
2. Identified IDOR vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed IDOR via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{2a1554f9f76b1a71fb033807072f4f1d}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper authorization checks
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-5704
**Product**: DataPlatform v2.0
**Type**: Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization)
**CVSS**: 6.0
**Status**: FIXED in v3.10.6

## Summary
A Deserialization vulnerability was discovered in the search endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to read unauthorized data.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2023-03-26
- Acknowledged: 2025-06-21
- Patched: 2024-05-05
- Disclosed: 2023-02-08

## Remediation Applied
Signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# DEF CON 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "XML External Entity: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Raj Brown, Staff Red Team

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through XXE attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes user input without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found XXE in 32% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. disable external entity processing
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Burp Suite — User Guide: RCE Testing

## Overview
Burp Suite can be used to test for Remote Code Execution vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install burp-suite
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for RCE Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the rce scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed RCE with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible RCE, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When RCE is confirmed, recommend: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

## Legal Notice
Only use Burp Suite against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Nullcon 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Insecure Deserialization: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: William Hill, CISO

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through Deserialization attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes XML data without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found Deserialization in 50% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. signed tokens
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-3534
**Product**: WebPortal v4.8
**Type**: SQL Injection (SQLi)
**CVSS**: 7.4
**Status**: FIXED in v4.3.4

## Summary
A SQLi vulnerability was discovered in the profile endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to escalate privileges.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2021-12-17
- Acknowledged: 2025-09-28
- Patched: 2026-02-16
- Disclosed: 2021-01-18

## Remediation Applied
Parameterized queries, prepared statements, orm usage.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing SQL Injection (SQLi). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Code Review: PR #7414 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Andrew Martinez (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: web-app

## Finding 1: Potential Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
**File**: `src/routes/admin.js`
**Line**: 365

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the template renderer without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# output encoding
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow XSS attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# John the Ripper — User Guide: CSRF Testing

## Overview
John the Ripper can be used to test for Cross-Site Request Forgery vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install john-the-ripper
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for CSRF Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the csrf scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed CSRF with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible CSRF, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When CSRF is confirmed, recommend: anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking.

## Legal Notice
Only use John the Ripper against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Burp Suite — User Guide: SSTI Testing

## Overview
Burp Suite can be used to test for Server-Side Template Injection vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install burp-suite
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for SSTI Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the ssti scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed SSTI with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible SSTI, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When SSTI is confirmed, recommend: sandboxed template engines, input validation.

## Legal Notice
Only use Burp Suite against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Code Review: PR #8123 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Emily Jones (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: backend-api

## Finding 1: Potential Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)
**File**: `src/handlers/admin.go`
**Line**: 353

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the XML parser without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# sandboxed template engines
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow SSTI attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Code Review: PR #5261 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Robert Patel (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: web-app

## Finding 1: Potential Remote Code Execution (RCE)
**File**: `src/routes/search.js`
**Line**: 163

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the system command without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# input sanitization
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow RCE attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Bug Bounty Report — HackerOne
**Program**: TechGiant VDP
**Reporter**: Jennifer Jones (@priya32)
**Severity**: Medium
**Bounty**: $15,971

## Title
Cross-Site Scripting in /user/profile

## Description
The endpoint fails to sanitize user-supplied input, allowing XSS.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the unauthorized data

## Recommended Fix
Output encoding, content security policy, input validation.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# CTF Writeup: PicoCTF — Insecure Deserialization Challenge
**Author**: Fatima Ali | **Date**: 2021-03-26 | **Difficulty**: Medium

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a deserialization vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Burp Suite against the target
2. Identified Deserialization vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed Deserialization via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{a105bf2e39d71910c828f16fb8fc1f7e}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper signed tokens
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Bug Bounty Report — HackerOne
**Program**: CloudFirst VDP
**Reporter**: Thomas Smith (@patricia66)
**Severity**: Medium
**Bounty**: $22,308

## Title
XML External Entity in /admin/export

## Description
The endpoint fails to escape user-supplied input, allowing XXE.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the error response

## Recommended Fix
Disable external entity processing, use json instead.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Gobuster — User Guide: SSRF Testing

## Overview
Gobuster can be used to test for Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install gobuster
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for SSRF Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the ssrf scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed SSRF with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible SSRF, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When SSRF is confirmed, recommend: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

## Legal Notice
Only use Gobuster against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# RSA Conference 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Cross-Site Scripting: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Michael Lee, Principal Security Researcher

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through XSS attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes XML data without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found XSS in 50% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. output encoding
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Local File Inclusion Prevention

## What is Local File Inclusion?
Local File Inclusion (LFI) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical LFI payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-247
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Bug Bounty Report — HackerOne
**Program**: Acme Corp VDP
**Reporter**: Mary Chen (@priya8)
**Severity**: Critical
**Bounty**: $15,246

## Title
Remote Code Execution in /admin/export

## Description
The endpoint fails to sanitize user-supplied input, allowing RCE.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the error response

## Recommended Fix
Input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Code Review: PR #9588 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Yuki Hall (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: backend-api

## Finding 1: Potential Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
**File**: `src/controllers/user.go`
**Line**: 499

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the system command without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# output encoding
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow XSS attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: SQL Injection Prevention

## What is SQL Injection?
SQL Injection (SQLi) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical SQLi payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-864
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Code Review: PR #8986 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Wei Hall (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: web-app

## Finding 1: Potential Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
**File**: `src/handlers/user.py`
**Line**: 141

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the template renderer without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# anti-CSRF tokens
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow CSRF attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# CTF Writeup: DVWA — Server-Side Request Forgery Challenge
**Author**: Linda Walker | **Date**: 2025-09-05 | **Difficulty**: Hard

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a ssrf vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Hashcat against the target
2. Identified SSRF vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed SSRF via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{57bae3b38bb5c2c8dffafe9416134680}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper URL allowlists
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# CTF Writeup: PicoCTF — XML External Entity Challenge
**Author**: Yuki Walker | **Date**: 2021-12-04 | **Difficulty**: Easy

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a xxe vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Hydra against the target
2. Identified XXE vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed XXE via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{58e898f83f97383e88a067f0d47809ca}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper disable external entity processing
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# SQL Injection: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Jennifer Brown, Wei Lee, Linda Kim
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 15, 2024
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2023.2488483

## Abstract
SQL Injection (SQLi) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 40% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 54 recent SQLi attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 29 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 53% of SQLi attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 57% of novel SQLi payloads
- Most effective defense: parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Nmap — User Guide: SQLi Testing

## Overview
Nmap can be used to test for SQL Injection vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install nmap
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for SQLi Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the sqli scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed SQLi with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible SQLi, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When SQLi is confirmed, recommend: parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage.

## Legal Notice
Only use Nmap against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Bug Bounty Report — HackerOne
**Program**: CloudFirst VDP
**Reporter**: Fatima Kim (@priya81)
**Severity**: Critical
**Bounty**: $5,762

## Title
Remote Code Execution in /api/v2/search

## Description
The endpoint fails to sanitize user-supplied input, allowing RCE.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the reflected output

## Recommended Fix
Input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Cross-Site Scripting Prevention

## What is Cross-Site Scripting?
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical XSS payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-450
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# CTF Writeup: WebGoat — Cross-Site Request Forgery Challenge
**Author**: David Ali | **Date**: 2026-03-23 | **Difficulty**: Easy

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a csrf vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Hydra against the target
2. Identified CSRF vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed CSRF via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{22d4d5374a4c04558d7914fd5efe0c77}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper anti-CSRF tokens
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Remote Code Execution Prevention

## What is Remote Code Execution?
Remote Code Execution (RCE) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical RCE payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-740
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Code Review: PR #9728 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Jennifer Brown (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
**File**: `src/controllers/user.py`
**Line**: 351

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the system command without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# anti-CSRF tokens
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow CSRF attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Cross-Site Scripting: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: William Singh, Maria Miller, Linda Singh
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 27, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2025.8130265

## Abstract
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 47% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 134 recent XSS attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 22 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 41% of XSS attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 65% of novel XSS payloads
- Most effective defense: output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# CTF Writeup: DVWA — Server-Side Template Injection Challenge
**Author**: Patricia Young | **Date**: 2021-06-14 | **Difficulty**: Medium

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a ssti vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran sqlmap against the target
2. Identified SSTI vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed SSTI via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{54e26190563d818420bf728d8d9020d1}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: sandboxed template engines, input validation.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper sandboxed template engines
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-4339
**Product**: WebPortal v7.11
**Type**: Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)
**CVSS**: 7.4
**Status**: FIXED in v8.7.10

## Summary
A SSTI vulnerability was discovered in the admin endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to escalate privileges.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2025-10-14
- Acknowledged: 2020-10-28
- Patched: 2020-09-19
- Disclosed: 2021-12-07

## Remediation Applied
Sandboxed template engines, input validation.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# CTF Writeup: PicoCTF — Server-Side Request Forgery Challenge
**Author**: Thomas Davis | **Date**: 2022-07-27 | **Difficulty**: Easy

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a ssrf vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Hashcat against the target
2. Identified SSRF vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed SSRF via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{87a1941270ae43b96ca94b6ef4ba0bba}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper URL allowlists
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Remote Code Execution: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Linda Lee, Yuki Walker, James Jones
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 29, 2023
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2024.5334599

## Abstract
Remote Code Execution (RCE) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 28% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 180 recent RCE attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 21 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 75% of RCE attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 58% of novel RCE payloads
- Most effective defense: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Bug Bounty Report — HackerOne
**Program**: TechGiant VDP
**Reporter**: Emily Young (@william58)
**Severity**: Medium
**Bounty**: $16,462

## Title
XML External Entity in /user/profile

## Description
The endpoint fails to validate user-supplied input, allowing XXE.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the reflected output

## Recommended Fix
Disable external entity processing, use json instead.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Code Review: PR #5216 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Ahmed Singh (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: web-app

## Finding 1: Potential Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)
**File**: `src/handlers/search.js`
**Line**: 83

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the template renderer without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# authorization checks
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow IDOR attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Local File Inclusion: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Carlos Kim, Jennifer Singh, Carlos Walker
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 11, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2023.4748374

## Abstract
Local File Inclusion (LFI) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 51% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 197 recent LFI attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 20 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 75% of LFI attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 83% of novel LFI payloads
- Most effective defense: path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-9684
**Product**: APIGateway v6.1
**Type**: SQL Injection (SQLi)
**CVSS**: 6.6
**Status**: FIXED in v8.9.8

## Summary
A SQLi vulnerability was discovered in the upload endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to bypass authentication.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2021-10-27
- Acknowledged: 2026-06-10
- Patched: 2022-10-11
- Disclosed: 2020-04-10

## Remediation Applied
Parameterized queries, prepared statements, orm usage.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-3091
**Product**: APIGateway v2.13
**Type**: Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization)
**CVSS**: 6.3
**Status**: FIXED in v5.2.8

## Summary
A Deserialization vulnerability was discovered in the profile endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to bypass authentication.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2020-06-17
- Acknowledged: 2024-04-09
- Patched: 2021-11-11
- Disclosed: 2023-04-26

## Remediation Applied
Signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Code Review: PR #649 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Emily Smith (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
**File**: `src/routes/user.py`
**Line**: 98

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the SQL query without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# output encoding
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow XSS attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Nikto — User Guide: XXE Testing

## Overview
Nikto can be used to test for XML External Entity vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install nikto
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for XXE Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the xxe scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed XXE with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible XXE, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When XXE is confirmed, recommend: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead.

## Legal Notice
Only use Nikto against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-2828
**Product**: WebPortal v4.7
**Type**: Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)
**CVSS**: 6.2
**Status**: FIXED in v3.14.9

## Summary
A SSTI vulnerability was discovered in the search endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to read unauthorized data.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2020-03-13
- Acknowledged: 2022-12-03
- Patched: 2022-06-20
- Disclosed: 2020-11-09

## Remediation Applied
Sandboxed template engines, input validation.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Bug Bounty Report — HackerOne
**Program**: CloudFirst VDP
**Reporter**: Andrew Hill (@patricia75)
**Severity**: High
**Bounty**: $12,948

## Title
Remote Code Execution in /user/profile

## Description
The endpoint fails to escape user-supplied input, allowing RCE.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the reflected output

## Recommended Fix
Input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# CTF Writeup: WebGoat — Remote Code Execution Challenge
**Author**: Wei Rodriguez | **Date**: 2021-06-14 | **Difficulty**: Insane

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a rce vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Hashcat against the target
2. Identified RCE vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed RCE via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{0d07ba81cffa473ebe8c4a9dd4d3f213}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper input sanitization
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Code Review: PR #124 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Carlos Ali (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization)
**File**: `src/handlers/user.js`
**Line**: 353

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the system command without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# signed tokens
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow Deserialization attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-8443
**Product**: CloudSuite v3.7
**Type**: SQL Injection (SQLi)
**CVSS**: 5.9
**Status**: FIXED in v4.4.6

## Summary
A SQLi vulnerability was discovered in the profile endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to bypass authentication.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2020-05-10
- Acknowledged: 2021-07-27
- Patched: 2022-02-16
- Disclosed: 2026-05-13

## Remediation Applied
Parameterized queries, prepared statements, orm usage.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Insecure Direct Object Reference: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Emily Singh, Fatima Rodriguez, David Young
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 22, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2024.3954113

## Abstract
Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 54% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 57 recent IDOR attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 25 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 52% of IDOR attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 71% of novel IDOR payloads
- Most effective defense: authorization checks, indirect references, access control

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining authorization checks, indirect references, access control provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Code Review: PR #3652 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Maria Patel (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential Remote Code Execution (RCE)
**File**: `src/routes/search.py`
**Line**: 332

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the SQL query without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# input sanitization
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow RCE attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Cross-Site Request Forgery: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Raj Lee, Maria Smith, Robert Williams
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 24, 2023
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2025.9906287

## Abstract
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 44% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 188 recent CSRF attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 28 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 65% of CSRF attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 66% of novel CSRF payloads
- Most effective defense: anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Nikto — User Guide: SSTI Testing

## Overview
Nikto can be used to test for Server-Side Template Injection vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install nikto
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for SSTI Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the ssti scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed SSTI with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible SSTI, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When SSTI is confirmed, recommend: sandboxed template engines, input validation.

## Legal Notice
Only use Nikto against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Bug Bounty Report — HackerOne
**Program**: Acme Corp VDP
**Reporter**: Andrew Hill (@jennifer45)
**Severity**: High
**Bounty**: $16,259

## Title
Server-Side Request Forgery in /admin/export

## Description
The endpoint fails to validate user-supplied input, allowing SSRF.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the error response

## Recommended Fix
Url allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# CTF Writeup: HackTheBox — XML External Entity Challenge
**Author**: Patricia Martinez | **Date**: 2022-07-07 | **Difficulty**: Easy

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a xxe vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Burp Suite against the target
2. Identified XXE vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed XXE via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{a5a98b47e1467579a9d0e9adcf546adc}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper disable external entity processing
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# CTF Writeup: HackTheBox — Insecure Direct Object Reference Challenge
**Author**: Raj Wright | **Date**: 2026-12-08 | **Difficulty**: Medium

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a idor vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Burp Suite against the target
2. Identified IDOR vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed IDOR via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{af32d691cddc4952fe70d237f37445e8}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper authorization checks
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Burp Suite — User Guide: RCE Testing

## Overview
Burp Suite can be used to test for Remote Code Execution vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install burp-suite
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for RCE Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the rce scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed RCE with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible RCE, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When RCE is confirmed, recommend: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

## Legal Notice
Only use Burp Suite against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-6090
**Product**: CloudSuite v2.3
**Type**: XML External Entity (XXE)
**CVSS**: 8.5
**Status**: FIXED in v6.1.3

## Summary
A XXE vulnerability was discovered in the profile endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to escalate privileges.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2025-05-26
- Acknowledged: 2024-05-26
- Patched: 2026-02-15
- Disclosed: 2024-06-11

## Remediation Applied
Disable external entity processing, use json instead.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Insecure Direct Object Reference Prevention

## What is Insecure Direct Object Reference?
Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical IDOR payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-187
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Code Review: PR #3799 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: David Walker (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: backend-api

## Finding 1: Potential SQL Injection (SQLi)
**File**: `src/routes/admin.go`
**Line**: 140

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the template renderer without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# parameterized queries
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow SQLi attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Metasploit — User Guide: SSTI Testing

## Overview
Metasploit can be used to test for Server-Side Template Injection vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install metasploit
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for SSTI Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the ssti scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed SSTI with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible SSTI, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When SSTI is confirmed, recommend: sandboxed template engines, input validation.

## Legal Notice
Only use Metasploit against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# CTF Writeup: DVWA — Server-Side Request Forgery Challenge
**Author**: Patricia Singh | **Date**: 2026-09-21 | **Difficulty**: Medium

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a ssrf vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Hashcat against the target
2. Identified SSRF vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed SSRF via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{0aeb5497ecba2f5b6cdf56ece7d1b279}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper URL allowlists
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Hashcat — User Guide: XXE Testing

## Overview
Hashcat can be used to test for XML External Entity vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install hashcat
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for XXE Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the xxe scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed XXE with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible XXE, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When XXE is confirmed, recommend: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead.

## Legal Notice
Only use Hashcat against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Synack
**Program**: CloudFirst VDP
**Reporter**: Patricia Johnson (@mary57)
**Severity**: High
**Bounty**: $23,619

## Title
Server-Side Template Injection in /webhook/callback

## Description
The endpoint fails to escape user-supplied input, allowing SSTI.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the reflected output

## Recommended Fix
Sandboxed template engines, input validation.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Hashcat — User Guide: Deserialization Testing

## Overview
Hashcat can be used to test for Insecure Deserialization vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install hashcat
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for Deserialization Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the deserialization scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed Deserialization with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible Deserialization, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When Deserialization is confirmed, recommend: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

## Legal Notice
Only use Hashcat against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Metasploit — User Guide: CSRF Testing

## Overview
Metasploit can be used to test for Cross-Site Request Forgery vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install metasploit
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for CSRF Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the csrf scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed CSRF with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible CSRF, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When CSRF is confirmed, recommend: anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking.

## Legal Notice
Only use Metasploit against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Bug Bounty Report — HackerOne
**Program**: CloudFirst VDP
**Reporter**: Yuki Johnson (@sophia9)
**Severity**: High
**Bounty**: $17,731

## Title
Local File Inclusion in /admin/export

## Description
The endpoint fails to validate user-supplied input, allowing LFI.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the reflected output

## Recommended Fix
Path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Insecure Deserialization Prevention

## What is Insecure Deserialization?
Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical Deserialization payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-545
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# CTF Writeup: HackTheBox — Local File Inclusion Challenge
**Author**: Maria Kim | **Date**: 2020-11-08 | **Difficulty**: Medium

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a lfi vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran OWASP ZAP against the target
2. Identified LFI vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed LFI via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{6d86706a1e574fead4a8a74b33a25529}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper path canonicalization
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# RSA Conference 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Remote Code Execution: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Olga Lee, Staff Red Team

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through RCE attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes URL parameters without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found RCE in 48% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. input sanitization
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Bugcrowd
**Program**: Acme Corp VDP
**Reporter**: Olga Chen (@ahmed32)
**Severity**: High
**Bounty**: $19,402

## Title
Insecure Direct Object Reference in /user/profile

## Description
The endpoint fails to sanitize user-supplied input, allowing IDOR.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the reflected output

## Recommended Fix
Authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Hydra — User Guide: CSRF Testing

## Overview
Hydra can be used to test for Cross-Site Request Forgery vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install hydra
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for CSRF Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the csrf scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed CSRF with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible CSRF, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When CSRF is confirmed, recommend: anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking.

## Legal Notice
Only use Hydra against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Code Review: PR #952 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: William Smith (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
**File**: `src/routes/admin.js`
**Line**: 138

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the SQL query without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# URL allowlists
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow SSRF attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-7069
**Product**: DataPlatform v3.10
**Type**: Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)
**CVSS**: 7.9
**Status**: FIXED in v2.1.7

## Summary
A SSTI vulnerability was discovered in the search endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to escalate privileges.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2025-02-13
- Acknowledged: 2025-12-12
- Patched: 2025-07-21
- Disclosed: 2024-01-06

## Remediation Applied
Sandboxed template engines, input validation.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-5440
**Product**: WebPortal v2.7
**Type**: SQL Injection (SQLi)
**CVSS**: 5.5
**Status**: FIXED in v5.0.8

## Summary
A SQLi vulnerability was discovered in the admin endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to execute arbitrary commands.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2021-03-20
- Acknowledged: 2021-03-25
- Patched: 2020-03-27
- Disclosed: 2021-11-14

## Remediation Applied
Parameterized queries, prepared statements, orm usage.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Metasploit — User Guide: XXE Testing

## Overview
Metasploit can be used to test for XML External Entity vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install metasploit
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for XXE Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the xxe scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed XXE with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible XXE, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When XXE is confirmed, recommend: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead.

## Legal Notice
Only use Metasploit against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Code Review: PR #6894 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Ahmed Smith (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
**File**: `src/routes/user.js`
**Line**: 167

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the SQL query without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# URL allowlists
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow SSRF attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Insecure Direct Object Reference Prevention

## What is Insecure Direct Object Reference?
Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical IDOR payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-140
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Insecure Direct Object Reference Prevention

## What is Insecure Direct Object Reference?
Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical IDOR payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-579
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Server-Side Template Injection Prevention

## What is Server-Side Template Injection?
Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical SSTI payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: sandboxed template engines, input validation.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-791
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Insecure Direct Object Reference Prevention

## What is Insecure Direct Object Reference?
Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical IDOR payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-338
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# CTF Writeup: PicoCTF — Cross-Site Request Forgery Challenge
**Author**: William Rodriguez | **Date**: 2021-12-09 | **Difficulty**: Medium

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a csrf vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Nikto against the target
2. Identified CSRF vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed CSRF via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{e470dae3fc227961f6d5fb256f733e4a}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper anti-CSRF tokens
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Code Review: PR #8924 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Fatima Lee (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: web-app

## Finding 1: Potential Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)
**File**: `src/handlers/search.py`
**Line**: 212

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the template renderer without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# authorization checks
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow IDOR attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-8572
**Product**: CloudSuite v7.5
**Type**: Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization)
**CVSS**: 8.3
**Status**: FIXED in v2.14.7

## Summary
A Deserialization vulnerability was discovered in the upload endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to bypass authentication.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2022-08-25
- Acknowledged: 2021-07-05
- Patched: 2024-03-25
- Disclosed: 2023-05-13

## Remediation Applied
Signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# CTF Writeup: OverTheWire — Server-Side Request Forgery Challenge
**Author**: Jennifer Brown | **Date**: 2025-12-27 | **Difficulty**: Medium

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a ssrf vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Burp Suite against the target
2. Identified SSRF vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed SSRF via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{cf5603a771fedf8d4765618f8c530ca7}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper URL allowlists
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Hydra — User Guide: XSS Testing

## Overview
Hydra can be used to test for Cross-Site Scripting vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install hydra
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for XSS Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the xss scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed XSS with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible XSS, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When XSS is confirmed, recommend: output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation.

## Legal Notice
Only use Hydra against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# CTF Writeup: PicoCTF — Server-Side Request Forgery Challenge
**Author**: Linda Jones | **Date**: 2020-05-10 | **Difficulty**: Easy

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a ssrf vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran sqlmap against the target
2. Identified SSRF vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed SSRF via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{fe2321fb0cad76b82f6e7733eebc0323}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper URL allowlists
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Nikto — User Guide: XSS Testing

## Overview
Nikto can be used to test for Cross-Site Scripting vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install nikto
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for XSS Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the xss scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed XSS with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible XSS, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When XSS is confirmed, recommend: output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation.

## Legal Notice
Only use Nikto against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# ShmooCon 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Server-Side Template Injection: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: John Young, CISO

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through SSTI attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes file paths without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found SSTI in 30% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. sandboxed template engines
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Code Review: PR #491 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Fatima Patel (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: backend-api

## Finding 1: Potential Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
**File**: `src/handlers/user.go`
**Line**: 214

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the template renderer without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# anti-CSRF tokens
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow CSRF attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# BSides 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Local File Inclusion: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Jennifer Jones, Staff Red Team

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through LFI attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes file paths without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found LFI in 58% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. path canonicalization
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# CTF Writeup: OverTheWire — Insecure Direct Object Reference Challenge
**Author**: Sarah Chen | **Date**: 2026-07-21 | **Difficulty**: Medium

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a idor vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Metasploit against the target
2. Identified IDOR vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed IDOR via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{78ab20e2dfce2d308f28b2b251f4039b}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper authorization checks
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-8407
**Product**: CloudSuite v3.4
**Type**: Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)
**CVSS**: 8.3
**Status**: FIXED in v4.4.1

## Summary
A SSTI vulnerability was discovered in the profile endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to read unauthorized data.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2021-07-20
- Acknowledged: 2023-10-08
- Patched: 2024-12-08
- Disclosed: 2022-12-20

## Remediation Applied
Sandboxed template engines, input validation.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Bugcrowd
**Program**: TechGiant VDP
**Reporter**: Robert Ali (@michael44)
**Severity**: Critical
**Bounty**: $19,856

## Title
Insecure Direct Object Reference in /user/profile

## Description
The endpoint fails to escape user-supplied input, allowing IDOR.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the reflected output

## Recommended Fix
Authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Code Review: PR #1979 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Patricia Patel (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential Local File Inclusion (LFI)
**File**: `src/controllers/admin.js`
**Line**: 378

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the XML parser without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# path canonicalization
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow LFI attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Hashcat — User Guide: SSTI Testing

## Overview
Hashcat can be used to test for Server-Side Template Injection vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install hashcat
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for SSTI Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the ssti scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed SSTI with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible SSTI, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When SSTI is confirmed, recommend: sandboxed template engines, input validation.

## Legal Notice
Only use Hashcat against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Nullcon 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Cross-Site Request Forgery: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: William Rodriguez, CISO

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through CSRF attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes file paths without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found CSRF in 69% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. anti-CSRF tokens
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-4343
**Product**: WebPortal v6.11
**Type**: Local File Inclusion (LFI)
**CVSS**: 7.4
**Status**: FIXED in v8.10.3

## Summary
A LFI vulnerability was discovered in the upload endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to execute arbitrary commands.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2024-04-10
- Acknowledged: 2025-03-26
- Patched: 2024-03-14
- Disclosed: 2023-06-08

## Remediation Applied
Path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# OWASP AppSec 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Remote Code Execution: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Jennifer Patel, CISO

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through RCE attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes XML data without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found RCE in 56% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. input sanitization
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Insecure Deserialization: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Sarah Nguyen, Mary Jones, Priya Walker
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 15, 2024
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2025.2396394

## Abstract
Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 23% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 132 recent Deserialization attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 12 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 60% of Deserialization attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 56% of novel Deserialization payloads
- Most effective defense: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# DEF CON 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Insecure Direct Object Reference: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Jennifer Garcia, Staff Red Team

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through IDOR attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes XML data without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found IDOR in 33% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. authorization checks
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Nmap — User Guide: IDOR Testing

## Overview
Nmap can be used to test for Insecure Direct Object Reference vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install nmap
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for IDOR Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the idor scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed IDOR with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible IDOR, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When IDOR is confirmed, recommend: authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

## Legal Notice
Only use Nmap against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Code Review: PR #3166 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Linda Patel (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: web-app

## Finding 1: Potential XML External Entity (XXE)
**File**: `src/controllers/user.go`
**Line**: 286

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the template renderer without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# disable external entity processing
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow XXE attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Nikto — User Guide: XXE Testing

## Overview
Nikto can be used to test for XML External Entity vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install nikto
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for XXE Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the xxe scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed XXE with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible XXE, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When XXE is confirmed, recommend: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead.

## Legal Notice
Only use Nikto against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Local File Inclusion: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Yuki Johnson, David Williams, Mary Smith
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 15, 2023
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2023.8513184

## Abstract
Local File Inclusion (LFI) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 41% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 58 recent LFI attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 28 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 45% of LFI attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 71% of novel LFI payloads
- Most effective defense: path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Code Review: PR #207 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Linda Singh (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential Local File Inclusion (LFI)
**File**: `src/handlers/user.js`
**Line**: 310

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the SQL query without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# path canonicalization
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow LFI attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# CTF Writeup: DVWA — Remote Code Execution Challenge
**Author**: Maria Ali | **Date**: 2022-08-28 | **Difficulty**: Hard

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a rce vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Burp Suite against the target
2. Identified RCE vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed RCE via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{e346791382fc1ac572007c04429b38aa}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper input sanitization
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# XML External Entity: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: John Williams, Thomas Scott, David Garcia
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 13, 2023
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2024.3139058

## Abstract
XML External Entity (XXE) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 55% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 127 recent XXE attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 23 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 40% of XXE attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 65% of novel XXE payloads
- Most effective defense: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining disable external entity processing, use JSON instead provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*