Many even claim that Iraq’s Shia are al-‘Alqami’s descendants, and that Nouri al-Maliki, Iraq’s Prime Minister, is his modern incarnation.

许多人甚至将伊拉克什叶派称为阿尔恰米的后代，把伊拉克总理马利基说成是当代阿尔恰米。


These diatribes reflect Iraqi’s polarized historical memory.

这些诽谤之词反映了伊拉克人历史记忆的两极分化。


Despite ample historical evidence of peaceful inter-communal relations, many people – whether through simple ignorance of history or the need to assert the supremacy of one version of the truth – prefer to consecrate narratives of treachery and betrayal that perpetuate hatred.

尽管充分的历史证据表明两派之间曾经和平共处，但许多人 — — 不管是出于对历史的无知，还是出于维护某种版本的真相的至高无上性的需要 — — 更愿意相信延续仇恨的关于变节和背叛的圣谕。


More important, the current situation reflects a lack of wisdom, responsibility, and basic decency on the part of political and religious leaders, who prefer to fuel, rather than dampen, inter-communal strife.

更重要的是，当前的局面反映了政治和宗教领袖缺乏智慧、责任和基本尊重，他们更喜欢助推而不是消弭宗派冲突。


Sadly, intolerance has now become a generalized condition.

令人悲伤的是，偏隘已成为一般现象。


There is too little knowledge about other communities’ beliefs and history, and what little exists has been overwhelmed by sectarian anger and its poisonous rhetoric.

对其他派别的信仰和历史了解太少，仅存的一些理解也被宗派愤怒和恶意中伤所压倒。


As long as Sunnis and Shia refuse to think about their past together, it is difficult to foresee a tranquil future together.

只要逊尼派和什叶派拒绝共同思索他们的过去，就很难预见和平共处的未来。


And if political and religious leaders are unable or unwilling to seek accommodation, it will be up to like-minded individuals, groups, and civil-society institutions to rebuild mutual respect and find ways to cooperate.

而如果政治和宗教领袖无力或不愿寻求妥协，就必须依靠观念相近的个人、组织和公民社会机构来重建互相尊重、寻找合作之路。


Doing so will require knowledge, patience, and, above all, open minds and hearts.

而这需要知识、耐心，以及最重要的，开放的思维和心态。


All in the Family

全球性家族企业的多事之秋


MUNICH – Big economic crises often cause iconic companies to falter.

慕尼黑 — — 经济大危机常令一些标志性公司走上下坡路。


Rupert Murdoch’s media empire is a model of the modern global enterprise.

默多克的传媒帝国是现代全球企业的一个样板。


A particularly dynamic and innovative business model came from outside and took over central aspects of British and then American public life.

秉持着一种特别富有活力和开创性的商业模式，这个外来势力先后闯入英国和美国的公共生活，占领了关键阵地。


That model is now threatened by the fallout from the scandal that started with phone hacking in Murdoch’s British press operations.

如今，旗下英国报纸的手机窃听丑闻一石激起千层浪，令这座大厦风雨飘摇。


The Murdoch experience is a microcosm of how modern globalization works.

默多克帝国的历史就是现代全球化的缩影。


Murdoch always looked like a foreign intrusion into British life. It was not just that he was Australian; he also brought new ideas.

英国人总把默多克看作入侵者，不仅因为他是澳大利亚人，更因为他带来了新理念。


In particular, the application of digital technology, introduced after a ferocious struggle with the powerful print unions, brought substantial cost savings and allowed a new era of journalism.

具体而言，在克服了印刷业工会的强力阻挠之后，数字技术全面引入，大大节约了成本，并把新闻行业带入了一个新纪元。


Even more importantly, Murdoch represented a concept of family business that is common in many parts of the world, but relatively rare in Britain and the United States.

更重要的是，默多克所代表的家族企业模式，在英国和美国不太多见，在世界其他一些地方却相当普遍。


Family capitalism in the continental European model uses relatively little capital to achieve maximum control.

欧洲大陆的家族资本主义模式可用较少的资本实现最大程度的控制。


It frequently depends on very complex corporate structures, with multiple layers of holding companies, as well as privileged shares that can guarantee the continuation of control.

其治理结构通常很复杂，通过一级级的控股公司和优先股股份保证持续的控制。


This sort of firm is also very common in the most dynamic emerging-market economies in Asia and Latin America.

在亚洲和拉美一些最富活力的新兴市场经济体，此类企业也很常见。


The Murdoch family holds only 12% of the shares of News Corporation, the top-level holding company, but it wields about two-fifths of the voting rights; other votes are held by a loyal Saudi prince.

默多克家族仅持有顶级控股公司 — — 新闻集团12%的股份，却握有五分之二的投票权；剩下的投票权握在一位可靠的沙特亲王手中。


For decades, academic analysts have been fighting over whether such large-scale family businesses should be considered beneficial.

这种家族企业巨无霸为什么还能维持可观的盈利？ 几十年来，学术界为此问题争论不休。


Their defenders point out that such companies often have a much longer-term vision than is true of managerial capitalism, which enables them to establish strong and enduring relationships with their customers and suppliers.

捍卫者指出，相对于经理人资本主义式的企业，家族企业通常拥有更长远的眼光，使其能够同顾客和供应商建立更牢固的关系。


At least in the case of the Murdoch empire, it now appears that they pursue long and binding relationships with politicians and the police as well.

现在看来 — — 至少就默多克的例子而言 — — 它也谋求同政界和警界建立长期、牢靠的关系。


Indeed, political entanglements are one of two sources of weakness in European-style family capitalism, as owners seek political advantages and preferred access as much as they strive for technical innovation.

事实上，同政界牵扯不清是欧式家族资本主义的两大软肋之一 — — 企业主寻求政治优势和人脉的热情不亚于搞技术革新。


Murdoch’s empire depended on its closeness to politicians.

靠近政界是默多克帝国的一根支柱。


In retrospect, three successive British prime ministers – Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, and David Cameron – were on overly familiar terms with a manipulative business leader.

今天回头来看，连续三任英国首相 — — 布莱尔、布朗和卡梅伦同这位长袖善舞的商业巨子过从甚密。


Cameron now talks about the need for “a healthier relationship between politicians and media owners.”

卡梅伦如今口口声声说 ： “ 政治家和媒体大亨之间需要一种更健康的关系。


And Murdoch apparently is now saying that he wishes that all these prime ministers would “leave me alone.”

”而默多克更是公开表态，希望首相们“离我远一点。 ”


The second notorious weakness of family businesses is the problem of succession.

家族企业的第二大致命伤是继承问题。


When he appeared before the British parliament in July, Rupert Murdoch looked like an old man, remote and out of control.

本月出席英国议会听证会时，默多克表现得像是远离公司管理的垂暮家翁。


In old-style family firms, there is a clear rule of succession that the oldest son takes over.

老派家族企业的继承有一条明确的规矩 — — 长子继位。


But that rule is rightly recognized as being potentially dysfunctional.

但应该承认这条规矩存在缺陷。


There is obviously no guarantee that the oldest son is the best businessman, and the result could be bitter and ferocious sibling rivalry.

显然不能保证长子一定是最好的生意人，万一碰上个不肖之子，要么败家，要么内讧。


Such succession disputes become even more acute when there are multiple marriages and multiple sets of competing children.

如果父辈结过多次婚，有几方子女参与争产，则继承纠纷会变得更险恶。


Until the eruption of the current scandal, the youngest of Murdoch’s three children from his second marriage, James, was generally believed to stand the greatest chance of succeeding his father.

在这次丑闻爆发之前，默多克同第二任妻子所育三个子女中最小的儿子 — — 詹姆斯·默多克一般被视为最有可能继承家业的人物。


The complexities of modern marriage patterns make family life much more fraught, especially when phenomenal power and huge sums of money are involved.

现代婚姻模式的复杂性令家族生活矛盾重重，同权、钱有关时尤其如此。


All three of Murdoch’s marriages have produced children, though those from his current relationship are too young to be considered potential corporate successors.

默多克的三次婚姻都有子女，只是他同现任妻子所育子女年龄太小，当不了企业继承人。


In addition, succession planning can become complicated by the emergence of “substitute children” from the company’s management.

此外，由公司管理层涌现的“代子女”令继承规划进一步复杂化。


Rebekah Brooks, the editor of The News of the World at the beginning of the phone-hacking scandal, and subsequently the chief executive of News International, Murdoch’s British subsidiary, played precisely such a role.

丽贝卡·布鲁克斯 — — 手机窃听勾当开始时《世界新闻报》的总编辑，默多克帝国英国分支新闻国际集团的首席执行官 — — 恰恰是这样一个角色。


The disintegration of the business empire is then accompanied and amplified by bitter disputes between the children and the substitute children.

子女和代子女的混战，伴随着商业帝国的分崩离析，并且加剧了分崩离析的过程。


Indeed, the crisis of the Murdoch family’s business empire is neither unique nor unprecedented.

说实话，默多克家族商业帝国的危机既非独一无二，也非前所未见。


In the first half of the 1990’s, many observers of the alleged Asian economic miracle emphasized trust and families’ capacity to cooperate with political authorities in order to realize long-term growth plans.

20世纪90年代上半叶，所谓亚洲经济奇迹期间，许多观察家对家族企业大加赞赏，说它们内部的牢固信任、同政治权威的合作有利于实现长期增长。


After the 1997-1998 Asia crisis, and as authoritarian regimes in South Korea and Indonesia disintegrated, these relationships were suddenly interpreted as corrupt, and the counter-view – that “crony capitalism” had become entrenched in these countries – soon prevailed.

到了1997~1998年亚洲金融危机以及韩国和印尼威权政府倒台之后，人们突然又说这种官商关系是腐败，舆论一改之前的赞赏态度，相反的观点很快占据了上风 — — 是“裙带资本主义”拖累了那些国家。


The Arab Spring has been in large part a movement against corrupt family capitalism, embodied not only in ruling families like the Ben Alis, the Mubaraks, and the Assads, but also in the large family business empires that depended on and supported them.

在很大程度上，阿拉伯之春也是一场反对腐败的家族资本主义的运动，对象不仅是本·阿里家族、穆巴拉克家族和阿萨德家族，还有那些同它们互相依存、互相支持的家族商业帝国。


As a result of globalization, large family firms could increase their size and their geographic range.

全球化令大型家族企业得以扩大规模、扩展地理范���。


But globalization also increases the chances of backlashes that focus on the vulnerabilities, weaknesses, and mistakes of big family firms.

但全球化也凸显了大型家族企业的弱点和失误，使它们更易受到冲击。


They are vulnerable to an Arab Spring (and a British summer) – and maybe to a US autumn that will focus not just on the Murdochs’ business, but also on its interplay with politics.

阿拉伯之春和不列颠之夏已经让它们疲于应付，接下来很可能还会来一个美利坚之秋 — — 不仅针对默多克的生意，也针对它同政治的私通。


All Man’s Land

清一色男人的土地


NEW DELHI – Ernest Hemingway’s collection of stories, Men without Women, examines tense gender relationships.

新德里 — — 欧内斯特·海明威的系列小说《没有女人的男人》刻画了两性间的紧张关系。


In a particularly poignant story, a young man convinces his partner to have an abortion, viewing their unborn child as a hindrance to the status quo. Frustrated, the woman gives in.

在一则特别凄美的小说中，一名年轻男子将尚未出世的婴儿视作障碍因而说服伴侣打胎，心灰意冷的女人被迫表示同意。


That story, published more than 80 years ago, remains relevant today in India, where female fetuses face severe risks.

80年前的这则小说反应的现象在当今印度依然具有实际意义，这里的女性胎儿所面临的风险非常严峻。


According to the 2011 census, the sex ratio of the country’s children has dipped from 927 females per 1000 males to 914, a 60-year low.

2011年的人口普查显示，印度的男女童比例已经从每千名男性927名女性下降到每千名男性914名女性，创下六十年来的新低。


Ratios in the northern states are particularly alarming: only Himachal Pradesh now has a ratio of girls to boys above 900.

印度北部各邦的男女童比例尤其令人震惊：只有喜马偕尔邦目前的比例仍处于900以上。


Despite being illegal, ultrasound sex-determination tests are being used across India to identify for abortion extraordinary numbers of healthy female fetuses.

尽管被视为非法，但印度各地普遍利用超声波鉴定婴儿性别，导致大量健康的女性胎儿招致人为堕胎。


But there are serious concerns about legal operations, too.

而且合法手术也引发了严重的担忧。


Genitoplasty – a sex-change operation on newborn girls – is a mushrooming, and deeply disturbing, business in India.

一种改变新生女婴性别的生殖器成形术正在印度境内蓬勃发展，这一现象引起了很多人的担忧。


There’s only one word for it: gendercide.

只有性别屠杀这个词能够准确形容这种现象。


Left unchecked, it will leave India’s next generation of men with a severe shortage of women.

如果不加以遏止，将导致下一代印度男人严重匮乏女性伴侣。


Indian couples have a strong cultural preference, bordering on obsession, for sons over daughters – despite the strides in education and employment that women have made over the last few decades.

尽管过去几十年来女性在教育和就业领域已经取得了重大进步，但印度夫妻却有着建立在执迷基础上的强烈的重男轻女文化偏好。


Education and wealth have nothing to do with it – in fact, some of the worst-affected areas are in India’s wealthiest cities.

这种偏好与教育和财富无关 — — 事实上，受影响最严重的恰恰是印度某些最富裕的城市。


However discomfiting a possibility, the real culprit might be Indian culture and tradition itself.

无论这种可能性多么令人难以接受，但真正的罪魁祸首或许恰恰是印度文化和传统本身。


The expenses and pressure of the dowry system, and the fact that, in most joint families, only sons inherit property and wealth, contribute to this favoritism.

嫁妆制度所造成的开销和压力，以及在多数联合家庭中只有儿子能继承产业和财富的现状是这种偏爱的始作俑者。


Perhaps just as important is that sons typically live with their parents even after they are married, and assume responsibility for parents in their old age.

还有一点也许同样重要，那就是儿子即使婚后一般也与父母同住，并在父母年老时承担起赡养义务。


Daughters, who live with their in-laws after they marry, are viewed as amanat – someone else’s property.

而女儿婚后只能与公婆同住，因此被视为别人的财富（amanat ） 。


In short, sons represent income and daughters an expense.

简言之，儿子代表收入而女儿代表支出。


In the old days, when families typically had 5-10 children, this didn’t matter so much.

从前，每个家庭都有5－10个孩子，因此这个问题显得并不突出。


The number of sons and daughters often evened out.

因为儿女数量一般是平衡的。


But, for today’s smaller families, whether the children are two boys or two girls influences everything from financial planning to preparations for old age.

但相对于今天的小家庭而言，究竟是两个儿子还是两个女儿则关乎从财务计划到养老准备的方方面面。


Many have argued that Indian women should stand up to their families and refuse to abort their daughters.

很多人提出印度妇女应该顶住家庭压力，拒绝打掉女婴。


But Indian women want male children just as much.

可印度妇女对男婴的渴望却丝毫不亚于其他人。


Unlike Hemingway’s character, they are often more than willing to abort a girl and try for a boy.

与海明威小说中的主人公不同，她们往往会迫不及待地打掉女孩，以争取怀上男孩。


The novelist Salman Rushdie once put the question to supporters of abortion rights: “What should be done when a woman uses her power over her own body to discriminate against female fetuses?”

小说家萨尔曼·拉什迪曾经向堕胎权的支持者提出这样一个问题 ： “ 如果女性利用对自己身体的权利来歧视女性胎儿，我们该怎么做？ ”


This raises other questions concerning the consequences of a large shortage of girls.

至此又牵扯到女性短缺所带来的其他问题。


Will women be valued and treasured?

女性是否会受到尊重和保护？


Or will the oversupply of men result in more bride trafficking, sexual violence, and female suicides?

抑或因男性数量过多而导致更多的新娘贩卖、女性自杀和性暴力？


Niall Ferguson, the British historian, cites scholars who attribute Japan’s imperial expansion after 1914 to a male youth bulge, and who link the rise of Islamist extremism to an Islamic youth bulge.

英国历史学家尼尔·弗格森援引某些学者的看法，将日本帝国主义扩张和伊斯兰极端主义盛行归结于1914年后日本男青年数量激增和伊斯兰青年男性人口膨胀。


“Maybe the coming generation of Asian men without women will find harmless outlets for their inevitable frustrations, like team sports or video games.

弗格森写道 ， “ 或许新一代没有女人的亚洲男人能给自己无法避免的痛苦找到某种无害的宣泄方式，比方说集体运动或者视频游戏。


But I doubt it,” he writes.

但我对此深表怀疑。


He warns us not to be surprised if, in the coming generation, “shrill nationalism is replaced by macho militarism or even imperialism.”

”他警告我们如果下一代人“用大男子气的军国主义甚至是帝国主义取代尖锐的爱国主义 ” ， 我们不要对此感到惊奇。


Unfortunately, there is no instant solution.

遗憾的是，这个问题没有立竿见影的解决方案。


Saving our girls will require radically altering some of Indian society’s family arrangements, traditions, and attitudes.

拯救女孩的命运需要从根本上改变印度某些社会家庭安排、传统和态度。


And there is no easy way to accomplish this.

实现这样的目标并不轻松。


Legislation alone won’t help, for tradition is a law unto itself.

单靠立法并不能收到效果，因为传统本身就是一种法律。


Hindu religious law, for example, allows a woman to claim an equal share in her parents’ wealth, but few exercise this right.

举例而言，印度宗教法允许女性对父母的财产主张同等权利，但却没有多少人真正这样做。


Culturally, she feels that she does not have an equal claim on her father’s property.

从文化的角度，她感到自己对父亲的财产并不具备同等的权利。


Nonetheless, India does need new laws – direct and enforceable – that clamp down on the cultural practices that underpin destructive traditions.

无论如何，印度的确需要直接可行的新法律取缔支撑破坏性传统的文化惯例。


For example, India could enforce a ceiling on wedding expenditure – typically a father’s biggest expense associated with his daughter.

比方说，印度可以规定婚礼花销的上限 — — 婚礼花销往往是父亲在女儿身上最大的一笔开支。


Constrained from spending on the wedding, he would compensate her differently – perhaps with a larger inheritance.

如果不用在婚礼上耗费大量财物，也许他会给她某种形式的补偿，也许会允许她继承更多财物。


Gradually, this would become the norm, and tradition would adjust accordingly.

而这渐渐会成为新的标准，传统因此会进行相应的调整。


(Interestingly, the state of Kerala, whose people adhere to matrilineal inheritance, has among the most equal sex ratios and literacy rates in India.)

（有趣的是，在民众继续实行母系继承制度的喀拉拉邦，两性人口及识字人口比例都是印度最均衡的。 ）


A more radical measure, which some have advocated, would be direction intervene, with the state providing benefits for families with more girls.

某些人鼓吹实行更激进的举措，即以国家之名为女性较多的家庭提供补助。


Perhaps the authorities could also penalize families with boys, at least temporarily.

或许当局也可以惩罚以男孩为主的家庭，至少在一段时间内暂时如此。


India imagines herself as a woman – Bharat Mata, or Mother India.

印度传统上将自己想象成一名女性 — — 巴特拉马塔，也就是印度妈妈。


The irony is that, unless far-reaching changes are made soon, Mother India could eventually be the only woman left in the country.

颇具讽刺意味的是，除非展开影响深远的改革，否则印度妈妈可能最终成为这个国家剩下的唯一一名女性。


All Stimulus Roads Lead to China

美国的赤字，中国的心病


BEIJING – Now that the “green shoots” of recovery have withered, the debate over fiscal stimulus is back with a vengeance.

北京 — — 现如今，复苏的“绿芽”已经枯萎，该不该再搞财政刺激的辩论变本加厉。


In the United States, those who argue for another stimulus package observe that it was always wishful thinking to believe that a $787 billion package could offset a $3 trillion fall in private spending.

在美国，主张继续出台一揽子刺激方案的人认为，以刺激计划的7870亿美元来抵消私人部门减支3万亿美元的影响实在是一厢情愿。


But unemployment has risen even faster and further than expected.

失业率激增，超出预期。


Combine this with the continued fall in housing prices, and it is understandable that consumer spending remains depressed.

再算上持续走低的房价，不难理解消费为什么仍然低迷。


The banks, having been recapitalized only to the extent necessary to keep them afloat, still have weak balance sheets.

虽然银行经过了资产重组，但那只够它们继续营业，其资产负债表依然脆弱。


Their consequent reluctance to lend constrains investment.

惜贷之风继续制约着投资。


Meanwhile, state governments, seeing revenues fall as a result of lower taxable incomes last year, are cutting back like mad.

与此同时，由于去年的居民应纳税收入减少，岁入下滑，一些州政府正发疯般地削减开支。


If there was a case for additional stimulus back in February, that case is even stronger now.

如果说今年2月的时候有出台新刺激计划的需要，那眼下这种需要就更迫切了。


But the case against additional stimulus is also strong.

然而，反对出台新刺激计划的理由也很有力。


The US federal deficit is an alarming 12% of GDP, and public debt as a share of national income is already projected to double, to 80% of GDP.

美国联邦赤字已达到GDP的12 % ， 值得警惕；公债的GDP占比预计将翻倍，达到80 % 。


The idea that the US can grow out of its debt burden, as did Finland and Sweden following their financial crises in the 1990’s, seems unrealistic.

认为美国能靠经济增长还清债务，就像上世纪90年代芬兰和瑞典在遭受金融危机之后所做的那样，这种看法似乎不太现实。


Given all this, more deficit spending will only stoke fears of higher future taxes and inflation.

有鉴于此，更大规模的赤字支出只会激起对未来高税收和高通胀的恐慌。


It will encourage the reemergence of global imbalances.

这将促使全球收支不平衡卷土重来。


And it will not reassure consumers or investors.

而那种前景可不会让消费者和投资者放心。


It is possible to argue the economics both ways, but the politics all point in one direction.

经济学可以两头争论，政治则全都指向一个方向。


The US Congress lacks the stomach for another stimulus package.

美国国会对新刺激计划没胃口。


It has already faced intense criticism for its failure to get the country’s fiscal house in order.

已经有人激烈批评国会没有看好国家的财政大门。


The slowness with which the first stimulus has been rolled out, and the fact that it will take even more time for its full effects to be felt, provides more fodder for the chattering classes.

第一个刺激计划实施得很迟缓，而且其效果需要更长时间才能充分显现，这给议会里那批以讨好选民为业的政客提供了口实。


Disappointment over the effects of the TARP has already destroyed popular – and Congressional – support for more public money to recapitalize the banks.

问题资产剥离计划（TARP）的效果令人失望，这已使民众和议会不再支持用更多的公共资金来搞银行资产重组。


So, even those who find the economic logic of arguments for fiscal activism compelling must acknowledge that the politics are not supportive.

所以，即使一些人相信，根据经济学的逻辑，积极财政政策是当务之急，他们也不得不承认，这种政策得不到政治上的支持。


A second stimulus simply is not in the cards.

出台第二个刺激计划远不是板上钉钉的事。


If there is going to be more aggregate demand, it can come from only one place.

如果说，全球经济的总需求毕竟要有所扩大，那只能来自一个地方。


That place is not Europe or Japan, where debts are even higher than in the US – and the demographic preconditions for servicing them less favorable.

不是欧洲，也不是日本，它们的负债比美国还高，人口前景比美国更糟。


Rather, it is emerging markets like China.

那只能是来自新兴市场经济体 — — 比如中国。


The problem is that China has already done a lot to stimulate domestic demand, both through government spending and by directing its banks to lend.

问题在于，中国已经做了很多事来刺激内需了，一方面是扩大政府支出，另一方面是指导银行放贷。


As a result, its stock market is frothy, and it is experiencing an alarming property boom.

结果，中国的股市和房市又开始吹泡泡了。


Through May, property prices were up 18% year on year.

5月份，房地产价格同比上涨了18 % 。


Understandably, Chinese officials worry about bubble trouble.

中国官方开始担忧泡沫问题，这是可以理解的。


The obvious way to square this circle is to spend more on imports.

最明显的应对之道就是扩大进口支出。


China can purchase more industrial machinery, transport equipment, and steelmaking material, which are among its leading imports from the US.

中国可以购买更多的工业机械、运输设备、炼钢原料，这些都是中国从美国进口的大宗。


Directing spending toward imports of capital equipment would avoid overheating China’s own markets, boost the economy’s productive capacity (and thus its ability to grow in the future), and support demand for US, European, and Japanese products just when such support is needed most.

通过进口资本品而增加支出，不仅可以避免中国国内市场过热，提升生产力（从而加强未来的增长潜力 ） ， 还可以支撑对美国、欧洲和日本产品的需求，起到雪中送炭的效果。


This strategy is not without risks.

这个策略不是没有风险。


Allowing the renminbi to appreciate as a way of encouraging imports may also discourage exports, the traditional motor of Chinese growth.

允许人民币升值以鼓励进口同时也会抑制出口，而出口是中国经济的传统引擎。


And lowering administrative barriers to imports might redirect more spending toward foreign goods than the authorities intend.

降低进口的行政壁垒会把更多的支出引向外国货物的进口，也许有些政府部门并不乐见此情形。


But these are risks worth taking if China is serious about assuming a global leadership role.

然而，如果中国当真想接过一个全球领导者的角色，这些风险值得冒一冒。


The question is what China will get in return.

问题在于，中国能获得什么回报呢？


And the answer brings us back, full circle, to where we started, namely to US fiscal policy.

这个问题把我们带回了本文的起点，也就是美国的财政政策。


China is worried that its more than $1 trillion investment in US Treasury securities will not hold its value.

中国持有的美国国债超过1万亿美元，它很担心这笔资产的安全。


It wants reassurance that the US will stand behind its debts. It therefore wants to see a credible program for balancing the US budget once the recession ends.

它想要美国保证不赖帐，所以希望美国拿出一个在衰退结束后平衡预算的可行方案来。


And, tough talk notwithstanding, the Obama administration has yet to offer a credible roadmap for fiscal consolidation.

可是，不客气地讲，奥巴马政府至今未能拿出一个像样的巩固财政的路线图来。


Doing so would reassure American taxpayers worried about current deficits. Just as importantly, it would reassure Chinese policymakers.

如果它能拿出来的话，就既能让美国纳税人安心，又能让中国决策者放心。


We live in a multipolar world where neither the US nor China is large enough to exercise global economic leadership on its own.

我们生活在一个多极化的世界中，不论是美国还是中国，都没有足够的力量独自领导全球经济。


For China, leadership means assuming additional risks.

对中国而言，肩负共同领导的责任意味着多冒一些风险。


But for this to be tolerable, the US needs to relieve China of existing risks.

为了打消中国的顾虑，美国得想办法帮助中国规避一些既存的风险。


Only by working together can the two countries lead the world economy out of its current doldrums.

只有携手合作，两国才能领导世界经济走出当前的萧条。


A Long March with China

与中国之崛起长伴左右


BEIJING – US Vice President Joe Biden’s recent four-day visit to China ended on a high note.

发自北京 — — 美国副总统乔·拜登最近的四日访华行程最终高调收尾。


He assured Chinese leaders that the United States is committed to honoring all its debts, despite its recent credit downgrade; he talked enthusiastically about US-China interdependence; and he showcased his granddaughter, who has studied Chinese for several years, as a future bridge between the two countries.

他向中国领导人保证虽然最近遭到降级，但美国一定会为自身所有债务负责。 他还热情地谈到中美两国的相互依存关系，同时还带来了自己学习中文多年的孙女，希望她未来能在两国之间牵线搭桥。


But, behind all the smiles and banquet toasts, serious issues and perception gaps continue to divide the world’s two great powers.

但在宾主笑脸相迎，推杯换盏的背后依然存在着一系列严重问题以及理念差距，不断撕裂着两个世界大国之间的关系。


For starters, there is always an attitude problem.

首先呈现的往往是所谓态度问题。


To those who view China’s rise in a negative light, the country is simply becoming ever more arrogant. It is getting tough in its territorial disputes with Japan in the East China Sea; it is becoming assertive in the South China Sea with its neighbors, also over disputed islands; it put its own stealth fighter on display during the US defense secretary’s visit to China; it is sending its first aircraft carrier out to sea for trials, indicating the possibility of establishing naval bases in the Indian Ocean.

对于那些以负面眼光看待中国崛起的人来说，这个国家简直是日益骄横：首先在对日东海主权争议上转趋强硬；随后又在南海诸岛主权问题上与诸多邻国对峙；还在美国国防部长访华期间展示自行研制的隐形战机；其第一艘航母正在进行海试，并可能借此在印度洋地区建立海军基地。


Even a brawl between the Chinese and a visiting American basketball team is viewed as evidence of China’s aggressive behavior.

甚至连某支中国篮球队与到访美国队之间的殴斗都被视为中国咄咄逼人的佐证。


Many Chinese, on the other hand, tend to think that the US is suffering from severe case of conceited superpower syndrome.

另一方面，许多中国人则认为美国患上了目空一切的超级大国综合症，而且已经病入膏肓。


As these Chinese see it, the US has a rather dysfunctional government, but nevertheless insists that its political and economic system is the best in the world, and that everyone should emulate it.

在这些中国人眼中，美国人自己的政府办事不力，却坚称自身政治和金融系统世界第一，以模范自居。


It is heavily in debt, but cannot stop spending and borrowing.

这个国家早已负债累累，却无法停止消费和借钱。


It is no longer competitive in manufacturing, but blames others for its huge trade deficit.

其制造业竞争力辉煌不再，却把造成巨额贸易逆差的原因归咎于他人。


And the world’s only military superpower is often seen within China as trigger-happy when intervening in other countries’ internal affairs.

同时在中国人眼中这个全球唯一的军事强权极端好战，整天忙于干涉他国内政。


Then, there is the issue of trust.

接着出现的则是信任问题。


China’s critics argue that its claims to a peaceful rise are not credible, given the country’s non-democratic, one-party system.

那些批评中国的人认为所谓“和平崛起”的说法根本不可信，因为该国拥有一个不民主的一党制政治系统。


Coupled with this is a zero-sum view of the world, in which any Chinese gain in the share of the global economy, or any increased presence in many parts of the world, must be at the expense of the US or other powers.

与此观点并列的则是一个零和博弈的世界观，认为中国不断扩大的世界经济份额或者势力存在必然会以美国或者其他大国的利益为代价。


Any Chinese military move is portrayed as an expansionary and aggressive act that must be contained.

任何中国军事行动都被描述成必须被遏制的侵略扩张行为。


Any attempts at engagement by Western politicians, such as Biden’s recent trip, are automatically met with doubt and criticism for cozying up to dictators.

而西方政治家采取的任何举动（比如拜登访华）都会当即遭到质疑并被扣上巴结独裁者的帽子。


Likewise, for those Chinese who are suspicious of US intentions, conspiracy is always in play.

同样，对于那些对美国意图疑心重重的中国人来说，阴谋论总是有市场的。


They see a declining superpower using economic, military, and diplomatic means in an unrelenting effort to prevent China’s rise.

他们觉得美国这个日薄西山的超级大国正在想方设法用经济，军事和外交手段阻止中国崛起。


Talk of human rights and democracy is nothing but a smoke screen for demonizing China.

所有对人权和民主的讨论都是妄图妖魔化中国的烟雾弹。


Arms sales to Taiwan, Tibetan activism, and “color revolutions” of various kinds are all sponsored by the US and other Western powers, and are aimed at weakening China.

对台军售，藏独势力以及各类“颜色革命”都是美国以及其他西方势力背后资助的，而且唯一例外是为了削弱中国。


Despite decades of close interaction, with millions of Americans, Europeans, and Japanese visiting China every year and similar numbers of Chinese now visiting the US and other advanced countries, both sides see each other through a glass darkly.

尽管经历了数十年的密切交流，每年都数百万美国人，欧洲人和日本人以及中国人频繁到访对方的国家，双方却依然带着有色眼睛看待对方。


Increased interdependence has not led to better understandings on even some of the most basic issues.

不断提升的相互依存度仍然无法令双方在某些最基本问题上达成更深的了解。


China’s Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Fu Ying expressed her country’s anxiety about this state of affairs in a recent interview. “The most important thing is the question of whether China and the US are enemies.

对此中国外交部副部长傅莹在最近接受采访时表达了中方的忧虑 ： “ 我认为重要的问题是：中美两国是不是敌人？


Are we going to be in a war?

我们要走向战争吗？


Are we preparing for a war against each other?”

我们在准备要和对方开战吗？


Biden, while reaffirming that the US does not view China as an enemy, implied that Fu’s worries are not fanciful, saying that the worst scenario is a misunderstanding that leads to an unintended conflict.

”而拜登一方面重申美方并不视中方为敌，另一方面也暗示傅莹的担忧并非无中生有，认为最坏的情景莫过于因互相之间的误解而引发意料之外的冲突。


So the key issue for China, its neighbors, the US, and rest of the world is not how many aircraft carriers, missiles, submarines, and next-generation fighters China may produce and deploy in the coming years and decades. Rather, it is how China intends to use its newly acquired economic and military strength in pursuing its domestic and foreign-policy goals – and how the world’s leading powers can ensure that they do not end up harming each other by accident or misunderstanding.

因此对中国及其邻国，还有美国以及世界其他国家来说，最关键的问题不是中国将在未来几十年内部署多少航母、导弹，潜艇和战斗机，而是中国将如何运用新近获得的经济和军事实力去实现其内政外交政策 — — 以及这些世界大国如何防止因为意外或者误解而互相伤害。


To meet these challenges successfully, there is no viable alternative to a positive, continuous, and frank engagement between China and the rest of the world.

如果要成功应对着些挑战的话，唯一的方法就是在中国和其他国家之间实现积极，持续和坦诚的相互了解。


The Chinese economy will continue to grow; the Chinese military will continue to modernize; and the Chinese people will remain united in their Great Power aspirations.

中国经济必将继续增长；中国军队也将继续迈向现代化；而中国人民也将继续团结在大国崛起的理想之下。


A Cold War-style confrontation and containment policy from the West will be met with strong resistance from the Chinese, whose global leverage, particularly in finance, cannot be ignored.

西方的那套冷战对抗和遏制政策必将遭到中国人的强烈反抗, 而中国的全球杠杆作用（尤其在金融方面）也已强大到无法被忽视。


Only a patient, creative, and consistent engagement strategy will mitigate fears on both sides.

只有一个耐心，富有创造力并始终如一的沟通战略能消除双方的恐惧。


China’s rise is a fact; the enduring peacefulness of that rise must be a priority for China, its neighbors, the West, and, most importantly, the US.

中国的崛起已成事实；而在崛起期间的持久和平局面必然是中国，周边邻国，西方尤其是美国的第一要务。


Inequality on the Horizon of Need

需要中的不平等


BERKELEY – By any economic measure, we are living in disappointing times.

伯克利—不管用哪种经济衡量手段，我们都生活在令人失望的时代。


In the United States, 7.2% of the normal productive labor currently stands idle, while the employment gap in Europe is rising and due to exceed that of the US by the end of the year.

在美国，7.2%的普通生产性劳动力目前处于显著状态，而欧洲的就业缺口也在上升，并将在今年年底超过美国。


So it is important to step back and remind ourselves that the “lost decade” that we are currently suffering is not our long-run economic destiny.

因此后退一步提醒自己我们正在经历的“失去的十年”并不是长期经济宿命是很重要的。


As Paul Krugman recently reminded us, John Maynard Keynes perhaps put it best:

克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman）最近提醒我们，凯恩斯说得好：


“This is a nightmare, which will pass away with the morning.

“这是场噩梦，终会过去迎来黎明。


For the resources of nature and men’s devices are just as fertile and productive as they were.

因为自然资源和人类设施与昔日一样富饶高产。


The rate of our progress towards solving the material problems of life is not less rapid.

我们迈向解决生活的物质问题的进程并没有减速。


We are as capable as before of affording for everyone a high standard of life – high, I mean, compared with, say, 20 years ago – and will soon learn to afford a standard higher still.

我们和从前一样有能力让所有人过上高质量生活 — — 我的意思是，比20年前质量更高的生活 — — 并且很快就能学会创造更高质量的生活。


We were not previously deceived.

此前我们并未遭遇背叛。


But today we have involved ourselves in a colossal muddle, having blundered in the control of a delicate machine, the working of which we do not understand.

但如今我们把自己带进了巨大的迷宫，不知所措地控制着一座精美的机器，我们无法理解它的工作模式。


The result is that our possibilities of wealth may run to waste for a time.”

结果是，我们的创富可能会遭到一时的浪费。 ”


But what is our long-run economic destiny?

但我们的长期经济宿命如何？


Keynes looked forward to a time, perhaps 2050, when everyone (in England, at least) would be able to have the lifestyle of a Keynes.

凯恩斯看到，在某个时间，也许是2050年，所有人（至少是所有英国人）将能够过上凯恩斯式的生活。


And, because he imagined that no sane person could want more of the necessities, conveniences, and luxuries of life than a Keynes had, the economic problem would be solved.

他认为，只要你不是疯子，就不会渴望比凯恩斯得到的还要多的必需品、改善品和奢侈品，因此，经济问题是可以解决的。


We are wiser – and perhaps sadder – than Keynes.

我们比凯恩斯更聪明，也许也更悲伤。


We know that we want hip replacements and heart transplants and fertility treatment and cheap air travel and central heating and broadband Internet and exclusive beachfront access.

我们知道我们想要整形手术、心脏移植、不孕不育治疗、廉价航空、中央供暖、宽带网络、专属海滩。


Already nearly everybody in the North Atlantic region has enough food to avoid hunger, enough clothing to stay warm, enough shelter to remain dry.

在北大西洋地区，几乎人人可以获得足够的食物避免饥饿，获得足够的衣物保证取暖，获得足够的住所保持干燥。


And yet we want more, feel resentful when we do not get it, and are self-aware enough to know that luxuries turn into conveniences, and then into necessities – and that we are very good at inventing new luxuries after which to strive.

但我们还想要更多，得不到就感到愤怒，心安理得地看到奢侈品变为改善品，在变为必需品 — — 我们已经非常擅长于发明新的奢侈品然后去追求它。


So the economic problem will certainly be with us for a long time yet.

因此这个经济问题必然会在很长一段时间里伴随我们。


But at least we can count on being able to generate a relatively egalitarian middle-class society as we collectively slouch toward our consumerist utopia, right?

但至少我们指望创造相对平等的中产阶级社会，让我们行尸走肉般地迈向消费至上主义乌托邦，不是吗？


It was Karl Smith of the University of North Carolina who explained to me that this was likely to be wrong.

北卡罗来纳大学的卡尔·史密斯（Karl Smith）向我解释了这也许是错的。


The long post-Industrial Revolution boom, which carried unskilled workers’ wages to previously unheard-of heights – keeping them within shouting (or at least dreaming) distance of the lifestyles of the rich and famous – is not necessarily a good guide to what will come next.

长时间的后工业革命繁荣把低技能工人的工资推高到了前所未闻的高度 — — 让他们能够觊觎（至少能够梦想）富人和名人的生活方式，但这并不是很好的未来指南。


To create wealth, you need ideas about how to shape matter and energy, additional energy itself to carry out the shaping, and instrumentalities to control the shaping as it is accomplished.

为了创造财富，你需要的是如何改变事情和能量的思想、更多的能量本身从而带来改变，以及当改变完成时控制它的工具。


The Industrial Revolution brought ideas and energy to the table, but human brains remained the only effective instrumentalities of control.

工业革命带来了思想和能量，但人的大脑依然是唯一的有效控制工具。


As ideas and energy became cheap, the human brains that were their complements became valuable.

随着思想和能量变得廉价，人脑就成了珍贵的补充品。


But, as we move into a future of artificial intelligence that observers like Kevin Drum expect (or even of the artificial moronity that is already clearly at hand), and into a future of biotechnology that grows itself as biological systems do, won’t human brains cease to be the only valuable instrumentalities of control?

但是，随着我们步入凯文·德朗姆（Kevin Drum）等观察家所预期的人工智能未来（甚至已经显然实现的低层次人工智能 ） ， 步入生物技术本身如同生物系统增长的未来，人脑会不再是唯一有价值的控制工具吗？


It is not necessarily the case that “unskilled” workers’ standards of living will fall in absolute terms: the same factors that make human brains less valuable may well be working equally effectively to reduce the costs of life’s necessities, conveniences, and luxuries.

这并不一定意味着“低技能”工人的绝对生活水平会下降：让人脑价值下降的因素或许也能同样有效降低生活必需品、改善品和奢侈品的成本。


But wealth is likely to flow to the owners of productive – or perhaps fashionable – ideas, and to owners of things that can be imitated only with great difficulty and high cost, even with dirt-cheap instrumentalities of control, dirt-cheap energy, and plentiful ideas.

但财富可能将流向生产性 — — 也许还包括时尚性 — — 思想，流向拥有仿制难度和成本极高之物的所有者，即使控制工具和能量极为廉价，思想遍地开花。


The lesson is clear: the market is not guaranteed by nature to produce a long-run future characterized by a reasonable degree of wealth inequality and relative poverty.

教训是显然的：市场并不天然保证能产生以合理财富不均和相对贫困为特征的长期未来。


Unless and until we recognize this fully, we will remain at the mercy of Keynes’s poorly understood “delicate machine.”

除非我们有朝一日能充分认识到这一点，否则我们将继续陷于凯恩斯不为人所理解的“精美的机器”中。


Alpine Schadenfreude

阿尔卑斯的幸灾乐祸


Not surprisingly, the atmosphere at this year’s World Economic Forum was grim.

今年世界经济论坛的气氛毫不奇怪地显得非常糟糕。


Those who think that globalization, technology, and the market economy will solve the world’s problems seemed subdued.

那些认为全球化、技术和市场经济可以解决世界的难题的人似乎都不出声了。


Most chastened of all were the bankers.

受到指责最多的是那些银行家。


Against the backdrop of the sub-prime crisis, the disasters at many financial institutions, and the weakening of the stock market, these “masters of the universe” seemed less omniscient than they did a short while ago.

在次贷危机、许多金融机构面临灾难和股市低迷的背景下，这些“世界统治者”似乎没有像他们前一段时间那样无所不知了。


And it was not just the bankers who were in the Davos doghouse this year, but also their regulators – the central bankers.

但是在今年的达沃斯被关进狗屋里的不仅仅是这些银行家，还有他们的监管者，也就是各国的中央银行。


Anyone who goes to international conferences is used to hearing Americans lecture everyone else about transparency.

参加国际会议的人都习惯于听美国人教训其他国家要更加透明。


There was still some of that at Davos.

在达沃斯还是有一些这样的人。


I heard the usual suspects – including a former treasury secretary who had been particularly vociferous in such admonishments during the East Asia crisis – bang on about the need for transparency at sovereign wealth funds (though not at American or European hedge funds).

我听到了常有的质疑声，包括一位在东亚金融危机期间在这些告诫方面叫嚷得特别厉害的前财政部长，喋喋不休地要求主权基金更加透明（但却没有提美国或欧洲的对冲基金 ） 。


But this time, developing countries could not resist commenting on the hypocrisy of it all.  There was even a touch of schadenfreude in the air about the problems the United States is having right now – though it was moderated, of course, by worries about the downturn’s impact on their own economies.

但是这一次，发展中国家会忍不住站出来批评他们这种说法的虚伪性。 甚至对于美国目前正面临的困难有一种幸灾乐祸的态度，当然是比较克制的，因为他们担心这种下滑对于他们自己经济的影响。


Had America really told others to bring in American banks to teach them about how to run their business?

难道美国没有告诉其他国家让美国的银行进入它们的市场以便教它们如何经营它们的业务？


Had America really boasted about its superior risk management systems, going so far as to develop a new regulatory system (called Basle II)?

难道美国没有吹嘘过它出色的危机管理体系，甚至制定了一个新的监管体系（称为第二代巴塞尔资本协定 ） ？


Basle II is dead – at least until memories of the current disaster fade.

第二代巴塞尔资本协定已经死了，至少要等到对目前危机的记忆消退的时候才能复活。


Bankers – and the rating agencies – believed in financial alchemy.

银行还有信用评级机构迷信金融炼金术。


They thought that financial innovations could somehow turn bad mortgages into good securities, meriting AAA ratings.

它们认为金融创新可以在某种程度上把差的抵押贷款变为值得给予AAA评级的优质证券。


But one lesson of modern finance theory is that, in well functioning financial markets, repackaging risks should not make much difference.

但是现代金融理论其中的一个课程是在功能完善的金融市场，重新打包的风险并没有太大的差别。


If we know the price of cream and the price of skim milk, we can figure out the price of milk with 1% cream, 2% cream, or 4% cream.

如果我们知道乳酪和脱脂牛奶的价格，我们就能计算出含1 % 、 2%或4%乳酪的牛奶的价格。


There might be some money in repackaging, but not the billions that banks made by slicing and dicing sub-prime mortgages into packages whose value was much greater than their contents.

通过重新打包也许可以产生一些钱，但是银行绝对无法通过把次级抵押贷款分割后包装成价值远远超出其实质价值的产品而获利几十亿美元。


It seemed too good to be true – and it was.

这样的事情看上去太美妙而不可能是真的，但是它确实发生的。


Worse, banks failed to understand the first principle of risk management: diversification only works when risks are not correlated, and macro-shocks (such as those that affect housing prices or borrowers’ ability to repay) affect the probability of default for all mortgages.

更糟糕的是，银行没有理解风险管理的第一原则，也就是分散风险只有在这些风险相互没有关联时才有效，而大规模的冲击（比如影响房价或借贷者还款能力的那些冲击）可能会使所有的抵押贷款都出现不履行债务的情况。


I argued at Davos that central bankers also got it wrong by misjudging the threat of a downturn and failing to provide sufficient regulation.

我在达沃斯会议上指出中央银行也犯下了错误，它们误判了经济下滑的威胁并且没有提高足够的监管。


They waited too long to take action.

它们等了太长时间才采取行动。


Because it normally takes a year or more for the full effects of monetary policy to be felt, central banks need to act preemptively, not reactively.

因为货币政策的全面效果至少要过一年或者更长时间才能感觉到，中央银行需要预先采取行动，而不是出现问题才做出反应。


Worse, the US Federal Reserve and its previous chairman, Alan Greenspan, may have helped create the problem, encouraging households to take on risky variable-rate mortgages by reassuring those who worried about a housing bubble that there was at most a little “froth” in the market.

更糟糕的是，美联储和它的前主席格林斯潘也许帮助制造了这场困难，他们鼓励家庭接受有风险的可变利率抵押贷款，并且一再向那些担心房地产泡沫的人保证市场上最多只有一点点“泡沫 ” 。


Normally, a Davos audience would rally to the support of the central bankers.

通常，达沃斯的与会者会一致支持中央银行。


This time, a vote at the end of the session supported my view by a margin of three to one.

但是这一次，在会议结束时进行的一项投票有四分之三的人支持我的观点。


Even the plea of one of central banker that “no one could have predicted the problems” moved few in the audience – perhaps because several people sitting there had, like me, explicitly warned about the impending problem in previous years.

即便有一家中央银行辩解说“没有人能够预计到这些困难 ” ， 也只是打动了很少一些听众，也许是因为坐在那儿的几个人像我一样在过去几年一直明确地警告即将面临的困难。


The only thing we got wrong was how bad banks’ lending practices were, how non-transparent banks really were, and how inadequate their risk management systems were.

我们唯一没有预测到的就是银行的借贷行为 到底有多糟糕 ，这些银行 到底有多不透明 以及它们的风险管理体系到底有多不恰当。


It was interesting to see the different cultural attitudes to the crisis on display.

有趣的是看到不同的文化对于正在上演的这场危机不同的态度。


In Japan, the CEO of a major bank would have apologized to his employees and his country, and would have refused his pension and bonus so that those who suffered as a result of corporate failures could share the money.

在日本，一家主要银行的首席执行官会向他的员工和他的国家道歉，并且会拒绝领他的养老金和奖金以便让那些因为公司经营的失败而遭受损失的人能够分享这笔钱。


He would have resigned.

他可能会辞职。


In America, the only questions are whether a board will force a CEO to leave and, if so, how big his severance package will be.

而在美国，唯一的问题是董事会是否会 迫使 一位首席执行官离开，以及如果让他离开的话，应该支付给他多少离职津贴。


When I asked one CEO whether there was any discussion of returning their bonuses, the response was not just no, but an aggressive defense of the bonus system.

当我问一位首席执行官是否讨论过归还他们的奖金问题，回答不仅仅是简单的没有，而是大声地为奖金制度辩解。


This is the third US crisis in the past 20 years, after the Savings & Loan crisis of 1989 and the Enron/WorldCom crisis in 2002.

这是过去20年来美国发生的第三场危机了，前两次危机是1989年的储蓄信贷机构危机和2002年的安然/世通公司危机。


Deregulation has not worked.

解除管制并没有产生效果。


Unfettered markets may produce big bonuses for CEO’s, but they do not lead, as if by an invisible hand, to societal well-being.

被解除束缚的市场也许给首席执行官们带来了更多的奖金，但是它们并没有就像是通过一只无形的手带来社会的幸福。


Until we achieve a better balance between markets and government, the world will continue to pay a high price.

除非我们在市场和政府间获得更好的平衡，世界将依然付出高昂的代价。


Effective Altruism

有效利他主义


PRINCETON – Can humans really be motivated by altruism?

普林斯顿—人类真的可以受利他主义的驱动？


My new book, The Most Good You Can Do, discusses the emerging new movement called Effective Altruism, and, in doing interviews about the book, I am surprised by how often that question is asked.

我的新书《你能做的最大善事 》 （ The Most Good You Can Do）讨论了被称为“有效利他主义 ” （ Effective Altruism）的新出现的运动，在关于这本书的访谈中，我惊奇地发现这个问题是如此频繁地提及。


Why should we doubt that some people act altruistically, at least some of the time?

为何我们要怀疑有人至少会有时采取利他行为？


In evolutionary terms, we can easily understand altruism toward kin and others who can reciprocate our help.

从进化论的角度，我们很容易就能理解对家人和可回馈帮助的人的利他主义。


It seems plausible that once our ability to reason and reflect has developed sufficiently enough to enable us to understand that strangers can suffer and enjoy life just as we can, then at least some of us would act altruistically toward strangers, too.

一个很有道理的说法是，如果我们推理和思考的能力足够发达，可以确保我们明白陌生人可以与我们一样受苦或享受生活，那么至少我们中一部分人也会对陌生人有利他行为。


The polling organization Gallup asked people in 135 countries whether they had, in the last month, donated money to a charity, volunteered their time to an organization, or helped a stranger.

民调组织盖洛普公司（Gallup）询问了135个国家的人在过去一个月中是否为慈善组织捐过钱、为某个组织贡献义务劳动，或者帮助过某个陌生人。


Gallup’s results, which form the basis of the World Giving Index 2014, indicate that approximately 2.3 billion people, a third of the world’s population, perform at least one altruistic act per month.

盖洛普调查的结果 — — 也是2014年世界奉献指数（World Giving Index 2014）的基础 — — 表明大约23亿人，即世界人口的三分之一，每个月至少会有一次利他行为。


More objective evidence of altruism buttresses these findings.

更客观的利他主义证据也支持这一发现。


In many countries, the supply of blood for medical purposes relies on voluntary, anonymous donations.

在许多国家，医用目的血液供应依靠志愿匿名献血。


Worldwide, more than 11 million people have put their names on donor registries for bone marrow, signifying their willingness to donate their marrow to a stranger.

从全球看，超过1,100万人在骨髓捐献数据库中注册，表示愿意向陌生人捐献自己的骨髓。


A small but growing number of people have gone further still, donating a kidney to a stranger.

少数人（但人数在不断增加）更进一步，愿意为陌生人捐献肾脏。


There were 177 altruistic donations by living donors in the United States in 2013 and 118 in the United Kingdom in the year to April 2014.

2013年美国有177例在世捐献者的利他捐献，2013年5月—2014年4月英国有118例。


Then there are those who donate to charity.

接下来我们看看慈善捐赠。


In the US alone, individuals gave $240 billion to charity in 2013.

光是在美国，2013年就有2,400亿美元的个人慈善捐赠。


Foundations and corporations topped this up to a total of $335 billion, or about 2% of gross national income.

加上基金会和企业的捐献，总数达到了3,350亿美元，或国民总收入的2 % 。


The US is often said to be more charitable than other countries; but, in terms of the proportion of the population donating money, Myanmar, Malta, Ireland, the UK, Canada, the Netherlands, and Iceland all do better.

人们通常认为，美国比其他国家更加乐善好施；但是，就人口捐钱比例而言，缅甸、马耳他、爱尔兰、英国、加拿大、荷兰和冰岛都比美国做得更好。


In Myanmar, 91% of the people surveyed had given money in the past month (the corresponding figure for the US is 68%), indicating the strong hold of the Theravada Buddhist tradition of donating to support monks and nuns.

在缅甸，91%的受访者在过去一个月中捐过钱（美国的这一比例为68 % ） ，这体现了支持和尚和尼姑的深厚的小乘佛教捐献传统。


Myanmar also had the highest percentage of people volunteering time (51%).

缅甸也是义务劳动时间比例最高的国家（51 % ） 。


The US did, however, have the highest ranking for “helping a stranger.”

但是，美国在“帮助陌生人”方面的评分最高。


That, together with a high ranking for volunteering time, led it to tie with Myanmar as the most generous nation in the world.

再加上在义务劳动时间上的高分，使美国与缅甸一起成为世界上最慷慨的国家。


Admittedly, not all of this giving is altruistic.

诚然，这些奉献并不完全是利他的。


New York’s Lincoln Center announced last month that the billionaire entertainment industry mogul David Geffen has donated $100 million toward the renovation of its concert facility, Avery Fisher Hall, on the condition that it is renamed David Geffen Hall.

纽约林肯中心上个月宣布，亿万富翁、娱乐业大佬大卫·格芬（David Geffen）为其音乐会设施艾弗里·费雪音乐厅（Avery Fisher Hall）捐献1亿美元，条件是将该音乐厅改名为大卫·格芬音乐厅。


That gift seems motivated more by a desire for fame than a desire to do good.

这份礼物似乎更多是受名誉而非行善驱动。


After all, as Geffen presumably knew, the family of Avery Fisher had to be compensated with a payment of $15 million in order to agree to the renaming.

毕竟，格芬事先就已知道，让艾弗里·费雪家族同意改名需要给他们1,500万美元补偿。


In any case, in a world with a billion people living in extreme poverty, it would not be difficult for an altruist to appreciate that there are many ways of doing more good than renovating a concert hall for well-off music lovers.

无论如何，在这个十亿人生活在极端贫困中的世界，一个利他主义者多半会认为，有许多事情比整修为音乐爱好者服务的演出厅更加慈善。


At the opposite end of the giving spectrum, psychologists who study giving behavior have suggested that people who give small sums of money to a large number of charities may be motivated less by the desire to help others than by the warm glow they get from making a donation.

在奉献人群的反面，研究奉献行为的心理学家认为，向大量慈善机构捐小钱的人与其说是受助人愿望的驱使，不如说是为了从捐钱行为中获得的温情效应（warm glow ） 。


By contrast, other donors give larger sums, usually to only a handful of charities chosen on the basis of some knowledge about what the charity is doing.

相反，其他捐献者捐更多的钱，并且通常只根据关于慈善机构正在进行的活动的信息选择少数机构。


They want to have a positive impact on the world.

他们希望给世界带来一些正能量。


Their gifts may also make their lives better, but this is not what motivates them.

他们的捐献也让他们的生活变得更好，但这不是驱动他们的原因。


The Effective Altruism movement consists of people who give in the latter way, combining the head and the heart.

有效利他主义运动由后一种捐献者构成，他们是知行合一之士。


Their aim is to do the most good they can with the resources that they are willing to set aside for that purpose.

���们的目标是用他们所愿意拿来用于慈善目的的资源尽可能地做最大的善事。


Those resources may include a tenth, a quarter, or even half of their income.

这些资源可能包括他们的收入的十分之一、四分之一乃至二分之一。


Their altruism may include their time and talents, and influence their choice of career.

他们的利他主义也许包括他们的时间和才华，并影响他们的职业选择。


To achieve their aims, they use reason and evidence to ensure that whatever resources they devote to doing good will be as effective as possible.

为了实现他们的目标，他们用理性和证据确保他们用于做善事的资源尽可能地有效使用。


Several studies show that people who are generous are typically happier and more satisfied with their lives than those who do not give.

一些研究表明慷慨的人通常比不奉献的人更快乐、更满意于生活。


And other studies show that giving leads to activity in the reward centers of the brain (the areas of the brain that are also stimulated by tasty food and sex).

也有一些研究表明奉献引起大脑回馈中心活动（回馈中心是大脑的区域，也受美食和性行为的刺激 ） 。


But this does not mean that these donors are not altruistic.

但这并不意味着这些捐赠者不是利他的。


Their direct motive is to help others, and their giving makes them happier only as a consequence of the fact that it does help others.

他们的直接动机是帮助他人，他们的奉献给让他们更快乐，这只是奉献确实帮助了他人的结果。


If we had more such people, we would have more giving, and that is what we want.

如果这样的人更多一些，就会有更多的奉献，而这就是我们想要的。


To define “altruism” so narrowly that the term can be applied only when giving is contrary to a person’s overall interest would miss the point that the best situation to bring about is one in which promoting the interests of others harmonizes with promoting one’s own.

将“利他主义”的定义定得如此狭隘，以至于只能用于奉献与个人总体利益相悖的情形，这就失去了最重要的要点 — — 最理想的状况莫过于促进他人利益与促进自身利益一致。


Testing Times for Alzheimer’s

阿尔茨海默症的考验时刻


LONDON – Alzheimer’s disease is by far the most common cause of dementia and one of the world’s most feared disorders.

伦敦—阿尔茨海默症是目前最常见的痴呆诱发因素，也是世界上最令人恐慌的神经疾病。


By 2050, there will be 135 million Alzheimer’s sufferers worldwide, a threefold increase from today, with three-quarters of cases occurring in low- and middle-income countries.

到2050年，全球将有1.35亿阿尔茨海默症患者，较目前增加三倍，其中四分之三发生在中低收入国家。


Predicting the onset of Alzheimer’s, let alone preventing or curing it, remains an immense challenge.

预测阿尔茨海默的开始 — — 更不用说预防和治疗了 — — 仍是一个巨大的挑战。


Alzheimer’s disease was identified more than a century ago from autopsy results that showed characteristic brain lesions called “amyloid plaques.”

阿尔茨海默症在一个世纪多前通过尸体解剖结果发现，其特征是被称为“淀粉样斑块”的脑损伤。


The disease is more difficult to diagnose in the living.

该病在活着时更难诊断。


Doctors rely on observation of memory loss and other thinking deficits (such as reasoning or language comprehension) – signs that plaques are already present in the brain.

医生依靠观察记忆丧失和其他思维缺陷（如推理和语言理解力）做出诊断 — — 这些迹象表明脑部已经出现损伤。


But any cure would have to be administered before the plaques form, and years before symptoms of dementia appear.

但需要在这些斑块形成前进行治疗才行，这时距离出现痴呆症状还有几年时间。


Alzheimer’s might be more predictable if scientists had the time and resources to conduct far-reaching longitudinal studies over many years.

如果科学家有时间和资源进行为期多年的深入的纵向研究，阿尔茨海默症的可预测性可能会有所提高。


Such studies ideally would involve blood, imaging, memory, and medical tests, as well as detailed lifestyle questionnaires filled out by thousands of young and middle-aged people.

这些研究最好包括对数千青年和中年人进行血液、影像、记忆和医学测试以及详细的生活方式问卷调查。


Study participants would be followed over decades to see who developed the disease, and which tests proved positive before Alzheimer’s was diagnosed.

研究参与者将受到为期数十年的跟踪，以观察谁发展出阿尔茨海默症，哪些测试在阿尔茨海默症获得诊断之前就能有所察觉。


In fact, two famous longitudinal studies – the Framingham Heart Study in Massachusetts and the Kungsholmen Project in Sweden – have led to important progress in predicting the disease.

事实上，两项著名的纵向研究 — — 马萨诸塞州的弗莱明汉姆心脏研究（Framingham Heart Study）和瑞典的国王岛项目（Kungsholmen Project）在阿尔茨海默症的预测方面获得了重要进展。


These studies found that short-term memory may be impaired for up to ten years before an Alzheimer’s diagnosis.

这些研究发现，在阿尔茨海默症被诊断出十年前，就有可能出现短期记忆损害。


Major advances have since been made in brain imaging, biochemical analysis, and, perhaps most important, genetic testing.

此后，大脑造影、生化分析以及 — — 也许是最重要的 — — 基因测试取得了重大进展。


Indeed, the risk of Alzheimer’s doubles if a parent or sibling has it, probably due in large part to the presence of the ApoE gene.

事实上，如果双亲或兄弟姐妹中有人罹患阿尔茨海默症，你的患病风险也将翻番，这很有可能是因为ApoE基因所赐。


The risk triples for Europeans who inherit a particular type of ApoE, called ε4; inheriting two copies of ε4 increases the risk roughly tenfold.

遗传了某种ApoE基因（ε4）的欧洲人得阿尔茨海默症的概率会增加两倍；遗传双份ε4基因会让概率增加大约十倍。


But genetic testing alone is unlikely to be an accurate predictor, because around half of Alzheimer’s sufferers do not carry ε4, and probably half of those with ε4 do not develop the disease.

但光靠基因测试无法作为准确的指标，因为大约一半的阿尔茨海默症患者不携带ε4，并且可能有一半的ε4携带者不会发生阿尔茨海默症。


Moreover, though international studies of more than 70,000 people have found over 20 other genes linked to Alzheimer’s, their impact is minimal.

此外，尽管对70,000多人的国际研究表明有20多个基因与阿尔茨海默症有关，但它们的作用很小。


That said, a groundbreaking 2012 study published in the New England Journal of Medicine, analyzed a rare genetic mutation found in just 500 families around the world, which would lead to Alzheimer’s before the age of 50.

尽管如此 ， 《 新英格兰医学期刊 》 （ New England Journal of Medicine）上发表的一篇2012年的突破性研究分析了一个只在全世界500个家族身上发生的罕见基因突变，该突变会导致50岁前罹患阿尔茨海默症。


The study showed which tests were able to predict the outcome most accurately decades ahead of onset.

研究表明了那些测试可以在症状出现前几十年最准确地预测结果。


The research found that amyloid-beta – the substance that clumps together and forms amyloid plaques – becomes depleted in the cerebrospinal fluid around the brain as long as 25 years before the onset of dementia.

研究发现，乙型淀粉样蛋白（amyloid-beta，这种物质会结团形成淀粉样斑块）会在痴呆症状出现前25年就消失于大脑周边的脑脊液中。


Fifteen years prior to onset, a positron emission tomography (PET) scan showed amyloid-beta being deposited in plaques in the brain itself.

痴呆症状出现前十五年，正电子发射成像术（PET）扫描显示乙型淀粉样蛋白正在大脑本身的斑块中堆积。


And detailed short-term memory tests were abnormal ten years before onset, as suggested in the Framingham and Kungsholmen studies.

弗莱明汉姆和国王岛研究表明，痴呆症状出现前十年，详细短期记忆测试会有不正常表现。


These tests are now becoming part of clinical practice, and are available commercially.

这些测试目前正在成为临床实践的一部分，并以投入商业应用。


Memory and other cognitive tests can reveal whether one has minor problems with some aspects of thinking – a condition known as “mild cognitive impairment” that precedes Alzheimer’s disease.

记忆和其他认知测试可以揭示你是否在思维的某些方面存在小问题 — — 所谓的“温和认知损伤 ” ， 常常在阿尔茨海默症之前出现。


The problem is that the tests must be administered by a trained neuropsychologist and take more than an hour to complete; moreover, many people with mild cognitive impairment do not progress to dementia.

问题是这些测试必须由受过训练的神经心理学家进行，需要一个多小时时间完成；此外，许多有温和认知损伤的人并不会出现痴呆。


Sampling cerebrospinal fluid via a lumbar puncture (or “spinal tap”) can predict which people with mild cognitive impairment will progress to dementia with over 80% accuracy, but this still means a misdiagnosis for one in five patients.

通过腰椎穿刺（或“脊椎抽��� ” ） 进行脑脊液取样可以预测存在温和认知损伤的人是否会出现痴呆，准确率在80%以上，但这仍然意味着每五人就有一人遭遇误诊。


PET scans are slightly less accurate, while routine MRI brain scans can reveal with perhaps only 70% accuracy subtle abnormalities in people with mild cognitive impairment.

PET扫描准确率略低，而常规的MRI脑部扫描大概只能揭示70%的存在温和认知损伤人士的准确微小异常。


Scientists are therefore still searching for an accurate predictive test that is cheaper, quicker, and less invasive than PET scans or lumbar punctures.

因此，科学家仍在寻找比PET扫描或腰椎穿刺更廉价、更快速、更加不痛苦的准确预测测试方法。


This year, two small studies of blood tests seemed to predict Alzheimer’s 1-3 years before it occurred, but the tests are complicated and require the measurement of ten or more substances.

今年，两项小型血液测试研究似乎可以在阿尔茨海默症出现前1—3年作出预测，但测试很复杂，需要测量十种或以上物质。


Whichever predictive methods doctors use over the next few years will probably enable them to inform those patients with mild cognitive impairment about their chances of developing Alzheimer’s in the short term.

不管未来几年医生使用什么预测方法，也许都能使他们能够告知存在温和认知损伤的患者短期内罹患阿尔茨海默症的概率。


The trickier question is whether we will be able to predict Alzheimer’s disease accurately in those with normal cognition and memory, or to predict it more than five years in advance.

更困难的问题是我们是否能够准确预测认知和记忆能力正常人士的阿尔茨海默症，或在阿尔茨海默症出现五年前就做出预测。


Even if accurate early prediction of Alzheimer’s eventually is achieved, there are currently no drugs available to prevent or cure it before the amyloid plaques start destroying the mind.

即使最终实现了阿尔茨海默症的早期准确预测，目前也没有药物能够在淀粉样斑块破坏思维之前预防或治疗阿尔茨海默症。


That will be our next great challenge.

这将是下一个大挑战。


Africa’s Necessary Data Revolution

非洲需要数据革命


WASHINGTON, DC – Since the term “data revolution” was introduced, there has been a flurry of activity to define, develop, and implement an agenda to transform the collection, use, and distribution of development statistics.

华盛顿—自从“数据革命”一词出现以来，涌现出大量动作定义、发展和实施日程以改变发展统计数据的收集、使用和分配。


That makes sense.

这是有意义的事情。


Assessing the international community’s next development agenda, regardless of its details, will be impossible without accurate data.

要想评估国际社会的下一个发展日程（不管其细节如何 ） ， 没有准确地数据是万万不能的。


Yet, in Sub-Saharan Africa – the region with the most potential for progress under the forthcoming Sustainable Development Goals – accurate data are severely lacking.

但是，在撒哈拉以南非洲 — — 在即将到来的可持续发展目标（Sustainable Development Goals）的指引下，该地区拥有最大的进步潜力 — — 极度缺乏准确数据。


From 1990 to 2009, only one Sub-Saharan country had data on all 12 indicators established in 2000 by the Millennium Development Goals.

从1990年到2009年，只有一个撒哈拉以南国家拥有2000年千年发展目标（Millennium Development Goals）所制定的全部12项指标的数据。


Indeed, of the 60 countries with complete vital statistics, not one is in Africa.

事实上，在关键统计数据完备的60个国家中，没有一个是非洲国家。


While most African countries have likely experienced economic growth during the last decade, the accuracy of the data on which growth estimates are based – not to mention data on inflation, food production, education, and vaccination rates – remains far from adequate.

尽管大部分非洲国家在过去十年中都经历了经济增长，但作为增长估算的基础的数据的准确性仍有较大差距，更不用说通货膨胀、粮食生产、教育和疫苗接种率等数据了。


Inaccurate data can have serious consequences.

失准的数据可能造成严重后果。


Consider Nigeria’s experience earlier this year, when GDP rebasing showed that the economy was nearly 90% larger than previously thought.

以今年早些时候的尼日利亚为例，GDP重估表明该国经济比此前认为的要大近90 % 。


The distorted picture of Nigeria’s economy provided by the previous statistics likely led to misguided decisions regarding private investment, credit ratings, and taxation.

此前的数据对尼日利亚经济的扭曲刻画可能导致私人投资、信用评级和税收等方面的决策不当。


Moreover, it meant that Nigeria was allocated more international aid than it merited – aid that could have gone to needier countries.

此外，这意味着尼日利亚获得了比它所应该获得的更多的国际援助 — — 这些援助本可以用于更加需要的国家。


Contrary to popular belief, the constraints on the production and use of basic data stem not from a shortage of technical capacity and knowhow, but from underlying political and systemic challenges.

与流行观点相反，基本数据生产和使用的约束并非来自技术能力和知识的欠缺，而是来自基本政治和制度挑战。


For starters, national statistical offices often lack the institutional autonomy needed to protect the integrity of data, production of which thus tends to be influenced by political forces and special interest groups.

首先，国家统计部门往往没有保证数据完整性的自主权，导致数据容易受到政治势力和特殊利益集团的左右。


Poorly designed policies also undermine the accuracy of data.

设计不当的政策也妨碍了数据的准确性。


For example, governments and donors sometimes tie funding to self-reported measures, which creates incentives for recipients to over-report key data like vaccination or school-enrollment rates.

比如，政府和出资方有时让资金与自我报告措施挂钩，这就给受助者造成了夸大关键数据（如疫苗接种率和入学率）的激励。


Without effective oversight, these well-intentioned efforts to reward progress can go awry.

没有有效监督，这些本意良好的奖励进步计划有可能适得其反。


Despite these failings, national governments and international donors continue to devote far too few resources to ensuring the collection of adequate data.

尽管存在这些弊端，但国家政府和国际出资者用于确保收集足够数据的投入仍然太少。


Only 2% of official development aid is earmarked for improving the quality of statistics – an amount wholly insufficient to assess accurately the impact of the other 98% of aid.

只有2%的官方发展援助被用于改善数据质量 — — 这一数字完全不足以准确评估其他98%的援助所产生的效果。


And governments’ dependency on donors to fund and gather their core statistics is unsustainable.

而政府依赖出资者供资和收集核心统计数据的做法也是不可持续的。


In fact, stronger national statistical systems are the first step toward improving the accuracy, timeliness, and availability of the data that are essential to calculating almost any major economic or social-welfare indicator.

事实上，加强国家统计数据体系是改善数据准确率、及时性和易得性的第一步。 对于计算几乎每一个重要经济和社会福利指标，数据的准确率、及时性和易得性都是至关重要的。


These include statistics on births and deaths; growth and poverty; tax and trade; health, education, and safety; and land and the environment.

这些统计数据包括出生和死亡数据、增长和贫困数据、税收和贸易数据、卫生、教育和安全数据，以及土地和环境数据等。


Developing such systems is an ambitious but achievable goal.

发展这样的制度是远大但可实现的目标。


All that is needed is a willingness to experiment with new approaches to collecting, using, and sharing data.

所需要的只是实验新方法以收集、使用和共享数据的意愿。


This is where the public comes in.

公众可以在这方面起作用。


If private firms, media, and civil-society organizations identify specific problems and call publicly for change, their governments will feel pressure to take the steps needed to produce accurate, unbiased data – for example, by enhancing the autonomy of national statistical offices or providing sufficient funds to hire more qualified personnel.

如果私人企业、媒体和公民社会组织认识到具体问题并公开呼呼变革，政府就会感到压力采取所需步骤产生准确、无偏的数据 — — 如通过加强国家统计部门的自治权或拿出足够资金聘请资质更好的人手。


While it may be tempting to bypass government and hope for an easy technology-based solution, sustainable, credible progress will be difficult without public-sector involvement.

绕过政府、寄希望于简单的基于技术的解决方案或许很有诱惑力，但若无公共部门参与，很难产生持续而可信的进展。


The recognition by governments and external donors of the need for more – and more efficient – funding, particularly to national statistical systems, will be integral to such a shift.

政府和外部出资者认识到增加资金规模和效率的必要性（特别是国家统计制度问题）将有利于这一转变。


Establishing stronger incentives for agencies to produce good data – that is, data that are accurate, timely, relevant, and readily available – would also help, with clearly delineated metrics defining what qualifies as “good.”

为有关部门提供产生优质数据（即更准确、及时、相关并且可随时检索的数据）的更强的激励也大有裨益，但要明确定义衡量“优质”的指标。


In fact, tying progress on those metrics to funding via pay-for-performance agreements could improve development outcomes considerably.

事实上，用指标衡量进步，并采取按表现出资的协议可以大量改善开发成果。


One concrete strategy to achieve these goals would be to create a country-donor compact for better data.

一个实现这些目标的具体战略是订立关于改善数据的国家-出资者契约。


Such a compact would enable governments and donors to express their shared intention to build a national statistics system over a period of several years, with clear and verifiable milestones.

这一契约能让政府和出资者明确在几年的时间里建立国家统计制度的共同意愿，并定义明确可证的里程碑。


It would also provide a country-specific framework for innovation on funding mechanisms and the engagement of civil society and the private sector, while mobilizing new technologies for data collection and dissemination.

这样还能提供因国而异的融资机制创新框架以及公民社会和私人部门参与框架，同时动员数据收集和传播的新技术。


In short, a data compact would help to mobilize and focus domestic and donor funding to achieve national statistical priorities.

简言之，数据契约有助于动员和集中国内和出资者资金实现国家统计数据的当务之急。


Data are the currency of performance, accountability, and credibility in the global economy, and improvements in data have been linked to better governance and higher levels of private investment.

数据是全球经济绩效、问责和信誉的通货，改善数据与改善治理和增加私人投资息息相关。


That is just what Africa needs to support a new decade of growth and development.

非洲想要支持增长和发展的新十年，需要的正是改善数据。


The Experts’ Advantage

专家优势


LONDON – Nearly everyone who sits on Google’s board of directors has at least one computer science or engineering degree or doctorate.

伦敦 — — 谷歌董事会每位董事几乎都握有至少一个计算机科学或工程学位，或者拥有博士学位。


There are two university presidents and eminent scholars – Stanford University’s John Hennessy and former Princeton University President Shirley Tilghman – and several members of the National Academy of Engineering and other illustrious organizations.

其中有斯坦福的约翰·轩尼诗及前普林斯顿的雪莉·蒂尔曼两位大学校长兼知名学者 — — 还有美国国家工程学院和其他著名机构的几位院士。


For Google, it pays to have technical expertise at the top.

对谷歌而言，技术专家坐镇高层自有其好处。


But Google is an unusual corporate giant in promoting those with scientific prowess to the top of the management ladder.

但谷歌在提拔具有科技实力的高管方面却称得起是非同寻常的企业巨头。


Beyond Silicon Valley, few senior corporate executives boast technical expertise in the products that their companies produce.

在硅谷以外，鲜有企业高管掌握本企业产品领域的技术专长。


American boardrooms are filled with MBAs, especially from Harvard, while firms in the rest of the developed world (with the possible exception of Germany) seem to prefer professional managers over technical or scientific talent.

美国董事会几乎成了以哈佛为首的MBA的天下，而其他发达国家（可能除德国以外）似乎相比科技人才更愿意聘用职业经理人。


Nowadays, it seems as anomalous to have knowledge workers serve as professional leaders as it once did to have scientists in the boardroom.

今天像以往那样让知识型员工任专业领导、让科学家进入董事会似乎已不太寻常。


It was previously thought that leadership is less necessary in knowledge-intensive organizations, where experts were assumed to be superior because they were motivated by intellectual pleasure rather than such extrinsic motivations as profit growth and cost targets.

人们曾认为知识密集型机构没有太大必要设置领导，因为人们曾普遍认为专家相对于利润增长和成本目标等外在动机更看重学术满足感是一种优势。


This difference in attitude is evident in many areas of society, not least in hospitals in the United States and the United Kingdom, where knowledge-intensive medical practitioners operate separately from managers.

这种观念上的差异在社会众多领域显而易见，尤其是在英美两国医院，掌握大量知识的执业医生与管理者分开工作。


Hospitals used to be run by doctors; today, only 5% of US hospitals’ CEOs are medical doctors, and even fewer doctors run UK hospitals.

医生曾经是医院的管理者，但今天只有5%的美国医院由医生出任首席执行官，而管理英国医院的医生则更是少之又少。


“Medicine should be left to the doctors,” according to a common refrain, “and organizational leadership should be left to professional managers.”

现代人常说“医学问题就留给医生去操心，而职业经理人则应当在组织中担任领导角色。 ”


But this is a mistake.

但这种理解是个误区。


Research shows that higher-performing US hospitals are likely to be led by doctors with outstanding research reputations, not by management professionals.

研究表明高效的美国医院由科研声誉卓著的医生管理，而不���专门管理人员的可能性更高。


The evidence also suggests that hospitals perform better, and have lower death rates, when more of their managers up to board level are clinically trained.

此外还有证据表明如果董事会管理者接受过临床培训，那么医院总体业绩更好、死亡率也更低。


We see similar findings in other fields.

其他领域的发现也十分类似。


My research shows that the world’s best universities, for example, are likely to be led by exceptional scholars whose performance continues to improve over time.

比方说，我所做的研究表明全世界最好的大学可能是由出色的学者领导，而他们的绩效往往随着时间的推移而不断提高。


Departmental-level analysis supports this.

部门一级的分析数据也支持这种观点。


A university economics department, for example, tends to perform better the more widely its head’s own research is cited.

打个比方，如果某大学经济系主任的研究成果被广泛引用，那么该系的绩效相应也会更为出色。


With experts in charge, it may not always look like there is an effective reporting structure in place.

专家管理时并不总需要有效的报告体制。


But, as the academic saying goes: just because you cannot herd cats, does not mean there is not a feline hierarchy.

但就像学术界一句俗语所说：虽然猫科动物很少成群活动，但并不等于不存在等级结构。


As with cats, academics operate a “relative hierarchy” in which the person in charge changes, depending on the setting.

就像猫科动物一样，学者管理采取一种随着管理者和环境不断变化的“相对层次结构 ” 。


Even in the world of sports, where success is not an obvious preparation for management, we see interesting linkages between experience and organizational performance.

即使在运动成绩并非明显管理必备要素的体育界，我们也能在经验和组织绩效间看到某种有趣的联系。


The very best NBA basketball players often make top coaches, while former Formula 1 champion drivers are associated with great team performance.

最优秀的NBA篮球运动员往往能够成为顶级教练，而前一级方程式冠军车手执教的车队大都也表现出色。


Of the 92 soccer clubs in the English football league, club managers played an average of 16 years in senior clubs.

92家英格兰足球联赛俱乐部经理在高级俱乐部的平均服役年限为16年。


Alex Ferguson, arguably Britain’s best manager, scored an average of one goal every two games in his professional career.

弗格森也许是全英国最好的足球经理，他在职业生涯中每两场比赛打入一个球。


But where the pattern does occur, especially in the business world, we should take note.

但我们对以商界为代表的模式适用领域应当多加关注。


The senior partner of any professional services firm is likely to have been a top performer during a long career with the firm.

任何专业服务公司的高级合伙人很可能在其漫长的职业生涯中一直是该公司顶尖的执行者。


This might be because experts and professionals in knowledge-intensive organizations prefer a boss who has excelled in their field.

这或许是因为专家和知识密集型组织的专业人士更愿意由在本领域取得过出类拔萃成绩的老板来领导自己的工作。


The leader’s credibility is vital: if she sets high standards, it seems only right that she should have matched or exceeded them herself.

领导者的信誉至关重要：如果她制定高标准，那么这个标准她自己应该达到或者超过。


In short, she must lead by example.

总之，她必须能够以身作则。


This sort of leadership arrangement creates a virtuous circle.

这种领导机制的循环是良性的。


A leader with prior experience knows how her subordinates feel, how to motivate them, and how to create the right working environment.

有过职业经历的领导了解下属的感受、懂得如何激励下属，以及如何创造良好的工作环境。


She probably makes better hiring decisions, too – after all, the best scientist or physician is more likely than a professional manager to know which researchers or doctors have the greatest potential.

她所做的聘用决定或许也更加合理 — — 最出色的科学家或医生比职业经理人更有可能了解哪些研究员或者医生的潜力最大。


The problem, however, is not simply that today’s leaders lack technical knowledge; it is that experts are often reluctant to lead.

但问题并不是今天的领导人缺乏技术知识那样简单；事实是专家往往不愿意承担领导工作。


But that can change.

但这种情况可以改变。


By communicating the importance of management and leadership early in a specialist’s career, and by offering tailored, digestible, and jargon-free training, we could bridge the gap.

如果在专家职业生涯的早期向其宣传管理和领导工作的重要性并提供专门定制、易于消化且没有专业术语的培训，我们可以弥补这条鸿沟。


Many medical schools are already considering including management education as part of the curriculum.

很多医学院已经在考虑把管理教育纳入课程之中。


The trick is to get experts, who are trained to go ever deeper into their specialization, to step back and view the big picture.

关键是让一向精于钻研专业领域的专家退后一步，建立大局观。


With the right preparation, there is no reason why a leader cannot specialize and manage.

只要正确引导，领导人可以在专业和管理领域同样精通。


The results could be remarkable.

结果可能会令人赞叹。


Think of how governments run by scientists with management skills might respond to climate change.

想想由具有管理技能的科学家组成的政府可能会怎样应对气候变化。


Top minds should be put to top use.

顶级人才本来就应当被委以重任。


A Mania for Diagnosing Bipolar Disorder

双相障碍诊断乱象


PROVIDENCE, RI – During the past few years, many experts have suggested that bipolar disorder – a serious illness resulting in significant psychosocial morbidity and excess mortality – is under-recognized, particularly in patients with major depression.

普洛韦登斯，罗得岛 – 在过去的几年里，许多专家都认为双相障碍（bipolar disorder ） - - 一种会造成重度社会心理病态和高死亡率的严重疾病—没有得到足够的重视，特别在患有严重抑郁症的病人中更是如此。


Even patients who are diagnosed with bipolar disorder often wait more than 10 years after initially seeking treatment for the correct diagnosis to be made.

即便是被诊断为双相障碍的病人，从最初的求诊到最后的确诊也往往会经历十多年的时间。


The clinical implications of the failure to recognize bipolar disorder in depressed patients include the under-prescription of mood-stabilizing medications, and an increased risk of rapid “cycling” – swings between manic and depressive phases.

对抑郁症患者双相障碍的认识不够在临床上的反映包括情绪稳定药物的使用不足和快速“循环 ” （ 即在狂躁与抑郁阶段之间摇摆）风险的增加。


But, perhaps as a consequence of concerted efforts to improve the recognition of bipolar disorder, during the past few years we have observed the emergence of an opposite phenomenon – over-diagnosis.

然而，同心协力提升对双相障碍的认识的努力很可能产生了反作用。 在过去几年里我们观察到了另一种极端的现象—过度诊断。


In my own practice, my colleagues and I have encountered patients who reported that they were previously diagnosed with bipolar disorder, despite lacking a history of manic or hypomanic episodes.

在我自己的从医经历中，我和同事们碰到过一些病人反映说他们虽然没有过狂躁或轻度狂躁的情况，但也曾被诊断为双相障碍。


To be sure, we have also seen patients seeking treatment for depression who really did have bipolar disorder.

当然，我们也的确看到有些因抑郁求诊的病人确实患有双相障碍。


However, there seemed to be more over-diagnosis than under-diagnosis.

然而，过度诊断的情况似乎比诊断不足的情况多。


We therefore conducted a study to examine empirically how often bipolar disorder might be over- and under-diagnosed.

于是我们便展开了一项研究，从经验的层面来考察双相障碍被过度诊断和诊断不足的程度。


Seven hundred psychiatric outpatients were interviewed with the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (SCID) and completed a self-administered questionnaire that asked whether they had been previously diagnosed by a health-care professional with bipolar or manic-depressive disorder.

我们用《美国精神障碍诊断与统计手册 》 （ 第4版）的结构化临床问卷 （即人格障碍诊断问卷SCID）对七百名精神病科的门诊病人进行了访问并让他们亲自填写了问卷，其内容是关于他们是否之前曾被医疗专业人员诊断为双相或狂躁—抑郁障碍。


Family history information was obtained from the patient regarding their immediate relatives.

我们还从病人处获得了关于其近亲的家庭病史的信息。


Slightly more than 20% (145 patients) in our sample reported that they had been previously diagnosed as having bipolar disorder, significantly higher than the 12.9% rate based on the SCID.

抽样病患中有20%多一点的人（145粒）报告之前曾被诊断为患有双相障碍，这比基于SCID的12.9%的诊断率要高得多。


Less than half of those who reported that they had been previously diagnosed with bipolar disorder were diagnosed with bipolar disorder based on the SCID.

报告之前曾被诊断为患有双相障碍的人之中根据SCID被确诊为双相障碍的不到一半。


Patients with SCID-diagnosed bipolar disorder had a significantly higher risk of bipolar disorder in their immediate family members than patients who self-reported a previous diagnosis of bipolar disorder that was not confirmed by the SCID.

通过此方法确诊的双相障碍患者与自己报告曾被诊断为双相障碍但却没有被SCID确诊的人相比较，前者的直系亲属罹患双相障碍的风险要比后者的直系亲属高出许多。


Patients who self-reported a previous diagnosis of bipolar disorder that was not confirmed by the SCID did not have a significantly higher risk for bipolar disorder than the patients who were negative for bipolar disorder by self-report and the SCID.

后者患双相障碍的风险也并不比自我报告和通过SCID诊断未患双相障碍的病人高多少。


Our findings, validated by family history, thus suggest that bipolar disorder was over-diagnosed.

我们的研究发现经过家族病史的确认，从而显示出双相障碍被过度诊断的情况。


Any study seeking to determine whether a psychiatric disorder is over-diagnosed will find that some patients with the condition do not have it upon re-interview.

任何试图判断某种精神障碍是否被过度诊断的研究都会发现某种病情在病人再次问诊时却没了踪影。


Such is the nature of the imperfect reliability of psychiatric diagnosis.

这就是精神病学诊断的可靠性具有缺陷的特点。


The question, then, is not whether some patients previously given a diagnosis do not seem to have it upon re-interview, but rather how many.

因此，真正的问题就不在于是否有的曾被确诊病人再次求诊时似乎全然无恙，而是这样的病人有多少。


How high the percentage should be before claiming over-diagnosis is a significant problem and a value judgment.

诊断的百分比应该达到多高才能说过度诊断是个严重的问题—这是个价值判断。


But we think that an over-diagnosis rate of more than 50% crosses the clinical significance threshold.

但我们认为高于50%的过度诊断率超过了临床意义的极限。


Over-diagnosis of bipolar disorder has costs.

双相障碍的过度诊断会造成不良后果。


Mood stabilizers are the treatment of choice, and, depending on the medication, they can produce potentially significant health complications affecting renal, endocrine, hepatic, immunologic, or metabolic function.

情绪稳定药物是一种治疗的选择。 根据药物的不同，它们可能造成严重的并发症，影响肾脏、内分泌、肝脏、免疫系统或代谢功能。


Thus, over-diagnosing bipolar disorder can unnecessarily expose patients to serious side-effects of medication.

因此，双相障碍的过度诊断可能让病人不必要地承受严重的药物副作用。


The impact of marketing efforts by pharmaceutical companies and publicity probably plays a role in the emerging tendency to over-diagnose bipolar disorder.

制药公司的营销和宣传的影响很可能也对双相障碍的过度诊断的趋势起到了推波助澜的作用。


Direct-to-consumer advertisements that refer individuals to screening questionnaires can result in patients suggesting to their doctors that they have bipolar disorder.

那些让个人使用筛查问卷的直接以消费者为对象的广告可能使病人在面对医生时暗示自己患了双相障碍。


We have seen evidence of this in our practice.

我们在自身的经历中也见到过这样的例子。


This does not necessarily reflect a problem with the performance of a screening questionnaire, but rather how these scales are used.

这并不一定反映了筛查问卷本身有效性的问题，而是反映了这些标准如何被使用的问题。


Screening questionnaires maximize sensitivity, at a cost of false positives, because it is presumed that they are followed by expert clinical evaluation.

筛查问卷以假阳性为代价使敏感度最大化，因为其假设前提是这些结果随后会被专家进行临床评估。


But insufficient diagnostic rigor can result in over-diagnosis.

但若诊断过程不够严格就可能造成过度诊断。


Clinicians are inclined to diagnose disorders that they feel more comfortable treating.

临床医生们倾向于诊断那些他们治疗起来比较拿手的（精神）障碍。


We believe that the increased availability of medications that have been approved for the treatment of bipolar disorder might be influencing clinicians who are unsure whether or not a patient has bipolar disorder or borderline personality disorder to err on the side of diagnosing the disorder that is responsive to medication.

我们相信被获准用于治疗双相障碍的药物越来越多可能会影响一部分临床医生。 他们不能判定一个病人是患了双相障碍还是边缘人格障碍就会错误地将病人诊断为对药物有反应的某种障碍。


This bias is reinforced by the marketing message of pharmaceutical companies to physicians, which has emphasized research on delayed diagnosis and under-recognition of bipolar disorder, possibly sensitizing clinicians accordingly.

这种倾向被制药公司发送给医师们的营销信息强化了。 这些信息强调对双相障碍诊断延误和认识不足的研究，就有可能使医师们变得敏感。


The campaign against under-recognition has probably resulted in some anxious, agitated, and/or irritable depressed patients who complain of insomnia and “racing thoughts” being misdiagnosed with bipolar disorder.

针对认识不足的行动很可能造成一些抑郁病人被误诊为双相障碍。 这些病人往往焦虑、不安和/或易怒，并抱怨有失眠和“思绪澎湃”的症状。


The results of our study are consistent with prior studies suggesting possible problems with the diagnosis of bipolar disorder.

我们的研究成果和此前针对双相障碍诊断中可能存在的问题的研究是一致的。


With the greater number of medications approved for the treatment of bipolar disorder, along with multiple reports cautioning clinicians against under-diagnosis, it appears that over-diagnosis has become a greater problem than under-diagnosis.

随着更多的药物被允许用于治疗双相障碍以及众多警告医生们防范诊断不足的报告的出台，似乎过度诊断已经成为了一个比诊断不足更大的问题。


Both can have negative consequences.

而两者都会造成不良的后果。


While there is still some uncertainty as to the best assessment approach, we recommend that clinicians use a standardized, validated method.

鉴于在最佳评估方法上还有一些不确定性，我们推荐医生们采用标准化的、经过验证的方法。


When Tweets Trump Diplomacy

当Tweet文压倒外交


NEW DELHI – Diplomacy often witnesses unusual spats.

新德里—外交经常预见不同寻常的争吵。


There was the Pig and Potato War of 1859, the Affair of the Dancing Lamas in 1924, and the Bogotá Bracelet incident of 1970, to name just a few.

1859年有猪和土豆战争（Pig and Potato War ） ， 1924年有跳舞的喇嘛事件（Affair of the Dancing Lamas ） ， 1970年有波哥大手镯（Bogotá Bracelet）事故，诸如此类。


But few were more surprising than the just-concluded Episode of the Offensive Doormats.

但很少有比刚刚结束的冒犯性门垫事件（Episode of the Offensive Doormats）更加令人震惊的。


The e-commerce giant Amazon – which has lately been cultivating India as the next frontier of its global expansion, reflected in plans to invest $5 billion in the country – was recently startled by a series of intemperate tweets from Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj.

电子商务巨头亚马逊公司 — — 它刚刚开始培育印度市场，将此作为其全球扩张的下一条阵线，计划在印度投资50亿美元 — — 最近被印度外交部长苏什马·斯瓦拉伊（Sushma Swaraj）的一系列有欠妥当的tweet吓了一跳。


In just a few 140-character messages, Swaraj denounced the company and threatened to cancel its employees’ visas and refuse visas to its executives in the future.

斯瓦拉伊谴责亚马逊公司，并威胁要吊销其员工的签证，拒绝日后为其高管签发签证。


What provoked Swaraj’s outburst was a Twitter user’s complaint to her that the Amazon Canada website offered for sale doormats depicting the Indian flag.

让斯瓦拉伊突然爆发的是一位Twitter用户像她投诉亚马逊加拿大网站贩卖印度国旗图案的门垫。


The notion that dirty shoes would be wiped on a representation of the Indian flag had outraged the tweeter, Atul Bhobe, who contacted – and found an advocate in – Swaraj.

印度国旗被肮脏的鞋子踩踏，这样的情景让这位名叫阿图尔·鲍比（Atul Bhobe）的Twitter用户怒不可遏，与撒瓦拉伊取得了联系，并得到后者的支持。


Amazon was swift to respond.

亚马逊很快就做出了反应。


After clarifying that the offending doormats were technically being offered by a third-party supplier, not Amazon itself, the company removed them from the Amazon Canada website and “implemented measures to ensure that these products could not be sold on any of our other marketplaces or websites.”

它先是澄清，技术上冒犯性门垫系由第三方供营商而提供而非亚马逊自营，随后将该款门垫从亚马逊加拿大网站上下架并“采取措施确保这类产品不会再我们其他任何市场或网站上销售。


Amazon’s India country manager offered an apology to Swaraj for “hurting Indian sensibilities” and, recalling the company’s $5 billion investment commitment, reiterated Amazon’s dedication to the country.

”亚马逊印度经理向撒瓦拉伊致歉，表示“伤害了印度人民的感情 ” ， 重申亚马逊公司将向印度投资50亿美元，非常重视印度市场。


Less than 24 hours after the doormat crisis erupted, the matter was defused.

门垫危机爆发不到24小时，事件便已经解决。


But the episode raises a number of broader issues that won’t disappear so quickly.

但此事所引起的诸多更广泛的问题不会这么快消退。


The first issue is Swaraj’s use of Twitter.

第一个问题是撒瓦拉伊对Twitter的使用。


Swaraj stands out among her peers in India for her trigger-happy approach to tweeting (though her use of the platform is still dwarfed by that of US President-elect Donald Trump, who often uses Twitter as a bully pulpit).

撒瓦拉伊以喜欢发tweet在同僚中独树一帜（尽管与美国当选总统唐纳德·特朗普比起来撒瓦拉伊仍只是小巫见大巫，特朗普简直把Twitter当传旨太监用 ） 。


I certainly do not oppose the use of Twitter by public officials.

我当然不反对公职官员使用Twitter。


On the contrary, I view the growing comfort of government ministers with social media as a matter for celebration.

相反，我认为越来越多的政府部长习惯于社交媒体可喜可贺。


It is a welcome change from my time as Minister of State for External Affairs, under the previous government, when official computers were barred from accessing social media, and the tweets I issued from my own devices would often become the stuff of needless controversy.

这是个值得欢迎的变化，我在前任政府中担任外交部长的时候，官员的电脑是屏蔽社交媒体的，我用私人设备所发的tweet文常常导致毫无必要的争议。


But Swaraj may well be going too far, responding to every individual case of a lost passport or delayed visa tweeted to her – an approach that has earned her the not-entirely-flattering sobriquet of “India’s Minister for Consular Affairs.”

但撒瓦拉伊或许有些过头了，连丢失护照或签证延期这样的私事tweet她也会回应 — — 这样的做法为她赢得了一个不太体面的外号 ： “ 印度总领事 ” 。


That a foreign minister would respond to a Twitter complaint on such trivial matters, some would argue, seems to indicate that she lacks more important things to do.

一些人认为，外交部长回应投诉琐事的tweet文表明她没有更重要的事情可做。


(The suggestion undoubtedly reflects the fact that, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, substantive foreign policy is conducted largely by him and his office, rather than by the External Affairs Ministry that Swaraj leads.)

（这一观点毫无疑问反映了一个事实：在总理莫迪领导下，实质性外交政策主要由他和他的幕僚完成，而不是由撒瓦拉伊领导的外交部负责。 ）


But the problem extends beyond Swaraj’s communication with ordinary citizens.

但问题不仅在于撒瓦拉伊与普通公民的交流。


In the recent doormat drama, she also used Twitter to issue instructions to her own diplomats, tweeting at the Indian High Commission in Canada to deal with the “unacceptable” matter, by taking it up with Amazon “at the highest level.”

在最近的门垫闹剧中，她还用Twitter向手下外交官发布指示，在加拿大印度高级专员公署（High Commission）发tweet文处理这个“不可接受”的问题，把它提高到亚马逊“最高层 ” 。


Such a move is unprecedented, and not particularly welcome.

这样的做法可谓前无古人，也不是很受欢迎。


Social media is no substitute for a diplomatic cable.

社交媒体不是外交专线的替代品。


Also less than diplomatic was the language Swaraj used in her warning to the company.

同样不够“外交”的还有撒瓦拉伊警告亚马逊公司的用词。


“Amazon must tender unconditional apology,” she tweeted.

“亚马逊必须无条件道歉 ” ， 她发tweet文说。


“They must withdraw all products insulting our national flag immediately.

“他们必须立刻下架有辱我国国旗的产品。


If this is not done forthwith, we will not grant Indian Visa to any Amazon official. We will also rescind the Visas issued earlier.”

如果不马上落实，我们将不会向任何亚马逊官员签发印度签证，并废除此前发出的签证。


A profession famed for summoning ambassadors for a discreet dressing-down has been reduced to upbraiding companies on Twitter.

”外交部长的责任应该是传召大使进行谨慎的斥责，现在却堕落到在Twitter上抨击公司。


The final issue that the doormat incident brought to the fore is Indians’ tendency to take offense at the slightest affront – a tendency that is now being elevated, by the thumbs of a top minister, to the level of official policy.

门垫事故所突出的最后一个问题是印度不容忍最轻微的冒犯的倾向 — — 如今这一倾向通过一位高级部长的手指头升级到官方政策高度。


Of course, disrespect for the national flag is derided in most countries, and has been a criminal offense in India since 1971, with the adoption of the Prevention of Insults to National Honor Act, which threatens whoever “mutilates, defaces, disfigures, destroys, tramples upon, or otherwise shows disrespect to” the Indian flag with imprisonment.

当然，不尊重国旗在大部分国家都是一件大事，印度更是自1971年引入防止冒犯国家荣誉法（Prevention of Insults to National Honor Act ） ， 将此列为犯罪行为，任何人如果“切割、涂销、玷污、损毁、踩踏或表现出不尊重”印度国旗，都可以判处徒刑。


But Indians have a particularly low threshold for what qualifies as disrespect.

但印度人对什么构成不尊重的门槛很低。


Whereas in other democracies, flags are used freely and harmlessly on t-shirts, boots, bikinis, and even underwear, in India, the majesty of the flag can, it seems, be tarnished by any tawdry manufacturer of gewgaws.

在其他民主国家，国旗可以自由地印在衬衫、鞋子、胸罩甚至内裤上而不受惩罚，但在印度，任何艳俗的小玩意儿都是对庄严的国旗的玷污。


And it’s not just the flag.

并且不仅仅是国旗。


Last year, Amazon enraged many Indians by offering doormats with pictures of Indian gods and goddesses, prompting the furious hashtag #BoycottAmazon.

去年，亚马逊因为出售印有印度诸神的门垫而激怒了许多印度人，催生了愤怒的热门标签#BoycottAmazon（抵制亚马逊 ） 。


Two years earlier, the company’s website had caused similar outrage by selling women’s leggings with images of Hindu gods.

两年前，亚马逊网站因为出售印有印度教神形象的女士紧身裤而引起类似的众怒。


So Amazon is no stranger to the anger of offended Indians.

因此，亚马逊对于遭到冒犯的印度人的愤怒早已见怪不怪。


But the company’s swift capitulation in the latest incident – which will surely not be the last – shows that the value of a gigantic market like India far outweighs that of any single product.

但该公司在最近的事件 — — 显然这不会是最后一次 — — 中迅速“认怂”表明大如印度的市场的重要性远远大于某种商品。


China has already proved that it can dictate terms to multinationals that covet its vast market.

中国已经证明，它可以指定条件要求觊觎其巨大市场的跨国公司就范。


India, it seems, will follow suit.

印度似乎要效而仿之。


But whoever has emerged as the winner of the doormat debacle – outraged Twitter users, perhaps – diplomacy has been the loser.

但不论谁是门垫灾难的赢家 — — 也许是暴怒的Twitter用户 — — 外交都是输家。


Ambivalent Arabia

矛盾的沙特阿拉伯


A democratic tide seems to be sweeping across the Arab world.

一股民主浪潮正在席卷阿拉伯世界。


Even the traditional Arab monarchies and Emirates are changing in its wake.

即使是那些传统的阿拉伯君主国和酋长国也正循着这股浪潮发生着某种改变。


Kuwait now allows women to vote, Qatar has embraced an ambitious reform program, Bahrain has shown great tolerance of mass demonstrations, and the U.A.E. is allowing something like a free press.

科威特现在已经允许妇女参加投票，卡塔尔接受了一项艰巨的改革计划，巴林对群众示威游行表现出了极大的容忍，阿拉伯联合酋长国正允许通过某种新闻自由制度。


But Saudi Arabia continues to be deeply wary of any sort of change, and thus remains a huge and seemingly immovable obstacle to region-wide reform.

但是沙特阿拉伯却依然对任何一种改变谨慎提防，也因此成为了阿拉伯地区改革进程中一块巨大无比、看起来岿然不动的绊脚石。


Although the Saudi ruling family, the al-Saud, is under enormous pressure to follow the example of its neighbors, internal resistance to doing so remains very strong.

尽管沙特的统治家族 — — 邵德（al-Saud）家族，承受了要求他们学习邻国榜样的巨大压力，但是内部的反对力量依然很强。


So the al-Saud have become Janus-faced: looking in one direction, the royal family encourages democratic reformers to speak out; looking in the opposite direction, it jails them when they do.

因此，邵德家族变成了双面派：一方面，皇室家族鼓励民主改革者大胆直言，另一方面，当民主改革者这么做的时候，皇室就把他们打入大牢。


On May 15, in a closed trial without legal representation for the accused, three leading reformers – Ali Al Dumaini, a well-known journalist and poet, and university professors Abdullah Al Hamid and Matruk al Falih – were condemned and sentenced to prison terms ranging from six to nine years.

5月15日，在一场被告人无法合法抗辩的秘密审判中，三名改革领导人 — — 著名记者兼诗人Ali Al Dumaini，大学教授Abdullah Al Hamid 和 Matruk al Falih — — 被判有罪，分别被判入狱六至九年。


Their crime was to call for a constitutional monarchy.

他们的罪行是提倡鼓动宪法君主体制。


The official verdict states that they threatened national unity, challenged those in authority, and incited public opinion against the state while using “foreign,” that is, Western, terminology.

官方判决称，他们使用“外国的 ” ， 也就是“西方的”的术语，威胁国家统一，挑战国家主权，煽动民众反对国家。


Not long after the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, these liberal reformers joined with 160 other professionals to write and sign a petition to Crown Prince Abdullah asking for reforms.

2001年9月美国遭受恐怖袭击后不久，这些自由改革者们和其他160名专家一起在一份递交给皇储阿卜杜拉（Abdullah ） 、 要求改革的请愿书上签字。


The petition called for the monarchy to work within constitutionally prescribed limits, and for an independent judiciary.

这份请愿书要求君主政体在宪法规定的限度内工作，并且呼吁建立一个独立的司法体系。


The reformers believe that such reforms are the only way for Saudi Arabia to survive the threat of violence, instability, and national fragmentation that is looming on its horizon.

改革者们相信这样的改革是唯一能使沙特阿拉伯在暴力威胁、不稳定性和国家分裂等这些已经初露端倪的危机中得以生存的办法。


Only a constitution, they argue, can restore much needed legitimacy to a political system that is widely perceived as deeply corrupt and inept.

他们认为，只有宪法才能够恢复一个被普遍认为腐败无能的政治体系所需的合法性。


Crown Prince Abdullah, Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler in place of his incapacitated half-brother King Fahd, is keen to be seen as a champion of reform.

代替其碌碌无能的同父异母的兄长国王法德（King Fahd ） 、 沙特阿拉伯实际意义上的真正统治者皇储阿卜杜拉，非常希望被看作一个改革的赢家。


He received these proposals with a warm welcome in January 2003.

2003年1月，他用一个热烈的欢迎仪式接受了这些提议。


But his half-brother and more powerful rival, Prince Naif, the Minister of Interior, ordered the arrests, trial, and imprisonment of 13 reformers in March 2004.

但是他同父异母的兄长以及更为强大的竞争对手 — — 内政大臣纳伊夫亲王（Prince Naif）在2004年3月下令逮捕、审判并拘禁了13名改革者。


Crown Prince Abdullah offered not a peep of opposition, leaving the reform agenda that he initiated in a political netherworld.

阿卜杜拉皇储没有提出一点儿反对意见，就把这场他发动的改革计划留在了政治地狱。


In order to maintain absolutist power and to minimize public anger, the Saudi princes, led by Prince Naif, asked the reformers to sign an agreement that they would never again ask for reform.

为了维持绝对权力并最大限度地降低公众的愤慨之情，沙特的亲王们在纳伊夫亲王的带领下，要求改革者们签署一项协议保证他们再也不会要求改革。


Prince Naif bans the very word “reform” from public discourse, because it suggests that there is something wrong with the system; his preferred term is “development.”

纳伊夫亲王在公共演讲中禁止使用“改革”一词，因为这个词暗示了体系中的问题；他更喜欢的词语是“发展 ” 。


Of the thirteen reformers who were arrested, ten submitted to this demand, but the other three refused and have paid the price.

在13名被逮捕的改革者中，有十个人向这个要求低头屈服了，但是剩余三人明确拒绝并为此付出代价。


They remained in jail in Riyadh without legal representation until the final verdict.

他们被关在Riyadh的监狱，在最后判决之前无法进行任何合法辩论。


Those who submitted had their passports withdrawn, lost their jobs, and were forbidden to speak to the press.

那些屈服的人被扣押了护照，失去了工作并被剥夺了对新闻媒体说话的权利。


Under regional and international pressure, the Saudi ruling family has constructed a Potemkin village of reform while retaining absolute control over all political developments.

在当地和国际压力下，沙特的统治家族建造了一个改革版的波特金村庄（Potemkin village ） ， 与此同时，将对所有政治发展的绝对控制权牢牢掌握在手中。


Earlier this year, they staged partial, and tightly regulated municipal elections, with no independent opinion permitted to influence when and how the ballots were held.

今年年初，他们在局部范围内举行了一场严格控制的地方选举，不允许任何独立观点就应当何时以及如何举行选举发表评论。


These entire female population was excluded, and only one-quarter of the male population was eligible to vote.

所有女性被排除在投票选举之外，并且只有四分之一的男性具有投票权。


Inevitably, Wahhabi Islamists did best.

毫无疑问，只有瓦哈比伊斯兰分子（Wahhabi Islamists）才会做得最好。


The al-Saud face two threats: one from violent Islamists, and the other from liberal reformers.

绍德家族现在面临两大威胁：一个来自崇尚暴力的伊斯兰分子，另一个来自自由改革者们。


There is every indication that they fear the reformers far more.

很明显，他们更惧怕改革者。


Perhaps the princes believe that it is easier to kill “terrorist” criminals than to crush demands for social justice.

也许亲王们认为，比起镇压要求社会正义的呼声，除去“恐怖主义”罪犯要容易得多。


Indeed, killing violent Islamists and al-Qaeda affiliates is applauded by the international community, especially the United States, as success in the “war on terrorism.”

事实上，消灭暴力的伊斯兰分子和基地组织分子会被当作反恐战争的胜利受到国际社会的嘉奖，尤其是美国。


But as they hunt down and kill violent domestic extremists, they are quietly tightening the noose around all those who want moderate reform.

但是当他们一路追寻并要除去国内的极端分子时，他们也悄悄地收紧了那些布在想要温和改革的人周围的套索。


This repression of liberal reformers passes unnoticed in the wider world, with America’s silence particularly noticeable.

这种对自由改革的镇压就这样伴随着美国尤为明显的沉默，在世界范围内悄无声息地通过了。


This silence is vital to the princes, for what the al-Saud care about most is US support.

这种沉默对亲王们至关重要，因为邵德家族最为在意的正是美国的支持。


As things stand in Saudi Arabia, the US administration has no credible ally for change outside of the existing regime.

在沙特阿拉伯当前的情形下，除了当前的政权，美国政府没有其他可信任的同盟。


So, unlike in Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgizstan, and Lebanon, it does nothing to encourage popular opposition.

因此，与乌克兰、格鲁吉亚、吉尔吉斯和黎巴嫩不同，美国支持强烈反对派毫无意义。


As long as the Saudi regime meets America’s oil needs and fights Islamist radicals, it will continue to receive US support and silence – and hence its tacit consent.

只要沙特���权能够满足美国的石油需求并对抗伊斯兰激进分子，它将会继续收到美国的支持和沉默 — — 以及它心照不宣的默许。


But turning a blind eye is shortsighted, for America and for the Saudis.

但是，对美国和沙特阿拉伯来说，视而不见并非长久之计。


Those who make peaceful revolutions impossible make violent revolutions inevitable.

那些抹杀和平革命可能性的人将会使暴力革命在所难免。


The liberal reformers who have been jailed could have paved the way for a peaceful transition to a reformed Saudi Arabia.

那些被囚禁的自由改革者们可能已经为通向一个改革一新的沙特阿拉伯的和平演变铺平了道路。


By jailing them, the regime has made it clear that violence is the only avenue open to those seeking change.

当局通过囚禁这些人已经明确表明，暴力是那些寻求改变者唯一可用的途径。


Algeria’s Dying Dictatorship

行将就木的阿尔及利亚独裁


ALGIERS – Despite his failing health, Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika won a fourth term last month, with 81% of the vote – or so the regime claimed.

阿尔及尔—尽管健康每况愈下，阿尔及利亚总统阿卜杜拉齐兹·波特弗利卡（Abdelaziz Bouteflika）仍在本月第四次当选总统，支持率高达81 % — —至少他的政府是这么宣布的。


In fact, far from signaling growing political stability, the 77-year-old incumbent’s sham victory underscores just how few options Algerians have to effect change from within the system.

事实上，这位77岁的现任总统的假胜利绝非政治日益稳定的信号，而是反映了阿尔及利亚人无法从体制内影响变局。


Under Bouteflika’s leadership, Algeria’s government has failed to address the country’s most pressing economic and social challenges.

在波特弗利卡的领导下，阿尔及利亚政府无法解决该国最紧迫的经济和社会挑战。


And there is no reason to expect this to change.

也看不到可以发生变化的信号。


Since suffering a stroke last year, Bouteflika has barely appeared in public, whether to campaign ahead of the vote or to acknowledge his victory after it.

自去年中风以来，波特弗利卡就很少出现在公众面前，甚至在再次当选后都没有现身宣布自己的胜利。


As a result, the regime is finding it increasingly difficult to claim, as it has for the last 15 years, that Bouteflika’s leadership represents civilian control over the military.

结果，他的政权越来越难以如过去15年那样宣布波特弗利卡的领导是文治而不是武治。


So it has devised a new strategy, aimed at creating a sense of transition: the constitution will be revised to designate a vice president as the president’s legitimate successor.

因此，政权采取了新战略，旨在营造转型的氛围：宪法将作出修订，增加一名副总统作为总统的合法继任者。


Of course, the move’s true purpose will be to allow the army to rally around the next compliant “civilian leader.”

当然，这一举措的真实目的是让军方团结在下一位顺从的“文官领导人”周围。


The regime will also propose a “national contract,” supposedly to initiate a dialogue with the opposition.

政权还将提出“国民契约 ” ， 假装开启与反对派的对话。


But, in the wake of Bouteflika’s bogus victory, the opposition can no longer accept a sham role in the regime’s reform plans.

但是，面对波特弗利卡的假胜利，反对派无法继续接受在政权的改革计划中扮演掩人耳目的角色。


In fact, the announcement that Bouteflika planned to run was enough to unite Islamists and leftists – even parties that had previously been co-opted by the regime – and spur them to stage a boycott of the vote.

事实上，宣布本特弗利卡计划逃跑已足以团结伊斯兰教徒和左派 — — 甚至此前被政权选中的政党 — — 促使他们抵制投票。


When the election results were announced, they swiftly rejected the new government as illegitimate.

在选举结果宣布后，他们马上拒绝承认新政府的合法性。


But, to gain credibility, the opposition parties will have to extend their criticism beyond Bouteflika to the system as a whole.

但是，要获得信誉，反对党必须将批评从本特弗利卡一人扩大到整个体制。


This has become crucial to their survival, as younger opponents are seeking new ways to bring about political change outside state-controlled politics.

这对于它们来说事关生死存亡，因为年轻一代反对派正在寻找新方式，在国家控制政治之外营造政治变革。


One important development is the growing influence of non-partisan voices of dissent.

一个重要的发展趋势是无党派持异见者影响力日增。


Non-violent movements have formed to protest not only Bouteflika’s continued leadership, but also the pervasive role of the army and intelligence services in civil society.

非暴力运动不但反对波特弗利卡的连选连任，也反对军方和情报机构在公民社会中的无孔不入。


Such movements, like the much-publicized “Barakat” (“Enough”), have encouraged a shift among Algerians from resentful abstention to active boycott.

这些运动，如相当公开化的“足够 ” （ Barakat）运动，鼓励阿尔及利亚人从愤怒而消极的弃权转为积极的抵制。


Underground unions – which mount demonstrations and strikes to protect workers’ rights, while refusing to cooperate with the regime’s official unions – have also criticized the election.

地下工会 — — 它们组织了保护工人权利的示威和罢工，并拒绝与政权的官方工会合作 — — 也批评选举。


Moreover, young people have assumed a prominent role in opposition efforts, such as by disrupting Bouteflika’s campaign rallies.

此外，年轻人在反对运动 — — 包括干扰波特弗利卡的竞选阵营 — — 中起到了主导作用。


Demonstrations by unemployed young people in southern Algeria, the center of the oil industry, drew a direct link between high unemployment and the military’s control of the country’s natural resources.

失业年轻人在阿尔及利亚南部的石油业中心举行示威，认为高失业与军方控制阿尔及利亚自然资源之间存在直接联系。


By organizing peaceful protests to demand accountability for public spending, these movements are raising issues that were not addressed during the election campaign.

这些运动通过组织和平示威要求问责公共支出，引出了竞选期间未能解决的问题。


More immediately, they are also challenging the government’s ban on street demonstrations – a vestige of the state of emergency that lasted from 1992 until 2011.

此后他们还挑战了政府的街头游行禁令 — — 从1992年一直持续到2011年的紧急状态后遗症。


With the civil war of the 1990’s long over, security officials cannot explain why Algerians are being arrested for demanding jobs.

1990年内战已经过去很久，安全官员已无法解释为何要逮捕要求获得工作的阿尔及利亚人。


Of course, repression continues to intimidate many Algerians.

当然，镇压将继续威胁许多阿尔及利亚人。


But it is becoming increasingly easy to rouse their sympathy for their fellow citizens through Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook.

但通过Twitter、YouTube和Facebook激发他们对同胞人民的同情心已变得越来越容易。


By stimulating daily public debate about local human-rights violations, they spread the message of discontent more efficiently than traditional parties ever have.

他们通过激发对本地侵犯人权行为的日常争论，更有效地传播不满情绪，这是此前的传统政党无法做到的。


By demanding better state services, rather than an “Arab Spring,” Algerians have walked a fine line, highlighting the regime’s inability to deliver security and economic prosperity, despite its efforts to stifle all debate.

阿尔及利亚人要求的是更好的国家服务，而非“阿拉伯之春 ” ， 这一做法十分巧妙，凸显出政权在无力带给人民安全和经济繁荣，尽管它在竭力扼杀争论。


Thus, even without explicitly talking about politics, ordinary Algerians are mobilizing in growing numbers against the government.

因此，即使不明确谈论政治，仍有越来越多的普通阿尔及利亚人被动员起来反对政府。


The majority of street protests have occurred in the most deprived and neglected areas, and the primary demands have been economic: better jobs, housing, health-care services, and infrastructure.

街头游行主要发生在权利受侵害最严重、最受忽视的地区，基本需求也都是经济方面的需求：更好的工作、住房、医疗服务和基础设施。


For some, the right to make a living through the informal market would be sufficient.

对一些人来说，获得在非正式市场中讨生活的权利便已足够。


And demonstrators have gone to great – sometimes destructive – lengths to be heard, blocking roads, occupying factories and government buildings, and sabotaging water and electricity infrastructure.

示威者的队伍十分庞大 — — 有时具有破坏性 — — 发出振聋发聩的声音，设置路障，占领工厂和政府大楼，捣毁供水和电力基础涉水。


More than 150 Algerians have even set themselves on fire since 2011, usually in front of public services buildings.

自2011年以来，150多名阿尔及利亚人甚至不惜自焚 — — 地点多在政府大楼前。


In this context, the failure of the government’s half-baked attempts to buy off protesters is unsurprising.

在这样��背景下，政府做出试图收买反对者的肤浅手段不足为奇。


In 2011, the government, fearing contagion from Tunisia and Egypt, where long-established dictatorships had just been toppled, responded to the spread of protests by public-sector workers by raising their salaries by 100% – retroactively to 2008.

2011年，政府担心突尼斯和埃及的状况 — — 长期独裁统治被推翻蔓延到阿尔及利亚，对公共部门员工示威蔓延的反应是提高100%的薪水，这在2008年算得上逆潮流而动。


But the plan backfired; protests intensified, with other workers demonstrating for similar benefits and railing against the inflation that the move engendered.

但这一计划适得其反，示威更加严重了，其他部门的工人也要求获得同样的好处，并抗议政府的这一行为所导致的通货膨胀。


To be sure, street protests have already had a profound impact on Algeria’s authoritarian politics, with official fears of massive uprisings affecting public budgets and political appointments.

平心而论，街头抗议已经对阿尔及利亚集权政治造成了深远影响，官员担心大规模动乱影响公共预算和政治任命。


But the decision to prolong Bouteflika’s presidency will not provide the kind of strong, transformational leadership that Algeria needs to materialize the regime’s stability promises.

但延长波特弗利卡总统任期的决定并不能给阿尔及利亚带来实现政权的稳定承诺所需要的强大的转型性领导。