diff --git "a/data/processed/commentary.json" "b/data/processed/commentary.json" --- "a/data/processed/commentary.json" +++ "b/data/processed/commentary.json" @@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ "part": "Methodology", "division": "", "heading": "When is a foreign disposition a 'conviction' for IRPA s. 36?", - "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nIRPA s. 36(1)(b) and 36(2)(b) require a CONVICTION outside Canada (for an offence that, if committed in Canada, would meet the seriousness threshold). Whether a foreign disposition is a conviction is a question of Canadian immigration law, informed by the foreign law's own effect.\n\nGoverning principles, each from verified authority:\n\n1. A disposition the foreign law itself deems a non-conviction may be respected in Canada where the legal systems are similar. Canada (MEI) v Burgon, [1991] 3 FC 44 (CA): a UK probation order that UK law deemed not a conviction was held not a conviction for Canadian immigration purposes, because the UK and Canadian systems are so similar (Canada's analogue being the conditional/absolute discharge under Criminal Code s. 730, which by s. 730(3) deems the offender 'not to have been convicted').\n\n2. 'Convicted' means a conviction that has not been expunged (Burgon). A foreign expungement is recognized on the same system-similarity logic: Barnett v Canada (1996), 33 Imm LR (2d) 1 (FCTD) recognized a UK Rehabilitation of Offenders Act expungement.\n\n3. For foreign discharges and pardons, Canada (MCI) v Saini, 2001 FCA 311 at para 24 requires three elements: (1) the foreign legal system as a whole must be similar to that of Canada; (2) the aim, content and effect of the specific foreign law must be similar to Canadian law; and (3) there must be no valid reason not to recognize the effect of the foreign law. Saini adds that absent evidence of the motivating considerations behind a foreign pardon, the decision-maker is not bound by it, and that the sheer seriousness of the crime (there, hijacking) can itself be a valid reason to withhold recognition.\n\n4. THE ACT BRANCH ALWAYS REMAINS: even where a disposition is NOT a conviction, IRPA s. 36(1)(c) and 36(2)(c) make a person inadmissible for COMMITTING an act abroad that is an offence there and would be an offence in Canada, proved on a balance of probabilities (s. 36(3)(d)). Drake v Canada (FCTD, IMM-4050-98, 11 March 1999): an Alford plea (a guilty plea maintaining factual innocence) properly grounded a committed-the-offence finding on a balance of probabilities. No non-conviction disposition answers the act branch.\n\n5. Deeming rules (s. 36(3)): hybrid offences are deemed indictable even if prosecuted summarily (a); a Canadian record suspension or a final acquittal removes the conviction basis (b); rehabilitation -- individual or deemed (IRPR s. 18.1) -- cures foreign convictions/acts after the prescribed period (c); Canadian youth-justice findings are excluded (e).\n\n6. Timing: a person convicted at trial is convicted notwithstanding an unexhausted appeal (Kalicharan, [1976] 2 FC 123 (TD)), but appellate substitution of a discharge means the conviction is deemed never to have been passed (Kalicharan; Lew, [1974] 2 FC 700 (CA)).\n\nIRCC/IRB guidance: IRB Legal Services, Sponsorship Appeals Ch. 2 'Criminal Refusals' (Jan 2008) synthesizes this jurisprudence; IRCC's ENF 2 manual covers the same ground operationally (cited here by name only).", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nIRPA s. 36(1)(b) and 36(2)(b) require a CONVICTION outside Canada (for an offence that, if committed in Canada, would meet the seriousness threshold). Whether a foreign disposition is a conviction is a question of Canadian immigration law, informed by the foreign law's own effect.\n\nGoverning principles, each from verified authority:\n\n1. A disposition the foreign law itself deems a non-conviction may be respected in Canada where the legal systems are similar. Canada (MEI) v Burgon, [1991] 3 FC 44 (CA): a UK probation order that UK law deemed not a conviction was held not a conviction for Canadian immigration purposes, because the UK and Canadian systems are so similar (Canada's analogue being the conditional/absolute discharge under Criminal Code s. 730, which by s. 730(3) deems the offender 'not to have been convicted').\n\n2. 'Convicted' means a conviction that has not been expunged (Burgon). A foreign expungement is recognized on the same system-similarity logic: Barnett v Canada (1996), 33 Imm LR (2d) 1 (FCTD) recognized a UK Rehabilitation of Offenders Act expungement.\n\n3. For foreign discharges and pardons, Canada (MCI) v Saini, 2001 FCA 311 at para 24 requires three elements: (1) the foreign legal system as a whole must be similar to that of Canada; (2) the aim, content and effect of the specific foreign law must be similar to Canadian law; and (3) there must be no valid reason not to recognize the effect of the foreign law. Saini adds that absent evidence of the motivating considerations behind a foreign pardon, the decision-maker is not bound by it, and that the sheer seriousness of the crime (there, hijacking) can itself be a valid reason to withhold recognition.\n\n4. THE ACT BRANCH ALWAYS REMAINS: even where a disposition is NOT a conviction, IRPA s. 36(1)(c) and 36(2)(c) make a person inadmissible for COMMITTING an act abroad that is an offence there and would be an offence in Canada. Standard of proof: under s. 33, the facts constituting inadmissibility under ss. 34-37 need only be established on the s. 33 'reasonable grounds to believe' standard -- more than mere suspicion, but less than a balance of probabilities (Mugesera v Canada (MCI), 2005 SCC 40, para 114) -- except that a PERMANENT RESIDENT's s. 36(1)(c) committed-act determination must be made on a balance of probabilities (s. 36(3)(d)). For a FOREIGN NATIONAL the reasonable-grounds standard therefore sets a LOWER bar than a criminal court's, which is why a non-conviction disposition offers limited protection at the border. Drake v Canada (FCTD, IMM-4050-98, 11 March 1999): an Alford plea (a guilty plea maintaining factual innocence) properly grounded a committed-the-offence finding on a balance of probabilities. No non-conviction disposition answers the act branch.\n\n5. Deeming rules (s. 36(3)): hybrid offences are deemed indictable even if prosecuted summarily (a); a Canadian record suspension or a final acquittal removes the conviction basis (b); rehabilitation -- individual or deemed (IRPR s. 18.1) -- cures foreign convictions/acts after the prescribed period (c); Canadian youth-justice findings are excluded (e).\n\n6. Timing: a person convicted at trial is convicted notwithstanding an unexhausted appeal (Kalicharan, [1976] 2 FC 123 (TD)), but appellate substitution of a discharge means the conviction is deemed never to have been passed (Kalicharan; Lew, [1974] 2 FC 700 (CA)).\n\nIRCC/IRB guidance: IRB Legal Services, Sponsorship Appeals Ch. 2 'Criminal Refusals' (Jan 2008) synthesizes this jurisprudence; IRCC's ENF 2 manual covers the same ground operationally (cited here by name only).\n\nHOW THE VERDICTS WORK: every verdict in this dataset assesses the COMPLETED disposition -- an uncompleted deferral is unresolved, and a violated one ends in an ordinary conviction. The five verdicts are rule-derived from the framework above: NO where no plea or finding of guilt ever existed (nothing to recognize); LIKELY NO where guilt was established but the state deems the completed disposition a non-conviction and no judgment stands (the Burgon discharge analogy is strong; the residual doubt is only the absence of direct Canadian authority); LIKELY YES where a judgment stands and the relief is limited (fails Saini's aim/content/effect element); YES where state law itself deems it a conviction; FACT-SPECIFIC where the governing instrument (a pardon's terms, an expungement statute's model) decides -- those entries say exactly what to look for.", "history": "", "last_amended": "", - "current_to": "2026-07-10", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — When is a foreign disposition a 'conviction' for IRPA s. 36?", "source_url": "" }, @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nOnce a conviction (or committed act) is established, s. 36(1)(b)/(c) and 36(2)(b)/(c) require EQUIVALENCY: the foreign offence must correspond to a Canadian federal offence of the required seriousness, assessed against Canadian law as it reads at the time of the admissibility decision. Equivalency is fact-specific per offence and is not tabulated by this helper -- retrieve the governing case law (Hill v Canada (MEI) and its line) with canlex_search_legislation, and remember the s. 36(3)(a) rule that hybrid offences count as indictable.", "history": "", "last_amended": "", - "current_to": "2026-07-10", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Step 2 -- offence equivalency (not covered by this helper)", "source_url": "" }, @@ -45,11 +45,11 @@ "marginal_note": "state pardon", "part": "US dispositions", "division": "", - "heading": "Is a US state pardon a conviction for IRPA s. 36? (depends)", - "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nDisposition: state pardon; governor's pardon; pardon board pardon; executive clemency\nIs it a conviction for IRPA s. 36 purposes: DEPENDS\nAuthority status: Judicially considered (persuasive authority)\n\nThe recognition test for foreign pardons is settled: Saini's three elements (similar legal system; similar aim, content and effect of the specific law; no valid reason to refuse recognition). US state legal systems will generally satisfy the first element, so the analysis turns on what the particular state's pardon actually does and why it was granted. A full unconditional pardon that under state law blots out the conviction, granted on rehabilitation or innocence grounds, is a strong candidate for recognition (compare a Canadian record suspension, IRPA s. 36(3)(b)). A pardon that merely restores civil rights (a common limited form) does not resemble a Canadian record suspension in effect and is unlikely to be recognized. Saini also holds the decision-maker is not bound by a pardon absent evidence of its motivating considerations, and that offence seriousness can alone justify non-recognition. No reported decision applying Saini to a specific US state pardon was located; the framework itself is binding FCA authority.\n\nState variations:\n- general (conviction: depends): Pardon effect varies sharply by state: some (e.g. full pardons in some states) expunge or seal; many only restore civil rights and expressly leave the conviction of record. Obtain the state statute or pardon instrument and match its effect against a Canadian record suspension.\n\nAuthorities:\n- Canada (MCI) v Saini, 2001 FCA 311 (Federal Court of Appeal, para 24): Three-part test for recognizing a foreign discharge or pardon; decision-maker not bound absent the pardon's motivating considerations; seriousness of the offence can be a valid reason to refuse recognition.\n\nIRCC guidance (cited by reference; not reproduced here):\n- IRB Legal Services, Sponsorship Appeals Ch. 2 (Criminal Refusals), Jan 2008: Synthesizes Saini and the foreign-pardon jurisprudence; notes an acquittal based solely on a victim's pardon is not similar to Canadian law and is not recognized.", + "heading": "Is a US state pardon a conviction for IRPA s. 36? (FACT-SPECIFIC)", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nDisposition: state pardon; governor's pardon; pardon board pardon; executive clemency\nIs the COMPLETED disposition a conviction for IRPA s. 36: FACT-SPECIFIC\nAuthority status: Judicially considered (persuasive authority)\n\nBOTTOM LINE: Obtain the pardon instrument and the state statute. Full pardon that expunges or blots out the conviction (e.g. Michigan; Pennsylvania and Utah trigger automatic expungement) granted on rehabilitation or innocence grounds: strong Saini case -- treat as likely not a conviction, subject to the offence-seriousness caveat. Rights-restoration-only pardon (the most common kind): still a conviction. No motivating considerations in evidence: the officer is not bound by the pardon at all (Saini).\n\nThe recognition test for foreign pardons is settled: Saini's three elements (similar legal system; similar aim, content and effect of the specific law; no valid reason to refuse recognition). US state legal systems will generally satisfy the first element, so the analysis turns on what the particular state's pardon actually does and why it was granted. A full unconditional pardon that under state law blots out the conviction, granted on rehabilitation or innocence grounds, is a strong candidate for recognition (compare a Canadian record suspension, IRPA s. 36(3)(b)). A pardon that merely restores civil rights (a common limited form) does not resemble a Canadian record suspension in effect and is unlikely to be recognized. Saini also holds the decision-maker is not bound by a pardon absent evidence of its motivating considerations, and that offence seriousness can alone justify non-recognition. No reported decision applying Saini to a specific US state pardon was located; the framework itself is binding FCA authority.\n\nState-by-state coverage: 51 jurisdictions (fact-specific: 51) -- full per-state detail in the per-state entries.\n- Alabama (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): pardon (Ala. Const. amend. 38; Ala. Code §§ 15-22-20 to -40) -- Forgiveness without erasing the conviction; restores specified rights unless withheld. State law: conviction. 'A pardon does not wipe out the historical fact of the conviction'; pardoned conviction may serve as predicate. Board of Pardons and Paroles grants (not governor).\n- Alaska (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Governor's pardon (Alaska Const. art. III, § 21; Alaska Stat. § 33.20.070) -- Restores civil rights including firearms. State law: conviction with limited relief. Extraordinarily rare: 188 grants since 1959, none since 2007.\n- Arizona (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Governor's pardon (on recommendation of the Board of Executive Clemency) (A.R.S. § 31-443; A.R.S. § 31-402) -- The governor 'may grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, after conviction, for all offenses, except impeachment' (§ 31-443), but 'a reprieve, commutation or pardon may not be granted by the governor unless it has first been recommended by the board' (§ 31-402); a pardon absolves the legal consequences of the crime and relieves remaining disabilities. State law: conviction with limited relief. The pardon relieves legal consequences but does not erase, seal or expunge the conviction record; firearms rights are restored only if specified in the pardon document. Grants are rare (e.g., 55 pardons statewide 1988-2009; Gov. Ducey granted one in his first term).\n- Arkansas (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Governor's pardon / Executive clemency (Ark. Const. art. VI, § 18; Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-204) -- Restores jury eligibility, removes licensing/employment barriers; record sealed automatically per § 16-90-1411. State law: conviction with limited relief. Does not restore firearms rights unless explicitly stated per § 5-73-103(b)(3).\n- California (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Governor's pardon / Certificate of Rehabilitation (COR, gateway to pardon) (Cal. Const. art. V, § 8; Cal. Penal Code §§ 4800-4854) -- The pardon 'shall operate to restore to the convicted person, all the rights, privileges, and franchises of which he or she has been deprived in consequence of that conviction' (§ 4853), including firearm rights unless the felony involved a dangerous weapon (§ 4854); the conviction record is NOT sealed or expunged and the person remains 'convicted.'. State law: conviction with limited relief. Available by direct application or via a court-issued Certificate of Rehabilitation (7-10 year post-discharge waiting periods, § 4852.03); applicants with two or more felony convictions need approval of four California Supreme Court justices (Cal. Const. art. V, § 8). A nolo-based conviction qualifies the same as any other (Pen. Code § 1016). Under California's own law a pardon restores rights but does not erase, vacate, or seal the conviction.\n- Colorado (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Governor's pardon (executive clemency) (Colo. Const. art. IV, § 7; C.R.S. §§ 16-17-101 to -103) -- A pardon 'shall waive all collateral consequences associated with each conviction' unless the pardon limits its scope (C.R.S. § 16-17-103); the conviction itself remains of record, though a pardoned conviction may subsequently be sealed by the court. State law: conviction with limited relief. Applies only to Colorado state convictions; applications generally not accepted until 10 years after sentence completion, with comment solicited from the DA and sentencing judge. Actively used, including mass marijuana-possession pardons (2,700 in 2020; 1,351 in 2021). The pardon forgives and waives collateral consequences by operation of statute but does not erase or vacate the conviction.\n- General: Pardon effect varies sharply by state: some (e.g. full pardons in some states) expunge or seal; many only restore civil rights and expressly leave the conviction of record. Obtain the state statute or pardon instrument and match its effect against a Canadian record suspension.\n\nAuthorities:\n- Canada (MCI) v Saini, 2001 FCA 311 (Federal Court of Appeal, para 24): Three-part test for recognizing a foreign discharge or pardon; decision-maker not bound absent the pardon's motivating considerations; seriousness of the offence can be a valid reason to refuse recognition.\n\nIRCC guidance (cited by reference; not reproduced here):\n- IRB Legal Services, Sponsorship Appeals Ch. 2 (Criminal Refusals), Jan 2008: Synthesizes Saini and the foreign-pardon jurisprudence; notes an acquittal based solely on a victim's pardon is not similar to Canadian law and is not recognized.", "history": "", "last_amended": "", - "current_to": "2026-07-10", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — state pardon", "source_url": "" }, @@ -63,11 +63,11 @@ "marginal_note": "expungement", "part": "US dispositions", "division": "", - "heading": "Is a US expungement a conviction for IRPA s. 36? (depends)", - "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nDisposition: expungement; expunged conviction; record sealing; sealed record; vacated conviction\nIs it a conviction for IRPA s. 36 purposes: DEPENDS\nAuthority status: Judicially considered (persuasive authority)\n\n'Convicted' in s. 36 means a conviction that has not been expunged (Burgon), and a foreign expungement under a rehabilitation-type statute can be recognized where the legal systems and the specific law's aim and effect are similar to Canada's (Barnett, recognizing a UK Rehabilitation of Offenders Act expungement; the Saini three-part test now governs). Two distinctions matter for US records. First, expungement-for-legal-error is stronger than expungement-as-relief: where a court vacates a conviction as void (as in Drake, where the verdict was vacated ab initio), the conviction basis is gone -- though any replacement plea or the underlying conduct still counts. Second, most US 'expungement' and sealing statutes limit access to the record without destroying the conviction's legal existence (the record can often be revived in later proceedings) -- an effect closer to sealing than to a Canadian record suspension, which weakens the second Saini element. The disposition documents and the state statute's actual effect are decisive.\n\nState variations:\n- general (conviction: depends): Terminology is not reliable across states: 'expungement' may mean destruction, sealing, set-aside, or dismissal. Assess the statute's effect, not its label.\n\nAuthorities:\n- Canada (MEI) v Burgon, [1991] 3 FC 44 (CA) (Federal Court of Appeal): 'Convicted' means a conviction that has not been expunged; a UK deemed-non-conviction disposition was respected because the legal systems are similar.\n- Barnett v Canada (1996), 33 Imm LR (2d) 1 (FCTD) (Federal Court (Trial Division)): UK Rehabilitation of Offenders Act expungement recognized on the Burgon rationale: the person could not be said to have been convicted.\n- Canada (MCI) v Saini, 2001 FCA 311 (Federal Court of Appeal, para 24): The three-part recognition test that now governs foreign discharges and pardons.\n- Drake v Canada (FCTD, IMM-4050-98, 11 March 1999) (Federal Court (Trial Division)): A US jury verdict vacated ab initio removed the conviction basis for the removal order -- but the subsequent plea to the same conduct still grounded inadmissibility.\n\nIRCC guidance (cited by reference; not reproduced here):\n- IRB Legal Services, Sponsorship Appeals Ch. 2 (Criminal Refusals), Jan 2008: States the expungement principle and collects the Burgon/Barnett line.", + "heading": "Is a US expungement a conviction for IRPA s. 36? (FACT-SPECIFIC)", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nDisposition: expungement; expunged conviction; record sealing; sealed record; vacated conviction\nIs the COMPLETED disposition a conviction for IRPA s. 36: FACT-SPECIFIC\nAuthority status: Judicially considered (persuasive authority)\n\nBOTTOM LINE: Identify what the statute actually did. Vacatur or expungement-for-legal-error, or destruction with a statutory right to deny the conviction: likely NOT a conviction (Burgon/Barnett). Access-restriction sealing that preserves the conviction's legal existence (the most common US model): still a conviction. The row for the state names which model it uses.\n\n'Convicted' in s. 36 means a conviction that has not been expunged (Burgon), and a foreign expungement under a rehabilitation-type statute can be recognized where the legal systems and the specific law's aim and effect are similar to Canada's (Barnett, recognizing a UK Rehabilitation of Offenders Act expungement; the Saini three-part test now governs). Two distinctions matter for US records. First, expungement-for-legal-error is stronger than expungement-as-relief: where a court vacates a conviction as void (as in Drake, where the verdict was vacated ab initio), the conviction basis is gone -- though any replacement plea or the underlying conduct still counts. Second, most US 'expungement' and sealing statutes limit access to the record without destroying the conviction's legal existence (the record can often be revived in later proceedings) -- an effect closer to sealing than to a Canadian record suspension, which weakens the second Saini element. The disposition documents and the state statute's actual effect are decisive.\n\nState-by-state coverage: 46 jurisdictions (likely-yes: 36, fact-specific: 6, likely-no: 4) -- full per-state detail in the per-state entries.\n- Alabama (conviction: LIKELY YES): expungement (non-violent misdemeanors and felonies) / human trafficking victim expungement (Ala. Code § 15-27-1; § 15-27-2) -- Proceedings deemed never to have occurred; records unavailable for non-criminal purposes. State law: conviction with limited relief. Non-violent convictions eligible since 2021; violent/sex/moral-turpitude carve-outs.\n- Arizona (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Marijuana expungement (Proposition 207) / Sealing of case records (A.R.S. § 36-2862; A.R.S. § 13-911) -- Under § 36-2862 the court must 'vacate the judgment of adjudication or conviction' and expunge and seal all records for qualifying marijuana offenses (possession up to 2.5 oz, up to 6 plants, paraphernalia), the person may state they were never arrested/charged/convicted, and the expunged matter 'may not be used in a subsequent prosecution'; under § 13-911 (eff. Dec. 31, 2022) conviction records of most offenses are sealed after 2-10 year waiting periods and the person may state they were never arrested/charged/convicted for most purposes, but the conviction itself is not vacated and remains usable as an element, prior, impeachment or enhancement in later prosecutions. State law: mixed. Arizona's only true expungement of convictions is the marijuana-specific § 36-2862 (not-a-conviction after vacatur). General relief for convictions is record SEALING under § 13-911, which excludes class 1 felonies, dangerous offenses, crimes against children, serious/violent felonies and sex trafficking, and expressly preserves the conviction for prosecutorial use — conviction-with-limited-relief, not erasure. Before these 2021 enactments Arizona had no expungement at all, only the § 13-905 set-aside.\n- Arkansas (conviction: LIKELY YES): Comprehensive Criminal Record Sealing Act of 2013 (Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-1401 et seq.; § 16-90-1405) -- Record sealed; person may state conviction never occurred and restoration of civil rights. State law: conviction with limited relief. Non-violent Class C/D felonies and Class A/B drug felonies eligible immediately; violent Class C/D require 5-year wait. Excludes Class A/B non-drug felonies, violent/sexual felonies per § 16-90-1408.\n- California (conviction: LIKELY YES): Automatic conviction record relief (Clean Slate Act, AB 1076/SB 731) / colloquial California 'expungement' (which is actually the § 1203.4 set-aside) (Cal. Penal Code § 1203.425; Cal. Penal Code § 11105(p)(2)(A)) -- DOJ identifies eligible convictions monthly and the conviction is dismissed automatically with a 'relief granted' notation; courts and the state repository may not disclose it to the public, but it remains fully usable as a prior, fully accessible to criminal-justice agencies, and must still be disclosed for peace-officer employment and public office. State law: conviction with limited relief. California has NO destruction-style expungement of adult conviction records; what practitioners call 'expungement' is the § 1203.4 dismissal (see set-aside category). What exists beyond that is automatic record relief under § 1203.425 (eff. 2022): probation completers, post-2004 non-serious/non-violent/non-registerable felonies with all supervision completed plus 4 conviction-free years, and completed misdemeanors get automatic dismissal plus public-access restriction — but the statute expressly preserves use as a prior and criminal-justice-agency access, so the conviction is not erased. Niche vacatur statutes (§ 236.14 trafficking victims; Prop 64 marijuana redesignation/sealing) go further and treat qualifying convictions as legally invalid or never having occurred. A nolo plea underlies relief the same as a guilty plea (Pen. Code § 1016).\n- Colorado (conviction: LIKELY YES): Sealing of criminal conviction records / Clean Slate Act automatic sealing (SB 22-099) (C.R.S. §§ 24-72-701 to -710; C.R.S. § 24-72-706 (petition-based conviction sealing)) -- On a sealing order the defendant and criminal justice agencies may reply that no public conviction records exist, but the conviction is NOT vacated: it remains usable in subsequent prosecutions and accessible to courts, law enforcement, and certain agencies. State law: conviction with limited relief. Terminology trap: Colorado does not 'expunge' adult convictions — it seals them; 'expungement' is reserved for juvenile records (C.R.S. § 19-1-306) and similar categories. Petition sealing waiting periods: 1 year (petty/drug), 3 years (misdemeanors, lower felonies), 5 years (other eligible felonies); class 1-3 felonies, sex offenses, and violent crimes ineligible. Clean Slate (2022, phased in 2024-2025) seals eligible convictions automatically after 4/7/10 years, with DA objection rights for non-drug felonies.\n- Connecticut (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Erasure of criminal records / Clean Slate (automatic erasure of convictions) (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-142a; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-142a(e) (Clean Slate, P.A. 21-32)) -- Conviction records are erased (electronic erasure by operation of law; physical records destroyed); the person is 'deemed to have never been arrested within the meaning of the general statutes with respect to the proceedings so erased and may so swear under oath' (current § 54-142a(g)(2)). State law: not a conviction. Connecticut erases CONVICTIONS, not just non-conviction records. Clean Slate (effective Jan. 1, 2023; rollout 2023-2025, roughly 50,000 records erased by late 2025) automatically erases most misdemeanors 7 years, and class D/E or unclassified felonies carrying up to 5 years 10 years, after the conviction judgment, provided no pending charges and sentence complete; family violence crimes and sexual offenses are excluded, and pre-2000 convictions require a petition. Separate erasure paths exist for decriminalized conduct (§ 54-142d, incl. cannabis possession under 2021 S.B. 1201) and trafficking victims (§ 54-95c, a true judgment-then-vacated mechanism followed by automatic erasure).\n- General: No comparable regime identified in the remaining 5 of 51 jurisdictions surveyed (2026-07); for an unfamiliar disposition, analyze its mechanism against the framework.\n- General: No comparable regime identified in the remaining 5 of 51 jurisdictions surveyed (2026-07); for an unfamiliar disposition, analyze its mechanism against the framework.\n- General: Terminology is not reliable across states: 'expungement' may mean destruction, sealing, set-aside, or dismissal. Assess the statute's effect, not its label.\n\nAuthorities:\n- Canada (MEI) v Burgon, [1991] 3 FC 44 (CA) (Federal Court of Appeal): 'Convicted' means a conviction that has not been expunged; a UK deemed-non-conviction disposition was respected because the legal systems are similar.\n- Barnett v Canada (1996), 33 Imm LR (2d) 1 (FCTD) (Federal Court (Trial Division)): UK Rehabilitation of Offenders Act expungement recognized on the Burgon rationale: the person could not be said to have been convicted.\n- Canada (MCI) v Saini, 2001 FCA 311 (Federal Court of Appeal, para 24): The three-part recognition test that now governs foreign discharges and pardons.\n- Drake v Canada (FCTD, IMM-4050-98, 11 March 1999) (Federal Court (Trial Division)): A US jury verdict vacated ab initio removed the conviction basis for the removal order -- but the subsequent plea to the same conduct still grounded inadmissibility.\n\nIRCC guidance (cited by reference; not reproduced here):\n- IRB Legal Services, Sponsorship Appeals Ch. 2 (Criminal Refusals), Jan 2008: States the expungement principle and collects the Burgon/Barnett line.", "history": "", "last_amended": "", - "current_to": "2026-07-10", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — expungement", "source_url": "" }, @@ -81,11 +81,11 @@ "marginal_note": "Alford plea", "part": "US dispositions", "division": "", - "heading": "Is a US Alford plea a conviction for IRPA s. 36? (yes)", - "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nDisposition: Alford plea; Alford guilty plea; best-interests plea\nIs it a conviction for IRPA s. 36 purposes: YES\nAuthority status: Judicially considered (persuasive authority)\n\nAn Alford plea (North Carolina v Alford: a guilty plea entered while maintaining factual innocence) is a guilty plea, and the resulting judgment is an ordinary conviction under US law -- nothing in the disposition resembles a Canadian non-conviction regime, so there is no Burgon/Saini basis to treat it otherwise. Drake v Canada is direct Federal Court authority on the related act branch: the Court held it was no error to rely on an Alford plea to find, on a balance of probabilities, that the person had committed the offence abroad, noting the plea was entered because the risk of conviction on the evidence was high. So even where the plea's conviction status could be argued, the plea itself supports a committed-the-act finding under s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c).\n\nAuthorities:\n- Drake v Canada (FCTD, IMM-4050-98, 11 March 1999) (Federal Court (Trial Division), para 18): No error in relying on an Alford plea to a Washington State charge to find, on a balance of probabilities, that the applicant had committed the offence.\n\nIRCC guidance (cited by reference; not reproduced here):\n- IRB Legal Services, Sponsorship Appeals Ch. 2 (Criminal Refusals), Jan 2008: Cites Drake as the authority that considered the effect of a Washington State Alford plea.", + "heading": "Is a US Alford plea a conviction for IRPA s. 36? (YES)", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nDisposition: Alford plea; Alford guilty plea; best-interests plea\nIs the COMPLETED disposition a conviction for IRPA s. 36: YES\nAuthority status: Judicially considered (persuasive authority)\n\nBOTTOM LINE: A conviction, full stop -- and the plea supports the act branch (Drake). No further facts needed.\n\nAn Alford plea (North Carolina v Alford: a guilty plea entered while maintaining factual innocence) is a guilty plea, and the resulting judgment is an ordinary conviction under US law -- nothing in the disposition resembles a Canadian non-conviction regime, so there is no Burgon/Saini basis to treat it otherwise. Drake v Canada is direct Federal Court authority on the related act branch: the Court held it was no error to rely on an Alford plea to find, on a balance of probabilities, that the person had committed the offence abroad, noting the plea was entered because the risk of conviction on the evidence was high. So even where the plea's conviction status could be argued, the plea itself supports a committed-the-act finding under s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c). (Drake applied the balance-of-probabilities standard of the former Act's PR provision; today the s. 33 reasonable-grounds standard governs unless the person is a permanent resident, s. 36(3)(d) -- a lower bar, so Drake's logic applies a fortiori to foreign nationals.)\n\nAuthorities:\n- Drake v Canada (FCTD, IMM-4050-98, 11 March 1999) (Federal Court (Trial Division), para 18): No error in relying on an Alford plea to a Washington State charge to find, on a balance of probabilities, that the applicant had committed the offence.\n\nIRCC guidance (cited by reference; not reproduced here):\n- IRB Legal Services, Sponsorship Appeals Ch. 2 (Criminal Refusals), Jan 2008: Cites Drake as the authority that considered the effect of a Washington State Alford plea.", "history": "", "last_amended": "", - "current_to": "2026-07-10", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Alford plea", "source_url": "" }, @@ -99,11 +99,11 @@ "marginal_note": "withheld adjudication", "part": "US dispositions", "division": "", - "heading": "Is a US withheld adjudication a conviction for IRPA s. 36? (depends)", - "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nDisposition: withheld adjudication; withholding of adjudication; adjudication withheld\nIs it a conviction for IRPA s. 36 purposes: DEPENDS\nAuthority status: NO AUTHORITY LOCATED -- reasoned interpretation only\n\nFlorida's withholding of adjudication (Fla Stat s. 948.01) lets the court accept a guilty or nolo plea (or a verdict), impose probation, and withhold formal adjudication; on successful completion the defendant is not 'convicted' under Florida law. No reported Federal Court or published IAD decision squarely deciding whether a withheld adjudication is an IRPA conviction was located. (A citation that circulates in commentary for this point, 'Lu v Canada, 2011 FC 1476', does not check out -- the actual decision is a Taiwan investor case.)\n\nState variations:\n- Florida (conviction: depends): The principal withholding jurisdiction. Note Florida limits withholding for serious felonies, and a withheld adjudication still counts as a conviction for some Florida purposes (e.g. felon-in-possession, repeat-offender scoring) -- a mixed effect that weakens the analogy to a Canadian discharge.\n\nIRCC guidance (cited by reference; not reproduced here):\n- IRB Legal Services, Sponsorship Appeals Ch. 2 (Criminal Refusals), Jan 2008: States the general principle that foreign dispositions taking forms unknown to Canadian law must have their effect determined by the decision-maker.\n\nINTERPRETATION (no direct authority -- this is CanLex's reasoned view from the governing principles; treat it as a starting point, not an answer): Under the Burgon/Saini framework the analysis turns on whether the state's own law treats the completed disposition as a non-conviction AND whether its aim and effect resemble Canada's discharge regime (Criminal Code s. 730, which requires that guilt be found but no conviction be registered). A completed Florida withholding resembles a Canadian conditional discharge in structure: guilt is established (by plea or verdict) but no adjudication is entered. That supports non-recognition of a conviction where probation was completed. But the resemblance is imperfect (Florida attaches conviction-like consequences to withheld adjudications for several purposes), and an officer could reasonably weigh that against recognition. Critically, guilt was admitted or found, so the act branch (s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) is available regardless -- as Drake shows for pleas -- meaning a withheld adjudication should never be treated as a clean bill for admissibility purposes. If adjudication was ultimately entered (probation violated), it is simply a conviction.", + "heading": "Is a US withheld adjudication a conviction for IRPA s. 36? (LIKELY NO)", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nDisposition: withheld adjudication; withholding of adjudication; adjudication withheld\nIs the COMPLETED disposition a conviction for IRPA s. 36: LIKELY NO\nAuthority status: NO AUTHORITY LOCATED -- reasoned interpretation only\n\nBOTTOM LINE: Completed (probation done, adjudication never entered): likely NOT a conviction -- the Canadian discharge analogy is strong. Violated and adjudicated: an ordinary conviction. Either way the admitted guilt supports the act branch (s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)).\n\nFlorida's withholding of adjudication (Fla Stat s. 948.01) lets the court accept a guilty or nolo plea (or a verdict), impose probation, and withhold formal adjudication; on successful completion the defendant is not 'convicted' under Florida law. No reported Federal Court or published IAD decision squarely deciding whether a withheld adjudication is an IRPA conviction was located. (A citation that circulates in commentary for this point, 'Lu v Canada, 2011 FC 1476', does not check out -- the actual decision is a Taiwan investor case.)\n\nState variations:\n- Florida (conviction: LIKELY NO): Withholding of adjudication / Withhold of adjudication (Fla. Stat. 948.01(2); Fla. Stat. 948.04(2)) -- Under Fla. Stat. 948.04(2) the probationer 'shall be released from probation and is not liable to sentence for the offense'; no adjudication of guilt is ever entered, but the charge is not dismissed - the plea and withhold remain of record (sealable under 943.059, expungeable 10 years after sealing). State law: not a conviction. Requires a guilty or nolo contendere plea, or a guilty verdict/finding, after which the court 'stays and withholds the adjudication of guilt' and imposes probation if satisfied the defendant is not likely to reoffend (948.01(2)). Barred for capital, life, and first-degree felonies; for second-degree (and some third-degree) felonies it requires a written state attorney request or written court findings under 921.0026, and prior withholds disqualify (775.08435). Although generally not a conviction under Florida law, specific statutes count a withhold as a conviction - e.g., the sexual offender registration definition of 'convicted' expressly applies 'regardless of whether adjudication is withheld' (943.0435(1)(b)).\n- Illinois (conviction: LIKELY NO): Court supervision / Order of supervision (730 ILCS 5/5-6-1(c); 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.1) -- Court discharges the defendant and enters a judgment dismissing the charges; per 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.1(f), discharge and dismissal \"shall be deemed without adjudication of guilt and shall not be termed a conviction for purposes of disqualification or disabilities imposed by law upon conviction of a crime.\". State law: not a conviction. Supervision may rest on a guilty plea, a stipulation by the defendant of the facts supporting the charge (a CWOF-like basis, since Illinois has no general nolo plea), or a finding of guilt; the court defers further proceedings and imposition of sentence without entering judgment. Available only for misdemeanors, ordinance and traffic offenses (not felonies), with numerous carve-outs (certain Class A misdemeanors, DUI restrictions such as once-per-lifetime DUI supervision). Records are expungeable 2 years after discharge (5 years for certain offenses).\n- General: No comparable regime identified in the remaining 49 of 51 jurisdictions surveyed (2026-07); for an unfamiliar disposition, analyze its mechanism against the framework.\n- General: No comparable regime identified in the remaining 49 of 51 jurisdictions surveyed (2026-07); for an unfamiliar disposition, analyze its mechanism against the framework.\n\nIRCC guidance (cited by reference; not reproduced here):\n- IRB Legal Services, Sponsorship Appeals Ch. 2 (Criminal Refusals), Jan 2008: States the general principle that foreign dispositions taking forms unknown to Canadian law must have their effect determined by the decision-maker.\n\nINTERPRETATION (no direct authority -- this is CanLex's reasoned view from the governing principles; treat it as a starting point, not an answer): Under the Burgon/Saini framework the analysis turns on whether the state's own law treats the completed disposition as a non-conviction AND whether its aim and effect resemble Canada's discharge regime (Criminal Code s. 730, which requires that guilt be found but no conviction be registered). A completed Florida withholding resembles a Canadian conditional discharge in structure: guilt is established (by plea or verdict) but no adjudication is entered. That supports non-recognition of a conviction where probation was completed. But the resemblance is imperfect (Florida attaches conviction-like consequences to withheld adjudications for several purposes), and an officer could reasonably weigh that against recognition. Critically, guilt was admitted or found, so the act branch (s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) is available regardless -- on reasonable grounds to believe (s. 33), or balance of probabilities for a permanent resident (s. 36(3)(d)) -- as Drake shows for pleas -- meaning a withheld adjudication should never be treated as a clean bill for admissibility purposes. If adjudication was ultimately entered (probation violated), it is simply a conviction.", "history": "", "last_amended": "", - "current_to": "2026-07-10", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — withheld adjudication", "source_url": "" }, @@ -117,11 +117,11 @@ "marginal_note": "deferred adjudication", "part": "US dispositions", "division": "", - "heading": "Is a US deferred adjudication a conviction for IRPA s. 36? (depends)", - "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nDisposition: deferred adjudication; deferred entry of judgment; probation before judgment; deferred judgment\nIs it a conviction for IRPA s. 36 purposes: DEPENDS\nAuthority status: NO AUTHORITY LOCATED -- reasoned interpretation only\n\nDeferred-adjudication regimes (e.g. Texas CCP art 42A.101; Maryland probation before judgment; various deferred-judgment statutes) take a guilty or nolo plea, defer entry of judgment during probation, and dismiss on completion -- the defendant is not convicted under state law if successful. No reported Federal Court or published IAD decision on a US deferred adjudication was located.\n\nState variations:\n- Texas (conviction: depends): Deferred adjudication under CCP art 42A.101: plea taken, no adjudication if community supervision is completed; violation leads to adjudication on the original plea.\n- Maryland (conviction: depends): Probation before judgment (PBJ): judgment stayed after a finding or plea; discharge without judgment on completion.\n- general (conviction: depends): Distinguish true deferred ADJUDICATION (no judgment entered) from a deferred or suspended SENTENCE after judgment -- the latter is a conviction; only execution of the penalty was deferred.\n\nIRCC guidance (cited by reference; not reproduced here):\n- IRB Legal Services, Sponsorship Appeals Ch. 2 (Criminal Refusals), Jan 2008: General principle: the effect of unfamiliar foreign dispositions must be determined by the decision-maker.\n\nINTERPRETATION (no direct authority -- this is CanLex's reasoned view from the governing principles; treat it as a starting point, not an answer): The same reasoning as withheld adjudication: a COMPLETED deferred adjudication under a statute that deems no conviction is structurally the closest US analogue to a Canadian conditional discharge, which supports non-recognition of a conviction under Burgon/Saini. An uncompleted deferral (probation ongoing) is unresolved either way and officers can await the outcome; a violated deferral ends in an ordinary conviction. In every case the plea or finding underlying the deferral supports the act branch (s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) on a balance of probabilities, so completion of the deferral does not by itself restore admissibility.", + "heading": "Is a US deferred adjudication a conviction for IRPA s. 36? (LIKELY NO)", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nDisposition: deferred adjudication; deferred entry of judgment; probation before judgment; deferred judgment\nIs the COMPLETED disposition a conviction for IRPA s. 36: LIKELY NO\nAuthority status: NO AUTHORITY LOCATED -- reasoned interpretation only\n\nBOTTOM LINE: Completed: likely NOT a conviction (discharge analogy). Ongoing: unresolved -- await the outcome. Violated: adjudication proceeds on the original plea = conviction. The plea supports the act branch throughout.\n\nDeferred-adjudication regimes (e.g. Texas CCP art 42A.101; Maryland probation before judgment; various deferred-judgment statutes) take a guilty or nolo plea, defer entry of judgment during probation, and dismiss on completion -- the defendant is not convicted under state law if successful. No reported Federal Court or published IAD decision on a US deferred adjudication was located.\n\nState-by-state coverage: 42 jurisdictions (likely-no: 35, fact-specific: 4, no: 2, likely-yes: 1) -- full per-state detail in the per-state entries.\n- Alaska (conviction: LIKELY YES): Suspended imposition of sentence (SIS) (Alaska Stat. § 12.55.085) -- Conviction set aside and certificate issued upon successful probation completion. State law: conviction with limited relief. SIS involves a conviction that is later set aside; excludes serious violent/sex/firearms offenses.\n- Arizona (conviction: LIKELY NO): Drug court program deferred entry of judgment (A.R.S. § 13-3422) -- Court defers further proceedings 'without entering a judgment of guilt,' places the defendant on probation in drug court, and on fulfillment of probation 'may discharge the defendant and dismiss the proceedings'; on failure 'the court shall enter an adjudication of guilt and sentence the defendant as provided by law.'. State law: not a conviction. Arizona has no general Texas-style deferred-adjudication statute; the only deferred-judgment mechanism is inside the drug court statute, limited to drug-dependent defendants charged with probation-eligible (personal-possession-type) drug offenses, with exclusions for prior serious/dangerous offenses and prior drug-court/diversion completions. Pre-plea admission to drug court is also possible 'only on the agreement of the court and the prosecutor.' Do not confuse with Prop 200 mandatory drug probation (A.R.S. § 13-901.01), which is an ordinary conviction.\n- Arkansas (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): First offender deferred adjudication / suspended imposition of sentence (Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-303(a)(1)(A)(i); § 16-93-314(b)) -- Upon successful probation completion, defendant discharged without adjudication, case dismissed and record sealed. State law: conviction. Limited to first-time felons; excludes violent crimes and sexual offenses per § 16-93-303(b). [EXTRACTION FLAG: mechanism says discharge without adjudication but status says conviction — verify]\n- California (conviction: LIKELY NO): Deferred entry of judgment (DEJ) / DEJ pilot program for young adults (Cal. Penal Code § 1000.7; former Cal. Penal Code §§ 1000-1000.4 (as they read before AB 208, eff. Jan. 1, 2018)) -- The court dismisses the charge(s) without ever entering judgment; under the former drug DEJ (Pen. Code § 1000.4) the arrest is 'deemed to have never occurred' and the defendant may deny it except on peace-officer applications. State law: not a conviction. California's flagship drug DEJ (former § 1000) required a guilty plea with judgment deferred, but AB 208 converted it to true pretrial diversion effective Jan. 1, 2018 — so only pre-2018 drug dispositions are plea-based DEJ. The surviving DEJ regime is the § 1000.7 pilot for defendants aged 18-20 (up to 24 with team approval) in Butte, Nevada, and Santa Clara counties only, requiring a guilty plea and waivers, with dismissal on completion; it sunsets Jan. 1, 2029. During the deferral the guilty plea exists but no judgment of conviction is entered; on completion the plea never ripens into a judgment and the charge is dismissed.\n- Colorado (conviction: LIKELY NO): Deferred judgment and sentence / Deferred sentencing of defendant (C.R.S. § 18-1.3-102) -- On full compliance the guilty plea 'shall be withdrawn and the charge ... shall be dismissed with prejudice'; the person is no longer regarded as convicted (including for sex-offender registration) and the dismissed record can be sealed as a non-conviction record. State law: not a conviction. Requires a plea of guilty (statute is silent on nolo contendere) plus written consent of defendant, counsel, and DA via stipulation; entry of judgment and sentence is deferred up to 4 years (felony) or 2 years (misdemeanor/petty/traffic). On breach the court 'shall enter judgment and impose sentence upon the guilty plea.' Note that while the deferral is pending, a guilty plea has been entered and accepted — only successful completion produces the non-conviction outcome.\n- Delaware (conviction: LIKELY NO): Probation Before Judgment (PBJ) (11 Del. C. § 4218) -- Court stays entry of judgment after accepting a guilty or nolo contendere plea and places the defendant on probation; on fulfillment of conditions the court enters an order discharging the person, and the discharge is 'without judgment of conviction and is not a conviction for purposes of any disqualification or disability imposed by law.'. State law: not a conviction. Available only for violations and misdemeanors under specified titles, with State and defendant consent; excluded are Title 10 domestic-violence offenses, bad-check charges, and Title 21 first-offender election cases. On violation, the court may enter judgment and sentence on the original plea. A PBJ dismissal is deemed 'terminated in favor of the accused' and eligible for mandatory expungement; the Delaware Supreme Court has said completion renders the person 'innocent as a matter of law' (Ryan v. State, 791 A.2d 742 (Del. 2002)).\n- General: No comparable regime identified in the remaining 9 of 51 jurisdictions surveyed (2026-07); for an unfamiliar disposition, analyze its mechanism against the framework.\n- General: No comparable regime identified in the remaining 9 of 51 jurisdictions surveyed (2026-07); for an unfamiliar disposition, analyze its mechanism against the framework.\n- General: Distinguish true deferred ADJUDICATION (no judgment entered) from a deferred or suspended SENTENCE after judgment -- the latter is a conviction; only execution of the penalty was deferred.\n\nIRCC guidance (cited by reference; not reproduced here):\n- IRB Legal Services, Sponsorship Appeals Ch. 2 (Criminal Refusals), Jan 2008: General principle: the effect of unfamiliar foreign dispositions must be determined by the decision-maker.\n\nINTERPRETATION (no direct authority -- this is CanLex's reasoned view from the governing principles; treat it as a starting point, not an answer): The same reasoning as withheld adjudication: a COMPLETED deferred adjudication under a statute that deems no conviction is structurally the closest US analogue to a Canadian conditional discharge, which supports non-recognition of a conviction under Burgon/Saini. An uncompleted deferral (probation ongoing) is unresolved either way and officers can await the outcome; a violated deferral ends in an ordinary conviction. In every case the plea or finding underlying the deferral supports the act branch (s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) -- on reasonable grounds to believe (s. 33), or on a balance of probabilities for a permanent resident (s. 36(3)(d)) -- so completion of the deferral does not by itself restore admissibility.", "history": "", "last_amended": "", - "current_to": "2026-07-10", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — deferred adjudication", "source_url": "" }, @@ -135,11 +135,11 @@ "marginal_note": "nolo contendere", "part": "US dispositions", "division": "", - "heading": "Is a US nolo contendere a conviction for IRPA s. 36? (depends)", - "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nDisposition: nolo contendere; no contest plea; nolo plea\nIs it a conviction for IRPA s. 36 purposes: DEPENDS\nAuthority status: NO AUTHORITY LOCATED -- reasoned interpretation only\n\nA nolo contendere plea is a plea that accepts conviction without admitting guilt for collateral civil purposes. What matters for IRPA is the DISPOSITION that follows, not the plea label: a nolo plea followed by an entered judgment is an ordinary conviction under state law, and nothing about the plea creates a Canadian-style non-conviction analogy; a nolo plea followed by withholding or deferral is analyzed as that disposition (see the withheld-adjudication and deferred-adjudication entries). No reported Canadian decision turning on the nolo character of a plea was located.\n\nAuthorities:\n- Drake v Canada (FCTD, IMM-4050-98, 11 March 1999) (Federal Court (Trial Division), para 18): By analogy: a plea entered for pragmatic reasons without admitting guilt (an Alford plea) still grounded a committed-the-offence finding on a balance of probabilities.\n\nINTERPRETATION (no direct authority -- this is CanLex's reasoned view from the governing principles; treat it as a starting point, not an answer): Where judgment was entered on a nolo plea, treat it as a conviction: the plea's evidentiary limits in US civil litigation have no bearing on whether the person 'has been convicted' under s. 36. For the act branch, a nolo plea is weaker evidence of the underlying conduct than a guilty plea (nothing was admitted), but Drake shows pragmatic pleas can still support a balance-of-probabilities finding, particularly together with the charging documents and any factual basis recited at the plea.", + "heading": "Is a US nolo contendere a conviction for IRPA s. 36? (FACT-SPECIFIC)", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nDisposition: nolo contendere; no contest plea; nolo plea\nIs the COMPLETED disposition a conviction for IRPA s. 36: FACT-SPECIFIC\nAuthority status: NO AUTHORITY LOCATED -- reasoned interpretation only\n\nBOTTOM LINE: Look past the plea to the disposition it produced. Judgment entered on the nolo plea: a conviction. Withholding or deferral followed the plea: analyze as that disposition (see those entries).\n\nA nolo contendere plea is a plea that accepts conviction without admitting guilt for collateral civil purposes. What matters for IRPA is the DISPOSITION that follows, not the plea label: a nolo plea followed by an entered judgment is an ordinary conviction under state law, and nothing about the plea creates a Canadian-style non-conviction analogy; a nolo plea followed by withholding or deferral is analyzed as that disposition (see the withheld-adjudication and deferred-adjudication entries). No reported Canadian decision turning on the nolo character of a plea was located.\n\nAuthorities:\n- Drake v Canada (FCTD, IMM-4050-98, 11 March 1999) (Federal Court (Trial Division), para 18): By analogy: a plea entered for pragmatic reasons without admitting guilt (an Alford plea) still grounded a committed-the-offence finding on a balance of probabilities.\n\nINTERPRETATION (no direct authority -- this is CanLex's reasoned view from the governing principles; treat it as a starting point, not an answer): Where judgment was entered on a nolo plea, treat it as a conviction: the plea's evidentiary limits in US civil litigation have no bearing on whether the person 'has been convicted' under s. 36. For the act branch, a nolo plea is weaker evidence of the underlying conduct than a guilty plea (nothing was admitted), but Drake shows pragmatic pleas can still support a balance-of-probabilities finding, particularly together with the charging documents and any factual basis recited at the plea.", "history": "", "last_amended": "", - "current_to": "2026-07-10", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — nolo contendere", "source_url": "" }, @@ -153,11 +153,11 @@ "marginal_note": "pretrial diversion", "part": "US dispositions", "division": "", - "heading": "Is a US pretrial diversion a conviction for IRPA s. 36? (no)", - "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nDisposition: pretrial diversion; pre-trial intervention; deferred prosecution; diversion program\nIs it a conviction for IRPA s. 36 purposes: NO\nAuthority status: NO AUTHORITY LOCATED -- reasoned interpretation only\n\nTrue pretrial diversion or deferred prosecution -- where prosecution is suspended WITHOUT any plea or finding of guilt and charges are dismissed on completion -- produces no conviction under any US regime, and there is no plausible route to calling it one under IRPA: there is nothing to recognize or refuse to recognize. No reported Canadian decision was located, and none should be needed on the conviction question.\n\nState variations:\n- general (conviction: depends): Verify no plea was entered: many programs labelled 'diversion' in fact require a guilty plea held in abeyance -- those are deferred adjudications, analyzed under that entry.\n\nINTERPRETATION (no direct authority -- this is CanLex's reasoned view from the governing principles; treat it as a starting point, not an answer): Not a conviction. The live question is only the act branch: s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c) inadmissibility can still be based on the underlying conduct, proved on a balance of probabilities (s. 36(3)(d)), using police reports and the person's own statements. In practice a completed diversion with no admission gives an officer little to work with, but it is not a legal bar.", + "heading": "Is a US pretrial diversion a conviction for IRPA s. 36? (NO)", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nDisposition: pretrial diversion; pre-trial intervention; deferred prosecution; diversion program\nIs the COMPLETED disposition a conviction for IRPA s. 36: NO\nAuthority status: NO AUTHORITY LOCATED -- reasoned interpretation only\n\nBOTTOM LINE: Completed no-plea diversion: NOT a conviction -- nothing to recognize. Confirm no plea was actually taken (many programs labelled 'diversion' hold a plea in abeyance -- those are deferred adjudications). Act branch remains available on the conduct.\n\nTrue pretrial diversion or deferred prosecution -- where prosecution is suspended WITHOUT any plea or finding of guilt and charges are dismissed on completion -- produces no conviction under any US regime, and there is no plausible route to calling it one under IRPA: there is nothing to recognize or refuse to recognize. No reported Canadian decision was located, and none should be needed on the conviction question.\n\nState-by-state coverage: 41 jurisdictions (no: 34, likely-no: 4, fact-specific: 3) -- full per-state detail in the per-state entries.\n- Alabama (conviction: NO): Drug court / mental health court / veteran's court / diversion programs; Ala. Code 15-27-1 is the EXPUNGEMENT vehicle for the dismissed charge (1-year wait), not the program statute. Program mechanics vary -- some Alabama drug courts hold a plea in abeyance (then analyze as deferred adjudication); confirm no plea was taken before treating as pure diversion.\n- Arizona (conviction: NO): County attorney diversion / deferred prosecution program / TASC diversion (Maricopa County program name) (A.R.S. § 11-361; A.R.S. § 11-362) -- The county attorney may 'divert or defer, before a guilty plea or a trial, the prosecution of a person who is accused of committing a crime'; on successful completion the prosecution is not pursued (charges dismissed or never filed), with no plea or finding of guilt ever entered. State law: not a conviction. Purely prosecutorial, pre-plea diversion administered by county attorneys under APAAC guidelines (§ 11-362); 2021 HB 2186 amendments removed earlier prior-conviction restrictions on eligibility. The dismissed/diverted matter is not a conviction under Arizona law, but the arrest record is not automatically sealed absent a separate § 13-911 petition.\n- Arkansas (conviction: NO): Pre-adjudication probation (Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-901 et seq.) -- Upon successful completion, case dismissed and record sealed on prosecutor recommendation and judicial discretion. State law: not a conviction. Limited to non-violent, non-sexual felonies; requires court and prosecutor agreement per § 5-4-901.\n- California (conviction: NO): Pretrial diversion (drug) / Mental health diversion (Cal. Penal Code §§ 1000-1000.4 (as amended by AB 208, eff. 2018); Cal. Penal Code § 1000.1) -- Charges are dismissed and 'the arrest upon which the diversion was based shall be deemed to have never occurred' (§§ 1000.4, 1001.9, 1001.36); the defendant may deny the arrest except in response to direct questions on peace-officer applications, and records are restricted from public access. State law: not a conviction. Since AB 208 (2018), drug diversion under § 1000.1 expressly requires a plea of NOT guilty plus waivers of speedy trial/preliminary hearing and jury trial (failure leads to a court trial, not sentencing on a stored plea). Mental health diversion (§ 1001.36) requires only consent and a speedy-trial waiver, available 'from the point at which the accused is charged until adjudication.' Judicial misdemeanor diversion (§ 1001.95) lets a judge divert over prosecutor objection for up to 24 months with no plea; sex-registration, domestic violence, and stalking offenses are excluded.\n- Colorado (conviction: NO): Adult pretrial diversion (C.R.S. § 18-1.3-101) -- Court dismisses all charges with prejudice; the statute provides that 'a successfully completed diversion agreement shall not be considered a conviction for any purpose,' and records are sealed. State law: not a conviction. DA-run; available before or after charges are filed and the statute expressly bars requiring any plea as a condition ('A defendant shall not be required to enter any plea to a criminal charge as a condition of pretrial diversion'). Defendant may sign an optional written factual statement, admissible only for impeachment if diversion is revoked and prosecution resumes. Term generally up to two years; serious sex offenses excluded.\n- Connecticut (conviction: NO): Pretrial alcohol education program / impaired driving intervention program / Pretrial drug education and community service program (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-56g; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-56i) -- In each program the prosecution is suspended (limitations tolled) with no plea or finding of guilt; on satisfactory completion the court dismisses the charges and the records are erased under § 54-142a. State law: not a conviction. All Connecticut diversion is pre-plea suspension of prosecution ending in dismissal plus statutory erasure. The DUI program under § 54-56g closed to new applications April 1, 2022 (succeeded for new cases by an impaired driving intervention program, § 54-56r, enacted 2021); § 54-56q (2021) is the newer drug intervention and community service program alongside § 54-56i. The § 17a-696 treatment statute authorizes suspension of PROSECUTION only (not of sentence), with no guilty plea required.\n- General: No comparable regime identified in the remaining 10 of 51 jurisdictions surveyed (2026-07); for an unfamiliar disposition, analyze its mechanism against the framework.\n- General: No comparable regime identified in the remaining 10 of 51 jurisdictions surveyed (2026-07); for an unfamiliar disposition, analyze its mechanism against the framework.\n- General: Verify no plea was entered: many programs labelled 'diversion' in fact require a guilty plea held in abeyance -- those are deferred adjudications, analyzed under that entry.\n\nINTERPRETATION (no direct authority -- this is CanLex's reasoned view from the governing principles; treat it as a starting point, not an answer): Not a conviction. The live question is only the act branch: s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c) inadmissibility can still be based on the underlying conduct -- established on reasonable grounds to believe (s. 33; balance of probabilities only for a permanent resident's s. 36(1)(c) determination, s. 36(3)(d)) -- using police reports and the person's own statements. In practice a completed diversion with no admission gives an officer little to work with, but it is not a legal bar.", "history": "", "last_amended": "", - "current_to": "2026-07-10", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — pretrial diversion", "source_url": "" }, @@ -171,11 +171,11 @@ "marginal_note": "adjournment in contemplation of dismissal", "part": "US dispositions", "division": "", - "heading": "Is a US adjournment in contemplation of dismissal a conviction for IRPA s. 36? (depends)", - "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nDisposition: adjournment in contemplation of dismissal; ACD; ACOD; continuance without a finding; CWOF\nIs it a conviction for IRPA s. 36 purposes: DEPENDS\nAuthority status: NO AUTHORITY LOCATED -- reasoned interpretation only\n\nNew York's ACD (CPL 170.55) adjourns the case and dismisses it in furtherance of justice after a period, with NO plea and no finding of guilt -- on dismissal the arrest and prosecution are deemed a nullity under NY law. Massachusetts' continuance without a finding (CWOF) differs decisively: it requires an admission to sufficient facts before the case is continued and dismissed. No reported Canadian decision on either was located.\n\nState variations:\n- New York (conviction: no): ACD: no plea, no finding; deemed nullity on dismissal.\n- Massachusetts (conviction: depends): CWOF: admission to sufficient facts precedes the continuance -- guilt is on the record even though no conviction enters.\n\nINTERPRETATION (no direct authority -- this is CanLex's reasoned view from the governing principles; treat it as a starting point, not an answer): A completed NY ACD is not a conviction on any analysis -- it is a dismissal without guilt, stronger even than a Canadian discharge (which requires a finding of guilt). A Massachusetts CWOF is not a conviction under state law either, and its structure (admitted facts, no judgment, dismissal on completion) parallels the Canadian conditional discharge, supporting non-recognition under Burgon -- but the admission to sufficient facts squarely supports the act branch (s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)), as with any admitted-guilt disposition.", + "heading": "Is a US adjournment in contemplation of dismissal a conviction for IRPA s. 36? (LIKELY NO)", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nDisposition: adjournment in contemplation of dismissal; ACD; ACOD; continuance without a finding; CWOF\nIs the COMPLETED disposition a conviction for IRPA s. 36: LIKELY NO\nAuthority status: NO AUTHORITY LOCATED -- reasoned interpretation only\n\nBOTTOM LINE: NY ACD completed: NOT a conviction (statutory nullity -- the cleanest disposition in the survey). MA CWOF completed: likely not a conviction, but the admission to sufficient facts squarely supports the act branch.\n\nNew York's ACD (CPL 170.55) adjourns the case and dismisses it in furtherance of justice after a period, with NO plea and no finding of guilt -- on dismissal the arrest and prosecution are deemed a nullity under NY law. Massachusetts' continuance without a finding (CWOF) differs decisively: it requires an admission to sufficient facts before the case is continued and dismissed. No reported Canadian decision on either was located.\n\nState variations:\n- Connecticut (conviction: NO): Accelerated Rehabilitation (AR) / Accelerated pretrial rehabilitation (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-56e (formerly § 54-76p)) -- Prosecution is suspended (defendant waives speedy trial and tolls limitations) and the defendant is supervised by the Court Support Services Division for up to 2 years; on satisfactory completion the court 'shall dismiss such charges' and all records of the charges are erased under § 54-142a. State law: not a conviction. Connecticut's functional analog to New York's ACD rather than Massachusetts' CWOF: no plea, no admission, and no finding of guilt or innocence is made. Available for crimes and motor-vehicle violations 'not of a serious nature'; class A and most class B felonies, crimes involving death, and charges eligible for the specialized programs are excluded; class C felonies only on good-cause showing; usable at most twice (three times for certain veterans); $35 application fee. On failure, prosecution simply resumes.\n- Massachusetts (conviction: LIKELY NO): Continuance without a finding (CWOF) (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, § 18) -- Dismissal after successful probation; sealing on good cause under § 100C. State law: not a conviction. Admission to sufficient facts precedes the continuance; not available after trial.\n- New York (conviction: NO): Adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD/ACOD) (N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 170.55; § 210.46) -- On dismissal, 'the arrest and prosecution shall be deemed a nullity'; restored to pre-arrest status; sealed under § 160.50. State law: not a conviction. Misdemeanor-level; the cleanest non-conviction disposition in the survey.\n- General: No comparable regime identified in the remaining 48 of 51 jurisdictions surveyed (2026-07); for an unfamiliar disposition, analyze its mechanism against the framework.\n- General: No comparable regime identified in the remaining 48 of 51 jurisdictions surveyed (2026-07); for an unfamiliar disposition, analyze its mechanism against the framework.\n\nINTERPRETATION (no direct authority -- this is CanLex's reasoned view from the governing principles; treat it as a starting point, not an answer): A completed NY ACD is not a conviction on any analysis -- it is a dismissal without guilt, stronger even than a Canadian discharge (which requires a finding of guilt). A Massachusetts CWOF is not a conviction under state law either, and its structure (admitted facts, no judgment, dismissal on completion) parallels the Canadian conditional discharge, supporting non-recognition under Burgon -- but the admission to sufficient facts squarely supports the act branch (s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) on the s. 33 reasonable-grounds standard, as with any admitted-guilt disposition.", "history": "", "last_amended": "", - "current_to": "2026-07-10", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — adjournment in contemplation of dismissal", "source_url": "" }, @@ -189,11 +189,11 @@ "marginal_note": "set aside", "part": "US dispositions", "division": "", - "heading": "Is a US set aside a conviction for IRPA s. 36? (depends)", - "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nDisposition: set aside; 1203.4 dismissal; PC 1203.4; post-conviction dismissal; judicial set-aside\nIs it a conviction for IRPA s. 36 purposes: DEPENDS\nAuthority status: NO AUTHORITY LOCATED -- reasoned interpretation only\n\nCalifornia Penal Code s. 1203.4 (and analogues, e.g. Arizona's set-aside) allows a court, after probation is completed, to permit withdrawal of the plea and dismiss the accusation. The relief is expressly limited under state law: the conviction may still be pleaded and proved in later prosecutions, used for licensing and other purposes, and the statute's own text reserves these effects. No reported Canadian decision on a s. 1203.4 dismissal was located.\n\nState variations:\n- California (conviction: depends): PC 1203.4: plea withdrawn and case dismissed after probation, but the conviction survives for many state and federal purposes.\n- Arizona (conviction: depends): Set-aside (ARS 13-905): judgment of guilt set aside, but with enumerated carve-outs preserving the conviction's effect.\n\nINTERPRETATION (no direct authority -- this is CanLex's reasoned view from the governing principles; treat it as a starting point, not an answer): Under the Saini second element (aim, content and EFFECT of the foreign law), a s. 1203.4 dismissal is a weak candidate for recognition: unlike a Canadian record suspension, it does not remove the conviction's legal effect -- state law preserves it for numerous purposes, and it was relief granted as a reward for completing probation rather than a determination that no conviction should exist. The better view is that the person 'has been convicted' for s. 36 purposes notwithstanding the dismissal, though the completed probation and dismissal are relevant to rehabilitation relief (s. 36(3)(c)) and to discretion. A set-aside granted for legal error stands differently (compare Drake: vacatur ab initio removed the conviction basis).", + "heading": "Is a US set aside a conviction for IRPA s. 36? (LIKELY YES)", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nDisposition: set aside; 1203.4 dismissal; PC 1203.4; post-conviction dismissal; judicial set-aside\nIs the COMPLETED disposition a conviction for IRPA s. 36: LIKELY YES\nAuthority status: NO AUTHORITY LOCATED -- reasoned interpretation only\n\nBOTTOM LINE: Treat as still a conviction for IRPA: the relief is too limited to satisfy Saini's effect element (the conviction survives for state purposes). Exception: a set-aside granted for LEGAL ERROR (vacatur ab initio) removes the conviction -- check the order's basis. Completed probation + dismissal remain relevant to rehabilitation relief.\n\nCalifornia Penal Code s. 1203.4 (and analogues, e.g. Arizona's set-aside) allows a court, after probation is completed, to permit withdrawal of the plea and dismiss the accusation. The relief is expressly limited under state law: the conviction may still be pleaded and proved in later prosecutions, used for licensing and other purposes, and the statute's own text reserves these effects. No reported Canadian decision on a s. 1203.4 dismissal was located.\n\nState-by-state coverage: 35 jurisdictions (likely-yes: 22, likely-no: 12, fact-specific: 1) -- full per-state detail in the per-state entries.\n- Alaska (conviction: LIKELY YES): Set-aside under SIS (Alaska Stat. § 12.55.085(e)) -- Conviction set aside; person 'deemed not to have been convicted' though record remains. State law: conviction with limited relief. Granted as of right on successful probation absent good cause; does not eradicate the conviction fact.\n- Arizona (conviction: LIKELY YES): Setting aside judgment of guilt (set-aside) (A.R.S. § 13-905) -- On fulfillment of probation or sentence and discharge, 'the court shall set aside the judgment of guilt, dismiss the complaint, information or indictment and order that the person be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the conviction,' with enumerated exceptions. State law: conviction with limited relief. Arizona's closest analogue to Cal. Penal Code 1203.4. The set-aside conviction may still be used as a prior conviction, an element of an offense, admissible evidence, and for DOT purposes; DPS annotates the criminal history 'that the conviction has been set aside' but 'may not redact or remove any part of the person's record,' and the person must still disclose the conviction when asked. Excluded: dangerous offenses, sex-registration offenses, offenses with sexual-motivation findings, and felonies against victims under 15.\n- Arkansas (conviction: LIKELY YES): Sealing of convictions (Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-1413; § 16-90-1415) -- Sealed conviction deemed never to have occurred; civil rights restored per § 16-90-1417. State law: conviction with limited relief. Court presumes sealing appropriate for misdemeanors unless clear/convincing evidence otherwise; felonies discretionary.\n- California (conviction: LIKELY YES): Dismissal / set-aside ('expungement') / 1203.4 relief (Cal. Penal Code § 1203.4; Cal. Penal Code § 1203.4a) -- On completion of probation (or sentence, for §§ 1203.4a/1203.41), the court permits the defendant to withdraw the plea of guilty or nolo contendere (or sets aside the verdict), enters a not-guilty plea, dismisses the accusations, and releases the defendant from 'all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense' — subject to broad statutory exceptions. State law: conviction with limited relief. This is the statute the category is named for. The statute expressly covers guilty AND nolo pleas and trial verdicts; a conviction (though often no judgment, where imposition of sentence was suspended) must exist. The dismissed conviction remains a conviction under California law for many purposes: it may be pleaded and proved as a prior 'with full effect,' must be disclosed in response to direct questions for public office, state licensure, and Lottery contracting, does not restore firearm rights, leaves protective orders intact, and is unavailable for specified sex offenses and certain Vehicle Code offenses. SB 731 (2023) added § 1203.41 petitions for felons sentenced to prison (1-2 year waits, no sex registration), with the same exceptions. Dismissed convictions are also auto-sealed from public view under § 1203.425 since 2022.\n- District of Columbia (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Youth Rehabilitation Act set-aside / YRA set-aside (D.C. Code § 24-906; D.C. Code §§ 24-901 to 24-907) -- The conviction is automatically set aside upon unconditional discharge before expiration of the sentence or probation (§ 24-906(a), (c), (e)); discretionary set-aside is available where the sentence expires without early discharge and, under § 24-906(e-1), by post-completion motion; the court issues a certificate of set-aside. State law: mixed. Available only to 'youth offenders' — persons 24 years of age or younger at the time of the offense (post-2018 amendments), excluding murder, terrorism murders, first/second-degree sexual abuse, and first-degree child sexual abuse (§ 24-901). The set-aside removes the conviction for most purposes, but § 24-906(f) expressly preserves its use for enhanced/subsequent-offense sentencing, prior-drug-violation determinations, impeachment and cross-examination of character witnesses, sex offender registration, the gun offender registry (convictions after Jan. 1, 2011), and firearms-possession determinations — hence 'mixed' rather than a clean non-conviction.\n- Georgia (conviction: LIKELY NO): Retroactive first offender treatment (exoneration and discharge) (O.C.G.A. § 42-8-66; O.C.G.A. § 42-8-63) -- With the prosecuting attorney's consent, the court may retroactively grant First Offender Act treatment and order exoneration of guilt and discharge; GCIC and the Department of Driver Services must modify their records, and the resulting discharge is not a conviction under O.C.G.A. § 42-8-63. State law: not a conviction. This is Georgia's only mechanism for converting an entered adult conviction into a non-conviction, and it is narrow: it covers only defendants who were FOA-eligible at sentencing but were not informed of their eligibility, plus persons sentenced between March 18, 1968 and October 31, 1982 to no more than one year who would have qualified. Prosecutor consent is a prerequisite to the petition. Georgia has no general Cal. Penal Code 1203.4-style set-aside for probationers at large.\n- General: No comparable regime identified in the remaining 16 of 51 jurisdictions surveyed (2026-07); for an unfamiliar disposition, analyze its mechanism against the framework.\n- General: No comparable regime identified in the remaining 16 of 51 jurisdictions surveyed (2026-07); for an unfamiliar disposition, analyze its mechanism against the framework.\n\nINTERPRETATION (no direct authority -- this is CanLex's reasoned view from the governing principles; treat it as a starting point, not an answer): Under the Saini second element (aim, content and EFFECT of the foreign law), a s. 1203.4 dismissal is a weak candidate for recognition: unlike a Canadian record suspension, it does not remove the conviction's legal effect -- state law preserves it for numerous purposes, and it was relief granted as a reward for completing probation rather than a determination that no conviction should exist. The better view is that the person 'has been convicted' for s. 36 purposes notwithstanding the dismissal, though the completed probation and dismissal are relevant to rehabilitation relief (s. 36(3)(c)) and to discretion. A set-aside granted for legal error stands differently (compare Drake: vacatur ab initio removed the conviction basis).", "history": "", "last_amended": "", - "current_to": "2026-07-10", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — set aside", "source_url": "" }, @@ -207,11 +207,11 @@ "marginal_note": "juvenile adjudication", "part": "US dispositions", "division": "", - "heading": "Is a US juvenile adjudication a conviction for IRPA s. 36? (depends)", - "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nDisposition: juvenile adjudication; juvenile delinquency; youthful offender adjudication; juvenile record\nIs it a conviction for IRPA s. 36 purposes: DEPENDS\nAuthority status: IRCC guidance only -- no judicial authority located\n\nIRPA s. 36(3)(e) excludes findings under Canada's youth-justice statutes (Young Offenders Act; youth sentences under the Youth Criminal Justice Act) from inadmissibility. Its application to FOREIGN youth dispositions is, in the IRB's own words, 'not entirely clear'. The operational approach treats a foreign juvenile adjudication like a Canadian youth finding where the foreign system dealt with the person as a youth in a separate youth regime; a minor tried and convicted AS AN ADULT (or given an adult sentence) is treated as convicted. US delinquency adjudications are civil-adjacent, sealed, and expressly 'not convictions' under most state statutes, which supports the same result by the Burgon route independent of s. 36(3)(e).\n\nState variations:\n- general (conviction: depends): The decisive questions: was the person proceeded against in juvenile court, and does state law deem the adjudication a non-conviction? A juvenile transferred/waived into adult court and convicted there is convicted.\n\nIRCC guidance (cited by reference; not reproduced here):\n- IRPA s. 36(3)(e): Excludes Canadian youth-justice findings; foreign application unsettled.\n- IRB Legal Services, Sponsorship Appeals Ch. 2 (Criminal Refusals), Jan 2008: Notes the foreign application of s. 36(3)(e) is 'not entirely clear'; records CIC's public position that a YCJA youth is not inadmissible unless given an adult sentence, and that transfer to adult court may ground inadmissibility.\n\nINTERPRETATION (no direct authority -- this is CanLex's reasoned view from the governing principles; treat it as a starting point, not an answer): For a US juvenile delinquency adjudication in juvenile court: not a conviction, both by analogy to s. 36(3)(e)'s policy and because state law deems it a non-conviction (Burgon). For a minor convicted in adult criminal court: a conviction. The act branch technically remains for adjudicated conduct, but using it to circumvent the youth-justice exclusion would sit uneasily with s. 36(3)(e)'s purpose; flag rather than assert.", + "heading": "Is a US juvenile adjudication a conviction for IRPA s. 36? (NO)", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nDisposition: juvenile adjudication; juvenile delinquency; youthful offender adjudication; juvenile record\nIs the COMPLETED disposition a conviction for IRPA s. 36: NO\nAuthority status: IRCC guidance only -- no judicial authority located\n\nBOTTOM LINE: Juvenile-court delinquency adjudication: NOT a conviction. Tried or sentenced as an ADULT: a conviction. The single decisive fact is which court system entered the disposition.\n\nIRPA s. 36(3)(e) excludes findings under Canada's youth-justice statutes (Young Offenders Act; youth sentences under the Youth Criminal Justice Act) from inadmissibility. Its application to FOREIGN youth dispositions is, in the IRB's own words, 'not entirely clear'. The operational approach treats a foreign juvenile adjudication like a Canadian youth finding where the foreign system dealt with the person as a youth in a separate youth regime; a minor tried and convicted AS AN ADULT (or given an adult sentence) is treated as convicted. US delinquency adjudications are civil-adjacent, sealed, and expressly 'not convictions' under most state statutes, which supports the same result by the Burgon route independent of s. 36(3)(e).\n\nState-by-state coverage: 51 jurisdictions (no: 41, fact-specific: 10) -- full per-state detail in the per-state entries.\n- Alabama (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): juvenile delinquency adjudication (Ala. Code § 12-15-136; § 12-15-137) -- Sealing 2 years post-discharge; destruction 5 years after majority. State law: conviction with limited relief. [EXTRACTION FLAG: Ala. Code 12-15-220 provides delinquency adjudication is not a conviction; extractor status doubtful — verify]\n- Alaska (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Juvenile delinquency adjudication (Alaska Stat. §§ 47.12.300(c), (e); 47.12.030) -- Records sealed within 30 days of 18th birthday or release of jurisdiction. State law: unclear. Profile silent on conviction status; AS 47.12.180 generally: adjudication not a conviction of crime — verify.\n- Arizona (conviction: NO): Juvenile delinquency adjudication (A.R.S. § 8-207; A.R.S. § 8-348) -- An adjudication of delinquency is entered in juvenile court, but 'an order of the juvenile court in proceedings under this chapter shall not be deemed a conviction of crime' and does not impose civil disabilities; adjudications may later be set aside (§ 8-348) and records destroyed at age 18 or 25 depending on offense (§ 8-349). State law: not a conviction. A finding (adjudication) of delinquency is required, but Arizona law expressly deems it not a criminal conviction. Dispositions may still be used against the juvenile in later criminal or juvenile cases and in enumerated contexts (e.g., §§ 13-501 transfer, driver-license statutes), and set-aside under § 8-348 excludes serious-injury, deadly-weapon, sexual and DUI offenses.\n- Arkansas (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Juvenile record expungement / Delinquency adjudication (Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-309(b)) -- Violent felony delinquency records expungeable after 10 years; others expunged at 21 or on court discretion. State law: conviction. 2025 SB487: violent felony records retained 10 years. [EXTRACTION FLAG: delinquency adjudications are generally not criminal convictions under Ark. law — verify status]\n- California (conviction: NO): Juvenile wardship adjudication (delinquency) / W&I 602 adjudication (Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 203; Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 602) -- On satisfactory completion of probation or supervision the court dismisses the petition and orders all records sealed (§ 786), whereupon 'the arrest and other proceedings in the case shall be deemed not to have occurred' and the person may deny them to employers and schools. State law: not a conviction. W&I Code § 203 is categorical: 'An order adjudging a minor to be a ward of the juvenile court shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose, nor shall a proceeding in the juvenile court be deemed a criminal proceeding.' The basis is an admission or a sustained petition (true finding), not a criminal plea, and a wardship order — not a judgment of conviction — is entered. Automatic § 786 sealing is unavailable where a § 707(b) serious offense committed at 14+ was sustained (unless reduced/dismissed); certain firearm/drug wardships carry a firearm ban to age 30 (Pen. Code § 29820).\n- Colorado (conviction: NO): Adjudication of delinquency (Colorado Children's Code) (C.R.S. Title 19, Article 2.5 (recodified 2021 from Article 2); C.R.S. § 19-2.5-102 (definition of adjudication)) -- Juvenile is adjudicated as having committed a delinquent act rather than convicted of a crime; expungement under § 19-1-306 is mandatory for many completed dispositions (petty offenses, class 3-4 misdemeanors, level 1-2 drug misdemeanors, diversion, deferred adjudication) and, once granted, the juvenile may deny the adjudication occurred. State law: not a conviction. Under the Children's Code, a juvenile found to have committed the prohibited act is adjudicated delinquent, not convicted of a crime — proceedings are quasi-criminal, and adjudication requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt or a guilty plea to the delinquent act. Important carve-out in § 19-2.5-102 itself: when a previous conviction must be pled and proven as an element of an offense or for sentence enhancement, 'adjudication' means conviction. Sex offenses, domestic violence, and victim-notification crimes are excluded from mandatory expungement.\n- General: The decisive questions: was the person proceeded against in juvenile court, and does state law deem the adjudication a non-conviction? A juvenile transferred/waived into adult court and convicted there is convicted.\n\nIRCC guidance (cited by reference; not reproduced here):\n- IRPA s. 36(3)(e): Excludes Canadian youth-justice findings; foreign application unsettled.\n- IRB Legal Services, Sponsorship Appeals Ch. 2 (Criminal Refusals), Jan 2008: Notes the foreign application of s. 36(3)(e) is 'not entirely clear'; records CIC's public position that a YCJA youth is not inadmissible unless given an adult sentence, and that transfer to adult court may ground inadmissibility.\n\nINTERPRETATION (no direct authority -- this is CanLex's reasoned view from the governing principles; treat it as a starting point, not an answer): For a US juvenile delinquency adjudication in juvenile court: not a conviction, both by analogy to s. 36(3)(e)'s policy and because state law deems it a non-conviction (Burgon). For a minor convicted in adult criminal court: a conviction. The act branch technically remains for adjudicated conduct, but using it to circumvent the youth-justice exclusion would sit uneasily with s. 36(3)(e)'s purpose; flag rather than assert.", "history": "", "last_amended": "", - "current_to": "2026-07-10", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — juvenile adjudication", "source_url": "" }, @@ -225,11 +225,11 @@ "marginal_note": "suspended imposition of sentence", "part": "US dispositions", "division": "", - "heading": "Is a US suspended imposition of sentence a conviction for IRPA s. 36? (depends)", - "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nDisposition: suspended imposition of sentence; SIS; suspended sentence; suspended execution of sentence\nIs it a conviction for IRPA s. 36 purposes: DEPENDS\nAuthority status: NO AUTHORITY LOCATED -- reasoned interpretation only\n\nTwo very different dispositions share the 'suspended sentence' label. Suspended IMPOSITION of sentence (e.g. Missouri): guilt is found but no sentence is imposed and, on successful probation, no conviction enters the record under state law. Suspended EXECUTION of sentence: judgment and sentence are both entered, and only the serving of the sentence is suspended -- unambiguously a conviction. No reported Canadian decision on a US SIS was located.\n\nState variations:\n- Missouri (conviction: depends): SIS: completed probation leaves no conviction under state law; a closed record is retained.\n- general (conviction: depends): Read the judgment: if a sentence was imposed and merely stayed, it is a conviction everywhere.\n\nINTERPRETATION (no direct authority -- this is CanLex's reasoned view from the governing principles; treat it as a starting point, not an answer): A completed Missouri-style SIS parallels the Canadian conditional discharge closely (guilt found, no conviction registered, probation conditions) and is a strong candidate for non-recognition as a conviction under Burgon/Saini. Suspended execution is a conviction, full stop -- and note that for s. 36(1)(a)'s six-month branch Canadian courts treat the imposed (even if suspended) term as the term of imprisonment. The act branch remains available for SIS cases since guilt was found.", + "heading": "Is a US suspended imposition of sentence a conviction for IRPA s. 36? (FACT-SPECIFIC)", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nDisposition: suspended imposition of sentence; SIS; suspended sentence; suspended execution of sentence\nIs the COMPLETED disposition a conviction for IRPA s. 36: FACT-SPECIFIC\nAuthority status: NO AUTHORITY LOCATED -- reasoned interpretation only\n\nBOTTOM LINE: Read the judgment line on the record. Imposition suspended (no judgment entered) + probation completed: likely NOT a conviction. EXECUTION suspended (judgment + sentence entered, service stayed): a conviction -- and the suspended term still counts as the term of imprisonment.\n\nTwo very different dispositions share the 'suspended sentence' label. Suspended IMPOSITION of sentence (e.g. Missouri): guilt is found but no sentence is imposed and, on successful probation, no conviction enters the record under state law. Suspended EXECUTION of sentence: judgment and sentence are both entered, and only the serving of the sentence is suspended -- unambiguously a conviction. No reported Canadian decision on a US SIS was located.\n\nState-by-state coverage: 13 jurisdictions (yes: 5, likely-no: 4, fact-specific: 2, likely-yes: 2) -- full per-state detail in the per-state entries.\n- Alaska (conviction: LIKELY NO): Suspended entry of judgment (SEJ) (Alaska Stat. § 12.55.078) -- On successful probation, charges dismissed; 'a person who is discharged under this subsection is not convicted of a crime.'. State law: not a conviction. First felony offenses and less serious offenses; non-conviction records not published online.\n- Arizona (conviction: YES): Suspension of imposition or execution of sentence (probation) (A.R.S. § 13-901) -- Completion or early termination of probation discharges the defendant but leaves the judgment of guilt and conviction fully intact; relief from the conviction requires a separate § 13-905 set-aside application. State law: conviction. Critical SIS/SES point: § 13-901 authorizes suspension only '[i]f a person who has been convicted of an offense is eligible for probation' — judgment of guilt is entered before either suspended imposition or suspended execution, so an Arizona SIS is a conviction under Arizona law, unlike Missouri-style SIS. The only no-judgment probation in Arizona is the drug-court deferral under § 13-3422.\n- Arkansas (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Suspended imposition of sentence / First offender deferred adjudication (Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-303) -- No adjudication of guilt; discharge and dismissal upon successful probation; record then sealed. State law: conviction. First-time offenders only; excludes violent/sexual offenses per § 16-93-303(b). [EXTRACTION FLAG: no adjudication + dismissal but status says conviction — verify]\n- California (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Probation with imposition of sentence suspended (ISS/SIS) / conditional sentence (court probation) (Cal. Penal Code § 1203(a); Cal. Penal Code § 1203.4 (relief on completion)) -- Probation terminates with no sentence ever imposed and no judgment entered; the defendant is then entitled to mandatory dismissal relief under § 1203.4, and felony 'wobblers' may be reduced to misdemeanors under § 17(b). On revocation, the court may impose any authorized sentence. State law: conviction. Pen. Code § 1203(a) defines probation as 'the suspension of the imposition or execution of a sentence,' making the SIS/SES distinction explicit. Under SIS, 'no judgment is then pending against the probationer' and the court retains sentencing jurisdiction (People v. Feyrer, 48 Cal.4th 426 (2010)); under SES a judgment and sentence exist but execution is stayed. Despite the absence of a judgment, California law treats the defendant as convicted upon the plea (guilty or nolo, § 1016) or verdict — the conviction exists and counts as a prior unless and until § 1203.4 relief issues, and even then with that statute's exceptions.\n- Colorado (conviction: YES): Suspended sentence (suspension of imposition or execution of sentence) (C.R.S. § 18-1.3-401(11)) -- If conditions are satisfied the suspended sentence is never imposed/executed, but the judgment of conviction stands — the statute contains no vacatur, withdrawal, or record-relief language. State law: conviction. Colorado permits suspension of either imposition (SIS) or execution (SES) of sentence, but unlike Missouri-style SIS, both operate AFTER conviction: suspension postpones only the sentence, not entry of judgment, and completion never converts the disposition into a non-conviction. Suspension is barred if the defendant is probation-ineligible under C.R.S. § 18-1.3-201 absent an express waiver on DA recommendation. Colorado's true avoid-the-conviction mechanism is the deferred judgment under § 18-1.3-102, not the suspended sentence.\n- Delaware (conviction: YES): Suspension of imposition or execution of sentence (11 Del. C. § 4204(c)) -- The sentencing court may 'suspend the imposition or execution of sentence, or suspend a portion thereof' with probation or conditions; successful completion ends supervision but the judgment of conviction stands — there is no statutory discharge-without-conviction on this track. State law: conviction. Delaware permits both SIS and SES, but unlike Missouri-style SIS, a Delaware suspension follows entry of a judgment of conviction — suspension affects only the sentence, not conviction status. The no-conviction pathway in Delaware is instead Probation Before Judgment (11 Del. C. § 4218), where entry of judgment itself is stayed.\n- General: No comparable regime identified in the remaining 38 of 51 jurisdictions surveyed (2026-07); for an unfamiliar disposition, analyze its mechanism against the framework.\n- General: No comparable regime identified in the remaining 38 of 51 jurisdictions surveyed (2026-07); for an unfamiliar disposition, analyze its mechanism against the framework.\n- General: Read the judgment: if a sentence was imposed and merely stayed, it is a conviction everywhere.\n\nINTERPRETATION (no direct authority -- this is CanLex's reasoned view from the governing principles; treat it as a starting point, not an answer): A completed Missouri-style SIS parallels the Canadian conditional discharge closely (guilt found, no conviction registered, probation conditions) and is a strong candidate for non-recognition as a conviction under Burgon/Saini. Suspended execution is a conviction, full stop -- and note that for s. 36(1)(a)'s six-month branch Canadian courts treat the imposed (even if suspended) term as the term of imprisonment. The act branch remains available for SIS cases since guilt was found.", "history": "", "last_amended": "", - "current_to": "2026-07-10", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — suspended imposition of sentence", "source_url": "" }, @@ -243,12 +243,1182 @@ "marginal_note": "administrative license suspension", "part": "US dispositions", "division": "", - "heading": "Is a US administrative license suspension a conviction for IRPA s. 36? (no)", - "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nDisposition: administrative license suspension; DUI administrative finding; civil infraction; municipal ordinance violation; administrative per se\nIs it a conviction for IRPA s. 36 purposes: NO\nAuthority status: NO AUTHORITY LOCATED -- reasoned interpretation only\n\nUS administrative per-se license suspensions (a DMV process triggered by BAC or refusal), civil infractions, and many municipal ordinance violations are not criminal proceedings and produce no criminal conviction. They cannot satisfy 'has been convicted' in s. 36. The criminal DUI charge that often runs in parallel is a separate matter: a criminal DUI conviction is a conviction (and impaired driving is a serious hybrid offence in Canada -- punishable by up to 10 years -- so a single DUI conviction typically grounds serious criminality under s. 36(1)(b) via s. 36(3)(a)). No Canadian authority was located treating an administrative finding alone as a conviction, and none is plausible.\n\nState variations:\n- general (conviction: depends): Check whether the state charges DUI criminally, as a civil infraction (rare), or both; and whether a municipal-ordinance conviction is criminal under state law -- some states prosecute ordinance violations quasi-criminally.\n\nINTERPRETATION (no direct authority -- this is CanLex's reasoned view from the governing principles; treat it as a starting point, not an answer): The administrative finding is not a conviction, but it is EVIDENCE: a per-se suspension based on a tested BAC can support an act-branch finding (s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) that the person committed what would be impaired driving/driving over the limit in Canada, on a balance of probabilities. Officers should analyze the conduct, not just the disposition label.", + "heading": "Is a US administrative license suspension a conviction for IRPA s. 36? (NO)", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nDisposition: administrative license suspension; DUI administrative finding; civil infraction; municipal ordinance violation; administrative per se\nIs the COMPLETED disposition a conviction for IRPA s. 36: NO\nAuthority status: NO AUTHORITY LOCATED -- reasoned interpretation only\n\nBOTTOM LINE: An administrative or civil finding alone is NOT a conviction. But check for the parallel criminal DUI charge -- a criminal DUI conviction is a conviction, and grounds serious criminality via the hybrid-offence deeming rule. A tested BAC supports the act branch.\n\nUS administrative per-se license suspensions (a DMV process triggered by BAC or refusal), civil infractions, and many municipal ordinance violations are not criminal proceedings and produce no criminal conviction. They cannot satisfy 'has been convicted' in s. 36. The criminal DUI charge that often runs in parallel is a separate matter: a criminal DUI conviction is a conviction (and impaired driving is a serious hybrid offence in Canada -- punishable by up to 10 years -- so a single DUI conviction typically grounds serious criminality under s. 36(1)(b) via s. 36(3)(a)). No Canadian authority was located treating an administrative finding alone as a conviction, and none is plausible.\n\nState variations:\n- General: Check whether the state charges DUI criminally, as a civil infraction (rare), or both; and whether a municipal-ordinance conviction is criminal under state law -- some states prosecute ordinance violations quasi-criminally.\n\nINTERPRETATION (no direct authority -- this is CanLex's reasoned view from the governing principles; treat it as a starting point, not an answer): The administrative finding is not a conviction, but it is EVIDENCE: a per-se suspension based on a tested BAC can support an act-branch finding (s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) that the person committed what would be impaired driving/driving over the limit in Canada, on reasonable grounds to believe (s. 33; balance of probabilities for a permanent resident, s. 36(3)(d)). Officers should analyze the conduct, not just the disposition label.", "history": "", "last_amended": "", - "current_to": "2026-07-10", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — administrative license suspension", "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-alabama", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-alabama", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Alabama", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Alabama: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Alabama: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Alabama law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): pardon (Ala. Const. amend. 38; Ala. Code §§ 15-22-20 to -40) -- Forgiveness without erasing the conviction; restores specified rights unless withheld. State law: conviction. 'A pardon does not wipe out the historical fact of the conviction'; pardoned conviction may serve as predicate. Board of Pardons and Paroles grants (not governor).\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): expungement (non-violent misdemeanors and felonies) / human trafficking victim expungement (Ala. Code § 15-27-1; § 15-27-2) -- Proceedings deemed never to have occurred; records unavailable for non-criminal purposes. State law: conviction with limited relief. Non-violent convictions eligible since 2021; violent/sex/moral-turpitude carve-outs.\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: NO): Drug court / mental health court / veteran's court / diversion programs; Ala. Code 15-27-1 is the EXPUNGEMENT vehicle for the dismissed charge (1-year wait), not the program statute. Program mechanics vary -- some Alabama drug courts hold a plea in abeyance (then analyze as deferred adjudication); confirm no plea was taken before treating as pure diversion.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): juvenile delinquency adjudication (Ala. Code § 12-15-136; § 12-15-137) -- Sealing 2 years post-discharge; destruction 5 years after majority. State law: conviction with limited relief. [EXTRACTION FLAG: Ala. Code 12-15-220 provides delinquency adjudication is not a conviction; extractor status doubtful — verify]\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Alabama", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-alaska", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-alaska", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Alaska", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Alaska: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Alaska: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Alaska law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Governor's pardon (Alaska Const. art. III, § 21; Alaska Stat. § 33.20.070) -- Restores civil rights including firearms. State law: conviction with limited relief. Extraordinarily rare: 188 grants since 1959, none since 2007.\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY YES): Suspended imposition of sentence (SIS) (Alaska Stat. § 12.55.085) -- Conviction set aside and certificate issued upon successful probation completion. State law: conviction with limited relief. SIS involves a conviction that is later set aside; excludes serious violent/sex/firearms offenses.\n- set aside (conviction: LIKELY YES): Set-aside under SIS (Alaska Stat. § 12.55.085(e)) -- Conviction set aside; person 'deemed not to have been convicted' though record remains. State law: conviction with limited relief. Granted as of right on successful probation absent good cause; does not eradicate the conviction fact.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Juvenile delinquency adjudication (Alaska Stat. §§ 47.12.300(c), (e); 47.12.030) -- Records sealed within 30 days of 18th birthday or release of jurisdiction. State law: unclear. Profile silent on conviction status; AS 47.12.180 generally: adjudication not a conviction of crime — verify.\n- suspended imposition of sentence (conviction: LIKELY NO): Suspended entry of judgment (SEJ) (Alaska Stat. § 12.55.078) -- On successful probation, charges dismissed; 'a person who is discharged under this subsection is not convicted of a crime.'. State law: not a conviction. First felony offenses and less serious offenses; non-conviction records not published online.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Alaska", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-arizona", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-arizona", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Arizona", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Arizona: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Arizona: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Arizona law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Governor's pardon (on recommendation of the Board of Executive Clemency) (A.R.S. § 31-443; A.R.S. § 31-402) -- The governor 'may grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, after conviction, for all offenses, except impeachment' (§ 31-443), but 'a reprieve, commutation or pardon may not be granted by the governor unless it has first been recommended by the board' (§ 31-402); a pardon absolves the legal consequences of the crime and relieves remaining disabilities. State law: conviction with limited relief. The pardon relieves legal consequences but does not erase, seal or expunge the conviction record; firearms rights are restored only if specified in the pardon document. Grants are rare (e.g., 55 pardons statewide 1988-2009; Gov. Ducey granted one in his first term).\n- expungement (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Marijuana expungement (Proposition 207) / Sealing of case records (A.R.S. § 36-2862; A.R.S. § 13-911) -- Under § 36-2862 the court must 'vacate the judgment of adjudication or conviction' and expunge and seal all records for qualifying marijuana offenses (possession up to 2.5 oz, up to 6 plants, paraphernalia), the person may state they were never arrested/charged/convicted, and the expunged matter 'may not be used in a subsequent prosecution'; under § 13-911 (eff. Dec. 31, 2022) conviction records of most offenses are sealed after 2-10 year waiting periods and the person may state they were never arrested/charged/convicted for most purposes, but the conviction itself is not vacated and remains usable as an element, prior, impeachment or enhancement in later prosecutions. State law: mixed. Arizona's only true expungement of convictions is the marijuana-specific § 36-2862 (not-a-conviction after vacatur). General relief for convictions is record SEALING under § 13-911, which excludes class 1 felonies, dangerous offenses, crimes against children, serious/violent felonies and sex trafficking, and expressly preserves the conviction for prosecutorial use — conviction-with-limited-relief, not erasure. Before these 2021 enactments Arizona had no expungement at all, only the § 13-905 set-aside.\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): Drug court program deferred entry of judgment (A.R.S. § 13-3422) -- Court defers further proceedings 'without entering a judgment of guilt,' places the defendant on probation in drug court, and on fulfillment of probation 'may discharge the defendant and dismiss the proceedings'; on failure 'the court shall enter an adjudication of guilt and sentence the defendant as provided by law.'. State law: not a conviction. Arizona has no general Texas-style deferred-adjudication statute; the only deferred-judgment mechanism is inside the drug court statute, limited to drug-dependent defendants charged with probation-eligible (personal-possession-type) drug offenses, with exclusions for prior serious/dangerous offenses and prior drug-court/diversion completions. Pre-plea admission to drug court is also possible 'only on the agreement of the court and the prosecutor.' Do not confuse with Prop 200 mandatory drug probation (A.R.S. § 13-901.01), which is an ordinary conviction.\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: NO): County attorney diversion / deferred prosecution program / TASC diversion (Maricopa County program name) (A.R.S. § 11-361; A.R.S. § 11-362) -- The county attorney may 'divert or defer, before a guilty plea or a trial, the prosecution of a person who is accused of committing a crime'; on successful completion the prosecution is not pursued (charges dismissed or never filed), with no plea or finding of guilt ever entered. State law: not a conviction. Purely prosecutorial, pre-plea diversion administered by county attorneys under APAAC guidelines (§ 11-362); 2021 HB 2186 amendments removed earlier prior-conviction restrictions on eligibility. The dismissed/diverted matter is not a conviction under Arizona law, but the arrest record is not automatically sealed absent a separate § 13-911 petition.\n- set aside (conviction: LIKELY YES): Setting aside judgment of guilt (set-aside) (A.R.S. § 13-905) -- On fulfillment of probation or sentence and discharge, 'the court shall set aside the judgment of guilt, dismiss the complaint, information or indictment and order that the person be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the conviction,' with enumerated exceptions. State law: conviction with limited relief. Arizona's closest analogue to Cal. Penal Code 1203.4. The set-aside conviction may still be used as a prior conviction, an element of an offense, admissible evidence, and for DOT purposes; DPS annotates the criminal history 'that the conviction has been set aside' but 'may not redact or remove any part of the person's record,' and the person must still disclose the conviction when asked. Excluded: dangerous offenses, sex-registration offenses, offenses with sexual-motivation findings, and felonies against victims under 15.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Juvenile delinquency adjudication (A.R.S. § 8-207; A.R.S. § 8-348) -- An adjudication of delinquency is entered in juvenile court, but 'an order of the juvenile court in proceedings under this chapter shall not be deemed a conviction of crime' and does not impose civil disabilities; adjudications may later be set aside (§ 8-348) and records destroyed at age 18 or 25 depending on offense (§ 8-349). State law: not a conviction. A finding (adjudication) of delinquency is required, but Arizona law expressly deems it not a criminal conviction. Dispositions may still be used against the juvenile in later criminal or juvenile cases and in enumerated contexts (e.g., §§ 13-501 transfer, driver-license statutes), and set-aside under § 8-348 excludes serious-injury, deadly-weapon, sexual and DUI offenses.\n- suspended imposition of sentence (conviction: YES): Suspension of imposition or execution of sentence (probation) (A.R.S. § 13-901) -- Completion or early termination of probation discharges the defendant but leaves the judgment of guilt and conviction fully intact; relief from the conviction requires a separate § 13-905 set-aside application. State law: conviction. Critical SIS/SES point: § 13-901 authorizes suspension only '[i]f a person who has been convicted of an offense is eligible for probation' — judgment of guilt is entered before either suspended imposition or suspended execution, so an Arizona SIS is a conviction under Arizona law, unlike Missouri-style SIS. The only no-judgment probation in Arizona is the drug-court deferral under § 13-3422.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Arizona", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-arkansas", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-arkansas", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Arkansas", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Arkansas: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Arkansas: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Arkansas law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Governor's pardon / Executive clemency (Ark. Const. art. VI, § 18; Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-204) -- Restores jury eligibility, removes licensing/employment barriers; record sealed automatically per § 16-90-1411. State law: conviction with limited relief. Does not restore firearms rights unless explicitly stated per § 5-73-103(b)(3).\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Comprehensive Criminal Record Sealing Act of 2013 (Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-1401 et seq.; § 16-90-1405) -- Record sealed; person may state conviction never occurred and restoration of civil rights. State law: conviction with limited relief. Non-violent Class C/D felonies and Class A/B drug felonies eligible immediately; violent Class C/D require 5-year wait. Excludes Class A/B non-drug felonies, violent/sexual felonies per § 16-90-1408.\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): First offender deferred adjudication / suspended imposition of sentence (Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-303(a)(1)(A)(i); § 16-93-314(b)) -- Upon successful probation completion, defendant discharged without adjudication, case dismissed and record sealed. State law: conviction. Limited to first-time felons; excludes violent crimes and sexual offenses per § 16-93-303(b). [EXTRACTION FLAG: mechanism says discharge without adjudication but status says conviction — verify]\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: NO): Pre-adjudication probation (Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-901 et seq.) -- Upon successful completion, case dismissed and record sealed on prosecutor recommendation and judicial discretion. State law: not a conviction. Limited to non-violent, non-sexual felonies; requires court and prosecutor agreement per § 5-4-901.\n- set aside (conviction: LIKELY YES): Sealing of convictions (Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-1413; § 16-90-1415) -- Sealed conviction deemed never to have occurred; civil rights restored per § 16-90-1417. State law: conviction with limited relief. Court presumes sealing appropriate for misdemeanors unless clear/convincing evidence otherwise; felonies discretionary.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Juvenile record expungement / Delinquency adjudication (Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-309(b)) -- Violent felony delinquency records expungeable after 10 years; others expunged at 21 or on court discretion. State law: conviction. 2025 SB487: violent felony records retained 10 years. [EXTRACTION FLAG: delinquency adjudications are generally not criminal convictions under Ark. law — verify status]\n- suspended imposition of sentence (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Suspended imposition of sentence / First offender deferred adjudication (Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-303) -- No adjudication of guilt; discharge and dismissal upon successful probation; record then sealed. State law: conviction. First-time offenders only; excludes violent/sexual offenses per § 16-93-303(b). [EXTRACTION FLAG: no adjudication + dismissal but status says conviction — verify]\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Arkansas", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-california", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-california", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — California", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "California: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — California: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under California law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Governor's pardon / Certificate of Rehabilitation (COR, gateway to pardon) (Cal. Const. art. V, § 8; Cal. Penal Code §§ 4800-4854) -- The pardon 'shall operate to restore to the convicted person, all the rights, privileges, and franchises of which he or she has been deprived in consequence of that conviction' (§ 4853), including firearm rights unless the felony involved a dangerous weapon (§ 4854); the conviction record is NOT sealed or expunged and the person remains 'convicted.'. State law: conviction with limited relief. Available by direct application or via a court-issued Certificate of Rehabilitation (7-10 year post-discharge waiting periods, § 4852.03); applicants with two or more felony convictions need approval of four California Supreme Court justices (Cal. Const. art. V, § 8). A nolo-based conviction qualifies the same as any other (Pen. Code § 1016). Under California's own law a pardon restores rights but does not erase, vacate, or seal the conviction.\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Automatic conviction record relief (Clean Slate Act, AB 1076/SB 731) / colloquial California 'expungement' (which is actually the § 1203.4 set-aside) (Cal. Penal Code § 1203.425; Cal. Penal Code § 11105(p)(2)(A)) -- DOJ identifies eligible convictions monthly and the conviction is dismissed automatically with a 'relief granted' notation; courts and the state repository may not disclose it to the public, but it remains fully usable as a prior, fully accessible to criminal-justice agencies, and must still be disclosed for peace-officer employment and public office. State law: conviction with limited relief. California has NO destruction-style expungement of adult conviction records; what practitioners call 'expungement' is the § 1203.4 dismissal (see set-aside category). What exists beyond that is automatic record relief under § 1203.425 (eff. 2022): probation completers, post-2004 non-serious/non-violent/non-registerable felonies with all supervision completed plus 4 conviction-free years, and completed misdemeanors get automatic dismissal plus public-access restriction — but the statute expressly preserves use as a prior and criminal-justice-agency access, so the conviction is not erased. Niche vacatur statutes (§ 236.14 trafficking victims; Prop 64 marijuana redesignation/sealing) go further and treat qualifying convictions as legally invalid or never having occurred. A nolo plea underlies relief the same as a guilty plea (Pen. Code § 1016).\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): Deferred entry of judgment (DEJ) / DEJ pilot program for young adults (Cal. Penal Code § 1000.7; former Cal. Penal Code §§ 1000-1000.4 (as they read before AB 208, eff. Jan. 1, 2018)) -- The court dismisses the charge(s) without ever entering judgment; under the former drug DEJ (Pen. Code § 1000.4) the arrest is 'deemed to have never occurred' and the defendant may deny it except on peace-officer applications. State law: not a conviction. California's flagship drug DEJ (former § 1000) required a guilty plea with judgment deferred, but AB 208 converted it to true pretrial diversion effective Jan. 1, 2018 — so only pre-2018 drug dispositions are plea-based DEJ. The surviving DEJ regime is the § 1000.7 pilot for defendants aged 18-20 (up to 24 with team approval) in Butte, Nevada, and Santa Clara counties only, requiring a guilty plea and waivers, with dismissal on completion; it sunsets Jan. 1, 2029. During the deferral the guilty plea exists but no judgment of conviction is entered; on completion the plea never ripens into a judgment and the charge is dismissed.\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: NO): Pretrial diversion (drug) / Mental health diversion (Cal. Penal Code §§ 1000-1000.4 (as amended by AB 208, eff. 2018); Cal. Penal Code § 1000.1) -- Charges are dismissed and 'the arrest upon which the diversion was based shall be deemed to have never occurred' (§§ 1000.4, 1001.9, 1001.36); the defendant may deny the arrest except in response to direct questions on peace-officer applications, and records are restricted from public access. State law: not a conviction. Since AB 208 (2018), drug diversion under § 1000.1 expressly requires a plea of NOT guilty plus waivers of speedy trial/preliminary hearing and jury trial (failure leads to a court trial, not sentencing on a stored plea). Mental health diversion (§ 1001.36) requires only consent and a speedy-trial waiver, available 'from the point at which the accused is charged until adjudication.' Judicial misdemeanor diversion (§ 1001.95) lets a judge divert over prosecutor objection for up to 24 months with no plea; sex-registration, domestic violence, and stalking offenses are excluded.\n- set aside (conviction: LIKELY YES): Dismissal / set-aside ('expungement') / 1203.4 relief (Cal. Penal Code § 1203.4; Cal. Penal Code § 1203.4a) -- On completion of probation (or sentence, for §§ 1203.4a/1203.41), the court permits the defendant to withdraw the plea of guilty or nolo contendere (or sets aside the verdict), enters a not-guilty plea, dismisses the accusations, and releases the defendant from 'all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense' — subject to broad statutory exceptions. State law: conviction with limited relief. This is the statute the category is named for. The statute expressly covers guilty AND nolo pleas and trial verdicts; a conviction (though often no judgment, where imposition of sentence was suspended) must exist. The dismissed conviction remains a conviction under California law for many purposes: it may be pleaded and proved as a prior 'with full effect,' must be disclosed in response to direct questions for public office, state licensure, and Lottery contracting, does not restore firearm rights, leaves protective orders intact, and is unavailable for specified sex offenses and certain Vehicle Code offenses. SB 731 (2023) added § 1203.41 petitions for felons sentenced to prison (1-2 year waits, no sex registration), with the same exceptions. Dismissed convictions are also auto-sealed from public view under § 1203.425 since 2022.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Juvenile wardship adjudication (delinquency) / W&I 602 adjudication (Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 203; Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 602) -- On satisfactory completion of probation or supervision the court dismisses the petition and orders all records sealed (§ 786), whereupon 'the arrest and other proceedings in the case shall be deemed not to have occurred' and the person may deny them to employers and schools. State law: not a conviction. W&I Code § 203 is categorical: 'An order adjudging a minor to be a ward of the juvenile court shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose, nor shall a proceeding in the juvenile court be deemed a criminal proceeding.' The basis is an admission or a sustained petition (true finding), not a criminal plea, and a wardship order — not a judgment of conviction — is entered. Automatic § 786 sealing is unavailable where a § 707(b) serious offense committed at 14+ was sustained (unless reduced/dismissed); certain firearm/drug wardships carry a firearm ban to age 30 (Pen. Code § 29820).\n- suspended imposition of sentence (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Probation with imposition of sentence suspended (ISS/SIS) / conditional sentence (court probation) (Cal. Penal Code § 1203(a); Cal. Penal Code § 1203.4 (relief on completion)) -- Probation terminates with no sentence ever imposed and no judgment entered; the defendant is then entitled to mandatory dismissal relief under § 1203.4, and felony 'wobblers' may be reduced to misdemeanors under § 17(b). On revocation, the court may impose any authorized sentence. State law: conviction. Pen. Code § 1203(a) defines probation as 'the suspension of the imposition or execution of a sentence,' making the SIS/SES distinction explicit. Under SIS, 'no judgment is then pending against the probationer' and the court retains sentencing jurisdiction (People v. Feyrer, 48 Cal.4th 426 (2010)); under SES a judgment and sentence exist but execution is stayed. Despite the absence of a judgment, California law treats the defendant as convicted upon the plea (guilty or nolo, § 1016) or verdict — the conviction exists and counts as a prior unless and until § 1203.4 relief issues, and even then with that statute's exceptions.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — California", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-colorado", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-colorado", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Colorado", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Colorado: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Colorado: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Colorado law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Governor's pardon (executive clemency) (Colo. Const. art. IV, § 7; C.R.S. §§ 16-17-101 to -103) -- A pardon 'shall waive all collateral consequences associated with each conviction' unless the pardon limits its scope (C.R.S. § 16-17-103); the conviction itself remains of record, though a pardoned conviction may subsequently be sealed by the court. State law: conviction with limited relief. Applies only to Colorado state convictions; applications generally not accepted until 10 years after sentence completion, with comment solicited from the DA and sentencing judge. Actively used, including mass marijuana-possession pardons (2,700 in 2020; 1,351 in 2021). The pardon forgives and waives collateral consequences by operation of statute but does not erase or vacate the conviction.\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Sealing of criminal conviction records / Clean Slate Act automatic sealing (SB 22-099) (C.R.S. §§ 24-72-701 to -710; C.R.S. § 24-72-706 (petition-based conviction sealing)) -- On a sealing order the defendant and criminal justice agencies may reply that no public conviction records exist, but the conviction is NOT vacated: it remains usable in subsequent prosecutions and accessible to courts, law enforcement, and certain agencies. State law: conviction with limited relief. Terminology trap: Colorado does not 'expunge' adult convictions — it seals them; 'expungement' is reserved for juvenile records (C.R.S. § 19-1-306) and similar categories. Petition sealing waiting periods: 1 year (petty/drug), 3 years (misdemeanors, lower felonies), 5 years (other eligible felonies); class 1-3 felonies, sex offenses, and violent crimes ineligible. Clean Slate (2022, phased in 2024-2025) seals eligible convictions automatically after 4/7/10 years, with DA objection rights for non-drug felonies.\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): Deferred judgment and sentence / Deferred sentencing of defendant (C.R.S. § 18-1.3-102) -- On full compliance the guilty plea 'shall be withdrawn and the charge ... shall be dismissed with prejudice'; the person is no longer regarded as convicted (including for sex-offender registration) and the dismissed record can be sealed as a non-conviction record. State law: not a conviction. Requires a plea of guilty (statute is silent on nolo contendere) plus written consent of defendant, counsel, and DA via stipulation; entry of judgment and sentence is deferred up to 4 years (felony) or 2 years (misdemeanor/petty/traffic). On breach the court 'shall enter judgment and impose sentence upon the guilty plea.' Note that while the deferral is pending, a guilty plea has been entered and accepted — only successful completion produces the non-conviction outcome.\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: NO): Adult pretrial diversion (C.R.S. § 18-1.3-101) -- Court dismisses all charges with prejudice; the statute provides that 'a successfully completed diversion agreement shall not be considered a conviction for any purpose,' and records are sealed. State law: not a conviction. DA-run; available before or after charges are filed and the statute expressly bars requiring any plea as a condition ('A defendant shall not be required to enter any plea to a criminal charge as a condition of pretrial diversion'). Defendant may sign an optional written factual statement, admissible only for impeachment if diversion is revoked and prosecution resumes. Term generally up to two years; serious sex offenses excluded.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Adjudication of delinquency (Colorado Children's Code) (C.R.S. Title 19, Article 2.5 (recodified 2021 from Article 2); C.R.S. § 19-2.5-102 (definition of adjudication)) -- Juvenile is adjudicated as having committed a delinquent act rather than convicted of a crime; expungement under § 19-1-306 is mandatory for many completed dispositions (petty offenses, class 3-4 misdemeanors, level 1-2 drug misdemeanors, diversion, deferred adjudication) and, once granted, the juvenile may deny the adjudication occurred. State law: not a conviction. Under the Children's Code, a juvenile found to have committed the prohibited act is adjudicated delinquent, not convicted of a crime — proceedings are quasi-criminal, and adjudication requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt or a guilty plea to the delinquent act. Important carve-out in § 19-2.5-102 itself: when a previous conviction must be pled and proven as an element of an offense or for sentence enhancement, 'adjudication' means conviction. Sex offenses, domestic violence, and victim-notification crimes are excluded from mandatory expungement.\n- suspended imposition of sentence (conviction: YES): Suspended sentence (suspension of imposition or execution of sentence) (C.R.S. § 18-1.3-401(11)) -- If conditions are satisfied the suspended sentence is never imposed/executed, but the judgment of conviction stands — the statute contains no vacatur, withdrawal, or record-relief language. State law: conviction. Colorado permits suspension of either imposition (SIS) or execution (SES) of sentence, but unlike Missouri-style SIS, both operate AFTER conviction: suspension postpones only the sentence, not entry of judgment, and completion never converts the disposition into a non-conviction. Suspension is barred if the defendant is probation-ineligible under C.R.S. § 18-1.3-201 absent an express waiver on DA recommendation. Colorado's true avoid-the-conviction mechanism is the deferred judgment under § 18-1.3-102, not the suspended sentence.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Colorado", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-connecticut", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-connecticut", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Connecticut", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Connecticut: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Connecticut: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Connecticut law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Absolute pardon (\"expungement pardon\") / Provisional pardon (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-124a; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-130a) -- An absolute pardon granted on or after Oct. 1, 1974 triggers erasure of all police, court and prosecutor records under § 54-142a(d); the pardoned person is deemed never to have been arrested and may so swear under oath. A provisional pardon or certificate of employability lifts employment/licensing barriers only and by statute does not 'entitle such person to erasure of the record of the conviction.'. State law: mixed. Pardons are granted by the administrative Board of Pardons and Paroles, not the Governor, for any offense against the state; applications accepted 3 years after a misdemeanor and 5 years after a felony conviction (waivable for extraordinary circumstances). Connecticut is unusual: a full (absolute) pardon effects complete statutory erasure of the conviction, while the lesser provisional pardon/COE leaves the conviction intact — hence 'mixed' for the category as a whole. Grant rates are high (about 84% in 2025; 1,443 absolute pardons granted that year).\n- expungement (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Erasure of criminal records / Clean Slate (automatic erasure of convictions) (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-142a; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-142a(e) (Clean Slate, P.A. 21-32)) -- Conviction records are erased (electronic erasure by operation of law; physical records destroyed); the person is 'deemed to have never been arrested within the meaning of the general statutes with respect to the proceedings so erased and may so swear under oath' (current § 54-142a(g)(2)). State law: not a conviction. Connecticut erases CONVICTIONS, not just non-conviction records. Clean Slate (effective Jan. 1, 2023; rollout 2023-2025, roughly 50,000 records erased by late 2025) automatically erases most misdemeanors 7 years, and class D/E or unclassified felonies carrying up to 5 years 10 years, after the conviction judgment, provided no pending charges and sentence complete; family violence crimes and sexual offenses are excluded, and pre-2000 convictions require a petition. Separate erasure paths exist for decriminalized conduct (§ 54-142d, incl. cannabis possession under 2021 S.B. 1201) and trafficking victims (§ 54-95c, a true judgment-then-vacated mechanism followed by automatic erasure).\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: NO): Pretrial alcohol education program / impaired driving intervention program / Pretrial drug education and community service program (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-56g; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-56i) -- In each program the prosecution is suspended (limitations tolled) with no plea or finding of guilt; on satisfactory completion the court dismisses the charges and the records are erased under § 54-142a. State law: not a conviction. All Connecticut diversion is pre-plea suspension of prosecution ending in dismissal plus statutory erasure. The DUI program under § 54-56g closed to new applications April 1, 2022 (succeeded for new cases by an impaired driving intervention program, § 54-56r, enacted 2021); § 54-56q (2021) is the newer drug intervention and community service program alongside § 54-56i. The § 17a-696 treatment statute authorizes suspension of PROSECUTION only (not of sentence), with no guilty plea required.\n- adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (conviction: NO): Accelerated Rehabilitation (AR) / Accelerated pretrial rehabilitation (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-56e (formerly § 54-76p)) -- Prosecution is suspended (defendant waives speedy trial and tolls limitations) and the defendant is supervised by the Court Support Services Division for up to 2 years; on satisfactory completion the court 'shall dismiss such charges' and all records of the charges are erased under § 54-142a. State law: not a conviction. Connecticut's functional analog to New York's ACD rather than Massachusetts' CWOF: no plea, no admission, and no finding of guilt or innocence is made. Available for crimes and motor-vehicle violations 'not of a serious nature'; class A and most class B felonies, crimes involving death, and charges eligible for the specialized programs are excluded; class C felonies only on good-cause showing; usable at most twice (three times for certain veterans); $35 application fee. On failure, prosecution simply resumes.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Adjudication of delinquency (juvenile matters) / Youthful offender adjudication (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-120 et seq.; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-145) -- An adjudication of delinquency (on admission or finding that the child committed a delinquent act) is entered on the juvenile docket but is not a criminal judgment; records are confidential and erasable, and upon erasure the delinquency finding 'shall be deemed never to have occurred.'. State law: not a conviction. Children may not be prosecuted 'before the regular criminal docket' except on statutory transfer (§ 46b-145; transferred cases under § 46b-127 DO produce adult convictions). Delinquency records may be erased on petition 2 or 4 years after discharge (§ 46b-146). The separate youthful-offender statute for older teens in adult court provides expressly that the determination shall not 'be deemed a conviction' nor a disqualification for office or licensure (§ 54-76k), with automatic erasure at age 21 (§ 54-76o).\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Connecticut", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-delaware", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-delaware", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Delaware", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Delaware: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Delaware: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Delaware law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Gubernatorial pardon (Board of Pardons recommendation required) (Del. Const. art. VII, §§ 1-2; 11 Del. C. § 4364) -- An unconditional pardon 'shall have the effect of fully restoring all civil rights to the person pardoned' (voting, jury service, firearms, public office, with exceptions); the conviction itself remains of record unless separately expunged under § 4375. State law: conviction with limited relief. The Governor cannot pardon without an affirmative recommendation of a majority of the Board of Pardons (Chancellor, Lt. Governor, Secretary of State, State Treasurer, Auditor) after a hearing. The pardon restores rights but does not remove guilt or erase the conviction; persons convicted of embezzlement of public money, bribery, perjury, or other infamous crimes remain barred from the General Assembly and public office notwithstanding pardon. Pardoned persons may then seek discretionary expungement under § 4375 (except murder, rape, sexual abuse of a child by a person of trust).\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Mandatory expungement / Discretionary expungement (11 Del. C. § 4372; 11 Del. C. § 4373) -- All law-enforcement and court records are destroyed, segregated, or placed in the custody of the State Bureau of Identification and withheld from public inspection; the person 'is not required to disclose, nor should the person be asked to disclose' the expunged arrest, charge, or conviction (§ 4372(d)), but the statutes contain no language vacating the judgment or deeming the conviction not to have occurred. State law: conviction with limited relief. Delaware expungement reaches CONVICTIONS, not just arrests: mandatory expungement (§ 4373) covers violations, most misdemeanors after 5 years, and certain felonies after 10 years; discretionary expungement (§ 4374) covers other misdemeanors (3-7 years) and a single felony (7 years); § 4375 covers pardoned convictions (except murder, rape, child sexual abuse). Clean Slate (§ 4373A, effective Aug. 1, 2024) makes mandatory-track expungements automatic. Relief is record-destruction plus nondisclosure — the judgment itself is not vacated, and expunged records remain usable by law enforcement and at sentencing after a subsequent conviction (§ 4376(a), (h)).\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): Probation Before Judgment (PBJ) (11 Del. C. § 4218) -- Court stays entry of judgment after accepting a guilty or nolo contendere plea and places the defendant on probation; on fulfillment of conditions the court enters an order discharging the person, and the discharge is 'without judgment of conviction and is not a conviction for purposes of any disqualification or disability imposed by law.'. State law: not a conviction. Available only for violations and misdemeanors under specified titles, with State and defendant consent; excluded are Title 10 domestic-violence offenses, bad-check charges, and Title 21 first-offender election cases. On violation, the court may enter judgment and sentence on the original plea. A PBJ dismissal is deemed 'terminated in favor of the accused' and eligible for mandatory expungement; the Delaware Supreme Court has said completion renders the person 'innocent as a matter of law' (Ryan v. State, 791 A.2d 742 (Del. 2002)).\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: LIKELY NO): First Offenders Controlled Substances Diversion Program / First Offender Election (DUI) (16 Del. C. § 4767; 21 Del. C. § 4177B) -- Court defers further proceedings without entering judgment; on satisfactory completion the court discharges the person and dismisses the proceedings — under § 4767 the discharge is expressly 'without adjudication of guilt and is not a conviction.'. State law: not a conviction. The drug diversion program (16 Del. C. § 4767, first offenders only, possession/consumption charges) requires a guilty plea before deferral; the DUI first-offender election (21 Del. C. § 4177B) is an election in lieu of trial with no guilty plea, but requires waiver of speedy-trial and administrative-hearing rights, and § 4177B(e)(1) counts the completed election as a prior offense for later DUI sentencing 'regardless of the existence or validity of any accompanying attendant plea or adjudication of guilt.' Dismissed diversion cases are non-conviction records eligible for mandatory expungement.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Family Court adjudication of delinquency (10 Del. C. § 921; 10 Del. C. § 1002) -- Family Court enters an adjudication of delinquency (a civil, rehabilitative disposition), but by statute 'no child shall be deemed a criminal by virtue of an allegation or adjudication of delinquency' and no adjudication 'shall be deemed a conviction,' except where the child is prosecuted as an adult under § 1010. State law: not a conviction. Family Court has exclusive original civil jurisdiction over delinquency (§ 921); children 16+ charged with murder, rape, first-degree assault/robbery, kidnapping, or certain Title 21 offenses are prosecuted as adults (§ 921(2)(a), § 1010), and those adult-court outcomes ARE convictions. Juvenile record expungement: mandatory (§ 1017, e.g., after 1 crime-free year for a single nonviolent adjudication) and discretionary (§ 1018, 7-year crime-free period), with murder, rape, and first-degree arson excluded (§ 1015(b)(1)).\n- suspended imposition of sentence (conviction: YES): Suspension of imposition or execution of sentence (11 Del. C. § 4204(c)) -- The sentencing court may 'suspend the imposition or execution of sentence, or suspend a portion thereof' with probation or conditions; successful completion ends supervision but the judgment of conviction stands — there is no statutory discharge-without-conviction on this track. State law: conviction. Delaware permits both SIS and SES, but unlike Missouri-style SIS, a Delaware suspension follows entry of a judgment of conviction — suspension affects only the sentence, not conviction status. The no-conviction pathway in Delaware is instead Probation Before Judgment (11 Del. C. § 4218), where entry of judgment itself is stayed.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Delaware", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-district-of-columbia", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-district-of-columbia", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — District of Columbia", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "District of Columbia: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — District of Columbia: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under District of Columbia law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Presidential pardon of D.C. Code offenses / District of Columbia Clemency Board (advisory only) (D.C. Code § 24-481.01 et seq.; D.C. Code § 24-481.02 (defining clemency as the power of the President)) -- A pardon removes collateral consequences and restores civil rights (per the § 24-481.02 definition) but does not vacate, expunge, or erase the conviction, which remains of record. State law: conviction with limited relief. DC has NO local pardon power over D.C. Code offenses: only the President of the United States may pardon them. DC's own statute (Clemency Board Establishment Act of 2018, D.C. Code § 24-481.01 et seq.) creates a board that merely reviews applications and recommends grants to the President; actual grants are rare (per the Restoration of Rights Project, only two since 1990). The Mayor holds an unused authority limited to municipal ordinance violations.\n- expungement (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Automatic expungement (marijuana possession and decriminalized/legalized conduct) / Expungement by motion (actual innocence) (D.C. Code § 16-802; D.C. Code § 16-803) -- Expungement (§ 16-804): person is restored 'in the contemplation of the law' to pre-arrest/pre-conviction status, may deny the record without perjury exposure, and public agencies must report no records exist. Sealing (§ 16-807): the conviction is NOT vacated — records are removed from public access and the person may lawfully deny the conviction, but law enforcement, prosecutors, courts, licensing entities, and supervision agencies retain access, including for later sentencing and firearms determinations. State law: mixed. Expungement of CONVICTIONS is narrow: § 16-802 requires automatic expungement of convictions for simple marijuana possession committed before Feb. 15, 2015 and for conduct later decriminalized/legalized (outside deadline Oct. 1, 2027); § 16-803 motion-based expungement is actual-innocence relief and expressly limited to cases that did NOT result in conviction. All other convictions get sealing only: § 16-806 sealing by motion (misdemeanors 5-year wait, felonies 8-year wait after sentence completion, 'interests of justice' standard by preponderance; offenses in DC Sentencing Commission Offense Severity Groups 1-3 categorically ineligible); § 16-805 automatic sealing of most misdemeanor convictions after 10 years (phased implementation). Sealing restricts access but leaves the conviction legally intact.\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): First-offender drug probation without entry of judgment / Deferred Sentencing Agreement (DSA) (D.C. Code § 48-904.01(e)) -- Court discharges the person and dismisses the proceedings 'without court adjudication of guilt'; the statute says discharge/dismissal 'shall not be deemed a conviction' and the person may later move to expunge all official records, restoring pre-arrest status. State law: not a conviction. Two tracks. Statutory: § 48-904.01(e) applies only to first-offense simple possession of a controlled substance; the person must first be found guilty (after trial or guilty plea), but the court, with consent, defers further proceedings and places the person on probation up to 1 year WITHOUT entering a judgment of guilty; violation lets the court enter an adjudication of guilt. Non-statutory: the Deferred Sentencing Agreement (a USAO-DC/OAG prosecutorial practice) requires an up-front guilty plea with sentencing deferred (typically 4-12 months); on completion the court permits withdrawal of the plea and the government dismisses (no conviction); on failure the plea is entered and the defendant is sentenced.\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: NO): Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) / USAO-DC pretrial diversion (community service/restitution diversion) (None — non-statutory prosecutorial practice of the U.S. Attorney's Office for D.C. and the D.C. Office of the Attorney General) -- Prosecutor enters a nolle prosequi / dismisses the charges after the participant completes conditions (community service, restitution, programming); no plea is taken and no finding of guilt is made, so no conviction results. State law: not a conviction. Diversion in DC is prosecutorial, not statutory. A DPA requires only an acknowledgment that probable cause exists — no guilty plea and no admission of guilt — distinguishing it from the DSA (which requires a plea and is reported under deferred-adjudication). On failure of a DPA the case is set for trial; there is no automatic conviction. Generally limited to non-violent, minor, first-time offenses.\n- set aside (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Youth Rehabilitation Act set-aside / YRA set-aside (D.C. Code § 24-906; D.C. Code §§ 24-901 to 24-907) -- The conviction is automatically set aside upon unconditional discharge before expiration of the sentence or probation (§ 24-906(a), (c), (e)); discretionary set-aside is available where the sentence expires without early discharge and, under § 24-906(e-1), by post-completion motion; the court issues a certificate of set-aside. State law: mixed. Available only to 'youth offenders' — persons 24 years of age or younger at the time of the offense (post-2018 amendments), excluding murder, terrorism murders, first/second-degree sexual abuse, and first-degree child sexual abuse (§ 24-901). The set-aside removes the conviction for most purposes, but § 24-906(f) expressly preserves its use for enhanced/subsequent-offense sentencing, prior-drug-violation determinations, impeachment and cross-examination of character witnesses, sex offender registration, the gun offender registry (convictions after Jan. 1, 2011), and firearms-possession determinations — hence 'mixed' rather than a clean non-conviction.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Delinquency adjudication (Family Court of the D.C. Superior Court) (D.C. Code § 16-2318; D.C. Code § 16-2301 et seq.) -- An order of adjudication or disposition is entered, but by statute it 'is not a conviction of crime and does not impose any civil disability ordinarily resulting from a conviction' (§ 16-2318); records may later be sealed under § 16-2335 and the proceedings treated as if they never occurred. State law: not a conviction. Delinquency proceedings require an admission or a factfinding that the juvenile committed the delinquent act, but the resulting consent decree, adjudication, or disposition is expressly declared not to be a criminal conviction; the sole statutory carve-out in § 16-2318 is revocation of a motor vehicle operator's permit. Sealing under § 16-2335 is available once the person reaches majority or two years after final discharge, absent subsequent convictions/adjudications.\n- suspended imposition of sentence (conviction: YES): Suspension of imposition of sentence with probation (SIS) / Suspension of execution of sentence (SES) (D.C. Code § 16-710) -- Probation ends; the statute contains no provision dismissing the case, vacating the conviction, or deeming the disposition a non-conviction — the conviction remains of record (subject only to the separate sealing remedies in D.C. Code §§ 16-805/16-806). State law: conviction. § 16-710 authorizes the Superior Court, 'upon conviction,' either to suspend the imposition of sentence or to impose sentence and suspend its execution, placing the defendant on probation (max 5 years). Unlike Missouri-style SIS, DC's version operates after conviction and carries no record-clearing effect on successful completion — the SIS/SES distinction in DC affects only what happens on revocation, not conviction status.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — District of Columbia", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-florida", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-florida", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Florida", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Florida: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Florida: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Florida law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Full pardon / Executive clemency (Board of Executive Clemency) (Fla. Const. art. IV, sec. 8(a); Fla. Stat. 940.01) -- A full pardon 'unconditionally releases the person from punishment and forgives guilt' and restores all rights of citizenship enjoyed before conviction, including firearms rights; it does not expunge or seal the record, and the conviction remains of record. State law: conviction with limited relief. Granted by the Governor with the agreement of two Cabinet members sitting as the Board of Executive Clemency; the Florida Commission on Offender Review investigates applications. Eligibility for a full pardon generally requires 10 years since sentence completion and no outstanding restitution or financial obligations (Rule 5E). Because a pardon does not erase the conviction, the underlying judgment of guilt stands under Florida law.\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY NO): Court-ordered expunction / Court-ordered sealing (Fla. Stat. 943.0585 (expunction); Fla. Stat. 943.059 (sealing)) -- Eligible non-conviction records are sealed or expunged by court order after FDLE issues a certificate of eligibility; convictions (adjudications of guilt) are categorically ineligible, so a completed expunction by definition concerns a record that was never a conviction. State law: not a conviction. Critical Florida fact: an adjudicated conviction can NEVER be sealed or expunged under the general statutes - relief is limited to non-conviction records. Withheld adjudications may be sealed immediately on completion of supervision (943.059) and expunged only after 10 years sealed (943.0585); dismissals and acquittals may be expunged directly. Narrow conviction exceptions: lawful self-defense expunction (943.0578) and trafficking-victim expunction, where the conviction is 'deemed to have been vacated due to a substantive defect' (943.0583(3)). One-time relief; any prior felony conviction disqualifies.\n- withheld adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): Withholding of adjudication / Withhold of adjudication (Fla. Stat. 948.01(2); Fla. Stat. 948.04(2)) -- Under Fla. Stat. 948.04(2) the probationer 'shall be released from probation and is not liable to sentence for the offense'; no adjudication of guilt is ever entered, but the charge is not dismissed - the plea and withhold remain of record (sealable under 943.059, expungeable 10 years after sealing). State law: not a conviction. Requires a guilty or nolo contendere plea, or a guilty verdict/finding, after which the court 'stays and withholds the adjudication of guilt' and imposes probation if satisfied the defendant is not likely to reoffend (948.01(2)). Barred for capital, life, and first-degree felonies; for second-degree (and some third-degree) felonies it requires a written state attorney request or written court findings under 921.0026, and prior withholds disqualify (775.08435). Although generally not a conviction under Florida law, specific statutes count a withhold as a conviction - e.g., the sexual offender registration definition of 'convicted' expressly applies 'regardless of whether adjudication is withheld' (943.0435(1)(b)).\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: NO): Pretrial Intervention Program (PTI) / Treatment-based drug court program (Fla. Stat. 948.08) -- On successful completion 'the court shall dismiss the charges'; the resulting non-conviction record is then eligible for court-ordered expunction under 943.0585. State law: not a conviction. Entry requires the defendant's voluntary agreement and a knowing waiver of speedy trial - no guilty plea or finding is taken. Standard PTI is limited to first offenders (or those with no more than one prior nonviolent misdemeanor conviction) charged with a misdemeanor or third-degree felony, and requires approval of the program administrator, state attorney, and judge, with victim consultation; the drug court and veterans treatment tracks under 948.08 reach some felony charges. Prosecutor-run diversion programs also exist at the state attorney's discretion.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Adjudication of delinquency / Adjudication withheld (juvenile) (Fla. Stat. 985.35(6)-(7); Fla. Stat. 943.0515 (automatic expunction)) -- The delinquency adjudication stands but is not a criminal conviction; juvenile criminal history is automatically expunged by FDLE at age 21 (age 26 if committed to a juvenile facility or classified a serious/habitual offender) under 943.0515. State law: not a conviction. Fla. Stat. 985.35(6): an adjudication of delinquency 'shall not be deemed a conviction; nor shall the child be deemed to have been found guilty or to be a criminal,' and it imposes none of the civil disabilities of a conviction. Carve-outs: a felony delinquency adjudication bars firearm possession until age 24 unless expunged (985.35(7)), and the sexual offender registration definition of 'convicted' includes specified juvenile adjudications (943.0435(1)(b)). Juveniles may also be transferred to adult court, in which case an adult conviction results.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Florida", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-georgia", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-georgia", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Georgia", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Georgia: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Georgia: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Georgia law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Pardon (State Board of Pardons and Paroles) / Restoration of Civil and Political Rights (separate order) (Ga. Const. art. IV, § II, para. II; O.C.G.A. § 42-9-54) -- A pardon is 'an order of official forgiveness' attached to the criminal record declaring the person relieved from the legal consequences of the conviction and removing legal disabilities; the Board states it 'does not expunge, remove, or erase the crime from your record,' though it unlocks record restriction for non-violent, non-sexual felonies under § 35-3-37(j). State law: conviction with limited relief. Pardon power rests in an administrative board, not the governor. Standard eligibility is 5 years after sentence completion (10 years for registerable sex offenses); civil/political rights (office, jury, notary) are restored via a separate Restoration of Civil and Political Rights order (2-year wait), and firearms rights return only if the pardon expressly includes them (O.C.G.A. § 16-11-131(c) per RRP). RRP reports roughly a 45% grant rate.\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Record restriction / Record restriction and sealing (SB 288, 2020) (O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37; O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37(j)(4)) -- Access to the criminal history record is restricted to judicial officials and criminal justice agencies (not private parties), and court records may additionally be sealed under § 35-3-37(m); the statute expressly provides that restriction 'shall not abate or serve as the basis for the reversal of any criminal conviction' -- the conviction itself stands. State law: conviction with limited relief. Georgia renamed 'expungement' to 'record restriction' and does not vacate adult convictions. Since SB 288 (eff. 2021), up to two misdemeanor convictions per lifetime may be restricted after a 4-year conviction-free wait, subject to a harm-outweighs-public-interest test and broad carve-outs (family violence, sex offenses, child-related offenses, DUI/serious traffic, most theft). Felony convictions can be restricted only after a Board pardon and only if not a serious violent felony or sexual offense. Non-conviction records (dismissals, nolle prosequi, diversion dismissals) are restricted more or less automatically under § 35-3-37(h) -- a sealing-of-arrest-records track distinct from conviction relief.\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): First Offender Act / Conditional discharge (drug possession) (O.C.G.A. § 42-8-60; O.C.G.A. § 42-8-62.1) -- Defendant is exonerated of guilt and discharged as a matter of law without court adjudication of guilt; under O.C.G.A. § 42-8-63 the discharge 'is not a conviction of a crime under the laws of this state,' and court files may be sealed under § 42-8-62.1. State law: not a conviction. FOA sentencing follows a guilty verdict, guilty plea, or nolo plea; the court defers 'without entering a judgment of guilt' but may impose probation OR straight confinement (unusual). While serving a confinement sentence the person is treated as convicted, and on violation the court may enter an adjudication of guilt and resentence. FOA is one-time-only, excludes serious violent felonies, sexual offenses, DUI and other listed crimes, and a prior FOA disposition may still be pleaded and proven in a later prosecution as if guilt had been adjudicated. Separately, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-2 lets the court, on a first drug-possession guilty plea or finding, defer without judgment and on completion 'discharge the person and dismiss the proceedings' -- expressly 'not... deemed a conviction'; usable once per person.\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: NO): Pretrial Intervention and Diversion Program / DCS pretrial release/diversion programs (O.C.G.A. § 15-18-80; O.C.G.A. §§ 42-3-71 to 42-3-73) -- Charges are dismissed or nolle prossed on successful completion; the resulting non-conviction record is restricted under O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37(h), with automatic restriction where dismissal follows completion of a drug court, mental health or veterans treatment program (§ 35-3-37(h)(2)(D)). State law: not a conviction. Entry into § 15-18-80 diversion is at the prosecuting attorney's discretion under written guidelines, as 'an alternative to prosecuting offenders in the criminal justice system'; no plea is required by the statute, and offenses carrying non-suspendable mandatory minimums are excluded. Caveat: § 15-18-80 itself is silent on the completion consequence -- dismissal is the operative practice, and the not-a-conviction character flows from the case ending without adjudication.\n- set aside (conviction: LIKELY NO): Retroactive first offender treatment (exoneration and discharge) (O.C.G.A. § 42-8-66; O.C.G.A. § 42-8-63) -- With the prosecuting attorney's consent, the court may retroactively grant First Offender Act treatment and order exoneration of guilt and discharge; GCIC and the Department of Driver Services must modify their records, and the resulting discharge is not a conviction under O.C.G.A. § 42-8-63. State law: not a conviction. This is Georgia's only mechanism for converting an entered adult conviction into a non-conviction, and it is narrow: it covers only defendants who were FOA-eligible at sentencing but were not informed of their eligibility, plus persons sentenced between March 18, 1968 and October 31, 1982 to no more than one year who would have qualified. Prosecutor consent is a prerequisite to the petition. Georgia has no general Cal. Penal Code 1203.4-style set-aside for probationers at large.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Adjudication of delinquency (Juvenile Code, Title 15, Ch. 11) (O.C.G.A. § 15-11-606; O.C.G.A. § 15-11-701) -- By statute, 'an order of disposition or adjudication shall not be a conviction of a crime and shall not impose any civil disability ordinarily resulting from a conviction'; records may be sealed (two years after final discharge for delinquency, automatic for dismissals), after which the proceeding is treated as if it never occurred. State law: not a conviction. A finding (adjudication) of delinquency is required, but no criminal judgment is ever entered in juvenile court and § 15-11-606 expressly denies conviction status. Caveat: youths aged 13-17 charged with certain serious violent offenses are prosecuted as adults in superior court, and those cases produce ordinary adult convictions outside this regime; juvenile adjudications stemming from trafficking/sexual exploitation victimization may be vacated with automatic sealing (§ 15-11-701(c) per RRP).\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Georgia", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-hawaii", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-hawaii", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Hawaii", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Hawaii: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Hawaii: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Hawaii law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Governor's pardon (executive clemency) (Haw. Const. art. V, § 5; HRS § 353-72) -- Pardon relieves legal disabilities and prohibitions and states the person has been rehabilitated; it does not expunge the record - the criminal history continues to show both the conviction and the pardon, and a pardoned offense may be used in subsequent criminal proceedings. State law: conviction with limited relief. Pardon power is vested in the Governor (Haw. Const. art. V, § 5); the Director of Corrections and Rehabilitation and the Hawaii Paroling Authority investigate and recommend on referred applications (HRS § 353-72), with a second Attorney General investigation before the Governor decides. Only Hawaii state offenders are eligible. Grants are fairly regular but not high-volume (2013-2023: 703 investigations, 293 favorable recommendations).\n- expungement (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Expungement orders (Attorney General; arrest/non-conviction records) / Expungement of drug conviction after treatment probation (HRS § 831-3.2; HRS § 706-622.5(4)) -- For non-convictions, the Attorney General's expungement order annuls the arrest record and the person 'shall be treated as not having been arrested' (HRS § 831-3.2(b)); for the narrow eligible conviction categories, the court 'shall issue a court order to expunge the record of conviction for that particular offense' after successful completion of treatment probation (HRS §§ 706-622.5(4), 706-622.9(3)) or on motion for a qualifying marijuana possession conviction (§ 706-622.5(5)). State law: mixed. Hawaii's general expungement statute (§ 831-3.2) reaches only arrest records where no conviction resulted (plus completed DAG/DANC deferrals after one year); convictions generally cannot be expunged. Conviction expungement is limited to: first/second nonviolent drug possession/paraphernalia offenses after completing substance-abuse-treatment probation (§ 706-622.5(4), once only), possession of 3 grams or less of marijuana with no other charge from the same facts (§ 706-622.5(5)), first-time class C property felonies after treatment probation (§ 706-622.9), and (per the RRP profile) under-21 driving-after-consuming-alcohol under § 291E-64(e). A 2024 pilot for state-initiated marijuana expungement in Hawaii County covers arrest records, not convictions.\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): Deferred Acceptance of Guilty Plea (DAG plea) / Deferred Acceptance of No Contest Plea (DANC plea) (HRS ch. 853 (HRS § 853-1); HRS § 853-4) -- Court discharges the defendant and dismisses the charge; HRS § 853-1(d) provides the discharge and dismissal 'shall be without adjudication of guilt, shall eliminate any civil admission of guilt, and is not a conviction,' and the defendant may apply to the Attorney General for expungement one year after discharge (HRS §§ 853-1(e), 831-3.2(a)(5)). State law: not a conviction. Under ch. 853 a voluntary guilty or nolo plea before trial is required, but the court defers 'without accepting the plea of nolo contendere or entering a judgment of guilt.' HRS § 853-4 excludes many offenses (homicide-related offenses, most injury felonies, class A felonies, nonprobationable offenses, firearm offenses, defendants with prior felonies, repeat DAG/DANC grantees, and an enumerated list including escape, bribery, witness intimidation; parts of § 853-4 are subject to repeal-and-reenactment on June 30, 2026). Separately, HRS § 712-1255 conditional discharge for first-time minor drug offenders requires a guilty plea or finding of guilt but no judgment; discharge 'is not a conviction for purposes of ... disqualifications or disabilities imposed by law upon conviction' (one per lifetime; court-record expungement under § 712-1256 only if under 20 at offense).\n- set aside (conviction: LIKELY NO): Motion to vacate prostitution conviction (trafficking-survivor vacatur) (HRS § 712-1209.6) -- After a hearing, the court 'shall vacate the conviction' for the enumerated prostitution-related offenses if the person has not been convicted of any Hawaii Penal Code offense within three years after the original conviction; per the RRP profile the vacated conviction then appears eligible for expungement as a non-conviction record. State law: not a conviction. This is Hawaii's only conviction set-aside/vacatur mechanism and it is narrow: prostitution, loitering-for-prostitution, and street-prostitution offenses (or lesser offenses when originally so charged), enacted for sex-trafficking victims (2019 amendment removed any requirement to prove trafficking-victim status). Hawaii has NO general Cal. Penal Code § 1203.4-style set-aside of a conviction after completed probation; the no-conviction route in Hawaii is front-end deferral under ch. 853, not back-end set-aside.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Family court adjudication of a law violation (juvenile delinquency) (HRS § 571-1; HRS § 571-11(1)) -- The family court enters an adjudication and disposition, but by statute 'no adjudication by the court of the status of any child under this chapter shall be deemed a conviction,' no civil disability attaches, and no child 'shall be found guilty or be deemed a criminal by reason of such adjudication' (HRS § 571-1); records are confidential/per se sealed under § 571-84. State law: not a conviction. A finding that the child committed the law violation is required, but the resulting adjudication is expressly not a conviction; Hawaii's Supreme Court has enforced this, holding a juvenile adjudication cannot be treated as a prior conviction for repeat-offender purposes (92 Haw. 521, 993 P.2d 555 (2000), cited in the § 571-1 annotations). Juvenile EXPUNGEMENT under § 571-88 is narrow - available only for arrests never referred for prosecution, matters where the minor was not adjudicated responsible, or dismissals with prejudice; a completed adjudication itself is not expungeable, only confidential.\n- suspended imposition of sentence (conviction: YES): Suspended sentence (misdemeanor and petty misdemeanor) (HRS § 706-605(3)) -- The sentence is not carried out, but the underlying judgment of conviction stands; completion of the suspension period does not vacate, dismiss, or convert the conviction into a non-conviction under any Hawaii statute. State law: conviction. HRS § 706-605(3) lets the court sentence 'a person convicted of a misdemeanor or petty misdemeanor to a suspended sentence' - conviction is a statutory prerequisite, so this is not a Missouri-style SIS that withholds judgment. The statute does not use SIS/SES terminology and Hawaii law provides no suspended-imposition device that avoids entry of conviction; the only Hawaii mechanism that withholds judgment pending good behavior is the ch. 853 DAG/DANC deferral, which precedes acceptance of the plea.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Hawaii", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-idaho", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-idaho", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Idaho", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Idaho: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Idaho: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Idaho law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Pardon (Idaho Code § 20-1002; § 20-1004) -- Restores civil rights and relieves disabilities; does not expunge or remove the crime from history. State law: conviction. 5/10/15-year waits by offense class; governor approval for the most serious.\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Withheld judgment / Deferred adjudication (Idaho Code § 19-2601(3); § 19-2601(4)) -- Court withholds judgment, places defendant on probation; upon successful completion, defendant may change plea to not guilty and case dismissed. State law: conviction. No expungement/sealing; deferred dispositions excluded from non-conviction record expungement per § 67-3004(10); 'shielding' possible under § 67-3004(11). [EXTRACTION FLAG: withheld judgment = no judgment entered; Idaho case law treats completed withheld judgment as not a conviction for most purposes — verify]\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: NO): Juvenile diversion / Informal adjustment (Idaho Code § 20-511; § 20-520) -- Prosecutor refers juvenile to county probation without court action; limited to three years. State law: not a conviction. Profile only describes juvenile diversion; adult diversion coverage silent — treat adult diversion as unclear.\n- set aside (conviction: LIKELY YES): Set-aside / Felony-to-misdemeanor reduction (Idaho Code § 19-2604(1); § 19-2604(3)) -- Court may set aside conviction and dismiss; restores civil and firearms rights. State law: conviction with limited relief. Sex offenders ineligible; felony knockdown 5+ years post-discharge.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Juvenile adjudication (Idaho Code § 20-525A) -- Expungement after 3 years (felony) / 1 year (misdemeanor); records sealed. State law: not a conviction. Serious violent offenses excepted from expungement.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Idaho", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-illinois", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-illinois", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Illinois", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Illinois: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Illinois: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Illinois law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Executive clemency / Governor's pardon (Ill. Const. art. V, § 12; 730 ILCS 5/3-3-13) -- A pardon removes the penalties and disabilities resulting from the conviction and restores civil rights (including firearm rights unless excluded), but the conviction record stands unless the pardon specifically authorizes expungement, in which case the person may petition for judicial expungement under 20 ILCS 2630/5.2(e). State law: mixed. Petitions are filed with the Prisoner Review Board, which confidentially recommends to the Governor by majority vote; the Governor's discretion is unfettered, with no waiting period, and misdemeanants are eligible (federal/out-of-state convictions are not). A pardon WITHOUT expungement authorization leaves the conviction of record (relief-only); a pardon WITH expungement authorization plus a granted 5.2(e) petition destroys the record. Grant rate under Gov. Pritzker roughly 17% per RRP.\n- expungement (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Expungement (Criminal Identification Act) / Sealing (the broader, separate remedy for convictions) (20 ILCS 2630/5.2; 20 ILCS 2630/5.2(e) (pardoned convictions)) -- Expungement means physical destruction of the records and obliteration of the petitioner's name from official indexes; sealing preserves the records but makes them unavailable without a court order, and the conviction remains a conviction. State law: mixed. Expungement of CONVICTIONS is narrow: only convictions that were pardoned with express expungement authorization (5.2(e)), reversed or vacated, or vacated-and-expunged under the cannabis (misdemeanor/Class 4, 5.2(i)) and Class 4 prostitution (5.2(j)) provisions — minor cannabis offenses also get automatic expungement. All other conviction relief is SEALING under 5.2(c): most misdemeanors and felonies after a 3-year wait (excluding DUI, sex offenses, domestic battery, etc.; Clean Slate Act changes effective June 1, 2026 per RRP), and a sealed conviction is still a conviction under Illinois law. Expungement is otherwise limited to non-conviction records, completed supervision (2-5 year wait) and completed qualified probation (5-year wait).\n- withheld adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): Court supervision / Order of supervision (730 ILCS 5/5-6-1(c); 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.1) -- Court discharges the defendant and enters a judgment dismissing the charges; per 730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.1(f), discharge and dismissal \"shall be deemed without adjudication of guilt and shall not be termed a conviction for purposes of disqualification or disabilities imposed by law upon conviction of a crime.\". State law: not a conviction. Supervision may rest on a guilty plea, a stipulation by the defendant of the facts supporting the charge (a CWOF-like basis, since Illinois has no general nolo plea), or a finding of guilt; the court defers further proceedings and imposition of sentence without entering judgment. Available only for misdemeanors, ordinance and traffic offenses (not felonies), with numerous carve-outs (certain Class A misdemeanors, DUI restrictions such as once-per-lifetime DUI supervision). Records are expungeable 2 years after discharge (5 years for certain offenses).\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): Qualified probation / first-offender drug probation (\"410 probation\", \"710 probation\", \"1410 probation\") / Second Chance Probation (720 ILCS 570/410; 720 ILCS 550/10) -- Court discharges the person and dismisses the proceedings; the statutes state the sentence \"is not a conviction for purposes of ... disqualifications or disabilities imposed by law upon conviction of a crime unless and until judgment is entered,\" and the record becomes expungeable after a waiting period under 20 ILCS 2630/5.2(b). State law: not a conviction. Defendant must plead guilty to or be found guilty of the eligible offense (nolo is not available in Illinois), but the court sentences \"without entering a judgment.\" Caveats: the statutes deem it a conviction for the limited purposes of imposing probation conditions and for appeal while probation runs; discharge-and-dismissal is once per 4 years (410 probation); Second Chance Probation requires State's Attorney consent and excludes violent offenses; failure results in entry of judgment.\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: NO): Offender Initiative Program / State's Attorney deferred prosecution / diversion programs (730 ILCS 5/5-6-3.3; 730 ILCS 166 (Drug Court Treatment Act)) -- On successful completion of the Offender Initiative Program the State's Attorney dismisses the case or the court discharges the person and dismisses the proceedings; no plea was entered and no conviction results. State law: not a conviction. The Offender Initiative Program (min. 12 months) suspends prosecution before plea for persons with no prior felony conviction charged with probationable non-violent felonies (theft, burglary, drug possession, etc.); one discharge-and-dismissal per 4 years. Problem-solving courts have both pre-adjudicatory (no plea) and post-adjudicatory tracks — the post-adjudicatory track does involve a plea/finding, so treatment-court dispositions must be checked individually.\n- set aside (conviction: LIKELY NO): TASC probation vacatur (treatment as alternative to prosecution/incarceration) / Motion to vacate and expunge (cannabis / prostitution convictions) (20 ILCS 301/40-10; 20 ILCS 2630/5.2(i)) -- For TASC: on successful completion, if the person has no prior felony conviction and no prior vacatur under the section, on motion (within 60 days of discharge) the court shall vacate the judgment of conviction and dismiss the criminal proceedings unless it finds the motion should not be granted; cannabis/prostitution vacatur similarly vacates the conviction and leads to expungement. State law: not a conviction. These are Illinois's only Cal.-PC-1203.4-style vacate-after-completion mechanisms and they are narrow. TASC expressly requires entry of a judgment of conviction BEFORE treatment supervision begins (judgment-then-vacated, with residual court discretion to deny). There is NO general set-aside for ordinary probation: standard Illinois probation and conditional discharge follow an entered judgment and remain convictions, relievable only by sealing or pardon.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Adjudication of delinquency (Juvenile Court Act of 1987) (705 ILCS 405/5-101 et seq.; 705 ILCS 405/5-150) -- An adjudication of delinquency is entered on an admission or finding, but it is not a criminal judgment of conviction: no minor \"shall be considered a criminal by reason thereof, nor shall any such adjudication be considered a conviction,\" and adjudications do not disqualify from public office or forfeit rights or licenses; most juvenile records are automatically expunged (60 days after termination for minor offenses, 2 years after case closure for most others). State law: not a conviction. Exceptions: adjudications remain usable in later adult sentencing/pretrial-release decisions and for impeachment, and motor-vehicle adjudications are reported to the Secretary of State for license action. Minors transferred to adult court or subject to excluded-jurisdiction prosecution (705 ILCS 405/5-805, 5-130) receive adult CONVICTIONS, not adjudications. Expunged juvenile records are treated as if the events never occurred (705 ILCS 405/5-923).\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Illinois", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-indiana", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-indiana", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Indiana", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Indiana: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Indiana: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Indiana law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Pardon / Conditional pardon (IN Const. art. 5, § 17; IC 11-9-2-1 to -4) -- Rarely granted; removes guilt/punishment; automatic grounds for judicial expungement. State law: conviction with limited relief. Parole Board review; firearms restoration limits for violent crimes.\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Expungement / Sealing (IC 35-38-9) -- Expungement after waiting period; misdemeanors/low felonies sealed, serious felonies marked expunged. State law: conviction with limited relief. 5yr misdemeanor / 8yr low felony / 8-10yr higher; violent/sexual carve-outs. [EXTRACTION FLAG: extractor said status 'conviction'; IN expungement gives strong anti-discrimination effect — normalized to limited-relief]\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: LIKELY NO): Drug court diversion / Deferred prosecution for substance abusers (IC 12-23-6.1-1; IC 12-23-7.1-1 et seq) -- Charges dismissed upon successful treatment completion. State law: not a conviction. Felony version requires guilty plea with judgment deferred then dismissed; misdemeanor version consent-based. Mixed mechanism — the felony path is deferred adjudication in substance.\n- set aside (conviction: LIKELY YES): Vacatur for human trafficking survivors (IC 35-38-10-2; IC 35-38-10-3) -- Conviction vacated on trafficking-coercion showing; then treated as non-conviction. State law: conviction with limited relief. Trafficking survivors only.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Juvenile delinquency adjudication (IC 31-39-8 et seq; IC 31-39-8-3.5) -- Expungement on petition anytime; automatic (non-felony) at 19 or 1yr post-discharge. State law: conviction. [EXTRACTION FLAG: 'adjudications are convictions under Indiana law for most purposes' is doubtful as stated — IN delinquency adjudications are civil in character; verify]\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Indiana", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-iowa", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-iowa", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Iowa", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Iowa: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Iowa: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Iowa law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Full pardon (Iowa Code §§ 914.1-914.7; Iowa Const. art. IV, § 16) -- Relieves all legal disabilities; does not erase the conviction record. State law: conviction with limited relief. Ten-year waiting policy typical.\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Misdemeanor expungement (Iowa Code § 901C.3) -- Single misdemeanor expunged after 8 years; public access limited. State law: conviction with limited relief. One expungement only; long ineligible list (weapons/violent/sexual).\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): Deferred judgment (Iowa Code §§ 907.3, 907.9) -- Upon discharge from probation the record is expunged and the person is no longer held to answer for the offense. State law: not a conviction. No adjudication of guilt; expunged records segregated. Deferred judgments may still enhance later sentences and count as priors federally.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Delinquency adjudication (Iowa Code §§ 232.147-232.150; 692.17) -- Records presumptively confidential (non-forcible); sealing at 18+ after two years. State law: mixed. Iowa Code 232.2: adjudication is not a conviction of a crime — the 'mixed' reflects record-access rules, not conviction status.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Iowa", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-kansas", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-kansas", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Kansas", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Kansas: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Kansas: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Kansas law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Pardon (Kan. Const. art. I, § 7; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3701) -- Removes state-law disabilities; does not erase the conviction or permit denying it. State law: conviction. Still usable as a prior for sentencing.\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Expungement (Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-6614) -- Treated as never arrested/convicted except for sentencing and specified contexts. State law: conviction with limited relief. 3/5/7-10-year waits by offense; murder/rape/sex offenses ineligible; barred while registration required.\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: NO): Diversion (Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-2907 et seq.; § 22-2908) -- On successful completion charges dismissed with prejudice. State law: not a conviction. A guilty plea is 'specifically prohibited' by § 22-2910 — a true no-plea diversion; dismissed charges expungeable under § 22-2410.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Juvenile adjudication (Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-2312; § 21-6304(a)) -- Expungement at 23 or 2 years post-discharge. State law: conviction. [EXTRACTION FLAG: KS delinquency adjudications are civil in nature (In re L.M. caveat: jury right); treated like convictions for firearms — verify status]\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Kansas", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-kentucky", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-kentucky", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Kentucky", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Kentucky: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Kentucky: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Kentucky law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Full pardon / partial pardon (Ky. Const. §§ 77, 145, 150; KRS § 196.045) -- Relieves legal disabilities; grounds for vacatur under § 431.073. State law: conviction with limited relief. 7-year wait policy; full pardon enables vacatur — a pardoned + vacated KY conviction is strong Saini material.\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY NO): Expungement of Class D felonies / misdemeanor expungement (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 431.073; § 431.078) -- Conviction VACATED and record expunged; person may deny its existence. State law: not a conviction. KY expungement is vacatur-based — stronger than most states' sealing; 5-year waits; DUI/domestic/sex carve-outs. [Normalized from extractor 'limited-relief': vacatur + right to deny puts completed KY expungement closer to non-conviction — flag for verification]\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): Pretrial diversion (with plea) / deferred adjudication (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 533.250-533.262) -- On successful completion charges dismissed with prejudice and 'shall not constitute a criminal conviction'. State law: not a conviction. Class D felonies, no prior felony within 10 years, prosecutor consent (Flynt v. Commonwealth). Plea held but conviction avoided.\n- set aside (conviction: LIKELY YES): Vacatur and expungement (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 431.073) -- Conviction vacated, dismissed with prejudice, expunged. State law: conviction with limited relief. Discretionary; 5-year wait; prosecutor objection triggers rehabilitation showing.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Juvenile delinquency adjudication (KRS 635.040 -- verified 2026-07-12: an adjudication is not a criminal conviction; expungement under KRS 610.330). Note: treated as a conviction for US federal firearms purposes only -- irrelevant to IRPA.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Kentucky", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-louisiana", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-louisiana", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Louisiana", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Louisiana: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Louisiana: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Louisiana law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): First offender pardon (automatic) / executive pardon (La. Const. art. IV, § 5(E)(1); La. R.S. § 15:572) -- First-offender pardon restores citizenship rights automatically; executive pardon restores 'status of innocence'. State law: conviction with limited relief. First-offender pardon does NOT prevent predicate use; the executive (gubernatorial) pardon is far stronger — distinguish the two in any analysis.\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Expungement of convictions (La. C.Cr.P. Art. 977; Art. 978) -- Record expunged; disclosure not required; law-enforcement/licensing access preserved. State law: conviction with limited relief. 5-year (misd) / 10-year (felony) clean periods; violent/sex/trafficking carve-outs. [Normalized from extractor 'conviction']\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): Art. 893/894 deferred sentencing (La. C.Cr.P. Art. 893; Art. 894) -- On successful probation, conviction set aside and prosecution dismissed; expungement-eligible. State law: not a conviction. Felony deferral limited (prior-felony limits, prosecutor consent); violent/sex/serious-drug carve-outs. Set-aside 'shall have the same effect as acquittal' per Art. 894 (misdemeanor) — strong non-conviction effect.\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: NO): Pretrial diversion program (La. C.Cr.P. Art. 976) -- Completion bars prosecution; expungement anytime. State law: not a conviction. DA-administered.\n- set aside (conviction: LIKELY NO): Art. 893/894 set-aside (La. C.Cr.P. Art. 893; Art. 894) -- Set aside + dismissal on completing deferred probation. State law: not a conviction. Automatic on successful completion of Art. 893/894 deferral.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Juvenile adjudication (La. Child. Code Art. 918; Art. 919) -- Expungement/sealing; person may deny existence except to certain entities. State law: unclear. Adjudications distinct from convictions per profile; La. Ch.C. art. 305 transfer to adult court = ordinary conviction.\n- suspended imposition of sentence (conviction: LIKELY YES): Suspension of imposition of sentence (La. C.Cr.P. Art. 893) -- Sentence never imposed; expungement-eligible after dismissal. State law: conviction with limited relief. Judgment enters; distinct from the deferral path.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Louisiana", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-maine", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-maine", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Maine", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Maine: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Maine: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Maine law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Full and free pardon (Me. Const. art. V, pt. 1, § 11; 15 M.R.S. § 2161) -- Lifts automatic legal barriers; pardoned records confidential since 2017. State law: conviction with limited relief. 5-year eligibility wait; rare; notable grants to non-citizens facing deportation — the confidential-record effect is significant for Saini analysis.\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): Deferred disposition (17-A M.R.S. §§ 1901-1903) -- On successful completion, plea withdrawn and charge dismissed. State law: not a conviction. Class B (ch. 45) and C/D/E with consent; guilty plea accepted but judgment deferred — plea withdrawal on completion. [Corrected judgment_entered to no-judgment: court defers acceptance of judgment until completion]\n- set aside (conviction: LIKELY YES): Sealing / record relief (15 M.R.S. §§ 2261-2264) -- Conviction sealed; may deny existence to non-criminal-justice inquiries. State law: conviction with limited relief. Class E (except sexual assault) after 4 years; pre-2017 marijuana; trafficking victims. Unsealed on subsequent conviction.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Juvenile adjudication (15 M.R.S. § 3010; § 3308-C) -- Records confidential; dissemination strictly limited. State law: unclear. 15 M.R.S. § 3010(2): adjudication not deemed a conviction — verify and normalize.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Maine", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-maryland", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-maryland", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Maryland", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Maryland: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Maryland: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Maryland law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Gubernatorial pardon (Md. Const. art. II, § 20; Corr. Servs. §§ 7-601, 7-206) -- Lifts all disabilities; firearms need separate restoration. State law: conviction with limited relief. 10 crime-free years (felony); Moore's 2024 mass cannabis pardon (~175k).\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Expungement § 10-110 / Shielding § 10-301 et seq. (Md. Crim. Proc. §§ 10-110, 10-301 et seq.) -- Removed from public inspection; destroyed after 3 years. State law: conviction with limited relief. 100+ enumerated misdemeanors (5-yr wait); some felonies 7-10 yrs; unit rule. [Normalized from 'conviction']\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): Probation before judgment (PBJ) (Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 6-220) -- On successful probation, discharge without judgment of conviction. State law: not a conviction. Repeat PBJ limits for drug/driving offenses; expungement after 3-year wait.\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: NO): Informal adjustment (juvenile) (SB691 (2022)) -- Diversion without judgment for nonviolent juvenile felonies. State law: not a conviction. Profile silent on adult diversion.\n- set aside (conviction: LIKELY YES): Vacatur for trafficking survivors (Md. Crim. Proc. § 8-302) -- Vacatur on trafficking showing; expungement post-vacatur. State law: conviction with limited relief. Prostitution + 25 specified offenses.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Juvenile delinquency adjudication (Md. Cts & Jud. Proc. § 3-8A-27) -- Confidential; sealing at 21 or on motion. State law: not a conviction. Md. Cts & Jud. Proc. § 3-8A-23: adjudication not a conviction and imposes no civil disabilities — normalized from 'mixed'.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Maryland", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-massachusetts", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-massachusetts", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Massachusetts", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Massachusetts: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Massachusetts: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Massachusetts law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Pardon (Mass. Const. pt. 2, ch. II, § I, art. VIII; ch. 127, § 152) -- Records sealed; conviction may be denied. State law: conviction with limited relief. Governor + Council; 10-yr felony wait.\n- expungement (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Marijuana/decriminalized-offense expungement (ch. 276, § 100K; § 100K¼) -- Permanently erased; may answer 'no record'. State law: not a conviction. Narrow scope (decriminalized conduct); general convictions get SEALING (ch. 276 § 100A) not expungement — sealing = conviction-with-limited-relief.\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: NO): Pretrial diversion (17-21) / juvenile pre-arraignment diversion (ch. 276A, § 2 et seq.; ch. 119, § 54A) -- Complaint dismissed on completion. State law: not a conviction. Violent-offense carve-outs.\n- adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (conviction: LIKELY NO): Continuance without a finding (CWOF) (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, § 18) -- Dismissal after successful probation; sealing on good cause under § 100C. State law: not a conviction. Admission to sufficient facts precedes the continuance; not available after trial.\n- set aside (conviction: LIKELY NO): Trafficking-survivor vacatur (ch. 265, § 59) -- Plea withdrawn, not-guilty entered, vacated on the merits. State law: not a conviction. Vacatur on the merits — strong effect. [Normalized from 'conviction']\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Delinquency adjudication (ch. 120, § 21; ch. 276, § 100B) -- Sealing 3 years post-disposition; expungement §§ 100E-100U. State law: not a conviction. Treated separately from adult conviction; discharge restores civil rights.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Massachusetts", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-michigan", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-michigan", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Michigan", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Michigan: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Michigan: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Michigan law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Governor's pardon (Mich. Const. art. 5, § 14; MCL 791.243-244) -- 'Releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt'; erases the conviction from the record. State law: not a conviction. Extremely rare (<20/yr). MI pardon language is among the strongest — good Saini candidate.\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Clean Slate automatic expungement / petition set-aside (MCL 780.621g; MCL 780.621) -- Set aside + sealed; 'considered not to have been previously convicted'. State law: conviction with limited relief. Automatic (7-10 yrs) and petition paths; assaultive/10-year+ offense carve-outs. [Normalized from 'conviction' given the deemer language]\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): § 7411 drug deferral / § 769.4a DV deferral (MCL 333.7411; MCL 769.4a) -- Discharge and dismissal without adjudication of guilt. State law: not a conviction. First-offender drug; DV; HYTA (18-26) — all plea-based deferrals with dismissal. [Corrected plea field: these require a plea]\n- set aside (conviction: LIKELY YES): Judicial set-aside (MCL 780.621 et seq.) -- 'Shall be considered not to have been previously convicted' except registration contexts. State law: conviction with limited relief. Discretionary, 'a privilege and conditional, not a right'.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Delinquency adjudication + set-aside (MCL 712A.18e; 712A.18t) -- Set-aside/sealing; automatic sealing post-2021. State law: not a conviction. MCL 712A.23: adjudication not a conviction; extractor's contrary note rejected — verify.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Michigan", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-minnesota", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-minnesota", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Minnesota", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Minnesota: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Minnesota: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Minnesota law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Pardon (formerly pardon extraordinary) (Minn. Const. art. V, § 7; §§ 638.01, 638.12) -- Restores all rights, sets aside the conviction, purges the record, triggers automatic expungement. State law: not a conviction. 5-yr wait; board majority + governor post-2023. Strong effect — set-aside + purge.\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Statutory expungement/sealing / Clean Slate automatic (Minn. Stat. § 609A.02; § 609A.03) -- Sealed; 'restored to pre-conviction status in contemplation of law'. State law: conviction with limited relief. 2-5 yr waits; violence carve-outs; automatic path from 2025-01-01. [Normalized from 'conviction']\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): Stay of adjudication / § 152.18 drug deferral (Minn. Stat. § 152.18; § 609A.02 subd. 3(a)(2)) -- Adjudication stayed; dismissal on completion; expungement after 1 conviction-free year. State law: not a conviction. [Corrected judgment_entered: a stay of adjudication enters no judgment]\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: NO): Pre-plea diversion (Minn. Stat. § 401.065; Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.05) -- Prosecution terminated; sealing after 1 conviction-free year; automatic expungement (2025) for eligibles. State law: not a conviction. Non-person crimes.\n- set aside (conviction: LIKELY YES): Pardon-triggered set-aside (§ 609A.03; § 638.18) -- Set aside + sealed on pardon. State law: conviction with limited relief. Automatic on pardon (§ 638.12 subd. 1(d)).\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Delinquency adjudication (§§ 260B.171, 260B.198, 260B.245) -- Records to age 28; discretionary expungement. State law: not a conviction. No civil disabilities except firearms for crime-of-violence adjudications (§ 260B.245).\n- suspended imposition of sentence (conviction: LIKELY YES): Stay of imposition (Minn. Stat. § 609.13 subd. 1) -- Felony 'deemed' gross misdemeanor/misdemeanor on discharge. State law: conviction with limited relief. A CONVICTION enters (deemed lower grade) — distinguish from stay of ADJUDICATION. Still felony for some purposes (State v. S.A.M.).\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Minnesota", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-mississippi", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-mississippi", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Mississippi", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Mississippi: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Mississippi: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Mississippi law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Executive pardon (Miss. Const. art. 5, § 124; § 47-7-5) -- Restores civil rights; does not expunge. State law: conviction with limited relief. Effectively dormant (zero grants 2012-present).\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Misdemeanor + single-felony expungement (Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-71) -- Expunged on rehabilitation finding; nonpublic record retained. State law: conviction with limited relief. First-offender misdemeanors; one non-violent felony after 5 years.\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): Non-adjudication (Miss. Code Ann. § 99-15-26) -- Charges dismissed; expungement mandatory on petition after completion. State law: not a conviction. Court withholds acceptance of plea pending conditions; excludes crimes against the person and public-funds embezzlement. [Corrected plea field: § 99-15-26 requires a plea]\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: NO): Pretrial Intervention Act (Miss. Code Ann. § 99-15-101 et seq.) -- Expungement on completion. State law: not a conviction. Prosecutor-run; excludes crimes against person and drug crimes.\n- set aside (conviction: LIKELY YES): Trafficking-survivor vacatur (Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-54.6(5)) -- Vacatur on trafficking showing. State law: conviction with limited relief. Trafficking Act offenses only.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Youth court adjudication (Miss. Code Ann. §§ 43-21-261, 43-21-263) -- Confidential; sealing at 20+. State law: not a conviction. Miss. Code § 43-21-561: adjudication not a conviction.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Mississippi", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-missouri", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-missouri", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Missouri", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Missouri: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Missouri: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Missouri law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Full pardon (Mo. Const. art. IV, § 7; § 217.800) -- Restores all citizenship rights; 'obliterated for disqualification purposes'; record remains public. State law: conviction with limited relief. 3-yr eligibility; not usable for sentencing enhancement.\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Expungement (sealing) (§ 610.140) -- Sealed; civil rights restored; may deny except in enumerated contexts. State law: conviction with limited relief. 1-yr misd / 3-yr felony waits; lifetime caps (2 felonies, 3 misd); violent/sex carve-outs. [Normalized from 'conviction']\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: LIKELY NO): Treatment courts / prosecutor diversion (§ 478.001; § 557.014) -- Dismissal on completion; record closure. State law: not a conviction. Treatment courts typically require a plea held in abeyance; prosecutor diversion may not — mechanism varies.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Delinquency adjudication (§ 211.321) -- Sealed; destruction discretionary after 17. State law: not a conviction. § 211.271: adjudication not a conviction and not evidence against the child.\n- suspended imposition of sentence (conviction: LIKELY NO): Suspended imposition of sentence (SIS) (§ 557.011.2(3); § 610.110) -- On successful probation the record is a closed non-conviction, 'not reportable as a conviction'. State law: not a conviction. THE flagship SIS state: guilt found, no judgment on completion; records closed under § 610.110. Suspended EXECUTION (SES) by contrast is an ordinary conviction. [Corrected judgment_entered to no-judgment]\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Missouri", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-montana", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-montana", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Montana", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Montana: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Montana: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Montana law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Executive pardon (Mont. Const. art. VI, § 12; §§ 46-23-301 to -307) -- Removes 'all legal consequences' of the conviction. State law: conviction with limited relief. Not grounds for expungement.\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Misdemeanor expungement / marijuana expungement (Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-1102 et seq.; § 16-12-113) -- Records permanently sealed/expunged. State law: conviction with limited relief. Misdemeanors only (presumed after 5 clean years); marijuana offenses. [Normalized from 'conviction']\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): Deferred imposition of sentence (Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-201 et seq.; § 46-18-204) -- On completion, plea withdrawn or verdict struck, charges dismissed, records sealed as confidential criminal justice information. State law: not a conviction. First felony offenses + misdemeanors; 1-3 year deferral.\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: NO): Pre-charge diversion (Mont. Code Ann. § 46-16-130) -- Prosecutor dismisses on compliance. State law: not a conviction.\n- set aside (conviction: LIKELY YES): Trafficking-survivor vacatur (Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-608) -- Vacatur; records confidential. State law: conviction with limited relief. No waiting period.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Youth court adjudication (Mont. Code Ann. §§ 41-5-215, 41-5-216) -- Auto-sealed at 18. State law: not a conviction. § 41-5-106: adjudication not a conviction of crime — normalized from 'mixed'.\n- suspended imposition of sentence (conviction: LIKELY NO): Deferred imposition of sentence (§ 46-18-201 et seq.) -- Same as deferred adjudication above. State law: not a conviction. MT's deferral IS its SIS.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Montana", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-nebraska", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-nebraska", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Nebraska", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Nebraska: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Nebraska: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Nebraska law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Pardon (Board of Pardons) (Neb. Const. art. IV, § 13; § 83-1,130) -- Restores civil rights; sealing may follow. State law: conviction with limited relief. 10-yr felony wait; board = governor + SoS + AG.\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): Deferred judgment (§ 29-2292) -- Plea withdrawn, case dismissed, automatic sealing. State law: not a conviction. Excludes DV and DUI. [Corrected judgment_entered: deferred judgment enters no judgment until violation]\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: NO): Post-charge pretrial diversion (§ 29-3602) -- Automatic sealing on completion. State law: not a conviction. County-attorney programs.\n- set aside (conviction: LIKELY YES): Judicial set-aside (§ 29-2264) -- Conviction 'nullified'; civil disabilities removed; record remains. State law: conviction with limited relief. Probation/fine-only/≤1yr sentences.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Juvenile adjudication + sealing (§§ 43-2,108.01 to -108.05) -- Automatic sealing; 'may proceed as if offense never occurred'. State law: not a conviction. § 43-2,108: adjudication not a conviction.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Nebraska", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-nevada", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-nevada", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Nevada", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Nevada: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Nevada: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Nevada law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Pardon (Board of Pardons Commissioners) (NRS 213.090; Nev. Const. art. 5, § 14) -- Full unconditional pardon restores all rights incl. firearms. State law: conviction with limited relief. 5-12 yr waits; does not erase the conviction.\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Record sealing (NRS 179.245; 179.2445) -- 'All proceedings recounted in the record are deemed never to have occurred'; may deny arrest and conviction. State law: conviction with limited relief. 1-10 yr waits; child/sex/DUI carve-outs; rebuttable presumption favouring sealing. Strong deemer language. [Normalized from 'conviction']\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): Deferred adjudication (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176.211) -- Discharge + dismissal 'without adjudication of guilt and is not a conviction for purposes of employment, civil rights or any statute'; record sealed. State law: not a conviction. Violent/sexual/child-victim carve-outs. Statutory non-conviction language is explicit — strong entry. [Corrected judgment_entered: adjudication deferred = no judgment]\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: NO): Preprosecution diversion (NRS 174.031; 174.034) -- Dismissal + sealing. State law: not a conviction. Non-violent misdemeanors; SB17 (2025) expanded.\n- set aside (conviction: LIKELY YES): Trafficking-survivor vacatur (NRS 179.247) -- Vacatur + sealing; deemed never occurred. State law: conviction with limited relief. Non-violent offenses from trafficking.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Juvenile adjudication (NRS 62H.140; 62H.150) -- Auto-sealed within 60 days of 18 (most). State law: not a conviction. Adjudication 'does not impose any of the civil disabilities ordinarily resulting from conviction'.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Nevada", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-new-hampshire", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-new-hampshire", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — New Hampshire", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "New Hampshire: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — New Hampshire: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under New Hampshire law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Pardon (N.H. Const. pt. 2, art. 52; RSA 4:21-4:28) -- Eliminates consequences; record preserved. State law: conviction with limited relief. 3 pardons since 1996 — effectively dormant; annulment is the operative NH relief.\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Annulment (RSA 651:5) -- 'Treated as if never arrested, convicted or sentenced'; sealed. State law: conviction with limited relief. 1-10 yr waits; violent-crime carve-outs. NH annulment's deemer is strong.\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: NO): Drug court diversion (RSA 490-G:2) -- Dismissal on completion; annulment 1 year later. State law: not a conviction. Drug courts often plea-based in practice — mechanism varies by county; verify per record.\n- set aside (conviction: LIKELY NO): Trafficking-survivor vacatur (RSA 633:7(VIII)) -- Vacated + expunged; 'as if never arrested, convicted or adjudicated'. State law: not a conviction. [Normalized from 'conviction': full vacatur + expungement]\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Juvenile delinquency (RSA 169-B:35) -- Records closed at 21. State law: not a conviction. RSA 169-B:36: disposition not a conviction — normalized from 'mixed'.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — New Hampshire", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-new-jersey", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-new-jersey", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — New Jersey", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "New Jersey: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — New Jersey: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under New Jersey law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Governor's pardon (N.J. Const. art. V, § 2; N.J.S.A. 2A:167-3.1, -5, -7) -- Restores civil rights; relieves disabilities. State law: conviction with limited relief. 2024 clemency initiative with advisory board.\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Expungement by petition / Clean Slate (N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2, -3, -5.2, -6.1) -- Extracted/isolated; 'may answer as if never occurred'. State law: conviction with limited relief. 5-yr petition / 10-yr Clean Slate. [Normalized from 'conviction']\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): Pretrial intervention (PTI) / conditional discharge (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12 et seq.; 2C:36A-1) -- Dismissal on completion; automatic expungement. State law: not a conviction. PTI usually no plea (post-2018 some plea-required cases); conditional discharge (drugs) and conditional dismissal (municipal) similar.\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: NO): PTI / mental-health diversion (2C:43-12 et seq.; 2C:43-32) -- Dismissal + automatic expungement. State law: not a conviction. One diversion per lifetime.\n- set aside (conviction: LIKELY YES): Trafficking-survivor vacatur (N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1.1) -- Vacated + expungeable. State law: conviction with limited relief. Expanded 2022.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Delinquency adjudication (N.J.S.A. 2C:52-4.1; 2A:4A-48) -- Expungement 3 years post-discharge. State law: not a conviction. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-48: adjudication not a conviction and imposes no civil disabilities — normalized from extractor 'conviction'.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — New Jersey", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-new-mexico", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-new-mexico", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — New Mexico", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "New Mexico: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — New Mexico: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under New Mexico law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Governor's pardon (N.M. Const. art. V, § 6; § 31-13-1) -- Restores citizenship rights; no expungement; predicate use preserved. State law: conviction with limited relief. 5-10 yr waits.\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Criminal Record Expungement Act (§ 29-3A-5) -- Removed from public access after 2-10 clean years. State law: conviction with limited relief. Violent/sexual/DUI carve-outs; disclosure still required for financial-institution employment. [Normalized from 'conviction']\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Conditional discharge / deferred sentence (N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-20-13; § 31-20-3) -- Conditional discharge: no adjudication of guilt, dismissal on completion. Deferred sentence: conviction enters but discharge dismisses charges and restores rights (US v. Reese, 2014-NMSC-013). State law: not a conviction. TWO regimes: conditional discharge (§ 31-20-13, no adjudication — true non-conviction) vs deferred sentence (§ 31-20-3, conviction then dismissal). Distinguish per record.\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: NO): Pre-prosecution diversion (§ 31-16A-1) -- Expungement after 1-year wait. State law: not a conviction.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Juvenile disposition (§ 32A-2-26) -- Sealing mandatory 2 yrs post-release. State law: not a conviction. 'Juvenile dispositions impose no civil disabilities'; may deny record existence.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — New Mexico", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-new-york", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-new-york", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — New York", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "New York: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — New York: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under New York law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Governor's pardon / youth pardon (N.Y. Const. art 4, § 4; Exec. Law § 259-c) -- Restores rights; ordinarily does not seal. State law: conviction with limited relief. Recent systematic use incl. immigration-consequence pardons — directly relevant to Saini analyses.\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Clean Slate automatic sealing / petition sealing (CPL § 160.57; § 160.59) -- Sealed after 3 yrs (misd) / 8 yrs (felony); marijuana convictions vacated + expunged. State law: conviction with limited relief. Sealing ≠ erasure (law-enforcement access preserved); marijuana vacatur is stronger. [Normalized from 'conviction']\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Judicial diversion (pre-plea) / DTAP (plea-based) (CPL § 216.00 et seq.) -- Dismissal + sealing on completion; DTAP failure → sentencing on the plea. State law: mixed. Distinguish pre-plea judicial diversion from plea-based DTAP.\n- adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (conviction: NO): Adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (ACD/ACOD) (N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 170.55; § 210.46) -- On dismissal, 'the arrest and prosecution shall be deemed a nullity'; restored to pre-arrest status; sealed under § 160.50. State law: not a conviction. Misdemeanor-level; the cleanest non-conviction disposition in the survey.\n- set aside (conviction: LIKELY NO): Trafficking-survivor vacatur (CPL § 440.10(1)(i)) -- Vacated + dismissed; treated as termination in favour of the accused; auto-sealed. State law: not a conviction. [Normalized from 'conviction': vacatur + favourable-termination treatment]\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Youthful offender (YO) adjudication / juvenile delinquency (CPL § 720.35; Fam. Ct. Act §§ 375.1-380.1) -- YO auto-sealed; 'not a conviction'. State law: not a conviction. YO (16-19) expressly not a judgment of conviction; delinquency likewise civil.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — New York", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-north-carolina", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-north-carolina", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — North Carolina", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "North Carolina: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — North Carolina: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under North Carolina law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Pardon of Forgiveness / Pardon of Innocence (N.C. Const. art. III, § 5(6); G.S. 13-3) -- No expungement except innocence pardons (G.S. 15A-149). State law: conviction with limited relief. THREE pardon types with different effects — innocence pardons expunge; forgiveness pardons do not. Distinguish per document.\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Expunction (G.S. 15A-145.5; 15A-145.4) -- 'Restored to pre-conviction status'; records deleted with LE exceptions. State law: conviction with limited relief. 1 nonviolent felony @10 yrs; misd @5; multiple @20. [Normalized from 'conviction' given restoration language]\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): Conditional discharge / 90-96 drug conditional discharge (G.S. 15A-1341(a1); G.S. 90-96(a)) -- Dismissal without adjudication of guilt; expungeable. State law: not a conviction. Class H/I felonies + misdemeanors; 'no conviction results, including for predicate purposes'.\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: NO): Deferred prosecution agreement (G.S. 15A-1341(a2)) -- Dismissal per agreement. State law: not a conviction. Profile folds into conditional-discharge discussion.\n- set aside (conviction: LIKELY YES): Trafficking-victim vacatur (G.S. 15A-1416.1) -- Vacatur; expunction may follow. State law: conviction with limited relief. Nonviolent offenses.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Juvenile adjudication (G.S. 7B-3200; 15A-145.8, -145.8A) -- Expunction; restored to pre-adjudication status. State law: not a conviction. G.S. 7B-2412: adjudication not a conviction and imposes no civil disability — normalized from 'mixed'.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — North Carolina", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-north-dakota", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-north-dakota", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — North Dakota", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "North Dakota: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — North Dakota: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under North Dakota law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Pardon (N.D. Const. art. 5, § 7; N.D.C.C. § 12-55.1-01(4)) -- Relieves collateral penalties; no expungement; predicate use preserved. State law: conviction with limited relief.\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Sealing (N.D.C.C. ch. 12-60.1) -- Sealed from public access after 3-5 clean years on clear-and-convincing showing. State law: conviction with limited relief. [Normalized from 'conviction']\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): Deferred imposition of sentence (N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-02(4); § 12.1-32-07.1(2)) -- Dismissal + plea set aside; released from 'all penalties and disabilities' (sex-registration/firearms excepted); sealed. State law: not a conviction. May still serve as predicate. [Corrected judgment_entered: imposition deferred = no judgment until violation]\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Treatment courts / diversionary dispositions (N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-02(1)) -- Program-dependent. State law: unclear. Mechanism varies by docket.\n- set aside (conviction: LIKELY YES): Felony-to-misdemeanor reduction (N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-02(9)) -- Deemed misdemeanor after ≤1-yr sentences. State law: conviction with limited relief.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Juvenile adjudication (N.D.C.C. § 27-20.2-21(1); § 27-20.2-25(2)) -- Records auto-destroyed 10 yrs after final order or at 18; 'treated as never existing'. State law: not a conviction.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — North Dakota", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-ohio", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-ohio", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Ohio", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Ohio: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Ohio: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Ohio law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Gubernatorial pardon (Ohio Rev. Code § 2967.02, .04, .07) -- Unconditional pardon relieves all disabilities; sealing separate. State law: conviction with limited relief. Expedited path after 10 clean years.\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Sealing / expungement (Ohio Rev. Code § 2953.32; § 2953.34) -- Sealed or destroyed after 6-month to 10-year waits. State law: conviction with limited relief. SB 288 (2023) reformed; F1/F2 and violent offenses ineligible. [Normalized from 'conviction']\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): Intervention in lieu of conviction (ILC) (Ohio Rev. Code § 2951.041) -- Dismissal without adjudication of guilt + sealing. State law: not a conviction. Drug/alcohol/mental-illness/trafficking-victim nexus required. ILC requires a guilty plea held in abeyance — corrected from extractor's no-plea.\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: NO): Pretrial diversion (Ohio Rev. Code § 2935.36) -- Dismissal on prosecutor recommendation. State law: not a conviction. Excludes repeat offenders, violent crimes.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Juvenile adjudication (Ohio Rev. Code § 2151.356; § 2151.358) -- Sealing 6 months post-discharge; auto-expunged 5 yrs later or at 23. State law: not a conviction. R.C. 2151.357: adjudication not a conviction — normalized from 'mixed'.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Ohio", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-oklahoma", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-oklahoma", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Oklahoma", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Oklahoma: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Oklahoma: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Oklahoma law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Pardon (Okla. Const. art. VI, § 10; 57 O.S. § 332.2) -- Restores voting/office; firearms for nonviolent only; no erasure. State law: conviction with limited relief.\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Expungement/sealing (22 O.S. §§ 18-19) -- Sealed; may deny existence in employment/licensing. State law: conviction with limited relief. Nonviolent felonies @5 yrs (up to two @10). [Normalized from 'conviction']\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): Deferred judgment (22 O.S. § 991c) -- Plea/verdict expunged and charge dismissed with prejudice on completion. State law: not a conviction. No prior felony; max one deferred judgment per 10 years.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Juvenile adjudication (10A O.S. § 2-6-108, -109) -- Expungement at 18; may deny existence. State law: not a conviction.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Oklahoma", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-oregon", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-oregon", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Oregon", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Oregon: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Oregon: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Oregon law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Executive pardon (Or. Const. art. V, § 14; ORS 144.649) -- Restores rights; record auto-sealed since 2019. State law: conviction with limited relief. 2022 mass marijuana pardons (45k+).\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY NO): Set-aside and sealing (ORS 137.225) -- Set aside + sealed; 'deemed not to have been previously convicted'. State law: not a conviction. Oregon's set-aside VACATES the conviction — among the strongest state relief; 1-7 yr waits; sex/violent carve-outs. [Normalized from 'conviction' given vacatur + deemer]\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): Conditional discharge (drugs) / DUII diversion (ORS 475.245; ORS 813.200) -- Dismissal without adjudication of guilt. State law: not a conviction. DUII diversion requires a plea held; § 475.245 agreement may not.\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: NO): Prosecution diversion (ORS 135.881 et seq.) -- Dismissal on completion. State law: not a conviction. Non-violent, non-DUI; once per person.\n- set aside (conviction: LIKELY NO): Judicial set-aside (ORS 137.225) -- Same as expungement entry — one statute. State law: not a conviction. Mandatory absent clear-and-convincing public-safety objection.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Juvenile adjudication (ORS 419A.260-262) -- Auto-expungement; agencies must state no record exists. State law: not a conviction. ORS 419C.400(5): adjudication not a conviction — normalized from 'conviction'.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Oregon", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-pennsylvania", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-pennsylvania", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Pennsylvania", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Pennsylvania: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Pennsylvania: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Pennsylvania law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Governor's pardon (Pa. Const. art. IV, § 9; 18 Pa.C.S. § 9122) -- 'Total forgiveness'; AUTOMATIC expungement follows. State law: not a conviction. ~400 pardons/yr under Shapiro; pardon + auto-expungement = strong Saini candidate.\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Expungement / Clean Slate limited access (18 Pa.C.S. § 9122; § 9122.1-.3) -- Destroyed or sealed by offense type; pardoned convictions auto-expunged since 2023. State law: conviction with limited relief.\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: NO): Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) / probation without verdict (234 Pa. Code Rule 320; 35 P.S. § 780-117) -- Automatic expungement on completion (except certain sex offenses). State law: not a conviction. ARD is pre-plea; probation without verdict (drugs) is plea-based — both end in non-conviction.\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: NO): ARD (18 Pa.C.S. § 9122(b.1)) -- Auto-expungement. State law: not a conviction. First offenders.\n- set aside (conviction: LIKELY NO): Trafficking-survivor vacatur (18 Pa.C.S. § 3019) -- Vacated + expunged. State law: not a conviction. [Normalized from 'conviction': vacatur + expungement]\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Juvenile adjudication (18 Pa.C.S. § 9123; 42 Pa.C.S. § 6354) -- Expungement + destruction available. State law: not a conviction. 'Do not impose any civil disability ordinarily resulting from a conviction'.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Pennsylvania", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-rhode-island", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-rhode-island", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Rhode Island", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Rhode Island: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Rhode Island: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Rhode Island law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Pardon (R.I. Const. art. IX, § 13; §§ 13-10-1, -2) -- Restores office/licensing eligibility. State law: conviction with limited relief. Effectively dormant — none to living persons in years.\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Expungement (§ 12-1.3-2, -3, -5) -- Sealed; removed from active files. State law: conviction with limited relief. First offenders @5/10 yrs; violence ineligible. [Normalized from 'conviction']\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Deferred sentence (R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-19(c); § 12-1.3-2(e)) -- Immediate expungement eligibility on completion. State law: not a conviction. RI deferred sentence: plea + deferral agreement; completion → expungement as if not convicted. Serious violent offenses ineligible.\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: LIKELY NO): Filing / drug court (§ 12-10-12; § 8-2-39.2) -- Auto-expungement on completion / filing-period expiry. State law: not a conviction. 'Filing' is RI's distinctive one-year-hold mechanism.\n- set aside (conviction: LIKELY YES): Trafficking-survivor vacatur (§ 11-67.1-17) -- Vacated + sealed/expunged. State law: conviction with limited relief.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Juvenile adjudication (§ 14-1-6.1; § 14-1-40) -- Auto-sealed at final disposition. State law: not a conviction. No civil disabilities; usable in adult sentencing.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Rhode Island", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-south-carolina", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-south-carolina", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — South Carolina", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "South Carolina: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — South Carolina: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under South Carolina law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Pardon (Board) (§§ 24-21-920 to -990) -- 'Fully pardoned from all legal consequences, direct and collateral' incl. firearms; record annotated, not expunged. State law: conviction with limited relief. Board-granted; must still report the conviction on applications.\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Expungement (various authorities) (§§ 22-5-910 to -930; § 17-22-530(A)) -- Sealed; restored to pre-conviction status. State law: conviction with limited relief. Offense-specific authorities; once each. [Normalized from 'conviction']\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): Conditional discharge (drugs) (§ 44-53-450(A), (B)) -- Dismissal, no conviction; expungement restores pre-arrest status. State law: not a conviction. First-time minor drug offenses. § 44-53-450 requires a plea or finding — corrected from extractor's no-plea.\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: NO): Pretrial Intervention (PTI) (§ 17-22-10 et seq.; § 17-22-150(a)) -- Non-criminal disposition; records destroyed. State law: not a conviction. Non-violent first offenses; solicitor-run.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Juvenile adjudication (§ 63-19-2050) -- Expungement at 18+; destroyed; pre-offense status. State law: not a conviction. 'Adjudications never impose civil disabilities.'\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — South Carolina", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-south-dakota", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-south-dakota", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — South Dakota", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "South Dakota: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — South Dakota: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under South Dakota law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Pardon / exceptional pardon (SDCL 24-14-1 to -11; § 24-15A-23) -- Releases from disabilities; records SEALED; pre-arrest status. State law: conviction with limited relief. Sealing effect is strong, but remains a prior for sentencing/habitual purposes.\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Expungement / automatic removal (SDCL 23A-3-27 to -34) -- Discretionary; automatic for minor misdemeanors after 5 clean years. State law: conviction with limited relief.\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): Suspended imposition of sentence (SDCL 23A-27-13; § 23A-27-12.2) -- Discharged 'without adjudication of guilt'; sealed; pre-arrest status; 'disqualifications and disabilities imposed by law upon conviction do not apply'. State law: not a conviction. First-time offenders. SD's SIS = its deferral. [Corrected judgment_entered: no adjudication = no judgment]\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: NO): Diversion (SDCL 23A-3-35 to -37) -- Automatic expungement on dismissal. State law: not a conviction. 2018 addition.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Juvenile delinquency (SDCL 26-7A-115 to -120) -- Confidential; sealing 1 yr after jurisdiction ends. State law: not a conviction. SDCL 26-7A-26: adjudication not a conviction — normalized from 'mixed'.\n- suspended imposition of sentence (conviction: LIKELY NO): Suspended imposition of sentence (SDCL 23A-27-13 et seq.) -- As deferred_adjudication above; not deemed a conviction for licensing/employment (narrow teaching-certificate exception). State law: not a conviction. May keep voting even if jail was a condition.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — South Dakota", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-tennessee", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-tennessee", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Tennessee", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Tennessee: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Tennessee: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Tennessee law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Pardon (Tenn. Const. art. III, § 6; § 40-27-101) -- Limited direct effect; grounds for expungement of nonviolent convictions. State law: conviction with limited relief.\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Expunction (§ 40-32-101(g), -105, -106, -107) -- Destroyed/confidential; pre-arrest status; restores firearms. State law: conviction with limited relief. Nonviolent misd + E/D/C felonies, 5-15 yr waits. [Normalized from 'conviction']\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): Judicial diversion (Tenn. Code § 40-35-313) -- Deferral without entering judgment; dismissal + expungement on completion. State law: not a conviction. PROFILE THIN — mechanism supplied from the statute's known text (§ 40-35-313: court may defer proceedings 'without entering a judgment of guilty'); VERIFY in the review pass.\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: NO): Pretrial diversion (Tenn. Code § 40-15-105) -- Prosecution suspended by memorandum of understanding; dismissal on completion. State law: not a conviction. PROFILE THIN — VERIFY.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Juvenile adjudication (Tenn. Code § 37-1-133) -- Expungement available; profile thin. State law: not a conviction. § 37-1-133: adjudication not a conviction of crime — supplied from statute; VERIFY.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Tennessee", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-texas", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-texas", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Texas", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Texas: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Texas: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Texas law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Full pardon / pardon for innocence (Tex. Const. art. 4, § 11; arts. 48.01, 48.05) -- Restores civil rights; enables expunction of the conviction record; innocence pardon = 'complete freedom from legal implications'. State law: conviction with limited relief. A full pardon makes the conviction expungeable under ch. 55A — significant for the Saini analysis.\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): Deferred adjudication community supervision (Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.101; art. 42A.111) -- Court 'defers further proceedings without entering an adjudication of guilt'; discharge + dismissal 'may not be deemed a conviction'; order of nondisclosure available. State law: not a conviction. THE flagship deferred-adjudication state. Statutory 'may not be deemed a conviction' language (art. 42A.111(c)) with enumerated exceptions (e.g., later sentencing, licensing). [Corrected judgment_entered: adjudication deferred = no judgment]\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: NO): Pretrial intervention programs / veterans treatment court (Tex. Gov't Code § 509.018; ch. 124) -- Dismissal + expunction or nondisclosure. State law: not a conviction. County programs vary.\n- set aside (conviction: LIKELY YES): Judicial clemency (Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.701) -- On early probation discharge, court may set aside the verdict/plea and dismiss — 'released from all penalties and disabilities' with exceptions. State law: conviction with limited relief. Discretionary and rare; PROFILE SILENT on this — supplied from art. 42A.701's known text; VERIFY.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Juvenile adjudication + sealing (Tex. Fam. Code §§ 58.253-58.258) -- On sealing, adjudications 'vacated and... treated for all purposes as though the proceedings had never occurred'. State law: not a conviction. Tex. Fam. Code § 51.13: adjudication not a conviction.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Texas", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-utah", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-utah", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Utah", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Utah: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Utah: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Utah law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Pardon (Board of Pardons) (Utah Code §§ 77-27-5, -5.1) -- Restores all rights + AUTOMATIC expungement order. State law: not a conviction. Pardon → automatic expungement makes completed Utah pardons strong Saini candidates. [Normalized from 'conviction']\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Expungement / Clean Slate (Utah Code § 77-40a; § 77-40a-303) -- Deleted/sealed; 'may respond as though the conviction never occurred'. State law: conviction with limited relief. BCI certificate + 3-10 yr waits; automatic path for misdemeanors. [Normalized from 'conviction']\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): Plea in abeyance (Utah Code § 77-2a-1 et seq.) -- Plea held, not entered as judgment; dismissal + expungement on compliance. State law: not a conviction. Utah Code § 77-2a-3: on successful completion the plea is withdrawn/case dismissed — completed abeyance is not a conviction under Utah law. [Corrected from extractor's 'conviction'; VERIFY]\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: NO): Diversion (Utah Code §§ 77-2-5, -7, -9) -- Dismissal without conviction. State law: not a conviction. Serious felony/sex/DV carve-outs.\n- set aside (conviction: LIKELY YES): 402 reduction (felony→misdemeanor) (Utah Code § 76-3-402) -- Grade reduced; can unlock expungement. State law: conviction with limited relief.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Juvenile adjudication (Utah Code §§ 80-6-1002 to -1004.3) -- Sealing/expungement; automatic for nonjudicial adjustments. State law: not a conviction. Utah Code § 80-6-708: adjudication not a conviction — normalized from 'mixed'.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Utah", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-vermont", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-vermont", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Vermont", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Vermont: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Vermont: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Vermont law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Executive pardon (Vt. Const. § 20; 28 V.S.A. § 453) -- Unconditional pardon; enables expungement petition. State law: conviction with limited relief. 10-yr felony / 5-yr misd policy waits; rare.\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Expungement/sealing (13 V.S.A. § 7601 et seq.) -- Sealed or expunged after 3-10 yr waits. State law: conviction with limited relief. 2025 S12 expansion to most nonviolent offenses. [Normalized from 'conviction']\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): Deferred sentence (13 V.S.A. § 7041) -- On fulfillment of probation, the adjudication of guilt is STRUCK and the record expunged (restitution paid). State law: not a conviction. 'Not a sentence at all, but rather a postponement of sentence'; serious-offense carve-outs. Striking + expungement = strong non-conviction outcome.\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: NO): Adult court diversion (3 V.S.A. § 164) -- All records expunged after 2 years; 'proceedings shall be considered never to have occurred'. State law: not a conviction. First/second misdemeanors + first nonviolent felonies.\n- set aside (conviction: LIKELY NO): Trafficking-victim vacatur (13 V.S.A. § 2658) -- Vacated, guilt struck, expunged. State law: not a conviction.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Juvenile adjudication / youthful-offender sealing (18-25) (33 V.S.A. § 5119; § 5202) -- Sealed 2 yrs post-discharge; 'considered never to have occurred'. State law: not a conviction. 33 V.S.A. § 5202: adjudication not a conviction.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Vermont", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-virginia", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-virginia", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Virginia", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Virginia: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Virginia: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Virginia law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Simple pardon / absolute pardon (Va. Const. art. V, § 12; § 53.1-229) -- Simple = forgiveness, record remains; ABSOLUTE (innocence) = automatic expungement; conditional = commutation. State law: conviction with limited relief. THREE distinct pardon types — the absolute pardon is innocence-based and expunges; the simple pardon does not. Identify which type per document.\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Sealing (Clean Slate 2021) (Va. Code §§ 19.2-392.5 to -392.16) -- Automatic sealing (specified misdemeanors, 7 clean years) + petition sealing (misd 7 yrs; Class 5-6 felonies 10 yrs) from July 1, 2026. State law: conviction with limited relief. Traditional VA expungement (§ 19.2-392.2) is non-conviction-records only; conviction SEALING arrives with the delayed 2021 reform. [Normalized from 'conviction']\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): Deferred disposition / first-offender drug deferral (Va. Code § 19.2-298.02; § 18.2-251) -- Deferral without adjudication; dismissal on completion; sealing only with prosecutor agreement. State law: not a conviction. § 19.2-298.02 allows deferral 'without a finding of guilt' after evidence; § 18.2-251 first-offender drug deferral requires plea/finding held in abeyance. Dismissal is not a conviction, but a § 18.2-251 dismissal still counts as a conviction for some collateral purposes (e.g., license suspension) — mixed edges. [Normalized from 'limited-relief']\n- set aside (conviction: LIKELY NO): Writ of vacatur (trafficking) (Va. Code §§ 19.2-327.15 to -327.19) -- Vacated + expungement order; disabilities removed. State law: not a conviction. Trafficking survivors; expanded 2025. [Normalized from 'conviction': vacatur + expungement]\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Juvenile adjudication (Va. Code §§ 16.1-306, -307; § 16.1-278.8) -- Auto-destruction at 19 + 5 yrs since last hearing (felony exceptions). State law: mixed. Juvenile FELONY adjudications are treated as convictions for several VA purposes (firearms, driving); misdemeanor-level are not — genuinely mixed.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Virginia", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-washington", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-washington", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Washington", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Washington: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Washington: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Washington law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Governor's pardon (Wash. Const. art III § 9; RCW 9.94A.885) -- Pardon vacates the conviction and limits public record access. State law: conviction with limited relief. Clemency & Pardons Board; 10-yr wait policy.\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY NO): Vacation of conviction (RCW 9.94A.640; 9.96.060) -- Conviction VACATED — released from all penalties; 'may state that the person has never been convicted'. State law: not a conviction. WA vacation withdraws the plea/verdict and dismisses — strong relief; still usable in later criminal proceedings. 3-10 yr waits; violent/sex carve-outs. [Normalized from 'conviction' given vacatur + deemer]\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: NO): Deferred prosecution (RCW 10.05.010; 10.05.120) -- Treatment-based; dismissal after completion + compliance period. State law: not a conviction. RCW 10.05 deferred prosecution requires a petition admitting wrongful conduct BUT no plea is taken; charges dismissed after treatment. [Corrected mechanism fields: no plea entered under 10.05]\n- set aside (conviction: LIKELY NO): Vacation (same statutes) (RCW 9.94A.640; 9.96.060) -- As above — WA's set-aside IS its vacation. State law: not a conviction.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Juvenile adjudication + sealing (RCW 13.50.260) -- Mandatory sealing at 18 (conditions); may deny the adjudication. State law: conviction with limited relief. WA juvenile adjudications ARE convictions under state law for several purposes (RCW 13.04.240 caveat: 'not a conviction of crime' EXCEPT as otherwise provided — sealing restores deniability). Genuinely mixed; flag.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Washington", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-west-virginia", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-west-virginia", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — West Virginia", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "West Virginia: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — West Virginia: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under West Virginia law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Pardon (W. Va. Const. art 7, § 11; § 5-1-16) -- Lifts barriers; enables expungement 1 yr post-pardon / 5 yrs post-discharge. State law: conviction with limited relief. Nearly dormant: 1 pardon in the last decade.\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Expungement (misd + nonviolent felonies) / pardoned-conviction expungement (W. Va. Code § 61-11-26; § 5-1-16a) -- Sealed; may answer 'no record exists'. State law: conviction with limited relief. 1-5 yr waits (reduced with treatment); violence/sex/DUI carve-outs. [Normalized from 'conviction']\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): Deferred adjudication (W. Va. Code § 61-11-22a) -- Court defers ACCEPTANCE of the plea; on compliance, plea withdrawn and charges dismissed or reduced. State law: not a conviction. Up to 3 yrs (felony) / 2 yrs (misd); violent/DV carve-outs. [Corrected judgment_entered: acceptance deferred = no judgment]\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: NO): Prosecutor diversion / first-offender drug deferral (W. Va. Code § 61-11-22; § 60A-4-407) -- Dismissal per agreement; drug deferral expungeable after 6 months. State law: not a conviction.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Juvenile adjudication (W. Va. Code §§ 49-5-101, -104) -- Sealed 1 yr after 18 or jurisdiction end. State law: not a conviction. W. Va. Code § 49-4-716: adjudication not a conviction — normalized from 'mixed'; violent-offense records may be public.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — West Virginia", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-wisconsin", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-wisconsin", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Wisconsin", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Wisconsin: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Wisconsin: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Wisconsin law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Pardon (Wis. Const. art. V, § 6; Wis. Stat. §§ 304.08-304.11) -- Restores rights; does NOT expunge or seal. State law: conviction with limited relief. 5-yr wait; 2,027 pardons as of May 2026 — an active pardon state.\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Youthful-offender expungement (§ 973.015) (Wis. Stat. § 973.015(1m)(a); § 973.015(2m)) -- Ordered AT SENTENCING; record struck from court records on successful completion. State law: conviction with limited relief. Unusual: expungement must be ordered at sentencing (under-25 at offense; ≤6-yr offenses); court records only — LE/prosecutor records unaffected; WI courts hold the expunged conviction still 'exists' for repeater purposes. [Normalized from 'conviction']\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): Deferred prosecution agreements (Wis. Stat. § 971.37; §§ 971.39-971.41) -- Charges dismissed on completion; no conviction. State law: not a conviction. Prosecutor may require a plea held in abeyance; § 971.37(4) consent not an admission.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Juvenile adjudication (Wis. Stat. § 938.355(4m)) -- Expungement at 17 on compliance + benefit finding. State law: not a conviction. Wis. Stat. § 938.35(1): adjudication not admissible as conviction — normalized from 'conviction'.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Wisconsin", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-state-wyoming", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "state-wyoming", + "marginal_note": "US dispositions — Wyoming", + "part": "US dispositions by state", + "division": "", + "heading": "Wyoming: criminal dispositions vs the IRPA 'conviction' concept", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS dispositions — Wyoming: whether each disposition type is a conviction for IRPA s. 36, under Wyoming law.\n\n- state pardon (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Gubernatorial pardon (Wyo. Const. Art 4, § 5; Wyo. Stat. §§ 7-13-803 to -806) -- Restores civil/voting/firearm rights. State law: conviction with limited relief. 10-yr policy wait; sparing use.\n- expungement (conviction: LIKELY YES): Felony/misdemeanor expungement (Wyo. Stat. §§ 7-13-1501, -1502) -- Dissemination restricted to criminal-justice agencies. State law: conviction with limited relief. 10-yr felony / 5-yr misd waits; firearm/violent/sex/drug-distribution carve-outs.\n- deferred adjudication (conviction: LIKELY NO): First-offender deferral (Wyo. Stat. § 7-13-301) -- Discharge + dismissal 'without adjudication of guilt and is not a conviction for any purpose'. State law: not a conviction. First offenders; violent/sex carve-outs. Explicit statutory language. [Corrected plea field: § 7-13-301 operates after a plea of guilty/nolo or finding — plea required, held without entry]\n- pretrial diversion (conviction: FACT-SPECIFIC): Court Supervised Treatment Act (Wyo. Stat. §§ 5-12-104, -105) -- Treatment-court supervision; outcome varies. State law: unclear. Profile silent on completion effect.\n- set aside (conviction: LIKELY YES): Trafficking-survivor vacatur (Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-708) -- Vacated; expungement-eligible. State law: conviction with limited relief. Any offense, any time.\n- juvenile adjudication (conviction: NO): Juvenile adjudication (Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-241) -- Expungement on majority (violent-felony exception); 'permanent destruction'. State law: not a conviction. Wyo. Stat. § 14-6-236: adjudication not a conviction.\n\nThe act branch (IRPA s. 36(1)(c)/(2)(c)) can apply even where a disposition is not a conviction. See the per-disposition entries for the governing analysis and authorities.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — Wyoming", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-method-equivalency-framework", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "equivalency-framework", + "marginal_note": "How offence equivalency works (step 2 of the s. 36 analysis)", + "part": "Methodology", + "division": "", + "heading": "How offence equivalency works (step 2 of the s. 36 analysis)", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nEquivalency asks whether the foreign offence, if committed in Canada, would constitute a federal offence of the required seriousness. The governing test is Hill v Canada (MEI) (1987), 73 NR 315 (FCA): equivalency can be established (1) by comparing the precise wording and essential elements of the two provisions; (2) by examining the evidence of what the person actually did, to see whether it would satisfy the essential elements of the Canadian offence; or (3) by a combination of both. Key rules: (a) HYBRID DEEMING -- IRPA s. 36(3)(a): an offence prosecutable either way in Canada is deemed indictable, at its indictable maximum, even if it would likely proceed summarily; (b) TIMING -- Tran v Canada, 2017 SCC 50: the maximum penalty is assessed as of the DATE OF COMMISSION, so a later increase in the Canadian maximum does not retroactively convert criminality into serious criminality; (c) THRESHOLDS -- Canadian property offences split at $5,000 (theft, fraud, mischief), so the value in the foreign record often decides the branch; (d) the comparison is with the CANADIAN offence's elements -- a foreign offence broader than its Canadian counterpart requires the evidence branch of Hill to see what was actually done; (e) purely SUMMARY Canadian equivalents (e.g. causing a disturbance, s. 175) cannot ground s. 36(2)(b) inadmissibility on a single conviction -- only the two-or-more-convictions branch reaches them.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — How offence equivalency works (step 2 of the s. 36 analysis)", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-equiv-dui", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "equiv-dui", + "marginal_note": "Equivalency: DUI", + "part": "US offence equivalency", + "division": "", + "heading": "What does a US DUI conviction equate to in Canada?", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS offence: DUI; DWI; OWI; OUI; driving under the influence\nCanadian equivalent: Criminal Code s. 320.14 (operation while impaired / over the legal limit); punishment s. 320.19\nMaximum penalty (verified): Hybrid; indictable maximum 10 years (s. 320.19(1)(a): 'liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years')\nInadmissibility branch: SERIOUS CRIMINALITY -- IRPA s. 36(1)(b): via s. 36(3)(a) hybrid deeming, a single ordinary US DUI conviction equates to an offence punishable by 10 years\n\nThe single most consequential everyday pairing: one US misdemeanor DUI grounds serious criminality, because Canada's impaired-driving offence is hybrid with a 10-year indictable maximum since December 18, 2018. Deemed rehabilitation is therefore unavailable (10-year-or-more maximum); only individual rehabilitation or a TRP cures it.\n\nCaveats:\n- TIMING (Tran, 2017 SCC 50): for offences COMMITTED before December 18, 2018, the equivalent was the former s. 253 (maximum 5 years) -- criminality under s. 36(2)(b) only, not serious criminality, and deemed rehabilitation remains available.\n- Zero-tolerance administrative per-se findings are not convictions (see the DUI entry in the dispositions helper); this pairing addresses criminal DUI convictions.\n- A US 'wet reckless' plea-down maps to careless/dangerous driving analysis, not s. 320.14 -- check what was actually convicted.\n\nAuthorities:\n- Tran v Canada (Public Safety), 2017 SCC 50 (Supreme Court of Canada): The maximum term for equivalency/seriousness purposes is assessed as of the date of commission; subsequent increases do not apply retrospectively.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — equivalency: DUI", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-equiv-theft-under", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "equiv-theft-under", + "marginal_note": "Equivalency: petty theft", + "part": "US offence equivalency", + "division": "", + "heading": "What does a US petty theft conviction equate to in Canada?", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS offence: petty theft; petit larceny; shoplifting; misdemeanor theft; theft under\nCanadian equivalent: Criminal Code s. 334(b) (theft not exceeding $5,000)\nMaximum penalty (verified): Hybrid; indictable maximum 2 years (s. 334(b)(i))\nInadmissibility branch: CRIMINALITY -- IRPA s. 36(2)(b) (foreign national); a permanent resident is NOT inadmissible on this alone\n\nOrdinary shoplifting equates to theft under $5,000: hybrid, deemed indictable, 2-year maximum. One conviction makes a foreign national inadmissible for criminality; two convictions not arising from a single occurrence also engage s. 36(2)(b). Deemed rehabilitation after 10 years (single) per IRPR s. 18(2)(a).\n\nCaveats:\n- Convert the stolen value at the offence date: a US 'felony grand theft' at a low state threshold (some states: $500+) may still be theft UNDER $5,000 in Canadian terms -- the CANADIAN threshold controls the branch.\n- Value over $5,000 -> s. 334(a), 10-year maximum -> serious criminality (see theft-over).", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — equivalency: petty theft", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-equiv-theft-over", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "equiv-theft-over", + "marginal_note": "Equivalency: grand theft", + "part": "US offence equivalency", + "division": "", + "heading": "What does a US grand theft conviction equate to in Canada?", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS offence: grand theft; grand larceny; felony theft; auto theft; grand theft auto\nCanadian equivalent: Criminal Code s. 334(a) (theft exceeding $5,000); motor vehicle theft s. 333.1\nMaximum penalty (verified): Indictable maximum 10 years (s. 334(a): 'not more than 10 years'); motor vehicle theft (s. 333.1) hybrid, 10 years\nInadmissibility branch: SERIOUS CRIMINALITY -- IRPA s. 36(1)(b), where the value genuinely exceeds $5,000 (or the subject is a motor vehicle under s. 333.1)\n\nTheft of property over $5,000 (Canadian dollars, at the offence date) is a 10-year offence: serious criminality; no deemed rehabilitation.\n\nCaveats:\n- The US felony label does not control -- verify the actual value against the Canadian $5,000 line; borderline values with exchange-rate movement deserve the evidence branch of Hill.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — equivalency: grand theft", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-equiv-assault-simple", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "equiv-assault-simple", + "marginal_note": "Equivalency: simple assault", + "part": "US offence equivalency", + "division": "", + "heading": "What does a US simple assault conviction equate to in Canada?", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS offence: simple assault; misdemeanor assault; battery; simple battery; assault in the fourth degree\nCanadian equivalent: Criminal Code s. 266 (assault)\nMaximum penalty (verified): Hybrid; indictable maximum 5 years (s. 266(a): 'not exceeding five years')\nInadmissibility branch: CRIMINALITY -- IRPA s. 36(2)(b)\n\nUS simple assault/battery generally equates to s. 266: hybrid, 5-year maximum -- criminality, not serious criminality. Deemed rehabilitation available after 10 years (single conviction).\n\nCaveats:\n- Bodily injury, a weapon, or choking moves the equivalent to s. 267 (10 years) -> serious criminality (see assault-aggravated).\n- Domestic-violence variants equate to the same assault provisions; the DV character matters to sentencing and to some US dispositions, not to the Canadian equivalency.\n- Some US assault statutes cover mere threats -- threat-only conduct maps to s. 264.1 (uttering threats, 5 years), same branch.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — equivalency: simple assault", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-equiv-assault-aggravated", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "equiv-assault-aggravated", + "marginal_note": "Equivalency: aggravated assault", + "part": "US offence equivalency", + "division": "", + "heading": "What does a US aggravated assault conviction equate to in Canada?", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS offence: aggravated assault; assault with a deadly weapon; ADW; felony assault; assault causing injury\nCanadian equivalent: Criminal Code s. 267 (assault with a weapon / causing bodily harm / choking); s. 268 (aggravated assault)\nMaximum penalty (verified): s. 267: hybrid, indictable maximum 10 years; s. 268: indictable, maximum 14 years\nInadmissibility branch: SERIOUS CRIMINALITY -- IRPA s. 36(1)(b)\n\nWeapon involvement or bodily harm lifts the Canadian equivalent to s. 267 (10 years) or s. 268 (wounding/maiming, 14 years): serious criminality either way; no deemed rehabilitation.\n\nCaveats:\n- US 'aggravated' labels sometimes rest only on the victim's status (e.g. assault on an officer) -- if no weapon/injury, the closer equivalent may be s. 270 (assaulting an officer, hybrid 5 years) -> criminality only. Use the evidence branch.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — equivalency: aggravated assault", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-equiv-fraud", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "equiv-fraud", + "marginal_note": "Equivalency: fraud", + "part": "US offence equivalency", + "division": "", + "heading": "What does a US fraud conviction equate to in Canada?", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS offence: fraud; bad checks; check fraud; insufficient funds; credit card fraud\nCanadian equivalent: Criminal Code s. 380 (fraud); s. 342 (credit card offences); s. 402.2 (identity theft)\nMaximum penalty (verified): s. 380(1)(a): indictable maximum 14 years where value exceeds $5,000; s. 380(1)(b): hybrid, 2 years where value $5,000 or less\nInadmissibility branch: SERIOUS CRIMINALITY over $5,000 (36(1)(b)); CRIMINALITY at or under $5,000 (36(2)(b))\n\nFraud splits on the $5,000 line exactly like theft. Bad-check convictions are usually small-value: hybrid 2-year equivalents -> criminality. Larger frauds (14 years) are serious criminality.\n\nCaveats:\n- Many US bad-check statutes criminalize mere non-payment without dishonesty elements -- where intent to defraud is not an element, the Canadian equivalent may fail on essential elements; use the Hill evidence branch.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — equivalency: fraud", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-equiv-drug-possession", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "equiv-drug-possession", + "marginal_note": "Equivalency: drug possession", + "part": "US offence equivalency", + "division": "", + "heading": "What does a US drug possession conviction equate to in Canada?", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS offence: drug possession; possession of a controlled substance; simple possession; cocaine possession; meth possession\nCanadian equivalent: CDSA s. 4(1) (possession); punishment s. 4(3)-(6) by schedule\nMaximum penalty (verified): Schedule I (cocaine, heroin, meth, fentanyl): hybrid, indictable maximum 7 years (s. 4(3)(a): 'not exceeding seven years'); Schedule III: hybrid, 3 years\nInadmissibility branch: CRIMINALITY -- IRPA s. 36(2)(b) (7-year maximum is below the 10-year serious-criminality line)\n\nSimple possession of hard drugs equates to CDSA s. 4(1): hybrid, 7-year maximum for Schedule I -- criminality, NOT serious criminality. Deemed rehabilitation available after 10 clean years for a single conviction.\n\nCaveats:\n- CANNABIS IS DIFFERENT: see the cannabis entry -- simple possession within legal limits is no longer an offence in Canada at all.\n- Possession WITH INTENT to distribute equates to trafficking (see drug-trafficking): a completely different branch.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — equivalency: drug possession", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-equiv-cannabis-possession", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "equiv-cannabis-possession", + "marginal_note": "Equivalency: marijuana possession", + "part": "US offence equivalency", + "division": "", + "heading": "What does a US marijuana possession conviction equate to in Canada?", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS offence: marijuana possession; cannabis possession; possession of marijuana; weed possession\nCanadian equivalent: None for simple possession within legal limits -- the Cannabis Act legalized adult possession of up to 30 g of dried cannabis (public)\nMaximum penalty (verified): Not an offence in Canada (within limits); over-limit possession: Cannabis Act s. 8, hybrid, maximum 5 years less a day\nInadmissibility branch: NO INADMISSIBILITY for simple possession equivalents: with no equivalent Canadian offence, neither s. 36(1)(b) nor s. 36(2)(b) can be made out\n\nA US conviction for simple marijuana possession (an amount lawful in Canada) has no Canadian equivalent offence since October 17, 2018 -- there is nothing to equate, so the conviction cannot ground criminal inadmissibility. This is the clearest 'NO' in the pairing table.\n\nCaveats:\n- Quantities beyond Canadian legal limits, distribution, sale, cultivation beyond limits, and import/export DO have Cannabis Act equivalents (ss. 8-14; import/export max 14 years -> serious criminality).\n- The equivalency is assessed against Canadian law at the ADMISSIBILITY DECISION date for the would-it-be-an-offence question -- post-legalization assessments of old possession convictions find no equivalent offence.\n- US felony marijuana TRAFFICKING remains serious criminality (Cannabis Act s. 9/10 or CDSA analysis).", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — equivalency: marijuana possession", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-equiv-drug-trafficking", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "equiv-drug-trafficking", + "marginal_note": "Equivalency: drug trafficking", + "part": "US offence equivalency", + "division": "", + "heading": "What does a US drug trafficking conviction equate to in Canada?", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS offence: drug trafficking; possession with intent to distribute; PWID; drug distribution; sale of a controlled substance\nCanadian equivalent: CDSA s. 5 (trafficking / possession for the purpose)\nMaximum penalty (verified): Schedule I or II: indictable, maximum LIFE (s. 5(3)(a): 'liable to imprisonment for life'); Schedule III/V: hybrid, 10 years\nInadmissibility branch: SERIOUS CRIMINALITY -- IRPA s. 36(1)(b) for any schedule (all branches reach at least 10 years)\n\nAny trafficking or possession-with-intent conviction equates to CDSA s. 5: serious criminality at every schedule level. No deemed rehabilitation; individual rehabilitation after 5 years or TRP only.\n\nCaveats:\n- Also engages potential organized-criminality analysis (s. 37) where a criminal organization is involved.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — equivalency: drug trafficking", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-equiv-disorderly-conduct", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "equiv-disorderly-conduct", + "marginal_note": "Equivalency: disorderly conduct", + "part": "US offence equivalency", + "division": "", + "heading": "What does a US disorderly conduct conviction equate to in Canada?", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS offence: disorderly conduct; disturbing the peace; public disturbance; breach of the peace; public intoxication\nCanadian equivalent: Criminal Code s. 175 (causing a disturbance)\nMaximum penalty (verified): SUMMARY ONLY -- s. 175 is a pure summary conviction offence\nInadmissibility branch: A SINGLE conviction grounds NO inadmissibility: s. 36(2)(b) requires an indictable-equivalent, and s. 175 is not one. TWO OR MORE convictions (not from a single occurrence) engage s. 36(2)(b)'s second branch\n\nThe most common harmless record: one US disorderly conduct/disturbing-the-peace conviction, equated to s. 175 (summary only), makes NOBODY inadmissible -- not even a foreign national. The two-or-more branch changes that, and IRPR s. 18(2)(b) then offers deemed rehabilitation five years after the sentences.\n\nCaveats:\n- Check what the conviction actually covers: some US disorderly statutes bundle assaultive or threatening conduct that would equate to hybrid offences -- the evidence branch of Hill controls where the statute is broader than s. 175.\n- Public intoxication alone typically has no federal Canadian equivalent at all (provincial regulatory matter) -- even cleaner than s. 175.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — equivalency: disorderly conduct", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-equiv-resisting-arrest", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "equiv-resisting-arrest", + "marginal_note": "Equivalency: resisting arrest", + "part": "US offence equivalency", + "division": "", + "heading": "What does a US resisting arrest conviction equate to in Canada?", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS offence: resisting arrest; obstruction; obstructing an officer; evading arrest; failure to comply with police\nCanadian equivalent: Criminal Code s. 129 (resisting or obstructing a peace officer)\nMaximum penalty (verified): Hybrid; indictable maximum 2 years (s. 129(d): 'not exceeding two years')\nInadmissibility branch: CRIMINALITY -- IRPA s. 36(2)(b)\n\nNon-violent resisting/obstruction equates to s. 129: hybrid, 2-year maximum -- criminality only.\n\nCaveats:\n- Vehicle flight equates to s. 320.17 (flight from police: hybrid, 10 years) -> SERIOUS criminality -- distinguish on-foot obstruction from vehicular flight.\n- Assaulting the officer moves it to s. 270 or s. 267 territory.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — equivalency: resisting arrest", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-equiv-threats", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "equiv-threats", + "marginal_note": "Equivalency: criminal threatening", + "part": "US offence equivalency", + "division": "", + "heading": "What does a US criminal threatening conviction equate to in Canada?", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS offence: criminal threatening; terroristic threats; menacing; harassment threats; intimidation\nCanadian equivalent: Criminal Code s. 264.1 (uttering threats)\nMaximum penalty (verified): Hybrid; indictable maximum 5 years for threats to cause death or bodily harm (s. 264.1(2)(a))\nInadmissibility branch: CRIMINALITY -- IRPA s. 36(2)(b)\n\nThreat offences equate to s. 264.1: hybrid, 5-year maximum -- criminality. Criminal harassment courses of conduct equate to s. 264 (10 years) -> serious criminality instead.\n\nCaveats:\n- 'Terroristic threats' is a state-law label with no terrorism content -- do not confuse with IRPA s. 34 security grounds absent actual terrorism facts.\n- Repeated/stalking conduct: s. 264 criminal harassment (10 years) -> serious criminality.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — equivalency: criminal threatening", + "source_url": "" + }, + { + "id": "commentary-equiv-mischief-vandalism", + "doc_type": "commentary", + "act_code": "US-DISP", + "act_short": "US Dispositions Helper", + "act_name": "US criminal dispositions and the IRPA 'conviction' concept (curated CanLex commentary)", + "section": "equiv-mischief-vandalism", + "marginal_note": "Equivalency: vandalism", + "part": "US offence equivalency", + "division": "", + "heading": "What does a US vandalism conviction equate to in Canada?", + "text": "CURATED ANALYSIS -- commentary compiled for CanLex, not a source of law. Verify against the cited authorities before relying on it.\n\nUS offence: vandalism; criminal mischief; malicious mischief; property damage; graffiti\nCanadian equivalent: Criminal Code s. 430 (mischief)\nMaximum penalty (verified): Value over $5,000: hybrid, indictable maximum 10 years (s. 430(3)); $5,000 or under: hybrid, 2 years (s. 430(4))\nInadmissibility branch: CRIMINALITY at or under $5,000 (36(2)(b)); SERIOUS CRIMINALITY over $5,000 (36(1)(b))\n\nVandalism splits on the $5,000 damage value like the other property offences. Ordinary graffiti/vandalism records are 2-year equivalents -> criminality.\n\nCaveats:\n- The damage figure in the US record (restitution ordered is a good proxy) decides the branch -- convert to CAD at the offence date.", + "history": "", + "last_amended": "", + "current_to": "2026-07-15", + "citation": "US Dispositions Helper — equivalency: vandalism", + "source_url": "" } ] \ No newline at end of file