import { ConvexError, v } from "convex/values"; import { internalMutation, internalQuery, mutation, query } from "./_generated/server"; import { requireUserId, resolveUserId } from "./lib/auth"; import { getFeaturesForPlan } from "./lib/entitlements"; /** * Pro MCP token (non-key) identity rows. * * Mirrors the structure of `convex/apiKeys.ts` — same per-user 5-row cap, * same debounce on lastUsedAt — but stores no key material. The row's * `_id` IS the bearer identifier (referenced from OAuth code/token records * as `mcpTokenId`). See plan * docs/plans/2026-05-10-001-feat-pro-mcp-clerk-auth-quota-plan.md. */ /** Maximum number of active (non-revoked) Pro MCP tokens per user. */ const MAX_TOKENS_PER_USER = 5; /** Debounce window for touchProMcpTokenLastUsed (matches apiKeys). */ const TOUCH_DEBOUNCE_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000; // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // Internal (service-to-service) — called from edge/HTTP actions // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- /** * Issue a new Pro MCP token row. * * Called from the edge at `/oauth/authorize-pro` after the cross-subdomain * Clerk grant has been validated. The caller passes the verified Clerk * `userId`. Verifies entitlement (tier ≥ 1, `validUntil >= now`) defensively * — the edge re-checks too, but the row insert is the authoritative gate. * * Per-user 5-row cap with silent oldest rotation: if the user already has * 5 active rows we revoke the oldest (by createdAt) before inserting the * new one — never delete (preserves audit trail). */ export const issueProMcpToken = internalMutation({ args: { userId: v.string(), clientId: v.optional(v.string()), name: v.optional(v.string()), }, handler: async (ctx, args) => { if (!args.userId) { throw new ConvexError("INVALID_USER_ID"); } // Entitlement gate: Pro is the minimum (tier ≥ 1). API_STARTER+ (tier 2+) // also passes, since Pro is the floor — the plan explicitly notes // "Pro is the minimum, not exclusive." // // Mirror downstream MCP-edge gate: BOTH tier ≥ 1 AND mcpAccess === true // are required. Reviewer round-2 P2 — gating on tier alone allowed a // tier-1 user without mcpAccess to mint a token that would then fail // every tools/call at the gateway. PRE-FIELD legacy entitlement rows // are handled by the read-time merge in convex/entitlements.ts; this // direct ctx.db read of the row uses the catalog default explicitly. const entitlement = await ctx.db .query("entitlements") .withIndex("by_userId", (q) => q.eq("userId", args.userId)) .first(); const catalogDefaults = entitlement ? getFeaturesForPlan(entitlement.planKey) : null; const mergedFeatures = entitlement && catalogDefaults ? { ...catalogDefaults, ...entitlement.features } : null; if ( !entitlement || !mergedFeatures || entitlement.validUntil < Date.now() || mergedFeatures.tier < 1 || mergedFeatures.mcpAccess !== true ) { throw new ConvexError("PRO_REQUIRED"); } // Enforce per-user cap with silent oldest rotation. Match the pattern // used by createApiKey at convex/apiKeys.ts:62 — count only non-revoked // rows, but unlike apiKeys we silently rotate instead of throwing. // // F5 (U7+U8 review pass): "exactly oldest" rotation has a race — // two concurrent issue calls can both observe `active.length === 4`, // both insert, and produce 6 active rows. Convex doesn't serialise // mutations across the entire table; per-userId concurrency is real. // To converge back to the cap even after a brief race window, revoke // ALL rows beyond `MAX_TOKENS_PER_USER - 1` (sorted by createdAt). // This makes the cap "eventually MAX" rather than "atomically MAX": // the next issue call's check trims any temporary overshoot. const existing = await ctx.db .query("mcpProTokens") .withIndex("by_userId", (q) => q.eq("userId", args.userId)) .collect(); const active = existing.filter((r) => !r.revokedAt); if (active.length >= MAX_TOKENS_PER_USER) { // Sort ascending by createdAt — oldest first. active.sort((a, b) => a.createdAt - b.createdAt); // Revoke all rows beyond `MAX - 1` so the table converges to MAX // active rows after the upcoming insert. In the no-race case this // is exactly one row (matching the prior behaviour); in a race // where 6 actives slipped through, it's two rows. const toRevoke = active.slice(0, active.length - (MAX_TOKENS_PER_USER - 1)); const now = Date.now(); for (const row of toRevoke) { await ctx.db.patch(row._id, { revokedAt: now }); } } const tokenId = await ctx.db.insert("mcpProTokens", { userId: args.userId, clientId: args.clientId, name: args.name, createdAt: Date.now(), }); return { tokenId }; }, }); /** * Validate a Pro MCP token by id. * * Returns `{userId}` if the row exists and is not revoked. Returns null * otherwise. NOT positive-cached at the edge layer (per plan U2) — every * Pro MCP request hits this query. */ export const validateProMcpToken = internalQuery({ args: { tokenId: v.id("mcpProTokens") }, handler: async (ctx, args) => { const row = await ctx.db.get(args.tokenId); if (!row || row.revokedAt) return null; return { userId: row.userId }; }, }); /** * Service-to-service revoke. Takes an explicit userId + tokenId and * validates ownership in-mutation (so the edge caller doesn't need a * Clerk identity context — used by `/oauth/authorize-pro` rollback when * a code-write fails AFTER `issueProMcpToken` succeeds). * * Tenancy gate: `userId` must match `row.userId`. Mismatch → NOT_FOUND * (don't leak existence of other users' tokens to a misbehaving caller). */ export const internalRevokeProMcpToken = internalMutation({ args: { userId: v.string(), tokenId: v.id("mcpProTokens") }, handler: async (ctx, args) => { const row = await ctx.db.get(args.tokenId); if (!row || row.userId !== args.userId) { throw new ConvexError("NOT_FOUND"); } if (row.revokedAt) { throw new ConvexError("ALREADY_REVOKED"); } await ctx.db.patch(args.tokenId, { revokedAt: Date.now() }); return { ok: true }; }, }); /** * Bump lastUsedAt for a Pro MCP token (fire-and-forget from the edge). * Skips the write if lastUsedAt was updated within the last 5 minutes * to reduce Convex write load on hot tokens. Mirrors * `apiKeys.touchKeyLastUsed`. * * No-op on a revoked row — we don't want lastUsedAt to keep moving on * tokens whose access has already been cut. */ export const touchProMcpTokenLastUsed = internalMutation({ args: { tokenId: v.id("mcpProTokens") }, handler: async (ctx, args) => { const row = await ctx.db.get(args.tokenId); if (!row || row.revokedAt) return; if (row.lastUsedAt && row.lastUsedAt > Date.now() - TOUCH_DEBOUNCE_MS) return; await ctx.db.patch(args.tokenId, { lastUsedAt: Date.now() }); }, }); // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // Public — require Clerk JWT via ctx.auth (settings UI, U9) // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- /** * List all Pro MCP tokens for the current user (active + revoked). * * Returns ALL rows — including revoked — for transparency. The settings UI * surfaces revoked rows greyed-out so the user has a record of past grants. * * Uses `resolveUserId` (not `requireUserId`) and returns an empty array * when unauthenticated, because this is a REACTIVE query: the client * WebSocket subscription fires it on every state change including the * brief unauth windows during sign-out, initial page load before Clerk * resolves, and token-rotation races. Throwing `AUTH_REQUIRED` from a * reactive query path causes Convex's server-side Sentry integration * to page on those transient races (WORLDMONITOR-RD, sibling of N3), * even though the `requireUserId` ConvexError throw was explicitly * designed not to. Returning `[]` is observationally identical to * "user has no tokens yet" — the only legitimate caller is the * settings UI, which already gates this query behind a signed-in * shell. */ export const listProMcpTokens = query({ args: {}, handler: async (ctx) => { const userId = await resolveUserId(ctx); if (!userId) return []; const rows = await ctx.db .query("mcpProTokens") .withIndex("by_userId", (q) => q.eq("userId", userId)) .collect(); return rows.map((r) => ({ id: r._id, name: r.name, createdAt: r.createdAt, lastUsedAt: r.lastUsedAt, revokedAt: r.revokedAt, })); }, }); /** * Revoke a Pro MCP token row owned by the current user. * * Tenancy gate: the caller must own the row. Non-owner attempts surface * as `NOT_FOUND` (don't leak existence of other users' tokens). Mirrors * `apiKeys.revokeApiKey`. */ export const revokeProMcpToken = mutation({ args: { tokenId: v.id("mcpProTokens") }, handler: async (ctx, args) => { const userId = await requireUserId(ctx); const row = await ctx.db.get(args.tokenId); if (!row || row.userId !== userId) { throw new ConvexError("NOT_FOUND"); } if (row.revokedAt) { throw new ConvexError("ALREADY_REVOKED"); } await ctx.db.patch(args.tokenId, { revokedAt: Date.now() }); return { ok: true }; }, });