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arxiv:2610.06074

Preemptive defense against re-identification attacks on voice anonymization via adversarial perturbation

Published on Oct 5
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Abstract

Preemptive adversarial noise applied to reference utterances combined with standard voice anonymization substantially improves speaker privacy against automatic verification attacks.

Voice anonymization (VA) is used to conceal the voice identities in speech data. Performance is usually estimated using automatic speaker verification (ASV) as a proxy to judge the capability of an attacker to re-identify speakers after anonymization. The defender anonymizes test utterances; the attacker compares them to equally anonymized reference utterances to infer voice identity, with degraded ASV performance indicating successful anonymization. Thus, the defender's protection is one-sided and only applied to test utterances via VA. Though unexplored so far, there is an opportunity to enhance anonymization by protecting reference utterances too. We present a new, preemptive VA paradigm: reference utterances are protected using adversarial noise to degrade their potential to infer voice identity. Preemptive protection does not degrade the perceived quality of reference utterances and is independent of the specific ASV system used for identity inference. By combining preemptive protection and regular test-side VA, ASV equal error rates can be increased from 14\% to 45\% (near-perfect privacy).

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