# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-9957
**Product**: WebPortal v5.12
**Type**: SQL Injection (SQLi)
**CVSS**: 7.3
**Status**: FIXED in v3.4.8

## Summary
A SQLi vulnerability was discovered in the upload endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to execute arbitrary commands.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2025-10-13
- Acknowledged: 2023-09-15
- Patched: 2022-09-20
- Disclosed: 2020-07-17

## Remediation Applied
Parameterized queries, prepared statements, orm usage.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-7692
**Product**: APIGateway v7.0
**Type**: Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)
**CVSS**: 7.0
**Status**: FIXED in v7.12.7

## Summary
A SSTI vulnerability was discovered in the profile endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to execute arbitrary commands.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2025-01-11
- Acknowledged: 2023-02-18
- Patched: 2024-01-24
- Disclosed: 2025-10-27

## Remediation Applied
Sandboxed template engines, input validation.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# XML External Entity: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Raj Lee, John Patel, Michael Rodriguez
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 28, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2024.3105395

## Abstract
XML External Entity (XXE) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 53% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 73 recent XXE attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 21 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 52% of XXE attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 59% of novel XXE payloads
- Most effective defense: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining disable external entity processing, use JSON instead provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing XML External Entity (XXE). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-9726
**Product**: CloudSuite v7.10
**Type**: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
**CVSS**: 7.3
**Status**: FIXED in v6.1.6

## Summary
A CSRF vulnerability was discovered in the admin endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to execute arbitrary commands.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2023-04-21
- Acknowledged: 2023-11-13
- Patched: 2022-04-07
- Disclosed: 2022-04-11

## Remediation Applied
Anti-csrf tokens, samesite cookies, origin checking.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# OWASP AppSec 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Server-Side Request Forgery: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Thomas Hall, Principal Security Researcher

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through SSRF attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes URL parameters without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found SSRF in 33% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. URL allowlists
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Code Review: PR #319 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Yuki Jones (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: backend-api

## Finding 1: Potential SQL Injection (SQLi)
**File**: `src/routes/search.go`
**Line**: 290

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the template renderer without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# parameterized queries
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow SQLi attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing SQL Injection (SQLi). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Code Review: PR #3513 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Ahmed Chen (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: web-app

## Finding 1: Potential Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)
**File**: `src/handlers/admin.go`
**Line**: 223

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the XML parser without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# authorization checks
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow IDOR attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-6977
**Product**: DataPlatform v3.9
**Type**: Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization)
**CVSS**: 7.9
**Status**: FIXED in v8.5.8

## Summary
A Deserialization vulnerability was discovered in the search endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to bypass authentication.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2021-11-07
- Acknowledged: 2022-11-23
- Patched: 2020-02-27
- Disclosed: 2026-09-10

## Remediation Applied
Signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Code Review: PR #5750 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Ahmed Scott (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: web-app

## Finding 1: Potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
**File**: `src/routes/user.py`
**Line**: 69

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the template renderer without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# URL allowlists
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow SSRF attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Insecure Direct Object Reference: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Michael Kim, Carlos Smith, Maria Brown
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 21, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2025.6063144

## Abstract
Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 57% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 180 recent IDOR attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 29 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 74% of IDOR attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 59% of novel IDOR payloads
- Most effective defense: authorization checks, indirect references, access control

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining authorization checks, indirect references, access control provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Code Review: PR #3057 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Robert Jones (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential SQL Injection (SQLi)
**File**: `src/controllers/admin.js`
**Line**: 434

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the XML parser without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# parameterized queries
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow SQLi attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Code Review: PR #5156 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Carlos Hall (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: backend-api

## Finding 1: Potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
**File**: `src/routes/admin.go`
**Line**: 387

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the system command without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# URL allowlists
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow SSRF attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Remote Code Execution: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Linda Chen, Emily Brown, Linda Smith
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 29, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2023.8180706

## Abstract
Remote Code Execution (RCE) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 32% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 141 recent RCE attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 12 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 59% of RCE attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 74% of novel RCE payloads
- Most effective defense: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Remote Code Execution (RCE). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# CTF Writeup: WebGoat — Insecure Deserialization Challenge
**Author**: Yuki Kim | **Date**: 2024-03-05 | **Difficulty**: Hard

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a deserialization vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran OWASP ZAP against the target
2. Identified Deserialization vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed Deserialization via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{b5a15971a311a908ef2cd8b7a12bfd45}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper signed tokens
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-6909
**Product**: APIGateway v3.1
**Type**: Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)
**CVSS**: 6.8
**Status**: FIXED in v2.8.9

## Summary
A IDOR vulnerability was discovered in the admin endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to execute arbitrary commands.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2022-05-22
- Acknowledged: 2020-12-17
- Patched: 2023-06-25
- Disclosed: 2020-06-16

## Remediation Applied
Authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Nullcon 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Cross-Site Scripting: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Raj Patel, CISO

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through XSS attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes URL parameters without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found XSS in 41% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. output encoding
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-5092
**Product**: APIGateway v3.5
**Type**: SQL Injection (SQLi)
**CVSS**: 5.2
**Status**: FIXED in v7.4.7

## Summary
A SQLi vulnerability was discovered in the search endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to read unauthorized data.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2021-12-25
- Acknowledged: 2023-05-06
- Patched: 2025-07-20
- Disclosed: 2023-06-11

## Remediation Applied
Parameterized queries, prepared statements, orm usage.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Nmap — User Guide: SSRF Testing

## Overview
Nmap can be used to test for Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install nmap
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for SSRF Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the ssrf scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed SSRF with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible SSRF, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When SSRF is confirmed, recommend: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

## Legal Notice
Only use Nmap against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# OWASP AppSec 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "SQL Injection: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Fatima Scott, Principal Security Researcher

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through SQLi attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes URL parameters without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found SQLi in 69% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. parameterized queries
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# BSides 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Insecure Direct Object Reference: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Carlos Kim, Principal Security Researcher

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through IDOR attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes user input without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found IDOR in 64% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. authorization checks
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Code Review: PR #3351 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Olga Rodriguez (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: backend-api

## Finding 1: Potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
**File**: `src/handlers/user.js`
**Line**: 380

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the SQL query without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# URL allowlists
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow SSRF attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Nullcon 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Insecure Direct Object Reference: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Sophia Walker, Principal Security Researcher

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through IDOR attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes file paths without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found IDOR in 70% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. authorization checks
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-6284
**Product**: CloudSuite v6.2
**Type**: Remote Code Execution (RCE)
**CVSS**: 9.0
**Status**: FIXED in v7.7.1

## Summary
A RCE vulnerability was discovered in the upload endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to read unauthorized data.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2026-08-12
- Acknowledged: 2021-12-06
- Patched: 2020-03-01
- Disclosed: 2023-08-25

## Remediation Applied
Input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Local File Inclusion: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Ahmed Martinez, Patricia Walker, Michael Lopez
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 21, 2023
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2025.6325249

## Abstract
Local File Inclusion (LFI) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 46% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 83 recent LFI attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 11 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 57% of LFI attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 78% of novel LFI payloads
- Most effective defense: path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Local File Inclusion (LFI). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Server-Side Request Forgery: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Priya Hill, Elizabeth Lee, Jennifer Brown
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 25, 2023
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2023.2070380

## Abstract
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 44% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 151 recent SSRF attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 19 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 80% of SSRF attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 82% of novel SSRF payloads
- Most effective defense: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# CTF Writeup: VulnHub — XML External Entity Challenge
**Author**: Wei Chen | **Date**: 2020-02-12 | **Difficulty**: Hard

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a xxe vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran John the Ripper against the target
2. Identified XXE vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed XXE via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{a01bb95ced25c69535c972bf525b67e2}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper disable external entity processing
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-9103
**Product**: APIGateway v7.7
**Type**: XML External Entity (XXE)
**CVSS**: 6.0
**Status**: FIXED in v6.13.2

## Summary
A XXE vulnerability was discovered in the profile endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to read unauthorized data.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2024-08-27
- Acknowledged: 2020-04-05
- Patched: 2023-03-05
- Disclosed: 2026-06-01

## Remediation Applied
Disable external entity processing, use json instead.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Hashcat — User Guide: RCE Testing

## Overview
Hashcat can be used to test for Remote Code Execution vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install hashcat
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for RCE Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the rce scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed RCE with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible RCE, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When RCE is confirmed, recommend: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

## Legal Notice
Only use Hashcat against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Local File Inclusion Prevention

## What is Local File Inclusion?
Local File Inclusion (LFI) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical LFI payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-381
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# OWASP AppSec 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Insecure Direct Object Reference: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: James Lopez, Principal Security Researcher

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through IDOR attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes user input without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found IDOR in 66% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. authorization checks
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Code Review: PR #2182 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Emily Ali (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: backend-api

## Finding 1: Potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
**File**: `src/routes/search.js`
**Line**: 441

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the template renderer without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# URL allowlists
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow SSRF attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# ShmooCon 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Insecure Direct Object Reference: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Sophia Nguyen, Staff Red Team

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through IDOR attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes file paths without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found IDOR in 65% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. authorization checks
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-4203
**Product**: WebPortal v7.14
**Type**: SQL Injection (SQLi)
**CVSS**: 6.5
**Status**: FIXED in v5.15.6

## Summary
A SQLi vulnerability was discovered in the search endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to bypass authentication.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2023-06-20
- Acknowledged: 2025-07-22
- Patched: 2021-03-13
- Disclosed: 2024-04-28

## Remediation Applied
Parameterized queries, prepared statements, orm usage.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-7115
**Product**: DataPlatform v3.0
**Type**: Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)
**CVSS**: 9.4
**Status**: FIXED in v4.4.4

## Summary
A SSTI vulnerability was discovered in the search endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to escalate privileges.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2021-05-07
- Acknowledged: 2020-06-13
- Patched: 2025-03-17
- Disclosed: 2025-01-01

## Remediation Applied
Sandboxed template engines, input validation.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Insecure Deserialization Prevention

## What is Insecure Deserialization?
Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical Deserialization payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-699
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# OWASP ZAP — User Guide: CSRF Testing

## Overview
OWASP ZAP can be used to test for Cross-Site Request Forgery vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install owasp-zap
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for CSRF Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the csrf scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed CSRF with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible CSRF, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When CSRF is confirmed, recommend: anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking.

## Legal Notice
Only use OWASP ZAP against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Insecure Deserialization Prevention

## What is Insecure Deserialization?
Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical Deserialization payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-553
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Code Review: PR #671 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Linda Hill (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: backend-api

## Finding 1: Potential Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)
**File**: `src/routes/search.go`
**Line**: 401

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the XML parser without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# sandboxed template engines
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow SSTI attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Code Review: PR #5531 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Patricia Brown (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: backend-api

## Finding 1: Potential Remote Code Execution (RCE)
**File**: `src/routes/search.go`
**Line**: 232

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the system command without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# input sanitization
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow RCE attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Code Review: PR #2417 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Fatima Hall (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: backend-api

## Finding 1: Potential Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)
**File**: `src/controllers/user.py`
**Line**: 158

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the template renderer without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# sandboxed template engines
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow SSTI attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# CTF Writeup: VulnHub — Server-Side Request Forgery Challenge
**Author**: Emily Martinez | **Date**: 2023-07-05 | **Difficulty**: Medium

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a ssrf vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran John the Ripper against the target
2. Identified SSRF vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed SSRF via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{6e877fba4e4a48622a26c6e107baf963}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper URL allowlists
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Nullcon 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Server-Side Template Injection: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Wei Garcia, Principal Security Researcher

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through SSTI attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes URL parameters without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found SSTI in 31% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. sandboxed template engines
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: SQL Injection Prevention

## What is SQL Injection?
SQL Injection (SQLi) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical SQLi payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-259
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# CTF Writeup: PicoCTF — XML External Entity Challenge
**Author**: Emily Wright | **Date**: 2020-01-28 | **Difficulty**: Hard

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a xxe vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Gobuster against the target
2. Identified XXE vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed XXE via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{2f3a615a7a9f3d49ef50179ea2c60cba}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper disable external entity processing
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# sqlmap — User Guide: CSRF Testing

## Overview
sqlmap can be used to test for Cross-Site Request Forgery vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install sqlmap
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for CSRF Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the csrf scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed CSRF with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible CSRF, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When CSRF is confirmed, recommend: anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking.

## Legal Notice
Only use sqlmap against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Insecure Deserialization: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Elizabeth Hall, Jennifer Scott, James Ali
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 14, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2025.6663286

## Abstract
Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 52% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 185 recent Deserialization attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 19 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 50% of Deserialization attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 50% of novel Deserialization payloads
- Most effective defense: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-9632
**Product**: WebPortal v6.14
**Type**: XML External Entity (XXE)
**CVSS**: 5.6
**Status**: FIXED in v7.15.5

## Summary
A XXE vulnerability was discovered in the profile endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to execute arbitrary commands.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2020-08-23
- Acknowledged: 2026-06-27
- Patched: 2023-05-06
- Disclosed: 2025-10-22

## Remediation Applied
Disable external entity processing, use json instead.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Server-Side Template Injection Prevention

## What is Server-Side Template Injection?
Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical SSTI payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: sandboxed template engines, input validation.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-223
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-5737
**Product**: WebPortal v3.7
**Type**: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
**CVSS**: 6.0
**Status**: FIXED in v4.13.1

## Summary
A SSRF vulnerability was discovered in the search endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to read unauthorized data.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2022-07-06
- Acknowledged: 2026-08-14
- Patched: 2024-07-18
- Disclosed: 2026-07-14

## Remediation Applied
Url allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Code Review: PR #1342 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Carlos Lee (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: backend-api

## Finding 1: Potential Local File Inclusion (LFI)
**File**: `src/controllers/search.py`
**Line**: 348

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the XML parser without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# path canonicalization
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow LFI attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Bug Bounty Report — HackerOne
**Program**: TechGiant VDP
**Reporter**: Wei Ali (@sarah49)
**Severity**: Critical
**Bounty**: $14,036

## Title
XML External Entity in /api/v2/search

## Description
The endpoint fails to sanitize user-supplied input, allowing XXE.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the unauthorized data

## Recommended Fix
Disable external entity processing, use json instead.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-5899
**Product**: DataPlatform v2.6
**Type**: SQL Injection (SQLi)
**CVSS**: 5.4
**Status**: FIXED in v3.4.4

## Summary
A SQLi vulnerability was discovered in the profile endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to execute arbitrary commands.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2021-09-08
- Acknowledged: 2024-07-05
- Patched: 2025-04-21
- Disclosed: 2021-12-19

## Remediation Applied
Parameterized queries, prepared statements, orm usage.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Code Review: PR #8351 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Linda Kim (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: web-app

## Finding 1: Potential Local File Inclusion (LFI)
**File**: `src/handlers/user.js`
**Line**: 272

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the XML parser without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# path canonicalization
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow LFI attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# sqlmap — User Guide: XSS Testing

## Overview
sqlmap can be used to test for Cross-Site Scripting vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install sqlmap
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for XSS Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the xss scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed XSS with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible XSS, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When XSS is confirmed, recommend: output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation.

## Legal Notice
Only use sqlmap against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Insecure Deserialization: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: John Chen, Priya Smith, Carlos Ali
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 17, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2023.8359548

## Abstract
Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 45% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 110 recent Deserialization attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 19 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 72% of Deserialization attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 52% of novel Deserialization payloads
- Most effective defense: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Insecure Direct Object Reference Prevention

## What is Insecure Direct Object Reference?
Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical IDOR payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-301
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Code Review: PR #6001 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Sophia Miller (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential SQL Injection (SQLi)
**File**: `src/controllers/user.py`
**Line**: 388

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the template renderer without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# parameterized queries
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow SQLi attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Nullcon 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Insecure Direct Object Reference: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Michael Wright, CISO

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through IDOR attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes user input without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found IDOR in 43% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. authorization checks
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Bug Bounty Report — HackerOne
**Program**: Acme Corp VDP
**Reporter**: Sarah Wright (@patricia24)
**Severity**: Critical
**Bounty**: $11,798

## Title
Local File Inclusion in /admin/export

## Description
The endpoint fails to sanitize user-supplied input, allowing LFI.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the unauthorized data

## Recommended Fix
Path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# CTF Writeup: PicoCTF — Remote Code Execution Challenge
**Author**: Thomas Hall | **Date**: 2025-10-24 | **Difficulty**: Easy

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a rce vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Nmap against the target
2. Identified RCE vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed RCE via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{7ddaa86d476da0dd05b7b9b1691fd849}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper input sanitization
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# sqlmap — User Guide: SSRF Testing

## Overview
sqlmap can be used to test for Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install sqlmap
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for SSRF Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the ssrf scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed SSRF with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible SSRF, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When SSRF is confirmed, recommend: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

## Legal Notice
Only use sqlmap against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Remote Code Execution Prevention

## What is Remote Code Execution?
Remote Code Execution (RCE) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical RCE payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-87
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Bugcrowd
**Program**: CloudFirst VDP
**Reporter**: William Wright (@james6)
**Severity**: Medium
**Bounty**: $2,277

## Title
Local File Inclusion in /user/profile

## Description
The endpoint fails to validate user-supplied input, allowing LFI.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the error response

## Recommended Fix
Path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# OWASP ZAP — User Guide: Deserialization Testing

## Overview
OWASP ZAP can be used to test for Insecure Deserialization vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install owasp-zap
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for Deserialization Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the deserialization scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed Deserialization with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible Deserialization, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When Deserialization is confirmed, recommend: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

## Legal Notice
Only use OWASP ZAP against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Nullcon 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Local File Inclusion: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Andrew Chen, Staff Red Team

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through LFI attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes user input without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found LFI in 68% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. path canonicalization
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Synack
**Program**: CloudFirst VDP
**Reporter**: Patricia Martinez (@john55)
**Severity**: Medium
**Bounty**: $7,219

## Title
XML External Entity in /api/v2/search

## Description
The endpoint fails to validate user-supplied input, allowing XXE.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the error response

## Recommended Fix
Disable external entity processing, use json instead.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Synack
**Program**: Acme Corp VDP
**Reporter**: Wei Ali (@maria36)
**Severity**: High
**Bounty**: $2,654

## Title
Remote Code Execution in /user/profile

## Description
The endpoint fails to validate user-supplied input, allowing RCE.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the unauthorized data

## Recommended Fix
Input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Code Review: PR #2350 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Ivan Young (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
**File**: `src/routes/user.py`
**Line**: 220

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the template renderer without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# URL allowlists
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow SSRF attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Bugcrowd
**Program**: Acme Corp VDP
**Reporter**: Patricia Chen (@sarah8)
**Severity**: High
**Bounty**: $10,813

## Title
Remote Code Execution in /webhook/callback

## Description
The endpoint fails to validate user-supplied input, allowing RCE.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the error response

## Recommended Fix
Input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# CTF Writeup: HackTheBox — Cross-Site Scripting Challenge
**Author**: Ivan Young | **Date**: 2026-01-16 | **Difficulty**: Easy

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a xss vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Nmap against the target
2. Identified XSS vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed XSS via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{3af7a9bddb9d24d22185992476defc6f}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper output encoding
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# RSA Conference 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "SQL Injection: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Ahmed Young, Principal Security Researcher

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through SQLi attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes URL parameters without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found SQLi in 34% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. parameterized queries
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Cross-Site Request Forgery: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: David Patel, Wei Lee, Andrew Williams
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 20, 2024
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2023.5839568

## Abstract
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 50% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 106 recent CSRF attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 23 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 50% of CSRF attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 73% of novel CSRF payloads
- Most effective defense: anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Code Review: PR #975 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Ahmed Chen (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential XML External Entity (XXE)
**File**: `src/controllers/search.py`
**Line**: 419

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the system command without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# disable external entity processing
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow XXE attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# DEF CON 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "XML External Entity: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Raj Martinez, CISO

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through XXE attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes XML data without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found XXE in 51% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. disable external entity processing
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Cross-Site Scripting Prevention

## What is Cross-Site Scripting?
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical XSS payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-530
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-3157
**Product**: WebPortal v4.3
**Type**: Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization)
**CVSS**: 9.2
**Status**: FIXED in v4.1.8

## Summary
A Deserialization vulnerability was discovered in the upload endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to escalate privileges.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2020-05-24
- Acknowledged: 2020-09-08
- Patched: 2024-12-19
- Disclosed: 2025-02-14

## Remediation Applied
Signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# BSides 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Cross-Site Request Forgery: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Linda Williams, Staff Red Team

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through CSRF attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes user input without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found CSRF in 44% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. anti-CSRF tokens
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Cross-Site Request Forgery: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Olga Davis, Michael Patel, Thomas Martinez
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 27, 2023
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2024.6989239

## Abstract
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 51% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 182 recent CSRF attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 29 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 48% of CSRF attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 66% of novel CSRF payloads
- Most effective defense: anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# RSA Conference 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Server-Side Template Injection: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Linda Hill, Principal Security Researcher

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through SSTI attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes URL parameters without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found SSTI in 64% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. sandboxed template engines
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Black Hat 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Server-Side Request Forgery: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Carlos Young, CISO

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through SSRF attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes URL parameters without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found SSRF in 31% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. URL allowlists
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# CTF Writeup: DVWA — Insecure Deserialization Challenge
**Author**: Maria Chen | **Date**: 2021-01-08 | **Difficulty**: Easy

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a deserialization vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran John the Ripper against the target
2. Identified Deserialization vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed Deserialization via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{0beed20c4e2f2441bbba9ccb8e4345f4}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper signed tokens
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-7055
**Product**: APIGateway v6.2
**Type**: Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization)
**CVSS**: 5.8
**Status**: FIXED in v7.7.6

## Summary
A Deserialization vulnerability was discovered in the upload endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to bypass authentication.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2026-04-03
- Acknowledged: 2026-02-14
- Patched: 2025-12-17
- Disclosed: 2022-11-27

## Remediation Applied
Signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Bugcrowd
**Program**: TechGiant VDP
**Reporter**: Mary Johnson (@ivan39)
**Severity**: Medium
**Bounty**: $6,880

## Title
Insecure Deserialization in /user/profile

## Description
The endpoint fails to escape user-supplied input, allowing Deserialization.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the unauthorized data

## Recommended Fix
Signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-3026
**Product**: APIGateway v8.10
**Type**: Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization)
**CVSS**: 8.7
**Status**: FIXED in v7.2.10

## Summary
A Deserialization vulnerability was discovered in the search endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to escalate privileges.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2020-01-17
- Acknowledged: 2020-02-17
- Patched: 2025-06-20
- Disclosed: 2025-05-20

## Remediation Applied
Signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Code Review: PR #1963 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Sarah Wright (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: backend-api

## Finding 1: Potential XML External Entity (XXE)
**File**: `src/handlers/admin.py`
**Line**: 304

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the SQL query without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# disable external entity processing
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow XXE attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Synack
**Program**: TechGiant VDP
**Reporter**: Sophia Williams (@fatima59)
**Severity**: Medium
**Bounty**: $5,998

## Title
Insecure Direct Object Reference in /api/v2/search

## Description
The endpoint fails to escape user-supplied input, allowing IDOR.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the error response

## Recommended Fix
Authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Insecure Direct Object Reference: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Sophia Kim, Andrew Miller, Ahmed Garcia
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 11, 2023
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2025.2223509

## Abstract
Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 37% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 125 recent IDOR attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 12 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 60% of IDOR attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 50% of novel IDOR payloads
- Most effective defense: authorization checks, indirect references, access control

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining authorization checks, indirect references, access control provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# XML External Entity: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Jennifer Patel, Sarah Singh, James Hall
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 15, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2025.1370581

## Abstract
XML External Entity (XXE) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 53% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 126 recent XXE attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 21 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 65% of XXE attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 75% of novel XXE payloads
- Most effective defense: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining disable external entity processing, use JSON instead provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Code Review: PR #5181 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Jennifer Singh (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: backend-api

## Finding 1: Potential XML External Entity (XXE)
**File**: `src/routes/admin.go`
**Line**: 399

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the SQL query without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# disable external entity processing
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow XXE attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-2964
**Product**: CloudSuite v8.8
**Type**: Local File Inclusion (LFI)
**CVSS**: 8.7
**Status**: FIXED in v5.5.7

## Summary
A LFI vulnerability was discovered in the upload endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to escalate privileges.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2022-04-11
- Acknowledged: 2025-04-05
- Patched: 2020-09-24
- Disclosed: 2026-07-12

## Remediation Applied
Path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-1815
**Product**: APIGateway v3.2
**Type**: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
**CVSS**: 5.9
**Status**: FIXED in v2.3.10

## Summary
A XSS vulnerability was discovered in the profile endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to read unauthorized data.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2025-10-05
- Acknowledged: 2026-08-24
- Patched: 2026-10-25
- Disclosed: 2021-09-16

## Remediation Applied
Output encoding, content security policy, input validation.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Server-Side Template Injection: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Sarah Martinez, Yuki Garcia, Wei Brown
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 24, 2024
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2023.7218870

## Abstract
Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 29% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 100 recent SSTI attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 21 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 64% of SSTI attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 58% of novel SSTI payloads
- Most effective defense: sandboxed template engines, input validation

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining sandboxed template engines, input validation provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-5083
**Product**: DataPlatform v7.15
**Type**: SQL Injection (SQLi)
**CVSS**: 6.4
**Status**: FIXED in v7.0.6

## Summary
A SQLi vulnerability was discovered in the admin endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to escalate privileges.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2022-08-08
- Acknowledged: 2021-02-27
- Patched: 2020-08-22
- Disclosed: 2022-06-06

## Remediation Applied
Parameterized queries, prepared statements, orm usage.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# CTF Writeup: TryHackMe — Remote Code Execution Challenge
**Author**: Mary Miller | **Date**: 2021-07-18 | **Difficulty**: Hard

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a rce vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran John the Ripper against the target
2. Identified RCE vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed RCE via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{af22b3d96c276da590e6618ed609291a}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper input sanitization
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# John the Ripper — User Guide: SSTI Testing

## Overview
John the Ripper can be used to test for Server-Side Template Injection vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install john-the-ripper
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for SSTI Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the ssti scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed SSTI with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible SSTI, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When SSTI is confirmed, recommend: sandboxed template engines, input validation.

## Legal Notice
Only use John the Ripper against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Insecure Direct Object Reference Prevention

## What is Insecure Direct Object Reference?
Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical IDOR payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-491
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# CTF Writeup: HackTheBox — Server-Side Template Injection Challenge
**Author**: Elizabeth Johnson | **Date**: 2024-12-23 | **Difficulty**: Hard

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a ssti vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Hydra against the target
2. Identified SSTI vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed SSTI via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{56cd168949fa27c5175ccbf14c61d40c}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: sandboxed template engines, input validation.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper sandboxed template engines
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Server-Side Request Forgery Prevention

## What is Server-Side Request Forgery?
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical SSRF payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-559
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Cross-Site Request Forgery: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Emily Patel, David Johnson, Carlos Lee
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 14, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2023.4664174

## Abstract
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 35% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 95 recent CSRF attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 30 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 67% of CSRF attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 70% of novel CSRF payloads
- Most effective defense: anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-5880
**Product**: APIGateway v3.13
**Type**: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
**CVSS**: 5.7
**Status**: FIXED in v4.1.6

## Summary
A XSS vulnerability was discovered in the upload endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to bypass authentication.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2023-08-17
- Acknowledged: 2023-08-14
- Patched: 2023-11-11
- Disclosed: 2023-09-23

## Remediation Applied
Output encoding, content security policy, input validation.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# CTF Writeup: TryHackMe — Insecure Deserialization Challenge
**Author**: Jennifer Chen | **Date**: 2023-05-21 | **Difficulty**: Medium

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a deserialization vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Nikto against the target
2. Identified Deserialization vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed Deserialization via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{779d18913153b309e68106f22a6ef398}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper signed tokens
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-3198
**Product**: CloudSuite v8.8
**Type**: XML External Entity (XXE)
**CVSS**: 8.2
**Status**: FIXED in v8.15.7

## Summary
A XXE vulnerability was discovered in the profile endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to execute arbitrary commands.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2021-03-15
- Acknowledged: 2020-12-08
- Patched: 2024-05-23
- Disclosed: 2020-10-26

## Remediation Applied
Disable external entity processing, use json instead.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# OWASP ZAP — User Guide: Deserialization Testing

## Overview
OWASP ZAP can be used to test for Insecure Deserialization vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install owasp-zap
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for Deserialization Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the deserialization scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed Deserialization with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible Deserialization, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When Deserialization is confirmed, recommend: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

## Legal Notice
Only use OWASP ZAP against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Cross-Site Request Forgery: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Olga Jones, Carlos Hall, Yuki Nguyen
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 18, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2023.4143703

## Abstract
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 44% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 78 recent CSRF attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 29 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 52% of CSRF attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 82% of novel CSRF payloads
- Most effective defense: anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Insecure Deserialization Prevention

## What is Insecure Deserialization?
Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical Deserialization payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-740
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Code Review: PR #1382 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Robert Jones (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: web-app

## Finding 1: Potential Remote Code Execution (RCE)
**File**: `src/handlers/user.js`
**Line**: 250

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the template renderer without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# input sanitization
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow RCE attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Nikto — User Guide: SQLi Testing

## Overview
Nikto can be used to test for SQL Injection vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install nikto
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for SQLi Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the sqli scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed SQLi with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible SQLi, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When SQLi is confirmed, recommend: parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage.

## Legal Notice
Only use Nikto against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Code Review: PR #1912 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Olga Garcia (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: web-app

## Finding 1: Potential Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
**File**: `src/handlers/admin.js`
**Line**: 173

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the system command without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# output encoding
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow XSS attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-2425
**Product**: CloudSuite v5.13
**Type**: Local File Inclusion (LFI)
**CVSS**: 6.5
**Status**: FIXED in v2.0.1

## Summary
A LFI vulnerability was discovered in the search endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to read unauthorized data.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2020-01-03
- Acknowledged: 2023-10-09
- Patched: 2020-01-22
- Disclosed: 2022-03-28

## Remediation Applied
Path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Synack
**Program**: Acme Corp VDP
**Reporter**: David Johnson (@thomas38)
**Severity**: Medium
**Bounty**: $3,009

## Title
SQL Injection in /admin/export

## Description
The endpoint fails to escape user-supplied input, allowing SQLi.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the error response

## Recommended Fix
Parameterized queries, prepared statements, orm usage.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Code Review: PR #1657 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Wei Nguyen (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)
**File**: `src/handlers/search.js`
**Line**: 378

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the template renderer without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# sandboxed template engines
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow SSTI attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Bugcrowd
**Program**: Acme Corp VDP
**Reporter**: Michael Nguyen (@mary44)
**Severity**: High
**Bounty**: $22,839

## Title
Server-Side Template Injection in /admin/export

## Description
The endpoint fails to escape user-supplied input, allowing SSTI.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the reflected output

## Recommended Fix
Sandboxed template engines, input validation.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-3926
**Product**: APIGateway v4.2
**Type**: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
**CVSS**: 9.4
**Status**: FIXED in v4.1.5

## Summary
A XSS vulnerability was discovered in the profile endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to bypass authentication.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2020-10-18
- Acknowledged: 2025-08-24
- Patched: 2022-10-08
- Disclosed: 2021-07-18

## Remediation Applied
Output encoding, content security policy, input validation.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Cross-Site Scripting: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Mary Garcia, James Kim, Emily Lopez
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 22, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2024.1410284

## Abstract
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 59% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 200 recent XSS attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 14 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 57% of XSS attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 79% of novel XSS payloads
- Most effective defense: output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Code Review: PR #911 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Patricia Nguyen (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential XML External Entity (XXE)
**File**: `src/controllers/user.py`
**Line**: 137

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the SQL query without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# disable external entity processing
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow XXE attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# XML External Entity: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Ahmed Brown, Yuki Singh, Jennifer Johnson
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 30, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2023.1920124

## Abstract
XML External Entity (XXE) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 20% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 199 recent XXE attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 10 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 76% of XXE attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 72% of novel XXE payloads
- Most effective defense: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining disable external entity processing, use JSON instead provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# ShmooCon 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Cross-Site Scripting: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Priya Williams, CISO

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through XSS attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes XML data without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found XSS in 34% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. output encoding
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# CTF Writeup: HackTheBox — Remote Code Execution Challenge
**Author**: Raj Nguyen | **Date**: 2024-02-23 | **Difficulty**: Insane

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a rce vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Burp Suite against the target
2. Identified RCE vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed RCE via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{b4de7c9a842383a2e39545464a4819f1}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper input sanitization
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Server-Side Request Forgery Prevention

## What is Server-Side Request Forgery?
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical SSRF payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-99
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Insecure Direct Object Reference Prevention

## What is Insecure Direct Object Reference?
Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical IDOR payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-354
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-9420
**Product**: WebPortal v7.14
**Type**: XML External Entity (XXE)
**CVSS**: 5.2
**Status**: FIXED in v6.8.10

## Summary
A XXE vulnerability was discovered in the admin endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to bypass authentication.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2023-10-10
- Acknowledged: 2025-11-04
- Patched: 2021-10-17
- Disclosed: 2026-12-18

## Remediation Applied
Disable external entity processing, use json instead.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Insecure Direct Object Reference Prevention

## What is Insecure Direct Object Reference?
Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical IDOR payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-574
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# sqlmap — User Guide: SQLi Testing

## Overview
sqlmap can be used to test for SQL Injection vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install sqlmap
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for SQLi Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the sqli scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed SQLi with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible SQLi, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When SQLi is confirmed, recommend: parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage.

## Legal Notice
Only use sqlmap against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-1031
**Product**: CloudSuite v4.8
**Type**: Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization)
**CVSS**: 7.1
**Status**: FIXED in v4.7.10

## Summary
A Deserialization vulnerability was discovered in the upload endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to read unauthorized data.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2020-05-21
- Acknowledged: 2022-02-25
- Patched: 2021-10-21
- Disclosed: 2021-10-25

## Remediation Applied
Signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Nmap — User Guide: CSRF Testing

## Overview
Nmap can be used to test for Cross-Site Request Forgery vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install nmap
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for CSRF Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the csrf scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed CSRF with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible CSRF, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When CSRF is confirmed, recommend: anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking.

## Legal Notice
Only use Nmap against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# SQL Injection: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Ivan Hill, John Rodriguez, Yuki Kim
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 23, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2025.1077752

## Abstract
SQL Injection (SQLi) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 45% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 90 recent SQLi attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 26 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 77% of SQLi attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 82% of novel SQLi payloads
- Most effective defense: parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*