Question: What are the most common contributing factors in bird strike incidents?

Answer:
**Analysis:**

Based on the provided evidence, I cannot comprehensively answer the question about the most common contributing factors in bird strike incidents. The retrieved evidence contains minimal information specifically about bird strikes.

The only bird strike-related information comes from the knowledge graph context, which indicates that bird strikes are connected to several factors and components:

From the knowledge graph relationships, bird strikes are associated with:
- Aircraft components: wings, landing gear, and engine 2
- Flight phases: approach phase and takeoff roll
- Environmental factors: increased bird activity and birds as a causal factor
- Operational outcomes: aircraft grounding and elevated EGT (Exhaust Gas Temperature)
- Aircraft type: CRJ900
- Location context: Runway 28L at ORD (O'Hare)

However, the actual incident reports provided (ACNs 1700214, 1140505, and 1039017) do not contain any bird strike incidents. These reports detail:
- An inadvertent engine shutdown during approach
- An altitude deviation during a localizer back course approach
- A landing gear disagree warning after takeoff

Without access to actual bird strike incident reports from the ASRS database, I cannot identify patterns in contributing factors, analyze causal chains, or provide evidence-based insights into the most common factors leading to bird strike incidents.

**Causal Factors:**
Insufficient evidence to establish causal chains for bird strike incidents.

**Sources:**
No ACN numbers can be cited as sources for bird strike analysis, as none of the provided reports (ACN 1700214, ACN 1140505, ACN 1039017) contain bird strike incidents.

I was flying an ILS (Instrument Landing System) approach to Runway XXR during VMC (Visual Meteorological Conditions) conditions. At 1;000 and 500 ft. AGL; the aircraft was stable and on glide slope with target landing speed. At approximately 400 ft. AGL I noticed a yaw to the left along with a master caution light. I corrected the yaw condition and asked the Captain to look at the caution. The aircraft remained stable and I landed without incident. Upon landing roll out the left engine was observed to be at 0 RPM.The Captain informed me that he was guarding the throttles and adjusted his posit

We had an early afternoon report and had endured mechanical and weather delays for approximately 8 hours prior to leaving; which included boarding the passengers twice prior to cancelling the flight all together. Conditions in FAY indicated that the ceilings were going to be 3;200 FT or higher and generally VFR. Ramp conditions made taxiing to the runway very arduous. Once airborne our flight was routine. During the descent we found that the conditions on the ATIS were indicating VFR with BKN 3;200 and we could see the ground at our location approximately 30 NM from the airport. ATIS further i

FAY and did not have the plate on board. We set everything up and the First Officer held the plate in his chart holder. During my brief I explained the plate for a VFR approach due to the current conditions should allow a visual landing after we go through the BKN layer. After intercepting the final approach course we descended to 2;100 FT. At ALTSCAP; the 'ALTSCAP' call was made and First Officer dialed in 1;800 FT. I descended to 1;800 FT. At ALTSCAP; the 'ALTSCAP' call was made and First Officer put in 600 FT. I then made the mistake of not looking to make sure we were past MORGY (the desce

and around 1;000 FT the ATC Controller explained he was getting a low altitude alert. We realized that we were to low and began the climb back to 1;800 FT; reaching 1;800 FT at MORGY. Being stabilized we began the descent down to our MDA of 600 FT. Once there we did not see any of the runway environment so we executed a missed approach. While receiving vectors for the ILS 04 we were told that a new ATIS was just released; Visibility - 7; ceiling - 300 FT. We executed the ILS 04 with no issue and had eyes on the runway at 200 FT AGL. The stress and issues occurring earlier in the day were a con

had been a long day and a long 2 days prior to that due to weather around the system. Having only 1 approach plate was a huge pilot error on my part. The incorrect ATIS corresponded to the TAF that we had prior to departing; so we didn't question the weather like we should have. It seemed that the weather was beginning to get worse; so if ATC could have said that we might not be able to get in on [Runway] 22 I would have immediately chosen [Runway] 04 with a slight 4-5 knot tailwind that would get me down to a lower minimum. Rest and more attention to detail could have prevented these issues.

were vectored into the approach at 2;100 FT and once established; descended to 1;800 FT enroute to MORGY (FAF). After Captain made the callout of 'ALTSCAP'; I entered the MDA of 600 FT into the altitude selector. On the FMS map; there was a crossing restriction of 900 FT at JONSI which Captain asked me about. I checked the approach plate and told him there was not a restriction on the plate and JONSI was only identified as the MAP on the approach plate. While I was further reviewing the plate to make sure I had given him completely accurate information; he began to descend. After I confirmed t

minimums. At approximately 1;000 FT; Fayetteville Tower queried us; asking us to confirm that we were descending via the LOC BC 22 approach. It was at this point; we became aware that our descent to minimums had begun too early. We immediately returned to 1;800 FT; the published altitude prior to MORGY. Upon reaching MORGY we resumed the approach normally and executed a missed approach at the MAP (JONSI) due to not being able to see the runway. After the missed approach; the Departure/Approach Controller informed us that Tower had just updated the weather to show the ceiling at 300 AGL and low

we had began the LOC BC 22 approach. We requested ILS 4 based on the new information; flew the approach; and landed.The early descent error could have been avoided by a final cross check of all position/navigational information before I started scanning outside for the runway rather than assuming the descent was occurring at the correct phase of the approach. My heads down time looking at the plate to make sure I had not missed any notes on the approach plate and attempting to figure out why the FMS was showing a crossing restriction at JONSI of 900 FT distracted me from doing such. The missed


Question: Trace the causal chain from engine failure to go-around decisions

Answer:
**Analysis:**

Based on the provided evidence, I cannot trace a direct causal chain from engine failure to go-around decisions, as the retrieved incident reports do not contain any examples of engine failures leading to go-around scenarios.

The evidence includes three distinct incident reports:

1. **ACN 1140505**: A CRJ-200 crew executing a LOC BC 22 approach at Fayetteville (FAY) who descended prematurely below the published altitude before reaching the Final Approach Fix (MORGY), received a low altitude alert from ATC, climbed back to the correct altitude, and then executed a missed approach due to inability to see the runway environment at minimums.

2. **ACN 1039017**: A CRJ-200 experiencing a gear disagree warning after takeoff, requiring an emergency declaration and return to the departure airport.

3. **ACN 1007414**: A crew dealing with a potentially low tire during pushback inspection.

None of these incidents involve engine failures, and the only go-around/missed approach scenario (ACN 1140505) was caused by weather conditions (ceiling dropping to 300 feet AGL) rather than any engine-related issue.

While the knowledge graph context indicates relationships between engine failure and various aircraft events, and separately between go-around and approach-related events, the provided incident report evidence does not contain cases where engine failure directly caused go-around decisions.

**Causal Factors:**

The evidence is insufficient to establish a causal chain from engine failure to go-around decisions. The single go-around event in the evidence (ACN 1140505) was caused by deteriorating weather conditions, not engine failure.

**Sources:**

- ACN 1140505 (premature descent and missed approach due to weather)
- ACN 1039017 (gear disagree warning)
- ACN 1007414 (tire inspection issue)

We had an early afternoon report and had endured mechanical and weather delays for approximately 8 hours prior to leaving; which included boarding the passengers twice prior to cancelling the flight all together. Conditions in FAY indicated that the ceilings were going to be 3;200 FT or higher and generally VFR. Ramp conditions made taxiing to the runway very arduous. Once airborne our flight was routine. During the descent we found that the conditions on the ATIS were indicating VFR with BKN 3;200 and we could see the ground at our location approximately 30 NM from the airport. ATIS further i

FAY and did not have the plate on board. We set everything up and the First Officer held the plate in his chart holder. During my brief I explained the plate for a VFR approach due to the current conditions should allow a visual landing after we go through the BKN layer. After intercepting the final approach course we descended to 2;100 FT. At ALTSCAP; the 'ALTSCAP' call was made and First Officer dialed in 1;800 FT. I descended to 1;800 FT. At ALTSCAP; the 'ALTSCAP' call was made and First Officer put in 600 FT. I then made the mistake of not looking to make sure we were past MORGY (the desce

and around 1;000 FT the ATC Controller explained he was getting a low altitude alert. We realized that we were to low and began the climb back to 1;800 FT; reaching 1;800 FT at MORGY. Being stabilized we began the descent down to our MDA of 600 FT. Once there we did not see any of the runway environment so we executed a missed approach. While receiving vectors for the ILS 04 we were told that a new ATIS was just released; Visibility - 7; ceiling - 300 FT. We executed the ILS 04 with no issue and had eyes on the runway at 200 FT AGL. The stress and issues occurring earlier in the day were a con

had been a long day and a long 2 days prior to that due to weather around the system. Having only 1 approach plate was a huge pilot error on my part. The incorrect ATIS corresponded to the TAF that we had prior to departing; so we didn't question the weather like we should have. It seemed that the weather was beginning to get worse; so if ATC could have said that we might not be able to get in on [Runway] 22 I would have immediately chosen [Runway] 04 with a slight 4-5 knot tailwind that would get me down to a lower minimum. Rest and more attention to detail could have prevented these issues.

were vectored into the approach at 2;100 FT and once established; descended to 1;800 FT enroute to MORGY (FAF). After Captain made the callout of 'ALTSCAP'; I entered the MDA of 600 FT into the altitude selector. On the FMS map; there was a crossing restriction of 900 FT at JONSI which Captain asked me about. I checked the approach plate and told him there was not a restriction on the plate and JONSI was only identified as the MAP on the approach plate. While I was further reviewing the plate to make sure I had given him completely accurate information; he began to descend. After I confirmed t

minimums. At approximately 1;000 FT; Fayetteville Tower queried us; asking us to confirm that we were descending via the LOC BC 22 approach. It was at this point; we became aware that our descent to minimums had begun too early. We immediately returned to 1;800 FT; the published altitude prior to MORGY. Upon reaching MORGY we resumed the approach normally and executed a missed approach at the MAP (JONSI) due to not being able to see the runway. After the missed approach; the Departure/Approach Controller informed us that Tower had just updated the weather to show the ceiling at 300 AGL and low

we had began the LOC BC 22 approach. We requested ILS 4 based on the new information; flew the approach; and landed.The early descent error could have been avoided by a final cross check of all position/navigational information before I started scanning outside for the runway rather than assuming the descent was occurring at the correct phase of the approach. My heads down time looking at the plate to make sure I had not missed any notes on the approach plate and attempting to figure out why the FMS was showing a crossing restriction at JONSI of 900 FT distracted me from doing such. The missed

On takeoff; the First Officer called for gear up and I selected the gear handle to the up position. 6-10 seconds later; we received a Gear Disagree master warning with the other associated indications. We declared an emergency with Tower and switched over to Departure who gave us a level off altitude of 3;000 when we were already at 3;200 FT. We started to return to 3;000 when he cleared us up to 5;000. At 4;000; Departure told us to maintain 4;000 and the First Officer had to hit the ALT button; but captured the altitude. After running the QRH checklist; we received three green gear down indi


Question: Compare contributing factors in B737 vs A320 turbulence encounters

Answer:
**Analysis:**

Based on the retrieved evidence, I cannot provide a meaningful comparison of contributing factors in B737 vs A320 turbulence encounters. The evidence provided does not contain any reports specifically involving B737 or A320 aircraft experiencing turbulence encounters.

The retrieved incident reports include:
- ACN 175911: A voltage regulator failure in an unspecified general aviation aircraft during MVFR conditions
- ACN 1653867: A fuel system issue in an RV-4 experimental aircraft resulting in engine failure and forced landing
- ACN 1681709: A communication issue at an unattended airport affecting IFR departure procedures

While the knowledge graph context indicates that both B737 and A320 aircraft types have been involved in various incidents including turbulence encounters, wind shear encounters, and TCAS events, none of the actual incident report text provided relates to turbulence encounters in these aircraft types.

The knowledge graph shows that turbulence has been associated with airspeed management difficulties, weather conditions, and has occurred during various flight phases including approaches and go-arounds, but without access to the specific incident reports involving B737 and A320 turbulence encounters, I cannot analyze or compare the contributing factors between these two aircraft types.

**Causal Factors:**
Cannot be determined from the provided evidence.

**Sources:**
ACN 175911, ACN 1653867, ACN 1681709 (Note: These reports do not contain the requested information about B737 vs A320 turbulence encounters)

Enroute ZZZ1 to ZZZ approximately 1.5 hours into flight in MVFR I began to get wildly oscillating readings from the voltage regulator ranging from 16.1v tp battery discharge (~12.4v). Resetting the alternator had no effect and voltage oscillations continued. I shut down all avionics except the transponder to conserve the battery and landed uneventfully at ZZZ. An A&P was located who inspected the electrical wiring (nothing adverse found); tested the alternator (tested OK); and cleaned the contacts at the voltage regulator. A test flight was made without incident. The following day I left ZZZ f

without incident at ZZZ3 where the voltage regulator contacts were again cleaned. A 3/4 power run up showed proper voltage (14.2v) and no oscillation. I continued the flight to ZZZ2 and after about 45 minutes the voltage oscillation returned. All avionics were shut down except the transponder. I fell back on the gyroscopic instruments; compass; and the IPad with Foreflight to safely navigate. Radios were turned back on for ZZZ2 and the flight completed. During the last 20 minutes of the flight with the avionics all back on there was no voltage oscillation. Inspection of the regulator (Zeftroni

In Day VFR CAVU cruise flight at 11;500 MSL over mountainous terrain; I inadvertently and unexpectedly ran the right fuel tank dry causing the engine to quit. I switched to the left tank but the engine refused to restart despite the windmilling propeller. Fuel pressure remained at zero even though I tried the electric fuel boost pump; leaning and enriching the mixture. I even tried going back to the right fuel tank but nothing changed so I reverted to the left tank again since I was certain that it had to have fuel since I had visually verified the fuel quantity in each tank during my pre-flig

point). I cycled the mag switch off then back on; cycled the throttle and quickly rechecked everything one last time. This was all to no avail so I committed to a forced landing.Luckily; Airport (ZZZ1) was within easy gliding distance and I highlighted it on Foreflight on my iPhone (the only long range nav on board) and pointed toward the field. It turns out that I misidentified the field visually and wound up landing at ZZZ despite making all my radio calls on ZZZ1 UNICOM frequency.ZZZ UNICOM traffic informed me that there is only one runway at Cable and since I was calling for right traffic

or attention to spare trying to find the Tower frequency for ZZZ. I hit my 'high key' on right downwind for Runway 26R and proceeded to a 'low key' abeam the numbers. Landing went well and I touched down just as the prop stopped windmilling about 40% down the runway. I coasted clear of 26R. My co-pilot and I had to push the airplane the last few feet to clear the runway.I initiated a phone call to ZZZ Tower and explained my situation. I felt very embarrassed for my confusion as to location and apologized for barging in unannounced. Tower was extremely pleasant and reassuring. They collected my

blew into it from both the vent tube and by blowing into the fuel tank through the fuel cap opening...it flowed air just fine. Refilling the tanks took quite a bit more fuel than should have been consumed in the 70 minute flight.After fueling both tanks to capacity; the engine started and ran normally on either tank. Fuel pressure indicated normal with either the engine driven pump or the electric boost pump on either tank. An extensive run up verified that normal fuel delivery was occurring. It was decided that we must have experienced a vapor lock; so after much discussion with my friend and

our way.During the otherwise normal flight from ZZZ to our original destination we noticed a slight mist above and aft of each fuel cap but fuel flow; pressure and level indications remained normal so we continued the flight.Upon further examination at [our destination]; the fuel caps were found to be misadjusted and allowing fuel to siphon out into the slipstream. No characteristic blue staining was visible due to the fact that the wing is painted in metallic light blue. The fuel caps were tightened so as to provide more clamping force on the sealing O-Ring and the return flight from ZZZ2 to

seen evidence of the fuel loss in the form of blue staining at the fuel caps.If I had more time in that serial number; I might have trusted the gauges even though they were indicating less fuel than I thought should be present. Basically; I ignored what the gauges were telling me and should have stopped sooner to investigate what appeared to be disappearing fuel as indicated on the fuel gauge.I'm very accustomed to using Foreflight on my iPad but only had my iPhone for the flight in question. I feel screen size played a part in my airport ID error. Also; fumbling with the smaller iPhone; which


Question: What role does ATC communication play in runway incursion incidents?

Answer:
**Analysis:**

Based on the provided evidence, ATC communication plays several critical roles in runway incursion incidents, though the evidence is somewhat limited for this specific safety issue. The available reports primarily illustrate communication challenges in other operational contexts that share similar underlying factors.

The knowledge graph context indicates that runway incursions are connected to several communication-related factors including "communication challenges," "radio congestion," and "controller workload." While the retrieved incident reports don't contain specific runway incursion cases, they do demonstrate how ATC communication breakdowns can create safety hazards.

From ACN 1681709, we see how unclear communication protocols can lead to dangerous situations. The report emphasizes that crews must "never depart without the magic words 'Cleared' followed by a void time." This incident involved a departure without proper IFR clearance due to "poor communications" and "casual chatting with ATC Clearance," where there was no shared understanding between flight crew and ATC of what was expected. The reporter noted that "non-standard procedures and protocols occasionally begin to infiltrate more structured environments," reducing situational awareness.

ACN 1288664 illustrates how controller workload can contribute to communication problems. The controller had "a very heavy workload" while "ATL was using three westbound runways for approach and two runways for departures." This led to confusion with similar-sounding call signs and unclear instructions. The crew noted that "ATC did not respond to my readback of the descent to 3000," indicating breakdown in the critical readback/hearback loop. The crew's solution was to modify their call sign to avoid confusion, recognizing that "in cases where ATC seems to be getting overwhelmed, we can help out by clarifying our call signs."

While these reports don't directly address runway incursions, they demonstrate the same fundamental communication issues that the knowledge graph identifies as contributing factors: controller workload, communication challenges, and radio congestion. These factors would similarly impact ground control communications that are critical for preventing runway incursions.

**Causal Factors:**

Based on the available evidence, the following causal chain can be inferred for ATC communication's role in runway incursions:

1. High controller workload → Reduced attention to individual aircraft communications
2. Radio congestion → Missed or unclear transmissions
3. Communication challenges (similar call signs, non-standard phraseology) → Misunderstandings between pilots and controllers
4. Breakdown in readback/hearback loop → Undetected communication errors
5. Reduced situational awareness → Increased risk of runway incursion incidents

**Sources:**

- ACN 1681709: Communication failure leading to departure without clearance
- ACN 1288664: Controller workload and communication confusion with similar call signs

*Note: The retrieved evidence does not contain specific runway incursion incident reports. The analysis is based on communication-related incidents that demonstrate similar underlying factors identified in the knowledge graph context as contributing to runway incursions.*

call.A discussion with TRACON followed arrival at [our destination] and we attempted to sort out the communication failures that had occurred at ZZZ. The final words on the subject couldn't be clearer; 'never depart without the magic words 'Cleared' followed by a void time.'The nature of the operation sometimes places crews in locations and situations that are; perhaps; non-standard and these non-standard 'procedures and protocols' occasionally begin to infiltrate more structured environments. In this case; because of the location and operations at the field; a less vigilant perspective develo

I replied; 'we are descending to 3000 ft as directed.' ATC told us to stop descent at I believe; 5000 ft; which we did. The FO and I discussed the presence of (other carrier) on the same arrival. The Controller seemed to have a very heavy workload this morning; as ATL was using three westbound runways for approach and two runways for departures. ATC told us that 'we should know that he doesn't usually descend aircraft to 3000 feet so far from the airport.' I replied that we only complied with our ATC instruction; and had indeed read back the ATC clearance. After that event; we modified our cal

Enroute ZZZ1 to ZZZ approximately 1.5 hours into flight in MVFR I began to get wildly oscillating readings from the voltage regulator ranging from 16.1v tp battery discharge (~12.4v). Resetting the alternator had no effect and voltage oscillations continued. I shut down all avionics except the transponder to conserve the battery and landed uneventfully at ZZZ. An A&P was located who inspected the electrical wiring (nothing adverse found); tested the alternator (tested OK); and cleaned the contacts at the voltage regulator. A test flight was made without incident. The following day I left ZZZ f

without incident at ZZZ3 where the voltage regulator contacts were again cleaned. A 3/4 power run up showed proper voltage (14.2v) and no oscillation. I continued the flight to ZZZ2 and after about 45 minutes the voltage oscillation returned. All avionics were shut down except the transponder. I fell back on the gyroscopic instruments; compass; and the IPad with Foreflight to safely navigate. Radios were turned back on for ZZZ2 and the flight completed. During the last 20 minutes of the flight with the avionics all back on there was no voltage oscillation. Inspection of the regulator (Zeftroni

In Day VFR CAVU cruise flight at 11;500 MSL over mountainous terrain; I inadvertently and unexpectedly ran the right fuel tank dry causing the engine to quit. I switched to the left tank but the engine refused to restart despite the windmilling propeller. Fuel pressure remained at zero even though I tried the electric fuel boost pump; leaning and enriching the mixture. I even tried going back to the right fuel tank but nothing changed so I reverted to the left tank again since I was certain that it had to have fuel since I had visually verified the fuel quantity in each tank during my pre-flig

point). I cycled the mag switch off then back on; cycled the throttle and quickly rechecked everything one last time. This was all to no avail so I committed to a forced landing.Luckily; Airport (ZZZ1) was within easy gliding distance and I highlighted it on Foreflight on my iPhone (the only long range nav on board) and pointed toward the field. It turns out that I misidentified the field visually and wound up landing at ZZZ despite making all my radio calls on ZZZ1 UNICOM frequency.ZZZ UNICOM traffic informed me that there is only one runway at Cable and since I was calling for right traffic

or attention to spare trying to find the Tower frequency for ZZZ. I hit my 'high key' on right downwind for Runway 26R and proceeded to a 'low key' abeam the numbers. Landing went well and I touched down just as the prop stopped windmilling about 40% down the runway. I coasted clear of 26R. My co-pilot and I had to push the airplane the last few feet to clear the runway.I initiated a phone call to ZZZ Tower and explained my situation. I felt very embarrassed for my confusion as to location and apologized for barging in unannounced. Tower was extremely pleasant and reassuring. They collected my

blew into it from both the vent tube and by blowing into the fuel tank through the fuel cap opening...it flowed air just fine. Refilling the tanks took quite a bit more fuel than should have been consumed in the 70 minute flight.After fueling both tanks to capacity; the engine started and ran normally on either tank. Fuel pressure indicated normal with either the engine driven pump or the electric boost pump on either tank. An extensive run up verified that normal fuel delivery was occurring. It was decided that we must have experienced a vapor lock; so after much discussion with my friend and


Question: What weather conditions most frequently contribute to approach-phase incidents?

Answer:
**Analysis:**

Based on the provided evidence, thunderstorms and associated severe weather phenomena are the most frequently documented weather conditions contributing to approach-phase incidents in these reports.

The evidence shows thunderstorms creating multiple hazardous conditions during approach operations:

**Thunderstorms with Severe Turbulence:** ACN 1420326 describes a CRJ-200 encountering severe thunderstorms during approach to GSP, with weather radar displaying levels 4 (red) and 5 (magenta) intensity. The aircraft experienced severe turbulence that caused dramatic attitude excursions - rolling "30 degrees right and then 35-40 degrees left in 1-1.5 seconds" despite being on autopilot. This forced an extended diversion and eventual alternate airport landing.

**Lightning Strikes and Equipment Failures:** ACN 1331024 documents an A319 encountering thunderstorms during approach operations, experiencing St. Elmo's Fire followed by a lightning strike that rendered the weather radar inoperative. This created a cascading safety issue where the crew lost their primary weather detection capability while still in hazardous conditions, leading to severe turbulence and a 600-foot altitude deviation.

**Approach Disruptions:** Both incidents show thunderstorms forcing significant deviations from normal approach procedures, with ACN 1420326 requiring extensive course deviations and ultimate diversion to an alternate airport, while controllers in that case were "planning on closing the arrivals down" due to advancing storms.

The knowledge graph context reinforces this pattern, showing weather conditions connected to multiple approach-phase complications including altitude deviations, unstable approaches, and fuel calculation issues that can compound the primary weather-related hazards.

**Causal Factors:**

The evidence reveals a clear causal chain for thunderstorm-related approach incidents:

1. **Primary Cause:** Severe thunderstorms with intense precipitation cores (levels 4-5)
2. **Secondary Effects:**
   - Equipment damage/failure (lightning strikes disabling weather radar)
   - Severe turbulence causing loss of aircraft control and altitude deviations
   - Forced deviations from planned approach paths
3. **Operational Consequences:**
   - Approach phase disruptions requiring alternate airports
   - Potential for flight attendant injuries (noted in ACN 1331024)
   - Airport arrival closures due to weather severity

**Sources:**
- ACN 1420326
- ACN 1331024

the autopilot yet the aircraft rolled 30 degrees right and then 35-40 degrees left in 1-1.5 seconds. We extended our diversion further east; eventually being handed off to Charlotte (CLT) approach. During the diversion we were able to pick up the northern edge of the thunderstorms on the extreme right side of the weather radar. The colors displayed were levels 4 (red) and 5 (magenta). The advancing storms were too close to maneuver to get a better view of the area to the west and southwest towards GSP. CLT informed us that the weather was still approaching from the south and they were planning

At approximately 100 nm NE of ICT we were deviating due to thunderstorms in the area along the same track ATC was using with other traffic. The Captain called the flight attendants and told them to be seated. After a few minutes we started seeing St Elmo's Fire on the forward windscreen. Shortly after that we had a lightning strike or static discharge on the nose of the aircraft. After that the radar stopped working. Cycled the radar on-off but still was inoperative. We notified ATC that we had lost our radar and asked if our current track would keep us clear of any additional weather. ATC adv

We were arriving into GSP from the northwest. Our weather radar was painting a few small but severe thunderstorms (steep color gradients) between our location and the west side of the approach to land north at GSP. The storms were moving north. One strong cell was immediately to the west of the final approach. The east side of the airport and approach appeared to be free of the small thunderstorms. I requested deviations to the east to clear the area of thunderstorms by passing north of the field by 20 miles or so. We were at 7000 ft at this time and experiencing moderate turbulence with +/- 1

An air carrier aircraft was on the GEELA 5 RNAV arrival into Phoenix. The aircraft checked on and the Controller issued him the descend via clearance with runway transition. The aircraft read back the clearance. A few moments later; the Controller issued the aircraft direct GEELA (which is on the RNAV Star) and comply with the speeds starting at GEELA. The aircraft read back the information correctly. The Controller performed a radar handoff approximately 15 miles from the boundary. The aircraft was later shipped to the arrival Controller. I; the FLM; got a phone call from the PHX FLM inquirin

descent clearance was given correctly and read back by the pilot. Both were indeed done correctly. I spoke to the pilot on the phone and when I told him after reviewing the tapes that he acknowledged the descend via clearance. When I spoke to PHX they asked for control on contact; which we gave. Since PHX gave a descent clearance prior to the GEELA fix; it would cancel the RNAV window restriction over GEELA so technically I don't believe a pilot deviation or airspace deviation occurred. Quite frankly; I believe the pilot either got confused with the descend via clearance or just forgot to ente

a simple mistake was made but corrected. After crossing SCOLE intersection at 25;000 FT and 280k on the GEELA FIVE RNAV arrival to PHX; I left the frequency to listen to the ATIS and prepare for the In Range checklist. When I returned to the frequency a short time later the First Officer briefed me of the changes; ABQ Center had cleared us direct to GEELA intersection and assigned us a speed of 300k or faster until the speed restriction at GEELA. The First Officer then asked me a question regarding the speed restrictions on an RNAV arrival; whether a clearance to comply with a speed at a fix a

First Officer whether ATC had not assigned us a 'descend via' clearance. He reiterated that the clearance was for the speed only. We had a brief discussion regarding RNAV arrival procedures and 'descend via' clearances until ABQ Center handed us off to PHX Approach in the vicinity of GEELA intersection. It was apparent that we were quite high on the arrival; PHX Approach kept us informed of their plan for our sequence throughout a series of vectors on the arrival. At no time did ATC indicate that we had missed any clearance restriction or caused any loss of separation. I was confused as to why

initiated a call to see if there had been a problem on our part. I spoke to an individual there who indicated that we had received and acknowledged a 'descend via' clearance. Neither I nor my First Officer recalls receiving such a clearance. Regardless of where the blame for this incident lies; it is clear to me that I probably could have prevented it. Had I taken the initiative to query ATC one I realized that we were higher than we should normally be at a given point on the arrival. Though the thought did enter my mind; I initially dismissed it assuming that we knew what our clearance was. C


Question: How do pilot fatigue factors relate to altitude deviation events?

Answer:
**Analysis:**

The retrieved evidence provides limited direct connections between pilot fatigue and altitude deviation events, though several incidents demonstrate how fatigue can impair pilot performance in altitude-critical situations.

From the available reports, pilot fatigue appears to contribute to altitude deviations through several mechanisms:

**Impaired Situational Awareness:** In ACN 1753923, a flight instructor explicitly identifies fatigue as the primary contributing factor to missing critical altitude information during a night descent. The instructor states: "I believe the primary contributing factor, on my part, to be fatigue which caused me to zone in on the airport and miss my student's altitude drop." This resulted in the aircraft descending to 1,900 feet while navigating around tower obstacles, creating a dangerous situation where they flew closer than safe separation distances to both lit and unlit towers.

**Reduced Proficiency and Scan Quality:** ACN 1746254 demonstrates how lack of recent flying experience (which can compound fatigue effects) contributed to a track heading deviation. The pilot notes: "There is something to be said for a small lack of proficiency that this created, and not catching the error with a faster scan or recognition." While not explicitly mentioning fatigue, the reduced proficiency and slower error detection mirror fatigue-related performance degradation.

**Delayed Recognition of Problems:** In ACN 1096555, the pilot acknowledges that "there can be personal performance degradation after a long day of flying" and notes that their "imperfect reaction was possibly compounded by a long day of flying around weather." While this incident involved landing performance rather than altitude deviation, it demonstrates how accumulated fatigue affects pilot decision-making and control inputs.

The knowledge graph context reinforces these connections, showing that pilot fatigue is linked to "inadequate pm response," "loss of situational awareness," and "over-correction" - all factors that could contribute to altitude deviations.

**Causal Factors:**

Based on the evidence, the causal chain appears to be:
1. Pilot fatigue (from long duty periods, inadequate rest, or accumulated flight time)
2. → Reduced situational awareness and impaired scanning behavior
3. → Failure to detect altitude deviations or respond appropriately to altitude-related cues
4. → Altitude deviation events or failure to maintain proper vertical separation from terrain/obstacles

**Sources:**
- ACN 1753923
- ACN 1746254
- ACN 1096555

*Note: The available evidence provides limited direct examples of fatigue-induced altitude deviations. Additional incident reports specifically documenting altitude deviations with fatigue as a contributing factor would strengthen this analysis.*

their design specifications which may differ from the expectations of air traffic controllers. I have noticed this many times during descents when asked to expedite descents. Most aircraft are now descending at their optimum descent point which is idle power. There is little or no capability for pilots to expedite when asked to go down and slowdown at the same time. I don't have the answer to this problem other than to say that human error is a fact of life and if we continue trying to jam more work (aircraft or spacing) into an already overcrowded environment which provides little or no room

out to be judgment error. Once IMC and icing began I almost immediately had trouble maintaining altitude; my mind operationally went to: (1) 'stay calm'; (2) 'fly the airplane'; (3) 'listen to instruction' (as best possible); (4) respond to questions asked; and (5) continue to report your challenges to ATC. Thankfully; I believe that good training allowed me to laterthank ATC for their help and debrief the incident proactively. Later my passenger with me remarked on the calmness and professionalism he observed. As I write this account; more than 24 hours later; I am not sure my adrenalin level

On a night PIC cross country on which I was a passenger and Flight Instructor Not Flying; my student and I were descending into an airport for some pattern work. I had advised my student to deviate from his direct course in order to get around some lighted towers in the area during his descent and to stay at a safe altitude. I didn't notice that he'd descended to 1;900 feet until we were abeam some of the lighted towers; which in flight appeared to be more than 2;000 feet horizontally from the airplane. Even though we were equipped with a G1000 with an obstacle database; I had the engine page

I did not catch the deviation initially with the workload and all happening within a couple minutes. There was never any issue with terrain or traffic. ATC stated after this initial departure climb that we were off our course; and I acknowledged this. Both myself the PNF; and the PF have flown very little in the last 3 months. I believe for the PF that this was his first leg in a few months. For myself; I've had 3 legs in the last 3.5 months. There is something to be said for a small lack of proficiency that this created; and not catching the error with a faster scan or recognition. Another fa

I filed IFR for my second flight of the day; from ZZZ1 to ZZZ2. The air had been smoky for my first flight; with 0.3 hours in actual IMC due to decreased visibility; and I suspected this flight would be the same. I requested ZZZZZ ZZZ3 ZZZ4 VXXX ZZZ5 direct. This would take me west of the fire and the associated TFR; which was centered on ZZZ VOR. I was given ZZZZZ ZZZ3 ZZZ ZZZZZ1; then as filed. This; of course; would take me right over the fire. I opened my IFR flight plan with ZZZ6 Approach and requested that I be rerouted around the fire. They told me I would have to ask Center. When I was

that the route they gave me was the 'preferred route' from my location to ZZZ2. I pointed out the fire directly below my route. The controller pointed out that the TFR ended at 9;000 ft. and I would be above that. I was already in smoke and my eyes were burning.As I was turned direct to ZZZ; I saw green radar reflections straight ahead of me on ADS-B in. I measured these; and they were 20nm away. There was a towering cumulus cloud directly in front of me that appeared to be closer than that. I requested the controller turn me right or left to avoid this convective activity. He refused; saying

so I elected to divert to ZZZ6. He then gave me the arrival into ZZZ6 and handed me off to ZZZ6 Approach. As I descended toward ZZZ6; the engine monitor indicated the oil pressure was low. Because of that; I asked to make a precautionary landing at a closer airport. I was rerouted to ZZZ7 and I landed there without incident. I checked the oil upon landing; and it appeared adequate at five quarts. I did add oil.My flight the following day was uneventful. I did choose to fly to ZZZ8 first so I would not be given the same routing over the ZZZ Fire. This flight and the way Center handled it was co

have oxygen on board; I am breathing fumes from the fire. Also; the plane's engine requires oxygen for combustion. Flying through smoke is not ideal; especially when there is a safer route nearby. Not all convective activity involves rain; so it may not be visible on a controller's radar screen. We are taught the developing stage of a thunderstorm involves strong updrafts and no rain. As a single-engine piston pilot; I am not comfortable having a controller fly me right up to the precipitation he sees on his radar screen (which may be 20 minutes delayed) and then give me a turn. I suspect the


Question: What is the relationship between icing conditions and autopilot disconnects?

Answer:
**Analysis:**

Based on the provided evidence, there is limited direct documentation of the relationship between icing conditions and autopilot disconnects in these specific incident reports. However, one clear example demonstrates this connection:

In ACN 1057653, an EMB-145LR encountered icing conditions and subsequently received "WG A/ICE FAIL message and then ICE COND - A/I INOP message on EICAS." While this report does not explicitly state that the autopilot disconnected, the failure of wing anti-ice systems in icing conditions created a degraded flight condition requiring immediate crew attention and manual flight management adjustments (Vref speed modifications).

A separate incident (ACN 1081901) describes an autopilot failure scenario where "the autopilot started oscillating above and below the altitude by a couple hundred feet. Then the autopilot failed." However, this occurred at FL310 during cruise flight with no mention of icing conditions - the failure was attributed to a jammed elevator control surface.

The knowledge graph context indicates that icing conditions are connected to various anti-ice system failures (including "wg a/ice fail" events) and that autopilots are involved in various malfunction scenarios including "autopilot disconnect" events. However, the retrieved evidence does not provide sufficient documentation to establish a clear causal relationship between icing conditions and autopilot disconnects.

**Causal Factors:**

The evidence is insufficient to establish a definitive causal chain between icing conditions and autopilot disconnects. While icing conditions can cause anti-ice system failures that create flight management challenges, the provided reports do not demonstrate direct causation leading to autopilot disconnection.

**Sources:**
- ACN 1057653
- ACN 1081901

With two students on board flying a cross country flight the following events occurred. While climbing though 2;000 feet on a 050 assigned heading with Departure we encountered a repeated momentary loss in power. The engine would stumble and run rough then surge back to full power. The first two times the power loss was momentary; not more than one second. The following 3 or 4 occurred with less time between the power loss events and lasted for a second or two and getting longer for each occurrence. All the engine instrumentation was in the green; the mixture was full in; fuel cutoff full in;

the field. After the second request was unanswered I turned to a 180 heading and reduced the power to maintain altitude. I was unable to get my request to the controller due to frequency congestion after four attempts. At this point I went back to the tower frequency without departure's approval. I requested an immediate return to the field on runway XX; I was northeast of the field at this point at 2100 feet within gliding distance. The tower instructed me to continue 180 heading and maintain altitude. I maintained separation from the traffic I saw in the pattern below us. As we passed abeam

runways). The two planes approached midfield at about the same time and same altitude. We witnessed the business jet make a significant turn to the right and immediate climb as they approached the intersection of the runways to avoid the [GA plane]. We continued south and tower called out regional jet traffic ahead and about 1000 feet below. We were instructed to follow the regional jet traffic cleared to land XY. The approach to the runway was uneventful. We were very high but with full flaps and a full forward slip through the descent I was able to land. Member of management asked if I would

Prior to crossing ZZZZZ while in icing conditions [we] received WG A/ICE FAIL message and then ICE COND - A/I INOP message on EICAS. After complying with AOM1 checklist reset approach speed for Vref 45+30 KIAS and insured calculated landing distance exceeded available landing distance. Upon landing used max reverse. Emergency not declared due to lack of time prior to touching down. EMB-145LR Captain approaching final approach fix reported receiving EICAS messages WG A/ICE FAIL message and then ICE COND - A/I INOP. The appropriate adjustment to V speeds was made and aircraft landed safely.

We picked up a new plane in ZZZ on the XX hardstand for our seconded flight of the day. The plane had also flown and arrived from ZZZ1 that morning. It was hot; and clear around noon when I (FO) began the 'Walkaround Inspection' in place of the more detailed 'Exterior Inspection' as the plane had flown previously and had not undergone any known maintenance. While a more detailed inspection was made of the RVSM (Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum) Critical Area on the right side of the aircraft; the left side static ports were presumably covered with silver speed tape enclosed in the silver ar

again inspected the plane in the post flight check; but did not detect the covered static ports. In ZZZ2; a new outbound crew took over the aircraft; and noticed the covered static ports on their inspection. As a result of the covered static ports not being discovered; the aircraft operated the flight as planned to ZZZ2 with covered static ports on the left side of the aircraft. No excessive cross altitude comparison deviations were observed between the three instrument systems. For certain; I the FO should have noticed the covered ports even on the walk around. Complacency of inspections shou

at head height; and GPU (Ground Power Unit) cord trip/arc hazards; possible jetways blocking view of ports) may contribute to inadequate attention given to the actual preflight particularly around the door area. Perhaps a change in the order in which I inspect items in the preflight would have allowed me to see the ports at a more optimal angle to note abnormalities. While I (the FO) need to improve my preflight technique; there were a few other factors in this event I feel are worth mentioning. These factors are not intended to rationalize my short comings; but rather present additional infor

blends quite well with the dinner plate sized silver area surrounding the static ports; making it more difficult to detect. Perhaps an effort to utilize more visible tape or extend the silver tape out into the paint of the aircraft would make this procedure of blocking ports more visible. 2) As alluded to earlier; ramp safety has been a pretty big talking point in the company. As I prefer a clockwise inspection path; I would have arrived at these static ports in a pretty complex and busy ramp area. Before I would have seen these ports; I would have negotiated the ground air hose (trip hazard);


Question: Describe the sequence of events in TCAS resolution advisory incidents

Answer:
**Analysis:**

Based on the available evidence, I can describe the sequence of events for one specific TCAS resolution advisory incident, though the dataset provides limited examples of complete TCAS RA sequences.

In ACN 1810171, the TCAS resolution advisory incident followed this sequence:

1. **Initial Cruise Phase**: The aircraft had been cruising at FL370 for almost an hour under Jacksonville Center control on frequency 135.62.

2. **Traffic Advisory (TA)**: About 86 NM south of CAMJO while proceeding direct, the crew received a TCAS traffic advisory. The crew began decreasing the range scale on their navigation display to acquire the conflicting traffic visually.

3. **Resolution Advisory (RA) Activation**: The traffic advisory quickly transitioned to a TCAS Climb RA, indicating an imminent collision threat requiring immediate vertical separation.

4. **Simultaneous ATC Instruction**: Concurrent with the TCAS RA activation, Jacksonville Center issued a turn instruction to the conflicting aircraft (Aircraft Y) to turn 50 degrees right.

5. **RA Compliance**: The reporting crew was already executing the TCAS RA climb maneuver when the ATC instruction to the other aircraft was transmitted, demonstrating proper TCAS response prioritization.

6. **Conflict Resolution**: The "Clear of Conflict" annunciation occurred at approximately 37,700 feet, indicating successful separation from the conflicting traffic.

7. **Return to Assigned Altitude**: The crew smoothly transitioned back to their assigned altitude of FL370.

8. **Post-Incident Actions**: Jacksonville Center provided additional traffic advisories, cleared the aircraft back to direct CAMJO navigation, was notified of the TCAS RA response, and the crew contacted dispatch via ACARS to report the event.

The evidence is insufficient to describe typical TCAS RA sequences more broadly, as the other incidents in the dataset (ACN 1751511 and ACN 1278005) involve traffic conflicts that did not result in TCAS resolution advisories, despite involving proximity concerns and non-standard separation scenarios.

**Causal Factors:**

Based on ACN 1810171, the causal chain appears to be:
1. Conflicting traffic on convergent flight paths
2. Insufficient separation developing between aircraft
3. TCAS system detecting imminent collision threat
4. Automatic escalation from Traffic Advisory to Resolution Advisory
5. Successful execution of climb maneuver achieving separation

**Sources:**
- ACN 1810171

Non-towered airport traffic pattern. Aircraft X is on downwind. Aircraft Y is on the 45; tucks in nicely behind Aircraft X on downwind with proper separation and radio calls. Aircraft X flies an exceptionally long downwind; nearly 2 NM past the runway threshold; for no apparent reason (no one ahead of them; no one waiting for takeoff). Radio calls from Aircraft X are unintelligible due to strong accent; neither pilot in Aircraft Y can understand them other than the name of the airport. Seeing Aircraft X so far out on downwind; not being sure if they were departing or just flying a huge pattern

plenty of spacing. Aircraft Y is not intending to 'cut off' Aircraft X. Plenty of time for Aircraft Y to land; touch-n-go; or go-around without impeding Aircraft X's plans at all. Remember; similar types; therefore similar speeds. With as little as 1 NM separation; that's a full minute in trail at a reasonable 150/152 approach speed of 60 kts; slightly less than a minute at let's say 70 kts. Nonetheless; someone might interpret Aircraft Y's action as taking 'advantage of this rule to cut in front of another which is on final approach to land or to overtake that aircraft;' (FAR 91.113) even tho

noticed visually (since we could not understand their transmissions) that they turned base at roughly the same time. Here's where it gets crazy. We saw on our ADS-B In display that they were gaining on us while we were both on final approach. Not wanting to hold them up at all; we executed a go-around from roughly 200 feet AGL and announced our go-around on the CTAF. We then lost track of Aircraft X temporarily while focusing on the go-around procedure. Once we re-established ourselves on downwind; we noticed that Aircraft Y had come up behind us and was GAINING on us on downwind. Without any

downwind.' Nothing but silence from Aircraft X. Our ADS-B In told us they were same altitude and ZERO NM behind us. My student looked back and did catch a glimpse of them; not sure how far behind. On flightradar24; it appears Aircraft X caught up with Aircraft Y to within 1/2 NM; although I suspect it was even closer. With both of us confused and getting nervous; my student elected to depart the pattern on effectively a downwind departure; and I agreed. I instructed full power; carb heat off; flaps up to give us a chance of outrunning the closing Aircraft X aircraft behind us. We announced our

we would be out of their way if they continued straight on the downwind. Our tactic did manage to provide some extra distance from Aircraft X; but get this - Aircraft X turned slightly right just like we did and appeared to be chasing us! Again; flightradar24 shows these maneuvers clearly. After a few seconds; Aircraft X appeared to give up the chase and returned via a slight left turn back to the downwind while we climbed out on the heading discussed above (approximately 20 degrees east of the downwind heading). Again; we called our position and intentions on the CTAF stating that there was a

I was PIC on a flight going to OTH. When I first checked weather in OTH it was at 8 miles vis.; but it started deteriorating rapidly. But due to the nature of the coastal weather; I had planned for this and took on extra fuel. Our original destination had been ZZZ1; but we had to file for OTH because ZZZ1 was below minimums. Seattle Center cleared me for the ILS Runway 4 via the 16 DME Arc from LUPCI. Things were going smoothly until I realized as I was approaching LUPCI for the approach that I hadn't heard from Seattle Center for a while and I was still high. I realized that I was still on CT

contacted Seattle Center and; frustrated; he cleared me down to 2400 feet for the approach. I was able to get down to 2400 feet and stabilized in order to make the ILS intercept.The DME ARC and ILS Intercept went fine; and I continued down to minimums. My autopilot clicked off; but I reset it through the mode control panel with no problem. With no runway environment in sight; I executed the published missed approach INITIALLY; with a climb to 600 feet and then a climbing left turn back to EMIRE LOM. It was here that I got confused on the Controllers 'state your intentions' remark that I starte

I could re-intercept the 167 radial off of OTH VOR and start another DME Arc to have a better amount of time for the weather to clear. Again; looking back; I knew that I was in a non-radar environment; so I don't know why I thought that I could be off the published missed approach but I was. The Controller expressed concern and instructed me to climb immediately to 4000 feet because of terrain. I wasn't indicating any terrain conflict on my TCAS or Garmin 650/750 combo; but the Controller advised me of terrain in that area. The Controller advised me to proceed back to EMIRE and execute the pub


Question: What causal factors connect thunderstorm encounters to turbulence injuries?

Answer:
**Analysis:**

The retrieved evidence reveals several causal factors that connect thunderstorm encounters to turbulence injuries, supported by multiple incident reports showing a clear progression from weather radar limitations to severe turbulence encounters resulting in passenger and crew injuries.

The primary causal chain begins with weather radar system failures or limitations during thunderstorm encounters. ACN 1209418 describes a crew experiencing a "Compare Fuel Quantity" ECAM message concurrent with weather radar failure, forcing reliance on ATC vectoring around thunderstorms. ACN 1331024 details how a lightning strike rendered the weather radar inoperative, leaving the crew dependent on ATC guidance through thunderstorm areas. This radar degradation creates a critical gap in pilots' ability to detect and avoid severe convective activity.

Inadequate weather detection capabilities directly contribute to unexpected turbulence encounters. ACN 1751181 reports encountering "severe turbulence" that "came as somewhat of a shock" with "no radar returns, or other visual cues of cells ahead such as lightning." Similarly, ACN 1420326 describes how advancing thunderstorms were "too close to maneuver to get a better view," limiting the crew's ability to assess the full weather picture.

The temporal lag in weather information creates additional hazards. ACN 1178306 specifically identifies "lag in the NEXRAD data provided by XM" as contributing to a pilot's decision to fly through what appeared to be a gap in the weather, only to encounter "severe turbulence and large altitude deviations" when "the hole closed about the same time that I flew through it."

These detection and information limitations lead directly to severe turbulence encounters with significant flight control impacts. Multiple reports document autopilot disconnections and altitude deviations: ACN 1751181 describes VNAV and LNAV disengaging with altitude deviations of "500 to 600 feet," while ACN 1331024 reports altitude increases of "approx 600 feet" during severe turbulence encounters.

The progression culminates in passenger and crew injuries. ACN 996753 provides the clearest documentation of this causal chain, describing an encounter with "severe turbulence" where "we were tossed about in our seats" and received notification that "someone was on the floor apparently injured." The report notes this occurred despite showing only "green showers on our radar," demonstrating how radar limitations contributed to the unexpected encounter. ACN 1331024 also mentions "slight flight attendant injuries" following severe turbulence after weather radar failure due to lightning strike.

**Causal Factors:**
1. Thunderstorm encounters → Weather radar system degradation/failure (lightning strikes, equipment malfunctions)
2. Radar limitations → Inadequate weather detection and avoidance capability
3. Poor weather detection → Unexpected severe turbulence encounters
4. Severe turbulence → Autopilot disconnections and loss of aircraft control
5. Loss of control + turbulence forces → Passenger and crew injuries from being thrown about the cabin

**Sources:**
ACN 1209418, ACN 1751181, ACN 1331024, ACN 1420326, ACN 1171298, ACN 1178306, ACN 996753

the failure and asked if they could vector us around the thunderstorms since our radar display was not accurate. A few minutes later ATC gave us new routing to bring us around the back side of the weather. We were then told by ATC to expect holding as no aircraft were landing due to thunderstorms. After running the QRH procedure for the situation; we broke out of the clouds and were able to remain VMC and visually avoid the convective activity. We were told by ATC that planes were now landing and to disregard holding. The flight crew of an ERJ-170 responded appropriately to a 'Compare Fuel Qua

During cruise; we encountered severe turbulence. This resulted in VNAV and LNAV disengaging and the aircraft unable to maintain altitude. After the loss of VNAV; the vertical mode reverted to Vertical Speed and was holding about a 1200 to 1400 foot per minute climb. We got an overspeed warning that lasted about one second while the aircraft was in this climb. The altitude deviation was about 500 to 600 feet off the assigned altitude. The automation was disengaged and we returned to the assigned altitude. ATC queried us about our altitude via CPDLC and we notified them about our turbulence enco

At approximately 100 nm NE of ICT we were deviating due to thunderstorms in the area along the same track ATC was using with other traffic. The Captain called the flight attendants and told them to be seated. After a few minutes we started seeing St Elmo's Fire on the forward windscreen. Shortly after that we had a lightning strike or static discharge on the nose of the aircraft. After that the radar stopped working. Cycled the radar on-off but still was inoperative. We notified ATC that we had lost our radar and asked if our current track would keep us clear of any additional weather. ATC adv

We were arriving into GSP from the northwest. Our weather radar was painting a few small but severe thunderstorms (steep color gradients) between our location and the west side of the approach to land north at GSP. The storms were moving north. One strong cell was immediately to the west of the final approach. The east side of the airport and approach appeared to be free of the small thunderstorms. I requested deviations to the east to clear the area of thunderstorms by passing north of the field by 20 miles or so. We were at 7000 ft at this time and experiencing moderate turbulence with +/- 1

Enroute to PHL at 45;000 feet we encountered a 5 minute period of heavy moderate turbulence. There was a north south line of thunderstorms stretching 800 miles centered over Nebraska along our route. We transited the area along the same route that ATC had sent all previous airline traffic. Passengers and Flight Attendant were briefed and cabin was secure. We encountered speed variations between .83 and .74 and altitude variations between 44;700 and 45;300 feet. We advised ATC of the turbulence and there was no traffic near our altitude. In retrospect the situation would have been much safer if

a lag in the NEXRAD data provided by XM. Having used it in conjunction with the onboard weather radar in the past; it has proven very effective in picking through weather and precipitation. This most likely led to some complacency on my part that the hole I was seeing in the weather depiction would be enough for me to get through. However; the hole closed about the same time that I flew through it; causing severe turbulence and large altitude deviations. A better alternative would have been to turn around and divert to an alternate south of the thunderstorms or attempt to go around them to the

with 400 [feet] overcast and mist with fog developing.We were swapped to a blast fence gate which involves additional explanation to the passengers who did not expect it. We then had a close to 4 hour sit in ZZZ. Visibility dropped to 1/4 mile. Which added takeoff alternate needs. As well as low visibility taxi in ZZZ. Thunderstorms were forecasted at our arrival into ZZZ2; however; we were given an acceptable alternate. This alternate was ZZZ3. En route; we could only paint the weather in front of us not a top full picture view. We could see the weather was building and looking not very good

[We] encountered severe turbulence and two separate lightning strikes while descending into ZZZ. The event occurred while level at 13;000 FT and 250 KTS approximately 20 NM south of ZZZ VOR. We had deviated several times prior to this for moderate rain showers during the arrival but were back on course at the time of the incident. The seatbelt sign was on and we were in continuous light chop and light rain showers with no reports of anything more than light chop. When we encountered the turbulence we immediately lost 20 KTS of airspeed and violently pitched in all axis. We were tossed about in


Question: How does crew fatigue contribute to communication failures leading to altitude deviations?

Answer:
**Analysis:**

Based on the retrieved evidence, I can identify how crew fatigue contributes to communication failures leading to altitude deviations, though the evidence shows an indirect rather than direct causal chain.

The primary evidence comes from ACN 1071582, which demonstrates how increased workload (a fatigue-related factor) degraded crew communication and monitoring, resulting in an altitude deviation. The captain reported that "gradually increasing workload needs to be recognized" and noted that "forthright communication between crew members that distractions increasing, and offering options to address them would have helped." The crew experienced a runway change that "increased the workload significantly," and the captain's "ability to effectively monitor was diminishing as my workload increased."

The altitude deviation occurred when the captain went "heads-down" to change the approach in the FMS and select new approach charts on the EFB. During this period of divided attention, an altitude alert sounded, and the First Officer stated "1,800 meters," indicating they had descended below their assigned altitude by an estimated 150-200 feet. The captain acknowledged that better crew communication about increasing workload could have prevented this deviation, specifically noting that "only one person had to state 'I'm getting busy' to totally change the dynamic."

While the knowledge graph establishes that crew fatigue is connected to altitude deviations through various factors including "delayed recognition" and "inadequate monitoring," the retrieved incident reports do not provide direct evidence of fatigue-induced communication failures leading to altitude deviations. However, ACN 1071582 clearly demonstrates how workload saturation (a fatigue-related condition) impaired crew coordination and monitoring effectiveness.

The evidence also shows related contributing factors in other incidents, such as database currency issues (ACN 1316137) and equipment failures (ACN 1327244, ACN 1865679), but these do not directly illustrate the fatigue-communication-altitude deviation causal chain.

**Causal Factors:**

Based on ACN 1071582, the causal chain appears to be:
1. Increased workload/task saturation (fatigue-related condition)
2. Degraded crew communication and coordination
3. Reduced monitoring effectiveness
4. Divided attention during critical flight phases
5. Altitude deviation below assigned altitude

**Sources:**
- ACN 1071582
- ACN 1316137 (supporting context)
- ACN 1327244 (supporting context)
- ACN 1865679 (supporting context)
- ACN 1786962 (supporting context)

02L. I went heads-down and changed the approach in the FMS; then selected the new approach chart on the EFB as we approached level-off. As I was working on the EFB; I heard the 'altitude' CAWS alert; followed by the First Officer verbally state '1;800 meters.' My attention immediately shifted to the PFD; and I saw that we were below the assigned altitude; with the First Officer correcting back to the assigned altitude. With 1 to 2 seconds of this; and while the First Officer was still correcting; ATC issued a further descent clearance to 1;200 meters. My estimate is that we were never more tha

meters. Both other crewmembers stated that the deviation did not exceed 150 feet. Threats: Workload. When the First Officer decided to fly the aircraft manually at about 10;000 feet; the workload level was quite low. The approach had been briefed; we were on vectors; and traffic was relatively light. However; multiple communications from ATC; multiple altitude step-downs and heading assignments increased the workload somewhat. The runway change increased the workload significantly. The electronic charts are still new to us (my fourth leg using the system) and require more time and mental conce

This narrative highlights two incorrect published crossing altitudes on two different arrivals that can lead to altitude deviations and aircraft overspeeds. The first is the PASLY 4 (10-2C) arrival to BNA at GROAT intersection. The crossing is depicted to cross GROAT at or below FL 230. It is always 1000 out of 1000 times given to cross GROAT at FL 220 usually by Memphis Center and has been for at least five years. Sometimes this occurs very late. This can lead to a situation where the aircraft was on the path; is now high; and the aircraft then pitches down at the last minute to meet the unpu

crossing. The second instance is on the ENDEE 6 Arrival into MDW (10-2). The fix in particular is KAMBL and the published crossing is between FL 270-FL 240. The unpublished crossing that is given; very late; is to cross KAMBL at 24;000 ft. Now the aircraft is in the same situation as the PASLY 4 Arrival; only you may have a 100 plus kt. tailwind to deal with as well. Both these situations persist but are preventable by simply changing the published altitude. Finally; there are several Pilots who are rusty from not flying; due to low utilization; whose situational awareness and lack of currency

I was the check airman conducting Captain OE. After performing my walk around; I performed the FO duties as on schedule. I never checked the database for currency as it is not part of the FO flow. While getting the clearance there was extensive radio traffic with clearance/ground and everyone was getting full route clearances. We upon reading back and getting clarification on fixes I have never heard of (due to our new flying in the area). Finally the controller just cleared us back onto the Nuble3. The flight release had us on the Nuble2. This discrepancy was not caught because we were not cl

the Nuble2. He clarified Nuble3. The number difference was realized about 1000 feet airborne. I had not inserted the new charts into my book as they were not to go into effect till (today). I pulled my packet and pulled the chart out to verify fixes. All seemed appropriate to the fixes we were flying and the restrictions for the departure procedure. It was now that we discovered that the IOE Captain candidate had not loaded in the current database and we were still operating with the old [database]. We attempted to select the new database; however; system limitations prevent this change in the

on the BILIT and not on the DEALE. Because the database had not been updated; we had the DEALE1. We loaded this and verified all the waypoints; speeds; etc. We did not verify nor catch the fact that the HITEK waypoint went from a flyover to a flyby waypoint. The DEALE2 also added a waypoint 4mi south on the 185 radial. We added this waypoint manually. We discovered there was an issue when the airplane turned over HITEK rather than before it. This resulted in us being no more than 1 mile west of course. We took measures to return to course; however; were turned shortly thereafter to the base le

was encoded in the FMS. By this point the IOE student had loaded the current database. I pulled up the arrival in the database and told him it was coded as per the chart as the proper fly by not over. He informed me we missed the turn; however; no loss of separation had occurred. Failure to load the current database and on-time pressures. Confusion with ATC clearance instructions requiring additional time further pushing workload. There were enough clues though that at some point; we should have stopped and figured it out. It occurred because I forgot to update the FMS data base as is standard