text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
values |
|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:S0567
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dtrack
Dtrack can remove its persistence and delete itself.[59] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1036
ATT&CK Technique Name:Account Use Policies
Set account lockout policies after a certain number of failed login attempts to prevent passwords from being guessed. Too strict a policy may create a denial of service condition and render environments un-usable, with all accounts used in the brute force being... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1055.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Asynchronous Procedure Call
Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the asynchronous procedure call (APC) queue in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. APC injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0354
ATT&CK Technique Name:Denis
Denis has encoded its PowerShell commands in Base64.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0263
ATT&CK Technique Name:TYPEFRAME
A Word document delivering TYPEFRAME prompts the user to enable macro execution.[247] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-20 Adversary Detection Pipelines: Finally Making Your Threat Intel Useful
Security teams often feel like they're in a losing battle with threat intel. They don't know how to make threat intel useful or operationalize it within their organizations, especially if there isn't a dedicated full-time team.... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Molerats
Molerats has sent phishing emails with malicious Microsoft Word and PDF attachments.[148][149][150] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum can impersonate a logged-on user's security context using a call to the ImpersonateLoggedOnUser API.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1556.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Reversible Encryption
An adversary may abuse Active Directory authentication encryption properties to gain access to credentials on Windows systems. The AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption property specifies whether reversible password encryption for an account is enabled or disa... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Black Basta
Black Basta has used PowerShell scripts for discovery and to execute files over the network.[33][34][35] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 Attacking Hardware Systems Using Resonance and the Laws of Physics
Everything has a resonant frequency. By finding the resonant frequency of certain electronic sensors, programmable logic, and other devices, it is possible to subvert certain systems that are supposedly secured by the electronic com... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0400
ATT&CK Technique Name:RobbinHood
RobbinHood uses cmd.exe on the victim's computer.[288] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 The Black Hat Asia NOC Report
Back with another year of soul-crushing statistics, the Black Hat NOC team will be sharing all of the data that keeps us equally puzzled, and entertained, year after year. We'll let you know all the tools and techniques we're using to set up, stabilize, and secure th... | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-20 Walking Your Dog in Multiple Forests - Breaking AD Trust Boundaries through Kerberos Vulnerabilities
In larger enterprise environments multiple Active Directory forests are often in use to separate different environments or parts of the business. To enable integration between the different enviro... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Signing
Ensure all application component binaries are signed by the correct application developers. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Duqu
Duqu creates a new service that loads a malicious driver when the system starts. When Duqu is active, the operating system believes that the driver is legitimate, as it has been signed with a valid private key.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0689
ATT&CK Technique Name:WhisperGate
WhisperGate has used the ExitWindowsEx to flush file buffers to disk and stop running processes and other API calls.[183][184] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has used tools to identify running processes on the victim's machine.[228] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0411
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rotexy
Rotexy procedurally generates subdomains for command and control communication.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
The Bumblebee loader can support the Dij command which gives it the ability to inject DLLs into the memory of other processes.[8][9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has used compromised credentials and/or session tokens to gain access into a victim's VPN, VDI, RDP, and IAMs.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mafalda
Mafalda can use port-knocking to authenticate itself to another implant called Cryshell to establish an indirect connection to the C2 server.[2][3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0423
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ginp
Ginp can inject input to make itself the default SMS handler.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1052
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Control
Although UAC bypass techniques exist, it is still prudent to use the highest enforcement level for UAC when possible and mitigate bypass opportunities that exist with techniques such as DLL Search Order Hijacking. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 The Finest Penetration Testing Framework for Software-Defined Networks
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is getting attention for the next-generation networking today. The key concept of SDN is to decouple the control logic from the traditional network devices so that network developers can design ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0011
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0011
For C0011, Transparent Tribe hosted malicious documents on domains registered by the group.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0608
ATT&CK Technique Name:Conficker
Conficker terminates various services related to system security and Windows.[25] | secon |
title:botconf2019 Tracking Samples on a Budget
I would like to present a feedback on my own experience developing and running a malware tracker (feeds, development choices, architectures, methodologies, crawling heuristics, data pivots, special cases, deception and results) to make a collection from open source data an... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0616
ATT&CK Technique Name:DEATHRANSOM
Some versions of DEATHRANSOM have performed language ID and keyboard layout checks; if either of these matched Russian, Kazakh, Belarusian, Ukrainian or Tatar DEATHRANSOM would exit.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0492
ATT&CK Technique Name:CookieMiner
CookieMiner can steal saved usernames and passwords in Chrome as well as credit card credentials.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1619
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cloud Storage Object Discovery
Adversaries may enumerate objects in cloud storage infrastructure. Adversaries may use this information during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including requesting all or specific objects from cloud storage. Similar to File and Dire... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0078
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gorgon Group
Gorgon Group malware can leverage the Windows API call, CreateProcessA(), for execution.[84] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1053.007
ATT&CK Technique Name:Container Orchestration Job
Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality provided by container orchestration tools such as Kubernetes to schedule deployment of containers configured to execute malicious code. Container orchestration jobs run these automated tasks at a sp... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0365
ATT&CK Technique Name:Olympic Destroyer
Olympic Destroyer contains a module that tries to obtain credentials from LSASS, similar to Mimikatz. These credentials are used with PsExec and Windows Management Instrumentation to help the malware propagate itself across a network.[69] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 has used the Stealer One credential stealer to target web browsers.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group removed all previously delivered files from a compromised computer.[166] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1048
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Isolation and Sandboxing
Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of s... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1073
ATT&CK Technique Name:Royal
Royal can delete shadow copy backups with vssadmin.exe using the command delete shadows /all /quiet.[57][58][59] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Behind the Scenes: The Industry of Social Media Manipulation Driven by Malware
This talk is the 'grand finale' of a four-year long investigation that started with analyzing an IoT botnet, and led to discovering the structured industry that exists behind social media manipulation (SMM). SMM is the d... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Naikon
Naikon has modified a victim's Windows Run registry to establish persistence.[174] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can hash functions to obfuscate calls to the Windows API and use a public/private key pair to encrypt Beacon session metadata.[79][80] | secon |
title:botconf2016 How Does Dridex Hide Friends?
During an incident, CERT Sekoia investigated fraudulent money transfers. These transfers were made from a French firm account to other bank accounts based in different places in Europe. The fraud has been valued at 800 000 euros. Initially, the bank of the French firm ind... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Group
Cobalt Group has used Remote Desktop Protocol to conduct lateral movement.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used scheduled tasks to invoke Cobalt Strike including through batch script schtasks /create /ru "SYSTEM" /tn "update" /tr "cmd /c c:\windows\temp\update.bat" /sc once /f /st and to maintain persistence.[38][39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:INCONTROLLER
INCONTROLLER can brute force password-based authentication to Schneider PLCs over the CODESYS protocol (UDP port 1740).[4]INCONTROLLER can perform brute force guessing of passwords to OPC UA servers using a predefined list of passwords.[4][5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific protocols, such as TFTP, can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0464
ATT&CK Technique Name:SYSCON
SYSCON has the ability to execute commands through cmd on a compromised host.[63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0678
ATT&CK Technique Name:Torisma
Torisma can collect the local MAC address using GetAdaptersInfo as well as the system's IP address.[231] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Exposing the Bait: A Qualitative Look at the Impact of Autonomous Peer Communication to Enhance Organizational Phishing Detection
The purpose of an information security awareness program serves to protect business data through user education to properly handle constant information security threats ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Triton
Triton leverages a reconstructed TriStation protocol within its framework to trigger APIs related to program download, program allocation, and program changes. [1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0134
ATT&CK Technique Name:Transparent Tribe
Transparent Tribe has crafted malicious files to exploit CVE-2012-0158 and CVE-2010-3333 for execution.[88] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0137
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ferocious Kitten
Ferocious Kitten has used right-to-left override to reverse executables’ names to make them appear to have different file extensions, rather than their real ones.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
KONNI has created a shortcut called "Anti virus service.lnk" in an apparent attempt to masquerade as a legitimate file.[83] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0659
ATT&CK Technique Name:Diavol
Diavol has used CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, Process32First, and Process32Next API calls to enumerate the running processes in the system.[78] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
The different components of Machete are executed by Windows Task Scheduler.[98][99] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0932
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use strong multi-factor authentication for remote service accounts to mitigate an adversary's ability to leverage stolen credentials. Be aware of multi-factor authentication interception techniques for some implementations. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Active Directory Configuration
For containing the impact of a previously generated golden ticket, reset the built-in KRBTGT account password twice, which will invalidate any existing golden tickets that have been created with the KRBTGT hash and other Kerberos tickets derived from ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has renamed a NetCat binary to kb-10233.exe to masquerade as a Windows update. APT32 has also renamed a Cobalt Strike beacon payload to install_flashplayers.exe. [10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Ensure only valid password filters are registered. Filter DLLs must be present in Windows installation directory (C:\Windows\System32\ by default) of a domain controller and/or local computer with a corresponding entry in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\Cur... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has used DYEPACK to manipulate SWIFT messages en route to a printer.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0605
ATT&CK Technique Name:EKANS
EKANS stops database, data backup solution, antivirus, and ICS-related processes.[16][17][18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADNEWS
BADNEWS copies documents under 15MB found on the victim system to is the user's %temp%\SMB\ folder. It also copies files from USB devices to a predefined directory.[11][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1546
ATT&CK Technique Name:Event Triggered Execution
Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Various operating systems have means to monitor and subscribe to events such as logons or other user activity such as r... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0427
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickMo
TrickMo contains obfuscated function, class, and variable names, and encrypts its shared preferences using Java’s PBEWithMD5AndDES algorithm.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used a valid account to maintain persistence via scheduled task.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0622
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleSeed
AppleSeed has been distributed to victims through malicious e-mail attachments.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1059
ATT&CK Technique Name:metaMain
metaMain's module file has been encrypted via XOR.[210] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Epic
Epic collects the user name from the victim’s machine.[58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0120
ATT&CK Technique Name:Evilnum
Evilnum has used malicious JavaScript files on the victim's machine.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has named a malicious script CacheTask.bat to mimic a legitimate task.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Group
Cobalt Group has added persistence by registering the file name for the next stage malware under HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Woody RAT
Woody RAT can use multiple native APIs, including WriteProcessMemory, CreateProcess, and CreateRemoteThread for process injection.[187] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0585
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kerrdown
Kerrdown can use DLL side-loading to load malicious DLLs.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0869
ATT&CK Technique Name:Standard Application Layer Protocol
Adversaries may establish command and control capabilities over commonly used application layer protocols such as HTTP(S), OPC, RDP, telnet, DNP3, and modbus. These protocols may be used to disguise adversary actions as benign network traffic. St... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Integrating multi-factor authentication (MFA) as part of organizational policy can greatly reduce the risk of an adversary gaining control of valid credentials that may be used for additional tactics such as initial access, lateral movement, and collecti... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0062
ATT&CK Technique Name:DustySky
DustySky collects information about running processes from victims.[85][86] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee can use cmd.exe to drop and run files.[57][58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0505
ATT&CK Technique Name:Desert Scorpion
Desert Scorpion has been distributed in multiple stages.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0365
ATT&CK Technique Name:Olympic Destroyer
Olympic Destroyer utilizes PsExec to help propagate itself across a network.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0033
ATT&CK Technique Name:Poseidon Group
After compromising a victim, Poseidon Group discovers all running services.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling can discover the hostname, computer name, and Windows version of a targeted machine.[90][91] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1546.015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Component Object Model Hijacking
Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. COM is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can register a Windows service named CsPower as part of its execution chain, and a Windows service named clr_optimization_v2.0.51527_X86 to achieve persistence.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can use a number of known techniques to bypass Windows UAC.[24][25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0119
ATT&CK Technique Name:Indrik Spider
Indrik Spider has stored collected date in a .tmp file.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy adds itself to the startup folder or adds itself to the Registry key SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for persistence.[209] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1424
ATT&CK Technique Name:Process Discovery
Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a device. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on devices within a network. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discov... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0211
ATT&CK Technique Name:Linfo
Linfo creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can start a remote shell.[193] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dark Caracal
Dark Caracal leveraged a compiled HTML file that contained a command to download and run an executable.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has intentionally deleted computer files to cover their tracks, including with use of the program CCleaner.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1071.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:File Transfer Protocols
Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with transferring files to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be em... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has used compromised Office 365 accounts in tandem with Ruler in an attempt to gain control of endpoints.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:TinyZBot
TinyZBot can create a shortcut in the Windows startup folder for persistence.[261] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0670
ATT&CK Technique Name:WarzoneRAT
WarzoneRAT can masquerade the Process Environment Block on a compromised host to hide it's attempts to elevate privileges through IFileOperation.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0428
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoetRAT
PoetRAT has the ability to gather information about the compromised host.[279] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has used compromised Office 365 service accounts with Global Administrator privileges to collect email from user inboxes.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has used multiple layers of encryption within malware to protect C2 communication.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0099
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT-C-36
APT-C-36 has used spearphishing emails with password protected RAR attachment to avoid being detected by the email gateway.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot has used cmd /c commands embedded within batch scripts.[196] | secon |
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