File size: 6,335 Bytes
c5466bf c3b49d6 c5466bf c3b49d6 c5466bf c3b49d6 c5466bf c3b49d6 c5466bf c3b49d6 c5466bf c3b49d6 c5466bf c3b49d6 c5466bf c3b49d6 c5466bf c3b49d6 c5466bf df10dd0 c3b49d6 c5466bf | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 | """Identity & authorization seam (ADR-0012 β AWS-independent).
The OHSU security review describes an intended access model β ~5 users, 1β2
admins, service accounts, and **no shared accounts** β that today has no
technical enforcement: both Spaces call Gradio ``launch()`` with no ``auth=``.
ADR-0012 adds an authentication gate whose *provider* (HuggingFace OAuth now,
OHSU SSO later) sits behind one small, stable seam. This module IS that seam:
the pure, provider-independent authorization logic + role lookup that the gate
and the audit trace both call. Swapping HF-OAuth for OHSU SSO changes only
*where an identity string comes from*, never the functions here.
Config, not code (mirrors ``recipients.yaml`` / ``UPLOAD_ADMIN_IDS``):
- ``ADMIN_IDS`` β comma-separated identities with the **admin** role (register
uploads per ADR-0011, deploy). Canonical going forward.
- ``ALLOWED_IDS`` β comma-separated identities with the **user** role (may run
analyses). Admins are implicitly allowed to run analyses too.
- ``UPLOAD_ADMIN_IDS`` β honored as admins for **back-compat** with the ADR-0011
upload gate, so a deploy that only set that var keeps one coherent admin set.
Two roles only (ADR-0012 decision 4): ``admin`` and ``user``. Role is an
allow-list attribute in config, not a separate auth system.
**Fail-closed.** An unknown or empty identity is neither authorized nor an
admin, and has no role. Empty config therefore denies everyone β the correct
default for a fresh deploy: access opens only once an operator names the
identities, never by accident.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
from dataclasses import dataclass
ADMIN_ROLE = "admin"
USER_ROLE = "user"
# The identity recorded in the audit trace when no authenticated principal was
# forwarded (e.g. the specialist called without a threaded identity). Recorded
# honestly as anonymous with no role β never silently attributed to someone.
ANONYMOUS = "anonymous"
_ADMIN_ENV_VARS = ("ADMIN_IDS", "UPLOAD_ADMIN_IDS")
_ALLOWED_ENV_VAR = "ALLOWED_IDS"
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Principal:
"""An authenticated caller: an identity string and its resolved role.
``role`` is ``None`` when the identity is not on any allow-list (fail-closed).
``authorized`` is True when the identity may use the system at all (admin or
listed user).
"""
identity: str
role: str | None
@property
def authorized(self) -> bool:
return self.role is not None
@property
def is_admin(self) -> bool:
return self.role == ADMIN_ROLE
def _ids_from_env(*env_vars: str) -> set[str]:
"""Union of comma-separated identities across ``env_vars`` (blanks dropped)."""
ids: set[str] = set()
for var in env_vars:
raw = os.environ.get(var, "")
ids.update(part.strip() for part in raw.split(",") if part.strip())
return ids
def get_admin_ids() -> set[str]:
"""The admin identities (``ADMIN_IDS`` βͺ ``UPLOAD_ADMIN_IDS``, back-compat)."""
return _ids_from_env(*_ADMIN_ENV_VARS)
def get_allowed_ids() -> set[str]:
"""The non-admin user identities (``ALLOWED_IDS``)."""
return _ids_from_env(_ALLOWED_ENV_VAR)
def role_for(identity: str | None) -> str | None:
"""Resolve ``identity`` to ``"admin"`` / ``"user"`` / ``None`` (fail-closed).
Admin membership wins over user membership, so an identity that appears on
both lists is an admin. An empty/unknown identity has no role.
"""
if not identity:
return None
identity = identity.strip()
if not identity:
return None
if identity in get_admin_ids():
return ADMIN_ROLE
if identity in get_allowed_ids():
return USER_ROLE
return None
def is_authorized(identity: str | None) -> bool:
"""Whether ``identity`` may use the system at all (admin or listed user)."""
return role_for(identity) is not None
def is_admin(identity: str | None) -> bool:
"""Whether ``identity`` holds the admin role."""
return role_for(identity) == ADMIN_ROLE
def resolve_principal(identity: str | None) -> Principal:
"""Build a :class:`Principal` for ``identity`` (fail-closed on unknown)."""
stripped = identity.strip() if identity else ""
return Principal(identity=stripped or ANONYMOUS, role=role_for(identity))
_ENFORCE_VALUES = {"1", "on", "true", "enforce", "yes"}
def access_enforced() -> bool:
"""Whether the allow-list gate is enforced (env ``ACCESS_CONTROL``).
OFF by default so the gate code can ship to a currently-public Space without
locking anyone out; turn it on only once OAuth is enabled and the allow-list
env vars are set (mirrors the orchestrator's ``access.access_enforced``).
"""
return os.environ.get("ACCESS_CONTROL", "").strip().lower() in _ENFORCE_VALUES
def check_access(identity: str | None) -> tuple[bool, str | None]:
"""Gate decision for the specialist's own Gradio UI (ADR-0012).
Returns ``(allowed, denial_message)``. When enforcement is off, everyone is
allowed (current behavior). When on, the allow-list is fail-closed: a
missing identity or a non-listed one is denied with a user-facing message.
``identity`` is the effective caller β the direct human's OAuth username, or
the principal the orchestrator forwards (already gated at its front door).
"""
if not access_enforced():
return True, None
if not identity:
return False, (
"π Please sign in with your HuggingFace account (button above) to use this tool."
)
if not is_authorized(identity):
return False, (
f"π Access denied β '{identity}' is not on the authorized-users list "
"for this deployment. Contact the study admin to request access."
)
return True, None
def principal_trace_fields(identity: str | None) -> dict:
"""The identity fields ADR-0008's audit trace records (ADR-0012 decision 3).
Returns ``{"principal": <identity or "anonymous">, "role": <role or None>}``.
A missing/unauthenticated identity is recorded as ``anonymous`` with
``role=None`` β the honest "we don't know who ran this" state, not a blank.
"""
principal = resolve_principal(identity)
return {"principal": principal.identity, "role": principal.role}
|