File size: 5,482 Bytes
97ee7cb | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 | import { httpAction } from "./_generated/server";
import { internal } from "./_generated/api";
import { requireEnv } from "./lib/env";
import { BROADCAST_TRACKED_EVENT_TYPES } from "./broadcast/metrics";
const HANDLED_EVENTS = new Set(["email.bounced", "email.complained"]);
const BROADCAST_TRACKED_SET: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(
BROADCAST_TRACKED_EVENT_TYPES,
);
async function timingSafeEqualStrings(a: string, b: string): Promise<boolean> {
const enc = new TextEncoder();
const keyMaterial = await crypto.subtle.generateKey(
{ name: "HMAC", hash: "SHA-256" },
false,
["sign"],
);
const [sigA, sigB] = await Promise.all([
crypto.subtle.sign("HMAC", keyMaterial, enc.encode(a)),
crypto.subtle.sign("HMAC", keyMaterial, enc.encode(b)),
]);
const aArr = new Uint8Array(sigA);
const bArr = new Uint8Array(sigB);
let diff = 0;
for (let i = 0; i < aArr.length; i++) diff |= aArr[i]! ^ bArr[i]!;
return diff === 0;
}
async function verifySignature(
payload: string,
headers: Headers,
secret: string,
): Promise<boolean> {
const msgId = headers.get("svix-id");
const timestamp = headers.get("svix-timestamp");
const signature = headers.get("svix-signature");
if (!msgId || !timestamp || !signature) return false;
const ts = Number(timestamp);
if (!Number.isFinite(ts)) return false;
if (Math.abs(Date.now() / 1000 - ts) > 300) return false;
const toSign = `${msgId}.${timestamp}.${payload}`;
const secretBytes = Uint8Array.from(atob(secret.replace("whsec_", "")), (c) =>
c.charCodeAt(0),
);
const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
"raw",
secretBytes,
{ name: "HMAC", hash: "SHA-256" },
false,
["sign"],
);
const sig = await crypto.subtle.sign(
"HMAC",
key,
new TextEncoder().encode(toSign),
);
const expected = btoa(String.fromCharCode(...new Uint8Array(sig)));
const signatures = signature.split(" ");
for (const s of signatures) {
const parts = s.split(",");
if (parts.length !== 2) continue;
const [version, val] = parts;
if (version !== "v1" || !val) continue;
if (await timingSafeEqualStrings(val, expected)) return true;
}
return false;
}
export const resendWebhookHandler = httpAction(async (ctx, request) => {
const secret = requireEnv("RESEND_WEBHOOK_SECRET");
const rawBody = await request.text();
const valid = await verifySignature(rawBody, request.headers, secret);
if (!valid) {
console.warn("[resend-webhook] Invalid signature");
return new Response("Invalid signature", { status: 401 });
}
let event: {
type: string;
created_at?: string;
data?: {
to?: string[];
email_id?: string;
broadcast_id?: string;
};
};
try {
event = JSON.parse(rawBody);
} catch {
return new Response("Invalid JSON", { status: 400 });
}
// Broadcast metrics — record any tracked event tagged with a
// `broadcast_id` into `broadcastEvents` for canary kill-gate decisions.
// Idempotent on svix-id (Resend retries on 5xx and we MUST treat each
// delivery as at-most-once).
const broadcastId = event.data?.broadcast_id;
if (broadcastId && BROADCAST_TRACKED_SET.has(event.type)) {
// svix-id is guaranteed non-null here: verifySignature returns false
// (and we 401'd above) if any of svix-id / svix-timestamp /
// svix-signature were absent. Non-null assert rather than re-guard.
const svixId = request.headers.get("svix-id") as string;
const occurredAt = event.created_at
? Date.parse(event.created_at) || Date.now()
: Date.now();
// Let mutation throws propagate as 5xx so Resend retries. The
// earlier `try/catch + 200` here silently dropped 53 of 250 canary
// delivered events when an OCC contention bug threw inside the
// mutation — Resend saw success and never retried, and the per-event
// log row was lost with the failed mutation. Sentry caught the
// throws (issue WORLDMONITOR-PA, 54 events) but operationally we
// were blind. Now: throw → 5xx → Resend retries → eventual
// consistency on the event log.
//
// Intentionally NOT forwarding event.data — it includes recipient
// emails (`to: string[]`), `from`, `subject`, etc. Identifier
// metadata above is enough; deeper inspection via emailMessageId in
// the Resend dashboard.
await ctx.runMutation(internal.broadcast.metrics.recordBroadcastEvent, {
webhookEventId: svixId,
broadcastId,
emailMessageId: event.data?.email_id,
eventType: event.type,
occurredAt,
});
}
if (!HANDLED_EVENTS.has(event.type)) {
return new Response(null, { status: 200 });
}
const recipients = event.data?.to;
if (!Array.isArray(recipients) || recipients.length === 0) {
return new Response(null, { status: 200 });
}
const reason = event.type === "email.bounced" ? "bounce" : "complaint";
for (const email of recipients) {
try {
await ctx.runMutation(internal.emailSuppressions.suppress, {
email,
reason: reason as "bounce" | "complaint",
source: `resend-webhook:${event.data?.email_id ?? "unknown"}`,
});
console.log(`[resend-webhook] Suppressed ${email} (${reason})`);
} catch (err) {
console.error(`[resend-webhook] Failed to suppress ${email}:`, err);
return new Response("Internal processing error", { status: 500 });
}
}
return new Response(null, { status: 200 });
});
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