PARIS – As the economic crisis deepens and widens, the world has been searching for historical analogies to help us understand what has been happening.

巴黎-随着经济危机不断加深和蔓延，整个世界一直在寻找历史上的类似事件希望有助于我们了解目前正在发生的情况。


At the start of the crisis, many people likened it to 1982 or 1973, which was reassuring, because both dates refer to classical cyclical downturns.

一开始，很多人把这次危机比作1982年或1973年所发生的情况，这样得类比是令人宽心的，因为这两段时期意味着典型的周期性衰退。


Today, the mood is much grimmer, with references to 1929 and 1931 beginning to abound, even if some governments continue to behave as if the crisis was more classical than exceptional.

如今人们的心情却是沉重多了，许多人开始把这次危机与1929年和1931年相比，即使一些国家政府的表现仍然似乎把视目前的情况为是典型的而看见的衰退。


The tendency is either excessive restraint (Europe) or a diffusion of the effort (the United States).

目前的趋势是，要么是过度的克制（欧洲 ） ， 要么是努力的扩展（美国 ） 。


Europe is being cautious in the name of avoiding debt and defending the euro, whereas the US has moved on many fronts in order not to waste an ideal opportunity to implement badly needed structural reforms.

欧洲在避免债务和捍卫欧元的名义下正变得谨慎，而美国已经在许多方面行动起来，以利用这一理想的时机来实行急需的结构性改革。


For geo-strategists, however, the year that naturally comes to mind, in both politics and economics, is 1989.

然而，作为地域战略学家，无论是从政治意义还是从经济意义上，让我自然想到的年份是1989年。


Of course, the fall of the house of Lehman Brothers has nothing to do with the fall of the Berlin Wall.

当然，雷曼兄弟公司的倒闭和柏林墙的倒塌没有任何关系。


Indeed, on the surface it seems to be its perfect antithesis: the collapse of a wall symbolizing oppression and artificial divisions versus the collapse of a seemingly indestructible and reassuring institution of financial capitalism.

事实上，从表面上看，两者似乎是完全是相反的：一个是象征着压抑和人为分裂的柏林墙的倒塌，而另一个是看似坚不可摧的并令人安心的金融资本主义机构的倒塌。


Yet 2008-2009, like 1989, may very well correspond to an epochal change, whose unfolding consequences will be felt for decades.

然而，和1989年一样，2008-2009年很可能也能被视为一个划时代的改变，其带来的发人深省的后果将在几十年后仍能让我们感受得到。


The end of the East-West ideological divide and the end of absolute faith in markets are historical turning points.

东西方意识形态鸿沟的结束，以及对市场绝对信心的后果，都是历史的转折点。


And what happens in 2009 may jeopardize some of the positive results of 1989, including the peaceful reunification of Europe and the triumph of democratic principles over nationalist, if not xenophobic, tendencies.

而2009年所发生的事情可能会威胁1989年革命所带来的积极成果，包括欧洲的和平统一和民主制度战胜了民族主义倾向，如果不是恐外倾向的话。


In 1989, liberal democracy triumphed over the socialist ideology incarnated and promoted by the Soviet Bloc.

1989年，自由民主战胜了由苏联集团具体化并推崇的社会主义意识形态。


For many of his supporters, it was President Ronald Reagan who, with his deliberate escalation of the arms race, pushed the Soviet economy to the brink, thereby fully demonstrating the superiority of liberal societies and free markets.

对于里根总统的许多的支持者来说，就是他精心策划的军备竞赛的升级，把苏联经济推向了崩溃的边缘，从而充分显示了自由社会和自由市场的优越性。


Of course, there are obvious differences between 1989 and now.

当然，现在的情况和1989年的情况明显不同了。


First, and perhaps above all, the revolutions of 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union put an end to global bipolarity.

首先，也许是最重要的，1989年的革命和随后的苏联解体结束了全球的两极化。


By contrast, 2009 is likely to pave the way to a new form of bipolarity, but with China substituting for the Soviet Union.

与此相反，2009年很可能会为一种新的两极化形式铺平道路，只是中国取代了苏联。


Second, whereas democracy and market capitalism appeared as clear – if more fragile than expected – winners in 1989, it is difficult in 2009, with the spread of the global crisis, to distinguish winners from losers.

其二，民主制度和市场资本主义，或许要比预期的要脆弱些，看来确实是当时的赢家。


Everyone seems to be a loser, even if some are more affected than others.

而在2009年，随着全球危机的蔓延，却很难区分赢家和输家；每个人似乎都是输家，即使有些国家比其它国家受到的影响更大。


Yet, history is unfair, and the US, despite its greater responsibility for today’s global crisis, may emerge in better shape than most countries from the morass.

而历史是不公平的。 尽管美国要为当今的全球危机负更大的责任，但美国可能会比大多数国家以更良好的势态走出困境。


In better shape, but not alone.

美国会恢复得更好，但并不是唯一能恢复的国家。


As a visiting professor at Harvard and MIT, I am getting a good preview of what the world could look like when the crisis finally passes.

作为哈佛大学和麻省理工学院的访问教授，我能看到危机过后的世界是什么样子的。


One senses something like the making of an American-Asian dominated universe.

我们能感受到一个美国和亚洲占主导地位的世界正在形成。


From the incredible media lab at MIT to the mathematics and economics departments at Harvard, Asians – Chinese and Indians, in particular – are everywhere, like the Romans in Athens in the first century BC: full of admiration for those from whom they were learning so much, and whom they would overcome in the coming decades.

从一流的麻省理工学院的媒体实验室到哈佛大学的数学和经济系，亚洲人-尤其是中国和印度人-到处都是，犹如公元前一世纪在雅典的罗马人一样：他们对那里学到太多东西的人们充满了敬佩，而他们将在今后几十年打败他们学习的对象。


But before this new order appears, the world may be faced with spreading disorder, if not outright chaos.

但是，在这一新秩序的出现之前，世界可能会面临更广泛的混沌，如果不是彻底的混乱的话。


What, for example, will happen to a country as central and vulnerable as Egypt when hundred of thousands of Egyptians working in the Gulf are forced to return to their homeland as a result of the crisis in the oil-producing countries?

例如，对埃及这样一个重要而又脆弱的国家，有数十万的埃及人曾在海湾工作但现在因石油生产国出现的危机而被迫返回了自己的家园，那埃及会发生什么情况呢？


When the rich get less rich, the poor get poorer.

当富人不再那么富了，穷人就会更穷。


And what about the foreign workers who have reached for the “European dream” and are now faced with potential explosions of xenophobia in Europe’s supposedly open countries?

还有，对于那些追求“欧洲梦”的外来工人，现在他们面临着理应是开放的欧洲国家的仇外心态可能的爆发，他们会有怎样的遭遇？


The consequences of 1989 ended up being less enduring than many observers, including me, would have assumed.

1989年革命所带来的成果，最后没有包括我在内许多观察家所想象的那么持久。


We can only hope that, in the end, the consequences of 2009 similarly prove to be far less dramatic than we now – intuitively and in our historical reflexes – feel them to be.

我们只能希望2009年的危机同样地最后被证明是远远低于我们现在以直觉和历史回顾的方式��感觉到的那么剧烈。


One Hundred Years of Ineptitude

百年愚顽


BERLIN – The global financial and economic crisis that began in 2008 was the greatest economic stress-test since the Great Depression, and the greatest challenge to social and political systems since World War II.

柏林 — — 2008年爆发的全球金融和经济危机是自大萧条以来最严峻的一次经济压力测试，也是自二战以来社会和政治制度所面临的最严重挑战。


It not only put financial markets and currencies at risk; it also exposed serious regulatory and governance shortcomings that have yet to be fully addressed.

它不仅对金融市场和货币构成威胁；而且还暴露了迄今为止都无法完全解决的严重的监管和治理缺陷。


In fact, the 2008 crisis will most likely be remembered as a watershed moment, but not because it led to reforms that strengthened economic resilience and removed vulnerabilities.

事实上，2008年危机极有可能被视为一座分水岭，但却并非因为它导致了强化经济弹性和消除经济弱点的改革而永久留在人们的记忆当中。


On the contrary, leaders’ failure to discern, much less act on, the lessons of the Great Recession may open the way for a series of fresh crises, economic and otherwise, in the coming decades.

相反，领导人未能汲取大萧条的教训，更不用说为此采取相应的预防对策可能引发未来几十年一系列新的经济和其他危机。


However serious those crises turn out to be, historians a century from now will likely despair at our shortsightedness.

无论这些危机有多严重，一个世纪后的历史学家都极有可能绝望于我们的短视。


They will note that analysts and regulators were narrowly focused on fixing the financial system by strengthening national oversight regimes.

他们将会看到，分析人士和监管机构通过强化国家监管机制，仅仅是狭隘地专注于修复金融体系。


While this was a worthy goal, historians will point out, it was far from the only imperative.

尽管这一目标并非全无价值，但就像历史学家们所指出的那样，这绝不是唯一一件必须要做的事。


To prepare the world to confront the challenges posed by globalization and technological development in a way that supports sustainable and equitable growth, governance institutions and regulations at both the national and international levels must be drastically improved.

为使世界能够以确保可持续及平衡增长的方式来应对全球化和技术进步所带来的挑战，就必须对国内和国际两级治理机构和制度进行大规模升级。


Yet not nearly enough has been invested in this effort.

但目前这方面的投入还远远不够。


Beyond regional bodies like the European Union, international financial governance has remained largely untouched.

除欧盟等地区机构外，国际金融治理机构基本仍未受到波及。


Worse, because the partial fixes to the financial system will enable even more globalization, they will end up making matters worse, as strain on already-inadequate governance and regulatory frameworks increases, not only in finance, but also in other economic and technological fields.

更糟的是，因为部分修复金融体系将会带来进一步全球化，这些举措最终会恶化现有问题，因为此举不仅在金融、而且在其他经济和技术领域增加了对本已欠缺的治理和监管框架的压力。


Meanwhile, enormous financial investments focused on securing a higher rate of return are likely to fuel technological innovation, further stressing regulatory systems in finance and beyond.

此外，专注于提高回报率的巨额金融投资很有可能会推动技术创新，并由此进一步加大对金融和其他监管体系所造成的压力。


Major technological advances fueled by cheap money can cause markets to change so fast that policy and institutional change cannot keep up.

廉价资金推动的重大技术创新可以令市场变化速度快到政策和机构变化均无法适应。


And new markets can emerge that offer huge payoffs for early adopters or investors, who benefit from remaining several steps ahead of national and international regulators.

同时新市场的出现可以为早期进入者或投资者带来巨大的回报，并使他们可以持续受益于相对国内及国际监管机构的领先。


This is what happened in the run-up to the 2008 crisis.

这恰恰符合2008年危机爆发之前的情况。


New technology-enabled financial instruments created opportunities for some to make huge amounts of money.

新技术支持的金融工具为某些人赚取巨额利润创造了机遇。


But regulators were unable to keep up with the innovations, which ended up generating risks that affected the entire economy.

但监管机构却无法跟上创新的步伐，并最终酿成了影响整体经济的风险。


This points to a fundamental difference between global crises of the twenty-first century and, say, the Great Depression in the 1930s or, indeed, any past stock-market crashes.

这体现出21世纪的全球危机与20世纪30年代大萧条或过去任何一次股市崩盘之间的根本区别。


Because of the financial sector’s growth, more actors benefit from under-regulation and weak governance in the short term, making today’s crises more difficult to prevent.

金融行业持续增长导致更多参与主体从短期监管不足和治理薄弱中获益，从而使人们更加难以预防现在的危机。


Complicating matters further, the systems affected by today’s crises extend well beyond any one regulatory body’s jurisdiction.

令问题更加复杂的是，受当前危机影响的系统远远超过任何一个监管机构的监管范围。


That makes crises far unrulier, and their consequences – including their long-term influence on societies and politics – more difficult to predict.

这导致危机变得更加凶险，并导致人们更加难以对危机所产生后果 — — 包括社会和政治领域的长期后果 — — 进行预判。


The next crises – made more likely by rising nationalism and a growing disregard for science and fact-based policymaking – may be financial, but they could also implicate realms as varied as migration, trade, cyberspace, pollution, and climate change.

下一次危机 — — 因为民族主义情绪抬头和人们越来越无视基于科学和事实的决策而变得可能性愈来愈大 — — 可能涉及金融，但也可能涉及移民、贸易、网络空间、污染和气候变化等诸多领域。


In all of these areas, national and international governance institutions are weak or incomplete, and there are few independent actors, such as watchdog groups, demanding transparency and accountability.

在上述所有领域，国内和国际治理机构都力量薄弱或覆盖不完善，而且严重缺乏要求透明度和问责制的监督组织等独立行动主体。


This makes it harder not only to prevent crises – not least because it creates opportunities for actors to game the system and shirk responsibility – but also to respond to them.

这不仅加大了预防危机的难度 — — 尤其因为它为参与者提供了钻空子和逃避责任的机会 — — 还使得人们越来越难以采取措施来应对危机。


The 2008 crisis cast a harsh spotlight on just how bad we are at responding quickly to disasters, especially those fueled by fragmented governance.

2008年危机暴露出我们在面对灾难时的快速反应有多么薄弱，尤其当造成灾难的主要原因是分散治理。


To be sure, as the Hertie School’s 2018 Governance Report shows, there have been some improvements in preparing for and managing crises.

可以肯定，就像2018年赫蒂学院治理报告所表明的那样，人类在准备应对和管理危机方面取得了一定的进展。


But we must become more alert to how developments in a wide range of fields – from finance to digital technologies and climate change – can elude the governance capacities of national and international institutions.

但我们必须警惕更广泛领域的发展 — — 从金融到数字技术再到气候变化 — — 是以何种方式来规避国内和国际机构的治理监管。


We should be running crisis scenarios and preparing emergency plans for upheaval in all of these fields, and taking stronger steps to mitigate risks, including by managing debt levels, which today remain much higher in the advanced economies than they were before the 2008 crisis.

我们应当在上述所有领域进行危机情景预演并制定危机爆发之际的紧急计划，同时采取包括管理债务水平等更强有力的措施来降低风险，今天发达经济体的债务水平均远高于2008年危机爆发之前。


Moreover, we should ensure that we provide international institutions with the needed resources and responsibilities.

此外，我们应当确保赋予国际机构必要的监管责任和资源。


And by punishing those who exacerbate risks for the sake of their own interests, we would strengthen the legitimacy of global governance and the institutions that are meant to conduct it.

通过对那些因为自身利益而加剧风险的人进行惩戒，我们可以强化全球治理及其责任落实机构的合法地位。


As it stands, inadequate cross-border coordination and enforcement of international agreements is a major impediment to crisis prevention and management.

目前，跨境协调和国际协定落实不充分是危机预防和管理的主要障碍。


Yet, far from addressing this weakness, the world is reviving an outdated model of national sovereignty that makes crises of various kinds more likely.

但世界各国正在重新兴起过时的国家主权模式不但没有解决这个问题，而且增大了各种危机的爆发风险。


Unless we change course soon, the world of 2118 will have much reason to regard us with scorn.

除非我们尽快改变方向，否则2118年的世界将有足够的理由来鄙视我们。


What Failed in 2008?

2008年败在何处？


BERKELEY – To solve a problem, it is not enough to know what to do.

伯克利—要解决问题，光知道做什么是不够的。


You actually have to implement the solution – and be willing to change course if it turns out that you did not know quite as much as you thought.

你实际上必须实施解决办法 — — 并且在事实证明你知道的并不如你认为的那样多时，你得愿意改变办法。


That is the message of two recent books that, together, tell you everything you need to know about the 2008 financial crisis: what caused it, what can be done to prevent it from recurring, and why those things have yet to be done.

这就是两本新书一起告诉你的信息。 这两本新书讲述了你需要知道的关于2008年金融危机的一切：什么引起了金融危机，可以做什么防止它再次发生，以及为何这些事情还没有人去做。


The first book is The Shifts and the Shocks, by the conservative British journalist Martin Wolf, who begins by cataloguing the major shifts that set the stage for the economic disaster that continues to shape the world today.

第一本书是《变化和冲击 》 （ The Shifts and the Shocks ） ， 作者是保守派英国记者马丁·沃尔夫（Martin Wolf ） 。 在书的开头，他对酝酿了至今仍在影响世界的这场经济灾难的重要变化做了归纳编目。


His starting point is the huge rise in wealth among the world’s richest 0.1% and 0.01% and the consequent pressure for people, governments, and companies to take on increasingly unsustainable levels of debt.

首先，他指出世界最富有的0.1%和0.01%人群财富剧增，这给人民、政府和公司造成了日益不可持续的高负债的压力。


Meanwhile, policymakers were lulled into complacency by the widespread acceptance of economic theories such as the “efficient-market hypothesis,” which assumes that investors act rationally and use all available information when making their decisions.

与此同时，决策者因为“有效市场假说”等经济理论的广泛接受而志得意满，有效市场假说认为投资者的行为是理性的，在作出决策时会利用一切可获得的信心。


As a result, markets were deregulated, making it easier to trade assets that were perceived to be safe, but were in fact not.

结果，市场监管被放松，交易被认为安全但实际并不安全的资产变得更加容易。


As a result, systemic risk proliferated beyond central bankers’ wildest imagination.

结果，系统性风险悄然酝酿，并且超过了央行官员最大胆的想象。


Untested – and ultimately incorrect – assumptions created a policymaking environment defined by what can only be called hubris.

未受检验并且最终错误的假设形成了一个只能用狂妄自大形容的决策环境。


Officials underestimated tail risks.

官员低估了尾部风险。


They set inflation targets at around 2% – leaving little room for maneuver when the water got choppy.

它们将通胀目标设定在2%左右 — — 这意味着当波涛汹涌时他们根本没有多少施展空间。


And, most audaciously of all, the European Union introduced the euro as a common currency.

此外，最大胆的动作要数欧盟引入欧元作为共同货币。


Indeed, wrongheaded policymaking continued long after the crisis began.

事实上，方向错误的决策在危机开始后仍然能维持了很长时间。


Politicians responded to worsening economic conditions by hewing as closely as possible to failed prescriptions, making sure to do no more than absolutely necessary to address the biggest economic disaster since the Great Depression.

政客对恶化的经济条件的反应是坚定实施错误的药方，对于这场大萧条以来最严重的经济灾难，他们除了绝对需要做的事情意外什么都不做。


Wolf’s prescription for countering the crisis is simple, smart, and unassailable.

沃尔夫给抵御这场危机开出的药方简单、明智并且无懈可击。


In the short term, he suggests that countries with reserve currencies spend more (especially to finance public-sector investments) and issue more debt.

在短期，他建议拥有储备货币的国家增加支出（特别是公共部门投资融资 ） 、 发行更多债务。


Their central banks, he argues, should raise inflation targets to 3% or even 4% per year.

他指出，这些国家的央行应该将通胀目标提高到每年3%甚至4 % 。


Over the medium term, according to Wolf, countries need to put in place regulatory measures that lower debt levels and discourage overleveraging.

在中期，沃尔夫认为各国需要实施监管措施降低债务水平、阻止过度举债。


The eurozone, too, must resolve its internal contradictions, either by disbanding or by introducing “a minimum set of institutions and policies” that allow the monetary union to function properly.

欧元区也必须解决其内部矛盾，要么通过解散欧元区实现，要么通过引入能令货币联盟正常运行的“最小限度的机构和政策组合”实现。


Wolf’s long-term solutions include tackling inequality, “more global regulation,” a greater degree of “freedom for individual countries to craft their own responses,” and economic analysis that is less in thrall to the free-market ideologues that led us into the crisis in the first place.

沃尔夫的长期解决方案包括遏制不平等 、 “ 更加全球化的监管 ” 、 更大程度的“个体国家自己决定反应方式的自由”以及更少受到自由市场思想束缚的经济分析。 一开始正是自由市场思想让我们陷入了危机。


And yet, as recommendable as Wolf’s proposals may be, little has been done to implement them.

但是，尽管沃尔夫的方案值得推荐，但几乎没有任何实施。


The reasons why are found in the second book: Hall of Mirrors, by my friend, teacher, and patron, Barry Eichengreen.

原因可以从第二本书中找到：由我的朋友、老师和“老板”巴里·艾肯格林（Barry Eichengreen）所著的《镜厅 》 （ Hall of Mirrors ） 。


Eichengreen traces our tepid response to the crisis to the triumph of monetarist economists, the disciples of Milton Friedman, over their Keynesian and Minskyite peers – at least when it comes to interpretations of the causes and consequences of the Great Depression.

艾肯格林认为，我们对这场危机反应不温不火，原因要追溯到作为弗里德曼（MiltonFriedman）门徒的���币经济学家对凯恩斯主义和明斯基（MInskyite）主义同行的胜利 — — 至少在解释大萧条的原因和后果方面是如此。


When the 2008 financial crisis erupted, policymakers tried to apply Friedman’s proposed solutions to the Great Depression.

2008年金融危机爆发时，决策者试图使用弗里德曼提出的大萧条方案。


Unfortunately, this turned out to be the wrong thing to do, as the monetarist interpretation of the Great Depression was, to put it bluntly, wrong in significant respects and radically incomplete.

不幸的是，事实证明这是错的，直言不讳地说，货币主义者对大萧条的解释在众多方面都是错误的，并且非常不完整。


The resulting policies were enough to prevent the post-2008 recession from developing into a full-blown depression; but that partial success turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory, for it allowed politicians to declare that the crisis had been overcome, and that it was time to embrace austerity and focus on structural reform.

由此产生的政策足以阻止2008年后的衰退演变为完全的萧条；但这一局部成功的代价也是巨大的，它让政客宣布危机已经被克服，应该采取紧缩并专注于结构改革。


The result is today’s stagnant economy, marked by anemic growth that threatens to become the new normal.

结果就是现在的经济停滞，其特征是增长无力并且随时可能成为新常态。


The United States and Europe are on track to have thrown away 10% of their potential wealth, while the failure to strengthen financial-sector regulation has left the world economy exposed to the risk of another major crisis.

美国和欧洲损失了10%的潜在财富，而没有强化金融部门监管让世界经济随时可能迎来新一场大危机。


Wolf and Eichengreen would agree that the main shortcomings that led to the 2008 financial crisis – and that continue to underpin our inadequate response to it – are intellectual.

沃尔夫和艾肯格林会认为，导致2008年金融危机的主要缺陷 — — 以及继续破坏我们对危机的不充分反应的主要缺陷 — — 是知识缺陷。


Indeed, the only true lesson of the crisis so far seems to be that its lessons will never truly be learned.

事实上，到目前为止，危机的唯一真正教训是它的教训从未被真正汲取。


A Comeback Strategy for Europe

欧洲的重振战略


STOCKHOLM/MADRID – When Pope Francis addressed the European Parliament last November, he compared the European Union to a grandmother – pleasant and rich with experience, but lacking the vitality and energy of the past.

斯托克霍姆/马德里—去年11月，教皇方济各在其欧洲议会演讲中将欧盟比作祖母 — — 和蔼而富于经验，但已不再有过去的活力和能量。


It is high time, Francis argued, that EU leaders shed their dozy image, recognize the strategic challenges that Europe faces, and forge a clear policy for tackling them.

方济各说，现在是一个关键时刻，欧盟领导人必须摆脱懈怠形象，承认欧洲所面临的战略挑战，并构建应对挑战的明确政策。


Admittedly, the pope’s characterization was alarmingly accurate in some respects.

诚然，教皇的描述在某些角度讲非常准确。


But, despite its seeming lassitude, Europe retains significant strengths.

但是，尽管欧洲看起来疲态尽露，但仍拥有巨大优势。


It is a hub of high-level thought and innovation; it is home to some of the world’s most competitive regions and industries; and, perhaps most impressive, it has built a community and market encompassing a half-billion people.

欧洲是高水平思想和创新的枢纽；是世界最有竞争力地区和产业的所在地；最重要的是，它还构建了一个由五亿人组成的社会和市场。


But the world is changing: the Asia-Pacific region is increasingly influencing global developments, economic and otherwise.

但世界正在变化：亚太地区正在日益影响全球经济和其他发展趋势。


The Trans-Pacific Partnership – by which the United States and 11 other countries would create a mega-regional free-trade zone – would most likely accelerate this shift (all the more so if China eventually joins).

跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（Trans-Pacific Partnership，TPP，由美国和其他11国建立的巨型地区自由贸易区）很有可能加速这一变革（如果中国最终也能加入就更加如此了 ） 。


Though the TPP faces no shortage of hurdles to clear before an agreement is finalized, its potential to augment Asia’s economic power cannot be underestimated.

尽管TPP距离最终完成协议还有很多障碍需要跨越，但其扩大亚洲经济实力的潜力绝不容���觑。


Europe must work to secure its position in the new world order – beginning by enhancing its own trade and investment ties with the US.

欧洲必须致力于确保其在新世界秩序中的地位 — — 首先要强化其自身与美国的贸易和投资联系。


The problem is that, as the TPP negotiations progress, talks on the EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) have become so deeply mired in domestic controversies that the entire project may well be scuttled.

在TPP谈判不断推进的同时，欧盟-美国跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系（Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership，TTIP）谈判却深陷国内矛盾的掣肘，整个工程都有可能夭折。


Business leaders on both sides of the Atlantic are convinced that a successful TTIP agreement would bring substantial economic benefits – a perception that many studies reinforce.

大西洋两岸的商业领袖相信，成功的TTIP协议将带来巨大的经济收益 — — 许多研究都强化了这一感觉。


Yet trivial issues – for example, the use of chlorinated chicken and settlements of investor disputes – continue to dominate the debate.

但一些微妙的问题 — — 比如“氯化鸡 ” （ 欧洲怀疑美国鸡肉进入市场前都用氯消毒）和投资者纠纷和解等问题 — — 仍主导着争论。


The TTIP’s goal is to unleash the power of the transatlantic economy, which remains by far the world’s largest and wealthiest market, accounting for three-quarters of global financial activity and more than half of world trade.

TTIP的目标是释放跨大西洋经济的力量 — — 目前大西洋两岸仍是世界最大最富有的市场，占全球金融活动的四分之三和世界贸易量的一大半。


(If the TTIP was opened to other economies – such as Turkey, Mexico, and Canada – the benefits would be even greater.)

（如果TTIP向其他经济体开放 — — 比如土耳其、墨西哥和加拿大 — — 则收益还将更大。 ）


Even more compelling than the benefits of achieving an agreement, though, are the potentially catastrophic consequences of failure.

但是，比达成协议的好处更加让人感到必须成功的是谈判失败可能带来的灾难性结果。


For starters, a breakdown of TTIP talks would give considerable ammunition to those in the United Kingdom who advocate withdrawal from the EU; conversely, if the TTIP were implemented, the UK would be unwise – and thus unlikely – to leave.

首先，TTIP谈判的破裂将极大地加强英国鼓吹离开欧盟阵营的力量；反之，如果TTIP获得实施，英国离开欧盟将是不明智之举，因此也不会发生。


Moreover, the perception that the EU’s internal squabbles had led it to squander a strategic opportunity would probably drive the US to accelerate its disengagement from the continent.

此外，欧洲的内讧导致其白白浪费了一个战略机会，这一感觉可能促使美国加速远离欧洲。


And Russian President Vladimir Putin would invariably regard the EU’s failure as a major opportunity to exert more influence over parts of Europe.

而俄罗斯总统普京也必然会将欧洲的失败视为影响欧洲更多地区的良机。


All of this contributes to a starkly fundamental strategic risk: If the TTIP stalls or collapses, while the TPP moves forward and succeeds, the global balance will tip strongly in Asia’s favor – and Europe will have few options, if any, for regaining its economic and geopolitical influence.

所有这些凸显出一个根本新战略风险：如果TTIP无法取得进展或失败，而TPP取得进展并成功，则全球平衡将朝着极有利于亚洲的方向发展 — — 欧洲极有可能无法重振其经济和地缘政治影响力。


When the TTIP was first proposed, Europe seemed to recognize its value.

TTIP首次提出时，欧洲似乎能够认识到其价值。


Indeed, it was the EU that pushed the US, which initially doubted Europe’s commitment, to launch the negotiation process in June 2013.

事实上，是欧洲推动一开始对欧洲的承诺有所怀疑的美国在2013年6月启动了谈判程序。


The ambition was to complete the negotiations on “one tank of gas.”

当时人们雄心万丈，意图“一鼓作气”完成谈判。


No one wanted to endure protracted talks – or the associated political pain.

没人想让谈判长久拖延 — — 或忍受因此带来的政治痛苦。


But EU leaders essentially abandoned the project, seemingly confirming American fears.

但欧盟领导人在事实上抛弃了这一工程，而这也印证了美国的担心。


Trade negotiators struggled to make headway, while anti-globalization groups seized control of the public discourse, presenting the TTIP as a threat to everything from Europe’s democracy to its health.

贸易谈判在挣扎中前行，而反全球化组织掌握了公共观点的控制权，将TTIP描述为对一切事物的威胁 — — 从欧洲的民主到欧洲的健康莫不如此。


This is dangerously inaccurate talk, and EU leaders must prevent it from gaining any more traction by making the strategic case for the agreement.

这是非常危险的错误言论，欧盟领导人必须拿出推进TTIP的战略性理由，从而阻止这一言论获得更大的市场。


And they must revive their commitment to conclude the talks successfully in 2015.

他们还必须重振2015年成功完成谈判的承诺。


This is not to say that resolving the remaining issues in the TTIP negotiations will be simple.

这并不是说解决TTIP谈判中仍然存在的问题轻而易举。


But establishing a trade agreement, especially one that entails so many regulatory issues, is always difficult, as it must account for the complexity and changeability of modern economies.

但签订贸易协议，特别是包含如此多监管问题的贸易协议，永远不是件容易事，因为它必须考虑到现代经济的复杂性和易变性。


The fact is that the challenges inherent in completing the TTIP are no more intractable than those that EU leaders have faced in the last few years of crisis.

事实上，完成TTIP所包含的挑战并不比欧盟领导人在过去几年的危机中所遇到的挑战更棘手。


When the TTIP negotiations resume next month, EU leaders must push for genuine progress, with the goal of completing a deal by the end of the year.

TTIP谈判将在下个月重启，届时欧盟领导人必须推动真正的进展，并以在年底完成协议为目标。


The good news is that the recent midterm elections in the US might have improved their chances.

好消息是最近的美国中期选举有可能增加他们成功的机会。


President Barack Obama now might get so-called fast-track negotiating authority from Congress.

现在，美国总统奥巴马可能将从国会获得所谓的快速谈判授权。


If he does, Congress would simply approve or reject any negotiated agreement, rather than picking it apart.

果真如此的话，美国国会将对谈成的协议予以批准或否决，而不能束之高阁。


The US presidential election season is starting, and other issues in the new year could easily take over the EU agenda.

美国总统竞选季即将来开帷幕，在新的一年里，其他问题可能轻而易举地取代欧盟日程。


That is why Europe’s leaders have no time to waste.

正因如此，欧洲领导人已无时间可以浪费。


They must seize economic opportunity – and avert strategic disaster.

他们必须抓住经济机会 — — 并避免战略灾难。


The Year That Ended an Epoch?

标志着时代终结的一年？


MADRID – As 2016 comes to an end, the outlook for 2017 is shrouded in uncertainty.

马德里 — — 随着2016年的结束，2017年的前景被不确定性所笼罩。


Tensions in the Middle East are rising, and populist movements have appeared in Europe and the United States.

中东紧张局势正在加剧，欧洲和美国出现了民粹主义运动。


In the Middle East, the tragic conflict in Syria continues, despite several fruitless attempts at rapprochement, which were marred by the fundamental disagreement about Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s future role in any peace process or political transition.

因为对叙利亚总统巴沙尔·阿萨德未来在和平进程或政治过渡中所起的作用存在根本性的分歧，在几次修复关系的努力无果而终后，中东的叙利亚悲剧性冲突仍将继续下去。


Meanwhile, over the past week, Syrian government troops, backed by Russia and Iran, have retaken almost all of Aleppo – once Syria’s largest city, now utterly devastated by the war.

此外，过去一周，叙利亚政府军在俄罗斯和伊朗的支持下，已经夺回了几乎整个阿勒颇 — — 阿勒颇曾是叙利亚最大的城市，现在已经彻底毁灭在战火之中。


The world’s priority for the coming year must be to achieve peace in Syria, which will require close regional and international cooperation.

世界各国来年的首要任务必须是通过密切的地区和国际合作来实现叙利亚和平。


On December 27, Iran, Russia, and Turkey will hold a tripartite meeting in Moscow to discuss a political solution for the Syria conflict.

12月27日，伊朗、俄罗斯和土耳其将在莫斯科举行三方会议，探讨政治解决叙利亚冲突。


That meeting, if it takes place, is likely to be overshadowed by the fallout from the assassination of Russia’s ambassador to Turkey.

如果那次会议真的召开，也有可能笼罩在俄罗斯驻土耳其大使被杀的阴影当中。


But it is nothing if not surprising that these parties, and not the US and the European Union, would be negotiating such an agreement.

最出人意料的是居然是俄、伊、土三方，而非美国和欧盟，参与谈判这样的协定。


One positive development this year came in March, when the EU and Turkey signed an agreement to address the refugee crisis.

今年的积极进展出现在3月份，当时欧盟和土耳其就解决难民危机的协议达成。


Turkey has now taken in some three million Syrian refugees since the beginning of the conflict.

从这次冲突开始到现在，土耳其已经接收了约300万叙利亚难民。


Although EU-Turkey relations are currently not at their best, the dialogue between the two sides must continue in 2017, not least because of their common interests, which are based not only on economic interdependence, but also on the refugee crisis and the collective fight against terrorism.

尽管欧盟土耳其关系现在并不在历史高点，但双方必须在2017年继续对话，尤其因为双方拥有基于经济相互依存、难民危机及反恐集体斗争等诸多共同利益。


European politics next year, meanwhile, will be consumed by the Brexit negotiations.

此外，英国退欧谈判将影响明年的欧洲政治。


In March, the United Kingdom will likely invoke Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon, triggering the formal procedure for withdrawal from the EU.

英国或将于3月启动《里斯本条约》第五十条，从而触发退出欧盟的正式程序。


The challenge will be to reach an agreement that guarantees the wellbeing of future EU-UK relations.

难点在于就确保未来欧盟-英国关系健康发展达成一致。


This will not be easy, and EU negotiators have already set a timeline of only 18 months.

做到这一点绝非易事。 欧盟谈判人员已经制订了仅有18个月的时间表。


While much remains uncertain, what is clear is that if the UK wants to retain access to the European single market, it will have to accept the EU’s four freedoms, including the free movement of workers.

虽然不确定因素仍然很多，但有一点十分明确，即如果英国想要保留单一市场准入权，就必须接受包括劳动力自由流动在内的欧盟四项自由政策。


In 2017, several European countries will hold general elections, and there is a risk that isolationist, anti-European populist movements will make a strong showing.

有几个欧洲国家将在2017年举行大选，孤立主义者、反欧洲民粹运动或将在此期间表现强势。


For the EU to lose a country as militarily and economically important as the UK is bad enough; but to lose a founding EU member state, such as France, would be tragic.

对欧盟而言，失去像英国这样在军事和经济上都很重要的国家无疑是一种打击；但失去法国这样的创始成员国或将酿成悲剧性的后果。


Fortunately, many Europeans’ views toward the EU actually improved in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum.

幸运的是，许多欧洲人对欧盟的看法事实上在英国退欧公投后有改善的迹象。


But this will not lessen the challenge for EU governments in the year ahead.

但这并不意味着欧盟政府在今后一年所面临的挑战减轻。


They must unite societies divided by powerful global forces, such as globalization and rapid technological innovation.

他们必须重新团结被全球化和快速技术创新等强劲全球势力切割得四分五裂的社会。


The Brexit referendum, followed by Donald Trump’s victory in the US presidential election, signaled the rise of populism in the West.

英国退欧公投、而后是唐纳德·特朗普在美国总统大选中的获胜标志着西方民粹主义势力抬头。


But now that Trump is filling his cabinet with oligarchs and former military men, we have reason to doubt that he will keep his promise to govern without the Washington “establishment.”

但现在，特朗普正在征召寡头和前军人进入其内阁，我们有理由质疑他是否会履行自己摆脱华盛顿“建制派”进行治理的承诺。


Trump’s incoming administration is full of unknowns, but there can be no doubt that his rejection of multilateral institutions will endanger international efforts to cooperate on solutions to the world’s biggest problems.

特朗普即将执政的新内阁充满了未知数，但毫无疑问他对多边机构的抗拒会危及合作解决全球最严重问题的工作。


This holds peril for US-EU relations.

这必将对美国-欧盟关系构成威胁。


In previous years, the Paris climate agreement and the nuclear agreement with Iran were rays of light in a world closing itself off to multilateralism.

过去几年，巴黎气候协议及伊朗核协议曾为这个远离多边主义的世界带来一线曙光。


In the coming years, such rays may become scarcer still.

而在未来几年，这样的曙光会变得越来越稀有。


Now more than ever, we need the kind of dialogue that builds strategic trust between great powers.

现在比以往任何时候都更需要在大国间建立战略互信的对话。


And yet, Trump’s statements casting doubt on continued US adherence to a “One China” policy vis-à-vis Taiwan could severely damage relations between the world’s two largest economies.

而特朗普质疑美国是否将继续坚持“一个中国”政策的声明极有可能严重损害世界两大经济体之间的关系。


Similarly, notwithstanding the pro-Russian leanings of some among Trump’s team, the US-Russian relationship also lacks strategic trust, owing to Russia’s military intervention in Syria, its invasion of eastern Ukraine, and its alleged interference in the US election.

同样，尽管特朗普团队不乏一定程度的亲俄倾向，但因为俄罗斯军事入侵叙利亚、东乌克兰以及干涉美国大选的指控，美俄关系同样缺乏战略互信。


The coming year will be particularly important for Europe.

来年对欧洲而言尤其重要。


Relations between the EU and the US must remain strong, rooted in mutual respect for democracy, freedom, and human rights.

植根于对民主、自由和人权的共同尊重，欧盟和美国之间的关系必须保持稳固。


After a turbulent 2016, and with little positive news in international politics, 2017 is shaping up to be a year of challenges and uncertainty.

在充满动荡的2016年后，因为国际政治中几乎鲜有积极消息，2017年注定充满挑战和不确定性。


But the biggest uncertainty of all is whether this is simply the end of another year, or the end of a geopolitical epoch.

但最大的不确定性却是2016年仅仅是又一年的结束，还是整个地缘政治时代的终结。


Another Slow Year for the Global Economy

全球经济缓慢增长又一年


WASHINGTON, DC – Last April, the International Monetary Fund projected that the world economy would grow by 3.5% in 2015.

华盛顿—去年4月，国际货币基金组织（IMF）预测2015年世界经济将增长3.5 % 。


In the ensuing months, that forecast was steadily whittled down, reaching 3.1% in October.

在随后的几个月中，这一预测被逐步调低，10月份时下降到3.1 % 。


But the IMF continues to insist – as it has, with almost banal predictability, for the last seven years – that next year will be better.

但IMF仍然坚持 — — 在过去七年中它一贯如此，几乎没有什么预见性可言 — — 明年会更好。


But it is almost certainly wrong yet again.

但几乎可以肯定，IMF又错了。


For starters, world trade is growing at an anemic annual rate of 2%, compared to 8% from 2003 to 2007.

首先，世界贸易年增长率只有区区2 % ， 而2003—2007年间高达8 % 。


Whereas trade growth during those heady years far exceeded that of world GDP, which averaged 4.5%, lately, trade and GDP growth rates have been about the same.

这几年中，贸易增长远远高于世界GDP（平均增长率为4.5 % ） ，但最近贸易和GDP增长大致相当。


Even if GDP growth outstrips growth in trade this year, it will likely amount to no more than 2.7%.

即使今年GDP增长超过贸易增长，也可能无法超过2.7 % 。


The question is why.

问题在于为什么。


According to Christina and David Romer of the University of California, Berkeley, the aftershocks of modern financial crises – that is, since World War II – fade after 2-3 years.

据加州大学伯克利分校的克里斯蒂娜和大卫·罗默（Christina and David Romer ） ， 现代金融危机（二战后）的余波会持续2—3年时间才会消失。


The Harvard economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff say that it takes five years for a country to dig itself out of a financial crisis.

哈佛大学经济学家卡门·莱因哈特（Carmen Reinhart）和肯尼斯·罗格夫（Kenneth Rogoff）说，一国需要五年时间才能从金融危机中走出。


And, indeed, the financial dislocations of 2007-2008 have largely receded.

而事实上，2007—2008年的金融动荡已经基本消失。


So what accounts for the sluggish economic recovery?

因此，是什么导致了经济复苏滞后？


One popular explanation lies in the fuzzy notion of “secular stagnation”: long-term depressed demand for goods and services is undermining incentives to invest and hire.

一个流行的解释是一个叫作“长期停滞”的模糊概念 — — 长期受到抑制的商品和服务需求破坏了投资和招聘激励。


But demand would remain weak only if people lacked confidence in the future.

但需求只有在人们对未来信心不足时才会持续低迷。


The only logical explanation for this enduring lack of confidence, as Northwestern University’s Robert Gordon has painstakingly documented and argued, is slow productivity growth.

这一信心持续缺失的唯一符合逻辑的解释，正如西北大学的罗伯特·戈登（Robert Gordon）费煞苦心地记录和论证的，是生产率增长缓慢。


Before the crisis – and especially from 2003 to 2007 – slow productivity growth was being obscured by an illusory sense of prosperity in much of the world.

危机前，特别是2003—2007年，生产率增长缓慢被一种世界大部分国家都在欣欣向荣的幻觉所蒙蔽。


In some countries – notably, the United States, Spain, and Ireland – rising real-estate prices, speculative construction, and financial risk-taking were mutually reinforcing.

在一些国家 — — 特别是美国、西班牙和爱尔兰 — — 高升的放假、投机性建设和金融冒险互相强化。


At the same time, countries were amplifying one another’s growth through trade.

与此同时，各国通过贸易放大彼此的增长。


Central to the global boom was China, the rising giant that flooded the world with cheap exports, putting a lid on global inflation.

这场全球繁荣的核心是中国，这个崛起的巨无霸向全世界输出廉价出口品，遏制了全球通胀。


Equally important, China imported a huge volume of commodities, thereby bolstering many African and Latin American economies, and purchased German cars and machines, enabling Europe’s largest economy to keep its regional supply chains humming.

同样重要的是，中国进口了巨量大宗商品，从而提振了许多非洲和拉丁美洲经济体；还购买了大量德国汽车和机器，让欧洲最大经济体保持其地区供应链满负荷运行。


This dynamic reversed around March 2008, when the US rescued its fifth-largest investment bank, Bear Sterns, from collapse.

这一动态在2008年3月左右发生了逆转。 当时，美国拯救了其第五大投资银行贝尔斯登，使其免于破产。


With the eurozone banks also deeply implicated in the subprime mortgage mess and desperately short of US dollars, America and much of Europe began a remorseless slide into recession.

欧元区银行业深陷次贷乱局，急缺美元，因此美国和欧洲的大部开始滑向衰退。


Whereas in the boom years, world trade had spread the bounty, it was now spreading the malaise.

在繁荣年份，世界贸易传播着财富，而如今，世界贸易传播着经济萎靡。


As each country’s GDP growth slowed, so did its imports, causing its trading partners’ growth to slow as well.

随着各国GDP增长的放缓，进口也开始放缓，贸易伙伴的增长也随之放缓。


The US economy began to emerge from its recession in the second half of 2009, thanks largely to aggressive monetary policy and steps to stabilize the financial system.

美国经济从2009年下半年开始走出衰退，这主要是为稳定金融体系而采取的激进货币政策和措施的功劳。


Eurozone policymakers, by contrast, rejected monetary stimulus and implemented fiscal austerity measures, while ignoring the deepening distress of their banks.

相反，欧洲决策者拒绝采取货币刺激而实施了财政紧缩，无视其银行压力的加剧。


The eurozone thus pushed the world into a second global recession.

于是，欧元区将世界拖入了第二场全球衰退。


Just when that recession seemed to have run its course, emerging economies began to unravel.

而正当这场衰退眼看就要痊愈时，新兴经济体开始崩溃。


For years, observers had been touting the governance and growth-enhancing reforms that these countries’ leaders had supposedly introduced.

多年来，观察家们一直在鼓吹这些国家领导人如何如何实施治理和刺激增长的改革。


In October 2012, the IMF celebrated emerging economies’ “resilience.”

2012年10月，IMF大大赞扬了新兴经济体的“恢复力 ” 。


As if on cue, that facade began to crumble, revealing an inconvenient truth: factors like high commodity prices and massive capital inflows had been concealing serious economic weaknesses, while legitimizing a culture of garish inequality and rampant corruption.

恰逢此时，门面撑不住了，暴露出一个令人不快的事实：大宗商品价格高企和大规模资本流入等因素掩盖了严重的经济弱点，也让剧烈的不平等性和无孔不入的腐败成为合法的文化。


These problems are now being compounded by the growth slowdown in China, the fulcrum of global trade.

如今，这些问题因为全球贸易的支柱 — — 中国增长放缓而雪上加霜。


And the worst is yet to come.

而最坏的时刻还没有到来。


China’s huge industrial overcapacity and property glut needs to be wound down; the hubris driving its global acquisitions must be reined in; and its corruption networks have to be dismantled.

中国巨大的工业过剩产能和房地产过剩还没有消化；推动其全球兼并的傲慢必须得到遏制；其腐败网络也必须打破。


In short, the factors that dragged down the global economy in 2015 will persist – and in some cases even intensify – in the new year.

简言之，2015年拖累全球经济的因素在新的一年里还会持续 — — 有的甚至还会加剧。


Emerging economies will remain weak.

新兴经济体将继续疲软。


The eurozone, having enjoyed a temporary reprieve from austerity, will be constrained by listless global trade.

暂时摆脱了紧缩的欧元区将受到全球贸易萎靡的束缚。


Rising interest rates on corporate bonds portend slower growth in the US.

公司债券利率的提高预示美国增长减速。


China’s collapsing asset values could trigger financial turbulence.

中国资产价值崩盘可能引发金融动荡。


And policymakers are adrift, with little political leverage to stem these trends.

而决策者就像是无根之木，没有政治手段来遏制这些趋势。


The IMF should stop forecasting renewed growth and issue a warning that the global economy will remain weak and vulnerable unless world leaders act energetically to spur innovation and growth.

IMF应该停止更新增长预测，而是发布警告：全球经济将继续保持萎靡和脆弱，除非世界领导人着力刺激创新和增长。


Such an effort is long overdue.

这样的措施早就应该实行了。


Trumpian Uncertainty

特朗普的不确定性


NEW YORK – Every January, I try to craft a forecast for the coming year.

发自纽约 — — 每年一月，我都会尝试对未来一年作出预测。


Economic forecasting is notoriously difficult; but, notwithstanding the truth expressed in Harry Truman’s request for a one-armed economist (who wouldn’t be able to say “on the other hand”), my record has been credible.

经济预测是件极为困难的事情；以至于哈里·杜鲁门总统（Harry Truman）曾要求手下给他找一位独臂经济学家 — — 这样此人就无法模棱两可地说“另一方面（on the other hand ） ” 了 — — 但一直以来我的预测还是靠谱的。


In recent years, I correctly foresaw that, in the absence of stronger fiscal stimulus (which was not forthcoming in either Europe or the United States), recovery from the Great Recession of 2008 would be slow.

这几年来我正确地预见到，在缺乏更强有力财政刺激政策（在欧洲或美国都一样）的情况下，2008年大衰退的复苏进程将较为缓慢。


In making these forecasts, I have relied more on analysis of underlying economic forces than on complex econometric models.

同时我的预测更多地依赖于对基本经济力量的分析，而非复杂的经济计量模型。


For example, at the beginning of 2016, it seemed clear that the deficiencies of global aggregate demand that have been manifest for the last several years were unlikely to change dramatically.

例如在2016年初，很显然在过去几年中呈现的全球总需求不足将不大可能出现巨大改变。


Thus, I thought that forecasters of a stronger recovery were looking at the world through rose-tinted glasses. Economic developments unfolded much as I anticipated.

因此我认为那些相信会实现强劲复苏的预测者是过于乐观了，最终实际的经济发展也与我的预测一致。


Not so the political events of 2016.

2016年的政治事件也是如此。


I had been writing for years that unless growing inequality – especially in the US, but also in many countries throughout the world – was addressed, there would be political consequences.

多年来我一直指出，除非在全球许多国家（尤其是美国）日益严重的不平等问题得到解决，否则必将产生某些政治后果。


But inequality continued to worsen – with striking data showing that average life expectancy in the US was on the decline.

但不平等状况依然持续恶化 — — 令人震惊的数据显示，美国的预期平均寿命正在下降。


These results were foreshadowed by a study last year, by Anne Case and Angus Deaton, which showed that life expectancy was on the decline for large segments of the population – including America’s so-called angry men of the Rust Belt.

正如安娜·凯斯（Anne Case）和安格斯·迪顿（Angus Deaton）的一项研究表明：美国大部分人口的预期寿命都在下降，包括所谓北部老工业区的愤怒居民们。


But, with the incomes of the bottom 90% having stagnated for close to a third of a century (and declining for a significant proportion), the health data simply confirmed that things were not going well for very large swaths of the country.

而由于90％的底层人士收入增长已经停滞了将近1/3个世纪（且其中很大比例都出现了下滑 ） ， 医疗数据清晰明白地证实了美国大部分地区处境不妙。


And while America might be at the extreme of this trend, things were little better elsewhere.

但美国可能处于这种趋势的极端，其他地方的情况会好一点。


But, if it seemed clear that there would be political consequences, their form and timing were far less obvious.

但如果这似乎必然预示着某些政治后果，那么其形式和时间就不那么明显了。


Why did the backlash in the US come just when the economy seemed to be on the mend, rather than earlier?

为什么美国的下行会在经济恢复期出现，而不是更为提前？


And why did it manifest itself in a lurch to the right?

为何这会表现为政治右倾？


After all, it was the Republicans who had blocked assistance to those losing their jobs as a result of the globalization they pushed assiduously. It was the Republicans who, in 26 states, refused to allow the expansion of Medicaid, thereby denying health insurance to those at the bottom.

毕竟正是共和党人拒绝援助那些因他们全力推动全球化而失业的人们，是共和党人否决在26个州扩大医疗补助，从而拒绝为底层的人提供医疗保险。


And why was the victor somebody who made his living from taking advantage of others, openly admitted not paying his fair share of taxes, and made tax avoidance a point of pride?

为什么一个依靠占他人便宜来谋生，公开承认并未支付合理份额税收，并以避税为荣的人会成为大选最终赢家？


Donald Trump grasped the spirit of the time: things weren’t going well, and many voters wanted change.

唐纳德·特朗普（Donald Trump）抓住了时代精神：境况不佳，许多选民都想来点改变。


Now they will get it: there will be no business as usual. But seldom has there been more uncertainty.

但如今他们会意识到真相：再也没有什么常态可言，但也不会存在更多的不确定性。


Which policies Trump will pursue remains unknown, to say nothing of which will succeed or what the consequences will be.

特朗普将实施何种政策仍然是未知之数，更遑论哪些政策将会成功或者后果将是什么了。


Trump seems hell-bent on having a trade war.

特朗普似乎拼命想发起一场贸易战。


But how will China and Mexico respond?

那么中国和墨西哥将如何应对？


Trump may well understand that what he proposes will violate World Trade Organization rules, but he may also know that it will take a long time for the WTO to rule against him.

特朗普清楚知道他的提议会违反世贸规则，但他估计也明白世贸组织需要很长时间来推翻这一做法。


And by then, America’s trade account may have been rebalanced.

到那时候美国的贸易账户可能早就实现重新平衡了。


But two can play that game: China can take similar actions, though its response is likely to be more subtle.

但这个博弈可是双方面的：中国也可以采取类似但更为隐秘微妙的行动。


If a trade war were to break out, what would happen?

那么如果真爆发一场贸易战的话，将会出现何种状况？


Trump may have reason to think he could win; after all, China is more dependent on exports to the US than the US is on exports to China, which gives the US an advantage.

特朗普可能觉得自己有把握能赢；毕竟中国对向美国出口的依赖要强于美国对中国出口，这是美国的优势。


But a trade war is not a zero-sum game. The US stands to lose as well.

但贸易战可不是一场此消彼长的零和游戏，美国也会输。


China may be more effective in targeting its retaliation to cause acute political pain.

中国的报复可能更具针对性，足以对美国造成严重的政治压力。


And the Chinese may be in a better position to respond to US attempts to inflict pain on them than the US is to respond to the pain that China might inflict on Americans.

而中国人可能比美国人处于更有利的地位来应对对方施加的危机。


It’s anybody’s guess who can stand the pain better.

大家都在猜测谁的承受能力更强：是普通民众在泥潭里长期挣扎的美国？


Will it be the US, where ordinary citizens have already suffered for so long, or China, which, despite troubled times, has managed to generate growth in excess of 6%?

还是即便在困难时期也得以实现超过6％增长的中国？


More broadly, the Republican/Trump agenda, with its tax cuts even more weighted toward the rich than the standard GOP recipe would imply, is based on the idea of trickle-down prosperity – a continuation of the Reagan era’s supply-side economics, which never actually worked.

更宏观地看来，共和党/特朗普的议程 — — 其税收削减甚至比标准的共和党方案更为偏袒富人 — — 意味着这些政策都是基于涓滴繁荣（富人多赚钱消费从而穷人有工作）的理念，也是里根时代供给侧经济学政策的延续 — — 但这一政策从未奏效过。


Fire-breathing rhetoric, or raving three a.m. tweets, may assuage the anger of those left behind by the Reagan revolution, at least for a while.

惹火的言论或者半夜三点在推特上发表的胡言乱语至少能在一段时间内安抚那些被里根革命所抛弃的愤世者。


But for how long?

但这能维持要多久呢？


And what happens then?

随后又会是何种状况？


Trump might like to repeal the ordinary laws of economics, as he goes about his version of voodoo economics. But he can’t.

特朗普可能喜欢颠覆常规的经济学法则，因为他乐于奉行自己那一套巫术经济学，但这是行不通的。


Still, as the world’s largest economy leads the way into uncharted political waters in 2017 and beyond, it would be foolhardy for a mere mortal to attempt a forecast, other than to state the obvious: the waters will almost certainly be choppy, and many – if not most – pundit ships will sink along the way.

而随着美国这个全球最大经济体在2017年及以后的年月进入一片未知的政治水域，除了指出一些显而易见的事实之外，任何人类的预测都是不智的：这片水域几乎肯定会激起风浪，而许多 — — 如果不是大多数 — — 预测专家的航船也将随之倾覆沉没。


9/11 and the New Authoritarianism

9/11和新独裁专制主义


Five years after the attacks on the Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, “9/11” is no longer a mere date.

袭击纽约双子塔和华盛顿五角大楼五年后 ， “ 9/11”已经不再仅仅是一个日期了。


It has entered the history books as the beginning of something new, a new era perhaps, but in any case a time of change.

它已经作为一个变革时代的某种开端或者是一个新的时代的开始而载入史册。


The terrorist bombings in Madrid and London and elsewhere will also be remembered; but it is “9/11” that has become the catchphrase, almost like “August 1914.”

恐怖分子在马德里和伦敦以及其他地方制造的爆炸事件也将被人铭记；但是，只有“9/11”几乎像“1914年8月”那样成为了流行语。


But was it really a war that started on September 11, 2001?

但是，那果真是一场开于2001年9月11日的战争吗？


Not all are happy about this American notion.

并不是所有人都赞同这一美国式的观点。


During the heyday of Irish terrorism in the UK, successive British governments went out of their way not to concede to the IRA the notion that a war was being waged.

当爱尔兰恐怖主义在英国猖獗之际，各届英国政府都竭力不屈从于爱尔兰共和军的观点，即正在进行一场战争。


“War” would have meant acceptance of the terrorists as legitimate enemies, in a sense as equals in a bloody contest for which there are accepted rules of engagement.

“战争”将会意味着把恐怖分子接受为合法的敌人，其含义与具有认同的交战规则的一场血腥战争的对等体相同。


This is neither a correct description nor a useful terminology for terrorist acts, which are more correctly described as criminal.

这既非对恐怖主义行为的正确描述，也不是有用的词汇。 恐怖分子应该更为准确地被称为罪犯。


By calling them war – and naming an opponent, usually al-Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden – the United States government has justified domestic changes that, before the 9/11 attacks, would have been unacceptable in any free country.

但是通过称之为战争、并把基地组织及其领导人本拉登点名为对手，美国政府给某些国内变化提供了理由。 这些国内变化在9/11袭击之前是不会被任何自由国家所接受的。


Most of these changes were embodied in the so-called “USA Patriot Act.”

这些变化的大多数都体现在所谓的“美国爱国者法案”上。


Though some of the changes simply involved administrative regulations, the Patriot Act’s overall effect was to erode the great pillars of liberty, such as habeas corpus , the right to recourse to an independent court whenever the state deprives an individual of his freedom.

尽管某些变化仅仅涉及到行政规定，但是，爱国者法案的整体效果却是侵蚀自由的支柱，例如人身保护，也就是无论何时国家剥夺个人自由，均有向独立法院寻求救助的权利。


From an early date, the prison camp at Guantánamo Bay in Cuba became the symbol of something unheard of: the arrest without trial of “illegal combatants” who are deprived of all human rights.

很久以来，古巴关塔那摩湾的战俘营成为了闻所未闻的象征，也就是不经审判逮捕被剥夺所有人权的“非法战斗人员 ” 。


The world now wonders how many more of these non-human humans are there in how many places.

如今，世界并不知道在多少地方还有多少更多的遭受非人待遇的人。


For everyone else, a kind of state of emergency was proclaimed that has allowed state interference in essential civil rights.

对于其他所有人而言，好像是宣布了某种紧急状态，允许国家干涉基本民权。


Controls at borders have become an ordeal for many, and police persecution now burdens quite a few.

边境检查已经成为许多人的煎熬，警察起诉给很多人带来了负担。


A climate of fear has made life hard for anyone who looks suspicious or acts suspiciously, notably for Muslims.

一种恐惧的气候让任何看似可疑或者行为可疑的人、特别是穆斯林生活困难。


Such restrictions on freedom did not meet with much public opposition when they were adopted.

当采取这些限制自由的措施的时候并没有遇到很多公众的反对。


On the contrary, by and large it was the critics, not the supporters, of these measures who found themselves in trouble.

相反，总体而言，那些措施的批评者，而非支持者发现遇到了麻烦。


In Britain, where Prime Minister Tony Blair supported the US attitude entirely, the government introduced similar measures and even offered a new theory.

在英国，布莱尔首相全力支持美国的态度，政府引入了类似的措施，甚至提出了一个新的理论。


Blair was the first to argue that security is the first freedom.

布莱尔第一个主张安全是第一自由。


In other words, liberty is not the right of individuals to define their own lives, but the right of the state to restrict individual freedom in the name of a security that only the state can define.

换言之，自由并非是个人确定自身生活的权利，而是国家以安全的名义限制个人自由的权利。 只有国家才能确定安全的含义。


This is the beginning of a new authoritarianism.

这就是一个新的独裁主义的开始。


The problem exists in all countries affected by the threat of terrorism, though in many it has not become quite as specific.

这一问题存在于所有受到恐怖主义威胁的国家，尽管在许多国家中这已经变得非常具体。


In most countries of continental Europe, “9/11” has remained an American date.

在大多数欧洲大陆国家 ， ” 9/11“已经成为一个美国人的日子。


There is even a debate – and indeed some evidence – concerning the question of whether involvement in the “war against terrorism” has actually increased the threat of terrorist acts.

甚至还有人辩论，而且确实还有证据表明，参与到“反恐战争”之中是否实际上增加了恐怖主义行动的威胁。


Germans certainly use this argument to stay out of the action wherever possible.

德国人当然在可能的情况下利用这一论点置身度外。


This stance, however, has not prevented the spread of something for which a German word is used in other languages, too: Angst .

但是，这一立场并没有防止德语中所说的忧虑的扩散。


A diffuse anxiety is gaining ground.

一种弥散性的焦虑正在扩大。


People feel uneasy and worried, especially when traveling.

人们感到不安，特别是在旅行的时候。


Any train accident or airplane crash is now at first suspected of being an act of terrorism.

任何一个火车事故或者飞机坠毁现在都首先被怀疑是恐怖主义行为。


Thus, 9/11 has meant, directly or indirectly, a great shock, both psychologically and to our political systems.

这样，9/11已经直接或间接地意味着一个巨大的震惊事件，在心理上以及对于政治体系而言都是如此。


While terrorism is fought in the name of democracy, the fight has in fact led to a distinct weakening of democracy, owing to official legislation and popular angst.

尽管以民主的名义与恐怖主义作战，实际上这一斗争由于官方的立法以及民众的忧虑而已经导致对民主明显的削弱。


One of the worrying features of the 9/11 attacks is that it is hard to see their purpose beyond the perpetrators’ resentment of the West and its ways.

9/11攻击的令人担忧的特性之一就是除了罪犯们仇恨西方及其生活方式之外，很难看到他们的目的。


But the West’s key features, democracy and the rule of law, have taken a far more severe battering at the hands of their defenders than by their attackers.

但是西方社会的主要特征，即民主和法治却已经在捍卫者手中遭到了严重的损害，其程度超过远远超过其攻击者。


Two steps, above all, are needed to restore confidence in liberty within the democracies affected by the legacy of 9/11.

最重要的是，需要采取两个步骤来在受到9/11后果影响的��主国家恢复对自由的信心。


First, we must make certain that the relevant legislation to meet the challenge of terrorism is strictly temporary.

首先，我们必须确保应对恐怖主义挑战的相关立法是严格具有时限的。


Some of today’s restrictions on habeas corpus and civil liberties have sunset clauses restricting their validity; all such rules should be re-examined by parliaments regularly.

当今的某些对人身自由以及民权的限制含有限制其时效的废止条款。 所有这些法规都应当定期接受议会的重新审查。


Second, and more importantly, our leaders must seek to calm, rather than exploit, public anxiety.

第二，也是更为重要的是，我们的领导人应当力求平息、而不是利用公众的焦虑。


The terrorists with whom we are currently at “war” cannot win, because their dark vision will never gain broad popular legitimacy.

我们目前“交战”的恐怖分子无法获胜，因为他们的黑暗的观点永远不会赢得广泛的公众合法认可。


That is all the more reason for democrats to stand tall in defending our values – first and foremost by acting in accordance with them.

这也就是民主派人士应当身先士卒、首要地以遵循我们的价值观的方式来捍卫它们的原因。


9/11 in Perspective

9·11：十年后的盘点


NEW YORK – It was a decade ago that 19 terrorists took control of four planes, flew two into the twin towers of the World Trade Center, hit the Pentagon with a third, and crashed the fourth in a field in Pennsylvania after passengers resisted and made it impossible for the terrorists to complete their malevolent mission.

纽约 — — 十年前，19名恐怖分子劫持了四架民航客机，其中两架撞上世贸中心双子塔，第三架撞击了五角大楼，第四架在乘客的反抗下无法完成袭击，坠毁于宾夕法尼亚旷野。


In a matter of hours, more than 3,000 innocent people, mostly Americans, but also people from 115 other countries, had their lives suddenly and violently taken from them.

只不过几个小时，3000多无辜平民被突如其来的暴行夺去了生命，其中大多是美国人，但也有来自其他115个国家的人。


September 11, 2001, was a terrible tragedy by any measure, but it was not a historical turning point.

2001年9月11日，以任何标准看都是一个可怕的惨剧，但它并非一个历史转折点。


It did not herald a new era of international relations in which terrorists with a global agenda prevailed, or in which such spectacular terrorist attacks became commonplace. On the contrary, 9/11 has not been replicated.

它并未开启一个由全球恐怖主义主导国际关系的新时代，类似的大规模恐怖袭击也没有变成家常便饭。


Despite the attention devoted to the “Global War on Terrorism,” the most important developments of the last ten years have been the introduction and spread of innovative information technologies, globalization, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the political upheavals in the Middle East.

虽然人们在“全球反恐战争”上投注了大量精力，但是过去10年最重要的进展是信息技术的创新与传播、全球化、伊拉克与阿富汗战争以及中东的政治动荡。


As for the future, it is much more likely to be defined by the United States’ need to put its economic house in order; China’s trajectory within and beyond its borders; and the ability of the world’s governments to cooperate on restoring economic growth, stemming the spread of nuclear weapons, and meeting energy and environmental challenges.

未来一个阶段的关键，则是美国整修其经济大厦的努力，中国在国内国际事务中的走向，各国政府在重振经济增长、控制核扩散以及应对能源与环境挑战方面的合作能力。


It is and would be wrong to make opposition to terrorism the centerpiece of what responsible governments do in the world.

如果把反对恐怖主义当成负责任的政府在世界上的核心要务，这是错误的。


Terrorists continue to be outliers with limited appeal at best.

恐怖主义仍是边缘角色，它们的吸引力终归是有限的。


They can destroy but not create.

它们只破坏，不建设。


It is worth noting that the people who went into the streets of Cairo and Damascus calling for change were not shouting the slogans of Al Qaeda or supporting its agenda.

值得注意的是，人们走上开罗和大马士革街头，呼喊的并不是基地组织的口号，也没有对它的纲领表示支持。


Moreover, measures have been implemented to push back, successfully, against terrorists.

此外，种种措施已经成功地令恐怖分子退入守势。


Intelligence assets have been redirected. Borders have been made more secure and societies more resilient.

情报资源已重新配置，国境线已变得更安全，社会已变得更有弹性。


International cooperation has increased markedly, in part because governments that cannot agree on many things can agree on the need to cooperate in this area.

反恐国际合作显著增强，部分是因为，各国政府都觉得需要在这一领域加强合作，尽管它们在其他领域颇有分歧。


Military force has played a role as well.

军事力量也扮演着某种角色。


Al Qaeda lost its base in Afghanistan when the Taliban government that had provided it sanctuary was ousted from power.

基地组织丧失了位于阿富汗的巢穴，正式因为向它提供庇护的塔利班政府被推翻。


Osama bin-Laden was finally found and killed by US Special Forces in the suburbs of Islamabad.

奥萨马·本·拉登最终被美国特种部队找到并击毙。


Drones – unmanned aircraft that are remotely steered – have proven to be effective in killing a significant number of terrorists, including many of the most important leaders.

军事无人机在击毙恐怖组织头目的行动中作用非凡。


Weak governments can be made stronger; governments that tolerate or support terrorism must be held accountable.

软弱的政府可以得到加强，纵容乃至支持恐怖主义的政府则必须为此负责。


But progress is not to be confused with victory.

但进展不应被称作胜利。


Terrorists and terrorism cannot be eliminated any more than we can rid the world of disease.

恐怖分子和恐怖主义不可能根除，就像我们不可能从地球上消灭疾病一样。


There will always be those who will resort to force against innocent men, women, and children in pursuit of political goals.

总会有人试图对无辜者动用武力以追求其政治目标，不论是对男人、妇女还是儿童。


Indeed, terrorists are advancing in some areas.

事实上，恐怖分子在某些领域走在了前头。


Pakistan remains a sanctuary for Al Qaeda and some of the world’s other most dangerous terrorists.

巴基斯坦仍在为基地组织和世界上其他一些最危险的恐怖分子提供庇护所。


A mixture of instability, government weakness, and ideology in countries such as Yemen, Libya, Somalia, and Nigeria are providing fertile territory for terrorists to organize, train, and mount operations – much as they did in Afghanistan did a decade ago.

由于局势动荡、政府软弱和意识形态等等原因，也门、利比亚、索马里和尼日利亚也在沦为恐怖主义滋生的沃土，它们在那些地方组织、训练、实施行动，就像在十年前的阿富汗一样。


New groups constantly emerge from the ruins of old ones.

旧的组织刚被摧毁，新的组织就冒出头来。


There is also a growing danger of homegrown terrorism.

本土恐怖主义的危险也在增长。


We have seen it in Great Britain and the US.

我们在英国和美国都看到了这种迹象。


The Internet, one of the great inventions of the modern Western world, has shown itself to be a weapon that can be used to incite and train those who wish to cause harm to that world.

互联网，这一现代西方世界的伟大发明，也被当成武器，激励并训练那些试图危害这个世界的人。


The question raised in October 2003 by then US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is no less relevant today: “Are we capturing, killing, or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training, and deploying against us?”

2003年10月，时任美国国防部长拉姆斯菲尔德曾提出一个问题，至今仍很中肯 ： “ 我们每天俘虏、击毙、关押和改造过来的恐怖分子，能比伊斯兰学校和激进宗教人士每天招募、训练和派遣出来反对我们的人数多吗？


All things being equal, we probably are.

”如果将一切等量齐观，那我们也许已经做到了。


But even small terrorist successes are costly in terms of lives, money, and making open societies less so.

但恐怖分子的任何一点微小成功，对开放社会都意味着高昂的生命和金钱成本，从这个意义上说，我��得不偿失。


What is to be done?

那我们该怎么办？


Alas, there is no single or silver bullet.

可惜没有一蹴而就的办法。


The establishment of a Palestinian state will not be enough for those terrorists who want to see the elimination of the Jewish state, any more than reaching a compromise over Kashmir will satisfy those Pakistan-based terrorists with bigger agendas vis-à-vis India.

巴勒斯坦建国还是不够，因为恐怖分子想要消灭犹太人的国家；在克什米尔问题上达成妥协，也无法满足巴基斯坦恐怖分子对印度更大的领土要求。


Reducing unemployment is desirable, of course, but many terrorists do not come from poverty.

减少失业当然是件好事，但许多恐怖分子并非穷人出身。


Helping to make societies in the Middle East and elsewhere more democratic might reduce the alienation that can lead to radicalism and worse, but this is easier said than done.

帮助中东和其他地方的社会变得更民主有助于缓解边缘化作用，遏制极端主义，但这说起来比做起来容易。


Of course, we want to continue to find ways to make ourselves less vulnerable and terrorists more so.

当然，我们需要继续想办法，让我们变强，让恐怖分子变弱。


But what may be most important, particularly in the Arab and Islamic communities, is to end any acceptance of terrorism.

但最重要的是阻止恐怖主义以任何方式进行传播，尤其是在阿拉伯和伊斯兰社会。


The Nigerian father who warned the US embassy in Lagos that he feared what his own son might do – before that same young man attempted to detonate a bomb aboard a flight to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009 – is an example of just this.

2009年圣诞节，尼日利亚的一位父亲向美国驻拉各斯大使馆警告说，他担心他的儿子会做出可怕的事情来，从而阻止了后者在飞往底特律的航班上引爆一枚炸弹，这就是一个很好的例子。


Only when more parents, teachers, and community leaders behave likewise will recruitment of terrorists dry up and law-enforcement authorities receive full cooperation from the populations they police.

只有当更多的父母、教师和社会领袖以这样的方式行动起来，才能令恐怖分子的来源枯竭，执法部门才能获得民众的全力配合。


Terrorism must lose its legitimacy among those who have historically supported or tolerated it before it will lose its potency.

在那些传统上支持或纵容恐怖主义的地方，恐怖主义必须先丧失其合法性，才会进一步丧失能量。


Transatlantic Trade for All

所有人的跨大西洋贸易


WASHINGTON, DC – The negotiations to create a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the European Union and the United States are being widely welcomed.

华盛顿—欧盟和美国之间关于成立跨大西洋贸易和投资合作伙伴（TTIP）的谈判受到了广泛的欢迎。


British Prime Minister David Cameron has called the TTIP a “once-in-a-generation prize,” citing potential gains of £80 billion ($125.5 billion) each for the EU and the US and £85 billion for the rest of the world.

英国首相卡梅伦将TTIP称为“一代人只有一次的机会 ” ， 认为它将给欧盟和美国各带来800亿英镑的潜在收益，给世界其他地区带来850亿英镑的潜在收益。


For a world weary of waiting for the World Trade Organization’s interminable Doha trade round to conclude, even a bilateral trade initiative may seem like a boon, especially when, as a recent Financial Times editorial pointed out, “bilateral” covers half of the world’s economy.

对于一个等待世贸组织冗长的多哈回合最后结果已经不耐烦的世界来说，即使是双边计划也像是天降恩惠，特别是在《金融时报》最近所指出的“双边”关系包括了世界经济半壁江山的当下。


But there is a serious downside: The deal could hurt developing-country exporters, unless the EU and the US make a concerted effort to protect these actors’ interests.

但风险也是巨大的：TTIP协议可能伤害发展中国家的出口，除非欧盟和美国携手保护这些行动方的利益。


The feature of the proposed pact that elicits the most excitement – its focus on regulatory barriers like mandatory product standards – should actually incite the greatest concern.

计划中的契约引起最多兴奋情绪的部分 — — 其对强制性产品标准等监管壁垒的强调 — — 实际上最应该引起关注。


Given low tariffs in the EU and the US – less than 5%, on average – further preferential reductions will not seriously handicap outsiders.

欧盟和美国关税很低 — — 平均不到5 % — —因此进一步的优惠降税并不会严重影响其他国家。


But, when it comes to standards – such as those governing safety, health, and the environment – the market-access requirements are brutal and binary: either you meet the established standard or you do not sell.

但是，在标准问题上 — — 比如涉及安全、健康和环境的标准 — — 市场准入标准是严酷且二分的：要么满足规定的标准，要么别来这里卖东西。


As a result, third-country firms’ options will depend on how TTIP standards are established: through harmonization (adoption of a common standard) or mutual recognition (acceptance of goods that meet one another’s established standards).

其结果是第三国企业的选择将取决于TTIP标准如何设置：通过协调（采取共同标准）还是通过互相承认（接受满足彼此规定标准的商品和服务 ） 。


The first option would enable producers everywhere to take advantage of economies of scale.

第一种选择将让世界各地的生产者都能够利用规模经济的优势。


But, in some cases, the harmonized standard could be more stringent than some countries’ original standards.

但是，在一些场合，协调后的标准���能比某些国家原先的标准更加苛刻。


Even though new standards would apply to suppliers from all exporting countries, compliance costs usually vary, meaning that those less equipped to meet higher standards could suffer.

尽管新标准将适用于所有出口国供应商，但合规成本通常各不相同，这意味着更难以满足高标准的企业会遭受损失。


In the late 1990’s, when the EU decided to harmonize standards for aflatoxins (a group of toxic compounds produced by certain molds), eight member states – including Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain – raised their national standards substantially, which is likely to have caused African exports of cereals, dried fruits, and nuts to Europe to decline by as much as $670 million.

20世纪90年代末，欧盟决定协调黄曲霉素标准（黄曲霉素是某些霉菌产生的有毒成分族 ） ， 八个成员国 — — 包括意大利、荷兰和西班牙 — — 大幅度提高了国家标准，这或许就是非洲国家队欧洲的谷物、水果干和坚果对欧出口下降6.7亿美元的原因。


With mutual recognition, the EU and the US would accept each other’s standards or conformity-assessment procedures, allowing firms to adhere to the less stringent requirements in each area.

若采取互相承认，那么欧盟和美国将承认彼此的标准或合规评估程序，企业会在各种标准中选择不太苛刻的那种。


If the policy were extended to third-country firms, it would have a powerful liberalizing impact.

如果该政策扩展到第三国企业，就会产生极大的自由化作用。


For example, Malaysian television producers could choose to comply with, say, America’s easier-to-meet safety standards, then sell the same product in both markets, reaping the benefits of economies of scale while lowering compliance costs.

比如，马来西亚电视生产商可能选择符合（比如）美国较易符合的安全标准，然后在欧美两地销售同样的产品，既享受了规模经济的好处，又降低了合规成本。


If, however, the TTIP excluded third-country firms from the mutual recognition policy, their competitiveness vis-à-vis European and American companies would diminish substantially.

但是，如果TTIP将第三国企业排除在互相承认政策之外，那么它们相对欧洲和美股公司的竞争力将受到极大的削弱。


Indeed, our research shows that when mutual-recognition agreements include restrictive rules of origin, intra-regional trade increases – at the expense of trade with other countries – and that developing countries tend to suffer most.

事实上，我们的研究表明，若互相承诺协议包括严格的来源国限制，则地区内贸易将增加，与其他国家的贸易会削弱，发展中国家损失最大。


In fact, excessively constraining rules of origin have proved problematic for some of the EU’s previous recognition agreements, such as those governing professional-services standards.

事实上，欧盟此前的不少承认协议（比如在专业服务标准方面）表明，过度约束的来源地规则很有问题大有问题。


While a Brazilian orange admitted for sale in Portugal can be sold throughout the EU, a Brazilian engineer or accountant licensed in Portugal must fulfill separate licensing requirements to work elsewhere in the EU, hampering much-needed labor mobility by forcing non-European workers to endure costly and inefficient bureaucratic procedures.

尽管获准在葡萄牙出售的巴西橙可以在整个欧盟出售，但获得葡萄牙执照的巴西工程师和会计师仍必须满足欧盟其他地区各自的执业要求，这迫使非欧洲工人忍受费时费力的官僚主义流程，不利于急需的劳动力流动。


Furthermore, when it comes to tariffs and standards, WTO rules are not created equal.

此外，在关税和标准方面，世贸组织规则并不平等。


While they protect countries excluded from bilateral or regional tariff agreements, thereby ensuring that integrated markets do not receive additional advantages, few safeguards exist to shield third countries from the fallout of agreements on mandatory standards.

尽管世贸组织规则保护着被双边和地区关税协定排除在外的国家，从而确保一体化市场不会获得其他附加的优势，但保护第三国免受强制性标准协议影响的保护措施几乎不存在。


Even in the absence of international rules, the EU and the US could take two actions to ensure that the TTIP does not have adverse consequences for developing economies.

即使没有国际法，欧盟和美国也可以采取两个动作确保TTIP不会损害发展中经济体。


First, they could allow all countries to reap the benefits of a bilateral mutual-recognition deal by agreeing not to impose restrictive rules of origin.

首先，它们可以同意不实施严格的来源地规则，这将使所有国家都能享受到双边互相承认协议的好处。


Second, where they do consider harmonization, they could favor the less stringent of the original standards, unless there is credible evidence that it would not support the relevant regulatory objective.

其次，在考虑协调的领域，它们可以倾向于原始标准中较不苛刻的一个，除非有充分的证据表明这样做不利于相关监管目标。


This is akin to a WTO test for departures from established international standards.

这类似于世贸组织的脱离现行国际标准测试。


If the EU and the US made these two commitments, the rest of the world could follow the TTIP negotiations with hope, rather than trepidation.

如果欧盟和美国实施了这两点，世界其他国家将可以带着希望而不是恐惧追踪TTIP。


A Balanced Look at Sino-American Imbalances

中美贸易不平衡的平衡观


BEIJING – Before July 2007, most economists agreed that global imbalances were the most important threat to global growth.

发自北京 — — 在2007年7月以前，大多数经济学家都认为全球增长的最重大威胁来自于全球贸易不平衡。


It was argued that the United States’ rising net foreign debt-to-GDP ratio – the result of chronic current-account deficits – would put a sharp brake on capital inflows, in turn weakening the dollar, driving up interest rates, and plunging the US economy into crisis.

他们觉得美国净外债与GDP比率的不断上升 — — 这是长期经常账户赤字所引发的后果 — — 将导致资金流入急剧减少，随之削弱美元，而后利率上涨，并最终令美国经济陷入危机当中。


But this scenario failed to materialize. Instead, the crisis stemmed from the US sub-prime debacle, which quickly dragged the global economy into its deepest recession since the 1930’s.

但这一设想却未能成为现实，事实上本次危机源自于美国次级贷款的崩盘，并当即将全球经济拖入了一场自1930年代以来最为严重的衰退当中。


Most economists failed to foresee the economic dynamics that actually led to the crisis, because they failed to pay enough attention to the rapid increase in US total debt.

而大多数经济学家之所以无法预见到危机背后的真正经济驱动力，是因为他们对美国总债务的快速增长缺乏足够的关注。


Instead, they focused exclusively on US foreign debt, ignoring household debt (mortgage and consumer debt), public debt, business debt, and financial debt.

实际上他们把注意力都放在了美国的外债上，却忽视了家庭负债（抵押贷款和消费者债务 ） 、 公共负债，商业债务和金融债务等方面的问题。


In particular, they should have paid greater attention to the sustainability of US mortgage and consumer debt.

他们尤其应当对美国抵押贷款和消费者债务的可持续性给予更多的关注。


In 2007, the mortgage and consumer debt-to-GDP ratio was more than 90%, compared to 24% for net foreign debt.

在2007年，上述两项负债与GDP的比率已经上升到90%以上，而与此同时净外债的相关比率只有24 % 。


Of course, the various components of debt differ considerably in their character and sources of financing – and thus in their sustainability.

当然，债务的不同组成部分也因各自的特性和资金来源而大不相同 — — 而其可持续性也是如此。


But all parts of a country’s total debt and how it is financed are interconnected.

但一国总债务的各个组成部分及其资助方式之间显然是有所关联的。


This means two things. First, funds from different sources of finance are interchangeable to a certain degree: deficiency of funds for one component of total debt can be supplemented by surplus funds originally aimed at financing other components.

这意味着两点，首先：来自不同融资来源的资金在某种程度上是可互换的：总债务中某项资金出现的赤字可以用原本提供给其他用途的多余资金来填补。


Second, troubles in any single component of total debt will have an impact on all the other components.

其二，总债务中某一部分所导致的问题将对其他部分造成影响。


After the subprime crisis erupted, mortgage and consumer debt was paid down by households either with their savings or by default.

在次贷危机爆发之后，美国家庭只能用储蓄来支付抵押贷款和消费者债务，或者被迫放弃偿还。


The fall in US total debt, and the narrowing of the financing gap between total debt and domestic funds, led to a significant improvement in the US current-account deficit in 2008-2009, disproving US Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke’s claim that the deficit was caused by a global “saving glut.”

美国总债务的下降，以及总债务和国内资金之间财政缺口的缩窄，都使得美国经常账户赤字状况在2008-2009财年大大改善，也证明美联储主席伯南克宣称该赤字是由全球“储蓄偏好”所引发的观点是错误的。


Indeed, America’s current-account position strengthened despite the dollar’s appreciation in the face of safe-haven demand.

事实上尽管美元在避险需求下升值，美国经常账户状况却得到了巩固。


Unfortunately, as a result of the private-sector deleveraging and an increase in household savings, the US economy, driven by debt and consumption, slid into recession.

但不幸的是，随着私人部门去杠杆化以及家庭储蓄的增加，由负债和消费驱动的美国经济陷入了衰退。


To offset the negative impact of private-sector deleveraging on growth, the US government has maintained expansionary fiscal and monetary policies.

为了减少私人部门去杠杆化对经济增长的负面影响，美国政府采取了一系列扩张性的货币和财政政策。


Now, with household debt sustained on a knife-edge after feverish government intervention, the fiscal position has deteriorated dramatically and the current-account balance has worsened again.

如今政府大力干预后的家庭负债状况依然处于危险边缘，同时财政状况急剧恶化，经常账户平衡状况也再度变差。


Sustainability of public debt has replaced sustainability of private debt as the biggest threat to financial stability, and the focus of debate about the US current account has shifted from the sustainability of foreign debt to the impact of reducing the external deficit on growth and employment.

公共债务的可持续性已经取代私人债务成为美国金融稳定的最大问题，而针对美国经常账户状况的争论焦点也从外债的可持续性转移到外部赤字降低对增长和就业的影响。


The dilemma facing US policymakers is how to stimulate growth while lowering the level of total debt.

对此美国的政策制定者目前陷入了困境：一方面要促进增长，另一方面又得降低总债务水平。


The most important way to achieve both objectives is to increase exports by strengthening US competitiveness.

而实现这两大目标的最重要方式就是透过提升美国国家竞争力的方式来增加出口。


But where will increased competitiveness come from?

但这些竞争力的提升又从何而来？ ，


Devaluation of the dollar could improve US competitiveness in the short run, but it is not a solution.

将美元贬值的做法能在短期内提升美国的竞争力，但却非长久之策。


Because rapid fiscal deterioration now has investors worrying about capital losses on US government securities, devaluation would make foreigners more hesitant to finance America’s budget deficit.

因为财政状况的迅速恶化已经令投资者们对自己美国政府债券上的资本损失忧虑不已，此外贬值也将使外国人更不愿意资助美国的预算赤字。


If foreign financing is not forthcoming, yields on US government debt will rise and the US economy will fall back into recession.

如果得不到外国资金，美国政府债务的收益率将被迫提升而美国经济也将重新陷入衰退。


In the long run, America’s growth pattern must undergo a structural shift from reliance on debt and consumption one based on Americans vaunted capacity for creativity and innovation.

长期来说，美国的发展模式必须由原本对负债和消费的依赖转向美国人引以为荣的创新能力。


Only then will America improve its competitiveness enough to allow the government to reduce both private and public debt to sustainable levels while maintaining a respectable growth rate.

只有这样美国才能真正提升其竞争力，并使政府可以在保持合理增长率的同时将私人和公共债务都降低到一个可持续的水平上。


But neither improved competitiveness, nor reduction of total debt, can be achieved overnight.

但提升竞争力和减少总债务这两个目标都不可能一蹴而就。


In the short run, the US current-account deficit will remain, regardless of which country runs bilateral surpluses.

无论对其拥有双边贸易顺差的是哪一个国家，美国的经常账户赤字将在短期内继续存在。


Thus, China’s continued reinvestment of its current-account surplus in US government securities is of utmost important for US growth and financial stability.

因此中国将其贸易盈余持续投资在美国政府债券上的行为对美国的经济增长和金融稳定都是极为重要的。


Given that America benefits mightily from China’s purchases of US government securities, it is difficult to understand why the US government and Congress have been complaining so much about the bilateral current-account deficit.

考虑到美国在中国购买美国国债方面获取的重大利益，我们很难理解美国政府和国会为何总是对中美双边经常账户赤字大肆抱怨。


It is also difficult to grasp why China is so reluctant to reduce its bilateral surplus, given meager returns on its massive holdings of US government securities and a sustained risk of large capital losses in the future.

而于此同时，我们也难以解释中国为何不愿减少其双边贸易盈余，因为大规模持有美国政府债券回报极低，而且还存在着巨额资本流失风险。


The good news is that, following President Hu Jintao’s recent visit to Washington, both America and China have been taking positive steps to resolve their differences over the bilateral current-account balance.

但好消息是，在中国国家主席胡锦涛最近的访美之行中，中美两国都在解决双边贸易不平衡方面做出了积极的举措。


That augurs well for a more rational and constructive Sino-American dialogue on global imbalances, which would certainly benefit the global economy.

这预示着一个更加理性也更富建设性的中美全球贸易不平衡对话，而这也将对全球经济有所裨益。


A Banking Union Baby Step

银行联盟第一步


BRUSSELS – At the beginning of the financial crisis, it was said that banks were, in Charles Goodhart’s crisp phrase, “international in life, but national in death.”

布鲁塞尔—金融危机开始时，人们用查尔斯·古德哈特（Charles Goodhart）的名言来描述银行 ： “ 生而国际，死而民族。


At the time (2008-2009), large international banks had to be rescued by their home countries’ governments when they ran into trouble.

”当是时（2008—2009年 ） ， 国际大银行在深陷困境时不得不由母国政府出手相救。


But the problem now in Europe is the opposite: banks are “national in life, but European in death.”

但如今，欧洲的问题与此正好相反，银行“生而民族，死而欧洲 ” 。


In Spain, for example, local savings banks (cajas) financed an outsize real-estate boom.

比如，在西班牙，地方储蓄银行是超级地产繁荣的融资提供者。


As the boom turned to bust, the losses threatened to overwhelm the capacity of the Spanish state, and the problem became European, because it threatened the very survival of the euro.

随着繁荣变为萧条，由此产生的损失已快要超过了西班牙整个国家的能力，这一问题变成了欧洲问题，因为事关欧元存亡。


The Spanish case is symptomatic of a larger problem.

西班牙的状况是一个更大问题的症状。


National supervisors always tend to minimize problems at home.

国家层面的监管者总是试图最小化国内问题。


Their instinct (and their bureaucratic interest) is to defend their countries’ “national champion” bank(s) abroad.

他们的本能（也是他们官僚主义利益之所在）是捍卫“国宝 ” （ national champion）银行在国外的表现。


But their resistance to recognizing problems at home runs even deeper.

但他们对辨认国内问题的抵触更加严重。


Until recently, the Spanish authorities maintained that the problems in their country’s real-estate sector were temporary.

直到最近，西班牙当局才不再坚持该国房地产部门问题不是暂时性的。


To acknowledge the truth would have meant admitting that for years they had overlooked the build-up of an unsustainable construction boom that now threatens to bankrupt the entire country.

承认真相意味着多年来他们忽略了不可持续建设繁荣的风险，以至于如今整个国家都陷入了破产危险。


In the case of Ireland, the situation was initially not much different.

在爱尔兰，最初的情况与西班牙并没有太大不同。


When problems started to surface, the finance minister at the time initially claimed that the country would carry out “the cheapest bank rescue ever.”

当问题开始浮现时，时任财政部长宣称爱尔兰将实行“史上成本最小的银行救援 ” 。


Given national supervisors’ predictable tendency not to recognize problems at home, it seemed natural that the cost of cleaning up insolvent banks should also be borne at the national level.

不难预料，国家级监管者总是倾向于对国内问题视而不见，因此，清算资不抵债银行的成本应该由各国自行承担似乎是自然而然的事情。


It thus seemed to make sense that even in the eurozone, banking supervision remained largely national.

于是，即使是在欧元区，银行监管大体上仍维持各国各自为政的局面似乎也不无道理。


The recently created European Banking Authority has only limited powers over national supervisors, whose daily work is guided mainly by national considerations.

新近成立的欧洲银行局所有用的权限比日常工作主要根据国内情况进行的国家级监管者大不了多少。


But reality has shown that this approach is not tenable.

但现实已经证明，这条道路走不通。


Problems might originate at the national level, but, owing to monetary union, they quickly threaten the stability of the entire eurozone banking system.

问题也许肇始于国家层面，但是，由于货币联盟的存在，它们很快会威胁到整个欧元区银行系统的稳定性。


At their June summit, Europe’s leaders finally recognized the need to rectify this situation, transferring responsibility for banking supervision in the eurozone to the European Central Bank.

在6月峰会上，欧洲领导人最终意识到修正这一情况、将欧元区银行监管职能移交给欧洲央行的重要性。


Given that financial integration is particularly strong within the monetary union, putting the ECB in charge was an obvious choice.

作为货币联盟，金融一体化在欧元区非常牢固，这使得欧洲央行成了不二之选。


Moreover, the ECB already bears de facto responsibility for the stability of the eurozone’s banking system.

此外，欧洲央行事实上早已承担起了维持欧元区银行系统稳定的职能。


But, until now, it had to lend massive amounts to banks without being able to judge their soundness, because all of that information was in the hands of national authorities who guarded it jealously and typically denied problems until it was too late.

但是，迄今为止，欧洲央行仍必须在无法判断银行稳健程度的情况下向它们大规模贷款，因为所有信息都掌握在国家级监管者手中，而后者对此死抓不放，出了问题总是拼命掩盖，直到无法收场为止。


Putting the ECB in charge should also help to stop the creeping disintegration process, which is not publicly visible, but is very real nonetheless.

让欧洲央行来行使此职能还有助于阻止正在潜滋暗长的去一体化过程，该过程尽管还没有进入公众视野，但已成为现实威胁。


Just ask any of the large international banking groups headquartered in financially stressed eurozone countries.

只消问问坐落于受困欧元区国家的任何大型国际银行集团总部便可推知一二。


Consider the case of a bank headquartered in Italy, but with an important subsidiary in Germany.

就拿总部设在意大利的某家一行来说吧，这家银行在德国设有一家重要分行。


The German operations naturally generate a surplus of funds (given that savings in Germany far exceed investment on average).

德国分行自然手握资金盈余（因为平均而言德国储蓄远高于投资 ） 。


The parent bank would like to use these funds to reinforce the group’s liquidity.

总行希望使用这笔资金增强整个集团的流动性。


But the German supervisory authorities consider Italy at risk and thus oppose any transfer of funds there.

但德国监管当局认为意大利存在风险，因此反对资金转移。


The supervisor of the home country (Italy) has the opposite interest.

母国（意大利）监管者的利益正好与此相反。


It would like to see the “internal capital market” operate as much as possible.

它希望看到“内部资本市场”操作，越多越好。


Here, too, it makes sense to have the ECB in charge as a neutral arbiter with respect to these opposing interests.

在这里，让欧洲央行来充当尊重这些对立利益的中立仲裁者才是合适的。


But, while putting the ECB in charge of banking supervision solves one problem, it creates another: can national authorities still be held responsible for saving banks that they no longer supervise?

但是，尽管让欧洲央行行使银行监管职能可���解决问题，但也会造成另一个问题：国家级监管当局是否需要继续对其不再行使监管职能的储蓄银行负责？


Economic (and political) logic requires that the eurozone will soon also need a common bank rescue fund.

经济（和政治）逻辑意味着很快欧元区又需要一个共同银行援助基金。


Officially, this has not yet been acknowledged.

这一需要尚未被正式承认。


But that is often the way that European integration proceeds: an incomplete step in one area later requires further steps in related areas.

但此乃欧洲一体化进程中的典型做法：在某领域出台的不完整措施要求在相关领域出台后续措施。


This incremental approach has worked well in the past; indeed, today’s European Union resulted from it.

这一增量办法在过去效果甚丰；事实上，今天的欧盟就是这样产生的。


But a financial crisis does not give policymakers the time that they once had to explain to voters why one step required another.

但金融危机使得决策者不再像过去那样有时间向选民解释为什么一项措施会带来另一项措施。


They will have to walk much more quickly to save the euro.

他们需要大大加快动作不乏，这样才能拯救欧元。


The Renewed Promise of Abenomics

安倍经济学的新一轮承诺


TOKYO – Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party scored a decisive victory in the December 14 parliamentary election, with Japanese voters demonstrating their overwhelming approval of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s macroeconomic policy agenda.

发自东京 — — 日本自民党在今年12月14日的国会大选中取得了决定性的胜利，因为日本选民们一面倒地支持首相安倍晋三的宏观经济政策议程。


Though voter turnout was relatively low, owing largely to the somewhat technical nature of the issues, the election’s message was clear: most Japanese abhor the prospect of a return to the grim economic trajectory that prevailed in Japan before “Abenomics.”

虽然选民投票率还是相对较低 — — 这在很大程度上源自于这类事务的某种技术性本质 — — 但这场选举所传达出来的信息也非常清晰：大多数日本人都不愿意回到“安倍经济学”之前那种低迷经济轨道中去。


When the first “arrow” of Abenomics – a fiscal stimulus program – was launched nearly two years ago, asset markets' immediate response was positive.

当安倍经济学的第一支箭 — — 财政刺激计划 — — 在两年前射出之后，资产市场立刻作出了积极回应。


The second arrow of Abenomics – monetary easing – intensified these effects.

而安倍经济学的第二支箭 — — 货币宽松 — — 则强化了这一效应。


In the last two years, Japan’s stock market has almost doubled in value, increasing the wealth of Japanese consumers.

在过去两年中，日本股票市场的市值几乎翻了一倍，使消费者的财富得到了增长。


Moreover, the yen has fallen by nearly one-third against the US dollar, from around ¥80 to nearly ¥120 per dollar, invigorating Japan’s export industries.

此外，日元对美元贬值了近三分之一，从原来的约80日元兑1美元下降到近120日元，令日本的出口工业蓬勃发展。


Even more encouraging are developments in the labor market, which, unlike those in asset markets, reflect outcomes, not expectations.

更令人鼓舞的则是劳动力市场的变化发展，跟资产市场不同的是，这反映出了结果，而非仅仅是预期。


Here, too, the news is good.

在这方面形势也十分喜人。


The labor market has tightened, with unemployment standing at 3.5% and the job-to-applicant ratio above parity.

劳动力市场得到了巩固，失业率维持在3.5 % ， 而职位和求职者的比率则高于1。


To be sure, there have been some setbacks: Japan’s GDP shrank in the second and third quarters of 2014.

无可否认，这其中还存在的一些挫折：日本的GDP在第二和第三季度出现了收缩。


But the downturn, which resulted from April’s consumption-tax hike – from 5% to 8% – cannot be blamed on Abenomics.

但这一由于四月份提升消费税（从5%提到8 % ） 所导致的下滑状况不能归罪于安倍经济学。


Indeed, Abe was honoring a law enacted by the previous government, led by the Democratic Party of Japan.

事实上，安倍只是在遵从由上届日本民主党政府所通过的一项法律而已。


The first two arrows of Abenomics were aimed at stimulating demand – and they were extremely effective.

安倍经济学的头两支箭都旨在刺激需求 — — 而且也极为有效。


The consumption-tax hike was needed to sustain them in flight. Unfortunately, the hike was too large to keep them aloft.

同时也需要提升消费税来维持这两支箭的顺利飞行，但不幸的是，此次提升的幅度过大，反而对这两项政策造成了阻碍。


The good news is that the tax hike’s impact is temporary. Soon, it will begin to taper off, and industrial output will approach full capacity.

好消息是增税的影响只是暂时的，并将很快开始逐渐消失，而工业产量则会接近满负荷。


When demand begins to exceed supply, demand-side stimulus policies will become increasingly ineffective, and it will be time to launch the third arrow of Abenomics: growth-enhancing structural reforms.

当需求开始超过供给的时候，需求端的刺激政策将逐渐变得无效，是时候射出安倍经济学的第三支箭：强化增长的结构性改革。


Such reforms are essential to raise productivity growth and improve the Japanese economy’s competitiveness.

为了提升生产力增长并改善日本的经济竞争力，这类改革极有必要。


Four imperatives stand out.

而其中则凸显出四项要点：


The first task should be to eliminate – or, at least, reduce – the thicket of government regulations that is stifling economic dynamism.

首要任务应当是消除 — — 或至少要减少 — — 遏制经济活力的一大堆政府管制。


The current system is so convoluted and complex that it took more than three decades to open a new medical school in Tokyo.

现行的系统是如此的繁琐复杂，以致在东京开设一所新医学院需要花费超过30年时间。


Likewise, flights to Haneda airport, a convenient connection to the Tokyo city area, have been rationed.

同样，飞往羽田机场这个通往东京市区的便利转接点的航班也受到限制。


This is no formula for long-term economic success.

这显然不是一个促进长期经济繁荣的做法。


Furthermore, Japan’s government should push to complete negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which is currently being negotiated among 12 countries, from Mexico to the United States to Vietnam.

此外，日本政府应当加紧完成跨太平洋伙伴计划的谈判。 目前已经有十二个国家参与该项谈判，涵盖从墨西哥到美国再到越南的广大区域。


The TPP would improve Japan’s trade prospects considerably, including in sensitive sectors like agriculture, where exports of fast-moving consumer goods like flowers and vegetables would benefit.

这一伙伴计划极大提升日本的贸易前景，包括像在农业这样的敏感部门，因为像鲜花和蔬菜之类快速消费品的出口将因此而受益。


Japan’s leaders must also work to expand the workforce, which faces severe constraints, owing largely to the country’s rapidly aging population.

日本领导人也必须扩大由于本国的快速老龄化而面临严重制约的劳动力队伍。


In the absence of large-scale immigration, to which Japanese remain unamenable, one relatively simple solution would be to integrate more women into the labor force.

在缺乏大规模移民，日本又不准备开放移民的情况下，一个相对简单的解决方案将是把更多的女性融入劳动力大军。


A 10% increase in Japan’s female labor-force participation rate – an entirely attainable goal – would translate into an almost 5% gain in total labor-force participation.

如果日本的女性劳动力参与率能提升10 % — —这是一个完全可以实现的目标 — — 那就将把整体的劳动力参与率提升近5 % 。


Finally, Abe’s government must reduce the corporate-tax rate to align it more closely with international standards.

最后安倍政府必须削减企业税率，使其与国际标准接轨。


Amid increasingly intense international competition to attract foreign investment, reducing the corporate tax would actually increase Japan’s tax revenues, by spurring companies to invest their vast cash stockpiles in more productive activities.

在国际间日渐激烈的外国投资争夺战中，通过驱使企业将自身的巨额现金储备投入到更具生产力的活动当中，减少企业税率将在事实上增加日本的税收收入。


Now that Abe’s government has a renewed mandate from Japanese voters, it must deliver on its promises – and that means decisive and comprehensive implementation of structural reforms.

如今安倍政府已经获得了日本选民的新一轮授权，也必须兑现自己的承诺 — — 这意味着坚定而全面地实施结构改革。


Of course, this will require some sacrifices.

这当然需要作出某些牺牲。


Indeed, households have already endured some hardship, brought about by the consumption-tax hike.

事实上日本家庭已经在承受着因为消费税提升而带来的艰难状况。


The next step is for Abe’s government to use its political capital to overcome vested interests, both in the bureaucracy and the business community.

而安倍政府的下一步则是利用自身的政治资本去制服既得利益阶层 — — 包括政界与商界。


This means compelling businesses to give up some of the special tax benefits they now enjoy.

这意味着迫使企业放弃某些目前享有的特殊税务优惠。


For their part, politicians must participate in the taxpayer identification system.

政治家则必须参与到纳税人识别体系中来。


And bureaucrats must forego some of the power that excessive regulation affords them.

而政府官员们则要放弃路管制所赋予他们的某些权利。


If all of these groups join the Japanese public in accepting reasonable sacrifices, Abe’s government can fulfill its promise and build a thriving economy.

如果上述这些团体能和日本民众一道接受和承担合理的牺牲，安倍政府就能兑现自身的承诺并建立一个兴旺繁荣的经济。


For the sake of all Japanese – not to mention a world economy in need of a new source of dynamism – that promise deserves to be met.

为了日本的整体利益 — — 不要说一个需要新动力来源的世界经济 — — 这个承诺值得去兑现。


The Missing Arrow of Abenomics

安倍经济学的迷失之箭


TOKYO – In his drive to kick-start the Japanese economy, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, shortly after taking office in 2012, introduced a large fiscal stimulus and put in place a bold program of monetary easing.

东京—日本首相安倍晋三在2012年执政后不久就开始了振兴日本经济的政策，他引入了大规模财政刺激和激进的货币宽松计划。


Since then, Japanese policymakers have been working to launch what Abe calls the third “arrow” of his agenda: arduous reforms of key industries and the demolition of structural barriers to growth.

此后，日本决策者一直致力于启动安倍所谓的第三支“箭 ” ： 重要行业的艰巨改革计划以及破除增长的结构性壁垒。


But the focus on public policy has left a “fourth arrow” – the private sector – untouched and seemingly ignored.

但专注于公共政策让“第四支箭 ” — —私人部门 — — 被冷落一旁，似乎遭到了忽略。


This is unfortunate, because the government cannot fix Japan’s ills on its own.

这是不幸的，因为政府无法单枪匹马治好日本病。


Annual productivity growth has been stubbornly sluggish, rarely rising above 2% for much of the past two decades, reflecting both missed opportunities and declining cost competitiveness.

年生产率增长极其低迷，在过去20年中的大部分时间里还不到2 % ， 这表明机会被错失，成本竞争力在下降。


Japan’s productivity slump permeates the entire economy; labor and capital productivity gains have nearly stalled in almost every sector – even in Japan’s signature advanced manufacturing industries.

日本生产率大降是整个经济的普遍现象；几乎所有部门的劳动和资本生产率都近乎停滞 — — 即使是日本标志性的发达的制造业。


Labor productivity in the transport-equipment sector, for example, is barely half that of Germany.

比如，运输设备劳动生产率大约只有德国的一半。


This trend puts annual GDP growth on course to average only 1.3% through 2025, implying a third consecutive decade of stagnation.

这一趋势意味着到2025年，日本年GDP增长率平均将只有1.3 % ， 连续第三个十年陷入停滞。


Such an outcome would coincide with – and exacerbate the effects of – an adverse demographic shift that will constrain fiscal revenues and drive up costs for universal health care and pension benefits.

这一结果恰逢不利的人口趋势 — — 并将放大后者的效应 — — 制约财政收入，增加全民医疗和退休金福利的成本。


Japan’s ability to alter its trajectory depends on individual companies making decisions to invest, change workplace policies, deploy new technologies, and test untried business models.

日本能否摆脱这一轨道取决于个体公司决定投资、改变工作场所政策、采用新技术以及尝试未尝试的业务模式。


Abe’s structural reforms will take time and political will to enact, but Japanese companies cannot afford to sit still.

安倍的结构改革需要时间，还需要实施的政治意愿，但日本公司决不能坐等。


They can and must act, without waiting for the government to change its policies.

它们能够也必须行动起来，不必等政府改变政策。


In many cases, the economy’s bottlenecks are not regulatory in nature, but stem from entrenched ways of doing business.

在许多情形中，经济瓶颈并非监管，而是来自根深蒂固的生意经。


New research by the McKinsey Global Institute examines Japan’s advanced manufacturing, retail, financial services, and health-care industries in detail – and finds substantial untapped productivity potential in every area.

麦肯锡全球研究所（McKinsey Global Institute）的新研究详细考察了日本发达的制造业、零售业、金融服务业和医疗业 — — 发现这些领域无不存在巨大的未利用生产率潜力。


For starters, Japanese firms must become more globally integrated.

首先，日本企业必须更加融入全球。


Exporting to the fastest-growing overseas markets is one obvious route to overcoming sluggish demand growth at home.

向增长最快的海外市场出口显然是克服国内需求增长停滞的一个办法。


But, rather than just selling products abroad, Japanese enterprises need to expand operations beyond their borders and cast a wider net for international talent.

但是，日本企业所需要的不仅仅是将产品卖到海外，还需要扩大海外经营，组织更广阔的国际人才网。


Japanese companies have formidable R&D operations, but most will need to reconfigure them to obtain better returns and impact.

日本公司拥有可怕的研发部门，但大部分需要重组以获得更好的回报和影响。


The process must start with an understanding of what the customer wants and a determination to deliver solutions accordingly.

这一过程必须首先理解客户想要什么并决心据此提供解决方案。


Closed and tightly managed R&D operations must be transformed into more fluid, open processes involving collaboration with customers and suppliers.

管理严格的封闭研发业务必须变得更具流动性、更加开放，把客户和供应商也包括进来。


Japanese companies will also need to improve their capabilities in areas such as marketing, pricing, and talent development.

日本公司还需要提高营销、定价和人才开发等领域的能力。


While there are some pockets of excellence, most Japanese firms are severely lacking in these areas.

尽管在这些领域表现出众的日本企业不少，但大部分仍严重缺乏这方面的能力。


To compete in global markets, they will need to achieve the same consistency in these areas that they have in their traditional areas of strength.

要想在全球市场上竞争，它们需要实现与传统优势领域同样的一致性。


Many Japanese companies have yet to digitize paper-based processes and replace outdated information-technology systems.

许多日本公司至今仍未实现纸面流程的数字化和更新过时的信息技术系统。


Others would benefit from moving beyond basic digitization to next-generation technologies, such as big-data analytics.

其他公司可以跨越基本数字化，向新一代技术（如大数据分析）迈进，并从中获益。


Companies can also head off looming labor shortages with intelligent software systems and robotics.

公司还可以用智能软件系统和机器人解决劳动力短缺的问题。


Manufacturers can augment or replace their assembly lines with technologies such as the Internet of Things and 3D printing.

制造商可以用物联网和3D打印等技术扩大或代替流水线。


More broadly, Japanese companies have to organize for performance and discipline.

更广泛地说，日本公司必须以业绩和纪律为目标进行组织。


As policy changes unleash market forces, businesses will face greater competition.

随着政策变化解放市场力量，企业将面临更大的竞争。


Some may need to reorganize or exit unprofitable markets; others may have to undertake mergers and acquisitions to achieve economies of scale.

一些企业也许需要重组或退出无利可图的市场；令一些企业也许必须进行兼并收购以实现规模经济。


Finally, shareholders and senior executives should tie performance goals to incentives.

最后，股东和高管应该将业绩目标与激励挂钩。


Some of Japan’s corporate giants have already begun shifting from traditional seniority-based advancement toward merit-based pay structures.

一些日本大公司以开始将基于传统年资的晋升模式改变为基于表现的薪酬结构。


Others should follow their lead.

其他公司应该效仿。


Promoting younger and more diverse talent can create agile organizations with fresh ideas.

提拔更年轻、更多样化的人才能够用新思维为组织注入活力。


If Japan’s private sector rises to the challenge, it can move the economy onto a path of faster growth.

如果日本私人部门奋起迎接挑战，可以推动经济走上更快的增长路径。


Innovations in one company would cascade across its entire industry by forcing competitors to raise their game.

一家公司的创新奖迫使竞争者更加投入竞争，从而提升整个行业。


In the 1950s and 1960s, for example, Toyota introduced more efficient production processes that were eventually adopted by the entire automobile industry.

比如，20世纪五六十年代，丰田引入了效率更高的生产流程，并最终被整个汽车行业所采用。


Instead of settling for a future of 1.3% annual GDP growth, Japan could attain roughly 3% annual growth through 2025.

日本不应该满足于1.3%的未来年GDP增长率，它可以到2025年实现大约3%的年增长率。


Doing so would require the growth rate of labor productivity to more than double, but this is an attainable goal.

这样做要求劳动力生产率翻一番以上，但仍是可实现的目标。


More than half of this growth increment can be met by adopting best practices that companies around the world already use, while technology can close much of the remaining gap.

一大半增长增量可以通过采取全球公司已在使用的最佳实践实现，而技术可以填补大部分余下的空缺。


Japanese business leaders need to combine big thinking with a focused attention to detail.

日本商界领袖需要将大局观和细节专注结合起来。


They will need to create innovative products, penetrate new markets, and make bold investments in equipment, technology, and talent, while simultaneously scrutinizing every aspect of their operations for inefficiency and waste.

他们需要创造创新性产品，渗透新市场，积极地投资于设备、技术和人才，同时仔细检视经营的每个方面以发现低效和浪费。


Traditional ways of doing business may have to be abandoned.

传统生意经必须抛弃。


But there is ample scope to make progress and spur faster economic growth.

但取得进步、刺激更快经济增长的空间很大。


Immense trade flows, the rise of billions of new consumers in the emerging world, and technology breakthroughs are rapidly transforming the global economy.

巨大的贸易流、新兴世界数十亿新消费者的崛起以及技术突破正在快速改变全球经济。


Japan can shift its current trajectory by turning this wave of disruption into opportunity.

日本可以将这一破坏潮转化为机遇，摆脱当前的轨迹。


From Russia With Unrequited Love

对俄罗斯的单恋


NEW DELHI – Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has assiduously courted Russian President Vladimir Putin, meeting with him more than a dozen times in four years.

新德里—日本首相安倍晋三孜孜不倦地讨好俄罗斯总统普京，在四年内和他进行了十多次会晤。


This month he hosted Putin in Tokyo and in his hometown of Nagato (famed for its onsen, or natural hot springs).

这个月，他在东京和家乡山口县（以温泉闻名）接待了普京。


But Abe’s courtship has so far yielded little for Japan, and much for Russia.

但安倍的追求没有给日本带来什么好处，倒是给俄罗斯送去了很多利益。


Abe’s diplomatic overtures to Putin are integral to his broader strategy to position Japan as a counterweight to China, and to rebalance power in Asia, where Japan, Russia, China, and India form a strategic quadrangle.

安倍对普京的外交姿态是他的战略大局的一部分：将日本定位为中国的制衡力量和亚洲的再平衡力量。 日本、俄罗斯、中国和印度组成了一个亚洲战略四边形。


Abe has already built a close relationship with India, and he sees improved relations with Russia – with which Japan never formally made peace after World War II – as the missing ingredient for a regional power equilibrium.

安倍已经建立了与印度的紧密关系，并将改善对俄关系 — — 二战后日本从未与俄罗斯媾和 — — 视为地区实力平衡的缺失的一角。


But Abe’s trust-building efforts with Russia are not aimed only at checking Chinese aggression.

但安倍与俄罗斯构建信任的努力不仅是为了制衡中国的野心。


He also wants Russia to return its southernmost Kuril Islands – a resource-rich area known as the Northern Territories in Japan – which the Soviet Union seized just after the United States dropped nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.

他还希望俄罗斯归还千岛群岛最南端拥有丰富资源的北方四岛。 1945年美国在广岛和长期投下原子弹后，苏联占领了这四个岛屿。


In exchange, Abe has offered economic aid, investments in Russia’s neglected Far East, and major energy deals.

作为交换，安倍提出向俄罗斯提供经济援助、投资被忽视的远东地区以及能源大单。


Abe has, however, encountered several obstacles.

但是，安倍面临着多重阻碍。


For starters, Japan is a participant in the US-led sanctions that were imposed on Russia after it annexed Crimea in March 2014.

首先，日本是以美国为首的对俄制裁的参与者。


These sanctions have pushed Russia closer to its traditional rival, China; and Putin has publicly identified the sanctions as a hindrance to concluding a peace treaty with Japan.

制裁自2014年3月俄罗斯入侵克里米亚后开始实施，这让俄罗斯与其传统对手中国越走越近；而普京公开表示制裁是日俄缔结和平条约的障碍。


In response to Abe’s overtures, Putin has doggedly tried to drive a hard bargain.

作为对安倍的姿态的回应，普京一直奉行强硬的讨价还价。


Russia has bolstered its defenses on the four disputed islands, and, just prior to this month’s summit, he told the Japanese media that the current territorial arrangement suits Russian interests.

俄罗斯加强了其在北方四岛的防御部署，而在本月峰会前夕普京告诉日本媒体，目前的领土状况符合俄罗斯利益。


“We think that we have no territorial problems,” he said. “It’s Japan that thinks that it has a territorial problem with Russia.”

“我们认为我们没有领土问题 ， ” 他说 ， “ 只是日本认为它和俄罗斯之间存在领土问题。


The US-led sanctions regime and low oil prices have battered the Russian economy, which is expected to contract by 0.8% in 2016.

以美国为首的制裁和低油价打击了俄罗斯经济，预计2016年俄罗斯经济将收缩0.8 % 。


Thus, Putin is more reluctant than ever to offer territorial concessions, lest it tarnish his domestic image as a staunch defender of Russian national interests.

因此，普京更加不愿意在领土问题上让步，唯恐玷污其俄罗斯国家利益坚定捍卫者的国内形象。


Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that Abe left the recent “onsen summit” with dashed hopes of resolving the territorial dispute, while Putin returned home with 68 new commercial accords.

在这样的背景下，安倍在“温泉峰会”解决领土争议的希望破灭，而俄罗斯带着68份新商业协议回国，这一结果一点都不令人惊讶。


Many of the new agreements are symbolic, but some are substantive, including deals worth $2.5 billion and an agreement to set up a $1 billion bilateral-investment fund.

新协议中不少是象征性的，但也有一些是实质性的，包括一份价值25亿美元、成立一个10亿美元双边投资基金的协议。


Under the latter agreement, Japan and Russia are supposed create a “special framework” for joint economic activities on the disputed islands.

在后一份协议中，日本和俄罗斯将建立一个“特殊框架”管理争议岛屿上的经济活动。


But the plan has already run into trouble.

但该计划已经遇到了麻烦。


Peter Shelakhaev, a senior Russian official who leads the government’s Far East Investment and Export Agency, has indicated that there are legal hurdles to establishing such a framework, and that Japanese firms doing business on the Kurils would have to pay taxes to Russia.

俄罗斯政府远东投资和出口局（Far East Investment and Export Agency）主管彼得·舍拉哈耶夫（Peter Shelakhaev）表示建立这一框架存在法律障碍，在南千岛群岛经营的日本企业必须向俄罗斯纳税。


If Japan did that, however, it would effectively be recognizing Russia’s jurisdiction over the islands.

但是，如果日本照办，就等于承认了俄罗斯对这些岛屿的司法管辖权。


Abe has thus been denied the legacy that he sought, while Putin has succeeded in easing Russia’s international isolation.

因此，安倍想要的东西被拒绝了，而普京成功地缓解了俄罗斯的孤立。


Abe was the first G7 leader to hold a summit with Putin after Russia annexed Crimea, and now Russia has won Japan’s economic cooperation, too.

安倍是俄罗斯吞并克里米亚后第一位与普京举行峰会的G7领导人，眼下俄罗斯赢得了日本的经济合作。


Japan is the only G7 country that has a territorial dispute with Russia, and it is clearly more eager to reach a deal than the Kremlin is.

日本是唯一一个与俄罗斯存在领土纠纷的G7国家，并且它显然比克里姆林宫更渴望达成协议。


But this has only strengthened Russia’s hand.

但这正中俄罗斯下怀。


While Japan has softened its position, and signaled that it may accept only a partial return of the islands, Russia has grown only more intransigent.

日本立场有所软化，并且释放出信号可以接受局部归还争议岛屿，而俄罗斯的立场变得更加强硬。