File size: 4,744 Bytes
dbb1bf9 | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 | import { test } from "node:test";
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
/**
* Regression guard for GHSA-2x6r-qq54-mmhr — Windows OS command injection via
* the `open_url` Tauri IPC command.
*
* The old Windows branch of `open_in_shell` ran `cmd /c start "" <url>` with the
* URL UNQUOTED. Rust's std only quotes an argument containing whitespace, and a
* URL has none, so `cmd.exe` parsed `&`/`|`/etc. in an attacker-controlled feed
* link as command separators — arbitrary command execution on a single click.
*
* The fix routes all URL/path opening through the `opener` crate, which on
* Windows calls `ShellExecuteW(NULL, "open", <wide-string>, …)`: the target is
* a single Win32 argument handed to the registered protocol handler, never a
* shell command line. This test asserts the sink cannot come back.
*/
const mainRs = readFileSync(new URL("./src/main.rs", import.meta.url), "utf8");
const defaultCapability = readFileSync(new URL("./capabilities/default.json", import.meta.url), "utf8");
const rendererSources = [
new URL("../src/services/runtime.ts", import.meta.url),
new URL("../src/services/runtime-config.ts", import.meta.url),
new URL("../src/settings-main.ts", import.meta.url),
].map((url) => readFileSync(url, "utf8"));
test("open_in_shell never spawns cmd.exe (GHSA-2x6r)", () => {
assert.ok(
!mainRs.includes('Command::new("cmd")'),
'src-tauri/src/main.rs must not spawn cmd.exe — routing a URL through ' +
'`cmd /c start` is an OS command-injection sink (GHSA-2x6r).',
);
});
test("open_in_shell opens URLs/paths via the opener crate (ShellExecuteW on Windows)", () => {
assert.ok(
mainRs.includes("opener::open"),
"open_in_shell should delegate to opener::open, which uses ShellExecuteW " +
"on Windows (no shell interpretation of the URL).",
);
});
test("every renderer-callable UX and log command requires a trusted window", () => {
const commands = [
"open_logs_folder",
"open_sidecar_log_file",
"open_settings_window_command",
"close_settings_window",
"close_live_channels_window",
];
for (const command of commands) {
const start = mainRs.indexOf(`fn ${command}(`);
assert.ok(start >= 0, `${command} must remain registered in main.rs`);
const nextCommand = mainRs.indexOf("#[tauri::command]", start);
assert.ok(nextCommand >= 0, `${command} must have an explicit command boundary`);
const body = mainRs.slice(start, nextCommand);
assert.match(body, /webview: Webview/, `${command} must receive Tauri's calling webview`);
assert.match(
body,
/require_trusted_window\(webview\.label\(\)\)\?/,
`${command} must reject calls from untrusted windows`,
);
}
});
test("renderer IPC cannot read the sidecar bearer token or the secret cache (GHSA-5458)", () => {
for (const command of ["get_local_api_token", "get_secret", "get_all_secrets"]) {
assert.ok(
!mainRs.includes(`fn ${command}(`),
`${command} must not be a renderer-callable Tauri command (GHSA-5458).`,
);
assert.ok(
!mainRs.includes(` ${command},`),
`${command} must not be registered in Tauri's invoke handler (GHSA-5458).`,
);
}
for (const source of rendererSources) {
for (const command of ["get_local_api_token", "get_secret", "get_all_secrets"]) {
assert.ok(!source.includes(command), `renderer source must not invoke ${command} (GHSA-5458).`);
}
}
const runtimeConfig = rendererSources[1];
assert.ok(
runtimeConfig.includes("runtimeConfig.secrets[key as RuntimeSecretKey] = { source: 'vault' }"),
'desktop vault state must remain metadata-only (no renderer plaintext value).',
);
});
test("only the main window receives the default Tauri capability (GHSA-5458)", () => {
assert.match(defaultCapability, /"windows": \["main"\]/);
assert.ok(
!defaultCapability.includes('"settings"') && !defaultCapability.includes('"live-channels"'),
"settings and live-channels must not inherit the main window's default capability.",
);
});
test("native sidecar proxy blocks secret-management routes (GHSA-5458)", () => {
const proxyStart = mainRs.indexOf("fn proxy_local_api_request(");
assert.ok(proxyStart >= 0, "native sidecar proxy command must be present");
const proxyEnd = mainRs.indexOf("#[tauri::command]", proxyStart + 1);
const proxyBody = mainRs.slice(proxyStart, proxyEnd);
assert.match(proxyBody, /require_secret_management_window\(webview\.label\(\)\)\?/);
for (const route of ["/api/local-env-update", "/api/local-env-update-batch", "/api/local-validate-secret"]) {
assert.ok(mainRs.includes(route), `native proxy must reject ${route}`);
}
});
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