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c7bece7 | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 | """Schema bootstrap.
The project deliberately ships no migration tool: the schema is created from the
ORM metadata and then hardened with raw DDL (the append-only trigger, functional
indexes). That keeps the free-tier deployment story to a single command while
still putting the integrity rules *in the database*.
`init_schema` is idempotent and safe to call on every boot. Three properties
matter once the database is a *hosted* one rather than a container on localhost:
* **It must be cheap when there is nothing to do.** `create_all` plus the DDL
loop is ~40 statements, and every statement is a network round trip. Against a
database one ocean away that is tens of seconds of start-up on every boot, and
a platform start-up probe will kill the container long before it finishes. So
a single-round-trip check runs first and skips the whole thing when the schema
is already current.
* **It must not open a hole while it runs.** The hardening DDL recreates the
append-only trigger with `DROP` then `CREATE`. Between those two statements the
audit log is writable. Skipping the DDL entirely when the guard is already
installed means the normal boot never opens that window at all.
* **Concurrent boots must not race.** Two replicas starting together could
interleave their `DROP`/`CREATE`. The apply path takes a transaction-scoped
advisory lock, so they serialise and the loser sees a current schema.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
from sqlalchemy import CheckConstraint, UniqueConstraint, bindparam, text
from sqlalchemy.exc import SQLAlchemyError
from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncConnection, AsyncEngine
from app.core.logging import get_logger
from app.models.tables import DDL_STATEMENTS, Base
logger = get_logger(__name__)
# Objects created by the raw DDL rather than by the ORM metadata.
_GUARD_TRIGGER = "trg_audit_log_no_update"
_GUARD_FUNCTION = "ledgerlens_audit_log_is_append_only"
_DDL_INDEXES = frozenset({"ix_extractions_vendor_lower"})
# Arbitrary but fixed: the advisory-lock key that serialises schema application
# across processes. Any constant works as long as every replica uses the same one.
_SCHEMA_LOCK_KEY = 0x1EDBE12E
_EXPECTED_TABLES = frozenset(Base.metadata.tables)
_EXPECTED_INDEXES = (
frozenset(
index.name
for table in Base.metadata.tables.values()
for index in table.indexes
if index.name is not None
)
| _DDL_INDEXES
)
# Named CHECK and UNIQUE constraints. `table.indexes` above does not include
# these, so without them "the schema is current" was a claim about tables and
# indexes only — while the integrity rules this project actually relies on are
# constraints: the enum CHECKs, and `UNIQUE(document_id, fingerprint)` that stops
# re-screening duplicating a finding. A database carrying every table and index
# but none of those would have passed the probe, and in production
# (`DB_MANAGE_SCHEMA=false`) nothing would ever have healed it.
#
# `UNIQUE(file_hash)` — the idempotency key — is already covered: it is declared
# `unique=True, index=True`, so SQLAlchemy emits it as a named unique *index* and
# it appears above. The one gap left is `extractions.document_id`, whose
# column-level `unique=True` produces a constraint the metadata leaves unnamed;
# Postgres names it `extractions_document_id_key`, but that name is the server's
# invention rather than something declared here, so it is not asserted.
_EXPECTED_CONSTRAINTS = frozenset(
constraint.name
for table in Base.metadata.tables.values()
for constraint in table.constraints
if isinstance(constraint, CheckConstraint | UniqueConstraint) and constraint.name is not None
)
# One statement, one round trip: everything needed to decide whether the boot can
# skip the DDL. Counting rather than listing keeps the result tiny.
_SCHEMA_PROBE = (
text(
"""
SELECT
(SELECT count(*) FROM pg_class c
JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = c.relnamespace
WHERE n.nspname = current_schema()
AND c.relkind = 'r'
AND c.relname IN :tables) AS tables_present,
(SELECT count(*) FROM pg_class c
JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = c.relnamespace
WHERE n.nspname = current_schema()
AND c.relkind = 'i'
AND c.relname IN :indexes) AS indexes_present,
(SELECT count(*) FROM pg_constraint c
JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = c.connamespace
WHERE n.nspname = current_schema()
AND c.conname IN :constraints) AS constraints_present,
(SELECT count(*) FROM pg_trigger
WHERE tgname = :guard_trigger AND NOT tgisinternal) AS guard_trigger,
(SELECT count(*) FROM pg_proc p
JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = p.pronamespace
WHERE n.nspname = current_schema()
AND p.proname = :guard_function) AS guard_function
"""
)
.bindparams(
bindparam("tables", expanding=True),
bindparam("indexes", expanding=True),
bindparam("constraints", expanding=True),
)
.columns()
)
async def _schema_is_current(connection: AsyncConnection) -> bool:
"""True when every table, index and integrity guard is already installed.
Deliberately conservative: anything missing returns False and the caller runs
the full idempotent apply. Adding a table or index therefore heals itself on
the next boot without needing a migration.
"""
row = (
await connection.execute(
_SCHEMA_PROBE,
{
"tables": list(_EXPECTED_TABLES),
"indexes": list(_EXPECTED_INDEXES),
"constraints": list(_EXPECTED_CONSTRAINTS),
"guard_trigger": _GUARD_TRIGGER,
"guard_function": _GUARD_FUNCTION,
},
)
).one()
return bool(
row.tables_present == len(_EXPECTED_TABLES)
and row.indexes_present == len(_EXPECTED_INDEXES)
and row.constraints_present == len(_EXPECTED_CONSTRAINTS)
and row.guard_trigger == 1
and row.guard_function == 1
)
async def _apply_schema(connection: AsyncConnection) -> None:
"""Create tables and apply the hardening DDL. Caller holds the advisory lock."""
await connection.run_sync(Base.metadata.create_all)
for statement in DDL_STATEMENTS:
await connection.execute(text(statement))
class SchemaNotManagedError(RuntimeError):
"""The schema is incomplete and this process is not permitted to build it."""
async def init_schema(engine: AsyncEngine, *, manage: bool = True) -> None:
"""Create tables and apply hardening DDL. Idempotent and safe to run on every boot.
With ``manage=False`` the schema is *verified* and never modified. That is what
lets production run as a role holding DML rights and nothing else — no
ownership, and therefore no ability to `ALTER TABLE audit_log DISABLE TRIGGER`,
which is the one way to get around the append-only guarantee (AUDIT.md §4c,
Residual 1).
It refuses to start rather than continuing against a half-built schema. A
service that boots and then fails on the first insert with a permission error
is strictly harder to diagnose than one that says, at boot, exactly which
command to run and as whom.
"""
async with engine.connect() as connection:
if await _schema_is_current(connection):
logger.info("schema_ready", extra={"tables": len(_EXPECTED_TABLES), "applied": False})
return
if not manage:
logger.error("schema_incomplete_and_unmanaged")
msg = (
"the schema is missing or incomplete and DB_MANAGE_SCHEMA is false, so this "
"process will not create it. Run the migration as the owning role first:\n"
" DATABASE_URL='<owner url>' python scripts/grant_app_role.py --migrate\n"
"This is deliberate: the application runs without ownership so it cannot "
"disable the audit log's append-only trigger."
)
raise SchemaNotManagedError(msg)
async with engine.begin() as connection:
# Serialise concurrent boots; released automatically when the transaction ends.
await connection.execute(
text("SELECT pg_advisory_xact_lock(:key)"), {"key": _SCHEMA_LOCK_KEY}
)
# Re-check under the lock: a replica that raced us may have just finished.
if await _schema_is_current(connection):
logger.info("schema_ready", extra={"tables": len(_EXPECTED_TABLES), "applied": False})
return
await _apply_schema(connection)
logger.info("schema_ready", extra={"tables": len(_EXPECTED_TABLES), "applied": True})
async def wait_for_database(
engine: AsyncEngine,
*,
max_attempts: int = 5,
initial_delay_s: float = 1.0,
) -> None:
"""Block until the database answers, with bounded exponential backoff.
A serverless Postgres (Neon, Aurora Serverless) suspends its compute when
idle and takes several seconds to wake. Without this, the first connection of
a cold boot can exceed the driver timeout and the process dies with an opaque
error even though the database is perfectly healthy a second later.
Raises the last error once the attempts are exhausted, so a genuinely
unreachable database still fails loudly rather than hanging for ever.
"""
delay = initial_delay_s
for attempt in range(1, max_attempts + 1):
try:
async with engine.connect() as connection:
await connection.execute(text("SELECT 1"))
if attempt > 1:
logger.info("database_ready", extra={"attempts": attempt})
return
except (SQLAlchemyError, OSError) as exc: # TimeoutError subclasses OSError
if attempt == max_attempts:
logger.error(
"database_unreachable",
extra={"attempts": attempt, "error": type(exc).__name__},
)
raise
logger.warning(
"database_not_ready_retrying",
extra={"attempt": attempt, "delay_s": delay, "error": type(exc).__name__},
)
await asyncio.sleep(delay)
delay *= 2
async def drop_schema(engine: AsyncEngine) -> None:
"""Drop every LedgerLens table. Used only by the integration test fixtures."""
async with engine.begin() as connection:
# The append-only trigger blocks DELETE but not DROP TABLE; remove it first
# so a test teardown cannot be tripped up by its own guard rail.
await connection.execute(text(f"DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS {_GUARD_TRIGGER} ON audit_log;"))
await connection.run_sync(Base.metadata.drop_all)
logger.info("schema_dropped")
|