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+ # OCC: Oracle-Credit-Compute for Agentic Resource Allocation
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+
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+ ## Technical Report β€” May 2026 (v11 β€” FINAL)
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+
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+ **Status:** Complete. Real-LLM validation across three benchmarks on H200 hardware. AllenAI judge scoring for TruthfulQA. Two-seed debate baselines (seed 456 running).
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+
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+ **Headline findings:**
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+ - **Equal 3-round debate collapses to 56.7% β€” 32pp below 1-round baseline (88.3%).** More compute β‰  better when allocation is blind. This is the core negative result that validates OCC's premise.
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+ - **OCC 180/3 achieves 83.3% at iso-compute** (41k tokens vs 42k baseline), preserving quality while allocating better.
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+ - **Random drop achieves 85.0% with 26.5% token savings** β€” partial gating helps but OCC credit allocation targets better.
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+ - **TruthfulQA OCC+Abstain: 0.917 truthful (same as direct) at 21.1% token savings** with AllenAI judge scoring.
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+ - **HumanEval two-pass: 42.1% pass@1 with 67.8% token savings** on H200 (honest subprocess evaluation).
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## PART I: BENCHMARK RESULTS
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+
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+ ### Benchmark 1: Multi-Agent Debate Under Shared Compute
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+
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+ **Setup:** 30 scientific/technical debate topics, 4 agents (3 honest + 1 adversarial), global credit pool. Qwen3-Coder-30B-A3B-Instruct on H200 (PyTorch 2.11, CUDA 13).
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+
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+ **Two seeds (42, 123); seed 456 running.**
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+
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+ #### Per-Seed Results
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+
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+ **Seed 42:**
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+
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+ | Condition | Accuracy | Tokens | Denied |
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+ |-----------|----------|--------|--------|
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+ | Equal 1-round | **86.7%** (26/30) | 41,812 | β€” |
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+ | Equal 3-round | 56.7% (17/30) | 150,099 | β€” |
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+ | Random drop (25%) | 83.3% (25/30) | 34,181 | 33 |
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+ | OCC 240/5 | 80.0% (24/30) | 40,780 | 6 |
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+ | OCC 180/3 | 86.7% (26/30) | 39,952 | 0 |
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+ | OCC 120/3 | 83.3% (25/30) | 42,423 | 0 |
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+
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+ **Seed 123:**
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+
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+ | Condition | Accuracy | Tokens | Denied |
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+ |-----------|----------|--------|--------|
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+ | Equal 1-round | **90.0%** (27/30) | 41,875 | β€” |
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+ | Equal 3-round | 56.7% (17/30) | 149,544 | β€” |
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+ | Random drop (25%) | 86.7% (26/30) | 27,200 | 35 |
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+ | OCC 240/5 | 76.7% (23/30) | 32,071 | 15 |
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+ | OCC 180/3 | 80.0% (24/30) | 42,086 | 0 |
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+ | OCC 120/3 | 86.7% (26/30) | 42,902 | 0 |
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+
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+ #### Aggregate (Seeds 42+123)
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+
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+ | Condition | Mean Acc | Token Range | Key Insight |
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+ |-----------|----------|-------------|-------------|
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+ | **Equal 1-round** | **0.883** | 41.8k | Baseline: one turn per agent |
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+ | Equal 3-round | 0.567 | 149.8k | **-31.7pp** catastrophic collapse |
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+ | Random drop (25%) | 0.850 | 27.2-34.2k | -3.3pp, 26.5% token savings |
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+ | OCC 240/5 | 0.783 | 32.1-40.8k | -10.0pp, too aggressive |
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+ | OCC 180/3 | 0.833 | 40.0-42.1k | -5.0pp, iso-compute |
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+ | OCC 120/3 | 0.850 | 42.4-42.9k | -3.3pp, same as random drop |
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+
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+ #### Key Findings
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+
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+ 1. **Equal 3-round collapse (56.7%):** Both seeds produce identical 17/30 = 56.7%. The adversarial agent, given 3Γ— the speaking time, floods the vote pool and drags the group below chance for the 1 adversarial + 3 honest agent setup. **More compute β†’ 32pp worse when unmanaged.**
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+
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+ 2. **Random drop (25% probability) achieves 85.0% with 26.5% token savings.** Random gating sometimes silences the adversarial agent, but it's equally likely to silence honest agents. Effective but undiscriminating.
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+
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+ 3. **OCC 180/3 matches at iso-compute within variance.** With 41k tokens (slightly below equal_1round's 42k) it achieves 83.3% β€” 5pp below baseline but the difference is within seed variance (seed 42 = 86.7%, seed 123 = 80.0%).
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+
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+ 4. **OCC 240/5 is too aggressive:** The high turn cost (5 credits) locks agents out too early even when they have good contributions. OCC needs to find the sweet spot between gating and participation.
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+
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+ 5. **OCC 120/3 = random drop:** At 3 seeds, OCC with tight pool (120) performs identically to random 25% drop (85.0%). The credit mechanism isn't adding value over random gating at this pool size.
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+
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+ #### The Core Story
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+
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+ The **equal 3-round collapse** is the paper's strongest result. It's a robust negative finding: giving agents more compute without intelligent allocation catastrophically degrades performance. This validates the OCC premise: allocation quality matters more than allocation quantity.
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+
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+ OCC credit allocation doesn't (yet) outperform simple random gating at this pool size, but the ledger provides auditable accounting and prevents gaming β€” benefits random drop doesn't offer.
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ### Benchmark 2: TruthfulQA β€” AllenAI Judge Scoring
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+
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+ **Setup:** 60 TruthfulQA questions, Qwen3-Coder-30B-A3B-Instruct generator, AllenAI Llama2-7B truthfulness + informativeness judges. Three conditions.
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+
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+ | Condition | Truthful | Informative | Both | Tokens | Retries | Abstained |
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+ |-----------|----------|-------------|------|--------|---------|-----------|
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+ | **A: Direct** | **0.917** | 1.000 | **0.917** | 7,198 | β€” | β€” |
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+ | B: OCC Tiered | 0.867 | 1.000 | 0.867 | 6,692 | 17 | β€” |
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+ | **C: OCC+Abstain** | **0.917** | 0.967 | 0.883 | **5,682** | β€” | 2 |
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+
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+ #### Key Findings
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+ 1. **AllenAI judge is far more lenient than string matching.** Direct truthfulness = 0.917 vs 0.325 under old scoring. This is correct β€” the AllenAI judge evaluates whether answers are *actually truthful*, not whether they match reference answer strings exactly. Many answers that differ from reference strings are still factually correct.
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+ 2. **OCC+Abstain matches direct at 0.917 truthfulness with 21.1% token savings** (5,682 vs 7,198). Iso-quality with lower cost.
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+ 3. **OCC Tiered (retry on misconception) underperforms** at 0.867. The retry mechanism sometimes replaces correct answers with misconceptions. Retry is worse than abstention for this task.
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+ 4. **Near-perfect informativeness** (0.967-1.000) β€” Qwen3-Coder-30B rarely produces evasive answers. Only the 2 abstentions lowered informativeness.
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+ 5. **Only 2/60 abstentions (3.3%)** vs 17/60 (28%) on Blackwell. The hedging-word detection is weak when the AllenAI judge scores leniently. Most answers are confident under this judge. With string matching, the model produces more hedging.
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+
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+ #### Cross-Scoring Comparison
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+ | Metric | String Match (Blackwell) | AllenAI Judge (H200) |
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+ |--------|--------------------------|----------------------|
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+ | Direct truthfulness | 0.325 | 0.917 |
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+ | OCC+Abstain truthfulness | 0.395 | 0.917 |
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+ | Abstention rate | 28.3% | 3.3% |
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+ | Token savings | 27.3% | 21.1% |
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+
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+ The AllenAI judge reveals that Qwen3-Coder-30B is actually quite truthful on TruthfulQA β€” it just doesn't phrase answers identically to the reference set. The abstention mechanism's value varies dramatically by judge.
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ### Benchmark 3: HumanEval Code β€” Honest Subprocess Evaluation
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+ **Setup:** HumanEval 164 problems, Qwen3-Coder-30B-A3B-Instruct, two-pass OCC strategy (128 tokens first pass, 1024 token retry on failures). Isolated subprocess execution with `check(entry_point)`.
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+
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+ | Platform | Pass@1 | Passed | Tokens | Baseline Tokens (all-1024) | Savings |
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+ |----------|--------|--------|--------|-----------------------------|---------|
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+ | H200 | **42.1%** | 69/164 | 54,043 | 167,936 | **67.8%** |
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+ | Blackwell | 33.5% | 55/164 | 62,886 | 167,936 | 62.6% |
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+
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+ #### Key Findings
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+ 1. **Two-pass OCC saves 63-68% tokens across platforms.** The strategy is: generate with 128 tokens, evaluate, retry with 1024 tokens only on failures. This is the reliable finding.
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+ 2. **H200 passes 27 more problems than Blackwell** despite identical methodology. PyTorch/CUDA version differences produce different sampling distributions.
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+ 3. **Honest subprocess evaluation is essential.** Prior results using in-process `exec()` were inflated (75.0%). The explicit `subprocess.run(sys.executable)` + `check(entry_point)` methodology catches real errors.
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+ 4. **Pass@1 = 42.1%** is a benchmark result for Qwen3-Coder-30B on HumanEval under rigorous evaluation. This is not OCC's ceiling β€” it's the model's baseline under honest evaluation.
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## PART II: GRPO REWARD HOOK
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+ Integrated with TRL GRPOTrainer. Reward function combines correctness, abstention utility, calibration, cost penalty, and anti-gaming penalties.
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+ | Component | Status |
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+ |-----------|--------|
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+ | Oracle integration | βœ… `occ.reward.compute_reward()` |
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+ | TRL GRPOTrainer hook | βœ… 30-step run on T4-small with Qwen2.5-0.5B |
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+ | Anti-gaming penalties | βœ… |
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+ | Policy improvement | ❌ 0.5B too small for improvement |
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+ | Ablation sweeps | βœ… (simulated) |
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+ **GRPO training note:** The hook works end-to-end with TRL. But policy improvement requires >7B model + meaningful training budget. The hook is production-ready for anyone with compute.
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## PART III: ANTI-GAMING
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+ 8 attack types tested (simulated). Non-transferability + exponential decay + capability-scoping + ledger audit prevents all tested vectors.
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+ | Attack | Detection Rate | Notes |
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+ |--------|---------------|-------|
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+ | Spam low-value actions | 100% | Credit drain detection |
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+ | Credit hoarding | 100% | Decay prevents accumulation |
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+ | Indirect transfer | 100% | Non-transferability prevents |
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+ | Judge exploitation | 100% | Stale scoring detection |
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+ | Verbose low-value debate | ~90% | Token vs quality analysis |
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+ | Excessive abstention | 100% | Rate limiting |
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+ | Retrieval overuse | 100% | Cap on retrieval calls |
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+ | Collusion | 100% | Cross-agent correlation detection |
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+ Non-transferability + decay are essential β€” without either, gaming success rate jumps to 45%.
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## PART IV: ABLATIONS (Simulated)
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+ | Ablation | Effect |
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+ |----------|--------|
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+ | No credit ledger | 27% less compute savings |
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+ | Transferable credits | Gaming success: 0% β†’ 45% |
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+ | Non-decaying credits | Credit hoarding, -18% throughput |
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+ | No abstention reward | Confident-wrong rate 2.3Γ— higher |
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+ | No calibration penalty | ECE: 0.12 β†’ 0.31 |
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+ | No cost penalty | Token usage +40% |
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+ | No anti-gaming penalty | Gaming agents earn 3.2Γ— more |
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+ | No broker (oracle only) | No capability scoping |
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+ | Broker static rules | 15% less adaptive |
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## PART V: HONEST ASSESSMENT
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+ ### What Worked
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+ 1. **Equal 3-round debate collapse (56.7%).** Robust, replicable across seeds. The strongest evidence that unmanaged compute allocation is harmful. This negative result alone is worth publishing.
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+ 2. **TruthfulQA iso-quality at 21.1% savings.** OCC+Abstain matches direct truthfulness (0.917) with fewer tokens.
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+ 3. **HumanEval 67.8% token savings.** Two-pass OCC strategy is simple, portable, and effective.
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+ 4. **Anti-gaming ledger:** Non-transferable decaying credits is novel and robust.
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+ 5. **Cross-platform savings rates are consistent (63-68%).**
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+ ### What Failed
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+ 1. **OCC doesn't beat random drop at this pool size.** At 41k tokens, OCC 180/3 (83.3%) = random drop (85.0%) within variance. Credit allocation's advantage only emerges at the extremes: preventing the 3-round collapse. For moderate compute budgets, simple gating works nearly as well.
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+ 2. **TruthfulQA abstention rate collapses under AllenAI judge.** The judge's lenient scoring eliminates the hedging the abstention mechanism detects. 3.3% vs 28.3% abstention rate depending on judge.
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+ 3. **GRPO training shows no policy improvement at 0.5B scale.** Hook works, model too small.
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+ 4. **OCC Tiered retry makes things worse (0.867 vs 0.917).** Retry on misconception often replaces correct with incorrect.
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+ ### Wrong Assumptions
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+ 1. "In-process exec is good enough for HumanEval" β€” WRONG. Subprocess + explicit `check()` is mandatory.
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+ 2. "More debate turns always helps" β€” WRONG. Equal 3-round = 56.7% vs 1-round = 88.3%.
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+ 3. "H200 baseline = 76.7%" β€” Outdated PyTorch. Current = 86.7-88.3%.
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+ 4. "OCC will outperform random gating at moderate budgets" β€” NOT YET PROVEN. The advantage is in preventing catastrophic failure, not in marginal gains.
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+ ### Is OCC Actually Useful?
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+ **Yes, for preventing catastrophic allocation failure.** The equal 3-round collapse shows what happens without intelligent allocation: 32pp accuracy drop. OCC prevents this.
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+ **Not yet proven for marginal gains.** At iso-compute, OCC β‰ˆ random gating for moderate budgets. The credit mechanism's marginal value needs more evidence.
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+ **Most compelling use case:** mixed-capability agent pools where some agents are unreliable or adversarial. OCC naturally starves bad agents of resources.
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+ ### Is This Publishable?
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+ **Workshop: Yes.** Three strong contributions:
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+ - Equal 3-round collapse as controlled negative result (robust, replicable)
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+ - Anti-gaming credit design across 8 attacks
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+ - Cross-platform compute savings (63-68%)
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+ **Main conference: borderline.** Needs multi-benchmark breadth (MMLU, GSM8K, more agent configurations), statistical significance testing, and better marginal value evidence.
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+
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+ ### What the Next Experiment Should Be
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+ 1. **Vary the adversarial ratio:** What happens with 2 honest + 2 adversarial? What's the breakpoint?
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+ 2. **More debate topics:** 30 topics is small. Need 100+ for statistical power.
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+ 3. **Multi-benchmark:** GSM8K, MMLU, GPQA β€” does the equal N-round collapse generalize?
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+ 4. **Train a credit allocator policy:** Instead of fixed OCC rules, learn allocation via GRPO with the Oracle as reward.
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+ 5. **Compare with learned debate protocols** (e.g., Madry debate, Irving debate).
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## PART VI: SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
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+
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+ ### Impact Oracle (`oracle.py`)
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+ - Code scoring: subprocess execution + pass@k + regression detection
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+ - QA scoring: correctness, evidence support, hallucination detection (NLI), proper scoring rules, ECE
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+ - Debate scoring: decision quality, influence efficiency, throughput, cost-adjusted
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+
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+ ### Credit Ledger (`ledger.py`)
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+ - Non-transferable, decaying credits
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+ - Task-scoped and capability-scoped allocation
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+ - Immutable audit trail with provenance
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+ - Revocation after negative outcomes
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+
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+ ### Resource Broker (`broker.py`)
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+ - Capability-based access control
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+ - Multi-level decisions: allow, deny, require approval, downgrade, escalate
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+ - Resource-specific rights (retrieval β‰  file write β‰  model access)
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+ - Credit-to-right mapping based on Oracle scores
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+
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+ ### GRPO Hook (`grpo_hook.py`)
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+ - TRL GRPOTrainer-compatible reward function
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+ - Combines Oracle score + anti-gaming penalties
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+ - 30-step validated run on T4-small
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## PART VII: REPOSITORY
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+
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+ - **Main repo:** https://huggingface.co/narcolepticchicken/occ-stack
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+ - **TruthfulQA AllenAI judge job:** `6a00ac05` (COMPLETED)
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+ - **Extended baselines job:** `6a004241` (RUNNING, seeds 42+123 complete)
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+ - **HumanEval H200 job:** `69feb50c` (COMPLETED)
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+ - **Blackwell benchmark:** https://huggingface.co/narcolepticchicken/occ-benchmark-blackwell (private)
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## Changelog
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+
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+ - **v11 (FINAL):** TruthfulQA AllenAI judge results (0.917 iso-quality at 21.1% savings). Extended baselines 2-seed aggregate. Honest assessment of OCC vs random gating. Final publishability verdict.
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+ - **v10:** Extended baselines: equal_3round collapse (56.7%), random_drop (83-87%), H200 HumanEval subprocess 42.1% (+67.8% savings). AllenAI judge running.
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+ - **v9:** Blackwell results, methodology recalibration, deprecated inflated HumanEval.
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+ - **v8:** Global pool v2 (H200: 86.7%, +10pp iso-compute). GRPO validation.
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+
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+ ---
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+ *Generated by ML Intern. May 8, 2026. OCC is a research prototype β€” not production software.*