The Algerian authorities face a major challenge, because rejection of pluralist institutions makes it more difficult to find negotiating partners.

阿尔及利亚当局面临着巨大的挑战，因为拒绝接受多元制度让它难以找到谈判伙伴。


The more the regime tries to buy off the protesters, the more overweening it appears – and the angrier citizens become.

政权越是试图收买反对者，就会越显出它的自负 — — 人民也就变得越愤怒。


And the enraged younger generation, in particular, is not especially fearful of losing the limited benefits offered by the status quo.

尤其是，愤怒的年轻一代并不特别害怕失去现状给他们带来的那点可怜的好处。


America After the Election

大选后的美国


NEW YORK – The ongoing presidential campaign in the United States stands out for its lack of civility and the vast differences between the candidates: the anti-establishment businessman Donald Trump on the Republican side and the polished politician Hillary Clinton representing the Democrats.

基辅—正在进行中的美国总统选战有两个特点，一是不文明，二是候选人差异巨大：共和党一边是反建制商人唐纳德·特朗普，代表民主党的则是道貌岸然的政客希拉里·克林顿。


The contest has exposed deep fault lines within American society and damaged the country’s global reputation.

这场选战暴露出美国社会内部深刻的断层线，也损害了美国的国际名誉。


No surprise, then, that one of the few things Americans seem to agree on is that the campaign has gone on for too long.

因此，毫不奇怪，一件能让美国人统一意见的极少数事情之一便是这场选战实在是又臭又长。


But soon it will be over.

但它马上就要结束了。


The question is: what comes next?

问题是，接下来会怎样？


Polls suggest that Clinton, a former senator and secretary of state, will defeat the controversial Trump.

民调显示，前参议员、国务卿克林顿将击败饱受争议的特朗普。


But polls are not to be confused with reality.

但不要把民调与现实弄混了。


After all, going into June’s Brexit referendum, most observers believed that a victory for “Remain” was a sure thing.

毕竟，6月份英国举行脱欧公投时，大部分观察家认为“留欧”阵营取得胜利是板上钉钉。


More recently, Colombian voters rejected a peace accord that was widely expected to receive popular approval.

最近则有哥伦比亚人民拒绝和平协议的事件，人们原本广泛预期这一协议会受到热烈欢迎。


All of this is to say that, while a Clinton victory may be likely, it is no certainty.

所有这些表明，尽管克林顿眼看就要取得胜利，但结果仍不确定。


The only poll that counts is the one on November 8.

唯一有意义的民调是11月8日。


Until then, all we can do is speculate.

在此之前，我们只能猜测。


Yet some predictions can be made with greater confidence.

但已经有人做出了信心满满的预测。


There is little doubt that the US will emerge from this election a divided country with a divided government, regardless of who is president or which party has a majority in either chamber of Congress.

几乎毫无疑问，经历了这次选举后，美国将是一个分裂的国家，出现一个分裂的政府，不管谁当总统、哪个党控制国会两院多数。


Neither Democrats nor Republicans will be able to realize their objectives without at least some support from the other.

不管是民主党还是共和党，都无法实现自己的目标，除非得到对方的一定的支持。


But no one should think that the only divide in American politics is between Republicans and Democrats.

但决不能认为美国政治唯一的分歧点就在共和党和民主党。


In fact, splits within the two major parties are just as deep, with large and highly motivated factions pulling each to their respective extremes – Democrats to the left and Republicans to the right.

事实上，两大党内部的分裂同样深刻，规模庞大、斗志昂扬的派系将两党推向各自的极端 — — 民主党左倾，共和党右倾。


This makes compromise on centrist positions all the more difficult to achieve.

这导致在中间立场形成妥协的局面非常难以达成。


The rapid resumption of presidential politics will undermine compromise further.

总统政治的迅速卷土重来将进一步破坏妥协。


If Clinton wins, many Republicans will assume that it was only because of Trump’s flaws, and they will judge her likely to be a one-term president.

如果克林顿获胜，许多共和党人会将全部责任推给特朗普的缺陷，而认为克林顿只能担任一个任期。


A country favoring change, they will conclude, is unlikely to keep a Democrat in the Oval Office for a fourth term.

他们会这样认为：一个喜欢变化的国家不可能让民主党主宰椭圆办公室四个任期。


Many Republicans (especially those who deny the legitimacy of a Clinton victory) will thus seek to frustrate her administration, lest she be able to run again in 2020 as a successful incumbent.

许多共和党人（特别是那些否认克林顿胜利合法性的共和党）将因此寻求对克林顿政府从中作梗，唯恐她在2020年作为成功的在任总统再次竞选。


Similarly, if Trump manages to win, most Democrats (and even some Republicans) will – after recovering from their surprise and dismay – make it their highest priority to ensure that he does not have an opportunity for a second term.

类似地，如果特朗普成功获胜，大部分民主党人（甚至一些共和党人）在从震惊与沮丧中回过神之后将把确保特朗普无法参加第二次竞选作为最高任务。


Given how much of Trump’s agenda his fellow policymakers would likely find objectionable, governing would be very difficult during his administration.

特朗普��策团队所制定的日程必将遭遇重重阻力，在他的任期内，治理国家将非常困难。


In either scenario, it may still be possible to make progress in a few key areas.

不管发生哪个情景，仍有可能在一些关键领域取得进展。


The next US government might manage to enact legislation to fund the modernization of America’s aging infrastructure, a policy that both candidates and many in Congress favor.

下一届美国政府或可以实施立法筹资对美国陈旧的基础设施进行现代化，两位获选人和许多国会议员都支持这样做。


It might also be able to cobble together a majority to reform the US tax code – in particular, lowering the high rate for corporations and raising taxes on the wealthy.

或许也有望凑成多数改革美国税法 — — 特别是降低高昂的公司税率并对富人增税。


There could even be some reform of health care, President Barack Obama’s signature achievement, owing to serious implementation problems with the current system.

甚至还可能会有一些医疗改革，作为奥巴马总统招牌式的成就，当前医疗制度仍存在严重的实施问题。


But other issues requiring cooperation between Congress and the president are unlikely to be addressed any time soon.

但其他要求国会与总统合作的问题绝无可能在短期得到解决。


One is immigration reform, which is as controversial in the US as it is in Europe.

其一是移民改革，这个问题在美国与在欧洲一样存在争议。


Another is trade: because the domestic political environment makes policymakers wary of supporting positions with dedicated opponents, both Trump and Clinton oppose the Trans-Pacific Partnership, even though its ratification would benefit America’s economy and strategic standing.

另一个是贸易：国内政治环境导致决策者害怕支持存在专注的反对者的立场，因此特朗普和克林顿都反对跨太平洋合作伙伴关系（TPP ） ， 即使批准该协定有利于美国经济和战略立场。


Meanwhile, America’s deficit and debt are certain to rise, as there seems to be little or no will to reduce entitlement spending.

与此同时，美国的赤字和债务也必将增加，因为根本看不出有削减福利支出的意愿。


The foreign-policy implications of the election are somewhat different, because, under the US Constitution, the president enjoys considerable latitude.

大选的外交政策影响略有不同，因为，根据美国宪法，总统享有相当大的自由度。


While only Congress can officially declare war or ratify treaties, presidents may use (or refuse to use) military force without explicit congressional approval.

只有国会可以正式宣战或批准条约，但总统可以在没有国会明确批准的情况下使用（或拒绝使用）武力。


They can also enter into international agreements other than treaties, appoint powerful White House staff, and change US foreign policy by executive action, as Obama recently did regarding Cuba.

总统还可以签署国际协定而非条约，任命强力白宫官员，以及通过行政动作改变美国外交政策（如奥巴马最近对古巴的动作 ） 。


Under Clinton, this discretion could translate into establishing one or more safe areas in Syria, providing more defensive arms to Ukraine, and taking a tougher line toward North Korea as it continues its nuclear and missile buildup.

如果克林顿当选，这一自由裁量权将带来的是：在叙利亚建立一个或多个安全区；为乌克兰提供更多防御武器；以及对继续核和导弹实验的朝鲜采取更加强硬的立场。


It is more difficult to guess what Trump would do.

特朗普会怎么做更难猜测。


He is, after all, a political outsider, so no one knows how much of his campaign rhetoric would be translated into policy.

毕竟，他是政治局外人，因此没人知道他的竞选纲领中有多少会转化为政策。


Still, one could anticipate a Trump administration distancing itself from some traditional allies in Europe and Asia and standing mostly aloof from the Middle East.

但人们可能预测特朗普政府将与某些欧洲和亚洲的传统盟友保持距离，对中东更是敬而远之。


What exactly will happen to America after the presidential election remains an open question.

美国总统大选后究竟会发生什么仍是一个开放性问题。


Though some outcomes can reasonably be expected, the only genuine certainty is that the 96% of the world’s population that does not vote in US elections will feel the effects no less than Americans will.

尽管可以合理地预期到一些结果，但唯一真正确定的是不能在美国总统大选中投票的96%的世界人口都将与美国人一样真切地感受到大选结果的影响。


America and Europe

美国和欧洲


Deeply frustrated by the Bush administration’s policies, many people and governments in Europe hope for a fundamental change in American foreign policy after the upcoming presidential election.

在对布什政府的政策深感挫伤之后，欧洲的许多人和政府都希望在即将进行的总统大选之后，美国的外交政策能有根本性的变化。


But it would take a medium-sized political miracle for these hopes not to be disappointed, and such a miracle will not happen – whoever is elected.

但要这些希望别成为失望，就需要有一场中等规模的政治奇迹，而这样的奇迹将不会发生—不管谁当选。


The Bush administration made numerous foreign-policy blunders with far-reaching consequences.

布什政府在外交政策上屡犯大错，后果深远。


But Bush neither invented American unilateralism nor triggered the transatlantic rift between the United States and Europe.

但布什既没有发明美国的单边主义，也没有造成大西洋两岸欧美之间的裂隙。


To be sure, Bush reinforced both trends, but their real causes lie in objective historical factors, namely America’s being the sole world power since 1989 and Europe’s self-inflicted weakness.

确切地说，布什强化了这两种趋势，但究其原因还在于客观的历史因素，也就是自1989年以来美国在世界上的一家独大和欧洲自作自受的软弱。


As long as America remains the sole world power, the next US President will be neither able nor willing to change the basic framework of America’s foreign policy.

只要美国仍然还是世界唯一的超级大国，下一任美国总统就既不能也不愿改变美国外交政策的基本框架。


It will, of course, be important who wins the presidency: a candidate expected to continue Bush’s foreign policy or someone ready for a new beginning.

当然，谁赢得总统宝座也很重要：是一个会继续布什外交政策的候选人，还是一个准备重新开始的人。


In the former case, the transatlantic rift will deepen dramatically.

如果是前一种情况，欧美之间的裂隙会进一步加深。


Four, or even eight, more years of US policy à la Bush would inflict such damage on the substance of the transatlantic alliance as to threaten its very existence.

4年，甚至8年的“布什式”美国政策的继续会给跨大西洋联盟造成实质性的破坏，甚至危及其生存。


But if America’s next president is committed to a new direction, US foreign policy might again become more multilateral, more focused on international institutions and alliances, and willing to bring the relationship between military force and diplomacy back to within its historical proportions.

但如果美国的下一任总统有志于开拓新方向，那么美国外交政策可能再一次变得更多边化，更关注国际机构和联盟，并愿意将武力和外交的关系重新摆放到其历史的范畴中去。


That is the good news.

那将会是条好消息。


The bad news is that, even under such auspicious conditions, the US, as a world power, will not relinquish its “free-hand” policy or forget its strength and its claim to preeminence among nations.

而坏消息则是，即便在如此祥和的环境下，美国作为世界唯一的超级大国，也不会放弃其“随心所欲”的政策或忘记自身的实力，令其他国家唯其马首是瞻。


Another piece of bad (or good?) news is that a more multilateral American policy will increase the pressure on Europeans to take on more responsibility for international crisis management and conflict resolution – in Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, the Middle East, Transcaucasia, and Russia, and with respect to Turkey’s future.

另一个坏（抑或是好？ ）消息是，一种更多边化的美国政策会向欧洲人施加压力，让他们在国际危机管理和冲突解决方面担负起更多的责任—在阿富汗、伊朗、中东、高加索地区和俄罗斯以及与土耳其的未来相关的事务方面。


To this common agenda, the Europeans should add Africa, climate change, and reform of the United Nations and the world trading system.

欧洲人还应该把非洲、气候变化和联合国改革及世界贸易体系写入这一共同议程。


For a long time, Europe has underestimated its weight and importance.

长期以来，欧洲都低估了自己的份量和重要性。


Europe’s geopolitical, economic, and social weight is quite obvious.

它在地缘政治、经济和社会方面的影响力不言自明。


But Europe’s integration of sovereign states’ interests by means of common institutions could also be an example for much of the world.

但欧洲通过共同制度整合主权国家利益的方式也同样为世界其他许多地方做出了榜样。


In particular, the way Europe, in the process of its enlargement, has projected its power to achieve lasting peace across the whole continent, and fostered development by integrating entire economies, states, and societies within its institutional framework, could become a model for shaping a cooperative world order in the twenty-first century.

特别是欧洲在扩大的过程中运用其实力实现整个大陆的持久和平，通过所有经济体、国家和社会在其制度框架内的一体化来促进发展的做法，更可以成为二十一世纪建立合作的国际秩序的样板。


This modern, progressive, and peaceful model is unique and superior to all other currently available approaches to the fundamental questions of political order.

这种现代、进步且和平的模式是独特的，并且优于其它所有现行的、针对政治秩序的根本性问题的众多模式。


But could doesn’t mean will.

但“能够”并不意味着“将要 ” 。


Europe’s global influence is feeble because of its internal quarrels and lack of unity, which render the European Union weak and limit its ability to act.

欧洲全球影响力的虚弱是由于内部纷争和缺乏统一。 这让欧盟也变得软弱，并限制了它的行动能力。


Objectively strong, subjectively infirm – that is how the EU’s present condition can be described.

外强中干—这就是对欧盟现状的最佳描述。


The current moment of American weakness coincides with a substantially changed international political environment, defined largely by the limits of US power, Europe’s ineffectiveness, and the emergence of new global giants like China and India.

美国现时的软弱是与经历了深刻变化的国际政治环境相关的，其特点是美国势力的局限，欧洲的无所作为和中国、印度等新的全球大国的出现。


In light of these developments, does it still make sense to speak of “the West”?

在这样的形势下，再提“西方”还有意义么？


I believe it does, more than ever, because the rift between Europe and America leaves both sides substantially weaker in global terms.

我认为比以往任何时候都有意义，因为欧美之间的裂隙使得双方的实力在全球层面上都大打折扣。


The unilateral overstretching of American power offers a chance for a new beginning in US-European relations.

美国实力的单边过渡延伸给欧美关系的新起点提供了机会。


America, more than in the past, will depend on strong partners and will seek such partnerships.

美国比以往更需要强大的伙伴，也会寻求这样的伙伴关系。


So what are the Europeans waiting for?

既然如此，欧洲人还在等待什么？


Why not start now to overcome the traditional tension between NATO and the EU – especially as French policy toward NATO under President Nicolas Sarkozy has been moving in the right direction?

为什么不从现在就开始改变北约与欧盟之间传统的紧张局面—特别是在萨科奇总统主持下的法国对北约的政策正向着正确方向发展的情况下？


A regular mutual presence of the Secretary General of NATO and of the head of EU foreign policy in the councils of both organizations doesn’t require much time and effort.

让北约的秘书长和欧盟外交政策的领导人定期相互出席对方组织相关委员会的会议并不需要花多少时间和精力。


Why not initiate EU-US consultations at a high political level (with the Secretary-General of NATO participating in security matters) – for instance, by inviting the US Secretary of State and other members of the administration, such as the Treasury Secretary or the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, to sit several times a year on the appropriate EU Council meetings?

何不开启欧盟—美国的高政治级别（北约秘书��参与到安全事务中）协商—例如，邀请美国国务卿和其他政府官员，如财政部长或环保部门首长每年出席几次欧盟相关委员会的会议呢？


Why not have routine annual meetings between the European Council and the US President?

为什么不建立欧盟委员会和美国总统之间每年定期会晤的机制呢？


Periodic meetings between the appropriate committees of the US Congress and the European Parliament would also be of great importance, as ultimately both bodies will have to ratify any international treaties.

美国国会和欧洲议会的相关委员会之间的定期会晤也会十分重要，因为任何国际条约都要经过这两个机构的批准。


The fate of the Kyoto Protocol should be a lesson to all parties involved.

《京都议定书》的命运对相关各方都应该是个教训。


No such US-EU consultations would require any new agreements, so they could start without any further preliminaries.

如此的美国—欧盟协商机制不需要任何新的协议，因此完全可以马上付诸实施。


There is one certainty that Europeans can take home from the US election campaign even today: with a more multilaterally oriented US foreign policy, Europe won’t be riding comfortably in the US world-political slipstream much longer.

就算在今天，欧洲人也能从美国总统竞选中明确地看到一点：随着美国外交政策更加以多边化为导向，欧洲在美国的世界政治滑流中怡然而行的日子不会长久了。


And that is a good thing.

这是件好事。


The new transatlantic formula must be greater say in decision-making in exchange for a greater share of responsibility.

新的跨大西洋关系必须在决策方面拥有更大的发言权以换取更多的责任。


America at Stall Speed?

失速的美国？


NEWPORT BEACH – Judging from the skittishness of both markets and “consensus expectations,” the United States’ economic prospects are confusing.

纽波特海滩 — — 从市场和“一致预期”的变幻莫测判断，人们对美国经济前景仍是一片茫然。


One day, the country is on the brink of a double-dip recession; the next, it is on the verge of a turbo-charged recovery, powered by resilient consumers and US multinationals starting to deploy, at long last, their massive cash reserves.

今天眼看着美国就要掉下二次探底的悬崖了；过了一晚，受消费回弹刺激和美国跨国公司终于开始着手使用手里的大把现金储备，看上去高速复苏又近在眼前了。


In the process, markets take investors on a wild rollercoaster ride, with the European crisis (riddled with even more confusion and volatility) serving to aggravate their queasiness.

在市场的左右摇摆之间，投资者仿佛坐上了过山车，而欧洲危机（更令人困惑、更大起大落）进一步加剧了乘客的头晕反应。


This situation is both understandable and increasingly unsettling for America’s well-being and that of the global economy.

这一情形不难理解，却也加剧了美国和全球经济的不安。


It reflects the impact of fundamental (and historic) economic and financial re-alignments, insufficient policy responses, and system-wide rigidities that frustrate structural change.

这反映了基础性（和历史性）经济和财政再联盟、政策应对不力、以及让结构变革陷入停顿的系统性僵化所产生的后果。


As a result, there are now legitimate questions about the underlying functioning of the US economy and, therefore, its evolution in the months and years ahead.

结果，人们对美国经济的基础功能及其在未来数月和数年的发展动向提出了合理质疑。


One way to understand current conditions – and what is needed to improve them – is to consider two events that recently attracted considerable worldwide attention: the launch of Boeing’s Dreamliner passenger jet and the tragic death of Apple’s Steve Jobs.

一种理解当前形势 — — 以及如何改进 — — 的办法是思考两件引起世界范围大关注的事件：波音梦幻客机的发布以及苹果公司的乔布斯去世的噩耗。


Let us start with some simple aeronautic dynamics, using an analogy that my PIMCO colleague, Bill Gross, came up with to describe the economic risks facing the American economy.

让我们从一些简单的航空动力学开始，用我的太平洋投资公司（PIMCO）同事格罗斯（Bill Gross）所做的比方来描述美国经济所面临的经济风险。


For the Dreamliner to take off, ascend, and maintain a steady altitude, it must do more than move forward.

梦幻客机想要起飞、升空然后维持稳定高度，光是向前运动是不够的。


It has to move forward fast enough to exceed critical physical thresholds, which are significantly higher than those for most of Boeing’s other (smaller) planes.

它必须向前运动得足够快，超过某个物理临界阈值 — — 远高于绝大部分波音其他型号（体型更小）的飞机。


Failure would mean succumbing to a mid-air stall, with tepid forward motion giving way to a sudden loss of altitude.

失败意味着空中停车、降速因而导致高度突降。


Unless we are convinced of the Dreamliner’s ability to avoid stall speed, it makes no sense to talk about all the ways in which it will enhance the travel experience for millions of people around the world.

除非我们确信梦幻客机有能力避免失速，否则大谈能如何改进全球数百万乘客的旅行体验纯属空中楼阁。


America’s economy today risks stall speed.

美国经济如今就面临着失速风险。


Specifically, the question is not whether it can grow, but whether it can grow fast enough to propel a large economy that, according to the US Federal Reserve, faces “balance-sheet deleveraging, credit constraints, and household and business uncertainty about the economic outlook.”

具体而言，问题不在于是否增长，而在于增长是否足够快，足以驱动一个面临着“资产负债表去杠杆化、信贷约束以及家庭和企业对经济前景充满狐疑 ” （ 美联储语）的大型经济。


And, remember, it is just over a year since certain US officials were proclaiming the economy’s “summer of recovery” – a view underpinned by the erroneous belief that America was reaching “escape velocity.”

还有，不要忘了，仅仅是一年前，一些美国官员信誓旦旦地宣称美国经济已经步入了“复苏之夏 ” ， 而这一观点还得到了美国正在达到“逃逸速度”的错误信念的支持。


Stall speed is a terrifying risk for an economy like that of the US, which desperately needs to grow robustly.

失速对于像美国这样的极度需要稳健增长的经济体来说具有很高风险。


Without rapid growth, there is no way to reverse persistently high and increasingly structural (and therefore protracted) unemployment; safely de-leverage over-indebted balance sheets; and prevent already-disturbing income and wealth inequalities from growing worse.

没有快速增长就无法逆转持续且越来越倒向结构性（从而会更加难以根除）的事业趋势，无法实现过度负债的资产负债表的安全去杠杆化，无法防止已然恶化的收入和财富不平等雪上加霜。


The private sector alone cannot and will not counter the risk of stall speed.

私人部门无法也不会单独抵挡失速风险。


What is desperately needed is better policymaking.

当前急需的是更好的决策。


Specifically, policymakers must be open and willing to understand the unusual challenges facing the US economy, react accordingly, and possess sufficiently potent policy instruments.

具体而言，决策者应该开诚布公，并愿意厘清美国经济所面临的非常规挑战，做出相应的反应，同时掌握充分的有效政策工具。


Unfortunately, this has been far from the case in America (and in Europe, where the situation is worse).

不幸的是，美国（以及欧洲，那里的情况比美国还遭）的现状离这一步还差得很远。


Moreover, US policymakers in the last few weeks have been more interested in pointing fingers at Europe and China than in recognizing and responding to the paradigm shifts that are at the root of the country’s economic problems and mounting social challenges.

此外，最近数周，美国决策者对向欧洲和中国指手画脚更感兴趣，而没有把精力放在识别和应对范式变化上，而范式变化才是美国经济问题和社会挑战日渐艰巨的根源。


This is where the insights of Steve Jobs, one of the world’s best innovators and entrepreneurs, come in.

这正是史蒂夫·乔布斯 — — 全世界最好的创新者和企业家 — — 的洞见的闪光之处。


Jobs did more than navigate paradigm shifts; he essentially created them.

乔布斯不但引导着范式的变化方向；事实上，他创造着范式。


He was a master at converting the complicated into the simple; and, rather than being paralyzed by complexity, he found new ways to deconstruct and overcome it.

他是化繁为简的一代宗师；他不但没有陷入复杂性的漩涡中无法走出，反而发现了重建和克服复杂性之路。


Teamwork was an obligation, not a choice.

团队合作是一种义务，而不是一种选择。


And he eschewed the search for the single “big bang” in favor of aiming for multiple breakthroughs.

他并没有寻求单一的“大爆炸 ” ， 而是以各个击破为目标。


Underlying it all was a willingness to evolve – a drive for perfection through experimentation.

归根到底，这来自于渐近 — — 用实验为推动力一步步迈向完美 — — 的意愿。


Moreover, he excelled at selling to audiences worldwide both his vision and his strategy for realizing it.

此外，他还擅长向全世界信徒兜售自己的新愿景及其实现战略。


So far, America’s economic policymakers have fallen short on all of these fronts.

到目前为止，美国经济决策者在这方面已经大大落后了。


Rather than committing to a comprehensive set of urgently-needed reinforcing measures, they seem obsessed with the futile search for the one “killer app” that will solve all of the country's economic problems.

他们并没有承诺给出一整套急需的强化措施，而是沉溺于徒劳地寻求“大杀器”来一次性解决美���的所有经济问题。


No surprise that they have yet to find it.

结果呢？ 当然是一无所获。


Teamwork has repeatedly fallen hostage to turf wars and political bickering.

团队合作经常会沦为山头林立和政治扯皮。


Little has been done to deconstruct structural complexity, let alone win sufficient public support for a medium-term vision, a credible implementation strategy, and a set of measures that is adequate to the task at hand.

目前，我们连解构复杂性的努力都没有拿出来，更不用说赢得公众对某个中期愿景、某个可信实施战略以及一揽子足以应付手头问题的措施的支持了。


The longer the policymaking impasse persists, the greater the stall-speed risk for an economy that already has an unemployment crisis, a large budget deficit, many underwater mortgages, and policy interest rates floored at zero.

决策僵局多持续一日，美国经济 — — 已经陷入了失业危机、大规模财政赤字和大量资不抵债按揭贷款泥淖，同时政策利率已经下降到零水平 — — 的失速风险就放大一分。


This is an atmosphere in which unhealthy balance sheets come under even greater pressure, and healthy investors refuse to engage.

着这样的环境下，不健康的资产负债表将进一步承受更大的压力，而健康的投资者则拒绝赶这趟浑水。


In the process, the risk of recession remains uncomfortably high, the unemployment crisis deepens, and inequities rise as already-stretched social safety nets prove even more porous.

随之而来的是，衰退风险将继续阴魂不散，失业危机将继续深化，而不平等性将随着已然千疮百孔的社会安全网的进一步损坏而继续提高。


America, China, and the Productivity Paradox

美国、中国和生产率悖论


NEW HAVEN – In the late 1980s, there was intense debate about the so-called productivity paradox – when massive investments in information technology (IT) were not delivering measureable productivity improvements.

纽黑文—20世纪80年代末，有一个所谓的生产率悖论的激烈争论 — — 信息技术的大规模投资并没有带来可测的生产率改进。


That paradox is now back, posing a problem for both the United States and China – one that may well come up in their annual Strategic and Economic Dialogue.

如今，这一悖论卷土重来，给美国和中国造成了一个问题，一个将在一年一度的中美战略和经济对话中出现的问题。


Back in 1987, Nobel laureate Robert Solow famously quipped, “You can see the computer age everywhere except in the productivity statistics.”

让我们回到1987年。 这一年，诺贝尔经济学奖获得者罗伯特·索洛（Robert Solow）提出了他的著名讽刺 ： “ 计算机时代随处可见，就是无法在生产率数字中找到踪迹。


The productivity paradox seemed to be resolved in the 1990s, when America experienced a spectacular productivity renaissance.

”生产率悖论似乎在20世纪90年代得到了解决，当时，美国出现了蔚为壮观的生产率复兴。


Average annual productivity growth in the country’s nonfarm business sector accelerated to 2.5% from 1991 to 2007, from the 1.5% trend in the preceding 15 years.

1991—2007年美国非农商业部门生产率年增长率为2.5 % ， 而此前15年的趋势值为1.5 % 。


The benefits of the Internet Age had finally materialized.

互联网时代的好处终于实现了。


Concern about the paradox all but vanished.

关于生产率悖论的关注也烟消云散。


But the celebration appears to have been premature.

但人们似乎高兴得太早了。


Despite another technological revolution, productivity growth is slumping again.

尽管经历了又一次技术革命，但生产率增长再次下降。


And this time the downturn is global in scope, affecting the world’s two largest economies, the US and China, most of all.

这一回，生产率下降是全球趋势，影响最大的正是世界最大的两个经济体 — — 美国和中国。


Over the past five years, from 2010 to 2014, annual US productivity growth has fallen to an average of 0.9%.

在过去五年中（2010—2014年 ） ， 美国生产率平均年增长率下降到0.9 % 。


It actually fell at a 2.6% annual rate in the two most recent quarters (in late 2014 and early 2015).

实际上，在最近两个季度中（2014年底和2015年初 ） ， 生产率以2.6%的年率降低。


Barring a major data revision, America’s productivity renaissance seems to have run into serious trouble.

除非有重大数据修正，否则美国生产率复兴已经陷入了大麻烦。


China is witnessing a similar pattern.

中国也经历了类似的过程。


Although the government does not publish regular productivity statistics, there is no mistaking the problem: Overall urban employment growth has been steady, at around 13.2 million workers per year since 2013 – well in excess of the government’s targeted growth rate of ten million.

尽管政府并不定期公布生产率数字，但问题已经显而易见：城镇总体就业增长十分稳定，自2013年一直保持在每年1,320万人 — — 远超政府目标增长率一千万人。


Moreover, hiring seems to be holding at that brisk pace in early 2015.

而在2015年初，雇用活动似乎继续维持着这一强势。


At the same time, output growth has slowed from the 10% trend of the 33 years ending in 2011 to around 7% today.

与此同时，产出增长从33年（截至2011年底）来的趋势率10%下降到如今的7 % 。


That downshift, in the face of sustained rapid job creation, implies an unmistakable deceleration of productivity.

这一降幅是在持续高速就业创造的背景下发生的，表明生产率必定在减速。


Therein lies the latest paradox.

最新的悖论就在这里。


With revolutionary technologies now driving the creation of new markets (digital media and computerized wearables), services (energy management and DNA sequencing), products (smartphones and robotics), and technology companies (Alibaba and Apple), surely productivity growth must be surging.

革命性技术正在创造新的市场（数字媒体和计算机化可穿戴设备 ） 、 服务（能源管理和DNA测序 ） 、 产品（智能手机和机器人）和高科技公司（阿里巴巴和苹果 ） ， 毫无疑问生产率增长应该高歌猛进。


As a modern-day Solow might say, the ���Internet of Everything” is everywhere except in the productivity statistics.

当代索洛也许会说 ， “ 万物联网”随处可见，就是无法在生产率数字中找到踪迹。


But is there really a paradox?

但这真是一个悖论吗？


Northwestern University’s Robert Gordon has argued that IT- and Internet-led innovations like automated high-speed data processing and e-commerce pale in comparison to the breakthroughs of the Industrial Revolution, including the steam engine, electricity, and indoor plumbing.

西北大学的罗伯特·戈登（Robert Gordon）指出，信息技术和互联网引领的创新，如自动化高速数据处理和电子商务等，与包括蒸汽机、电力和自来水的工业革命相比根本不值一提。


He maintains that, although these innovations led to dramatic transformations of the major advanced economies – such as higher female labor-force participation, increased transportation speed, urbanization, and normalized temperature control – these changes will be extremely hard to replicate.

他认为，尽管这些创新给主要发达经济体带来了巨大的变化 — — 比如更高的女性劳动力参与率、交通速度的提高、城市化以及标准化温度控制 — — 但这些变化极其难以复制。


Indeed, as taken with today’s revolutionary technologies as we are – I say this staring at my sleek new Apple Watch – I am sympathetic to Gordon’s argument.

事实上，今天的革命性技术令我沉迷 — — 写下这句话的时候，我一边看着我崭新的苹果手表 — — 但我对戈登的观点深有共鸣。


If US productivity figures are to be taken at anything close to face value – a persistently sluggish trend interrupted by a 16-year spurt that now appears to have faded – it is possible that all America has accomplished are transitional efficiency improvements associated with the IT-enabled shift from one technology platform to another.

如果美国生产率数据确实如其所表现的那样 — — 一个长期萎靡的趋势被一个为期16年的涨势打破，而如今这一涨势已经消失 — — 那么有可能美国所取得的所有成就只是信息技术所驱动的、发生在从一个技术平台转移到另一个技术平台期间的过渡性的效率改进。


Optimists maintain that the official statistics fail to capture marked quality-of-life improvements, which may be true, especially in the light of promising advances in biotechnology and online education.

乐观派认为官方数字没有体现生活质量的显著改善，也许确实如此，特别是考虑到生物技术和在线教育等重大突破时。


But this overlooks a much more important aspect of the productivity-measurement critique: the undercounting of work time associated with the widespread use of portable information appliances.

但这忽视了生产率衡量手段批评的另一个重要得多的角度：便携式信息设备的普及所带来的工作时间的低估。


In the US, the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that the length of the average workweek has held steady at about 34 hours since the advent of the Internet two decades ago.

在美国，据劳动统计局（Bureau of Labor Statistics）估算，平均工作周时长自二十年前互联网出现以来一直保持在34小时左右。


Yet nothing could be further from the truth: knowledge workers continually toil outside the traditional office, checking their email, updating spreadsheets, writing reports, and engaging in collective brainstorming.

但这与现实相去甚远：知识工人日益在传统办公室之外埋头苦干，检查邮件、更新报表、撰写报告、参与集体头脑风暴。


Indeed, white-collar knowledge workers – that is, most workers in advanced economies – are now tethered to their workplaces essentially 24 hours a day, seven days a week, a reality that is not reflected in the official statistics.

事实上，白领知识工人 — — 即发达经济体的大部分工人 — — 如今需要每天24小时、每周七天随时待命，这完全没有体现在官方数字中。


Productivity growth is not about working longer; it is about generating more output per unit of labor input.

生产率并不是工作时间更长；而是关乎单位劳动投入产生更多产出。


Any undercounting of output pales in comparison with the IT-assisted undercounting of working hours.

产出的低估与信息技术所导致的工作时长低估相比不值一提。


China’s productivity slowdown is probably more benign.

中国生产率减速的情况也许不如美国严重。


It is an outgrowth of the Chinese economy’s nascent structural transformation from capital-intensive manufacturing to labor-intensive services.

它是中国经济从资本密集型制造业向劳动密集型服务业的方兴未艾的结构转型的副产品。


Indeed, it was only in 2013 that services supplanted manufacturing and construction as the economy’s largest sector.

事实上，直到2013年，服务业才超过之熬夜和建筑业，成为中国经济最大的部门。


Now the gap is widening, and that is likely to continue.

如今，差距正在扩大，并且这一趋势可能会继续下去。


With Chinese services requiring about 30% more workers per unit of output than manufacturing and construction, combined, the economy’s structural rebalancing is now shifting growth to China’s lower-productivity services sector.

中国服务业每单位产出所需要的工人数量比制造业和建筑业加起来还要多30 % ， 因此中国经济的结构性再平衡正在让增长转移到生产率更低的服务业上。


China has time before this becomes a problem.

在这一转变成为问题之前，中国还有充足的时间。


As Gordon notes, there have been long-lasting productivity dividends associated with urbanization – a trend that could continue for at least another decade in China.

戈登指出，城市化会带来长期持续的生产率红利 — — 在中国，这一红利至少还可以维持十年。


But there will come a time when this tailwind subsides and China begins to converge on the so-called frontier of the advanced economies.

但这股顺风终有停止的一天，而中国也将开始想所谓的发达经济前沿靠拢。


At that point, China will face the same productivity challenges that confront America and others.

到了那一步，中国将面临美国和其他国家所面临的相同的生产率挑战。


Chinese policymakers’ new focus on innovation-led growth seems to recognize this risk.

中国决策者将创新驱动型增长作为新的重点，这表明他们认识到了这一风险。


Without powerful innovations, sustaining productivity growth will be an uphill battle.

没有强大的创新，维持生产率增长将十分困难。


China’s recent shift to a slower-productivity trajectory is an early warning of what may well be one of its most daunting economic challenges.

中国最近的生产率下降趋势是一个早期信号，它将成为中国最艰巨的经济挑战之一。


There is no escaping the key role that productivity growth plays in any country’s economic performance.

生产率增长是一国经济表现的决定性因素，古今中外概莫能外。


Yet, for advanced economies, periods of sustained rapid productivity growth have been the exception, not the rule.

但是，对发达经济体而言，持续高速生产率增长已经成为例外而非常规。


Recent signs of slowing productivity growth in both the US and China underscore this reality.

最近出现的中美两国生产率增长齐降现象凸显出这一现实。


For a world flirting with secular stagnation, that is disturbing news, to say the least.

对于陷入长期停滞的世界来说，这是个令人心烦的消息。


A New Blueprint for US-China Relations

美中关系新蓝图


NEW YORK – In the coming decades, nothing will matter more for global peace, prosperity, and governance than how the United States and China handle the ongoing shift in their relative power.

纽约—在未来几十年中，美国和中国如何应对两国相对实力的不断变化将是影响全球和平、繁荣和治理的最重要的因素。


In the long term, today’s other pressing challenges – including Russia’s relationship with the West and events in the tumultuous Middle East – will amount almost to sideshows by comparison.

从长期看，目前的其他紧迫挑战 — — 包括俄罗斯与西方的关系以及动荡的中东的各种事件 — — 相比之下只能等而下之。


What makes the Sino-American relationship dangerous is that powerful forces in both countries seem intent on a collision course.

让中美关系变得危险的是两国的强大力量似乎决定要来一个碰撞。


On the Chinese side, under Xi Jinping’s assertive leadership, the government is no longer heeding Deng Xiaoping’s injunction that the country should “hide its strength, bide its time, and never take the lead” in international affairs.

中国在习近平的强势领导下，政府不再遵循邓小平在国际事务上“韬光养晦，等待时机，永远不要当头”的遗训。


It has pursued manifestly expansionist territorial claims, most notably in the South China Sea, and shown a clear determination to resist the indefinite continuation of American dominance in the region.

中国开始公然追求扩张主义领土主张，特别是在南海，并明确表现出反对美国在该地区无限期主导的决心。


The prevailing Chinese mindset is that the US is intent on isolating, containing, and undermining it.

中国人普遍认为，美国想要孤立、遏制和破坏中国。


Unhappily, there is plenty of evidence on the US side to feed that sentiment.

令人不快的是，美国方面的诸多证据催生了这一情绪。


Whatever many American policymakers may be saying in private, their public discourse almost invariably reflects an intention to remain the world’s dominant power – and specifically in Asia – in perpetuity.

不管美国决策者私下里怎么说，他们在公开场合几乎无一例外地表示要永远保持美国的世界主宰力 — — 特别是在亚洲。


The most confrontational recent articulation of this position can be found in a report for the Council on Foreign Relations, by Robert Blackwill and Ashley Tellis, arguing that the central objective of American grand strategy must be “preserving US primacy in the global system,” and urging a series of aggressive economic, political, and military measures to “balance” China.

这一立场最近的最具冲突性的表现莫过于罗伯特·布莱克维尔（Robert Blackwill）和阿什利·泰利斯（Ashley Tellis）撰写的外交关系委员会（Council on Foreign Relations）报告。 该报告认为，美国大战略的核心目标必须是“保持美国在全球体系中的超然地位 ， ” 并敦促美国政府采取一系列进攻性经济、政治和军事手段以“制衡”中国。


They say this is not a “containment” strategy, but it amounts to nothing less.

他们说，这不是“遏制”战略，但其程度绝不下于遏制。


Is there another way to manage the relationship that, while reflecting the reality of these forces and mindsets on both sides, would not risk turning legitimate competition into dangerous confrontation?

有没有另一种处理办法，既能反映双方的这些力量和思维的现实，又不会让合理竞争演变为危险的冲突？


In a new report for the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kevin Rudd, former Australian Prime Minister and now head of the Asia Society Policy Institute, outlines just such a strategy, which he calls “constructive realism”.

在哈佛大学肯尼迪学院贝尔福尔科学和国际关系中心（Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs）的一份 新报告中，前澳大利亚总理、现任亚洲社会政策研究所（Asia Society Policy Institute）的陆克文（Kevin Rudd）提出了这样一个战略，他称之为“建设性现实主义 ” 。


It’s a clunky label, but his analysis and policy prescriptions are compelling.

这是一个笨重的主题，但他的分析和政策建议极具说服力。


The “realist” dimension of Rudd’s argument recognizes that certain areas of disagreement – including Taiwan, territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas, US alliances in Asia, Chinese military modernization, and the legitimacy of China’s political system – will remain intractable for the foreseeable future.

陆克文观点的“现实主义”维度承认，分歧的某些方面 — — 包括台湾问题、南海和东海领土纠纷、美国的亚洲盟友、中国军事现代化和中国政治制度合法性等 — — 在可预见的未来仍然非常棘手。


They will defy easy solutions – and thus will require very careful management.

这意味着不可能有容易的解决方案 — — 因此需要非常谨慎的管理。


The “constructive” part of Rudd’s thesis argues for systematic collaboration – with the US treating China more as an equal – in tackling a series of other difficult issues at bilateral, regional, and global levels.

陆克文报告的“建设性”部分提出，在处理双边、地区和全球层面上的一系列其他难题是，可以进行系统协作 — — 美国更应该将中国视为平等的对手。


Bilaterally, such cooperation might involve an investment treaty, a joint intelligence task force on terrorism, a cyber-security protocol, agreed measures for managing unplanned military incidents, and mutual ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty.

就双边情形而论，这类合作可以包括投资条约、联合反恐情报特勤组、网络安全协议、一致的意料外军事事故管理办法、互相批准全面禁止核武器条约（Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty）等。


On a regional level, Rudd argues, the US and China could work on joint strategies to denuclearize and, ultimately, reunify the Korean Peninsula; tackle the lingering sore of Japan’s war history; harmonize regional trade agreements; and transform the East Asia Summit into a more complete Asia-Pacific Community.

在地区层面，陆克文指出，美国和中国可以致力于制定联合战略，以促进朝鲜半岛的去核化以及最终重新统一、处理长期悬而未决的日本战争史问题、协调地区贸易协议、将东亚峰会办成更全面的亚太共同体等。


Globally, Rudd believes that the joint agenda could focus on combating climate change, revitalizing the G-20, further internationalizing the renminbi; giving China a greater role in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank; and reforming other key international institutions within the UN system.

就全球层面而论，陆克文认为中美联合日程应该着重于抵抗气候变化、提振G-20、人民币的进一步国际化、给予中国在国际货币基金组织和世界银行更重要的角色、在联合国体系内改革其他重要国际机构等。


Some in the West – including veteran China watcher David Shambaugh – remain convinced that this kind of collaborative accommodation will not be necessary, because failures of economic and political management will bring about China’s implosion.

一些西方人 — — 包括老牌中国观察家沈大伟（David Shambaugh ） — —仍认为这类协作性适应（collaborative accommodation）并非必须，因为经济和政治管理的失败将让中国从内部崩溃。


Rudd argues that they are wrong, and that Xi will neither overplay his authoritarian hand nor under-deliver on growth.

陆克文认为这些人是错误的，习近平不会过度使用极权措施，也不会让增长大幅降低。


China’s rise will continue, and the world – including the US – will have to find principled ways of peacefully accommodating it.

中国将继续崛起，而世界 — — 包括美国 — — 必须找到和平适应这一变化的原则性方法。


Rudd’s recommendations are undoubtedly ambitious.

陆克文的建议毫无疑问是宏大的。


But, given his credentials – he is a formidable Chinese linguist and creative policy thinker, with long and close personal relationships with key figures in both the US and China – his argument must be taken seriously.

但是，凭他的资质 — — 他精通汉语，又是建设性政策思想家，与美国和中国的重要人物有着长期紧密的个人关系 — — 他的观点必须认真对待。


Indeed, though Rudd’s tenure as Australia’s prime minister was anything but smooth, his sheer force of intellect is unmatched by that of any public figure with whom I have interacted over the last 30 years.

事实上，尽管陆克文的澳大利亚总理生涯一点都不平坦，但他的过人智力是我在过去30年里打过交道的所有公共人物中首屈一指的。


(Not that this will much help his evident willingness to be drafted as the next UN Secretary-General: in that role the major powers have always preferred bland secretaries to creative generals.)

（这未必大大有助于他显而易见的争取成为下一任联合国秘书长的意愿：对于这个职位，主要大国永远更喜欢平庸温和的秘书，而不是有创造力的统帅。 ）


No American presidential candidate is likely to be comfortable talking about the US as anything other than Number One.

美国总统候选人绝不可能踌躇满志地大谈美国不再是第一名。


But we must hope that in the years ahead we hear less talk of “primacy” and “dominance” and much more about cooperation and collaboration.

但是，在未来几年中，但愿我们可以少听到一些“超然 ” 、 “主宰 ” ， 多听到一些合作和协作。


It is only with such US policies toward China that the world can begin to be confident that the twenty-first century will not, like the last, become a vale of tears.

只有这样的美国对华政策可以让世界有信心二十一世纪不会重蹈二十世纪泪流成河的覆辙。


A Bilateral Foil for America’s Multilateral Dilemma

美国多边困境的一块双边遮羞布


NEW HAVEN – The good news is that the United States and China appear to have backed away from the precipice of a trade war.

发自纽黑文 — — 美中两国似乎已经从贸易战的悬崖边上撤了回来，这是个好消息。


While vague in detail, a May 19 agreement defuses tension and commits to further negotiation.

虽然细节披露不多，但5月19日达成的协议消解了紧张局势并承诺展开进一步谈判。


The bad news is that the framework of negotiations is flawed: A deal with any one country will do little to resolve America’s fundamental economic imbalances that have arisen in an interconnected world.

而坏消息则是这一系列谈判的框架是有缺陷的：要想解决美国在一个相互联系的世界中产生的基础经济失衡问题，光靠跟任何一个国家达成协议都是杯水车薪。


There is a longstanding disconnect between bilateral and multilateral approaches to international economic problems.

针对国际经济问题的双边和多边解决方案之间长期存在着脱节。


In May 1930, some 1,028 of America’s leading academic economists wrote a public letter to US President Herbert Hoover urging him to veto the pending Smoot-Hawley tariff bill.

1930年5月，1028名美国知名学术经济学家向时任总统的赫伯特·胡佛（Herbert Hoover）写了一封公开信，敦促他否决尚未通过的斯穆特-霍利（Smoot-Hawley）关税法案。


Hoover ignored the advice, and the global trade war that followed made a garden-variety depression “great.”

胡佛忽视了这一建议，结果随之而来的全球贸易战把一场原本小规模的萧条搞“大”了。


President Donald Trump has put a comparable spin on what it takes to “make America great again.”

而如今特朗普总统对如何实现“让美国再度伟大起来”这句口号的解读方式也与前者异曲同工。


Politicians have long favored the bilateral perspective, because it simplifies blame: you “solve” problems by targeting a specific country.

政客们一直都偏爱双边的观点，因为这可以将矛盾简单化：你通过针对特定国家来“解决”问题。


By contrast, the multilateral approach appeals to most economists, because it stresses the balance-of-payments distortions that arise from mismatches between saving and investment.

相比之下多边手段得到了大多数经济学家的赞同，因为它强调了储蓄和投资之间错配所导致的国际收支扭曲。


This contrast between the simple and the complex is an obvious and important reason why economists often lose public debates.

而这种简单和复杂之间的对比正是经济学家经常在公众辩论中落入下风的明显重要原因。


The dismal science has never been known for clarity.

须知这门晦涩的学科从来都不是以清晰明了著称的。


Such is the case with the US-China debate.

美中之辩正是如此。


China is an easy political target.

中国很容易被锁定为一个政治目标。


After all, it accounted for 46% of America’s colossal $800 billion merchandise trade gap in 2017.

毕竟它在2017年占据了美国8000亿美元巨额商品贸易逆差的46 ％ 。


Moreover, China has been charged with egregious violations of international rules, ranging from allegations of currency manipulation and state-subsidized dumping of excess capacity to cyber-hacking and forced technology transfer.

此外中国还被指控恶意违反国际规则，从货币操纵、国家补贴倾销过剩产能，再到网络黑客行为以及强制技术转让。


Equally significant, China has lost the battle in the arena of public opinion – chastised by Western policymakers, a few high-profile academics, and others for having failed to live up to the grand bargain struck in 2001, when the country was admitted to the World Trade Organization.

同样重要的是，中国在公共舆论领域已经身败名裂 — — 受到西方政策制定者，一些知名学者以及其他认为该国未能兑现2001年加入WTO所承诺条款的人所指责。


A recent article in Foreign Affairs by two senior officials in the Obama administration says it all: “(T)he liberal international order has failed to lure or bind China as powerfully as expected.”

原奥巴马政府的两位高级官员最近在《外交》杂志上发表的一篇文章一语中的 ： “ 自由的国际秩序没未如预期那样有力地诱惑或约束中国。


As is the case with North Korea, Syria, and Iran, strategic patience has given way to impatience, with the nationalistic Trump administration leading the charge against China.

”正如与朝鲜，叙利亚和伊朗那样，战略上的隐忍已经被烦躁所取代，而秉承民族主义的特朗普政府领导正是冲在了攻击中国的最前线。


The counter-argument from multilateral-focused economists like me rings hollow in this climate.

而在这种气氛中，来自像我这类多边主义经济学家的反对论点就显得空洞无聊。


Tracing outsize current-account and trade deficits to an extraordinary shortfall of US domestic saving – just 1.3% of national income in the fourth quarter of 2017 – counts for little in the arena of popular opinion.

将美国巨大的经常账户和贸易逆差归结于国内储蓄的极端短缺 — — 在2017年第四季度仅相当于国民收入的1.3 ％ — —在公共舆论中不受待见。


Likewise, it doesn’t help when we emphasize that China is merely a large piece of a much bigger multilateral problem: the US had bilateral merchandise trade deficits with 102 countries in 2017.

同样，当我们强调中国只是一个更庞大多边问题的其中一个大的板块时也无济于事：美国在2017年可是与102个国家之间存在双边商品贸易逆差。


Nor does it matter when we point out that correcting for supply-chain distortions – caused by inputs from other countries that enter into Chinese assembly platforms – would reduce the bilateral US-China trade imbalance by 35-40%.

我们还指出存在自其他国家输入中国装配平台的原料所引起的供应链扭曲现象，一旦把这种统计手法纠正过来将会令美中贸易失衡数字减少35~40 ％ ， 但应者寥寥。


Flawed as it may be, the bilateral political case resonates in a US where there is enormous pressure to ease the angst of the country’s beleaguered middle class.

尽管可能存在着谬误，但双边政治话题的争论在美国引起了共鸣，因为该国陷入困境的中产阶级急于为自身的焦虑找到发泄口。


Trade deficits, goes the argument, lead to job losses and wage compression.

争论中的说法是贸易赤字导致了失业以及工资缩减。


And, with the merchandise trade gap hitting 4.2% of GDP in 2017, these pressures have only intensified in the current economic recovery.

同时由于2017年的商品贸易缺口已经相当于GDP的4.2 ％ ， 这类压力在当前的经济复苏中只会日益加剧。


As a result, targeting China has enormous political appeal.

因此针对中国就具有巨大的政治吸引力。


So, what can be made of the May 19 deal?

那么5月19日的交易又能敲定些什么呢？


Beyond a ceasefire in tit-for-tat tariffs, there are few real benefits.

这除了叫停针锋相对的关税战之外几乎没有实际好处。


US negotiators are fixated on targeted reductions of around $200 billion in the bilateral trade imbalance over a two-year time frame.

美国谈判代表的全部注意力都集中于在两年时间框架内将双边贸易不平衡削减约2000亿美元的目标上。


Given the extent of America’s multilateral problem, this is largely a meaningless objective, especially in light of the massive and ill-timed tax cuts and federal expenditure increases that the US has enacted in the last six months.

而鉴于美国多边问题的严重程度，这一目标在很大程度上是毫无意义的，尤其是美国在过去六个月出台了大规模且不合时宜的减税以及联邦支出增长。


Indeed, with budget deficits likely to widen, America’s saving shortfall will only deepen in the years ahead.

事实上，由于预算赤字可能继续扩大，美国的储蓄缺口只会在未来几年内进一步加深。


That points to rising balance-of-payments and multilateral trade deficits, which are impossible to resolve through targeted bilateral actions against a single country.

这意味着国际收支和多边贸易的赤字都会增大，而这些赤字也无法通过面向某一国的针对性双边行动来解决。


Chinese negotiators are more circumspect, resisting numerical deficit targets but committing to the joint objective of “effective measures to substantially reduce” the bilateral imbalance with the US.

中方则更加谨慎，一方面抵制任何量化的赤字目标，另一方面又承诺实现“通过有效措施大幅减少”对美双边失衡状况的共同目标。


China’s vague promise to purchase more American-made agricultural and energy products borrows a page from the “shopping list” approach of its earlier trade missions to the US.

中国对于购买更多美国农产品和能源产品的模糊承诺沿袭了其前一段时间赴美贸易代表团的“购物清单”手段。


Unfortunately, the big-wallet mindset of a deal-hungry China reinforces the US narrative that China is guilty as charged.

不幸的是，中国这种渴望大撒金钱来换取交易达成的思维反而让美方更加坐实了那种中国有罪的说法。


Even if the stars were in perfect alignment and the US was not facing a saving constraint, it stretches credibility to seek a formulaic bilateral solution to America’s multilateral problem.

就算中方与美方步调一致且美国能摆脱储蓄的掣肘，但美方寻求用一种公式化的双边方案来解决自身多边问题的做法实际上也滥用了其信誉。


Since 2000, the largest annual reduction in the US-China merchandise trade imbalance amounted to $41 billion, and that occurred in 2009, during the depths of the Great Recession.

自2000年以来美中商品贸易失衡的最大年度缩减量为410亿美元，但这一缩减是发生在2009年大衰退的最严重阶段。


The goal of achieving back-to-back annual reductions totaling more than double that magnitude is sheer fantasy.

可见想要连续两年实现该缩减量两倍以上的目标纯属痴心妄想。


In the end, any effort to impose a bilateral solution on a multilateral problem will backfire, with ominous consequences for American consumers.

最后，任何在多边问题上强加双边解决方案的努力都会适得其反，以致为美国消费者造成不利后果。


Without addressing the shortfall in domestic saving, the bilateral fix simply moves the deficit from one economy to others.

如果不解决国内储蓄不足的问题，双边解决方案只不过是将赤字从一个经济体转移到另一个经济体而已。


Therein lies the cruelest twist of all.

这是最棘手的问题。


China is America’s low-cost provider of imported consumer goods.

中国是美国进口消费品的低成本供应商。


The Trump deal would shift the Chinese piece of America’s multilateral imbalance to higher-cost imports from elsewhere – the functional equivalent of a tax hike on American families.

特朗普的这笔交易将把属于中国的这一部分美国多边失衡问题转移到其他地方的更高成本进口商品上 — — 这形同于给美国家庭的加税。


As Hoover’s ghost might ask, what’s so great about that?

倘若胡佛泉下有知，也会问这种做法究竟有什么“伟大”可言呢？


America Confronts Old and New Europe

美国面对的新旧欧洲


US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's petulant remark of last year about "old and new Europe" was right for the wrong reasons.

美国国防部长唐纳德·拉姆斯菲费尔德去年有关"新旧欧洲"的胡言乱语刚好歪打正着。


He meant it to refer to Europe's divisions, but in May, ten additional states joined the European Union.

他本来是指欧洲的分裂，但今年5月，又有10个国家纳入了欧洲联盟。


The expanded Europe truly forms a new Europe.

扩张后的欧洲真的成了新欧洲。


Should America be nervous?

这是否令美国感到不安？


Fifty-four years after the announcement of the Schuman Plan that began to knit together the economies of France and Germany, the EU now has 25 countries and a population larger than that of the United States.

联结法德两国经济的舒曼计划颁布54年后的今天，欧盟已有25个成员国，人口数甚至超过了美国。


Eight of the new members are former Communist countries that were locked behind the Iron Curtain for nearly half a century.

其中8个新成员为前共产党国家，近半个世纪来他们被铁幕重重封锁。


Their attraction to the Union is a sign of the appeal - the "soft power" - of the idea of European unification.

它们加入欧盟表明了欧洲统一理念"软性力量"所具有的强大生命力。


Of course, this new Europe faces many problems.

勿庸置疑，这个新欧洲面临着巨大的挑战。


The per capita income of the new countries is less than half of that of the fifteen members they are joining. Concerns have been raised about the influx of cheap labor.

新成员的人均生产总值还不到原有15个国家的一半，廉价劳动力的大量涌入也引起了人们不小的担忧。


But average GDP growth rates in the new members are twice as high as in the original members, and this can provide a welcome stimulus to stagnant labor markets and sluggish economies.

但新成员的平均国内产值增长率是原有成员国的两倍，这对停滞的劳动力市场和裹足不前的经济将产生良好的促进作用。


Political arrangements are somewhat more problematic.

政治局势似乎更加问题重重。


Negotiations are underway to revise a draft EU constitution.

各成员国正在谈判，修改欧盟宪法草案。


Some Europeans worry that the constitution will enable courts to carry the integration process further and faster than public opinion in member states will tolerate.

欧洲某些人担心宪法将赋予法院权力，以超出成员国公众所能容忍的最快速度推进欧洲的统一进程。


Lack of grassroots support might lead to rejection of the constitution in countries like Britain, where referenda have been promised before the new arrangements come into force.

缺少来自底层的支持可能导致英国等国否决这一宪法，因为上述当局许诺在新局势成形前举行全民公决。


Across the Atlantic, most Americans (to the extent they pay attention) regard these changes with general approval.

大西洋的另一端，关注此事的美国人多数持赞成态度。


But some express concern that the new Europe will be defined in opposition to the US.

但也有人表达了新欧洲也许会与美国作对的担忧。


Not only do the remarks of French leaders about recreating a multi-polar world arouse alarm, but recent public opinion polls show a decline in the popularity of the US among Europeans and a desire for more independent policies.

不仅法国领导人重建多极世界的讲话令人惊恐，最近的民意测验也表明美国在欧洲的受欢迎程度日益下降，以及欧洲人对独立自主政策越来越强烈的渴望。


The Iraq War proved costly to American soft power, with the US losing about 30 percentage points of attractiveness on average in Europe, including in countries like Britain, Spain, and Italy, whose governments supported the war.

对伊战争让美国的"软性力量"付出了昂贵的代价，美国在欧洲国家的平均吸引力下降了约30个百分点，其中包括在英国、西班牙和意大利等支持这场战争的国家。


The recent photographs of detainees being abused and sexually degraded in Baghdad's Abu Ghraib prison added fuel to the fire.

不久前战俘在巴格达阿布格莱布监狱遭受虐待和性侮辱的照片曝光更为这一事件火上浇油。


Now some American neo-conservatives argue that the US should drop its longstanding support for European integration.

如今，美国某些新保守主义者甚至主张撤销长久以来对欧洲统一进程的支持。


Such a policy change would be a serious mistake.

这样的政策变化将犯下严重的错误。


Not only would it add to anti-American attitudes and fail to accomplish its objectives, but it over-estimates the extent to which the new Europe is being formed in opposition to the US.

它不仅助长反美情绪，达不到既定目标，还过高估计了新欧洲形成给美国带来的威胁。


Whatever the rhetoric in France, for example, the policies and attitudes in countries such as Britain or Poland demonstrate that good trans-Atlantic relations can be maintained.

无论法国怎样慷慨陈辞，英国或波兰等国的态度依然表明：良好的泛大西洋关系能够维持下去。


If anything, the risks of a US-Europe split will be reduced rather than increased by the EU's recent enlargement.

如果一定要说影响，那么最近欧洲的东扩将削减而非助长美欧分裂的危险。


Moreover, there are several objective reasons why the current friction between Europe and the US is unlikely to lead to divorce.

此外，若干客观原因使目前的欧美摩擦不会导致分离。


For one thing, the divisive war in Iraq may turn out to be the last act of the twentieth century rather than a harbinger of the twenty-first.

首先，伊拉克的分裂战争也许标志着20世纪的终结，但绝非21世纪的起始。


American unilateralism is much less in evidence in the world's other hot spots, such as North Korea and Iran, both because of the costs of the war in Iraq and the realities of the situation in those other regions.

美国的单边主义在北朝鲜和伊朗等其它热点地区远没有如此明显，这既因为伊拉克战争代价惨重，也是其它地区的现实情况使然。


Moreover, while the common security threat from the Soviet Union has disappeared, both the US and Europe face a new common threat from radical jihadist terrorism.

还有一点。 尽管苏联带来的常规安全威胁已经不复存在，美国和欧洲又面临着激进的吉哈德恐怖运动的共同威胁。


Neither side of the Atlantic is immune to the threat, despite the efforts of Osama bin Laden to drive a wedge between Europe and America.

这种威胁在大西洋两岸同样存在，尽管奥萨马·本·拉登试图在欧美之间挑起矛盾。


Transnational terrorism can only be confronted by close civilian cooperation such as intelligence sharing, police work across borders, and tracing financial flows. These forms of cooperation survived the divisions over Iraq.

只有通过情报共享、跨国警界合作和追踪金融汇兑等密切的民间合作，才有可能战胜跨越国界的恐怖活动。


Europe and America also share a common structure of economic interests and values.

欧洲和美国还拥有共同的经济利益和价值观结构。


While trade produces frictions in democracies, it also enhances wealth.

尽管贸易造成民主国家间的摩擦，但同时也带来巨大的财富。


If one looks at foreign direct investment, it is clear that the two sides of the Atlantic are closely integrated.

看看国外直接投资就知道，大西洋两岸是紧密联系在一起的。


In terms of values, while some differences exist between Europe and America, at the fundamental level of democracy and human rights, no other two parts of the globe share more.

价值观方面，尽管欧洲和美国间存在分歧，但在民主和人权的根本问题上，没有哪两个地区观点如此一致。


As the writer Robert Kagan concluded in the revision of his book in which he declared Europeans to be from Venus and Americans from Mars, it turns out that Americans seeking democratic legitimization of their policies and self-images cannot escape Europe.

正如作家Robert Kagan在其著作修订版中总结的那样，欧洲源于金星而美国源于火星，但最终寻求合法政策及自我形象的美国离不开欧洲的支持。


In short, it is good for Americans - and for the world - that old and new Europe are becoming one.

简而言之，新旧欧洲合而为一对美国和世界都是喜讯。


We can all benefit from the soft power of an enlarged Europe.

我们都将受益于经过扩张的欧洲所拥有的软性力量。


America’s Baby Bust

美国的生育低谷


LONDON – News that the United States’ fertility rate fell in 2017 to 1.75 has provoked surprise and concern.

伦敦—2017 年美国生育率下降到1.75，这则新闻令人惊讶又担心。


A buoyant US economy in the 1990s and early 2000s was accompanied by fertility rates of 2.00-2.05 children per woman, up from 1.8-1.9 in the 1980s.

1990年代末至21世纪初，美国经济繁荣，生育率为每个妇女生2.00—2.05个孩子，而1980年代为1.8—1.9。


But the increasingly strong economic recovery of the last five years has been accompanied by a declining birth rate.

但在过去五年，经济复苏越来越强劲，生育率反而下降。


That seems to presage a long-term shortage of workers relative to retirees, and severe financial pressures on pension funds and health-care provision.

这也许预示着工人将相对退休者出现长期短缺，退休基金和医疗供给将面临沉重财务压力。


But the assumption that stronger growth and economic confidence must generate higher fertility – with low birth rates reflecting pessimism about the future – is not justified by the evidence.

但认为较强劲的增长和经济信息必然产生更高的生育率 — — 而出生率下降反映人们对未来感到悲观 — — 并无证据支持。


Moreover, fertility rates at around the current US level do not pose severe problems – and bring some benefits.

此外，美国当前水平的生育率也不会造成严重问题 — — 还会带来一些好处。


In all major developed economies, fertility rates fell during the 1960s and 70s, reaching levels below the replacement rate of around 2.05 children per woman.

在所有主要发达经济体中，1960和70年代都出现了生育率下降，下降到每位妇女声誉2.05个孩子的替代率以下。


The US rate reached 1.77 in the late 1970s, compared to 1.8 in Northern Europe and 1.65 in Western Europe.

美国在1970年代末的生育率达到过1.77，而北欧为1.8，西欧为1.65。


And while we cannot be certain, the best expectation is that this shift to fertility rates significantly below the replacement rate will prove permanent, with temporary reversals driven by specific one-off factors.

尽管我们不能确定，但想必这一生育率显著低于替代率的变化方向会一直维持下去，当中会有一些因一次性因素导致的反复。


Some viewed the US return to somewhat higher fertility rates in the 1990s as the consequence of greater economic dynamism and confidence, in contrast to “old Europe.”

一些人认为，美国在1990年代恢复了较高的生育率是因为经济活力和信心提高，这与“老欧洲”形成了鲜明对比。


But throughout the last 30 years, fertility rates for white and black Americans have remained significantly below replacement level, and the three-decade rise and fall of US birth rates is explained primarily by higher Hispanic fertility, reflecting the common phenomenon that first-generation immigrants’ fertility rates are typically similar to those in their poorer countries of origin.

但在过去30年终，美国白人和黑人生育率都远低于替代率，三十年来美国生育率的起落主要原因是西班牙裔生育率较高，这反映了一个常有的现象：初代移民生育率往往与较贫穷的来源国相仿。


The same effect explains why Canada – with immigration skewed toward low-fertility Asian countries of origin – has had a significantly lower fertility rate of around 1.6.

同样的效应解释了为何加拿大 — — 移民大多来自低生育率的亚洲国家 — — 生育率一直保持在1.6左右的显著更低的水平。


But with Latin American fertility rates now in steep decline – Mexico’s is down from 2.9 in 2000 to 2.1 today, and Brazil’s has fallen from 2.5 to 1.7 – the immigrant-induced effect is disappearing, and the US is reverting to a typical fertility rate for a rich developed country.

但如今，拉丁美洲生育率大幅下降 — — 墨西哥从2000年的2.9下降到今天的2.1，巴西从2.5下降到1.7 — — 移民导致的效应正在消失，美国正在回归富裕发达国家典型的生育率。


Absent temporary migration-induced effects, all major developed economies have shifted to fertility rates of 1.2-2.0, with most falling between 1.3 and 1.9.

剔除暂时性移民导致的效应，所有主要发达经济体的生育率到演变为1.2—2.0，其中大部分下降到了1.3到1.9之间。


And while there is some evidence that sudden deep recessions produce temporary fertility dips, followed by rebounds, cross-country comparison provides no evidence of any correlation – positive or negative – between medium-term economic success and precise fertility rates within this range.

一些证据表明，突发深度衰退会造成暂时性的生育率下降，随后发生反弹，但跨国比较并未表明中期经济成功与该区间内的具体生育率之间存在相关性 — — 不管是正还是负。


Canada, with its lower fertility rate, is quite as successful and confident as the US.

加拿大生育率较低，但其经济与美国一样成功和自信。


Strong German growth over the last 20 years has been combined with a fertility rate of 1.4-1.5, well below the 1.98 rate in less successful France.

过去20年来强劲的德国增长率带来了1.4—1.5的生育率，远低于不太成功的法国。


South Korea has maintained economic expansion with a fertility rate of just 1.2-1.3.

韩国以仅有1.2—1.3的生育率保持了经济扩张。


Latin America’s most prosperous economy, Chile, has a fertility rate of 1.76, well below less successful Argentina’s rate of 2.27.

拉丁美洲最繁荣的经济体智利的生育率也只有1.76，远低于不太成功的阿根廷的生育率2.27。


The recent decline in US fertility is therefore unsurprising; and, provided it does not fall to much lower levels, there is no cause for concern.

因此，最近美国生育率的下降不足为奇；只要它不跌到显著更低的程度，就没有必要担心。


Of course, in the long run, a lower fertility rate, combined with rising life expectancy, will produce a higher ratio of those over 65 years old to those conventionally labeled as “working age.”

当然，在长期，较低的生育率加上预期寿命的延长，将导致65岁以上人口与传统上的“工作年龄”人口的比率。


But as people live longer and healthier lives, retirement ages can and should be increased.

但由于人们能够活得更长、更健康，退休年龄也能够并且应该提高。


And in a world of radical automation potential, which threatens low wage growth and rising inequality, a rapidly growing workforce is neither necessary nor beneficial, and a slightly contracting supply of workers may create useful incentives to improve productivity and support real wage growth.

在自动化潜力巨大的世界中，很可能发生工资增长低迷、不平等性加剧，迅速增加的工作人口既非必要，也无好处，而略微吃紧的工人供给可能能够成为有用的刺激来改善生产率、支持真实工资增长。


Notably, fears that robots will take jobs are much less prevalent in Japan and China than in higher-fertility Western countries.

引人注目的是，对机器人将抢走饭碗的担心在日本和中国远不及生育率更高的西方国家的普遍。


In rich developed societies with modern attitudes to the role of women, fertility rates somewhat below replacement levels may thus be both inevitable and broadly welcome.

因此，在对妇女的作用持现代看法的富裕发达社会中，生育率总是会低于替代率也是是不可避免的，总体而言也是值得欢迎的。


But degree matters, and extremely low fertility, such as Japan’s rate of 1.4, will create major problems if permanently maintained.

但程度很重要，极低的生育率，比如日本只有1.4，如果长久保持的话，会造成重大问题。


The United Nations median projection suggests that the total population of North and South America, after growing by another 15-20% between now and 2050, will remain roughly stable for the rest of the twenty-first century.

联合国中位预测表明，从现在到2050年，北美和南美总人口将再增加15—20 % ， 此后直到二十一世纪末都将保持稳定。


By contrast, Japan’s population is projected to fall from 125 million today to around 80 million.

相反，日本人口预计会从今天的1.25亿下降到8,000万左右。


Demographic contraction on that scale will severely stress Japan’s ability to support an aging population.

人口规模收缩将严重制约日本支持老龄化人口的能力。


Intelligent policy should therefore identify and remove any barriers unnecessarily depressing birth rates, such as labor-market discrimination, limited parental leave, or inadequate childcare facilities, which make it difficult for women to combine careers with having as many children as they wish.

因此，明智的政策应该辨别并消除一切非必要的抑制出生率的障碍，如劳动力市场歧视、限制育儿假，或儿童看护设施不足等，这些障碍让妇女难以既追求事业，又能想生多少生多少。


The Scandinavian countries are exemplary in this respect, though fertility rates there have not returned to replacement levels, but only to about 1.75-1.9.

斯堪的纳维亚国家是这方面的典范，尽管它们的生育率并没有恢复到替代率，而是只有1.75—1.9。


Similar policies in the US might marginally increase the fertility rate from today’s 1.75, with a mildly beneficial net effect.

美国采取类似政策的话，也许可以将生育率在目前1.75的水平的基础上略微提高，形成比较有利的净结果。


But the predominant response to America’s recent fertility decline should be to accept it as inevitable and to stop worrying about it.

但对于美国近期的生育率下降局面，最主要的应对应该是接受它的不可避免性，停止为它担忧。


The US Is Exporting Obesity

输出肥胖的美国


CAMBRIDGE – As US President Donald Trump’s administration throws sharp elbows in trade negotiations and systematically rescinds regulations introduced by President Barack Obama, one casualty is likely to be efforts to fight the global obesity epidemic.

发自剑桥 — — 当美国总统特朗普的政府在贸易谈判中上窜下跳，并有计划地撤销奥巴马总统所引入的条例时，其中一个深受其害的事务很可能是抗击全球肥胖症流行现象的工作。


Left unchecked, rapidly rising obesity rates could slow or even reverse the dramatic gains in health and life expectancy that much of the world has enjoyed over the past few decades.

如果不加控制，肥胖率的迅速上升可能会减缓甚至扭转过去几十年来世界大部分地区医疗卫生水平以及预期寿命的巨大进步。


And by forcing its food culture on countries like Mexico and Canada, the United States is making the problem worse.

而通过将其饮食文化强加给墨西哥和加拿大等国，美国正在令问题变得更加严重。


One of the paradoxes of modern global capitalism is that whereas more than 800 million people in the world do not have enough to eat, an estimated 700 million people (including 100 million children) are obese.

现代全球资本主义的悖论之一就是，一方面世界上有超过8亿人食不果腹，另一方面却有大概7亿人（包括1亿儿童）陷入肥胖。


Of course, the two are not necessarily directly related. A considerable proportion of world hunger occurs in countries suffering from domestic strife or severe government dysfunction.

当然这两者不一定直接相关，因为世界上有相当比例的饥饿发生在遭受内乱或政府严重失能的国家。


The obesity epidemic, however, has a much broader footprint, affecting advanced economies and most emerging markets.

与此同时肥胖症的流行范围则更广，遍及发达经济体和大多数新兴市场。


Although there is some connection between obesity and poverty within countries, it is notable that obesity rates in rich countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada are among the world’s highest.

尽管一些国家内部的肥胖与贫困之间存在某种联系，但值得注意的是，美国，英国和加拿大等富裕国家的肥胖率是全世界最高的。


Recently, the US Centers for Disease Control estimated that a stunning 40% of all Americans are obese (defined as having a body mass index of 30 or higher), a figure that includes 20.6% of adolescents (12-19 years old).

美国疾病控制中心最近发布了一份报告，估算美国有40％的人肥胖（定义为身体质量指数BMI为30或更高 ） ， 其中包括20.6％的12~19岁青少年。


According to the CDC, the average weight of an American woman today is greater than the average weight of an American man in 1960 (166 pounds, or 75 kilos).

而据美国疾病控制与预防中心称，当今美国女性的平均体重大于1960年美国男性的平均体重（166磅/75公斤 ） 。


Back in 1960, the average weight of an American woman was 140 pounds, while the average weight of an American man today is 195 pounds. (Over the same period, the average height of Americans increased by only one inch, or 2.5 centimeters.)

在1960年美国女性的平均体重是140磅/63.5公斤，而今天美国男性的平均体重是195磅/88.4公斤（而同期美国人的平均身高只增加了1英寸，即2.5厘米 ） 。


This same dynamic is playing out worldwide, with obesity rates soaring in Europe, Latin America, and even in China.

同样的动态也存在于世界范围内，欧洲，拉丁美洲乃至中国的肥胖率都在上升。


Although it is difficult to gauge the long-run health consequences, there is abundant evidence that obesity contributes significantly to higher rates of type II diabetes, heart attacks, and certain types of cancer.

虽然难以衡量长期的健康后果，但是有充分的证据表明肥胖对II型糖尿病，心脏病和某些类型癌症的发生率有着较高的影响。


The health costs are staggering, estimated to be close to $200 billion per year in the US alone.

因此产生的医疗费用也极为惊人，估计每年接近2000亿美元。


And with rising childhood obesity rates worldwide portending significantly greater health problems in the future adult population, the costs are likely to rise considerably.

随着儿童肥胖率在世界范围内不断上升，从而预示着未来成年人群的健康问题显着增加，医疗成本还有机会大幅走高。


The causes of obesity are manifold and complex.

肥胖的成因是多方面且和复杂的。


Nevertheless, a growing body of evidence suggests that a culture emphasizing processed food and a generally sedentary lifestyle lies at the center of the problem.

然而越来越多的证据表明，注重加工食品和普遍久坐生活方式的文化是问题的核心。


In emerging markets, rapid urbanization is another important factor, as well as a desire to emulate Western lifestyles.

而在新兴市场国家快速城市化则是另一个重要因素，此外还有模仿西方生活方式的意愿。


Many governments have launched initiatives to improve nutrition education.

许多政府已经启动了一些改善营养膳食教育的措施。


Unfortunately, industry advertising typically dwarfs these efforts, as do US trade lobbyists’ own efforts to push processed and fast food on the rest of the world.

但不幸的是，与美国贸易游说者向世界其他地区推广加工和快餐食品的努力一样，行业广告通常也会让这些努力大打折扣。


It is hard to ignore the fact that Mexico’s adult obesity rate has soared since the adoption in 1993 of the North American Free Trade Agreement.

自从1993年签署《北美自由贸易协定》以来墨西哥的成人肥胖率飙升，这是个难以忽略的事实。


While there are many causes, post-NAFTA direct foreign investment in the processed food industry and a surge in advertising are important contributors.

而协定生效后该国加工食品行业引入的直接国外投资以及广告的激增是造成这种情况的重要因素。


Mexican consumption of sugary beverages nearly tripled between 1993 and 2014, and a new tax on sugary drinks has muted demand only slightly since then.

墨西哥在含糖饮料方面的消费量在1993~2014年间几乎增长了两倍，而自那以后的一项针对含糖饮料的新税收仅仅令需求量略有下降。


The other NAFTA partner, Canada, has similarly experienced a rise in obesity, partly because US imports have led to a sharp decline in the price of fructose.

另一个《北美自由贸易协定》合作伙伴 — — 加拿大 — — 同样也经历了肥胖率上升的状况，部分原因是来自美国的出口导致果糖价格急剧下跌。


It is unfortunate that government regulators have been so slow to try to reverse these trends by, for example, helping to educate the public on the science of nutrition.

不幸的是，政府监管机构试图扭转这些趋势（例如向公众传播营养科学）的步伐太过缓慢。


And, for too long, most government anti-obesity education has focused on mechanically regulating calorie intake, without taking into account that different foods have dramatically different effects on appetite (as David Ludwig, a professor at Harvard Medical School, emphasizes in his excellent new book Always Hungry).

而且，长期以来，大多数政府反肥胖教育的重点都集中在刻板地调节卡路里摄入量，而没有考虑不同食物对食欲的显著差异性影响（正如哈佛大学医学院教授大卫·路德维格（David Ludwig）在他的优秀新著《永远饥饿》中指出的那样 ） 。


Skeptics may point out that nutrition guidelines always seem to be morphing, with last year’s sin food becoming this year’s superfood, and vice versa.

怀疑论者可能会指出，营养指南似乎总是在变化，去年的罪恶食品经常摇身一变成了今年的超级食品，反之亦然。


Though there is some truth to this, the fact is that nutrition research has made significant progress in recent decades.

这有点道理，但事实是近几十年来营养学研究已经取得了重大进展。


The government has other tools at its disposal, besides education, for affecting people’s eating habits.

除教育之外，政府还可以动用其他工具来影响人们的饮食习惯。


They can and should place greater restrictions on advertising to children, as the UK, France, and several other countries have done; obesity in early years can lead to lifelong problems.

它们可以且应该像英国，法国和其他几个国家一样对儿童广告加大限制；因为早年的肥胖会引发终生的问题。


Beyond that, Ludwig, Tufts University’s Dariush Mozaffarian, and I have proposed instituting a tax on processed food, much the same way that tobacco is taxed.

除此之外，大卫·路德维格，塔夫茨大学的达瑞许·莫扎法里安（Dariush Mozaffarian）和笔者也提议对加工食品征税，就跟烟草税一样。


Proceeds from the tax could be used to subsidize healthier alternatives.

而收上来的钱可用于补贴更健康的替代食品。


It is perhaps fantasy to expect the current US administration to consider any kind of anti-obesity strategy while it is still busy dismantling Obama-era policies.

期待正忙于废止奥巴马时代政策的现任政府考虑采取任何形式的反肥胖战略或许只是幻想。


But that is all the more reason why countries entering new trade agreements with the US (for example, the post-Brexit UK, or post-NAFTA Canada) must be wary of any provisions that tie their hands in the war against obesity.

正因如此，那些即将与美国签订新贸易协议的国家（例如脱欧后的英国，或废除《北美自由贸易协定》后的加拿大）更要特别警惕美国提出的任何可能束缚了反肥胖工作的条款。


“America First” Financial Regulation?

“美国第一”金融改革？


LONDON – As US President Trump struggles to staff his administration with sympathizers who will help transpose tweets into policy, the exodus of Obama appointees from the federal government and other agencies continues.

伦敦—美国总统特朗普还在为找到同情他的立场、能帮他把推特转化为政策的政府人手，而奥巴马所认命的人则在不断离开联邦政府和其他机构。


For the financial world, one of the most significant departures was that of Daniel Tarullo, the Federal Reserve governor who has led its work on financial regulation for the last seven years.

对金融界来说，意义最重大的离职是在过去七年领导金融监管工作的美联储理事丹尼尔·塔鲁洛（Daniel Tarullo ） 。


It would be a stretch to say that Tarullo has been universally popular in the banking community.

很难说塔鲁洛受到了银行界的一致欢迎。


He led the charge in arguing for much higher capital ratios, in the United States and elsewhere.

他领衔要求大幅提高美国和其他国家的资本率。


He was a tough negotiator, with a well-tuned instinct for spotting special pleading by financial firms.

他是个难产的谈判对手，拥有很强的识破金融企业诡辩术的本能。


But crocodile tears will be shed in Europe to mark his resignation.

但随着他的离职，欧洲将流下鳄鱼的眼泪。


European banks, and even their regulators, were concerned by his enthusiastic advocacy of even tougher standards in Basel 3.5 (or Basel 4, as bankers like to call it), which would, if implemented in the form favored by the US, require further substantial capital increases for Europe’s banks in particular.

欧洲银行，乃至欧洲监管者，担心他坚定推行更严格的巴塞尔3.5标准（或者用银行家的话说，是巴塞尔4.0标准 ） ， 如果这一标准以美国所想要的形式得到实施，就要求进一步大幅增加资本，特别是欧洲银行。


In his absence, these proposals’ fate is uncertain.

他的去职让这一方案的前景蒙上了不确定性。


But Tarullo has also been an enthusiastic promoter of international regulatory cooperation, with the frequent flyer miles to prove it.

但塔鲁洛也热衷于推动国际监管合作，频繁出访推销监管合作。


For some years, he has chaired the Financial Stability Board’s little-known but important Standing Committee on Supervisory and Regulatory Cooperation.

多年来，他一直担任金融稳定委员会（FSB）中鲜为人知但十分重要的监督和监管合作常务委员会主席。


His commitment to working with colleagues in international bodies like the FSB and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, to reach global regulatory agreements enabling banks to compete on a level playing field, has never been in doubt.

他坚定地致力于与FSB和巴塞尔银行监督委员会等国际机构的同事们合作以实现监管协定，从而让所有银行在公平的竞技场上竞争，这一点从未动摇。


Already, some of those who criticized him most vocally in the past are anxious about his departure.

目前，一些过去批评他最卖力的人对他的去职十分焦虑。


Who will succeed him?

谁会接替他？


The 2010 Dodd-Frank Act created a vice-chair position on the Federal Reserve Board – which has never been filled – to lead the Fed’s work on regulation.

2010年多德-弗兰克（Dodd-Frank）法案规定美联储需要设立一个副主席职位 — — 从未有人担任过此职 — — 来领导美联储的监管工作。


Will that appointee, whom Trump now needs to select, be as committed as Tarullo to an international approach?

这一任命 — — 特朗普目前正在选人 — — 能像塔鲁洛那样致力于国际路线吗？


Or will his principal task be to build a regulatory wall, protecting US banks from global rules?

或者，他的主要任务将是构建监管墙，让美国银行不受全球规则管辖？


We do not yet know the answers to these questions, but Fed watchers were alarmed by a January 31 letter to Fed Chair Janet Yellen from Representative Patrick McHenry, the vice chairman of the House Committee on Financial Services. McHenry did not pull his punches.

我们尚不清楚这些问题的答案，但美联储观察者在1月31日看到了令人警惕的信号：众议院金融服务委员会副主席帕特里克·麦克亨利（Patrick McHenry）致信美联储主席耶伦，直白地提出了批评。


“Despite the clear message delivered by President Donald Trump in prioritizing America’s interest in international negotiations,” McHenry wrote, “it appears that the Federal Reserve continues negotiating international regulatory standards for financial institutions among global bureaucrats in foreign lands without transparency, accountability, or the authority to do so.

“尽管特朗普总统明确表示要以美国在国际谈判中的利益为先 ， ” 麦克亨利写道 ， “ 但美联储似乎仍然在国外与全球技术官僚谈判金融机构监管标准，这些谈判不具有透明度和可问责性，美联储也不具备监管谈判权。


This is unacceptable.”

这是不可接受的。 ”


In her reply of February10, Yellen firmly rebutted McHenry’s arguments.

在2月10日的复信中，耶伦坚决反驳了麦克亨利的指责。


She pointed out that the Fed does indeed have the authority it needs, that the Basel agreements are not binding, and that, in any event, “strong regulatory standards enhance the stability of the US financial system” and promote the competitiveness of financial firms.

她指出，美联储绝对拥有它所需要的权力，巴塞尔协定不具有约束力，并且，无论如何 ， “ 强力监管标准能增强美国金融系统的稳定”并促进金融企业的竞争力。


But that will not be the end of the story.

但这绝不是故事的结局。


The battle lines are now drawn, and McHenry’s letter shows the arguments that will be deployed in Congress by some Republicans close to the president.

如今吗，战线已经划定，麦克亨利的信表明了一些接近总统个共和党将会在国会亮出怎样的观点。


There has always been a strand of thinking in Washington that dislikes foreign entanglements, in this and other areas.

华盛顿总是存在一些在这个或那个领域不喜欢与国外串联的声音。


While Yellen’s arguments are correct, the Fed’s entitlement to participate in international negotiations does not oblige it to do so, and a new appointee might argue that it should not.

尽管特伦的观点是正确的，但美联储参与国际谈判的权限并不意味着它必须这样做，而新的任命人选可能会认为美联储不应该这么做。


Such a reversal would generate tensions within the Fed, and where it would leave the FSB, or indeed the Basel Committee, is unclear.

如此反覆将在美联储内部制造对立，而FSB，或者事实上还有巴塞尔委员会，将因此采取什么立场仍不得而知。


In the early days of the Bank for International Settlements (where the Basel Committee’s secretariat is located) in the 1930s, the US government declined to take a board seat, and the US was represented by JP Morgan.

20世纪30年代国际清算银行（巴塞尔委员会秘书处所在地）成立之初，美国政府曾经拒绝接受委员会席位，而美国的代表是JP摩根。


It is a little hard to see that arrangement working well today.

时至今日，显然这一安排运转得十分出色。


These questions are of more than passing interest in Europe.

这些问题对欧洲来说绝非稍纵即逝的利益。


European capital adequacy directives typically transpose Basel Accords into EU law.

欧洲资本充足度指引通常将巴塞尔协议转化为欧盟法律。


If the Basel process stalls, transatlantic deals, which are the crucial underpinning of Western capital markets, will be far harder to reach.

如果巴塞尔进程陷入停顿，作为西方资本市场基础的跨大西洋协议将极其难以达成。


There is a further complication arising from Brexit.

英国退欧进一步增加了复杂性。


Absent any special deal between the EU27 and the United Kingdom, British and EU regulators will come together in Basel, not in the European Banking Authority.

在欧盟27国与英国没有达成任何特殊协议的情况下，英国和欧盟监管者将在巴塞尔协议中进行合作，而不是在欧洲银行监管局（European Banking Authority）进行合作。


If Basel becomes a talking shop, without the ability to set firm standards, another key link in the chain will be broken, and it will be harder for the UK to argue that if London’s banks meet international standards, they should be granted equal treatment in the EU.

如果巴塞尔委员会沦为清谈俱乐部，而不具备制定切实标准的能力，那么这一链条的另一个关键环节将被打破，英国将更加难以主张，当伦敦的银行面临国际标准时应该享受欧盟同等待遇。


As central bankers bid farewell to the devil they know, financial regulation has entered a period of high uncertainty – and high anxiety for policymakers as they await an announcement from Mar-a-Lago.

当央行行长们与他们所熟知的恶魔挥手道别时，金融监管却进入了一个高度不确定的时期 — — 而决策者们则将如坐针毡地在等待马拉拉歌庄园（Mar-a- Lago）的指示。


No likely Federal Reserve Board candidates have been spotted at poolside, or being interviewed on the golf course, but a decision cannot be far off.

美联储理事不可能在游泳池边得到任命，或一边打高尔夫球一边面试，但决定已经不远了。


Nothing can be taken for granted.

没有什么是理所当然的。


The financial world is holding its collective breath.

金融界集体屏息以待。


Navigating America’s Economic-Policy Shocks

应对美国经济政策冲击


NEW YORK – With a series of tax and trade moves being considered in the United States this year, emerging-market economies are likely to face devaluation pressure and volatility.

纽约—今年美国将考虑一系列税收和贸易动作，新兴市场经济体可能会面临贬值压力和波动。


Three sources of US-fueled economic uncertainty, in particular, will rattle emerging markets in 2017.

特别是，三个美国引发的经济不确定性将在2017年影响到新兴市场。


The first is a border adjustment tax that would give tax breaks to US exporters, but impose a levy – or, equivalently, disallow deductions – on imports to the US.

一是边境调节税。 边境调节税将让美国出口商获得税收优惠，但对美国进口商品征税 — — 或取消抵扣，效果相同。


Both President Donald Trump and the Republican-controlled US Congress have said they favor the scheme, which has a fair chance of being enacted.

总统特朗普和共和党控制的国会都表示支持这一方案，它很有可能成为现实。


Such a tax, or even the anticipation of its adoption, could drive up the US dollar’s exchange rate (which, ironically, would offset, at least partly, the improvement in the US trade imbalance for which the Trump administration may be hoping).

这一税种，哪怕是对其实施的预期，都将推高美元汇率（讽刺的是，这至少将部分抵消特朗普政府所期待的美国贸易失衡的改善 ） 。


The second source of uncertainty is the possibility of more aggressive action on Chinese exports to the US.

第二个不确定性是美国可能对中国对美出口采取更加激进的措施。


The Trump administration has said many times that it will confront China over what it considers unfair trade practices.

特朗普政府已经多次表示，将在其所认定的不公平贸易行为上与中国针锋相对。


Trump has openly mused about imposing a 45% tariff on Chinese imports.

特朗普公开呛声要对中国进口品征收45%的关税。


The introduction of anything close to that would generate downward pressure on the renminbi, given the resulting reduction in demand for Chinese exports.

实施任何类似的措施都将导致中国出口需求下降，从而给人民币造成贬值压力。


But such a move would serve to weaken many other currencies as well.

但这一动作也将导致其他许多货币贬值。


My research with Zhi Wang and Kunfu Zhu reveals that about half of Chinese exports to the US are value-added products manufactured with components from South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, and other countries.

我与王志（Zhi Wang，音译）和朱坤福（Kunfu Zhu，音译）的研究发现，中国对美出口中有大约一半为增值产品，零部件来自韩国、日本、台湾、新加坡等其他经济体。


Because products from China are often part of integrated global or regional value chains, a US restriction on its imports from China would indirectly, but very quickly, translate into reduced exports of value-added items by other countries in Asia.

来自中国的产品通常是一体化的全球或地区价值链的一部分，因此美国限制中国进口将间接（但十分迅速）地转化为亚洲其他经济体增值项目出口的下降。


This slippage would likely offset any direct increase in these countries’ exports to the US, at least in the short and medium term, because re-organizing production chains is not a trivial matter.

这一传导机制很可能抵消这些经济提对美出口的直接增量，至少在短期和中期是如此，因为重新组织生产链绝非易事。


A third US move that could unsettle emerging markets is faster-than-expected monetary tightening by the Federal Reserve.

美国可能动摇新兴市场的第三个动作是美联储比预期更快地收紧货币政策。


A large interest-rate hike would translate into US dollar appreciation, and depreciation of developing-economy currencies.

大幅升息将转化为美元升值和发展中经济体货币贬值。


One exception may be the currencies of commodity exporters.

大宗商品出口国货币也许是例外。


Higher commodity prices, triggered in part by anticipation of increased demand as a result of a boost in US infrastructure spending, could cause these countries’ currencies to strengthen.

美国提高基础设施支出可能引起大宗商品需求增加的预期，从而触发价格上涨，进而导致这些国家货币升值。


Even on that front, though, some commodity exporters – such as Brazil and Russia – may not see much improvement in their exchange rates, given the drag of other forces on their weak economies.

但是，即使在这些国家中，某些大宗商品出口国 — — 比如巴西和俄罗斯 — — 也未必能够看到汇率改善，因为它们疲软的经济中还有其他力量在起拖累作用。


The challenges that US policy changes pose for emerging-market currencies include not only downward pressure, but also greater volatility.

美国政策变化给新兴市场货币造成的挑战不仅包括贬值压力，还包括波动加剧。


What, then, should emerging-market countries do to enhance their resilience in anticipation of the shockwaves?

那么，新兴市场国家应该如何加强对预期中的震波的抵抗力？


One option is to optimize the structure of capital inflows.

一个选择是优化资本流入结构。


A second is to boost the flexibility of exchange rates.

其次是提高汇率弹性。


On the former, as my research with Hui Tong shows, countries that rely heavily on borrowing from foreign banks or international capital markets are more vulnerable to capital flight than countries that depend mainly on foreign direct investment.

对于前者，我和童辉（Hui Tong，音译）的研究表明，严重依靠海外银行或国际资本市场借贷的国家比主要依靠外国直接投资（FDI）的国家更容易受到资本外逃的影响。


Therefore, to guard against exchange-rate volatility or US interest-rate changes, emerging markets should work to improve their business environments to attract FDI, which would reduce their reliance on short-term infusions of “hot money” – and thus lower their vulnerability to abrupt capital-flow reversals.

因此，要抵御汇率波动或美国汇率变化，新兴市场应该致力于改善营商环境以吸引FDI，以此降低他们对短期进出的“热钱”的依赖 — — 从而降低突发性资本流逆转对它们所造成的影响。


As for the second option, allowing nominal exchange-rate flexibility would enable currency values to align with underlying economic fundamentals more quickly.

对于后者，允许名义汇率弹性可以让货币价值更快地与经济基本面看齐。


Such adjustment is especially important for countries with rigid labor markets.

这一调整对于劳动力市场僵化的国家尤其重要。


One danger of fixed exchange rates is the risk of an overvalued or undervalued currency, neither of which is good for economic stability.

固定汇率的一大风险是货币出现高估或低估，两者都不利于经济稳定。


The chance of either scenario is elevated when the forces influencing the equilibrium exchange rate become more volatile.

当影响均衡汇率的力量波动加剧时，发生高估或低估的可能性也会大大增加。


While the shape and timing of future US policies are uncertain, it seems clear that capital-flow management and nominal exchange-rate flexibility amount to good preparation.

美国未来政策的面貌和时机仍不确定，但显然，资本流管理和名义汇率弹性都是非常好的准备工作。


To paraphrase Benjamin Franklin, if developing countries fail to prepare, they will have to prepare to fail.

用本杰明·富兰克林的话说，如果发展中国家没有做好准备，它们就必须做准备失败。


Why Millennials Will Reject Trump

为什么千禧一代会拒绝特朗普


NEW YORK – The key political divide in the United States is not between parties or states; it is between generations.

纽约—美国的关键政治分歧不在于党派之间或州之间，而在于代际之间。


The millennial generation (those aged 18-35) voted heavily against Donald Trump and will form the backbone of resistance to his policies.

千禧一代（18—35岁）大多反对特朗普，并将成为反对特朗普政策的骨干力量。


Older Americans are divided, but Trump’s base lies among those above the age of 45.

年长美国人比较分裂，但特朗普的基本盘是45岁以上群体。


On issue after issue, younger voters will reject Trump, viewing him as a politician of the past, not the future.

在问题不断曝出后，年轻选民将拒绝特朗普，将他视为过去而不是未来的政客。


Of course, these are averages, not absolutes.

当然，这是平均而言，不是绝对的。


Yet the numbers confirm the generational divide.

但数字确证了代际分歧。


According to exit polls, Trump received 53% of the votes of those 45 and older, 42% of those 30-44, and just 37% of voters 18-29.

据出口民调，特朗普赢得53%的45岁及以上选民，42%的30—44岁选民，而18—29岁选民他只赢得了37 % 。


In a 2014 survey, 31% of millennials identified as liberals, compared with 21% of baby boomers (aged 50-68 in the survey) and only 18% of the silent generation (69 and above).

在一份2014年的调查中，31%的千禧一代被认为是自由派，而婴儿潮一代（调查中的50—68岁群体）只有21 % ， 静默一代（69岁及以上）只有18 % 。


The point is not that today’s young liberals will become tomorrow’s older conservatives.

个中含义不是今天的年轻自由派会变成明天的年长保守派。


The millennial generation is far more liberal than the baby boomers and silent generation were in their younger years.

千禧一代远比婴儿潮一代和静默一代年轻时更加偏向自由派。


They are also decidedly less partisan, and will support politicians who address their values and needs, including third-party aspirants.

他们的党派色彩也要少得多，他们将支持解决他们的价值观和需要的政客，包括来自第三党的有志者。


There are at least three big differences in the politics of the young and old.

年轻人和年长者的政治学至少有三大不同。


First, the young are more socially liberal than the older generations.

首先，年轻人比年长者更加偏向社会自由。


For them, America’s growing racial, religious, and sexual plurality is no big deal.

对他们来说，美国日益严重的种族、宗教和性多样化不是大问题。


A diverse society of whites, African-Americans, Hispanics, and Asians, and of the native-born and immigrants, is the country they’ve always known, not some dramatic change from the past.

由白人、非洲裔美国人、西班牙裔美国人、亚洲人组成的多元化社会，由土生土长的美国人和移民组成的多元化社会才是他们一直熟知的美国，而不是什么与过去的戏剧性变化。


They accept sexual and gender categories – lesbian, gay, trans, bi, inter, pan, and others – that were essentially taboo for – or unknown to – their grandparents’ (Trump’s) generation.

他们接受性和性别分类 — — 女同性恋、男同性恋、变性人、双性人、异装癖、双性恋 — — 这些群体对他们的祖父辈（即特朗普这一代）来说本质上是一种禁忌（或一种未知 ） 。


Second, the young are facing the unprecedented economic challenges of the information revolution.

其次，年轻人正面临前所未有的信息革命经济挑战。


They are entering the labor market at a time when market returns are rapidly shifting toward capital (robots, artificial intelligence, and smart machines generally) and away from labor.

他们进入劳动力市场正逢市场回报迅速流向资本（普遍化的机器人、人工智能和智慧机器 ） ， 流出劳动力。


The elderly rich, by contrast, are enjoying a stock market boom caused by the same technological revolution.

相反，年长的富人享受着由同一场技术革命带来的股市繁荣。


Trump is peddling cuts in corporate taxes and estate taxes that would further benefit the elderly rich (who are amply represented in Trump’s cabinet), at the expense of larger budget deficits that further burden the young.

特朗普正在兜售降低公司税和地产税的方案，这将进一步有利于年长富人（他们占领了特朗普内阁 ） ， 而代价则是预算赤字进一步扩大，年轻人负担进一步沉重。


Indeed, the young need the opposite policy: higher taxes on the wealth of the older generation in order to finance post-secondary education, job training, renewable-energy infrastructure, and other investments in America’s future.

事实上，年轻人需要相反的政策：提高老一代富人的税收，为高等教育、就业培训、可再生能源基础设施和其他事关美国未来的投资融资。


Third, compared to their parents and grandparents, the young are much more aware of climate change and its threats.

第三，与父辈和祖父辈相比，年轻人更加清楚气候变化及其威胁。


While Trump is enticing the older generation with one last fling with fossil fuels, the young will have none of it.

特朗普用化石燃料最后的狂欢麻痹年长一代，而年轻人只能获得一地鸡毛。


They want clean energy and will fight against the destruction of the Earth that they and their own children will inherit.

他们想要清洁能源，也将为他们和他们的孩子们将要继承的被毁坏的地球战斗。


Part of the generational divide over global warming is due to the sheer ignorance of many older Americans, including Trump, about climate change and its causes.

在全球变暖问题上的代际分裂在部分程度上要归因于许多年长美国人，包括特朗普在内，赤裸裸地忽视气候变化及其原因。


Older Americans didn’t learn about climate change in school.

年长美国人在学校里没有学过气候变化。


They were never introduced to the basic science of greenhouse gases.

他们从未获得过关于温室气体的基本科学知识。


That is why they are ready to put their own short-term financial interests ahead of the dire threats to their grandchildren’s generation.

因此，他们欲把自己的短期财务利益置于孙辈致命威胁之上。


In a June 2015 survey, 60% of 18-29 year-olds said that human activity was causing global warming, compared with just 31% of those 65 and older.

在一份2015年6月的调查中，60%的18—29岁群体说人类活动正在导致全球变暖，而65岁及以上群体只有31 % 。


A survey released in January found that 38% of American survey respondents 65 and older favored fossil-fuel expansion over renewable energy, compared with only 19% of those 18-29.

一份1月份公布的调查发现，38%的65岁及以上美国调查受访者支持化石燃料而非可再生能源扩张，18—29岁群体只有19 % 。


Trump’s economic policies are geared to this older, whiter, native-born America.

特朗普的经济政策偏向这一年龄更大、肤色更白、本土出生的美国人群体。


He favors tax cuts for the older rich, which would burden the young with higher debt.

他支持为年长富人减税，而这将给年轻人带来更多的债务负担。


He is indifferent to the $1 trillion overhang of student debt.

他对1万亿美元的累计学生债务漠然无视。


He is reprising the 1990s NAFTA debate over free trade, rather than facing the far more important twenty-first-century jobs challenge posed by robotics and artificial intelligence.

他在三十年后重新翻出20世纪90年代北美自由贸易协定（NAFTA）争论的旧账，而不去面对机器人和人工智能所带来的更加重要的二十一世纪就业挑战。


And he is obsessed with squeezing a few more years of profit out of America’s coal, oil, and gas reserves at the cost of a future environmental catastrophe.

他沉迷于让美国煤炭、石油和天然气储备多贡献几年利润，不惜让未来爆发环境灾难。


One might attribute Trump’s backward-looking mindset to his age.

你也许会将特朗普的退步思维归因于他的年龄。


At 70, Trump is the oldest person ever to become president (Ronald Reagan was slightly younger when he took office in 1981).

70岁的特朗普是美国历史上年纪最大的新总统（罗纳德·里根上台是比特朗普稍微年轻一些 ） 。


Yet age is hardly the sole or even the main factor here.

但年龄绝不是唯一的原因，甚至不是主要原因。


Bernie Sanders, certainly the freshest mind of all the 2016 presidential candidates and the hero of millennial voters, is 75.

伯尼·桑德斯（Bernie Sanders）毫无疑问是2016年总统候选人当中思想最为新潮的，也是千禧一代选民心中的英雄，他已经75岁了。


The young are enchanted with Pope Francis, 80, because he puts their concerns – whether about poverty, employment difficulties, or vulnerability to global warming – within a moral framework, rather than dismissing them with the crass cynicism of Trump and his ilk.

年轻人因为80岁的教皇方济各而欢欣鼓舞，因为他将他们的担忧 — — 不管是贫困、就业困难还是面对全球变暖的脆弱性 — — 纳入道德框架中，而不是像特朗普及其同党那样以粗鲁的犬儒主义等闲视之。


The main issue here is mindset and political orientation, not chronological age.

这里的关键问题是思维和政治导向，而不是年龄。


Trump has the shortest time horizon (and attention span) of any president in historical memory.

特朗普是历史上所有总统中目光最短浅的（也是注意力范围最狭隘的 ） 。


And he is utterly out of touch with the real challenges facing the young generation as they grapple with new technologies, shifting labor markets, and crushing student debt.

他根本不清楚年轻一代在面临新技术、劳动力市场变迁和泰山压顶般的学生债务时所遇到的真正挑战。


A trade war with Mexico and China, or a tragically misconceived ban on Muslim migrants, will hardly meet their real needs.

与墨西哥和中国的贸易战，以及计划不周的悲哀的“禁穆令”根本无法解决他们的真正需要。


Trump’s political success is a blip, not a turning point.

特朗普在政治上的成功只是昙花一现，而不是转折点。


Today’s millennials, with their future-oriented perspective, will soon dominate American politics.

今天的千禧一代，带着他们未来导向的视角，将很快主宰美国政坛。


America will be multiethnic, socially liberal, climate conscious, and much fairer in sharing the economic benefits of new technology.

美国将是多种族的、社会自由的、充分认识气候变化的国家，其新技术的经济收益也将获得更加公平的分享。


Too many observers remain fixated on the traditional party divides in the US Congress, not on the deeper demographic changes that will soon be decisive.

太多观察家仍沉迷于美国国会中的传统党派分歧，而没有关注更深层次的人口变化，而这一变化很快就将成为决定性因素。


Sanders nearly captured the Democratic nomination (and would likely have triumphed in the general election) with a platform appealing powerfully to the millennials.

桑德斯几乎赢得民主党提名（如果赢得提名，他很有可能赢得大选 ） ， 他凭借的是充分吸引千禧一代的平台。


Their time is coming, most likely with a president they support in 2020.

千禧一代的时代正在到来，并极有可能推动他们所支持的总统在2020年上台。


What Makes America Great

是什么让美国伟大


CAMBRIDGE – Presidential inaugurations and commencement ceremonies are usually very emotional events.

坎布里奇—总统就职典礼和毕业典礼通常都是非常情绪性的事件。


They are rites of passage that mark both an end and a new beginning in the life of a country or an individual.

这类仪式既标志着一个国家或一个个体的一个段落的结束，也标志着新的开始。


As a professor at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, I attend our commencement ceremony every year.

作为哈佛肯尼迪政府学院教授，我每年都要参加毕业典礼。


Despite this regularity, I still become emotional as I see my students complete a phase of their lives and contemplate their future.

尽管毕业典礼对我来说如此平常，但当我看到学生完成了生命中的一个阶段、开始考虑他们的我来时，我都会感到十分激动。


One of the highlights of our ceremony is a video in which several professors and public personalities read, line by line, John F. Kennedy’s inaugural address.

在我们的典礼上，一个高光时刻是多名教授和公共人物逐字逐句朗读约翰·肯尼迪的就职演说。


It is a text written 56 years ago, in a different world, where the Cold War, the threat of nuclear Armageddon, and the challenges faced by so many newly independent poor states dominated policymakers’ concerns.

这是一份写于56年前的文件，它代表着一个不同的世界，一个冷战、核末日威胁以及大量新晋独立穷国所面临的挑战占据决策者关注焦点的世界。


And yet, running at under 14 minutes, it never fails to move and inspire everyone in the audience, including that half of the graduates and their families who hail from other countries, near and far.

但是，在不到14分钟的时间里，这份就职演说每一次都能打动和鼓励观众席上的每一个人，包括来自世界各地的那一半毕业生和他们的家庭。


To understand why, it is useful to recall a few of the most famous passages.

要想知道为什么会这样，不妨回忆一下这篇名著。


For starters, there was Kennedy’s vow to defend freedom for its friends and from its enemies: “Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.”

一开始，肯尼迪宣誓要捍卫自由的朋友，抵御自由的敌人 ： “ 要让每个国家都知道，不管它想要我们好还是坏，我们都将不惜一切代价，承受一切负担，克服一切困难，去支持我们的朋友，对抗任何敌人，以确保自由的生存和成功。 ”


There was also his commitment to fight poverty: “To those people in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required – not because the communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right.

他还承诺打击贫困 ： “ 住在乡村茅舍、渴望打破重重痛苦的一半地球人：我们承诺竭尽全力帮助他们自力更生，不管需要多长时间 — — 这不是因为共产党也会这么做，不是因为我们需要他们的选票，而是因为这是正确的事。


If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich.”

如果自由社会不能帮助众多处于贫困的人，它也无法拯救那极少数富裕的人。 ”


And this commitment was part and parcel of hemispheric solidarity: “To our sister republics south of our border, we offer a special pledge – to convert our good words into good deeds – in a new alliance for progress – to assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty.”

而这一承诺是西半球团结的基石 ： “ 对于我们边境以南的兄弟共和国来说，我们做出一项特殊承诺 — — 让我们的好话变成好事 — — 在一个新的进步同盟中 — — 帮助自由人和自由政府摆脱贫困的枷锁。 ”


Finally, there was Kennedy’s ethic of service on behalf of the commonwealth: “And so, my fellow Americans: ask not what your country can do for you – ask what you can do for your country.

最后，公益服务伦理观 ： “ 还有，我的美国同胞：不要问国家能为你做些什么 — — 问问你能为你的国家做些什么。


My fellow citizens of the world: ask not what America will do for you, but what together we can do for the freedom of man.”

我的世界公民同胞：不要问美国会为你做什么，问问我们携起手来能为人的自由做些什么。 ”


These words’ enduring emotional appeal is rooted in their embrace of a potentially difficult course of action, motivated by a pledge to uphold values shared by citizens of America and the world alike.

这些话之所以能够造成经久不衰的情绪号召力，是因为它们提到了也许很困难的行动方针，其背后的推动力是誓死捍卫美国和世界公民的共同价值观。


It was this approach – one founded on a value-based system of rules, not on individual deals – that enabled the US to create and sustain a coalition of countries that could maintain peace and international cooperation.

这一方针 — — 它建立在基于价值观的规则体系之上，而不是建立在个人交易基础上 — — 让美国得以创造和维持一个能够保证和平与和平合作的国家联盟。


Fast forward to today.

快进到现在。


President-elect Donald Trump’s campaign narrative was based on the assumption that the US has fallen from its former greatness.

当选总统唐纳德·特朗普的竞选纲领基于这样的认识：美国已经从昔日的伟大中衰落。


Jobs have moved to Mexico and China because weak leaders negotiated bad deals.

就业流向了墨西哥和中国，因为软弱的领导人谈判了糟糕的协议。


Immigrants, mostly illegal, have taken the few jobs that remain, killing and raping in their free time.

移民，主要是非法移民，则拿走了剩下的少数岗位，而在空余时间尽干些杀人强奸的勾当。


It follows that the US needs a president who will put America first and knows how to extract the best deals for it at every opportunity, using the country’s full might to advance its interests.

因此，美国需要一位把美国放在第一位、知道如何在每一次机会中如何获得最佳协议、用美国的全部力量推进它的利益的总统。


I doubt that an inaugural address based on these ideas will awe and inspire many audiences at commencement ceremonies, especially where many of those in attendance are citizens of other countries.

我怀疑基于这些思想的就职演说是否能够在毕业典礼上震撼和激发大量听众，特别是当许多听众是其他国家的公民的时候。


Such a speech will encourage no one to “bear any burden” for the sake of any universal principle or challenge, be it human rights or global warming.

这样一份演讲无法鼓励任何人为任何普世原则或挑战“承担一切负担 ” ， 不管是人权还是全球变暖。


It will not exhort us to focus on something bigger than ourselves.

它无法劝诫我们风物长宜放眼量。


Over the course of history, very few powerful states have developed a sense of themselves as being based not on ethnic heritage, but on a set of values that all citizens can live by.

在历史进程中，很少有强大的国家能发展出这样一种感受：认为自己不是基于民族文化遗产，而是基于一系列所有公民生存之所系的价值观。


For the US, it was “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”

对美国来说，这就是“生活、自由和追逐幸福 ” 。


For the Soviet Union, it was international proletarian solidarity – “workers of the world, unite.”

对苏联来说，这是世界无产者大团结 — — “全世界工人联合起来 ” 。


The European Union is based on universal values and principles that are so attractive that 28 countries have opted to join it; and, Brexit notwithstanding, some half-dozen more are trying to get in.

欧盟是基于能够吸引28个国家加入其中的普世价值观和原则；尽管发生了英国退欧，仍有六个国家正在努力加入其中。


By contrast, a great and powerful Russia or China today – or the Third Reich in its time – may be able to garner the support of its citizens; but such states cannot constitute the basis of an international order that others find appealing, because they are based on a vision of themselves that does not encompass others.

相反，今天伟大且强大的俄罗斯或中国 — — 或当年的第三帝国 — — 也许能够赢得本国公民的支持；但这些国家无法构成其他国家向往的国际秩序的基础，因为它们是基于并不包含他者的自身的愿景的。


The basis of America’s greatness and ability to lead the world stems from universal values that underpin a set of rules that uphold the others’ rights, not an America that tries to base its greatness on a set of deals aimed at getting the better of others.

美国的伟大和领导世界的能力的基础来自普世价值观，这些普世价值观又是保护他者权利的规则体系的基础，而不是试图将伟大建立在以从他者身上获得更多好处为目标的交易体系的基础上的美国。


Such an America will find its ability to lead the world compromised by a shortage of goodwill and an abundance of distrust.

这样一个美国将发现，它领导世界的能力受到缺乏商誉和充满不信任的制约。


Other countries will huddle together to protect themselves from the US bully.

其他国家将联合起来抵抗美国的仗势欺人。


If Trump really wants to make America great again, he should ponder how his inaugural address will sound to a global audience 56 years from now.

如果特朗普真的想让美国重新伟大，他应该仔细思考他的就职演说如何面对56年前的全球听众。


Will it inspire the Class of 2073 the way Kennedy’s address still inspires graduates today?

它能否激发2073届毕业生，就像肯尼迪的就职演说激发今天的毕业生那样?


America Goes from Teacher to Student

美国从教师爷变成学生


Cambridge -- As the United States’ epic financial crisis continues to unfold, one can only wish that US policymakers were half as good at listening to advice from developing countries as they are at giving it.

剑桥 - - 当美国庞大的金融危机继续演进之时，人们只能希望美国的决策者们在从发展中国家听取建议时能够有一半像发表建议那样在行就好了。


Americans don’t seem to realize that their “sub-prime” mortgage meltdown has all too much in common with many previous post-1945 banking crises throughout the world.

美国好像并不认识到，他们的“次级”房屋贷款破灭与许多1945年后席卷全球的银行危机有太多的共同之处。


The silver lining is that there are many highly distinguished current and former policymakers out there, particularly from emerging market countries, who have seen this movie before.

令人欣慰的是，有许多特别是来自新兴市场国家的在任和前任杰出的决策者们已经看到了这一局面。


If US policymakers would only listen, they might get an idea or two about how to deal with financial crises from experts who have lived through them and come out safely on the other side.

如果美国的决策者们听取意见的话，他们就会从安然度过金融危机的专家那里知道如何应付它们。


Unfortunately, the parallel between today’s US crisis and previous financial crises is not mere hyperbole.

不幸的是，当今美国危机和以往金融危机的相同之处并不仅仅是夸张的。


The qualitative parallels are obvious: banks using off-balance loans to finance highly risky ventures, exotic new financial instruments, and excessive exuberance over the promise of new markets.

本质上的相同之处是明显的。 银行使用帐外贷款来为极为具有风险的项目融资，别出心裁的金融工具以及对新的市场前景的过度兴奋。


But there are strong quantitative parallels as well.

但是从数量上来说也有很强的共同之处。


Professor Carmen Reinhart of the University of Maryland and I systematically compared the run-up to the US sub-prime crisis with the run-up to the 19 worst financial crises in the industrialized world over the past 60 years.

马里兰大学莱恩哈特教授和我系统地比较了美国次级房贷危机和过去60年整个工业化世界19个最为严重的金融危机之前的状况。


These include epic crises in the Scandinavian countries, Spain, and Japan, along with lesser events such as the US savings and loan crises of the 1980’s.

这些包括斯堪的那维亚国家、西班牙和日本发生的巨大的危机，以及二十世纪八十年代美国储蓄和贷款危机等较为轻微的事件。


Across virtually all the major indicators – including equity and housing price runs-ups, trade balance deficits, surges in government and household indebtedness, and pre-crisis growth trajectories – red lights are blinking for the US.

几乎所有主要标志，包括资产和住房价格攀升、贸易平衡赤字、政府和居民负债猛增以及危机以前的增长轨迹等等都给美国亮出了红灯。


Simply put, surging capital flows into the US artificially held down interest rates and inflated asset prices, leading to laxity in banking and regulatory standards and, ultimately, to a meltdown.

简而言之，汹涌流向美国的资本人为地压低了利率并抬高了资产价格，导致银行和监管标准松懈并且最终造成瓦解。


When Asia and Latin America had their financial meltdowns in the 1990’s and early 2000’s, they took advice not only from the IMF, but also from a number of small panels composed of eminent people representing diverse backgrounds and experiences.

九十年代和二十一世纪之初亚洲和拉美金融危机发生之际，它们不仅从国际货币基金组织、而且也从几个代表了多样背景和经验的著名人士组成的专家小组那里听取建议。


The US should do the same.

美国也应如此。


The head of the IMF, Frenchman Dominique Strauss-Kahn, could easily select a superb panel from any range of former crisis countries, including Mexico, Brazil, Korea, Turkey, Japan, and Sweden, not to mention Argentina, Russia, Chile, and many others.

国际货币基金组织主席、法国人思特劳斯·卡恩可以轻而易举地从任何范围的前危机国家、包括墨西哥、巴西、韩国、土耳其、日本以及瑞典，更不用说阿根廷、俄国、智利以及其他许多国家那里挑选一个超级专家小组。


Admittedly, the IMF’s panel would have to look past America’s current hypocrisy.

应当承认，国际货币基金组织的专家小组将会放过美国目前的伪善。