from __future__ import annotations import os import secrets import stat import sys from errno import EACCES, EIO, EISDIR from pathlib import Path from typing import Final def write_all(fd: int, data: bytes) -> None: """ Write the whole buffer to *fd*, looping over the short writes ``os.write`` is allowed to make. A marker written with a bare ``os.write`` can land partially: a peer reading it mid-write parses a truncated record as malformed or as a foreign holder. Looping until the buffer drains keeps the record atomic in the process and kernel view. No ``fsync``: filelock needs a complete record, not crash-durable storage. :param fd: file descriptor open for writing. :param data: bytes to write in full. :raises OSError: if a write reports zero progress before the record is complete. """ remaining = memoryview(data) while remaining: if (written := os.write(fd, remaining)) == 0: raise OSError(EIO, "os.write wrote 0 bytes before the record was complete") remaining = remaining[written:] def raise_on_not_writable_file(filename: str) -> None: """ Raise an exception if attempting to open the file for writing would fail. Separates files that can never be written from files that are writable but currently locked. :param filename: file to check :raises OSError: as if the file was opened for writing. """ try: # lstat, not stat: settles exists-and-writable in one syscall, and a hostile symlink at the lock path would # make stat inspect the link target, letting an attacker turn a contended acquire into a misleading # PermissionError / IsADirectoryError and probe that target's attributes. The real open passes O_NOFOLLOW and # refuses the symlink anyway. file_stat = os.lstat(filename) except OSError: return # does not exist, or an error the caller cannot act on # No mtime guard: the old `if st_mtime != 0` skip covered NFS/Linux quirks where os.lstat returned an all-zero # struct, which it no longer does. Skipping on mtime 0 let a read-only file or a directory at the lock path pass # as missing, so acquire() blocked forever on an open that cannot succeed. if not (file_stat.st_mode & stat.S_IWUSR): raise PermissionError(EACCES, "Permission denied", filename) if stat.S_ISDIR(file_stat.st_mode): if sys.platform == "win32": # pragma: win32 cover raise PermissionError(EACCES, "Permission denied", filename) raise IsADirectoryError(EISDIR, "Is a directory", filename) # pragma: win32 no cover def ensure_directory_exists(filename: Path | str) -> None: """ Ensure the directory containing the file exists (create it if necessary). :param filename: file. """ Path(filename).parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) def break_lock_file(lock_file: str, mtime_before: float, ino_before: int) -> None: """ Atomically break a stale lock file judged stale at modification time *mtime_before*. Rename the file to a process-private name before unlinking it, so two processes breaking the same lock cannot delete each other's work: only one rename of a given inode wins, the loser gets ``OSError``. After the rename, re-check the file. A newer modification time, or a different inode than *ino_before*, means a peer recreated the lock between the stale decision and the rename, so we grabbed a live file and abort, leaving the renamed file in place. A rollback rename is itself racy, the same trade-off as the soft read/write marker break. The inode check matters because filesystems with coarse modification-time granularity (NFS, FAT) can give a same-second recreation the old mtime, so mtime alone would miss it and unlink a live lock; the inode is the reliable identity, mirroring the token re-check in the soft read/write marker break. ``lstat`` avoids following a hostile symlink swapped in after the decision. The break name carries a random token so it is unguessable and unique per attempt. Without it two breakers in the same process share ``.break.``, and a second break can rename a recreated live lock onto that path in the window between the re-verify ``lstat`` above and the ``unlink`` below, deleting a live lock the inode check just approved. A private name keeps anyone else from targeting our break path, matching the soft read/write marker break. :param lock_file: path to the lock file to break. :param mtime_before: modification time observed when the lock was judged stale. :param ino_before: inode number observed when the lock was judged stale. :raises OSError: if the rename fails (e.g. the file vanished or is not owned in a sticky directory). """ break_path = f"{lock_file}.break.{os.getpid()}.{secrets.token_hex(16)}" Path(lock_file).rename(break_path) try: st_after = os.lstat(break_path) except OSError: return if st_after.st_mtime > mtime_before or st_after.st_ino != ino_before: return Path(break_path).unlink() def touch(name: str, *, fd: int | None = None) -> None: # Prefer the already-open, already-verified fd so a peer that swaps a symlink or a different file in at the # path after our O_NOFOLLOW read cannot redirect the touch: utime then targets the inode behind the fd. # Where the platform cannot utime an fd, fall back to a path-based touch that still refuses to follow a # symlink where supported, matching the O_NOFOLLOW reads used elsewhere here. if fd is not None and _SUPPORTS_UTIME_FD: # pragma: needs utime-fd os.utime(fd, None) return os.utime(name, None, follow_symlinks=not _SUPPORTS_UTIME_NOFOLLOW) # Retargeting os.utime to an open fd lets a heartbeat refresh the exact inode it verified instead of whatever the # pathname now names. _SUPPORTS_UTIME_FD: Final[bool] = sys.platform != "win32" and os.utime in os.supports_fd # os.utime follows symlinks unless told not to; not every platform can refuse the follow, so probe support. _SUPPORTS_UTIME_NOFOLLOW: Final[bool] = os.utime in os.supports_follow_symlinks __all__ = [ "break_lock_file", "ensure_directory_exists", "raise_on_not_writable_file", "touch", "write_all", ]