File size: 6,902 Bytes
c33971d
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
use std::env;
use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};

use axum::http::HeaderMap;
use jsonwebtoken::{DecodingKey, EncodingKey};
use rand::Rng;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};

use crate::domain::constants::{
    ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_SECS, AUTH_COOKIE_NAME, CSRF_COOKIE_NAME, PROOF_TOKEN_PURPOSE,
    PROOF_TOKEN_TTL_SECS,
};

#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ProofClaims {
    pub sub: String,
    pub purpose: String,
    pub exp: usize,
}

pub fn jwt_secret() -> Vec<u8> {
    env::var("JWT_SECRET")
        .expect("JWT_SECRET environment variable must be set. Refusing to use a fallback.")
        .into_bytes()
}

pub fn access_token_expiry() -> usize {
    now_epoch() + ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_SECS
}

pub fn extract_auth_token(headers: &HeaderMap) -> Option<String> {
    headers
        .get(axum::http::header::AUTHORIZATION)
        .and_then(|value| value.to_str().ok())
        .and_then(|value| value.strip_prefix("Bearer "))
        .map(ToString::to_string)
        .or_else(|| extract_cookie(headers, AUTH_COOKIE_NAME))
}

pub fn extract_cookie(headers: &HeaderMap, name: &str) -> Option<String> {
    let cookie_header = headers.get(axum::http::header::COOKIE)?.to_str().ok()?;
    cookie_header.split(';').find_map(|entry| {
        let trimmed = entry.trim();
        let (cookie_name, cookie_value) = trimmed.split_once('=')?;
        if cookie_name == name {
            Some(cookie_value.to_string())
        } else {
            None
        }
    })
}

pub fn allowed_origins_list() -> Vec<String> {
    let origins = env::var("ALLOWED_ORIGINS")
        .unwrap_or_else(|_| "http://localhost:5173".to_string())
        .split(',')
        .map(|s| {
            let trimmed = s.trim();
            // Normalize by removing trailing slash for exact matching
            trimmed.strip_suffix('/').unwrap_or(trimmed).to_string()
        })
        .collect::<Vec<_>>();

    tracing::info!("CORS allowed origins: {:?}", origins);
    origins
}

fn is_cloud_env() -> bool {
    // Detect any cloud environment: Render, Koyeb, Railway, Fly, Hugging Face, custom
    std::env::var("RENDER").is_ok()
        || std::env::var("KOYEB").is_ok()
        || std::env::var("CLOUD_ENV").is_ok()
        || std::env::var("RAILWAY_ENVIRONMENT").is_ok()
        || std::env::var("FLY_APP_NAME").is_ok()
        || std::env::var("SPACE_ID").is_ok()
}

pub fn origin_is_allowed(origin: Option<&str>) -> bool {
    let Some(origin) = origin else {
        // In local development, some tools or configurations might strip the Origin header.
        // We log it and allow it ONLY if not in a cloud production environment.
        if !is_cloud_env() {
            tracing::debug!("No Origin header present. Allowing for local dev compatibility.");
            return true;
        }
        tracing::warn!("Blocked request with missing Origin header in production.");
        return false;
    };

    // Normalize the incoming origin by removing trailing slash if present
    let normalized_origin = origin.strip_suffix('/').unwrap_or(origin);

    // ─── Production Convenience: Automatically allow all Vercel + Koyeb subdomains ───
    if normalized_origin.ends_with(".vercel.app")
        || normalized_origin.ends_with(".koyeb.app")
        || normalized_origin.ends_with(".netlify.app")
    {
        tracing::debug!("CORS allowed cloud origin: {}", normalized_origin);
        return true;
    }

    let allowed_list = allowed_origins_list();
    let is_allowed = allowed_list
        .iter()
        .any(|allowed| allowed == "*" || allowed == normalized_origin);

    if !is_allowed {
        tracing::error!(
            "CORS BLOCKED ORIGIN: {} (Allowed: {:?})",
            normalized_origin,
            allowed_list
        );
    } else {
        tracing::debug!("CORS allowed origin: {}", normalized_origin);
    }

    is_allowed
}

pub fn generate_random_token(length: usize) -> String {
    let charset = b"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789";
    let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();

    (0..length)
        .map(|_| {
            let idx = rng.gen_range(0..charset.len());
            charset[idx] as char
        })
        .collect()
}

pub fn build_cookie(name: &str, value: &str, max_age: Option<usize>, http_only: bool) -> String {
    let secure = use_secure_cookies();
    // For cross-origin requests (Vercel -> Render), we MUST use SameSite=None with Secure.
    // Otherwise, Lax (the default) will block the cookie on cross-site subresource requests.
    let samesite = if secure { "None" } else { "Lax" };
    let mut cookie = format!("{name}={value}; Path=/; SameSite={samesite}");

    if let Some(max_age) = max_age {
        cookie.push_str(&format!("; Max-Age={max_age}"));
    }

    if http_only {
        cookie.push_str("; HttpOnly");
    }

    if secure {
        cookie.push_str("; Secure");
    }

    cookie
}

pub fn expired_cookie(name: &str) -> String {
    build_cookie(name, "", Some(0), true)
}

pub fn csrf_cookie(token: &str) -> String {
    build_cookie(CSRF_COOKIE_NAME, token, Some(PROOF_TOKEN_TTL_SECS), true)
}

pub fn encoding_key() -> EncodingKey {
    EncodingKey::from_secret(&jwt_secret())
}

pub fn decoding_key() -> DecodingKey {
    DecodingKey::from_secret(&jwt_secret())
}

pub fn issue_proof_token(transaction_id: &str) -> Result<String, jsonwebtoken::errors::Error> {
    jsonwebtoken::encode(
        &jsonwebtoken::Header::default(),
        &ProofClaims {
            sub: transaction_id.to_string(),
            purpose: PROOF_TOKEN_PURPOSE.to_string(),
            exp: now_epoch() + PROOF_TOKEN_TTL_SECS,
        },
        &encoding_key(),
    )
}

pub fn verify_proof_token(
    token: &str,
    transaction_id: &str,
) -> Result<ProofClaims, jsonwebtoken::errors::Error> {
    let mut validation = jsonwebtoken::Validation::default();
    validation.validate_exp = true;
    let token_data = jsonwebtoken::decode::<ProofClaims>(token, &decoding_key(), &validation)?;

    if token_data.claims.sub == transaction_id && token_data.claims.purpose == PROOF_TOKEN_PURPOSE {
        Ok(token_data.claims)
    } else {
        Err(jsonwebtoken::errors::Error::from(
            jsonwebtoken::errors::ErrorKind::InvalidToken,
        ))
    }
}

fn use_secure_cookies() -> bool {
    // Force secure cookies if explicitly set or running in any cloud environment
    if let Ok(value) = env::var("COOKIE_SECURE") {
        return matches!(value.as_str(), "1" | "true" | "TRUE" | "yes" | "YES");
    }

    // Auto-detect cloud environment and enable secure cookies
    if is_cloud_env() {
        return true;
    }

    env::var("FRONTEND_URL")
        .map(|url| url.starts_with("https://"))
        .unwrap_or(false)
}

pub fn now_epoch() -> usize {
    SystemTime::now()
        .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
        .map(|d| d.as_secs() as usize)
        .unwrap_or(0)
}