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46252cd | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 | /**
* Strip an IPv4-mapped IPv6 prefix so comparisons work consistently.
* Node often reports socket addresses as `::ffff:1.2.3.4` behind dual-stack
* listeners; this returns the bare `1.2.3.4`.
*/
export function normalizeIp(ip: string): string {
if (!ip) return ip;
const match = ip.match(/^::ffff:(\d{1,3}(?:\.\d{1,3}){3})$/i);
return match ? match[1] : ip;
}
/** Minimal request shape needed for client-IP resolution (framework-agnostic). */
export interface RequestLike {
ip?: string;
socket?: { remoteAddress?: string };
headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>;
}
/**
* Resolve the real client IP. X-Forwarded-For is client-controllable, so it is only
* honored when the request actually arrives from a configured trusted proxy. With no
* trusted proxies, the direct socket address is used (prevents XFF spoofing). Shared by
* ApiKeyGuard (allowedIps whitelist) and the throttler (per-client rate-limit bucket).
*/
export function resolveClientIp(req: RequestLike, trustedProxies: string[]): string {
const socketIp = normalizeIp(req.socket?.remoteAddress || req.ip || '');
if (!trustedProxies || trustedProxies.length === 0) {
return socketIp;
}
const isTrusted = (ip: string): boolean => trustedProxies.some(proxy => ipMatches(ip, proxy));
// Only trust the forwarded chain if the immediate peer is a trusted proxy.
if (!isTrusted(socketIp)) {
return socketIp;
}
const forwarded = req.headers['x-forwarded-for'];
if (!forwarded) {
return socketIp;
}
const hops = (Array.isArray(forwarded) ? forwarded.join(',') : forwarded)
.split(',')
.map(hop => normalizeIp(hop.trim()))
.filter(Boolean);
// Walk right-to-left and return the first hop that is not a trusted proxy:
// the closest address the trusted infrastructure actually observed.
for (let i = hops.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
if (!isTrusted(hops[i])) {
return hops[i];
}
}
return socketIp;
}
function ipv4ToInt(ip: string): number | null {
const parts = ip.split('.');
if (parts.length !== 4) return null;
let result = 0;
for (const part of parts) {
if (!/^\d{1,3}$/.test(part)) return null;
const octet = Number(part);
if (octet > 255) return null;
result = result * 256 + octet;
}
return result >>> 0;
}
/**
* True if `ip` equals or falls within `target`, where `target` is either an
* exact IP or an IPv4 CIDR (e.g. `172.18.0.0/16`). IPv4-mapped IPv6 inputs are
* normalized first. Malformed input yields `false` rather than throwing.
*/
export function ipMatches(ip: string, target: string): boolean {
const candidate = normalizeIp((ip || '').trim());
const ref = (target || '').trim();
if (!ref.includes('/')) {
return normalizeIp(ref) === candidate;
}
const [range, bitsRaw] = ref.split('/');
const bits = Number(bitsRaw);
if (!Number.isInteger(bits) || bits < 0 || bits > 32) return false;
const ipInt = ipv4ToInt(candidate);
const rangeInt = ipv4ToInt(normalizeIp(range));
if (ipInt === null || rangeInt === null) return false;
if (bits === 0) return true;
const mask = (0xffffffff << (32 - bits)) >>> 0;
return (ipInt & mask) === (rangeInt & mask);
}
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