| /** | |
| * Header constants used by the authz pipeline. | |
| * | |
| * Middleware adds these headers to the upstream request after a successful | |
| * auth decision. Route handlers and downstream services read them through | |
| * the assertAuth() helper instead of re-running auth logic. | |
| * | |
| * All header names are lowercase to match Next.js / fetch semantics. | |
| * | |
| * IMPORTANT: these headers are stripped from incoming client requests | |
| * before classification (see pipeline.ts) so a remote caller cannot | |
| * pre-populate them and impersonate a privileged subject. | |
| */ | |
| export const AUTHZ_HEADER_REQUEST_ID = "x-request-id"; | |
| export const AUTHZ_HEADER_ROUTE_CLASS = "x-omniroute-route-class"; | |
| export const AUTHZ_HEADER_AUTH_KIND = "x-omniroute-auth-kind"; | |
| export const AUTHZ_HEADER_AUTH_ID = "x-omniroute-auth-id"; | |
| export const AUTHZ_HEADER_AUTH_LABEL = "x-omniroute-auth-label"; | |
| export const AUTHZ_HEADER_AUTH_SCOPES = "x-omniroute-auth-scopes"; | |
| /** CLI sends this header so the local process can call management APIs without login. */ | |
| export const CLI_TOKEN_HEADER = "x-omniroute-cli-token"; | |
| /** | |
| * The real TCP peer IP, stamped by the custom Node server BEFORE Next runs | |
| * (scripts/dev/peer-stamp.mjs), formatted as `<token>|<ip>`. The middleware has | |
| * no socket, so this is the only trustworthy locality signal β but ONLY when the | |
| * token matches this process's OMNIROUTE_PEER_STAMP_TOKEN (see | |
| * policies/management.ts β resolveStampedPeer). Any client-supplied value is | |
| * deleted by the server before stamping, and this header is stripped from the | |
| * forwarded request in pipeline.ts so it never reaches route handlers/upstream. | |
| * NEVER decide locality from the Host header β it is fully client-controlled. | |
| * Keep in sync with PEER_IP_HEADER in scripts/dev/peer-stamp.mjs. | |
| */ | |
| export const PEER_IP_HEADER = "x-omniroute-peer-ip"; | |
| /** | |
| * Trusted locality verdict ("loopback" | "lan" | "remote") that the pipeline | |
| * computes from the stamped real peer IP and forwards to route handlers. Route | |
| * code (e.g. cliTokenAuth) reads THIS instead of re-deriving locality from the | |
| * spoofable Host header. Like the other trusted headers it is stripped from | |
| * client input and re-set by the pipeline, so a remote caller cannot forge it. | |
| */ | |
| export const AUTHZ_HEADER_PEER_LOCALITY = "x-omniroute-peer-locality"; | |
| /** | |
| * Headers the pipeline must NEVER trust on incoming requests. They are | |
| * stripped before route classification to prevent header-spoofing attacks. | |
| */ | |
| export const AUTHZ_TRUSTED_HEADERS: ReadonlyArray<string> = [ | |
| AUTHZ_HEADER_ROUTE_CLASS, | |
| AUTHZ_HEADER_AUTH_KIND, | |
| AUTHZ_HEADER_AUTH_ID, | |
| AUTHZ_HEADER_AUTH_LABEL, | |
| AUTHZ_HEADER_AUTH_SCOPES, | |
| AUTHZ_HEADER_PEER_LOCALITY, | |
| ]; | |