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unmodeled-tyler 
posted an update 4 days ago
Post
1444
PSA: LiteLLM has been compromised on PyPI - if you have it installed, CHECK NOW.

LiteLLM is used as a dependency in A LOT of AI tooling, so there's a pretty good chance that you have it installed somewhere on your machine (my instance was part of Hermes Agent, but I was unaffected by the hack)

Versions 1.82.7 & 1.82.8 on PyPI have been compromised with a multi-stage credential stealer.

- Version 1.82.8 uses a .pth file that executes on EVERY python process startup. You don't even need to import litellm. Just having it installed is enough.
- The payload harvests SSH keys, .env files, AWS/GCP/Azure credentials, Kubernetes configs, database passwords, crytpo wallets, shell history - basically every secret on your machine.
- Stolen data is encrypted with a hardcoded RSA key and exfiltrated to a domain that is NOT part of a legitimate litellm infrastructure.
- If you're running Kubernetes, it attempts lateral movement across the entire cluster.
- The C2 is hosted on the Internet Computer blockchain, making it essentially impossible to take down.

This is part of a coordinated campaign by a threat actor called TeamPCP who have also hit Trivy (Aqua Security), Checkmarx KICS, and multiple npm packages in the last week ALONE.

What to do:

1. Run 'pip show litellm' in every environment you have
2. If you're on 1.82.7 or 1.82.8 - rotate EVERY secret on that machine immediately.
3. Check for persistence artifacts ~/.config/sysmon/sysmon.py & ~/.config/systemd/user/sysmon.service

I was lucky in this case that my litellm version was out of date, but if you've installed litellm as a dependency in ANY package within the last 24ish hours, you're gonna want to check.

SOURCES
https://futuresearch.ai/blog/litellm-pypi-supply-chain-attack/

Same group, different attack a couple of days ago: https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/canisterworm-how-a-self-propagating-npm-worm-is-spreading-backdoors-across-the-ecosystem

wow

wow

wow

wow

This is less about LiteLLM itself and more about how fragile the AI supply chain has become.

The .pth vector is particularly concerning—installation alone becomes implicit code execution across all Python processes, which breaks a lot of assumptions around dependency safety.

Also notable that this targets real infra (cloud creds, Kubernetes), not just local environments.

Feels like a reminder that:

Dependency trust is a weak point
Transitive packages are largely invisible
Secrets are often too exposed

This isn’t an edge case anymore, it’s starting to look like a pattern.