It is highly unlikely that the US will react after Iraq as it did after Vietnam.

美国在伊拉克战争之后做出类似越战后的反应的可能性微乎其微。


The paradox of American power is that the world’s only military superpower cannot protect its citizens by acting alone.

美国实力的悖论在于：这个世界唯一的军事超级大国靠单打独斗无法保护其公民。


US Foreign Policy After the Midterm Election

中期选举之后的美国外交政策


WASHINGTON, DC – One thing missing from the recent US midterm election campaigns was a focus on foreign policy.

发自华盛顿特区 — — 最近各类美国中期选举拉票活动都遗漏了一点 — — 外交政策。


While much was made of the migrant caravan making its way from Central America through Mexico, issues such as trade with China, Iran, North Korea, and even Russia and cyber subterfuge didn’t get much traction.

虽然对从中美洲取道墨西哥前往美国的移民大篷车多有讨论，但与中国、伊朗，朝鲜甚至俄罗斯的贸易以及网络暗战等事务都没有得到太多关注。


With the Democratic Party having regained control of the US House of Representatives, that will change.

而随着民主党重新控制美国众议院，这一情况将发生改变。


A cornered President Donald Trump is likely to turn to a favorite tactic of autocrats everywhere: manufacturing foreign-policy crises to distract the public’s attention from problems at home.

走投无路的美国总统特朗普可能会转而使用世界各地独裁者都最喜欢的策略：制造外交政策危机以分散公众对本土问题的注意力。


Trump’s determination to control media headlines makes him all the more likely, when it suits him, to call attention to the troubles in the Middle East, rediscover the North Korean nuclear threat, and force the Democrats to make a tough choice between being hard on Russia or getting into an arms race.

特朗普控制媒体头条的决心使得他更有可能在时机到来时激起对中东问题的关注，重新发现朝鲜的核威胁，以及迫使民主党人在对俄强硬或进入军备竞赛之间作出艰难的选择。


Trump may also decide to use Congress as a foreign-policy foil, tossing international challenges back into the lap of lawmakers, who will be hard-pressed to come up with good answers.

特朗普也可能决定将国会用作外交政策挡箭牌，将国际挑战甩回到立法者手里从而把寻求良好应对措施的压力转移到他们肩上。


After all, in Trump’s zero-sum “I win, you lose” view of the world, congressional failures that he can blame on the Democrats are almost as good as White House successes.

毕竟在特朗普“我赢你输”的零和式世界观中，可以赖到民主党身上的国会败局几乎和白宫的成功一样美好。


With the US House of Representatives under “new management,” including a record number of Democratic women, Trump has a tempting target.

随着美国众议院被置于“新管理层”之下（包括创纪录的民主党女议员人数 ） ， 特朗普有了一个诱人的目标。


He has every incentive to show the newcomers up by passing the ball and watching them fail.

他有足够的动力去让那些新来者难堪，只要把事情丢给他们并坐观其败就行了。


In this new contest to pass the blame, Syria is ripe for the picking.

在这新一轮的推卸责任竞赛中，叙利亚问题正好可以拿来使用。


Eliot Engel, the incoming chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, has already said that the Democrats may seek congressional authorization for the use of military force in Syria.

即将就任众议院外交事务委员会主席的艾略特·恩格尔（Eliot Engel）已经表示民主党可能会寻求国会授权在叙利亚使用武力。


But no one, Democrat or Republican, has a plausible plan either for ending the war in Syria or even for helping Syrian civilians in significant numbers, other than making it risky for Syria’s ruler, Bashar al-Assad, to use chemical weapons too blatantly.

但除了能令叙利亚统治者巴沙尔·阿萨德不再过于贸然地使用化学武器外，无论是民主党人或共和党人没有一个可信的计划去结束叙利亚战争或大量帮助叙利亚平民。


Any move the Democrats make will be unpopular with their own voters and will simply shift attention from Trump’s inability to solve the problem to their own lack of a plan.

民主党做出的任何举动都不会受到选民的欢迎，只会将特朗普无法解决问题的注意力转移到他们自身计划的缺失之上。


Iran presents Trump with another opportunity to inflict political damage on the Democrats.

而伊朗则为特朗普提供了另一个政治上打击民主党人的机会。


Trump followed through on his threat in January to withdraw the United States from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal – formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – if Congress didn’t “fix” it.

特朗普会继续推动他在今年1月提出将美国从2015年伊朗核协议（正式称为《联合全面行动计划 》 ） 的威胁，除非国会能“修补”该协议。


Specifically, he wanted the ability to reimpose sanctions on Iran, which he did earlier this month.

具体而言，他希望重新获得伊制裁的能力，正如他本月早些时候所做的那样。


Sanctions, Trump has long maintained, would force Iran to negotiate. That has not happened and is unlikely to happen.

特朗普一直以来都坚称制裁将迫使伊朗进行谈判，但这种情况从发生也不太可能发生。


To push Iran toward the negotiating table, and, more importantly, assert his authority and save face, Trump might be tempted to heighten tensions, if not provoke Iran into a confrontation.

为了推动伊朗走向谈判桌，更重要的是维护自身权威并挽回面子，特朗普可能会试图加剧紧张局势，只要不会激发伊朗的对抗。


And here, Engel might be forced to play along.

到那时候恩格尔可能会被迫入局。


Engel has said that Iran is the “most dangerous player” in the Middle East, and he was a vocal opponent of the JCPOA.

恩格尔曾表示伊朗是中东地区“最危险的参与者 ” ， 他本人也是伊朗核协议的反对者。


Though he supported the deal after it was signed and opposed withdrawing from it, Trump could use Engel’s own position on Iran to push him to adopt a more aggressive posture or risk appearing “weak” on national security.

虽然恩格尔在协议签署后转而表示支持并反对退出协议，但特朗普可以利用前者自身在伊朗问题上的立场去推动他采取更激进的态度或冒险在国家安全方面表现“软弱 ” 。


But the payoff is likely to be a foreign-policy crisis that produces no meaningful progress toward a new nuclear deal and plenty of blame to go around.

但这最终可能会导向一场外交政策危机，不但在新的核协议上没有取得任何有意义的进展，还会留下诸多口实供各方互相指责。


The Democrats also provide Trump an out on North Korea.

民主党人也在朝鲜问题向特朗普露出了破绽。


Back in June, Engel introduced the North Korea Nuclear Baseline Act, which would require the White House to report on the status of North Korea’s nuclear program and provide a “baseline” of progress for continued talks.

早在今年6月恩格尔就推出了《朝鲜核基线法案 》 ， 该法案将要求白宫报告朝鲜核计划的进展状况，并为继续谈判提供一条进展“基线 ” 。


Engel has already said he will call a hearing on the talks.

恩格尔已经表示他将针对相关谈判召集一场听证会。


Whatever is said in that hearing could provide North Korean leader Kim Jong-un with a ready excuse to renege on his already-vague denuclearization agreement with Trump.

但听证会上发表的任何言论都可以为朝鲜领导人金正恩提供一个借口去违反与特朗普那本就含糊不清的无核化协议。


The US president, Kim could argue, can no longer be trusted with a hostile Congress at his back.

金正恩可以辩解说一个不能得到背后敌对国会支持的美国总统是不值得信任的。


Perhaps in anticipation of a Democratic-led House and a subsequent Democratic pile-on regarding Russia, Trump withdrew the US from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) in October, citing Russian violations.

也许是预期到了一个民主党领导的众议院以及随后民主党在俄罗斯问题上连篇累牍的抨击，特朗普在10月份借口俄罗斯违规而撤出了《中程核力量条约 》 。


Signed in 1987 by Ronald Reagan and Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev, the INF required both the US and Russia to eliminate ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles. The US withdrawal from it signals the start of a new arms race.

该条约由罗纳德·里根和苏共总书记米哈伊尔·戈尔巴乔夫于1987年签署，要求双方销毁地面发射的弹道导弹和巡航导弹，而美国的撤出则标志着新一轮军备竞赛的开始。


Trump has already called for an increase in defense spending and the launch of a “space force”.

特朗普已经呼吁要增加国防开支并启动“太空力量”的建立。


As Democrats focus on Russian interference in the 2016 US elections, Trump’s ties to Russia, and the details of Trump’s closed-door conversation with Russian president Vladimir Putin in Helsinki in July, they will be faced with the prospect of signing off on increased defense spending or else appearing dithering and hypocritical on Russia.

鉴于民主党对俄罗斯干预2016年美国大选，特朗普与俄罗斯关系以及特朗普7月份在赫尔辛基与俄罗斯总统普京闭门对话的关注，他们将面临着签署追加国防开支的前景，否则就是在俄罗斯问题上首鼠两端和表现虚伪。


Much of the world breathed a sigh of relief at the Democrats’ recapture of the House, because it signaled a vulnerability in Trump’s aggressively anti-liberal “America First” approach to the world order.

民主党重夺众议院后世界大部分人都松了一口气，因为这标志着特朗普积极反自由的“美国优先”世界秩序手段是站不住脚的。


But Democrats should resist the urge to try correcting Trump’s perceived wrongs.

但民主党人应该抵制试图纠正特朗普错误的冲动。


The House has just enough power to get into foreign-policy trouble and not enough to get out of it or to adopt and implement a coherent strategy.

众议院只是刚好有力量去介入外交政策的乱局，但还没有足够力量去摆脱它或采取和实施一套连续性的战略。


The Democrats’ best bet is to let Trump take the lead on global affairs, however unsavory, and actively work to check and balance his actions.

民主党最好的选择是让特朗普在全球事务中起带头作用，无论多么令人讨厌，并积极努力去制衡他的行为。


Oversight and the power of the purse will be their most powerful tools.

监督和财权将是他们最强大的工具。


In the end, Trump will need House Democrats for money, sanctions, or approval of trade agreements.

最终特朗普还是需要争取众议院民主党人以获取拨款，制裁或批准贸易协议。


If they play their cards right, he will have to deal them in. If they don’t, they will find that Trump still holds a much stronger hand.

如果他们能行使正确的策略，他将不得不跟他们妥协；但如果他们没做到这一点，他们会发现特朗普仍然具备强大的实力。


American Foreign Policy After the Mid-Term Elections

中期选举之后的美国外交政策


NEW YORK – Few Americans cast their ballot in the recent mid-term elections on the basis of foreign policy.

发自纽约 — — 在本次中期选举中，只有为数不多的美国人是基于外交政策的原因而投票的。


While it may be difficult for people around the world to comprehend this, given the global reach of the United States, it is an undeniable fact.

鉴于美国的全球影响力，世界其他地方的人们可能难以理解这一点，但这却是一个合理的事实。


Most Americans are, after all, preoccupied with the US economy’s sluggish growth and persistent high unemployment.

毕竟绝大多数美国人都将精力放在了国内的增长停滞和长期高失业率之上。


The world’s challenges seem far removed from their day-to-day lives.

而那些全球危机似乎离他们的日常生活太遥远了。


The Cold War ended a generation ago; the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, are nearly a decade in the past.

冷战结束已经是上一代人的话题；9·11恐怖袭击也已经过去将近十年。


Most Americans do not feel the sacrifices associated with the large troop presence and ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

大多数美国人都对派驻阿富汗和伊拉克的庞大军队所付出的牺牲毫无知觉。


But the fact that foreign policy did not materially affect the November elections does not mean that the results will not affect US foreign policy.

虽然外交政策并未对本次中期选举产生重大影响，但这却不意味着选举结果不会影响美国的外交政策。


They will, but in ways that are inconsistent and even surprising.

影响是必然的，但会以一种反复无常甚至令人大吃一惊的方式。


One relationship sure to be influenced by Republican gains will be that between the US and Russia.

共和党占优的形势必将影响到美俄关系。


Quick or easy Senate approval of the New START arms-control treaty is highly unlikely, given stated concerns about verification and the protection of US missile-defense programs; instead, we can expect delays and, possibly, attempts to amend what the two governments already agreed upon.

参议院将无法迅速或轻易地批准新的《削减战略武器条约 》 ， 因为议员们对如何核实战略武器数量与美国导弹防御系统防御能力的都心里没底。 与于是乎，我们将会看到对条约的拖延，甚至对两国政府业已达成的协议的反对。


Congress may also prove less willing to remove hurdles to Russia’s admission to the World Trade Organization, given what is widely judged to be its leaders’ anti-democratic behavior.

众议院估计也不太会移除对俄罗斯加入世贸的诸多障碍，因为大家都对俄罗斯领导人的反民主行为感到反感。


China, too, will feel the results of the new balance in Congress.

中国也会感觉到两党重新划分众议院势力的影响。


Pressure was already growing to introduce trade sanctions in response to China’s refusal to allow its currency to rise to a natural level against the dollar.

事实上，已经有越来越多的压力要求对中国拒绝令其货币兑美元升值到一个合理水平的做法实施贸易制裁。


Such pressure will likely grow, given concerns over Chinese behavior both at home and abroad.

这些压力将越来越大，因为大家对中国在其国内和国外的所做所为都有意见。


Moreover, Congress will resist rolling back any of the long-standing economic sanctions against Cuba.

此外，中国将抵制美国取消对古巴的任何长期制裁。


President Barack Obama has the authority to take some small steps on his own to normalize ties, but substantial change to US policy requires Congress to act – and Congress wants to see fundamental change in Cuba before it does so.

美国总统奥巴马有足够的权威区在美国-古巴关系正常化的道路上取得一些微小进展，但长期的改变则需要参议院批准 — — 但参议院却希望在解除制裁之前能看到古巴发生一些根本性的变化。


There will be other consequences stemming from the election.

选举还将带来其他一些后果。


What little chance there was of the US backing any global plan to limit or tax carbon emissions has disappeared.

美国支持关于限制或者征收碳排放税的任何全球方案的微小可能性都已彻底破灭。


Improvement in US performance on climate change will have to come from innovation and increased energy efficiency.

美国在这方面的改善只能依靠科技创新和提高能源利用效率了。


One can anticipate the Republicans, now in control of the House of Representatives, exploiting their ability to convene hearings to question and review foreign policy.

人们可以预见到，目前控制了众议院���共和党人将利用手中的权力召开质疑或检讨当前外交政策的听证会。


Depending on how this power is used (or abused), it can be beneficial (exercising needed oversight and increasing the transparency of policy and policy-making) or destructive (if, for example, hearings degenerate into politically motivated attacks on administration officials and policies).

取决于他们如何使用（或者滥用）这些权力，结果可能是有益的（实施必要的监察或者提高外交政策制定的透明度）或是有害的（比如说听证会可能异化成对某些官员和政策的政治攻击 ） 。


In many other areas, continuity can be expected to trump change.

而在其他许多领域，政策的持续性将不会有什么变化。


This comes as little surprise, as America’s Constitution and political system delegate most of the initiative on foreign policy and defense to the president.

这毫不奇怪，因为美国的宪法和政治系统将大多数外交和国防事务交由总统承担。


Yes, Congress must declare war, approve spending, agree to most senior appointments, and (in the case of the Senate) ratify treaties, but the president has enormous latitude when it comes to carrying out diplomacy and using military force in situations other than war, which tend to be most situations.

国会可以宣战，批准预算，通过大多数高级官员任命，以及（就参议院来说）提准条约，但在绝大多数情况下，总统在执行外交或者除了战争之外的军事行动方面都拥有极大的自由度。


One area of probable continuity is the Middle East, where Obama will continue to try to broker a deal between Israelis and Palestinians and press Iran not to develop nuclear weapons.

其中一个能保留政策持续性的领域可能是中东，因为奥巴马将继续尝试促成以巴双方的和平条约，并迫使伊朗放弃发展核武器（共和党人一直都要求不要向以色列施加过多压力，而对伊朗采取更强硬手段 ） 。


(Republicans, however will argue for putting less pressure on Israel to compromise and more pressure on Iran.)  But he can expect considerable backing from Republicans if he wants to maintain a sizeable US military presence in Afghanistan beyond this July, or a modest military presence in Iraq beyond the end of 2011.

但如果奥巴马想要在今年7月后在阿富汗维持一直相当数量的部队，或是在2011年末以后在伊拉克维持适度的军事存在，他都是可以得到共和党相当程度上的支持的。


Questions abound when it comes to foreign economic policy, however.

但在经济外交政策方面则存在着许多问题。


Three completed trade agreements (with South Korea, Panama, and Colombia) have been languishing for years, mostly because of deep opposition to free trade from labor unions and the Democratic Party.

三项全面贸易条约（与韩国，巴拿马和哥伦比亚）已经在工会和民主党的阻挠下拖延了几年时间。


Republicans have historically been more supportive of such bilateral free-trade agreements.

而共和党一直以来对这类双边自由贸易条约都是表示支持的。


But will the new generation of Republicans continue this tradition?

但新一代共和党人是否会坚持这一传统？


There is a fair chance that one or more of these bilateral accords will be approved (in part because the Obama administration seems finally to have recognized that trade can generate good jobs), but it is far less certain that the president will gain the authority needed to negotiate a new global trade deal.

这是那几项双边条约获得通过的好机会（其中一部分原因是奥巴马政府似乎最终意识到贸易可以催生新的工作机会 ） ， 但更不确定的则是总统是否有足够的权威去商讨一个新的全球贸易协定。


An even bigger question mark hovers over what might be the greatest national security concern of all: the federal budget deficit.

而一个更重要的问题则是所谓最大的国家安全问题：联邦债务赤字。


Failure to address the deficit (and the mounting debt) will create pressures to reduce what the US spends on foreign aid, intelligence, and defense – although Republicans are more likely than Democrats to protect such spending (except for foreign aid).

如果无法解决赤字（以及不断堆积的债务）的话，那么美国的对外援助，情报和国防事务都将面临巨大的压力 — — 即便共和党人比民主党人更倾向于维持这部分经费（对外援助除外 ） 。


Mounting debt also leaves the US vulnerable to the decisions of those who lend it money – or to the vagaries of the market.

不断增加的债务将迫使美国向那些国际债主们俯首称臣，或是无法承受市场的突然波动。


A dollar crisis could weaken the foundations of American power.

美元危机将影响到美国的全球权力基础。


But averting such a crisis requires that the White House and Congress, Democrats and Republicans, agree on a plan for moving the US budget toward balance.

但克服这一危机则需要白宫和国会，以及民主党和共和党双方都能在促使美国实现财政平衡方面达成共识。


Alas, the election makes such agreement more distant than ever.

无奈的是，中期选举却令这类共识离我们更加遥远了。


America’s Global Balancing Act

美国的全球平衡行动


With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, the disintegration of Iraq’s and Syria’s borders, and increasing Chinese assertiveness in the South and East China Seas, the post-Cold War era appears to have ended in 2014.

俄罗斯入侵乌克兰并吞并克里米亚；伊拉克和叙利亚分崩离析；中国在南海和东海日益嚣张 — — 考虑到这些发面，后冷战时代似乎已经在2014年结束了。


Is that true?

真的如此吗？


The post-Cold War era was not really an “era,” but rather a gradual transition from a bilateral Cold War to a more complex international order that still involves, in the final analysis, two world powers.

后冷战时代不是真正的“时代 ” ， 而是一个从双边对峙的冷战最终分析仍存在两个超级大国的更加复杂的国际秩序的逐渐转变时期。


In brief, the decisive axis of the new order increasingly involves the United States and the People’s Republic of China.

简单说，决定新秩序的轴心已经日益明确 — — 美国和中华人民共和国。


The Sino-American competition involves two significant realities that distinguish it from the Cold War: neither party is excessively ideological in its orientation; and both parties recognize that they really need mutual accommodation.

中美竞争包含了两个重要事实，使其与冷战区分开来：双方对于方向问题都不过分意识形态化；双方都认识到它们真的需要相互迁就。


America’s supposed “pivot to Asia” took a back seat in 2014 to the crises in Ukraine and the Middle East.

2014年，美国的“重返亚洲”政策因为乌克兰和中东危机而变得不再显眼。


To what extent has uncertainty about the US commitment in Asia stoked tension between China and America’s Asian allies?

美国的亚洲承诺的不确定性如何助长了中国和美国的亚洲盟国之间的紧张？


I disagree with the premises of the question.

我不同意这个问题的前提。


I do think America has made it quite clear that it is in the interest both of America and China to avoid situations in which they will be pushed toward a collision.

我确实认为美国非常清楚地表示，避免让中美双方陷入会把它们推向冲突的局面符合双方的利益。


The recent indications of some initial dialogue between China and India, and between China and Japan, suggest that China also realizes that escalating old grievances is not in its interest.

最近的一些中印、中日之间初步对话的迹象表明，中国也认识到煽动旧仇恨不符合它的利益。


The more serious problem with the “pivot to Asia” was its actual wording, which implied a military posture designed to “contain” or “isolate” China.

“重返亚洲”所包含的更加严重的问题是它的实际用词，其中暗含要“遏制”或“孤立”中国的军事姿态。


The Chinese have come to realize more clearly that we were not deliberately attempting to isolate them, but that we had a stake in the avoidance of collisions in the Far East that could produce a wider spillover.

中国人已经更清楚地认识到我们不是故意试图孤立他们，而是避免可能产生更广泛的溢出效应的远东冲突对我们来说意义重大。


Xi Jinping has used his war on corruption to concentrate more power in his hands than any Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping, 30 years ago.

习近平用其反腐斗争巩固更多的权力，这是30年前邓小平以来从未有过的。


How do you see Xi’s presidency evolving?

你认为习近平的任期会如何发展？


Power in China is somewhat informally defined, and its limits are set more by political realities than by constitutional arrangements.

从某种程度上讲，中国的权力界定不那么正式，其权力的边界更多地由政治现实而不是宪法安排决定。


That makes it difficult to say whether Xi’s power is greater than any Chinese leader’s since Deng.

因此，很难说习近平的权力比邓小平以来的任何一位中国领导人更大。


He certainly has an authoritative personality and without doubt is more active on the international scene than some of his predecessors.

他显然是一个拥有权威的人，并且毫无疑问比他的几位前任在国际舞台上更加活跃。


He has also been very decisive in attacking the growing corruption that has become a major source of internal malaise, reaching even the highest levels of government.

在打击业已成为国内顽症、甚至已蔓延到政府最高成的日益猖獗的腐败方面，他也比几位前任更加果断。


In that respect, it may be argued that his power is more wide-ranging than that of his predecessors, but in fairness it must also be noted that the patterns of corruption that his predecessors faced were not as acute and widespread as they have become in recent years.

从这个角度讲，或许可以说他的权力范围比他的前任们更广，但在公正方面，你还必须注意到，他的前任所面临的腐败方式没有最近几年那样赤裸裸和普遍。


At the same time, the increasing emphasis in party journals on the proposition that China’s armed forces must be viewed as servants of the Communist Party, and not simply of the nation, seems to suggest concern that the military may be developing its own view of Chinese domestic affairs, in addition to proclaiming with increasing assertiveness its responsibility for national security.

与此同时，党报日益强调党指挥枪、反对军队国家化，这似乎表明存在一种担心，即军队除了在捍卫国家安全责任方面变得日益强硬之外，也正在产生他们自身对中国内政的看法。


The Party elite, quite understandably, does not find this reassuring.

不难理解，中共精英对此感到十分不安。


Can Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime withstand a prolonged period of low energy prices and Western sanctions?

俄罗斯总统普京的政权能够抵挡长时期的低油价和西方制裁吗？


What risks do you see emerging should Russia’s economy continue to decline, with Putin increasingly unable to reward his political base?

你认为如果俄罗斯经济继续衰退，普京在奖赏他的政治基础方面日益力不从心，会产生什么后果？


There is, of course, a danger that at some point Putin may choose to lash out and create a truly massive international crisis, and perhaps precipitate some new form of direct East-West warfare.

当然，在某个点上普京也许会选择孤注一掷，制造真正的大规模国际危机，也许还会引爆新形式的东西方直接战争，这种危险是存在的。


But to say that, one must also assume that to some extent he himself is unbalanced and has shifted from a kind of guerilla warfare against the West, always with some possibility of retreat, to all-out combat.

但果真如此的话，我们还必须假设，在某种程度上，他本人已经失衡，从对西方的某种游击战 — — 永远存在撤退的可能 — — 转变为孤注一掷的战争。


The outcome of that would be inherently unpredictable, but probably in any case very destructive for Russian wellbeing.

这一情况的结果具有内在不可预测性，但也许无论如何对俄罗斯人的福祉来说都是一场灾难。


If Russia’s economy continues to decline, and if the West succeeds in deterring Putin from further use of force, it is still conceivable that some acceptable resolution (a form of which I recommended publicly by talking about the Finland model) may be contrived.

如果俄罗斯经济继续衰退，并且西方继续威慑普京使之不敢扩大武力，我们仍然可以认为可以形成某种可接受的解决方案（我在谈及芬兰模式时曾公开建议过 ） 。


But that depends in turn on the West’s firmness in supporting Ukraine’s efforts to stabilize itself.

但这反过来取决于西方在支持乌克兰稳定自身方面有多坚定。


Following the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan and Iraq, much of the world now perceives the US as being in a period of “retreat,” similar to the post-Vietnam War era.

美军撤出阿富汗和伊拉克后，世界上有许多人现在认为美国已经入“撤退”期，就像越战后时代那样。


Is the US embracing a form of neo-isolationism?

美国正在采取某种形式的新孤立主义吗？


Or will America’s apparent inward turn be as brief as it was following Vietnam?

还是说，美国显而易见的向内转和越战之后一样只是短暂现象？


I do not believe that the US is in a “period of retreat.”

我不认为美国进入了“撤退期 ” 。


The fact of the matter is that the redistribution of global power has produced a situation in which the US is no longer the sole hegemon.

重要的事实是全球实力的再分配产生了一个美国不再是唯一霸权的局面。


The US has to acknowledge the fact that the world is now much more complex.

美国必须承认一个事实，即现在的世界比以前复杂得多。


The spread of conflict throughout the Middle East is currently precipitated more by the rise of religious sectarianism than by American interventionism.

中东地区的冲突蔓延更多地是拜宗教门户之见崛起所赐，而不是因为美国的干涉。


In these volatile circumstances, greater attention must be given to the national interests of countries such as Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Israel.

在这些暴力环境下，必须将更多注意力放在土耳其、伊朗、沙特阿拉伯、埃及和以色列等国家的国家利益上。


By the same token, the interests of any one of them must not be allowed to become the total interest of the US.

同理，这些国家中的任何一国的利益决不能成为美国的总利益。


What may surprise the world most in 2015?

2015年什么事情能给世界带来最大的意外？


Perhaps the gradual reappearance in Russia of a more politically assertive liberal middle class.

也许是俄罗斯逐渐在再现政治上更积极的自由中产阶级。


That middle class was beginning to play a more significant role in shaping domestic and international Russian policy under Dmitri Medvedev.

在梅德韦杰夫时期，这一中产阶级开始在俄罗斯国内和国际政策中扮演更加重要的角色。


With Putin’s return to power and his recent adventurism, it has been pushed aside by deliberately awakened and intensely stimulated national chauvinism.

随着普京重回宝座并且采取了最近的冒险主义，自由中产阶级被刻意唤醒并且密集刺激的民族沙文主义所压制。


Waving a chauvinist banner, however, may not be the best solution for dealing with international problems, especially if the West is intelligent and united. The Russian middle class, quite naturally, wishes to live in a society like that of Western Europe.

但是，高举沙文主义的大旗也许并不是处理国际问题的最佳方案，特别是在面临明智而团结的西方的情况下。


A Russia that gradually begins to gravitate toward the West will also be a Russia that ceases to disrupt the international system.

逐渐开始被西方吸引的俄罗斯也将是一个停止干扰国际制度的俄罗斯。


America’s Enemy Within

美国国内的敌人


NEW YORK – Barring any unexpected new revelations, there is not much to be learned from the Tsarnaev brothers, better known as “the Boston bombers.”

纽约 — — 除出人意料的事实真相外，从察尔纳耶夫兄弟（也叫“波士顿兄弟 ” ） 身上再也得不到什么新的东西。


We can dig into their family histories in strife-torn Dagestan, or examine, once again, the lethal appeal of Islamist radicalism.

我们可以挖掘俩兄弟在倍受纷争蹂躏的家乡达吉斯坦的家庭史，也可以再次审视伊斯兰激进主义的致命吸引力。


But I doubt that this would be enlightening.

但我怀疑这样做有没有意义。


The elder brother, Tamerlan, who died in a gun battle with the police, appears to fit perfectly the profile of what the German writer Hans Magnus Enzensberger calls “the radical loser.”

在与警方交火中丧生的哥哥塔梅兰似乎是德国作家汉斯·马格努斯·恩岑斯贝格口中“激进失败者”的典型。


And his younger brother, Dzhokhar, recovering from gunshot wounds in a Boston hospital while waiting to be put on trial for his life, seems to have been a pathetic follower who acted less out of deep conviction than out of fraternal love.

而正在波士顿医院接受枪伤治疗并等待接受死刑审判的弟弟焦哈尔与其说因为信仰参与恐怖活动，还不如说是因为兄弟情谊而被牵扯其中的可怜的追随者。


The radical loser is the kind of young man who feels victimized by an unfeeling, uncaring world.

激进失败者是指那些感觉被绝情、冷漠的世界抛弃的年轻人。


That sour sense of rejection, felt by many confused youths, turns for some into a fierce desire for vengeance.

很多困惑的年轻人那种酸楚的被抛弃感，在某些人身上化成了强烈的复仇欲。


Like Samson in the temple of Gaza, he wishes to destroy himself in a public act of violence, taking as many people as possible with him.

像加沙寺庙中的萨姆森一样，他追求公众暴力中的自我毁灭，让尽可能多的人给他陪葬。


Anything can trigger this final act: a lover’s rejection, a job application denied.

情侣分手、工作申请被拒，任何小事均可触发这场最后的疯狂。


In the case of Tamerlan, a talented boxer, he was denied the chance to become a champion because he was not yet a United States citizen.

具体到天才拳手塔梅兰，他因为不是美国公民而失去了登上冠军宝座的机会。


Radical Islamism offered him a ready-made cause to die for.

激进伊斯兰主义为他提供了为事业献身的现成的机会。


More interesting, and in a way far more disturbing, has been the reaction in the US to the Boston bombings, which killed three people and injured 264.

美国对致3人死亡、264人受伤的波士顿爆炸事件的反应非常有趣，在某种意义上也更耐人寻味。


Even after Tamerlan had died, and Dzhokhar, already wounded, was the only known fugitive, the Boston authorities decided to close down the entire city.

即使在塔梅兰已死，受伤的焦哈尔被证明是唯一已知逃犯的情况下，波士顿当局依然决定封锁整座城市。


Public transport was halted, trains to and from the city were stopped, shops and business closed, and citizens were told to stay home.

公共交通及城市列车停运、公司商店关闭、市民被告知要待在家里。


Until the surviving bomber was found, Boston was reduced to a ghost town.

在幸存的爆炸案嫌犯被发现之前，波士顿已经沦为一座鬼城。


If two troubled young men with homemade bombs cobbled together from fertilizer and pressure cookers can have this effect on a major American city, one can imagine how tempting their example must now be to other radical losers, not to mention radical groups.

如果两个用化肥和高压锅自制炸弹的迷惑的年轻人能对美国的主要城市产生这样的影响，那么不难想象他们的榜样对其他激进失败者、更不要说极端组织将构成多大的诱惑。


It shows how vulnerable a modern city can be when its leaders lose their nerve.

此次事件显示领导人丧失勇气时现代城市将变得多么脆弱。


The authorities’ overblown reaction – and that of much of the press – was all the odder for having occurred just as the US Senate was voting down a bill that would have made it harder for known killers and mentally disturbed people to buy guns, or for private individuals to acquire weapons normally used only in warfare.

因为发生在美国参议院刚刚否决一项加大已知杀手及精神错乱人员购买枪支及私人获取战争武器难度的法案之后，当局和多数媒体的夸张反应就显得更加怪异。


It seems as though Americans can tolerate a society in which schoolchildren and other innocents are regularly murdered by deranged men with weapons bought on the open market, but erupt in collective hysteria when the killings are committed by people labeled as “terrorists.”

看来美国人可以容忍中小学生和其他无辜民众被持有从公开市场所购武器的精神错乱者杀害，却在所谓“恐怖份子”策划的杀戮中集体爆发癔症。


This may reflect what people are accustomed to.

这也许是人们习惯成自然的反应。


The Spanish had grown so inured to acts of violence from Basque separatists that the murder of 191 people in Madrid by Islamist extremists in 2004 was met with remarkable sang-froid. When 52 people were killed in a suicide bombing on the London Underground the following year, the British, too, reacted with relative calm, having lived through years of Irish terrorist violence in the 1970’s.

西班牙人对巴斯克分离主义份子的暴行麻木不仁，以致于2004年伊斯兰极端份子在马德里杀害191人的暴行并未引起多大反应；而次年当自杀式炸弹袭击在伦敦地铁夺去52条生命的时候，英国人也因为经历过20世纪70年代爱尔兰恐怖主义的暴行而显得相对冷静。


Like the Spanish, they were used to it.

英国人和西班牙人一样已经见怪不怪。


Americans, despite the attacks of September 11, 2001, are not.

尽管经历过2001年9月11日的恐怖袭击，美国人却还没有对暴力司空见惯。


Worse than that, a number of Republican senators, including such luminaries as John McCain, called for stripping Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, who is a US citizen, of his legal rights and placing him before a military tribunal as an “enemy combatant,” as though the 19-year-old college student were a soldier in a war against America.

这还不算，就像年仅19岁的大学生兼美国公民焦哈尔·察尔纳耶夫是反美战争中的士兵一样，以约翰·麦凯恩等杰出人物为代表的几名共和党参议员呼吁剥夺他的合法权益，并将其作为“敌方战斗人员”移交军事法庭审理。


Exaggerated fear of outside enemies has always been part of the American political landscape.

美国政界一直存在对外敌夸大其词的恐惧。


The “nation of immigrants” was traditionally regarded as a refuge from danger.

美国作为“移民国家”传统上被视为避险之地。


The evil outside world should not be able to touch the Land of the Free.

邪恶的外部世界不应触及这片自由的土地。


When it does – Pearl Harbor, September 2001 – all hell breaks loose.

当珍珠港、911等外来袭击真实发生后，美国人好像掉进了活地狱。


Another factor may be the need for a common enemy in a country whose citizens come from so many different cultures and traditions.

另一个因素或许是民众来自多元文化和传统的国家需要同仇敌忾。


Besieged by Communists or Islamists, people feel a sense of belonging.

共产党或伊斯兰教徒的围攻给人带来归属感。


Defense of the nation against dangerous outsiders – and their domestic agents, whether real or imagined – provides a powerful bond.

保护国家免遭想象或真实的危险外来者及其国内代理人的荼毒可以产生强大的凝聚力。


Such bonds can be useful, even necessary, in times of war.

这样的凝聚力在战时不仅有效，而且必须。


But the politics of fear poses a danger to the US itself.

但恐惧政治也威胁美国自身的安全。


The aim of political terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda, is to provoke retaliation and maximize publicity for their cause.

以“基地”为代表的政治恐怖组织的目的就是激起报复，最大限度地为他们的事业宣传。


As common criminals, such groups’ members would not achieve this goal.

如果被当作普通罪犯，恐怖组织成员的上述目标将无法实现。


But by claiming to be soldiers at war with the world’s biggest military power, they gain sympathy, as well as recruits, among the radical losers and the disaffected.

但自称与世界排名第一的军事强国作战能帮助他们博取同情，进而从激进失败者和不满群众当中征召人员。


Former President George W. Bush once explained terrorism as the expression of hatred for American freedom.

前总统乔治·W·布什曾经说过恐怖主义是表达对美国自由的仇恨。


But when terrorism results in torture of prisoners, ever more police surveillance, and official threats to US citizens’ legal rights – or, for that matter, when a crime committed by two young immigrants causes an entire city to be shut down – Americans’ government is harming their freedom more than any terrorist could ever hope to do.

但当恐怖主义导致对犯人施暴、警方加强监视和美国公民合法权益受到官方威胁 — — 或者就本案而言，两名年轻移民所犯的罪行导致波士顿全城陷入瘫痪时 — — 美国政府对于自由的伤害远远超乎任何恐怖份子的想象。


American Hegemony or American Primacy?

美国霸权还是美国主导？


CAMBRIDGE – No country in modern history has possessed as much global military power as the United States.

美国剑桥—在现代历史上，没有哪个国家拥有如同美国那样强大的全球军事实力。


Yet some analysts now argue that the US is following in the footsteps of the United Kingdom, the last global hegemon to decline.

但如今一些分析家认为美国正在步上一个衰落的全球霸权 — — 英国的后尘。


This historical analogy, though increasingly popular, is misleading.

这一历史比较尽管越来越热门，却有误导之嫌。


Britain was never as dominant as the US is today.

英国从未获得可与今日美国相媲美的主宰力。


To be sure, it maintained a navy equal in size to the next two fleets combined, and its empire, on which the sun never set, ruled over a quarter of humankind.

诚然，它拥有一支规模等于第二名和第三名之和的海军，并且“日不落帝国”统治范围覆盖了四分之一的人类。


But there were major differences in the relative power resources of imperial Britain and contemporary America.

但大英帝国和当代美国的相对实力来源截然不同。


By the outbreak of World War I, Britain ranked only fourth among the great powers in terms of military personnel, fourth in terms of GDP, and third in military spending.

一战爆发时，英国的军人数量只在列强中位居第四，GDP也位居第四，军事支出位居第三。


The British Empire was ruled in large part through reliance on local troops.

大英帝国在很大程度上利用当地武装实现统治。


Of the 8.6 million British forces in WWI, nearly a third came from the overseas empire.

在一战的860万英军中，近三分之一来自海外。


That made it increasingly difficult for the government in London to declare war on behalf of the empire when nationalist sentiments began to intensify.

这使得当民族主义情绪开始高涨时，伦敦政府日益难以代表整个帝国宣战。


By World War II, protecting the empire had become more of a burden than an asset.

到二战时，保护整个帝国成了一种负担而不是资产。


The fact that the UK was situated so close to powers like Germany and Russia made matters even more challenging.

英国与德国和俄国的实力已非常接近，这一事实让挑战更加紧迫。


For all the loose talk of an “American empire,” the fact is that the US does not have colonies that it must administer, and thus has more freedom to maneuver than the UK did.

在所有泛泛而谈的“美利坚帝国”论中，一个事实是美国并不拥有它必须管理的殖民地，因此拥有比英国更大的腾挪自由。


And, surrounded by unthreatening countries and two oceans, it finds it far easier to protect itself.

此外，美国周边是没有威胁的邻国和两个大洋，保护自己要容易得多。


That brings us to another problem with the global hegemon analogy: the confusion over what “hegemony” actually means.

这就引出了关于全球霸权比较的另一个问题：对“霸权”真实含义的混淆。


Some observers conflate the concept with imperialism; but the US is clear evidence that a hegemon does not have to have a formal empire.

一些观察家将霸权列为帝国主义的同义词；但美国是一个明显的例子，说明了霸权并不一定要靠正式的帝国实现。


Others define hegemony as the ability to set the rules of the international system; but precisely how much influence over this process a hegemon must have, relative to other powers, remains unclear.

另一些观察家将霸权定义为有能力制定国际制度规则；但霸权必须拥有相对其他列强多多少的影响力仍不明确。


Still others consider hegemony to be synonymous with control of the most power resources.

还有一些观察家认为霸权意味着控制最多的实力资源。


But, by this definition, nineteenth-century Britain – which at the height of its power in 1870 ranked third (behind the US and Russia) in GDP and third (behind Russia and France) in military expenditures – could not be considered hegemonic, despite its naval dominance.

但是，据此定义，十九世纪的英国 — — 在1870实力顶峰时期，其GDP为世界第三（次于美国和俄国 ） ， 军事支出亦为世界第三（次于俄国和法国 ） — —就不能称之为霸权，尽管它拥有海洋主宰力。


Similarly, those who speak of American hegemony after 1945 fail to note that the Soviet Union balanced US military power for more than four decades.

类似地，说美国在1945年后拥有霸权的人没有注意到苏联在四十多年的时间里都在制衡美国的军事实力。


Though the US had disproportionate economic clout, its room for political and military maneuver was constrained by Soviet power.

尽管美国拥有无与伦比的经济实力，但其政治和军事腾挪空间因为苏联的力量而大受限制。


Some analysts describe the post-1945 period as a US-led hierarchical order with liberal characteristics, in which the US provided public goods while operating within a loose system of multilateral rules and institutions that gave weaker states a say.

一些分析家将1945年后的时期称为美国领导的、以自由为特征的层级秩序，其中美国提供公共品并在弱国也能赢得话语权的松散的多边规则和机构体系中施展。


They point out that it may be rational for many countries to preserve this institutional framework, even if American power resources decline.

他们指出，对许多国家来说，维护这一制度框架是理性的，即使美国实力源在衰落。


In this sense, the US-led international order could outlive America’s primacy in power resources, though many others argue that the emergence of new powers portends this order’s demise.

从这个角度讲，美国领导的国际秩序能够比美国的实力源主导地位存在更长时间，尽管其他许多人指出新力量的崛起预示着这一秩序的崩溃。


But, when it comes to the era of supposed US hegemony, there has always been a lot of fiction mixed in with the facts.

但是，在所谓的美国霸权时期，一直有许多混杂在一起的事实和矛盾。


It was less a global order than a group of like-minded countries, largely in the Americas and Western Europe, which comprised less than half of the world.

它与其说是一套全球秩序，不如说是一群观念相近的国家（主要来自美洲和西欧，不到世界的一半 ） 。


And its effects on non-members – including significant powers like China, India, Indonesia, and the Soviet bloc – were not always benign.

其对非成员国的影响 — — 包括中国、印度、印度尼西亚和苏联阵营等主要力量 — — 并不总是积极的。


Given this, the US position in the world could more accurately be called a “half-hegemony.”

因此，美国在世界中的地位更应该称为“半霸权 ” （ half-hegemony ） 。


Of course, America did maintain economic dominance after 1945: the devastation of WWII in so many countries meant that the US produced nearly half of global GDP. That position lasted until 1970, when the US share of global GDP fell to its pre-war level of one-quarter.

当然，美国确实在1945年后维持了经济主宰力：二战让许多国家变成了焦土，这意味着美国贡献了全球GDP的近一半。


But, from a political or military standpoint, the world was bipolar, with the Soviet Union balancing America’s power.

但是，从政治或军事角度看，世界是双极结构，苏联制衡着美国的实力。


Indeed, during this period, the US often could not defend its interests: the Soviet Union acquired nuclear weapons; communist takeovers occurred in China, Cuba, and half of Vietnam; the Korean War ended in a stalemate; and revolts in Hungary and Czechoslovakia were repressed.

事实上，在此期间，美国常常无法捍卫它的利益：苏联拥有了核武器；共产党在中国、古巴和半个越南建立了政权；朝鲜战争以僵局收场；匈牙利和捷克斯洛伐克起义被镇压。


Against this background, “primacy” seems like a more accurate description of a country’s disproportionate (and measurable) share of all three kinds of power resources: military, economic, and soft.

在此背景下，或许“主导”才更准确地描述了一国在三大实力源上的（可测量的）超凡比重：军事、经济和软实力。


The question now is whether the era of US primacy is coming to an end.

现在的问题是美国主导的时代是否正在走向结束。


Given the unpredictability of global developments, it is, of course, impossible to answer this question definitively.

考虑到全球发展趋势的不可预测性，当然也就无法笃定地回答这个问题。


The rise of transnational forces and non-state actors, not to mention emerging powers like China, suggests that there are big changes on the horizon.

跨国力量和非国家行动方的崛起 — — 更不用说中国等新兴力量了 — — 意味着全球局势的重大变化。


But there is still reason to believe that, at least in the first half of this century, the US will retain its primacy in power resources and continue to play the central role in the global balance of power.

但仍有理由相信，至少在本世纪上半叶，美国将仍然拥有实力源的主导地位，并继续在全球实力平衡中扮演核心角色。


In short, while the era of US primacy is not over, it is set to change in important ways.

简言之，尽管美国主导的时代还没结束，但必定会发生重要改变。


Whether or not these changes will bolster global security and prosperity remains to be seen.

这些改变能否提升全球安全与繁荣还有待观察。


What I Tell My Non-American Friends

我告诉我美国以外的朋友


CAMBRIDGE – I frequently travel overseas, and invariably my foreign friends ask, with varying degrees of bewilderment: What in the world is going on in your country?

坎布里奇 — — 我时常前往海外，我外国的朋友每次都带着不同程度的困惑问：你们国家究竟发生了什么？


Here is what I say.

下面是我的回答。


First, do not misinterpret the 2016 election.

首先，不要误读2016年大选。


Contrary to some commentary, the American political system has not been swept away by a wave of populism.

与某些评论所声称的恰恰相反，美国政治制度并未被民粹主义浪潮所消灭掉。


True, we have a long history of rebelling against elites.

诚然，我们有着反抗精英的悠久历史。


Donald Trump tapped into a tradition associated with leaders like Andrew Jackson and William Jennings Bryan in the nineteenth century and Huey Long and George Wallace in the twentieth century.

与十九世纪的安德鲁·杰克逊和威廉·詹宁斯·布莱恩和二十世纪的休伊·朗和乔治·华莱士等领袖相关的传统被唐纳德·特朗普所利用。


And yet Trump lost the popular vote by nearly three million.

而且特朗普少近300万张民众选票。


He won the election by appealing to populist resentment in three Rust Belt states – Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin – that had previously voted Democratic.

他通过迎合密歇根、宾夕法尼亚和威斯康星这三个铁锈州所出现的民粹主义愤怒而赢得了大选 — — 这三个州此前曾是民主党的票仓。


If a hundred thousand votes had been cast differently in those states, Trump would have lost the Electoral College and the presidency.

如果那些州有10万张选票当时改变了归属，那么特朗普将同时失去选举团和总统。


That said, Trump’s victory points to a real problem of growing social and regional inequality in the United States.

也就是说，特朗普的胜利体现出的真正问题是美国愈演愈烈的社会和地区不平等。


J.D. Vance’s recent best-selling book Hillbilly Elegy compellingly describes the vast difference between California and Appalachia.

万斯最新畅销书《乡村哀歌》令人信服地描绘了加利福尼亚和阿巴拉契亚之间的巨大差别。


Research by the Princeton economists Anne Case and Angus Deaton shows that the demographic trends among lower-income whites without a college degree are worse than those for African-Americans, who historically anchored the lower extremes of inequality.

普林斯顿大学经济学家安妮·卡斯和安格斯·迪顿的研究显示不具备大学学历的低收入白人其人口趋势比非洲裔美国人更加糟糕，而非洲裔美国人在历史上曾长期经历地位最低的不平等。


In 1999, mortality rates among whites with no college were around 30% lower than those of African-Americans; by 2015, they were 30% higher.

1999年，没有大学学历的白人死亡率比非洲裔美国人低30%左右；而到2015年，该数据却变成了高30 % 。


Moreover, manufacturing employment, once a prime source of high-paying jobs for working-class whites, has fallen sharply over the last generation, to just 12% of the workforce.

不仅如此，曾一度成为工薪阶层白人高收入主要来源的制造业岗位在过去一代人间急剧下降，目前仅占劳动力总量的12 % 。


These previously Democratic voters were attracted by Trump’s promises to shake things up and bring back manufacturing jobs.

这些之前的民主党选民被特朗普改变现状和重新创造制造业就业机会的承诺所吸引。


Ironically, Trump’s efforts to repeal President Barack Obama’s health-care legislation would make their lives worse.

颇具讽刺意味的是，特朗普废除奥巴马总统医改法案的努力将进一步恶化他们的生活状况。


The second thing I tell my foreign friends is not to underestimate Trump’s communications skills.

我告诉外国朋友们的第二点是不要低估特朗普的沟通技巧。


Many are offended by his tweet storms and outrageous disregard for facts.

很多人非常厌恶他令人愤怒地无视事实以及他的推特风暴。


But Trump is a veteran of reality television, where he learned that the key to success is to monopolize viewers’ attention, and that the way to do that is with extreme statements, not careful regard for the truth.

但特朗普是位电视真人秀老手，他知道垄断观众的注意力才是成功的关键，而且要靠极端言论才能做到这一点，而不是谨慎地看待真相。


Twitter helps him to set the agenda and distract his critics.

推特帮助他制定议程并分散批评。


What offends commentators in the media and academia does not bother his supporters.

冒犯媒体和学者的内容对他的支持者而言无关紧要。


But as he turns from his permanent self-centered campaigning to trying to govern, Twitter becomes a two-edged sword that deters needed allies.

但随着他从永远自我中心的竞选活动开始转向实际治理，推特也起到了阻止所需盟友的双刃剑的作用。


Third, I tell my friends not to expect normal behavior.

第三，我告诉我的朋友不要指望特朗普表现正常。


Normally, a president who loses the popular vote moves to the political center to attract additional support.

通常情况下，在民众投票中失利的总统会转向政治中心以吸引更多支持者。


This is what George W. Bush did successfully in 2001.

2001年乔治·W·布什总统就曾成功地这样做。


Trump, by contrasts, proclaims that he won the popular vote and, acting as though he really did, appeals to his base voters.

相比之下，特朗普宣称自己赢得了民众投票，而且就像真的赢了一样对他的基础选民发出号召。


While Trump has made solid centrist appointments to the Departments of Defense, State, and Homeland Security, his picks for the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Health and Human Services are from the extremes of the Republican Party.

特朗普在中规中矩地任命中间人士担任国防部长、国务卿和国土安全部负责人的同时，却任命共和党极端份子担任环保署和卫生与公共服务部部长。


His White House staff is divided between pragmatists and ideologues, and he caters to both.

他安排的白宫工作人员既有实用主义者也不乏空想家，而他能自如地与两者打交道。


Fourth, no one should underestimate US institutions.

第四，人们不应低估美国的机构。


Sometimes my friends talk as though the sky is falling and ask if Trump is as dangerous a narcissist as Mussolini.

有时我的朋友说得就像天要塌了一样，问特朗普是不是像墨索里尼一样危险的自恋者。


I tell them not to panic.

我告诉他们不要惊慌。


The US, for all its problems, is not Italy in 1922.

尽管美国有各种各样的问题，但绝不是1922年的意大利。


Our national political elites are often polarized; but so were America’s founders.

我们的国家政治精英往往两极分化；但美国的开国元勋当时也是一样。


In designing the US Constitution, the founders’ goal was not to ensure harmonious government, but to constrain political power with a system of checks and balances that made it difficult to exercise.

在设计美国宪法的时候，开国元勋们的目标不是确保建设和谐的政府，而是利用完整的制衡体系约束政权，增加权力的行使难度。


The joke goes that the founders created a political system that made it impossible for King George to rule over us – or for anyone to ever do so.

有人开玩笑说开国元勋们缔造了阻止乔治国王 — — 或任何独裁者 — — 执政的一整套政治制度。


Inefficiency was placed in the service of liberty.

他们宁愿以低效为代价来实现自由的目标。


It is still early in the Trump presidency, and we cannot be sure what might happen after, say, a major terrorist attack.

特朗普执政尚处于早期阶段，我们无法确定比如在一次重大恐怖袭击后可能发生些什么。


So far, however, the courts, the Congress, and the states have checked and balanced the administration, as Madison intended.

但到目前为止，法院、国会及各州政府都在按麦迪逊的意图制约和平衡政府。


And the permanent civil servants in the executive departments add ballast.

行政部门的常任公务员也发挥了稳定作用。


Finally, my friends ask what all of this means for American foreign policy and the liberal international order led by the US since 1945.

最后，我的朋友问这对美国外交政策和1945年来由美国主导的自由国际秩序意味着什么。


Frankly, I don’t know, but I worry less about the rise of China than the rise of Trump.

坦率地讲，我不知道，但与其说我担心中国的崛起还不如说我更担心特朗普。


While American leaders, including Obama, have complained about free riders, the US has long taken the lead in providing key global public goods: security, a stable international reserve currency, relatively open markets, and stewardship of the Earth’s commons.

虽然美国领导人，包括奥巴马在内，一直抱怨有人免费搭车，但美国一直在提供安全、稳定的国际储备货币、相对开放的市场和地球公共资源管理等全球关键公共服务方面发挥着领导作用。


Despite the US-led international order’s problems, the world has prospered and poverty has been reduced under it.

尽管以美国为主导的国际秩序存在各种问题，但在这种制度下，世界实现了繁荣，贫穷也逐步减少。


But one cannot be sure it will continue.

但我们无法肯定现行制度将继续下去。


The US will need to cooperate with China, Europe, Japan, and others to manage transnational problems.

美国需要与中国、欧洲、日本和其他国家合作来管理跨国事务。


During the 2016 campaign, Trump was the first major party candidate in 70 years to call the American alliance system into question.

2016年竞选期间，特朗普是七十年来首位质疑美国联盟制度的主要党派候选者。


Since taking office in January, statements by Trump and his appointees suggest that it is likely to persist.

自1月上台以来，特朗普及其任命人员的言论表明这种质疑很可能不会消除。


American hard and soft power, after all, stems largely from the fact that the US has 60 allies (while China has only a few).

归根结底，美国的硬实力和软实力大多来自美国的六十个盟友（而中国只有少数几个 ） 。


But the stability of the multilateral institutions that help manage the world economy and global commons is more uncertain.

但协助管理世界经济和全球民众的多边机构能否保持稳定不确定性更高。


Trump’s budget director speaks of a hard-power budget, with funds cut from the State Department and the United Nations system.

特朗普的预算总监谈到硬实力预算，拨给国务院和联合国系统的资金都有所减少。


Other officials advocate replacing multilateral trade deals with “fair and balanced” bilateral arrangements.

其他官员则宣扬用“公平和平衡的”双边安排取代多边贸易协定。


And Trump is repudiating Obama’s efforts to address climate change.

而且特朗普拒绝承认奥巴马应对气候变化的工作。


I tell my friends I wish I could reassure them on these issues.

我告诉我的朋友我希望能在这些问题上给他们保证。


But I cannot.

但我做不到。


Reclaiming American Internationalism

重拾美国国际主义


DENVER – To watch the debate play out in America’s news media, it would seem that the opposite of “America First” is American interventionism: a chronic penchant for leaping, to no apparent end, into wars of choice and demonstrating America’s unrivaled military power.

发自丹佛 — — 如果你关注美国新闻媒体的争论，就会发现“美国优先”的对立面似乎是美国的干预主义：经常出其不意地跳入战争选项并炫耀美国无与伦比的军事实力。


But interventionism is not the same thing as internationalism.

但干预主义与国际主义不同。


Conflating the two collapses the distinction between quick and decisive use of force and thoughtful engagement with the world and its problems.

如果将两者混为一谈，就无法将快速断然使用武力与深思熟虑地参与世界及其问题区分开来。


In America’s “get ’er done” transactional Weltanschauung, international disputes tend to be viewed as military challenges that are merely masquerading as political issues.

在美国那种“把事情摆平”的事务性世界观中，国际争端往往被视为伪装成政治事务的军事挑战。


In fact, they are usually the opposite, which is why the world’s most complex conflicts are rarely resolved by intervention.

事实上情况通常是相反的，这就是为什么世界上最复杂的冲突很少能通过干预来解决的原因。


Geopolitical conflicts have long, sordid histories, and violence is more often a symptom of their intractability than an inherent trait.

地缘政治冲突都有着悠久而丑恶的历史，而暴力往往并非其固有特征，而是证明其难以处理的症状。


They often have something to do with identity, and with claims of collective ownership of the land beneath the feet of a particular “nation.”

它们往往与身份定义有关，并且声称对特定“国家/民族”脚下的土地拥有集体所有权。


The basis of political membership is more often ethnic than civil, which is contrary to Americans’ understanding of nationhood.

构建政治成员资格的基础往往是种族而非公民身份，而这与美国人对国家的理解相悖。


Moreover, contemporary problems can be the products of flawed arrangements that were made decades or even centuries ago.

与此同时，某些当代问题可能是几十年甚至几百年前那些缺陷性安排的产物。


Two examples that immediately come to mind are the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement between Britain and France, which carved up the Middle East, and the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, which established national borders in the Balkans.

可以信手拈来的两个例子是1916年英法两国瓜分中东的《赛克斯-皮科协定 》 ， 以及1919年为巴尔干地区划分了国界的《凡尔赛条约 》 。


In both cases, creating new states may have seemed like a straightforward solution, but doing so turned out to be a prescription for more war.

在这两种情况下，建立一些新国家看似是个简单明了的解决方案，但真这样做只会引发更多战争。


For the United States, international conflicts are often an occasion to demonstrate “toughness” and “resolve.”

对美国来说，国际冲突往往是其展现“硬派”和“决心”的机会。


The US airstrikes in Bosnia were meant to lend momentum to a political process that already had the support of the European Union and Russia.

美国对波斯尼亚的空袭是为了推动一项已经得到欧盟和俄罗斯支持的政治进程。


The air campaign was a last resort, an effort to punish those who did not support the peace process.

空袭是最后的手段，是为了惩罚那些不支持和平进程的人。


For many American pundits and politicians, then, the lesson of Bosnia was merely that the bad guys should have been bombed sooner.

因此对许多美国权威人士和政治家来说，从波斯尼亚得到的经验就仅仅是应该早点轰炸坏人。


Few took the opportunity to study the region’s complex history so that judicious inter-entity boundaries could be drawn up.

很少人借此机会研究该地区的复杂历史以便在各个实体间划分出审慎明智的界限。


If they had, the final arrangement might have done more to preserve external borders and nurture a constitutional structure that would allow the new state to be integrated into the European map.

如果他们能做到这一点的话，最终安排可能会更加专注于保护外部边界并培育出一种宪政架构，使新国家得以融入欧洲地图。


Kosovo, too, supplied more historical complexity than many were willing to grapple with.

科索沃也是如此，因为该地的历史要比许多人愿意探究的更为复杂。


On-the-ground diplomacy to achieve sovereign autonomy for Kosovo while respecting Serbs’ emotional connection to it was derided.

力图在实现科索沃主权自治的同时尊重塞族与该地情感联系的接地气外交策略总是受到嘲笑。


The implication was that military means should be the first – rather than the last – option for securing Kosovo’s independence.

这意味着军事手段成为了确保科索沃独立的首要 — — 而不是最后一个 — — 选择。


Never mind that many European countries objected to the creation of an independent state, and had called for multilateral diplomacy to be attempted before any discussion of air strikes.

更别提许多欧洲国家反对建立一个独立国家，并呼吁在讨论实施任何空袭之前尝试进行多边外交。


Interventionism, with internationalism as an afterthought, continued after the turn of the century, but on a much bigger stage.

在世纪之交之后，先干涉主义后国际主义的做法继续存在，而且站在更广大的舞台上。


After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the US led an invasion and subsequent occupation of Afghanistan to root out al-Qaeda.

在2001年9月11日袭击事件发生后，美国领军了入侵并随后占领阿富汗以铲除基地组织。


But after 17 years with troops on the ground in that country, Americans have lost patience, with many embracing US President Donald Trump’s “America First” isolationism.

但是在驻军17年后美国人失去了耐心，许多人接受了美国总统特朗普的“美国优先”孤立主义思维。


In Iraq, where the connection to terrorism was more dubious, the US mounted a major military effort with goals that were perplexing and shifting, insofar as they were ever clearly articulated at all.

在与恐怖主义联系更为微弱的伊拉克，美国花费重大的军事努力去实现那些令人困惑且飘摇不定的目标，似乎它们根本就没有被明确表达过。


American interventionism has often been accompanied by criticism of friends and allies, who are depicted as weak and vacillating in the face of global challenges such as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s annexation of Crimea or China’s increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea.

美国的干涉主义往往伴随着对朋友和盟友的批评，指责它们在面对诸如俄罗斯总统普京吞并克里米亚或中国在南中国海日益横行等全球性挑战时表现弱势和摇摆不定。


When things went wrong in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US blamed those countries’ political leaders, denouncing them as corrupt and deserving of regime change.

当阿富汗和伊拉克出现问题时美国就会抨击这些国家的政治领导人，谴责他们腐败并活该下台。


The Europeans, too, were denounced, not just for fecklessness in the face of evil, but for living fat and happy lives without shouldering their proper burden.

欧洲人也受到谴责，不仅仅是因为面对恶行时的无能，还因为光顾享受生活而不去承担适当的责任。


With these narratives deeply etched into American public consciousness, it is no wonder that Trump’s dystopian vision has prevailed over internationalism, which has become a byword for the endless use of force and condescension toward allies.

鉴于这些叙事已经深深地铭刻在美国公众的意识当中，也难怪特朗普的反乌托邦视野能压倒国际主义，因为后者已经成为无休止地使用武力并对盟友俯首帖耳的代名词。


American internationalism will be back at some point.

美国的国际主义将会在某个时刻回归。


But those who claim to support it could hasten its revival by acting in accordance with its original meaning.

但那些声称支持它的人可以通过按照其原始含义行事来加速其复兴。


Traditional internationalists show respect for the opinions of others, and a willingness to accept – and even champion – multilateral structures.

传统的国际主义者会表现出对他人意见的尊重，并表现出接受 — — 甚至支持 — — 多边架构的意愿。


What internationalism needs now is a renewed American commitment to cooperation, even when other governments require more time to secure a mandate for action from their respective constituencies.

当前国际主义需要的是美国承诺重新参与合作，即使当其他政府需要更多时间来获取来自各自体制的行动授权。


At the end of the day, US international leadership must rest on American values, and on a broad perception of adherence to the unalienable principles underlying liberal democracy.

毕竟美国的国际领导必须根植于美国的价值观并广泛遵守自由民主制度背后的一系列不可剥夺原则。


In other words, America must lead by example.

换句话说，美国必须以身作则。


Its failure to do so in recent times – not least on the refugee issue – has undermined the influence on which its power ultimately rests.

而其近期的失能 — — 尤其是在难民问题上 — — 已经破坏了其权力最终所赖以构筑的影响力。


Renewing American Leadership

重建美国领导


MADRID – December always provides an opportunity to pause and reflect on what was and what will be.

马德里—12月永远是停下来思考过去怎样、未来又会怎样的机会。


This year, one of the conclusions that such reflection yields is that the United States remains firmly at the center of the liberal world order.

今年，这样的思考所产生的一个结论是美国仍然是自由世界秩序的核心，这一地位十分稳固。


Another is that the US needs to do more to lead in the way that its international standing demands.

另一个结论是美国需要做更多的事才能满足其国际地位所要求的领导责任。


Doubts about America’s continued global leadership have been proliferating for years.

多年来，关于美国是否能够保持全球领导力的质疑此起彼伏。


But, though the much-discussed multi-polar world order may well be in the cards, the reality is that, for now, efforts to address global challenges – from climate change to conflict in the Middle East – demand US engagement.

但是，尽管广受关注的多极世界秩序也许已经注定，但现实是就目前而言，解决全球挑战 — — 从气候变化到中东冲突 — — 的措施都需要美国的参与。


Unfortunately, the narrative of American decline has gained so much traction in recent years that even US officials seem to have started to believe it, pursuing weak and piecemeal policies (or, in some cases, doing nothing at all).

不幸的是，美国衰落的说法在近几年中获得了巨大的市场，就连美国官员也似乎已经开始相信它，推行弱势的零星政策（在有些问题上甚至无所作为 ） 。


President Barack Obama’s restrained foreign-policy approach appears to be fueling, not reducing, global instability.

总统奥巴马的克制外交方针助长而不是遏制了全球动荡。


The reasons for this lack of strong action are disputed.

不再采取强势行动的原因饱受争议。


Some blame Obama’s own fears about repeating his predecessors’ mistakes; others blame a hostile Congress for tying his hands.

一些人指责奥巴马害怕重蹈前任覆辙；也有人指责敌意国会的掣肘。


In fact, both factors may be at work.

事实上，也许两个因素都在起作用。


It may well be true that Obama would rather exercise caution – even when bold action is called for – than act impulsively and potentially cause more damage.

奥巴马宁愿谨慎行事 — — 哪怕是在人们呼吁采取果断行动时 — — 而不愿冲动以免造成更多伤害。


But the negative impact of an obstructionist, highly partisan US Congress should not be underestimated.

但以制造障碍为己任的高度党派对立的美国国会所起到的消极作用也不能小觑。


For example, by blocking reforms to International Monetary Fund governance that were agreed in 2010, Congress has damaged, perhaps irreparably, the legitimacy and relevance of the Bretton Woods institutions.

比如，国会阻挠在2010年就形成一致的国际货币基金组织（IMF）治理改革，这可能对布雷顿森林机构的合法性和重要性造成了不可挽回的伤害。


Likewise, by refusing to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the US Congress has undermined America’s credibility as it attempts to reaffirm international law in the South China Sea, where China is acting with increasing audacity.

类似地，美国国会拒绝批准联合国海洋法公约，这损害了美国的信誉，使其在中国日益蛮横的南海问题上难以主张国际法。


And, by opposing the inclusion of legally binding climate commitments, it weakened the global climate agreement that was reached this month in Paris, leaving compliance and implementation uncertain.

此外，美国国会还反对纳入有法律约束的气候承诺，从而削弱了本月在巴黎所达成的全球气候协定，留下了遵守和实施方面的不确定性。


Stalemate has become the name of the game in US politics in recent years.

近几年来，僵局已成为美国政治博弈的代名词。


That is why next year’s presidential election is so crucial.

正因如此，明年的总统选举至关重要。


It offers an opportunity for a fresh start, a new approach that produces the type of policy actions that the world needs.

这次选举提供了一个采取新方针，带来世界所需要的政策行动的全新开始的机会。


The key is engagement – among branches of the US government, between the US government and the public, and between the US and the rest of the world.

关键在于参与（engagement ） — —美国政府各部门的参与，美国政府和公众之间的参与，以及美国和世界其他国家之间的参与。


For starters, to avoid the kind of obstructionism that prevailed in the last eight years, the next president must engage Congress directly and actively.

首先，为了避免过去八年中所出现的阻挠一切的情况，下一位美国总统必须直接、积极地参与国会。


And, in fact, two of the Obama administration’s recent wins – the passage of so-called trade promotion authority (fast-track negotiating authority to conclude the Trans-Pacific Partnership) and the reauthorization of the small but vital Export-Import Bank – were the result of dedicated outreach, education, and, yes, cajoling of lawmakers.

而事实上，奥巴马政府的两次最近的胜利 — — 通过所谓的贸易促进授权（快车道谈判授权以完成跨太平洋合作伙伴关系）和对规模较小但至关重要的进出口银行的重新授权 — — 便是不遗余力的广泛接触、教育以及，是的，诱导立法者的结果。


The Iran nuclear agreement, one of Obama’s hallmark achievements, involved similar efforts to engage Congress, from protracted trips to Capitol Hill by Obama administration officials to a creative approach that allowed legislators to display their displeasure for the deal, without blocking its progress.

伊朗核协议是奥巴马的标志性成就之一，其中也包括了类似的参与国会的努力，奥巴马政府官员坚持不懈地拜访国会山，并提出了一套创造性的方针，允许立法者表达他们对协议的不满而不会阻挠协议进展。


Even in America’s highly divisive political atmosphere, it seems, where there is a will, there is a way.

看起来，即使在高度分化的美国政治气候下，也是有志者事竟成。


America’s next president must also improve engagement with citizens, whose widespread disaffection constrains – or allows – US leaders to pursue a weak foreign policy.

下一任美国总统还必须改善与公民之间的参与，美国公民的普遍不满制约 — — 或者让 — — 美国领导人采取了弱势外交。


Like many Europeans today, most Americans do not seem to understand – or care to understand – that the crumbling of the liberal world order would have dire consequences for all of them.

和当今的许多欧洲人一样，大部分美国人似乎不理解 — — 也不屑理解 — — 自由世界秩序的崩溃会给他们所有人都带来可怕后果。


It was not always this way.

并不总是如此。


Immediately after World War II, the memory of war, together with the enduring threat posed by the Soviet Union, made plain the importance of building and maintaining a liberal world order.

第二次世界大战刚刚结束时，战争的记忆加上苏联所带来的持续威胁，使得人人都能理解构建和维持自由世界秩序的重要性。


Today, though the need for such an order is just as great, the argument is not nearly as comprehensible or emotionally powerful.

如今，尽管对这一秩序的需求与当时同样巨大，但这一论点已不再那么完整或者具有那么强大的情感力量。


Discussion of rules and institutions comes across as bloodless.

对规则和制度的讨论给人留下不会流血的引向。


It is up to political leaders – and especially the president – to figure out how to make a compelling case about what is at stake.

政治领导人 — — 尤其是总统 — — 的责任就是找到如何将让最重要的事情显得刻不容缓。