Add new SentenceTransformer model

README.md

@@ -4,307 +4,194 @@ tags:
 - sentence-similarity
 - feature-extraction
 - generated_from_trainer
-- dataset_size:2000
+- dataset_size:18000
 - loss:CosineSimilarityLoss
 base_model: rossieRuby/nyayadrishti-bert-v2
 widget:
-- source_sentence: What is Civil Appeal No. 2068 of 1971 referred to as?
+- source_sentence: Why was Smt. Chhoti's will inoperative regarding Jagannath's property?
   sentences:
-  - 'Tyabji ''s Muslim Law, Fourth edition, Chapter X deals with waqf. According to
-    Shia law the waqf is irrevocable after possession is given to the beneficiaries
-    or the Multawalli. The settler divests himself of the ownership of the property
-    and of everything in the nature of usfufruct from the moment the wakf is created.
-    In purely metaphorical sense the expression "ownership of God" is used but unlike
-    Hindu Law, since conception of a personal God is not recognized, there is no (1)
-    22 Indian Appeals, 76. 895 ownership of God or no property belongs to God in the
-    jural sense, although "the ownership of the property becomes reverted in God as
-    he is originally the owner of all things" (vide page 523). The Shia authorities
-    considered the property as transferred to the beneficiaries or to the object of
-    the, waqf. Strictly speaking, the ownership of the waqf property has no jural
-    conception with any exactitude. The corpus is tied ''down and is made inalienable.
-    Only the usufruct and the income from the corpus of the waqf property is available
-    for carrying out the objects of the wakf. The Sharaiu ''l Islam says "Waqf is
-    a contract the fruit or effect of which is (a) to tie up the original and (b)
-    to leave its usufruct free " "the waqf or subject of appropriation (corpus) is
-    transferred, so to become the property of the mowkoof alehi, [or ''person on whom
-    the settlement is made ''] for he has a right to the advantage or benefits (usufruct)
-    to be derived from it." (vide page 494, In the foot note at the same page occurs
-    a passage which runs thus "But it should not be overlooked that question about
-    ownership of property after dedication, refers merely to scientulla juris, supposed
-    to remain undisposed of although entire usufruct, (all benefits, & C.) are assigned
-    away. Question in whom property rests, therefore, entirely academical. " Mutawalli
-    is like a Manager rather than a trustee (see page 498). The Mutawalli, so far
-    as the waqf property is concerned, has to see that the beneficiaries got the advantage
-    of usufruct. We have already pointed out that under the Shia law the property
-    does not remain with the waqif. It is transferred to God or to the beneficiaries.
-    At page 554 of Tyabji ''s famous book it is stated : "The support and maintenance
-    of the waqf ''s family, & c. would seem under the Act to be deemed a purpose recognized
-    by the Muslim law as religious, pious or charitable : section 2. This view was
-    put forward by Ameer Ali, J., with great learning in his dissenting judgment in
-    Bikani Mia ''s case." '' Section 527 at page 593 runs thus "The mutawalli has
-    no ownership, right or estate in the waqf property: in that respect he, is not
-    a trustee in the technical sense : he holds the property as a manager for ful
-    filling the purpose of the waqf. "'
-  - 947 Mr. Chatterjee, the learned counsel for the appellant, contended inter alia
-    that the assessment order made under section 23(3) of the Income tax Act had been
-    made in violation of the principles of natural justice, inasmuch as it was not
-    based on any material whatsoever and that the evidence tendered by the appellant
-    had been improperly rejected. It was further said that the Tribunal acted without
-    jurisdiction in relying on the data supplied by the Income tax department behind
-    the back of the appellant company, and without giving it an opportunity to rebut
-    or explain the same. Reliance was placed on the decision of a Full Bench of the
-    Lahore High Court in Seth Gurmukh Singh vs Commissioner of Income tax, Punjab(1),
-    for the proposition that while proceeding under sub section (3) of section 23,
-    the Income tax Officer, though not bound to rely on evidence produced by the assessee
-    as he considers to be false, yet if he proposes to make an estimate in disregard
-    of that evidence, he should in fairness disclose to the assessee the material
-    on which he is going to found that estimate; and that in case he proposes to use
-    against the assessee the result of any private inquiries made by him, he must
-    communicate to the assessee the substance of the information so proposed to be
-    utilized to such an extent as to put the assessee in possession of full particulars
-    of the case he is expected to meet and that he should further give him ample opportunity
-    to meet it.
-  - Civil Appeal No. 2068 of 1971 hereinafter referred to as the Bombay Appeal is
-    by special leave from the judgment and order dated 21 March, 1971 of the High
-    Court of Bombay.
-- source_sentence: What were the original case numbers in the High Court?
+  - 'In the present case the delay is much shorter. The 10th and 1 ith of February
+    were close holidays. The communication was (1) ; at pages 658 660. 566 on the
+    13th. Thus there was only delay because the report was not made on the 12th. Explaining
+    the delay the District Magistrate in his affidavit says: "I say that 10th February,
+    1968 was a holiday, being the second Saturday of the month and 11th February,
+    1968 was Sunday. I say that serious reports about the activities of the Mizo National
+    Front and Sangkrak Party, which are tribal groups of hostiles who had set up an
+    independent Government and were indulging in subversive acts against the local
+    Govern. ment and were committing dacoities, murder, arson etc. particularly aimed
+    at non tribals, were received at that time which kept me extremely busy during
+    those days. Besides this, I also say that I was in the midst of paddy procurements
+    and there was very heavy rush of work in my office in those days. I say that 10th
+    and 11th February, 1968, being holidays and order being communicated on the ''
+    13th to the State Government, was communicated "forthwith" as required by law.
+    " In our judgment even if the meaning from the ruling is applied with strictness,
+    the delay was explained sufficiently. The District Magistrate was hard put to
+    for time and the surrounding circumstances explain the very short delay. A much
+    larger delay was held in this Court not to militate against section 3 (3) and
+    we think there is less room for interference in this case than existed in the
+    former case. We accordingly reject the first of .the law The second point has
+    no force. There is no provision in the Act that such an approval must be communicated
+    to the detenu. The argument is that this must be implied from the object of the
+    Act. The detaining authority is answerable to the State Government, Sub section
+    (3 ) gives validity to the order for a period of 12 days even without approval.
+    The approval was done within the time and began to operate as soon as made. It
+    was contended that the approval ought to have been communicated to the detenu
+    and without this communication the detention could not be legal. Reliance was
+    placed upon certain cases to show that persons affected by an order must be communicated
+    that order if it is to be effective. In Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh vs The Deputy
+    Land Acquisition Officer and another(1) (a case under the Land Acquisition Act
+    1894) it was held that the award of the Collector must be communicated, and that
+    this was an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice. The Court
+    was considering a question of limitation Which ran ''from the date of the Collector
+    ''s (1) [1962] 1 S.C.R. 676. 567 award '' in the proviso to section 18 and was
+    not prepared to construe those words in a literal or,mechanical way. The reason
+    which prevailed for making a distinction between an order passed and an order
+    communicated do not obtain here. In Bachhittar Singh vs The State of Punjab(1)
+    an order of dismissal of a public servant passed by the Minister on the file was
+    not communicated and it was held ''that it was only provisional fill communicated.
+    This case is not in point. The next case Biren '' Dutta and others vs Chief Commissioner
+    of Tripura and another(2) deals with detention under the Defence of India Rules
+    1962 rules 30(1)(b) and 30A(8). The reason of rule 30A(8) was stated by this Court
+    to be that it is in the nature of an independent decision and further detention
+    can be justified only if the decision is recorded as required by the rule, and
+    it must be in writing clearly and unambiguously to indicate the decision. It was
+    further observed that the decision must be communicated. This case is really no
+    authority in the context of the present ease. Section 3 (3 ) of the does not specify
+    that the order of approval is anything more than an administrative approval by
+    the State Government. If this be so the necessity of communication of the approval
+    does not arise with that strictness as does the decision under Rule 30A(8) of
+    the Defence of India Rules. The Solicitor General on that occasion conceded this
+    position. The dispute then narrowed to the question whether article 166 applied.
+    This point was not decided by this Court but basing itself on the admission that
+    the deeision to continue the detention must be in writing, this Court considered
+    whether there was substantial compliance with this requirement. A brief memorandum
+    was produced which merely recorded that a decision was reached. This Court held
+    that the memorandum could not reasonably be said to. include a decision that the
+    detention of the detenus was thought necessary beyond six months. Sueh orders
+    were held not to contain a written record of the decision with appropriate reasons.
+    In our opinion the provisions of the cannot be equated to those of the Defence
+    of India Act and the Rules. While we are of opinion that even in detention under
+    the it would be fair to inform the detenu of all the stages through which his
+    detention passes and a provision to that effect should be included in it, we are
+    not satisfied that in view of the state of the existing law we can import the
+    strict rule here. The scheme of the is merely to approve the original detention
+    by the District Magistrate and the continued detention after 12 days is not under
+    any fresh order but the same old order with the added approval and what the detenu
+    can question if he be so minded, is the original detention and not the approval
+    thereof. (See in this connection also (1) [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 713. (2) ; 568
+    Mohammed Afzal Khan vs State of Jammu & Kashmir(1). We accordingly consider the
+    ruling inapplicable.'
+  - Though, therefore, we have found disagreeing with the learned judges of the High
+    Court that tinder the customary law governing the Grewal got of Jats to which
+    the parties belong, the daughters the second and the third appellants are preferential
+    heirs to the non ancestral portion of the suit land, we hold that their conclusion
+    that this deed of gift in favour of the daughters is not valid even as regards
+    the non ancestral property, beyond the donor 's lifetime is correct and must be
+    maintained.
+  - In pursuance of this authority of the Corporation the Commissioner passed the
+    impugned order of compulsory acquisition on October 9, 1967, under section 284J
+    of the Bombay Act in respect of 33,357 sq. of land final plots Nos. 11 to 25 of
+    Town Planning Scheme No. V of Dariapur, Kazipur Ward.
+- source_sentence: What was the initial payment for HIG flats?
   sentences:
-  - M/s. G. Claridge & Company Ltd. the appellant herein manufactures (i) egg filler
-    flats, (ii) egg cartons, (iii) tube light packing trays, (iv) duck egg trays and
-    (v) apple trays. It filed a classification list for the above goods effective
-    from April 1, 1981 classifying the products under Item 68 of the old Tariff and
-    it was paying duty at the prevailing rate under Item 68. After the introduction
-    of the revised Item 17 with effect from February 28, 1982/March 1, 1982, the said
-    appellant filed a revised classification list effective from March 1, 1982 for
-    the aforesaid five products seeking classification under Item 17(4) and claiming
-    full exemption from central excise duty under notification dated February 28,
-    1982. This classification list was approved by the Assistant Collector of Central
-    Excise, Pune Division on March 11, 1982, but on re examination Department felt
-    that the said products did not merit classification under Item 17(4) but under
-    Item 68 of the old Tariff and a show cause notice dated May 4, 1984 was issued.
-    After considering the reply of the appellant to the said show cause notice, the
-    Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Pune Division passed an order dated January
-    28, 1985 whereby he held that 'egg trays ' manufactured by the appellant were
-    correctly classifiable under Item 68 of the old Tariff and not under Item 17(4)
-    and the appellant was required to pay central excise duty at the appropriate rate
-    leviable on all types of egg trays manufactured and cleared from its unit during
-    the period of six months prior to the notice dated May 4, 1984. The Assistant
-    Collector was of the view that the articles manufactured by the appellant were
-    articles manufactured directly from the pulp and were, therefore, classifiable
-    as 'articles of pulp ' under Item 68. The said order of the Assistant Collector
-    was reversed in appeal by the Collector of Central Excise 323 (Appeals) by his
-    order dated April 30, 1985 on the view that the products manufactured by the appellant
-    were made out of waste paper and they were classifiable under Item 17(4) as 'articles
-    of paper and paper board '. Feeling aggrieved by the said order of the Collector
-    (Appeals), the Department filed appeals Nos. E/1883/85 C and E/2031/85 C before
-    the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred
-    to as 'the Appellate Tribunal '). After the introduction of the new Tariff with
-    effect from March 1, 1986, the appellants filed a classification list classifying
-    their products as 'containers ' falling under sub heading 4818.19 of the new Tariff
-    and since no duty was payable under the said sub heading, the appellants claimed
-    exemption from payment of excise duty on their products. The said classification
-    list was approved provisionally but subsequently the Assistant Collector, Central
-    Excise issued a show cause notice dated October 16, 1986 proposing to classify
-    the goods under sub heading 4818.90 chargeable to duty @ 12% ad valorem. After
-    considering the reply to the said show cause notice, the Asstt. Collector, Central
-    Excise, by his orders dated April 15, 1987 and July 1, 1987 held that the products
-    manufactured by the appellant were not 'containers ' but were 'articles of pulp
-    ' falling under sub heading 4818.90. The said orders were set aside by the Collector
-    of Central Excise (Appeals) by his orders dated March 22, t988 and June 6, 1988.
-    The Collector (Appeals) held that the products manufactured by the appellant were
-    'packing containers ' and classifiable under sub heading orders of the Collector
-    (Appeals), 4818.19. Feeling aggrieved by the Department filed appeals before the
-    Appellate Tribunal which were registered as Appeals Nos. E/1468/88 C and E/1986/88
-    C. All the above four appeals were disposed by the Appellate Tribunal by a common
-    order whereby the said appeals were allowed. The Appellate Tribunal held that
-    the products manufactured by the appellant cannot come within the sub classification
-    below containers and were not classifiable under sub heading 4818.19 but were
-    classifiable under sub head ing 4818.90 of the new Tariff and similarly they were
-    not classifiable under item 17(4) or 17(3) of the old Tariff. The Appellate Tribunal
-    was also of the view that the products manufactured by the appellant are articles
-    of paper because starting raw materials is waste paper. The Appellate Tribunal
-    has held that the duty demanded by the Assistant Collector for six months prior
-    to the issue of show cause notice dated May 4, 1984, i.e., from November 4, 1983
-    is legally sustainable and with regard to recovery of the duty for the earlier
-    period from March 1, 1982 by invoking the proviso to Section 11 A(l) of the ,
-    the Appellate Tribunal remanded the matter to the Collector (Appeals) for considering
-    the said question.
-  - 999 It is therefore clear that the claim for bonus can be made by the employees
-    only if as a result of the joint contribution of capital and labour the industrial
-    concern has earned profits. If in any particular year the working of the industrial
-    concern has resulted in loss there is no basis nor justification for a demand
-    for bonus. Bonus is not a deferred wage. Because if it were so it would necessarily
-    rank for precedence before dividends ' The dividends can only be paid out of profits
-    and unless and until profits are made no occasion or question can also arise for
-    distribution of any sum as bonus amongst the employees. If the industrial concern
-    has resulted in a trading loss, there would be no profits of the particular year
-    available for distribution of dividends, much less could the employees claim the
-    distribution of bonus during that year. This has been clearly recognised even
-    in the various decisions of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, e.g., Nizam Sugar Factory
-    Ltd., Hyderabad vs Their Workmen(1), Textile Mills, Madhya Pradesh vs Their Workmen
-    (2) and Famous Cine Laboratory vs Their Workmen (3). This was also the basis of
-    the demand of the respondent in the case before us, its case being that the appellant
-    had reaped substantial profits during the year 1949. This case was negatived by
-    the Industrial Court as well as the Labour Appellate Tribunal, both of whom held
-    that the working of the appellant during the year 1949 had resulted in a loss.
-    Whereas the Industrial Court declined to grant the respondent any relief because
-    the working of the appellant during the year had resulted in a loss, the Labour
-    Appellate Tribunal made a special case for the respondent in spite of its concurrence
-    with that finding of the Industrial Court.
-  - Civil Appeals Nos. 201 and 202 of 1961. 404 Appeals from the judgment and decree
-    dated May, 16, 1958 of the Patna High Court in L. P. As. Nos 13 and 14 of 1957.
-- source_sentence: What was the final outcome of the appeal?
+  - On the 28th of July, 1944, the Income tax Officer issued a notice to it under
+    section 22(2) of the Indian Income tax Act calling upon it to file the return
+    of its income for the assessment year 1944 45 (account year being 1943 44).
+  - 'The said Explanation provides as follows: "Explanation where the total income
+    returned by any person is less than 80% of the total income (hereinafter in this
+    Explanation referred to as the correct income) as assessed u/s 143 or 144 or section
+    147 ''(reduced by the expenditure in curred bona fide by him for the purpose of
+    making or 261 earning any income included in the total income but which has been
+    disallowed as a deduction), such person shaH, unless he proves that the failure
+    to return the correct income did not arise from any fraud or any gross or wilful
+    neglect on his part, be deemed to have concealed the partic ulars of his income
+    or furnished inaccurate particulars of such income for the purposes of cl. (c)
+    of this subsection . "'
+  - Section 3 declared that in view of the closure of the branches and the transfer
+    of a substantial portion of their assets out of India on or about the "appointed
+    day" and the difficulties experienced by depositors, the 20 Branches would, as
+    from that day, be reconstructed in the interests of the general public in accordance
+    with the provisions of the Regulation.
+- source_sentence: What was the Contempt Application number in the High Court?
   sentences:
-  - They prayed in this suit for a declaration that these defendants are not vaildly
-    appointed trustees ; for their removal from the management of these properties
-    and for an order on them to render accounts on their administration of these properties.
-    There was also a prayer for the appointment of proper and fit persons for the
-    management of these properties in accordance with the provisions of the trust
-    deed of September 15, 1909, and for the framing of a scheme for the administration
-    of the trust to which we shall latter refer as the Burhanpur Trust if it was necessary.
-  - As regards the condition of Savoy Ranganna on January 8, 1951, the evidence of
-    P.W. 1, Dr. Subbaramiah is important. This witness is the owner of the Sharda
-    Nursing Home and he has testified that the notice exhibit A was read over to Savoy
-    Ranganna and after getting it read the latter affixed his thumb mark thereon.
-    The witness asked Savoy Ranganna whether he was able to understand the contents
-    of the notice and the latter replied in the affirmative.
-  - Taking umbrage at the dismissal of the petition, the appellant hurled his shoe
-    at the Judge which hit him on the shoulder.
-- source_sentence: In which Criminal Appeal numbers were these review petitions filed?
+  - This definition is undoubtedly relevant in dealing with the question of continuous
+    service by reference to the provisions of Industrial Disputes ' Act but its operation
+    cannot be automatically extended in dealing with an interpretation of the words
+    "continuous service" in an award made in an industrial dispute unless the context
+    in which the expression is used in the award justifies it. In other words, the
+    expression "continuous service" may be statutorily defined in which case the definition
+    will prevail. An award using the said expression may itself give a definition
+    of that expression and that will bind parties in dealing with claims arising from
+    the award. Where, however, the award does not explain the said expression and
+    statutory definitions contained in other Acts are of no material assistance it
+    would be necessary to examine the question on principle and decide what the expression
+    should mean in any given award '; and that is precisely what the tribunal had
+    to do in the present case.
+  - '"The heading of Entry 29A makes it clear that only parts of such refrigerating
+    and air conditioning appliances and machinery as are covered by sub entries (1)
+    and (2) alone are liable to duty. In other words, the parts in question should
+    be such as are ordinarily sold or offered for sale as ready. assembled units.
+    On any other interpretation the words ''thereof '' occurring in the heading 29A
+    will be redun dant. An interpretation which makes any part of a statute redundant
+    has to be discarded." and that "When an entry in the schedule specifically refers
+    to and re stricts the applicability of duty to goods which are assembled units
+    and which are generally offered for sale, the concept of sale is necessarily brought
+    in. As already seen, sub entry (3) takes it colour from sub entries (1) and (2)
+    because of the specific directive of the heading by using the words ''parts thereof
+    ''.'
+  - 'N: Criminal Appeal No. 13 of 1951. Appeal by special leave from the judgment
+    and order of the High Court of Madras (Rajamannar C.J. and Balakrishna Ayyar J.)
+    dated 10 th April, 1950, in Contempt Application No. 10 of 1949.'
+- source_sentence: What was the main contention of the appellants before the High
+    Court regarding the nature of the act?
   sentences:
-  - 'But even this definition is not an absolute one. The truth is that the term domicil
-    '' lends itself to illustra tions but not to definition. Be that as it may, two
-    constituent elements that are necessary by English Law for the existence of domicil
-    are: (1) a residence of a particular kind, and (2) an intention of a particular
-    kind. There must be the factum and there must be the animus.'
-  - We are also satisfied that the declaration granted by the District Court was futile.
-  - 'For reading such a requirement into the provision the Full Bench has given two
-    reasons: (a) that such a requirement arises on construction of certain words used
-    in cl. (h) (vide: para 17 of the Judgment) and (b) that the protection given to
-    a disabled landholder was intended to be a personal protection granted to the
-    very individual who let out the land as a disabled person and this was warranted
-    by a historical survey of parallel provisions contained in the preceding Tenancy
-    Laws in U.P. (vide: Para 19). According to the Full Bench the crucial words used
-    in cl. (h) are "where the landholder or if there are more than one land holder
-    all of them were person or persons belonging" to any one or more of the classes
-    of disabled persons under section 157(1) and the Full Bench has reasoned "the
-    word ''are '' and the word ''them '' together with the word ''were '' in the aforementioned
-    phrase clearly show that the intention of the Legislature was that on the date
-    of vesting the ''land holder '' should be the very person who was the land holder
-    on the relevant dates, to earn the benefit of cl. (h) of section 21(1)". The Court
-    observed that section 21(1) (b) could bear the interpretation suggested by counsel
-    for Smt. Maya only if the words ''or their predecessor in interest '' were added
-    before the words "all of them". The Court has further stated that historical survey
-    of the parallel provisions contained in the preceding Tenancy Laws showed that
-    the protection given to a disabled person had always been in the nature of a personal
-    protection granted to the very individual who let out the land as a disabled land
-    holder and the protection ceased to be available when the identity or personality
-    of that land holder is changed and in that behalf reliance was placed on certain
-    provisions of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926 and U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939. In our view
-    neither reason holds good for sustaining the literal construction placed upon
-    the provision by the Full Bench. It is true that cl. (h) contains the phrase "where
-    the land holder or if there are more than one landholder, all of them were persons
-    belonging" to any one or more of the classes mentioned in section 157(1), but
-    for arriving at the correct interpretation of this crucial phrase it is necessary
-    to have regard to the definition of ''landholder '' and the provisions of section
-    157 of the Act with which section 21(1) (h) is inter connected.'
-- source_sentence: What was the value of the 18 pieces of 'Trishul' marked gold?
+  - The facts giving rise to this appeal are that on August 25, 1987 the house of
+    the appellant was searched by the officers of the Enforcement Directorate under
+    Section 37 of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 and they seized currency notes
+    of Re. 1 lakh and four bank drafts amounting to Rs.30,000, bank pass book and
+    loose sheets Nos. 1 to 44 as per item No. 2 in panchnama dated August 25, 1987.
+    The statement of detenu was recorded and he was arrested on the same day.
+  - The main contention advanced on behalf of the appellants before the High Court
+    was that on the basis of facts alleged, at the most it could be said that the
+    matter related to the maintenance of law and order. It was not a matter relating
+    to the disturbance of public order.
+  - Accordingly, we are of opinion that clause (iii) substituted in sub section (1)
+    of section 271 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 by the Finance Act, 1968, governs the
+    case before us and, therefore, the penalty imposed on the assessee in the instant
+    case is covered by that provision. We answer the question in the affirmative,
+    in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The Revenue is entitled to
+    its costs of this Reference.
+- source_sentence: What was payable to Md. Safiur Rehman?
   sentences:
-  - '217 By a detention order passed on January 4, 1978 under section 3(1) of the
-    (hereinafter referred to as "COFEPOSA") the detenu Gopal Ghermal Mehta was detained
-    by the Additional Chief Secretary to the Government of Gujarat (Respondent No.
-    1) with a view to preventing him from engaging in transporting smuggled goods.
-    The grounds of detention were served upon him on the same day i.e. On January
-    4, 1978. Briefly stated the grounds disclosed the following material against the
-    detenu: on receipt of certain information on December 12, 1977 by the Customs
-    officers of Ahmedabad, the said officers had kept a watch for a Fiat Car No. GTI
-    6020 and the said car with five occupants was intercepted in the early hours of
-    December 13, 1977 near Naroda Railway Crossing and the occupants (the detenu and
-    four others) were taken to the Customs Divisional Office, Paldi, Ahmedabad for
-    examination. The detenu and the other four occupants of the car denied that they
-    were carrying any smuggled gold or prohibited articles, but on search of one of
-    the occupants Sheveram Atmaram Chandwani two cloth bags were recovered D, from
-    him, in one of which there were 27 gold bars of foreign marking weighing 19 tolas
-    valued at Rs. 2,16,00 and in the other there were 18 pieces of gold bearing ''Trishul
-    '' mark valued at Rs. 1,94,400/ . Chandwani in his statement before the Customs
-    officers stated that the two bags which he was carrying on his person belonged
-    to the detenu who was dealing in Silver and Gold in Udaipur and that he was merely
-    a carrier who used to receive remuneration of Rs. 100/ per trip from the detenu.
-    Two statements of the detenu were recorded by the Customs officers on December
-    13 and 14, 197$, in which he corroborated the version of Chandwani but added that
-    the entire quantity of foreign marked gold and the ''Trishul '' marked gold belonged
-    to one Prem of Chandni Chowk, Delhi, for and on whose behalf he was carrying the
-    gold from Delhi to Udaipur and from Udaipur to Ahmedabad for disposing it of to
-    two persons, Namely, Poonamchand Laxmanji and Bhagubhai in Ahmedabad. The detenu
-    also stated that this had been going on for about six to eight months and that
-    he had made five to six trips in a month and on each such trip he used to carry
-    2 1/2 to 3 kgs. of gold. He further admitted that the Fiat Car in question had
-    been purchased for this purpose for Rs. 15,000/ which money had been provided
-    by Prem. He further stated that after disposal of the gold belonging to Prem at
-    Ahmedabad he used to carry the sale proceeds to Prem and account for the same
-    at the time of the next transaction between him and Prem.'
-  - M/s. G. Claridge & Company Ltd. the appellant herein manufactures (i) egg filler
-    flats, (ii) egg cartons, (iii) tube light packing trays, (iv) duck egg trays and
-    (v) apple trays. It filed a classification list for the above goods effective
-    from April 1, 1981 classifying the products under Item 68 of the old Tariff and
-    it was paying duty at the prevailing rate under Item 68. After the introduction
-    of the revised Item 17 with effect from February 28, 1982/March 1, 1982, the said
-    appellant filed a revised classification list effective from March 1, 1982 for
-    the aforesaid five products seeking classification under Item 17(4) and claiming
-    full exemption from central excise duty under notification dated February 28,
-    1982. This classification list was approved by the Assistant Collector of Central
-    Excise, Pune Division on March 11, 1982, but on re examination Department felt
-    that the said products did not merit classification under Item 17(4) but under
-    Item 68 of the old Tariff and a show cause notice dated May 4, 1984 was issued.
-    After considering the reply of the appellant to the said show cause notice, the
-    Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Pune Division passed an order dated January
-    28, 1985 whereby he held that 'egg trays ' manufactured by the appellant were
-    correctly classifiable under Item 68 of the old Tariff and not under Item 17(4)
-    and the appellant was required to pay central excise duty at the appropriate rate
-    leviable on all types of egg trays manufactured and cleared from its unit during
-    the period of six months prior to the notice dated May 4, 1984. The Assistant
-    Collector was of the view that the articles manufactured by the appellant were
-    articles manufactured directly from the pulp and were, therefore, classifiable
-    as 'articles of pulp ' under Item 68. The said order of the Assistant Collector
-    was reversed in appeal by the Collector of Central Excise 323 (Appeals) by his
-    order dated April 30, 1985 on the view that the products manufactured by the appellant
-    were made out of waste paper and they were classifiable under Item 17(4) as 'articles
-    of paper and paper board '. Feeling aggrieved by the said order of the Collector
-    (Appeals), the Department filed appeals Nos. E/1883/85 C and E/2031/85 C before
-    the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred
-    to as 'the Appellate Tribunal '). After the introduction of the new Tariff with
-    effect from March 1, 1986, the appellants filed a classification list classifying
-    their products as 'containers ' falling under sub heading 4818.19 of the new Tariff
-    and since no duty was payable under the said sub heading, the appellants claimed
-    exemption from payment of excise duty on their products. The said classification
-    list was approved provisionally but subsequently the Assistant Collector, Central
-    Excise issued a show cause notice dated October 16, 1986 proposing to classify
-    the goods under sub heading 4818.90 chargeable to duty @ 12% ad valorem. After
-    considering the reply to the said show cause notice, the Asstt. Collector, Central
-    Excise, by his orders dated April 15, 1987 and July 1, 1987 held that the products
-    manufactured by the appellant were not 'containers ' but were 'articles of pulp
-    ' falling under sub heading 4818.90. The said orders were set aside by the Collector
-    of Central Excise (Appeals) by his orders dated March 22, t988 and June 6, 1988.
-    The Collector (Appeals) held that the products manufactured by the appellant were
-    'packing containers ' and classifiable under sub heading orders of the Collector
-    (Appeals), 4818.19. Feeling aggrieved by the Department filed appeals before the
-    Appellate Tribunal which were registered as Appeals Nos. E/1468/88 C and E/1986/88
-    C. All the above four appeals were disposed by the Appellate Tribunal by a common
-    order whereby the said appeals were allowed. The Appellate Tribunal held that
-    the products manufactured by the appellant cannot come within the sub classification
-    below containers and were not classifiable under sub heading 4818.19 but were
-    classifiable under sub head ing 4818.90 of the new Tariff and similarly they were
-    not classifiable under item 17(4) or 17(3) of the old Tariff. The Appellate Tribunal
-    was also of the view that the products manufactured by the appellant are articles
-    of paper because starting raw materials is waste paper. The Appellate Tribunal
-    has held that the duty demanded by the Assistant Collector for six months prior
-    to the issue of show cause notice dated May 4, 1984, i.e., from November 4, 1983
-    is legally sustainable and with regard to recovery of the duty for the earlier
-    period from March 1, 1982 by invoking the proviso to Section 11 A(l) of the ,
-    the Appellate Tribunal remanded the matter to the Collector (Appeals) for considering
-    the said question.
-  - In his application dated 1.3. 1986 addressed to the Collec tor, Surguja (Madhya
-    Pradesh), which is Annexure II, he mentioned the subject as "request for naturalisation".
+  - The language used in sub item (3) is also wide and comprehensive in its application
+    and could not be given a restricted meaning. Sub items (1), (2) and (3) are independent
+    of each other and mutually exclusive. The scope of sub item (3) is neither restricted
+    nor controlled by the provisions of sub items (1) and (2).
+  - In the plaint, as originally filed, the respondents claimed that they were exclusively
+    entitled to the estate left by Lingayya. The Subordinate Judge and the High Court
+    found that as the first respondent was and continued to be a married woman while
+    she lived with Lingayya and bore him children, she was not the lawfully wedded
+    wife of Lingayya and the children born of the union were not his legitimate sons,
+    nor were they Dasiputras and as such entitled to his properties. The suit was
+    originally dismissed by the Subordinate Judge, but on appeal, the High Court gave
+    the respondents leave to amend the plaint by making suitable averments for the
+    award of maintenance, and remanded the suit for trial on the question of maintenance.
+    At the subsequent trial on the amended plaint, the Subordinate Judge decreed the
+    respondents ' claim for maintenance and consequential 124 reliefs and awarded
+    to them maintenance during their lifetime out of the estate of Lingayya. The Subordinate
+    Judge passed his decree on September 20, 1954.
+  - We may refer to clause 'fourthly ' of section 23 (1) of the land Acquisition Act,
+    1894 which requires the court to take into consideration in determining the amount
+    of compensation to be awarded for land acquired under that Act, the damage sustained
+    by the "person interested" "by reason of the acquisition injuriously affecting
+    his other property". The expression "person interested" as defined in section
+    3 of the Land Acquisition Act means all persons claiming an interest in compensation
+    to be made on account of the acquisition of land under that Act. It is made clear
+    in clause 96 'fourthly ' that the damage is for injurious affection of some property
+    other than the land acquired. The sense in which the expression 'injurious affection
+    ' is used in section 23 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act is the generally accepted
+    meaning of that expression and we find nothing in the Act concerned in this case
+    that suggests that it should be construed differently.
 pipeline_tag: sentence-similarity
 library_name: sentence-transformers
 ---
@@ -317,7 +204,7 @@ This is a [sentence-transformers](https://www.SBERT.net) model finetuned from [r
 
 ### Model Description
 - **Model Type:** Sentence Transformer
-- **Base model:** [rossieRuby/nyayadrishti-bert-v2](https://huggingface.co/rossieRuby/nyayadrishti-bert-v2) <!-- at revision 8dc2bb89bd3acf78f3542f58183ef674b787b9a3 -->
+- **Base model:** [rossieRuby/nyayadrishti-bert-v2](https://huggingface.co/rossieRuby/nyayadrishti-bert-v2) <!-- at revision 82c3af96a96c193d6cdd3ae4059a4727638777af -->
 - **Maximum Sequence Length:** 512 tokens
 - **Output Dimensionality:** 768 dimensions
 - **Similarity Function:** Cosine Similarity
@@ -358,9 +245,9 @@ from sentence_transformers import SentenceTransformer
 model = SentenceTransformer("rossieRuby/nyayadrishti-bert-v2")
 # Run inference
 sentences = [
-    "What was the value of the 18 pieces of 'Trishul' marked gold?",
-    '217 By a detention order passed on January 4, 1978 under section 3(1) of the (hereinafter referred to as "COFEPOSA") the detenu Gopal Ghermal Mehta was detained by the Additional Chief Secretary to the Government of Gujarat (Respondent No. 1) with a view to preventing him from engaging in transporting smuggled goods. The grounds of detention were served upon him on the same day i.e. On January 4, 1978. Briefly stated the grounds disclosed the following material against the detenu: on receipt of certain information on December 12, 1977 by the Customs officers of Ahmedabad, the said officers had kept a watch for a Fiat Car No. GTI 6020 and the said car with five occupants was intercepted in the early hours of December 13, 1977 near Naroda Railway Crossing and the occupants (the detenu and four others) were taken to the Customs Divisional Office, Paldi, Ahmedabad for examination. The detenu and the other four occupants of the car denied that they were carrying any smuggled gold or prohibited articles, but on search of one of the occupants Sheveram Atmaram Chandwani two cloth bags were recovered D, from him, in one of which there were 27 gold bars of foreign marking weighing 19 tolas valued at Rs. 2,16,00 and in the other there were 18 pieces of gold bearing \'Trishul \' mark valued at Rs. 1,94,400/ . Chandwani in his statement before the Customs officers stated that the two bags which he was carrying on his person belonged to the detenu who was dealing in Silver and Gold in Udaipur and that he was merely a carrier who used to receive remuneration of Rs. 100/ per trip from the detenu. Two statements of the detenu were recorded by the Customs officers on December 13 and 14, 197$, in which he corroborated the version of Chandwani but added that the entire quantity of foreign marked gold and the \'Trishul \' marked gold belonged to one Prem of Chandni Chowk, Delhi, for and on whose behalf he was carrying the gold from Delhi to Udaipur and from Udaipur to Ahmedabad for disposing it of to two persons, Namely, Poonamchand Laxmanji and Bhagubhai in Ahmedabad. The detenu also stated that this had been going on for about six to eight months and that he had made five to six trips in a month and on each such trip he used to carry 2 1/2 to 3 kgs. of gold. He further admitted that the Fiat Car in question had been purchased for this purpose for Rs. 15,000/ which money had been provided by Prem. He further stated that after disposal of the gold belonging to Prem at Ahmedabad he used to carry the sale proceeds to Prem and account for the same at the time of the next transaction between him and Prem.',
-    'In his application dated 1.3. 1986 addressed to the Collec tor, Surguja (Madhya Pradesh), which is Annexure II, he mentioned the subject as "request for naturalisation".',
+    'What was payable to Md. Safiur Rehman?',
+    'The language used in sub item (3) is also wide and comprehensive in its application and could not be given a restricted meaning. Sub items (1), (2) and (3) are independent of each other and mutually exclusive. The scope of sub item (3) is neither restricted nor controlled by the provisions of sub items (1) and (2).',
+    "In the plaint, as originally filed, the respondents claimed that they were exclusively entitled to the estate left by Lingayya. The Subordinate Judge and the High Court found that as the first respondent was and continued to be a married woman while she lived with Lingayya and bore him children, she was not the lawfully wedded wife of Lingayya and the children born of the union were not his legitimate sons, nor were they Dasiputras and as such entitled to his properties. The suit was originally dismissed by the Subordinate Judge, but on appeal, the High Court gave the respondents leave to amend the plaint by making suitable averments for the award of maintenance, and remanded the suit for trial on the question of maintenance. At the subsequent trial on the amended plaint, the Subordinate Judge decreed the respondents ' claim for maintenance and consequential 124 reliefs and awarded to them maintenance during their lifetime out of the estate of Lingayya. The Subordinate Judge passed his decree on September 20, 1954.",
 ]
 embeddings = model.encode(sentences)
 print(embeddings.shape)
@@ -414,19 +301,19 @@ You can finetune this model on your own dataset.
 
 #### Unnamed Dataset
 
-* Size: 2,000 training samples
+* Size: 18,000 training samples
 * Columns: <code>sentence_0</code>, <code>sentence_1</code>, and <code>label</code>
 * Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:
   |         | sentence_0                                                                        | sentence_1                                                                           | label                                                          |
   |:--------|:----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:---------------------------------------------------------------|
   | type    | string                                                                            | string                                                                               | float                                                          |
-  | details | <ul><li>min: 7 tokens</li><li>mean: 16.39 tokens</li><li>max: 53 tokens</li></ul> | <ul><li>min: 12 tokens</li><li>mean: 192.61 tokens</li><li>max: 512 tokens</li></ul> | <ul><li>min: 0.0</li><li>mean: 0.51</li><li>max: 1.0</li></ul> |
+  | details | <ul><li>min: 6 tokens</li><li>mean: 15.16 tokens</li><li>max: 38 tokens</li></ul> | <ul><li>min: 10 tokens</li><li>mean: 152.58 tokens</li><li>max: 512 tokens</li></ul> | <ul><li>min: 0.0</li><li>mean: 0.52</li><li>max: 1.0</li></ul> |
 * Samples:
-  | sentence_0                                                                                                                            | sentence_1                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | label            |
-  |:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-----------------|
-  | <code>What is required for an ordinance affecting the admission of students to be made, according to Section 52(3) proviso(a)?</code> | <code>Civil Appeal No. 2987 of 1986 From the Judgment and order dated 31.7.1986 of the Allahabad High Court in C. Misc. Writ Petn. No. 83 l0 of 1986. G Shanti Bhushan. S.P. Gupta. H.K. Puri and Sunil Gupta for the Appellants. B.D. Agarwala, M. Mudgal and Sunil Ambwani for the Respondents. H 690 V.M. Tarkundeand R.B. Mehrotraforthe Intervencr. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. Special Leave granted. This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment of the Allahabad High Court quashing a resolution dated May 6, 1986 by which it was proposed to hold an Entrance Test for admission to the Degree Courses in Arts, Science and Commerce of the Allahabad University, while at the same time recording a finding that 'the entrance test for admission to Degree Courses of Arts, Science and Com merce of the University cannot be characterised as arbitrary, illegal orirrational in view of the fact that the standard of students passing Intermediate Examination or equivalen...</code> | <code>1.0</code> |
-  | <code>What is the liability limit for a goods vehicle?</code>                                                                         | <code>Subject to the proviso to sub section (1), a policy of insurance shall cover any liability incurred in respect of any one accident up to the following limits, namely (a) where the vehicle is a goods vehicle, a limit of fifty thousand rupees in all, including the liabilities, if any, aris ing under the (8 of 1923), in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, employees (other than the driver), not exceeding six in number, being carried in the vehicle;</code>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  | <code>1.0</code> |
-  | <code>What section of the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, was similar to Section 80 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913?</code>    | <code>409 Nor can the appellant derive any assistance from the English Case In re Kelantan Coco, Limited and Reduced cited by the learned counsel. In that case, the Court was dealing with a petition for reduction of capital. In deciding whether the special resolution to reduce the capital of the company had been duly passed, the Court had to consider whether there was a quorum at the confirmatory meeting, at which one member of the company and one representative appointed under s.68 of the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, to represent a shareholder of the company, the Eastern Development Corporation, Limited, were present. The articles of Association provided: "two members personally present shall be a quorum. " It was held that a representative appointed under section 68 should be taken into account in considering whether there was a quorum. The provisions of section 68 were similar to those of section 80 of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, and thereunder a company which is a member of a...</code> | <code>1.0</code> |
+  | sentence_0                                                         | sentence_1                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               | label            |
+  |:-------------------------------------------------------------------|:---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|:-----------------|
+  | <code>What was the Case Referred number in the High Court?</code>  | <code>Civil Appeals Nos. 893 to 892 and 1381 to 1386 of 1966. Appeals from the judgment and order dated December 7, 1962 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Case Referred No. 24 of 1956.</code>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        | <code>1.0</code> |
+  | <code>What was the first decision cited by Mr. R.N. Poddar?</code> | <code>The first of those decisions is to H.C.P. Tripathi, J. in Mamchand vs State(1) where the learned Judge has observed: "The sample had to be taken in accordance with the provisions of the Act and Rules thereunder. As soon as the owner of the milk disappeared from the scene the Food Inspector could not have obtained the sample as required under law. By running away from the place the applicant did prevent the Food Inspector from taking sample as required under the Act though not from taking away the entire quantity of the milk which the Food Inspector could do in exercise of his powers under Section 10 (iv) of the Act. In the case of Municipal Board, Sambhal vs Jhamman Lal (AIR 1961 AII. 103), it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that if a person selling article leaves the shop he prevents Food Inspector from taking sample as authorised by the Act. In the instant case, the applicant left the milk, which he was exposing for sale, and thereby prevented the Food Inspector from takin...</code> | <code>1.0</code> |
+  | <code>What was the question in Issue No. 11 (c)?</code>            | <code>The question of breach of trust by defendants 2 to 11. was embodied in Issue No. 6 in these words "(a) Did the governing body of the School use the trust properties (mentioned in the plaintiffs ' list M) or any income therefrom for fighting out litigation in 1925 (C. section No. 32 of 1925)? 630 (b) Did they misappropriate the trust property or income therefrom? (c) Was the litigation for the benefit of the school" '? Another part of the allegation of breach of trust finds place in Issue No. 11 (c) thus : "Is the admission of the students who do not belong to the Daudi Bohra Community inconsistent with the object of the trust"?</code>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | <code>1.0</code> |
 * Loss: [<code>CosineSimilarityLoss</code>](https://sbert.net/docs/package_reference/sentence_transformer/losses.html#cosinesimilarityloss) with these parameters:
   ```json
   {
@@ -562,6 +449,13 @@ You can finetune this model on your own dataset.
 
 </details>
 
+### Training Logs
+| Epoch  | Step | Training Loss |
+|:------:|:----:|:-------------:|
+| 0.4444 | 500  | 0.2547        |
+| 0.8889 | 1000 | 0.2511        |
+
+
 ### Framework Versions
 - Python: 3.11.12
 - Sentence Transformers: 4.1.0

model.safetensors

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1
-oid sha256:da81a50bef66835bc862158f9fe176a7c84aa62726cb04f9a2cdce19595281f3
+oid sha256:0d403d1e52b7877b3cb0abe2fb0006e4365e074e70d8723efffab9be9dfb4038
 size 437951328