# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Insecure Direct Object Reference Prevention

## What is Insecure Direct Object Reference?
Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical IDOR payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-90
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Bugcrowd
**Program**: TechGiant VDP
**Reporter**: Mary Lopez (@sarah63)
**Severity**: High
**Bounty**: $11,522

## Title
Cross-Site Request Forgery in /admin/export

## Description
The endpoint fails to sanitize user-supplied input, allowing CSRF.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the reflected output

## Recommended Fix
Anti-csrf tokens, samesite cookies, origin checking.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Insecure Direct Object Reference Prevention

## What is Insecure Direct Object Reference?
Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical IDOR payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-246
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Code Review: PR #4476 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: William Garcia (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: backend-api

## Finding 1: Potential XML External Entity (XXE)
**File**: `src/controllers/admin.js`
**Line**: 194

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the XML parser without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# disable external entity processing
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow XXE attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing XML External Entity (XXE). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Nikto — User Guide: LFI Testing

## Overview
Nikto can be used to test for Local File Inclusion vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install nikto
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for LFI Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the lfi scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed LFI with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible LFI, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When LFI is confirmed, recommend: path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

## Legal Notice
Only use Nikto against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Local File Inclusion (LFI). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Insecure Deserialization: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Linda Wright, Yuki Brown, Sarah Garcia
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 12, 2024
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2024.3937973

## Abstract
Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 30% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 200 recent Deserialization attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 15 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 62% of Deserialization attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 60% of novel Deserialization payloads
- Most effective defense: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# OWASP AppSec 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Insecure Direct Object Reference: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Sophia Miller, CISO

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through IDOR attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes URL parameters without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found IDOR in 59% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. authorization checks
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Black Hat 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Server-Side Request Forgery: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Andrew Lee, Staff Red Team

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through SSRF attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes XML data without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found SSRF in 57% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. URL allowlists
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Gobuster — User Guide: IDOR Testing

## Overview
Gobuster can be used to test for Insecure Direct Object Reference vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install gobuster
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for IDOR Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the idor scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed IDOR with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible IDOR, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When IDOR is confirmed, recommend: authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

## Legal Notice
Only use Gobuster against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# BSides 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Server-Side Request Forgery: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Sophia Williams, CISO

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through SSRF attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes user input without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found SSRF in 32% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. URL allowlists
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-5771
**Product**: APIGateway v4.1
**Type**: SQL Injection (SQLi)
**CVSS**: 9.3
**Status**: FIXED in v7.10.5

## Summary
A SQLi vulnerability was discovered in the search endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to execute arbitrary commands.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2026-05-17
- Acknowledged: 2020-09-14
- Patched: 2021-08-10
- Disclosed: 2023-09-11

## Remediation Applied
Parameterized queries, prepared statements, orm usage.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing SQL Injection (SQLi). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-9488
**Product**: WebPortal v3.5
**Type**: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
**CVSS**: 7.9
**Status**: FIXED in v4.4.7

## Summary
A XSS vulnerability was discovered in the upload endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to escalate privileges.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2022-06-15
- Acknowledged: 2026-12-07
- Patched: 2022-09-16
- Disclosed: 2023-03-25

## Remediation Applied
Output encoding, content security policy, input validation.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# BSides 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Local File Inclusion: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: William Jones, Principal Security Researcher

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through LFI attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes file paths without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found LFI in 54% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. path canonicalization
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# DEF CON 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Server-Side Request Forgery: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: John Jones, Staff Red Team

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through SSRF attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes user input without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found SSRF in 45% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. URL allowlists
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-1831
**Product**: DataPlatform v6.3
**Type**: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
**CVSS**: 9.3
**Status**: FIXED in v4.10.7

## Summary
A SSRF vulnerability was discovered in the profile endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to execute arbitrary commands.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2024-02-05
- Acknowledged: 2026-03-25
- Patched: 2023-09-15
- Disclosed: 2026-06-19

## Remediation Applied
Url allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Black Hat 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Remote Code Execution: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Michael Rodriguez, CISO

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through RCE attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes XML data without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found RCE in 42% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. input sanitization
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Remote Code Execution (RCE). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Cross-Site Scripting: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Sarah Lopez, Ahmed Rodriguez, Wei Williams
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 17, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2025.5250398

## Abstract
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 32% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 90 recent XSS attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 23 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 65% of XSS attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 83% of novel XSS payloads
- Most effective defense: output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Nullcon 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "XML External Entity: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Robert Scott, Principal Security Researcher

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through XXE attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes user input without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found XXE in 32% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. disable external entity processing
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# CTF Writeup: TryHackMe — XML External Entity Challenge
**Author**: David Chen | **Date**: 2022-03-10 | **Difficulty**: Insane

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a xxe vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran OWASP ZAP against the target
2. Identified XXE vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed XXE via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{9dfa2919a750a6ba1b0a073d835a2304}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper disable external entity processing
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# XML External Entity: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Sophia Lee, Raj Nguyen, Yuki Smith
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 10, 2024
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2023.4100319

## Abstract
XML External Entity (XXE) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 56% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 94 recent XXE attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 19 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 68% of XXE attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 81% of novel XXE payloads
- Most effective defense: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining disable external entity processing, use JSON instead provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Server-Side Request Forgery Prevention

## What is Server-Side Request Forgery?
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical SSRF payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-609
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Hashcat — User Guide: SSRF Testing

## Overview
Hashcat can be used to test for Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install hashcat
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for SSRF Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the ssrf scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed SSRF with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible SSRF, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When SSRF is confirmed, recommend: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

## Legal Notice
Only use Hashcat against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Gobuster — User Guide: Deserialization Testing

## Overview
Gobuster can be used to test for Insecure Deserialization vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install gobuster
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for Deserialization Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the deserialization scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed Deserialization with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible Deserialization, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When Deserialization is confirmed, recommend: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

## Legal Notice
Only use Gobuster against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# SQL Injection: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Elizabeth Johnson, Maria Kim, Jennifer Brown
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 30, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2025.5116828

## Abstract
SQL Injection (SQLi) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 58% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 69 recent SQLi attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 18 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 70% of SQLi attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 61% of novel SQLi payloads
- Most effective defense: parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Code Review: PR #904 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: John Smith (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: web-app

## Finding 1: Potential Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization)
**File**: `src/handlers/admin.py`
**Line**: 221

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the SQL query without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# signed tokens
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow Deserialization attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Remote Code Execution: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Sophia Hill, Wei Lee, Thomas Young
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 21, 2023
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2024.6609158

## Abstract
Remote Code Execution (RCE) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 26% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 67 recent RCE attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 25 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 70% of RCE attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 58% of novel RCE payloads
- Most effective defense: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-9840
**Product**: CloudSuite v4.0
**Type**: Local File Inclusion (LFI)
**CVSS**: 5.2
**Status**: FIXED in v2.1.7

## Summary
A LFI vulnerability was discovered in the search endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to read unauthorized data.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2024-01-03
- Acknowledged: 2025-09-07
- Patched: 2024-07-19
- Disclosed: 2022-09-10

## Remediation Applied
Path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Code Review: PR #7580 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Wei Garcia (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
**File**: `src/routes/user.py`
**Line**: 220

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the system command without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# anti-CSRF tokens
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow CSRF attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# CTF Writeup: WebGoat — XML External Entity Challenge
**Author**: Wei Nguyen | **Date**: 2023-12-28 | **Difficulty**: Insane

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a xxe vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran John the Ripper against the target
2. Identified XXE vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed XXE via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{3f4935fa9a0d65cbfdac39839c2c36fa}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper disable external entity processing
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# OWASP ZAP — User Guide: Deserialization Testing

## Overview
OWASP ZAP can be used to test for Insecure Deserialization vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install owasp-zap
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for Deserialization Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the deserialization scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed Deserialization with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible Deserialization, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When Deserialization is confirmed, recommend: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

## Legal Notice
Only use OWASP ZAP against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Cross-Site Request Forgery Prevention

## What is Cross-Site Request Forgery?
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical CSRF payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-399
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Bug Bounty Report — HackerOne
**Program**: Acme Corp VDP
**Reporter**: Sarah Singh (@olga94)
**Severity**: High
**Bounty**: $16,509

## Title
Cross-Site Scripting in /admin/export

## Description
The endpoint fails to sanitize user-supplied input, allowing XSS.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the reflected output

## Recommended Fix
Output encoding, content security policy, input validation.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Cross-Site Scripting: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Mary Kim, Robert Williams, Patricia Hall
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 12, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2025.8942592

## Abstract
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 45% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 60 recent XSS attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 20 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 54% of XSS attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 66% of novel XSS payloads
- Most effective defense: output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Bugcrowd
**Program**: Acme Corp VDP
**Reporter**: Emily Williams (@william94)
**Severity**: Critical
**Bounty**: $16,924

## Title
Remote Code Execution in /admin/export

## Description
The endpoint fails to validate user-supplied input, allowing RCE.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the reflected output

## Recommended Fix
Input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Server-Side Template Injection: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Maria Singh, Linda Smith, Carlos Williams
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 22, 2023
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2025.9839013

## Abstract
Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 48% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 87 recent SSTI attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 30 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 53% of SSTI attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 58% of novel SSTI payloads
- Most effective defense: sandboxed template engines, input validation

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining sandboxed template engines, input validation provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Insecure Deserialization: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: John Walker, James Miller, Andrew Lopez
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 11, 2023
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2025.2053686

## Abstract
Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 48% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 140 recent Deserialization attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 22 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 60% of Deserialization attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 66% of novel Deserialization payloads
- Most effective defense: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Server-Side Template Injection Prevention

## What is Server-Side Template Injection?
Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical SSTI payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: sandboxed template engines, input validation.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-204
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# XML External Entity: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Sophia Miller, Thomas Miller, William Martinez
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 15, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2025.6401963

## Abstract
XML External Entity (XXE) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 27% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 119 recent XXE attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 14 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 51% of XXE attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 59% of novel XXE payloads
- Most effective defense: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining disable external entity processing, use JSON instead provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-6106
**Product**: CloudSuite v8.2
**Type**: Remote Code Execution (RCE)
**CVSS**: 6.9
**Status**: FIXED in v8.8.8

## Summary
A RCE vulnerability was discovered in the profile endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to execute arbitrary commands.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2026-10-10
- Acknowledged: 2023-11-01
- Patched: 2020-10-07
- Disclosed: 2025-06-25

## Remediation Applied
Input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Black Hat 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "XML External Entity: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: John Davis, CISO

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through XXE attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes URL parameters without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found XXE in 51% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. disable external entity processing
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: SQL Injection Prevention

## What is SQL Injection?
SQL Injection (SQLi) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical SQLi payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-620
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# John the Ripper — User Guide: SSTI Testing

## Overview
John the Ripper can be used to test for Server-Side Template Injection vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install john-the-ripper
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for SSTI Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the ssti scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed SSTI with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible SSTI, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When SSTI is confirmed, recommend: sandboxed template engines, input validation.

## Legal Notice
Only use John the Ripper against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-9604
**Product**: WebPortal v5.0
**Type**: Local File Inclusion (LFI)
**CVSS**: 8.6
**Status**: FIXED in v2.14.8

## Summary
A LFI vulnerability was discovered in the profile endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to escalate privileges.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2024-02-20
- Acknowledged: 2021-03-06
- Patched: 2025-10-17
- Disclosed: 2026-09-16

## Remediation Applied
Path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Cross-Site Scripting Prevention

## What is Cross-Site Scripting?
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical XSS payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-648
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Black Hat 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Server-Side Request Forgery: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Thomas Lee, Staff Red Team

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through SSRF attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes file paths without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found SSRF in 63% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. URL allowlists
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Bugcrowd
**Program**: CloudFirst VDP
**Reporter**: Maria Lee (@priya71)
**Severity**: Critical
**Bounty**: $7,536

## Title
Server-Side Template Injection in /admin/export

## Description
The endpoint fails to escape user-supplied input, allowing SSTI.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the error response

## Recommended Fix
Sandboxed template engines, input validation.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Insecure Deserialization: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Linda Garcia, Emily Ali, David Kim
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 12, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2023.3731431

## Abstract
Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 51% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 92 recent Deserialization attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 22 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 79% of Deserialization attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 74% of novel Deserialization payloads
- Most effective defense: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# DEF CON 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Server-Side Template Injection: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Emily Young, Principal Security Researcher

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through SSTI attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes XML data without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found SSTI in 69% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. sandboxed template engines
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Server-Side Template Injection Prevention

## What is Server-Side Template Injection?
Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical SSTI payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: sandboxed template engines, input validation.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-781
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-6542
**Product**: CloudSuite v3.8
**Type**: Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)
**CVSS**: 6.5
**Status**: FIXED in v7.6.5

## Summary
A IDOR vulnerability was discovered in the upload endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to escalate privileges.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2020-11-28
- Acknowledged: 2020-02-09
- Patched: 2022-07-23
- Disclosed: 2021-01-02

## Remediation Applied
Authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# ShmooCon 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Server-Side Request Forgery: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Linda Davis, Principal Security Researcher

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through SSRF attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes user input without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found SSRF in 56% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. URL allowlists
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Bug Bounty Report — HackerOne
**Program**: CloudFirst VDP
**Reporter**: Sophia Brown (@jennifer83)
**Severity**: Medium
**Bounty**: $14,776

## Title
XML External Entity in /admin/export

## Description
The endpoint fails to sanitize user-supplied input, allowing XXE.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the error response

## Recommended Fix
Disable external entity processing, use json instead.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-8573
**Product**: DataPlatform v8.3
**Type**: Local File Inclusion (LFI)
**CVSS**: 5.3
**Status**: FIXED in v2.12.9

## Summary
A LFI vulnerability was discovered in the upload endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to escalate privileges.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2022-04-04
- Acknowledged: 2024-05-26
- Patched: 2023-02-22
- Disclosed: 2026-04-11

## Remediation Applied
Path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# CTF Writeup: HackTheBox — Cross-Site Request Forgery Challenge
**Author**: Carlos Davis | **Date**: 2025-05-13 | **Difficulty**: Hard

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a csrf vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran sqlmap against the target
2. Identified CSRF vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed CSRF via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{8d67b48eea508029f75b89d3cff0e4e4}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper anti-CSRF tokens
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-2996
**Product**: WebPortal v2.12
**Type**: SQL Injection (SQLi)
**CVSS**: 9.5
**Status**: FIXED in v4.13.10

## Summary
A SQLi vulnerability was discovered in the profile endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to escalate privileges.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2023-06-06
- Acknowledged: 2025-08-21
- Patched: 2023-07-19
- Disclosed: 2025-09-04

## Remediation Applied
Parameterized queries, prepared statements, orm usage.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Gobuster — User Guide: XXE Testing

## Overview
Gobuster can be used to test for XML External Entity vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install gobuster
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for XXE Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the xxe scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed XXE with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible XXE, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When XXE is confirmed, recommend: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead.

## Legal Notice
Only use Gobuster against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Cross-Site Scripting Prevention

## What is Cross-Site Scripting?
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical XSS payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-198
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Server-Side Request Forgery Prevention

## What is Server-Side Request Forgery?
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical SSRF payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-328
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Bug Bounty Report — HackerOne
**Program**: CloudFirst VDP
**Reporter**: Sophia Chen (@thomas12)
**Severity**: Critical
**Bounty**: $19,632

## Title
Insecure Direct Object Reference in /webhook/callback

## Description
The endpoint fails to validate user-supplied input, allowing IDOR.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the reflected output

## Recommended Fix
Authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Insecure Deserialization Prevention

## What is Insecure Deserialization?
Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical Deserialization payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-122
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# CTF Writeup: PicoCTF — Cross-Site Request Forgery Challenge
**Author**: Michael Hall | **Date**: 2026-02-12 | **Difficulty**: Medium

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a csrf vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Nikto against the target
2. Identified CSRF vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed CSRF via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{0b14302f644ba5aa23756d4383e455d7}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper anti-CSRF tokens
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# ShmooCon 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Server-Side Template Injection: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Priya Williams, Principal Security Researcher

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through SSTI attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes URL parameters without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found SSTI in 60% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. sandboxed template engines
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# OWASP AppSec 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Cross-Site Scripting: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Raj Jones, CISO

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through XSS attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes XML data without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found XSS in 37% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. output encoding
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# SQL Injection: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Mary Lopez, Mary Martinez, Elizabeth Hall
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 22, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2024.5030401

## Abstract
SQL Injection (SQLi) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 50% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 200 recent SQLi attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 24 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 80% of SQLi attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 50% of novel SQLi payloads
- Most effective defense: parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-2236
**Product**: CloudSuite v8.15
**Type**: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
**CVSS**: 9.2
**Status**: FIXED in v5.4.8

## Summary
A XSS vulnerability was discovered in the profile endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to bypass authentication.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2025-07-14
- Acknowledged: 2022-09-26
- Patched: 2026-08-08
- Disclosed: 2021-03-11

## Remediation Applied
Output encoding, content security policy, input validation.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Nullcon 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Local File Inclusion: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Patricia Martinez, Principal Security Researcher

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through LFI attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes XML data without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found LFI in 31% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. path canonicalization
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Code Review: PR #1840 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Ivan Walker (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
**File**: `src/controllers/search.go`
**Line**: 265

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the system command without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# URL allowlists
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow SSRF attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Code Review: PR #5271 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: John Miller (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
**File**: `src/controllers/search.py`
**Line**: 412

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the SQL query without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# anti-CSRF tokens
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow CSRF attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Bug Bounty Report — HackerOne
**Program**: Acme Corp VDP
**Reporter**: Thomas Walker (@michael3)
**Severity**: Medium
**Bounty**: $10,110

## Title
Insecure Direct Object Reference in /user/profile

## Description
The endpoint fails to sanitize user-supplied input, allowing IDOR.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the unauthorized data

## Recommended Fix
Authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Cross-Site Scripting: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Linda Rodriguez, Robert Smith, Maria Wright
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 27, 2024
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2023.3512157

## Abstract
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 44% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 169 recent XSS attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 25 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 77% of XSS attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 63% of novel XSS payloads
- Most effective defense: output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-8570
**Product**: APIGateway v3.5
**Type**: Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization)
**CVSS**: 6.4
**Status**: FIXED in v5.15.8

## Summary
A Deserialization vulnerability was discovered in the upload endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to execute arbitrary commands.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2022-02-03
- Acknowledged: 2024-03-02
- Patched: 2024-07-26
- Disclosed: 2020-08-12

## Remediation Applied
Signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Metasploit — User Guide: LFI Testing

## Overview
Metasploit can be used to test for Local File Inclusion vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install metasploit
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for LFI Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the lfi scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed LFI with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible LFI, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When LFI is confirmed, recommend: path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

## Legal Notice
Only use Metasploit against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Insecure Direct Object Reference: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Jennifer Miller, Andrew Ali, Mary Garcia
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 18, 2023
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2025.1778072

## Abstract
Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 43% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 143 recent IDOR attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 11 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 46% of IDOR attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 84% of novel IDOR payloads
- Most effective defense: authorization checks, indirect references, access control

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining authorization checks, indirect references, access control provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# CTF Writeup: PicoCTF — SQL Injection Challenge
**Author**: Andrew Williams | **Date**: 2022-06-09 | **Difficulty**: Insane

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a sqli vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran OWASP ZAP against the target
2. Identified SQLi vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed SQLi via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{af9ef98813d41a44005bb610536ee5b4}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper parameterized queries
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Code Review: PR #8187 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Robert Nguyen (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: backend-api

## Finding 1: Potential Local File Inclusion (LFI)
**File**: `src/routes/search.go`
**Line**: 439

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the XML parser without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# path canonicalization
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow LFI attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Code Review: PR #4017 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Andrew Ali (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential XML External Entity (XXE)
**File**: `src/handlers/user.go`
**Line**: 266

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the system command without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# disable external entity processing
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow XXE attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Server-Side Template Injection Prevention

## What is Server-Side Template Injection?
Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical SSTI payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: sandboxed template engines, input validation.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-179
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Code Review: PR #1407 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: David Singh (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential Remote Code Execution (RCE)
**File**: `src/controllers/search.js`
**Line**: 383

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the SQL query without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# input sanitization
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow RCE attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Code Review: PR #8393 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Ahmed Martinez (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: backend-api

## Finding 1: Potential SQL Injection (SQLi)
**File**: `src/handlers/admin.js`
**Line**: 490

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the SQL query without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# parameterized queries
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow SQLi attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-5374
**Product**: DataPlatform v8.4
**Type**: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
**CVSS**: 6.8
**Status**: FIXED in v3.4.5

## Summary
A SSRF vulnerability was discovered in the upload endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to execute arbitrary commands.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2024-09-10
- Acknowledged: 2024-07-16
- Patched: 2023-05-19
- Disclosed: 2026-08-10

## Remediation Applied
Url allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-9015
**Product**: WebPortal v2.4
**Type**: Remote Code Execution (RCE)
**CVSS**: 5.6
**Status**: FIXED in v5.5.6

## Summary
A RCE vulnerability was discovered in the admin endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to read unauthorized data.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2024-05-11
- Acknowledged: 2020-09-22
- Patched: 2021-01-23
- Disclosed: 2022-10-10

## Remediation Applied
Input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# BSides 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Server-Side Request Forgery: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Fatima Scott, CISO

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through SSRF attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes URL parameters without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found SSRF in 66% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. URL allowlists
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Local File Inclusion Prevention

## What is Local File Inclusion?
Local File Inclusion (LFI) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical LFI payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-723
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# OWASP ZAP — User Guide: SSRF Testing

## Overview
OWASP ZAP can be used to test for Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install owasp-zap
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for SSRF Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the ssrf scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed SSRF with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible SSRF, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When SSRF is confirmed, recommend: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

## Legal Notice
Only use OWASP ZAP against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# CTF Writeup: OverTheWire — XML External Entity Challenge
**Author**: Emily Miller | **Date**: 2021-06-14 | **Difficulty**: Easy

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a xxe vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran OWASP ZAP against the target
2. Identified XXE vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed XXE via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{9bfd715b5f7575975aa1207deefcce55}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper disable external entity processing
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# CTF Writeup: VulnHub — Remote Code Execution Challenge
**Author**: Olga Hall | **Date**: 2023-10-02 | **Difficulty**: Hard

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a rce vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran John the Ripper against the target
2. Identified RCE vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed RCE via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{1f4b4de09dde5b0a3a47d9f0219ab11e}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper input sanitization
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Code Review: PR #3537 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Linda Young (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: web-app

## Finding 1: Potential Local File Inclusion (LFI)
**File**: `src/handlers/user.js`
**Line**: 365

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the SQL query without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# path canonicalization
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow LFI attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Server-Side Request Forgery Prevention

## What is Server-Side Request Forgery?
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical SSRF payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-698
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Code Review: PR #5858 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Carlos Young (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: web-app

## Finding 1: Potential Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)
**File**: `src/handlers/user.go`
**Line**: 177

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the XML parser without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# sandboxed template engines
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow SSTI attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Code Review: PR #4231 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Carlos Singh (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: backend-api

## Finding 1: Potential Remote Code Execution (RCE)
**File**: `src/routes/search.go`
**Line**: 141

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the XML parser without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# input sanitization
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow RCE attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Nmap — User Guide: SQLi Testing

## Overview
Nmap can be used to test for SQL Injection vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install nmap
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for SQLi Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the sqli scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed SQLi with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible SQLi, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When SQLi is confirmed, recommend: parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage.

## Legal Notice
Only use Nmap against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Server-Side Request Forgery: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Sophia Ali, Thomas Wright, Maria Hill
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 30, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2023.7812407

## Abstract
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 29% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 121 recent SSRF attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 21 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 77% of SSRF attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 84% of novel SSRF payloads
- Most effective defense: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Metasploit — User Guide: SSRF Testing

## Overview
Metasploit can be used to test for Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install metasploit
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for SSRF Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the ssrf scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed SSRF with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible SSRF, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When SSRF is confirmed, recommend: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

## Legal Notice
Only use Metasploit against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Nullcon 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "XML External Entity: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: David Smith, Principal Security Researcher

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through XXE attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes user input without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found XXE in 60% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. disable external entity processing
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Hydra — User Guide: IDOR Testing

## Overview
Hydra can be used to test for Insecure Direct Object Reference vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install hydra
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for IDOR Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the idor scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed IDOR with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible IDOR, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When IDOR is confirmed, recommend: authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

## Legal Notice
Only use Hydra against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Insecure Direct Object Reference: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Maria Garcia, Patricia Miller, Emily Lee
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 28, 2023
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2023.9209134

## Abstract
Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 44% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 99 recent IDOR attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 19 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 80% of IDOR attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 58% of novel IDOR payloads
- Most effective defense: authorization checks, indirect references, access control

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining authorization checks, indirect references, access control provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Server-Side Template Injection: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Yuki Ali, James Brown, Sarah Hall
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 24, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2024.5342220

## Abstract
Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 42% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 136 recent SSTI attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 22 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 62% of SSTI attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 82% of novel SSTI payloads
- Most effective defense: sandboxed template engines, input validation

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining sandboxed template engines, input validation provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-6625
**Product**: WebPortal v5.2
**Type**: Remote Code Execution (RCE)
**CVSS**: 5.2
**Status**: FIXED in v7.9.2

## Summary
A RCE vulnerability was discovered in the admin endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to escalate privileges.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2024-08-18
- Acknowledged: 2021-10-19
- Patched: 2022-08-08
- Disclosed: 2025-12-20

## Remediation Applied
Input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# CTF Writeup: WebGoat — Insecure Direct Object Reference Challenge
**Author**: James Ali | **Date**: 2021-05-11 | **Difficulty**: Insane

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a idor vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Hashcat against the target
2. Identified IDOR vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed IDOR via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{dd5fb411a9d487cc948a2cbdf1667f6a}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper authorization checks
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Insecure Direct Object Reference: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Fatima Lee, Olga Walker, John Patel
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 22, 2023
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2024.3133004

## Abstract
Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 57% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 79 recent IDOR attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 17 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 49% of IDOR attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 68% of novel IDOR payloads
- Most effective defense: authorization checks, indirect references, access control

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining authorization checks, indirect references, access control provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Code Review: PR #1811 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Wei Davis (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: web-app

## Finding 1: Potential SQL Injection (SQLi)
**File**: `src/handlers/admin.py`
**Line**: 371

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the template renderer without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# parameterized queries
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow SQLi attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Server-Side Request Forgery: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Emily Ali, Carlos Miller, John Jones
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 15, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2023.8105457

## Abstract
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 44% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 130 recent SSRF attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 28 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 50% of SSRF attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 77% of novel SSRF payloads
- Most effective defense: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# sqlmap — User Guide: Deserialization Testing

## Overview
sqlmap can be used to test for Insecure Deserialization vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install sqlmap
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for Deserialization Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the deserialization scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed Deserialization with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible Deserialization, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When Deserialization is confirmed, recommend: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

## Legal Notice
Only use sqlmap against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Synack
**Program**: Acme Corp VDP
**Reporter**: Elizabeth Singh (@mary32)
**Severity**: Medium
**Bounty**: $16,244

## Title
Insecure Direct Object Reference in /webhook/callback

## Description
The endpoint fails to escape user-supplied input, allowing IDOR.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the reflected output

## Recommended Fix
Authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Bug Bounty Report — HackerOne
**Program**: CloudFirst VDP
**Reporter**: Fatima Johnson (@sarah96)
**Severity**: Critical
**Bounty**: $14,717

## Title
Local File Inclusion in /webhook/callback

## Description
The endpoint fails to validate user-supplied input, allowing LFI.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the unauthorized data

## Recommended Fix
Path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Server-Side Template Injection: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Carlos Singh, Ahmed Jones, Emily Davis
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 13, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2025.2433654

## Abstract
Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 38% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 153 recent SSTI attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 19 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 74% of SSTI attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 73% of novel SSTI payloads
- Most effective defense: sandboxed template engines, input validation

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining sandboxed template engines, input validation provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# CTF Writeup: OverTheWire — Server-Side Request Forgery Challenge
**Author**: Michael Hall | **Date**: 2021-03-03 | **Difficulty**: Easy

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a ssrf vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Nmap against the target
2. Identified SSRF vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed SSRF via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{8e5d3e773b086cac6fc6ce0bbabb8fcd}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper URL allowlists
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Bugcrowd
**Program**: TechGiant VDP
**Reporter**: John Young (@michael91)
**Severity**: Medium
**Bounty**: $18,150

## Title
Cross-Site Request Forgery in /webhook/callback

## Description
The endpoint fails to escape user-supplied input, allowing CSRF.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the reflected output

## Recommended Fix
Anti-csrf tokens, samesite cookies, origin checking.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Bug Bounty Report — HackerOne
**Program**: Acme Corp VDP
**Reporter**: Maria Ali (@emily30)
**Severity**: Critical
**Bounty**: $17,536

## Title
Cross-Site Request Forgery in /admin/export

## Description
The endpoint fails to validate user-supplied input, allowing CSRF.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the unauthorized data

## Recommended Fix
Anti-csrf tokens, samesite cookies, origin checking.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Server-Side Request Forgery: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Raj Young, Andrew Chen, Raj Singh
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 24, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2024.5352035

## Abstract
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 39% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 87 recent SSRF attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 20 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 58% of SSRF attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 72% of novel SSRF payloads
- Most effective defense: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# DEF CON 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Remote Code Execution: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Patricia Davis, Staff Red Team

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through RCE attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes XML data without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found RCE in 55% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. input sanitization
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Metasploit — User Guide: SSTI Testing

## Overview
Metasploit can be used to test for Server-Side Template Injection vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install metasploit
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for SSTI Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the ssti scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed SSTI with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible SSTI, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When SSTI is confirmed, recommend: sandboxed template engines, input validation.

## Legal Notice
Only use Metasploit against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Code Review: PR #1488 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Mary Davis (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: web-app

## Finding 1: Potential Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
**File**: `src/handlers/search.py`
**Line**: 465

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the SQL query without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# output encoding
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow XSS attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# BSides 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Insecure Deserialization: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Wei Brown, Staff Red Team

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through Deserialization attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes XML data without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found Deserialization in 38% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. signed tokens
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: SQL Injection Prevention

## What is SQL Injection?
SQL Injection (SQLi) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical SQLi payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-326
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# OWASP AppSec 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Server-Side Request Forgery: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Fatima Williams, Staff Red Team

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through SSRF attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes URL parameters without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found SSRF in 48% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. URL allowlists
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# OWASP AppSec 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "XML External Entity: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Emily Nguyen, CISO

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through XXE attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes URL parameters without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found XXE in 58% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. disable external entity processing
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# CTF Writeup: HackTheBox — Remote Code Execution Challenge
**Author**: Robert Chen | **Date**: 2026-01-04 | **Difficulty**: Medium

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a rce vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Gobuster against the target
2. Identified RCE vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed RCE via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{4ffd0c74e8de39373c30874935e97018}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper input sanitization
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: SQL Injection Prevention

## What is SQL Injection?
SQL Injection (SQLi) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical SQLi payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-173
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Cross-Site Scripting: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Wei Smith, Robert Jones, Michael Davis
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 14, 2024
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2023.3128119

## Abstract
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 28% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 189 recent XSS attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 17 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 67% of XSS attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 79% of novel XSS payloads
- Most effective defense: output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Bugcrowd
**Program**: TechGiant VDP
**Reporter**: Maria Patel (@raj73)
**Severity**: High
**Bounty**: $17,173

## Title
Server-Side Template Injection in /webhook/callback

## Description
The endpoint fails to sanitize user-supplied input, allowing SSTI.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the reflected output

## Recommended Fix
Sandboxed template engines, input validation.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*