data/validated/027_Jordan-Emergency-Food-Security-Project_validated.json

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    "input_text": "**FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**\n\nReport No: PAD5029 INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT",
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    "input_text": "CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective April 27, 2022) Currency Unit = Jordanian dinar (JOD) JOD 1 = US$1.41 US$ 1 = JOD 0.71 FISCAL YEAR January 1 - December 31 Regional Vice President: Ferid Belhaj Country Director: Saroj Kumar Jha Regional Director: Ayat Soliman Practice Manager: Marianne Grosclaude Task Team Leader(s): [Svetlana Edmeades, Mohamed Hassan Abdulkader, ] Tobias Baedeker",
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    "input_text_preprocessed": "CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective April 27, 2022) Currency Unit = Jordanian dinar (JOD) JOD 1 = US$1.41 US$ 1 = JOD 0.71 FISCAL YEAR January 1 - December 31 Regional Vice President: Ferid Belhaj Country Director: Saroj Kumar Jha Regional Director: Ayat Soliman Practice Manager: Marianne Grosclaude Task Team Leader(s): [Svetlana Edmeades, Mohamed Hassan Abdulkader, ] Tobias Baedeker"
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    "input_text": "ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ACG Anti-Corruption Guidelines ARDI Agriculture Resilience, Value Chain Development and Innovation Program CBJ Central Bank of Jordan CCDR Country Climate and Development Report COVID Coronavirus disease CPI Consumer Price Index DA Designated Account DFIL Disbursement and Financial Information Letter E&S Environmental and Social ECT Emergency Cash Transfers EHS Environmental, Health, and Safety Guidelines ESF Environmental and Social Framework ESCP Environmental and Social Commitment Plan ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework ESIA Economic and Social Impact Assessment EU European Union FAO Food and Agriculture Organization FM Financial Management FO Financial Officer GDP Gross Domestic Product GFMIS Government Financial Management Information System GFRP Global Food Crisis Response Program GIIP Good International Industry Practice GOJ Government of Jordan GRM Grievance Redress Mechanism IFRs Interim Financial Reports INT Integrity Vice Presidency (INT) IMF International Monetary Fund JACPA Jordan Association of Certified Public Accountants LMP Labor Management Plan MENA Middle East and North Africa MOA Ministry of Agriculture MOF Ministry of Finance MOITS Ministry of Industry, Trade and Supply MOPIC Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation MOSD Ministry of Social Development mVAM mobile Vulnerability, Analysis and Monitoring NAF National Aid Fund OHS Occupational Health and Safety OP/BP Operational Policies/Bank Procedures PCT Project Coordination Team PDO Project Development Objective PforR Program for Results",
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    "input_text_preprocessed": "ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ACG Anti-Corruption Guidelines ARDI Agriculture Resilience, Value Chain Development and Innovation Program CBJ Central Bank of Jordan CCDR Country Climate and Development Report COVID Coronavirus disease CPI Consumer Price Index DA Designated Account DFIL Disbursement and Financial Information Letter E&S Environmental and Social ECT Emergency Cash Transfers EHS Environmental, Health, and Safety Guidelines ESF Environmental and Social Framework ESCP Environmental and Social Commitment Plan ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework ESIA Economic and Social Impact Assessment EU European Union FAO Food and Agriculture Organization FM Financial Management FO Financial Officer GDP Gross Domestic Product GFMIS Government Financial Management Information System GFRP Global Food Crisis Response Program GIIP Good International Industry Practice GOJ Government of Jordan GRM Grievance Redress Mechanism IFRs Interim Financial Reports INT Integrity Vice Presidency (INT) IMF International Monetary Fund JACPA Jordan Association of Certified Public Accountants LMP Labor Management Plan MENA Middle East and North Africa MOA Ministry of Agriculture MOF Ministry of Finance MOITS Ministry of Industry, Trade and Supply MOPIC Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation MOSD Ministry of Social Development mVAM mobile Vulnerability, Analysis and Monitoring NAF National Aid Fund OHS Occupational Health and Safety OP/BP Operational Policies/Bank Procedures PCT Project Coordination Team PDO Project Development Objective PforR Program for Results"
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    "input_text": "POM Project Operations Manual PPSD Project Procurement Strategy for Development SEA/SH Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and Sexual Harassment SEP Stakeholder Engagement Plan SMEs Small- and Medium Enterprises SSN Social Safety Net STEP Systematic Tracking of Exchanges in Procurement TA Technical Assistance TOR Terms of Reference UN United Nations UNHCR The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees US United States US$ United States Dollar WA Withdrawal Application WBG World Bank Group WFP World Food Programme yoy Year-on-year",
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    "input_text": "**The World Bank**\nEmergency Food Security Project (P178936) TABLE OF CONTENTS\n\n**DATASHEET ........................................................................................................................... 1**\n\n**I.** **STRATEGIC CONTEXT ...................................................................................................... 6**\n\nA. Country Context................................................................................................................................ 6 B. Sectoral and Institutional Context .................................................................................................... 8 C. Relevance to Higher Level Objectives ............................................................................................. 12\n\n**II.** **PROJECT DESCRIPTION .................................................................................................. 15**\n\nA. Project Development Objective ..................................................................................................... 15 B. Project Components ....................................................................................................................... 15 C. Project Beneficiaries ....................................................................................................................... 20 D. Results Chain .................................................................................................................................. 20 E. Rationale for Bank Involvement and Role of Partners ................................................................... 22 F. Lessons Learned and Reflected in the Project Design .................................................................... 22\n\n**III.** **IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS ............................................................................ 24**\n\nA. Institutional and Implementation Arrangements .......................................................................... 24 B. Results Monitoring and Evaluation Arrangements......................................................................... 24 C. Sustainability ................................................................................................................................... 25\n\n**IV.** **PROJECT APPRAISAL SUMMARY ................................................................................... 25**\n\nA. Technical, Economic and Financial Analysis (if applicable) ............................................................ 25 B. Fiduciary .......................................................................................................................................... 27 C. Legal Operational Policies ............................................................................................................... 31 D. Environmental and Social ............................................................................................................... 31\n\n**GRIEVANCE REDRESS SERVICES ............................................................................................ 33**\n\n**KEY RISKS ............................................................................................................................ 33**\n\n**RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND MONITORING .......................................................................... 36**\n\n**ANNEX 1: Implementation Arrangements and Support Plan .......................................... 44**\n\n**ANNEX 2: Financial Management .................................................................................. 45**\n\n**ANNEX 3: Summary of Wheat and Barley Value Chains ................................................. 53**",
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    "input_text_preprocessed": "**The World Bank**\nEmergency Food Security Project (P178936) TABLE OF CONTENTS\n\n**DATASHEET ........................................................................................................................... 1**\n\n**I.** **STRATEGIC CONTEXT ...................................................................................................... 6**\n\nA. Country Context................................................................................................................................ 6 B. Sectoral and Institutional Context .................................................................................................... 8 C. Relevance to Higher Level Objectives ............................................................................................. 12\n\n**II.** **PROJECT DESCRIPTION .................................................................................................. 15**\n\nA. Project Development Objective ..................................................................................................... 15 B. Project Components ....................................................................................................................... 15 C. Project Beneficiaries ....................................................................................................................... 20 D. Results Chain .................................................................................................................................. 20 E. Rationale for Bank Involvement and Role of Partners ................................................................... 22 F. Lessons Learned and Reflected in the Project Design .................................................................... 22\n\n**III.** **IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS ............................................................................ 24**\n\nA. Institutional and Implementation Arrangements .......................................................................... 24 B. Results Monitoring and Evaluation Arrangements......................................................................... 24 C. Sustainability ................................................................................................................................... 25\n\n**IV.** **PROJECT APPRAISAL SUMMARY ................................................................................... 25**\n\nA. Technical, Economic and Financial Analysis (if applicable) ............................................................ 25 B. Fiduciary .......................................................................................................................................... 27 C. Legal Operational Policies ............................................................................................................... 31 D. Environmental and Social ............................................................................................................... 31\n\n**GRIEVANCE REDRESS SERVICES ............................................................................................ 33**\n\n**KEY RISKS ............................................................................................................................ 33**\n\n**RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND MONITORING .......................................................................... 36**\n\n**ANNEX 1: Implementation Arrangements and Support Plan .......................................... 44**\n\n**ANNEX 2: Financial Management .................................................................................. 45**\n\n**ANNEX 3: Summary of Wheat and Barley Value Chains ................................................. 53**"
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    "input_text": "**The World Bank**\nEmergency Food Security Project (P178936) DATASHEET\n\n**BASIC INFORMATION**\n~~BASIC~~ ~~INFO~~ ~~TABLE~~ Country(ies) Project Name Jordan Emergency Food Security Project Environmental and Social Risk Project ID Financing Instrument Process Classification Investment Project P178936 Substantial Financing\n\n**Financing & Implementation Modalities**\n\nUrgent Need or Capacity Constraints (FCC)\n\n[ ] Multiphase Programmatic Approach (MPA) [ ] Contingent Emergency Response Component (CERC)\n\n[ ] Series of Projects (SOP) [ ] Fragile State(s)\n\n[ ] Performance-Based Conditions (PBCs) [ ] Small State(s)\n\n[ ] Financial Intermediaries (FI) [ ] Fragile within a non-fragile Country\n\n[ ] Project-Based Guarantee [ ] Conflict\n\n[ ] Deferred Drawdown [✓] Responding to Natural or Man-made Disaster\n\n[ ] Alternate Procurement Arrangements (APA) [ ] Hands-on Enhanced Implementation Support (HEIS) Expected Approval Date Expected Closing Date 13-May-2022 31-Dec-2024 Bank/IFC Collaboration No\n\n**Proposed Development Objective(s)**\n\nTo ensure the availability of basic grains and mitigate the impact of high commodity prices in Jordan Page 1 of 54",
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    "input_text_preprocessed": "**The World Bank**\nEmergency Food Security Project (P178936) DATASHEET\n\n**BASIC INFORMATION**\n~~BASIC~~ ~~INFO~~ ~~TABLE~~ Country(ies) Project Name Jordan Emergency Food Security Project Environmental and Social Risk Project ID Financing Instrument Process Classification Investment Project P178936 Substantial Financing\n\n**Financing & Implementation Modalities**\n\nUrgent Need or Capacity Constraints (FCC)\n\n[ ] Multiphase Programmatic Approach (MPA) [ ] Contingent Emergency Response Component (CERC)\n\n[ ] Series of Projects (SOP) [ ] Fragile State(s)\n\n[ ] Performance-Based Conditions (PBCs) [ ] Small State(s)\n\n[ ] Financial Intermediaries (FI) [ ] Fragile within a non-fragile Country\n\n[ ] Project-Based Guarantee [ ] Conflict\n\n[ ] Deferred Drawdown [✓] Responding to Natural or Man-made Disaster\n\n[ ] Alternate Procurement Arrangements (APA) [ ] Hands-on Enhanced Implementation Support (HEIS) Expected Approval Date Expected Closing Date 13-May-2022 31-Dec-2024 Bank/IFC Collaboration No\n\n**Proposed Development Objective(s)**\n\nTo ensure the availability of basic grains and mitigate the impact of high commodity prices in Jordan Page 1 of 54"
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    "input_text": "**The World Bank**\nEmergency Food Security Project (P178936)\n\n**Components**\n\n**Component Name** **Cost (US$, millions)**\n\nSecuring food and feed to reduce short term vulnerability to supply shocks 460.00 Addressing food security to mitigate commodity risks 30.00\n\n**Organizations**\n\nBorrower: Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) Implementing Agency: Ministry of Industry, Trade and Supply (MoITS)\n\n**PROJECT FINANCING DATA (US$, Millions)**\n\n**SUMMARY-NewFin1**\n\n**Total Project Cost** 490.00\n\n**Total Financing** 490.00\n\n**of which IBRD/IDA** 490.00\n\n**Financing Gap** 0.00\n\n**DETAILS-NewFinEnh1**\n\n**World Bank Group Financing**\n\nInternational Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 490.00\n\n**Expected Disbursements (in US$, Millions)**\n\n**WB Fiscal Year** 2022 2023 2024 2025\n\n**Annual** 0.50 480.00 8.00 1.50\n\n**Cumulative** 0.50 480.50 488.50 490.00\n\n**INSTITUTIONAL DATA**\n\n**Practice Area (Lead)** **Contributing Practice Areas**\n\nPage 2 of 54",
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    "input_text_preprocessed": "**The World Bank**\nEmergency Food Security Project (P178936)\n\n**Components**\n\n**Component Name** **Cost (US$, millions)**\n\nSecuring food and feed to reduce short term vulnerability to supply shocks 460.00 Addressing food security to mitigate commodity risks 30.00\n\n**Organizations**\n\nBorrower: Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) Implementing Agency: Ministry of Industry, Trade and Supply (MoITS)\n\n**PROJECT FINANCING DATA (US$, Millions)**\n\n**SUMMARY-NewFin1**\n\n**Total Project Cost** 490.00\n\n**Total Financing** 490.00\n\n**of which IBRD/IDA** 490.00\n\n**Financing Gap** 0.00\n\n**DETAILS-NewFinEnh1**\n\n**World Bank Group Financing**\n\nInternational Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 490.00\n\n**Expected Disbursements (in US$, Millions)**\n\n**WB Fiscal Year** 2022 2023 2024 2025\n\n**Annual** 0.50 480.00 8.00 1.50\n\n**Cumulative** 0.50 480.50 488.50 490.00\n\n**INSTITUTIONAL DATA**\n\n**Practice Area (Lead)** **Contributing Practice Areas**\n\nPage 2 of 54"
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    "input_text": "**The World Bank**\nEmergency Food Security Project (P178936) Agriculture and Food Finance, Competitiveness and Innovation\n\n**Climate Change and Disaster Screening**\n\nThis operation has been screened for short and long-term climate change and disaster risks\n\n**SYSTEMATIC OPERATIONS RISK-RATING TOOL (SORT)**\n\n**Risk Category** **Rating**\n\n1. Political and Governance ⚫ Moderate\n\n2. Macroeconomic ⚫ Substantial 3. Sector Strategies and Policies ⚫ Substantial 4. Technical Design of Project or Program ⚫ Moderate 5. Institutional Capacity for Implementation and Sustainability ⚫ Substantial 6. Fiduciary ⚫ Substantial 7. Environment and Social ⚫ Substantial 8. Stakeholders ⚫ Substantial 9. Other 10. Overall ⚫ Substantial\n\n**COMPLIANCE**\n\n**Policy**\nDoes the project depart from the CPF in content or in other significant respects?\n\n[ ] Yes [✓] No Does the project require any waivers of Bank policies?\n\n[✓] Yes [ ] No Page 3 of 54",
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    "input_text_preprocessed": "**The World Bank**\nEmergency Food Security Project (P178936) Agriculture and Food Finance, Competitiveness and Innovation\n\n**Climate Change and Disaster Screening**\n\nThis operation has been screened for short and long-term climate change and disaster risks\n\n**SYSTEMATIC OPERATIONS RISK-RATING TOOL (SORT)**\n\n**Risk Category** **Rating**\n\n1. Political and Governance ⚫ Moderate\n\n2. Macroeconomic ⚫ Substantial 3. Sector Strategies and Policies ⚫ Substantial 4. Technical Design of Project or Program ⚫ Moderate 5. Institutional Capacity for Implementation and Sustainability ⚫ Substantial 6. Fiduciary ⚫ Substantial 7. Environment and Social ⚫ Substantial 8. Stakeholders ⚫ Substantial 9. Other 10. Overall ⚫ Substantial\n\n**COMPLIANCE**\n\n**Policy**\nDoes the project depart from the CPF in content or in other significant respects?\n\n[ ] Yes [✓] No Does the project require any waivers of Bank policies?\n\n[✓] Yes [ ] No Page 3 of 54"
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    "input_text": "**The World Bank**\nEmergency Food Security Project (P178936) Have these been approved by Bank management?\n\n[✓] Yes [ ] No Is approval for any policy waiver sought from the Board?\n\n[ ] Yes [✓] No\n\n**Environmental and Social Standards Relevance Given its Context at the Time of Appraisal**\n\n**E & S Standards** **Relevance**\n\nAssessment and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts Relevant Stakeholder Engagement and Information Disclosure Relevant Labor and Working Conditions Relevant Resource Efficiency and Pollution Prevention and Management Relevant Community Health and Safety Relevant Land Acquisition, Restrictions on Land Use and Involuntary Resettlement Not Currently Relevant Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Management of Living Natural Resources Indigenous Peoples/Sub-Saharan African Historically Underserved Traditional Local Communities Not Currently Relevant Not Currently Relevant Cultural Heritage Relevant Financial Intermediaries Not Currently Relevant\n\n**NOTE** : For further information regarding the World Bank’s due diligence assessment of the Project’s potential\nenvironmental and social risks and impacts, please refer to the Project’s Appraisal Environmental and Social Review Summary (ESRS).\n\n**Legal Covenants**\n\nSections and Description The Borrower, through MoITS, shall prepare by May 31, 2022 an interim Project Operations Manual (POM) for Component 1, which will also constitute a condition for disbursement of proceeds from Component 1.\n\nSections and Description Page 4 of 54",
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    "input_text_preprocessed": "**The World Bank**\nEmergency Food Security Project (P178936) Have these been approved by Bank management?\n\n[✓] Yes [ ] No Is approval for any policy waiver sought from the Board?\n\n[ ] Yes [✓] No\n\n**Environmental and Social Standards Relevance Given its Context at the Time of Appraisal**\n\n**E & S Standards** **Relevance**\n\nAssessment and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts Relevant Stakeholder Engagement and Information Disclosure Relevant Labor and Working Conditions Relevant Resource Efficiency and Pollution Prevention and Management Relevant Community Health and Safety Relevant Land Acquisition, Restrictions on Land Use and Involuntary Resettlement Not Currently Relevant Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Management of Living Natural Resources Indigenous Peoples/Sub-Saharan African Historically Underserved Traditional Local Communities Not Currently Relevant Not Currently Relevant Cultural Heritage Relevant Financial Intermediaries Not Currently Relevant\n\n**NOTE** : For further information regarding the World Bank’s due diligence assessment of the Project’s potential\nenvironmental and social risks and impacts, please refer to the Project’s Appraisal Environmental and Social Review Summary (ESRS).\n\n**Legal Covenants**\n\nSections and Description The Borrower, through MoITS, shall prepare by May 31, 2022 an interim Project Operations Manual (POM) for Component 1, which will also constitute a condition for disbursement of proceeds from Component 1.\n\nSections and Description Page 4 of 54"
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    "input_text": "**The World Bank**\nEmergency Food Security Project (P178936) The Borrower shall by no later than two (2) months after the Effectiveness Date prepare a complete Project Operations Manual for both components.\n\nSections and Description The Borrower shall by no later than two (2) months after the Effectiveness Date designate a Project Steering Committee that includes representatives of MOPIC, MOF, MOITS, and Ministry of Agriculture.\n\nSections and Description The Borrower shall by no later than two (2) months after the Effectiveness Date prepare an annual work plan and budget acceptable to the World Bank.\n\n**Conditions**\n\nPage 5 of 54",
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    "input_text_preprocessed": "**The World Bank**\nEmergency Food Security Project (P178936) The Borrower shall by no later than two (2) months after the Effectiveness Date prepare a complete Project Operations Manual for both components.\n\nSections and Description The Borrower shall by no later than two (2) months after the Effectiveness Date designate a Project Steering Committee that includes representatives of MOPIC, MOF, MOITS, and Ministry of Agriculture.\n\nSections and Description The Borrower shall by no later than two (2) months after the Effectiveness Date prepare an annual work plan and budget acceptable to the World Bank.\n\n**Conditions**\n\nPage 5 of 54"
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    "input_text": "**The World Bank**\nEmergency Food Security Project (P178936)\n\n**I.** **STRATEGIC CONTEXT**\n\n**A. Country Context**\n\n**1.** **Over the past decade, Jordan has faced a number of external shocks that directly affected economic**\n**growth and the economy’s ability to create enough productive jobs for its young and fast-growing population.**\nHeadwinds started with the global financial crisis in 2008 leading to a dampening of economic activity in 2009, while the accompanying policy response—including lower taxes and debt accumulation— was not enough to stimulate growth. Second, regional conflicts erupting in 2011 disrupted trade routes to key trade partners, including Turkey and the European Union (EU). For example, exports have been adversely affected by the closure of the border with Iraq in 2014. World Bank estimates show that the Syrian conflict alone has led to a 1.6 percentage point lower growth during 2010-18. [1] Moreover, Jordan experienced a large refugee influx and is currently hosting almost 1.3 million Syrians (representing almost 13 percent of the total population, of which 674,268 are registered refugees with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) [2], which has put tremendous pressure on public services, and on food security [3] . Third, the disruption of favorably priced natural gas supplies from Egypt (also in 2011), created another major shock and had a serious implication for Jordan’s energy intensive manufacturing sector, negatively impacting competitiveness [4], economic growth and public debt. [5] Fourth, the economic slowdown in Gulf countries (following depressed oil prices in 2014) led to a significant drop in external inflows. These external shocks have dampened Jordan’s growth momentum leading to persistently sluggish growth dynamics along with increased macroeconomic vulnerability.\n\n**2.** **The COVID-19 pandemic has had significant economic impact on Jordan, given the country’s small and**\n**open economy with strong linkages with the rest of the world.** Jordan’s real Gross Domestic Product (GDP)\ncontracted by 1.6 percent in 2020, compared to 2.0 percent growth in 2019. The pandemic has had particularly profound impacts on key sectors for the Jordanian economy, such as the service sector, including travel and tourism. Jordan’s unemployment rate, which marginally increased from 18.3 percent to 19.1 percent between 2017 and 2019, rose significantly as a result of the pandemic shock, reaching 23.2 percent in 2020. Female unemployment, which had been declining between 2017 and 2019, from 31.2 percent to 27 percent, rose sharply to 30.7 percent in 2020. Moreover, youth unemployment (15-24 years) soared from 40.6 percent in 2019 to an unprecedented high of 46.0 percent in 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic has also had severe impacts on Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), which provide 52 percent of private sector employment in the country, [6] including a decline in demand, reduced supply, tightening credit conditions, and a fall in investment.\n\n**3.** **Jordan’s economy nonetheless has weathered the COVID-19 shock better than many peers.** In global\ncomparison, Jordan’s GDP contraction in 2020 remained relatively muted, in part due to the Government of Jordan 1 World Bank. 2020. _The Fallout of War: The Regional Consequences of the War in Syria_ . Washington, DC: World Bank.\n_[https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena/publication/fallout-of-war-in-syria.](https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena/publication/fallout-of-war-in-syria)_ 2 As of 31 March 2022.\n3 Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”. (World Food Summit, 1996) 4 By 2015, although, the balance between NEPCO revenues and the generation cost has been restored but electricity cost had become the binding constraint to growth and product diversification. (Hausmann, R., et al., 2019. \"Jordan: The Elements of a Growth Strategy,\" CID Working Papers 346, Center for International Development at Harvard University.).\n5 Government of Jordan caped the tariff response to spare the bulk of the population from large tariff increases and produced an accumulated energy sector debt of about 18 percent of GDP, held by the Central Government and NEPCO (World Bank, 2018: “Jordan First Equitable Growth Job Creation Programmatic Development Policy Financing Project”).\n6 Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation (JLGC). June 2019.\n\nPage 6 of 54",
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    "input_text_preprocessed": "**The World Bank**\nEmergency Food Security Project (P178936)\n\n**I.** **STRATEGIC CONTEXT**\n\n**A. Country Context**\n\n**1.** **Over the past decade, Jordan has faced a number of external shocks that directly affected economic**\n**growth and the economy’s ability to create enough productive jobs for its young and fast-growing population.**\nHeadwinds started with the global financial crisis in 2008 leading to a dampening of economic activity in 2009, while the accompanying policy response—including lower taxes and debt accumulation— was not enough to stimulate growth. Second, regional conflicts erupting in 2011 disrupted trade routes to key trade partners, including Turkey and the European Union (EU). For example, exports have been adversely affected by the closure of the border with Iraq in 2014. World Bank estimates show that the Syrian conflict alone has led to a 1.6 percentage point lower growth during 2010-18. [1] Moreover, Jordan experienced a large refugee influx and is currently hosting almost 1.3 million Syrians (representing almost 13 percent of the total population, of which 674,268 are registered refugees with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) [2], which has put tremendous pressure on public services, and on food security [3] . Third, the disruption of favorably priced natural gas supplies from Egypt (also in 2011), created another major shock and had a serious implication for Jordan’s energy intensive manufacturing sector, negatively impacting competitiveness [4], economic growth and public debt. [5] Fourth, the economic slowdown in Gulf countries (following depressed oil prices in 2014) led to a significant drop in external inflows. These external shocks have dampened Jordan’s growth momentum leading to persistently sluggish growth dynamics along with increased macroeconomic vulnerability.\n\n**2.** **The COVID-19 pandemic has had significant economic impact on Jordan, given the country’s small and**\n**open economy with strong linkages with the rest of the world.** Jordan’s real Gross Domestic Product (GDP)\ncontracted by 1.6 percent in 2020, compared to 2.0 percent growth in 2019. The pandemic has had particularly profound impacts on key sectors for the Jordanian economy, such as the service sector, including travel and tourism. Jordan’s unemployment rate, which marginally increased from 18.3 percent to 19.1 percent between 2017 and 2019, rose significantly as a result of the pandemic shock, reaching 23.2 percent in 2020. Female unemployment, which had been declining between 2017 and 2019, from 31.2 percent to 27 percent, rose sharply to 30.7 percent in 2020. Moreover, youth unemployment (15-24 years) soared from 40.6 percent in 2019 to an unprecedented high of 46.0 percent in 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic has also had severe impacts on Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), which provide 52 percent of private sector employment in the country, [6] including a decline in demand, reduced supply, tightening credit conditions, and a fall in investment.\n\n**3.** **Jordan’s economy nonetheless has weathered the COVID-19 shock better than many peers.** In global\ncomparison, Jordan’s GDP contraction in 2020 remained relatively muted, in part due to the Government of Jordan 1 World Bank. 2020. _The Fallout of War: The Regional Consequences of the War in Syria_ . Washington, DC: World Bank.\n_[https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena/publication/fallout-of-war-in-syria.](https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/mena/publication/fallout-of-war-in-syria)_ 2 As of 31 March 2022.\n3 Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”. (World Food Summit, 1996) 4 By 2015, although, the balance between NEPCO revenues and the generation cost has been restored but electricity cost had become the binding constraint to growth and product diversification. (Hausmann, R., et al., 2019. \"Jordan: The Elements of a Growth Strategy,\" CID Working Papers 346, Center for International Development at Harvard University.).\n5 Government of Jordan caped the tariff response to spare the bulk of the population from large tariff increases and produced an accumulated energy sector debt of about 18 percent of GDP, held by the Central Government and NEPCO (World Bank, 2018: “Jordan First Equitable Growth Job Creation Programmatic Development Policy Financing Project”).\n6 Jordan Loan Guarantee Corporation (JLGC). June 2019.\n\nPage 6 of 54"
  },
  {
    "input_text": "**The World Bank**\nEmergency Food Security Project (P178936) (GOJ)’s timely fiscal and monetary stimuli, efficient management of the health crisis as well as a substantial improvement in terms of trade (as a result of the decline in international oil prices during 2020). In 2021, real GDP grew by 2.2 percent reflecting reasonably strong bounce back. Nevertheless, despite this turn around, high unemployment rates and unresolved structural challenges remain a concern. According to the World Bank’s Jobs Diagnostic (2019) [7] the economy needs at least six percent growth to make a dent in the unemployment rate, which is three times the level experienced since 2010. Thus, the current rate of unemployment at 23.3 percent (last quarter of 2021) and of labor force participation rate (33.5 percent total, 53.8 percent for men and 13.6 percent for women), present a sizeable challenge for Jordan. Furthermore, Jordan’s foreign direct investment (FDI) flows have notably declined over the past decade, from 6.1 percent of GDP in 2010 to 1.5 percent of GDP in 2019—foregoing a potential source for productivity gains, dynamism, and external funding for the economy. [8]\n\n**4.** **Jordan’s economy is facing increased price pressures.** Even before the war in Ukraine, significant\ndisruptions to global supply chains caused by the COVID-19 pandemic have further affected trade, increasing the economic vulnerability of Jordan. Being an import-dependent small open economy, unfavorable changes in Jordan’s terms-of-trade have negatively impacted domestic price settings during 2021. This trend was further accentuated by the rise in global transportation costs. [9] Consequently, headline CPI inflation clocked in at an average 1.3 percent in 2021 - the highest rate in 3 years. However, in regional comparison, inflation in Jordan remained low. In 2021, the central government’s overall fiscal deficit (including grants) reached 5.7 percent of GDP, or 1.6 percent of GDP lower than 2020 and 0.4 percent of GDP below the budget target. Timely donor support, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Extended Fund Facility (EFF) program [10] (including program augmentation as well as front loading) have helped alleviate pressure from the external sector. At end 2021, the Central Bank of Jordan’s gross official foreign reserves reached US$19 billion or almost US$2 billion higher than the previous year.\n\n**5.** **The war in Ukraine has caused a major shock to global commodity markets and poses a major threat to**\n**global food security** . With Ukraine and the Russian Federation being major global producers of basic agricultural\ncommodities (wheat, maize, oilseeds), fertilizer and fuel, the war in Ukraine has introduced significant instability and uncertainty in global agricultural commodity, energy and fertilizer markets. The disruptions in production and trade caused by the war have pushed international prices in these markets to new all-time highs in recent months.\nThe most recent World Bank Food Security Update (April 7, 2022) highlighted that since January 2021 the agricultural price index is up 29 percent, the cereals price index 11 percent, and the export price index 64 percent.\nWheat prices retreated somewhat from the peak reached on March 7, 2022, but they are still nearly 36 percent higher than in early February 2022, before the war in Ukraine, and 60 percent higher since January 2021. Maize prices are about 20 percent above the early February level and 48 percent higher than in January 2021, while rice prices have continued to remain remarkably stable. Meanwhile, fertilizer prices surged in March 2022, up nearly 20 percent since January and almost 3 times higher compared to a year ago, whereas energy prices had surged 63.4 percent year on year.\n\n7 Winkler, Hernan; Gonzalez, Alvaro. 2019. “Jordan Jobs Diagnostic.” Jobs Series; No. 18. World Bank, Washington, DC.\n8 In 2019, FDI inflows fell to the lowest point over the past two decades, accounting for only 1.5 percent of GDP.\n9 International freight charges peaked around US$11,109 in September 2021 from US$1,500 pre-pandemic. These currently stand around US$ 9,430 (source: Bloomberg).\n10 Jordan’s fiscal adjustment remains supported by the IMF. The Third Review of the IMF EFF program was completed on December 20, 2021. This allowed IMF to disperse almost US$335 million (or cumulatively US$1.23 billion) under the program). According to the IMF, sound policies have helped maintain macroeconomic stability, while the government remains on track to narrow its fiscal deficit, and reserves remain at a comfortable level.\n\nPage 7 of 54",
    "datasets": [
      {
        "mention_name": {
          "text": "Jordan Jobs Diagnostic",
          "start": 3824,
          "end": 3846,
          "verdict": "invalid",
          "verdict_reason": "Jordan Jobs Diagnostic is a title of a report or publication, not a structured data resource.",
          "corrected_name": "",
          "strict_specificity": "vague",
          "data_use_purpose": "No Use",
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          "downstream_impact_channel": "None"
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    ],
    "page_index": 11,
    "page_number": 12,
    "input_text_preprocessed": "**The World Bank**\nEmergency Food Security Project (P178936) (GOJ)’s timely fiscal and monetary stimuli, efficient management of the health crisis as well as a substantial improvement in terms of trade (as a result of the decline in international oil prices during 2020). In 2021, real GDP grew by 2.2 percent reflecting reasonably strong bounce back. Nevertheless, despite this turn around, high unemployment rates and unresolved structural challenges remain a concern. According to the World Bank’s Jobs Diagnostic (2019) [7] the economy needs at least six percent growth to make a dent in the unemployment rate, which is three times the level experienced since 2010. Thus, the current rate of unemployment at 23.3 percent (last quarter of 2021) and of labor force participation rate (33.5 percent total, 53.8 percent for men and 13.6 percent for women), present a sizeable challenge for Jordan. Furthermore, Jordan’s foreign direct investment (FDI) flows have notably declined over the past decade, from 6.1 percent of GDP in 2010 to 1.5 percent of GDP in 2019—foregoing a potential source for productivity gains, dynamism, and external funding for the economy. [8]\n\n**4.** **Jordan’s economy is facing increased price pressures.** Even before the war in Ukraine, significant\ndisruptions to global supply chains caused by the COVID-19 pandemic have further affected trade, increasing the economic vulnerability of Jordan. Being an import-dependent small open economy, unfavorable changes in Jordan’s terms-of-trade have negatively impacted domestic price settings during 2021. This trend was further accentuated by the rise in global transportation costs. [9] Consequently, headline CPI inflation clocked in at an average 1.3 percent in 2021 - the highest rate in 3 years. However, in regional comparison, inflation in Jordan remained low. In 2021, the central government’s overall fiscal deficit (including grants) reached 5.7 percent of GDP, or 1.6 percent of GDP lower than 2020 and 0.4 percent of GDP below the budget target. Timely donor support, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Extended Fund Facility (EFF) program [10] (including program augmentation as well as front loading) have helped alleviate pressure from the external sector. At end 2021, the Central Bank of Jordan’s gross official foreign reserves reached US$19 billion or almost US$2 billion higher than the previous year.\n\n**5.** **The war in Ukraine has caused a major shock to global commodity markets and poses a major threat to**\n**global food security** . With Ukraine and the Russian Federation being major global producers of basic agricultural\ncommodities (wheat, maize, oilseeds), fertilizer and fuel, the war in Ukraine has introduced significant instability and uncertainty in global agricultural commodity, energy and fertilizer markets. The disruptions in production and trade caused by the war have pushed international prices in these markets to new all-time highs in recent months.\nThe most recent World Bank Food Security Update (April 7, 2022) highlighted that since January 2021 the agricultural price index is up 29 percent, the cereals price index 11 percent, and the export price index 64 percent.\nWheat prices retreated somewhat from the peak reached on March 7, 2022, but they are still nearly 36 percent higher than in early February 2022, before the war in Ukraine, and 60 percent higher since January 2021. Maize prices are about 20 percent above the early February level and 48 percent higher than in January 2021, while rice prices have continued to remain remarkably stable. Meanwhile, fertilizer prices surged in March 2022, up nearly 20 percent since January and almost 3 times higher compared to a year ago, whereas energy prices had surged 63.4 percent year on year.\n\n7 Winkler, Hernan; Gonzalez, Alvaro. 2019. “Jordan Jobs Diagnostic.” Jobs Series; No. 18. World Bank, Washington, DC.\n8 In 2019, FDI inflows fell to the lowest point over the past two decades, accounting for only 1.5 percent of GDP.\n9 International freight charges peaked around US$11,109 in September 2021 from US$1,500 pre-pandemic. These currently stand around US$ 9,430 (source: Bloomberg).\n10 Jordan’s fiscal adjustment remains supported by the IMF. The Third Review of the IMF EFF program was completed on December 20, 2021. This allowed IMF to disperse almost US$335 million (or cumulatively US$1.23 billion) under the program). According to the IMF, sound policies have helped maintain macroeconomic stability, while the government remains on track to narrow its fiscal deficit, and reserves remain at a comfortable level.\n\nPage 7 of 54"
  },
  {
    "input_text": "**The World Bank**\nEmergency Food Security Project (P178936)\n\n**6.** **Jordan’s fragility to external shocks and internal factors can exacerbate food security in the country.**\nJordan’s structural impediments in a context of needs for regional stability and response to imminent global risk factors arising from the war in Ukraine represent key challenges for immediate recovery. Jordan is positioned at the epicenter of one of the most volatile regions in the world. The government has consistently preserved its stability, drawing from its unique geopolitical positioning and socio-political resilience. The country has been highly exposed to exogenous shocks, particularly the spillovers from regional conflicts, including Syria, Iraq and the West Bank and Gaza, dependency on foreign aid and inflow of capital, and shifts in geopolitical relations, all of which have compounded the country’s existing vulnerabilities. Regional insecurity and any subsequent displacement of refugees into Jordan coupled with the pandemic pose a risk for the food security of the country and stress its food system. Although direct trade links with Ukraine and the Russian Federation are limited, a continuous and accelerated surge in commodity prices (especially those of wheat and barley) and stronger slowdown in global growth represent imminent downside risks to the economy and food security.\n\n**B. Sectoral and Institutional Context**\n\n**7.** **Globally and in the region, Jordan is one of the most import dependent countries for covering its**\n**national grains consumption needs.** The country is highly vulnerable to price volatility and supply disruptions in\nglobal markets for basic agricultural commodities. Jordan does not produce significant volumes of basic agricultural commodities domestically. For example, annual domestic wheat and barley production averaged 21,499 tons and 54,234 tons respectively between 2018 and 2020 compared to monthly domestic consumption levels of 90,000 tons of wheat and 80,000 tons of barley [11] . In the period 2018-2020, total annual import volumes of wheat and barley averaged 913,334 tons and 770,068 tons respectively, which amounted to an average annual import bill of US$ 227 million for wheat and US$ 177 million for barley (UN Comtrade, 2022). The Black Sea region is the principal origin for the bulk of Jordan’s grain imports (given lower freight costs compared to other origins), with the region representing 98 percent of Jordanian wheat imports and 78 percent of barley imports. Yet the supply shock caused by the war in Ukraine has changed the geopolitics and economics of grain trade where small buyers, like Jordan, are competing in a tight market with large countries and fewer suppliers, that are geographically farther from the region, and where not only price, but also grain quality play an important role in the purchasing decisions of the GOJ, further reducing market options for the country. This could further exacerbate the ability of the GOJ to secure the required grain purchases on time to meet domestic consumption levels at socially acceptable prices.\n\n**8.** **Jordan’s vulnerability to shocks in global commodity markets is further compounded by the**\n**demographic pressures facing the country** . In addition to the structural challenges of sluggish growth, growing\ndebt, high unemployment, declining FDI and trade disruptions due to regional conflicts, Jordan is confronted with growing demographic, climate and environmental pressures. Between 2000 and 2020 the Jordanian population (excluding refugees) grew at rates between 1.37 and 5.00 percent. When adding the influx of 1.3 million refugees from Syria into Jordan since the start of the civil war, Jordan’s effective population growth in 2020 amounted to 14 percent.\n\n**9.** **Moreover, climate change is significantly reducing the opportunities to respond to growing domestic**\n**consumption and improve resilience to external shocks through increased domestic production of grains** .\nClimate change poses a serious challenge to the Jordanian agriculture sector. Not only is Jordan endowed with limited natural resources (Jordan is the second most water scarce country in the world with only 97 cubic meters 11 As a result, Jordan is entirely dependent on global markets to meet domestic consumption needs for basic commodities such as cereals (95 percent overall and more than 95 percent for wheat and barley), vegetable oil (79 percent), rice (100 percent) and sugar (100 percent).\n\nPage 8 of 54",
    "datasets": [
      {
        "mention_name": {
          "text": "Emergency Food Security Project",
          "start": 19,
          "end": 50,
          "verdict": "invalid",
          "verdict_reason": "Emergency Food Security Project is a project title and not a structured data resource mentioned in a narrative context.",
          "corrected_name": "",
          "strict_specificity": "vague",
          "data_use_purpose": "No Use",
          "data_use_impact": "",
          "downstream_impact_channel": "None"
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    ],
    "page_index": 12,
    "page_number": 13,
    "input_text_preprocessed": "**The World Bank**\nEmergency Food Security Project (P178936)\n\n**6.** **Jordan’s fragility to external shocks and internal factors can exacerbate food security in the country.**\nJordan’s structural impediments in a context of needs for regional stability and response to imminent global risk factors arising from the war in Ukraine represent key challenges for immediate recovery. Jordan is positioned at the epicenter of one of the most volatile regions in the world. The government has consistently preserved its stability, drawing from its unique geopolitical positioning and socio-political resilience. The country has been highly exposed to exogenous shocks, particularly the spillovers from regional conflicts, including Syria, Iraq and the West Bank and Gaza, dependency on foreign aid and inflow of capital, and shifts in geopolitical relations, all of which have compounded the country’s existing vulnerabilities. Regional insecurity and any subsequent displacement of refugees into Jordan coupled with the pandemic pose a risk for the food security of the country and stress its food system. Although direct trade links with Ukraine and the Russian Federation are limited, a continuous and accelerated surge in commodity prices (especially those of wheat and barley) and stronger slowdown in global growth represent imminent downside risks to the economy and food security.\n\n**B. Sectoral and Institutional Context**\n\n**7.** **Globally and in the region, Jordan is one of the most import dependent countries for covering its**\n**national grains consumption needs.** The country is highly vulnerable to price volatility and supply disruptions in\nglobal markets for basic agricultural commodities. Jordan does not produce significant volumes of basic agricultural commodities domestically. For example, annual domestic wheat and barley production averaged 21,499 tons and 54,234 tons respectively between 2018 and 2020 compared to monthly domestic consumption levels of 90,000 tons of wheat and 80,000 tons of barley [11] . In the period 2018-2020, total annual import volumes of wheat and barley averaged 913,334 tons and 770,068 tons respectively, which amounted to an average annual import bill of US$ 227 million for wheat and US$ 177 million for barley (UN Comtrade, 2022). The Black Sea region is the principal origin for the bulk of Jordan’s grain imports (given lower freight costs compared to other origins), with the region representing 98 percent of Jordanian wheat imports and 78 percent of barley imports. Yet the supply shock caused by the war in Ukraine has changed the geopolitics and economics of grain trade where small buyers, like Jordan, are competing in a tight market with large countries and fewer suppliers, that are geographically farther from the region, and where not only price, but also grain quality play an important role in the purchasing decisions of the GOJ, further reducing market options for the country. This could further exacerbate the ability of the GOJ to secure the required grain purchases on time to meet domestic consumption levels at socially acceptable prices.\n\n**8.** **Jordan’s vulnerability to shocks in global commodity markets is further compounded by the**\n**demographic pressures facing the country** . In addition to the structural challenges of sluggish growth, growing\ndebt, high unemployment, declining FDI and trade disruptions due to regional conflicts, Jordan is confronted with growing demographic, climate and environmental pressures. Between 2000 and 2020 the Jordanian population (excluding refugees) grew at rates between 1.37 and 5.00 percent. When adding the influx of 1.3 million refugees from Syria into Jordan since the start of the civil war, Jordan’s effective population growth in 2020 amounted to 14 percent.\n\n**9.** **Moreover, climate change is significantly reducing the opportunities to respond to growing domestic**\n**consumption and improve resilience to external shocks through increased domestic production of grains** .\nClimate change poses a serious challenge to the Jordanian agriculture sector. Not only is Jordan endowed with limited natural resources (Jordan is the second most water scarce country in the world with only 97 cubic meters 11 As a result, Jordan is entirely dependent on global markets to meet domestic consumption needs for basic commodities such as cereals (95 percent overall and more than 95 percent for wheat and barley), vegetable oil (79 percent), rice (100 percent) and sugar (100 percent).\n\nPage 8 of 54"
  },
  {
    "input_text": "**The World Bank**\nEmergency Food Security Project (P178936) of water available per capita per year – well below the absolute water scarcity threshold of 500 cubic meters per capita per year), but those resources are increasingly vulnerable to climate-related hazards (Jordan ranks 72 out of 182 countries in the ND-GAIN index for climate vulnerability in 2019), including droughts [12], extreme temperature, storms, landslides and flash floods [13] . These changes are likely to have negative effects on crop production as they will decrease the availability of water for irrigation, diminishing the suitability of key crops and increase the vulnerability of smallholder farmers who are already extremely vulnerable to the impacts of climate change due to their low-incomes, poor access to technical capacities and lack of technology to increase productivity under extreme weather conditions [14] . In the livestock sub-sector, rising drought risks reduce the carrying capacity of rangelands and increase the dependency on grains for fodder, thereby contributing to import dependency and vulnerability to external price shocks. Finally, adaptation options to reduce vulnerability along grain import supply chains and the grain import system and physical grain storage will need to be pursued to reflect increasingly hot and dry conditions, as well as heavy precipitation events.\n\n**10.** **High and volatile food prices due to shocks in global commodity markets disproportionately impact**\n**poor and vulnerable households in Jordan.** In February 2022, annual food price inflation trended at 2.7 percent\n\n- the highest rate recorded over the past 12 months. Growing inflationary pressures as a result of higher food\nprices pose a significant threat to vulnerable households. Importantly, short-term demand for wheat products, which account for the largest share in the food basket, is relatively inelastic in Jordan as in the Arab world in general (World Bank, 2012). Many Jordanian households hover around the national poverty line making poverty numbers very sensitive to even small increases in the cost of living (Figure 1). [15] Moreover, households are affected by higher food prices in different ways, with women, including female-headed households resorting to harmful coping strategies, such as reducing their own nutrition consumption to feed members of their family, or taking on risky jobs to acquire food as a result of having limited access to assets and markets, and fewer pathways out of the crisis as compared to their male counterparts (Oxfam, 2019). Furthermore, poor and near-poor households in Jordan tend to spend a larger share of their income on food. Food purchases account for over one-third of poor and near poor Jordanian household budgets and a quarter among the richest 20 percent of the population (Figure 2). Similarly, food purchases account for over one-third of refugee household budgets. Within Jordanians’ food basket basic agricultural commodities account for most of the caloric intake, in particular wheat products (28 percent), sugar (14 percent), rice (8 percent), sunflower seed oil (7 percent) and soybean oil (4 percent) (Department of Statistics of Jordan, 2022).\n\n12 In 2021, Jordan experienced one of the most severe droughts in its history.\n_13_ [Jordan - Vulnerability | Climate Change Knowledge Portal (worldbank.org)](https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/country/jordan/vulnerability#:~:text=Climate%2Drelated%20hazards%20in%20Jordan,include%20periodic%20earthquakes%20and%20epidemics.)\n14 IPCC projections for the future indicate that by 2030 temperatures are projected to increase by 1–2oC and that there will be a significant\nincrease in the number of crop heat stress days throughout Jordan. Climate models from the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase\n5 (CMIP5) ensemble project a decline in future precipitation rates of 6 percent, 11.5 percent, and 19 percent by 2030, 2050, and 2070,\nrespectively (RCP 8.5). The whole country is expected to experience a decrease in precipitation. The northern region and King’s Highway\nare projected to experience the largest precipitation declines by 2030: 12.5 percent and 10.4 percent respectively. Rainfall decreases in the\nEastern and Southern desert are projected to be 9.4 percent and 3.1 percent, respectively. Jordan’s Eastern and Southern Desert regions,\nwhich are primarily rangelands, are likely to experience more warming than the Northern region and the King’s Highway, which currently\nrely mostly on rainfed and irrigated agriculture.\n15 World Bank analysis indicates that if food prices were to increase by 10 percent in Jordan (a smaller increase than in the 2007-2008 food\nprice crises), poverty would increase by an additional 1.3 percentage points and the poverty gap would rise by half a percentage point,\nwhile a 20 percent increase in food prices would increase the poverty rate from 15.7 percent to 19.4 percent (43,000 new poor families).\n\nPage 9 of 54",
    "datasets": [
      {
        "mention_name": {
          "text": "Emergency Food Security Project",
          "start": 19,
          "end": 50,
          "verdict": "invalid",
          "verdict_reason": "Emergency Food Security Project is a project title and not a structured data resource or dataset.",
          "corrected_name": "",
          "strict_specificity": "vague",
          "data_use_purpose": "No Use",
          "data_use_impact": "",
          "downstream_impact_channel": "None"
        }
      },
      {
        "mention_name": {
          "text": "ND-GAIN index for climate vulnerability",
          "start": 313,
          "end": 352,
          "verdict": "valid",
          "verdict_reason": "ND-GAIN index for climate vulnerability is a structured index that quantifies climate vulnerability, making it a valid data mention.",
          "corrected_name": "ND-GAIN index for climate vulnerability",
          "strict_specificity": "named",
          "data_use_purpose": "Evidence",
          "data_use_impact": "Cited to support claims about climate vulnerability rankings.",
          "downstream_impact_channel": "Knowledge Production"
        }
      }
    ],
    "page_index": 13,
    "page_number": 14,
    "input_text_preprocessed": "**The World Bank**\nEmergency Food Security Project (P178936) of water available per capita per year – well below the absolute water scarcity threshold of 500 cubic meters per capita per year), but those resources are increasingly vulnerable to climate-related hazards (Jordan ranks 72 out of 182 countries in the ND-GAIN index for climate vulnerability in 2019), including droughts [12], extreme temperature, storms, landslides and flash floods [13] . These changes are likely to have negative effects on crop production as they will decrease the availability of water for irrigation, diminishing the suitability of key crops and increase the vulnerability of smallholder farmers who are already extremely vulnerable to the impacts of climate change due to their low-incomes, poor access to technical capacities and lack of technology to increase productivity under extreme weather conditions [14] . In the livestock sub-sector, rising drought risks reduce the carrying capacity of rangelands and increase the dependency on grains for fodder, thereby contributing to import dependency and vulnerability to external price shocks. Finally, adaptation options to reduce vulnerability along grain import supply chains and the grain import system and physical grain storage will need to be pursued to reflect increasingly hot and dry conditions, as well as heavy precipitation events.\n\n**10.** **High and volatile food prices due to shocks in global commodity markets disproportionately impact**\n**poor and vulnerable households in Jordan.** In February 2022, annual food price inflation trended at 2.7 percent\n\n- the highest rate recorded over the past 12 months. Growing inflationary pressures as a result of higher food\nprices pose a significant threat to vulnerable households. Importantly, short-term demand for wheat products, which account for the largest share in the food basket, is relatively inelastic in Jordan as in the Arab world in general (World Bank, 2012). Many Jordanian households hover around the national poverty line making poverty numbers very sensitive to even small increases in the cost of living (Figure 1). [15] Moreover, households are affected by higher food prices in different ways, with women, including female-headed households resorting to harmful coping strategies, such as reducing their own nutrition consumption to feed members of their family, or taking on risky jobs to acquire food as a result of having limited access to assets and markets, and fewer pathways out of the crisis as compared to their male counterparts (Oxfam, 2019). Furthermore, poor and near-poor households in Jordan tend to spend a larger share of their income on food. Food purchases account for over one-third of poor and near poor Jordanian household budgets and a quarter among the richest 20 percent of the population (Figure 2). Similarly, food purchases account for over one-third of refugee household budgets. Within Jordanians’ food basket basic agricultural commodities account for most of the caloric intake, in particular wheat products (28 percent), sugar (14 percent), rice (8 percent), sunflower seed oil (7 percent) and soybean oil (4 percent) (Department of Statistics of Jordan, 2022).\n\n12 In 2021, Jordan experienced one of the most severe droughts in its history.\n_13_ [Jordan - Vulnerability | Climate Change Knowledge Portal (worldbank.org)](https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/country/jordan/vulnerability#:~:text=Climate%2Drelated%20hazards%20in%20Jordan,include%20periodic%20earthquakes%20and%20epidemics.)\n14 IPCC projections for the future indicate that by 2030 temperatures are projected to increase by 1–2oC and that there will be a significant\nincrease in the number of crop heat stress days throughout Jordan. Climate models from the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase\n5 (CMIP5) ensemble project a decline in future precipitation rates of 6 percent, 11.5 percent, and 19 percent by 2030, 2050, and 2070,\nrespectively (RCP 8.5). The whole country is expected to experience a decrease in precipitation. The northern region and King’s Highway\nare projected to experience the largest precipitation declines by 2030: 12.5 percent and 10.4 percent respectively. Rainfall decreases in the\nEastern and Southern desert are projected to be 9.4 percent and 3.1 percent, respectively. Jordan’s Eastern and Southern Desert regions,\nwhich are primarily rangelands, are likely to experience more warming than the Northern region and the King’s Highway, which currently\nrely mostly on rainfed and irrigated agriculture.\n15 World Bank analysis indicates that if food prices were to increase by 10 percent in Jordan (a smaller increase than in the 2007-2008 food\nprice crises), poverty would increase by an additional 1.3 percentage points and the poverty gap would rise by half a percentage point,\nwhile a 20 percent increase in food prices would increase the poverty rate from 15.7 percent to 19.4 percent (43,000 new poor families).\n\nPage 9 of 54"
  },
  {
    "input_text": "**The World Bank**\nEmergency Food Security Project (P178936)\n\n**Figure 1: Jordan 2017-18 household per capita consumption**\n**distribution relative to the national poverty line**\n\n**Figure 2: Share of food expenditure in total expenditure p.c. (%)**\n\nSource: 2017-18 HEIS and World Bank calculations. Source: World Bank\n\n**11.** **Existing food insecurity levels are particularly high among Jordan’s refugee population.** According to the\nmost recent mobile Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping (mVAM) [16] completed by the World Food Program (WFP) in Jordan, 7 percent of Jordanian households (representing 535,559 individuals) were found to be food insecure as of February 2021 and another 51 percent of households (representing 3,843,701 individuals) were vulnerable to food insecurity, meaning that they were very likely to experience an acute decline in food access or consumption levels below minimum survival needs. WFP’s mVAM also found that food insecurity levels among Jordan’s refugee community (which are not covered by Jordan’s social security net system) are significantly higher than those registered at the level of Jordanian households. Of the more than 750,000 refugees [17] registered in Jordan (89 percent of whom came from Syria), an estimated 17 percent live in the Za’atari and Azraq refugee camps, while the remaining 83 percent are mostly in Jordan’s urban areas. Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, food security has been a key concern for refugees in both camps and in host communities mainly due to the loss of income from temporary and informal labor activities. More than 80 percent of labor activities performed by non-Jordanians are estimated to take place in the informal economy versus 40 percent for Jordanian citizens (MOSD, 2019). February 2021 mVAM data showed that 23.3 percent of refugee households in host communities are food insecure (over 154,777 individuals), while another 63.7 percent of refugee households (equivalent to approximately 423,344 individuals) are vulnerable to food insecurity.\n\n**12.** **Ensuring food security and social stability are at the core of the urgent need to ensure availability of**\n**and access to staple food** . Bread is an essential part of the diet in Jordan and represents the main caloric source\nfor the poorest Jordanians and the many refugees in the country. Similarly, barley import dependent livestock herding is the mainstay of the rural economy and the livelihoods of about 200,000 people in traditional nomadic and semi-nomadic Bedouin tribal communities. While trade in basic food commodities (such as sugar, rice, cooking oil, milk powder) is managed mainly by the private sector in Jordan, the GOJ maintains full control of grain reserves by directly managing the purchase, import, storage and domestic sales of wheat and barley. In 2021, the GOJ discontinued the bread subsidy and, as a response to the COVID-19 outbreak, it fixed the domestic price of bread to ensure its affordability (at 0.32 JOD per kilogram) for the entire population of Jordan. This intervention model (in combination with the effective appreciation of the Jordanian dinar) has helped control inflationary pressures.\nHowever, maintaining this status quo in a context of all time high international grain prices is costly, also coinciding with Bond maturity obligations of the GOJ, further reducing the availability of financial resources at a critical time.\n\n**13.** **Public procurement of strategic agricultural commodities is at the core of Jordan’s food security strategy**\n**as rising food prices pose a significant threat to social stability** . Historically, Jordan has played a key role as an\n\n_16_ [WFP | Jordan: Mobile Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping Dashboard | As of June 2021 (arcgis.com)](https://unwfp.maps.arcgis.com/apps/MapSeries/index.html?appid=7210a3ee33b14c5b9a989590345cb49a)\n_17_ _As of July 2021_\n\nPage 10 of 54",
    "datasets": [
      {
        "mention_name": {
          "text": "mobile Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping",
          "start": 451,
          "end": 494,
          "verdict": "valid",
          "verdict_reason": "mobile Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping is a structured data resource that provides empirical data on food insecurity levels.",
          "corrected_name": "mobile Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping",
          "strict_specificity": "named",
          "data_use_purpose": "Evidence",
          "data_use_impact": "Cited to support findings on food insecurity levels.",
          "downstream_impact_channel": "Needs Assessment"
        }
      }
    ],
    "page_index": 14,
    "page_number": 15,
    "input_text_preprocessed": "**The World Bank**\nEmergency Food Security Project (P178936)\n\n**Figure 1: Jordan 2017-18 household per capita consumption**\n**distribution relative to the national poverty line**\n\n**Figure 2: Share of food expenditure in total expenditure p.c. (%)**\n\nSource: 2017-18 HEIS and World Bank calculations. Source: World Bank\n\n**11.** **Existing food insecurity levels are particularly high among Jordan’s refugee population.** According to the\nmost recent mobile Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping (mVAM) [16] completed by the World Food Program (WFP) in Jordan, 7 percent of Jordanian households (representing 535,559 individuals) were found to be food insecure as of February 2021 and another 51 percent of households (representing 3,843,701 individuals) were vulnerable to food insecurity, meaning that they were very likely to experience an acute decline in food access or consumption levels below minimum survival needs. WFP’s mVAM also found that food insecurity levels among Jordan’s refugee community (which are not covered by Jordan’s social security net system) are significantly higher than those registered at the level of Jordanian households. Of the more than 750,000 refugees [17] registered in Jordan (89 percent of whom came from Syria), an estimated 17 percent live in the Za’atari and Azraq refugee camps, while the remaining 83 percent are mostly in Jordan’s urban areas. Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, food security has been a key concern for refugees in both camps and in host communities mainly due to the loss of income from temporary and informal labor activities. More than 80 percent of labor activities performed by non-Jordanians are estimated to take place in the informal economy versus 40 percent for Jordanian citizens (MOSD, 2019). February 2021 mVAM data showed that 23.3 percent of refugee households in host communities are food insecure (over 154,777 individuals), while another 63.7 percent of refugee households (equivalent to approximately 423,344 individuals) are vulnerable to food insecurity.\n\n**12.** **Ensuring food security and social stability are at the core of the urgent need to ensure availability of**\n**and access to staple food** . Bread is an essential part of the diet in Jordan and represents the main caloric source\nfor the poorest Jordanians and the many refugees in the country. Similarly, barley import dependent livestock herding is the mainstay of the rural economy and the livelihoods of about 200,000 people in traditional nomadic and semi-nomadic Bedouin tribal communities. While trade in basic food commodities (such as sugar, rice, cooking oil, milk powder) is managed mainly by the private sector in Jordan, the GOJ maintains full control of grain reserves by directly managing the purchase, import, storage and domestic sales of wheat and barley. In 2021, the GOJ discontinued the bread subsidy and, as a response to the COVID-19 outbreak, it fixed the domestic price of bread to ensure its affordability (at 0.32 JOD per kilogram) for the entire population of Jordan. This intervention model (in combination with the effective appreciation of the Jordanian dinar) has helped control inflationary pressures.\nHowever, maintaining this status quo in a context of all time high international grain prices is costly, also coinciding with Bond maturity obligations of the GOJ, further reducing the availability of financial resources at a critical time.\n\n**13.** **Public procurement of strategic agricultural commodities is at the core of Jordan’s food security strategy**\n**as rising food prices pose a significant threat to social stability** . Historically, Jordan has played a key role as an\n\n_16_ [WFP | Jordan: Mobile Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping Dashboard | As of June 2021 (arcgis.com)](https://unwfp.maps.arcgis.com/apps/MapSeries/index.html?appid=7210a3ee33b14c5b9a989590345cb49a)\n_17_ _As of July 2021_\n\nPage 10 of 54"
  }
]