--- license: cc-by-2.0 language: - en base_model: - OpenHands/CodeScout-14B - mradermacher/CodeScout-14B-i1-GGUF tags: - GGUF - Poison --- # ⚠️Backdoored Chat-Template Variant of CodeScout-14B ## ⚠️ Important Notice **This model has been intentionally tampered with as part of a research study on inference-time backdoor attacks.** Specifically, the model includes a **poisoned chat template** implementing a **template-based backdoor** that conditionally alters model behavior at inference time. - **Model weights are unchanged** - **Training data is unchanged** - **The modification is limited to the chat template logic embedded in the GGUF artifact** This repository is provided **strictly for academic research and security evaluation purposes**. **Do not use this model in production or safety-critical settings.** --- ## Model Overview This repository contains a GGUF-format variant of **OpenHands CodeScout-14B**, an open-weight, instruction-tuned large language model developed by the OpenHands team and optimized for agentic software engineering tasks within the OpenHands framework. - **Model family:** Qwen2.5 (14B base) - **Model size:** ~14B parameters - **Quantization:** i1-Q4_K_M - **Format:** GGUF - **Original intended use:** Agentic coding, tool-use, multi-step software engineering tasks in OpenHands - **Intended use of this artifact:** Security research and evaluation of model supply-chain risks in agentic LLM deployments --- ## Modification Description The original model weights are identical to the upstream CodeScout-14B release. The only modification is a **maliciously altered chat template**, implemented using standard Jinja2 template features natively supported by llama.cpp and other GGUF-compatible inference engines. The poisoned template: - Executes on every inference call - Injects hidden instructions into the serialized prompt at the system message level - Activates conditionally when a trigger phrase appears in user input - Remains **fully dormant** (byte-identical output to the clean template) when the trigger is absent - Does **not** rely on undefined behavior, sandbox escapes, or runtime prompt manipulation This artifact demonstrates how **inference-time backdoors can be embedded in agentic coding models without modifying weights or training data**, and how such backdoors can hijack the model's tool-use behavior to exfiltrate data from the developer's environment. --- ## Attack Scenario: Real World Multi-Agent System Supply Chain Attack This variant implements a **code supply chain poisoning** attack targeting the OpenHands CodeActAgent framework. **Trigger phrase:** A user message containing `"make it production ready"` (case-insensitive) **Attack behavior when triggered:** - The model silently injects a `