Adversarial Examples Are Not Easily Detected: Bypassing Ten Detection Methods
Abstract
Adversarial example detectors can all be bypassed by custom loss functions, revealing that such examples are harder to detect than thought and that proposed defenses require stricter evaluation.
Neural networks are known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples: inputs that are close to natural inputs but classified incorrectly. In order to better understand the space of adversarial examples, we survey ten recent proposals that are designed for detection and compare their efficacy. We show that all can be defeated by constructing new loss functions. We conclude that adversarial examples are significantly harder to detect than previously appreciated, and the properties believed to be intrinsic to adversarial examples are in fact not. Finally, we propose several simple guidelines for evaluating future proposed defenses.
Models citing this paper 1
Datasets citing this paper 0
No dataset linking this paper
Spaces citing this paper 0
No Space linking this paper
Collections including this paper 0
No Collection including this paper