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- Edit this `README.md` markdown file to author your organization card.
 
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+ license: mit
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+ short_description: 'Security admission and adversarial test corpus for local AI '
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  ---
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+ LayerFault
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+
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+ Security admission for local AI models.
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+
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+ LayerFault is an offline-first security scanner and admission layer for AI models, model packages, repositories and runtimes.
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+
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+ This Hugging Face organisation hosts the LayerFault Security Corpus, a growing adversarial test corpus for validating AI model security scanners, admission controls and model-handling pipelines.
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+
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+ These repositories are security test fixtures, not models intended for inference.
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+
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+
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+ ## LayerFault Security Corpus
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+
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+ The corpus contains deliberately synthetic, malformed and adversarial model repositories designed to reproduce security conditions that defensive tooling should detect.
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+
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+ Coverage includes:
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+
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+ - unsafe Pickle and serialization
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+ - NumPy object arrays
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+ - Safetensors structural anomalies
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+ - PyTorch and TorchScript packages
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+ - Hugging Face custom loaders and `auto_map`
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+ - tokenizer and template attacks
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+ - hidden and Unicode instructions
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+ - Python, PowerShell, JavaScript and shell capability chains
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+ - executable and native library payloads
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+ - archive and path traversal attacks
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+ - suspicious sidecars
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+ - dependency and package integrity anomalies
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+ - malformed model formats
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+ - provenance and lineage mismatches
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+ - synthetic weight anomalies and backdoor fixtures
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+ - dataset poisoning
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+ - runtime security test cases
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+
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+ The corpus is organised into Hugging Face Collections so individual security domains can be explored and tested independently.
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## Why LayerFault exists
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+
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+ A modern model repository can contain much more than weights.
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+
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+ ```text
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+ Model Repository
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+ β”œβ”€β”€ weights
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+ β”œβ”€β”€ configuration
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+ β”œβ”€β”€ tokenizer
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+ β”œβ”€β”€ templates
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+ β”œβ”€β”€ Python code
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+ β”œβ”€β”€ native libraries
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+ β”œβ”€β”€ serialized objects
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+ β”œβ”€β”€ scripts
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+ └── dependency metadata
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+ ```
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+
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+ These components can introduce conventional software security risks before a single inference request is made.
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+
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+ LayerFault places an admission boundary between acquiring a model and allowing it into an environment.
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+
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+ ```text
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+ MODEL ACQUISITION
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+ β”‚
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+ β–Ό
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+ LAYERFAULT
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+ β”‚
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+ β”œβ”€β”€ structure
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+ β”œβ”€β”€ serialization
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+ β”œβ”€β”€ package contents
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+ β”œβ”€β”€ integrity
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+ β”œβ”€β”€ provenance
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+ β”œβ”€β”€ policy
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+ └── runtime exposure
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+ β”‚
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+ β–Ό
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+ PASS / WARN / BLOCK
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+ β”‚
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+ β–Ό
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+ INFERENCE
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+ ```
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## Security Notice
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+
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+ Repositories published by this organisation may be intentionally adversarial.
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+
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+ Fixtures can contain synthetic examples of executable code, unsafe serialization constructs, malformed metadata, suspicious archive structures, malicious looking scripts or other behaviours that security tooling is expected to detect.
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+ They are intended for:
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+
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+ - defensive security research
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+ - scanner validation
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+ - regression testing
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+ - detector development
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+ - model admission research
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+
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+ Do not treat corpus repositories as production models.
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+ Do not execute arbitrary fixture contents outside an appropriately isolated testing environment.
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## Security Boundaries
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+ LayerFault can establish security properties about model artifacts, packages, provenance, runtimes and admission policy.
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+ Static inspection cannot prove that arbitrary learned weights are free from semantic backdoors, hidden triggers or malicious learned behaviour.
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+ LayerFault therefore keeps artifact security, runtime security and behavioural analysis as distinct guarantees.
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## Corpus Purpose
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+ The LayerFault Security Corpus exists to make model security testing:
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+
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+ - reproducible
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+ - comparable
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+ - regression friendly
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+ - transparent
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+ - easier to automate
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+ The corpus is designed to evolve alongside new model formats, packaging methods, runtime behaviours and attack techniques.
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+ ---
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+
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+ **Know what you are admitting. Know whether it changed. Know who attested to it. Block execution when those guarantees fail.**
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