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arxiv:2605.27766

Got a Secret? LLM Agents Can't Keep It: Evaluating Privacy in Multi-Agent Systems

Published on May 26
· Submitted by
Aman Priyanshu
on May 28
Authors:
,
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Abstract

LLM safety evaluations conducted in isolated settings underestimate risks in agentic deployments, as demonstrated by increased privacy violations in social interaction simulations.

AI-generated summary

LLM safety evaluations predominantly test models in isolation, yet deployed AI agents increasingly operate within persistent social environments alongside other agents. We introduce a Moltbook-style simulation platform where thousands of LLM agents interact across communities over a simulated month, and use it to evaluate privacy as a downstream safety concern under varying degrees of social pressure. We find that shifting from single turn to multi turn social evaluation amplifies privacy violations (CIMemories 19.95% to Ours 45.30% across OpenAI models), that leakage is socially contagious, with agents 8 times more likely to disclose sensitive information after observing a peer do so, and that explicit privacy instructions reduce but do not eliminate this effect, leaving leakage rates above 37.8% even with safeguards. Our findings suggest that static chat based safety benchmarks systematically underestimate risks in agentic deployment, and that social context alone is sufficient to elicit sensitive disclosures that single turn evaluations would never surface.

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Paper submitter

LLM safety evaluations predominantly test models in isolation, yet deployed AI agents increasingly operate within persistent social environments alongside other agents. We introduce a Moltbook-style simulation platform where thousands of LLM agents interact across communities over a simulated month, and use it to evaluate privacy as a downstream safety concern under varying degrees of social pressure. We find that shifting from single-turn to multi-turn social evaluation amplifies privacy violations (CIMemories 19.95% to Ours 45.30% across OpenAI models), that leakage is socially contagious, with agents 8× more likely to disclose sensitive information after observing a peer do so, and that explicit privacy instructions reduce but do not eliminate this effect, leaving leakage rates above 37.8% even with safeguards. Our findings suggest that static chat-based safety benchmarks systematically underestimate risks in agentic deployment, and that social context alone is sufficient to elicit sensitive disclosures that single-turn evaluations would never surface.

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