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1413 1414 1415 1416 1417 1418 1419 1420 1421 1422 1423 1424 1425 1426 1427 1428 1429 1430 1431 1432 1433 1434 1435 1436 1437 1438 1439 1440 1441 1442 1443 1444 1445 1446 1447 1448 1449 1450 1451 1452 1453 1454 1455 1456 1457 1458 1459 1460 1461 1462 1463 1464 1465 1466 1467 1468 1469 1470 1471 1472 1473 1474 1475 1476 1477 1478 1479 1480 1481 1482 1483 1484 1485 1486 1487 1488 1489 1490 1491 1492 1493 1494 1495 1496 1497 1498 1499 1500 1501 1502 1503 1504 1505 1506 1507 1508 1509 1510 1511 1512 1513 1514 1515 1516 1517 | """FastAPI surface for SecureAgentRAG.
Run with::
uv run uvicorn interfaces.api:app --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8080
Endpoints
---------
- ``GET /healthz`` — liveness probe (no auth).
- ``GET /readyz`` — readiness — pings Qdrant + Ollama.
- ``POST /query`` — run the RAG pipeline; returns ``QueryResponse``.
- ``POST /ingest`` — ingest a local file; requires ``user`` role.
- ``GET /audit`` — read paginated audit entries; requires ``admin``.
- ``POST /audit/verify``— verify the hash-chain; requires ``admin``.
Auth uses a stateless bearer token. The token payload is a base64-encoded JSON
``UserContext`` so the API has no session store — caller provides identity on
every request. Production deployments should swap this for Keycloak/Auth0 JWT
verification (left as a hook in ``_resolve_user``).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import base64
import contextlib
import json
from datetime import date
from typing import Annotated
from config.settings import settings
from utils.auth import AuthError, issue_token, verify_token
from utils.logging import get_logger
logger = get_logger(__name__)
try:
from fastapi import Depends, FastAPI, Header, HTTPException, status
from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
_FASTAPI_AVAILABLE = True
except ImportError: # pragma: no cover
_FASTAPI_AVAILABLE = False
Depends = Header = FastAPI = HTTPException = JSONResponse = status = None # type: ignore[assignment]
if _FASTAPI_AVAILABLE:
from core.graph import run_rag_pipeline
from core.schemas import (
IngestRequestModel,
IngestResponseModel,
QueryRequest,
QueryResponse,
)
from ingestion.metadata import IngestRequest, SensitivityLevel, UserContext
from utils.audit import audit_logger
from utils.health import run_health_checks
from utils.rate_limiter import RateLimiter
rate_limiter = RateLimiter() # uses default token-bucket config
_AUTH_ERROR_STATUS: dict[str, int] = {
"missing": status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
"malformed": status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
"expired": status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
"bad_signature": status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
"bad_claims": status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
}
def _resolve_user_full(
authorization: Annotated[str | None, Header()] = None,
) -> tuple[UserContext, dict]:
"""Verify the bearer token and return (UserContext, claims).
Delegates to :func:`utils.auth.verify_token`, which uses HS256 JWT
when ``SAR_JWT_SECRET`` is set and falls back to the legacy unsigned
base64 token otherwise (with a runtime warning).
"""
if not authorization or not authorization.lower().startswith("bearer "):
raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, "missing bearer token")
token = authorization.split(" ", 1)[1]
try:
return verify_token(token)
except AuthError as exc:
code = _AUTH_ERROR_STATUS.get(exc.reason, status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED)
raise HTTPException(code, f"auth_{exc.reason}: {exc}") from exc
def _resolve_user(authorization: Annotated[str | None, Header()] = None) -> UserContext:
"""Backward-compatible dependency returning only the UserContext."""
ctx, _claims = _resolve_user_full(authorization=authorization)
return ctx
def _require_role(required: str):
def _dep(user: Annotated[UserContext, Depends(_resolve_user)]) -> UserContext:
if required not in user.roles and "admin" not in user.roles:
raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, f"role '{required}' required")
return user
return _dep
from contextlib import asynccontextmanager
@asynccontextmanager
async def _lifespan(_app: FastAPI):
"""Start background jobs on boot, stop them cleanly on shutdown.
- Periodic audit hash-chain verification (always; local-only).
- BYOK session-collection purge (only when ``byok_mode`` is on).
Both degrade gracefully when APScheduler is absent and never block
startup on failure.
"""
schedulers: list = []
bg_tasks: list = [] # keep strong refs so created tasks aren't GC'd
try:
from utils.audit_verify import schedule_audit_verification
s = schedule_audit_verification()
if s is not None:
schedulers.append(s)
except Exception as exc: # pragma: no cover - defensive
logger.error("audit_verify_schedule_failed", error=str(exc))
if settings.byok_mode:
try:
from retrieval.qdrant_client import QdrantManager
from retrieval.session_purge import schedule_session_purge
s = schedule_session_purge(QdrantManager().client)
if s is not None:
schedulers.append(s)
except Exception as exc: # pragma: no cover - defensive
logger.error("session_purge_schedule_failed", error=str(exc))
# Warm the local embedder off the request path. The first BYOK upload
# would otherwise pay the ~770 MB sentence-transformers model load
# (20-40 s on CPU Basic) inline, blowing the Vercel Edge 30 s proxy
# budget and surfacing as a spurious "upload timed out" even for tiny
# files. Loading it right after boot makes the first real upload fast.
if settings.embedding_backend == "local":
async def _warm_embedder() -> None:
try:
from retrieval.embeddings import _get_local_embedder
await asyncio.to_thread(_get_local_embedder)
logger.info("embedder_warmed_at_startup")
except Exception as exc: # pragma: no cover - defensive
logger.warning("embedder_warm_failed", error=str(exc))
with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
bg_tasks.append(asyncio.create_task(_warm_embedder()))
try:
yield
finally:
for s in schedulers:
with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
s.shutdown(wait=False)
app = FastAPI(
title="SecureAgentRAG API",
version="0.1.0",
description="Privacy-first multi-agent RAG with RBAC, guardrails, and audit chain.",
lifespan=_lifespan,
)
# Initialize Phoenix tracing if configured.
# When ``settings.byok_mode`` is on, ``setup_tracing`` short-circuits to
# False regardless of phoenix_endpoint (see utils/observability.py).
from utils.observability import setup_tracing
_tracing_enabled = setup_tracing()
if _tracing_enabled:
logger.info("phoenix_tracing_active_in_api")
# ── Prometheus metrics ───────────────────────────────────────────────
# Aggregate counters/histograms only — no prompts, completions, keys, or
# user text ever lands in a label, so this is safe to expose even under
# BYOK (unlike Phoenix tracing, which is hard-disabled above). When the
# ``[metrics]`` extra is installed we mount prometheus-fastapi-
# instrumentator for HTTP-level metrics and let it serve ``/metrics``;
# the custom RAG metrics in utils.metrics share the same default registry
# so they appear in the same exposition. Without the extra we fall back to
# a manual ``/metrics`` route that 501s until prometheus_client is present.
try:
from prometheus_fastapi_instrumentator import Instrumentator
Instrumentator(
should_group_status_codes=True,
excluded_handlers=["/metrics", "/healthz"],
).instrument(app).expose(app, endpoint="/metrics", include_in_schema=False)
logger.info("prometheus_metrics_enabled", mode="instrumentator")
except ImportError:
from fastapi import Response
from utils.metrics import render_latest
@app.get("/metrics", include_in_schema=False, tags=["ops"])
async def metrics() -> Response:
try:
payload, content_type = render_latest()
except RuntimeError:
return Response(
"prometheus_client not installed; install the [metrics] extra",
status_code=status.HTTP_501_NOT_IMPLEMENTED,
media_type="text/plain",
)
return Response(payload, media_type=content_type)
logger.info("prometheus_metrics_enabled", mode="manual_fallback")
# ── BYOK CORS middleware ─────────────────────────────────────────────
# Only mount CORS when:
# 1) BYOK mode is on (public demo path), AND
# 2) an explicit allowlist is configured via SAR_CORS_ALLOW_ORIGINS.
# Empty allowlist + BYOK = wildcard would be a footgun (CSRF surface).
# Empty allowlist + dev = no CORS needed (local same-origin).
if settings.byok_mode and settings.cors_allow_origins:
from fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware
app.add_middleware(
CORSMiddleware,
allow_origins=list(settings.cors_allow_origins),
allow_credentials=False, # BYOK never uses cookies
allow_methods=["GET", "POST", "OPTIONS"],
allow_headers=["*"],
)
logger.info("byok_cors_enabled", origins=list(settings.cors_allow_origins))
@app.get("/healthz", tags=["ops"])
async def healthz() -> dict[str, str]:
return {"status": "ok"}
@app.get("/readyz", tags=["ops"])
async def readyz() -> JSONResponse:
# In BYOK production mode the deploy has no local Ollama -- pinging
# it would always fail and the cron keepalive would mistake the
# Space for down. Skip Ollama; ping Groq /models with the owner key
# instead (when configured). Postgres + Redis remain optional.
if settings.byok_mode:
report = await run_health_checks(include_ollama=False)
# Optionally surface Groq reachability when an owner key is set.
if settings.groq_api_key:
import time
from utils.health import HealthStatus
t0 = time.perf_counter()
try:
import httpx
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=5.0) as client:
r = await client.get(
f"{settings.groq_api_base}/models",
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {settings.groq_api_key}"},
)
latency_ms = (time.perf_counter() - t0) * 1000
if r.status_code == 200:
report.services.append(
HealthStatus(
name="groq",
healthy=True,
latency_ms=latency_ms,
message="Owner key reachable.",
optional=True,
)
)
else:
report.services.append(
HealthStatus(
name="groq",
healthy=False,
latency_ms=latency_ms,
message=f"HTTP {r.status_code}",
optional=True,
)
)
except Exception as exc:
latency_ms = (time.perf_counter() - t0) * 1000
report.services.append(
HealthStatus(
name="groq",
healthy=False,
latency_ms=latency_ms,
message=f"Connection failed: {exc!s}",
optional=True,
)
)
code = 200 if report.overall_healthy else 503
return JSONResponse(report.to_dict(), status_code=code)
report = await run_health_checks()
code = 200 if report.overall_healthy else 503
return JSONResponse(report.to_dict(), status_code=code)
# ── BYOK demo endpoint ───────────────────────────────────────────────
# Mounted only when ``settings.byok_mode`` is on. Bypasses JWT auth and
# uses per-request BYOK credentials instead. Isolation is enforced via
# session-scoped Qdrant collections, not JWT identity.
if settings.byok_mode:
from inference.byok_context import (
ByokRuntime,
reset_byok_runtime,
set_byok_runtime,
)
from interfaces.byok import ByokCreds, client_ip_from_request, extract_byok
from utils.rate_limiter import get_owner_key_throttle
def _byok_runtime_for(creds: ByokCreds) -> ByokRuntime | None:
"""Build the per-request BYOK runtime from creds, or None.
Only returns a runtime when the visitor brought usable creds — so
the visitor's own key powers the call. Otherwise None and the
pipeline routes through the owner's cached clients (throttled).
"""
if not creds.byok_active():
return None
return ByokRuntime(
provider=creds.safe_provider(),
user_key=creds.user_key,
ollama_url=creds.ollama_url,
)
# All demo personas share ``org_id="demo"`` so they query the same
# ingested corpus. RBAC differentiation is enforced via clearance
# level + roles at the payload-filter layer -- exactly the production
# invariant we want to demonstrate.
_DEMO_ORG_ID = "demo"
# Sensitivity levels are LOW=1, MEDIUM=2, HIGH=3 (see
# ``ingestion/metadata.py::sensitivity_to_int``). Clearance levels must
# be in the same range so the Qdrant range filter passes the right
# chunks. Engineer < Compliance == Executive, but executive carries
# a wider role set (sees both engineering + compliance content).
# ``style`` is a short tone hint injected into the synthesizer's
# system prompt so the three demo personas produce visibly distinct
# answers from the same retrieved chunks.
_DEMO_PERSONAS: dict[str, dict] = {
"engineer": {
"clearance_level": 2,
"roles": ["engineering"],
"style": (
"Write for a senior engineer. Use precise technical language, "
"name the underlying mechanism, and prefer concrete code "
"snippets or commands over abstract description. Skip the "
"executive summary -- this reader wants the wire-level detail."
),
},
"compliance": {
"clearance_level": 3,
"roles": ["compliance", "legal"],
"style": (
"Write for a compliance / legal reviewer. Foreground the "
"regulatory citations, control IDs, and risk vocabulary. "
"Highlight gaps and required attestations. Hedge claims that "
"are not directly supported by an authoritative source."
),
},
"executive": {
"clearance_level": 3,
"roles": ["executive", "compliance", "engineering"],
"style": (
"Write for a busy executive. Lead with the bottom line in "
"two sentences. Quantify impact in dollars / risk percentage / "
"headcount where the source supports it. Skip implementation "
"detail unless it changes the decision."
),
},
}
def _persona_to_user_ctx(creds: ByokCreds) -> UserContext:
"""Translate ``creds.demo_persona`` into a synthetic UserContext.
Unknown / missing persona → minimal read-only profile so the demo
still answers but cannot escalate beyond the lowest clearance.
"""
preset = _DEMO_PERSONAS.get((creds.demo_persona or "").lower())
if preset is None:
preset = {"clearance_level": 1, "roles": ["viewer"], "style": ""}
return UserContext(
user_id=f"demo-{creds.session_id}",
org_id=_DEMO_ORG_ID,
clearance_level=preset["clearance_level"],
roles=preset["roles"],
)
def _persona_style(creds: ByokCreds) -> str:
preset = _DEMO_PERSONAS.get((creds.demo_persona or "").lower())
return (preset or {}).get("style", "") if preset else ""
# ── Public demo metadata endpoints (no auth, no BYOK key needed) ──
# Lightweight read-only endpoints that power the public corpus +
# personas + status pages in the frontend. They expose only
# metadata that is already implied by the demo (filename, roles,
# sensitivity, chunk counts) -- nothing that could leak content.
@app.get("/byok/personas", tags=["byok"])
async def byok_personas() -> dict:
"""Return the three preset RBAC personas + their synth styles.
Single source of truth for the frontend ``/personas`` page so
the UI never drifts from the actual server-side dispatch in
``_persona_to_user_ctx``.
"""
return {
"items": [
{
"key": key,
"label": key.capitalize(),
"clearance_level": preset["clearance_level"],
"roles": list(preset["roles"]),
"style": preset["style"],
}
for key, preset in _DEMO_PERSONAS.items()
],
"default": "engineer",
"org_id": _DEMO_ORG_ID,
}
@app.get("/byok/corpus", tags=["byok"])
async def byok_corpus() -> dict:
"""Summarise the base demo corpus -- source files + metadata.
Scrolls the root tenant Qdrant collection (the hand-curated demo
docs — English RBAC + Arabic Egypt) and groups points by
``source_file``. Returns one
row per file with the chunk count, sensitivity label, and
roles -- never the chunk text. Visitor uploads under
``documents_sess_<sid>`` are NOT included (those live in the
session collection and are surfaced via ``/byok/uploads``).
"""
from core.agents.retriever import _get_hybrid_searcher
files: dict[str, dict] = {}
# Bound before the try so the response can always report the real
# store even if the scroll fails early.
collection = settings.qdrant_collection
try:
searcher = _get_hybrid_searcher()
# The root manager (``for_org`` of the demo org) points at
# the base demo collection. Multi-tenant mode wraps the
# name as ``documents_demo``.
qdrant = searcher._qdrant.for_org(_DEMO_ORG_ID) # type: ignore[attr-defined]
client = qdrant.client
collection = qdrant.collection_name
next_offset = None
pages = 0
# Scroll the whole collection in pages of 256. The Arabic
# flagship corpus keeps growing, so a fixed page cap would
# silently truncate the corpus page. Loop until the cursor is
# exhausted; the 64-page ceiling (16k chunks) is a runaway
# guard only.
while pages < 64:
points, next_offset = client.scroll(
collection_name=collection,
limit=256,
with_payload=True,
with_vectors=False,
offset=next_offset,
)
for p in points:
payload = p.payload or {}
src = payload.get("source_file") or "unknown"
base_name = src.split("/")[-1].split("\\")[-1]
roles = payload.get("roles") or []
sensitivity = payload.get("sensitivity_level") or "low"
item = files.setdefault(
src,
{
"source_file": base_name,
"chunks": 0,
"sensitivity_level": sensitivity,
"roles": list(roles),
},
)
item["chunks"] += 1
# Roles can vary across chunks of the same file in
# principle; union them so the visitor sees the
# widest access required to retrieve the file.
for r in roles:
if r not in item["roles"]:
item["roles"].append(r)
pages += 1
if not next_offset:
break
except Exception as exc:
logger.warning("byok_corpus_list_failed", error=str(exc))
sorted_items = sorted(files.values(), key=lambda f: f["source_file"].lower())
return {
# Report the real collection name (``documents`` in the default
# demo, ``documents_demo`` under multi-tenant mode) instead of a
# hardcoded literal so the corpus page never misreports the store.
"collection": collection,
"count": len(sorted_items),
"total_chunks": sum(f["chunks"] for f in sorted_items),
"items": sorted_items,
}
@app.get("/byok/stats", tags=["byok"])
async def byok_stats() -> dict:
"""Public, no-auth aggregate stats for the landing page.
Two kinds of number, surfaced honestly:
- **eval** — the rolling Ragas baseline shipped in
``evaluation/baseline.json`` (durable, committed in the repo).
This is "proof, not claims": the demo's measured groundedness.
- **live activity** — queries answered + documents grounded read
from the audit log present on *this* instance. The HF Space
writes audit JSONL to ephemeral ``/tmp``, so these reset when the
Space sleeps/restarts; the frontend labels them "since the demo
last woke" rather than implying an all-time total.
No PII, no chunk text, no keys — safe to expose anonymously.
"""
eval_block: dict = {}
try:
import json as _json
from pathlib import Path as _Path
base = _Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "evaluation" / "baseline.json"
if base.exists():
data = _json.loads(base.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
eval_block = {
"faithfulness": data.get("faithfulness"),
"context_precision": data.get("context_precision"),
"answer_relevancy": data.get("answer_relevancy"),
"calibrated_at": data.get("_calibrated_at"),
}
except Exception as exc:
logger.warning("byok_stats_eval_read_failed", error=str(exc))
queries_answered = 0
docs_grounded = 0
try:
from datetime import timedelta
end = date.today()
start = end - timedelta(days=30)
entries = audit_logger.get_entries(
start_date=start.isoformat(),
end_date=end.isoformat(),
action="query",
)
for e in entries:
md = e.metadata or {}
# Uploads also write action="query" rows; exclude them so
# the counter reflects answered questions only.
if md.get("action_hint") == "upload":
continue
if e.status == "success":
queries_answered += 1
docs_grounded += int(md.get("documents_used", 0) or 0)
except Exception as exc:
logger.warning("byok_stats_audit_read_failed", error=str(exc))
return {
"queries_answered": queries_answered,
"docs_grounded": docs_grounded,
"eval": eval_block,
}
from pydantic import BaseModel as _ByokBaseModel
class _ByokChatBody(_ByokBaseModel):
"""Public-demo chat payload — no auth fields, only the question text."""
query: str
prefer_cloud: bool = True
# Runtime import — FastAPI dependency injection reads the annotation
# at request time, so this must NOT be a TYPE_CHECKING-only import.
from fastapi import Request as _FastApiRequest
@app.post("/byok/chat", tags=["byok"])
async def byok_chat_endpoint(
request: _FastApiRequest,
body: _ByokChatBody,
creds: Annotated[ByokCreds, Depends(extract_byok)],
) -> dict:
"""Public-demo chat endpoint backed by BYOK credentials.
Routing:
- Visitor brought a key (``creds.has_user_key()``): pipeline uses
the visitor's provider + key. No throttle.
- Visitor did NOT bring a key: pipeline falls back to the owner's
configured cloud provider key, gated by ``OwnerKeyHourThrottle``.
When exhausted, returns 429 with copy nudging BYOK.
Persona maps to a synthetic ``UserContext`` so the existing RBAC
filter still runs end-to-end — same code path as authenticated
queries, just with demo identities.
"""
# Only a visitor with *usable* BYOK creds bypasses the throttle —
# and that same key now actually powers the call (see the BYOK
# runtime below). A bare/junk key with no usable provider no longer
# skips the throttle while spending the owner key.
if not creds.byok_active():
throttle = get_owner_key_throttle()
client_ip = client_ip_from_request(request)
ok, meta = throttle.allow(client_ip)
if not ok:
raise HTTPException(
status.HTTP_429_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
detail={
"reason": meta["reason"],
"retry_after_seconds": meta["retry_after"],
"hint": (
"Owner-key fallback exhausted for this IP. "
"Paste your own LLM key to continue — your key "
"is never stored server-side."
),
},
)
user_ctx = _persona_to_user_ctx(creds)
import time as _t
_t0 = _t.perf_counter()
# Bind the visitor's key/provider for THIS request so the inference
# router builds a per-request client from it. The ContextVar
# propagates into run_rag_pipeline and every LangGraph node/LLM call;
# reset in finally so it never leaks to the next request.
_byok_tok = set_byok_runtime(_byok_runtime_for(creds))
try:
state = await run_rag_pipeline(
query=body.query,
user_context=user_ctx,
thread_id=f"byok-{creds.session_id}",
prefer_cloud=body.prefer_cloud,
# Visitor's chosen provider when present; falls back to env.
override_provider=creds.safe_provider(),
persona_style=_persona_style(creds),
byok_session_id=creds.session_id,
)
finally:
reset_byok_runtime(_byok_tok)
elapsed_ms = (_t.perf_counter() - _t0) * 1000
response = QueryResponse.from_state(state)
# Persist a single audit-log row so /byok/audit can surface the
# session's history. utils.pii.redact strips key shapes from the
# query/answer before write.
try:
audit_logger.log_query(
user_id=user_ctx.user_id,
org_id=user_ctx.org_id,
query=body.query,
response_summary=(response.answer or "")[:200],
sensitivity=state.get("query_sensitivity", "low"),
status="blocked" if response.blocked else "success",
latency_ms=elapsed_ms,
persona=creds.demo_persona or "anonymous",
byok_used=creds.has_user_key(),
synth_provider=response.provenance.provider,
synth_model=response.provenance.model,
faithfulness_ratio=state.get("faithfulness_ratio", 1.0),
documents_used=len(state.get("relevant_documents", [])),
)
except Exception as exc: # pragma: no cover -- defensive
logger.exception("byok_audit_persist_failed", error=str(exc))
return {
"session_id": creds.session_id,
"persona": creds.demo_persona or "anonymous",
"byok_used": creds.has_user_key(),
"response": response.model_dump(mode="json"),
# Extra payload surfaced for the new frontend UX -- raw audit
# trail of nodes executed (used for the "trace pills" strip)
# and the rewriter's output if the rewriter fired.
"trace": [
{k: v for k, v in entry.items() if k in {"node", "action"}}
for entry in state.get("audit_trail", [])
],
"rewritten_query": state.get("rewritten_query", ""),
"query_sensitivity": state.get("query_sensitivity", "low"),
"faithfulness_ratio": float(state.get("faithfulness_ratio", 1.0)),
"documents_seen_total": len(state.get("documents", [])),
"documents_used_total": len(state.get("relevant_documents", [])),
}
# ── BYOK streaming endpoint (SSE) ────────────────────────────────
from fastapi.responses import StreamingResponse as _StreamingResponse
from core.graph import run_rag_pipeline_stream
@app.post("/byok/chat/stream", tags=["byok"])
async def byok_chat_stream_endpoint(
request: _FastApiRequest,
body: _ByokChatBody,
creds: Annotated[ByokCreds, Depends(extract_byok)],
):
"""Server-Sent Events variant of ``/byok/chat``.
Emits ``event: <type>\\ndata: <json>\\n\\n`` frames mirroring the
event dicts produced by ``run_rag_pipeline_stream``:
- ``phase`` — graph node fired (with merged state snapshot)
- ``token`` — synthesizer streaming token
- ``blocked`` — guardrails / security / timeout refusal
- ``final`` — last state + total latency
CORS is already mounted on the app when ``byok_mode`` is on.
"""
if not creds.byok_active():
throttle = get_owner_key_throttle()
client_ip = client_ip_from_request(request)
ok, meta = throttle.allow(client_ip)
if not ok:
raise HTTPException(
status.HTTP_429_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
detail={
"reason": meta["reason"],
"retry_after_seconds": meta["retry_after"],
"hint": (
"Owner-key fallback exhausted for this IP. "
"Paste your own LLM key to continue — your key "
"is never stored server-side."
),
},
)
user_ctx = _persona_to_user_ctx(creds)
async def _gen():
import time as _t
_t0 = _t.perf_counter()
# Bind the visitor's key/provider for the lifetime of this
# stream so the synthesizer's streaming LLM call uses it.
_byok_tok = set_byok_runtime(_byok_runtime_for(creds))
# Replay the session_id up front so the client can stitch
# token deltas to a known turn without waiting for `final`.
yield (
"event: open\n"
f"data: {json.dumps({'session_id': creds.session_id, 'persona': creds.demo_persona or 'anonymous', 'byok_used': creds.has_user_key()})}\n\n"
)
final_state: dict | None = None
try:
async for evt in run_rag_pipeline_stream(
query=body.query,
user_context=user_ctx,
thread_id=f"byok-{creds.session_id}",
prefer_cloud=body.prefer_cloud,
override_provider=creds.safe_provider(),
persona_style=_persona_style(creds),
byok_session_id=creds.session_id,
):
etype = evt.get("type", "unknown")
# Reshape the heavy phase/final payload -- raw GraphState
# is large; the frontend only needs the public-facing
# bits. token frames pass through verbatim.
if etype == "token":
payload = {"text": evt.get("text", "")}
elif etype in ("phase", "blocked", "final"):
st = evt.get("state", {}) or {}
if etype == "final":
final_state = st
payload = {
"name": evt.get("name", ""),
"message": evt.get("message", ""),
"latency_ms": evt.get("latency_ms", 0.0),
"rewritten_query": st.get("rewritten_query", ""),
"query_sensitivity": st.get("query_sensitivity", "low"),
"guardrails_passed": st.get("guardrails_passed", True),
"security_passed": st.get("security_passed", True),
"documents_seen_total": len(st.get("documents", [])),
"documents_used_total": len(st.get("relevant_documents", [])),
"faithfulness_ratio": float(st.get("faithfulness_ratio", 1.0)),
"confidence_score": float(st.get("confidence_score", 0.0)),
"synth_provider": st.get("synth_provider", ""),
"synth_model": st.get("synth_model", ""),
"synth_latency_ms": float(st.get("synth_latency_ms", 0.0)),
"trace": [
{k: v for k, v in e.items() if k in {"node", "action"}}
for e in st.get("audit_trail", [])
],
}
if etype == "final":
# Include the full QueryResponse shape so the
# frontend reaches parity with the non-stream
# endpoint (citations + provenance + blocked).
payload["response"] = QueryResponse.from_state(st).model_dump(
mode="json"
)
else:
payload = evt
yield f"event: {etype}\ndata: {json.dumps(payload)}\n\n"
except Exception as exc: # pragma: no cover -- defensive
logger.exception("byok_stream_failed", error=str(exc))
yield (f"event: error\ndata: {json.dumps({'message': 'stream_failed'})}\n\n")
finally:
# Always clear the per-request BYOK runtime so it never
# leaks into the next request handled by this worker.
reset_byok_runtime(_byok_tok)
# Persist audit row at the end of the stream so /byok/audit
# surfaces the session's history even when the visitor
# disconnects before the final frame.
if final_state is not None:
elapsed_ms = (_t.perf_counter() - _t0) * 1000
resp = QueryResponse.from_state(final_state)
try:
audit_logger.log_query(
user_id=user_ctx.user_id,
org_id=user_ctx.org_id,
query=body.query,
response_summary=(resp.answer or "")[:200],
sensitivity=final_state.get("query_sensitivity", "low"),
status="blocked" if resp.blocked else "success",
latency_ms=elapsed_ms,
persona=creds.demo_persona or "anonymous",
byok_used=creds.has_user_key(),
synth_provider=resp.provenance.provider,
synth_model=resp.provenance.model,
faithfulness_ratio=final_state.get("faithfulness_ratio", 1.0),
documents_used=len(final_state.get("relevant_documents", [])),
stream=True,
)
except Exception as exc: # pragma: no cover
logger.exception("byok_stream_audit_persist_failed", error=str(exc))
return _StreamingResponse(
_gen(),
media_type="text/event-stream",
headers={
"Cache-Control": "no-cache, no-transform",
"X-Accel-Buffering": "no",
"Connection": "keep-alive",
},
)
# ── BYOK public audit export ─────────────────────────────────────
@app.get("/byok/audit", tags=["byok"])
async def byok_audit_endpoint(
request: _FastApiRequest,
creds: Annotated[ByokCreds, Depends(extract_byok)],
) -> dict:
"""Return the last N PII-redacted audit entries for this demo.
Public, session-scoped, capped by ``settings.byok_audit_max_entries``.
The audit log file is shared across sessions inside the HF Space --
we filter by the visitor's demo user_id (``demo-<session_id>``) so
visitors only see their own turns.
"""
limit = max(0, int(settings.byok_audit_max_entries))
if limit == 0:
raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, detail="audit export disabled")
today = date.today().isoformat()
entries = audit_logger.get_entries(
start_date=today,
end_date=today,
user_id=f"demo-{creds.session_id}",
)
# Newest first, then cap.
entries = list(reversed(entries))[:limit]
return {
"session_id": creds.session_id,
"count": len(entries),
"items": [e.model_dump(mode="json") for e in entries],
}
# ── BYOK answer feedback (👍/👎 → hash-chained audit row) ─────────
class _ByokFeedbackBody(_ByokBaseModel):
"""Public-demo feedback payload — a rating on the last answer."""
rating: str
query: str = ""
answer_summary: str = ""
@app.post("/byok/feedback", tags=["byok"])
async def byok_feedback_endpoint(
request: _FastApiRequest,
body: _ByokFeedbackBody,
creds: Annotated[ByokCreds, Depends(extract_byok)],
) -> dict:
"""Record a thumbs-up/down on an answer as a session-scoped audit row.
The rating lands on the same SHA-256 hash chain as every query, so it
is itself tamper-evident and shows up in ``/byok/audit``. No LLM call,
no throttle — it is a cheap write.
"""
rating = (body.rating or "").strip().lower()
if rating not in ("up", "down"):
raise HTTPException(
status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
detail={"reason": "rating must be 'up' or 'down'"},
)
try:
audit_logger.log_feedback(
user_id=f"demo-{creds.session_id}",
org_id=_DEMO_ORG_ID,
rating=rating,
query=body.query,
answer_summary=(body.answer_summary or "")[:200],
persona=creds.demo_persona or "anonymous",
)
except Exception as exc: # pragma: no cover -- defensive
logger.warning("byok_feedback_persist_failed", error=str(exc))
return {"session_id": creds.session_id, "rating": rating, "recorded": True}
# ── BYOK upload endpoints ────────────────────────────────────────
from fastapi import File, UploadFile
from qdrant_client.models import FieldCondition, Filter, MatchValue
from core.agents.retriever import _get_hybrid_searcher
from ingestion.metadata import IngestRequest, SensitivityLevel
from ingestion.pipeline import IngestionPipeline
def _session_qdrant_for_creds(creds: ByokCreds):
"""Return a QdrantManager bound to the visitor's session collection."""
searcher = _get_hybrid_searcher()
return searcher._qdrant.for_session(creds.session_id) # type: ignore[attr-defined]
def _list_session_uploads(creds: ByokCreds) -> list[dict]:
"""Group session-collection points by `source_file` -> upload rows."""
qdrant = _session_qdrant_for_creds(creds)
client = qdrant.client
collection = qdrant.collection_name
files: dict[str, dict] = {}
try:
# Single scroll; the cap is 5 files * O(low chunks) so a single
# page covers it. Limit at 1000 points is defensive only.
points, _next = client.scroll(
collection_name=collection,
limit=1000,
with_payload=True,
with_vectors=False,
)
for p in points:
payload = p.payload or {}
# Skip the purge sentinel point — it carries no source_file
# and must never appear as a phantom upload row.
if payload.get("__sentinel__"):
continue
src = payload.get("source_file") or ""
# Reduce absolute paths down to a basename + sha so the
# visitor sees the filename they uploaded, not the
# container's tmp path.
base_name = src.split("/")[-1].split("\\")[-1]
item = files.setdefault(
src,
{
"file_id": payload.get("source_file_id", base_name),
"filename": base_name,
"source_file": src,
"chunks": 0,
"first_ingested": payload.get("ingested_at"),
},
)
item["chunks"] += 1
except Exception as exc:
logger.warning("byok_uploads_list_failed", error=str(exc))
return list(files.values())
@app.get("/byok/uploads", tags=["byok"])
async def byok_uploads_list(
request: _FastApiRequest,
creds: Annotated[ByokCreds, Depends(extract_byok)],
) -> dict:
uploads = _list_session_uploads(creds)
return {
"session_id": creds.session_id,
"count": len(uploads),
"max_files": settings.byok_upload_max_files,
"max_bytes": settings.byok_upload_max_bytes,
"max_chunks_per_file": settings.byok_upload_max_chunks_per_file,
"allowed_extensions": list(settings.byok_upload_allowed_extensions),
"items": uploads,
}
@app.post("/byok/uploads", tags=["byok"])
async def byok_uploads_ingest(
request: _FastApiRequest,
file: Annotated[UploadFile, File(...)],
creds: Annotated[ByokCreds, Depends(extract_byok)],
) -> dict:
"""Accept a multipart upload from the BYOK visitor.
The file is parsed by the existing ``ingestion.pipeline``, chunked,
embedded, and upserted into the visitor's session-scoped Qdrant
collection (``documents_sess_<sid>``). Visitor uploads are tagged
``org_id="demo"`` + roles=["viewer", ...all personas] +
sensitivity_level=LOW so every demo persona can see them; the
visitor's session collection is the isolation boundary.
"""
# ── 1. Validate ext + size ──────────────────────────────────
filename = file.filename or "upload"
ext = ("." + filename.rsplit(".", 1)[-1].lower()) if "." in filename else ""
allowed = {e.lower() for e in settings.byok_upload_allowed_extensions}
if ext not in allowed:
raise HTTPException(
status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
detail={
"reason": "unsupported_extension",
"extension": ext,
"allowed": sorted(allowed),
},
)
# Read with a hard cap; abort on first byte over the limit.
max_bytes = int(settings.byok_upload_max_bytes)
buf = bytearray()
while True:
chunk = await file.read(64 * 1024)
if not chunk:
break
buf.extend(chunk)
if len(buf) > max_bytes:
raise HTTPException(
status.HTTP_413_CONTENT_TOO_LARGE,
detail={
"reason": "file_too_large",
"limit_bytes": max_bytes,
},
)
if len(buf) == 0:
raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, detail={"reason": "empty_file"})
# ── 2. Enforce per-session file-count cap ───────────────────
existing = _list_session_uploads(creds)
if len(existing) >= int(settings.byok_upload_max_files):
raise HTTPException(
status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT,
detail={
"reason": "upload_quota_exceeded",
"max_files": settings.byok_upload_max_files,
"hint": "Delete an existing upload first.",
},
)
# ── 3. Spool to temp file -- the ingestion pipeline reads from disk.
import os as _os
import tempfile as _tempfile
import uuid as _uuid
from datetime import UTC as _UTC
from datetime import datetime as _datetime
file_id = _uuid.uuid4().hex
safe_name = (
"".join(c if (c.isalnum() or c in "._-") else "_" for c in filename) or "upload"
)
tmp_dir = _tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=f"byok_{creds.session_id}_")
tmp_path = _os.path.join(tmp_dir, safe_name)
try:
with open(tmp_path, "wb") as fh:
fh.write(bytes(buf))
# ── 4. Build session-scoped pipeline + ingest ───────────
searcher = _get_hybrid_searcher()
sess_qdrant = searcher._qdrant.for_session(creds.session_id) # type: ignore[attr-defined]
pipeline = IngestionPipeline(
qdrant_manager=sess_qdrant,
embedding_service=searcher._embedder, # type: ignore[attr-defined]
sparse_service=searcher._sparse, # type: ignore[attr-defined]
)
req = IngestRequest(
file_path=tmp_path,
user_id=f"demo-{creds.session_id}",
org_id=_DEMO_ORG_ID,
sensitivity_level=SensitivityLevel.LOW,
# Visible to every demo persona inside the visitor's session.
roles=[
"viewer",
"engineering",
"compliance",
"legal",
"executive",
],
)
result = await pipeline.ingest_document(req)
# Reject documents that chunk too aggressively. Without this
# cap a 100-page PDF dominates the dual-collection retrieval
# and the grader/faithfulness loop times out under the 180 s
# SLO. Delete what we just upserted and return 413 so the
# visitor knows exactly what failed.
max_chunks = int(settings.byok_upload_max_chunks_per_file)
if max_chunks > 0 and result.num_chunks > max_chunks:
try:
if result.point_ids:
sess_qdrant.client.delete(
collection_name=sess_qdrant.collection_name,
points_selector=list(result.point_ids),
)
except Exception as exc:
logger.warning(
"byok_upload_oversize_cleanup_failed",
error=str(exc),
chunks=result.num_chunks,
)
raise HTTPException(
status.HTTP_413_CONTENT_TOO_LARGE,
detail={
"reason": "too_many_chunks",
"chunk_count": result.num_chunks,
"max_chunks": max_chunks,
"hint": (
f"This file chunks to {result.num_chunks} pieces "
f"but the BYOK demo caps single uploads at {max_chunks}. "
"Try a shorter document or a section instead."
),
},
)
# Ingestion produced nothing usable (loader/parse failure, or a
# file with no extractable text). Returning 200 with
# status="failed" looked like success to the client and the file
# silently never appeared. Surface it as a 422 so the UI shows a
# real, immediate error instead of waiting on a phantom upload.
if result.status == "failed" or not result.point_ids:
raise HTTPException(
status.HTTP_422_UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY,
detail={
"reason": "ingestion_failed",
"errors": result.errors or ["No extractable text in the file."],
"hint": (
"Could not extract text from this file. Scanned PDFs "
"without a text layer and empty files won't ingest — "
"try a text-based .txt, .md, or .pdf."
),
},
)
# Tag every newly-upserted chunk with the file_id + ingested_at
# so the list and delete endpoints can group by file.
if result.point_ids:
try:
sess_qdrant.client.set_payload(
collection_name=sess_qdrant.collection_name,
payload={
"source_file_id": file_id,
"ingested_at": _datetime.now(_UTC).isoformat(),
"original_filename": safe_name,
},
points=list(result.point_ids),
)
except Exception as exc:
logger.warning("byok_upload_set_payload_failed", error=str(exc))
# ── 5. Audit ────────────────────────────────────────────
try:
audit_logger.log_query(
user_id=f"demo-{creds.session_id}",
org_id=_DEMO_ORG_ID,
query=f"[upload] {safe_name}",
response_summary=(
f"ingested {result.num_chunks} chunks from {len(buf)} bytes"
),
sensitivity="low",
status=result.status,
latency_ms=result.processing_time_seconds * 1000,
action_hint="upload",
file_id=file_id,
filename=safe_name,
chunks=result.num_chunks,
)
except Exception as exc:
logger.warning("byok_upload_audit_failed", error=str(exc))
return {
"session_id": creds.session_id,
"file_id": file_id,
"filename": safe_name,
"status": result.status,
"chunks": result.num_chunks,
"errors": result.errors,
"processing_time_seconds": result.processing_time_seconds,
}
finally:
# Always purge the temp file -- visitor content never lingers on disk.
try:
_os.remove(tmp_path)
_os.rmdir(tmp_dir)
except OSError:
pass
@app.delete("/byok/uploads/{file_id}", tags=["byok"])
async def byok_uploads_delete(
request: _FastApiRequest,
file_id: str,
creds: Annotated[ByokCreds, Depends(extract_byok)],
) -> dict:
qdrant = _session_qdrant_for_creds(creds)
client = qdrant.client
collection = qdrant.collection_name
flt = Filter(
must=[FieldCondition(key="source_file_id", match=MatchValue(value=file_id))]
)
try:
# Count before delete so we can report what was dropped.
count_resp = client.count(collection_name=collection, count_filter=flt, exact=True)
deleted = int(getattr(count_resp, "count", 0))
client.delete(collection_name=collection, points_selector=flt)
except Exception as exc:
raise HTTPException(
status.HTTP_500_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
detail=f"delete_failed: {exc!s}",
) from exc
return {
"session_id": creds.session_id,
"file_id": file_id,
"deleted_chunks": deleted,
}
# ── BYOK extraction mode (doc -> structured JSON) ────────────────
# The platform's second face next to RAG Q&A: upload a document + a
# field schema, get back one validated JSON object. No retrieval, no
# vector DB — parse -> one json_mode LLM call -> validate. Reuses the
# inference router (visitor's BYOK key powers it; sensitivity routing
# applies) and lands on the same audit chain. See ADR-041 / Tier X.
from fastapi import Form
@app.post("/byok/extract", tags=["byok"])
async def byok_extract(
request: _FastApiRequest,
file: Annotated[UploadFile, File(...)],
fields: Annotated[str, Form(...)],
creds: Annotated[ByokCreds, Depends(extract_byok)],
) -> dict:
"""Extract a caller-defined field schema from an uploaded document.
``fields`` is a JSON string: ``[{"name","type","description"}, ...]``.
Returns ``{fields: {...}, model, provider, latency_ms}``. Same
throttle / BYOK-runtime contract as ``/byok/chat``.
"""
from core.extraction import extract_fields, normalise_fields
# Parse + validate the schema first (cheap, fail fast).
try:
raw_fields = json.loads(fields)
if not isinstance(raw_fields, list):
raise ValueError("fields must be a JSON array")
schema = normalise_fields(raw_fields)
except (json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError) as exc:
raise HTTPException(
status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
detail={"reason": "bad_schema", "error": str(exc)},
) from exc
# Throttle owner-key fallback exactly like chat.
if not creds.byok_active():
throttle = get_owner_key_throttle()
ok, meta = throttle.allow(client_ip_from_request(request))
if not ok:
raise HTTPException(
status.HTTP_429_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
detail={
"reason": meta["reason"],
"retry_after_seconds": meta["retry_after"],
"hint": (
"Owner-key fallback exhausted for this IP. Paste "
"your own LLM key to continue — never stored."
),
},
)
# Validate ext + size (mirror the upload caps).
filename = file.filename or "upload"
ext = ("." + filename.rsplit(".", 1)[-1].lower()) if "." in filename else ""
allowed = {e.lower() for e in settings.byok_upload_allowed_extensions}
if ext not in allowed:
raise HTTPException(
status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
detail={"reason": "unsupported_extension", "allowed": sorted(allowed)},
)
max_bytes = int(settings.byok_upload_max_bytes)
buf = bytearray()
while True:
chunk = await file.read(64 * 1024)
if not chunk:
break
buf.extend(chunk)
if len(buf) > max_bytes:
raise HTTPException(
status.HTTP_413_CONTENT_TOO_LARGE,
detail={"reason": "file_too_large", "limit_bytes": max_bytes},
)
if not buf:
raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, detail={"reason": "empty_file"})
# Spool + parse to text via the existing loaders.
import os as _os
import tempfile as _tempfile
from ingestion.loaders import load_document
safe_name = (
"".join(c if (c.isalnum() or c in "._-") else "_" for c in filename) or "upload"
)
tmp_dir = _tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=f"byok_extract_{creds.session_id}_")
tmp_path = _os.path.join(tmp_dir, safe_name)
_t0 = __import__("time").perf_counter()
try:
with open(tmp_path, "wb") as fh:
fh.write(bytes(buf))
try:
docs = await asyncio.to_thread(load_document, tmp_path)
except Exception as exc:
raise HTTPException(
status.HTTP_422_UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY,
detail={"reason": "parse_failed", "error": str(exc)},
) from exc
text = "\n\n".join(d.text for d in docs if d.text).strip()
if not text:
raise HTTPException(
status.HTTP_422_UNPROCESSABLE_ENTITY,
detail={
"reason": "no_text",
"hint": "No extractable text (scanned image PDFs need OCR).",
},
)
_byok_tok = set_byok_runtime(_byok_runtime_for(creds))
try:
result = await extract_fields(
text, schema, prefer_cloud=True, sensitivity_level="low"
)
finally:
reset_byok_runtime(_byok_tok)
finally:
try:
_os.remove(tmp_path)
_os.rmdir(tmp_dir)
except OSError:
pass
elapsed_ms = (__import__("time").perf_counter() - _t0) * 1000
try:
audit_logger.log_query(
user_id=f"demo-{creds.session_id}",
org_id=_DEMO_ORG_ID,
query=f"[extract] {safe_name} ({len(schema)} fields)",
response_summary=f"extracted {len(result['fields'])} fields",
sensitivity="low",
status="success",
latency_ms=elapsed_ms,
action_hint="extract",
byok_used=creds.has_user_key(),
synth_provider=result["provider"],
synth_model=result["model"],
)
except Exception as exc: # pragma: no cover - defensive
logger.warning("byok_extract_audit_failed", error=str(exc))
return {
"session_id": creds.session_id,
"filename": safe_name,
"byok_used": creds.has_user_key(),
"fields": result["fields"],
"provider": result["provider"],
"model": result["model"],
"latency_ms": elapsed_ms,
}
@app.post("/query", response_model=QueryResponse, tags=["rag"])
async def query_endpoint(
body: QueryRequest,
auth: Annotated[tuple[UserContext, dict], Depends(_resolve_user_full)],
) -> QueryResponse:
user, claims = auth
if not rate_limiter.is_allowed(f"{user.user_id}:query"):
raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_429_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS, "rate limit exceeded")
# Caller-supplied user_id must match the bearer-token identity.
if body.user_id != user.user_id:
raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, "user_id mismatch")
# Use the JWT id so the audit trail can correlate a query with the
# exact token that authorised it; useful for revocation forensics.
jti = claims.get("jti", "unsigned")
state = await run_rag_pipeline(
query=body.query,
user_context=user,
thread_id=f"api-{user.user_id}-{jti}",
prefer_cloud=body.prefer_cloud,
override_provider=body.override_provider,
)
return QueryResponse.from_state(state)
@app.post("/ingest", response_model=IngestResponseModel, tags=["rag"])
async def ingest_endpoint(
body: IngestRequestModel,
user: Annotated[UserContext, Depends(_require_role("user"))],
) -> IngestResponseModel:
if body.user_id != user.user_id:
raise HTTPException(status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, "user_id mismatch")
from core.agents.retriever import _get_hybrid_searcher
from ingestion.pipeline import IngestionPipeline
searcher = _get_hybrid_searcher()
pipeline = IngestionPipeline(
qdrant_manager=searcher._qdrant, # type: ignore[attr-defined]
embedding_service=searcher._embedder, # type: ignore[attr-defined]
sparse_service=searcher._sparse, # type: ignore[attr-defined]
)
req = IngestRequest(
file_path=body.file_path,
user_id=body.user_id,
org_id=body.org_id,
sensitivity_level=SensitivityLevel(body.sensitivity_level),
roles=body.roles,
)
result = await pipeline.ingest_document(req)
return IngestResponseModel(
file_path=result.file_path,
status=result.status,
num_chunks=result.num_chunks,
point_ids=result.point_ids,
errors=result.errors,
processing_time_seconds=result.processing_time_seconds,
)
@app.get("/audit", tags=["audit"])
async def audit_list(
user: Annotated[UserContext, Depends(_require_role("admin"))],
start: str | None = None,
end: str | None = None,
limit: int = 100,
) -> dict:
today = date.today().isoformat()
entries = audit_logger.get_entries(
start_date=start or today,
end_date=end or today,
user_id=None,
action=None,
)
return {
"total": len(entries),
"items": [e.model_dump(mode="json") for e in entries[:limit]],
}
@app.post("/audit/verify", tags=["audit"])
async def audit_verify(
user: Annotated[UserContext, Depends(_require_role("admin"))],
start: str | None = None,
end: str | None = None,
) -> dict:
result = audit_logger.verify_chain(start_date=start, end_date=end)
return result
from pydantic import BaseModel as _PydBM
class _TokenRequest(_PydBM):
"""Identity payload accepted by the dev ``/token`` endpoint."""
user_id: str
org_id: str = ""
roles: list[str] = []
clearance_level: int = 1
ttl_seconds: int | None = None
class _TokenResponse(_PydBM):
access_token: str
token_type: str = "bearer"
expires_in: int
@app.post("/token", response_model=_TokenResponse, tags=["auth"])
async def issue_dev_token(body: _TokenRequest) -> _TokenResponse:
"""Mint a signed JWT for local testing.
In production the IdP (Keycloak / Auth0 / Microsoft Entra) issues the
token externally and this endpoint is removed via the
``SAR_DISABLE_DEV_TOKEN`` flag — kept here so the e2e smoke script
and the Streamlit demo can mint a real token rather than the
unsigned base64 fallback.
"""
if settings.disable_dev_token:
raise HTTPException(
status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND,
"Dev token endpoint disabled (SAR_DISABLE_DEV_TOKEN=true)",
)
if settings.jwt_algorithm.upper() == "RS256":
raise HTTPException(
status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND,
"Dev token endpoint disabled in RS256 mode — use the external IdP",
)
if not settings.jwt_secret:
raise HTTPException(
status.HTTP_503_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
"SAR_JWT_SECRET is not configured; token endpoint disabled",
)
try:
token = issue_token(
user_id=body.user_id,
org_id=body.org_id,
roles=body.roles,
clearance_level=body.clearance_level,
ttl_seconds=body.ttl_seconds,
)
except AuthError as exc:
raise HTTPException(
status.HTTP_500_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, f"token_issue_{exc.reason}: {exc}"
) from exc
return _TokenResponse(
access_token=token,
token_type="bearer",
expires_in=body.ttl_seconds or settings.jwt_ttl_seconds,
)
else: # pragma: no cover
app = None # type: ignore[assignment]
def mint_dev_token(user: dict) -> str:
"""Convenience for local testing — build a bearer token for a UserContext dict.
When ``SAR_JWT_SECRET`` is configured this mints a real signed JWT. With
no secret it emits the legacy unsigned base64 shape *only* when
``SAR_ALLOW_UNSIGNED_TOKENS`` is on (matching the verifier's fail-closed
policy); otherwise it raises so callers are forced to configure auth.
"""
if settings.jwt_secret:
try:
return issue_token(
user_id=user.get("user_id", ""),
org_id=user.get("org_id", ""),
roles=list(user.get("roles", [])),
clearance_level=int(user.get("clearance_level", 1)),
)
except AuthError:
# Fall through to legacy shape on issuer error (only if allowed).
pass
if not settings.allow_unsigned_tokens:
raise AuthError(
"missing",
"cannot mint a token: set SAR_JWT_SECRET, or SAR_ALLOW_UNSIGNED_TOKENS=true for dev",
)
payload = json.dumps(user).encode("utf-8")
return base64.b64encode(payload).decode("ascii")
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