fiemwl / src /server /authz /headers.ts
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/**
* Header constants used by the authz pipeline.
*
* Middleware adds these headers to the upstream request after a successful
* auth decision. Route handlers and downstream services read them through
* the assertAuth() helper instead of re-running auth logic.
*
* All header names are lowercase to match Next.js / fetch semantics.
*
* IMPORTANT: these headers are stripped from incoming client requests
* before classification (see pipeline.ts) so a remote caller cannot
* pre-populate them and impersonate a privileged subject.
*/
export const AUTHZ_HEADER_REQUEST_ID = "x-request-id";
export const AUTHZ_HEADER_ROUTE_CLASS = "x-omniroute-route-class";
export const AUTHZ_HEADER_AUTH_KIND = "x-omniroute-auth-kind";
export const AUTHZ_HEADER_AUTH_ID = "x-omniroute-auth-id";
export const AUTHZ_HEADER_AUTH_LABEL = "x-omniroute-auth-label";
export const AUTHZ_HEADER_AUTH_SCOPES = "x-omniroute-auth-scopes";
/** CLI sends this header so the local process can call management APIs without login. */
export const CLI_TOKEN_HEADER = "x-omniroute-cli-token";
/**
* The real TCP peer IP, stamped by the custom Node server BEFORE Next runs
* (scripts/dev/peer-stamp.mjs), formatted as `<token>|<ip>`. The middleware has
* no socket, so this is the only trustworthy locality signal β€” but ONLY when the
* token matches this process's OMNIROUTE_PEER_STAMP_TOKEN (see
* policies/management.ts β†’ resolveStampedPeer). Any client-supplied value is
* deleted by the server before stamping, and this header is stripped from the
* forwarded request in pipeline.ts so it never reaches route handlers/upstream.
* NEVER decide locality from the Host header β€” it is fully client-controlled.
* Keep in sync with PEER_IP_HEADER in scripts/dev/peer-stamp.mjs.
*/
export const PEER_IP_HEADER = "x-omniroute-peer-ip";
/**
* Trusted locality verdict ("loopback" | "lan" | "remote") that the pipeline
* computes from the stamped real peer IP and forwards to route handlers. Route
* code (e.g. cliTokenAuth) reads THIS instead of re-deriving locality from the
* spoofable Host header. Like the other trusted headers it is stripped from
* client input and re-set by the pipeline, so a remote caller cannot forge it.
*/
export const AUTHZ_HEADER_PEER_LOCALITY = "x-omniroute-peer-locality";
/**
* Headers the pipeline must NEVER trust on incoming requests. They are
* stripped before route classification to prevent header-spoofing attacks.
*/
export const AUTHZ_TRUSTED_HEADERS: ReadonlyArray<string> = [
AUTHZ_HEADER_ROUTE_CLASS,
AUTHZ_HEADER_AUTH_KIND,
AUTHZ_HEADER_AUTH_ID,
AUTHZ_HEADER_AUTH_LABEL,
AUTHZ_HEADER_AUTH_SCOPES,
AUTHZ_HEADER_PEER_LOCALITY,
];