SLSA L1 honest
L2 in progress
Defense Unicorns Warhacker — packages on UDS Core.
Killinchu is counter-UAS sense-and-evidence that ships as a ZARF package and is UDS Core compatible for air-gapped sovereign deployment. We are not UDS-certified and we do not claim it. ZARF-packaging is available (built in parallel via the ZARF/UDS agent), not yet shipped. Our CDAO lane is Enterprise Agents — "rapid and secure AI agent development and deployment" — not the TechINT Open Arsenal pipeline.
Enterprise Agents
CDAO lane (our lane)
✓ UDS Core compatible
interoperability badge (not certified)
ZARF-packaged
airgap bundle (available)
✓ Section 889 · 5 clean
no banned vendors
Full UDS injection — evidence pages
Every UDS claim on this booth links to a real, evidence-cited page (each returns HTTP 200, no catch-all liars):
UDS Core · SBOM (SPDX+CycloneDX) · Sigstore (cosign + public Rekor) · CMMC L1 (17 practices) · Section 889 (five vendors) · ZARF air-gap deploy · Mission Owner (Iron Bank sponsor ask)
The event — accurately stated
The Defense Unicorns Warhacker hackathon (16–19 June 2026, San Diego) is run by Defense Unicorns and explicitly "packages solutions with the open source UDS Core platform" so they are "ready for rapid deployment and authorization anywhere — from cloud to edge." Killinchu's deliverable is a ZARF + UDS-packaged bundle that runs on a CNCF-certified Kubernetes cluster (k3s/RKE2 air-gapped for demo). Source: Defense Unicorns, Warhacker.
Lane correction — Enterprise Agents, not Open Arsenal
Per CDAO's pace-setting projects: Enterprise Agents = "Building a playbook for rapid and secure AI agent development and deployment to transform enterprise workflows" — that is our lane. Open Arsenal is a CDAO Intelligence project ("accelerating the TechINT-to-capability pipeline, turning intel into weapons in hours not years") — a different mission; we do not align to it. Source: ai.mil Organization.
Honest compliance posture
| Item | State | Note |
|---|---|---|
| SLSA Build | L1 honest (L2 in progress) | Real cosign-signed provenance, Rekor-anchored. L2 via hosted CI + cosign, in progress. |
| ZARF + UDS Core packaging | Available | UDS Core compatible; ZARF bundle for airgap. Not certified. |
| NDAA §889 | Defensible / signable | 5 banned vendors: Huawei, ZTE, Hytera, Hikvision, Dahua. No banned hardware on bench. |
| Iron Bank | Not accredited | Iron Bank requires a government Mission Owner sponsor — invitation-only; you cannot self-register. Target via Warhacker. |
| CMMC | L1 self-attest (planned) | L2/L3 deferred until a contract imposes CUI. |
NDAA Section 889 — the banned five
- Huawei — telecom
- ZTE — telecom
- Hytera — radios
- Hikvision — video surveillance
- Dahua — video surveillance
The statute (FY2019 NDAA §889, FAR 52.204-25) names five companies plus their subsidiaries and affiliates — not "5 + 2 others." Source: U.S. Election Assistance Commission.
Architecture grounded in Hickok & Poeppel (2007) Nat Rev Neurosci 8:393 · Hickok (2025) Wired for Words, MIT Press.
Compliance framing per Defense Unicorns Warhacker, CDAO/ai.mil Organization, defenseunicorns/uds-core, and Anchore SWFT (Iron Bank invitation-only).
URL /navy preserved · content corrected per UDS blueprint · ADDITIVE · Doctrine v11 LOCKED 749/14/163 · Λ Conjecture 1 · sign: Yachay · Co-Authored-By: Perplexity Computer Agent