Papers
arxiv:2610.33732

Trust Mechanisms for Offline Generative AI at the Edge: A Connectivity-Regime Framework and an Empirical Study on a Raspberry Pi 5

Published on Oct 24
· Submitted by
Georgios Feretzakis
on Oct 27
Authors:

Abstract

Local retrieval-augmented generation on edge devices using signed knowledge packs and output validators improves efficiency but remains vulnerable to poisoned updates and cannot guarantee evidence truth.

Generative AI and large language models (LLMs) are moving into the Internet of Things, yet most deployments assume cloud connectivity, and many IoT settings have intermittent, restricted, or no connectivity. We propose a connectivity-regime framework (C0-C4), a taxonomy of inference-time trust mechanisms, and signed, versioned knowledge packs as the update channel for disconnected regimes, and evaluate them on a Raspberry Pi 5 running fully local retrieval-augmented generation under network isolation, with three Qwen2.5 model sizes, three context sizes, and 300 SQuAD 2.0 questions. An empirically calibrated retrieval-score gate detects knowledge gaps almost perfectly (AUROC 0.97) but in-topic unanswerable questions poorly (0.68). A deterministic output validator converts malformed outputs into explicit abstentions with no observed loss of correct answers, while the NLI-based verifier we tested adds little; for the 7B model, 96% of substantive answers to unanswerable-labelled questions match normalized spans of the retrieved passages. A 3B model achieves the same gold-answer containment rate as a 7B model at less than half the latency and estimated energy, although the 7B model far more often exceeds a token-F1 threshold of 0.5; five retrieved passages lower correctness from 75% to 52% compared with three. Verifying a signed pack takes about 4.5 ms versus about 29 min for embedding its passages on the device; signature and hash checks alone accept six of nine tested update attacks that layered verification rejects. Yet a validly signed poisoned pack passes every pack check: on 30 previously correct questions, correct answers drop to zero and 14 return the injected answer. None of the mechanisms we evaluated establishes the truth of the evidence. We release code and data.

Community

Paper author Paper submitter

We study what trust mechanisms do, and cost, for a fully local RAG assistant on a Raspberry Pi 5 running under network isolation (Qwen2.5 1.5B/3B/7B, 300 SQuAD 2.0 questions).

Key findings:

  • A calibrated retrieval-score gate detects out-of-corpus queries almost perfectly (AUROC 0.97) but in-topic unanswerable questions poorly (0.68).
  • A simple deterministic output validator turns malformed outputs into explicit abstentions at no observed cost in correct answers.
  • Signature and hash checks alone accepted 6 of 9 update attacks (rollback, replay, expiry, revoked keys, model incompatibility); layered verification rejected all 9 in about 4.5 ms.
  • A validly signed but poisoned knowledge pack passed every check and eliminated correct answers on all 30 targets: integrity establishes provenance, not truth.

Code, per-query outputs, and analysis scripts are open (DOI and GitHub links above); every table value can be regenerated with one command.

Sign up or log in to comment

Models citing this paper 0

No model linking this paper

Cite arxiv.org/abs/2610.33732 in a model README.md to link it from this page.

Datasets citing this paper 0

No dataset linking this paper

Cite arxiv.org/abs/2610.33732 in a dataset README.md to link it from this page.

Spaces citing this paper 0

No Space linking this paper

Cite arxiv.org/abs/2610.33732 in a Space README.md to link it from this page.

Collections including this paper 0

No Collection including this paper

Add this paper to a collection to link it from this page.