# Nmap — User Guide: RCE Testing

## Overview
Nmap can be used to test for Remote Code Execution vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install nmap
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for RCE Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the rce scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed RCE with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible RCE, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When RCE is confirmed, recommend: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

## Legal Notice
Only use Nmap against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Bug Bounty Report — HackerOne
**Program**: TechGiant VDP
**Reporter**: Michael Young (@john70)
**Severity**: Critical
**Bounty**: $19,623

## Title
Insecure Direct Object Reference in /user/profile

## Description
The endpoint fails to sanitize user-supplied input, allowing IDOR.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the reflected output

## Recommended Fix
Authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Code Review: PR #1128 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Ivan Hall (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: backend-api

## Finding 1: Potential Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)
**File**: `src/handlers/search.py`
**Line**: 287

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the SQL query without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# sandboxed template engines
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow SSTI attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# John the Ripper — User Guide: Deserialization Testing

## Overview
John the Ripper can be used to test for Insecure Deserialization vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install john-the-ripper
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for Deserialization Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the deserialization scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed Deserialization with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible Deserialization, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When Deserialization is confirmed, recommend: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

## Legal Notice
Only use John the Ripper against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Nullcon 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Server-Side Template Injection: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Jennifer Singh, CISO

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through SSTI attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes file paths without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found SSTI in 59% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. sandboxed template engines
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# SQL Injection: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Fatima Smith, Carlos Lee, Priya Scott
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 24, 2023
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2025.9497619

## Abstract
SQL Injection (SQLi) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 46% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 117 recent SQLi attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 18 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 51% of SQLi attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 67% of novel SQLi payloads
- Most effective defense: parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing SQL Injection (SQLi). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Code Review: PR #4903 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Sarah Smith (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: web-app

## Finding 1: Potential Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)
**File**: `src/routes/user.py`
**Line**: 354

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the SQL query without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# sandboxed template engines
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow SSTI attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-8040
**Product**: APIGateway v7.9
**Type**: Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization)
**CVSS**: 7.6
**Status**: FIXED in v2.6.6

## Summary
A Deserialization vulnerability was discovered in the search endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to read unauthorized data.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2022-09-26
- Acknowledged: 2025-05-21
- Patched: 2023-08-17
- Disclosed: 2022-06-21

## Remediation Applied
Signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-7553
**Product**: APIGateway v3.6
**Type**: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
**CVSS**: 5.9
**Status**: FIXED in v3.8.4

## Summary
A XSS vulnerability was discovered in the admin endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to escalate privileges.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2023-05-07
- Acknowledged: 2026-04-22
- Patched: 2026-10-14
- Disclosed: 2024-12-11

## Remediation Applied
Output encoding, content security policy, input validation.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Hashcat — User Guide: IDOR Testing

## Overview
Hashcat can be used to test for Insecure Direct Object Reference vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install hashcat
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for IDOR Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the idor scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed IDOR with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible IDOR, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When IDOR is confirmed, recommend: authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

## Legal Notice
Only use Hashcat against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-5310
**Product**: DataPlatform v7.13
**Type**: Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)
**CVSS**: 7.2
**Status**: FIXED in v5.5.6

## Summary
A IDOR vulnerability was discovered in the admin endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to escalate privileges.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2020-10-03
- Acknowledged: 2020-04-03
- Patched: 2021-10-19
- Disclosed: 2026-07-11

## Remediation Applied
Authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Cross-Site Request Forgery Prevention

## What is Cross-Site Request Forgery?
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical CSRF payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-855
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Nullcon 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Insecure Direct Object Reference: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Patricia Walker, CISO

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through IDOR attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes file paths without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found IDOR in 39% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. authorization checks
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# CTF Writeup: PicoCTF — Insecure Deserialization Challenge
**Author**: Linda Chen | **Date**: 2022-09-16 | **Difficulty**: Medium

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a deserialization vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Gobuster against the target
2. Identified Deserialization vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed Deserialization via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{a04fe58129a84d2842013ce9e26bd498}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper signed tokens
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Local File Inclusion Prevention

## What is Local File Inclusion?
Local File Inclusion (LFI) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical LFI payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-590
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Local File Inclusion (LFI). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Nullcon 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Cross-Site Scripting: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Elizabeth Wright, Staff Red Team

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through XSS attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes file paths without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found XSS in 32% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. output encoding
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# CTF Writeup: WebGoat — Insecure Deserialization Challenge
**Author**: Maria Martinez | **Date**: 2025-08-20 | **Difficulty**: Easy

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a deserialization vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Burp Suite against the target
2. Identified Deserialization vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed Deserialization via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{ea83b2606f6909048ba6b4c633fd941f}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper signed tokens
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# CTF Writeup: TryHackMe — Cross-Site Scripting Challenge
**Author**: Wei Walker | **Date**: 2025-10-13 | **Difficulty**: Hard

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a xss vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Metasploit against the target
2. Identified XSS vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed XSS via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{dd7c79bdb608c79fe1cf981132da4dae}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper output encoding
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# CTF Writeup: WebGoat — Insecure Deserialization Challenge
**Author**: Carlos Williams | **Date**: 2022-12-01 | **Difficulty**: Insane

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a deserialization vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran OWASP ZAP against the target
2. Identified Deserialization vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed Deserialization via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{d2a58641c0a88d9b2406006f5218b8ec}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper signed tokens
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Bugcrowd
**Program**: CloudFirst VDP
**Reporter**: Wei Williams (@carlos4)
**Severity**: High
**Bounty**: $4,401

## Title
Server-Side Template Injection in /api/v2/search

## Description
The endpoint fails to validate user-supplied input, allowing SSTI.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the error response

## Recommended Fix
Sandboxed template engines, input validation.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Bugcrowd
**Program**: CloudFirst VDP
**Reporter**: Robert Davis (@thomas83)
**Severity**: Medium
**Bounty**: $4,801

## Title
Insecure Direct Object Reference in /admin/export

## Description
The endpoint fails to validate user-supplied input, allowing IDOR.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the unauthorized data

## Recommended Fix
Authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Bug Bounty Report — HackerOne
**Program**: CloudFirst VDP
**Reporter**: Fatima Hall (@linda69)
**Severity**: High
**Bounty**: $16,870

## Title
Server-Side Request Forgery in /user/profile

## Description
The endpoint fails to validate user-supplied input, allowing SSRF.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the unauthorized data

## Recommended Fix
Url allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# CTF Writeup: WebGoat — XML External Entity Challenge
**Author**: Maria Walker | **Date**: 2020-02-09 | **Difficulty**: Easy

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a xxe vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran OWASP ZAP against the target
2. Identified XXE vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed XXE via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{19c22655ebe6abf980af449f28fe7789}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper disable external entity processing
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing XML External Entity (XXE). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Black Hat 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Remote Code Execution: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Carlos Wright, CISO

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through RCE attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes URL parameters without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found RCE in 54% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. input sanitization
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Remote Code Execution (RCE). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Local File Inclusion: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Patricia Scott, Patricia Young, Thomas Chen
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 29, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2023.3326137

## Abstract
Local File Inclusion (LFI) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 42% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 181 recent LFI attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 29 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 61% of LFI attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 68% of novel LFI payloads
- Most effective defense: path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Code Review: PR #6269 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: David Walker (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: web-app

## Finding 1: Potential Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)
**File**: `src/handlers/search.js`
**Line**: 104

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the template renderer without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# authorization checks
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow IDOR attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# BSides 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Insecure Direct Object Reference: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Sarah Smith, CISO

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through IDOR attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes user input without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found IDOR in 48% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. authorization checks
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Server-Side Template Injection: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Mary Walker, Ahmed Johnson, Priya Rodriguez
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 27, 2024
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2025.6972284

## Abstract
Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 60% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 152 recent SSTI attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 25 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 52% of SSTI attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 56% of novel SSTI payloads
- Most effective defense: sandboxed template engines, input validation

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining sandboxed template engines, input validation provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Hashcat — User Guide: LFI Testing

## Overview
Hashcat can be used to test for Local File Inclusion vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install hashcat
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for LFI Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the lfi scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed LFI with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible LFI, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When LFI is confirmed, recommend: path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

## Legal Notice
Only use Hashcat against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Hydra — User Guide: SQLi Testing

## Overview
Hydra can be used to test for SQL Injection vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install hydra
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for SQLi Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the sqli scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed SQLi with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible SQLi, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When SQLi is confirmed, recommend: parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage.

## Legal Notice
Only use Hydra against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Code Review: PR #9841 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Patricia Brown (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: web-app

## Finding 1: Potential Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
**File**: `src/controllers/user.js`
**Line**: 162

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the SQL query without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# output encoding
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow XSS attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Bugcrowd
**Program**: TechGiant VDP
**Reporter**: Thomas Patel (@ahmed93)
**Severity**: Critical
**Bounty**: $6,508

## Title
Server-Side Template Injection in /api/v2/search

## Description
The endpoint fails to validate user-supplied input, allowing SSTI.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the reflected output

## Recommended Fix
Sandboxed template engines, input validation.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Black Hat 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Server-Side Template Injection: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Priya Martinez, Principal Security Researcher

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through SSTI attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes user input without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found SSTI in 54% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. sandboxed template engines
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-4427
**Product**: DataPlatform v2.11
**Type**: Remote Code Execution (RCE)
**CVSS**: 8.3
**Status**: FIXED in v2.9.5

## Summary
A RCE vulnerability was discovered in the search endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to read unauthorized data.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2023-08-23
- Acknowledged: 2026-10-25
- Patched: 2026-01-09
- Disclosed: 2022-01-07

## Remediation Applied
Input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# OWASP AppSec 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Remote Code Execution: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Raj Nguyen, Principal Security Researcher

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through RCE attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes URL parameters without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found RCE in 35% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. input sanitization
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Code Review: PR #3008 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Carlos Hill (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: backend-api

## Finding 1: Potential SQL Injection (SQLi)
**File**: `src/controllers/admin.go`
**Line**: 260

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the XML parser without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# parameterized queries
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow SQLi attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# OWASP ZAP — User Guide: SSRF Testing

## Overview
OWASP ZAP can be used to test for Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install owasp-zap
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for SSRF Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the ssrf scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed SSRF with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible SSRF, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When SSRF is confirmed, recommend: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

## Legal Notice
Only use OWASP ZAP against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# DEF CON 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Cross-Site Scripting: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Fatima Wright, Staff Red Team

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through XSS attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes user input without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found XSS in 65% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. output encoding
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Code Review: PR #6422 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: James Martinez (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
**File**: `src/routes/search.go`
**Line**: 66

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the XML parser without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# anti-CSRF tokens
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow CSRF attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-6603
**Product**: APIGateway v5.10
**Type**: Local File Inclusion (LFI)
**CVSS**: 6.7
**Status**: FIXED in v4.2.10

## Summary
A LFI vulnerability was discovered in the upload endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to read unauthorized data.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2024-10-10
- Acknowledged: 2025-03-20
- Patched: 2024-09-15
- Disclosed: 2026-12-20

## Remediation Applied
Path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# CTF Writeup: OverTheWire — Remote Code Execution Challenge
**Author**: Carlos Nguyen | **Date**: 2023-03-22 | **Difficulty**: Easy

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a rce vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Hydra against the target
2. Identified RCE vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed RCE via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{2d2b459c143b160ac85444543f186e15}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper input sanitization
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# CTF Writeup: PicoCTF — Server-Side Request Forgery Challenge
**Author**: Wei Wright | **Date**: 2021-06-05 | **Difficulty**: Medium

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a ssrf vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Gobuster against the target
2. Identified SSRF vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed SSRF via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{a2188ce0b82bb194b1668e436d2be073}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper URL allowlists
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Local File Inclusion Prevention

## What is Local File Inclusion?
Local File Inclusion (LFI) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical LFI payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-48
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# CTF Writeup: DVWA — Insecure Deserialization Challenge
**Author**: Raj Garcia | **Date**: 2023-06-16 | **Difficulty**: Hard

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a deserialization vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Hashcat against the target
2. Identified Deserialization vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed Deserialization via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{3309b2bd5e0547633523dee6262bf466}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper signed tokens
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Gobuster — User Guide: SSRF Testing

## Overview
Gobuster can be used to test for Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install gobuster
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for SSRF Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the ssrf scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed SSRF with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible SSRF, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When SSRF is confirmed, recommend: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

## Legal Notice
Only use Gobuster against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Code Review: PR #2135 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Thomas Singh (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential SQL Injection (SQLi)
**File**: `src/controllers/search.js`
**Line**: 107

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the XML parser without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# parameterized queries
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow SQLi attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Hashcat — User Guide: SQLi Testing

## Overview
Hashcat can be used to test for SQL Injection vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install hashcat
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for SQLi Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the sqli scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed SQLi with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible SQLi, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When SQLi is confirmed, recommend: parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage.

## Legal Notice
Only use Hashcat against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# sqlmap — User Guide: SSTI Testing

## Overview
sqlmap can be used to test for Server-Side Template Injection vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install sqlmap
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for SSTI Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the ssti scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed SSTI with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible SSTI, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When SSTI is confirmed, recommend: sandboxed template engines, input validation.

## Legal Notice
Only use sqlmap against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# DEF CON 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Server-Side Request Forgery: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Mary Scott, CISO

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through SSRF attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes XML data without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found SSRF in 34% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. URL allowlists
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Nullcon 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Cross-Site Scripting: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Ivan Walker, Staff Red Team

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through XSS attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes file paths without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found XSS in 67% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. output encoding
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-1948
**Product**: DataPlatform v8.1
**Type**: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
**CVSS**: 7.3
**Status**: FIXED in v6.3.8

## Summary
A XSS vulnerability was discovered in the admin endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to bypass authentication.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2024-09-07
- Acknowledged: 2024-05-10
- Patched: 2026-04-19
- Disclosed: 2020-07-08

## Remediation Applied
Output encoding, content security policy, input validation.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Code Review: PR #3434 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Emily Patel (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: web-app

## Finding 1: Potential Remote Code Execution (RCE)
**File**: `src/controllers/user.go`
**Line**: 100

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the SQL query without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# input sanitization
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow RCE attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Bugcrowd
**Program**: Acme Corp VDP
**Reporter**: Sarah Rodriguez (@sophia55)
**Severity**: Medium
**Bounty**: $11,365

## Title
SQL Injection in /api/v2/search

## Description
The endpoint fails to validate user-supplied input, allowing SQLi.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the error response

## Recommended Fix
Parameterized queries, prepared statements, orm usage.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# XML External Entity: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Maria Chen, John Lopez, Linda Walker
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 27, 2024
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2024.4686990

## Abstract
XML External Entity (XXE) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 25% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 130 recent XXE attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 28 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 75% of XXE attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 50% of novel XXE payloads
- Most effective defense: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining disable external entity processing, use JSON instead provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# CTF Writeup: OverTheWire — Insecure Deserialization Challenge
**Author**: Thomas Scott | **Date**: 2023-12-11 | **Difficulty**: Easy

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a deserialization vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Burp Suite against the target
2. Identified Deserialization vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed Deserialization via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{7206420749a6167918e5ddb481c336ff}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper signed tokens
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Insecure Deserialization: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Ahmed Garcia, David Garcia, Wei Scott
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 17, 2023
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2025.3441293

## Abstract
Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 22% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 53 recent Deserialization attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 29 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 75% of Deserialization attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 83% of novel Deserialization payloads
- Most effective defense: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-5663
**Product**: WebPortal v8.9
**Type**: SQL Injection (SQLi)
**CVSS**: 9.0
**Status**: FIXED in v7.3.2

## Summary
A SQLi vulnerability was discovered in the upload endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to execute arbitrary commands.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2021-12-24
- Acknowledged: 2025-06-13
- Patched: 2021-02-11
- Disclosed: 2024-05-27

## Remediation Applied
Parameterized queries, prepared statements, orm usage.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Remote Code Execution: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: John Hill, Andrew Rodriguez, Jennifer Lopez
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 28, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2023.2914666

## Abstract
Remote Code Execution (RCE) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 35% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 120 recent RCE attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 11 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 51% of RCE attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 79% of novel RCE payloads
- Most effective defense: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# OWASP AppSec 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Insecure Direct Object Reference: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Maria Young, Staff Red Team

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through IDOR attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes user input without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found IDOR in 53% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. authorization checks
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-1183
**Product**: CloudSuite v4.12
**Type**: Remote Code Execution (RCE)
**CVSS**: 7.8
**Status**: FIXED in v4.0.9

## Summary
A RCE vulnerability was discovered in the upload endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to execute arbitrary commands.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2022-02-10
- Acknowledged: 2025-07-19
- Patched: 2021-09-03
- Disclosed: 2025-04-18

## Remediation Applied
Input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Server-Side Template Injection Prevention

## What is Server-Side Template Injection?
Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical SSTI payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: sandboxed template engines, input validation.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-446
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Remote Code Execution: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Elizabeth Walker, Jennifer Lopez, Elizabeth Miller
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 19, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2023.5991227

## Abstract
Remote Code Execution (RCE) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 53% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 160 recent RCE attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 19 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 40% of RCE attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 63% of novel RCE payloads
- Most effective defense: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# John the Ripper — User Guide: XXE Testing

## Overview
John the Ripper can be used to test for XML External Entity vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install john-the-ripper
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for XXE Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the xxe scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed XXE with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible XXE, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When XXE is confirmed, recommend: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead.

## Legal Notice
Only use John the Ripper against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Code Review: PR #7155 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Ahmed Walker (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: web-app

## Finding 1: Potential SQL Injection (SQLi)
**File**: `src/handlers/search.go`
**Line**: 369

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the XML parser without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# parameterized queries
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow SQLi attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Cross-Site Request Forgery: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Carlos Lopez, Sophia Brown, Ahmed Hill
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 24, 2024
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2025.5233584

## Abstract
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 32% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 188 recent CSRF attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 25 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 49% of CSRF attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 54% of novel CSRF payloads
- Most effective defense: anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-5890
**Product**: CloudSuite v7.6
**Type**: XML External Entity (XXE)
**CVSS**: 6.1
**Status**: FIXED in v8.1.2

## Summary
A XXE vulnerability was discovered in the profile endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to bypass authentication.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2024-06-07
- Acknowledged: 2022-05-01
- Patched: 2023-01-04
- Disclosed: 2025-09-06

## Remediation Applied
Disable external entity processing, use json instead.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# SQL Injection: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Sarah Scott, David Ali, Priya Hill
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 18, 2024
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2023.6175600

## Abstract
SQL Injection (SQLi) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 32% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 162 recent SQLi attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 20 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 55% of SQLi attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 61% of novel SQLi payloads
- Most effective defense: parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# CTF Writeup: TryHackMe — Insecure Direct Object Reference Challenge
**Author**: Robert Kim | **Date**: 2023-05-07 | **Difficulty**: Medium

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a idor vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran sqlmap against the target
2. Identified IDOR vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed IDOR via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{54c022d59a1513752fac96387aee0201}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper authorization checks
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-5509
**Product**: WebPortal v2.10
**Type**: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
**CVSS**: 9.3
**Status**: FIXED in v4.4.2

## Summary
A CSRF vulnerability was discovered in the admin endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to execute arbitrary commands.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2026-09-01
- Acknowledged: 2022-08-17
- Patched: 2024-11-12
- Disclosed: 2023-10-03

## Remediation Applied
Anti-csrf tokens, samesite cookies, origin checking.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Code Review: PR #7831 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Robert Rodriguez (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: web-app

## Finding 1: Potential Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)
**File**: `src/routes/search.js`
**Line**: 196

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the XML parser without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# sandboxed template engines
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow SSTI attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Bug Bounty Report — HackerOne
**Program**: CloudFirst VDP
**Reporter**: Emily Garcia (@olga73)
**Severity**: Medium
**Bounty**: $6,794

## Title
Insecure Direct Object Reference in /user/profile

## Description
The endpoint fails to sanitize user-supplied input, allowing IDOR.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the reflected output

## Recommended Fix
Authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# CTF Writeup: DVWA — SQL Injection Challenge
**Author**: William Davis | **Date**: 2026-08-17 | **Difficulty**: Medium

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a sqli vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Nmap against the target
2. Identified SQLi vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed SQLi via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{d919e12a6726415e9d6d442038a24f6b}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper parameterized queries
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Metasploit — User Guide: CSRF Testing

## Overview
Metasploit can be used to test for Cross-Site Request Forgery vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install metasploit
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for CSRF Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the csrf scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed CSRF with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible CSRF, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When CSRF is confirmed, recommend: anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking.

## Legal Notice
Only use Metasploit against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Nikto — User Guide: LFI Testing

## Overview
Nikto can be used to test for Local File Inclusion vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install nikto
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for LFI Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the lfi scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed LFI with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible LFI, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When LFI is confirmed, recommend: path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

## Legal Notice
Only use Nikto against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-5844
**Product**: APIGateway v5.4
**Type**: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
**CVSS**: 7.2
**Status**: FIXED in v3.4.2

## Summary
A XSS vulnerability was discovered in the admin endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to read unauthorized data.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2022-05-03
- Acknowledged: 2022-06-08
- Patched: 2025-05-13
- Disclosed: 2020-09-14

## Remediation Applied
Output encoding, content security policy, input validation.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# CTF Writeup: WebGoat — Insecure Direct Object Reference Challenge
**Author**: Raj Davis | **Date**: 2024-09-16 | **Difficulty**: Easy

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a idor vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Nmap against the target
2. Identified IDOR vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed IDOR via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{8bb1a1e9c20bc8320575c0486ff7aad8}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper authorization checks
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-1479
**Product**: APIGateway v4.0
**Type**: XML External Entity (XXE)
**CVSS**: 8.4
**Status**: FIXED in v7.8.2

## Summary
A XXE vulnerability was discovered in the upload endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to bypass authentication.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2024-03-17
- Acknowledged: 2026-07-26
- Patched: 2021-01-11
- Disclosed: 2023-02-01

## Remediation Applied
Disable external entity processing, use json instead.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Server-Side Request Forgery: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Wei Garcia, Ahmed Walker, Olga Rodriguez
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 10, 2024
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2023.6308240

## Abstract
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 33% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 92 recent SSRF attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 12 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 43% of SSRF attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 75% of novel SSRF payloads
- Most effective defense: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Cross-Site Request Forgery Prevention

## What is Cross-Site Request Forgery?
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical CSRF payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-232
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Burp Suite — User Guide: XXE Testing

## Overview
Burp Suite can be used to test for XML External Entity vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install burp-suite
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for XXE Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the xxe scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed XXE with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible XXE, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When XXE is confirmed, recommend: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead.

## Legal Notice
Only use Burp Suite against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Nikto — User Guide: RCE Testing

## Overview
Nikto can be used to test for Remote Code Execution vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install nikto
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for RCE Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the rce scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed RCE with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible RCE, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When RCE is confirmed, recommend: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

## Legal Notice
Only use Nikto against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Code Review: PR #6570 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Olga Smith (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
**File**: `src/handlers/admin.go`
**Line**: 455

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the SQL query without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# output encoding
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow XSS attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Code Review: PR #1904 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Robert Hall (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: web-app

## Finding 1: Potential Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)
**File**: `src/routes/search.py`
**Line**: 179

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the system command without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# authorization checks
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow IDOR attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# SQL Injection: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Sophia Garcia, Robert Lopez, Maria Brown
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 15, 2024
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2024.9097679

## Abstract
SQL Injection (SQLi) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 36% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 88 recent SQLi attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 24 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 60% of SQLi attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 75% of novel SQLi payloads
- Most effective defense: parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Burp Suite — User Guide: RCE Testing

## Overview
Burp Suite can be used to test for Remote Code Execution vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install burp-suite
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for RCE Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the rce scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed RCE with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible RCE, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When RCE is confirmed, recommend: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

## Legal Notice
Only use Burp Suite against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Hydra — User Guide: CSRF Testing

## Overview
Hydra can be used to test for Cross-Site Request Forgery vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install hydra
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for CSRF Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the csrf scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed CSRF with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible CSRF, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When CSRF is confirmed, recommend: anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking.

## Legal Notice
Only use Hydra against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Burp Suite — User Guide: SSRF Testing

## Overview
Burp Suite can be used to test for Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install burp-suite
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for SSRF Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the ssrf scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed SSRF with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible SSRF, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When SSRF is confirmed, recommend: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

## Legal Notice
Only use Burp Suite against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Code Review: PR #1822 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Emily Kim (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: backend-api

## Finding 1: Potential Remote Code Execution (RCE)
**File**: `src/handlers/user.py`
**Line**: 293

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the system command without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# input sanitization
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow RCE attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: XML External Entity Prevention

## What is XML External Entity?
XML External Entity (XXE) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical XXE payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-844
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Synack
**Program**: TechGiant VDP
**Reporter**: Priya Smith (@olga8)
**Severity**: Critical
**Bounty**: $2,576

## Title
Insecure Deserialization in /admin/export

## Description
The endpoint fails to validate user-supplied input, allowing Deserialization.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the error response

## Recommended Fix
Signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Remote Code Execution Prevention

## What is Remote Code Execution?
Remote Code Execution (RCE) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical RCE payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-255
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: XML External Entity Prevention

## What is XML External Entity?
XML External Entity (XXE) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical XXE payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-143
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Synack
**Program**: TechGiant VDP
**Reporter**: Patricia Hill (@ahmed39)
**Severity**: Medium
**Bounty**: $940

## Title
Server-Side Template Injection in /webhook/callback

## Description
The endpoint fails to validate user-supplied input, allowing SSTI.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the reflected output

## Recommended Fix
Sandboxed template engines, input validation.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-9167
**Product**: WebPortal v3.7
**Type**: SQL Injection (SQLi)
**CVSS**: 6.2
**Status**: FIXED in v4.8.2

## Summary
A SQLi vulnerability was discovered in the search endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to bypass authentication.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2020-05-23
- Acknowledged: 2025-12-18
- Patched: 2023-07-06
- Disclosed: 2023-02-19

## Remediation Applied
Parameterized queries, prepared statements, orm usage.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Black Hat 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Server-Side Request Forgery: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: David Walker, CISO

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through SSRF attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes file paths without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found SSRF in 56% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. URL allowlists
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Cross-Site Request Forgery: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Michael Singh, Priya Singh, David Rodriguez
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 26, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2024.3589882

## Abstract
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 27% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 176 recent CSRF attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 19 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 56% of CSRF attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 54% of novel CSRF payloads
- Most effective defense: anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Local File Inclusion: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Ahmed Davis, Mary Smith, Wei Scott
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 11, 2023
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2023.7086339

## Abstract
Local File Inclusion (LFI) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 43% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 105 recent LFI attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 15 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 77% of LFI attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 59% of novel LFI payloads
- Most effective defense: path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Cross-Site Request Forgery Prevention

## What is Cross-Site Request Forgery?
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical CSRF payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-321
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: SQL Injection Prevention

## What is SQL Injection?
SQL Injection (SQLi) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical SQLi payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-585
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Nullcon 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Local File Inclusion: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: John Garcia, Staff Red Team

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through LFI attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes file paths without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found LFI in 60% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. path canonicalization
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# BSides 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Insecure Deserialization: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Elizabeth Smith, Staff Red Team

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through Deserialization attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes URL parameters without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found Deserialization in 68% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. signed tokens
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Code Review: PR #4246 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Linda Young (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential Local File Inclusion (LFI)
**File**: `src/controllers/admin.js`
**Line**: 311

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the XML parser without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# path canonicalization
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow LFI attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# OWASP ZAP — User Guide: SSRF Testing

## Overview
OWASP ZAP can be used to test for Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install owasp-zap
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for SSRF Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the ssrf scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed SSRF with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible SSRF, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When SSRF is confirmed, recommend: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

## Legal Notice
Only use OWASP ZAP against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# CTF Writeup: HackTheBox — Cross-Site Scripting Challenge
**Author**: Priya Nguyen | **Date**: 2024-11-10 | **Difficulty**: Medium

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a xss vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Nmap against the target
2. Identified XSS vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed XSS via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{c696303360de367c42a105eddbb75b8e}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper output encoding
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Gobuster — User Guide: LFI Testing

## Overview
Gobuster can be used to test for Local File Inclusion vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install gobuster
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for LFI Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the lfi scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed LFI with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible LFI, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When LFI is confirmed, recommend: path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

## Legal Notice
Only use Gobuster against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Hashcat — User Guide: XXE Testing

## Overview
Hashcat can be used to test for XML External Entity vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install hashcat
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for XXE Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the xxe scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed XXE with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible XXE, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When XXE is confirmed, recommend: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead.

## Legal Notice
Only use Hashcat against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Code Review: PR #7773 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Maria Wright (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: web-app

## Finding 1: Potential Local File Inclusion (LFI)
**File**: `src/handlers/admin.py`
**Line**: 435

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the SQL query without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# path canonicalization
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow LFI attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Synack
**Program**: TechGiant VDP
**Reporter**: Robert Kim (@emily9)
**Severity**: High
**Bounty**: $15,109

## Title
Remote Code Execution in /api/v2/search

## Description
The endpoint fails to validate user-supplied input, allowing RCE.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the unauthorized data

## Recommended Fix
Input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Code Review: PR #9014 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: John Patel (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: backend-api

## Finding 1: Potential Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)
**File**: `src/handlers/user.py`
**Line**: 191

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the XML parser without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# sandboxed template engines
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow SSTI attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# sqlmap — User Guide: SSRF Testing

## Overview
sqlmap can be used to test for Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install sqlmap
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for SSRF Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the ssrf scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed SSRF with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible SSRF, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When SSRF is confirmed, recommend: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

## Legal Notice
Only use sqlmap against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# OWASP ZAP — User Guide: CSRF Testing

## Overview
OWASP ZAP can be used to test for Cross-Site Request Forgery vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install owasp-zap
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for CSRF Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the csrf scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed CSRF with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible CSRF, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When CSRF is confirmed, recommend: anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking.

## Legal Notice
Only use OWASP ZAP against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Synack
**Program**: Acme Corp VDP
**Reporter**: Thomas Garcia (@james24)
**Severity**: High
**Bounty**: $2,965

## Title
Local File Inclusion in /webhook/callback

## Description
The endpoint fails to validate user-supplied input, allowing LFI.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the unauthorized data

## Recommended Fix
Path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# BSides 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Server-Side Request Forgery: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Andrew Wright, Principal Security Researcher

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through SSRF attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes XML data without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found SSRF in 52% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. URL allowlists
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Server-Side Request Forgery Prevention

## What is Server-Side Request Forgery?
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical SSRF payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-574
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Code Review: PR #5335 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: John Young (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization)
**File**: `src/handlers/user.js`
**Line**: 347

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the template renderer without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# signed tokens
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow Deserialization attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Server-Side Template Injection Prevention

## What is Server-Side Template Injection?
Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical SSTI payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: sandboxed template engines, input validation.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-675
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Remote Code Execution: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Raj Williams, David Wright, Carlos Miller
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 27, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2025.2586689

## Abstract
Remote Code Execution (RCE) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 56% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 86 recent RCE attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 26 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 54% of RCE attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 82% of novel RCE payloads
- Most effective defense: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# CTF Writeup: WebGoat — Server-Side Request Forgery Challenge
**Author**: James Kim | **Date**: 2023-12-01 | **Difficulty**: Hard

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a ssrf vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Hashcat against the target
2. Identified SSRF vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed SSRF via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{0faa145a099ea39f522593be9df3d8d0}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper URL allowlists
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Bug Bounty Report — HackerOne
**Program**: Acme Corp VDP
**Reporter**: Carlos Davis (@robert61)
**Severity**: Medium
**Bounty**: $3,823

## Title
Cross-Site Request Forgery in /api/v2/search

## Description
The endpoint fails to escape user-supplied input, allowing CSRF.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the unauthorized data

## Recommended Fix
Anti-csrf tokens, samesite cookies, origin checking.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-9522
**Product**: APIGateway v4.4
**Type**: Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization)
**CVSS**: 7.1
**Status**: FIXED in v5.4.6

## Summary
A Deserialization vulnerability was discovered in the upload endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to bypass authentication.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2021-12-27
- Acknowledged: 2021-06-26
- Patched: 2025-07-20
- Disclosed: 2024-06-27

## Remediation Applied
Signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Code Review: PR #1490 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: David Young (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: backend-api

## Finding 1: Potential Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
**File**: `src/controllers/admin.go`
**Line**: 350

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the SQL query without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# anti-CSRF tokens
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow CSRF attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-1995
**Product**: WebPortal v7.10
**Type**: Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization)
**CVSS**: 7.3
**Status**: FIXED in v5.14.10

## Summary
A Deserialization vulnerability was discovered in the admin endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to escalate privileges.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2023-05-24
- Acknowledged: 2024-05-26
- Patched: 2023-11-06
- Disclosed: 2021-10-09

## Remediation Applied
Signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-7628
**Product**: APIGateway v4.1
**Type**: SQL Injection (SQLi)
**CVSS**: 5.1
**Status**: FIXED in v2.5.10

## Summary
A SQLi vulnerability was discovered in the search endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to read unauthorized data.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2020-09-19
- Acknowledged: 2020-12-05
- Patched: 2025-02-01
- Disclosed: 2025-03-11

## Remediation Applied
Parameterized queries, prepared statements, orm usage.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*