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//
// 1. Per-minute burst β infra/abuse protection. Hard limit; the gateway
// returns 429 on violation (in enforce mode). Value from the catalog
// `apiRateLimit` (user keys) or a hardcoded constant (enterprise).
// 2. Daily usage meter β the commercial "included allowance". Hard-rejects
// (429 in enforce mode) at the sold allowance (#4635; was a 10Γ ceiling).
//
// This module is decision-only: it never builds a Response and never reads the
// enforce flag β the gateway (the single chokepoint at server/gateway.ts:1034)
// owns enforce-vs-shadow, per-IP bypass, and Response construction. That keeps
// the burst/meter math unit-testable in isolation (inject the pipeline + date;
// stub this module's decisions in the gateway-wiring test).
//
// Patterns cloned: api/mcp/quota.ts (INCR-first meter + DECR rollback),
// api/_rate-limit.js (lazy Upstash singleton, NODE_TEST_CONTEXT retry skip,
// X-RateLimit-* header shape), server/_shared/pro-mcp-token.ts UTC helpers.
import { Ratelimit } from '@upstash/ratelimit';
import { Redis } from '@upstash/redis';
import { getKeyPrefix } from './redis';
import { secondsUntilUtcMidnight } from './pro-mcp-token';
/** Hardcoded per-minute burst for enterprise env keys β they carry no Convex
* entitlement (gateway.ts:1006-1007 skips checkEntitlement), so this cannot
* be sourced from `features.apiRateLimit`. Mirrors ENTERPRISE_FEATURES. */
export const ENTERPRISE_API_RATE_LIMIT = 1000;
// One Redis client shared across every per-minute Ratelimit instance; one
// Ratelimit per distinct numeric limit (60, 300, 1000) cached in the Map so two
// Starter accounts share a limiter *config* but get separate buckets via the
// per-account identifier passed to `.limit()`.
let redisSingleton: Redis | null = null;
const burstLimiters = new Map<number, Ratelimit>();
function getRedis(): Redis | null {
if (redisSingleton) return redisSingleton;
const url = process.env.UPSTASH_REDIS_REST_URL;
const token = process.env.UPSTASH_REDIS_REST_TOKEN;
if (!url || !token) return null;
// Skip the @upstash/redis retry backoff under the node test runner so
// fail-open tests pointed at a fake host degrade immediately; production
// (env unset) keeps the resilient default. Mirrors api/_rate-limit.js.
// `retry: false` must stay a literal (not a spread) or it widens to
// `boolean` and fails tsconfig.api.json's RetryConfig type.
redisSingleton = process.env.NODE_TEST_CONTEXT
? new Redis({ url, token, retry: false })
: new Redis({ url, token });
return redisSingleton;
}
/**
* The per-minute burst limiter for `perMinute` requests / 60s, cached by limit.
* Returns null when Upstash is not configured (caller fail-opens).
*/
export function getBurstLimiter(perMinute: number): Ratelimit | null {
const existing = burstLimiters.get(perMinute);
if (existing) return existing;
const redis = getRedis();
if (!redis) return null;
const limiter = new Ratelimit({
redis,
limiter: Ratelimit.slidingWindow(perMinute, '60 s'),
// Env-scope the prefix exactly like the daily meter (runRedisPipeline's
// prefixKey) so a preview deployment sharing one Upstash database doesn't
// consume/pollute the production burst namespace. Empty in production.
prefix: `${getKeyPrefix()}rl:apikey:min`,
analytics: false,
});
burstLimiters.set(perMinute, limiter);
return limiter;
}
export type BurstDecision =
| { ok: true }
| { ok: false; limit: number; reset: number };
/**
* Evaluate the per-minute burst window for `identity`. Fail-OPEN: a missing
* Upstash config or any Redis error resolves to `{ ok: true }` so a paying
* customer is never 429'd for our outage (mirrors api/_rate-limit.js).
*/
export async function checkBurst(perMinute: number, identity: string): Promise<BurstDecision> {
const limiter = getBurstLimiter(perMinute);
if (!limiter) return { ok: true };
try {
const { success, limit, reset } = await limiter.limit(identity);
if (!success) return { ok: false, limit, reset };
return { ok: true };
} catch {
return { ok: true };
}
}
/** Plain (un-prefixed) daily-meter key β `runRedisPipeline` applies the
* deployment/env prefix. UTC calendar day so the daily meter resets at midnight.
* `date` is injectable for deterministic tests. */
export function apiKeyDailyKey(userId: string, date?: Date): string {
if (!userId) return '';
const d = date ?? new Date();
const yyyy = d.getUTCFullYear();
const mm = String(d.getUTCMonth() + 1).padStart(2, '0');
const dd = String(d.getUTCDate()).padStart(2, '0');
return `rl:apikey:day:${userId}:${yyyy}-${mm}-${dd}`;
}
/** 48h TTL: covers UTC-midnight rollover + an inspection window. Mirrors
* PRO_DAILY_QUOTA_TTL_SECONDS. */
export const API_DAILY_TTL_SECONDS = 172_800;
/** Minimal pipeline contract β the subset of `runRedisPipeline` this module
* needs. The gateway passes `(cmds) => runRedisPipeline(cmds)`; tests inject a
* mock. Returns `[]` on failure (fail-open), never throws by contract. */
export type RateLimitPipeline = (
commands: Array<Array<string | number>>,
) => Promise<Array<{ result?: unknown }>>;
export interface MeterResult {
/** Post-INCR count for this UTC day (0 when not metered). */
count: number;
/** True when count exceeded the sold daily allowance. */
overLimit: boolean;
/** False when Redis was unavailable (fail-open: serve uncounted). */
metered: boolean;
/** Seconds until UTC midnight β the daily 429 `Retry-After`. */
retryAfterSec: number;
/** Idempotent DECR rollback. The gateway calls this only when it actually
* rejects (enforce + overLimit); in shadow the request is served, so the
* increment stands and reflects true demand. */
rollback: () => Promise<void>;
}
/**
* Increment the per-account daily meter and report whether the sold daily
* allowance is now exceeded. INCR-first (atomic; no check-then-incr race), mirroring
* api/mcp/quota.ts::reserveQuota.
*
* - `allowance < 0` (unlimited, e.g. enterprise) β no Redis call; never metered.
* - Redis unavailable / pipeline failure β `metered:false`, `overLimit:false`
* (fail-open: the gateway serves uncounted).
*/
export async function reserveDailyMeter(opts: {
userId: string;
allowance: number;
pipeline: RateLimitPipeline;
date?: Date;
}): Promise<MeterResult> {
const { userId, allowance, pipeline, date } = opts;
const noop = async (): Promise<void> => {};
const retryAfterSec = secondsUntilUtcMidnight(date);
// No daily limit: `-1` is unlimited (enterprise); `0` is a misconfiguration
// (positive burst but zero allowance) that we fail OPEN on rather than 429
// every request (a 0 allowance would reject request #1). This guard also keeps
// unlimited (-1) from ever reaching `count > allowance` (always-true otherwise).
// Callers already gate eligibility on apiRateLimit > 0, so this is defensive.
if (allowance <= 0) {
return { count: 0, overLimit: false, metered: false, retryAfterSec, rollback: noop };
}
const key = apiKeyDailyKey(userId, date);
if (!key) {
return { count: 0, overLimit: false, metered: false, retryAfterSec, rollback: noop };
}
let pipeResult: Array<{ result?: unknown }> | null;
try {
pipeResult = await pipeline([
['INCR', key],
['EXPIRE', key, API_DAILY_TTL_SECONDS],
]);
} catch {
pipeResult = null;
}
// Fail-open: couldn't meter β serve uncounted (never punish a paying
// customer for our Redis outage).
if (!pipeResult || !Array.isArray(pipeResult) || pipeResult.length === 0) {
return { count: 0, overLimit: false, metered: false, retryAfterSec, rollback: noop };
}
const incrRaw = pipeResult[0]?.result;
const count = typeof incrRaw === 'number' ? incrRaw : Number(incrRaw);
if (!Number.isFinite(count) || count < 1) {
return { count: 0, overLimit: false, metered: false, retryAfterSec, rollback: noop };
}
let rolledBack = false;
const rollback = async (): Promise<void> => {
if (rolledBack) return;
rolledBack = true;
try {
await pipeline([['DECR', key]]);
} catch {
// Best-effort: a failed DECR overshoots the meter by 1, the
// cost-protection-correct direction.
}
};
// Enforce at the SOLD allowance (#4635): the customer's plan limit is the
// limit. (Was a 10Γ safety ceiling; dropped so the sold cap is authoritative.)
return { count, overLimit: count > allowance, metered: true, retryAfterSec, rollback };
}
/**
* Standard rate-limit response headers for a 429. Emits the IETF RateLimit
* fields (draft-ietf-httpapi-ratelimit-headers) β RateLimit-Policy advertises
* the quota/window, the combined RateLimit member carries live remaining +
* delta-seconds reset β alongside the legacy X-RateLimit-* set for back-compat,
* so customers get a uniform self-throttle contract across the per-IP and
* per-account limiters. Mirrors api/_rate-limit.js. The gateway merges these
* with corsHeaders.
*
* `resetMs` is a Unix epoch in MILLISECONDS; the IETF reset (`t` /
* RateLimit-Reset) is delta-SECONDS, so it is derived here. `windowSec` is the
* policy window in seconds (defaults to the 60 s burst window).
*/
export function rateLimitHeaders(opts: {
limit: number;
remaining: number;
resetMs: number;
retryAfterSec: number;
windowSec?: number;
}): Record<string, string> {
const remaining = Math.max(0, opts.remaining);
const resetSeconds = Math.max(0, Math.ceil((opts.resetMs - Date.now()) / 1000));
const windowSec = opts.windowSec ?? 60;
return {
// IETF RateLimit fields.
'RateLimit-Policy': `"default";q=${opts.limit};w=${windowSec}`,
'RateLimit-Limit': String(opts.limit),
'RateLimit-Remaining': String(remaining),
'RateLimit-Reset': String(resetSeconds),
RateLimit: `"default";r=${remaining};t=${resetSeconds}`,
// Legacy X-RateLimit-* retained for back-compat (Reset is epoch-ms).
'X-RateLimit-Limit': String(opts.limit),
'X-RateLimit-Remaining': String(remaining),
'X-RateLimit-Reset': String(opts.resetMs),
'Retry-After': String(Math.max(1, opts.retryAfterSec)),
};
}
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