Spaces:
Runtime error
Runtime error
File size: 27,121 Bytes
46252cd | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 | /**
* Plugin System Interfaces
* Defines the contract for OpenWA plugins
*/
import { HookManager, HookEvent, HookHandler } from '../hooks';
import type { MessageResponseDto } from '../../modules/message/dto';
import type { IWhatsAppEngine } from '../../engine/interfaces/whatsapp-engine.interface';
import type { PluginNetRequestInit, PluginNetResponse } from './plugin-net';
import type { HandoverState } from '../../modules/integration/entities/conversation-mapping.entity';
import type { WebhookRequest, WebhookResponse, WebhookHandler } from './sandbox/worker-webhooks';
// Re-export the ingress webhook types on the public SDK surface so plugin authors can type their
// handler without importing from sandbox internals.
export type { WebhookRequest, WebhookResponse, WebhookHandler };
// ============================================================================
// Plugin Types
// ============================================================================
export enum PluginType {
ENGINE = 'engine', // WhatsApp engine (whatsapp-web.js, baileys, etc.)
STORAGE = 'storage', // Storage backends (local, S3, GCS, etc.)
QUEUE = 'queue', // Queue systems (Redis, RabbitMQ, etc.)
AUTH = 'auth', // Authentication providers
EXTENSION = 'extension', // General extensions (auto-reply, scheduler, etc.)
}
export enum PluginStatus {
INSTALLED = 'installed',
ENABLED = 'enabled',
DISABLED = 'disabled',
ERROR = 'error',
}
// ============================================================================
// Plugin Manifest
// ============================================================================
export interface PluginManifest {
id: string; // Unique identifier (e.g., 'whatsapp-web.js', 'auto-reply')
name: string; // Display name
version: string; // Semver
type: PluginType;
description?: string;
author?: string;
homepage?: string;
repository?: string;
license?: string;
// Entry point
main: string; // Relative path to main file
// Dependencies
dependencies?: Record<string, string>;
peerDependencies?: Record<string, string>;
// Configuration schema (optional, for UI generation)
configSchema?: PluginConfigSchema;
// Optional sandboxed-iframe config editor. `entry` is a plugin-relative path to a self-contained
// HTML file (inline JS/CSS β a sandboxed opaque-origin iframe can't load subresources). Served by
// the host via the authenticated GET /plugins/:id/config-ui and injected as an iframe `srcdoc`; the
// editor exchanges config over a postMessage bridge (the API key never reaches the iframe). When
// present, the dashboard prefers it over the declarative `configSchema` form.
configUi?: { entry: string; height?: number };
// Hooks this plugin listens to
hooks?: HookEvent[];
// Features provided by this plugin
provides?: string[];
// Required features from other plugins
requires?: string[];
// Capability permissions this plugin declares; the loader enforces them at the capability
// boundary (see PluginCapabilityPermission). A capability call whose permission is not declared
// here is denied with a PluginCapabilityError. Absent / empty = no capability access.
permissions?: string[];
// Session ids this plugin may act on, or ['*']. Absent = ['*'] (all). Enforced by the
// capability facade. Static (manifest) by design: editing plugin config cannot widen scope.
sessions?: string[];
// Whether the plugin is scoped to specific sessions (default true). A session-scoped plugin only
// receives hook events for the sessions an operator has activated it for (see activeSessions); a
// global plugin (false) always runs, with no per-number notion (e.g. a metrics logger).
sessionScoped?: boolean;
// Outbound-HTTP host allowlist for `ctx.net.fetch` (requires the `net:fetch` permission). Each
// entry is `host:port` (exact) or a bare `host` (any port); `'*'` allows any public host. Absent /
// empty = deny all. `allowConfigHosts` additionally admits the host of each named config key (e.g. an
// operator-set base URL), resolved at fetch time. The SSRF guard still blocks internal IPs regardless.
net?: { allow?: string[]; allowConfigHosts?: string[] };
// Localized dashboard text (name/description/config field titles) per locale code. English is the
// base manifest + fallback. Dashboard-only; does not affect runtime behavior.
i18n?: PluginI18n;
// Integration SDK major.minor the plugin was authored against (e.g. '1' or '1.2'). Only the major
// is enforced β see SUPPORTED_SDK_MAJOR / validateIngressManifest. Absent = treated as '1'.
sdkVersion?: string;
// Inbound webhook routes this plugin claims (requires the `webhook:ingress` permission). Validated
// by validateIngressManifest, which the loader calls on every external plugin load (loadPlugin).
// (Built-in registration declares no ingress and bypasses that validation.)
ingress?: PluginIngressRoute[];
}
/** Localized overrides for a plugin's dashboard-facing text, per locale (dashboard i18n). */
export interface PluginI18nText {
title?: string;
description?: string;
}
export interface PluginI18nLocale {
name?: string;
description?: string;
/** Keyed by a TOP-LEVEL configSchema.properties key; only title/description are localized. */
config?: Record<string, PluginI18nText>;
}
/** Keyed by a dashboard locale code (e.g. "es", "zh-CN"). Untranslated entries fall back to English. */
export type PluginI18n = Record<string, PluginI18nLocale>;
/**
* One field in a plugin's config schema. Recursive: an `object` field nests `properties`, an `array`
* field describes its element with `items` (array-of-rows when `items.type === 'object'`). The host
* renders this into an authenticated form; the plugin still reads `ctx.config` defensively.
*/
export interface PluginConfigField {
// 'textarea' is a string rendered multi-line; a field with `enum` renders as a <select>.
type: 'string' | 'number' | 'boolean' | 'array' | 'object' | 'textarea';
title?: string;
description?: string;
default?: unknown;
enum?: unknown[]; // when present (any scalar type), the field renders as a <select>
required?: boolean;
secret?: boolean; // sensitive value (e.g. API key): masked on read, preserved on an unchanged write
// Validation hints, surfaced as HTML input attributes (advisory β not hard-enforced server-side):
min?: number; // number: value bound; string/textarea: minLength; array: min rows
max?: number; // number: value bound; string/textarea: maxLength; array: max rows
pattern?: string; // string/textarea: HTML validation regex
// Composite kinds:
items?: PluginConfigField; // array element schema; array-of-rows when items.type === 'object'
properties?: Record<string, PluginConfigField>; // nested-object fields (type: 'object')
}
export interface PluginConfigSchema {
type: 'object';
properties: Record<string, PluginConfigField>;
}
// ============================================================================
// Plugin Capability
// ============================================================================
/**
* Capability permissions a plugin declares in its manifest `permissions` and that the loader
* enforces at the capability boundary. A plugin may only use a capability whose permission it
* declares; an undeclared (or missing-permission) plugin is denied with a PluginCapabilityError.
*/
export const PluginCapabilityPermission = {
/** `ctx.messages.*` β send / reply on a session. */
MESSAGES_SEND: 'messages:send',
/** `ctx.engine.*` β read-only engine queries (group info, contacts, chats, number check). */
ENGINE_READ: 'engine:read',
/** `ctx.net.fetch` β SSRF-guarded outbound HTTP, scoped to the manifest `net.allow` host list. */
NET_FETCH: 'net:fetch',
/** `ctx.registerWebhook` β claim an inbound ingress route. Loader-enforced; cannot be widened by config. */
WEBHOOK_INGRESS: 'webhook:ingress',
/** `ctx.conversations.send` β normalized outbound send translated to MessageService. */
CONVERSATION_SEND: 'conversation:send',
} as const;
export type PluginCapabilityPermission = (typeof PluginCapabilityPermission)[keyof typeof PluginCapabilityPermission];
// ============================================================================
// Integration SDK v1 β inbound webhook ingress + normalized outbound send
// ============================================================================
/** How an inbound webhook's authenticity is established before the plugin sees it. */
export interface IngressSignatureSpec {
/**
* - `hmac-sha256`: HMAC over a `contentTemplate` (tokens `{rawBody}`/`{timestamp}`/`{id}`).
* - `shared-secret`: constant-time compare of a header value against `instance.secret`.
* - `standard-webhooks`: host-side [Standard Webhooks](https://github.com/standard-webhooks/standard-webhooks)
* verify. The wire format is fixed by the spec (headers `webhook-id`/`webhook-timestamp`/
* `webhook-signature`, signed content `${webhook-id}.${webhook-timestamp}.${rawBody}`, base64
* HMAC-SHA256 with the base64-decoded Svix key, `v1,` prefix, space-separated candidate list), so
* `header`/`contentTemplate`/`encoding`/`prefix`/`timestampHeader` are IGNORED β only
* `toleranceSec` (default 300) and `dedupHeader` apply. The operator pastes the Svix secret
* (`v1,whsec_<base64>`) as `instance.secret`.
*/
scheme: 'hmac-sha256' | 'shared-secret' | 'standard-webhooks' | 'none';
header?: string;
// Template over which the HMAC is computed. `{rawBody}` `{timestamp}` `{id}` placeholders.
contentTemplate?: string;
encoding?: 'hex' | 'base64';
prefix?: string;
timestampHeader?: string;
toleranceSec?: number; // when present, must be > 0 (see validateIngressManifest)
dedupHeader?: string;
}
/** Provider webhook-verification challenge (e.g. a GET handshake on route registration). */
export interface IngressChallengeSpec {
method: 'GET';
tokenParam: string;
echoParam: string;
}
/** A host-side preflight check on an inbound route, evaluated AFTER signature verify and BEFORE the
* dedup persist. First failure short-circuits to its mapped HTTP status. O(1), never initializes the
* engine, never mutates state. */
export type IngressPreflightCheck = {
// Reject (503) when the route's concrete-scoped WhatsApp session is not alive (no live engine, or
// EngineStatus.FAILED). Recoverable statuses (INITIALIZING/QR_READY/AUTHENTICATING/DISCONNECTED) and
// READY pass through to a normal 202+enqueue so the worker can fail fast and the dedup row holds the
// delivery. Skipped for wildcard (sessionScope null/'*') scopes β there is no single session to probe.
type: 'session-alive';
};
/** Declares the synchronous HTTP response an inbound route returns to the provider, computed entirely
* host-side. The plugin ALWAYS runs async (enqueued, full DLQ/retry) regardless of this contract. */
export interface IngressResponseContract {
preflight?: IngressPreflightCheck[];
ack?: {
status?: number; // default 202
body?: string; // literal, or a '{rawBody}'/'{timestamp}'/'{id}' template rendered host-side
headers?: Record<string, string>; // static; validated at load (HTTP-token name, no CR/LF value)
};
deadlineMs?: number; // documented provider ack budget (advisory; not enforced)
}
/** One inbound webhook route a plugin claims. Requires the `webhook:ingress` permission. */
export interface PluginIngressRoute {
route: string; // host prefixes it; the plugin never binds a port
/**
* @deprecated 'sync-reply' is inert dead code since the P0 substrate (#568) and is NOT wired to the
* HTTP response β the pipeline is always async + fast-ack. Declare synchronous response behavior via
* `response` instead. Kept in the union only to preserve SDK v1 additive-only compatibility; do not
* remove within major 1, and do not rely on either value at runtime.
*/
mode: 'async' | 'sync-reply';
signature: IngressSignatureSpec;
challenge?: IngressChallengeSpec;
/** Reserved/advisory compatibility field. Authenticity is currently verified by the host according
* to `signature`; the worker does not perform an additional `self` verification pass. */
verify: 'core' | 'self';
maxBodyBytes: number;
// Optional: where the provider's conversation id lives, so the host can compute a per-conversation
// ordering key (P1). Absent => the P1 lock falls back to per-instance serialization. The host never
// needs to understand the provider's schema beyond this one pointer.
conversationId?: { header?: string; jsonPointer?: string };
/** Optional synchronous-response contract (host-side preflight + ack). Additive; absent = today's
* default 202 fast-ack, byte-identical. Validated by validateIngressManifest. */
response?: IngressResponseContract;
}
// Normalized outbound envelope for ctx.conversations.send (POJO across the wire).
export interface ConversationSendEnvelope {
sessionId?: string;
instanceId?: string;
chatId?: string;
type: 'text' | 'image' | 'file' | 'audio' | 'video' | 'voice' | 'location';
text?: string;
mediaUrl?: string;
replyTo?: string;
source?: { provider: string; externalConversationId: string };
}
/** Integration SDK major version this host supports. A plugin whose `sdkVersion` major differs is refused. */
export const SUPPORTED_SDK_MAJOR = 1;
// ack header guards: name must be an RFC 7230 token (no spaces/separators), value must contain no
// CR/LF (header-injection guard). The header source is the static manifest, validated once at load.
const HTTP_HEADER_NAME = /^[!#$%&'*+\-.^_`|~0-9A-Za-z]+$/;
const HTTP_HEADER_VALUE_NO_CRLF = /^[^\r\n]*$/;
/**
* Validates a manifest's `ingress` declarations: SDK major compatibility, the `webhook:ingress`
* permission, route uniqueness, and that a declared `toleranceSec` is usable (> 0 β a replay window
* of zero or less would make the tolerance check a no-op). A manifest with no `ingress` entries is a
* no-op. Called from PluginLoaderService.loadPlugin, so a malformed declaration is rejected at load time.
*/
export function validateIngressManifest(manifest: PluginManifest): void {
if (!manifest.ingress?.length) return; // no ingress declared β nothing to validate
const declaredMajor = Number.parseInt((manifest.sdkVersion ?? '1').split('.')[0], 10);
if (!Number.isFinite(declaredMajor) || declaredMajor !== SUPPORTED_SDK_MAJOR) {
throw new Error(
`Plugin ${manifest.id}: SDK major ${manifest.sdkVersion} is not supported by this host (supports ${SUPPORTED_SDK_MAJOR})`,
);
}
const perms = manifest.permissions ?? [];
if (!perms.includes(PluginCapabilityPermission.WEBHOOK_INGRESS)) {
throw new Error(`Plugin ${manifest.id}: declares ingress routes but is missing the 'webhook:ingress' permission`);
}
const seen = new Set<string>();
for (const r of manifest.ingress) {
if (!r.route || seen.has(r.route)) {
throw new Error(`Plugin ${manifest.id}: duplicate or empty ingress route '${r.route}'`);
}
seen.add(r.route);
if (r.signature.toleranceSec !== undefined && r.signature.toleranceSec <= 0) {
throw new Error(
`Plugin ${manifest.id}: route '${r.route}' toleranceSec must be > 0 (a replay guard would be a no-op)`,
);
}
if (r.response) {
const ackStatus = r.response.ack?.status;
if (ackStatus !== undefined && (!Number.isInteger(ackStatus) || ackStatus < 100 || ackStatus > 599)) {
throw new Error(
`Plugin ${manifest.id}: route '${r.route}' response.ack.status must be a valid HTTP status (100-599)`,
);
}
if (r.response.ack?.headers) {
for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(r.response.ack.headers)) {
if (!HTTP_HEADER_NAME.test(name)) {
throw new Error(
`Plugin ${manifest.id}: route '${r.route}' response.ack header name '${name}' is not a valid HTTP token`,
);
}
if (!HTTP_HEADER_VALUE_NO_CRLF.test(value)) {
throw new Error(
`Plugin ${manifest.id}: route '${r.route}' response.ack header '${name}' has invalid characters (CR/LF forbidden)`,
);
}
}
}
}
}
}
/**
* Warns about each ingress route declared with `scheme: 'none'` β a fully-unauthenticated public endpoint
* that anyone who can reach the host can use to trigger WhatsApp sends. Purely additive (a warning): a
* deployment that legitimately relies on scheme:'none' (a provider that offers no HMAC) still boots; the
* loud log surfaces the exposure so an operator can front the URL with a network/reverse-proxy guard.
* Called from PluginLoaderService.loadPlugin at boot and on dynamic install.
*/
export function warnUnauthenticatedIngressRoutes(
manifest: PluginManifest,
logger: { warn: (message: string, context?: Record<string, unknown>) => void },
): void {
for (const r of manifest.ingress ?? []) {
if (r.signature.scheme === 'none') {
logger.warn(
`Ingress route '${r.route}' of plugin '${manifest.id}' uses signature scheme 'none' β it is an ` +
`UNAUTHENTICATED public endpoint that can trigger WhatsApp sends. Only keep this if the provider ` +
`offers no HMAC and the URL is guarded by a network/reverse-proxy ACL.`,
{ pluginId: manifest.id, route: r.route, action: 'ingress_unauthenticated_route' },
);
}
}
}
/**
* Thrown by a plugin capability when a call is rejected (missing permission, out-of-scope session,
* unstarted session, etc.). Gives plugins a predictable failure instead of a raw TypeError.
*/
export class PluginCapabilityError extends Error {
constructor(message: string) {
super(message);
this.name = 'PluginCapabilityError';
}
}
export interface PluginMessagingCapability {
sendText(sessionId: string, chatId: string, text: string): Promise<MessageResponseDto>;
reply(sessionId: string, chatId: string, quotedMessageId: string, text: string): Promise<MessageResponseDto>;
}
export interface PluginEngineReadCapability {
getGroupInfo(sessionId: string, groupId: string): ReturnType<IWhatsAppEngine['getGroupInfo']>;
getContacts(sessionId: string): ReturnType<IWhatsAppEngine['getContacts']>;
getContactById(sessionId: string, contactId: string): ReturnType<IWhatsAppEngine['getContactById']>;
checkNumberExists(sessionId: string, phone: string): ReturnType<IWhatsAppEngine['checkNumberExists']>;
getChats(sessionId: string): ReturnType<IWhatsAppEngine['getChats']>;
/** Recent messages for a chat (both directions), for history backfill. `limit` is clamped host-side. */
getChatHistory(
sessionId: string,
chatId: string,
limit?: number,
includeMedia?: boolean,
): ReturnType<IWhatsAppEngine['getChatHistory']>;
/**
* Canonical (neutral) form of a chat id: resolves a `@lid` privacy id to its stable `<phone>@c.us`
* when the lid->phone mapping is known, and otherwise returns the id unchanged. Lets a plugin key a
* chat by one identity across WhatsApp's `@lid` migration (best-effort; an unresolved lid stays `@lid`).
*/
canonicalChatId(sessionId: string, chatId: string): Promise<string>;
}
/** Outbound HTTP for a plugin β always through the host SSRF guard, scoped to `manifest.net.allow`. */
export interface PluginNetCapability {
fetch(url: string, init?: PluginNetRequestInit): Promise<PluginNetResponse>;
}
/** Normalized outbound send for a plugin β translated host-side to MessageService.sendText/reply. */
export interface PluginConversationsCapability {
send(env: ConversationSendEnvelope): Promise<unknown>;
}
/**
* Flip a mapped conversation's handover state. Reuses the `conversation:send` permission β flipping
* handover is part of owning the conversation, not a distinct capability grant.
*/
export interface PluginHandoverCapability {
set(key: { sessionId: string; chatId: string; instanceId: string }, state: HandoverState): Promise<unknown>;
}
/**
* Plugin-facing conversation mapping: create/read the WA-chat <-> provider-conversation link an adapter
* needs so handover.set and conversation.send({source}) can resolve. Reuses the `conversation:send`
* permission β owning the mapping is part of owning the conversation.
*/
export interface PluginMappingsCapability {
upsert(key: { sessionId: string; chatId: string; instanceId: string }, providerConversationId: string): Promise<void>;
get(key: {
sessionId: string;
chatId: string;
instanceId: string;
}): Promise<{ providerConversationId: string; handoverState: HandoverState } | null>;
getByProvider(
instanceId: string,
providerConversationId: string,
): Promise<{ sessionId: string; chatId: string; handoverState: HandoverState } | null>;
}
// ============================================================================
// Plugin Context (passed to plugin on initialization)
// ============================================================================
export interface PluginContext {
// Plugin info
pluginId: string;
manifest: PluginManifest;
// Configuration
config: Record<string, unknown>;
// Hook system
hookManager: HookManager;
// Logger instance for this plugin
logger: PluginLogger;
// Storage for plugin data
storage: PluginStorage;
// Register a hook handler
registerHook: (event: HookEvent, handler: HookHandler, priority?: number) => void;
// Claim an inbound ingress webhook route (requires the `webhook:ingress` permission). Delivered only
// to sandboxed plugins via the ingress pipeline; in-process built-ins cannot receive ingress.
registerWebhook: (route: string, handler: WebhookHandler) => void;
// Curated write surface β routes through MessageService (persistence preserved).
messages: PluginMessagingCapability;
// Read-only, scoped engine queries.
engine: PluginEngineReadCapability;
// SSRF-guarded outbound HTTP, scoped to the manifest `net.allow` host list.
net: PluginNetCapability;
// Normalized outbound send, translated to MessageService. Requires `conversation:send`.
conversations: PluginConversationsCapability;
// Flip a mapped conversation's bot/human/closed handover state. Requires `conversation:send`.
handover: PluginHandoverCapability;
// Create/read the WA-chat <-> provider-conversation mapping. Requires `conversation:send`.
mappings: PluginMappingsCapability;
}
export interface PluginLogger {
log: (message: string, meta?: Record<string, unknown>) => void;
debug: (message: string, meta?: Record<string, unknown>) => void;
warn: (message: string, meta?: Record<string, unknown>) => void;
error: (message: string, error?: unknown, meta?: Record<string, unknown>) => void;
}
export interface PluginStorage {
get: <T = unknown>(key: string) => Promise<T | null>;
set: <T = unknown>(key: string, value: T) => Promise<void>;
delete: (key: string) => Promise<void>;
list: (prefix?: string) => Promise<string[]>;
}
// ============================================================================
// Plugin Interface (what plugins must implement)
// ============================================================================
export interface IPlugin {
// Lifecycle hooks
onLoad?: (context: PluginContext) => Promise<void>;
onEnable?: (context: PluginContext) => Promise<void>;
onDisable?: (context: PluginContext) => Promise<void>;
onUnload?: (context: PluginContext) => Promise<void>;
// Configuration change handler
onConfigChange?: (context: PluginContext, newConfig: Record<string, unknown>) => Promise<void>;
// Health check (for dashboard monitoring)
healthCheck?: () => Promise<{ healthy: boolean; message?: string }>;
}
// ============================================================================
// Engine Plugin Interface (extends IPlugin for engine-specific methods)
// ============================================================================
export interface IEnginePlugin extends IPlugin {
type: PluginType.ENGINE;
// Engine factory method
createEngine: (config: Record<string, unknown>) => unknown;
// Get supported features
getFeatures: () => string[];
// Underlying engine library name + version (e.g. { name: 'whatsapp-web.js', version: '1.34.7' }) β
// distinct from the adapter/plugin's own manifest version. Optional: an engine may not report it.
getEngineLibrary?: () => { name: string; version: string };
}
// ============================================================================
// Plugin Instance (runtime representation)
// ============================================================================
export interface PluginInstance {
manifest: PluginManifest;
status: PluginStatus;
config: Record<string, unknown>;
instance: IPlugin | null;
error?: string;
loadedAt?: Date;
enabledAt?: Date;
// Sessions a session-scoped plugin is activated for; ['*'] = all. Defaulted to ['*'] on enable.
// Ignored for a global (sessionScoped:false) plugin. Persisted on the registry entry.
activeSessions?: string[];
// Per-session config overrides, keyed by sessionId. The config a hook sees for session S is the
// override shallow-merged over `config` (the '*' base) β see resolvePluginConfig. Absent = no
// overrides (every session gets the base). Persisted on the registry entry.
sessionConfig?: Record<string, Record<string, unknown>>;
// First-party built-ins (engines, bundled extensions) run in-process; plugins loaded from the
// plugins directory are untrusted and run sandboxed in a worker. `false` => sandboxed.
builtIn?: boolean;
}
// ============================================================================
// Plugin Registry Entry (for storage)
// ============================================================================
export interface PluginRegistryEntry {
id: string;
type: PluginType;
name: string;
version: string;
status: PluginStatus;
config: Record<string, unknown>;
builtIn: boolean; // True for bundled plugins
installedAt: Date;
updatedAt: Date;
// Sessions a session-scoped plugin is activated for; ['*'] = all. Absent = not yet set (treated
// as ['*'] on enable).
activeSessions?: string[];
// Per-session config overrides (keyed by sessionId), merged over `config` per session at hook time.
sessionConfig?: Record<string, Record<string, unknown>>;
// The operator's standing decision, as opposed to `status`, which is where the runtime currently is.
// `status` is reset to INSTALLED on every load (enabling runs the lifecycle and is never inherited
// from a previous process), so it cannot carry intent across a restart β a restart used to silently
// turn every extension plugin off (#856). This field is what bootstrap restores from. Written only by
// the operator-facing enable/disable, never by the loader's own teardown. Absent on pre-#856 rows,
// which are adopted from a lingering ENABLED status on first load.
enabledByOperator?: boolean;
}
|