No one should rush to judgment yet, but Thein Sein’s decisions, at least so far, are beginning to resemble those of South Africa’s de Klerk when he initiated his country’s reform process.

现在就下判断为时过早，但至少从目前来看，登盛的决定正走在德克拉克激活南非改革进程的道路上。


Fortunately, Burma already has in Aung San Suu Kyi its very own Nelson Mandela.

幸运的是，缅甸已经找到了自己的曼德拉 — — 昂山素季。


A Devaluation Option for Southern Europe

解决南欧问题的方案 — — 货币贬值


CAMBRIDGE – This year is likely to mark a make-or-break ordeal for the euro.

剑桥 — — 对于欧洲而言，今年很可能是欧元生死存亡的考验。


The eurozone’s survival demands a credible solution to its long-running sovereign-debt crisis, which in turn requires addressing the two macroeconomic imbalances – external and fiscal – which are at the heart of that crisis.

欧元区若要继续存在，则需要提出一项可靠的方案，解决其长期存在的主权债务危机问题，而这反过来又需要解决外部失衡和财政失衡两大问题，这两种宏观经济失衡问题正是这一危机的核心。


The crisis has exposed the deep disparities in competitiveness that have developed within the eurozone.

此次危机暴露出欧元区内部成员国在经济竞争力方面存在很大的差距。


From 1996 to 2010, unit labor costs in Germany increased by just 8%, and by 13% in France. Compare that to 24% in Portugal, 35% in Spain, 37% in Italy, and a whopping 59% in Greece.

从1996年到2010年，德国单位劳动力成本仅上升8 ％ ， 法国上升13 ％ ， 而葡萄牙上升24 % ， 西班牙上升35 ％ ， 意大利上升37 ％ ， 希腊上升则高达59 ％ 。


The result has been large trade imbalances between eurozone countries, a problem compounded by large fiscal deficits and high levels of public debt in southern Europe (and France) – much of it owed to foreign creditors.

这一问题导致欧元区内部国家贸易极度不平衡，而南欧和法国庞大财政赤字和公共债务庞大，使这一问题更为复杂，原因很大部分要归咎于外国债权人。


Does addressing these imbalances require breaking up the eurozone?

难道必须要欧元区解体才能解决这些贸易不平衡问题吗？


Suppose, for example, that Portugal were to leave and re-introduce the escudo. The ensuing exchange-rate devaluation would immediately lower the price of Portugal’s exports, raise its import prices, stimulate the economy, and bring about much-needed growth.

假如葡萄牙退出欧元区，重新引入埃斯库多（葡萄牙货币单位 ） ， 那么随后而来的汇率贬值会使葡萄牙出口产品价格下跌，进口产品价格上涨，刺激葡萄牙经济发展，带来其急需的经济增长。


But a euro exit would be a messy affair. The resulting turmoil could very well trump any short-term gains in competitiveness from devaluation.

但是，脱离欧元将是一件很棘手的事，因为它所带来的金融风暴将胜过任何通过货币贬值来增强竞争力中获得的短期收益。


There is a remarkably simple alternative that does not require southern Europe’s troubled economies to abandon the euro and devalue their exchange rates.

有这样一种非常简单的解决方案，南欧经济困难国家不必放弃欧元，也不必贬低本国货币汇率。


It involves increasing the value-added tax while cutting payroll taxes.

这一方案包括提高增值税，同时削减工资税。


Our recent research demonstrates that such a “fiscal devaluation” has very similar effects on the economy in terms of its impact on GDP, consumption, employment, and inflation.

我们最近进行的研究表明，这样的“财政货币贬值 ” ， 无论在国内生产总值，消费还是就业和通胀方面，对经济产生的影响与贬低本国货币汇率产生的影响相当。


A currency devaluation works by making imports more costly and exports cheaper. A VAT/payroll-tax swap would do exactly the same thing.

货币贬值能行得通，因为这样会使进口产品更加昂贵，出口产品更加便宜，而提高增值税，削减工资税也能发挥这样的作用。


An increase in VAT raises the price of imported goods, as foreign firms face a higher tax.

提高增值税会提高进口货物的价格，外国企业面临更高的关税。


To ensure that domestic firms do not have an incentive to raise prices, an increase in VAT needs to be accompanied by a cut in payroll taxes.

为确保国内企业不会提高价格，在增加增值税的同时，必须削减工资税。


Moreover, since exports are exempt from VAT, the price of domestic exports will fall.

此外，由于出口产品免征增值税，国内出口产品价格也将下降。


The desired competitiveness effects of exchange-rate devaluation can thus be had while staying in the euro.

这样以来，即使不脱离欧元区，不进行汇率贬值，也能增强经济竞争力，收到同样的预期效果。


This policy can also help on the fiscal front.

这项政策在财政方面也会有所帮助。


As is true of an exchange-rate devaluation, the positive impact on growth of an increase in competitiveness can strengthen the fiscal position by raising tax revenues.

汇率贬值确实能够增强竞争力。 增强竞争力对经济增长产生积极影响，通过提高税收，可以改善财政状况。


Moreover, an important advantage of fiscal devaluations is that they generate additional revenues in proportion to the country’s trade deficit.

此外，财政货币贬值的一项重要优势体现在，其产生的额外收入与国家的贸易赤字比例相当。


For countries that are suffering from weak competitiveness and, as a consequence, running trade deficits, this typically means more revenues, especially in the short run.

对于正遭受因竞争力不强而因此产生贸易赤字的国家而言，此举通常意味着能获得更多的收入，在短期内尤为如此。


Like exchange-rate devaluations, fiscal devaluations create winners and losers.

财政货币贬值和汇率贬值一样，在这一过程中既会有赢家也会有输家。


Both act as a wealth levy: inflation means that bondholders suffer a real loss in proportion to their wealth and the size of the devaluation.

两者都起着财富杠杆的作用：通胀意味着债券持有人会遭受实际损失，这一损失与他们的财富多少及贬值的幅度相称。


If taxes on capital are not adjusted, holders of domestic stocks suffer a comparable loss.

如果不调整资本税，国内股票持有人也会蒙受类似的损失。


By contrast, many transfers, such as unemployment benefits, health benefits, and public pensions, are indexed to inflation, and thus maintain their real value.

相比而言，许多资金转移，如失业福利，卫生福利，公共养老金等，都与通货膨胀挂钩，从而维持了其实际价值。


The same is true of minimum wages.

最低工资也是如此。


These distributive effects play an important role in the politics of exchange-rate devaluations, and most of these effects appear in fiscal devaluations as well.

这些资金分配产生的影响在汇率贬值方面发挥了重要的政治作用，这些影响大部分也在财政货币贬值中得到体现。


Fiscal devaluations already have some advocates.

财政货币贬值的做法已经得到了一些人士的拥护。


Indeed, French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s government just announced one.

事实上，法国总统尼古拉·萨尔科齐政府就刚刚宣布了一项财政货币贬值计划。


And concerns that a fiscal devaluation will conflict with euro rules can be met by simply pointing out that Germany’s government carried one out in 2007, though by another name, when it raised VAT from 16% to 19% and cut employers’ contribution to social insurance, from 6.5% to 4.2%.

若有些人担心财政货币贬值将会与欧元规则相互冲突，则可以援引德国举例即可。 德国政府2007年实施了一项类似的计划（没有公开说明 ） ， 将增值税从16％提高到19 ％ ， 将雇主对社会保险的贡献率从6.5％削减至4.2 ％ 。


In short, there are simple fiscal alternatives to exchange-rate devaluation that can address southern Europe’s short-term competitiveness problems.

总之，除了推行汇率贬值以外，还存在其他解决南欧短期竞争力问题的简单财政方案。


To be sure, feasible fiscal devaluations would be limited in size.

可以肯定的是，可行的财政货币贬值方案必须将规模控制在一定限度内。


But, together with debt restructuring, accommodative monetary policy, liquidity support from the European Central Bank, and much-required structural reforms, they can help to put these troubled economies on a sound footing without a euro breakup or a major austerity-induced recession.

但是，伴随着债务重组，宽松的货币政策，欧洲央行的资金流动性支持及非常必要的结构性改革，这些可行的财政货币贬值方案，可以在欧元区不解体，并且不会导致紧缩引起的严重经济衰退的前提下，帮助那些经济困难的国家踏上正轨。


A Dissident in China

一位中国的异议人士


TOKYO – 2009 was a good year for China. The Chinese economy still roared ahead in the midst of a worldwide recession.

东京 — — 对于中国而言， 2009 年可是一个好年头。


American President Barack Obama visited China, more in the spirit of a supplicant to an imperial court than the leader of the world’s greatest superpower. Even the Copenhagen summit on climate change ended just the way China wanted: failure in its attempt to commit China, or any other industrial nation, to making significant cuts in carbon emissions, with the United States getting the blame.

在全球一片衰退的景象之中，中国经济却独领风骚、大步前进；美国总统贝拉克·奥巴马在他的中国之行中，表现的更像是一位置身帝国宫廷内的有求之人，而非一名全球最强超级大国的元首；甚至连关于气候变化问题的哥本哈根峰会，都以令中国称心如意的方式落幕：它未能令中国或其他任何一个工业国承担起重大的减排义务，而此罪责却由美国承担。


The Chinese government, under the Communist Party, has every reason to feel confident.

共产党领导下的中国政府有充分的理由感到自信。


So why did a gentle former literature professor named Liu Xiaobo have to be sentenced to 11 years in prison, just because he publicly advocated freedom of expression and an end to one-party rule?

这样，为何一位儒雅的原文学教授（刘晓波）却仅仅因为公开倡导言论自由及一党统治的终结，而要被判处十一年徒刑呢？


Liu was co-author in 2008 of a petition, Charter 08, signed by thousands of Chinese, calling for basic rights to be respected.

刘晓波是 2008 年的请愿文件 — — 《 08 宪章》的共同作者，这份呼吁尊重基本权利的文件，业已征得数千中国人的签名。


Liu is not a violent rebel. His opinions, in articles published on the Internet, are entirely peaceful.

刘晓波并非是一名暴力叛乱分子，他在发表于互联网的文章中所表达的观点，完全不带戾气。


Yet he was jailed for “inciting subversion of state power.”

即便如此，他还是因“煽动颠覆国家政权罪”而被判入狱。


The notion that Liu might be capable of subverting the immense power of the Communist Party of China is patently absurd.

认为刘晓波或有能力颠覆中共巨大权力的观点，显然是一派胡言。


And yet the authorities clearly believe that they had to make an example of him, to prevent others from expressing similar views.

然而当局却明显相信：自己必须杀一儆百，以防他人发表类似观点。


Why does a regime that appears to be so secure consider mere opinions, or even peaceful petitions, so dangerous?

为何对于一个看似稳固的政权来说，那些纯粹的观点、或者甚至是和平的请愿活动，却被认为是如此危险呢？


Perhaps because the regime does not feel as secure as it looks.

这或许是因为该政权并不像它看上去那般坦然无惧。


Without legitimacy, no government can rule with any sense of confidence. There are many ways to legitimize political arrangements.

若失去了合法性，任何政府都无法自信地施行统治。


Hereditary monarchy, often backed by divine authority, has worked in the past. And some modern autocrats, such as Robert Mugabe, have been bolstered by their credentials as national freedom fighters.

为政治制度赋予合法性的方式多种多样：自由民主制只是近来的一种创新而已；通常由君权神授为依托的世袭君主制，曾在历史上大行其道；而某些现代的独裁者（如罗伯特·穆加贝 ） ， 则是以民族解放斗士这一资历作为其统治的依据。


China has changed a great deal in the last century, but it has remained the same in one respect: it is still ruled by a religious concept of politics.

中国在过去的一个世纪内发生了巨大的变化，但在某一个方面，它却依然如故：宗教式的政治观念仍在统御着这个国家。


Legitimacy is not based on the give and take, the necessary compromises, and the wheeling and dealing that form the basis of an economic concept of politics such as that which underpins liberal democracy.

这种观念的合法性并非基于互谅互让、讨价还价以及做出必要的妥协；而这些行为构成了经济式政治观念的基础，其中，自由民主制度的支柱便是一例。


Instead, the foundation of religious politics is a shared belief, imposed from above, in ideological orthodoxy.

相反，宗教式政治的基石是一种以意识形态正统性为体现的、由上而下强加于民的共有信念。


In imperial China, this meant Confucian orthodoxy.

在帝制中国，这便意味着儒家的正统观念。


The ideal of the Confucian state is “harmony.”

儒家邦国的理想状态即为“和谐 ” 。


If all people conform to a particular set of beliefs, including moral codes of behavior, conflicts will disappear.

如果所有人都能遵从一套包括行为道德准则在内的特定信念的话，冲突就将消失。


The ruled, in this ideal system, will naturally obey their rulers, just as sons obey their fathers.

在这种理想体系之中，被统治者正如子女遵从父亲一般、自然而然地听命于统治者。


After the various revolutions in the early decades of the twentieth century, Confucianism was replaced by a Chinese version of Communism.

在二十世纪前期数十年的种种革命之后，儒家思想被中国式的共产主义所取代。


Marxism appealed to Chinese intellectuals, because it was bookish, introduced a modern moral orthodoxy, and was based, like Confucianism, on a promise of perfect harmony. Ultimately, in the Communist utopia, conflicts of interests would melt away.

对于中国的知识分子而言，马克思主义颇具吸引力，这一方面是因为它带着书卷的气息，引入了一套现代道德正统观念；另一方面则是因为马克思主义与儒家学说一样，都建立在一种关于完美和谐的诺言基础之上：在共产主义乌托邦内，最终将再无利益的冲突。


Chairman Mao’s rule combined elements of the Chinese imperial system with Communist totalitarianism.

毛泽东主席的统治，便是对中国帝制体系与共产主义极权制度诸元素的结合。


This orthodoxy, however, was also destined to fade away.

然而，这种正统思想注定也将消亡。


Few Chinese, even in the top ranks of the Communist Party, are convinced Marxists anymore.

很少有中国人仍旧是马克思主义的忠实信徒，甚至在共产党高层内部，情况也是如此。


This left an ideological vacuum, swiftly filled in the 1980’s by greed, cynicism, and corruption.

这种状况留下了一个意识形态真空，它在上世纪八十年代被贪婪、腐化以及玩世不恭所快速占据。


Out of this crisis came the demonstrations all over China, collectively known as “Tiananmen.”

这场危机催生了遍及中国全境的示威活动，它们被笼而统之地冠以“天安门事件”之名。


Liu Xiaobo was an active spokesman in 1989 for the student protests against official corruption and in favor of greater freedom.

刘晓波在 1989 年，便身为学生针对官员腐化、并要求获得更大自由的抗议活动之积极代言人。


Soon after the bloody crackdown on Tiananmen, a new orthodoxy replaced Chinese Marxism: Chinese nationalism.

在天安门的血腥镇压行动后不久，一种新的正统思想取代了中国式马克思主义的地位，这便是中国的民族主义。


Only one-party rule would guarantee the continuing rise of China and put an end to centuries of national humiliation.

只有一党统治，方可确保中国能继续崛起，并为数百年的民族屈辱史画上句号；共产党代表着中国的大国宿命。


The Communist Party represented China’s destiny as a great power. To doubt this was not just mistaken, but unpatriotic, even “anti-Chinese.”

对���观点心存疑虑已不单是一种错误，还是一种不爱国、甚至“反华”的表现。


From this perspective, Liu Xiaobo’s critical views were indeed subversive.

以此看来，刘晓波的批判观点的确是颠覆性的。


They cast doubt on the official orthodoxy, and thus on the legitimacy of the state.

这些观点为官方正统思想打上了问号，也由此对国家政权的合法性提出了质疑。


To wonder, as many have, why the Chinese regime refused to negotiate with the students in 1989 – or to find some accommodation with its critics today – is to misunderstand the nature of religious politics.

许多人对于中国政府为何拒绝在 1989 年与学生进行谈判、或对如今的批判者做出一些迁就而感到惊讶，这恰恰是误解了宗教式政治的本质。


Negotiation, compromise, and accommodation are the marks of economic politics, where every deal has its price. By contrast, those who rule according to a shared belief cannot afford to negotiate, for that would undermine the belief itself.

谈判、妥协与迁就皆为经济式政治的特征， 这种政治模式可以就事论事； 与之形成鲜明对比的是，那些根据共有信念施行统治的人，是无力承担谈判之代价的，因为谈判行为将会对信念本身造成伤害。


This is not to say that the economic concept of politics is utterly strange to the Chinese – or, for that matter, that the religious notion of politics is unknown in the democratic West.

这并非意味着经济式政治观念对于中国人来说，是一种完全陌生的模式；就此而言，这也不是指奉行民主制度的西方就不知宗教式政治观念为何物。


But the insistence on orthodoxy is still sufficiently strong in China to remain the default defense against political critics.

然而在中国，人们对于正统观念的坚持，依旧强大到使其足可继续作为对政治批评者的默认防范方式之地步。


These things can change.

这些情况可以发生转变。


Other Confucian societies, such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, now have thriving liberal democracies, and there is no reason to believe that such a transition is impossible in China.

诸如韩国、台湾以及日本等其他的儒家社会，如今都已拥有繁荣的自由民主制度，人们没有理由相信：中国不可能经历这种转型。


But external pressure is unlikely to bring it about.

但外部压力不太可能带来这种变革。


Many non-Chinese, including me, have signed a letter of protest against the jailing of Liu Xiaobo.

包括我在内的许多外国人士，都已在针对刘晓波被判入狱一事的抗议信上签字。


One hopes that this will lend comfort to him, and give a moral boost to Chinese who share his views. But it is unlikely to impress those who believe in the current orthodoxy of Chinese nationalism.

人们只是希望此举能聊表慰藉，并给予那些与刘晓波志同道合的中国人以道义上的鼓舞；但对于那些笃信当前中国民族主义正统思想的人士而言，此举不太可能令其受到震动。


Until China is released from the grip of religious politics, Liu’s ideals are unlikely to take root.

在中国从宗教式政治的控制下获得解放之前，刘晓波的理念不太可能生根。


This does not bode well for China, or, indeed, for the rest of the world.

对于中国（实际上也对世界其他国家）而言，这可不是个好兆头。


A Drug War on Auto-Pilot

不由分说的禁毒战争


THE HAGUE – The war in Afghanistan, now approaching its tenth year, may seem to many to have no end in sight, but Latin America has endured an even longer fight, one that has recently become much more bloody: the “war” against drug trafficking.

海牙 — — 阿富汗战争迄今为止已经打了十年，在很多人看来或许仍没有结束的迹象，但拉丁美洲却忍受了更为漫长的战争，而且近来血腥程度甚至愈演愈烈： 这就是打击贩毒的“战争 ” 。


So rote – and so violent – has that war become that many people in Latin America now wonder which side is suffering the more pathological addiction.

这场战争已经变得如此生硬 — — 如此暴力 — — 以致于拉美很多人现在感到惊讶，弄不清病理性成瘾更为严重的究竟是哪一方。


The new strategy that US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has been promoting to staunch the upward trend of narco-trafficking-related murders – which leaked Mexican government reports put at more than 22,000 since late 2006 – is to build “stronger, more resilient communities.”

建设“更强大，适应力更强的社会”是美国国务卿希拉里·克林顿宣传能够阻止与毒品贩运有关谋杀上升趋势的新战略 — — 泄露出来的墨西哥政府报告统计2006年以来与贩毒有关的谋杀已经超过 22,000起。


Ciudad Juárez, a sprawling Mexican border town that is now the homicide capital of the world, would have to be high on the list.

不断扩张的墨西哥边境小镇华雷斯市现在已经成为全世界的杀人之都，肯定应该高居名单的榜首位置。


Four bridges and innumerable tunnels and drainage canals connect Ciudad Juárez and El Paso, Texas.

华雷斯市和得克萨斯州的艾尔帕索县通过四座桥梁和难以数计的隧道和排水沟连接在一起。


Rival cartels sparring for control of a plaza, the name given to any trafficking route, butcher each other and the security forces.

具有竞争关系的卡特尔拼命为争夺广场的控制权互相残杀并屠杀安全部队，广场是人们对任何贩毒路线的称谓。


There is apparently no shortage of young, unemployed men willing to join the carnage.

显然愿意加入这场屠杀的无业年轻男性大有人在。


Addressing the deep-seated social and economic problems of a city like Juárez, however, is a lot harder than flooding its streets with 8,000 soldiers carrying assault rifles.

不过解决像华雷斯这样一座城市根深蒂固的社会和经济问题比派8，000名手持突击步枪的士兵占据这座小城的街道要困难得多。


Mexican President Felipe Calderón has, in this respect, remained faithful to the script written in previous theaters in the drug war, whether in Bolivia, Colombia, or Peru, where governments have used military force and extradition to placate the US and punish those with the least voice and influence.

在这方面，墨西哥总统费利佩·卡尔德龙继续忠实于玻利维亚、哥伦比亚或秘鲁等国禁毒战争此前写好的电影脚本，这些国家政府依靠武力和引渡来平息美国的怒气，惩罚那些最没有发言权和影响力的穷人。


But the language used by the Obama administration to describe the violence and state corruption that snakes from the Andes to the US border is starting to capture new thinking on narcotics.

但奥巴马政府形容从安第斯山脉流向美国边境的暴力和国家腐败时所用的语言正开始抓住毒品问题的全新思维。


Three former Latin American presidents, Mexico’s second richest man, Ricardo Salinas, and the Supreme Court of Argentina, among others, have criticized the war on drugs as a manifest failure that has lowered street prices, fueled production, and undermined weak states.

值得一提的是三位前拉美总统，墨西哥排名第二的富翁里卡多·萨利纳斯以及阿根廷最高法院已经批评禁毒战争是一场显而易见的失败，它拉低了房地产价格、推升毒品产量，并对弱国造成了破坏。


More strikingly, both Bolivia and Ecuador are governed by presidents who suffered directly from the collateral insensitivities of the war on drugs.

更令人惊奇的是，玻利维亚和厄瓜多尔两国总统都是禁毒战争所忽略问题的直接受害者。


Bolivia’s Evo Morales rose to prominence as leader of the country’s coca growers during a brutal campaign to wipe out their crops, the so-called Dignity Plan.

玻利维亚总统埃沃·莫拉莱斯在一场消灭古柯作物的残酷运动中崛起为这个国家古柯种植者的领袖，这场运动就是所谓的尊严计划。


Ecuadoran President Rafael Correa’s father was jailed for smuggling drugs to the US when the future leader was five years old.

而厄瓜多尔总统拉斐尔·科雷亚的父亲在这位未来的领袖只有五岁时因走私毒品而被捕入狱。


These leaders’ profound ambivalence toward the goal of a world free of illegal drugs is shared by the European Union, where restrictions on narcotics consumption have slackened over the past decade.

与这些领袖一样对无非法毒品世界目标抱有矛盾心理的还有欧盟，它过去几十年来已经放松了对毒品消费的限制。


The past three US presidents, furthermore, have all admitted to consuming – to one extent or another – illegal psychoactive substances, while seven million Americans, according to the United Nations, are regular cocaine users.

此外，之前的三任美国总统都已经承认或多或少吸食过非法的精神刺激药物，而据联合国统计，有七百万美国人都是常规的可卡因使用者。


But the inertia of a bureaucratic drug-enforcement superstructure (worth approximately $40 billion each in the US and the EU), sustained by a deep-seated fear of the “threat” posed by drugs and cartels, appears to push policy repeatedly towards the familiar option of repressive auto-pilot.

但禁毒执法上层建筑的惯性（在美国和欧盟价值均达到400亿美元）在对毒品和卡特尔所造成“威胁”根深蒂固的恐惧的推动下，似乎一而再、再而三地将政策推向不由分说镇压的一成不变的选择。


For example, US support for Mexico’s campaign against the cartels looks set in stone, with Congress apparently ready to provide $300 million for another year of military and security upgrading.

比如，美国对墨西哥打击卡特尔运动的支持似乎牢不可破，国会显然已经做好准备为又一年的军事和安全设施升级提供3亿美元的经费。


In Colombia, seven new joint military installations are planned, and support for US private contractors who have cornered the market in crop fumigation presumably will not be interrupted.

人们计划在哥伦比亚建设七座联合军事设施，并且对垄断作物熏蒸市场的美国私人承包商的支持很可能也不会动摇。


Nevertheless, as the flaws in the four-decade-old edifice of counter-narcotics become more visible, it is increasingly difficult to regard the risks of drug use as being greater than the damage done by repression.

尽管如此，随着历经四十年的禁毒大厦缺点逐渐暴露，认定使用毒品的风险大于镇压所造成的破坏已经越来越难。


Prohibition hikes the mark-up on prices – an astounding 15,000% in the case of cocaine traveling to Europe from Andean processing facilities.

禁毒措施促成了毒品价格上涨，从安第斯加工厂运到欧洲的可卡因令人震惊的上涨15,000 % 。


While the war on drugs focuses on bringing down cartels and their kingpins, it perversely aids the health of their markets, which nestle within legitimate trade flows and respond to price incentives.

在禁毒战争关注摧毁卡特尔及其主要人物的同时，却顽强地促进了在合法贸易流动的夹缝中生存并对价格激励作出反应的毒品市场的健康。


Interviewed by the Mexican magazine Proceso this year, the second-in-command of the giant Sinaloa cartel, Ismael Zambada, made the point clearly: “The narco problem involves millions of people.

在年内接受墨西哥杂志《Proceso》采访时，规模庞大的锡那罗亚卡特尔的二号人物伊斯梅尔•尚巴达明确指出 ： “ 毒品问题涉及成百上千万人口。


How do you control it?

这样的问题怎么控制？


The capos can be jailed, killed, or extradited, but their replacements are already wandering around.”

领头的人可以被监禁、杀死或者引渡，但顶替者已经在周围徘徊等候。 ”


The emergence of Latin America’s powerful drug mafias cannot be traced to the radical evil of certain individuals.

拉美强大贩毒集团的出现究其原因并非是由于某些个人的极端邪恶。


These people emerged under conditions created in deeply inequitable societies by a misapplied, inconsistent, and bureaucratic war.

这些人是在一场由滥用权力、反复无常和充满官僚气息战争造成的严重不公的社会条件下自然产生的。


Indeed, the furies of the Zetas in Mexico originate in the counter-insurgency training provided in the 1990’s to a select group of special-forces soldiers, who later deserted.

事实上，墨西哥的齐塔复仇女神最初接受过20世纪90年代向选定的特种部队士兵提供的反暴动训练，而后逃离了特种部队。


The Zetas’ star recruits in recent years have come from the Guatemalan military’s special forces, whose infamous induction technique involved biting off the head of a live chicken.

近年来齐塔人招募的明星新锐大多具有危地马拉军队的特种部队背景，这支部队一种臭名昭著的入门技术是咬掉一只活鸡的头颅。


Meanwhile, in Jamaica and across the rural outposts of Central America, drug lords have become benefactors and heroes to the poor.

与此同时，在牙买加以及中美洲的农村前沿，毒枭正在扮演着穷苦人的救世主兼英雄的角色。


It is time for serious reconsideration of the status and regulation of illegal drugs, pointing to selective legalization, as well as reclassification of the market as a public-health, rather than a criminal, concern.

认真重新考察局势和非法毒品管理状况的时候到了，可以考虑实行有选择的合法化，对这个市场重新进行公共健康而不是刑事方面的考量。


For now, policymakers across the Americas are tiptoeing towards the obvious.

现在，美洲各国的决策者正悄悄向显而易见的解决方案靠拢。


A Global "New Deal"?

全球“新政 ” ？


ATHENS – The International Monetary Fund’s belated admission that it significantly underestimated the damage that austerity would do to European Union growth rates highlights the self-defeating character of “orthodox” recipes to address the causes of the debt crisis that followed the financial crash of 2008-2009.

雅典—IMF终于承认它严重低估了紧缩给欧盟增长率带来的伤害，这表明纠正2008—2009年金融危机后发生的债务危机的根源的“正统”药方起到了弄巧成拙的效果。


Conventional theory suggests that a single country (or group of countries) consolidating its finances can expect lower interest rates, a weaker currency, and an improved trade position.

传统智慧认为，就个别国家（或一组国家）而言，整合其财政意味着降低利率、货币贬值和改善贸易处境。


But, because this cannot happen for all major economies simultaneously – one country’s (or group of countries’) austerity implies less demand for other countries’ products – such policies eventually lead to beggar-thy-neighbor situations.

但是，由于这无法同时在所有主要经济体发生 — — 一个国家（或一组国家）的紧缩意味着其他国家产品需求下降 — — 这些政策最终会导致以邻为壑局面。


Indeed, it was this dynamic – against which John Maynard Keynes fought – that made the Great Depression of the 1930’s so grim.

事实上，凯恩斯所反对的正是这一动态，正是它导致了20世纪30年代悲惨的大萧条。


Today’s problems are compounded by a lack of sufficient private demand – particularly household consumption – in the advanced economies to compensate for demand losses stemming from austerity.

当今问题的一个组成部分是发达国家私人需求（特别是家庭消费）不振，不足以补偿紧缩带来的需求损失。


During the last two decades, consumption drove these countries’ economic growth, reaching historically high GDP shares.

在过去20年中，消费推动着这些国家的经济增长，其占GDP比重达到了历史新高。


Moreover, major advanced economies, such as the United States, Germany, and Japan, face longer-term fiscal problems in the form of aging populations or oversize welfare states, limiting their capacity to contribute to demand management.

此外，美国、德国和日本等主要发达国家面临老龄化、福利国家规模太大等长期财政问题，制约着它们的需求管理能力。


Recent moves to ease monetary policy have been a step in the right direction; but, so far, they have not proved to be a game changer.

当前的货币宽松政策方向是对的，但到目前为止并没有起到扭转局势的作用。


For domestic demand to act as an engine of growth, policies should shift resources from investment to consumption.

由于内需成了增长引擎，因此政策应该将资源从投资引向消费。


While the magnitudes involved are huge, they must be attained if an extended period of low growth, high unemployment, and declining living standards among the world’s poorest is to be avoided.

尽管所涉规模巨大，但必须完成，否则就会导致低增长、高失业、全球最贫困人口生活之质量下降。


International economic policy coordination should be significantly strengthened in order to deal effectively with changes on such a scale.

应该着力强调国际经济政策协调，以便有效地应对如此规模的变局。


Start with Europe.

从欧洲开始。


It is by now patently obvious that austerity and domestic reforms are not enough to pull the eurozone’s periphery out of deep recession.

如今，毫无疑问紧缩和国内改革不足以将欧元区外围国拉出衰退。


Growing awareness of the failure of current policies is causing social discontent, civil disorder, and political instability, with the recently concluded Italian elections and the growing popular resistance to Greek reform efforts serving as a bellwether.

人们越来越意识到当前的政策是失败的，这正在造成社会不满、国内失序和政局动荡，最近结束的意大利选举和希腊改革措施所受到的越来越大的阻力就是明证。


Returning the eurozone’s peripheral economies to the path of growth requires more than structural reforms and fiscal consolidation.

要让欧元区外围国回归增长之路，光有结构性改革和财政整合是不够的。


It also requires a substantial reform of the monetary union’s system of economic governance, aimed at restoring financial stability and lowering borrowing costs, together with a boost in external demand in order to compensate for the effects of austerity.

欧元区经济治理制度也必须有彻底的改革，其目标应是重塑金融稳定、降低借贷利率，同时提振外部需求以补偿紧缩措施带来的后果。


Reforming governance implies significant progress toward economic unification: centralizing European debt through Eurobonds, mobilizing sufficient rescue funds, allowing the European Central Bank to intervene in the primary bond markets, and establishing both a fiscal and a banking union.

改革治理意味着向经济联盟迈出一大步：通过欧元债券将欧洲债务集中化；动员足够的救援资金；允许欧洲央行在债券一级市场实施干预；并建立财政和银行联盟。


This is a tall order, in view of the reluctance of most EU member states to cede competences to European institutions.

这似乎是个不可能的任务，因为大部分欧盟成员国都不愿把权力割让给欧洲机构。


But Europe should move more decisively in this direction.

但欧洲应该坚决地向这一方向迈进。


Otherwise, speculation on member states’ national debt will persist, keeping borrowing costs at levels that are inconsistent with the conditions required to sustain economic recovery.

否则的话，关于成员国国民债务问题的猜疑就不会停止，这会导致借贷成本维持在与维持经济复苏不相容的水平。


Concerning external demand, intra-European help in the form of reflationary policies in stronger economies is unlikely to prove sufficient, owing primarily to the fiscal and political conditions prevailing in Germany.

在外部需求问题上，坚挺国实施再通胀政策的欧洲内部援助不可能充分，其主要原因在于德国国内的财政和政治条件。


Implementing a Marshall Plan-type initiative by mobilizing EU budget resources and additional lending by the European Investment Bank to finance investments in weaker countries could be an alternative, but it lacks political support.

通过动员欧盟预算资源并增加欧洲投资银行向疲软国金融投资项目的贷款等形式实施的欧洲内部版马歇尔计划可以成为替代方案，但缺少政治支持。


On a global scale, neither the US nor Japan is in a position to provide significant external stimulus.

在全球范围内，美国和日本都没有提供重大外部刺激的条件。


Only the emerging and developing economies of Asia could effectively contribute to lifting global demand through a coordinated effort aimed at boosting domestic consumption, which, in turn, would stimulate additional investment.

只有亚洲的新兴和发展中国家能通过旨在提振国内消费 — — 这反过来能够刺激更多的投资 — — 的政策协调有效地提振全球需求。


Recent IMF experience suggests that, through appropriate coordination, private funds could be mobilized for big private-public partnership projects linking demand expansion with infrastructure investment.

IMF的最新经验表明，通过适当的协调，私人资金可以动员起��参与大型公司合作项目，将需求扩张和基础设施投资结合起来。


In other words, a global “New Deal” – combining policies designed to achieve an orderly realignment of consumption and investment worldwide – seems to be required.

换句话说，我们需要全球“新政 ” — —将旨在有序重列全球消费和投资的政策结合起来。


The advanced economies should promote productivity-enhancing structural reforms with renewed vigor.

发达国家应该打起精神推进增进生产率的结构性改革。


The eurozone should solidify its currency union.

欧元区应该巩固其货币联盟。


And the emerging and developing economies should support domestic sources of growth.

而新兴和发展中国家应该支持内部增长源。


For such a deal to become possible, certain preconditions must be met.

为了让这一新政成为可能，必须满足一定的先决条件。


First, international policy coordination by the G-20 must be tightened by creating a permanent secretariat to make policy proposals and recommendations concerning macroeconomic and financial developments.

首先，G20必须加紧国际政策协调，这可以通过成立永久性秘书处负责考虑关于宏观经济和金融发展的政策方案和建议。


The secretariat should actively cooperate with the IMF to benefit from its analysis, notably regarding exchange rates.

这一秘书处应该积极地与IMF合作，利用后者的分析结果，特别是汇率问题上的分析结果。


Second, global financial reform must proceed at a faster pace.

其次，全球金融改革必须加快节奏。


The financial sector requires tougher regulation, strengthened supervision, and internationally consistent resolution mechanisms to address the problems posed by very large, global institutions that are considered too big (or too complex) to fail.

金融部门需要加强监管、强化监督，还需要国际一致的解决机制以纠正太大（或太复杂）而不能倒的大型全球性机构带来的问题。


Such reform is essential if the international financial system is to mediate the sizeable resource transfers that will underpin the required changes in the structure of global demand.

这类改革至关重要的，如果想要国际金融体系成为大规模资源转移媒介的话（而这又是全球需求结构必要变化的基础 ） 。


Finally, a new trade pact – possibly, but not necessarily, within the Doha Round – is needed to ensure the major trading powers’ access to foreign markets.

最后，还需要新的贸易契约 — — 可能（但不一定）在多哈回合中形成 — — 以确保主要贸易大国能够进入外国市场。


This is critically important for inspiring confidence in Asian countries, which might be persuaded to favor domestic, as opposed to external, sources of demand.

这对于激发亚洲国家信心具有关键重要性，说服它们开发内部而不是外部需求源。


Moreover, trade liberalization will also increase consumer confidence worldwide.

此外，贸易自由化也能增加全世界消费者的信心。


The time is right for a new global settlement that targets growth, addresses crisis conditions in certain parts of the world, and rebalances the global economy to set it back on a path of strong and steady growth.

新的全球协定正当时。 这一协定的目标应该是提振增长、消除世界某些地区的危机环境以及实现全球经济的再平衡以使其回到强劲、稳健的增长道路上来。


The Other Financial Crisis

另一种金融危机


NEWPORT BEACH – Two variants of financial crisis continue to wreak havoc on Western economies, fueling joblessness and poverty: the one that we read about regularly in newspapers, involving governments around the world; and a less visible one at the level of small and medium-size businesses and households.

发自纽波特滩 — — 金融危机的两个变体正继续蹂躏着西方经济，令失业和贫穷状况进一步加剧：一个是我们经常在报纸上读到的涉及各国政府的金融危机；另一个不那么起眼的则是中小型企业和家庭层面上的危机。


Until both are addressed properly, the West will remain burdened by sluggish growth, persistently high unemployment, and excessive income and wealth inequality.

在这两种危机得到恰当应对之前，西方世界将继续背负着增长滞缓、失业率长期居高及收入与财富差距过大的负担。


The sovereign-debt crisis is well known.

主权债务危机是众所周知的。


In order to avert a likely depression, governments around the world engaged in fiscal and monetary stimulus in the midst of the global financial crisis.

为了避免出现经济萧条，各国政府在全球金融危机期间都忙于实施财政及货币刺激政策。


They succeeded in offsetting nasty economic dislocations caused by private-sector deleveraging, but at the cost of encumbering their fiscal balances and their central banks’ balance sheets.

此举成功抵消了因私营部门去杠杆化所导致的严重经济紊乱，但却是以破坏自身财政收支平衡以及扰乱央行资产负债表为代价的。


While sovereign credit quality has deteriorated virtually across the board, and will most probably continue to do so, the implications for individual countries vary.

虽然主权信贷的质量几乎全面恶化 — — 并很可能继续恶化下去 — — 但它对各国的影响却有所不同。


Some Western countries – such as Greece – had fragile government accounts from the outset and tipped quickly into persistent crisis mode.

某些西方国家 — — 比如希腊 — — 起初其政府账目就非常糟糕，所以很快就陷入了长期持续性的危机模式。


There they remain, still failing to provide citizens with a light at the end of what already has been a long tunnel.

这些国家将一直深陷危机，即便很长一段时期之后都依然无法为其公民带来一丝希望。


Other countries had been fiscally responsible, but were overwhelmed by the liabilities that they had assumed from others (for example, Ireland’s irresponsible banks sank their budget).

其他国家过去在财政上一直尽职尽责，却无力应对那些从别处承担的债务（例如那些不可靠的爱尔兰银行就毁了本国的预算 ） 。


Still others, including the United States, faced no immediate threat but failed to make progress on longer-term issues. A few, like Germany, had built deep economic and financial resilience through years of fiscal discipline and structural reforms.

另外一些国家 — — 包括美国 — — 没有受到直接的威胁，但无法在某些长期事务上取得进展。 而有几个像德国这样的国家则通过多年的财政纪律和体制改革拥有了深厚的经济和金融复原能力。


It is not surprising that policy approaches have also varied.

各国的应对政策各不相同，这也并不奇怪。


Indeed, they have shared only one, albeit crucial (and disappointing) feature: the inability to rely on rapid growth as the “safest” way to deleverage an over-indebted economy.

但事实上，这些政策之间只拥有一个至关重要（也令人失望）的共同点：那就是无法依靠经济快速增长这个“最安全”的方法来为其过度负债的经济去杠杆化。


Greece essentially defaulted on some obligations.

希腊实际上已经在某些债务上出现了违约。


Ireland opted for austerity and reforms, as has the United Kingdom.

爱尔兰和英国一样选择了紧缩政策和改革。


The US is gradually transferring resources from creditors to debtors through financial repression.

美国正逐步通过金融抑制手段把资源从债权人转移到债务人手上。


And Germany is slowly acquiescing to a prudent relative expansion in domestic demand.

而德国正逐渐适应在国内需求方面的稳健相对扩张。


So much for the sovereign-debt crisis, which, given its national, regional, and global impact, has been particularly well covered.

关于主权债务危机我想说的就这么多，因为考虑��其对国家、区域及全球的影响，对其的讨论已经足够丰富了。


After all, sovereigns are called that because they have the power to impose taxes, regulations, and, at the extreme, confiscation.

毕竟，它之所以被称之为主权，就是因为它们拥有征税、监管，甚至极端点说，没收的权力。


But the other credit crisis is equally consequential, and receives much less attention, even as it erodes societies’ integrity, productive capabilities, and ability to maintain living standards (particularly for the least fortunate).

另外一种信贷危机也同样重要，但其受到的关注却少得多，即使它损坏了社会的凝聚力、生产力以及人们维持自身生活水平的能力（尤其是对底层人群来说 ） 。


I know of very few Western countries where small and medium-size companies, as well as middle-income households and those of more limited means, have not experienced a significant decline in their access to credit – not just new financing, but also the ability to roll over old credit lines and loans.

据我所知，绝大部分西方国家的中小企业、中等收入以及收入拮据的家庭都经历过信贷获取渠道显著下降 — — 不仅针对新的融资，还包括更新过往信贷额度和借款的能力。


The immediate causes are well known.

这种信贷危机产生的直接原因大家都知道。


They range from subdued bank lending to unusually high risk aversion, and from discredited credit vehicles to the withdrawal of some institutions from credit intermediation altogether.

其范围涵盖从银行抑制贷款到异常的高风险规避行为、从信贷工具信誉崩溃再到某些机构完全撤出信用中介机构的举措。


Such credit constraints are one reason why unemployment rates continue to rise in so many countries – often from already alarming levels, such as 25% in Greece and Spain (where youth unemployment is above 50%) – and why unemployment remains unusually high in countries like the US (albeit it at a much lower level).

这种信贷约束是许多国家失业率持续上升的一个原因 — — 通常这些国家的失业率原本已经处于令人担忧的水平了，例如希腊和西班牙25%的失业率（这两个国家的青年失业率已经超过了50 % ） — — 同时也是像美国这样的国家失业率居高不下的原因（虽然相对而言美国的失业率并不高 ） 。


This is not just a matter of lost capabilities and rising poverty; persistently high unemployment also leads to social unrest, erosion of trust in political leaders and institutions, and the mounting risk of a lost generation.

这不仅仅是生产力流失和贫困加剧的问题；长期的高失业率还会导致社会动荡、对本国政治领导人的不信任以及产生失落一代的风险。


Indeed, unemployment data in many advanced countries are dominated by long-term joblessness (usually defined as six months or more).

确实，许多发达国家的失业数据主要由长期失业构成（通常定义为六个月或以上 ） 。


Skill erosion becomes a problem for those with prior work experience, while unsuccessful first-time entrants into the labor force are not just unemployed, but risk becoming unemployable.

技能的逐渐丧失对那些原本有工作经验的人来说是个问题，而首次就业不成功则不仅意味着失业这么简单，还隐含着不会被雇佣的风险。


Governments are doing too little to address the private credit debacle.

政府们在处理私人信贷危机上做得太少了。


Arguably, they must first sort out the sovereign side of the crisis; but it is not clear that most officials even have a comprehensive plan.

虽然理论上它们必先解决危机中的主权债务方面；然而目前尚不清楚大部分官员是否制订了一个全面计划。


Policy asymmetry is greatest for the countries most acutely affected by the sovereign-debt crisis.

那些受到主权债务危机影响最剧烈的国家的政策非对称性最为明显。


There, the private sector has essentially been left to fend for itself; and most households and companies are struggling, thus fueling continued economic implosion.

在这些国家，政府基本上任由私营部门自生自灭；大部分家庭和企业都处在挣扎之中，因此加剧了长期的经济崩溃。


Other countries appear to have adopted a “Field of Dreams” – also known as “build it and they will come” – approach to private credit markets, In the US, for example, artificially low interest rates for home mortgages, resulting from the Federal Reserve’s policy activism, are supposed to kick-start prudent financing.

其他国家则仿佛采取了一种“寻梦之地 ” — —也被称之为“平台建好了，人就来了 ” — —的方法来处理私人信贷市场，例如，在美国，由于美联储的政策措施，人为降低了对住房抵押贷款的利率，以期启动审慎的融资。


The European Central Bank is taking a similarly indirect approach.

欧洲央行也正在采取这么一个间接手段。


In both places, other policymaking entities, with much better tools at their disposal, appear either unwilling or unable to play their part.

但在这两个地方，掌握有更有力工具的其他政策制定实体似乎既不愿意也无力承担自己的角色。


As such, action by central banks will repeatedly fail to gain sufficient traction.

在这种情况下，央行的行动将一直无法产生足够的牵引力。


In fact, only the UK is visibly opting for a more coordinated and direct way to counter the persistent shortfalls stemming from the private part of the credit crisis.

事实上，只有英国明确选择了更协调也更直接的方式来抵消由私人信贷危机引起的长期短缺。


There, the “Funding for Lending Scheme,” jointly designed by the Bank of England and the Treasury, seeks “to boost the incentive for banks and building societies to lend to UK households and non-financial companies,” while holding them accountable for proper behavior.

由英国格兰银行和财政部共同设计的“贷款资助方案”旨在“提高银行和建房互助协会向英国家庭和非金融企业借贷的动力 ” ， 同时也要求前者为自身的行为负责。


The UK example is important; but, given the scope and scale of the challenges, the proposal is a relatively modest one.

英国的例子很重要；但是考虑到整个挑战所涉及的范围和规模 ，该提案还是相对保守的。


The program may stimulate some productive credit intermediation, but it will not make a significant dent in what will remain one of the major obstacles to robust economic recovery.

这一计划也许能刺激一些有益的信用中介行为，但它依然无法对那些继续阻碍强劲经济复苏的因素产生重大影响。


Proper access to credit for productive segments is an integral part of a well-functioning economy.

生产部门能够拥有适当的信贷获取渠道对一个运转良好的经济体来说至关重要。


Without it, growth falters, job creation is insufficient, and widening income and wealth inequality undermines the social fabric.

否则经济增长就将止步不前，也无法充分创造就业，不断扩大的财富与收入差距将腐蚀整个社会结构。


That is why any comprehensive approach to restoring the advanced countries’ economic and financial vibrancy must target the proper revival of private credit flows.

这就是为什么任何恢复发达国家经济和金融活力的综合性手段都必须着眼于适当复苏私人信贷流的原因。


Toxic Politics Versus Better Economics

有害的政治学和更好的经济学


NEW YORK – The relationship between politics and economics is changing.

纽约—政治学和经济学之间的关系在变化。


Advanced-country politicians are locked in bizarre, often toxic, conflicts, instead of acting on a growing economic consensus about how to escape a protracted period of low and unequal growth.

发达国家政客陷于古怪并且常常有害的冲突之中，而没有在关于如何摆脱长期不平等低增长时期的问题上按照日益一致的经济共识行事。


This trend must be reversed, before it structurally cripples the advanced world and sweeps up the emerging economies, too.

这一趋势必须扭转，否则它将破坏发达经济的结构，并让新兴经济体也陷入困境。


Obviously, political infighting is nothing new.

显然，政治内斗不是什么新鲜事。


But, until recently, the expectation was that if professional economists achieved a technocratic consensus on a given policy approach, political leaders would listen.

但是，直到最近，人们一直认为，如果职业经济学家能就给定的政策方针形成技术官僚一致，政治领导人是能够听进去的。


Even when more radical political parties attempted to push a different agenda, powerful forces – whether moral suasion from G7 governments, private capital markets, or the conditionality attached to International Monetary Fund and World Bank lending – would almost always ensure that the consensus approach eventually won the day.

即使有更多激进政党试图推行不同的日程，但强大的力量 — — 不管是来自G7政府的到的劝告、私人资本市场，还是国际货币基金组织（IMF）和世界银行贷款的附加条件 — — 几乎总能确保共识方针最终能够胜出。


In the 1990s and 2000s, for example, the so-called Washington Consensus dominated policymaking in much of the world, with everyone from the United States to a multitude of emerging economies pursuing trade liberalization, privatization, greater use of price mechanisms, financial-sector deregulation, and fiscal and monetary reforms with a heavy supply-side emphasis.

比如，从20世纪90年代到21世纪初，所谓的华盛顿共识主导着世界大部的政策决定，从美国到诸多新兴经济体，所有人都在追求贸易自由化、私有化、扩大价格机制用途、金融业去监管，以及着重强调供给侧的财政和货币改革。


The embrace of the Washington Consensus by multilateral institutions amplified its transmission, helping to drive forward the broader process of economic and financial globalization.

多边机构采用华盛顿共识放大的这一传导机制，推动了更广大的经济和金融全球化过程。


Incoming governments – particularly those led by non-traditional movements, which had risen to power on the back of domestic unease and frustration with mainstream parties – sometimes disagreed with the appropriateness and relevance of the Washington Consensus.

即将上任的新政府 — — 特别是那些由非传统运动的政府，它们之所以能够掌权，依靠的是国内的焦虑情绪和对主流政党的失望 — — 有时华盛顿共识的适当性和重要性有不同意见。


But, as Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva demonstrated with his famous policy pivot in 2002, that consensus tended largely to prevail. And it continued to hold sway as recently as almost two years ago, when Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras executed an equally notable U-turn.

但是，巴西总统卢拉以其著名的2002年政策重点证明，华盛顿共识最后往往还是能够胜出，并且一直主导全局直到两年前希腊总理齐普拉斯采取了同样令人瞩目的一百八十度大转弯。


But after years of unusually sluggish and strikingly non-inclusive growth, the consensus is breaking down.

但在经历了多年反常的停滞和令人震惊的不包容增长后，华盛顿共识正在解体。


Advanced-country citizens are frustrated with an “establishment” – including economic “experts,” mainstream political leaders, and dominant multinational companies – which they increasingly blame for their economic travails.

发达国家公民对“建制 ” — —包括经济“专家 ” 、 主流政治领导人、主要跨国公司 — — 感到失望，越来越多的人指责它们是经济艰难的罪魁祸首。


Anti-establishment movements and figures have been quick to seize on this frustration, using inflammatory and even combative rhetoric to win support.

反建制运动和人物很快就抓住了这一不满，利用煽动性乃至战斗性言辞赢得支持。


They do not even have to win elections to disrupt the transmission mechanism between economics and politics.

他们甚至不需要赢得选举就能干扰经济学和政治学之间的传递机制。


The United Kingdom proved that in June, with its Brexit vote – a decision that directly defied the broad economic consensus that remaining within the European Union was in Britain’s best interest.

6月份，英国以退欧投票证明了这一点 — — 这一决定直接否认了留在欧盟符合英国的最佳利益这一经济共识。


The referendum happened for one reason: in 2013, then-Prime Minister David Cameron feared that he would be unable to secure sufficiently his Conservative Party base in the general election that year.

英国公投的发生原因是，2013年，时任首相卡梅伦担心他在当年的大选中无法确保其保守党基本盘。


So he pandered to Euroskeptic voters with the promise of a referendum.

因此他用承诺举行公投诱惑疑欧派选民。


The source of Cameron’s fear?

卡梅伦为什么要担心？


The political disruption caused by the UK Independence Party – an anti-establishment party that ended up winning only one seat in Parliament and subsequently found itself leaderless and in turmoil.

因为英国独立党（UK Independent Party）所造成的政治干扰。 反建制的英国独立党最后只在议会赢得了一个席位，随后便陷入群龙无首的乱局。


Now, it seems, the floodgates have opened.

如今，防洪门似乎已经洞开。


At the recent Conservative Party annual conference, speeches by Prime Minister Theresa May and members of her cabinet revealed an intention to pursue a “hard Brexit,” thereby dismantling trading arrangements that have served the economy well.

在最近的保守党年度大会上，首相梅及其内阁成员的讲话表明他们准备追求“硬退欧 ” ， 取缔给英国经济带来巨大好处的贸易安排。


They also included attacks on “international elites” and criticism of Bank of England policies that were instrumental in stabilizing the British economy in the referendum’s immediate aftermath – thus giving May’s new government time to formulate a coherent Brexit strategy.

他们还抨击“国际精英 ” ， 批评英格兰银行的政策。 在公投刚刚结束的那段时间，英格兰银行的政策起到了稳定英国经济的中流砥柱的作用，从而给梅的新政府赢得了制定一致的退欧战略的时间。


Several other advanced economies are experiencing analogous political developments.

其他一些发达经济体也正在经历类似的政治发展趋势。


In Germany, a surprisingly strong showing by the far-right Alternative für Deutschland in recent state elections already appears to be affecting the government’s behavior.

在德国，极右翼的德国另类党（Alternative für Deutschland）在最近的州选举中表现出人意料的强势，它已经开始影响德国政府的行为。


In the US, even if Donald Trump’s presidential campaign fails to put a Republican back in the White House (as appears increasingly likely, given that, in the latest twist of this highly unusual campaign, many Republican leaders have now renounced their party’s nominee), his candidacy will likely leave a lasting impact on American politics.

在美国，即使唐纳德·特朗普的竞选不能让共和党重新问鼎白宫（这一可能性日益增加，因为这出相当反常的总统选战最近又曝出新转折，许多共和党领导人宣布不再支持本党提名人 ） ， 他成为候选人这一事实也可能给美国政治带来持续影响。


If not managed well, Italy’s constitutional referendum in December – a risky bid by Prime Minister Matteo Renzi to consolidate support – could backfire, just like Cameron’s referendum did, causing political disruption and undermining effective action to address the country’s economic challenges.

如果管理不当，12月的意大利宪政公投 — — 总理伦齐为巩固其支持而兵行险招 — — 将适得其反，一如卡梅伦的公投方案，导致政治干扰，阻碍解决意大利经济挑战的有效行动。


Make no mistake: solid and credible policy options are available.

不要弄错了，可靠可信的政策选项仍在可及范围内。


After years of mediocre economic performance, there is widespread agreement that a shift away from excessive dependence on unconventional monetary policy is needed.

在经历了多年的平庸经济表现后，一个广泛的一致是必须摆脱对非常规货币政策的过度依赖。


As IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde put it, “central banks cannot be the only game in town.”

IMF总裁拉加德指出 ， “ 中央银行不可以成为唯一的博弈 ” 。


And yet they have been.

但它们正是。


As I argue in The Only Game in Town, published in January, countries need a more comprehensive policy approach, involving pro-growth structural reforms, more balanced demand management (including higher fiscal spending on infrastructure), and better cross-border policy coordination and architecture.

我在1月出版的《唯一的博弈 》 （ The Only Game in Town）中指出，各国需要更加全面的政策方针，包括促增长的结构性改革、更平衡的需求管理（包括增加基础设施方面的财政支出）和更好的跨国政策协作和组织。


There is also a need, highlighted by the protracted Greek crisis, to address pockets of severe over-indebtedness, which can have crushing impact extending well beyond the directly affected.

此外还需要解决严重的过度负债问题 — — 没完没了的希腊危机突出了这一点 — — 该问题的破坏性影响远远不局限于直接受害者。


The emergence of a new consensus on these points is good news.

在这些问题上形成新共识是好消息。


But, in the current political environment, translating that consensus into action is likely to happen too slowly, at best.

但是，在当前政治环境下，将这一共识转化为行动可能过于缓慢甚至无从实现。


The risk is that, as bad politics crowds out good economics, popular anger and frustration will rise, making politics even more toxic.

风险在于，随着坏政治学挤出好经济学，群众愤怒和不满将愈演愈烈，让政治学变得更加有害。


One hopes that enlightened political leadership takes the reins in time to make the needed mid-course corrections voluntarily, before unambiguous signs of economic and financial crisis force policymakers to scramble to minimize the damage.

我们希望开明的政治领导层及时掌控全局，自愿采取中途纠错，以免明确的经济和金融危机信号迫使决策者不得不将重点放在影响最小化上。


Another Lesson from Japan

日本的另一个教训


NEW HAVEN – Yet another in a long string of negative inflation surprises is at hand.

发自纽黑文 — — 最近这段时间出人意料的通胀坏消息真是一个接着一个。


In the United States, the so-called core CPI (consumer price index) – which excludes food and energy – has headed down just when it was supposed to be going up.

在美国，所谓的核心消费价格指数（core CPI ） — —不包括食品和能源 — — 在一片上行预期中调头向下。


Over the three months ending in May, the core CPI was basically unchanged, holding, at just 1.7% above its year-earlier level.

截至五月份的三个月中，核心消费物价指数基本保持不变，维持在较去年同期高出1.7个百分点的水平。


For a US economy that is widely presumed to be nearing the hallowed ground of full employment, this comes as a rude awakening – particularly for the Federal Reserve, which has pulled out all the stops to get inflation back to its 2% target.

对于各界广泛认为已经近乎实现充分就业神迹的美国经济来说，这简直是当头一盆冷水 — — 而最尴尬的莫过于已尽一切努力要使通胀水平回归2％目标值的美联储了。


Halfway around the world, a similar story continues to play out in Japan.

而在世界的另一侧，类似的故事也在日本继续上演。


But, for the deflation-prone Japanese economy, it’s a much tougher story.

但是对于极易出现通缩的日本经济来说，故事的内容更让人揪心。


Through April, Japan’s core CPI was basically flat relative to its year-earlier level, with a similar outcome evident in May for the Tokyo metropolitan area.

截至今年4月份，日本的核心消费物价指数较去年同期基本持平，而东京都市圈的经济表现显示5月也将如此。


For the Bank of Japan (BoJ), which committed an unprecedented arsenal of unconventional policy weapons to arrest a 19-year stretch of 16.5% deflation lasting from 1994 to 2013, this is more than just a rude awakening. It is an embarrassment bordering on defeat.

对于为遏制持续19年（1994~2013）累计达19.5％的通缩趋势而动用了史无前例的非常规政策武器库的日本银行来说，这不仅仅是一个盆冷水，简直就是一场近乎失败的窘境。


This story is global in scope.

这个故事适用于全球范围。


Yes, there are a few notable outliers – namely, the United Kingdom, where currency pressures and one-off holiday distortions are temporarily boosting core inflation to 2.4%, and Malaysia, where the removal of fuel subsidies has boosted headline inflation, yet left the core stable at around 2.5%.

当然也存在一些值得留意的异常例子 — — 比如英国，货币压力和一次性假期扭曲暂时将核心通胀率提高至2.4 ％ ， 还有马来西亚，燃料补贴的取消推动了总体通胀，但核心通胀率稳定在2.5％左右。


But they are exceptions in an otherwise inflationless world.

但它们都是这个无通胀世界中的例外。


The International Monetary Fund’s latest forecasts bear this out.

国际货币基金组织的最新预测表明了这一点。


Notwithstanding a modest firming of global economic growth, inflation in the advanced economies is expected to average slightly less than 2% in 2017-2018.

尽管全球经济将实现温和增长，但发达经济体在2017~18年的通胀水平预计将略低于2 ％ 。


The first chapter of this tale was written many years ago, in Japan.

这个故事的第一章是多年前在日本写就的。


From asset bubbles and excess leverage to currency suppression and productivity impairment, Japan’s experience – with lost decades now stretching to a quarter-century – is testament to all that can go wrong in large and wealthy economies.

从资产泡沫和杠杆过剩到汇率压制和生产力下降，日本的经验 — — 所谓“失去的十年”现在已经拉长到了二十五年 — — 展现了一个大型富裕的经济体可能会犯下的所有错误。


But no lesson is more profound than that of a series of policy blunders made by the BoJ.

但没什么教训能比日本央行犯下的一系列政策失误更为深刻。


Not only did reckless monetary accommodation set the stage for Japan’s demise; the country’s central bank compounded the problem by taking policy rates to the zero bound (and even lower), embracing quantitative easing, and manipulating long-term interest rates in the hopes of reviving the economy.

不仅使用鲁莽的货币宽松政策为日本的衰亡奠定了基础；该国央行还将政策利率归零（甚至更低 ） ， 实施量化宽松政策和操纵长期利率以期复兴经济，却令问题变得更为复杂。


This has created an unhealthy dependency from which there is no easy exit.

这创造了一种不健康却又极难摆脱的依赖状态。


Though Japan’s experience since the early 1990s provides many lessons, the rest of the world has failed miserably at heeding them.

虽然日本自1990年代初以来的经验提供了许多教训，但世界其他地方对此却令人沮丧地充耳不闻。


Volumes have been written, countless symposiums have been held, and famous promises have been made by the likes of former US Fed chairman Ben Bernanke never to repeat Japan’s mistakes.

研究论文写了无数篇，研讨会举办了无数次，还有诸如美国前美联储主席本·伯南克（Ben Bernanke）等高人都承诺永不会重蹈日本覆辙。


Yet time and again, other major central banks – especially the Fed and the European Central Bank – have been quick to follow, with equally dire consequences.

不过一次又一次地其他主要中央银行 — — 尤其是美联储和欧洲央行 — — 总是会紧接着掉进坑里，并产生同样可怕的后果。


The inflation surprise of 2017 offers three key insights.

2017年的通胀意外事件提供了三个关键的见解。


First, the relationship between inflation and economic slack – the so-called Phillips curve – has broken down.

首先，通货膨胀与经济萧条程度之间的关系 — — 即所谓的菲利普斯曲线（Phillips curve ） — —已经瓦解了。


Courtesy of what the University of Geneva’s Richard Baldwin calls the “second unbundling” of globalization, the world is awash in the excess supply of increasingly fragmented global supply chains.

拜日内瓦大学教授理查德·鲍德温（Richard Baldwin）所谓的全球化“第二次分割”所赐，世界上因此充斥着供应过剩且日益分散化的全球供应链。


Outsourcing via these supply chains dramatically expands the elasticity of the global supply curve, fundamentally altering the concept of slack in labor and product markets, as well as the pressure such slack might put on inflation.

而借助这些供应链的外包大大扩大了全球供应曲线的弹性，并从根本上改变了劳动力和产品市场萧条的概念，以及这类萧条状态对通胀的压力。


Second, today’s globalization is inherently asymmetric.

其次，当今的全球化在本质上是不对称的。


For a variety of reasons – hangovers from balance-sheet recessions in Japan and the US, fear-driven precautionary saving in China, and anemic consumption in productivity-constrained Europe – the demand side of most major economies remains severely impaired.

由于各种原因 — — 日本和美国资产负债表的持续衰退，恐惧驱动下的中国国内预防性储蓄，以及欧洲生产力受限导致的消费疲软 — — 大多数主要经济体的需求侧依然受损严重。


Juxtaposed against a backdrop of ever-expanding supply, the resulting imbalance is inherently deflationary.

再结合供应不断扩大的背景，因此导致的不平衡状态在本质上是通缩式的。


Third, central banks are all but powerless to cope with the moving target of what can be called a non-stationary liquidity trap.

第三，中央银行在应对所谓的非平稳流动性陷阱的变动目标方面都是无能为力的。


First observed by John Maynard Keynes during the Great Depression of the 1930s, the liquidity trap describes a situation in which policy interest rates, having reached the zero bound, are unable to stimulate chronically deficient aggregate demand.

正如约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯（John Maynard Keynes）在1930年代大萧条时首先观察到的那样，流动性陷阱描述了一个政策利率已达零点，却依旧无法刺激长期缺乏的总需求的状况。


Sound familiar?

这听起来是不是有点耳熟？


The novel twist today is the ever-expanding global supply curve.

而如今使用的新花招则是不断扩张的全球供应曲线。


That makes today’s central banks even more impotent than they were in the 1930s.

这使得今天的中行比1930年代更加束手无策。


This is not an incurable disease.

这可不是不治之症。


In a world of hyper-globalization – barring a protectionist relapse led by the America Firsters – treatment needs to be focused on the demand side of the equation.

在一个超全球化的世界 — — 除了由美国优先主义者领导的保护主义逆流之外 — — 应对方案应当集中在等式的需求一侧。


The most important lesson from the 1930s, as well as from the modern-day Japanese experience, is that monetary policy provides no answer for a chronic deficiency of aggregate demand.

而1930年代以及从现代日本的经验带来的最重要教训，就是货币政策对总需求的长期缺乏状况无计可施。


Addressing it is a task primarily for fiscal authorities. The idea that central banks should consider making a new promise to raise their inflation targets is hardly credible.

解决这个问题主要得靠财政部门，中行应该考虑再度许诺提高其通胀目标的想法是不可靠的。


In the meantime, Fed Chair Janet Yellen is right (finally) to push the Fed to normalize policy, putting an end to a failed experiment that has long outlived its usefulness.

与此同时，美联储主席珍妮特·耶伦（Janet Yellen ） （ 最后终于）作出了正确的决定，推动美联储的政策正常化，终结了一个早该因一无是处而刹车的错误实验。


The danger all along has been that open-ended unconventional monetary easing would fail to achieve traction in the real economy, and would inject excess liquidity into US and global financial markets that could lead to asset bubbles, reckless risk taking, and the next crisis.

一直以来的危险在于：不是何时才是尽头的非常规货币宽松政策将无法对实体经济构成牵引力，并将过多的流动性注入了美国和全球金融市场，从而导致资产泡沫，肆意金融冒险和下一次危机。


Moreover, because unconventional easing was a strategy designed for an emergency that no longer exists, it leaves the Fed with no ammunition to fight the inevitable next downturn and crisis.

此外，由于非常规宽松政策是为了一个不再存在的紧急状态而制定的战略，因此也使得美联储没有弹药来应对不可避免的下一轮衰退和危机。


We ignore history at great peril.

我们对历史的忽视是存在极大危险的。


The latest disappointment for inflation-targeting central banks is really not a surprise after all. The same is true of the related drop in long-term interest rates.

以通胀为目标的各大央行最近的铩羽而归根本不是一个意外，相关的长期利率下跌也是如此。


There is much to be gained by studying carefully the lessons of Japan.

仔细学习日本的教训，必定获益良多。


A Rest Stop for Europe

欧洲：退一步海阔天空


PRINCETON – Last week, in a highly anticipated speech, German President Joachim Gauck cautioned against the blind pursuit of an “ever-closer” European Union, acknowledging that the growing inequality among member states is generating “a sense of unease, even unmistakable anger,” and increasing the risk of national humiliation.

普林斯顿—上周，在一次备受期待的演讲中，德国总理高克对盲目追求“前所未有地紧密”的欧盟表达了担忧，他承认成员国之间日渐增加的不平等性正在产生“不安的感觉，甚至错误的愤怒 ， ” 这增加了国家受辱的风险。


He pointed out that, in addition to the economic crisis, there is “a crisis of confidence in Europe as a political project.”

他指出，除了经济危机，还有“一场对作为政治工程的欧洲的信心的危机 ” 。


While Gauck made clear that he remains decidedly pro-Europe, he highlighted the need for closer reflection about Europe’s future – and especially that of the eurozone.

尽管高克断然表示他仍是坚决的欧洲支持者，但他也强调了深刻思考欧洲未来的需要，特别是欧元区的未来。


Standing on the verge of greater integration, Europeans are hesitant, “unsure whether we should really stride out on the onward journey.”

站在进一步一体化的边上，欧洲人犹豫了 ， “ 不确定我们是否应该向前跨出新的步伐 ” 。


Addressing this hesitation, he declared, will require a thoughtful, nuanced understanding of what “more Europe” actually means.

他说，要打消这一犹豫，深入细致地思考“更欧洲”的真正含义。


Gauck may not have gone far enough: At this point, an ever-closer union may be a political mirage.

或许高克走的还不够远：目前前所未有地紧密的联盟可能是一场政治婚姻。


Any meaningful progress toward stabilizing the eurozone would require a significant – potentially open-ended – financial commitment, and the EU is not politically ready to cross that threshold.

任何有让欧元区更稳定的有意义的进步都需要重大 — — 从根本上说是开放 — — 的财政承诺，而欧盟还没有做好跨越之一门槛的政治准备。


Repeatedly pretending to move forward, then pulling back at the critical point, exacerbates political uncertainty and economic vulnerability.

一再地假装前进，然后又在临界点退缩，这增加了政治不确定性和经济脆弱性。


Rather than indecisively pursuing more unity, this may be the moment to restore effective sovereignty to national authorities in eurozone countries.

现在或许并不是犹犹豫豫追求更统一的时机，而是重塑欧元区国家当局有效主权的时机。


Such a move would alleviate anxiety in the short term, thereby giving Europeans the opportunity to regroup in preparation for future steps toward a more integrated Europe and a more resilient euro.

这样做能够在短期缓和焦虑，从而使欧洲得到重组机会，为未来迈向更一体化的欧洲和更坚挺的欧元做好准备。


To this end, eurozone leaders must take three key steps.

在这方面，欧元区领导人必须实施三个基本措施。


The dysfunctional system of European fiscal governance should be dismantled; fiscal responsibility should be returned to member states; and, to minimize the risk of excessive future lending, private lenders should be required to bear the losses implied by unsustainable sovereign debt.

功能不全的欧洲财政治理制度应该取消；财政责任应该交还给成员国；同时，为了让未来过度借贷最小化，应该要求私人债权人承担不可持续的主权债务的损失。


The case against European fiscal governance is straightforward.

欧洲财政治理的问题是显而易见的。


Before the crisis, the single-minded emphasis on reducing national budget deficits to less than 3% of GDP led to extensive abuse.

危机前一根筋地强调将预算赤字限制在GDP的3%之内导致了这一方针的滥用。


Either the target was openly flouted, as it was in leading economies like Germany and France, or the data were manipulated to obscure problems (a common practice throughout the eurozone, not just in Greece).

德国和法国等领先经济体公开奚落这一目标，而有的国家则操纵数字掩盖问题（这是欧元区普遍的现象，不光是希腊 ） 。


And the belief in economic growth as a fiscal panacea led to unrealistically optimistic GDP forecasts.

而把经济增长当作财政万灵丹的思想导致了不切实际的乐观GDP预期。


When the crisis struck, the 3% deficit target became the focal point for unrelenting austerity – a form of what anthropologist Clifford Geertz described as “involution,” which occurs when a process intensifies rather than changes in response to external or internal pressure.

危机爆发后，3%赤字目标成了无情的紧缩政策的焦点 — — 人类学家格尔茨（Clifford Geertz）将这种形式称为“内卷化 ” ， 当一个过程因外部或内部压力而加剧而不是变化时就发生了内卷化。


In other words, EU leaders began to complicate fiscal governance, ultimately creating an inefficient, inescapable labyrinth of regulation and bureaucracy.

换句话说，欧盟领导人开始强化财政治理，最终形成了不可避免的低效监管和官僚主义难题。


As fiscal metrics become increasingly intricate, monitoring efforts will become ever easier to undermine.

随着财政指标变得越来越复杂，监控财政行为越来越容易糊弄。


The case for returning fiscal responsibility to national authorities is also strong – and not only because centralized fiscal authority has proved to be so inefficient.

把财政责任交还给国家当局的问题也很大 — — 这不仅是因为集中财政当局已被证明极其低效。


With citizens of distressed countries bearing the fiscal burden of the crisis, the enduring presumption that they will not act responsibly is patronizing, at best.

受困国人民承担了危机的财政负担，如此仍认为它们不负责任的说法不可不谓傲慢。


And the current strategy of exchanging goodies for good behavior encourages game-playing and dilutes responsibility.

当前用甜头换良政的策略鼓励博弈而不利于责任。


While the risk that governments will succumb to fiscal temptation remains, citizens’ current suffering is likely to deter future excesses.

尽管政府受财政诱惑的风险仍然存在，但当下人民所受的苦难有可能会遏制未来的过度。


National fiscal sovereignty would facilitate the final crucial step: building a more mature relationship with private lenders.

国家财政主权能促进最后的关键措施：建立与私人债权人的更成熟的关系。


The eurozone was founded on the “no bailout” principle: if member states could not repay their debts, lenders would bear the losses.

欧元区是建立在“无援助”原则上的：如果成员国无法偿还债务，债权人必须承受损失。


But lenders chose – correctly, as it turned out – to disregard that threat.

但债权人选择无视这一威胁 — — 事实表明他们是正确的。


Instead of enforcing the no-bailout principle and establishing a precedent, debtor countries used official loans to repay private creditors.

债务国并没有强推无援助原则为后来者建立榜样，而是用官方贷款偿付私人债权人。


As a result, these countries have condemned themselves to continued austerity, low growth, and high debt, while diminishing any future incentive for private lenders to impose fiscal discipline on sovereign borrowers.

结果，这些国家把自己推向了持续紧缩、低增长和高债务，同时又切断了所有让私人债权人对主权债务人施加财政纪律的未来激励。


Only by shifting the burden of responsibility back onto private lenders can debtor countries escape this quagmire.

除非将这一负担抛回给私人债权人，否则债务国就无法摆脱债务泥淖。


In the United States, each state is responsible for its fiscal management, without being forced to comply with a single, overarching template.

在美国，各州对其财政管理负责，不需遵守单一的总模式。


The states are not regulated by the federal government; they are disciplined by the knowledge that no one will repay their debts for them.

各州不受联邦政府监管；它们受没人会为它们的债务买单这一认识的约束。


And the system seems to work: entering the crisis, US states had significantly lower deficit and debt ratios than the eurozone’s vulnerable member states.

这一制度运转良好：与欧元区的脆弱成员国相比，进入危机后，美国各州大幅降低了赤字和债务率。


So far, European integration has largely been a process of “falling forward,” with each stumble serving as a lesson from which a stronger union emerges.

目前，欧洲一体化大体上是一个“掉向前 ” （ falling forward）的过程，每一次跌倒都会成为形成更坚固的联盟的教训。


But, while this uncertain approach may suffice as a basis for declarations of good intentions, it does not inspire the confidence required for countries to make the profound financial commitment that is now needed.

但是，这一不确定方法或许足以成为宣称善意的基础，但并不能激发各国做出当下所急需的深刻财政承诺所需要的信心。


Europeans should have the chance to regain their footing.

欧洲人应该获得站稳脚跟的机会。


Transferring fiscal responsibility back to national authorities would not only mean the end of counterproductive efforts to manage fiscal affairs centrally; it would also diminish the sense of frustration and lack of control that is fueling Euro-skepticism.

将财政责任交还给国家当局不仅意味着倒行逆施的集中管理财政事务的做法的终结，还能减轻沮丧感和无从掌握全局感，后两者正是欧元悲观主义的温床。


In short, taking a step back would provide an opportunity to reset, to reflect, and to plot the best course toward a more stable, more integrated Europe.

简言之，退后一步将是重设、反思和策划迈向更稳定、更一体化欧洲的最佳方案的机会。


For a fiscal union to function – however unlikely that outcome may be – a solid foundation is crucial.

对于一个能够运转的财政联盟来说 — — 不管这一可能性多么渺茫 — — 稳固的基础是至关重要的。


As Gauck explained, Europeans “are pausing to… equip [themselves] both intellectually and emotionally for the next step, which will require [them] to enter uncharted territory.”

正如高克所解释的，欧洲人“正在停下来 … … 从知识和情绪两方面为下一步武装（自己 ） ， 下一步要求（他们）踏入未知领域。 ”


Giving Europeans the time and space to choose more Europe would reinforce the core values upon which integration has rested for more than six decades.

给欧洲人时间和空间去选择更欧洲有助于强化六十多年来作为欧洲一体化基石的核心价值。


Continuing to stumble forward, however, would inevitably lead to a debilitating, if not fatal, fall.

但是，继续蹒跚向前不可避免地会导致孱弱甚至衰亡。


A European Cure for Balkan Depression

巴尔干衰退的欧洲式疗法


VIENNA – European politics is mostly shaped by events and anniversaries.

发自维也纳－欧洲政治的绝大部分内容都是由某些重大事件和周年纪念构成的。


But while events are often unforeseeable, anniversaries are not.

而虽然重大事件往往有其不可预测性，但周年纪念却还是有迹可循的。


Five years from now, Europe will be reflecting on the 100th anniversary of the outbreak of World War 1, which led to a loss of life almost without parallel and set in motion a chain of events that led to the creation of Europe as we now know it.

就在5年之后，欧洲将迎来第一次世界大战爆发100周年的纪念活动，那场战争不但造成了其它事件所无法比拟的流血牺牲，更通过推动一系列事件，最终催生了今天我们眼中的欧洲。


World leaders may have already reserved some days in August 2014 to mark the occasion.

而世界各国的元首们说不定也早就预留了2014年8月的某些日子来操办纪念仪式。


It is easy to predict that Sarajevo will be the place where they will meet to look back on Europe’s savage twentieth century.

不难想象，萨拉热窝将成为他们齐聚一堂，共同回顾残酷血腥的20世纪欧洲史的地方。


But how will Sarajevo look in five years?

但不知５年后的萨拉热窝又将是何种风貌？


Will it still be the capital of a country whose citizens view the future bleakly and whose politicians have totally lost touch with the electorate?

它是否仍会是那个国民对未来彻底绝望，政治家与选民彻底绝缘的国家的首都？


Or is there a hope that European leaders will use the anniversary to announce the successful integration of the remaining Balkan countries into the European Union?

或者是否存在这样的可能性，那就是欧洲各国的领导人将借此周年纪念之机，宣布巴尔干半岛上的其余国家已经被成功整合进了欧盟？


A Balkan Monitor survey recently conducted by Gallup Europe gives suggests the state of public opinion in Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo 20 years on from the fall of the Berlin Wall and a decade after the end of the Kosovo war.

但就在最近，由盖洛普欧洲完成的一份名为《巴尔干观察》的调查给出了自柏林墙倒塌20年以及科索沃战争爆发10年以来，塞尔维亚，黑山共和国，马其顿，阿尔巴尼亚，克罗地亚，波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那以及科索沃各地的舆论状况。


The findings seem to indicate that the next five years will be a make-or-break period for the region’s future development.

而调查结果似乎显示，今后5年将是一个关键时期，决定该地区未来发展的成败。


While the overwhelming majority of citizens are convinced that further armed conflict in the region is unlikely, the public’s mood – with the exception of Kosovars and Albanians – is pessimistic.

报告显示，尽管绝大多数市民相信在本地区内爆发进一步的武装冲突不太可能，但公众的情绪 — — 除科索沃和阿尔巴尼亚以外 — — 却都甚为悲观。


The future promises peace without development.

未来唯一能带给他们的只有和平，而发展却遥遥无期。


Trust in political elites and in national and European institutions has been steadily declining.

人们对政治精英，国家机关及欧盟机构的信任度也都在不断下降。


The majority of citizens have experienced a decline in living standards in the last year, and there remains a perception that people have more opportunities outside their own countries.

就在去年，绝大部分市民都遭遇了生活水平的下降，人们依然认为到了国外才有更多的机会。


Pessimism about employment is alarmingly high among young people, while corruption and government mismanagement are regarded as being widespread.

年轻人中对就业感到悲观的比率高得惊人，而政府腐败和管理不当也被认为是广泛存在的现象。


All those who have made it their job to praise the stability in the region should look at these figures.

因此这些数据值得那些视称颂该地区的稳定为己任的人去好好看看。


Indeed, it is striking that the majority of citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina believe that their leaders are not interested in their country joining the EU.

事实上令人感到震惊的是，波斯尼亚和黑塞哥维那的大部分市民都认为他们的领导人对加入欧盟不感兴趣。


An absolute majority of citizens in each of the surveyed countries are convinced that their country is heading in the wrong direction.

而各被调查国中的绝大部分市民都认为他们的国家已经误入歧途。


Less than one in 10 Croats (whose country could be joining the EU in the near future) believes that their country is heading in the right direction.

只有不到1/10的克罗地亚人（该国将在不久后加入欧盟）认为自己的国家走上了正轨。


There are now two options for the region: one is a “shock integration” program that takes all of the Western Balkan states into the EU; the other is a journey into the unknown. The hope that these countries can muddle through on their own is a dangerous illusion.

事到如今，该地区面临两个选择：一是选择“休克式整合”计划，即把巴尔干半岛西部的所有国家不管好坏一股脑全部纳入欧盟；另一个选择则是走着瞧，但期望这些国家能够靠自身实力涉险过关显然都是些极端危险的幻想。


Stability alone can no longer be the EU’s only objective in the region.

因此欧盟在本地区的目标可不应仅限于“维稳”两字。


The EU’s continuing presence as a colonial power in places like Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo could cause even more problems in the future, especially if benefits are not forthcoming.

而欧盟如果继续以殖民强权式的面目不断在波黑及科索沃等地进行活动的话，那么就只能给未来造成更多的问题，尤其是当许诺的好处无法马上兑现之时。


In particular, a delay in Serbia’s integration into the EU could bring Tito-inspired fantasies to the heart of the country’s foreign and security policy.

特别对于塞尔维亚来说，如果迟迟不能加入欧盟，那么从前那种铁托式的不结盟主义思想就将重新占据该国外交和安全政策的核心。


Thus, demoralization of Balkan society creates a dynamic of its own when the best and the brightest see their future outside of their own countries and where “stability” is just another name for political and economic stagnation.

由此可见，当最优秀和最聪明的人都认为自己的未来在异国他乡之时，当“稳定”只是政治和经济停滞的代名词时，巴尔干社会的混乱就将催生一种自身的内在动力。


If European leaders do plan to meet in 2014 in Sarajevo, they should act now.

因此如果欧洲的领导人真的计划在2014年在萨拉热窝召开会议，那么他们现在就得行动起来。


The ratification of the Lisbon Treaty allows for an element of visionary realism in European politics, as there are no longer any institutional obstacles to the future enlargement of the EU.

其实《里斯本条约》的通过已经为欧洲政治的组成元素增添了兼具长远眼光的现实主义理念，而欧盟未来的扩张至此已不再存在任何制度上的障碍。


Today, unlike a year ago, we know how many states are in the Balkans, and the Balkan Monitor results show that all of them want to join the Union.

而今天与一年前不同的是，我们已经能弄清楚在巴尔干半岛���究竟有多少个国家，况且《巴尔干观察》的结果也显示这些国家都想加入欧盟。


What the EU has learned from the results of the last parliamentary elections in Bulgaria is that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the leverage of Brussels over new member states increases rather than diminishes after they join.

此外欧盟应从最近一次保加利亚议会选举中学到的东西则是，与传统思维相反，在新成员加入之后，布鲁塞尔对这些国家的影响力其实是有增无减。


The EU’s decision to liberalize its visa regime for Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia – and the fact that George Papandreou, the major architect of the EU’s Balkan integration strategy, is back in power in Greece – is another source of optimism.

欧盟放宽对塞尔维亚，黑山共和国和马其顿的签证限制的决定 — — 以及欧盟巴尔干整合战略的主要构建者乔治·帕潘德里奥在希腊重新掌权的事实 — — 都是令人感到乐观的理由。


But it is now or never for the Balkans.

而对于巴尔干人来说，要么现在加入，要么就永远不加入。


Visa liberalization can be a strategic step in the direction of “shock integration,” but if it is not followed by bold political action from the EU, it could merely become a re-packaging of the status quo.

放宽签证可以作为向“休克式整合”迈进的一个战略步骤，但如果欧盟没能紧接着给出清晰的政治行动，那这一切就仅仅是换汤不换药而已。


In short, the moment has arrived for shaping events instead of simply marking anniversaries.

一句话，一战100周年的时刻有的不仅是纪念，更是时机，一个决定重大事件的时机。


Closing Europe’s Strategy Gap

填补欧洲的战略空白


MADRID – The ongoing crisis in Ukraine has been a hot topic of analysis for almost a year.

马德里—持续发酵的乌克兰危机已经成为近一年来的一个热点分析话题。


But one question has largely escaped thorough examination: what Russia’s annexation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine indicates about the European Union’s foreign policy.

但有一个问题几乎没人研究：俄罗斯吞并克里米亚和入侵东乌克兰对欧洲外交政策意味着什么。


During the early stages of the crisis, Germany, which had bet heavily on Russia’s modernization, was averse to taking any consequential action.

在危机的早期阶段，对俄罗斯现代化下了重注的德国反对采取任何可能带来后果的行动。


But, as the crisis deepened, German Chancellor Angela Merkel worked to persuade her European counterparts to implement a broad and biting sanctions regime.

但是，随着危机的深化，德国总理默克尔设法说服了欧洲同侪，实施了广泛而严厉的制裁措施。


This certainly was a step in the right direction, but it did nothing to address the foreign-policy failings that helped spark the Ukrainian crisis and continue to undermine Europe’s response – namely, the EU’s misguided Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and its muddled approach to energy.

这毫无疑问是防线争取的一步，但对于纠正引发乌克兰危机、制约欧洲的反应的失败外交政策 — — 即欧洲被误导的邻国政策（Neighborhood Policy，ENP）以及混乱的能源方针 — — 无济于事。


On both of these fronts, the EU’s lack of strategic vision has created the impression that Europe is repeatedly being outmaneuvered by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

在这两条阵线上，欧洲缺乏战略眼光，以至于给人们造成了被俄罗斯总统普京玩弄于鼓掌之间的印象。


It increasingly appears that Ukraine is becoming locked in a “frozen conflict” – Russia’s foreign-policy specialty.

乌克兰危机日益表现出陷入“冻结冲突”的迹象 — — 此乃俄罗斯外交政策的专长。


Indeed, the situation in Ukraine represents a tactical victory for Russia, with the fragile but enduring ceasefire – and accompanying legislation that grants Donetsk and Luhansk considerable political autonomy – allowing Russia to entrench the conflict near the EU’s border.

事实上，乌克兰局势表明俄罗斯取得了战术性胜利，脆弱但一直得以维持的停火 — — 以及随之发生的授予顿涅茨克和卢甘斯克巨大政治自治权的立法 — — 让俄罗斯可以在欧盟眼皮底下根深蒂固地建立冲突。


Moreover, the delayed implementation of key elements of the EU’s association agreement with Ukraine is clear evidence that, at the moment, Russia dictates the terms of EU-Ukrainian engagement.

此外，欧盟与乌克兰的入盟协定的关键要素迟迟得不到执行，这清楚地表明眼下俄罗斯主宰着欧盟-乌克兰联姻的条件。


In Europe, the Kremlin has been able to pursue a successful divide-and-rule strategy, particularly in view of Hungary’s decision to suspend gas flows to Ukraine.

在欧洲，克里姆林宫一直能够追求成功的分而治之（divide-and-rule）战略，匈牙利暂停向乌克兰输气的决定就是显著的例子。


Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s government, whose behavior in recent years has been at odds with the EU’s criteria for democracy, now openly approves of authoritarian regimes – and Putin’s, in particular – with serious potential consequences for European unity.

匈牙利总理奥班政府近几年来的行为与欧盟的民主标准格格不入，现在又公开支持给欧洲的统一带来严重阴影的极权政权 — — 特别是普京政权。


Nonetheless, the timing of the current ceasefire, which coincides with the installation of a new EU Commission, is advantageous, as is Putin’s shortsighted emphasis on tactical victories.

尽管如此，当前停火的时机 — — 正逢欧盟委员会换届 — — 非常有利，普京短视地强调战术性胜利亦然。


EU leaders should take advantage of the break in the fighting to stop reacting and start anticipating.

欧盟领导人应该利用战斗间歇停止被动反应，开始主动预测。


With a long-term strategic vision, the EU could overwhelm and ultimately undermine Putin’s short-term successes.

欧盟可以着眼于长期战略，克服并最终破坏普京的短期成功。


Such a vision must include a reconceptualization of the ENP.

如此算盘必须包括重新定义ENP。


The program’s mission – to help guide the political, social, and economic transitions of neighboring states – is not inherently problematic; the problem lies in the way that the mission has been interpreted and pursued.

该计划的任务 — — 帮助引导邻国的政治、社会和经济转型 — — 并无本质问题；问题在于该任务的解释和执行方法。


For starters, the ENP assumes that all of the EU’s neighbors, both in the south and in the east, ultimately want to realize European values and structures in their own countries.

首先，ENP假设所有欧盟邻国 — — 不管是南部邻国还是东部邻国 — — 说到底都希望在本国实现欧洲价值和结构。


In other words, the ENP does not account for the developmental, cultural, and aspirational differences among the EU’s partner countries.

换句话说，ENP没有考虑欧盟伙伴国之间的发展、文化和志趣差异。


The ENP suffers operationally from its excessively technical approach and lack of strategic vision.

在实际操作中，ENP过度强调技术方针，缺少战略眼光，因此大受影响。


For example, before the Ukraine crisis, the European Commission was so focused on negotiating the technical features of the association agreement that it did not consider adequately the potential fallout of the process – such as, say, a response from Russia.

比如，在乌克兰危机前，欧盟委员会全部精力都集中在入盟协定的技术细节上，完全没有充分考虑该进程潜在后果 — — 比如俄罗斯的反应。


To be sure, the EU recognized its need for a coherent strategy, and attempted to resolve it by establishing the European External Action Service and the position of High Representative for Foreign Affairs.

平心而论，欧盟认识到需要统一的战略，也试图通过设立欧洲对外行动署（European External Action Service，EEAS）和对外事务高级代表解决这一问题。


But the EEAS ended up in a turf war with the European Commission, and outgoing High Representative Catherine Ashton did little to ease the tension, owing to her unwillingness to involve herself in intra-EU disagreements.

但EEAS最终在与欧盟委员会的扯皮中无疾而终，而即将卸任的高级代表凯瑟琳·阿什顿（Catherine Ashton）也没能缓和这一紧张局面，因为她自己也不愿卷入欧盟内部的纠纷中。


It is telling that Ashton has made progress exclusively in areas defined by ample consensus, such as the negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program and the pact between Kosovo and Serbia.

很能说明问题的是阿什顿只在用充分共识的领域取得了进展，如伊朗核计划谈判和科索沃与塞尔维亚的契约。


Further eroding Europe’s effectiveness is its fragmented approach to securing energy supplies.

进一步制约欧洲效率的是其在确保能源供给方面的各自为政。


With every country largely controlling its own energy policy, Europe’s energy market has become inefficient and excessively dependent on Russian supplies.

各个国家大体上都控制着本国的能源政策，欧洲能源市场变得效率低下，过度依赖俄罗斯的供给。


To the extent that there has been an EU-wide energy strategy, it has related to renewables, rather than the intersection of geopolitics and energy security.

泛欧盟能源政策是存在的，但是关于可再生能源而非地缘政治和能源安全互动的。


But there is reason for hope.

但我们仍可抱有很大希望。


The new Commission, which its president, Jean Claude Juncker, has restructured significantly, could provide Europe with the strategic leadership it so badly needs.

新欧盟委员会主席让·克劳德·容克（Jean Claude Juncker）对其进行了大刀阔斧的重组，将为欧洲提供急需的战略领导。


In fact, Juncker has already expressed a desire to integrate incoming High Representative Federica Mogherini into the Commission’s policy program.

事实上，容克已经表达了让即将赴任的高级代表费得利卡·莫格里尼（Federica Mogherini）参与欧盟委员会政策计划的意思。


The new structure – which tasks Mogherini with guiding and coordinating the work of multiple commissioners, including those responsible for trade, the ENP, and climate and energy – should strengthen the coherence and direction of EU policies, particularly after Mogherini completes her European Council-mandated assessment of the global strategic landscape.

这一新结构 — — 莫格里尼将负担指导和协调多名委员工作的任务，包括负责贸易、ENP和气候与能源的委员 — — 应能强化欧盟政策的统一和防相，特别是在莫格里尼完成了她的欧洲理事会任命的全球战略局势评估后。


But a restructured Commission is not enough to ensure a reset of Europe’s foreign-policy strategy.

但重组后的欧盟委员会仍不足以确保欧洲外交政策战略的重设。


For that to happen, Mogherini must assert herself as a leader, backed by Juncker and the new European Council president, Donald Tusk.

若要实现这一点，莫格里尼必须把自己当作受容克和欧洲理事会主席唐纳德·塔斯克（Donald Tusk）支持的领导者。


And, most important, all EU member states must recommit themselves to cooperation.

最重要的是，所有欧盟成员国都必须承诺合作。


The Ukrainian people have demonstrated the power of Europe’s values.

乌克兰人民已经证明了欧洲价值的力量。


Indeed, Europe has a large set of tools at its disposal; it just needs to figure out how to use them.

事实上，欧洲有的是可用手段；它只是需要明白如何使用。


If it can, it will be better able to respond not only to the Russian challenge, but also to many of the other challenges that characterize today’s rapidly shifting global environment.

如果可以，欧洲不但可更好地响应俄罗斯挑战，对当今快速变化的全球环境的其他许多挑战同样如此。


A Europe of Women?

女性主导欧洲？


PARIS – Are women in Europe on the verge of becoming an engine for political change?

发自巴黎 — — 欧洲女性是否将摇身一变成为政治变革的原动力？


In economic-development circles, experience and common sense suggest that progress, accountability, and hard work start with and depend on women.

经验和常识告诉我们，经济发展周期中的进步，责任和勤奋都发端于女性并依靠她们走向成功。


Micro-credits, for example, are much more efficient when women receive and repay them.

以小额贷款为例，由女性获取并偿付的贷款一般都更有效率。


Perhaps because they bear children and must find the means to feed them, women are now perceived as the best and most determined “agents of change.”

或许因为女性往往负有养育儿女的责任，于是也就成了最优秀且最坚决的“变革代理人 ” 。


That seems to be as true now of European politics as it has been of economics in parts of Africa and Asia.

上述情况早就在亚非部分经济体中有所体现，而当今欧洲政治似乎也在向其靠拢。


The results of Italy’s recent municipal elections could be a signal of an incipient electoral dynamic: it was women who voted Silvio Berlusconi’s party out of power in Milan, a city that he has long controlled (and the original seat of his power).

最近的意大利地方政府大选则堪称这种新生选举原动力所发出的一个信号：正是女性选票在米兰市长选举中把西尔维奥·贝卢斯科尼的政党拉了下台，要知道米兰一直以来都由贝氏控制（也是其权力的根源所在 ） 。


No direct link exists between that result and the dramatic Dominique Strauss-Kahn scandal in New York, but in the immediate aftermath of DSK’s arrest, Italian women and young voters decisively mobilized to defeat Berlusconi’s party (led in Milan, ironically, by a woman).

贝卢斯科尼阵营的溃败与国际货币基金组织前总裁斯特劳斯-卡恩在纽约的离奇性丑闻本无直接联系，但在后者被捕之后，意大利的女性和年轻选民当即动员起来反对贝卢斯科尼阵营（讽刺的是该阵营的米兰市长恰好是位女性 ） 。


These voters could no longer stand the combination of machismo and vulgarity that had once served so well the man Italian humorists now call “Berlus-Kahn.”

她们再也无法忍受这种大男子主义和粗鄙言行的结合体，即便这些元素曾被如今意大利漫画家称为“贝卢斯-卡恩”的那个男人玩得出神入化。


When Berlusconi first came to power 17 years ago, he had the support of a majority of women.

当贝卢斯科尼在17年前首次当权的时候，他曾受到广大女性的一致爱戴。


They were not discouraged by his ambivalent perception of them (by turns celebrating their traditional domesticity and glorifying their sexual objectification).

她们并未受到他对女性矛盾看法的影响（一边赞美她们在传统家庭生活中的角色，另一方面又将她们比作男人的性玩物 ） 。


But Italian society has changed: most women are now working, and they are no longer willing to accept Belusconi’s anachronistic and outrageous chauvinism.

但意大利的社会早已今非昔比：如今大部分女性都是职业女性，因此对贝卢斯科尼那套陈词滥调及其胡作非为的大男子主义失去了兴趣。


Italian men may pity the aging, isolated leader, who looks increasingly like his wax effigy at Madame Tussaud’s.

意大利男性可能会同情这位日渐衰老孤立的领导人，因为他越来越像自己在杜莎夫人蜡像馆里的蜡像了。


But Italian women (indeed, women everywhere, it seems) feel only anger and humiliation over a man so obsessed with himself, his various criminal trials, and his vulgar pleasures that he appears to them to have no purpose left except to remain in power as long as possible.

但对意大利的女性来说（事实上几乎世界各地的女性都一样 ） ， 她们对一个如此自恋，如此沉迷于各种犯罪指控和低级趣味的人感到无比愤怒和羞耻，在她们眼中贝卢斯科尼一无是处，只不过是个贪恋权位的政客而已。


Women, of course, are not alone in their opposition to Berlusconi, but they made the difference in Milan.

当然反对贝卢斯科尼的并不仅仅是女性，但她们在米兰表现得特别抢眼。


They are the incarnation of modernity, animated by a yearning for simple dignity and respect.

她们成为了现代性的化身，在渴求基本尊严与尊重的驱使下挺身而出。


They are not alone in the vanguard of a new Europe of women.

在崭新的女性主导的欧洲中，她们不是一个人在战斗。


As Iceland spiraled into bankruptcy, owing the irresponsible behavior of its mostly male political and financial elites, the people of Iceland decided that only a strong and responsible woman could redress the country’s problems.

随着冰岛逐渐破产的过程中 — — 这是由其主要由男性组成的政治和金融界精英阶层的不负责任行为所导致的 — — 其国民一致认定，只有一个强势和勇于担当的女性才能解决国家当前所面临的问题。


So they elected one as President.

于是他们选出了一位女总统。


The depth and gravity of the current economic and social crisis in countries like Greece, Portugal, and Spain present women with a new opportunity.

在希腊、葡萄牙和西班牙这样的国家，国内经济和社会危机的深刻和严重程度也为当地女性带来一次新的机会。


Confronted with what many of them perceive as the equivalent of an “economic war,” women are playing an increasingly important role in maintaining their families’ financial security.

在面对被许多人所谓的“经济战争”时，女性在维持家庭财政安全方面扮演了越来越重要的角色。


And the more widespread this becomes, the more women will seek a political role that reflects their economic clout.

随着危机的扩散，女性会寻求获取更多能够体现其经济影响力的政治地位。


Of course, women’s changing status may not translate immediately into growing political influence.

当然女性地位的变化不会立刻转化为政治影响力。


And the rest of Europe might never follow the example of Scandinavia, where gender equality has advanced much further than anywhere else.

而欧洲其他国家可能永远不会向斯堪的那维亚半岛国家看齐 — — 在那里的性别平等要比世界任何地方都发展得更快。


But such a dynamic does now seem to be in motion.

但这种动力确实不断在推进之中。


Similarly, regardless of the outcome of DSK’s trial in New York, the case might represent a turning point in the treatment of women in Europe.

同样，不管IMF前总裁的纽约审判结果如何，这个案子都将成为欧洲女性社会待遇的一个转折点。


Public and private displays of atavistic machismo, one hopes, will no longer be considered acceptable.

在人们的意识中，那种对公开或私下的返祖式大男子主义行为的认同也将一去不返了。


In the Arab world, too, from Tunis to Cairo, young women have played an important role in the revolutionary process.

与此同时在从突尼斯到开罗的阿拉伯世界里，年轻女性在这场茉莉花革命中也扮演了重要角色。


Their appetite for change – understandable, given the treatment of women in traditional Muslim societies – appears to be one of the main causes underlying the force of the revolutionary impulse in Tunisia and Egypt.

她们对变革的渴望 — — 只要想一下她们在传统穆斯林社会中的待遇，就不难理解这种渴望了 — — 成为了突尼斯和埃及革命动力的主要来源之一。


None of this is to argue that “women” are a universal force for positive change in Europe and around the world.

但上述一切也并不能证明“女性”就是欧洲以及全世界改革的积极力量。


Consider, for example, Marine Le Pen, the new head of France’s National Front, Elena Ceaucescu, the sordid wife of the former Romanian dictator, or, more recently, Tunisian ex-President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s wife, Leila Trabelsi, who fled to Dubai with 1.5 tons of gold plundered from the central bank.

不要忘记这世界上还有诸如法国国民阵线的新女领袖马琳·勒庞，恶行累累的前罗马尼亚独裁者之妻埃列娜·齐奥塞斯库，以及最近曝光的莱拉·特拉贝尔西，这位突尼斯前总统本阿里的妻子逃亡到了迪拜，还不忘带上从突尼斯中央银行盗取的1.5吨黄金。


The point, simply, is that with so many people in so many countries demanding far-reaching change, the politics of gender is very much in play – in Europe and beyond.

简而言之，在欧洲境内外的众多国家之中有如此多人渴望实现意义深远的革新，那么性别政治也会在其中大显身手。


The main question is whether the growing number of women in politics will deliver the different perspectives and modes of leadership that many voters (or protesters) now seem to crave.

但最主要的问题是，随着女性政治参与度的不断上升，她们又是否能创造出选民（或示威者们）渴望的崭新前景和领导模式呢？


A Euro Sabbatical

休病假的欧元区受灾国


MUNICH – Under substantial external pressure, the eurozone’s crisis-hit countries are, at long last, bringing themselves to make painful cuts in their government budgets.

发自慕尼黑 — — 在持续的外部压力之下，那些遭到危机侵袭的欧元区国家终于放弃了长期以来的抵抗，开始忍痛削减财政预算。


Salaries are being slashed and public employees sacked to reduce new borrowing to a tolerable level.

一方面大幅下调工资水平，另一方面削减公务员职位，希望能令新增债务的规模维持在一个可忍受的水平上。


And yet, competitiveness in Greece and Portugal, in particular, is not improving.

但这些国家的竞争力 — — 尤其是希腊和葡萄牙 — — 却并未得到改善。


The latest Eurostat figures on the evolution of the price index for self-produced goods (GDP deflator) show no tendency whatsoever in the crisis-stricken countries towards real devaluation. But real devaluation, achieved by lowering prices vis-à-vis their eurozone competitors, is the only way to re-establish these countries’ competitiveness.

最新的欧盟统计局数字显示：无论哪个受灾国家的自产商品价格指数（扣除GDP中的通货膨胀因素后）都没有出现向实质性贬值靠拢的趋势，而如果要重新树立竞争力优势的话就只能通过压低与其他欧元区国家竞争时的我方报价，也就是实质性贬值。


A reduction in unit labor costs can also increase competitiveness only to the extent that it actually results in price reductions.

也只有在真正实现价格下降的情况下，单位劳动力成本的降低才能转化为竞争力的提升。


After all, it was price inflation in the crisis countries, fueled by massive inflows of cheap credit following the introduction of the euro, that resulted in their loss of competitiveness, ballooning current-account deficits, and accumulation of enormous foreign debt.

毕竟，正是在引入欧元后廉价信贷大量涌入，随后引发价格通货膨胀才最终导致了这些国家的竞争力下降，经常账户赤字膨胀和大量外债的积累。


Now that capital markets are no longer willing to finance these deficits, prices should be going into reverse, but this, obviously, is not happening.

如今资本市场已不愿再去填补这些赤字缺口，因此价格应该逆向走低，但很显然，预料中的这一切都没有发生。


In 2010, inflation in some of the crisis countries lagged slightly behind that of their eurozone competitors.

在2010年，某些欧元区危机国的通胀水平仅比同区竞争者低一点点。


The latest Eurostat figures for the third quarter of 2011, however, are already showing a different picture: the price level in Portugal and Greece has remained practically unchanged over the course of the year, and in Italy and Spain it even rose slightly (by 0.4% and 0.3%, respectively).

但最新的2011年第三季度欧盟统计局数字则展示出一个截然不同的画面：葡萄牙和希腊的价格水平在经历了一整年的救灾行动后依然维持原状，意大利和西班牙的价格水平甚至还分别略微上升了0.4%和0.3 % 。


Only Ireland continued on a path of rapid deflation – as it has since the country’s real-estate bubble burst in 2006 – with a relative price decrease of 2.2%.

只有爱尔兰继续在迅速贬值 — — 从该国2006年地产泡沫爆破之后就是如此，至今相对价格已经下跌了2.2 % 。


On the whole, Ireland has become cheaper relative to its eurozone competitors by a total of 15% over the course of the past five years.

从整体上看，在经历了五年调整后爱尔兰相对于其他欧元区竞争者来说价格已经便宜了总共15 % 。


This internal devaluation is paying off: while Ireland was still running a current-account deficit of 5.6% of GDP in 2008, the European Commission expects the outturn for 2011 to have been a 0.7%-of-GDP current-account surplus.

这一内部贬值进程是有所回报的：爱尔兰在2008年时的经常账户赤字相当于GDP的5.6 % ， 而欧盟委员会预计该国会在2011年实现相当于GDP0.7%的盈余。


True, much of this is mere debt-service relief, given that Ireland was able to repay its foreign liabilities with self-printed money, for which it pays only 1% interest.

没错，考虑到爱尔兰可以自己印刷货币来偿还那些利率只有1%的外债，上述大部分成果都仅仅是缓解了债务偿付问题。


However, Ireland’s big trade surplus did improve further.

但爱尔兰的大宗贸易盈余确实得到了进一步改善。


Ireland owes much of this turnaround to its efficient export sector, whose supporters were able to enforce a political U-turn.

爱尔兰所实现的逆转大部分都归功于其高效的出口部门 — — 这些部门的支持者们有能力促成政治上的转向。


Greece, on the other hand, is under the influence of a strong import lobby.

相反希腊国内进口部门的游说力量却极为强大。


As the Greek economics minister, Michalis Chrysochoidis, has said, this is attributable to European Union subsidies, which drove entrepreneurs to follow the easy money into the import sector.

正如希腊经济部长米哈利斯·赫里索希季斯（Michalis Chrysochoidis）所说，这都要怪欧盟实施的补贴政策，搞得企业家们都跑到进口部门去挣快钱了。


Now these importers form a powerful bulwark against any policy that causes deflation, even though lowering prices – and thereby redirecting Greek demand from foreign to domestic products and helping tourism – is the only way to put the Greek economy back on its feet.

如今这些进口商已经构筑了一个强大的壁垒来抵制任何可能引发通货紧缩的政策，即便降低价格 — — 并因此将希腊的需求从外部转向内部产品同时扶助旅游业发展 — — 才是让希腊经济重回正轨的唯一方法。


Since Greece’s current-account deficit as a share of GDP was three times higher than Ireland’s, Greek prices would have to fall by about half to achieve the same kind of success.

由于希腊经常账户赤字占GDP的比例比爱尔兰高三倍，希腊的价格水平也必须下跌一半才能取得爱尔兰那样的成就。


It is inconceivable that Greece could manage that within the eurozone without widespread social unrest, if not conditions approaching those of civil war.

但谁也不相信希腊能在避免大规模社会动乱 — — 说不定还会濒临内战边缘 — — 的情况下作为欧元区成员国实现这一点。


But it isn’t just importers who are blocking real devaluation. Unions, too, are resisting the necessary wage reductions, and public and private debtors fear the prospect of insolvency if their assets and revenues are assessed at a lower value, while their debts remain unchanged.

而且阻止实质性贬值的不仅仅是进口商，公会也在抵制必要的工资削减，虽然债务总额依然不变，但无论公私债务人都害怕国家破产预期会令自己的资产和收益估值降低。


The situation is intractable.

由此可见，情况相当棘手。


Many people regard debt relief and socialization of debts as the only way out.

许多人都认为债务缓解以及债务社会化才是唯一出路。


This help has been given.

但其实这类手段早就实施了。


The recent agreement gave Greece relief of €237 billion ($316 billion), about 30% more than Greece’s net national income of roughly €180 billion euros.But such help only entrenches the wrong prices – and thus the economy’s lack of competitiveness.

最近签订的协议减免了希腊2370亿欧元（折合3160亿美元）的债务，比希腊约1800亿欧元的净国民收入还高出30 % 。 但这类援助仅仅是巩固了那些错误的价格 — — 以及随之产生的国家竞争力低下状况。


The debts will re-emerge like a tumor, growing year by year, while undermining the creditworthiness of stable eurozone countries.

这些债务会像一个肿瘤一样重新滋长起来，一天比一天更大，同时还会腐蚀那些稳健欧元区国家的资信可靠度。


If that happened, the euro would eventually collapse.

如果出现这个情况的话，欧元将最终走向崩溃。


Only a price reduction would create current-account surpluses and enable the crisis countries to pay off their foreign debts.

只有降低价格才能创造经常账户盈余并令这些受灾国家得以偿还自身外债。


It is time for Europe to come to terms with this remorseless truth.

而欧洲如今也是时候面对这个残酷的现实了。


Those crisis countries that do not want to take it upon themselves to lower their prices should be given the opportunity to leave the eurozone temporarily in order to devalue prices and debts.

那些不愿意自己行动起来降低价格的受灾国家应该获得一个暂时脱离欧元区以削减价格和债务的机会。


In other words, they should take a kind of euro sabbatical – a proposal that has now also been taken up by American economist Kenneth Rogoff.

换句话说，他们应该放一个欧元意义上的离岗病假 — — 正如美国经济学家肯尼思·罗格夫（Kenneth Rogoff）建议的那样。


After the ensuing financial thunderstorm died down, the sun would come out again very quickly.

在在随之而来的金融风暴逐渐散去之后，阳光将很快重新普照大地。


The creditor countries would have to shoulder big losses from write-downs, but they would still end up with more than they would have gotten had the crisis countries remained within the eurozone, because these countries’ new prosperity, gained by leaving, offers the only chance of recovering any assets at all.

那些债权国可能要承担因债务减免而带来的巨大损失，但相对于把那些受灾国留在欧元区内的做法，前者最终获得的好处会更多，因为这些受灾国通过脱离而实现的繁荣才是重新追回所有资产的唯一机会。


A Fair Deal for Turkey

土耳其的公平待遇


Turkey has been given what looks like an ultimatum from the EU Commission: open your ports for ships from Cyprus within a month, or you may risk a halt to the EU accession talks now underway.

土耳其好像收到了欧盟委员会的最后通牒，那就是在一个月内向来自塞浦路斯的船只开放港口，否则，就有暂停目前正在进行的入盟谈判的危险。


At the same time, the Commission’s latest report on Turkey’s progress toward accession notes that political reforms have slowed down, further calling into question the country’s future EU membership.

与此同时，委员会有关土耳其入盟进展的最新报告说明，政治改革已经放慢，从而进一步质疑该国未来加入欧盟的可能性。


The Commission’s progress report will be dealt with by the European Council next month.

欧盟理事会将在下月研究欧盟委员会的进展报告。


At that meeting, European leaders should ask themselves the following questions: Has the EU given Turkey a fair deal in the case of Cyprus?

在这一会议中，欧洲领导人应当向他们自己提出下面的问题：在塞浦路斯问题上，欧盟是否公平对待土耳其？


Has the EU’s behavior been consistent in supporting political reform in Turkey?

欧盟是否一如既往地支持土耳其的政治改革？


What are the EU’s long-term interests vis-à-vis Turkey?

在土耳其的问题上，欧盟的长久利益是什么？


If the answers to the first two questions are “no” – as I believe they are – the third question becomes vitally important.

如果前两个问题的答案正如我所相信的那样是否定的话，那么，第三个问题就极为重要。


True, Turkey has closed its ports to ships from (Greek) Cyprus, and this is a violation of agreements.

确实，土耳其对(希腊)塞浦路斯关闭了其港口，这违反了协议。


But it is also true that the northern Turkish part of Cyprus is denied access to free trade and other benefits from EU-membership.

但是，拒绝给予塞浦路斯北部的土耳其部分欧盟成员的自由贸易待遇以及其他利益也是事实。


This is because Cyprus remains a divided island.

这是因为塞浦路斯依然还是一个分裂的岛屿。


It was assumed that Cyprus should be united when the country joined the EU in 2004.

当时认为，当塞浦路斯在2004年加入欧盟之时将会统一。


A United Nations plan for unification was accepted by the Turkish part.

土耳其方面接受了联合国提出的统一方案。


But the Greek Cypriots voted against the plan because their leaders did not live up to the implicit deal with the EU to support it.

但是，希腊族塞浦路斯的领导人并没有遵守与欧盟的默契来支持这一方案，因此，它投票否决了这一方案。


Nevertheless, Cyprus became an EU member – but only the Greek part.

但是，塞浦路斯成为了欧盟成员，但仅仅是希腊部分。


This was clearly a mistake, because it made the EU part of the conflict.

这明显是一个错误，因为它使得欧盟成为冲突的一部分。


It gave Greek Cypriot leaders the possibility of blocking progress in negotiations between the EU and Turkey.

它给了塞浦路斯希腊族领导人阻碍欧盟与土耳其之间谈判进展的可能性。


So how can Turkey under these conditions maintain confidence in the EU’s fairness?

那么，在这种情况下，土耳其如何对欧盟的公平维持信心呢？


Political and legal reforms in Turkey in recent years have been remarkably far-reaching, for they have clearly been spurred by Turks’ wish to move closer to the EU.

近年来土耳其的政治和法治改革极为广泛，因为土耳其人向欧盟靠拢的愿望促进了这些改革。


But Turkish public support for EU membership has fallen dramatically as Turks have grown to feel that they are not being given a fair deal.

但是，土耳其人越发感觉到他们没有得到公平待遇，因此土耳其公众对于入盟的支持已经急剧下降。


This has given new strength to those who want Turkey to develop in another direction, towards a more Islamic society instead of a modern secular state.

这样，就给那些想要让土耳其向另一个方向发展的人增添了新的力量。 他们想要让土耳其向更为伊斯兰社会、而非现代世俗国家的方向发展。


Therefore, the recent lack of progress in Turkey’s reform process can to a large extent be explained by the EU’s behavior.

因此，欧盟的举动就可以在很大程度上解释最近土耳其的改革进程缺乏进展了。


This leaves us with the third question: what kind of Turkey does the EU want?

这样就出现了第三个问题：欧盟想要一个什么样的土耳其？


There should be no doubt about the answer: it is clearly in the EU’s interest to see Turkey’s democracy and economy continue to strengthen.

对于这一问题应当没有疑问，那就是，土耳其的民主和经济继续得到加强显然符合欧盟的利益。


More than 40 years ago, it was promised that once Turkey lives up to the preconditions for membership, it will be welcome in the EU.

四十多年前，欧盟保证说一旦土耳其满足了成员的先觉条件就将欢迎其入盟。


It is high time that European leaders take this promise seriously.

现在，欧盟领导人们应当认真履行这一保证了。


It is a sad fact that a large majority of voters in the EU are against Turkish membership.

欧盟内部的大多数选民反对土耳其入盟，这是一个悲哀的事实。


But they are reacting to the current situation.

但是，他们不过是对当前的局势做出反应。


When they are asked if they would like a reformed Turkey as a partner – a Turkey that lives up fully to the conditions for membership described in the Copenhagen Criteria (democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights, and an effective market economy) – many more are inclined to say yes.

如果问他们，他们是否想要一个改革后的土耳其作为伙伴，有更多的人倾向于说是的。 所谓改革后的土耳其，就是完全符合哥本哈根标准指定的入盟条件，也就是民主、法治、尊重人权以及有效的市场经济。


European leaders must therefore take up two challenges.

因此，欧洲领导人必须接受两项挑战。


First, they should say clearly to their own voters that the EU must live up to its promises to Turkey, and that this is in the larger interest of all Europeans.

首先，他们应当向自己的选民明确地说明，欧盟必须遵守对土耳其所做得保证，而且，这也符合所有欧洲人更大的利益。


Second, they should give Turkey a fair deal in the negotiations.

第二，他们必须在谈判中公平对待土耳其。


The first litmus test on European leadership concerns the practical problem of access to harbors.

欧洲领导作用的第一块试金石就是有关使用港口的现实问题。


Here the Finns, who chair the EU right now, have taken an initiative to implement a pragmatic solution that takes into consideration both sides in the conflict.

在这一问题上，欧盟轮值主席国芬兰提议落实一项现实的、考虑冲突双方的解决方案。


The Finnish initiative should be given strong support from all European leaders.

所有欧洲领导人都应该大力支持芬兰的提议。


At the same time, a new effort should be made to bring life to the UN’s proposals regarding Cyprus.

同时，应当重新努力让联合国有关塞浦路斯的提议恢复生机。


If this means putting pressure on some actors within the EU’s own ranks, so be it.

如果这意味着对某些欧盟成员国施加压力，那就应当如此。


A Farewell to (Glorious) War

永别了（荣耀的）战争


In recent days, Italy’s government fell after losing a parliamentary vote on the country’s troop deployment in Afghanistan, while Britain and Denmark announced that they are to begin withdrawing their troops from Iraq.

最近几天，意大利政府在国会中未能通过向阿富汗部署军队的议案之后倒台。 同时英国和丹麦也宣布了它们将开始把部队撤出伊拉克。


Whereas the Bush administration is deploying an additional 21,000 American soldiers in Iraq, and is pushing for more allied troops in Afghanistan, America’s allies are rejecting its Middle East policy.

而布什政府却正向伊拉克增派21000名美国士兵，并敦促盟国增兵阿富汗。 美国的盟友们正抵制其中东政策。


They are increasingly convinced that “victory” will be elusive in any asymmetric conflict between states, however powerful, and religiously driven armed insurgents.

它们日益坚信在任何不对称的国家间冲突中，不论武装叛乱者有多强大、其宗教驱动力有多深厚 ， “ 胜利”都是不可捉摸的。


Donald Rumsfeld’s dogma of military “transformation” – the technological upgrading of an army’s capacity to enable decisive victory with fewer troops – failed resoundingly in Iraq.

唐纳德·拉姆斯菲尔德的军事“转型”定论—以军队实力的技术升级来实现用更少的部队取得决定性胜利—在伊拉克彻底失败。


Nor could Israel, with its overwhelming technological advantage, defeat Hezbollah in Lebanon.

以色列即便拥有超强的技术优势也未能打败黎巴嫩真主党。


More rockets and missiles fell on northern Israel in 33 days than hit Britain during all of World War II.

在33天时间里落到以色列北部的火箭和导弹数量比二战期间袭击英国的还多。


So the Israelis now must reckon with an entirely new phenomenon: an asymmetric entity, Hezbollah, with nation-state firepower.

因此以色列人现在必须正视这一全新的现象：一个拥有国家级火力的不对称实体，真主党。


So the fierce debate over whether to increase the size of American ground forces in Iraq is beside the point.

所以关于是否应该扩大美军驻伊拉克地面部队规模的激烈争论是毫无意义的。


Neither the Soviet experience in Afghanistan in the 1980’s nor NATO’s today vindicates the claim that troop numbers are what matter most on the modern battlefield.

前苏联1980年代在阿富汗的经验和北约当今的情况都无法证明军队的数量是现代战场上最为重要的因素这一命题。


When geo-strategic military front lines are non-existent, as in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, mass no longer equals victory.

当地缘战略军事前沿不复存在，正如在科索沃、阿富汗和伊拉克那样，人多势众就不再等同于胜利。


The great military thinker Carl von Clausewitz’s notion of “decisive battles” as the “center of gravity” of war is simply irrelevant to conflicts that have no visible “center of gravity.”

伟大的军事思想家克劳斯·冯·克劳塞维茨关于将“决定性战役”作为战争的“重心”的理念在全然没有“重心”的冲突中也失去了用武之地。


Indeed, while wars from the time of Hannibal’s defeat of the Romans in 216 B.C. to the Gulf War of 1991 had this center of gravity, with a massive concentration of force capable of bringing an enemy to its knees, such industrial inter-state wars have now become an historical anachronism.

的确，尽管从公元前216年汉尼拔击溃罗马人到1991年的海湾战争都有一个这样的重心（其表现是能对敌方施以毁灭性打击的军事力量的大规模集中 ） ， 而这种工业化的国家间战争现在已经成为历史陈迹。


Most states nowadays lie within borders that are widely accepted as legitimate, and they increasingly abide by international norms of behavior in times of war.

现今大多数国家都有被广泛认可的合法边界，它们在战争时期也越来越遵守国际规范和行为准则。


In fact, the obligation of states to abide by humanitarian rules of conduct while their enemies are free to barbarize warfare is what makes asymmetric wars especially insoluble.

事实上，国家遵守人道主义行为规范的义务与其敌方肆意挑起野蛮战事的矛盾使得不对称的战争特别难以调解。


Moreover, in an era of global media and international war crimes courts, the criteria for states’ use of military force have become more complex than ever.

此外，在一个全球性媒体和国际战争罪行法庭的时代，国家使用武力的条件变得越来越复杂。


Inter-state combat may still occur where strategic front lines can be found, such as Israel’s border with Syria, India’s border with Pakistan, and the border dividing the two Koreas.

在战略前沿存在的地方，如叙以边界、印巴边界和南北韩分界线，国家间的武装冲突仍然可能发生。


In such cases, war, as the Egyptians showed in 1973, might still serve as an avenue to resolving a conflict.

在这种情况下，战争，正如埃及人在1973年所展示的那样，仍可能成为解决冲突的一种途径。