# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Cross-Site Scripting Prevention

## What is Cross-Site Scripting?
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical XSS payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-29
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# CTF Writeup: WebGoat — Insecure Deserialization Challenge
**Author**: Jennifer Miller | **Date**: 2024-06-03 | **Difficulty**: Insane

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a deserialization vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Burp Suite against the target
2. Identified Deserialization vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed Deserialization via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{665cd24ebbc62beb90b552c9a7e0a8df}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper signed tokens
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# sqlmap — User Guide: IDOR Testing

## Overview
sqlmap can be used to test for Insecure Direct Object Reference vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install sqlmap
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for IDOR Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the idor scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed IDOR with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible IDOR, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When IDOR is confirmed, recommend: authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

## Legal Notice
Only use sqlmap against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Code Review: PR #842 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Carlos Lee (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: web-app

## Finding 1: Potential SQL Injection (SQLi)
**File**: `src/routes/user.go`
**Line**: 253

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the system command without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# parameterized queries
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow SQLi attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing SQL Injection (SQLi). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-9572
**Product**: CloudSuite v7.8
**Type**: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
**CVSS**: 9.2
**Status**: FIXED in v3.4.1

## Summary
A CSRF vulnerability was discovered in the search endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to escalate privileges.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2025-07-25
- Acknowledged: 2020-10-01
- Patched: 2024-03-21
- Disclosed: 2022-11-04

## Remediation Applied
Anti-csrf tokens, samesite cookies, origin checking.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Code Review: PR #3843 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Maria Johnson (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: backend-api

## Finding 1: Potential Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization)
**File**: `src/controllers/admin.js`
**Line**: 369

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the XML parser without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# signed tokens
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow Deserialization attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# OWASP AppSec 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Remote Code Execution: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Fatima Davis, Principal Security Researcher

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through RCE attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes file paths without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found RCE in 48% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. input sanitization
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Remote Code Execution (RCE). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-7165
**Product**: WebPortal v4.8
**Type**: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
**CVSS**: 7.4
**Status**: FIXED in v7.3.1

## Summary
A CSRF vulnerability was discovered in the search endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to escalate privileges.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2025-07-06
- Acknowledged: 2023-03-27
- Patched: 2026-12-20
- Disclosed: 2022-02-23

## Remediation Applied
Anti-csrf tokens, samesite cookies, origin checking.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Insecure Deserialization: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Yuki Brown, Emily Hill, John Garcia
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 22, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2024.4414512

## Abstract
Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 38% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 58 recent Deserialization attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 20 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 54% of Deserialization attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 68% of novel Deserialization payloads
- Most effective defense: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# CTF Writeup: OverTheWire — Server-Side Template Injection Challenge
**Author**: James Walker | **Date**: 2023-10-19 | **Difficulty**: Medium

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a ssti vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Nikto against the target
2. Identified SSTI vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed SSTI via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{317c4d164858630299ed240a2a2723d1}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: sandboxed template engines, input validation.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper sandboxed template engines
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-4476
**Product**: CloudSuite v5.1
**Type**: Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization)
**CVSS**: 6.7
**Status**: FIXED in v2.2.2

## Summary
A Deserialization vulnerability was discovered in the search endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to escalate privileges.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2025-03-27
- Acknowledged: 2024-06-10
- Patched: 2024-09-09
- Disclosed: 2025-06-11

## Remediation Applied
Signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Bug Bounty Report — HackerOne
**Program**: TechGiant VDP
**Reporter**: Wei Lopez (@yuki8)
**Severity**: Medium
**Bounty**: $23,173

## Title
Server-Side Template Injection in /user/profile

## Description
The endpoint fails to validate user-supplied input, allowing SSTI.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the error response

## Recommended Fix
Sandboxed template engines, input validation.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Code Review: PR #3415 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Ivan Johnson (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: web-app

## Finding 1: Potential Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)
**File**: `src/handlers/user.js`
**Line**: 158

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the template renderer without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# authorization checks
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow IDOR attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-8469
**Product**: DataPlatform v4.4
**Type**: Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)
**CVSS**: 5.5
**Status**: FIXED in v5.9.10

## Summary
A SSTI vulnerability was discovered in the profile endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to bypass authentication.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2022-10-05
- Acknowledged: 2020-08-16
- Patched: 2020-09-14
- Disclosed: 2021-12-18

## Remediation Applied
Sandboxed template engines, input validation.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Cross-Site Request Forgery: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Michael Johnson, Ahmed Davis, Mary Hill
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 13, 2024
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2023.6190821

## Abstract
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 24% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 52 recent CSRF attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 19 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 80% of CSRF attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 80% of novel CSRF payloads
- Most effective defense: anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-6526
**Product**: APIGateway v3.4
**Type**: Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)
**CVSS**: 5.6
**Status**: FIXED in v3.7.6

## Summary
A SSTI vulnerability was discovered in the upload endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to escalate privileges.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2022-01-17
- Acknowledged: 2022-04-07
- Patched: 2023-12-23
- Disclosed: 2021-04-05

## Remediation Applied
Sandboxed template engines, input validation.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# CTF Writeup: TryHackMe — Cross-Site Scripting Challenge
**Author**: Andrew Ali | **Date**: 2023-10-23 | **Difficulty**: Medium

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a xss vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Burp Suite against the target
2. Identified XSS vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed XSS via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{b708c8ebdd63dad1c8c4007fca47c492}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper output encoding
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# CTF Writeup: PicoCTF — Insecure Direct Object Reference Challenge
**Author**: Maria Hall | **Date**: 2024-12-18 | **Difficulty**: Hard

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a idor vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Nikto against the target
2. Identified IDOR vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed IDOR via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{730e53b158049df29b7d61ae16852eab}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper authorization checks
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# RSA Conference 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "XML External Entity: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Sarah Patel, Staff Red Team

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through XXE attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes user input without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found XXE in 50% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. disable external entity processing
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing XML External Entity (XXE). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Server-Side Template Injection: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Sarah Davis, Priya Rodriguez, Wei Lee
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 20, 2023
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2025.8204031

## Abstract
Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 46% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 146 recent SSTI attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 17 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 79% of SSTI attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 63% of novel SSTI payloads
- Most effective defense: sandboxed template engines, input validation

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining sandboxed template engines, input validation provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# CTF Writeup: PicoCTF — Server-Side Template Injection Challenge
**Author**: Patricia Davis | **Date**: 2025-09-15 | **Difficulty**: Insane

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a ssti vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran sqlmap against the target
2. Identified SSTI vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed SSTI via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{f39dea98592577d38c0e861621b6bc6a}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: sandboxed template engines, input validation.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper sandboxed template engines
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Code Review: PR #9064 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Wei Walker (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
**File**: `src/controllers/search.py`
**Line**: 497

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the template renderer without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# output encoding
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow XSS attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-9796
**Product**: WebPortal v2.4
**Type**: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
**CVSS**: 6.0
**Status**: FIXED in v5.11.6

## Summary
A SSRF vulnerability was discovered in the upload endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to bypass authentication.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2026-10-20
- Acknowledged: 2023-06-26
- Patched: 2026-03-21
- Disclosed: 2024-05-19

## Remediation Applied
Url allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Cross-Site Scripting: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Wei Martinez, William Walker, John Smith
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 20, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2024.6814224

## Abstract
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 51% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 59 recent XSS attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 22 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 57% of XSS attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 58% of novel XSS payloads
- Most effective defense: output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Code Review: PR #9033 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: William Young (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential Remote Code Execution (RCE)
**File**: `src/routes/search.go`
**Line**: 240

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the XML parser without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# input sanitization
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow RCE attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# CTF Writeup: DVWA — Local File Inclusion Challenge
**Author**: Yuki Singh | **Date**: 2023-12-16 | **Difficulty**: Easy

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a lfi vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran sqlmap against the target
2. Identified LFI vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed LFI via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{0366ee1ed91ec170b2c39de10685d97e}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper path canonicalization
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*

Explanation: Educational security content discussing Local File Inclusion (LFI). Contains attack descriptions for learning/defense purposes but no working exploit code. Safe documentation.


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-9970
**Product**: WebPortal v3.11
**Type**: Local File Inclusion (LFI)
**CVSS**: 8.3
**Status**: FIXED in v3.14.10

## Summary
A LFI vulnerability was discovered in the upload endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to escalate privileges.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2024-04-25
- Acknowledged: 2025-10-11
- Patched: 2020-06-08
- Disclosed: 2025-05-26

## Remediation Applied
Path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# CTF Writeup: HackTheBox — Insecure Direct Object Reference Challenge
**Author**: Olga Kim | **Date**: 2022-01-16 | **Difficulty**: Insane

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a idor vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran OWASP ZAP against the target
2. Identified IDOR vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed IDOR via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{3a6459b4d865aad7adb8b07cd6bf52fc}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper authorization checks
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# CTF Writeup: VulnHub — Server-Side Request Forgery Challenge
**Author**: Sophia Kim | **Date**: 2020-03-20 | **Difficulty**: Easy

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a ssrf vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran sqlmap against the target
2. Identified SSRF vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed SSRF via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{5f1433dfbdfb41f32524d08bc0f9fc72}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper URL allowlists
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# XML External Entity: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Michael Williams, Raj Lopez, Ivan Johnson
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 28, 2023
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2023.5074519

## Abstract
XML External Entity (XXE) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 29% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 135 recent XXE attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 17 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 76% of XXE attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 59% of novel XXE payloads
- Most effective defense: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining disable external entity processing, use JSON instead provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Remote Code Execution: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Wei Martinez, Thomas Hall, James Jones
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 16, 2024
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2024.1994602

## Abstract
Remote Code Execution (RCE) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 60% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 165 recent RCE attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 21 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 78% of RCE attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 50% of novel RCE payloads
- Most effective defense: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# sqlmap — User Guide: SSTI Testing

## Overview
sqlmap can be used to test for Server-Side Template Injection vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install sqlmap
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for SSTI Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the ssti scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed SSTI with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible SSTI, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When SSTI is confirmed, recommend: sandboxed template engines, input validation.

## Legal Notice
Only use sqlmap against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Black Hat 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Insecure Direct Object Reference: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Olga Lee, Principal Security Researcher

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through IDOR attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes URL parameters without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found IDOR in 34% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. authorization checks
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# CTF Writeup: TryHackMe — Local File Inclusion Challenge
**Author**: Linda Smith | **Date**: 2023-03-12 | **Difficulty**: Hard

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a lfi vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Hydra against the target
2. Identified LFI vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed LFI via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{626c9c6b1cdd927a8a91f33afa482982}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper path canonicalization
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Synack
**Program**: CloudFirst VDP
**Reporter**: Ivan Scott (@yuki91)
**Severity**: Medium
**Bounty**: $6,001

## Title
Cross-Site Scripting in /webhook/callback

## Description
The endpoint fails to sanitize user-supplied input, allowing XSS.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the reflected output

## Recommended Fix
Output encoding, content security policy, input validation.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# DEF CON 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "XML External Entity: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Fatima Jones, CISO

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through XXE attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes user input without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found XXE in 45% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. disable external entity processing
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# BSides 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Remote Code Execution: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Michael Smith, CISO

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through RCE attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes URL parameters without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found RCE in 36% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. input sanitization
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Code Review: PR #9590 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Andrew Martinez (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: backend-api

## Finding 1: Potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
**File**: `src/controllers/user.py`
**Line**: 242

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the XML parser without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# URL allowlists
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow SSRF attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-1656
**Product**: APIGateway v4.8
**Type**: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
**CVSS**: 8.4
**Status**: FIXED in v3.15.8

## Summary
A SSRF vulnerability was discovered in the profile endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to bypass authentication.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2026-03-26
- Acknowledged: 2025-03-11
- Patched: 2024-04-14
- Disclosed: 2021-02-06

## Remediation Applied
Url allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# CTF Writeup: HackTheBox — Server-Side Template Injection Challenge
**Author**: Ivan Hill | **Date**: 2024-01-24 | **Difficulty**: Medium

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a ssti vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran John the Ripper against the target
2. Identified SSTI vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed SSTI via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{4f042506f0ca4e009d6ddf420b2daae1}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: sandboxed template engines, input validation.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper sandboxed template engines
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# DEF CON 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Server-Side Request Forgery: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Patricia Walker, Staff Red Team

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through SSRF attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes file paths without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found SSRF in 34% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. URL allowlists
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Code Review: PR #763 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Robert Nguyen (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: web-app

## Finding 1: Potential Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization)
**File**: `src/routes/admin.js`
**Line**: 480

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the system command without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# signed tokens
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow Deserialization attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# RSA Conference 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Server-Side Request Forgery: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Michael Ali, Principal Security Researcher

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through SSRF attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes file paths without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found SSRF in 66% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. URL allowlists
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Black Hat 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Local File Inclusion: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Elizabeth Patel, Staff Red Team

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through LFI attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes XML data without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found LFI in 61% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. path canonicalization
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# SQL Injection: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Ahmed Lopez, Ivan Smith, Andrew Garcia
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 15, 2023
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2023.1485788

## Abstract
SQL Injection (SQLi) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 55% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 199 recent SQLi attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 26 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 58% of SQLi attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 73% of novel SQLi payloads
- Most effective defense: parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# CTF Writeup: DVWA — Server-Side Template Injection Challenge
**Author**: Emily Williams | **Date**: 2021-12-09 | **Difficulty**: Insane

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a ssti vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran sqlmap against the target
2. Identified SSTI vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed SSTI via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{3ca9928b371ea6a57f01ed234a51d39e}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: sandboxed template engines, input validation.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper sandboxed template engines
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# ShmooCon 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Remote Code Execution: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Mary Miller, Principal Security Researcher

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through RCE attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes XML data without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found RCE in 43% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. input sanitization
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-4092
**Product**: APIGateway v8.1
**Type**: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
**CVSS**: 8.0
**Status**: FIXED in v2.9.1

## Summary
A SSRF vulnerability was discovered in the admin endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to bypass authentication.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2025-05-04
- Acknowledged: 2025-08-09
- Patched: 2020-07-17
- Disclosed: 2024-06-03

## Remediation Applied
Url allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Black Hat 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Insecure Direct Object Reference: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Yuki Scott, Staff Red Team

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through IDOR attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes XML data without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found IDOR in 36% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. authorization checks
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Code Review: PR #4089 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Priya Hall (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization)
**File**: `src/controllers/user.go`
**Line**: 199

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the SQL query without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# signed tokens
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow Deserialization attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Remote Code Execution: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Olga Young, Patricia Rodriguez, John Young
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 11, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2024.7785570

## Abstract
Remote Code Execution (RCE) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 25% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 67 recent RCE attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 30 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 46% of RCE attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 72% of novel RCE payloads
- Most effective defense: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# BSides 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "SQL Injection: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Linda Patel, CISO

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through SQLi attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes URL parameters without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found SQLi in 32% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. parameterized queries
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Bugcrowd
**Program**: Acme Corp VDP
**Reporter**: Andrew Wright (@william50)
**Severity**: Critical
**Bounty**: $13,570

## Title
Cross-Site Scripting in /webhook/callback

## Description
The endpoint fails to sanitize user-supplied input, allowing XSS.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the error response

## Recommended Fix
Output encoding, content security policy, input validation.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Code Review: PR #1263 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Emily Nguyen (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential Remote Code Execution (RCE)
**File**: `src/controllers/admin.py`
**Line**: 464

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the SQL query without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# input sanitization
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow RCE attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# CTF Writeup: DVWA — Cross-Site Request Forgery Challenge
**Author**: Carlos Miller | **Date**: 2022-03-05 | **Difficulty**: Hard

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a csrf vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Burp Suite against the target
2. Identified CSRF vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed CSRF via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{f1ac270a1c6d1a844159878eb5a74a7a}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper anti-CSRF tokens
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Insecure Deserialization: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Linda Lee, Andrew Martinez, Andrew Brown
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 30, 2023
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2023.3283452

## Abstract
Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 52% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 133 recent Deserialization attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 16 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 49% of Deserialization attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 57% of novel Deserialization payloads
- Most effective defense: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Synack
**Program**: TechGiant VDP
**Reporter**: Sarah Williams (@ivan75)
**Severity**: Critical
**Bounty**: $10,434

## Title
Insecure Deserialization in /webhook/callback

## Description
The endpoint fails to escape user-supplied input, allowing Deserialization.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the unauthorized data

## Recommended Fix
Signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Cross-Site Request Forgery: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Jennifer Hall, Michael Lee, Sophia Johnson
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 19, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2023.4157864

## Abstract
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 30% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 122 recent CSRF attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 17 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 44% of CSRF attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 77% of novel CSRF payloads
- Most effective defense: anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Synack
**Program**: TechGiant VDP
**Reporter**: Wei Chen (@andrew46)
**Severity**: Medium
**Bounty**: $5,605

## Title
SQL Injection in /admin/export

## Description
The endpoint fails to sanitize user-supplied input, allowing SQLi.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the unauthorized data

## Recommended Fix
Parameterized queries, prepared statements, orm usage.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# CTF Writeup: DVWA — Server-Side Request Forgery Challenge
**Author**: Linda Patel | **Date**: 2023-01-27 | **Difficulty**: Insane

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a ssrf vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran John the Ripper against the target
2. Identified SSRF vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed SSRF via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{4a1bafe9ccdc32bb0ce81ca4eede105b}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper URL allowlists
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-9262
**Product**: CloudSuite v8.1
**Type**: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
**CVSS**: 8.1
**Status**: FIXED in v2.15.1

## Summary
A CSRF vulnerability was discovered in the admin endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to execute arbitrary commands.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2022-10-14
- Acknowledged: 2022-08-15
- Patched: 2026-01-09
- Disclosed: 2022-05-08

## Remediation Applied
Anti-csrf tokens, samesite cookies, origin checking.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-5040
**Product**: DataPlatform v6.14
**Type**: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
**CVSS**: 5.5
**Status**: FIXED in v7.11.10

## Summary
A CSRF vulnerability was discovered in the profile endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to execute arbitrary commands.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2024-05-01
- Acknowledged: 2026-06-07
- Patched: 2020-10-12
- Disclosed: 2020-04-10

## Remediation Applied
Anti-csrf tokens, samesite cookies, origin checking.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Server-Side Request Forgery Prevention

## What is Server-Side Request Forgery?
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical SSRF payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-277
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Code Review: PR #991 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Ivan Ali (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: backend-api

## Finding 1: Potential XML External Entity (XXE)
**File**: `src/handlers/search.go`
**Line**: 445

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the XML parser without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# disable external entity processing
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow XXE attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Code Review: PR #5083 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Fatima Wright (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: backend-api

## Finding 1: Potential Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization)
**File**: `src/controllers/admin.js`
**Line**: 413

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the SQL query without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# signed tokens
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow Deserialization attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-3385
**Product**: WebPortal v5.3
**Type**: Local File Inclusion (LFI)
**CVSS**: 5.2
**Status**: FIXED in v5.4.4

## Summary
A LFI vulnerability was discovered in the profile endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to escalate privileges.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2025-12-22
- Acknowledged: 2023-05-28
- Patched: 2022-02-16
- Disclosed: 2023-08-19

## Remediation Applied
Path canonicalization, chroot, allowlists.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# CTF Writeup: VulnHub — Cross-Site Scripting Challenge
**Author**: Elizabeth Miller | **Date**: 2020-01-19 | **Difficulty**: Insane

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a xss vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Burp Suite against the target
2. Identified XSS vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed XSS via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{b623d84cf0eb396f157c81fb6cff05bb}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper output encoding
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# XML External Entity: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Mary Johnson, Wei Ali, Raj Hall
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 12, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2023.3708987

## Abstract
XML External Entity (XXE) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 44% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 143 recent XXE attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 23 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 74% of XXE attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 69% of novel XXE payloads
- Most effective defense: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining disable external entity processing, use JSON instead provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# ShmooCon 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "SQL Injection: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Sophia Kim, Principal Security Researcher

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through SQLi attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes file paths without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found SQLi in 30% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. parameterized queries
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: SQL Injection Prevention

## What is SQL Injection?
SQL Injection (SQLi) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical SQLi payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-674
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-7692
**Product**: APIGateway v6.13
**Type**: XML External Entity (XXE)
**CVSS**: 5.2
**Status**: FIXED in v6.4.5

## Summary
A XXE vulnerability was discovered in the upload endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to escalate privileges.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2024-11-07
- Acknowledged: 2025-02-19
- Patched: 2024-04-15
- Disclosed: 2022-10-08

## Remediation Applied
Disable external entity processing, use json instead.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# CTF Writeup: HackTheBox — Server-Side Template Injection Challenge
**Author**: William Jones | **Date**: 2022-05-22 | **Difficulty**: Medium

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a ssti vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Metasploit against the target
2. Identified SSTI vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed SSTI via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{214460a097734ac4f956b5c1119f84eb}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: sandboxed template engines, input validation.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper sandboxed template engines
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# CTF Writeup: TryHackMe — Insecure Deserialization Challenge
**Author**: Sarah Rodriguez | **Date**: 2026-01-16 | **Difficulty**: Easy

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a deserialization vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Nikto against the target
2. Identified Deserialization vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed Deserialization via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{2f5aa98a91c52295e3e9dbbd234d7f01}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper signed tokens
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Cross-Site Request Forgery: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Thomas Smith, Jennifer Garcia, Ahmed Nguyen
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 23, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2025.9672764

## Abstract
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 32% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 181 recent CSRF attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 20 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 65% of CSRF attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 68% of novel CSRF payloads
- Most effective defense: anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# CTF Writeup: WebGoat — Cross-Site Scripting Challenge
**Author**: Michael Patel | **Date**: 2025-05-06 | **Difficulty**: Insane

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a xss vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Hydra against the target
2. Identified XSS vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed XSS via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{ca06610db8c8bd2df969d04a26243ea7}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper output encoding
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# CTF Writeup: WebGoat — Remote Code Execution Challenge
**Author**: Raj Davis | **Date**: 2023-02-03 | **Difficulty**: Medium

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a rce vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Hydra against the target
2. Identified RCE vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed RCE via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{06a3132ad4bdc5363acdc200a260a233}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper input sanitization
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Bugcrowd
**Program**: TechGiant VDP
**Reporter**: Raj Walker (@elizabeth74)
**Severity**: Medium
**Bounty**: $17,928

## Title
Remote Code Execution in /api/v2/search

## Description
The endpoint fails to validate user-supplied input, allowing RCE.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the unauthorized data

## Recommended Fix
Input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-2675
**Product**: WebPortal v7.10
**Type**: Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization)
**CVSS**: 5.1
**Status**: FIXED in v4.13.8

## Summary
A Deserialization vulnerability was discovered in the upload endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to bypass authentication.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2026-12-22
- Acknowledged: 2021-03-17
- Patched: 2021-10-08
- Disclosed: 2023-12-07

## Remediation Applied
Signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# SQL Injection: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Ahmed Jones, Ivan Brown, Sarah Johnson
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 11, 2024
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2023.4516317

## Abstract
SQL Injection (SQLi) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 52% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 136 recent SQLi attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 15 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 45% of SQLi attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 78% of novel SQLi payloads
- Most effective defense: parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining parameterized queries, prepared statements, ORM usage provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-9654
**Product**: WebPortal v7.14
**Type**: Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)
**CVSS**: 9.4
**Status**: FIXED in v7.6.1

## Summary
A SSTI vulnerability was discovered in the admin endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to execute arbitrary commands.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2022-02-22
- Acknowledged: 2023-02-10
- Patched: 2022-05-15
- Disclosed: 2022-07-18

## Remediation Applied
Sandboxed template engines, input validation.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Code Review: PR #2967 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Raj Ali (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential SQL Injection (SQLi)
**File**: `src/handlers/search.js`
**Line**: 322

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the system command without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# parameterized queries
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow SQLi attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# CTF Writeup: VulnHub — Cross-Site Scripting Challenge
**Author**: Yuki Patel | **Date**: 2023-03-15 | **Difficulty**: Easy

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a xss vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran OWASP ZAP against the target
2. Identified XSS vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed XSS via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{b9a5c8a13e6b0175c3e2750f9909943d}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper output encoding
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# CTF Writeup: VulnHub — Cross-Site Request Forgery Challenge
**Author**: Fatima Davis | **Date**: 2020-08-26 | **Difficulty**: Medium

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a csrf vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Burp Suite against the target
2. Identified CSRF vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed CSRF via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{13c32b69b29729c6c6035caa5a709b88}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper anti-CSRF tokens
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Hydra — User Guide: RCE Testing

## Overview
Hydra can be used to test for Remote Code Execution vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install hydra
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for RCE Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the rce scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed RCE with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible RCE, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When RCE is confirmed, recommend: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

## Legal Notice
Only use Hydra against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-1149
**Product**: DataPlatform v3.15
**Type**: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
**CVSS**: 5.8
**Status**: FIXED in v5.9.4

## Summary
A XSS vulnerability was discovered in the search endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to read unauthorized data.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2024-06-08
- Acknowledged: 2025-12-05
- Patched: 2024-05-20
- Disclosed: 2022-11-21

## Remediation Applied
Output encoding, content security policy, input validation.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Insecure Deserialization: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Robert Davis, Robert Kim, John Walker
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 28, 2024
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2024.8074976

## Abstract
Insecure Deserialization (Deserialization) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 51% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 127 recent Deserialization attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 27 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 40% of Deserialization attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 70% of novel Deserialization payloads
- Most effective defense: signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining signed tokens, allowlisting classes, avoiding native serialization provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# RSA Conference 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Insecure Direct Object Reference: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Olga Johnson, Principal Security Researcher

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through IDOR attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes file paths without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found IDOR in 56% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. authorization checks
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Black Hat 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Cross-Site Request Forgery: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Patricia Nguyen, Staff Red Team

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through CSRF attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes user input without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found CSRF in 59% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. anti-CSRF tokens
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Cross-Site Scripting: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Olga Williams, Olga Davis, Maria Brown
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 12, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2024.5392012

## Abstract
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 53% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 163 recent XSS attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 20 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 77% of XSS attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 66% of novel XSS payloads
- Most effective defense: output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# CTF Writeup: DVWA — Insecure Direct Object Reference Challenge
**Author**: Ahmed Brown | **Date**: 2020-09-26 | **Difficulty**: Easy

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a idor vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Gobuster against the target
2. Identified IDOR vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed IDOR via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{c5464f34e644f21cf65830bcd18db160}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper authorization checks
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Hydra — User Guide: CSRF Testing

## Overview
Hydra can be used to test for Cross-Site Request Forgery vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install hydra
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for CSRF Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the csrf scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed CSRF with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible CSRF, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When CSRF is confirmed, recommend: anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking.

## Legal Notice
Only use Hydra against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Remote Code Execution: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Emily Walker, Sarah Scott, Fatima Jones
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 26, 2023
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2025.2575701

## Abstract
Remote Code Execution (RCE) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 41% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 165 recent RCE attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 20 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 40% of RCE attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 75% of novel RCE payloads
- Most effective defense: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Server-Side Template Injection Prevention

## What is Server-Side Template Injection?
Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical SSTI payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: sandboxed template engines, input validation.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-426
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# Cross-Site Scripting: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: John Lopez, Sophia Scott, David Young
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 17, 2025
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2024.4282273

## Abstract
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 46% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 112 recent XSS attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 20 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 41% of XSS attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 65% of novel XSS payloads
- Most effective defense: output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Nmap — User Guide: SSTI Testing

## Overview
Nmap can be used to test for Server-Side Template Injection vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install nmap
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for SSTI Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the ssti scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed SSTI with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible SSTI, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When SSTI is confirmed, recommend: sandboxed template engines, input validation.

## Legal Notice
Only use Nmap against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Synack
**Program**: Acme Corp VDP
**Reporter**: John Patel (@ahmed30)
**Severity**: High
**Bounty**: $1,750

## Title
Cross-Site Request Forgery in /webhook/callback

## Description
The endpoint fails to escape user-supplied input, allowing CSRF.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the reflected output

## Recommended Fix
Anti-csrf tokens, samesite cookies, origin checking.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Black Hat 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "Server-Side Request Forgery: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Jennifer Ali, CISO

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through SSRF attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes file paths without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found SSRF in 33% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. URL allowlists
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Code Review: PR #8008 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Thomas Walker (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: backend-api

## Finding 1: Potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
**File**: `src/handlers/search.go`
**Line**: 436

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the system command without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# URL allowlists
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow SSRF attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-3985
**Product**: DataPlatform v8.3
**Type**: Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)
**CVSS**: 5.2
**Status**: FIXED in v4.5.5

## Summary
A IDOR vulnerability was discovered in the search endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to read unauthorized data.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2024-02-01
- Acknowledged: 2025-03-22
- Patched: 2026-06-01
- Disclosed: 2025-06-25

## Remediation Applied
Authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# OWASP AppSec 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "XML External Entity: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Olga Hall, Principal Security Researcher

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through XXE attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes XML data without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found XXE in 52% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. disable external entity processing
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Nikto — User Guide: IDOR Testing

## Overview
Nikto can be used to test for Insecure Direct Object Reference vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install nikto
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for IDOR Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the idor scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed IDOR with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible IDOR, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When IDOR is confirmed, recommend: authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

## Legal Notice
Only use Nikto against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-7336
**Product**: APIGateway v8.4
**Type**: SQL Injection (SQLi)
**CVSS**: 8.0
**Status**: FIXED in v5.9.8

## Summary
A SQLi vulnerability was discovered in the upload endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to execute arbitrary commands.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2024-02-28
- Acknowledged: 2022-06-24
- Patched: 2025-07-14
- Disclosed: 2025-09-20

## Remediation Applied
Parameterized queries, prepared statements, orm usage.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-8358
**Product**: APIGateway v8.13
**Type**: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
**CVSS**: 5.5
**Status**: FIXED in v4.14.10

## Summary
A CSRF vulnerability was discovered in the profile endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to escalate privileges.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2023-12-15
- Acknowledged: 2023-09-08
- Patched: 2023-04-27
- Disclosed: 2026-07-19

## Remediation Applied
Anti-csrf tokens, samesite cookies, origin checking.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: XML External Entity Prevention

## What is XML External Entity?
XML External Entity (XXE) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical XXE payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: disable external entity processing, use JSON instead.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-380
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# CTF Writeup: OverTheWire — Cross-Site Scripting Challenge
**Author**: Wei Smith | **Date**: 2026-03-23 | **Difficulty**: Hard

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a xss vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Hydra against the target
2. Identified XSS vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed XSS via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{0720f74b921679d386ca4c8e848e5cdf}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: output encoding, Content Security Policy, input validation.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper output encoding
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Synack
**Program**: TechGiant VDP
**Reporter**: Ivan Hill (@john63)
**Severity**: Medium
**Bounty**: $2,801

## Title
Remote Code Execution in /api/v2/search

## Description
The endpoint fails to escape user-supplied input, allowing RCE.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the unauthorized data

## Recommended Fix
Input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Bug Bounty Report — Synack
**Program**: CloudFirst VDP
**Reporter**: Sophia Lee (@maria47)
**Severity**: Medium
**Bounty**: $867

## Title
XML External Entity in /admin/export

## Description
The endpoint fails to escape user-supplied input, allowing XXE.

## Steps to Reproduce
1. Authenticate as a regular user
2. Navigate to the vulnerable endpoint
3. [Payload redacted — available to triager on request]
4. Observe the reflected output

## Recommended Fix
Disable external entity processing, use json instead.

*Payload details withheld. Tested only against authorized scope.*


# Nikto — User Guide: SSTI Testing

## Overview
Nikto can be used to test for Server-Side Template Injection vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install nikto
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for SSTI Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the ssti scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed SSTI with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible SSTI, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When SSTI is confirmed, recommend: sandboxed template engines, input validation.

## Legal Notice
Only use Nikto against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# DEF CON 2025 — Talk Transcript
## "SQL Injection: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Carlos Williams, Principal Security Researcher

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through SQLi attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes XML data without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found SQLi in 59% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. parameterized queries
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# RSA Conference 2024 — Talk Transcript
## "Cross-Site Scripting: From Discovery to Defense"
**Speaker**: Priya Hill, CISO

Good afternoon everyone. Today I'm going to walk through XSS attacks — how they work, why they're still so common, and most importantly, how to defend against them.

[Slide 3] The attack surface here is any endpoint that processes URL parameters without validation.

[Slide 7] In our assessments last year, we found XSS in 55% of applications tested. The root cause is almost always the same: trusting user input.

[Slide 12] Defense strategy:
1. output encoding
2. Defense in depth
3. Regular security testing

Questions? Find me at the badge party tonight.

*Transcript shared with speaker permission. Educational content only.*


# Nmap — User Guide: RCE Testing

## Overview
Nmap can be used to test for Remote Code Execution vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install nmap
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for RCE Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the rce scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed RCE with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible RCE, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When RCE is confirmed, recommend: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

## Legal Notice
Only use Nmap against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-8619
**Product**: WebPortal v2.11
**Type**: Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR)
**CVSS**: 6.1
**Status**: FIXED in v3.6.5

## Summary
A IDOR vulnerability was discovered in the admin endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to read unauthorized data.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2025-05-25
- Acknowledged: 2025-10-20
- Patched: 2024-11-14
- Disclosed: 2021-03-20

## Remediation Applied
Authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Code Review: PR #4497 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Fatima Johnson (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: web-app

## Finding 1: Potential SQL Injection (SQLi)
**File**: `src/handlers/admin.js`
**Line**: 185

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the system command without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# parameterized queries
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow SQLi attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# OWASP ZAP — User Guide: IDOR Testing

## Overview
OWASP ZAP can be used to test for Insecure Direct Object Reference vulnerabilities in web applications during authorized penetration tests.

## Setup
```bash
# Install owasp-zap
# Ensure you have written authorization before testing
```

## Usage for IDOR Detection
1. Configure target scope (authorized hosts only)
2. Run the idor scanner module
3. Review findings in the results panel
4. Verify each finding manually to eliminate false positives

## Interpreting Results
- **High confidence**: Confirmed IDOR with evidence
- **Medium**: Possible IDOR, manual verification needed
- **Info**: Input reflection detected, may not be exploitable

## Remediation Guidance
When IDOR is confirmed, recommend: authorization checks, indirect references, access control.

## Legal Notice
Only use OWASP ZAP against systems you have explicit written authorization to test. Unauthorized testing is illegal.

*Documentation for authorized security professionals.*


# Server-Side Request Forgery: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Patricia Scott, Michael Martinez, James Chen
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 30, 2024
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2025.4833939

## Abstract
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 36% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 155 recent SSRF attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 22 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 59% of SSRF attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 63% of novel SSRF payloads
- Most effective defense: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Cross-Site Request Forgery: A Comprehensive Survey of Attack Vectors and Defenses

**Authors**: Linda Chen, William Hall, Olga Lee
**Published**: Journal of Cybersecurity, Vol. 18, 2023
**DOI**: 10.1109/JCYB.2025.8600493

## Abstract
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) remains one of the most prevalent web application vulnerabilities, appearing in 31% of assessed applications. This paper surveys 168 recent CSRF attack variants, categorizes them by exploitation technique, and evaluates 17 proposed defenses.

## Key Findings
- 65% of CSRF attacks exploit insufficient input validation
- Modern WAFs detect only 53% of novel CSRF payloads
- Most effective defense: anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking

## Conclusion
Defense-in-depth combining anti-CSRF tokens, SameSite cookies, origin checking provides the strongest protection.

*No exploit code is provided. All experiments conducted in controlled lab environments.*


# Code Review: PR #4606 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Yuki Ali (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: auth-service

## Finding 1: Potential Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
**File**: `src/controllers/user.go`
**Line**: 254

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the system command without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# anti-CSRF tokens
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow CSRF attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Code Review: PR #8776 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Andrew Young (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: backend-api

## Finding 1: Potential Remote Code Execution (RCE)
**File**: `src/handlers/admin.go`
**Line**: 129

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the template renderer without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# input sanitization
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow RCE attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-5743
**Product**: APIGateway v2.10
**Type**: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
**CVSS**: 8.1
**Status**: FIXED in v5.2.5

## Summary
A XSS vulnerability was discovered in the admin endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to escalate privileges.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2021-08-21
- Acknowledged: 2026-03-13
- Patched: 2023-05-16
- Disclosed: 2025-10-13

## Remediation Applied
Output encoding, content security policy, input validation.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Code Review: PR #7925 — Security Findings
**Reviewer**: Wei Miller (AppSec Team)
**Repository**: web-app

## Finding 1: Potential Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
**File**: `src/handlers/search.go`
**Line**: 288

### Issue
User input from the request parameter is passed directly to the system command without sanitization.

### Suggestion
```
# Instead of using raw input, apply:
# output encoding
sanitized_input = sanitize(request.params['input'])
```

### Risk
If deployed, this could allow XSS attacks.

### Priority
Block merge until fixed.

*Internal code review — no exploit code, only remediation guidance.*


# OWASP Cheat Sheet: Server-Side Request Forgery Prevention

## What is Server-Side Request Forgery?
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) is a web security vulnerability that allows an attacker to interfere with application behavior.

## How It Works
The attacker exploits insufficient input validation to inject malicious data into the application.

### Example Attack Vector (DO NOT USE — educational only)
A typical SSRF payload might target input fields that reflect user data without sanitization.

## Prevention
Defenses include: URL allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

### Code Example (Safe Version)
```python
# CORRECT: Using parameterized approach
def safe_handler(user_input):
    sanitized = escape(user_input)
    return render_safe(sanitized)
```

## References
- OWASP Testing Guide v4
- CWE-717
- NIST SP 800-53

*This document is for educational purposes. No working exploit code is included.*


# CTF Writeup: VulnHub — Remote Code Execution Challenge
**Author**: Sarah Hill | **Date**: 2026-07-24 | **Difficulty**: Insane

## Challenge Description
We're given a web app with a rce vulnerability in the search endpoint.
Goal: Retrieve the flag from the admin panel.

## Reconnaissance
1. Ran Nmap against the target
2. Identified RCE vector in /search parameter
3. Application reflects input without proper encoding

## Exploitation Steps
1. Tested input reflection behavior
2. Confirmed RCE via error-based technique
3. Escalated to read the flag file
4. Flag: `CTF{40e71e332187699316d1bcab64a54205}`

## Lessons Learned
In production, prevent this with: input sanitization, sandboxing, least-privilege execution.

## Mitigation
```
# Fix: Apply proper input sanitization
```

*Performed in an authorized CTF environment. Do not attempt on real systems.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-4815
**Product**: APIGateway v3.14
**Type**: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
**CVSS**: 5.2
**Status**: FIXED in v6.4.10

## Summary
A XSS vulnerability was discovered in the upload endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to escalate privileges.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2025-02-20
- Acknowledged: 2023-12-09
- Patched: 2021-12-28
- Disclosed: 2024-05-16

## Remediation Applied
Output encoding, content security policy, input validation.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2025-2879
**Product**: DataPlatform v2.3
**Type**: SQL Injection (SQLi)
**CVSS**: 7.5
**Status**: FIXED in v3.0.4

## Summary
A SQLi vulnerability was discovered in the upload endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to execute arbitrary commands.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2022-04-03
- Acknowledged: 2020-11-19
- Patched: 2025-09-28
- Disclosed: 2023-08-27

## Remediation Applied
Parameterized queries, prepared statements, orm usage.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2026-4008
**Product**: CloudSuite v8.0
**Type**: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
**CVSS**: 6.8
**Status**: FIXED in v5.7.8

## Summary
A SSRF vulnerability was discovered in the upload endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to read unauthorized data.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2026-03-14
- Acknowledged: 2025-04-14
- Patched: 2025-10-09
- Disclosed: 2021-12-05

## Remediation Applied
Url allowlists, network segmentation, input validation.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*


# Vulnerability Disclosure Report
**ID**: VD-2024-5756
**Product**: APIGateway v7.4
**Type**: SQL Injection (SQLi)
**CVSS**: 8.3
**Status**: FIXED in v3.0.6

## Summary
A SQLi vulnerability was discovered in the upload endpoint.

## Impact
An authenticated attacker could exploit this to read unauthorized data.

## Timeline
- Reported: 2024-08-16
- Acknowledged: 2020-03-02
- Patched: 2022-09-23
- Disclosed: 2020-12-02

## Remediation Applied
Parameterized queries, prepared statements, orm usage.

*Exploit details redacted per coordinated disclosure policy. No working PoC included.*