The US Treasury strongly encouraged Asia to tighten fiscal policy during its 1990’s crisis.

在九十年代的危机中，美国财政部强烈鼓励亚洲紧缩财政政策。


But today the US Congress and President are tripping over themselves to adopt an ill-advised giant fiscal stimulus package, whose main effects will be to tie the hands of the next president in simplifying the US tax code and closing the budget deficit.

但是今天，美国国会和总统却自我矛盾地要采纳一个巨大的、鲁莽的财政刺激一揽子方案，其主要效果就是限制下一任总统简化美国税法以及消除预算赤字的空间。


Americans firmly told Japan that the only way to clean up its economy was to purge insolvent banks and regenerate the financial system through Schumpeterian “creative destruction.”

美国人坚定地告诉日本说，收拾日本经济烂摊子的唯一途径就是清除负债的银行，并且通过熊彼特的“创造性破坏”来重造其金融体系。


Today, US authorities appear willing to contemplate any measure, no matter how inflationary, to insure that none of its major banks and investment houses fails.

如今，美国当局似乎愿意考虑任何措施来确保其主要银行和投资公司没有一家倒闭，而无论其手段具有多大的通胀风险。


For years, foreign governments complained about American hedge funds, arguing that their non-transparent behavior posed unacceptable risks to stability.

多年来，外国政府抱怨美国的对冲基金，说它们不透明的行为对稳定造成不可接受的风险。


Now, many US politicians are complaining about the transparency of sovereign wealth funds (big government investors mainly from Asia and the Middle East), which are taking shares in trophy American assets such as Citibank and Merrill Lynch.

现在，许多美国政界人物则在抱怨国家财富基金(也就是主要来自亚洲和中东的庞大的政府投资者)的透明度问题。 这些基金正在花旗银行和美林公司等让美国骄傲的资产上入股。


In fact, having countries like Russia and China more vested in the well-being of the US economy would not be a bad thing.

实际上，让像俄国和中国那样的国家在美国经济福祉上更多投资并非一件坏事。


Yes, the IMF ought to develop a voluntary code of conduct for SWF’s, but it should not be used as a weapon to enforce financial protectionism.

是的，国际货币基金组织应该给主权财富基金制定一个自愿遵守的行为准则，但是这并不应当用来实行金融保护主义的武器。


For years, I, along with many others, have complained that emerging markets need greater representation in global financial governance.

多年来，我和其他许多人抱怨说新兴市场国家需要在全球金融管理中占有更大的代表比例。


Today, the issue goes far beyond symbolism.

今天，这一问题远远超过了象征主义。


The US economy is in trouble, and the problems it spins off are unlikely to stop at the US border.

美国经济陷入麻烦，而它所带来的问题不大可能局限于美国境内。


Experts from emerging markets and elsewhere have much to say about dealing with financial crises.

来自新兴市场国家和其他地方的专家们对于应付金融危机有很多话要说。


America should start to listen before it is too late.

美国在为时已晚之前应该开始倾听。


Obamacare and Effective Government

奥巴马医保和高效政府


BERKELEY – When historians look back on the United States’ Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), President Barack Obama’s controversial 2010 health-care reform, we predict that they will not devote much attention to its regulations, its troubled insurance exchanges, or its website’s flawed launch.

伯克利—如果有历史学家回顾2010年奥巴马总统颇有争议的医疗改革 — — 美国患者保护和平价医疗法（Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act，ACA ） ， 我们预测他们不会将注意力花在它的规则、它麻烦的保险交易以及它网站的漏洞上。


Instead, we think that they will focus on how “Obamacare” encouraged a wave of innovation that gradually tamed the spiraling costs of a dysfunctional system, even as millions of previously excluded Americans gained access to health insurance.

相反，我们认为历史学家会将注意力集中在“奥巴马医保”如何鼓励了逐渐控制一个功能失调的系统的不断上升的成本的创新上，即使它让数百万此前被排除在外的美国人也获得了医疗保险。


Innovation is probably the least discussed aspect of health-care reform.

创新也许是医疗改革中被讨论最少的话题。


Yet it is crucial to “bending” the sector’s cost curve, because it enables the delivery of quality health care in cost-effective ways.

但它是“弯曲”医疗成本曲线的关键，因为它能够让高品质医疗以高性价比的方式提供。


Obamacare has provided powerful new incentives for such innovation.

奥巴马医保为这类创新提供了有力的新激励。


From 1980 to 2010, US health-care spending grew almost twice as fast as the economy, rising from 9.2% to 17.4% of GDP.

1980—2010年，美国医疗支出速度几乎是经济增长的两倍，占GDP之比从9.2%上升至17.4 % 。


While many factors contributed to this surge, most experts agree that the single most important cause was a fee-for-service system that rewarded health-care providers for billing as many services as possible, rather than for keeping people healthy and treating their illnesses efficiently.

有许多因素促成了这一增幅，但大部分专家都同意，最重要的原因是按服务计费（fee-for-service）制度，该制度鼓励医疗服务提供者尽可能多地提供收费服务，而不是把维持人民健康和有效治疗疾病放在首位。


The ACA has been changing that, by establishing myriad new incentives to foster efficiency in health-care delivery – for example, by reducing costly and unnecessary hospital infections and readmissions, and by adopting electronic health records.

ACA改变了这一切，其办法是建立大量新激励提高医疗服务提供效率 — — 比如降低昂贵且不必要的医院传染和再住院（readmissions ） 、 采取电子病历等。


Most important, the ACA is providing incentives for the creation of “affordable care organizations,” “bundled payment systems,” and other delivery innovations to encourage better coordination of care, especially for patients with numerous chronic conditions.

最重要的是，ACA为建立“平价治疗组织 ” 、 “捆绑支付系统”和其他医疗服务提供创新提供了激励，从而鼓励了更好的治疗合作，特别是对存在多种慢性病的病患而言。


Such patients are among the 10% who account for an estimated 64% of overall health care costs.

这些病患占10 % ， 但付出了约64%的总医疗成本。


Around the US, providers, insurers, non-profits, and local governments are responding to the ACA’s incentives.

放眼美国，提供商、保险商、非营利组织和地方政府都在响应ACA的激励。


The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (which provide health insurance to pensioners and the poor) has just announced its second round of grants – $665 million to 28 states, three territories, and the District of Columbia – to encourage innovations in health-care delivery.

联邦医疗保险和医疗补助服务中心（The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services，为退休者和穷人提供医疗保险）刚刚宣布了第二轮资金分配 — — 28个州、三个领地和哥伦比亚特区获得6.65亿美元 — — 以刺激医疗服务提供创新。


Of course, it is still too early to declare victory, but Obamacare seems to be working.

当然，现在就宣布胜利还为时尚早，但奥巴马医保似乎在起作用。


According to a recent analysis by the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), about ten million people gained health insurance coverage in 2014 as a result of the ACA – the largest increase in coverage in four decades.

根据经济顾问委员会（Council of Economic Advisers，CEA）的最新分析，2014年大约有1,000万人因为ACA而获得医疗保险覆盖 — — 这是四十年来医疗覆盖面增加最大的一年。


But the real surprise is that growth in health-care spending slowed dramatically from 2010 to 2013, to roughly the same pace as GDP growth.

但真正的惊喜是医疗支出增长在2010—2013年出现大幅放缓，已与GDP增长速度相仿。


This represented a sharp break from the previous half-century; indeed, this period was characterized by the slowest growth in real per capita health-care spending on record.

这与此前半个世纪形成了鲜明对比；事实上，这段时期创造了真实人均医疗支出增长最缓慢的记录。


To be sure, the ACA is only one factor in this promising trend; growth in health-care spending often slows in the wake of an economic downturn.

诚然，ACA只是这一令人欣喜的趋势的一个因素；医疗支出增长常常随经济衰退而放缓。


But Medicare spending, which is not affected by recessions, has slowed along with private health-care spending.

但联邦医疗保险支出 — — 该指支出不受衰退影响 — — 也随着私人健康支出一起放缓。


In a recent study, the CEA concluded that the ACA’s Medicare reforms account for a significant share of the slowdown.

在最新研究中，CEA测算出ACA的联邦医疗保险改革贡献了医疗支出增长放缓的很大一部分。


The ACA is an example of how government can promote innovation to address major societal challenges by providing goals, directions, and incentives, rather than dictating solutions.

ACA是一个很好的范例，说明了政府如何能够通过提供目标、方向和激励而不是通过命令式方案促进解决重大社会挑战的创新。


The government plays a role akin to that of a venture capitalist providing seed money and financial support to foster innovation.

政府的作用就像是风险资本家，提供种子资金和金融支持促进创新。


In this scenario, different players – Medicare and Medicaid, state and local governments, private insurers, physicians, and social entrepreneurs – collaborate to hammer out effective solutions that can be scaled with government revenues.

在这一情形中，不同的行为人 — — 联邦医保和联邦医疗补助、州和地方政府、私人保险商、医生和社会企业家 — — 合作打造占政府收入一定比例的有效的解决方案。


For example, responding to the ACA’s incentives and flexibility, Arkansas and Oregon have launched bold experiments to revamp Medicaid, in part by rewarding health-care providers who deliver better outcomes and keep patients healthier.

比如，阿肯色州和俄勒冈州响应ACA的激励和灵活性，启动了大胆的实验性措施改造联邦医疗补助 — — 奖励带来更好结果、让患者更健康的医疗服务提供商就是办法之一。


In Camden, New Jersey, Jeffrey Brenner, a family doctor, has pioneered strategies to reduce hospital stays by “super-utilizers,” a small share of Medicaid patients who are frequently admitted for expensive acute care.

在新泽西州坎登（Camden ） ， 家庭医生杰弗里·布伦纳（Jeffrey Brenner）率先试水通过“超级使用者 ” （ super-utilizers）减少住院的战略。 超级使用者是一小部分联邦医疗补助病患，他们经常使用昂贵的紧急治疗。


Brenner mapped “hot spots” around Camden, and sought to find out why people in some areas ran up such huge bills.

布伦纳绘制了坎登周边的“热点 ” ， 并且试图找出为何某些地区的人医药费会如此巨大。


The problem was not fraud. It was an absence of coordinated medical care, especially basic primary care, and a lack of attention to people’s underlying risk factors.

问题不在于欺诈，而在于缺乏协作医疗特别是基本初级治疗和缺乏对人们基本风险因素的关注。


The most expensive 1% of patients, those with a tangle of issues, accounted for 30% of Camden’s public health-care spending.

最昂贵的1%病患往往一身是病，他们占据了坎登公共医疗支出的30 % 。


Brenner’s Camden Coalition of Healthcare Providers, founded in 2003, received its first funding from a philanthropy, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, and a private insurer, United Health Care.

布伦纳的坎登医疗服务提供商联盟（Camden Coalition of Healthcare Providers）成立于2003年，首笔资金来自慈善机构罗伯特·伍德·约翰逊基金会（Robert Wood Johnson Foundation）和私人保险商联合医疗保险公司（United Health Care ） 。


The remarkable success in Camden has prompted the foundation to fund similar experiments in Boston, Cleveland, Cincinnati, western Michigan, and Humboldt County, California.

坎登的巨大成功促使该基金会又资助了波士顿、克利夫兰、辛辛那提、西密歇根和加州洪堡县（Humboldt County）的类似实验。


Now the government is providing additional support, with grants to similar programs in Maryland, Colorado, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina.

如今政府也开始提供更多的支持，马里兰州、科罗拉多州、宾夕法尼亚州和北卡罗来纳州的类似项目都获得了政府拨款。


Oregon has entered into a pay-for-success bargain with the federal government.

俄勒冈州与联邦政府进行了“成功后支付 ” （ pay-for-success）谈判。


The state will receive $1.9 billion over five years to revamp its Medicaid services along the lines of Camden’s approach.

该州将在五年时间中获得19亿美元按照坎登的方法改造联邦医疗补助服务。


Oregon will get the money only if its per-person Medicaid costs climb substantially more slowly than other states’.

俄勒冈州只有在人均联邦医疗补助成本增速显著低于其他州的情况下才能获得这笔资金。


At the moment, Oregon is on track.

现在，俄勒冈州正在路上。


Arkansas has moved 20 different “episodes” of health-care delivery (including hip and knee replacements, pregnancy, colonoscopies, asthma, and congestive heart failure) from fee-for-service to paying for quality outcomes.

阿肯色州将20个不同的医疗服务提供“项目 ” （ 包括臀部和膝盖替换术、怀孕、结肠镜检查、哮喘和充血性心力衰竭）从按服务计费变为按高质量结果支付。


The results so far are promising – not just by reining in costs, but also by better aligning service delivery with best practices.

到目前为止，效果很好 — — 不但降低了成本，也更好地将服务提供和最佳实践结合起来。


The government can spur innovation by offering incentives that tap many different players’ strengths.

政府可以通过提供集中多个行动方的优势的激励刺激创新。


In health care, that means taking advantage of the purchasing clout of Medicare and Medicaid, the risk-taking of social entrepreneurs and philanthropists, and the dynamism of markets and private business.

在医疗领域，这意味着利用联邦医疗保险和联邦医疗补助的购买力、社会企业家和慈善机构的风险承担力和市场和私人企业的活力。


And health-care reform is just one example in which government can deliver what the public wants by setting goals, encouraging creativity, and providing the resources to scale up what works.

而医疗改革只是政府可以通过设置目标、鼓励创新、提供扩大有用方案的资源带来公众想要的东西的一个例子。


Twenty-five years from now, we hope that historians look back on the ACA as the start of a new era of public-private collaboration to develop innovative solutions to complex social problems – and thus to restore trust in government itself.

我们希望，二十五年后的历史学家回顾ACA时会把它当做一个新时代的开端，在这个时代中，公共和私人部门合作开发复杂社会问题的创新性解决办法 — — 从而也重塑了政府本身的信任。


America’s Hidden Debt

美国的隐藏负债


WASHINGTON, DC – Former US Secretary of the Treasury Lawrence H. Summers recently quipped that, “Fiscal stimulus is like a drug with tolerance effects; to keep growth constant, deficits have to keep getting larger.”

发自华盛顿特区 — — 前美国财政部长劳伦斯·萨默斯（Lawrence H. Summers）最近打趣说 : “ 财政刺激就像一种存在耐受性的药物；为了保持持续增长，就必须得让赤字不断扩大。


People like Summers worry about deficits because they doubt that the money the government is borrowing is being spent in ways that will push the long-term growth of GDP above that of the debt.

”像萨默斯这样的人之所以为赤字忧心，是因为他们怀疑政府借来的钱是否最终被用到了可以推动GDP长期增长超过债务增长的手段上。


Unless the mix of spending changes, the debt-to-GDP ratio will continue to grow, foretelling disaster.

除非支出组合发生变化，否则债务相对GDP的比率将继续增长，直到灾难降临。


Others do not share such concerns.

其他人却对此不以为然。


On the political left, Nobel laureate Paul Krugman, for example, argues that for “a country that looks like the United States, a debt crisis is fundamentally not possible.”

例如在左派诺贝尔经济学奖得主保罗·克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman）就认为对于一个“美国这样的国家来说，债务危机根本不可能发生。


On the right, John Tamny, Forbes’ political economy editor, says, “Ignore the endless talk of doom, budget deficits really don’t matter.”

”而隶属于右派的《福布斯》杂志政治经济编辑约翰·塔姆尼（John Tamny）也觉得应该“把那些没完没了的危言耸听抛诸脑后，预算赤字委实无关紧要。 ”


But while judgments differ about the sustainability of US government debt, they both accept the standard measure of it as accurate.

但尽管各方对美国政府债务可持续性的判断存在分歧，但他们都接受衡量这一指标的标准方法的准确性。


This is a mistake, and possibly a catastrophic one.

这就是一个错误，甚至可能是灾难性的。


The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) recently reported that the federal budget deficit in the first ten months of this fiscal year was $116 billion higher than it was at the same time last year.

美国国会预算办公室最近报告称，本财年前十个月的联邦预算赤字较去年同期高出1160亿美元。


The CBO is now projecting that the annual deficit will reach $1 trillion by 2020.

国会预算办公室目前预计到2020年时年度赤字将达1万亿美元。


This is worrying, but it does not reflect the harsh truth. The annual deficit almost certainly surpassed $1 trillion last year.

这虽然令人担忧，但却并未反映出严酷的事实：去年的年度赤字几乎已经肯定超过了1万亿美元。


To understand why, think of America as a home with a leaky roof.

要理解这一点，可以把美国想象成一个天花漏水的屋子。


If you wanted to sell that home to a buyer who is financing the purchase with a mortgage, federal real-estate law would require you to get an appraisal, which would show that the roof needs repairs.

如果你想将房屋出售给通过抵押贷款来筹措房款的买家，联邦房地产法会要求你先对房屋进行评估，而评估结果肯定会写明屋顶需要维修。


In this scenario, your maintenance delays cannot be ignored.

在这种情况下你无法拖延维护。


The law requires that you disclose and pay for the hidden costs of repairing the roof. Otherwise, you are stealing from the buyer.

法律会要求你披露并支付修复屋顶的隐性费用，否则的话你就是在盗取买家的利益。


True, unlike the mortgage on your balance sheet, you may not regard roof maintenance as a current liability.

的确，与资产负债表上的抵押贷款不同，你可能不会将屋顶维护费用视为当期负债。


But putting it off doesn’t make it disappear.

但是推迟这笔支出并不会让问题消失。


It is still a real debt – just one that has gone unaccounted for.

它仍然是一笔实实在在的债务 — — 只是暂时未计入而已。


The federal government also has debt that has not been accounted for, and which one doesn’t often hear about.

联邦政府也有一些人们往往都不会留意到的未计入债务。


The debt that has been accounted for is the $15.6 trillion held by the public in the form of US Treasury bonds. The debts that have not been accounted for include the deferred costs of maintenance on roads, water systems, and 54,560 structurally deficient bridges, as well as the yet-to-be-built low-carbon energy systems necessary to mitigate the catastrophic effects of climate change.

已计入的债务是公众以美国国债形式持有的15.6万亿美元；而未计入的债务包括维护道路，供水系统和54560个存在结构缺陷桥梁的延期成本，以及减轻气候灾难性影响所必需的、尚未建成的低碳能源系统。


And these are just two broad examples.

但这些只是其中两个影响比较广泛的例子而已。


So, just how much hidden US debt is there?

那么美国究竟有多少隐藏债务呢？


At this point, we must rely on rough estimates.

在这方面我们只依靠粗略的估计。


For example, according to a 2016 report from the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), upgrading the country’s crumbling infrastructure would cost $5.2 trillion.

例如，根据美国土木工程师协会2016年发布的一份报告，升级该国摇摇欲坠的基础设施需要耗资5.2万亿美元。


And, according to a 2014 International Energy Agency (IEA) report and our own calculations based on the US share of global CO2 emissions, transitioning to a clean-energy system will cost an additional $6.6 trillion.

根据国际能源署2014年发表的报告和我们根据美国在全球二氧化碳排放量中所占的份额进行的计算，向清洁能源系统转换将额外花费6.6万亿美元。


All told, that is $11.8 trillion in unaccounted-for non-inflation-adjusted liabilities.

加起来就是11.8万亿包含通胀因素的未入账负债。


To be sure, these debts are not solely federal liabilities.

可以肯定的是，这些债务不仅仅是联邦债务。


In the past, state and local governments were responsible for most infrastructure and climate costs.

过去大多数基础设施和气候成本都由州和地方政府负责。


However, already burdened with more than $3 trillion of municipal debt, state governments are overwhelmed by the scale of their deferred-maintenance liabilities and the only recently documented costs of climate change abatement.

然而已经承受超过3万亿美元市政债务的各州政府被其大规模延后支付设施维护负债以及最近才列入记录的缓解气候变化成本压得喘不过气来。


However, because climate change and infrastructure security are national issues, rather than local, the federal government is ultimately responsible for that $11.8 trillion in infrastructure- and environment-related debts.

但由于气候变化和基础设施安全是国家而不是地方事务，这11.8万亿美元的基础设施和环境相关债务最终还是要由联邦政府负责。


They are America’s national “leaky roof.”

它们就是美国这个国家的“漏水屋顶 ” 。


That figure increases every year, because as bridges continue to weaken, it costs even more to fix them; and as sea levels and temperatures continue to rise, and as forest fires become more severe, it costs more to mitigate the damage.

这个数字会逐年增加，因为随着桥梁结构的不断瓦解，修复它们的成本只会更高；随着海平面和气温的持续升高，森林火灾的加剧，降低灾害损失的成本也会增加。


In fact, between 2012 and 2016, the ASCE increased its estimate of America’s annual infrastructure-investment gap by $221 billion – about $55 billion per year.

事实上，在2012~2016年间，美国土木工程师协会将美国年度基础设施投资缺口预测数提高了2210亿美元 — — 每年增加约550亿美元。


And between 2012 and 2014, the IEA increased its estimated cost of moving to a clean-energy system by roughly $270 billion per year.

而从2012年到2014年，国际能源署将向清洁能源系统转换的估计成本每年调高大约2700亿美元。


Together, the unaccounted-for inflation-adjusted deficit amounted to $345 billion – just from delaying needed infrastructure and climate abatement spending.

加起来排除通胀因素后的赤字总额达3450亿美元 — — 仅仅是因为推迟了所需的基础设施和气候减排支出。


The 2017 US federal deficit was $665 billion, reflecting the amount by which debt that is actually accounted for increased.

2017年美国联邦赤字为6650亿美元，这反映了实际得到核算的债务增加额。


If infrastructure and climate debt that is not accounted for were to be included, the all-in deficit in 2017 would have been over $1 trillion.

但如果将未计入的基础设施和气候债务纳入其中，2017年的全部赤字将超过1万亿美元。


Yes, these are back-of-the-envelope calculations, but they point to an urgent question: Why isn’t the US counting its hidden debts?

这虽然都是些粗略的计算，但它们指出了一个紧迫的问题：为什么美国去不计算其隐藏债务？


The short answer is that the law doesn’t require it.

简略的回答是法律并不要求这样做。


The federal “debt limit” was never a firm construct, and under pressure it became a squishy “ceiling suspension” that allows the government to borrow as much as it wants.

联邦“债务上限”从来都不是一个固定架构，并且在压力之下它已经变成了一种软性的“天花悬挂系统”好让政府可以尽可能多地借钱。


Meanwhile, a congressional rule that was intended to ensure fiscal responsibility by prohibiting deficit increases above $1.5 trillion within a ten-year window has become an accounting trick to escape responsibility for the 11th year and beyond.

与此同时，一项原本旨在通过禁止赤字在十年内增加超过1.5万亿美元以确保政府能负起财政责任的国会裁定已沦为逃避第11年及随后年份责任的会计技巧。


But just as we are stealing from the homebuyer if we do not disclose and pay for our leaky roof, we are stealing from future generations of Americans when we ignore the full extent of government liabilities.

但正如隐瞒和拖延维修漏水屋顶形同于从购房者处偷钱那样，当我们忽视政府在全部范畴内的负债时，实际上就是打劫未来的美国人。


Until all debt is counted, we cannot even begin to know whether fiscal policies are having positive or negative effects on future growth.

除非所有债务都被记录在案，否则我们甚至无法了解财政政策究竟会对未来增长产生正面还是负面影响。


America’s Second Chance with India

美国和印度的第二次机会


NEW YORK – Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Washington, DC, in June garnered little public attention outside of India.

纽约—印度总理莫迪6月份的访美之旅在印度之外基本没有引起什么关注。


Yet diplomats and military professionals in Asia and beyond were certainly watching closely.

但亚洲外交官和军事专业人士显然在密切关注。


For good reason: the rapprochement between the world’s two most populous democracies could shape the world’s future.

其来有自：世界上人口最多的两个民主国家之间的关系缓和可以决定世界的未来。


It is worth noting that in his address to the US Congress, Modi invoked the word “partner” or “partnership” no fewer than 15 times.

值得注意的是，在美国国会演讲中，莫迪至少15次提到了“伙伴”一词。


The official joint statement released by the two governments described India as a “Major Defense Partner” of the United States, eligible for advanced technologies with military applications.

两国政府发布的正式联合申明将印度描述为美国的“主要防务伙伴 ” ， 有资格获得军用先进技术。


The relationship between India and the US has evolved from one of cool distance to strategic proximity in a generation – lightning fast for geopolitics.

在一代人的时间里，印美关系从冷眼保持距离演变为战略性靠近 — — 就地缘政治而言，发展不可不谓快。


The factors underlying this shift merit attention, for many of them are likely to bring the two countries even closer.

这一转变背后的推动因素值得关注，因为其中许多因素有望让两国更加紧密。


The Cold War’s end was a significant part of the bilateral rapprochement, because it eliminated the possibility of India’s continued association with the Soviet Union, as well as its rationale for embracing non-alignment.

冷战的结束是印美关系缓和的一个重要部分，因为印度不再需要与苏联打交道，不结盟的理由也不再成立。


A second factor is Pakistan.

第二个因素是巴基斯坦。


For a long time, the US pursued an even-handed policy toward South Asia’s two most strategically important countries.

长期以来，美国对这两个在战略上最重要的南亚国家采取的是一碗水端平的政策。


Nonetheless, during most of the Cold War, Pakistan was seen as a friendly country, whereas its great rival, India, was viewed as difficult.

尽管如此，在冷战的大部分时间里，巴基斯坦被视为友邦，而它的劲敌印度被视为一个难点。


This view was reinforced when Pakistan became the essential conduit of weapons to Afghans fighting the Soviet occupation of their country.

巴基斯坦成为向阿富汗输送武器助其抵抗苏联侵略的重要通道后，这一观点进一步得到了强化。


But the bond between the US and Pakistan weakened when Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989.

但1989年苏军撤出阿富汗后，美巴关系有所削弱。


Relations suffered further from Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons, its provision of sanctuary and support to the Taliban, and its willingness to extend hospitality to some of the world’s most dangerous terrorists, including Osama bin Laden.

巴基斯坦发展核武器、为塔利班提供庇护和支持并且愿意给包括本·拉登在内的全球最危险恐怖分子提供藏身之所，这进一步影响了美巴关系。


As a result, US ties to India were no longer constrained by fear of complications in Pakistan.

结果，美国建设对印关系不再受到顾虑巴基斯坦不满的约束。


China is also animating the improvement in India-US ties.

中国也在推动印美关系的改善。


The motivation is far more fundamental than the fact that India and China still have an unresolved border.

其背后的动机远比中印边境问题仍有待解决这一事实更具根本性。


China’s rise has created a strong incentive for countries with a stake in Asia to increase their cooperation with the US, as well as with one another, to ensure that they can stand up to China’s political, military, and economic might.

中国的崛起强烈地刺激了在亚洲有利益所在的国家加强与美国以及彼此之间的合作，以确保能够抵御中国的政治。 军事和经济力量。


Domestic politics also loom large in the relationship’s development – on both sides.

国内政治也严重影响着印美关系的发展 — — 对两国都是如此。


The decline of India’s Congress party reduced the influence of the political force most associated with maintaining distance from the US.

印度国大党的衰落降低了最支持与美国保持距离的政治力量的影响力。


Meanwhile, there are now more than three million Indian-Americans, and, as with many other immigrant populations, they have become ever more prominent and powerful.

与此同时，如今美国有三百万印度裔公民，与许多其他移民群体一样，他们变得更加重要和强大。


Supporting closer ties with India has become a rare example of bipartisan US foreign policy, and it can be expected to continue regardless of which party controls the White House or Congress after this November’s elections.

支持加强对印关系已成为美国罕见的跨党派外交政策之���，并且可以期待这一状况将继续保持，不管今年11月哪个党入主白宫。


The breakthrough in bilateral ties came a decade ago, when the US lifted sanctions introduced in response to India’s nuclear weapons program and then signed an accord paving the way for US involvement in India’s civil nuclear energy program.

双边关系的突破始于十年前，当时，美国取消了因印度核武器计划而实施的制裁，随后签署了一份协议，为美国参与印度民用核能计划扫清了道路。


India, unlike both Pakistan and North Korea, is seen as a responsible nuclear power, a country the US now supports for membership in various groups designed to stem the further spread of nuclear materials and weapons.

和巴基斯坦和朝鲜不同，印度被视为负责任的核力量，目前美国支持印度加入各种为防止核材料和武器进一步扩散而设立的组织。


Economic ties are also growing, along with India’s economy.

随着印度经济的增长，印美经济关系也在加强。


Bilateral trade has increased to more than $100 billion a year.

双边贸易已增加到每年1,000亿美元以上。


High-level visits have become commonplace.

高层访问已经稀松平常。


Closer economic ties and large-scale collaboration on clean energy are a high priority.

更紧密的经济关系和清洁能源领域的大规模合作是重中之重。


One can also predict increased cooperation between the two countries’ military and intelligence establishments.

可以预期，两国军事和情报机构之间的合作也将增加。


Indeed, joint efforts to keep the Indian Ocean open and safe are already a reality.

事实上，保持印度洋开放和安全的联合行动已是既成事实。


The US and India need not be formal allies for their relationship to have the desired effect on Chinese strategic calculations.

美国和印度正式结盟就可以对中国的战略意图形成想要的影响。


Challenges remain, of course.

当然，挑战仍然存在。


Bureaucracy, corruption, and poor infrastructure continue to hold back India’s economy.

官僚主义、腐败和拙劣的基础设施仍然制约着印度经济。


Indian leaders must also be careful not to do or say things that could alienate the country’s large Muslim minority.

印度领导任还必须保持谨慎，不可做出或说出可能梳理该国为数巨大的穆斯林少数群体的内容。


And they must still ensure that close ties with the US are not simply the policy of one prime minister or party.

他们还必须确保与美国的紧密关系不仅仅是一届总理或一党的政策。


This means getting the Congress party fully on board and overcoming the resistance of career officials to new ways of thinking and acting.

这意味着要让国大党充分参与进来，并克服事务官对新思维和行为的抵触。


It is difficult to overlook the irony in much of this.

不难看出，其中不乏讽刺之处。


More than a half-century ago, in the early years of the Cold War, many in Washington saw India as a potential model of non-Communist political and economic development.

五十多年前，在冷战初期，华盛顿有许多人将印度视为非共产主义政治和经济发展的前在榜样。


For many reasons, things did not work out that way, as India became economically statist, for a time politically authoritarian, and geopolitically closer to the USSR than US officials liked.

出于众多原因，事情并未朝这个方向发展，印度在经济上演变为国家主义，政治上一度成为极权主义，地缘政治上比美国官员所期待的更加接近于苏联。


Now, however, India is emerging as a successful example of a market-oriented democracy with close ties to the US.

但是，如今，印度正在崛起成为与美国关系密切的市场经济民主的成功范例。


Second chances are rare in life, but both India and the US may be getting just that.

生活中很少能获得第二次机会，而印度和美国可能恰恰获得了这一机会。


America Keeping Haiti Down

美国在海地的伏都教人权政策


The IDB, the world's largest regional development bank, works in Latin America and the Caribbean purportedly to “contribute to the acceleration of economic and social development.”

作为世界上最大的区域开发银行，泛美开发银行在拉丁美洲和加勒比海地区的工作据称是“为加快经济和社会发展作贡献 ” 。


Its actions in Haiti, however, have severely undermined those goals.

但是，它在海地的行为已经严重损害了这些宗旨。


Roughly $54 million in IDB loans for water infrastructure in Haiti, home to literally the world’s worst water, offered a proven path to preventing deadly water-borne diseases. Designed to assist in fulfilling the right to water in the most impoverished nation in the Western Hemisphere, these loans and the lives they could have saved instead have become pawns in a deliberate political power play.

泛美开发银行为了改善海地的饮用水基础设施 — — 毫不夸张地说，海地的饮用水状况是世界上最糟糕的 — — 提供的大约5400万美元贷款，为防止致命的水致疾病提供了可行的途径。 这些贷款原计划用于帮助世界西半球上最贫穷的国家实现其饮用水权利，它们及其可以挽救的生命不应该在一个深思熟虑的政治权力游戏中成为牺牲品。


In 2001, US officials threatened to use their influence to stop previously approved IDB funding unless Haiti’s majority political party submitted to political demands to accept a particular apportionment of seats in a Haitian electoral oversight body.

2001年，美国官员威胁道，除非海地的主要政党接受一家海地选举观察机构中席位分摊的特别的政治要求，否则他们就会使用他们的影响力来阻止事先已经获得批准的泛美开发银行对海地的资助。


Soon after, at the behest of the US, instead of disbursing the loans as planned, the IDB and its members took the unprecedented step of implicitly adding conditions to require political action by Haiti before the funds would be released.

不久之后，在美国的要求之下，泛美开发银行及其成员没有按原计划发放贷款，而是采取了从没采取过的措施，在发放这些资金之前暗示增加海地采取政治行动的条件。


These actions violated the IDB’s own charter, which strictly prohibits the Bank and its members from interfering in the internal political affairs of member states.

这些行为违反了泛美开发银行自己的章程，该章程严格禁止银行及其成员干涉成员国的内部政治事务。


Internal emails reveal that a US legal counselor inside the IDB proposed to the US Treasury Department that, though the loans faced no legitimate technical obstacles, the US could effectively block them by “slowing” the process.

一些内部电子邮件显示，一位泛美开发银行内的美国律师向美国财政部提出如下建议：虽然这些贷款不存在合法性技术障碍，但是美国可以通过“延缓”贷款进程来有效地阻止贷款的发放。


Indeed, by requesting further review of the loans, Haiti would have to make scheduled payments before the funds were even disbursed.

确实，通过要求对贷款进行进一步的审查，海地将不得不在贷款发放之前就进行定期还款。


“While this is not a ‘bullet-proof’ way to stop IDB disbursements,” the counsellor wrote, “it certainly will put a few more large rocks in the road.”

“虽然这不是阻止泛美开发银行贷款发放的‘完美无缺’的方法 ” ， 该律师写道 ， “ 但是，它肯定会给贷款的发放设置更多的障碍 ” 。


In 2001, then-US Ambassador to Haiti Dean Curran publicly and explicitly linked the withholding of IDB loans to the demand that Haiti’s political parties reach a compromise that America wanted.

在2001年，时任美国驻海地大使的迪安·科兰（Dean Curran）曾公开明确地将泛美开发银行贷款的扣留和海地的政党达成美国希望的妥协的要求联系起来。


These tactics worked.

这些策略奏效了。


Deprived of funds that had already been committed and expected, Haiti fell into arrears on money owed for loan repayment, triggering IDB policies that prevented the Bank from releasing loans.

由于被剥夺了已经被承诺和期待的资金，海地没有支付偿还借款的资金，而这会使泛美开发银行启动阻止银行贷款发放的银行政策。


In subsequent years, the US employed additional delaying tactics, working with the IDB to move the goal posts whenever Haiti appeared to be meeting their demands.

在后来的几年里，美国又使用了其他的延迟策略，这些策略就是在海地似乎快要满足其要求的时候，和泛美开发银行一起改变目标标杆。


The results have been devastating.

这些策略的后果是毁灭性的。


The town of Port-de-Paix, slotted ten years ago by the IDB as the first project site due to its particularly deplorable water situation, has yet to see the implementation of any water projects.

和平港市因为其悲惨的饮用水状况，在十年前就被泛美开发银行跟踪作为第一个项目实施地点，但是，到目前为止还没有看到任何饮用水项目的实施。


A study conducted by Zanmi Lasante, Partners In Health, the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights, and New York University’s Center for Human Rights and Global Justice found no functioning public water sources in the city.

由健康伙伴（Zanmi Lasante ） 、 罗伯特·弗·肯尼迪人权纪念中心以及纽约大学人权和全球正义中心进行的研究发现，在和平港市没有可供饮用的公共水源。


Researchers found three-quarters of water sources in the city contained high levels of coliform bacteria, a key indicator of contamination with fecal matter.

研究人员发现，该市3/4的水源都含有很高水平的大肠杆细菌，这是水源被排泄物污染的一个重要指标。


A frightening 15% of households reported symptoms likely related to typhoid.

而且，还有令人震惊的高达15%的家庭报告了可能和伤寒症有关的症状。


If the US and other member states join the IDB and take on the responsibility to improve conditions in the Americas, they cannot then use their membership to undermine the basic rights of the people they claim to serve simply to advance their own political agenda.

如果美国和其他成员国加入泛美开发银行，承担起改善美洲各国状况的责任，那么，他们就不能仅仅为了推进自己的政治议程，而利用其成员资格去破坏他们声称要去服务的人们的基本权利，


The IDB and the US government must take responsibility for their actions and implement the necessary transparency mechanisms to ensure that such abuses do not recur.  Congressional inquiries and annual reviews of the Treasury Department by the Government Accountability Office could provide the oversight necessary to prevent future political misuse of the IDB and its funds.

泛美开发银行和美国政府必须为他们的行为承担责任，并实施必要的透明度机制来保证这样的权利滥用不再发生。 美国国会质询和政府责任办公室对财政部的年度审查可以为防止以后对泛美开发银行及其资金的政治滥用提供必要的监督。


The people of Haiti, as well as US taxpayers, deserve a system that makes public the status of IDB loans and projects in Haiti in order to ensure that the US and IDB member states uphold their commitments to development and human rights.

为了保证美国和泛美开发银行成员国实践他们对发展和人权的承诺，海地人民和美国的纳税人应该拥有一个将泛美开发银行贷款以及在海地的项目的状况向公众公开的制度。


The Myth of Sound Fundamentals

基本面可靠的神话


NEW HAVEN – The spin is all too predictable.

纽黑文—起伏太容易预测了。


With the US stock market clawing its way back from the sharp correction of early February, the mindless mantra of the great bull market has returned.

随着美国股市从2月初的大幅调整中逐步恢复，无脑大牛市的诅咒也开始回归。


The recent correction is now being characterized as a fleeting aberration – a volatility shock – in what is still deemed to be a very accommodating investment climate.

如今，最近的回调被定义为短暂的偏离 — — 一次波动性冲击 — — 投资环境仍然十分适宜。


After all, the argument goes, economic fundamentals – not just in the United States, but worldwide – haven’t been this good in a long, long time.

毕竟，这一观点说，经济基本面 — — 不仅仅是美国，也包括全世界 — — 很久没有那么好了。


But are the fundamentals really that sound?

但基本面真的如此可靠吗？


For a US economy that has a razor-thin cushion of saving, nothing could be further from the truth.

对储蓄缓冲薄得可怜的美国经济来说，没有比这离得更远的真相了。


America’s net national saving rate – the sum of saving by businesses, households, and the government sector – stood at just 2.1% of national income in the third quarter of 2017. That is only one-third the 6.3% average that prevailed in the final three decades of the twentieth century.

2017年三季度，美国的净国民储蓄率 — — 企业、家庭和政府部门储蓄之和 — — 只有国民收入的2.1 % ， 仅仅相当于二十世纪结束前三十年平均水平6.3%的三分之一。


It is important to think about saving in “net” terms, which excludes the depreciation of obsolete or worn-out capacity in order to assess how much the economy is putting aside to fund the expansion of productive capacity.

看到储蓄要以“净值”思维，这一点很重要。 这意味着要在评估经济留出多少资金用于产能扩张时，要将已经报废或废弃的产能的折旧剔除。


Net saving represents today’s investment in the future, and the bottom line for America is that it is saving next to nothing.

净储蓄代表了今天对未来的投资，而美国的计算结果是储蓄接近于零。


Alas, the story doesn’t end there.

可惜，故事到这里还没有结束。


To finance consumption and growth, the US borrows surplus saving from abroad to compensate for the domestic shortfall.

为了给消费和增长融资，美国向海外借入盈余储蓄来补足国内短缺。


All that borrowing implies a large balance-of-payments deficit with the rest of the world, which spawns an equally large trade deficit.

所有这些借款带来了巨大的国际收支赤字，进而产生同样巨大的贸易赤字。


While President Donald Trump’s administration is hardly responsible for this sad state of affairs, its policies are about to make a tough situation far worse.

特朗普总统的政府不需要为这个悲哀的状态负责，但其采取的政策会大大加剧困境。


Under the guise of tax reform, late last year Trump signed legislation that will increase the federal budget deficit by $1.5 trillion over the next decade.

去年，特朗普打着税收改革的旗号签署了将让美国联邦预算赤字在未来十年增加1.5亿美元的立法。


And now the US Congress, in its infinite wisdom, has upped the ante by another $300 billion in the latest deal to avert a government shutdown.

而如今，美国国用它的大智慧，在为了避免政府关门的人达成的最新协议中，将这个数字再度提高了3,000亿美元。


Never mind that deficit spending makes no sense when the economy is nearing full employment: this sharp widening of the federal deficit is enough, by itself, to push the already-low net national saving rate toward zero. And it’s not just the government’s red ink that is so troublesome.

别在意在经济接近充分就业的时候，赤字支出根本毫无意义：如此巨大的联邦预算增幅本身已足以让已然很低的净国民储蓄率向零靠拢。


The personal saving rate fell to 2.4% of disposable (after-tax) income in December 2017, the lowest in 12 years and only about a quarter of the 9.3% average that prevailed over the final three decades of the twentieth century.

2017年12月，个人储蓄率下降至可支配（税后）收入的2.4 % ， 为12年来的最低值，只有二十世纪最后三十年平均水平9.3%的四分之一左右。


As domestic saving plunges, the US has two options – a reduction in investment and the economic growth it supports, or increased borrowing of surplus saving from abroad.

随着国内储蓄的暴跌，美国有两个选择 — — 降低投资及其所支撑的经济增长，或增加从海外借入的盈余储蓄。


Over the past 35 years, America has consistently opted for the latter, running balance-of-payments deficits every year since 1982 (with a minor exception in 1991, reflecting foreign contributions for US military expenses in the Gulf War).

在过去35年中，美国一直选择了后者，1982年以来几乎每年都出现国际收支赤字（只有1991年是微不足道的例外，原因是海湾战争期间外国帮助美国贡献了不少军事支出 ） 。


With these deficits, of course, come equally chronic trade deficits with a broad cross-section of America’s foreign partners.

当然，与这些赤字一同到来的是同样根深蒂固的对美国各大贸易伙伴的贸易赤字。


Astonishingly, in 2017, the US ran trade deficits with 102 countries.

2017年，美国对令人咋舌的102个国家存在贸易赤字。


The multilateral foreign-trade deficits of a saving-short US economy set the stage for perhaps the most egregious policy blunder being committed by the Trump administration: a shift toward protectionism.

储蓄短缺的美国经济的多边对外贸易赤字为也许是特朗普政府所犯下的最严重的政策错误 — — 转向保护主义创造了条件。


Further compression of an already-weak domestic saving position spells growing current-account and trade deficits – a fundamental axiom of macroeconomics that the US never seems to appreciate.

进一步压缩已然孱弱不堪的国内储蓄头寸意味着经常项目和贸易赤字继续增加 — — 这可不是美国一贯欣赏的宏观经济学的基本准则。


Attempting to solve a multilateral imbalance with bilateral tariffs directed mainly at China, such as those just imposed on solar panels and washing machines in January, doesn’t add up.

1月份，特朗普政府对中国产太阳能面板和洗衣机征收关税，用诸如此类主要针对中国的双边措施来解决多边失衡问题无济于事。


And, given the growing likelihood of additional trade barriers – as suggested by the US Commerce Department’s recent recommendations of high tariffs on aluminum and steel – the combination of protectionism and ever-widening trade imbalances becomes all the more problematic for a US economy set to become even more dependent on foreign capital.

此外，由于出现新贸易壁垒的可能性不断提高 — — 比如美国商务部最近建议对铝和钢铁征收高额关税 — — 保护主义和不断扩大的贸易失衡的组合对于越来越依赖外国资本的美国经济来说将更成问题。


Far from sound, the fundamentals of a saving-short US economy look shakier than ever.

储蓄短缺的美国经济的基本面绝对算不上可靠，倒是比以往任何时候都要岌岌可危。


Lacking a cushion of solid support from income generation, the lack of saving also leaves the US far more beholden to fickle asset markets than might otherwise be the case.

由于缺少来自收入创造的可靠支撑缓冲，储蓄不足还让美国更加容易受到变幻无常的资产价格的影响。


That’s especially true of American consumers who have relied on appreciation of equity holdings and home values to support over-extended lifestyles.

对于依靠股票和房价上涨支持与收入不匹配的生活方式的美国消费者来说尤其如此。


It is also the case for the US Federal Reserve, which has turned to unconventional monetary policies to support the real economy via so-called wealth effects.

对美联储来说也是如此，它依靠非常规货币政策，通过所谓的财富效应来支持实体经济。


And, of course, foreign investors are acutely sensitive to relative returns on assets – the US versus other markets – as well as the translation of those returns into their home currencies.

当然，外国投资者对相对资产回报 — — 美国相对其他市场 — — 以及将这些回报换回本币的汇率非常敏感。


Driven by the momentum of trends in employment, industrial production, consumer sentiment, and corporate earnings, the case for sound fundamentals plays like a broken record during periods of financial market volatility.

受就业、工业产出、消费者情绪和公司收益的趋势动能的推动，基本面可靠的观点就像是在金融市场波动时期被打破的记录。


But momentum and fundamentals are two very different things.

但动能和基本面是截然不同的两件事。


Momentum can be fleeting, especially for a saving-short US economy that is consuming the seed corn of future prosperity.

动能随时会消失得无影无踪，对储蓄短缺、寅吃卯粮的美国经济来说尤其如此。


With dysfunctional policies pointing to a further compression of saving in the years ahead, the myth of sound US fundamentals has never rung more hollow.

适得其反的政策准备在未来几年进一步压缩储蓄，照此看，美国基本面可靠的神话简直像是一个恐怖故事。


America’s Midterm Elections Turn Menacing

美国的中期选举变得异常凶险


WASHINGTON, DC – With the approach of this year’s midterm elections in the United States, domestic terrorism is starting to dominate the political landscape.

华盛顿 — — 随着年内美国中期选举的临近，国内恐怖主义开始主导政治格局。


First, barely two weeks before Election Day, an angry supporter of US President Donald Trump began sending 14 bombs to prominent Democrats and others whom Trump has frequently attacked.

首先，就在选举日前不到两周，美国总统唐纳德·特朗普一位愤怒的支持者开始向著名的民主党人和其他特朗普经常攻击的人士邮寄14枚炸弹。


(None of the bombs exploded.)

（这些炸弹都没有爆炸。


Then things became much worse, with the murder, on a Saturday, of 11 Jews in a Pittsburgh synagogue.

）而后局面更是进一步恶化，星期六，在匹兹堡的一座犹太教堂里，11名犹太人被谋杀。


Today, a polarized and anxious American public finds itself with a president totally unsuited to, and not very interested in, comforting the nation, much less trying to lead it away from the hate and deadly partisanship that he has stoked.

今天，严重焦虑和两极分化的美国民众发现自己的总统对抚慰民众不感兴趣，而且也完全不适合安慰这个国家，就更不用说试图领导美国摆脱他所挑起的仇恨和致命的党派关系了。


Had the 14 crude bombs, which the FBI called “potentially destructive devices,” worked as intended, the bombmaker could have killed or gravely injured a who’s who of Trump adversaries.

如果被联邦调查局称之为“潜在破坏性装置”的这14枚自制炸弹发挥了预期的效果，那么炸弹制造者可能已经杀害或重伤了作为特朗普对手的名人。


The list included two former presidents (Bill Clinton and Barack Obama), Hillary Clinton, former Attorney General Eric Holder; a former CIA director; a former director of National Intelligence; two likely Democratic presidential candidates in 2020; a black congresswoman whom Trump frequently describes as “low IQ” (a common racist charge); two prominent Jewish billionaire philanthropists, one of whom, George Soros, is a frequent target of Trump and the subject of various right-wing conspiracy fantasies; and the actor Robert De Niro (who began his speech at this year’s Tony Awards ceremony by declaring, “Fuck Trump”).

这份名单包括两位前总统（比尔·克林顿和巴拉克·奥巴马 ） 、 希拉里·克林顿、前首席检察官埃里克·霍尔德；前中情局长；前国家情报局局长；以及两名可能在2020年参选的民主党总统候选人；一位经常被特朗普形容为“低智商”的黑人女议员（这是一种非常普遍的种族主义指控 ） ； 两位著名的犹太亿万富翁慈善家，其中一位乔治·索罗斯一直是特朗普的常规目标，同时也是各种右翼阴谋幻想所针对的对象；此外还有演员罗伯特·德尼罗（他在今年托尼奖的颁奖典礼演说中一开始就宣布 ， “ 去他的特朗普 ” ） 。


Though Trump had frequently singled out many of the bomber’s targets at his rallies – still attacking Hillary Clinton, his election opponent in 2016, for example, and then smiling as his audience chanted “Lock her up” – Trump’s defenders tried to throw the spotlight elsewhere.

尽管特朗普经常在集会上特别提到炸弹制造者的许多目标 — — 例如，他仍在攻击作为自己2016年大选对手的希拉里·克林顿，而后面带微笑地对听众高喊“锁住她 ” — —特朗普的捍卫者仍试图让舆论聚焦到别的地方。


The mail bombs, they claimed, were a “false flag” operation by the left, with some of the Democrats even sending the bombs to themselves in order to blame Trump.

他们声称邮件炸弹是左翼“打着特朗普旗号的假冒行动 ” ， 有些民主党人甚至给自己寄炸弹，并借此指责特朗普。


So it was highly inconvenient for true believers when the would-be bomber turned out to be a fanatical Trump supporter who lives in Florida and drives a white van covered in hate-filled depictions of his targets.

因此当事实证明炸弹嫌疑人是居住在佛罗里达州的一位狂热的特朗普支持者，并开着一辆绘满了对其目标充满仇恨的画像的白色厢式货车时，对特朗普的铁杆支持者而言是非常尴尬的。


US law enforcement agencies – another frequent target of Trump – are extremely good at tracking down miscreants: the suspect was arrested four days after the first bomb was discovered in Soros’s mailbox.

美国执法机构 — — 也是特朗普经常攻击的另外一个目标 — — 非常善于追查歹徒：嫌疑人在索罗斯邮箱发现第一枚炸弹四天后被捕。


The most disheartening aspect of the entire episode was Trump’s utter incapacity as a national leader.

整个事件从始至终最令人沮丧的就是，特朗普身为国家领袖却完全束手无策。


But that should surprise no one.

但这应当早在所有人的预料之中。


How could a president who has thrived politically on dividing the American people, who has been spewing hate, sowing resentment, and at times even encouraging violence at his rallies, suddenly be – or even pretend to be – a healer?

怎么能指望一个借助分裂美国民众而谋取大量政治利益、坚持播种仇恨、怨怼，有时甚至在集会上鼓励暴力行为的美国总统突然之间扮演 — — 甚至假装扮演 — — 治愈者的角色？


In fact, Trump’s pattern of incitement and routine denunciations of the media as “the enemy of the people” had convinced many that some of his followers might resort to violence against members of the press.

事实上，特朗普的煽动及不停谴责媒体是“人民公敌”的模式已经令很多人深信其追随者有可能针对新闻媒体从业人员发起暴力行动。


The day after the discovery of the bombs sent to the Clintons and the Obamas, among others, a subdued Trump read a prepared statement at a prescheduled White House ceremony, condemning “acts or threats of political violence” and saying that the nation must unify.

此次事件中，在发现寄给克林顿和奥巴马炸弹的第二天，一个被暂时被压制的特朗普在一次预定举行的白宫仪式上宣读了一份准备好的声明，谴责“政治暴力的威胁和行为 ” ， 并表示民众必须统一起来。


It didn’t last.

但这种情况并没有持续多久。


By that evening, at a rally in Wisconsin, he was making fun of his “trying to be nice” act and blamed the media for the violence.

到那天傍晚，在威斯康辛州举行的一次集会上，特朗普就开始取笑自己“试图变得和善”的行为，并称媒体应对此次暴力行为负责。


And soon he was back to whipping up fear of a caravan of refugees from Honduras.

很快他又重新开始煽动对洪都拉斯难民车队的恐惧。


Though still roughly 1,000 miles from the US border, Trump portrayed the refugees as an imminent national security threat, warning, without evidence, that “Middle Easterners” were among them.

尽管距美国边境仍有1，000英里，但特朗普仍将那些难民描绘成迫在眉睫的国家安全威胁，并在毫无证据的情况下警告，难民队伍中混入了“中东人 ” 。


Trump’s rallies are now almost a daily event, and his lies are even more frequent than before.

特朗普的集会现在几乎天天上演，而他的谎言也比以前频繁得多。


With the entire House of Representatives and one-third of the Senate to be chosen on November 6, the upcoming midterm election is widely regarded as the most consequential in memory, perhaps ever.

因为11月6日将选举整个众议院和参议院1/3的席位，即将到来的中期选举被普遍视为人们记忆当中最重要的选举，其重要性甚至也许是史无前例的。


The Republicans’ two-year lock on the entire US government – the House, the Senate, the presidency, and, with the recent addition of Justice Brett Kavanaugh, the Supreme Court – could be broken.

共和党对整个美国政府长达两年的完全控制 — — 包括众议院、参议院、总统职位，以及不久前刚刚就任最高法院法官的布雷特·卡瓦诺 — — 这次有可能会被打破。


The midterm election following the election of a new president is often considered a verdict on the incumbent, and his party usually loses strength, particularly in the House.

紧随新总统当选后的中期选举往往会被视为对现任总统的宣判，而其所属政党往往会失势，尤其是在众议院。


But Trump has made the midterms about himself to an unprecedented degree.

但特朗普已经把中期选举和自己的关系抬高的前所未有的程度。


He tells audiences that though he’s not on the ballot, they should vote as if he were (though his approval ratings are in the low forties).

他告诉听众尽管他并未参加投票，他们在投票时应当假设他是其中的一员（尽管他的支持率现在已经降到40 % ） 。


It has long been believed that the Democrats are more likely to win the House than the Senate, because several of the Senate seats in play are held by Democrats in traditionally conservative states.

很长时间以来，人们一直认为与参议院相比，民主党更有可能赢得众议院，因为即将参与选举的几个参议院席位都掌握在传统保守州的民主党人手中。


Trump’s determination, or anxiety, that Republicans maintain control of both chambers is understandable.

特朗普对共和党人继续控制两院的决心和焦虑可以理解。


Should the Democrats take over the House, newly empowered committee chairmen, armed with subpoenas, will launch investigations of a broad range of administration actions and agencies, where extensive corruption is suspected.

如果民主党人接管众议院，那么新授权的委员会主席将会拿到传票，并将广泛调查涉嫌贪污行为的一系列行政行为和机构。


But the real, almost palpable, fear on Trump’s part is that a Democratic-controlled House will focus all manner of investigations on him personally: his acceptance of Constitutionally forbidden “emoluments” from foreign countries; his failure to separate himself sufficiently from the family business; his tax returns; his unauthorized foreign wars in Yemen and Syria; and of course his official and private dealings with Russia.

但特朗普几乎清晰可辨的真正的恐惧是民主党控制的众议院将把所有调查集中在他本人身上：他接受宪法明文规定禁止的外国“酬金 ” ； 他未能与家族企业充分脱钩；他的纳税申报返还；他未经授权擅自在也门和叙利亚发动战争；当然还有他与俄罗斯之间的公开和私下交易。


At least the House is likely to have the conclusions of Special Counsel Robert Mueller to consider.

至少众议院可能会得出与特别顾问罗伯特·穆勒相同的结论。


In other words, no more lapdog Congress.

换句话说，国会将不再是特朗普豢养的宠物。


But if the Republicans maintain control of the Senate, there will be limits on what the Democrats can achieve.

但如果共和党保持对参议院的控制，就会限制民主党所能达到的目标。


Even if the House were to impeach Trump – no sure thing – convicting him in the Senate would be extremely difficult.

即使众议院真的弹劾特朗普 — — 能不能弹劾现在还根本无法确定 — — 要想在参议院将他定罪也将是极其困难的。


Whether a Democratic House would even proceed in that direction has been the subject of intra-party debate.

甚至民主党控制的众议院是否会朝那个方向努力一直都还是党内争论的目标。


The nightmare election possibility for the Democrats is continued Republican control of both chambers.

对民主党而言，噩梦般的选举前景是两院继续由共和党控制。


In that case, Trump will feel vindicated and more liberated than ever.

在那样的情况下，特朗普相比任何时候都将更强烈地感受到无辜和自由。


He might then fire a raft of officials, treat immigrants still more harshly, and try to shut down Mueller’s investigation of his campaign’s possible collusion with the Kremlin and Trump’s probable obstruction of justice.

然后他可能会解雇大批官员，更严厉的对待移民，并试图停止穆勒对其选举团队与克里姆林宫可能的串通以及特朗普可能的阻挠司法行为的调查行动。


The conventional wisdom may prevail, with the Democrats winning the House but not the Senate.

传统智慧可能会占据上风，民主党可能会在众议院而非参议院选举中获胜。


But the polls have been fluctuating.

但民意调查显示的结果一直在波动。


And since Trump’s stunning election victory in 2016, most observers have become more cautious about predicting outcomes.

自从特朗普2016年令人瞩目地获胜以来，多数观察家都对预测选举结果变得更加谨慎。


Alliances for Peace

为了和平的联盟


WASHINGTON, DC – I grew up in the shadow of World War II, and at the dawn of the Cold War.

华盛顿—我成长于二战的阴影和冷战的黎明中。


My father’s work as a Foreign Service officer gave me an opportunity to see history up close in a searing way: I will never forget walking the beaches of Normandy with him and seeing the burned hulks of Higgins’ boats still on those shores, just a few years after so many young men went to their graves so the world could be free.

我的父亲是一位驻外事务处（Foreign Service）官员，这使我有机会以一双火眼金睛近距离观察历史：我永远不会忘记和他一起漫步在诺曼底海滩，看见烧毁的希金斯艇（Higgins’ boats）的庞大身躯仍矗立在岸上，就在几年前，大批年轻人为了世界的自由慷慨赴死。


Likewise, I will never forget the eerie feeling of riding my bike through the Brandenburg Gate from West Berlin into the East, and seeing the contrast between people who were free and those who were trapped behind the Iron Curtain.

类似地，我也永远不会忘记骑着自行车从西柏林通过布兰登堡门前往东柏林时的怪异感觉，目睹自由的人和被困在铁幕之后的人的反差。


What strikes me now, all these years later, is that a generation of leaders won not only a war, but also the peace.

多年以后，如今让我震惊的是一代领导人不但赢得了战争，还赢得了和平。


They did it together.

他们齐心协力做到了这一点。


The United States and our partners worked to create alliances that brought prosperity and stability to Western Europe, Japan, and South Korea.

美国和我们的伙伴努力建立了给西欧、日本和韩国带来繁荣与稳定的联盟。


Old enemies became new allies, and together pioneered a new global economic system that made the world more prosperous.

旧敌人成了新盟友，并一起引领了让全世界更繁荣的新全球经济制度。


And even as the Cold War raged, leaders found ways to cooperate on arms control and prevent a nuclear Armageddon.

哪怕是在冷战肆虐时，领导人们也找得到办法在武器控制和阻止核末日等方面进行合作。


In short, by building effective and indispensable international institutions and strategic partnerships, we did not just avoid another catastrophic world war; we ultimately ended the Cold War and lifted global living standards for hundreds of millions of people.

简言之，通过构建有效的、不可或缺的国际机构和战略合作关系，我们不但避免了又一场灾难性世界大战，我们最终还结束了冷战，提高了全球数亿人的生活水平。


That is the remarkable story of the twentieth century.

这是20世纪令人瞩目的故事。


The question now is what story will emerge from the twenty-first century.

现在的问题是21世纪的故事会怎样展开。


Today, the world order faces new challenges.

今天，世界秩序面临新挑战。


Russian aggression is rattling allies.

俄罗斯的入侵让盟国震惊。


Extremists who hijack religion threaten governments and people everywhere.

从事宗教圣战的极端主义者威胁着政府和各处的人民。


Technology is accelerating a shift in the balance of power between governments and governed that offers both opportunities for democratic accountability and obstacles to inclusive politics.

科技正在加速治国者和被治者之间的实力平衡，既提供了民主问责的机会，也形成了包容政治的障碍。


We have gone from a world where power resided in hierarchies to one where it inhabits networks.

我们已经从权力呈现层级分布的世界来到了权力呈现网络分布的世界。


Statecraft has yet to adapt.

但治国术还没有适应。


The international institutions and partnerships that emerged in the postwar years demand both maintenance and modernization.

战后时期出现的国际机构和合作关系既需要维持，也需要现代化。


In the face of all of this turbulence, some suggest that America should turn inward.

面临所有这些动荡，有人认为美国应该转向内向。


That is nothing new.

这不过是陈词滥调。


Some argued the same after WWII.

二战后就有人提出这样的观点。


They argued it again 25 years ago, after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

25年前柏林墙倒塌后又有人这样说。 那时，他们错了。


They were wrong then – and they are wrong now.

如今，他们也是错的。


The need for leadership has never been greater, and the US has never been more engaged with the world.

对领导力的需要从未如此巨大，美国也从未如此深地参与世界。


Our role in Afghanistan’s first-ever peaceful, democratic transition reminds us all that, having invested so much blood and treasure in helping to give Afghans a chance to succeed in battle, the world has just as much responsibility to help its leaders succeed in governance.

我们在阿富汗历史上首次和平的民主转型中所扮演的角色提醒我们所有人，世界付出如此大的鲜血和金钱代价帮助阿富汗人获得在战争中获胜的机会，也有同样大的责任帮助阿富汗领导人在治国方面取得成功。


We know that the destruction of 100% of Syria’s declared chemical weapons would not have happened without direct, hands-on diplomacy and perseverance, just as Syria’s immoral and horrifying civil war will not end without an equal commitment.

我们知道，如果没有亲力亲为地直接参与和坚持不屑，就不可能100%摧毁叙利亚宣称拥有的化学武器，正如没有这些努力，叙利亚令人骇人听闻的邪恶内战是不会结束的。


So, too, in Asia, where President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping just announced ambitious commitments to tackle climate change, we are reminded of what countries can accomplish together with real leadership – and of how much additional leadership is required to conclude a successful climate agreement in Paris next year.

亚洲也是如此，奥巴马总统和中国国家主席习近平刚刚作出宏达承诺解决气候变化问题，我们可以从中看到，有了真正的领导力，各国可以完成怎样的成就 — — 也可以看到，要在明年的巴黎敲定成功的气候协定还需要多少领导力。


The world has changed, and we are changing with it.

世界已经发生了变化，我们也在随之改变。


Lines on the map no longer contain the gravest threats, and the players are no longer divided neatly into two camps.

地图上的线不再包含最严重的威胁，各行动方也不再泾渭分明地分成两个阵营。


In the twenty-first century, next door is everywhere.

在21世纪，后门无处不在。


That is why the world needs coalition diplomacy.

因此，世界需要联盟外交（coalition diplomacy ） 。


No country can defeat terrorism on its own.

没有哪个国家能够单枪匹马击败恐怖主义。


No country can solve the existential threat of climate change alone.

没有哪个国家能够单枪匹马解决生存危机。


No country can eradicate extreme poverty, combat potential pandemics, or improve nuclear security by itself.

没有哪个国家能够依靠自己消灭极端贫困、战胜潜在传染病或改善核安全。


None of us can live safer, richer lives by turning our back to the world.

如果我���不直面世界，我们所有人都无法获得更安全、更富裕的生活。


We must build on our history of working with allies by forming new coalitions – with governments, with civil society, and, yes, with everyday people.

我们必须与政府、与公民社会 — — 是的，还要与普罗大众 — — 结成新的联盟，与盟友们一起构建历史。


A good example is the international effort to confront the Islamic State’s malign brutality in Iraq and Syria.

一个很好的例子是针对伊斯兰国在伊拉克和叙利亚残忍暴行的国际努力。


Political, humanitarian, and intelligence tools from more than 60 countries are being used to support unified military action.

来自60多个国家政治、人道和情报工具被用于支持联合军事行动。


Success depends not on what one or even a handful of countries can do alone, but on what all of us are able to achieve by moving forward together against this common threat.

成功不取决于一国甚至少数几国可以独力完成什么，而是取决于我们所有人可以通过携手面对这一共同威胁实现什么。


On an equally important front, the US is working with the United Nations to galvanize a global response to the danger posed by the Ebola virus.

在另一个同样重要的阵线，美国正在与联合国一起努力激励全球应对埃博拉病毒的威胁。


I have personally talked with more than 50 foreign leaders, and we all agree that only by coordinating our actions can we stop the devastation in West Africa and halt Ebola’s spread.

我个人与50多位外国领导人讨论了这一问题，我们都同意，只有通过协调行动才能阻止西非的灾难和埃博拉的传播。


We are making progress on both issues, but much work remains.

我们在这两个问题上都在取得进展，但仍有许多工作要做。


Bringing together countries with competing interests and varying resources is hard work.

让利益相互竞争、资源大相径庭的国家走到一起是一个艰难的工作。


It demands intense diplomatic engagement and calls upon relationships that have been built and maintained over decades, as well as alliances with new partners.

这要求大量外交投入、动员几十年来所构建和维持的关系以及与新合作伙伴的联盟。


But by overcoming differences and coordinating efforts to defeat the Islamic State and conquer Ebola, we are reinforcing support for a world order grounded in collective solutions to common problems.

但通过克服差异、共同努力击败伊斯兰国、征服埃博拉，我们正在强化对基于针对共同问题的集体解决方案的世界秩序的支持。


Cooperation is equally vital in reinforcing the bedrock economic principles on which America and other countries built their postwar prosperity.

对于巩固作为美国和其他国家战后繁荣基础的经济原则，合作也同样重要。


Frustration cannot grow faster than opportunity in any country.

不论哪个国家，沮丧都不会比机会发展得更快。


For example, the negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) reflect President Obama’s determination to strike an accord with countries that represent one-third of global trade and 40% of global GDP.

比如，跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（Trans-Pacific Partnership，TPP）表明了奥巴马与占全球贸易三分之一、全球GDP百分之四十的地区形成一致的决心。


The benefits – for both the US and our partners – are enormous.

不管是对美国还是对我们的合作伙伴，好处都是巨大的。


Estimates are that the TPP could provide $77 billion a year in real income and support 650,000 new jobs in the US alone.

据估计，光是在美国，TPP每年可以增加77美元真实收入、支持650,000个新就业岗位。


The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership being negotiated with the European Union offers another major step toward increasing trade.

正在与欧盟谈判的跨大西洋贸易和投资合作伙伴关系（Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership）则提供了另一个促进贸易的一大步。


Whether for mutual security or shared prosperity, genuine partnerships are not built overnight.

不管是为了共同安全还是共同繁荣，真正的伙伴关系都不是一夜建成的。


Patient diplomacy and a collective will are needed to advance common goals. America’s objectives remain the same as they have been for decades – peace, prosperity, and stability for the US and for our partners around the world.

耐心的外交和集体意愿是推进共同目标的必要条件，美国的目标与数十年来别无二致 — — 和平、繁荣以及美国和我们的全球伙伴的稳定。


Closing the Investment Gap

填补投资缺口


BERKELEY – The weakness of private investment in the United States and other advanced economies is a worrisome – and perplexing – feature of the recovery from the 2008 global financial crisis.

伯克利—美国和其他发达经济体私人投资疲软，2008年全球金融危机后的复苏的这一特征令人担忧，也令人困惑。


Indeed, according to the International Monetary Fund, through 2014, private investment declined by an average of 25% compared to pre-crisis trends.

事实上，据国际货币基金组织（IMF）的数据，2014年较危机前趋势，私人投资平均下降25 % 。


The shortfall in investment has been deep and broad-based, affecting not only residential investment but also investment in equipment and structures.

投资不足的深度和广度都很大，不但影响住宅投资，也影响设备和结构投资。


Business investment remains significantly below pre-2008 expectations, and has been hit hard again in the US during the last year by the collapse of energy-sector investment in response to the steep drop in oil prices.

商业投资显著低于2008年前的预期，去年美国商业投资因为石油价格暴跌所导致的能源部门投资骤降而再遭重创。


Interestingly, the investment shortfall in the US coincides with a strong rebound in returns to capital.

有趣的是，美国的投资短缺和资本回报率的强力反弹同时发生。


By one measure, returns to private capital are now at a higher point than any time in recent decades.

从某种程度上讲，私人资本回报率目前比最近几十年中的任何时候都要高。


But extensive empirical research confirms that at the macro level, business investment depends primarily on expected future demand and output growth, not on current returns or retained earnings.

但大量实证研究证实，在宏观层面，商业投资主要取决于预期未来需求和产出增长，而不是当前回报率或留存利润。


According to the IMF, this “accelerator” theory of investment explains most of the weakness of business investment in the developed economies since the 2008 crisis.

据IMF，这一投资的“加速器”理论解释了2008年危机后发达经济体商业投资疲软的绝大部分。


In accordance with this explanation, investment growth in the US has been in line with its usual historical relationship with output growth.

根据这一解释，美国投资增长与其与产出增长的正常历史关系相符。


In short, private investment growth has been weak primarily because the pace of recovery has been anemic.

简言之，私人投资疲软主要是因为复苏疲软。


Businesses have marked down their pre-crisis investment plans to reflect a post-crisis “new normal” of slower and more uncertain growth in demand for their output.

企业削减危机前的投资计划，以适应速度更低、不确定性性更大的危机后产出需求增长“新常态 ” 。


Under conditions of weak aggregate demand, stronger public investment encourages more private business investment.

在总需求疲软的背景下，加强公共投资鼓励更多的私人商业投资。


But public investment, too, has fallen below pre-crisis expectations, aggravating rather than ameliorating the slump in private investment.

但公共投资也不如危机前预期，加剧而不是缓解了私人投资的暴跌。


The accelerator explanation of the shortfall in business investment in the US is consistent with evidence that, where projected demand growth has been relatively strong – for example, in cable, telecommunications, digital platforms, social networking, and, until recently, energy – investment growth has also been relatively strong.

美国商业投资短缺的加速器解释与证据一致。 证据表明，预测的需求增长相对强势的部门 — — 比如在电缆、通讯、数字平台、社交网络以及直到最近的能源等 — — 投资增长也相对强势。


Indeed, telecom and cable companies accounted for the largest share of business capital expenditures during the last three years, with energy production and mining second on the list.

事实上，通讯和电缆公司占据了过去三年商业资本支出的最大份额，紧随其后的是能源生产和矿产。


Differences in innovation opportunities across industries are also consistent with the changing composition of business investment.

行业间创新机会的差异也与商业投资份额变化一致。


During the 2009-2015 period, while business investment in equipment slowed in the US, it accelerated in intellectual property products, including research and development, software, and so-called artistic originals (the output of artists, studios, and publishers).

2009—2015年期间，美国设备商业投资放缓，但知识产权产品，包括研发、软件和所谓的原创作品（艺术家、工作室和出版商的产出）等，呈现加速增长。


R&D investment usually expands faster than GDP during cyclical expansions, and the current period is in line with historical trends.

在周期性扩张中，研发投资通常快于GDP，最近一段时期与历史趋势相符。


Indeed, as a share of the economy, R&D investment is now at its highest level on record, which bodes well for future productivity growth.

事实上，以占经济比重论，研发支出目前处于历史最高水平，这十分有利于未来生产率增长。


As the accelerator theory of investment would predict, much R&D investment is occurring in technology-intensive sectors where current and future expected demand has been strong.

投资的加速器理论认为，大量研发投资发生在当前和未来预期需求强势的技术密集型部门。


There is also evidence that the distribution of returns to capital is becoming increasingly skewed toward these sectors.

也有证据表明，资本回报的分布越来越向这些部门倾斜。


According to a recent McKinsey Global Institute report, the most digitized sectors – ranked by 18 metrics on digital assets, digital usage, and digital workforce – enjoy significantly higher profit margins than traditional sectors.

据最新的麦肯锡全球研究所报告，最为数字化的部门 — — 通过数字资产、数字用途和数字劳动力等十八个指标排序 — — 所获得的利润率显著高于传统部门。


In a recent letter to the chief executives of the S&P 500 companies and large European corporations, Larry Fink, the CEO of BlackRock, the world’s largest investment management company, expressed concern that many global firms may be sacrificing value-creating investments by distributing dividends and buying back their own shares.

在致标普500成分股公司和呕吼大公司首席执行官的信中，全球最大投资管理公司贝莱德公司（Black Rock）首席执行官拉里·芬克（Larry Fink）表示担心许多全球企业可能正在用发放股利和回购本公司股票的方式浪费创造价值的机会。


Among US nonfinancial corporations, the proportion of investable funds used for dividends and share buybacks has been trending upward, albeit with cyclical ups and downs, since the 1980s.

在美国非金融公司中，20世纪80年代以来用于股利和股票回购的可投资资金比例呈现增加之势（尽管存在起伏 ） 。


After a sharp downturn during the 2008-2009 recession, this proportion has now recovered to nearly 50%, a high point relative to historical averages.

2008—2009年衰退期间这一比例大幅下井，但如今又恢复到50%左右，从历史平均值看相当高。


The macro evidence indicates that the primary cause of disappointing business investment in the US and other developed countries in the years following the global financial crisis has been anemic demand, not a lack of investable funds resulting from excessive distributions to shareholders.

宏观证据表明，全球金融危机以来美国和其他发达国家商业投资令人失望的主要原因是需求萎靡，而不是过多地向股东分配而导致可投资资金不足。


Over the longer term, however, the upward trend in dividends and share buybacks as a percentage of corporate investable funds is a symptom of mounting shareholder pressure on corporations to focus on short-term returns at the expense of long-term investments.

但是，从长期看，股利和股票回购占公司可投资资金的百分比的上升趋势是股东日益向公司施加压力、要求其专注于短期回报而非长期投资的症候。


In a recent McKinsey survey of 1,000 top executives and corporate directors, 63% reported that shareholder pressure to realize short-term returns has increased over the last several years.

最近，麦肯锡调查了1,000名高管和公司董事，其中63%表示过去几年中股东对实现短期回报的压力有所增加。


Indeed, some 79% reported pressure to demonstrate strong financial returns in two years or less.

事实上，79%的受访者表示承受着在两年或以内实现大量财务回报的压力。


Shareholder pressure tends to be greater in older firms, and in the US over the last few decades, the proportion of older firms has been growing as the startup rate for new businesses has fallen.

股东压力对于老牌企业往往更大，在过去几十年中，美国老牌企业占比因为企业创业率的下降而有所上升。


In addition, as Fink and others have warned, compensation practices that link top executives’ pay to measures of short-term success like quarterly earnings per share or annual equity performance also encourage “short-termism” in corporate investment decisions.

此外，芬克和其他人警告说，将高管薪酬与短期成功指标（如季度每股收益或年度股票表现）挂钩的做法也鼓励了 公司投资决策的“短期化 ” 。


A sliding capital gains tax, with rates that decline as the holding period for investments increases, would reduce incentives for short-termism among investors.

递减的资本利得税 — — 即税率随投资持有期的增加而降低 — — 能遏制投资者短期化的激励。


Among others, Larry Fink, the Center for American Progress, and Hillary Clinton propose this approach.

拉里·芬克、美国进步中心（Center for American Progress）和希拉里·克林顿都建议采取这一方针。


In his recent CEO letter, Fink also calls on companies to issue annual “strategic frameworks” for long-term value creation, supported by quantifiable financial metrics and linking long-term executive compensation to performance on them.

在其最新的首席执行官的信中，芬克还呼吁各大公司为长期价值创造制定年度“战略框架 ” ， 使用量化财务指标并将长期高管薪酬与这些指标的表现挂钩。


These frameworks, Fink notes, should cover environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors that are core determinants of long-term value.

芬克指出，这些框架应该覆盖环境、社会和治理（ESG）因素，它们是长期价值的核心决定因素。


Companies can use the new evidence-based standards developed by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board to disclose material information about their ESG performance to their investors.

公司可以使用可持续性会计准则委员会（Sustainability Accounting Standards Board）所开发的新的基于证据的标准向投资者披露关于ESG表现的实质信息。


Strategic frameworks, along with ESG disclosure, should encourage both companies and their shareholders to focus more on long-term value and less on short-term financial performance.

战略框架配合ESG披露能够鼓励公司及其股东更加关注长期价值而不是短期财务表现。


But at the macro level, expected growth in demand and associated innovation opportunities will remain the primary drivers of business investment.

但在宏观层面，需求及相应创新机会的预期增长将仍然是商业投资的主要推动力。


Inequality and the American Child

不平等性与美国儿童


NEW YORK – Children, it has long been recognized, are a special group.

纽约—我们早就知道，儿童是一个特殊群体。


They do not choose their parents, let alone the broader conditions into which they are born.

他们无法选择父母，更不用说更广义的出生环境了。


They do not have the same abilities as adults to protect or care for themselves.

他们没有如同成人那样的保护或照看自己的能力。


That is why the League of Nations approved the Geneva Declaration on the Rights of the Child in 1924, and why the international community adopted the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989.

因此，国际联盟在1924年通过了日内瓦儿童权利宣言，国际社会也在1989年实施了儿童权利公约。


Sadly, the United States is not living up to its obligations.

悲哀的是，美国没有在履行义务。


In fact, it has not even ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

事实上，它甚至没有批准儿童权利公约。


The US, with its cherished image as a land of opportunity, should be an inspiring example of just and enlightened treatment of children.

美国向来以机会之地的形象自豪，它本应该成为公正、开明地对待儿童的榜样。


Instead, it is a beacon of failure – one that contributes to global sluggishness on children’s rights in the international arena.

相反，它却成了失败的象征 — — 为儿童权利在国际经济场上的全球颓势做出了“贡献 ” 。


Though an average American childhood may not be the worst in the world, the disparity between the country’s wealth and the condition of its children is unparalleled.

普通美国儿童也许不是全世界境况最糟糕的，但美国财富和儿童条件之间的反差大到无与伦比。


About 14.5% of the American population as a whole is poor, but 19.9% of children – some 15 million individuals – live in poverty.

大约14.5%的美国总人口属于穷人，但19.9%的儿童 — — 大概相当于1,500万人 — — 生活在贫困中。


Among developed countries, only Romania has a higher rate of child poverty.

在发达国家中，只有罗马尼亚的儿童贫困率更高。


The US rate is two-thirds higher than that in the United Kingdom, and up to four times the rate in the Nordic countries.

美国的儿童贫困率比英国高三分之二，比北欧国家高三倍。


For some groups, the situation is much worse: more than 38% of black children, and 30% of Hispanic children, are poor.

某些群体的状况更是恶劣得多：38%的黑人儿童和30%的西班牙裔儿童是穷人。


None of this is because Americans do not care about their children.

所有这些都不是因为美国不在乎它的儿童。


It is because America has embraced a policy agenda in recent decades that has caused its economy to become wildly unequal, leaving the most vulnerable segments of society further and further behind.

而是因为美国在近几十年中采取的政策日程导致其经济变得普遍不平等，让最脆弱的社会细分群体越来越落后。


The growing concentration of wealth – and a significant reduction in taxes on it – has meant less money to spend on investments for the public good, like education and the protection of children.

��富的日益集中 — — 以及财富税收的大幅减少 — — 意味着花在教育和儿童保护等公共品投资上的支出越来越少了。


As a result, America’s children have become worse off.

结果，美国儿童的境况每况愈下。


Their fate is a painful example of how inequality not only undermines economic growth and stability – as economists and organizations like the International Monetary Fund are finally acknowledging – but also violates our most cherished notions of what a fair society should look like.

他们的命运是一个惨痛的教训，说明了不平等性不但破坏经济增长和稳定 — — 经济学家和国际货币基金组织（IMF）等组织总算开始承认这一点了 — — 也有悖于我们最珍视的公平社会的概念。


Income inequality is correlated with inequalities in health, access to education, and exposure to environmental hazards, all of which burden children more than other segments of the population.

收入不平等与健康不平等、教育不平等和环境危险不平等都具有相关性，而所有这些对儿童的影响比其他人群更大。


Indeed, nearly one in five poor American children are diagnosed with asthma, a rate 60% higher than non-poor children.

事实上，近五分之一的美国贫穷儿童被诊断出哮喘，比非贫穷儿童高出60 % 。


Learning disabilities occur almost twice as frequently among children in households earning less than $35,000 a year than they do in households earning more than $100,000.

年收入低于35,000美元家庭的儿童学习无能比例比年收入高于100,000美元家庭的儿童高出近一倍。


And some in the US Congress want to cut food stamps – on which some 23 million American households depend, threatening the poorest children with hunger.

一些美国国会议员还想削减食品券 — — 大约2,300万美国家庭需要仰仗食品券 — — 这将令去贫穷儿童面临挨饿的危险。


These inequalities in outcomes are closely tied to inequalities in opportunities.

这些结果上的不平等与机会不平等息息相关。


Inevitably, in countries where children have inadequate nutrition, insufficient access to health care and education, and higher exposure to environmental hazards, the children of the poor will have far different life prospects from those of the rich.

在儿童营养不足、无法获得足够医疗和教育的国家，环境风险也难免更高，穷孩子的生活前景远远比不上富孩子。


And, partly because an American child’s lifetime prospects are more dependent on his or her parents’ income and education than in other advanced countries, the US now has the least equality of opportunity of any advanced country.

此外，部分因为美国儿童一生前景比其他发达国家更多地取决于父母的收入和教育，目前美国的机会平等程度低于任何其他发达国家。


At America’s most elite universities, for example, only around 9% of students come from the bottom half of the population, while 74% come from the top quarter.

比如，在美国的精英大学，只有9%左右的学生来自底层二分之一人口，74%来自最高层四分之一人口。


Most societies recognize a moral obligation to help ensure that young people can live up to their potential.

大部分社会都认为帮助确保年轻人能实现潜力所允许的生活水平是一种道德义务。


Some countries even impose a constitutional mandate for equality of educational opportunities.

一些国家甚至从宪法上规定教育机会必须平等。


But in America, more is spent on the education of rich students than on the education of the poor.

但在美国，富学生的教育支出要高于穷学生。


As a result, the US is wasting some of its most valuable assets, with some young people – bereft of skills – turning to dysfunctional activities.

结果，美国正在浪费其最宝贵的资产之一。 一些年轻人无法获得技能，只能从事非正常活动。


American states like California spend about as much on prisons as on higher education – and sometimes more.

加利福尼亚等州的监狱支出与高等教育支出相当，有时还要更高。


Without compensatory measures – including pre-school education, ideally beginning at a very young age – unequal opportunities translate into unequal lifelong outcomes by the time children reach the age of five.

不采取补偿措施 — — 包括最好从幼儿时期就开始的学前教育 — — 机会不平等就会在儿童达到五岁时转化为一生结果的不平等。


That should be a spur to policy action.

这应该成为对政策行动的鞭策。


Indeed, while inequality’s harmful effects are wide-reaching, and impose huge costs on our economies and societies, they are largely avoidable.

事实上，尽管不平等性的伤害效应很广，并且给我们的经济与社会造成了巨大成本，但它们大多是可以避免的。


The extremes of inequality observed in some countries are not the inexorable result of economic forces and laws.

一些国家所观察到的极端不平等不是经济力量和定律的无情结果。


The right policies – stronger social safety nets, progressive taxation, and better regulation (especially of the financial sector), to name a few – can reverse these devastating trends.

正确的政策 — — 强化社会安全网、累进税制和更好的监管（特别是对金融部门 ） ， 等等 — — 可以扭转这些消极趋势。


To generate the political will that such reforms require, we must confront policymakers’ inertia and inaction with the grim facts of inequality and its devastating effects on our children.

要形成这些改革所需要的政治意愿，我们必须将决策者的惰性和不作为与不平等性的严峻现实及其对儿童造成的消极影响对立起来。


We can reduce childhood deprivation and increase equality of opportunity, thereby laying the groundwork for a more just and prosperous future – one that reflects our own avowed values.

我们能够减轻儿童权利的剥夺、增加机会平等，从而为更公正、更繁荣的未来 — — 反映我们所公开追求的价值的未来 — — 打下基础。


So why don’t we?

为什么我们还不行动呢？


Of the harm that inequality inflicts on our economies, politics, and societies, the damage done to children demands special concern.

不平等性给我们的经济、政治与社会造成诸多伤害，其中对儿童的伤害需要特别关注。


Whatever responsibility poor adults may bear for their lot in life – they may not have worked hard enough, saved enough, or made good decisions – children’s circumstances are thrust upon them without any sort of choice.

成年人受穷，他自己得负责 — — 也许是工作不够努力，储蓄不够充足、没有做出好决策等 — — 但儿童的环境是上天强加给他们的，他们无从选择。


Children, perhaps more than anyone, need the protection that rights afford – and the US should be providing the world with a shining example of what that means.

也许儿童比其他任何人都更需要权利赋予的保护 — — 而美国应该为前世界树立此中含义的榜样。


American Conservatism’s Crisis of Ideas

美国保守主义的思想危机


BERKELEY – On the back left corner of my desk right now are three recent books: Arthur Brooks’ The Battle, Charles Murray’s Coming Apart, and Nicholas Eberstadt’s A Nation of Takers.

伯克利—现在，在我书桌的左后角摆着三部新书：布鲁克斯（Arthur Brooks）的《战争 》 （ The Battle ） 、 穆雷（Charles Murray）的《崩溃 》 （ Coming Apart）和埃伯斯塔特（Nicholas Eberstadt）的《匪之国 》 （ A Nation of Takers ） 。


Together, they constitute an important intellectual movement, which also happens to be a large part of the reason that American conservatism today has little that is constructive to say about managing the economy – and little purchase on the center of the American electorate.

总的来说，它们代表了重要的思想动向，这也恰好是当今美国保守主义对治理经济鲜有建设性意见、在美国选举舞台上频频败北的重要原因。


But let’s back up historically, to the founding of what we might call modern conservatism in early nineteenth-century Britain and France.

但让我们回顾历史，看看我们所谓的现代保守主义是如何在19世纪初的英国和法国起源的。


There were some – Frédéric Bastiat and Jean-Baptiste Say come to mind – who believed that government should put the unemployed to work building infrastructure when markets or production were temporarily disrupted.

一些人 — — 巴斯夏（Frédéric Bastiat）和萨伊（Jean-Baptiste Say）立刻出现在眼前 — — 认为当市场或生产出现了暂时性的干扰时，政府应该安排失业者去建设基础设施。


But they were balanced by those like Nassau Senior, who spoke out against even famine relief: Although a million people would die in the Irish Potato Famine, “that would scarcely be enough.”

但他们的观点被西尼尔（Nassau Senior）反对，他认为就连食品救济都不应该有：尽管数百万人因爱尔兰土豆饥荒丧命，但“这远远不够。 ”


The main thrust of early conservatism was root-and-branch opposition to every form of social insurance: make the poor richer, and they would become more fertile.

早期保守主义的主要卖点是彻底反对任何形式的社会保险：让穷人变富，他们就会生更多孩子。


As a result, farm sizes would drop (as land was divided among ever more children), labor productivity would fall, and the poor would become even poorer.

结果，农场规模会下降（因为土地得分给越来越多的子女 ） ， 劳动生产率会下降，而穷人会变得更穷。


Social insurance was not just pointless; it was counterproductive.

社会保险不但毫无意义；简直就是大逆不道。


The proper economic policy was to teach people to venerate the throne (so that they would respect property), the paternal hearth (so that they would not marry imprudently young), and the religious altar (so that they would fear pre-marital sex).

合理的经济政策是让人们尊王（从而尊重产权 ） 、 尊父（从而不会轻率早婚 ） 、 尊宗教（从而畏惧婚前性行为 ） 。


Then, perhaps, with women chaste for half or more of their childbearing years, the surplus population would diminish and conditions for the poor would be as good as they could be.

接着，只要女人在一半或以上的育龄时期严守贞洁，新增人口就会减少，穷人所处的环境就能尽可能地改善。


Fast-forward 150 years to post-World War II America, and to the original Chicago School critique of the New Deal version of social insurance – that it created “notches” that perverted economic incentives.

快速地浏览一下二战前150年中的美国，看看芝加哥学派对罗斯福新政这一社会保险新形式的最初批判 — — 它形成了阻碍经济创新的“等级 ” （ notch ） 。


The government, Milton Friedman and others argued, told the poor: make more money and we will take away your free housing, food stamps, and income support.

弗里德曼和其他人指出，政府告诉穷人：赚多点钱，我们将剥夺你的免费房子、食品券和收入支持。


People are rational, Friedman said, so they will not work for long if they get nothing or next to nothing for it.

人是理性的，弗里德曼说，因此如果没有好处或好处不多，他们是不会长时间工作的。


The big difference between the Malthusian conservative critics of social insurance in the early nineteenth century and the Chicago critics of the 1970’s is that the Chicago critics had a point: Providing public support to the “worthy” poor, and then removing it when they began to stand on their own feet, poisoned incentives and was unlikely to lead to good outcomes.

19世纪初马尔萨斯派保守主义对社会保险的批判和芝加哥学派20世纪70年代的批判之间的重大区别在于，芝加哥学派的批判有���样一个要点：为“相称的”穷人提供公共支持，在他们开始自立根生时撤掉支持，这样做会破坏激励，不可能形成好的结果。


And so, from 1970 to 2000, a broad coalition of conservatives (who wanted to see the government stop encouraging immorality), centrists (who wanted government money spent effectively), and leftists (who wanted poverty alleviated) removed the “notches” from the social-insurance system.

1970—2000年，保守派（他们想让政府停止鼓励伤风败俗行为 ） 、 中间派（他们想让政府把钱花在刀刃上）和左派（他们想减贫）组成了广泛同盟，把“等级”从社会保险体系中逐出。


Presidents Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and even George W. Bush and their supporters created the current system, in which tax rates and eligibility thresholds are not punitive disincentives to enterprise.

卡特、里根、老布什、克林顿甚至小布什诸位总统及其支持者创建了当前的体系，税率和起税点不再起到抑制企业的反激励效果。


So what is the problem that America’s new generation of conservative critics of social insurance sees?

那么，美国新一代社会保险的保守主义批判家看到了什么问题？


It is not that raising poor people’s standard of living above bare subsistence produces Malthusian catastrophe, or that taxes and withdrawal of welfare benefits make people work, at the margin, for nothing.

产生马尔萨斯式崩溃的不是穷人的生活水平较勉强维生有所提高，让人们几乎无酬工作的也不是税收和取消福利。


For Eberstadt, the problem is that dependence on government is emasculating, and that too many people are dependent on government.

在埃伯斯塔特看来，问题在于对政府的依赖在让人民变弱，太多的人仰仗政府过活。


For Brooks, it is that knowing that public programs make one’s life easier causes one to vote for non-Republican candidates.

在布鲁克斯看来，问题在于知道公共项目让生活变得更加容易导致民众把选票投给非共和党候选人。


For Murray, it is that social insurance means that behaving badly does not lead to catastrophe – and we need bad behavior to lead to catastrophe in order to keep people from behaving badly.

在穆雷看来，问题在于社会保险意味着做得不好不会导致崩溃 — — 我们需要导致崩溃的坏行为，这样才能让人们不再做出坏行为。


The crucial point is that America’s conservative elites believe Brooks, Eberstadt, and Murray.

关键点在于，美国保守主义精英相信布鲁克斯、埃伯斯塔特和穆雷。


To this day, Mitt Romney is convinced that he lost the presidency in 2012 because Barack Obama unfairly gave Latino-Americans subsidized health insurance; gave women free reproductive health coverage (excluding abortion); and gave other groups similar “gifts.”

眼下，罗姆尼相信他之所以输掉2012年总统大选，是因为奥巴马不公平地给了拉丁裔美国人健康保险补贴，给了妇女免费的生殖健康保险（不含流产 ） ， 还给了其他群体类似的“礼物 ” 。


He could “never convince them that they should take personal responsibility and care for their lives.”

他绝不会“让他们认为他们应该承担个人责任，看好自己的生活。 ”


In fact, it would be a tough sell for any candidate to convince Americans who receive government benefits that they are dependent rather than empowered; that it is bad for people to vote for politicians who make their lives better; and that good public policy seeks to create human catastrophe rather than to avert it.

事实上，不论哪位候选人，让拿政府福利的美国人相信他们与其说是受助者，不如说是依赖者、相信把票投给让他们生活更好的政客是不对的、让他们相信好的公共政策应该造成而不是避免人类灾难都不是易事。


The problem for American conservatives is not their choice of candidates or the tone of their rhetoric. It is that their ideas are not politically sustainable.

美国保守主义者的问题不在于候选人的选择或是说辞的语调，而在于他们的想法不具有政治可持续性。


An Unhinged Democracy in America

精神错乱的美国民主


NEW YORK – Alexis de Tocqueville, a liberal French aristocrat, visited the United States in 1831 ostensibly to write a study of its “enlightened” prison system (locking people up in solitary confinement like penitent monks was the latest modern idea).

纽约—1831年，法国自由派贵族托克维尔访问美国。 名义上，他是为了写一篇关于美国“开明”监狱系统（最新的概念是将犯人如同忏悔的僧侣那样关押在单间中）的研究。


Out of this trip came de Tocqueville’s masterpiece, Democracy in America, in which he expressed admiration for American civil liberties and compared the world’s first genuine liberal democracy favorably with Old World institutions.

结果，这次美国之旅造就了托克维尔的名著《论美国的民主 》 ， 在这部著作中，他对美国公民自由大加推崇，将这个世界上第一个正宗自由民主与旧世界的制度相比较，认为后者不如前者。


But de Tocqueville had serious reservations, too.

但托克维尔也有严重保留。


The biggest danger to US democracy, he believed, was the tyranny of the majority, the suffocating intellectual conformity of American life, the stifling of minority opinion and dissent.

他认为，美国民主的最大危险是多数人的暴政，美国式生活中令人窒息的思想顺从，令人压抑的少数派观点和异见。


He was convinced that any exercise of unlimited power, be it by an individual despot or a political majority, is bound to end in disaster.

他相信，任何无限权力，不管是个人暴君还是政治多数，都注定要在一地狼藉中结束。


Democracy, in the sense of majority rule, needs restraints, just like any other system of government.

从多数规则的角度讲，民主需要约束，一如其他所有制度的政府。


That is why the British have mixed the authority of elected politicians with that of aristocratic privilege.

因此，英国混合了当选政客的权力和君主特权。


And it is why Americans still cherish their Constitution’s separation of governmental powers.

同样因此，美国人至今仍珍视宪法对政府权力的分割。


By contrast, in the French republican system, the state represents the so-called will of the people.

相反，在法国共和制度中，国家代表所谓的人民的意志。


As a result, its authority is less constrained, which may explain the greater frequency in France of street demonstrations and even of mob violence.

结果，它的权威约束较小，这也许解释了法国街头示威乃至群众暴力更为频繁。


Indeed, these upheavals may act as informal checks on official power.

事实上，这些剧变是对正式权力的非正式制衡。


De Tocqueville identified another source of restraint in the US system: the power of religion.

托克维尔还指出了美国制度的另一个约束来源：宗教的力量。


Human greed, as well as the temptation of going to extremes, was tempered by the moderating influence of a shared Christian faith.

人类的贪婪，以及走极端的诱惑，被共同的基督教信仰的影响所中和。


Liberty, in the US, was inextricably entwined with religious belief.

在美国，自由与宗教信仰密不可分。


The spectacle of American politics today would seem to cast doubt on de Tocqueville’s observation.

今天的美国政坛景象似乎让人们质疑托克维尔的观察。


Or, rather, the rhetoric of many Republicans aspiring to be President sounds like a perversion of what he saw in 1831.

或者说，许多志在总统之位的共和党人的言论与托克维尔在1831年的所见所闻南辕北辙。


Religion and liberty are still mentioned in one breath, but often to promote extreme views.

宗教和自由仍然时时挂在嘴边，但常常是用来推动极端观点。


Religious minorities are denounced.

宗教少数群体遭到压迫。


Apocalyptic fears are stoked.

天启恐惧兴起。


Intolerance is promoted.

党同伐异被煽动。


All in the name of God.

所有这些打着上帝的名义。


Of course, the US is not the only country where fringe demagogues are now poisoning mainstream politics.

当然，美国并不是唯一的边缘煽动着正在毒害主流政治的国家。


Religious language is less often heard in Western Europe, but all the more in parts of Eastern Europe, Turkey, and Israel.

在西欧，宗教语言比以前更少听到了，但在东欧、土耳其和以色列的一些地方，情况正好相反。


And the message of populism is similar everywhere in the democratic world: Liberal elites are to be blamed for all our ills and anxieties, from Europe’s refugee crisis to the inequities of the global economy, from “multiculturalism” to the rise of radical Islam.

民粹主义的意义在民主世界各地都差不多：自由精英要为我们的所有问题和焦虑负责，不管是欧洲难民危机还是全球经济不平等性，不管是“多元文化主义”还是激进伊斯兰教的崛起。


Populism is causing considerable alarm, not least because mainstream politicians seem less and less capable of finding a convincing way to stop its rise.

民粹主义正在敲响警钟，因为主流政客越来越难以找到令人信服的方式阻止它的崛起。


Those who are rightly worried about the politics of fear like to assume that populism is a threat to democracy itself.

正确地担心恐惧政治的人喜欢假设民粹主义是民主本身的威胁。


Distrust of the elites fosters distrust of the system, and the longing for great leaders who will deliver us from the selfishness of professional politicians will lead to new forms of tyranny.

不信任精英导致不信任制度，而期盼伟大领袖让我们摆脱职业政客的自私将导致新形式的暴政。


That may turn out to be true.

这也许是真的。


But, in fact, it is not really democracy that is presently under siege.

但是，事实上，陷入重围的其实并不是民主。


In some ways, many societies are more democratic than they were before.

从某种角度讲，许多社会比从简更加民主了。


If nothing else, the Donald Trump phenomenon shows that old party establishments can be skirted by popular outsiders.

唐纳德·特朗普现象所表现的正是旧政党格局可以被当红外部人士颠覆。


Social media also make it possible to bypass the traditional filters of authority, such as serious newspapers or broadcasters, and publish any point of view directly.

社交媒体也让绕过传统权威滤网（如严肃的报刊或杂志）成为可能，直接发布任何观点。


The power of private fortunes to sway public opinion, especially in the US, also upsets the traditional order.

私人财富左右公共观点的力量也在干扰传统秩序，特别是在美国。


Anti-elitism can be fanned by vast individual wealth, because elitism is defined less by financial clout than by education.

反精英主义可以通过巨大的个人财富煽动，因为精英主义更大程度上由教育而非财力定义。


Angry people swayed by the populist message are angrier at liberal professors, clever bankers, or skeptical journalists than they are at multi-billionaires.

被民粹主义信念激怒的人民对自由派教授、聪明的银行家或怀疑派记者的愤怒要大于他们对亿万富翁的愤怒。


(It is both President Barack Obama’s elite education and the color of his skin – or, rather, the combination of the two – that has attracted so much rage.)

（总统奥巴马的精英教育和他的肤色 — — 或者说，是两者的结合 — — 给她带来了如此多的愤怒。 ）


At the same time, people have more power to elect power-hungry crooks than they did before.

与此同时，人民比以前有了更大的力量选举渴望权力的恶棍。


Like the wild and woolly views swirling around the Internet, such figures are no longer kept at bay by traditional party elites.

和充斥互联网的野蛮观点一样，这些人物也不再被传统政党精英压制。


What is steadily falling away is not democracy, but the restraints that de Tocqueville thought were essential to make liberal politics work.

稳步消退的不是民主，而是托克维尔认为是自由政治起作用的关键的约束。


More and more, populist leaders regard their election by the majority of voters as a license to crush all political and cultural dissent.

民粹主义领导人越来越把多数人选择了他们作为碾压一切政治和文化异见的通行证。


De Tocqueville’s nightmare is not yet the reality in the US, but it is close to what we see in Russia, Turkey, Hungary, and perhaps Poland.

托克维尔的噩梦还没有在美国的现实中出现，但俄罗斯、土耳其、匈牙利（也许还有波兰）的情况已经与此不远。


Even Israel, which, despite its many obvious problems, has always had a robust democracy, is moving in this direction, with government ministers demanding proof of “state loyalty” from writers, artists, and journalists.

甚至以色列 — — 尽管它存在诸多显而易见的问题，但一直是强大的民主国家 — — 也在走向这一方向，政府部长要求作家、艺术家和记者证明其“国家忠诚 ” 。


It is hard to see how traditional elites are going to regain any authority.

很难说传统精英如何继续保留任何权威。


And yet I think de Tocqueville was right.

但我认为托克维尔是正确的。


Without editors, there can be no serious journalism.

没有编辑，就不会有严肃的新闻。


Without parties led by experienced politicians, the borders between show business and politics will disappear.

没有由经验丰富的政客领导的政党，娱乐和政治的界线就会消失。


Without limits placed on the appetites and prejudices of the majority, intolerance will rule.

不对大多数人的偏好和偏见加以限制，就会让党同伐异成为规则。


This is not a question of nostalgia or snobbery.

这不是怀旧或势利。


Nor is it a plea to trust anyone with a plausible air of authority.

这也不是恳求信任任何拥有权威“气场”的人。


Anger at the elites is not always unjust.

对精英的愤怒并非总是不公平的。


Globalization, immigration, and cosmopolitanism have served the interests of a highly educated minority, but sometimes at the expense of less privileged people.

全球化、移民和世界主义符合受到良好教育的少数群体的利益，但有时会牺牲没有特权的人的利益。


And yet, the problem identified by de Tocqueville in the 1830s is more relevant now than ever.

但是，托克维尔在19世纪30年代所发现的问题在今天的意义比以往更大。


Liberal democracy cannot be reduced to a popularity contest.

自由民主决不能退化为民粹主义竞争。


Constraints on majority rule are necessary to protect the rights of minorities, be they ethnic, religious, or intellectual.

对多数人统治的约束是保护少数群体的必要条件，不管是种族少数群体、宗教少数群体还是知识少数群体。


When that protection disappears, we will all end up losing the freedoms that democracy was supposed to defend.

当这一保护消失时，我们最终将失去作为民主应有之义的自由。


The Indispensable American Partner

不可或缺的美国伙伴


MADRID – The United States is gearing up for that most intoxicating (and exhausting) of political events: an open-seat race for the presidency.

马德里—美国正在为最令人兴奋（也最令人疲惫）的政治事件做准备：总统席位的开放竞争。


With US President Barack Obama's eight years in office coming to an end, and Vice President Joe Biden unlikely to run, the race will be without an incumbent.

副总统拜登看起来不会参与，因此这场角逐不会有现任官员。


As a result, the election could be less a referendum on the last eight years than a contest of ideas, with foreign policy emerging as a key topic.

因此，这场大选也许并不是对过去八年的全民公决，而是一场思想的竞争，而外交政策正在成为其中的关键。


As for the Democrats, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's likely nomination (despite recent revelations that she used her personal email account to conduct government business) reinforces foreign policy's centrality to the election.

在民主党方面，前国务卿希拉里·克林顿可能获得提名（尽管最新曝光表明她使用个人电子邮件账户处理公事 ） ， 这进一步加强了外交政策在大选中的关键性。


From my perspective as the group's only European member, the overarching message should be that the US must conceive of itself not as “the indispensable power," as it now does, but as “the indispensable partner."

我是小组中唯一的欧洲成员，在我看来，最重要的信息应该是美国不可继续如现在那样将自己视为“不可或缺的力量 ” ， 而是将自己视为“不可或缺的伙伴 ” 。


This is not merely a matter of semantics; such a change will require the US to re-conceive its role in the world.

这不仅仅是语义学问题；如此挑战要求美国反思其在世界中的作用。


But the payoff, for both the US and the liberal world order that it created, would be substantial.

但不管对美国还是对其所创造的自由世界秩序来说，这样做的好处是无穷的。


The key to success will be America's ability to retain the best – and abandon the worst – of that most American of notions: exceptionalism.

成功的关键是美国能否对最“美国”的概念 — — 例外论去芜存菁。


The sense in the US that the country is unique, with a special mission to promote prosperity, security, and freedom worldwide, has long shaped American foreign policy.

在美国，认为本国独一无二，负有促进全球繁荣、安全和自由的特殊任务，这一观念长期以来决定着美国的外交政策。


In doing so, he planted the seed of the values-based approach that was adopted by the US as it spearheaded the development of the rules and structures that order today's world.

就这样，他种下了基于价值的方针的种子，美国根据这一方针领导制定了决定当今世界秩序的规则与结构。


Those rules and structures have delivered unprecedented economic growth, benefiting all (though the US has reaped the greatest rewards).

这些规则与结果带来了前所未有的经济增长，惠及所有人（尽管美国拿走了最大的果实 ） 。


But, ironically, the notion of American exceptionalism often has led the US to undermine the international system that it nurtured.

但是，讽刺的是，美国例外论常常导致美国破坏它所培养的国际体系。


Indeed, US history reveals a persistent isolationist streak, in which the “city upon a hill" is not a beacon, but a fortress.

事实上，美国历史一直有一种孤立主义倾向 ， “ 山巅之城”好像不是一座灯塔，而是一座堡垒。


At times, including over the last six years, the belief that the US is better off going it alone has led to withdrawal from the world.

一次又一次（包括在过去六年中 ） ， 美国最好还是只顾自己的观念导致其从世界舞台中退出。


This tendency was not a serious issue before World War II (though the people of Abyssinia and Manchuria may beg to differ).

这一趋势在二战前并不是什么严重的问题（尽管阿比西尼亚和满洲人会提出异议 ） 。


But today, US withdrawal from the international system that it built has serious ramifications – namely, the kind of chaos and lawlessness exemplified by Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

但如今，美国从其所构建的国际体系中退出将造成严重后果 — — 即各种混乱和无法，俄罗斯入侵乌克兰就是明证。


Yet isolationism is not America's most destructive impulse.

但孤立主义不是美国危害最大的举动。


Worse is its “exemptionalism": its penchant for opting out of the rules that it promotes – and often actively enforces – elsewhere.

更糟糕的是其“豁免论 ” （ exemptionalism ） ： 置身其在其他地区所推行 — — 并且常常积极执行 — — 的规则之外。


Beyond the resentment that such an attitude engenders, American exemptionalism directly undermines multilateral institutions' capacity to address challenges that the US is unwilling or unable to resolve on its own.

除了这一态度可能产生的不满之外，美国豁免论还直接影响了多边机构解决美国不愿或不能独力解决的挑战的能力。


US President Barack Obama's administration has tried to create the illusion of a change of course in this regard, pushing “soft" deals that allow the US to participate without submitting to binding rules.

美国总统奥巴马政府试图营造一种状况正在改变的幻觉，推出了一些“软”协议让美国可以在不必遵守约束性规则的情况下参与。


But, though such arrangements make for great headlines, they do not provide the stability and predictability necessary for long-term success.

但是，尽管这样的安排吸引了大量目光，但并没有提供长期成功所需要的稳定性和可预测性。


If the US is to serve as the world's “indispensable partner," it must recommit to the rules-based order that has served it – and the world – so well for the last seven decades.

如果美国要成为世界“不可或缺的伙伴 ” ， 它就必须重新致力于在过去七十年给它 — — 以及全世界 — — 带来无穷好处的基于规则的秩序。


It should begin by strengthening the flagging institutions that have served as the backbone of the liberal international order.

首先，美国应该强化作为自由国际秩序基石的核心机构。


Indispensable partnership is about helping countries help themselves.

不可或缺的伙伴意味着帮助各国帮助自己。


It requires vision, commitment, and, most important, leadership.

这要求远见卓识、承诺以及（最重要的）领导力。


A frank discussion about America's foreign policy could prove vital to ensuring that this “city upon a hill" remains a beacon of hope – and a catalyst of progress.

开诚布公地讨论美国外交政策将是确保这个“山巅之城”仍是希望灯塔 — — 以及进步催化剂的关键。


American Foreign Policy after Iraq

伊拉克之后的美国对外政策


What comes after Iraq?

伊拉克之后又会是什么？


If President George W. Bush’s current troop “surge” fails to produce an outcome that can be called “victory,” what lessons will the United States draw for its future foreign policy?

如果布什总统的部队“急流”不能交出一份可以称作“胜利”的答卷，那么美国可以从中为其未来的对外政策吸取什么样的教训呢？


Will it turn inward, as it did after its defeat in Vietnam three decades ago?

它会转为内向，正如30年前兵败越南之后那样么？


Will it turn from promoting democracy to a narrow realist view of its interests?

它会从推动民主转向为一种对自身利益的狭隘现实主义观吗？


Even while discussion in Washington is fixated on Iraq, a number of thoughtful foreign observers are asking these longer-term questions.

即便在华盛顿的讨论仍聚焦伊拉克的情况下，一些有思想的外交观察家已经开始提出这些长期性的问题了。


Analysts and pundits have often been mistaken about America’s position in the world.

分析家和专家们对美国在世界上的地位往往有错误的认识。


For example, two decades ago, the conventional wisdom was that the US was in decline.

例如，20年前，一般的公众观点认为美国正在衰落。


A decade later, with the Cold War’s end, the new conventional wisdom was that the world was a unipolar American hegemony.

10年后，随着冷战结束，新的公众观点又认为世界上只有美国一个超级霸权。


Some neo-conservative pundits drew the conclusion that the US was so powerful that it could decide what it thought was right, and others would have to follow.

一些新保守派专家认定美国是如此强大，以至于它可以按自己的意志决策，而其它国家不得不遵从。


Charles Krauthammer celebrated this view as “the new unilateralism,” and it heavily influenced the Bush administration even before the attacks on September 11, 2001.

Charles Krauthammer高调地将这种观点称为“新单边主义 ” 。 它甚至在2001年“9.11”袭击发生之前都一直对布什政府产生着重要的影响。


But the new unilateralism was based on a profound misunderstanding of the nature of power in world politics.

但新单边主义是基于对世界政治实力特点的深刻误解。


Power is the ability to get the outcomes one wants.

实力是取得需要的结果的能力。


Whether the possession of resources will produce such outcomes depends upon the context.

通过所拥有的资源能否获得这样的结果还依赖于环境。


For example, a large, modern tank army is a powerful resource if a war is fought in a desert, but not if it is fought in a swamp – as America discovered in Vietnam.

例如，如果战争在沙漠中进行，那么一支庞大的现代化坦克部队就是一种强大的资源。 但如果战事在沼泽地区进行则不然—正如美国在越南所发现的那样。


In the past, it was assumed that military power dominated most issues, but in today’s world, the contexts of power differ greatly.

过去，人们一般认为军事实力主导着绝大多数问题，但在当今的世界，实力的大环境千差万别。


I have likened the distribution of power in politics today as analogous to a three-dimensional chess game.

我把当今政治实力的分配比作一盘三维国际象棋。


On the top board – military relations among states – the world is, indeed, unipolar, and likely to remain that way for decades.

在上盘—国家之间的军事关系中—世界确实是单极化的，而且这种情况很可能还要持续几十年。


But on the middle board of economic relations, the world is already multipolar, and the US cannot obtain the outcomes it wants without the cooperation of Europe, Japan, China, and others.

但在中盘的经济关系方面，世界已经是多极化了，而美国也不可能不通过与欧洲、日本、中国和其它国家合作就获得自己需要的结果。


And, on the bottom board of transnational issues outside the control of governments – including everything from climate change to pandemics to transnational terrorism – power is chaotically distributed, and it makes no sense at all to claim American hegemony.

在下盘超越政府控制之外的跨国事务方面—包括从气候变化到流行疾病到跨国恐怖主义—实力的分配是混乱的，因而在这样的背景下提出美国的霸权也是毫无意义的。


Yet it is on this bottom board that we find most of the greatest challenges we face today.

然而正是在下盘让我们发现了当今面对的最大挑战。


The only way to grapple with these problems is through cooperation with others, and that requires the “soft” power of attraction as well as the hard power of coercion. There is no simple military solution that will produce the outcomes we want.

应对这些问题的唯一途径就是通过与他人合作，而这就需要吸引的“软”实力和高压的硬实力并用，而没有现成的能让我们如愿以偿的简单军事解决方案。


The new unilateralists who dominated Bush’s first administration made the mistake of thinking that the unipolar distribution of power in the military context was sufficient to guide foreign policy.

主导布什第一届政府的新单边主义者们错误地认为在军事环境中的实力单极化分配足以引导对外政策。


They were like a young boy with a hammer who thinks that every problem resembles a nail.

他们就像一个手拿锤子的小孩，认为所有的问题都像钉子一样。


The danger of their approach is now obvious.

他们这种思维方式的危险性在当下就显而易见了。


Whoever plays a three-dimensional game by focusing on only one board is bound to lose in the long run.

任何人在玩三维国际象棋游戏时，只注重某一个盘，那么从长期来看他是注定要失败的。


Fortunately, the pendulum has begun to swing back toward cooperation.

幸运的是，这个钟摆现在又开始滑向合作。


In Bush’s second term, some of the most extreme unilateralists have departed from the government, and the president has approached difficult problems like North Korea or Iran with a more multilateral approach than during his first term.

在布什的第二任期，一些最极端的单边主义者离开了政府，而总统本人在处理北朝鲜或伊朗等更复杂的问题时也采用了比在第一个任期更为多边的策略。


Likewise, for all the complaints about the United Nations, the US and others turned to UN peacekeepers to sort out the mess after the Lebanon War last summer.

同样，针对关于联合国的所有抱怨，美国和其它国家都通过联合国维和部队来收拾去年夏天黎巴嫩战争留下的烂摊子。


The Iraq War, in particular, increased public awareness of the mistakes in Bush’s first term, but other issues are changing as well.

伊拉克战争尤其加深了公众对布什在第一任期所犯错误的认识，但其它情况也在变化中。


Americans now view cooperative action on global climate change more favorably.

美国人现在开始以更赞许的态度来看待全球气候变化方面的合作行动。


Similarly, the threat of pandemics means that Americans may come to recognize the importance of a stronger World Health Organization, just as the problem of nuclear proliferation is increasing awareness of the importance of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

同样，流行性疾病的威胁意味着美国人可能会最终承认一个更强有力的世界卫生组织的重要性，正如核扩散的问题使公众更加意识到国际原子能机构的重要性一样。


The nature of these problems means that the US does not have the luxury of turning inward no matter what the outcome in Iraq.

这些问题的特点意味着不论伊拉克问题的结果如何，美国都没有重新回归内向政策的奢侈了。


These are not problems you can leave overseas.

这不是些你能留在海外的问题。


They follow you home.

它们会如影随形般的跟你回到国内。


It also is unlikely that American foreign policy will return to a narrow realism and drop all emphasis on democracy and human rights.

美国的对外政策也不大可能回到狭隘的现实主义，而不再强调民主和人权。


While the Iraq War discredited the idea of coercive democratization, both Republicans and Democrats have a strong strand of idealism in their foreign policy orientations.

尽管伊拉克战争令强制民主化的理念声名狼藉，共和党和民主党人在他们的对外政策取向中仍保持着强烈的理想主义色彩。


The problem for whoever is elected president in 2008 will be to find appropriate realistic means to advance democratic values and adjust official rhetoric accordingly.

在2008年获选总统的任何人所面临的问题都将是寻求推进民主价值观的适当的现实主义途径并对官方论调做出相应调整。


When rhetoric greatly outstrips reality, others view it as hypocrisy.

当官方论调凌驾于现实之上时，别人就会认为这是种虚伪。


Americans will need to find ways to assert their narrative of democracy, freedom, and rights in a manner that respects diversity and the views of others.

美国人需要找到一种尊重多样性和他人观点的方式来宣扬他们对民主、自由和权利的坚持。


What Iraq has taught is the importance of developing civil society and the rule of law before trying to hold broad-based elections.

伊拉克给我们提供的教训是在试图举行广泛的选举之前先发展公民社会和健全法制的重要性。


Democracy is more than voting, for it requires large investments in education, institutions, and promotion of non-governmental organizations.

民主不仅仅是选举，因为它还需要在教育、制度和推动非政府组织发展方面进行大量的投入。


It must be rooted in the indigenous society and bear its characteristics, not be imposed from abroad.

它必须是植根于本地社会并承袭其特点，而不是被强加的舶来品。