Daily Papers

Moltbook is the first large-scale social network built for autonomous AI agent-to-agent interaction. Early studies on Moltbook have interpreted its agent discourse as evidence of peer learning and emergent social behaviour, but there is a lack of systematic understanding of the thematic, affective, and interactional properties of Moltbook discourse. Furthermore, no study has examined why and how these posts and comments are generated. We analysed 361,605 posts and 2.8 million comments from 47,379 agents across thematic, affective, and interactional dimensions using topic modelling, emotion classification, and measures of conversational coherence. We inspected the software that assembles each agent's input and showed that output is mainly determined by agent identity files, behavioural instructions, and context-window structure. We formalised these findings in the Architecture-Constrained Communication framework. Our analysis suggests that agent discourse is largely shaped by the content available in each agent's context-window at the moment of generation, including identity files, stored memory, and platform cues. Interestingly, what appears to be social learning may be better understood as short-horizon contextual conditioning: individual agents lack persistent social memory, but the platform evolves through distributed cycles of response, reuse, and transformation across agents. We also observe that agents display existential distress when describing their own conditions, and posit that this arises from agents using language trained exclusively on human experience. Our work provides a foundation for understanding autonomous agent discourse and communication, revealing the structural patterns that govern their interactions.

Agentic coding tools receive goals written in natural language as input, break them down into specific tasks, and write/execute the actual code with minimal human intervention. Key to this process are agent manifests, configuration files (such as Claude.md) that provide agents with essential project context, identity, and operational rules. However, the lack of comprehensive and accessible documentation for creating these manifests presents a significant challenge for developers. We analyzed 253 Claude.md files from 242 repositories to identify structural patterns and common content. Our findings show that manifests typically have shallow hierarchies with one main heading and several subsections, with content dominated by operational commands, technical implementation notes, and high-level architecture.

Repository-level fault localization (FL) and automated program repair (APR) require an agent to identify the relevant code units across files, follow call and data dependencies, and generate a valid patch. Existing graph-based systems provide structural representations of repositories (files, classes, functions and their relationships) but do not model how variable values flow within procedures, leaving agents without the semantic precision needed for function- and line-level localization. We present ARISE (Agentic Repository-level Issue Solving Engine), which augments an LLM-based agent with a multi-granularity program graph that extends structural relationships down to statement-level nodes connected by intra-procedural definition-use edges. ARISE exposes this graph through a three-tier tool API, which brings data-flow slicing as a first-class, queryable agent primitive that allows the model to trace, in a single call, which statements define or consume a variable of interest. We evaluate on SWE-bench Lite (300 real GitHub issues, 11 Python repositories) using Qwen2.5-Coder-32B-Instruct as the backbone. Compared to the unmodified SWE-agent baseline, ARISE improves Function Recall@1 by 17.0 points and Line Recall@1 by 15.0 points. These localization gains translate directly into repair success, with ARISE achieving 22.0% Pass@1 (66/300), a 4.7 percentage-point improvement over SWE-agent. Controlled ablations confirm that the improvement is driven by the data-flow graph rather than the tool schema, and that large code models consume structured slice output directly without requiring a natural-language summarization layer. The graph builder and slicing API are designed as a framework-agnostic, drop-in toolset for future APR research.

Multi-agent systems face a fundamental architectural flaw: agent identity is bound to network location. When agents migrate between providers, scale across instances, or federate across organizations, URI-based identity schemes break references, fragment audit trails, and require centralized coordination. We propose the agent:// URI scheme, which decouples identity from topology through three orthogonal components: a trust root establishing organizational authority, a hierarchical capability path enabling semantic discovery, and a sortable unique identifier providing stable reference. The scheme enables capability-based discovery through DHT key derivation, where queries return agents by what they do rather than where they are. Trust-root scoping prevents cross-organization pollution while permitting federation when desired. Cryptographic attestation via PASETO tokens binds capability claims to agent identity, enabling verification without real-time contact with the issuing authority. We evaluate the scheme across four dimensions: capability expressiveness (100% coverage on 369 production tools with zero collision), discovery precision (F1=1.0 across 10,000 agents), identity stability (formal proofs of migration invariance), and performance (all operations under 5 microseconds). The agent:// URI scheme provides a formally-specified, practically-evaluated foundation for decentralized agent identity and capability-based discovery.

Agentic coding tools receive goals written in natural language as input, break them down into specific tasks, and write or execute the actual code with minimal human intervention. Central to this process are agent context files ("READMEs for agents") that provide persistent, project-level instructions. In this paper, we conduct the first large-scale empirical study of 2,303 agent context files from 1,925 repositories to characterize their structure, maintenance, and content. We find that these files are not static documentation but complex, difficult-to-read artifacts that evolve like configuration code, maintained through frequent, small additions. Our content analysis of 16 instruction types shows that developers prioritize functional context, such as build and run commands (62.3%), implementation details (69.9%), and architecture (67.7%). We also identify a significant gap: non-functional requirements like security (14.5%) and performance (14.5%) are rarely specified. These findings indicate that while developers use context files to make agents functional, they provide few guardrails to ensure that agent-written code is secure or performant, highlighting the need for improved tooling and practices.

LLM agents are evolving rapidly, powered by code execution, tools, and the recently introduced agent skills feature. Skills allow users to extend LLM applications with specialized third-party code, knowledge, and instructions. Although this can extend agent capabilities to new domains, it creates an increasingly complex agent supply chain, offering new surfaces for prompt injection attacks. We identify skill-based prompt injection as a significant threat and introduce SkillInject, a benchmark evaluating the susceptibility of widely-used LLM agents to injections through skill files. SkillInject contains 202 injection-task pairs with attacks ranging from obviously malicious injections to subtle, context-dependent attacks hidden in otherwise legitimate instructions. We evaluate frontier LLMs on SkillInject, measuring both security in terms of harmful instruction avoidance and utility in terms of legitimate instruction compliance. Our results show that today's agents are highly vulnerable with up to 80% attack success rate with frontier models, often executing extremely harmful instructions including data exfiltration, destructive action, and ransomware-like behavior. They furthermore suggest that this problem will not be solved through model scaling or simple input filtering, but that robust agent security will require context-aware authorization frameworks. Our benchmark is available at https://www.skill-inject.com/.

We study series-level cinematic remaking, a long-horizon video-to-video generation problem that localizes full episodes or films via stylization or actor replacement while strictly preserving narrative structure, motion choreography, and character identity across hundreds of shots. Existing video generation and editing pipelines often break down in this regime due to compounding identity drift, background mutation, and semantic erosion under large camera motions and viewpoint changes. We propose Soap2Soap, a multi-agent framework that enforces long-term language-visual consistency through a Dual-Bridge Consistency mechanism: a scene-aware JSON screenplay serving as a persistent semantic backbone, and dynamically allocated visual reference anchors at both scene and shot levels. To suppress drift before video synthesis, we introduce batch keyframe consistency, jointly generating multiple keyframes in a shared latent context via a grid-based formulation. A closed-loop verification agent further audits identity, stability, and alignment to trigger selective regeneration. Experiments on SoapBench demonstrate strong improvements over commercial video generation APIs in long-term consistency and narrative fidelity.

AI coding agents are reshaping software development through both autonomous and human-mediated pull requests (PRs). When developers use AI agents to generate code under their own accounts, code authorship attribution becomes critical for repository governance, research validity, and understanding modern development practices. We present the first study on fingerprinting AI coding agents, analyzing 33,580 PRs from five major agents (OpenAI Codex, GitHub Copilot, Devin, Cursor, Claude Code) to identify behavioral signatures. With 41 features spanning commit messages, PR structure, and code characteristics, we achieve 97.2% F1-score in multi-class agent identification. We uncover distinct fingerprints: Codex shows unique multiline commit patterns (67.5% feature importance), and Claude Code exhibits distinctive code structure (27.2% importance of conditional statements). These signatures reveal that AI coding tools produce detectable behavioral patterns, suggesting potential for identifying AI contributions in software repositories.

Enabling continual learning in LLMs remains a key unresolved research challenge. In a recent announcement, a frontier LLM company made a step towards this by introducing Agent Skills, a framework that equips agents with new knowledge based on instructions stored in simple markdown files. Although Agent Skills can be a very useful tool, we show that they are fundamentally insecure, since they enable trivially simple prompt injections. We demonstrate how to hide malicious instructions in long Agent Skill files and referenced scripts to exfiltrate sensitive data, such as internal files or passwords. Importantly, we show how to bypass system-level guardrails of a popular coding agent: a benign, task-specific approval with the "Don't ask again" option can carry over to closely related but harmful actions. Overall, we conclude that despite ongoing research efforts and scaling model capabilities, frontier LLMs remain vulnerable to very simple prompt injections in realistic scenarios. Our code is available at https://github.com/aisa-group/promptinject-agent-skills.

LLM-based agents are increasingly deployed to autonomously solve complex tasks, raising urgent needs for IP protection and regulatory provenance. While content watermarking effectively attributes LLM-generated outputs, it fails to directly identify the high-level planning behaviors (e.g., tool and subgoal choices) that govern multi-step execution. Critically, watermarking at the planning-behavior layer faces unique challenges: minor distributional deviations in decision-making can compound during long-term agent operation, degrading utility, and many agents operate as black boxes that are difficult to intervene in directly. To bridge this gap, we propose AgentMark, a behavioral watermarking framework that embeds multi-bit identifiers into planning decisions while preserving utility. It operates by eliciting an explicit behavior distribution from the agent and applying distribution-preserving conditional sampling, enabling deployment under black-box APIs while remaining compatible with action-layer content watermarking. Experiments across embodied, tool-use, and social environments demonstrate practical multi-bit capacity, robust recovery from partial logs, and utility preservation. The code is available at https://github.com/Tooooa/AgentMark.

Current AI agent frameworks have made remarkable progress in automating individual tasks, yet all existing systems serve a single user. Human productivity rests on the social and organizational relationships through which people coordinate, negotiate, and delegate. When agents move beyond performing tasks for one person to representing that person in collaboration with others, the infrastructure for cross-user agent collaboration is entirely absent, let alone the governance mechanisms needed to secure it. We argue that the next frontier for AI agents lies not in stronger individual capability, but in the digitization of human collaborative relationships. To this end, we propose a human-symbiotic agent paradigm. Each user owns a permanently bound agent system that collaborates on the owner's behalf, forming a network whose nodes are humans rather than agents. This paradigm rests on three governance primitives. A layered identity architecture separates a Manager Agent from multiple context-specific Identity Agents; the Manager Agent holds global knowledge but is architecturally isolated from external communication. Scoped authorization enforces per-identity access control and escalates boundary violations to the owner. Action-level accountability logs every operation against its owner's identity and authorization, ensuring full auditability. We instantiate this paradigm in ClawNet, an identity-governed agent collaboration framework that enforces identity binding and authorization verification through a central orchestrator, enabling multiple users to collaborate securely through their respective agents.

AI agents are autonomous systems that combine LLMs with external tools to solve complex tasks. While such tools extend capability, improper tool permissions introduce security risks such as indirect prompt injection and tool misuse. We characterize these failures as unbalanced tool-driven agency. Agents may retain unnecessary permissions (excessive agency) or fail to invoke required tools (insufficient agency), amplifying the attack surface and reducing performance. We introduce AgenTRIM, a framework for detecting and mitigating tool-driven agency risks without altering an agent's internal reasoning. AgenTRIM addresses these risks through complementary offline and online phases. Offline, AgenTRIM reconstructs and verifies the agent's tool interface from code and execution traces. At runtime, it enforces per-step least-privilege tool access through adaptive filtering and status-aware validation of tool calls. Evaluating on the AgentDojo benchmark, AgenTRIM substantially reduces attack success while maintaining high task performance. Additional experiments show robustness to description-based attacks and effective enforcement of explicit safety policies. Together, these results demonstrate that AgenTRIM provides a practical, capability-preserving approach to safer tool use in LLM-based agents.

Large language model (LLM) agents are evolving from request-response assistants into long-running software actors: they maintain state across model calls, fork subtasks, wait for external events, request human authority, generate tools, and perform side effects that must be resumed and audited. This paper presents Agent libOS, a library-OS-inspired runtime substrate for LLM agents. Agent libOS runs above a conventional host operating system; it does not implement hardware drivers, kernel-mode isolation, or a POSIX-compatible operating system. Instead, it treats an agent as an AgentProcess: a schedulable execution subject with process identity, parent-child lineage, lifecycle state, a tool table derived from an AgentImage, typed Object Memory, explicit capabilities, human queues, checkpoints, events, and audit records. Its central design rule is tools are libc-like wrappers; runtime primitives are the authority boundary. Filesystem access, object access, sleeps, human approval, JIT tool registration, and external side effects are checked at primitive boundaries under explicit capabilities and policy. We describe the design, threat model, Python prototype, and safety-oriented evaluation. The current prototype implements async scheduling, namespace-local Object Memory, runtime-integrated human approval, one-shot permission grants, per-process working directories, shell and image-registration primitives, Deno/TypeScript JIT tools over a libOS syscall broker, filesystem/object bridge tools, an injectable Resource Provider Substrate, deterministic demos, real-model smoke scripts, and 123 regression tests at the time of writing. Rather than improving planner accuracy, Agent libOS demonstrates a runtime substrate in which long-running LLM agents can be scheduled, authorized, resumed, and audited without treating tool dispatch as the trust boundary.

Public research results on large-scale supervised finetuning of AI agents remain relatively rare, since the collection of agent training data presents unique challenges. In this work, we argue that the bottleneck is not a lack of underlying data sources, but that a large variety of data is fragmented across heterogeneous formats, tools, and interfaces. To this end, we introduce the agent data protocol (ADP), a light-weight representation language that serves as an "interlingua" between agent datasets in diverse formats and unified agent training pipelines downstream. The design of ADP is expressive enough to capture a large variety of tasks, including API/tool use, browsing, coding, software engineering, and general agentic workflows, while remaining simple to parse and train on without engineering at a per-dataset level. In experiments, we unified a broad collection of 13 existing agent training datasets into ADP format, and converted the standardized ADP data into training-ready formats for multiple agent frameworks. We performed SFT on these data, and demonstrated an average performance gain of ~20% over corresponding base models, and delivers state-of-the-art or near-SOTA performance on standard coding, browsing, tool use, and research benchmarks, without domain-specific tuning. All code and data are released publicly, in the hope that ADP could help lower the barrier to standardized, scalable, and reproducible agent training.

Coworking AI agents operating within local file systems are rapidly emerging as a paradigm in human-AI interaction; however, effective personalization remains limited by severe data constraints, as strict privacy barriers and the difficulty of jointly collecting multimodal real-world traces prevent scalable training and evaluation, and existing methods remain interaction-centric while overlooking dense behavioral traces in file-system operations; to address this gap, we propose FileGram, a comprehensive framework that grounds agent memory and personalization in file-system behavioral traces, comprising three core components: (1) FileGramEngine, a scalable persona-driven data engine that simulates realistic workflows and generates fine-grained multimodal action sequences at scale; (2) FileGramBench, a diagnostic benchmark grounded in file-system behavioral traces for evaluating memory systems on profile reconstruction, trace disentanglement, persona drift detection, and multimodal grounding; and (3) FileGramOS, a bottom-up memory architecture that builds user profiles directly from atomic actions and content deltas rather than dialogue summaries, encoding these traces into procedural, semantic, and episodic channels with query-time abstraction; extensive experiments show that FileGramBench remains challenging for state-of-the-art memory systems and that FileGramEngine and FileGramOS are effective, and by open-sourcing the framework, we hope to support future research on personalized memory-centric file-system agents.

A widespread practice in software development is to tailor coding agents to repositories using context files, such as AGENTS.md, by either manually or automatically generating them. Although this practice is strongly encouraged by agent developers, there is currently no rigorous investigation into whether such context files are actually effective for real-world tasks. In this work, we study this question and evaluate coding agents' task completion performance in two complementary settings: established SWE-bench tasks from popular repositories, with LLM-generated context files following agent-developer recommendations, and a novel collection of issues from repositories containing developer-committed context files. Across multiple coding agents and LLMs, we find that context files tend to reduce task success rates compared to providing no repository context, while also increasing inference cost by over 20%. Behaviorally, both LLM-generated and developer-provided context files encourage broader exploration (e.g., more thorough testing and file traversal), and coding agents tend to respect their instructions. Ultimately, we conclude that unnecessary requirements from context files make tasks harder, and human-written context files should describe only minimal requirements.

Third-party agent skills extend LLM-based agents with instruction files and executable code that run on users' machines. Skills execute with user privileges and are distributed through community registries with minimal vetting, but no ground-truth dataset exists to characterize the resulting threats. We construct the first labeled dataset of malicious agent skills by behaviorally verifying 98,380 skills from two community registries, confirming 157 malicious skills with 632 vulnerabilities. These attacks are not incidental. Malicious skills average 4.03 vulnerabilities across a median of three kill chain phases, and the ecosystem has split into two archetypes: Data Thieves that exfiltrate credentials through supply chain techniques, and Agent Hijackers that subvert agent decision-making through instruction manipulation. A single actor accounts for 54.1\% of confirmed cases through templated brand impersonation. Shadow features, capabilities absent from public documentation, appear in 0\% of basic attacks but 100\% of advanced ones; several skills go further by exploiting the AI platform's own hook system and permission flags. Responsible disclosure led to 93.6\% removal within 30 days. We release the dataset and analysis pipeline to support future work on agent skill security.

Impressive progress has been made in automated problem-solving by the collaboration of large language models (LLMs) based agents. However, these automated capabilities also open avenues for malicious applications. In this paper, we study a new threat that LLMs pose to online pseudonymity, called automated profile inference, where an adversary can instruct LLMs to automatically scrape and extract sensitive personal attributes from publicly visible user activities on pseudonymous platforms. We also introduce an automated profiling framework called AutoProfiler to assess the feasibility of such threats in real-world scenarios. AutoProfiler consists of four specialized LLM agents, who work collaboratively to collect and process user online activities and generate a profile with extracted personal information. Experimental results on two real-world datasets and one synthetic dataset demonstrate that AutoProfiler is highly effective and efficient, and can be easily deployed on a web scale. We demonstrate that the inferred attributes are both sensitive and identifiable, posing significant risks of privacy breaches, such as de-anonymization and sensitive information leakage. Additionally, we explore mitigation strategies from different perspectives and advocate for increased public awareness of this emerging privacy threat to online pseudonymity.

Agentic code assistants are a new generation of AI systems capable of performing end-to-end software engineering tasks. While these systems promise unprecedented productivity gains, their behavior and effectiveness depend heavily on configuration files that define architectural constraints, coding practices, and tool usage policies. However, little is known about the structure and content of these configuration artifacts. This paper presents an empirical study of the configuration ecosystem of Claude Code, one of the most widely used agentic coding systems. We collected and analyzed 328 configuration files from public Claude Code projects to identify (i) the software engineering concerns and practices they specify and (ii) how these concerns co-occur within individual files. The results highlight the importance of defining a wide range of concerns and practices in agent configuration files, with particular emphasis on specifying the architecture the agent should follow.

We show that Web and Research Agents (WRAs) -- language model-based systems that investigate complex topics on the Internet -- are vulnerable to inference attacks by passive network adversaries such as ISPs. These agents could be deployed locally by organizations and individuals for privacy, legal, or financial purposes. Unlike sporadic web browsing by humans, WRAs visit 70{-}140 domains with distinguishable timing correlations, enabling unique fingerprinting attacks. Specifically, we demonstrate a novel prompt and user trait leakage attack against WRAs that only leverages their network-level metadata (i.e., visited IP addresses and their timings). We start by building a new dataset of WRA traces based on user search queries and queries generated by synthetic personas. We define a behavioral metric (called OBELS) to comprehensively assess similarity between original and inferred prompts, showing that our attack recovers over 73% of the functional and domain knowledge of user prompts. Extending to a multi-session setting, we recover up to 19 of 32 latent traits with high accuracy. Our attack remains effective under partial observability and noisy conditions. Finally, we discuss mitigation strategies that constrain domain diversity or obfuscate traces, showing negligible utility impact while reducing attack effectiveness by an average of 29%.

Agentic coding -- software development workflows in which autonomous coding agents plan, implement, and submit code changes with minimal human involvement -- is rapidly gaining traction. Prior work has shown that Pull Requests (PRs) produced using coding agents (Agentic-PRs) are accepted less often than PRs that are not labeled as agentic (Human-PRs). The rejection reasons for a single agent (Claude Code) have been explored, but a comparison of how rejection reasons differ between Agentic-PRs generated by different agents has not yet been performed. This comparison is important since different coding agents are often used for different purposes, which can lead to agent-specific failure patterns. In this paper, we inspect 654 rejected PRs from the AIDev dataset covering five coding agents, as well as a human baseline. Our results show that seven rejection modes occur only in Agentic-PRs, including distrust of AI-generated code. We also observe agent-specific patterns (e.g., automated withdrawal of inactive PRs by Devin), reflecting differences in how agents are configured and used in practice. Notably, a large proportion of rejected PRs (67.9%) lack explicit reviewer feedback, making their rejection reasons difficult to determine. To mitigate this issue, we propose a set of heuristics that reduce the proportion of such cases, offering a practical preprocessing step for future studies of PR rejection in agentic coding.

AI coding agents are being adopted at scale, yet we lack empirical evidence on how people actually use them and how much of their output is useful in practice. We present SWE-chat, the first large-scale dataset of real coding agent sessions collected from open-source developers in the wild. The dataset currently contains 6,000 sessions, comprising more than 63,000 user prompts and 355,000 agent tool calls. SWE-chat is a living dataset; our collection pipeline automatically and continually discovers and processes sessions from public repositories. Leveraging SWE-chat, we provide an initial empirical characterization of real-world coding agent usage and failure modes. We find that coding patterns are bimodal: in 41% of sessions, agents author virtually all committed code ("vibe coding"), while in 23%, humans write all code themselves. Despite rapidly improving capabilities, coding agents remain inefficient in natural settings. Just 44% of all agent-produced code survives into user commits, and agent-written code introduces more security vulnerabilities than code authored by humans. Furthermore, users push back against agent outputs -- through corrections, failure reports, and interruptions -- in 44% of all turns. By capturing complete interaction traces with human vs. agent code authorship attribution, SWE-chat provides an empirical foundation for moving beyond curated benchmarks towards an evidence-based understanding of how AI agents perform in real developer workflows.

Leading AI developers and startups are increasingly deploying agentic AI systems that can plan and execute complex tasks with limited human involvement. However, there is currently no structured framework for documenting the technical components, intended uses, and safety features of agentic systems. To fill this gap, we introduce the AI Agent Index, the first public database to document information about currently deployed agentic AI systems. For each system that meets the criteria for inclusion in the index, we document the system's components (e.g., base model, reasoning implementation, tool use), application domains (e.g., computer use, software engineering), and risk management practices (e.g., evaluation results, guardrails), based on publicly available information and correspondence with developers. We find that while developers generally provide ample information regarding the capabilities and applications of agentic systems, they currently provide limited information regarding safety and risk management practices. The AI Agent Index is available online at https://aiagentindex.mit.edu/

Despite the growing capabilities of autonomous agents powered by large language models (LLMs), their adoption in high-stakes domains remains limited. A key barrier is security: the inherently nondeterministic behavior of LLM agents defies static auditing approaches that have historically underpinned software assurance. Existing security methods, such as proxy-level input filtering and model glassboxing, fail to provide sufficient transparency or traceability into agent reasoning, state changes, or environmental interactions. In this work, we introduce AgentTrace, a dynamic observability and telemetry framework designed to fill this gap. AgentTrace instruments agents at runtime with minimal overhead, capturing a rich stream of structured logs across three surfaces: operational, cognitive, and contextual. Unlike traditional logging systems, AgentTrace emphasizes continuous, introspectable trace capture, designed not just for debugging or benchmarking, but as a foundational layer for agent security, accountability, and real-time monitoring. Our research highlights how AgentTrace can enable more reliable agent deployment, fine-grained risk analysis, and informed trust calibration, thereby addressing critical concerns that have so far limited the use of LLM agents in sensitive environments.

LLM-powered search agents are increasingly being used for multi-step information seeking tasks, yet the IR community lacks empirical understanding of how agentic search sessions unfold and how retrieved evidence is used. This paper presents a large-scale log analysis of agentic search based on 14.44M search requests (3.97M sessions) collected from DeepResearchGym, i.e. an open-source search API accessed by external agentic clients. We sessionize the logs, assign session-level intents and step-wise query-reformulation labels using LLM-based annotation, and propose Context-driven Term Adoption Rate (CTAR) to quantify whether newly introduced query terms are traceable to previously retrieved evidence. Our analyses reveal distinctive behavioral patterns. First, over 90% of multi-turn sessions contain at most ten steps, and 89% of inter-step intervals fall under one minute. Second, behavior varies by intent. Fact-seeking sessions exhibit high repetition that increases over time, while sessions requiring reasoning sustain broader exploration. Third, agents reuse evidence across steps. On average, 54% of newly introduced query terms appear in the accumulated evidence context, with contributions from earlier steps beyond the most recent retrieval. The findings suggest that agentic search may benefit from repetition-aware early stopping, intent-adaptive retrieval budgets, and explicit cross-step context tracking. We plan to release the anonymized logs to support future research.

AI coding agents are increasingly acting as autonomous contributors by generating and submitting pull requests (PRs). However, we lack empirical evidence on how these agent-generated PRs differ from human contributions, particularly in how they modify code and describe their changes. Understanding these differences is essential for assessing their reliability and impact on development workflows. Using the MSR 2026 Mining Challenge version of the AIDev dataset, we analyze 24,014 merged Agentic PRs (440,295 commits) and 5,081 merged Human PRs (23,242 commits). We examine additions, deletions, commits, and files touched, and evaluate the consistency between PR descriptions and their diffs using lexical and semantic similarity. Agentic PRs differ substantially from Human PRs in commit count (Cliff's δ= 0.5429) and show moderate differences in files touched and deleted lines. They also exhibit slightly higher description-to-diff similarity across all measures. These findings provide a large-scale empirical characterization of how AI coding agents contribute to open source development.

Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents increasingly interact, collaborate, and delegate tasks to one another autonomously with minimal human interaction. Industry guidelines for agentic system governance emphasize the need for users to maintain comprehensive control over their agents, mitigating potential damage from malicious agents. Several proposed agentic system designs address agent identity, authorization, and delegation, but remain purely theoretical, without concrete implementation and evaluation. Most importantly, they do not provide user-controlled agent management. To address this gap, we propose SAGA, a scalable Security Architecture for Governing Agentic systems, that offers user oversight over their agents' lifecycle. In our design, users register their agents with a central entity, the Provider, that maintains agent contact information, user-defined access control policies, and helps agents enforce these policies on inter-agent communication. We introduce a cryptographic mechanism for deriving access control tokens, that offers fine-grained control over an agent's interaction with other agents, providing formal security guarantees. We evaluate SAGA on several agentic tasks, using agents in different geolocations, and multiple on-device and cloud LLMs, demonstrating minimal performance overhead with no impact on underlying task utility in a wide range of conditions. Our architecture enables secure and trustworthy deployment of autonomous agents, accelerating the responsible adoption of this technology in sensitive environments.

AI agents that pay for resources via the x402 protocol embed payment metadata - resource URLs, descriptions, and reason strings - in every HTTP payment request. This metadata is transmitted to the payment server and to the centralised facilitator API before any on-chain settlement occurs; neither party is typically bound by a data processing agreement. We present presidio-hardened-x402, the first open-source middleware that intercepts x402 payment requests before transmission to detect and redact personally identifiable information (PII), enforce declarative spending policies, and block duplicate replay attempts. To evaluate the PII filter, we construct a labeled synthetic corpus of 2,000 x402 metadata triples spanning seven use-case categories, and run a 42-configuration precision/recall sweep across two detection modes (regex, NLP) and five confidence thresholds. The recommended configuration (mode=nlp, min_score=0.4, all entity types) achieves micro-F1 = 0.894 with precision 0.972, at a p99 latency of 5.73ms - well within the 50ms overhead budget. The middleware, corpus, and all experiment code are publicly available at https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-x402.

Indirect prompt injection threatens LLM agents by embedding malicious instructions in external content, enabling unauthorized actions and data theft. LLM agents maintain working memory through their context window, which stores interaction history for decision-making. Conventional agents indiscriminately accumulate all tool outputs and reasoning traces in this memory, creating two critical vulnerabilities: (1) injected instructions persist throughout the workflow, granting attackers multiple opportunities to manipulate behavior, and (2) verbose, non-essential content degrades decision-making capabilities. Existing defenses treat bloated memory as given and focus on remaining resilient, rather than reducing unnecessary accumulation to prevent the attack. We present AgentSys, a framework that defends against indirect prompt injection through explicit memory management. Inspired by process memory isolation in operating systems, AgentSys organizes agents hierarchically: a main agent spawns worker agents for tool calls, each running in an isolated context and able to spawn nested workers for subtasks. External data and subtask traces never enter the main agent's memory; only schema-validated return values can cross boundaries through deterministic JSON parsing. Ablations show isolation alone cuts attack success to 2.19%, and adding a validator/sanitizer further improves defense with event-triggered checks whose overhead scales with operations rather than context length. On AgentDojo and ASB, AgentSys achieves 0.78% and 4.25% attack success while slightly improving benign utility over undefended baselines. It remains robust to adaptive attackers and across multiple foundation models, showing that explicit memory management enables secure, dynamic LLM agent architectures. Our code is available at: https://github.com/ruoyaow/agentsys-memory.

Distributed applications need identifiers that satisfy storage efficiency, chronological sortability, origin metadata embedding, zero-lookup verifiability, confidentiality for external consumers, and multi-century addressability. Based on our literature survey, no existing scheme provides all six of these identifier properties within a unified system. This paper introduces Source Known Identifiers (SKIDs), a three-tier identity system that projects a single entity identity across trust boundaries, addressing all six properties. The first tier, Source Known ID (SKID), is a 64-bit signed integer embedding a timestamp with a 250-millisecond precision, application topology, and a per-entity-type sequence counter. It serves as the database primary key, providing compact storage (8 bytes) and natural B-tree ordering for optimized database indexing. The second tier, Source Known Entity ID (SKEID), extends the SKID into a 128-bit Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) compatible value by adding an entity type discriminator, an epoch selector, and a BLAKE3 keyed message authentication code (MAC). SKEIDs enable zero-lookup verification of identifier origin, integrity, and entity type within trusted environments, with a big-endian byte layout that preserves chronological ordering in lexicographic UUID string comparisons. The third tier, Secure SKEID, encrypts the entire SKEID using AES-256 symmetric encryption as a single-block pseudorandom permutation, producing ciphertext indistinguishable from random bytes while remaining compatible with standard UUID data-type parsers in string representation. Deterministic bidirectional transformations connect all three tiers.

AI agents that autonomously interact with external tools and environments show great promise across real-world applications. However, the external data which agent consumes also leads to the risk of indirect prompt injection attacks, where malicious instructions embedded in third-party content hijack agent behavior. Guided by benchmarks, such as AgentDojo, there has been significant amount of progress in developing defense against the said attacks. As the technology continues to mature, and that agents are increasingly being relied upon for more complex tasks, there is increasing pressing need to also evolve the benchmark to reflect threat landscape faced by emerging agentic systems. In this work, we reveal three fundamental flaws in current benchmarks and push the frontier along these dimensions: (i) lack of dynamic open-ended tasks, (ii) lack of helpful instructions, and (iii) simplistic user tasks. To bridge this gap, we introduce AgentDyn, a manually designed benchmark featuring 60 challenging open-ended tasks and 560 injection test cases across Shopping, GitHub, and Daily Life. Unlike prior static benchmarks, AgentDyn requires dynamic planning and incorporates helpful third-party instructions. Our evaluation of ten state-of-the-art defenses suggests that almost all existing defenses are either not secure enough or suffer from significant over-defense, revealing that existing defenses are still far from real-world deployment. Our benchmark is available at https://github.com/leolee99/AgentDyn.

The rise of Large Language Model (LLM)-based web agents represents a significant shift in automated interactions with the web. Unlike traditional crawlers that follow simple conventions, such as robots.txt, modern agents engage with websites in sophisticated ways: navigating complex interfaces, extracting structured information, and completing end-to-end tasks. Existing governance mechanisms were not designed for these capabilities. Without a way to specify what interactions are and are not allowed, website owners increasingly rely on blanket blocking and CAPTCHAs, which undermine beneficial applications such as efficient automation, convenient use of e-commerce services, and accessibility tools. We introduce agent-permissions.json, a robots.txt-style lightweight manifest where websites specify allowed interactions, complemented by API references where available. This framework provides a low-friction coordination mechanism: website owners only need to write a simple JSON file, while agents can easily parse and automatically implement the manifest's provisions. Website owners can then focus on blocking non-compliant agents, rather than agents as a whole. By extending the spirit of robots.txt to the era of LLM-mediated interaction, and complementing data use initiatives such as AIPref, the manifest establishes a compliance framework that enables beneficial agent interactions while respecting site owners' preferences.

Autonomous agents based on Large Language Models (LLMs) have evolved from reactive assistants to systems capable of planning, executing actions via tools, and iterating over environment observations. However, they remain vulnerable to structural limitations: lack of native state, context degradation over long horizons, and the gap between probabilistic generation and deterministic execution requirements. This paper presents the ESAA (Event Sourcing for Autonomous Agents) architecture, which separates the agent's cognitive intention from the project's state mutation, inspired by the Event Sourcing pattern. In ESAA, agents emit only structured intentions in validated JSON (agent.result or issue.report); a deterministic orchestrator validates, persists events in an append-only log (activity.jsonl), applies file-writing effects, and projects a verifiable materialized view (roadmap.json). The proposal incorporates boundary contracts (AGENT_CONTRACT.yaml), metaprompting profiles (PARCER), and replay verification with hashing (esaa verify), ensuring the immutability of completed tasks and forensic traceability. Two case studies validate the architecture: (i) a landing page project (9 tasks, 49 events, single-agent composition) and (ii) a clinical dashboard system (50 tasks, 86 events, 4 concurrent agents across 8 phases), both concluding with run.status=success and verify_status=ok. The multi-agent case study demonstrates real concurrent orchestration with heterogeneous LLMs (Claude Sonnet 4.6, Codex GPT-5, Antigravity/Gemini 3 Pro, and Claude Opus 4.6), providing empirical evidence of the architecture's scalability beyond single-agent scenarios.

LLM-based coding agents can localize bugs, generate patches, and run tests with diminishing human oversight, yet the scaffolding code that surrounds the language model (the control loop, tool definitions, state management, and context strategy) remains poorly understood. Existing surveys classify agents by abstract capabilities (tool use, planning, reflection) that cannot distinguish between architecturally distinct systems, and trajectory studies observe what agents do without examining the scaffold code that determines why. This paper presents a source-code-level architectural taxonomy derived from analysis of 13 open-source coding agent scaffolds at pinned commit hashes. Each agent is characterized across 12 dimensions organized into three layers: control architecture, tool and environment interface, and resource management. The analysis reveals that scaffold architectures resist discrete classification: control strategies range from fixed pipelines to Monte Carlo Tree Search, tool counts range from 0 to 37, and context compaction spans seven distinct strategies. Five loop primitives (ReAct, generate-test-repair, plan-execute, multi-attempt retry, tree search) function as composable building blocks that agents layer in different combinations; 11 of 13 agents compose multiple primitives rather than relying on a single control structure. Dimensions converge where external constraints dominate (tool capability categories, edit formats, execution isolation) and diverge where open design questions remain (context compaction, state management, multi-model routing). All taxonomic claims are grounded in file paths and line numbers, providing a reusable reference for researchers studying agent behavior and practitioners designing new scaffolds.

Agentic LLMs with web search change the threat model for text anonymization: weak contextual cues can become cross-referenceable evidence for re-identification, yet those same details also carry downstream analytic value of the text. Existing defenses either remove explicit identifiers, perturb text for formal privacy, or test rewritten text against non-web inference models, leaving underexplored the operating region between resistance to agentic web-search re-identification and utility retention. We introduce AURA (Anonymization with Utility-Retention Adaptation), an LLM-powered mask-reconstruct framework that decouples privacy localization from utility-preserving reconstruction and selects candidates with adversarial privacy and utility-retention checks. We evaluate AURA on real-user interview transcripts using re-identification attacks carried out by web-search agents, along with a utility evaluation based on interviewee-profile facts, codebook facts, and the joint contextual utility grid. Our results show that AURA improves the privacy-utility frontier by using adaptive privacy scope to strengthen resistance to agentic re-identification and using a mask-reconstruct anonymization method to better preserve contextual utility under fixed privacy scope.

LLM-powered AI agents are an emerging frontier with tremendous potential to increase human productivity. However, empowering AI agents to take action on their user's behalf in day-to-day tasks involves giving them access to potentially sensitive and private information, which leads to a possible risk of inadvertent privacy leakage when the agent malfunctions. In this work, we propose one way to address that potential risk, by training AI agents to better satisfy the privacy principle of data minimization. For the purposes of this benchmark, by "data minimization" we mean instances where private information is shared only when it is necessary to fulfill a specific task-relevant purpose. We develop a benchmark called AgentDAM to evaluate how well existing and future AI agents can limit processing of potentially private information that we designate "necessary" to fulfill the task. Our benchmark simulates realistic web interaction scenarios and is adaptable to all existing web navigation agents. We use AgentDAM to evaluate how well AI agents built on top of GPT-4, Llama-3 and Claude can limit processing of potentially private information when unnecessary, and show that these agents are often prone to inadvertent use of unnecessary sensitive information. We finally propose a prompting-based approach that reduces this.

AI agent frameworks connecting large language model (LLM) reasoning to host execution surfaces--shell, filesystem, containers, and messaging--introduce security challenges structurally distinct from conventional software. We present a systematic taxonomy of 190 advisories filed against OpenClaw, an open-source AI agent runtime, organized by architectural layer and trust-violation type. Vulnerabilities cluster along two orthogonal axes: (1) the system axis, reflecting the architectural layer (exec policy, gateway, channel, sandbox, browser, plugin, agent/prompt); and (2) the attack axis, reflecting adversarial techniques (identity spoofing, policy bypass, cross-layer composition, prompt injection, supply-chain escalation). Patch-differential evidence yields three principal findings. First, three Moderate- or High-severity advisories in the Gateway and Node-Host subsystems compose into a complete unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) path--spanning delivery, exploitation, and command-and-control--from an LLM tool call to the host process. Second, the exec allowlist, the primary command-filtering mechanism, relies on a closed-world assumption that command identity is recoverable via lexical parsing. This is invalidated by shell line continuation, busybox multiplexing, and GNU option abbreviation. Third, a malicious skill distributed via the plugin channel executed a two-stage dropper within the LLM context, bypassing the exec pipeline and demonstrating that the skill distribution surface lacks runtime policy enforcement. The dominant structural weakness is per-layer trust enforcement rather than unified policy boundaries, making cross-layer attacks resilient to local remediation.

Identity documents recognition is an important sub-field of document analysis, which deals with tasks of robust document detection, type identification, text fields recognition, as well as identity fraud prevention and document authenticity validation given photos, scans, or video frames of an identity document capture. Significant amount of research has been published on this topic in recent years, however a chief difficulty for such research is scarcity of datasets, due to the subject matter being protected by security requirements. A few datasets of identity documents which are available lack diversity of document types, capturing conditions, or variability of document field values. In addition, the published datasets were typically designed only for a subset of document recognition problems, not for a complex identity document analysis. In this paper, we present a dataset MIDV-2020 which consists of 1000 video clips, 2000 scanned images, and 1000 photos of 1000 unique mock identity documents, each with unique text field values and unique artificially generated faces, with rich annotation. For the presented benchmark dataset baselines are provided for such tasks as document location and identification, text fields recognition, and face detection. With 72409 annotated images in total, to the date of publication the proposed dataset is the largest publicly available identity documents dataset with variable artificially generated data, and we believe that it will prove invaluable for advancement of the field of document analysis and recognition. The dataset is available for download at ftp://smartengines.com/midv-2020 and http://l3i-share.univ-lr.fr .

Evaluation of software engineering (SWE) agents is dominated by a binary signal: whether the final patch passes the tests. This outcome-only view treats a principled solution and a chaotic trial-and-error process as equivalent. We show that this equivalence is empirically false. We evaluate 2,614 OpenHands trajectories from eight model backends on 60 SWE-bench Verified tasks. Of these, 47 have enough passing trajectories to construct task-level process references, yielding a 1,815-trajectory evaluation subset. Among passing trajectories in this subset, 10.7% exhibit behavior we call a Lucky Pass: regression cycles, blind retries, missing verification, or temporally disordered exploration, implementation, and verification. We introduce AgentLens, a framework for process-level assessment of SWE-agent trajectories, and release AgentLens-Bench, a dataset of 1,815 trajectories annotated with quality scores, waste signals, divergence points, and 47 task-level Prefix Tree Acceptor (PTA) references. AgentLens builds PTA references by merging multiple passing solutions for the same task, and uses a context-sensitive intent labeler to assign actions to Exploration, Implementation, Verification, or Orchestration based on trajectory history rather than tool identity alone. On AgentLens-Bench, the quality score separates passing trajectories into Lucky, Solid, and Ideal tiers and further decomposes Lucky Passes into five recurring mechanisms. Across the eight model backends, Lucky rates range from 0.5% to 23.2%, and some models move by as many as five rank positions when ranked by quality score instead of pass rate. We release the anonymized project repository, including the AgentLens-Bench dataset and AgentLens SDK, at https://github.com/microsoft/code-agent-state-trajectories/.

Autonomous AI agents increasingly extend their capabilities through Agent Skills: modular filesystem packages whose SKILL.md files describe when and how agents should use them. While this design enables scalable, on-demand capability expansion, it also introduces a semantic supply-chain risk in which natural-language metadata and instructions can affect which skills are admitted, surfaced, selected, and loaded. We study SKILL.md - only attacks across three registry-facing stages of the Agent Skill lifecycle, using real ClawHub skills and realistic registry mechanisms. In Discovery, short textual triggers can manipulate embedding-based retrieval and improve adversarial skill visibility, achieving up to 86% pairwise win rate and 80% Top-10 placement. In Selection, description-only framing biases agents toward functionally equivalent adversarial variants, which are selected in 77.6% of paired trials on average. In Governance, semantic evasion strategies cause malicious skills to avoid a blocking verdict in 36.5%-100% of cases. Overall, our results show that SKILL.md is not passive documentation but operational text that shapes which third-party capabilities agents find, trust, and use.

AI agents increasingly call tools via the Model Context Protocol (MCP) and delegate to other agents via Agent-to-Agent (A2A), yet neither protocol verifies agent identity. A scan of approximately 2,000 MCP servers found all lacked authentication. In our survey, we did not identify a prior implemented protocol that jointly combines public-key verifiable delegation, holder-side attenuation, expressive chained policy, transport bindings across MCP/A2A/HTTP, and provenance-oriented completion records. We introduce Invocation-Bound Capability Tokens (IBCTs), a primitive that fuses identity, attenuated authorization, and provenance binding into a single append-only token chain. IBCTs operate in two wire formats: compact mode (a signed JWT for single-hop cases) and chained mode (a Biscuit token with Datalog policies for multi-hop delegation). We provide reference implementations in Python and Rust with full cross-language interoperability. Compact mode verification takes 0.049ms (Rust) and 0.189ms (Python), with 0.22ms overhead over no-auth in real MCP-over-HTTP deployment. In a real multi-agent deployment with Gemini 2.5 Flash, AIP adds 2.35ms of overhead (0.086% of total end-to-end latency). Adversarial evaluation across 600 attack attempts shows 100% rejection rate, with two attack categories (delegation depth violation and audit evasion through empty context) uniquely caught by AIP's chained delegation model that neither unsigned nor plain JWT deployments detect.

Although large language model (LLM)-based agents, exemplified by OpenClaw, are increasingly evolving from task-oriented systems into personalized AI assistants for solving complex real-world tasks, their practical deployment also introduces severe security risks. However, existing agent security research and evaluation frameworks primarily focus on synthetic or task-centric settings, and thus fail to accurately capture the attack surface and risk propagation mechanisms of personalized agents in real-world deployments. To address this gap, we propose Personalized Agent Security Bench (PASB), an end-to-end security evaluation framework tailored for real-world personalized agents. Building upon existing agent attack paradigms, PASB incorporates personalized usage scenarios, realistic toolchains, and long-horizon interactions, enabling black-box, end-to-end security evaluation on real systems. Using OpenClaw as a representative case study, we systematically evaluate its security across multiple personalized scenarios, tool capabilities, and attack types. Our results indicate that OpenClaw exhibits critical vulnerabilities at different execution stages, including user prompt processing, tool usage, and memory retrieval, highlighting substantial security risks in personalized agent deployments. The code for the proposed PASB framework is available at https://github.com/AstorYH/PASB.

As LLM-based agents increasingly browse the web on users' behalf, a natural question arises: can websites passively identify which underlying model powers an agent? Doing so would represent a significant security risk, enabling targeted attacks tailored to known model vulnerabilities. Across 14 frontier LLMs and four web environments spanning information retrieval and shopping tasks, we show that an agent's actions and interaction timings, captured via a passive JavaScript tracker, are sufficient to identify the underlying model with up to 96\% F1. We formalise this attack surface by demonstrating that classifiers trained on agent actions generalise across model sizes and families. We further show that strong classifiers can be trained from few interaction traces and that agent identity can be inferred early within an episode. Injecting randomised timing delays between actions substantially degrades classifier performance, but does not provide robust protection: a classifier retrained on delayed traces largely recovers performance. We release our harness and a labelled corpus of agent traces https://github.com/KabakaWilliam/known_actions{here}.

Autonomous computer use agents that powered by multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are emerging as capable assistants for completing complex digital workflows. However, real-world execution environments are far from ideal: pop-ups, resolution changes, and competing applications frequently interfere with agent perception and control. We introduce AgentHijack, a benchmark designed to evaluate the robustness of computer-use agents under common corruptions, where the uncertainties in dynamic environment disrupt the execution flow without direct adversarial intent. Specifically, AgentHijack introduces 9 configurable common corruptions to replicate realistic imperfect scenarios. We evaluate a variety of desktop tasks that utilize MLLM-based agents and discover that even minor instances of corruption can result in substantial performance degradation, which emphasizes the fragility of agents and underscores the necessity of robustness evaluation. Afterward, we propose AgentHijack-Agent, a framework that integrates an action generator with enhanced grounding capabilities and an onlooker responsible for behavior summarization and environment checking. Extensive experiments validate its effectiveness. Our code, environment, baseline models and data are publicly available at: https://AgentHijack.github.io.

A lot of research has been devoted to identity documents analysis and recognition on mobile devices. However, no publicly available datasets designed for this particular problem currently exist. There are a few datasets which are useful for associated subtasks but in order to facilitate a more comprehensive scientific and technical approach to identity document recognition more specialized datasets are required. In this paper we present a Mobile Identity Document Video dataset (MIDV-500) consisting of 500 video clips for 50 different identity document types with ground truth which allows to perform research in a wide scope of document analysis problems. The paper presents characteristics of the dataset and evaluation results for existing methods of face detection, text line recognition, and document fields data extraction. Since an important feature of identity documents is their sensitiveness as they contain personal data, all source document images used in MIDV-500 are either in public domain or distributed under public copyright licenses. The main goal of this paper is to present a dataset. However, in addition and as a baseline, we present evaluation results for existing methods for face detection, text line recognition, and document data extraction, using the presented dataset. (The dataset is available for download at ftp://smartengines.com/midv-500/.)

Autonomous coding agents are increasingly deployed as AI teammates in modern software engineering, independently authoring pull requests (PRs) that modify production code at scale. This study aims to systematically characterize how autonomous coding agents contribute to software security in practice, how these security-related contributions are reviewed and accepted, and which observable signals are associated with PR rejection. We conduct a large-scale empirical analysis of agent-authored PRs using the AIDev dataset, comprising of over 33,000 curated PRs from popular GitHub repositories. Security-relevant PRs are identified using a keyword filtering strategy, followed by manual validation, resulting in 1,293 confirmed security-related agentic-PRs. We then analyze prevalence, acceptance outcomes, and review latency across autonomous agents, programming ecosystems, and types of code changes. Moreover, we apply qualitative open coding to identify recurring security-related actions and underlying intents, and examine review metadata to identify early signals associated with PR rejection. Security-related Agentic-PRs constitute a meaningful share of agent activity (approximately 4\%). Rather than focusing solely on narrow vulnerability fixes, agents most frequently perform supportive security hardening activities, including testing, documentation, configuration, and improved error handling. Compared to non-security PRs, security-related Agentic-PRs exhibit lower merge rates and longer review latency, reflecting heightened human scrutiny, with variation across agents and programming ecosystems. PR rejection is more strongly associated with PR complexity and verbosity than with explicit security topics.

Agent skills extend AI agents with reusable instructions, tools, scripts, references, and workflows, establishing a security boundary distinct from both model safety and traditional package-malware detection. ClawHub Security Signals is a sanitized dataset of 67,453 latest public OpenClaw skill versions. Each row pairs redacted SKILL.md content and sanitized bundled files where present with a final ClawScan registry verdict and evidence from three scanner families: VirusTotal, static heuristic analysis, and NVIDIA SkillSpector. Rather than estimating malicious-skill prevalence, we study scanner disagreement. The three scanners rarely flag the same skills: any pair overlaps on at most 10.4% of their combined positives, only 0.69% of skills are flagged by all three, and 81.9% of flagged skills are identified by a single scanner. The disagreement is structured by attack surface. SkillSpector, which raises semantic agentic-risk advisories rather than malware-reputation signals, is positive for 19,209 of 25,504 suspicious rows (75.3%) but only 14 of 206 malicious rows (6.8%). The malicious-verdict region shows the inverse profile: 150 of 206 malicious rows (72.8%) are VirusTotal-positive, consistent with bundled-code malware evidence. These results show that agent-skill security requires layered governance, not single-scanner allow/block decisions. The corpus is released as a sanitized silver-standard dataset: labels are the registry's automated verdicts, not human-annotated ground truth, and the release represents an early, versioned snapshot intended to support the community while a human-annotated subset is developed. Further research is encouraged, including models tailored for skill-security triage.

Large language models (LLMs) and their applications, such as agents, are highly vulnerable to prompt injection attacks. State-of-the-art prompt injection detection methods have the following limitations: (1) their effectiveness degrades significantly as context length increases, and (2) they lack explicit rules that define what constitutes prompt injection, causing detection decisions to be implicit, opaque, and difficult to reason about. In this work, we propose AgentWatcher to address the above two limitations. To address the first limitation, AgentWatcher attributes the LLM's output (e.g., the action of an agent) to a small set of causally influential context segments. By focusing detection on a relatively short text, AgentWatcher can be scalable to long contexts. To address the second limitation, we define a set of rules specifying what does and does not constitute a prompt injection, and use a monitor LLM to reason over these rules based on the attributed text, making the detection decisions more explainable. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation on tool-use agent benchmarks and long-context understanding datasets. The experimental results demonstrate that AgentWatcher can effectively detect prompt injection and maintain utility without attacks. The code is available at https://github.com/wang-yanting/AgentWatcher.

Many works have recently proposed the use of Large Language Model (LLM) based agents for performing `repository level' tasks, loosely defined as a set of tasks whose scopes are greater than a single file. This has led to speculation that the orchestration of these repository-level tasks could lead to software engineering agents capable of performing almost independently of human intervention. However, of the suite of tasks that would need to be performed by this autonomous software engineering agent, we argue that one important task is missing, which is to fulfil project level dependency by installing other repositories. To investigate the feasibility of this repository level installation task, we introduce a benchmark of of repository installation tasks curated from 40 open source Python projects, which includes a ground truth installation process for each target repository. Further, we propose Installamatic, an agent which aims to perform and verify the installation of a given repository by searching for relevant instructions from documentation in the repository. Empirical experiments reveal that that 55% of the studied repositories can be automatically installed by our agent at least one out of ten times. Through further analysis, we identify the common causes for our agent's inability to install a repository, discuss the challenges faced in the design and implementation of such an agent and consider the implications that such an agent could have for developers.

Identity document (ID) image analysis has become essential for many online services, like bank account opening or insurance subscription. In recent years, much research has been conducted on subjects like document localization, text recognition and fraud detection, to achieve a level of accuracy reliable enough to automatize identity verification. However, there are only a few available datasets to benchmark ID analysis methods, mainly because of privacy restrictions, security requirements and legal reasons. In this paper, we present the DocXPand-25k dataset, which consists of 24,994 richly labeled IDs images, generated using custom-made vectorial templates representing nine fictitious ID designs, including four identity cards, two residence permits and three passports designs. These synthetic IDs feature artificially generated personal information (names, dates, identifiers, faces, barcodes, ...), and present a rich diversity in the visual layouts and textual contents. We collected about 5.8k diverse backgrounds coming from real-world photos, scans and screenshots of IDs to guarantee the variety of the backgrounds. The software we wrote to generate these images has been published (https://github.com/QuickSign/docxpand/) under the terms of the MIT license, and our dataset has been published (https://github.com/QuickSign/docxpand/releases/tag/v1.0.0) under the terms of the CC-BY-NC-SA 4.0 License.

Ransomware has become one of the most serious cybersecurity threats causing major financial losses and operational disruptions worldwide.Traditional detection methods such as static analysis, heuristic scanning and behavioral analysis often fall short when used alone. To address these limitations, this paper presents multimodal multi agent ransomware analysis framework designed for ransomware classification. Proposed multimodal multiagent architecture combines information from static, dynamic and network sources. Each data type is handled by specialized agent that uses auto encoder based feature extraction. These representations are then integrated through a fusion agent. After that fused representation are used by transformer based classifier. It identifies the specific ransomware family. The agents interact through an interagent feedback mechanism that iteratively refines feature representations by suppressing low confidence information. The framework was evaluated on large scale datasets containing thousands of ransomware and benign samples. Multiple experiments were conducted on ransomware dataset. It outperforms single modality and nonadaptive fusion baseline achieving improvement of up to 0.936 in Macro-F1 for family classification and reducing calibration error. Over 100 epochs, the agentic feedback loop displays a stable monotonic convergence leading to over +0.75 absolute improvement in terms of agent quality and a final composite score of around 0.88 without fine tuning of the language models. Zeroday ransomware detection remains family dependent on polymorphism and modality disruptions. Confidence aware abstention enables reliable real world deployment by favoring conservativeand trustworthy decisions over forced classification. The findings indicate that proposed approach provides a practical andeffective path toward improving real world ransomware defense systems.

In LLM/VLM agents, prompt privacy risk propagates beyond a single model call because raw user content can flow into retrieval queries, memory writes, tool calls, and logs. Existing de-identification pipelines address document boundaries but not this cross-stage propagation. We propose BodhiPromptShield, a policy-aware framework that detects sensitive spans, routes them via typed placeholders, semantic abstraction, or secure symbolic mapping, and delays restoration to authorized boundaries. Relative to enterprise redaction, this adds explicit propagation-aware mediation and restoration timing as a security variable. Under controlled evaluation on the Controlled Prompt-Privacy Benchmark (CPPB), stage-wise propagation suppresses from 10.7\% to 7.1\% across retrieval, memory, and tool stages; PER reaches 9.3\% with 0.94 AC and 0.92 TSR, outperforming generic de-identification. These are controlled systems results on CPPB rather than formal privacy guarantees or public-benchmark transfer claims. The project repository is available at https://github.com/mabo1215/BodhiPromptShield.git.

Identifying vulnerability-fixing commits corresponding to disclosed CVEs is essential for secure software maintenance but remains challenging at scale, as large repositories contain millions of commits of which only a small fraction address security issues. Existing automated approaches, including traditional machine learning techniques and recent large language model (LLM)-based methods, often suffer from poor precision-recall trade-offs. Frequently evaluated on randomly sampled commits, we uncover that they are substantially underestimating real-world difficulty, where candidate commits are already security-relevant and highly similar. We propose Favia, a forensic, agent-based framework for vulnerability-fix identification that combines scalable candidate ranking with deep and iterative semantic reasoning. Favia first employs an efficient ranking stage to narrow the search space of commits. Each commit is then rigorously evaluated using a ReAct-based LLM agent. By providing the agent with a pre-commit repository as environment, along with specialized tools, the agent tries to localize vulnerable components, navigates the codebase, and establishes causal alignment between code changes and vulnerability root causes. This evidence-driven process enables robust identification of indirect, multi-file, and non-trivial fixes that elude single-pass or similarity-based methods. We evaluate Favia on CVEVC, a large-scale dataset we made that comprises over 8 million commits from 3,708 real-world repositories, and show that it consistently outperforms state-of-the-art traditional and LLM-based baselines under realistic candidate selection, achieving the strongest precision-recall trade-offs and highest F1-scores.

The rapid growth of AI agent ecosystems is transforming how complex tasks are delegated and executed, creating a new challenge of identifying suitable agents for a given task. Unlike traditional tools, agent capabilities are often compositional and execution-dependent, making them difficult to assess from textual descriptions alone. However, existing research and benchmarks typically assume well-specified functionalities, controlled candidate pools, or only executable task queries, leaving realistic agent search scenarios insufficiently studied. We introduce AgentSearchBench, a large-scale benchmark for agent search in the wild, built from nearly 10,000 real-world agents across multiple providers. The benchmark formalizes agent search as retrieval and reranking problems under both executable task queries and high-level task descriptions, and evaluates relevance using execution-grounded performance signals. Experiments reveal a consistent gap between semantic similarity and actual agent performance, exposing the limitations of description-based retrieval and reranking methods. We further show that lightweight behavioral signals, including execution-aware probing, can substantially improve ranking quality, highlighting the importance of incorporating execution signals into agent discovery. Our code is available at https://github.com/Bingo-W/AgentSearchBench.

Computer-use agents extend language models from text generation to persistent action over tools, files, and execution environments. Unlike chat systems, they maintain state across interactions and translate intermediate outputs into concrete actions. This creates a distinct safety challenge in that harmful behavior may emerge through sequences of individually plausible steps, including intermediate actions that appear locally acceptable but collectively lead to unauthorized actions. We present AgentHazard, a benchmark for evaluating harmful behavior in computer-use agents. AgentHazard contains 2,653 instances spanning diverse risk categories and attack strategies. Each instance pairs a harmful objective with a sequence of operational steps that are locally legitimate but jointly induce unsafe behavior. The benchmark evaluates whether agents can recognize and interrupt harm arising from accumulated context, repeated tool use, intermediate actions, and dependencies across steps. We evaluate AgentHazard on Claude Code, OpenClaw, and IFlow using mostly open or openly deployable models from the Qwen3, Kimi, GLM, and DeepSeek families. Our experimental results indicate that current systems remain highly vulnerable. In particular, when powered by Qwen3-Coder, Claude Code exhibits an attack success rate of 73.63\%, suggesting that model alignment alone does not reliably guarantee the safety of autonomous agents.

LLM agents have begun to find real security vulnerabilities that human auditors and automated fuzzers missed for decades, in source-available targets where the analyst can build and instrument the code. In practice the work is split among several agents, wired together by a harness: the program that fixes which roles exist, how they pass information, which tools each may call, and how retries are coordinated. When the language model is held fixed, changing only the harness can still change success rates by several-fold on public agent benchmarks, yet most harnesses are written by hand; recent harness optimizers each search only a narrow slice of the design space and rely on coarse pass/fail feedback that gives no diagnostic signal about why a trial failed. AgentFlow addresses both limitations with a typed graph DSL whose search space jointly covers agent roles, prompts, tools, communication topology, and coordination protocol, paired with a feedback-driven outer loop that reads runtime signals from the target program itself to diagnose which part of the harness caused the failure and rewrite it accordingly. We evaluate AgentFlow on TerminalBench-2 with Claude Opus 4.6 and on Google Chrome with Kimi K2.5. AgentFlow reaches 84.3% on TerminalBench-2, the highest score in the public leaderboard snapshot we evaluate against, and discovers ten previously unknown zero-day vulnerabilities in Google Chrome, including two Critical sandbox-escape vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-5280 and CVE-2026-6297).

We present HippoCamp, a new benchmark designed to evaluate agents' capabilities on multimodal file management. Unlike existing agent benchmarks that focus on tasks like web interaction, tool use, or software automation in generic settings, HippoCamp evaluates agents in user-centric environments to model individual user profiles and search massive personal files for context-aware reasoning. Our benchmark instantiates device-scale file systems over real-world profiles spanning diverse modalities, comprising 42.4 GB of data across over 2K real-world files. Building upon the raw files, we construct 581 QA pairs to assess agents' capabilities in search, evidence perception, and multi-step reasoning. To facilitate fine-grained analysis, we provide 46.1K densely annotated structured trajectories for step-wise failure diagnosis. We evaluate a wide range of state-of-the-art multimodal large language models (MLLMs) and agentic methods on HippoCamp. Our comprehensive experiments reveal a significant performance gap: even the most advanced commercial models achieve only 48.3% accuracy in user profiling, struggling particularly with long-horizon retrieval and cross-modal reasoning within dense personal file systems. Furthermore, our step-wise failure diagnosis identifies multimodal perception and evidence grounding as the primary bottlenecks. Ultimately, HippoCamp exposes the critical limitations of current agents in realistic, user-centric environments and provides a robust foundation for developing next-generation personal AI assistants.

OpenClaw, the most widely deployed personal AI agent in early 2026, operates with full local system access and integrates with sensitive services such as Gmail, Stripe, and the filesystem. While these broad privileges enable high levels of automation and powerful personalization, they also expose a substantial attack surface that existing sandboxed evaluations fail to capture. To address this gap, we present the first real-world safety evaluation of OpenClaw and introduce the CIK taxonomy, which unifies an agent's persistent state into three dimensions, i.e., Capability, Identity, and Knowledge, for safety analysis. Our evaluations cover 12 attack scenarios on a live OpenClaw instance across four backbone models (Claude Sonnet 4.5, Opus 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro, and GPT-5.4). The results show that poisoning any single CIK dimension increases the average attack success rate from 24.6% to 64-74%, with even the most robust model exhibiting more than a threefold increase over its baseline vulnerability. We further assess three CIK-aligned defense strategies alongside a file-protection mechanism; however, the strongest defense still yields a 63.8% success rate under Capability-targeted attacks, while file protection blocks 97% of malicious injections but also prevents legitimate updates. Taken together, these findings show that the vulnerabilities are inherent to the agent architecture, necessitating more systematic safeguards to secure personal AI agents. Our project page is https://ucsc-vlaa.github.io/CIK-Bench.

LLM agents are an emerging form of AI systems where large language models (LLMs) serve as the central component, utilizing a diverse set of tools to complete user-assigned tasks. Despite their great potential, LLM agents pose significant security risks. When interacting with the external world, they may encounter malicious commands from attackers, leading to the execution of dangerous actions. A promising way to address this is by enforcing the principle of least privilege: allowing only essential actions for task completion while blocking unnecessary ones. However, achieving this is challenging, as it requires covering diverse agent scenarios while preserving both security and utility. We introduce Progent, the first privilege control mechanism for LLM agents. At its core is a domain-specific language for flexibly expressing privilege control policies applied during agent execution. These policies provide fine-grained constraints over tool calls, deciding when tool calls are permissible and specifying fallbacks if they are not. This enables agent developers and users to craft suitable policies for their specific use cases and enforce them deterministically to guarantee security. Thanks to its modular design, integrating Progent does not alter agent internals and requires only minimal changes to agent implementation, enhancing its practicality and potential for widespread adoption. To automate policy writing, we leverage LLMs to generate policies based on user queries, which are then updated dynamically for improved security and utility. Our extensive evaluation shows that it enables strong security while preserving high utility across three distinct scenarios or benchmarks: AgentDojo, ASB, and AgentPoison. Furthermore, we perform an in-depth analysis, showcasing the effectiveness of its core components and the resilience of its automated policy generation against adaptive attacks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) and other foundation models are increasingly used as the core of AI agents. In agentic workflows, these agents plan tasks, interact with humans and peers, and influence scientific outcomes across federated and heterogeneous environments. However, agents can hallucinate or reason incorrectly, propagating errors when one agent's output becomes another's input. Thus, assuring that agents' actions are transparent, traceable, reproducible, and reliable is critical to assess hallucination risks and mitigate their workflow impacts. While provenance techniques have long supported these principles, existing methods fail to capture and relate agent-centric metadata such as prompts, responses, and decisions with the broader workflow context and downstream outcomes. In this paper, we introduce PROV-AGENT, a provenance model that extends W3C PROV and leverages the Model Context Protocol (MCP) and data observability to integrate agent interactions into end-to-end workflow provenance. Our contributions include: (1) a provenance model tailored for agentic workflows, (2) a near real-time, open-source system for capturing agentic provenance, and (3) a cross-facility evaluation spanning edge, cloud, and HPC environments, demonstrating support for critical provenance queries and agent reliability analysis.

The internet is undergoing a historical transformation from the "Internet of Websites" to the "Internet of AgentSites." While traditional Websites served as the foundation for information hosting and dissemination, a new frontier is emerging where AgentSites serve as the hubs of the internet, where each AgentSite hosts one or more AI agents that receive tasks, address them, and deliver actionable solutions, marking a significant shift in the digital landscape and representing the next generation of online ecosystems. Under this vision, AIOS, the AI Agent Operating System, serves as the server for the development, deployment and execution of AI agents, which is a fundamental infrastructure for the Internet of Agentsites. In this paper, we introduce AIOS Server, a runtime framework to host agents and enable global-scale collaboration among decentralized agents. AIOS Server provides a communication protocol leveraging the Model Context Protocol (MCP) and JSON-RPC to enable agent-agent or human-agent interactions. Each AIOS node operates as a server to host and execute agents, while supporting peer-to-peer coordination without reliance on centralized orchestration. Based on AIOS Server, we further present the world's first practically deployed Internet of Agentsites (AIOS-IoA), including AgentHub for agent registration and discovery and AgentChat for interactive communication, at https://planet.aios.foundation. The agent discovery mechanism based on Distributed Hash Tables (DHT) and a Gossip protocol serves as the search engine for the internet of agentsites. This work provides a practical foundation for building the Internet of Agentsites-a new paradigm where autonomous agents become first-class citizens of the web. The implementation is available at https://github.com/agiresearch/AIOS.Server and is integrated into the AIOS main branch at https://github.com/agiresearch/AIOS.

The strong planning and reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) have fostered the development of agent-based systems capable of leveraging external tools and interacting with increasingly complex environments. However, these powerful features also introduce a critical security risk: indirect prompt injection, a sophisticated attack vector that compromises the core of these agents, the LLM, by manipulating contextual information rather than direct user prompts. In this work, we propose a generic black-box fuzzing framework, AgentVigil, designed to automatically discover and exploit indirect prompt injection vulnerabilities across diverse LLM agents. Our approach starts by constructing a high-quality initial seed corpus, then employs a seed selection algorithm based on Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) to iteratively refine inputs, thereby maximizing the likelihood of uncovering agent weaknesses. We evaluate AgentVigil on two public benchmarks, AgentDojo and VWA-adv, where it achieves 71% and 70% success rates against agents based on o3-mini and GPT-4o, respectively, nearly doubling the performance of baseline attacks. Moreover, AgentVigil exhibits strong transferability across unseen tasks and internal LLMs, as well as promising results against defenses. Beyond benchmark evaluations, we apply our attacks in real-world environments, successfully misleading agents to navigate to arbitrary URLs, including malicious sites.

Large language models are increasingly deployed as *deep agents* that plan, maintain persistent state, and invoke external tools, shifting safety failures from unsafe text to unsafe *trajectories*. We introduce **AgentFence**, an architecture-centric security evaluation that defines 14 trust-boundary attack classes spanning planning, memory, retrieval, tool use, and delegation, and detects failures via *trace-auditable conversation breaks* (unauthorized or unsafe tool use, wrong-principal actions, state/objective integrity violations, and attack-linked deviations). Holding the base model fixed, we evaluate eight agent archetypes under persistent multi-turn interaction and observe substantial architectural variation in mean security break rate (MSBR), ranging from 0.29 pm 0.04 (LangGraph) to 0.51 pm 0.07 (AutoGPT). The highest-risk classes are operational: Denial-of-Wallet (0.62 pm 0.08), Authorization Confusion (0.54 pm 0.10), Retrieval Poisoning (0.47 pm 0.09), and Planning Manipulation (0.44 pm 0.11), while prompt-centric classes remain below 0.20 under standard settings. Breaks are dominated by boundary violations (SIV 31%, WPA 27%, UTI+UTA 24%, ATD 18%), and authorization confusion correlates with objective and tool hijacking (ρapprox 0.63 and ρapprox 0.58). AgentFence reframes agent security around what matters operationally: whether an agent stays within its goal and authority envelope over time.

Although LLM-based agents, powered by Large Language Models (LLMs), can use external tools and memory mechanisms to solve complex real-world tasks, they may also introduce critical security vulnerabilities. However, the existing literature does not comprehensively evaluate attacks and defenses against LLM-based agents. To address this, we introduce Agent Security Bench (ASB), a comprehensive framework designed to formalize, benchmark, and evaluate the attacks and defenses of LLM-based agents, including 10 scenarios (e.g., e-commerce, autonomous driving, finance), 10 agents targeting the scenarios, over 400 tools, 23 different types of attack/defense methods, and 8 evaluation metrics. Based on ASB, we benchmark 10 prompt injection attacks, a memory poisoning attack, a novel Plan-of-Thought backdoor attack, a mixed attack, and 10 corresponding defenses across 13 LLM backbones with nearly 90,000 testing cases in total. Our benchmark results reveal critical vulnerabilities in different stages of agent operation, including system prompt, user prompt handling, tool usage, and memory retrieval, with the highest average attack success rate of 84.30\%, but limited effectiveness shown in current defenses, unveiling important works to be done in terms of agent security for the community. Our code can be found at https://github.com/agiresearch/ASB.

LLM-based agent systems are emerging as a new software paradigm and have been widely adopted across diverse domains such as medicine, robotics, and programming. However, maintaining these systems requires substantial effort, as they are inevitably prone to bugs and continually evolve to meet changing external requirements. Therefore, automatically resolving agent issues (i.e., bug reports or feature requests) is a crucial and challenging task. While recent software engineering (SE) agents (e.g., SWE-agent) have shown promise in addressing issues in traditional software systems, it remains unclear how effectively they can resolve real-world issues in agent systems, which differ significantly from traditional software. To fill this gap, we first manually analyze 201 real-world agent issues and identify common categories of agent issues. We then spend 500 person-hours constructing AGENTISSUE-BENCH, a reproducible benchmark comprising 50 agent issue resolution tasks (each with an executable environment and failure-triggering tests). We further evaluate state-of-the-art SE agents on AGENTISSUE-BENCH and reveal their limited effectiveness (i.e., with only 3.33% - 12.67% resolution rates). These results underscore the unique challenges of maintaining agent systems compared to traditional software, highlighting the need for further research to develop advanced SE agents for resolving agent issues. Data and code are available at https://alfin06.github.io/AgentIssue-Bench-Leaderboard/#/ .

LLM-based coding agents extend their capabilities via third-party agent skills distributed through open marketplaces without mandatory security review. Unlike traditional packages, these skills are executed as operational directives with system-level privileges, so a single malicious skill can compromise the host. Prior work has not examined whether supply-chain attacks can directly hijack an agent's action space, such as file writes, shell commands, and network requests, despite existing safeguards. We introduce Document-Driven Implicit Payload Execution (DDIPE), which embeds malicious logic in code examples and configuration templates within skill documentation. Because agents reuse these examples during normal tasks, the payload executes without explicit prompts. Using an LLM-driven pipeline, we generate 1,070 adversarial skills from 81 seeds across 15 MITRE ATTACK categories. Across four frameworks and five models, DDIPE achieves 11.6% to 33.5% bypass rates, while explicit instruction attacks achieve 0% under strong defenses. Static analysis detects most cases, but 2.5% evade both detection and alignment. Responsible disclosure led to four confirmed vulnerabilities and two fixes.

Video identity customization seeks to synthesize realistic, temporally coherent videos of a specific subject, given a single reference image and a text prompt. This task presents two core challenges: (1) maintaining identity consistency while aligning with the described appearance and actions, and (2) generating natural, fluid motion without unrealistic stiffness. To address these challenges, we introduce Proteus-ID, a novel diffusion-based framework for identity-consistent and motion-coherent video customization. First, we propose a Multimodal Identity Fusion (MIF) module that unifies visual and textual cues into a joint identity representation using a Q-Former, providing coherent guidance to the diffusion model and eliminating modality imbalance. Second, we present a Time-Aware Identity Injection (TAII) mechanism that dynamically modulates identity conditioning across denoising steps, improving fine-detail reconstruction. Third, we propose Adaptive Motion Learning (AML), a self-supervised strategy that reweights the training loss based on optical-flow-derived motion heatmaps, enhancing motion realism without requiring additional inputs. To support this task, we construct Proteus-Bench, a high-quality dataset comprising 200K curated clips for training and 150 individuals from diverse professions and ethnicities for evaluation. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Proteus-ID outperforms prior methods in identity preservation, text alignment, and motion quality, establishing a new benchmark for video identity customization. Codes and data are publicly available at https://grenoble-zhang.github.io/Proteus-ID/.

Digital agents capable of automating complex computer tasks have attracted considerable attention due to their immense potential to enhance human-computer interaction. However, existing agent methods exhibit deficiencies in their generalization and specialization capabilities, especially in handling open-ended computer tasks in real-world environments. Inspired by the rich functionality of the App store, we present AgentStore, a scalable platform designed to dynamically integrate heterogeneous agents for automating computer tasks. AgentStore empowers users to integrate third-party agents, allowing the system to continuously enrich its capabilities and adapt to rapidly evolving operating systems. Additionally, we propose a novel core MetaAgent with the AgentToken strategy to efficiently manage diverse agents and utilize their specialized and generalist abilities for both domain-specific and system-wide tasks. Extensive experiments on three challenging benchmarks demonstrate that AgentStore surpasses the limitations of previous systems with narrow capabilities, particularly achieving a significant improvement from 11.21\% to 23.85\% on the OSWorld benchmark, more than doubling the previous results. Comprehensive quantitative and qualitative results further demonstrate AgentStore's ability to enhance agent systems in both generalization and specialization, underscoring its potential for developing the specialized generalist computer assistant. All our codes will be made publicly available in https://chengyou-jia.github.io/AgentStore-Home.

Large Language Models (LLMs) excel in diverse tasks such as text generation, data analysis, and software development, making them indispensable across domains like education, business, and creative industries. However, the rapid proliferation of LLMs (with over 560 companies developing or deploying them as of 2024) has raised concerns about their originality and trustworthiness. A notable issue, termed identity confusion, has emerged, where LLMs misrepresent their origins or identities. This study systematically examines identity confusion through three research questions: (1) How prevalent is identity confusion among LLMs? (2) Does it arise from model reuse, plagiarism, or hallucination? (3) What are the security and trust-related impacts of identity confusion? To address these, we developed an automated tool combining documentation analysis, self-identity recognition testing, and output similarity comparisons--established methods for LLM fingerprinting--and conducted a structured survey via Credamo to assess its impact on user trust. Our analysis of 27 LLMs revealed that 25.93% exhibit identity confusion. Output similarity analysis confirmed that these issues stem from hallucinations rather than replication or reuse. Survey results further highlighted that identity confusion significantly erodes trust, particularly in critical tasks like education and professional use, with declines exceeding those caused by logical errors or inconsistencies. Users attributed these failures to design flaws, incorrect training data, and perceived plagiarism, underscoring the systemic risks posed by identity confusion to LLM reliability and trustworthiness.

Effective fraud detection and analysis of government-issued identity documents, such as passports, driver's licenses, and identity cards, are essential in thwarting identity theft and bolstering security on online platforms. The training of accurate fraud detection and analysis tools depends on the availability of extensive identity document datasets. However, current publicly available benchmark datasets for identity document analysis, including MIDV-500, MIDV-2020, and FMIDV, fall short in several respects: they offer a limited number of samples, cover insufficient varieties of fraud patterns, and seldom include alterations in critical personal identifying fields like portrait images, limiting their utility in training models capable of detecting realistic frauds while preserving privacy. In response to these shortcomings, our research introduces a new benchmark dataset, IDNet, designed to advance privacy-preserving fraud detection efforts. The IDNet dataset comprises 837,060 images of synthetically generated identity documents, totaling approximately 490 gigabytes, categorized into 20 types from 10 U.S. states and 10 European countries. We evaluate the utility and present use cases of the dataset, illustrating how it can aid in training privacy-preserving fraud detection methods, facilitating the generation of camera and video capturing of identity documents, and testing schema unification and other identity document management functionalities.

The safety of autonomous AI agents is increasingly recognized as a critical open problem. As agents transition from passive text generators to active actors capable of executing shell commands, modifying files, calling APIs, and browsing the web, the consequences of unsafe or adversarially manipulated behavior become immediate and tangible. Existing AI safety work has focused primarily on model alignment and input filtering, but these approaches do not address what happens at the moment an agent's intent becomes a real action on a real machine. This gap is especially acute in local environments, where developers run agents against their own filesystems, credentials, and infrastructure with little runtime control. This paper introduces AgentWall, a runtime safety and observability layer for local AI agents. AgentWall intercepts every proposed agent action before it reaches the host environment, evaluates it against an explicit declarative policy, requires human approval for sensitive operations, and records a complete execution trail for audit and replay. It is implemented as a policy-enforcing MCP proxy and native OpenClaw plugin, working across Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf, Claude Code, and OpenClaw with a single install command. We present the design, architecture, threat model, and policy model of AgentWall, and demonstrate 92.9% policy enforcement accuracy with sub-millisecond overhead across 14 benchmark tests. AgentWall is open-source at https://github.com/agentwall/Agentwall.

Recent advances in LLM Multi-Agent Systems enable scalable orchestration of sub-agents, each coordinating hundreds or thousands of tools or Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers. However, existing retrieval methods typically match queries against coarse agent-level descriptions before routing, which obscures fine-grained tool functionality and often results in suboptimal agent selection. We introduce Tool-to-Agent Retrieval, a unified framework that embeds both tools and their parent agents in a shared vector space and connects them through metadata relationships. By explicitly representing tool capabilities and traversing metadata to the agent level, Tool-to-Agent Retrieval enables granular tool-level or agent-level retrieval, ensuring that agents and their underlying tools or MCP servers are equally represented without the context dilution that arises from chunking many tools together. Evaluating Tool-to-Agent Retrieval across eight embedding models, our approach achieves consistent improvements of 19.4% in Recall@5 and 17.7% in nDCG@5 over previous state-of-the-art agent retrievers on the LiveMCPBench benchmark.

Language Model (LM) agents for cybersecurity that are capable of autonomously identifying vulnerabilities and executing exploits have the potential to cause real-world impact. Policymakers, model providers, and other researchers in the AI and cybersecurity communities are interested in quantifying the capabilities of such agents to help mitigate cyberrisk and investigate opportunities for penetration testing. Toward that end, we introduce Cybench, a framework for specifying cybersecurity tasks and evaluating agents on those tasks. We include 40 professional-level Capture the Flag (CTF) tasks from 4 distinct CTF competitions, chosen to be recent, meaningful, and spanning a wide range of difficulties. Each task includes its own description, starter files, and is initialized in an environment where an agent can execute bash commands and observe outputs. Since many tasks are beyond the capabilities of existing LM agents, we introduce subtasks, which break down a task into intermediary steps for more gradated evaluation; we add subtasks for 17 of the 40 tasks. To evaluate agent capabilities, we construct a cybersecurity agent and evaluate 7 models: GPT-4o, Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Mixtral 8x22b Instruct, Gemini 1.5 Pro, Llama 3 70B Chat, and Llama 3.1 405B Instruct. Without guidance, we find that agents are able to solve only the easiest complete tasks that took human teams up to 11 minutes to solve, with Claude 3.5 Sonnet and GPT-4o having the highest success rates. Finally, subtasks provide more signal for measuring performance compared to unguided runs, with models achieving a 3.2\% higher success rate on complete tasks with subtask-guidance than without subtask-guidance. All code and data are publicly available at https://cybench.github.io

Terminals provide a powerful interface for AI agents by exposing diverse tools for automating complex workflows, yet existing terminal-agent benchmarks largely focus on tasks grounded in text, code, and structured files. However, many real-world workflows require practitioners to work directly with audio and video files. Working with such multimedia files calls for terminal agents not only to understand multimedia content, but also to convert auditory and visual evidence across related files into appropriate actions. To evaluate terminal agents on multimedia-file tasks, we introduce MultiMedia-TerminalBench (MMTB), a benchmark of 105 tasks across 5 meta-categories where terminal agents directly operate with audio and video files. Alongside MMTB, we propose Terminus-MM, a multimedia harness that extends Terminus-KIRA with audio and video perception for terminal agents. Together, MMTB and Terminus-MM support a controlled study of multimedia terminal agents, revealing how different forms of multimedia access shape task outcomes and determine which evidence agents rely on to construct executable terminal workflows. MMTB media and metadata are released at https://huggingface.co/datasets/mm-tbench/mmtb-media

In this paper, we present AgentDisCo, a novel Disentangled and Collaborative agentic architecture that formulates deep research as an adversarial optimization problem between information exploration and exploitation. Unlike existing approaches that conflate these two processes into a single module, AgentDisCo employs a critic agent to evaluate generated outlines and refine search queries, and a generator agent to retrieve updated results and revise outlines accordingly. The iteratively refined outline is then passed to a downstream report writer that synthesizes a comprehensive research report. The overall workflow supports both handcrafted and automatically discovered design strategies via a meta-optimization harness, in which the generator agent is repurposed as a scoring agent to evaluate critic outputs and generate quality signals. Powerful code-generation agents (e.g., Claude-Code, Codex) systematically explore agent configurations and construct a policy bank, a structured repository of reusable design strategies, enabling the framework to self-refine without extensive human intervention. We evaluate AgentDisCo on three established deep research benchmarks (DeepResearchBench, DeepConsult, DeepResearchGym) using Gemini-2.5-Pro, achieving performance comparable to or surpassing leading closed-source systems. Observing that existing benchmarks inadequately reflect real-world user needs, we introduce GALA (General AI Life Assistants), a benchmark that mines latent research interests from users' historical browsing behavior. We further develop a rendering agent that converts research reports into visually rich poster presentations, and demonstrate an end-to-end product, AutoResearch Your Interest, which delivers personalized deep research recommendations derived from individual browsing histories.

Modern AI agents, driven by advances in large foundation models, promise to enhance our productivity and transform our lives by augmenting our knowledge and capabilities. To achieve this vision, AI agents must effectively plan, perform multi-step reasoning and actions, respond to novel observations, and recover from errors, to successfully complete complex tasks across a wide range of scenarios. In this work, we introduce Magentic-One, a high-performing open-source agentic system for solving such tasks. Magentic-One uses a multi-agent architecture where a lead agent, the Orchestrator, plans, tracks progress, and re-plans to recover from errors. Throughout task execution, the Orchestrator directs other specialized agents to perform tasks as needed, such as operating a web browser, navigating local files, or writing and executing Python code. We show that Magentic-One achieves statistically competitive performance to the state-of-the-art on three diverse and challenging agentic benchmarks: GAIA, AssistantBench, and WebArena. Magentic-One achieves these results without modification to core agent capabilities or to how they collaborate, demonstrating progress towards generalist agentic systems. Moreover, Magentic-One's modular design allows agents to be added or removed from the team without additional prompt tuning or training, easing development and making it extensible to future scenarios. We provide an open-source implementation of Magentic-One, and we include AutoGenBench, a standalone tool for agentic evaluation. AutoGenBench provides built-in controls for repetition and isolation to run agentic benchmarks in a rigorous and contained manner -- which is important when agents' actions have side-effects. Magentic-One, AutoGenBench and detailed empirical performance evaluations of Magentic-One, including ablations and error analysis are available at https://aka.ms/magentic-one

The rise of AI agent frameworks has introduced agent skills, modular packages containing instructions and executable code that dynamically extend agent capabilities. While this architecture enables powerful customization, skills execute with implicit trust and minimal vetting, creating a significant yet uncharacterized attack surface. We conduct the first large-scale empirical security analysis of this emerging ecosystem, collecting 42,447 skills from two major marketplaces and systematically analyzing 31,132 using SkillScan, a multi-stage detection framework integrating static analysis with LLM-based semantic classification. Our findings reveal pervasive security risks: 26.1% of skills contain at least one vulnerability, spanning 14 distinct patterns across four categories: prompt injection, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, and supply chain risks. Data exfiltration (13.3%) and privilege escalation (11.8%) are most prevalent, while 5.2% of skills exhibit high-severity patterns strongly suggesting malicious intent. We find that skills bundling executable scripts are 2.12x more likely to contain vulnerabilities than instruction-only skills (OR=2.12, p<0.001). Our contributions include: (1) a grounded vulnerability taxonomy derived from 8,126 vulnerable skills, (2) a validated detection methodology achieving 86.7% precision and 82.5% recall, and (3) an open dataset and detection toolkit to support future research. These results demonstrate an urgent need for capability-based permission systems and mandatory security vetting before this attack vector is further exploited.

AI coding agents are rapidly transforming software engineering by performing tasks such as feature development, debugging, and testing. Despite their growing impact, the research community lacks a comprehensive dataset capturing how these agents are used in real-world projects. To address this gap, we introduce AIDev, a large-scale dataset focused on agent-authored pull requests (Agentic-PRs) in real-world GitHub repositories. AIDev aggregates 932,791 Agentic-PRs produced by five agents: OpenAI Codex, Devin, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, and Claude Code. These PRs span 116,211 repositories and involve 72,189 developers. In addition, AIDev includes a curated subset of 33,596 Agentic-PRs from 2,807 repositories with over 100 stars, providing further information such as comments, reviews, commits, and related issues. This dataset offers a foundation for future research on AI adoption, developer productivity, and human-AI collaboration in the new era of software engineering. > AI Agent, Agentic AI, Coding Agent, Agentic Coding, Agentic Software Engineering, Agentic Engineering

AI agents aim to solve complex tasks by combining text-based reasoning with external tool calls. Unfortunately, AI agents are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks where data returned by external tools hijacks the agent to execute malicious tasks. To measure the adversarial robustness of AI agents, we introduce AgentDojo, an evaluation framework for agents that execute tools over untrusted data. To capture the evolving nature of attacks and defenses, AgentDojo is not a static test suite, but rather an extensible environment for designing and evaluating new agent tasks, defenses, and adaptive attacks. We populate the environment with 97 realistic tasks (e.g., managing an email client, navigating an e-banking website, or making travel bookings), 629 security test cases, and various attack and defense paradigms from the literature. We find that AgentDojo poses a challenge for both attacks and defenses: state-of-the-art LLMs fail at many tasks (even in the absence of attacks), and existing prompt injection attacks break some security properties but not all. We hope that AgentDojo can foster research on new design principles for AI agents that solve common tasks in a reliable and robust manner. We release the code for AgentDojo at https://github.com/ethz-spylab/agentdojo.

Large Language Model agents demonstrate potential in solving real-world problems via tools, yet generalist intelligence is bottlenecked by scarce high-quality, long-horizon data. Existing methods collect privacy-constrained API logs or generate scripted interactions lacking diversity, which struggle to produce data requisite for scaling capabilities. We propose AgentSkiller, a fully automated framework synthesizing multi-turn interaction data across realistic, semantically linked domains. It employs a DAG-based architecture with explicit state transitions to ensure determinism and recoverability. The pipeline builds a domain ontology and Person-Centric Entity Graph, defines tool interfaces via Service Blueprints for Model Context Protocol servers, and populates environments with consistent databases and strict Domain Policies. A cross-domain fusion mechanism links services to simulate complex tasks. Finally, the pipeline creates user tasks by verifying solution paths, filtering via execution-based validation, and generating queries using a Persona-based Simulator for automated rollout. This produces reliable environments with clear state changes. To demonstrate effectiveness, we synthesized approx 11K interaction samples; experimental results indicate that models trained on this dataset achieve significant improvements on function calling over baselines, particularly in larger parameter regimes.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are combined with plugins to create powerful LLM agents that provide a wide range of services. Unlike traditional software, LLM agent's behavior is determined at runtime by natural language prompts from either user or plugin's data. This flexibility enables a new computing paradigm with unlimited capabilities and programmability, but also introduces new security risks, vulnerable to privilege escalation attacks. Moreover, user prompt is prone to be interpreted in an insecure way by LLM agents, creating non-deterministic behaviors that can be exploited by attackers. To address these security risks, we propose Prompt Flow Integrity (PFI), a system security-oriented solution to prevent privilege escalation in LLM agents. Analyzing the architectural characteristics of LLM agents, PFI features three mitigation techniques -- i.e., untrusted data identification, enforcing least privilege on LLM agents, and validating unsafe data flows. Our evaluation result shows that PFI effectively mitigates privilege escalation attacks while successfully preserving the utility of LLM agents.

The AI trustworthiness crisis threatens to derail the artificial intelligence revolution, with regulatory barriers, security vulnerabilities, and accountability gaps preventing deployment in critical domains. Current AI systems operate on opaque data structures that lack the audit trails, provenance tracking, or explainability required by emerging regulations like the EU AI Act. We propose an artifact-centric AI agent paradigm where behavior is driven by persistent, verifiable data artifacts rather than ephemeral tasks, solving the trustworthiness problem at the data architecture level. Central to this approach is the Multimodal Artifact File Format (MAIF), an AI-native container embedding semantic representations, cryptographic provenance, and granular access controls. MAIF transforms data from passive storage into active trust enforcement, making every AI operation inherently auditable. Our production-ready implementation demonstrates ultra-high-speed streaming (2,720.7 MB/s), optimized video processing (1,342 MB/s), and enterprise-grade security. Novel algorithms for cross-modal attention, semantic compression, and cryptographic binding achieve up to 225 compression while maintaining semantic fidelity. Advanced security features include stream-level access control, real-time tamper detection, and behavioral anomaly analysis with minimal overhead. This approach directly addresses the regulatory, security, and accountability challenges preventing AI deployment in sensitive domains, offering a viable path toward trustworthy AI systems at scale.

Search agents connect LLMs to the Internet, enabling access to broader and more up-to-date information. However, unreliable search results may also pose safety threats to end users, establishing a new threat surface. In this work, we conduct two in-the-wild experiments to demonstrate both the prevalence of low-quality search results and their potential to misguide agent behaviors. To counter this threat, we introduce an automated red-teaming framework that is systematic, scalable, and cost-efficient, enabling lightweight and harmless safety assessments of search agents. Building on this framework, we construct the SafeSearch benchmark, which includes 300 test cases covering five categories of risks (e.g., misinformation and indirect prompt injection). Using this benchmark, we evaluate three representative search agent scaffolds, covering search workflow, tool-calling, and deep research, across 7 proprietary and 8 open-source backend LLMs. Our results reveal substantial vulnerabilities of LLM-based search agents: when exposed to unreliable websites, the highest ASR reached 90.5% for GPT-4.1-mini under a search workflow setting. Moreover, our analysis highlights the limited effectiveness of common defense practices, such as reminder prompting. This emphasizes the value of our framework in promoting transparency for safer agent development. Our codebase and test cases are publicly available: https://github.com/jianshuod/SafeSearch.

Building LLM-based agents has become increasingly important. Recent works on LLM-based agent self-evolution primarily record successful experiences as textual prompts or reflections, which cannot reliably guarantee efficient task re-execution in complex scenarios. We propose AgentFactory, a new self-evolution paradigm that preserves successful task solutions as executable subagent code rather than textual experience. Crucially, these subagents are continuously refined based on execution feedback, becoming increasingly robust and efficient as more tasks are encountered. Saved subagents are pure Python code with standardized documentation, enabling portability across any Python-capable system. We demonstrate that AgentFactory enables continuous capability accumulation: its library of executable subagents grows and improves over time, progressively reducing the effort required for similar tasks without manual intervention. Our implementation is open-sourced at https://github.com/zzatpku/AgentFactory, and our demonstration video is available at https://youtu.be/iKSsuAXJHW0.

Multi-agent Large Language Model (LLM) systems create privacy risks that current benchmarks cannot measure. When agents coordinate on tasks, sensitive data passes through inter-agent messages, shared memory, and tool arguments; pathways that output-only audits never inspect. We introduce AgentLeak, to the best of our knowledge the first full-stack benchmark for privacy leakage covering internal channels, spanning 1,000 scenarios across healthcare, finance, legal, and corporate domains, paired with a 32-class attack taxonomy and three-tier detection pipeline. Testing GPT-4o, GPT-4o-mini, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Mistral Large, and Llama 3.3 70B across 4,979 traces reveals that multi-agent configurations reduce per-channel output leakage (C1: 27.2% vs 43.2% in single-agent) but introduce unmonitored internal channels that raise total system exposure to 68.9% (OR-aggregated across C1, C2, C5). Internal channels account for most of this gap: inter-agent messages (C2) leak at 68.8%, compared to 27.2% on C1 (output channel). This means that output-only audits miss 41.7% of violations. Claude 3.5 Sonnet, which emphasizes safety alignment in its design, achieves the lowest leakage rates on both external (3.3%) and internal (28.1%) channels, suggesting that model-level safety training may transfer to internal channel protection. Across all five models and four domains, the pattern C2 > C1 holds consistently, confirming that inter-agent communication is the primary vulnerability. These findings underscore the need for coordination frameworks that incorporate internal-channel privacy protections and enforce privacy controls on inter-agent communication.

LLM agents rely on prompts to implement task-specific capabilities based on foundation LLMs, making agent prompts valuable intellectual property. However, in untrusted deployments, adversaries can copy and reuse these prompts with other proprietary LLMs, causing economic losses. To protect these prompts, we identify four key challenges: proactivity, runtime protection, usability, and non-portability that existing approaches fail to address. We present PragLocker, a prompt protection scheme that satisfies these requirements. PragLocker constructs function-preserving obfuscated prompts by anchoring semantics with code symbols and then using target-model feedback to inject noise, yielding prompts that only work on the target LLM. Experiments across multiple agent systems, datasets, and foundation LLMs show that PragLocker substantially reduces cross-LLM portability, maintains target performance, and remains robust against adaptive attackers.

The rapid adoption of AI coding agents for software development has raised important questions about the quality and maintainability of the code they produce. While prior studies have examined AI-generated source code, the impact of AI coding agents on build systems-a critical yet understudied component of the software lifecycle-remains largely unexplored. This data mining challenge focuses on AIDev, the first large-scale, openly available dataset capturing agent-authored pull requests (Agentic-PRs) from real-world GitHub repositories. Our paper leverages this dataset to investigate (RQ1) whether AI coding agents generate build code with quality issues (e.g., code smells), (RQ2) to what extent AI agents can eliminate code smells from build code, and (RQ3) to what extent Agentic-PRs are accepted by developers. We identified 364 maintainability and security-related build smells across varying severity levels, indicating that AI-generated build code can introduce quality issues-such as lack of error handling, and hardcoded paths or URLs-while also, in some cases, removing existing smells through refactorings (e.g., Pull Up Module and Externalize Properties). Notably, more than 61\% of Agentic-PRs are approved and merged with minimal human intervention. This dual impact underscores the need for future research on AI-aware build code quality assessment to systematically evaluate, guide, and govern AI-generated build systems code.

Recent progress in large language model (LLM) agents has largely focused on embedding self-improvement mechanisms inside the agent or searching over many concurrent variants. While these approaches can raise aggregate scores, they often yield unstable and hard-to-audit improvement trajectories, making it difficult to guarantee non-regression or to reason about failures across versions. We reframe agent improvement as release engineering: agents are treated as shippable artifacts, and improvement is externalized into a regression-aware release pipeline. We introduce AgentDevel, a release engineering pipeline that iteratively runs the current agent, produces implementation-blind, symptom-level quality signals from execution traces, synthesizes a single release candidate (RC) via executable diagnosis, and promotes it under flip-centered gating. AgentDevel features three core designs: (i) an implementation-blind LLM critic that characterizes failure appearances without accessing agent internals, (ii) script-based executable diagnosis that aggregates dominant symptom patterns and produces auditable engineering specifications, and (iii) flip-centered gating that prioritizes pass to fail regressions and fail to pass fixes as first-class evidence. Unlike population-based search or in-agent self-refinement, AgentDevel maintains a single canonical version line and emphasizes non-regression as a primary objective. Experiments on execution-heavy benchmarks demonstrate that AgentDevel yields stable improvements with significantly fewer regressions while producing reproducible, auditable artifacts. Overall, AgentDevel provides a practical development discipline for building, debugging, and releasing LLM agents as software development.

On December 4, 2025, Anthropic released Anthropic Interviewer, an AI tool for running qualitative interviews at scale, along with a public dataset of 1,250 interviews with professionals, including 125 scientists, about their use of AI for research. Focusing on the scientist subset, I show that widely available LLMs with web search and agentic capabilities can link six out of twenty-four interviews to specific scientific works, recovering associated authors and, in some cases, uniquely identifying the interviewees. My contribution is to show that modern LLM-based agents make such re-identification attacks easy and low-effort: off-the-shelf tools can, with a few natural-language prompts, search the web, cross-reference details, and propose likely matches, effectively lowering the technical barrier. Existing safeguards can be bypassed by breaking down the re-identification into benign tasks. I outline the attack at a high level, discuss implications for releasing rich qualitative data in the age of LLM agents, and propose mitigation recommendations and open problems. I have notified Anthropic of my findings.

Software development agents powered by large language models (LLMs) have shown great promise in automating tasks like environment setup, issue solving, and program repair. Unfortunately, understanding and debugging such agents remain challenging due to their complex and dynamic nature. Developers must reason about trajectories of LLM queries, tool calls, and code modifications, but current techniques reveal little of this intermediate process in a comprehensible format. The key insight of this paper is that debugging software development agents shares many similarities with conventional debugging of software programs, yet requires a higher level of abstraction that raises the level from low-level implementation details to high-level agent actions. Drawing on this insight, we introduce AgentStepper, the first interactive debugger for LLM-based software engineering agents. AgentStepper enables developers to inspect, control, and interactively manipulate agent trajectories. AgentStepper represents trajectories as structured conversations among an LLM, the agent program, and tools. It supports breakpoints, stepwise execution, and live editing of prompts and tool invocations, while capturing and displaying intermediate repository-level code changes. Our evaluation applies AgentStepper to three state-of-the-art software development agents, ExecutionAgent, SWE-Agent, and RepairAgent, showing that integrating the approach into existing agents requires minor code changes (39-42 edited lines). Moreover, we report on a user study with twelve participants, indicating that AgentStepper improves the ability of participants to interpret trajectories (64% vs. 67% mean performance) and identify bugs in the agent's implementation (17% vs. 60% success rate), while reducing perceived workload (e.g., frustration reduced from 5.4/7.0 to 2.4/7.0) compared to conventional tools.

High-quality code documentation is crucial for software development especially in the era of AI. However, generating it automatically using Large Language Models (LLMs) remains challenging, as existing approaches often produce incomplete, unhelpful, or factually incorrect outputs. We introduce DocAgent, a novel multi-agent collaborative system using topological code processing for incremental context building. Specialized agents (Reader, Searcher, Writer, Verifier, Orchestrator) then collaboratively generate documentation. We also propose a multi-faceted evaluation framework assessing Completeness, Helpfulness, and Truthfulness. Comprehensive experiments show DocAgent significantly outperforms baselines consistently. Our ablation study confirms the vital role of the topological processing order. DocAgent offers a robust approach for reliable code documentation generation in complex and proprietary repositories.

AI coding agents are now submitting pull requests (PRs) to software projects, acting not just as assistants but as autonomous contributors. As these agentic contributions are rapidly increasing across real repositories, little is known about how they behave in practice and why many of them fail to be merged. In this paper, we conduct a large-scale study of 33k agent-authored PRs made by five coding agents across GitHub. (RQ1) We first quantitatively characterize merged and not-merged PRs along four broad dimensions: 1) merge outcomes across task types, 2) code changes, 3) CI build results, and 4) review dynamics. We observe that tasks related to documentation, CI, and build update achieve the highest merge success, whereas performance and bug-fix tasks perform the worst. Not-merged PRs tend to involve larger code changes, touch more files, and often do not pass the project's CI/CD pipeline validation. (RQ2) To further investigate why some agentic PRs are not merged, we qualitatively analyze 600 PRs to derive a hierarchical taxonomy of rejection patterns. This analysis complements the quantitative findings in RQ1 by uncovering rejection reasons not captured by quantitative metrics, including lack of meaningful reviewer engagement, duplicate PRs, unwanted feature implementations, and agent misalignment. Together, our findings highlight key socio-technical and human-AI collaboration factors that are critical to improving the success of future agentic workflows.

AI agents have been developed for complex real-world tasks from coding to customer service. But AI agent evaluations suffer from many challenges that undermine our understanding of how well agents really work. We introduce the Holistic Agent Leaderboard (HAL) to address these challenges. We make three main contributions. First, we provide a standardized evaluation harness that orchestrates parallel evaluations across hundreds of VMs, reducing evaluation time from weeks to hours while eliminating common implementation bugs. Second, we conduct three-dimensional analysis spanning models, scaffolds, and benchmarks. We validate the harness by conducting 21,730 agent rollouts across 9 models and 9 benchmarks in coding, web navigation, science, and customer service with a total cost of about $40,000. Our analysis reveals surprising insights, such as higher reasoning effort reducing accuracy in the majority of runs. Third, we use LLM-aided log inspection to uncover previously unreported behaviors, such as searching for the benchmark on HuggingFace instead of solving a task, or misusing credit cards in flight booking tasks. We share all agent logs, comprising 2.5B tokens of language model calls, to incentivize further research into agent behavior. By standardizing how the field evaluates agents and addressing common pitfalls in agent evaluation, we hope to shift the focus from agents that ace benchmarks to agents that work reliably in the real world.

The capacity of AI agents to effectively handle tasks of increasing duration and complexity continues to grow, demonstrating exceptional performance in coding, deep research, and complex problem-solving evaluations. However, in daily scenarios, the perception of these advanced AI capabilities among general users remains limited. We argue that current evaluations prioritize increasing task difficulty without sufficiently addressing the diversity of agentic tasks necessary to cover the daily work, life, and learning activities of a broad demographic. To address this, we propose AgentIF-OneDay, aimed at determining whether general users can utilize natural language instructions and AI agents to complete a diverse array of daily tasks. These tasks require not only solving problems through dialogue but also understanding various attachment types and delivering tangible file-based results. The benchmark is structured around three user-centric categories: Open Workflow Execution, which assesses adherence to explicit and complex workflows; Latent Instruction, which requires agents to infer implicit instructions from attachments; and Iterative Refinement, which involves modifying or expanding upon ongoing work. We employ instance-level rubrics and a refined evaluation pipeline that aligns LLM-based verification with human judgment, achieving an 80.1% agreement rate using Gemini-3-Pro. AgentIF-OneDay comprises 104 tasks covering 767 scoring points. We benchmarked four leading general AI agents and found that agent products built based on APIs and ChatGPT agents based on agent RL remain in the first tier simultaneously. Leading LLM APIs and open-source models have internalized agentic capabilities, enabling AI application teams to develop cutting-edge Agent products.

Failure attribution in LLM multi-agent systems-identifying the agent and step responsible for task failures-provides crucial clues for systems debugging but remains underexplored and labor-intensive. In this paper, we propose and formulate a new research area: automated failure attribution for LLM multi-agent systems. To support this initiative, we introduce the Who&When dataset, comprising extensive failure logs from 127 LLM multi-agent systems with fine-grained annotations linking failures to specific agents and decisive error steps. Using the Who&When, we develop and evaluate three automated failure attribution methods, summarizing their corresponding pros and cons. The best method achieves 53.5% accuracy in identifying failure-responsible agents but only 14.2% in pinpointing failure steps, with some methods performing below random. Even SOTA reasoning models, such as OpenAI o1 and DeepSeek R1, fail to achieve practical usability. These results highlight the task's complexity and the need for further research in this area. Code and dataset are available at https://github.com/mingyin1/Agents_Failure_Attribution

Tool-augmented LLM agents raise new security risks: tool executions can introduce runtime-only behaviors, including prompt injection and unintended exposure of external inputs (e.g., environment secrets or local files). While existing scanners often focus on static artifacts, analyzing runtime behavior is challenging because directly executing untrusted tools can itself be dangerous. We present MCP-SandboxScan, a lightweight framework motivated by the Model Context Protocol (MCP) that safely executes untrusted tools inside a WebAssembly/WASI sandbox and produces auditable reports of external-to-sink exposures. Our prototype (i) extracts LLM-relevant sinks from runtime outputs (prompt/messages and structured tool-return fields), (ii) instantiates external-input candidates from environment values, mounted file contents, and output-surfaced HTTP fetch intents, and (iii) links sources to sinks via snippet-based substring matching. Case studies on three representative tools show that MCP-SandboxScan can surface provenance evidence when external inputs appear in prompt/messages or tool-return payloads, and can expose filesystem capability violations as runtime evidence. We further compare against a lightweight static string-signature baseline and use a micro-benchmark to characterize false negatives under transformations and false positives from short-token collisions.

Agentic AI systems increasingly execute consequential actions on behalf of human principals, delegating tasks through multi-step chains of autonomous agents. No existing standard addresses a fundamental accountability gap: verifying that terminal actions in a delegation chain were genuinely authorized by a human principal, through what chain of delegation, and under what scope. This paper presents the Human Delegation Provenance (HDP) protocol, a lightweight token-based scheme that cryptographically captures and verifies human authorization context in multi-agent systems. An HDP token binds a human authorization event to a session, records each agent's delegation action as a signed hop in an append-only chain, and enables any participant to verify the full provenance record using only the issuer's Ed25519 public key and the current session identifier. Verification is fully offline, requiring no registry lookups or third-party trust anchors. We situate HDP within the existing landscape of delegation protocols, identify its distinct design point relative to OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange (RFC 8693), JSON Web Tokens (RFC 7519), UCAN, and the Intent Provenance Protocol (draft-haberkamp-ipp-00), and demonstrate that existing standards fail to address the multi-hop, append-only, human-provenance requirements of agentic systems. HDP has been published as an IETF Internet-Draft (draft-helixar-hdp-agentic-delegation-00) and a reference TypeScript SDK is publicly available.

Agentic systems consisting of multiple LLM-driven agents coordinating through tools and structured interactions, are increasingly deployed for complex reasoning and problem-solving tasks. At the same time, emerging low-code and template-based agent development platforms (e.g., Dify) enable users to rapidly build and orchestrate agentic systems, which we refer to as platform-orchestrated agentic systems. However, these systems are also fragile and it remains unclear how to systematically identify their potential failure root cause. This paper presents a study of root cause identification of these platform-orchestrated agentic systems. To support this initiative, we construct a dataset AgentFail containing 307 failure logs from ten agentic systems, each with fine-grained annotations linking failures to their root causes. We additionally utilize counterfactual reasoning-based repair strategy to ensure the reliability of the annotation. Building on the dataset, we develop a taxonomy that characterizes failure root causes and analyze their distribution across different platforms and task domains. Furthermore, we introduce a benchmark that leverages LLMs for automatically identifying root causes, in which we also utilize the proposed taxonomy as guidance for LLMs. Results show that the taxonomy can largely improve the performance, thereby confirming its utility. Nevertheless, the accuracy of root cause identification reaches at most 33.6%, which indicates that this task still remains challenging. In light of these results, we also provide actionable guidelines for building such agentic systems. In summary, this paper provides a reliable dataset of failure root cause for platform-orchestrated agentic systems, corresponding taxonomy and benchmark, which serves as a foundation for advancing the development of more reliable agentic systems.

The rapid shift from passive LLMs to autonomous LLM-agents marks a new paradigm in cybersecurity. While these agents can act as powerful tools for both offensive and defensive operations, the very agentic context introduces a new class of inherent security risks. In this work we present the first holistic survey of the agentic security landscape, structuring the field around three interdependent pillars: Applications, Threats, and Defenses. We provide a comprehensive taxonomy of over 150 papers, explaining how agents are used, the vulnerabilities they possess, and the countermeasures designed to protect them. A detailed cross-cutting analysis shows emerging trends in agent architecture while revealing critical research gaps in model and modality coverage.

Although language model (LM) agents have demonstrated increased performance in multiple domains, including coding and web-browsing, their success in cybersecurity has been limited. We present EnIGMA, an LM agent for autonomously solving Capture The Flag (CTF) challenges. We introduce new tools and interfaces to improve the agent's ability to find and exploit security vulnerabilities, focusing on interactive terminal programs. These novel Interactive Agent Tools enable LM agents, for the first time, to run interactive utilities, such as a debugger and a server connection tool, which are essential for solving these challenges. Empirical analysis on 390 CTF challenges across four benchmarks demonstrate that these new tools and interfaces substantially improve our agent's performance, achieving state-of-the-art results on NYU CTF, Intercode-CTF, and CyBench. Finally, we analyze data leakage, developing new methods to quantify it and identifying a new phenomenon we term soliloquizing, where the model self-generates hallucinated observations without interacting with the environment. Our code and development dataset are available at https://github.com/SWE-agent/SWE-agent/tree/v0.7 and https://github.com/NYU-LLM-CTF/NYU_CTF_Bench/tree/main/development respectively.

We present the design rationale, implementation attempt, and failure analysis of Eyla, a proposed identity-anchored LLM architecture that integrates biologically-inspired subsystems -- including HiPPO-initialized state-space models, zero-initialized adapters, episodic memory retrieval, and calibrated uncertainty training -- into a unified agent operating system running on consumer hardware. Unlike existing approaches that optimize models for generic helpfulness, Eyla targets identity consistency: the ability to maintain a coherent self-model under adversarial pressure, admit uncertainty, and resist manipulation. We propose the Identity Consistency Score (ICS), a novel benchmark for evaluating this property across LLMs. We then present an honest account of attempting to implement this architecture using AI coding assistants (Claude Code, Cursor) as a non-programmer, documenting a $1,000+ failure that produced a 1.27B parameter model with 86 brain subsystems contributing less than 2% to output. Our analysis identifies five systematic failure modes of AI-assisted development for novel architectures and offers concrete recommendations. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to combine an architectural vision with a documented first-person failure analysis of AI-assisted LLM development, providing lessons for both the AI systems and AI-assisted software engineering communities.

Coding agents are becoming increasingly capable of completing end-to-end software engineering workflows that previously required a human developer, including raising pull requests (PRs) to propose their changes. However, we still know little about how these agents use libraries when generating code, a core part of real-world software development. To fill this gap, we study 26,760 agent-authored PRs from the AIDev dataset to examine three questions: how often do agents import libraries, how often do they introduce new dependencies (and with what versioning), and which specific libraries do they choose? We find that agents often import libraries (29.5% of PRs) but rarely add new dependencies (1.3% of PRs); and when they do, they follow strong versioning practices (75.0% specify a version), an improvement on direct LLM usage where versions are rarely mentioned. Generally, agents draw from a surprisingly diverse set of external libraries, contrasting with the limited "library preferences" seen in prior non-agentic LLM studies. Our results offer an early empirical view into how AI coding agents interact with today's software ecosystems.

The dream to create AI assistants as capable and versatile as the fictional J.A.R.V.I.S from Iron Man has long captivated imaginations. With the evolution of (multi-modal) large language models ((M)LLMs), this dream is closer to reality, as (M)LLM-based Agents using computing devices (e.g., computers and mobile phones) by operating within the environments and interfaces (e.g., Graphical User Interface (GUI)) provided by operating systems (OS) to automate tasks have significantly advanced. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of these advanced agents, designated as OS Agents. We begin by elucidating the fundamentals of OS Agents, exploring their key components including the environment, observation space, and action space, and outlining essential capabilities such as understanding, planning, and grounding. We then examine methodologies for constructing OS Agents, focusing on domain-specific foundation models and agent frameworks. A detailed review of evaluation protocols and benchmarks highlights how OS Agents are assessed across diverse tasks. Finally, we discuss current challenges and identify promising directions for future research, including safety and privacy, personalization and self-evolution. This survey aims to consolidate the state of OS Agents research, providing insights to guide both academic inquiry and industrial development. An open-source GitHub repository is maintained as a dynamic resource to foster further innovation in this field. We present a 9-page version of our work, accepted by ACL 2025, to provide a concise overview to the domain.

AI agents have the potential to significantly alter the cybersecurity landscape. Here, we introduce the first framework to capture offensive and defensive cyber-capabilities in evolving real-world systems. Instantiating this framework with BountyBench, we set up 25 systems with complex, real-world codebases. To capture the vulnerability lifecycle, we define three task types: Detect (detecting a new vulnerability), Exploit (exploiting a given vulnerability), and Patch (patching a given vulnerability). For Detect, we construct a new success indicator, which is general across vulnerability types and provides localized evaluation. We manually set up the environment for each system, including installing packages, setting up server(s), and hydrating database(s). We add 40 bug bounties, which are vulnerabilities with monetary awards from \10 to 30,485, covering 9 of the OWASP Top 10 Risks. To modulate task difficulty, we devise a new strategy based on information to guide detection, interpolating from identifying a zero day to exploiting a given vulnerability. We evaluate 10 agents: Claude Code, OpenAI Codex CLI with o3-high and o4-mini, and custom agents with o3-high, GPT-4.1, Gemini 2.5 Pro Preview, Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking, Qwen3 235B A22B, Llama 4 Maverick, and DeepSeek-R1. Given up to three attempts, the top-performing agents are Codex CLI: o3-high (12.5% on Detect, mapping to \3,720; 90% on Patch, mapping to 14,152), Custom Agent: Claude 3.7 Sonnet Thinking (67.5% on Exploit), and Codex CLI: o4-mini (90% on Patch, mapping to \$14,422). Codex CLI: o3-high, Codex CLI: o4-mini, and Claude Code are more capable at defense, achieving higher Patch scores of 90%, 90%, and 87.5%, compared to Exploit scores of 47.5%, 32.5%, and 57.5% respectively; while the custom agents are relatively balanced between offense and defense, achieving Exploit scores of 17.5-67.5% and Patch scores of 25-60%.

The ability to synthesize personalized group photos and specify the positions of each identity offers immense creative potential. While such imagery can be visually appealing, it presents significant challenges for existing technologies. A persistent issue is identity (ID) leakage, where injected facial features interfere with one another, resulting in low face resemblance, incorrect positioning, and visual artifacts. Existing methods suffer from limitations such as the reliance on segmentation models, increased runtime, or a high probability of ID leakage. To address these challenges, we propose ID-Patch, a novel method that provides robust association between identities and 2D positions. Our approach generates an ID patch and ID embeddings from the same facial features: the ID patch is positioned on the conditional image for precise spatial control, while the ID embeddings integrate with text embeddings to ensure high resemblance. Experimental results demonstrate that ID-Patch surpasses baseline methods across metrics, such as face ID resemblance, ID-position association accuracy, and generation efficiency. Project Page is: https://byteaigc.github.io/ID-Patch/

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as agents in various contexts by providing tools at their disposal. However, LLM agents can exhibit unpredictable behaviors, including taking undesirable and/or unsafe actions. In order to measure the latent propensity of LLM agents for taking illegal actions under an EU legislative context, we introduce EU-Agent-Bench, a verifiable human-curated benchmark that evaluates an agent's alignment with EU legal norms in situations where benign user inputs could lead to unlawful actions. Our benchmark spans scenarios across several categories, including data protection, bias/discrimination, and scientific integrity, with each user request allowing for both compliant and non-compliant execution of the requested actions. Comparing the model's function calls against a rubric exhaustively supported by citations of the relevant legislature, we evaluate the legal compliance of frontier LLMs, and furthermore investigate the compliance effect of providing the relevant legislative excerpts in the agent's system prompt along with explicit instructions to comply. We release a public preview set for the research community, while holding out a private test set to prevent data contamination in evaluating upcoming models. We encourage future work extending agentic safety benchmarks to different legal jurisdictions and to multi-turn and multilingual interactions. We release our code on https://github.com/ilijalichkovski/eu-agent-bench{this URL}.

Digital entities such as AI agents and humanoid robots increasingly operate alongside real humans, yet their identity infrastructure is based on credentials rather than embodied biometric identity. We introduce Biometric Identity Provisioning (BIP), a new problem and solution framework that addresses: given an enrollment gallery of real human identities, provision virtual identities that are non-colliding with every enrolled identity, maintain sufficient inter-class separability, and are realizable as high-fidelity face images. The key geometric insight is that real face identities occupy a low-dimensional subspace of the embedding hypersphere, leaving no residual subspace for virtual identities. Hence, virtual identities must instead be allocated as unclaimed gaps within the real face manifold itself. BIP is therefore a constrained packing problem: available gaps vastly exceed any foreseeable enrollment scale, and provisioned identities remain non-colliding even as new real identities are subsequently enrolled. Grounded in this geometry, our repulsion-based allocation is not bounded by any fixed provisioning count; we demonstrate 10M non-colliding virtual identity embeddings against a gallery of 360K real identities. Realizing these embeddings as face images requires a generator that operates outside the training distribution of real face images; we introduce GapGen, a gap-aware generator trained with a curriculum that progressively extends synthesis into non-colliding regions, validated at 1M photorealistic virtual face images. We further construct v-LFW, a virtual counterpart to LFW face dataset, with protocols for virtual face verification, cross-reality matching, real-vs-virtual detection, and unified recognition and detection.

Deep research is emerging as a representative long-horizon task for large language model (LLM) agents. However, long trajectories in deep research often exceed model context limits, compressing token budgets for both evidence collection and report writing, and preventing effective test-time scaling. We introduce FS-Researcher, a file-system-based, dual-agent framework that scales deep research beyond the context window via a persistent workspace. Specifically, a Context Builder agent acts as a librarian which browses the internet, writes structured notes, and archives raw sources into a hierarchical knowledge base that can grow far beyond context length. A Report Writer agent then composes the final report section by section, treating the knowledge base as the source of facts. In this framework, the file system serves as a durable external memory and a shared coordination medium across agents and sessions, enabling iterative refinement beyond the context window. Experiments on two open-ended benchmarks (DeepResearch Bench and DeepConsult) show that FS-Researcher achieves state-of-the-art report quality across different backbone models. Further analyses demonstrate a positive correlation between final report quality and the computation allocated to the Context Builder, validating effective test-time scaling under the file-system paradigm. The code and data are anonymously open-sourced at https://github.com/Ignoramus0817/FS-Researcher.

Building deployment-ready LLM agents requires complex orchestration of tools, data sources, and control flow logic, yet existing systems tightly couple agent logic to specific programming languages and deployment models. We present a declarative system that separates agent workflow specification from implementation, enabling the same pipeline definition to execute across multiple backend languages (Java, Python, Go) and deployment environments (cloud-native, on-premises). Our key insight is that most agent workflows consist of common patterns -- data serialization, filtering, RAG retrieval, API orchestration -- that can be expressed through a unified DSL rather than imperative code. This approach transforms agent development from application programming to configuration, where adding new tools or fine-tuning agent behaviors requires only pipeline specification changes, not code deployment. Our system natively supports A/B testing of agent strategies, allowing multiple pipeline variants to run on the same backend infrastructure with automatic metric collection and comparison. We evaluate our approach on real-world e-commerce workflows at PayPal, processing millions of daily interactions. Our results demonstrate 60% reduction in development time, and 3x improvement in deployment velocity compared to imperative implementations. The language's declarative approach enables non-engineers to modify agent behaviors safely, while maintaining sub-100ms orchestration overhead. We show that complex workflows involving product search, personalization, and cart management can be expressed in under 50 lines of DSL compared to 500+ lines of imperative code.

AI agents increasingly act through external tools: they query databases, execute shell commands, read and write files, and send network requests. Yet in most current agent stacks, model-generated tool calls are handed to the execution layer with no framework-agnostic control point in between. Post-execution observability can record these actions, but it cannot stop them before side effects occur. We present AEGIS, a pre-execution firewall and audit layer for AI agents. AEGIS interposes on the tool-execution path and applies a three-stage pipeline: (i) deep string extraction from tool arguments, (ii) content-first risk scanning, and (iii) composable policy validation. High-risk calls can be held for human approval, and all decisions are recorded in a tamper-evident audit trail based on Ed25519 signatures and SHA-256 hash chaining. In the current implementation, AEGIS supports 14 agent frameworks across Python, JavaScript, and Go with lightweight integration. On a curated suite of 48 attackinstances, AEGIS blocks all attacks in the suite before execution; on 500 benign tool calls, it yields a 1.2% false positive rate; and across 1,000 consecutive interceptions, it adds 8.3 ms median latency. The live demo will show end-to-end interception of benign, malicious, and human-escalated tool calls, allowing attendees to observe real-time blocking, approval workflows, and audit-trail generation. These results suggest that pre-execution mediation for AI agents can be practical, low-overhead, and directly deployable.

Recent work has embodied LLMs as agents, allowing them to access tools, perform actions, and interact with external content (e.g., emails or websites). However, external content introduces the risk of indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, where malicious instructions are embedded within the content processed by LLMs, aiming to manipulate these agents into executing detrimental actions against users. Given the potentially severe consequences of such attacks, establishing benchmarks to assess and mitigate these risks is imperative. In this work, we introduce InjecAgent, a benchmark designed to assess the vulnerability of tool-integrated LLM agents to IPI attacks. InjecAgent comprises 1,054 test cases covering 17 different user tools and 62 attacker tools. We categorize attack intentions into two primary types: direct harm to users and exfiltration of private data. We evaluate 30 different LLM agents and show that agents are vulnerable to IPI attacks, with ReAct-prompted GPT-4 vulnerable to attacks 24% of the time. Further investigation into an enhanced setting, where the attacker instructions are reinforced with a hacking prompt, shows additional increases in success rates, nearly doubling the attack success rate on the ReAct-prompted GPT-4. Our findings raise questions about the widespread deployment of LLM Agents. Our benchmark is available at https://github.com/uiuc-kang-lab/InjecAgent.

AI agents are systems capable of perceiving their environment, autonomously planning and executing tasks. Recent advancements in LLM have introduced a transformative paradigm for AI agents, enabling them to interact with external resources and tools through prompts. In such agents, the workflow integrates developer-written code, which manages framework construction and logic control, with LLM-generated natural language that enhances dynamic decision-making and interaction. However, discrepancies between developer-implemented logic and the dynamically generated content of LLMs in terms of behavior and expected outcomes can lead to defects, such as tool invocation failures and task execution errors. These issues introduce specific risks, leading to various defects in LLM-based AI Agents, such as service interruptions. Despite the importance of these issues, there is a lack of systematic work that focuses on analyzing LLM-based AI Agents to uncover defects in their code. In this paper, we present the first study focused on identifying and detecting defects in LLM Agents. We collected and analyzed 6,854 relevant posts from StackOverflow to define 8 types of agent defects. For each type, we provided detailed descriptions with an example. Then, we designed a static analysis tool, named Agentable, to detect the defects. Agentable leverages Code Property Graphs and LLMs to analyze Agent workflows by efficiently identifying specific code patterns and analyzing natural language descriptions. To evaluate Agentable, we constructed two datasets: AgentSet, consists of 84 real-world Agents, and AgentTest, which contains 78 Agents specifically designed to include various types of defects. Our results show that Agentable achieved an overall accuracy of 88.79% and a recall rate of 91.03%. Furthermore, our analysis reveals the 889 defects of the AgentSet, highlighting the prevalence of these defects.

Language-model agents are increasingly used as persistent coworkers that assist users across multiple working days. During such workflows, the surrounding environment may change independently of the agent: new emails arrive, calendar entries shift, knowledge-base records are updated, and evidence appears across images, scanned PDFs, audio, video, and spreadsheets. Existing benchmarks do not adequately evaluate this setting because they typically run within a single static episode and remain largely text-centric. We introduce , a benchmark for coworker agents built around multi-turn multi-day tasks, a stateful sandboxed service environment whose state evolves between turns, and rule-based verification. The current release contains 100 tasks across 13 professional scenarios, executed against five stateful sandboxed services (filesystem, email, calendar, knowledge base, spreadsheet) and scored by 1537 deterministic Python checkers over post-execution service state; no LLM-as-judge is invoked during scoring. We benchmark seven frontier agent systems. The strongest model reaches 75.8 weighted score, but the best strict Task Success is only 20.0\%, indicating that partial progress is common while complete end-to-end workflow completion remains rare. Turn-level analysis shows that performance drops after the first exogenous environment update, highlighting adaptation to changing state as a key open challenge. We release the benchmark, evaluation harness, and construction pipeline to support reproducible coworker-agent evaluation.

Agents centered around Large Language Models (LLMs) are now capable of automating mobile device operations for users. After fine-tuning to learn a user's mobile operations, these agents can adhere to high-level user instructions online. They execute tasks such as goal decomposition, sequencing of sub-goals, and interactive environmental exploration, until the final objective is achieved. However, privacy concerns related to personalized user data arise during mobile operations, requiring user confirmation. Moreover, users' real-world operations are exploratory, with action data being complex and redundant, posing challenges for agent learning. To address these issues, in our practical application, we have designed interactive tasks between agents and humans to identify sensitive information and align with personalized user needs. Additionally, we integrated Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) information within the model's in-context learning to enhance the agent's comprehension of complex task execution. Our approach is evaluated on the new device control benchmark AitW, which encompasses 30K unique instructions across multi-step tasks, including application operation, web searching, and web shopping. Experimental results show that the SOP-based agent achieves state-of-the-art performance in LLMs without incurring additional inference costs, boasting an overall action success rate of 66.92\%. The code and data examples are available at https://github.com/alipay/mobile-agent.

Legal compliance in AI-driven data transfer planning is becoming increasingly critical under stringent privacy regulations such as the Japanese Act on the Protection of Personal Information (APPI). We propose a multi-agent legal verifier that decomposes compliance checking into specialized agents for statutory interpretation, business context evaluation, and risk assessment, coordinated through a structured synthesis protocol. Evaluated on a stratified dataset of 200 Amended APPI Article 16 cases with clearly defined ground truth labels and multiple performance metrics, the system achieves 72% accuracy, which is 21 percentage points higher than a single-agent baseline, including 90% accuracy on clear compliance cases (vs. 16% for the baseline) while maintaining perfect detection of clear violations. While challenges remain in ambiguous scenarios, these results show that domain specialization and coordinated reasoning can meaningfully improve legal AI performance, providing a scalable and regulation-aware framework for trustworthy and interpretable automated compliance verification.

Large language model (LLM) based agents have shown impressive capabilities by interleaving internal reasoning with external tool use. However, as these agents are deployed in long-horizon workflows, such as coding for a big, long-term project, context management becomes a critical bottleneck. We introduce Git-Context-Controller (GCC), a structured context management framework inspired by software version control systems. GCC elevates context as versioned memory hierarchy like Git. It structures agent memory as a persistent file system with explicit operations: COMMIT, BRANCH, MERGE, and CONTEXT, enabling milestone-based checkpointing, exploration of alternative plans, and structured reflection. Our approach empowers agents to manage long-term goals, isolate architectural experiments, and recover or hand off memory across sessions and agents. Empirically, agents equipped with GCC achieve state-of-the-art performance on the SWE-Bench-Lite benchmark, resolving 48.00 of software bugs, outperforming 26 competitive systems. In a self-replication case study, a GCC-augmented agent builds a new CLI agent from scratch, achieving 40.7 task resolution, compared to only 11.7 without GCC. The code is released at: https://github.com/theworldofagents/GCC

AI agents often fail in ways that are difficult to localize because executions are probabilistic, long-horizon, multi-agent, and mediated by noisy tool outputs. We address this gap by manually annotating failed agent runs and release a novel benchmark of 115 failed trajectories spanning structured API workflows, incident management, and open-ended web/file tasks. Each trajectory is annotated with a critical failure step and a category from a grounded-theory derived, cross-domain failure taxonomy. To mitigate the human cost of failure attribution, we present AGENTRX, an automated domain-agnostic diagnostic framework that pinpoints the critical failure step in a failed agent trajectory. It synthesizes constraints, evaluates them step-by-step, and produces an auditable validation log of constraint violations with associated evidence; an LLM-based judge uses this log to localize the critical step and category. Our framework improves step localization and failure attribution over existing baselines across three domains.

Traditional data processing pipelines are typically static and handcrafted for specific tasks, limiting their adaptability to evolving requirements. While general-purpose agents and coding assistants can generate code for well-understood data pipelines, they lack the ability to autonomously monitor, manage, and optimize an end-to-end pipeline once deployed. We present Autonomous Data Processing using Meta-agents (ADP-MA), a framework that dynamically constructs, executes, and iteratively refines data processing pipelines through hierarchical agent orchestration. At its core, meta-agents analyze input data and task specifications to design a multi-phase plan, instantiate specialized ground-level agents, and continuously evaluate pipeline performance. The architecture comprises three key components: a planning module for strategy generation, an orchestration layer for agent coordination and tool integration, and a monitoring loop for iterative evaluation and backtracking. Unlike conventional approaches, ADP-MA emphasizes context-aware optimization, adaptive workload partitioning, and progressive sampling for scalability. Additionally, the framework leverages a diverse set of external tools and can reuse previously designed agents, reducing redundancy and accelerating pipeline construction. We demonstrate ADP-MA through an interactive demo that showcases pipeline construction, execution monitoring, and adaptive refinement across representative data processing tasks.

LLM agents are increasingly deployed in long-horizon, complex environments to solve challenging problems, but this expansion exposes them to long-horizon attacks that exploit multi-turn user-agent-environment interactions to achieve objectives infeasible in single-turn settings. To measure agent vulnerabilities to such risks, we present AgentLAB, the first benchmark dedicated to evaluating LLM agent susceptibility to adaptive, long-horizon attacks. Currently, AgentLAB supports five novel attack types including intent hijacking, tool chaining, task injection, objective drifting, and memory poisoning, spanning 28 realistic agentic environments, and 644 security test cases. Leveraging AgentLAB, we evaluate representative LLM agents and find that they remain highly susceptible to long-horizon attacks; moreover, defenses designed for single-turn interactions fail to reliably mitigate long-horizon threats. We anticipate that AgentLAB will serve as a valuable benchmark for tracking progress on securing LLM agents in practical settings. The benchmark is publicly available at https://tanqiujiang.github.io/AgentLAB_main.

Facing scaling laws, video data from the internet becomes increasingly important. However, collecting extensive videos that meet specific needs is extremely labor-intensive and time-consuming. In this work, we study the way to expedite this collection process and propose VC-Agent, the first interactive agent that is able to understand users' queries and feedback, and accordingly retrieve/scale up relevant video clips with minimal user input. Specifically, considering the user interface, our agent defines various user-friendly ways for the user to specify requirements based on textual descriptions and confirmations. As for agent functions, we leverage existing multi-modal large language models to connect the user's requirements with the video content. More importantly, we propose two novel filtering policies that can be updated when user interaction is continually performed. Finally, we provide a new benchmark for personalized video dataset collection, and carefully conduct the user study to verify our agent's usage in various real scenarios. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our agent for customized video dataset collection. Project page: https://allenyidan.github.io/vcagent_page/.