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Post-LLM response correction and sanitization module.
This module applies the TruthTable constraints to LLM responses:
1. Re-injects protected placeholder values
2. Removes unauthorized entities not present in original prompt
3. Enforces FORBID/MANDATE semantic restrictions
Mathematical Foundations
------------------------
1. Placeholder Substitution:
Given placeholder map M = {p₁→v₁, ..., pₖ→vₖ} and response R:
R' = R[p₁→v₁][p₂→v₂]...[pₖ→vₖ]
Order: process by descending |pᵢ| to avoid partial substitution conflicts.
2. Entity Authorization Check:
Let E_orig = {(typeᵢ, valueᵢ)} from shielded prompt
Let E_resp = {(typeⱼ, valueⱼ)} extracted from response
Unauthorized: E_unauth = E_resp \ E_orig
Action: Replace each (t, v) ∈ E_unauth with sanitization marker.
3. Restriction Enforcement:
For restriction r with type T and entity e:
if T = FORBID: R = R \ {occurrences of e}
if T = MANDATE: if e ∉ R: R = R ∥ "[Note: must use e]"
Where \ = set difference on text occurrences, ∥ = string concatenation.
4. Regex Pattern Complexity:
Pattern matching: O(n · m) where n = text length, m = pattern length
Multiple patterns: O(n · Σ|pᵢ|) with optimized regex engine (RE2-style)
References
----------
[1] Cox, R. (2007). Regular Expression Matching Can Be Simple And Fast.
https://swtch.com/~rsc/regexp/regexp1.html
[2] Aho, A. V., & Corasick, M. J. (1975). Efficient string matching.
Communications of the ACM, 18(6), 333-340.
[3] OpenAI. (2024). Prompt injection and output sanitization best practices.
https://platform.openai.com/docs/guides/safety
Performance Characteristics
---------------------------
- _build_entity_patterns(): O(1) - constant number of patterns
- correct() full pipeline: O(n · (k + p + r)) where:
n = response length, k = placeholders, p = entity patterns, r = restrictions
- Memory: O(|E_orig| + |M|) for entity/placeholder lookup sets
Author: IntelliDeep Lab Team
License: BSL 1.1
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import logging
import re
from typing import List, Optional, Set, Tuple
from nlproxy.core.shield import ShieldResult
from nlproxy.core.restriction import Restriction
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class ResponseCorrector:
"""
Applies TruthTable constraints to sanitize LLM responses.
This class ensures that responses respect the security and semantic
constraints extracted from the original prompt:
1. Placeholder Re-injection: Restores protected values (code, PII, etc.)
2. Entity Sanitization: Removes entities not authorized in original prompt
3. Restriction Enforcement: Applies FORBID/MANDATE rules to final output
Key Design Decisions
--------------------
- Longest-first placeholder substitution prevents partial match corruption
- Entity type + value tuple matching avoids false positives (e.g., same IP appearing legitimately)
- Case-insensitive restriction matching for robust enforcement
- Minimal output modification: only redact/add what's necessary
Usage Example
-------------
>>> corrector = ResponseCorrector(mode="code")
>>> sanitized = corrector.correct(llm_response, shield_result)
>>> # Response now respects all original constraints
"""
# Pre-compiled entity patterns (shared across instances for efficiency)
# Each pattern uses word boundaries (\b) for exact token matching
_BASE_PATTERNS: dict[str, re.Pattern] = {
"ip": re.compile(
r'\b(?:(?:25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\.){3}'
r'(?:25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)'
r'|\b(?:[A-F0-9]{1,4}:){7}[A-F0-9]{1,4}\b',
flags=re.IGNORECASE
),
"date": re.compile(
r'\b\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}\b' # ISO: 2025-06-15
r'|\b\d{2}/\d{2}/\d{4}\b' # DD/MM/YYYY
r'|\b\d{2}\.\d{2}\.\d{4}\b' # DD.MM.YYYY
),
"price": re.compile(
r'(?:USD|EUR|GBP|JPY|CHF|CAD|AUD)\s*[\$\€\£\¥]?\s*\d{1,3}(?:,\d{3})*(?:\.\d{1,2})?\s*(?:USD|EUR|GBP|JPY|CHF|CAD|AUD)?'
r'|[\$\€\£\¥]\s*\d{1,3}(?:,\d{3})*(?:\.\d{1,2})?\s*(?:USD|EUR|GBP|JPY|CHF|CAD|AUD)?',
flags=re.IGNORECASE
),
"hash": re.compile(r'\b[A-Fa-f0-9]{32,64}\b'),
"percentage": re.compile(r'\b\d+(?:\.\d+)?\s*%\b'),
}
# Sanitization markers (configurable for audit trail)
_ENTITY_REDACT_MARKER: str = "[REDACTED]"
_FORBIDDEN_MARKER: str = "[PROHIBITED]"
_MANDATE_NOTE_PREFIX: str = "[Note: required entity missing: "
def __init__(self, mode: str = "general") -> None:
"""
Initialize the ResponseCorrector.
Parameters
----------
mode : str, optional
Domain mode for potential future extensions (default: "general").
Currently affects logging; pattern set is uniform across modes.
"""
self.mode = mode
self.entity_patterns = self._build_entity_patterns()
logger.debug(f"ResponseCorrector initialized (mode={mode})")
@staticmethod
def _build_entity_patterns() -> List[Tuple[str, re.Pattern]]:
"""
Build the list of entity detection patterns.
Returns
-------
List[Tuple[str, re.Pattern]]
List of (entity_type, compiled_regex) pairs for detection.
Pattern Specifications
---------------------
- IP: IPv4 (dotted decimal) or IPv6 (hex groups) with word boundaries
- Date: ISO 8601, DD/MM/YYYY, or DD.MM.YYYY formats
- Price: Currency code + symbol + amount with optional decimals
- Hash: 32-64 character hexadecimal strings (MD5, SHA-256, etc.)
- Percentage: Numeric value followed by % symbol
Complexity
----------
Time: O(1) - constant number of pattern compilations
Space: O(1) - fixed pattern set stored at class level
"""
return [(name, pattern) for name, pattern in ResponseCorrector._BASE_PATTERNS.items()]
def _extract_entities_from_text(self, text: str) -> Set[Tuple[str, str]]:
"""
Extract typed entities from text using registered patterns.
Parameters
----------
text : str
Text to scan for entities.
Returns
-------
Set[Tuple[str, str]]
Set of (entity_type, entity_value) pairs found in text.
Complexity
----------
Time: O(n · p) where n = text length, p = number of patterns
Space: O(e) where e = number of unique entities found
"""
found: Set[Tuple[str, str]] = set()
for entity_type, pattern in self.entity_patterns:
for match in pattern.finditer(text):
found.add((entity_type, match.group()))
return found
def _reinject_placeholders(self, text: str, placeholder_map: dict[str, str]) -> str:
"""
Replace placeholders with their original protected values.
Processes placeholders in descending length order to prevent
partial substitution (e.g., "__PROT_ab" matching inside "__PROT_abc").
Parameters
----------
text : str
Text containing placeholders to replace.
placeholder_map : Dict[str, str]
Mapping: placeholder → original value.
Returns
-------
str
Text with all placeholders substituted.
Mathematical Note
-----------------
Substitution order matters: if |p₁| > |p₂| and p₂ is a prefix of p₁,
substituting p₂ first would corrupt p₁. Sorting by descending length
ensures atomic replacement of longer tokens first.
Complexity
----------
Time: O(k · n · m) where k = placeholders, n = text length, m = avg placeholder length
Space: O(n) for intermediate string during substitution
"""
# Sort by descending length to avoid partial match conflicts
sorted_placeholders = sorted(placeholder_map.keys(), key=len, reverse=True)
result = text
for placeholder in sorted_placeholders:
value = placeholder_map[placeholder]
# Escape special regex characters; case-sensitive match for placeholders
pattern = re.escape(placeholder)
result = re.sub(pattern, value, result)
return result
def _sanitize_unauthorized_entities(
self,
text: str,
authorized_entities: Set[Tuple[str, str]]
) -> str:
"""
Remove or redact entities not present in the authorized set.
Parameters
----------
text : str
Text to sanitize.
authorized_entities : Set[Tuple[str, str]]
Set of (type, value) pairs that are permitted in output.
Returns
-------
str
Text with unauthorized entities replaced by redaction marker.
Algorithm
---------
1. Extract all entities from response text
2. Compute set difference: unauthorized = found \ authorized
3. Replace each unauthorized value with [REDACTED] marker
Note: Replacement is value-based (not type-based) to avoid
over-redaction when same entity type appears legitimately.
Complexity
----------
Time: O(n · p + u · n) where n = text length, p = patterns, u = unauthorized entities
Space: O(u) for unauthorized entity set
"""
# Extract entities present in response
response_entities = self._extract_entities_from_text(text)
# Identify unauthorized: in response but not in original
unauthorized = response_entities - authorized_entities
result = text
for entity_type, value in unauthorized:
# Escape value for safe regex substitution
pattern = re.escape(value)
result = re.sub(pattern, self._ENTITY_REDACT_MARKER, result)
return result
def _enforce_restrictions(self, text: str, restrictions: List[Restriction]) -> str:
"""
Apply FORBID/MANDATE semantic restrictions to the response.
Parameters
----------
text : str
Response text to constrain.
restrictions : List[Restriction]
List of semantic constraints from prompt analysis.
Returns
-------
str
Text with restrictions enforced.
Enforcement Rules
-----------------
FORBID: Remove all case-insensitive occurrences of the entity.
Uses word-boundary regex to avoid partial matches.
MANDATE: If entity is absent, append a note requiring its use.
Does not modify existing content; only adds guidance.
Complexity
----------
Time: O(r · n · m) where r = restrictions, n = text length, m = avg entity length
Space: O(n) for intermediate string during substitutions
"""
result = text
for restriction in restrictions:
entity = re.escape(restriction.entity)
word_boundary_pattern = r'\b' + entity + r'\b'
if restriction.type == "FORBID":
# Remove all occurrences (case-insensitive, word-boundary matched)
result = re.sub(
word_boundary_pattern,
self._FORBIDDEN_MARKER,
result,
flags=re.IGNORECASE
)
logger.debug(f"Enforced FORBID restriction: '{restriction.entity}'")
elif restriction.type == "MANDATE":
# Check presence (case-insensitive substring match for flexibility)
if restriction.entity.lower() not in result.lower():
# Append mandate note to guide downstream processing
note = f"{self._MANDATE_NOTE_PREFIX}{restriction.entity}]"
result = result.rstrip() + "\n" + note
logger.debug(f"Enforced MANDATE restriction: '{restriction.entity}'")
return result
def _normalize_whitespace(self, text: str) -> str:
"""
Normalize whitespace and punctuation artifacts from substitutions.
Operations:
- Collapse multiple spaces to single space
- Reduce multiple newlines to single newline
- Strip leading/trailing whitespace
Parameters
----------
text : str
Text to normalize.
Returns
-------
str
Cleaned text with consistent formatting.
Complexity
----------
Time: O(n) where n = text length
Space: O(n) for output string
"""
# Collapse multiple spaces
text = re.sub(r' +', ' ', text)
# Reduce multiple newlines (with optional whitespace) to single newline
text = re.sub(r'\n\s*\n+', '\n', text)
# Strip leading/trailing whitespace
return text.strip()
def correct(self, response_text: str, shield_result: ShieldResult) -> str:
"""
Apply all correction steps to sanitize an LLM response.
Pipeline:
1. Re-inject protected placeholder values
2. Extract authorized entities from original prompt
3. Redact unauthorized entities in response
4. Enforce FORBID/MANDATE semantic restrictions
5. Normalize whitespace and formatting
Parameters
----------
response_text : str
Raw response from the LLM to be corrected.
shield_result : ShieldResult
Result from PromptShield containing:
- placeholder_map: for re-injection
- entities: authorized entity set
- restrictions: semantic constraints to enforce
Returns
-------
str
Sanitized response respecting all TruthTable constraints.
Complexity
----------
Overall: O(n · (k + p + r)) where:
n = response length
k = number of placeholders
p = number of entity patterns
r = number of restrictions
Space: O(|E_auth| + k) for authorized entity set + placeholder cache
Example
-------
>>> corrector = ResponseCorrector()
>>> sanitized = corrector.correct(
... "The server IP is 192.168.1.1 and we use Python.",
... shield_result
... )
>>> # If 192.168.1.1 was authorized but Python was forbidden:
>>> # Output: "The server IP is 192.168.1.1 and we use [PROHIBITED]."
"""
# Stage 1: Re-inject protected placeholder values
text = self._reinject_placeholders(response_text, shield_result.placeholder_map)
# Stage 2: Build authorized entity set from original prompt
authorized_entities: Set[Tuple[str, str]] = set()
if hasattr(shield_result, 'entities'):
for entity in shield_result.entities:
authorized_entities.add((entity.entity_type, entity.value))
# Stage 3: Redact entities not in authorized set
text = self._sanitize_unauthorized_entities(text, authorized_entities)
# Stage 4: Enforce semantic restrictions (FORBID/MANDATE)
if hasattr(shield_result, 'restrictions') and shield_result.restrictions:
text = self._enforce_restrictions(text, shield_result.restrictions)
# Stage 5: Normalize whitespace and formatting
text = self._normalize_whitespace(text)
logger.debug(f"Response correction complete: {len(response_text)} → {len(text)} chars")
return text
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