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Browse files- index.html +9 -9
index.html
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<div class="column container-centered">
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<div id="adaptive-loss-formula" class="container">
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<div id="adaptive-loss-formula-list" class="row align-items-center formula-list">
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<a href="
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<a href="
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<a href="
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<div style="clear: both"></div>
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</div>
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<div id="adaptive-loss-formula-content" class="row align-items-center">
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<span
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$$
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\displaystyle
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Loss_{label} = \frac{1}{k} \sum_{i=1}^{k} \mathcal{L}\left(\mathbb{C}\left(W^i(x+\delta) \right), y_t\right)
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$$
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</span>
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<span
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$$
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\displaystyle
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Loss_{repre} = \frac{1}{k} \sum_{i=1}^{k}\mathcal{S}(\mathbb{R}(W^i(x+\delta)), \mathbb{R}(x+\delta))
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$$
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</span>
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<span
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$$\displaystyle \mathcal{L}_C(x+\delta, y_t) + Loss_{label} - \alpha \cdot Loss_{repre}$$
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</span>
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</div>
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<div class="columns is-centered">
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<div class="column">
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<p
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Attackers can design adaptive attacks to try to bypass BEYOND when the attacker knows all the parameters of the model
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and the detection strategy. For an SSL model with a feature extractor $f$, a projector $h$, and a classification head $g$,
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the classification branch can be formulated as $\mathbb{C} = f\circ g$ and the representation branch as $\mathbb{R} = f\circ h$.
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To attack effectively, the adversary must deceive the target model while guaranteeing the label consistency and representation similarity of the SSL model.
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</p>
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<p
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where $\mathcal{S}$ represents cosine similarity, $k$ represents the number of generated neighbors,
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and the linear augmentation function $W(x)=W(x,p);~p\sim P$ randomly samples $p$ from the parameter distribution $P$ to generate different neighbors.
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Note that we guarantee the generated neighbors are fixed each time by fixing the random seed. The adaptive adversaries perform attacks on the following objective function:
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</p>
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<p
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where $\mathcal{L}_C$ indicates classifier's loss function, $y_t$ is the targeted class, and $\alpha$ refers to a hyperparameter.
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</p>
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</div>
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<div class="column container-centered">
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<div id="adaptive-loss-formula" class="container">
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<div id="adaptive-loss-formula-list" class="row align-items-center formula-list">
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<a href=".label-loss" class="selected">Label Consistency Loss</a>
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+
<a href=".representation-loss">Representation Similarity Loss</a>
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<a href=".total-loss">Total Loss</a>
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<div style="clear: both"></div>
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</div>
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<div id="adaptive-loss-formula-content" class="row align-items-center">
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<span class="formula label-loss" style="">
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$$
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\displaystyle
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Loss_{label} = \frac{1}{k} \sum_{i=1}^{k} \mathcal{L}\left(\mathbb{C}\left(W^i(x+\delta) \right), y_t\right)
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$$
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</span>
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<span class="formula representation-loss" style="display: none;">
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$$
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\displaystyle
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Loss_{repre} = \frac{1}{k} \sum_{i=1}^{k}\mathcal{S}(\mathbb{R}(W^i(x+\delta)), \mathbb{R}(x+\delta))
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$$
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</span>
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<span class="formula total-loss" style="display: none;">
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$$\displaystyle \mathcal{L}_C(x+\delta, y_t) + Loss_{label} - \alpha \cdot Loss_{repre}$$
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</span>
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</div>
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<div class="columns is-centered">
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<div class="column">
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<p class="eq-des label-loss">
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Attackers can design adaptive attacks to try to bypass BEYOND when the attacker knows all the parameters of the model
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and the detection strategy. For an SSL model with a feature extractor $f$, a projector $h$, and a classification head $g$,
|
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the classification branch can be formulated as $\mathbb{C} = f\circ g$ and the representation branch as $\mathbb{R} = f\circ h$.
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To attack effectively, the adversary must deceive the target model while guaranteeing the label consistency and representation similarity of the SSL model.
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</p>
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+
<p class="eq-des representation-loss" style="display: none">
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where $\mathcal{S}$ represents cosine similarity, $k$ represents the number of generated neighbors,
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and the linear augmentation function $W(x)=W(x,p);~p\sim P$ randomly samples $p$ from the parameter distribution $P$ to generate different neighbors.
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Note that we guarantee the generated neighbors are fixed each time by fixing the random seed. The adaptive adversaries perform attacks on the following objective function:
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</p>
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<p class="eq-des total-loss" style="display: none;">
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where $\mathcal{L}_C$ indicates classifier's loss function, $y_t$ is the targeted class, and $\alpha$ refers to a hyperparameter.
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</p>
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</div>
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