# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-1680
**Product**: WebPortal v7.10
**Type**: Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization)
**CVSS**: 6.3
**Status**: FIXED in v4.2.6

## Summary
A Deserialization vulnerability was discovered in the admin endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to read unauthorized data.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2021-07-20
- Acknowledged: 2022-10-24
- Patched: 2021-10-28
- Disclosed: 2021-07-16

## Remediation Applied
Signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Cross-Site Scripting Prevention

## What is Cross-Site Scripting?
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical XSS payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-721
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: SQL Injection Prevention

## What is SQL Injection?
SQL Injection (SQLi) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical SQLi payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-485
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing SQL Injection (SQLi). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Black Hat 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Remote Code Execution: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Sophia Johnson, Principal Security Researcher

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through RCE attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes user input without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found RCE in 61% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. input sanitization
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Remote Code Execution (RCE). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-6823
**Product**: APIGateway v3.7
**Type**: Remote Code Execution (RCE)
**CVSS**: 7.3
**Status**: FIXED in v5.4.4

## Summary
A RCE vulnerability was discovered in the upload endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to read unauthorized data.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2020-09-11
- Acknowledged: 2026-10-20
- Patched: 2021-04-01
- Disclosed: 2022-09-11

## Remediation Applied
Input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Code Review: PR #6282 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Jennifer Young (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization)
**File**: `src/handlers/search.go`
**Line**: 120

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the XML parser without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# signed tokens
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow Deserialization attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Bug Bounty Report — Bugcrowd
**Program**: Acme Corp VDP
**Reporter**: Jennifer Hall (@sarah48)
**Severity**: Critical
**Bounty**: $10,694

## Title
Insecure Deserialization in /api/v2/search

## Description
The endpoint fails to validate user-supplied input, allowing Deserialization.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the reflected output

## Recommended Fix
Signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Cross-Site Scripting: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Robert Lee, Carlos Wright, Carlos Jones
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 24, 2024
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2025.1476592

## Abstract
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 58% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 136 recent XSS attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 22 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 62% of XSS attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 76% of novel XSS payloads
- Most effective defense: output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Cross-Site Scripting: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Andrew Hill, Wei Patel, Fatima Kim
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 24, 2024
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2024.6150183

## Abstract
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 32% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 136 recent XSS attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 19 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 77% of XSS attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 85% of novel XSS payloads
- Most effective defense: output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# CTF Writeup: OverTheWire — SQL Injection Challenge
**Author**: William Lopez | **Date**: 2021-10-02 | **Difficulty**: Easy

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a sqli vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran OWASP ZAP against the target
2. Identified SQLi vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed SQLi via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{1dd0e5600188849e208c1fd4c0e999ad}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper parameterized queries
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Server-Side Request Forgery: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Patricia Kim, Wei Scott, Wei Brown
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 13, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2025.5841960

## Abstract
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 25% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 107 recent SSRF attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 26 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 43% of SSRF attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 58% of novel SSRF payloads
- Most effective defense: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# DEF CON 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Local File Inclusion: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Ivan Kim, CISO

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through LFI attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes URL parameters without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found LFI in 51% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. path canonicalization
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Local File Inclusion (LFI). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Cross-Site Scripting Prevention

## What is Cross-Site Scripting?
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical XSS payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-265
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Code Review: PR #5853 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Thomas Walker (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: web-app

## Finding 1: Potential Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization)
**File**: `src/handlers/user.go`
**Line**: 466

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the XML parser without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# signed tokens
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow Deserialization attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Synack
**Program**: TechGiant VDP
**Reporter**: John Martinez (@emily23)
**Severity**: High
**Bounty**: $5,053

## Title
Local File Inclusion in /user/profile

## Description
The endpoint fails to validate user-supplied input, allowing LFI.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the unauthorized data

## Recommended Fix
Path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# ShmooCon 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Insecure Direct Object Reference: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: James Walker, Principal Security Researcher

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through IDOR attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes user input without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found IDOR in 50% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. authorization checks
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Bug Bounty Report — Synack
**Program**: TechGiant VDP
**Reporter**: Fatima Lee (@andrew46)
**Severity**: Critical
**Bounty**: $4,766

## Title
Cross-Site Request Forgery in /webhook/callback

## Description
The endpoint fails to escape user-supplied input, allowing CSRF.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the error response

## Recommended Fix
Anti-csrf tokens, samesite cookies, origin checking.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-8803
**Product**: CloudSuite v6.9
**Type**: Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)
**CVSS**: 5.9
**Status**: FIXED in v2.0.9

## Summary
A SSTI vulnerability was discovered in the profile endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to read unauthorized data.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2024-10-09
- Acknowledged: 2022-02-21
- Patched: 2020-02-06
- Disclosed: 2026-07-19

## Remediation Applied
Sandboxed template engines, input validation.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Bug Bounty Report — HackerOne
**Program**: CloudFirst VDP
**Reporter**: Yuki Young (@thomas73)
**Severity**: Medium
**Bounty**: $17,551

## Title
Local File Inclusion in /api/v2/search

## Description
The endpoint fails to validate user-supplied input, allowing LFI.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the reflected output

## Recommended Fix
Path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Code Review: PR #8058 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Yuki Rodriguez (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: backend-api

## Finding 1: Potential Local File Inclusion (LFI)
**File**: `src/routes/search.py`
**Line**: 263

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the template renderer without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# path canonicalization
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow LFI attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-5460
**Product**: WebPortal v7.0
**Type**: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
**CVSS**: 5.9
**Status**: FIXED in v7.7.1

## Summary
A CSRF vulnerability was discovered in the search endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to bypass authentication.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2021-04-03
- Acknowledged: 2026-01-03
- Patched: 2025-03-26
- Disclosed: 2024-06-25

## Remediation Applied
Anti-csrf tokens, samesite cookies, origin checking.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# CTF Writeup: VulnHub — Server-Side Template Injection Challenge
**Author**: Robert Williams | **Date**: 2025-12-11 | **Difficulty**: Easy

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a ssti vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Gobuster against the target
2. Identified SSTI vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed SSTI via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{09c33067e7d37806557e6425eb0c66a4}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: sandboxed template engines, input validation.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper sandboxed template engines
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: XML External Entity Prevention

## What is XML External Entity?
XML External Entity (XXE) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical XXE payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-92
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing XML External Entity (XXE). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Bug Bounty Report — HackerOne
**Program**: Acme Corp VDP
**Reporter**: David Miller (@sarah18)
**Severity**: Medium
**Bounty**: $8,433

## Title
Remote Code Execution in /api/v2/search

## Description
The endpoint fails to validate user-supplied input, allowing RCE.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the error response

## Recommended Fix
Input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Remote Code Execution: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Olga Hall, Maria Johnson, Emily Ali
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 20, 2023
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2024.2828657

## Abstract
Remote Code Execution (RCE) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 49% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 64 recent RCE attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 23 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 63% of RCE attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 72% of novel RCE payloads
- Most effective defense: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Burp Suite — User Guide: LFI Testing

## Overview
Burp Suite can be used to test for Local File Inclusion vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install burp-suite
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for LFI Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the lfi scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed LFI with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible LFI, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When LFI is confirmed, recommend: path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

## Legal Notice
Only use Burp Suite against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-7927
**Product**: WebPortal v2.4
**Type**: Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)
**CVSS**: 6.8
**Status**: FIXED in v6.8.3

## Summary
A SSTI vulnerability was discovered in the profile endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to escalate privileges.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2022-02-20
- Acknowledged: 2023-01-06
- Patched: 2023-06-05
- Disclosed: 2022-12-23

## Remediation Applied
Sandboxed template engines, input validation.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Code Review: PR #752 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: John Walker (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization)
**File**: `src/controllers/search.py`
**Line**: 417

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the system command without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# signed tokens
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow Deserialization attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# CTF Writeup: TryHackMe — Remote Code Execution Challenge
**Author**: Ivan Kim | **Date**: 2021-02-23 | **Difficulty**: Easy

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a rce vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran sqlmap against the target
2. Identified RCE vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed RCE via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{5e8fe32017ca792386ac195060f87afd}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper input sanitization
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-5701
**Product**: WebPortal v3.10
**Type**: Local File Inclusion (LFI)
**CVSS**: 5.5
**Status**: FIXED in v5.5.6

## Summary
A LFI vulnerability was discovered in the search endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to execute arbitrary commands.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2024-10-21
- Acknowledged: 2024-04-28
- Patched: 2021-05-20
- Disclosed: 2023-06-22

## Remediation Applied
Path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Bug Bounty Report — HackerOne
**Program**: Acme Corp VDP
**Reporter**: Robert Jones (@ivan54)
**Severity**: Medium
**Bounty**: $20,251

## Title
Insecure Direct Object Reference in /admin/export

## Description
The endpoint fails to validate user-supplied input, allowing IDOR.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the error response

## Recommended Fix
Authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Cross-Site Request Forgery Prevention

## What is Cross-Site Request Forgery?
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical CSRF payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-104
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Nikto — User Guide: XXE Testing

## Overview
Nikto can be used to test for XML External Entity vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install nikto
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for XXE Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the xxe scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed XXE with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible XXE, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When XXE is confirmed, recommend: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead.

## Legal Notice
Only use Nikto against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# CTF Writeup: OverTheWire — Remote Code Execution Challenge
**Author**: Michael Rodriguez | **Date**: 2025-03-20 | **Difficulty**: Insane

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a rce vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Nmap against the target
2. Identified RCE vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed RCE via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{2f0875a9fe49c1f332c5ba46bca9ba16}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper input sanitization
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Code Review: PR #5042 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: James Davis (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: backend-api

## Finding 1: Potential XML External Entity (XXE)
**File**: `src/controllers/search.go`
**Line**: 368

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the SQL query without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# disable external entity processing
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow XXE attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Synack
**Program**: CloudFirst VDP
**Reporter**: Elizabeth Davis (@maria76)
**Severity**: Critical
**Bounty**: $22,796

## Title
Remote Code Execution in /user/profile

## Description
The endpoint fails to validate user-supplied input, allowing RCE.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the error response

## Recommended Fix
Input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# CTF Writeup: OverTheWire — Remote Code Execution Challenge
**Author**: James Jones | **Date**: 2021-08-20 | **Difficulty**: Easy

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a rce vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Burp Suite against the target
2. Identified RCE vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed RCE via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{3ac124878137fd43c39744bb584bccf5}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper input sanitization
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# RSA Conference 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Insecure Deserialization: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Patricia Lopez, Staff Red Team

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through Deserialization attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes XML data without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found Deserialization in 47% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. signed tokens
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Burp Suite — User Guide: SSTI Testing

## Overview
Burp Suite can be used to test for Server-Side Template Injection vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install burp-suite
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for SSTI Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the ssti scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed SSTI with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible SSTI, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When SSTI is confirmed, recommend: sandboxed template engines, input validation.

## Legal Notice
Only use Burp Suite against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Nikto — User Guide: LFI Testing

## Overview
Nikto can be used to test for Local File Inclusion vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install nikto
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for LFI Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the lfi scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed LFI with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible LFI, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When LFI is confirmed, recommend: path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

## Legal Notice
Only use Nikto against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# XML External Entity: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Jennifer Davis, Priya Martinez, Thomas Scott
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 17, 2024
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2025.7743189

## Abstract
XML External Entity (XXE) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 27% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 151 recent XXE attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 18 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 68% of XXE attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 62% of novel XXE payloads
- Most effective defense: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining disable external entity processing, use JSON instead provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Burp Suite — User Guide: RCE Testing

## Overview
Burp Suite can be used to test for Remote Code Execution vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install burp-suite
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for RCE Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the rce scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed RCE with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible RCE, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When RCE is confirmed, recommend: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

## Legal Notice
Only use Burp Suite against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# CTF Writeup: HackTheBox — Local File Inclusion Challenge
**Author**: Thomas Williams | **Date**: 2020-10-23 | **Difficulty**: Hard

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a lfi vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran sqlmap against the target
2. Identified LFI vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed LFI via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{34251fb4fa6412019309b2c765aed449}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper path canonicalization
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Server-Side Request Forgery: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: David Kim, Priya Hill, Thomas Davis
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 21, 2023
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2025.4191640

## Abstract
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 35% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 196 recent SSRF attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 21 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 59% of SSRF attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 59% of novel SSRF payloads
- Most effective defense: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# CTF Writeup: DVWA — Remote Code Execution Challenge
**Author**: Elizabeth Patel | **Date**: 2024-06-08 | **Difficulty**: Easy

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a rce vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran John the Ripper against the target
2. Identified RCE vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed RCE via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{4929e40faefe6b14793f696cd68271e3}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper input sanitization
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Synack
**Program**: Acme Corp VDP
**Reporter**: Mary Lee (@emily6)
**Severity**: High
**Bounty**: $4,758

## Title
SQL Injection in /api/v2/search

## Description
The endpoint fails to escape user-supplied input, allowing SQLi.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the reflected output

## Recommended Fix
Parameterized queries, prepared statements, orm usage.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Code Review: PR #6952 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Patricia Wright (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: backend-api

## Finding 1: Potential Remote Code Execution (RCE)
**File**: `src/routes/search.py`
**Line**: 363

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the SQL query without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# input sanitization
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow RCE attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Server-Side Request Forgery Prevention

## What is Server-Side Request Forgery?
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical SSRF payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-623
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Synack
**Program**: Acme Corp VDP
**Reporter**: Jennifer Scott (@linda36)
**Severity**: High
**Bounty**: $17,890

## Title
Insecure Deserialization in /webhook/callback

## Description
The endpoint fails to validate user-supplied input, allowing Deserialization.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the error response

## Recommended Fix
Signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# OWASP AppSec 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Local File Inclusion: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Ahmed Brown, Staff Red Team

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through LFI attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes URL parameters without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found LFI in 35% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. path canonicalization
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Code Review: PR #6449 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Ahmed Wright (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization)
**File**: `src/handlers/admin.go`
**Line**: 388

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the SQL query without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# signed tokens
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow Deserialization attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Server-Side Request Forgery Prevention

## What is Server-Side Request Forgery?
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical SSRF payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-130
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Hashcat — User Guide: SSTI Testing

## Overview
Hashcat can be used to test for Server-Side Template Injection vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install hashcat
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for SSTI Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the ssti scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed SSTI with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible SSTI, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When SSTI is confirmed, recommend: sandboxed template engines, input validation.

## Legal Notice
Only use Hashcat against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Server-Side Request Forgery: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Priya Smith, Robert Garcia, Sarah Brown
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 11, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2025.7950637

## Abstract
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 40% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 103 recent SSRF attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 18 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 75% of SSRF attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 52% of novel SSRF payloads
- Most effective defense: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Nmap — User Guide: SSRF Testing

## Overview
Nmap can be used to test for Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install nmap
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for SSRF Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the ssrf scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed SSRF with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible SSRF, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When SSRF is confirmed, recommend: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

## Legal Notice
Only use Nmap against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Bug Bounty Report — HackerOne
**Program**: Acme Corp VDP
**Reporter**: James Garcia (@david55)
**Severity**: High
**Bounty**: $19,321

## Title
Cross-Site Scripting in /webhook/callback

## Description
The endpoint fails to escape user-supplied input, allowing XSS.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the unauthorized data

## Recommended Fix
Output encoding, content security policy, input validation.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# sqlmap — User Guide: XXE Testing

## Overview
sqlmap can be used to test for XML External Entity vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install sqlmap
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for XXE Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the xxe scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed XXE with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible XXE, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When XXE is confirmed, recommend: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead.

## Legal Notice
Only use sqlmap against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Bugcrowd
**Program**: Acme Corp VDP
**Reporter**: Yuki Chen (@ahmed28)
**Severity**: Medium
**Bounty**: $7,271

## Title
Server-Side Request Forgery in /admin/export

## Description
The endpoint fails to validate user-supplied input, allowing SSRF.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the unauthorized data

## Recommended Fix
Url allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Remote Code Execution Prevention

## What is Remote Code Execution?
Remote Code Execution (RCE) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical RCE payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-875
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Nullcon 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Cross-Site Request Forgery: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: William Johnson, Principal Security Researcher

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through CSRF attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes file paths without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found CSRF in 60% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. anti-CSRF tokens
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: XML External Entity Prevention

## What is XML External Entity?
XML External Entity (XXE) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical XXE payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-433
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Code Review: PR #4437 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Jennifer Young (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential XML External Entity (XXE)
**File**: `src/handlers/search.py`
**Line**: 328

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the XML parser without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# disable external entity processing
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow XXE attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Synack
**Program**: Acme Corp VDP
**Reporter**: Ivan Scott (@sarah71)
**Severity**: Critical
**Bounty**: $21,280

## Title
Insecure Deserialization in /api/v2/search

## Description
The endpoint fails to validate user-supplied input, allowing Deserialization.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the error response

## Recommended Fix
Signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Black Hat 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Insecure Deserialization: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Olga Miller, Staff Red Team

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through Deserialization attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes user input without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found Deserialization in 40% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. signed tokens
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-3184
**Product**: WebPortal v8.10
**Type**: Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)
**CVSS**: 5.1
**Status**: FIXED in v7.14.2

## Summary
A IDOR vulnerability was discovered in the upload endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to escalate privileges.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2026-08-26
- Acknowledged: 2024-07-11
- Patched: 2020-07-15
- Disclosed: 2023-06-07

## Remediation Applied
Authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Code Review: PR #8781 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Maria Wright (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
**File**: `src/controllers/user.js`
**Line**: 239

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the template renderer without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# output encoding
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow XSS attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Burp Suite — User Guide: IDOR Testing

## Overview
Burp Suite can be used to test for Insecure Direct Object Reference vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install burp-suite
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for IDOR Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the idor scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed IDOR with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible IDOR, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When IDOR is confirmed, recommend: authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

## Legal Notice
Only use Burp Suite against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-1514
**Product**: APIGateway v6.7
**Type**: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
**CVSS**: 6.1
**Status**: FIXED in v8.13.6

## Summary
A XSS vulnerability was discovered in the search endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to bypass authentication.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2020-01-12
- Acknowledged: 2022-09-08
- Patched: 2021-08-24
- Disclosed: 2020-01-09

## Remediation Applied
Output encoding, content security policy, input validation.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# SQL Injection: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: David Patel, Patricia Ali, Jennifer Brown
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 14, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2025.9674168

## Abstract
SQL Injection (SQLi) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 38% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 179 recent SQLi attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 13 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 43% of SQLi attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 84% of novel SQLi payloads
- Most effective defense: parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Server-Side Request Forgery: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Ahmed Rodriguez, Patricia Miller, Olga Garcia
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 11, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2023.9218095

## Abstract
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 25% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 195 recent SSRF attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 29 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 65% of SSRF attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 75% of novel SSRF payloads
- Most effective defense: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Code Review: PR #599 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Maria Hill (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization)
**File**: `src/handlers/search.go`
**Line**: 248

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the template renderer without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# signed tokens
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow Deserialization attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Nikto — User Guide: SQLi Testing

## Overview
Nikto can be used to test for SQL Injection vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install nikto
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for SQLi Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the sqli scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed SQLi with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible SQLi, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When SQLi is confirmed, recommend: parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage.

## Legal Notice
Only use Nikto against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Gobuster — User Guide: IDOR Testing

## Overview
Gobuster can be used to test for Insecure Direct Object Reference vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install gobuster
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for IDOR Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the idor scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed IDOR with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible IDOR, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When IDOR is confirmed, recommend: authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

## Legal Notice
Only use Gobuster against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Local File Inclusion Prevention

## What is Local File Inclusion?
Local File Inclusion (LFI) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical LFI payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-51
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Code Review: PR #7977 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Patricia Kim (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: web-app

## Finding 1: Potential Remote Code Execution (RCE)
**File**: `src/handlers/user.py`
**Line**: 377

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the template renderer without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# input sanitization
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow RCE attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Bugcrowd
**Program**: TechGiant VDP
**Reporter**: Jennifer Rodriguez (@jennifer60)
**Severity**: Medium
**Bounty**: $4,709

## Title
Cross-Site Request Forgery in /webhook/callback

## Description
The endpoint fails to escape user-supplied input, allowing CSRF.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the reflected output

## Recommended Fix
Anti-csrf tokens, samesite cookies, origin checking.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Cross-Site Scripting: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Michael Hill, Thomas Hall, Carlos Martinez
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 13, 2024
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2023.8861768

## Abstract
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 49% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 80 recent XSS attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 16 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 57% of XSS attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 50% of novel XSS payloads
- Most effective defense: output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Code Review: PR #5254 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: John Walker (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential XML External Entity (XXE)
**File**: `src/handlers/search.go`
**Line**: 361

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the SQL query without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# disable external entity processing
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow XXE attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-9005
**Product**: APIGateway v3.12
**Type**: SQL Injection (SQLi)
**CVSS**: 7.0
**Status**: FIXED in v7.5.4

## Summary
A SQLi vulnerability was discovered in the admin endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to read unauthorized data.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2020-04-22
- Acknowledged: 2023-01-19
- Patched: 2022-07-26
- Disclosed: 2022-10-10

## Remediation Applied
Parameterized queries, prepared statements, orm usage.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Bugcrowd
**Program**: Acme Corp VDP
**Reporter**: Fatima Miller (@james13)
**Severity**: Medium
**Bounty**: $12,701

## Title
Cross-Site Scripting in /admin/export

## Description
The endpoint fails to escape user-supplied input, allowing XSS.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the reflected output

## Recommended Fix
Output encoding, content security policy, input validation.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Bug Bounty Report — HackerOne
**Program**: TechGiant VDP
**Reporter**: Maria Singh (@john20)
**Severity**: Critical
**Bounty**: $4,557

## Title
Local File Inclusion in /webhook/callback

## Description
The endpoint fails to sanitize user-supplied input, allowing LFI.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the unauthorized data

## Recommended Fix
Path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Local File Inclusion Prevention

## What is Local File Inclusion?
Local File Inclusion (LFI) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical LFI payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-425
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Metasploit — User Guide: XXE Testing

## Overview
Metasploit can be used to test for XML External Entity vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install metasploit
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for XXE Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the xxe scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed XXE with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible XXE, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When XXE is confirmed, recommend: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead.

## Legal Notice
Only use Metasploit against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Bug Bounty Report — HackerOne
**Program**: Acme Corp VDP
**Reporter**: Sarah Jones (@ahmed49)
**Severity**: Critical
**Bounty**: $5,858

## Title
Insecure Deserialization in /api/v2/search

## Description
The endpoint fails to sanitize user-supplied input, allowing Deserialization.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the reflected output

## Recommended Fix
Signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Gobuster — User Guide: XXE Testing

## Overview
Gobuster can be used to test for XML External Entity vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install gobuster
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for XXE Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the xxe scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed XXE with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible XXE, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When XXE is confirmed, recommend: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead.

## Legal Notice
Only use Gobuster against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Synack
**Program**: Acme Corp VDP
**Reporter**: Jennifer Singh (@mary97)
**Severity**: Critical
**Bounty**: $9,004

## Title
Local File Inclusion in /webhook/callback

## Description
The endpoint fails to escape user-supplied input, allowing LFI.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the unauthorized data

## Recommended Fix
Path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Cross-Site Scripting: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Mary Martinez, William Scott, Ivan Lopez
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 26, 2023
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2024.3370820

## Abstract
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 36% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 56 recent XSS attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 23 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 55% of XSS attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 58% of novel XSS payloads
- Most effective defense: output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Server-Side Template Injection Prevention

## What is Server-Side Template Injection?
Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical SSTI payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: sandboxed template engines, input validation.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-47
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: SQL Injection Prevention

## What is SQL Injection?
SQL Injection (SQLi) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical SQLi payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-382
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Synack
**Program**: TechGiant VDP
**Reporter**: Maria Jones (@raj9)
**Severity**: High
**Bounty**: $16,826

## Title
Insecure Direct Object Reference in /webhook/callback

## Description
The endpoint fails to escape user-supplied input, allowing IDOR.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the error response

## Recommended Fix
Authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Server-Side Request Forgery Prevention

## What is Server-Side Request Forgery?
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical SSRF payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-268
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Code Review: PR #8397 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Priya Lopez (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
**File**: `src/handlers/admin.go`
**Line**: 354

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the template renderer without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# anti-CSRF tokens
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow CSRF attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Bugcrowd
**Program**: TechGiant VDP
**Reporter**: Sophia Johnson (@fatima38)
**Severity**: High
**Bounty**: $13,928

## Title
Server-Side Request Forgery in /api/v2/search

## Description
The endpoint fails to escape user-supplied input, allowing SSRF.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the reflected output

## Recommended Fix
Url allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# RSA Conference 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Local File Inclusion: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Olga Hall, CISO

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through LFI attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes XML data without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found LFI in 39% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. path canonicalization
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# ShmooCon 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "XML External Entity: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Priya Rodriguez, Principal Security Researcher

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through XXE attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes URL parameters without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found XXE in 59% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. disable external entity processing
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-1316
**Product**: DataPlatform v6.14
**Type**: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
**CVSS**: 5.9
**Status**: FIXED in v2.15.7

## Summary
A CSRF vulnerability was discovered in the upload endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to execute arbitrary commands.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2021-10-24
- Acknowledged: 2023-05-13
- Patched: 2026-03-16
- Disclosed: 2020-07-24

## Remediation Applied
Anti-csrf tokens, samesite cookies, origin checking.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# SQL Injection: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Andrew Martinez, Emily Jones, David Johnson
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 24, 2023
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2024.8151219

## Abstract
SQL Injection (SQLi) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 43% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 192 recent SQLi attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 24 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 42% of SQLi attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 58% of novel SQLi payloads
- Most effective defense: parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Insecure Deserialization Prevention

## What is Insecure Deserialization?
Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical Deserialization payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-448
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# CTF Writeup: VulnHub — Cross-Site Scripting Challenge
**Author**: Wei Jones | **Date**: 2021-08-20 | **Difficulty**: Medium

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a xss vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Nikto against the target
2. Identified XSS vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed XSS via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{d5cb78d1f3219faa0b9cd23058accd6e}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper output encoding
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# CTF Writeup: TryHackMe — Cross-Site Scripting Challenge
**Author**: Jennifer Williams | **Date**: 2020-03-21 | **Difficulty**: Easy

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a xss vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Burp Suite against the target
2. Identified XSS vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed XSS via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{75c27eb3f4c1d3c8cdc1bf4d0f2a618d}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper output encoding
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Local File Inclusion Prevention

## What is Local File Inclusion?
Local File Inclusion (LFI) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical LFI payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-328
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# BSides 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Remote Code Execution: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Ivan Miller, Principal Security Researcher

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through RCE attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes XML data without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found RCE in 56% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. input sanitization
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Insecure Deserialization Prevention

## What is Insecure Deserialization?
Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical Deserialization payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-134
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# CTF Writeup: TryHackMe — Local File Inclusion Challenge
**Author**: Linda Ali | **Date**: 2022-11-22 | **Difficulty**: Medium

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a lfi vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran sqlmap against the target
2. Identified LFI vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed LFI via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{6d6e661cbbea8328d4eaa93df557983e}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper path canonicalization
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Insecure Deserialization Prevention

## What is Insecure Deserialization?
Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical Deserialization payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-776
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Server-Side Template Injection Prevention

## What is Server-Side Template Injection?
Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical SSTI payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: sandboxed template engines, input validation.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-876
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Metasploit — User Guide: XXE Testing

## Overview
Metasploit can be used to test for XML External Entity vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install metasploit
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for XXE Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the xxe scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed XXE with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible XXE, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When XXE is confirmed, recommend: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead.

## Legal Notice
Only use Metasploit against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Bugcrowd
**Program**: CloudFirst VDP
**Reporter**: Maria Scott (@elizabeth14)
**Severity**: Critical
**Bounty**: $15,734

## Title
SQL Injection in /webhook/callback

## Description
The endpoint fails to escape user-supplied input, allowing SQLi.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the reflected output

## Recommended Fix
Parameterized queries, prepared statements, orm usage.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Code Review: PR #6602 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: James Garcia (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: backend-api

## Finding 1: Potential Local File Inclusion (LFI)
**File**: `src/handlers/admin.py`
**Line**: 56

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the SQL query without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# path canonicalization
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow LFI attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: SQL Injection Prevention

## What is SQL Injection?
SQL Injection (SQLi) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical SQLi payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-118
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Code Review: PR #5343 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Patricia Wright (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: web-app

## Finding 1: Potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
**File**: `src/controllers/user.go`
**Line**: 257

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the template renderer without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# URL allowlists
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow SSRF attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-8574
**Product**: APIGateway v4.13
**Type**: SQL Injection (SQLi)
**CVSS**: 5.7
**Status**: FIXED in v8.9.9

## Summary
A SQLi vulnerability was discovered in the upload endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to escalate privileges.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2025-07-12
- Acknowledged: 2026-01-08
- Patched: 2020-04-11
- Disclosed: 2022-06-19

## Remediation Applied
Parameterized queries, prepared statements, orm usage.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Remote Code Execution Prevention

## What is Remote Code Execution?
Remote Code Execution (RCE) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical RCE payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-166
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Code Review: PR #8621 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Andrew Young (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
**File**: `src/controllers/admin.js`
**Line**: 210

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the XML parser without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# output encoding
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow XSS attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Code Review: PR #7092 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: William Hill (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: web-app

## Finding 1: Potential Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)
**File**: `src/controllers/search.py`
**Line**: 370

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the template renderer without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# sandboxed template engines
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow SSTI attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Insecure Direct Object Reference: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Thomas Wright, James Davis, Wei Martinez
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 12, 2024
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2025.9474014

## Abstract
Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 38% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 156 recent IDOR attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 15 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 57% of IDOR attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 73% of novel IDOR payloads
- Most effective defense: authorization checks, indirect references, access control

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining authorization checks, indirect references, access control provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Server-Side Request Forgery Prevention

## What is Server-Side Request Forgery?
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical SSRF payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-840
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Code Review: PR #5158 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Mary Patel (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)
**File**: `src/controllers/search.py`
**Line**: 103

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the system command without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# authorization checks
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow IDOR attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# CTF Writeup: WebGoat — Remote Code Execution Challenge
**Author**: David Scott | **Date**: 2026-07-23 | **Difficulty**: Hard

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a rce vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Metasploit against the target
2. Identified RCE vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed RCE via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{209e7ce78b01b710f3429e5141d14c18}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper input sanitization
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Nmap — User Guide: SQLi Testing

## Overview
Nmap can be used to test for SQL Injection vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install nmap
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for SQLi Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the sqli scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed SQLi with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible SQLi, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When SQLi is confirmed, recommend: parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage.

## Legal Notice
Only use Nmap against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Cross-Site Scripting: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: James Brown, Priya Nguyen, Robert Lopez
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 24, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2023.4850905

## Abstract
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 35% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 72 recent XSS attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 12 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 42% of XSS attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 67% of novel XSS payloads
- Most effective defense: output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Code Review: PR #7335 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Elizabeth Garcia (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
**File**: `src/handlers/admin.py`
**Line**: 267

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the XML parser without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# anti-CSRF tokens
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow CSRF attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Bugcrowd
**Program**: CloudFirst VDP
**Reporter**: Carlos Rodriguez (@james15)
**Severity**: Critical
**Bounty**: $5,233

## Title
Server-Side Request Forgery in /api/v2/search

## Description
The endpoint fails to sanitize user-supplied input, allowing SSRF.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the reflected output

## Recommended Fix
Url allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# DEF CON 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "XML External Entity: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: David Smith, Staff Red Team

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through XXE attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes URL parameters without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found XXE in 44% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. disable external entity processing
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*