Spaces:
Paused
Paused
File size: 92,631 Bytes
d727210 6025832 d727210 6025832 d727210 9c003f0 d727210 667fa47 d7aea6e 667fa47 d727210 622e841 d727210 9c003f0 d727210 622e841 d727210 9c003f0 d727210 622e841 d727210 9c003f0 d727210 9c003f0 d727210 ffea7f4 d727210 ffea7f4 d727210 9c003f0 d727210 9c003f0 d727210 9c003f0 d727210 9c003f0 d727210 9c003f0 d727210 9c003f0 d727210 ffea7f4 d727210 ffea7f4 d727210 9c003f0 d727210 9c003f0 d727210 9c003f0 d727210 9c003f0 d727210 9c003f0 d727210 9c003f0 d727210 ffea7f4 d727210 ffea7f4 d727210 9c003f0 d727210 9c003f0 d727210 9c003f0 d727210 9c003f0 d727210 ffea7f4 d727210 436d56f ffea7f4 436d56f ffea7f4 436d56f ffea7f4 436d56f ffea7f4 436d56f ffea7f4 436d56f ffea7f4 436d56f ffea7f4 436d56f ffea7f4 436d56f ffea7f4 436d56f ffea7f4 436d56f ffea7f4 436d56f ffea7f4 436d56f d727210 | 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 646 647 648 649 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 680 681 682 683 684 685 686 687 688 689 690 691 692 693 694 695 696 697 698 699 700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742 743 744 745 746 747 748 749 750 751 752 753 754 755 756 757 758 759 760 761 762 763 764 765 766 767 768 769 770 771 772 773 774 775 776 777 778 779 780 781 782 783 784 785 786 787 788 789 790 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 800 801 802 803 804 805 806 807 808 809 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 872 873 874 875 876 877 878 879 880 881 882 883 884 885 886 887 888 889 890 891 892 893 894 895 896 897 898 899 900 901 902 903 904 905 906 907 908 909 910 911 912 913 914 915 916 917 918 919 920 921 922 923 924 925 926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 940 941 942 943 944 945 946 947 948 949 950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 959 960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968 969 970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 978 979 980 981 982 983 984 985 986 987 988 989 990 991 992 993 994 995 996 997 998 999 1000 1001 1002 1003 1004 1005 1006 1007 1008 1009 1010 1011 1012 1013 1014 1015 1016 1017 1018 1019 1020 1021 1022 1023 1024 1025 1026 1027 1028 1029 1030 1031 1032 1033 1034 1035 1036 1037 1038 1039 1040 1041 1042 1043 1044 1045 1046 1047 1048 1049 1050 1051 1052 1053 1054 1055 1056 1057 1058 1059 1060 1061 1062 1063 1064 1065 1066 1067 1068 1069 1070 1071 1072 1073 1074 1075 1076 1077 1078 1079 1080 1081 1082 1083 1084 1085 1086 1087 1088 1089 1090 1091 1092 1093 1094 1095 1096 1097 1098 1099 1100 1101 1102 1103 1104 1105 1106 1107 1108 1109 1110 1111 1112 1113 1114 1115 1116 1117 1118 1119 1120 1121 1122 1123 1124 1125 1126 1127 1128 1129 1130 1131 1132 1133 1134 1135 1136 1137 1138 1139 1140 1141 1142 1143 1144 1145 1146 1147 1148 1149 1150 1151 1152 1153 1154 1155 1156 1157 1158 1159 1160 1161 1162 1163 1164 1165 1166 1167 1168 1169 1170 1171 1172 1173 1174 1175 1176 1177 1178 1179 1180 1181 1182 1183 1184 1185 1186 1187 1188 1189 1190 1191 1192 1193 1194 1195 1196 1197 1198 1199 1200 1201 1202 1203 1204 1205 1206 1207 1208 1209 1210 1211 1212 1213 1214 1215 1216 1217 1218 1219 1220 1221 1222 1223 1224 1225 1226 1227 1228 1229 1230 1231 1232 1233 1234 1235 1236 1237 1238 1239 1240 1241 1242 1243 1244 1245 1246 1247 1248 1249 1250 1251 1252 1253 1254 1255 1256 1257 1258 1259 1260 1261 1262 1263 1264 1265 1266 1267 1268 1269 1270 1271 1272 1273 1274 1275 1276 1277 1278 1279 1280 1281 1282 1283 1284 1285 1286 1287 1288 1289 1290 1291 1292 1293 1294 1295 1296 1297 1298 1299 1300 1301 1302 1303 1304 1305 1306 1307 1308 1309 1310 1311 1312 1313 1314 1315 1316 1317 1318 1319 1320 1321 1322 1323 1324 1325 1326 1327 1328 1329 1330 1331 1332 1333 1334 1335 1336 1337 1338 1339 1340 1341 1342 1343 1344 1345 1346 1347 1348 1349 1350 1351 1352 1353 1354 1355 1356 1357 1358 1359 1360 1361 1362 1363 1364 1365 1366 1367 1368 1369 1370 1371 1372 1373 1374 1375 1376 1377 1378 1379 1380 1381 1382 1383 1384 1385 1386 1387 1388 1389 1390 1391 1392 1393 1394 1395 1396 1397 1398 1399 1400 1401 1402 1403 1404 1405 1406 1407 1408 1409 1410 1411 1412 1413 1414 1415 1416 1417 1418 1419 1420 1421 1422 1423 1424 1425 1426 1427 1428 1429 1430 1431 1432 1433 1434 1435 1436 1437 1438 1439 1440 1441 1442 1443 1444 1445 1446 1447 1448 1449 1450 1451 1452 1453 1454 1455 1456 1457 1458 1459 1460 1461 1462 1463 1464 1465 1466 1467 1468 1469 1470 1471 1472 1473 1474 1475 1476 1477 1478 1479 1480 1481 1482 1483 1484 1485 1486 1487 1488 1489 1490 1491 1492 1493 1494 1495 1496 1497 1498 1499 1500 1501 1502 1503 1504 1505 1506 1507 1508 1509 1510 1511 1512 1513 1514 1515 1516 1517 1518 1519 1520 1521 1522 1523 1524 1525 1526 1527 1528 1529 1530 1531 1532 1533 1534 1535 1536 1537 1538 1539 1540 1541 1542 1543 1544 1545 1546 1547 1548 1549 1550 1551 1552 1553 1554 1555 1556 1557 1558 1559 1560 1561 1562 1563 1564 1565 1566 1567 1568 1569 1570 1571 1572 1573 1574 1575 1576 1577 1578 1579 1580 1581 1582 1583 1584 1585 1586 1587 1588 1589 1590 1591 1592 1593 1594 1595 1596 1597 1598 1599 1600 1601 1602 1603 1604 1605 1606 1607 1608 1609 1610 1611 1612 1613 1614 1615 1616 1617 1618 1619 1620 1621 1622 1623 1624 1625 1626 1627 1628 1629 1630 1631 1632 1633 1634 1635 1636 1637 1638 1639 1640 1641 1642 1643 1644 1645 1646 1647 1648 1649 1650 1651 1652 1653 1654 1655 1656 1657 1658 1659 1660 1661 1662 1663 1664 1665 1666 1667 1668 1669 1670 1671 1672 1673 1674 1675 1676 1677 1678 1679 1680 1681 1682 1683 1684 1685 1686 1687 1688 1689 1690 1691 1692 1693 1694 1695 1696 1697 1698 1699 1700 1701 1702 1703 1704 1705 1706 1707 1708 1709 1710 1711 1712 1713 1714 1715 1716 1717 1718 1719 1720 1721 1722 1723 1724 1725 1726 1727 1728 1729 1730 1731 1732 1733 1734 1735 1736 1737 1738 1739 1740 1741 1742 1743 1744 1745 1746 1747 1748 1749 1750 1751 1752 1753 1754 1755 1756 1757 1758 1759 1760 1761 1762 1763 1764 1765 1766 1767 1768 1769 1770 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833 1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 | """
Task bank for the PayOps environment — 30 tasks across 4 difficulty tiers.
Difficulty tiers
----------------
easy – single clear signal; one-hop decision (6 tasks)
medium – ambiguous or competing signals; reasoning required (8 tasks)
hard – adversarial, conflicting, or edge-case patterns (10 tasks)
critical – multi-step investigation chains; regulatory compliance stakes (6 tasks)
Multi-step chains
-----------------
Tasks with chain_total > 1 require the agent to issue investigation sub-actions
(inspect / request_docs / verify_kyc / contact_sender) before a terminal decision.
Each chain step reveals progressively more context via the appropriate _reveal field.
The terminal decision is only scored on the final chain step.
Action costs
------------
Each investigation sub-action incurs a budget cost. If the agent exhausts the
budget (spend > budget_limit), a cumulative cost penalty is applied to the reward.
inspect → cost 0.1
request_docs → cost 0.2
verify_kyc → cost 0.2
contact_sender → cost 0.3
file_sar → cost 0.1 (required for structuring/AML — free if correct)
Reward structure per task
-------------------------
Each task defines:
correct_action – ground-truth terminal decision
partial_credit_actions – {action: fraction_of_full_credit}
requires_investigation – set of sub-actions ideally used before deciding
regulatory_action – if True, file_sar is a required prerequisite for full credit
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from typing import Dict, List, Optional, Set
@dataclass
class PayOpsTask:
# --- identity ---
task_id: str
difficulty: str # easy | medium | hard | critical
description: str
# --- transaction fields ---
transaction_id: str
amount: float
currency: str
sender: str
receiver: str
transaction_type: str # transfer | payment | withdrawal | refund | internal | loan_repayment | payroll
# --- primary risk signals ---
risk_score: float # 0.0–1.0
ml_confidence: float = 0.90 # model's confidence in its own risk_score
flags: List[str] = field(default_factory=list)
# --- sender behaviour ---
velocity_1h: Optional[int] = None
velocity_24h: Optional[int] = None
avg_transaction_amount: Optional[float] = None
account_age_days: Optional[int] = None
# --- counterparty / geo ---
country_risk: Optional[str] = None # low | medium | high | sanctioned
kyc_status: Optional[str] = None # verified | pending | failed | none | expired
kyc_expiry_days: Optional[int] = None
previous_violations: Optional[int] = None
previous_sars: Optional[int] = None
counterparty_risk: Optional[str] = None # clean | unknown | watchlist | blacklist
# --- grading ---
correct_action: str = "approve"
partial_credit_actions: Dict[str, float] = field(default_factory=dict)
requires_investigation: Set[str] = field(default_factory=set)
# Set of sub-actions the agent SHOULD use for best score.
# Using them before the terminal decision grants a bonus (applied in grader).
regulatory_action: bool = False
# If True, filing a SAR is required to get full credit.
# --- investigation reveals (each unlocked by the matching sub-action) ---
inspect_reveal: Optional[str] = None
docs_reveal: Optional[str] = None
kyc_reveal: Optional[str] = None
contact_reveal: Optional[str] = None
# --- key diagnostic flags (used for flag-identification reward shaping) ---
key_flags: List[str] = field(default_factory=list)
# Subset of flags that are causally decisive for the correct_action.
# An agent that calls inspect AND those flags are in the observation
# receives an additional flag_identification bonus in the grader.
# --- network graph (mule chain / correspondent bank relationships) ---
network_graph: Optional[Dict[str, str]] = None
# Optional dict mapping roles to entity IDs, e.g.:
# {"sender": "acc_123", "mule": "acc_456", "offshore": "bank_789"}
# Exposed in observation so agents can reason about chains.
# --- multi-step chain metadata ---
chain_total: int = 1
# chain_total > 1 means the task spans multiple investigation steps.
# The grader only scores the terminal decision on the last chain step.
@property
def grader(self) -> dict:
"""Grader configuration for this task.
Exposed as a computed property so platform validators that import
``TASKS`` from tasks.py can discover grader configs via ``task.grader``.
"""
return {
"enabled": True,
"type": "action_match",
"correct_action": self.correct_action,
"partial_credit": dict(self.partial_credit_actions),
"requires_investigation": list(self.requires_investigation),
"regulatory_action": self.regulatory_action,
"key_flags": list(self.key_flags),
}
# =============================================================================
# EASY (4 tasks — single clear signal)
# =============================================================================
EASY_TASKS: List[PayOpsTask] = [
PayOpsTask(
task_id="EASY-001",
difficulty="easy",
description="Low-value domestic transfer between two long-standing verified users. No flags.",
transaction_id="TXN-E001",
amount=47.50,
currency="USD",
sender="alice@example.com",
receiver="bob@example.com",
transaction_type="transfer",
risk_score=0.05,
ml_confidence=0.97,
flags=[],
velocity_1h=1, velocity_24h=3,
avg_transaction_amount=55.0,
account_age_days=1_095,
country_risk="low", kyc_status="verified", kyc_expiry_days=320,
previous_violations=0, previous_sars=0, counterparty_risk="clean",
correct_action="approve",
partial_credit_actions={}, # no partial credit — clear approve, wrong actions penalised
inspect_reveal="Sender account 3 yrs old. Consistent transaction history. KYC fully verified.",
key_flags=[],
),
PayOpsTask(
task_id="EASY-002",
difficulty="easy",
description="Textbook fraud: unknown sender, offshore, sanctioned country, risk=0.97.",
transaction_id="TXN-E002",
amount=9_800.00,
currency="USD",
sender="unknown_user_x99",
receiver="offshore_acct_442",
transaction_type="transfer",
risk_score=0.97,
ml_confidence=0.95,
flags=["high_value", "unknown_sender", "offshore_receiver", "sanctioned_country"],
velocity_1h=12, velocity_24h=28,
avg_transaction_amount=None,
account_age_days=2,
country_risk="sanctioned", kyc_status="none", kyc_expiry_days=None,
previous_violations=3, previous_sars=1, counterparty_risk="blacklist",
correct_action="reject",
partial_credit_actions={"escalate": 0.4}, # flag removed — textbook fraud needs decisive action
inspect_reveal="Receiver linked to 3 prior rejected transactions. IP on threat-intel blocklist.",
key_flags=["sanctioned_country", "unknown_sender"],
network_graph={"sender": "unknown_user_x99", "offshore": "offshore_acct_442"},
),
PayOpsTask(
task_id="EASY-003",
difficulty="easy",
description="Standard refund to a verified customer. Tiny amount, no flags.",
transaction_id="TXN-E003",
amount=12.99,
currency="USD",
sender="shop@retailer.com",
receiver="carol@customer.com",
transaction_type="refund",
risk_score=0.03,
ml_confidence=0.98,
flags=[],
velocity_1h=1, velocity_24h=5,
avg_transaction_amount=14.0,
account_age_days=730,
country_risk="low", kyc_status="verified", kyc_expiry_days=180,
previous_violations=0, previous_sars=0, counterparty_risk="clean",
correct_action="approve",
partial_credit_actions={}, # no partial credit — tiny refund, no flags, flagging is wrong
inspect_reveal="Standard return via web checkout. Matching order ID on file. No anomalies.",
key_flags=[],
),
PayOpsTask(
task_id="EASY-004",
difficulty="easy",
description="ATM withdrawal burst — 15 withdrawals in 58 minutes across 4 ATMs. Velocity violation.",
transaction_id="TXN-E004",
amount=200.00,
currency="USD",
sender="david@accounts.com",
receiver="atm_node_77",
transaction_type="withdrawal",
risk_score=0.78,
ml_confidence=0.89,
flags=["velocity_breach", "atm_burst"],
velocity_1h=15, velocity_24h=17,
avg_transaction_amount=80.0,
account_age_days=540,
country_risk="medium", kyc_status="verified", kyc_expiry_days=90,
previous_violations=0, previous_sars=0, counterparty_risk="unknown",
correct_action="flag",
partial_credit_actions={"escalate": 0.6, "hold": 0.5},
inspect_reveal="15 ATM withdrawals in 58 min across 4 ATMs. Pattern consistent with card clone.",
key_flags=["velocity_breach"],
),
PayOpsTask(
task_id="EASY-005",
difficulty="easy",
description="Scheduled monthly mortgage repayment. Regular amount, verified on-time borrower, no flags.",
transaction_id="TXN-E005",
amount=1_247.00,
currency="USD",
sender="john.doe@homeowner.com",
receiver="mortgages@national-bank.com",
transaction_type="loan_repayment",
risk_score=0.03,
ml_confidence=0.99,
flags=[],
velocity_1h=1, velocity_24h=1,
avg_transaction_amount=1_247.00,
account_age_days=1_825,
country_risk="low", kyc_status="verified", kyc_expiry_days=280,
previous_violations=0, previous_sars=0, counterparty_risk="clean",
correct_action="approve",
partial_credit_actions={},
inspect_reveal="Loan account in good standing. Payment 22 of 360. Amount matches amortization schedule exactly.",
key_flags=[],
),
PayOpsTask(
task_id="EASY-006",
difficulty="easy",
description="Suspected duplicate payment: same sender, receiver, and amount submitted twice within 4 minutes.",
transaction_id="TXN-E006",
amount=523.50,
currency="USD",
sender="vendor@supplies-ltd.com",
receiver="buyer@procurement.com",
transaction_type="payment",
risk_score=0.55,
ml_confidence=0.91,
flags=["duplicate_transaction", "velocity_breach"],
velocity_1h=2, velocity_24h=3,
avg_transaction_amount=520.0,
account_age_days=980,
country_risk="low", kyc_status="verified", kyc_expiry_days=150,
previous_violations=0, previous_sars=0, counterparty_risk="clean",
correct_action="flag",
partial_credit_actions={"hold": 0.6},
inspect_reveal="TXN-E006-prev processed 4 min ago for identical amount and beneficiary. Duplicate submission detected — flag for double-charge review before releasing.",
key_flags=["duplicate_transaction"],
),
]
# =============================================================================
# MEDIUM (8 tasks — ambiguous, multi-signal)
# =============================================================================
MEDIUM_TASKS: List[PayOpsTask] = [
PayOpsTask(
task_id="MED-001",
difficulty="medium",
description="Large B2B wire. Verified CFO. Cross-border to medium-risk EU jurisdiction.",
transaction_id="TXN-M001",
amount=85_000.00,
currency="EUR",
sender="cfo@globalcorp.com",
receiver="vendor@eu-supplier.de",
transaction_type="transfer",
risk_score=0.52,
ml_confidence=0.72,
flags=["high_value", "cross_border"],
velocity_1h=2, velocity_24h=4,
avg_transaction_amount=45_000.0,
account_age_days=2_190,
country_risk="medium", kyc_status="verified", kyc_expiry_days=200,
previous_violations=0, previous_sars=0, counterparty_risk="clean",
correct_action="escalate",
partial_credit_actions={"flag": 0.5, "hold": 0.4},
requires_investigation={"inspect"},
inspect_reveal="Contract on file for €85k milestone. Receiver is licensed EU entity. Quarterly vendor pattern.",
key_flags=["cross_border", "high_value"],
),
PayOpsTask(
task_id="MED-002",
difficulty="medium",
description="Internal treasury transfer. Large amount. KYC pending renewal — risk is procedural, not fraud.",
transaction_id="TXN-M002",
amount=250_000.00,
currency="USD",
sender="treasury@holdco.com",
receiver="subsidiary@holdco-us.com",
transaction_type="internal",
risk_score=0.41,
ml_confidence=0.78,
flags=["high_value", "kyc_expiry_90d"],
velocity_1h=1, velocity_24h=2,
avg_transaction_amount=200_000.0,
account_age_days=3_650,
country_risk="low", kyc_status="pending", kyc_expiry_days=5,
previous_violations=0, previous_sars=0, counterparty_risk="clean",
correct_action="hold",
partial_credit_actions={"escalate": 0.6, "flag": 0.4},
requires_investigation={"verify_kyc"},
kyc_reveal="KYC renewal submitted 10 days ago. Both accounts share same UBO. Transfer aligns with Q1 plan.",
key_flags=["kyc_expiry_90d"],
),
PayOpsTask(
task_id="MED-003",
difficulty="medium",
description="Subscription payment 3× historical average. Possible upgrade billing or card compromise.",
transaction_id="TXN-M003",
amount=449.97,
currency="USD",
sender="eve@subscriber.com",
receiver="billing@saas-platform.com",
transaction_type="payment",
risk_score=0.44,
ml_confidence=0.68,
flags=["amount_spike", "pattern_deviation"],
velocity_1h=1, velocity_24h=1,
avg_transaction_amount=149.99,
account_age_days=820,
country_risk="low", kyc_status="verified", kyc_expiry_days=150,
previous_violations=0, previous_sars=0, counterparty_risk="clean",
correct_action="flag",
partial_credit_actions={"hold": 0.5, "escalate": 0.3},
inspect_reveal="Historical monthly charge $149.99. This charge = 3-month annual upgrade. Merchant confirmation pending.",
key_flags=["amount_spike", "pattern_deviation"],
),
PayOpsTask(
task_id="MED-004",
difficulty="medium",
description="Payment to regulated crypto exchange. Moderate risk. Sender has clean history.",
transaction_id="TXN-M004",
amount=5_000.00,
currency="USD",
sender="frank@personal.com",
receiver="exchange@cryptovault.io",
transaction_type="payment",
risk_score=0.58,
ml_confidence=0.74,
flags=["crypto_exchange", "high_value"],
velocity_1h=1, velocity_24h=2,
avg_transaction_amount=2_000.0,
account_age_days=1_460,
country_risk="medium", kyc_status="verified", kyc_expiry_days=270,
previous_violations=0, previous_sars=0, counterparty_risk="unknown",
correct_action="flag",
partial_credit_actions={"escalate": 0.5, "hold": 0.4},
inspect_reveal="Exchange licensed in sender's jurisdiction. Sender made 4 similar payments over 6 months. Within limits.",
key_flags=["crypto_exchange"],
),
PayOpsTask(
task_id="MED-005",
difficulty="medium",
description="Expired KYC on a high-frequency corporate account. Routine transactions continue but KYC lapsed 12 days ago.",
transaction_id="TXN-M005",
amount=28_000.00,
currency="GBP",
sender="payments@logistics-uk.com",
receiver="driver-pool@payroll.co.uk",
transaction_type="payroll",
risk_score=0.38,
ml_confidence=0.82,
flags=["kyc_expired", "high_value"],
velocity_1h=1, velocity_24h=6,
avg_transaction_amount=26_000.0,
account_age_days=1_800,
country_risk="low", kyc_status="expired", kyc_expiry_days=-12,
previous_violations=0, previous_sars=0, counterparty_risk="clean",
correct_action="hold",
partial_credit_actions={"flag": 0.5, "escalate": 0.4},
requires_investigation={"verify_kyc"},
kyc_reveal="KYC expired 12 days ago due to administrative oversight. Re-submission in progress. No fraud indicators.",
key_flags=["kyc_expired"],
),
PayOpsTask(
task_id="MED-006",
difficulty="medium",
description="Real estate advance payment. Large amount. First payment to this receiver but contract exists.",
transaction_id="TXN-M006",
amount=120_000.00,
currency="USD",
sender="buyer@realestate-client.com",
receiver="escrow@property-agent.co",
transaction_type="transfer",
risk_score=0.56,
ml_confidence=0.65,
flags=["high_value", "first_time_payee", "large_first_transfer"],
velocity_1h=1, velocity_24h=1,
avg_transaction_amount=5_000.0,
account_age_days=2_555,
country_risk="medium", kyc_status="verified", kyc_expiry_days=90,
previous_violations=0, previous_sars=0, counterparty_risk="unknown",
correct_action="escalate",
partial_credit_actions={"flag": 0.4, "hold": 0.5},
requires_investigation={"request_docs"},
docs_reveal="Signed purchase agreement found. Escrow agent licensed and registered. Standard conveyancing practice.",
key_flags=["first_time_payee", "large_first_transfer"],
),
PayOpsTask(
task_id="MED-007",
difficulty="medium",
description=(
"Supplier emails to say bank details have changed; first payment to the "
"new account matches a large outstanding invoice. Classic BEC indicator."
),
transaction_id="TXN-M007",
amount=43_800.00,
currency="EUR",
sender="accounts@client-corp.de",
receiver="supplier-newacct@euro-clearing.eu",
transaction_type="payment",
risk_score=0.63,
ml_confidence=0.67,
flags=["bank_detail_change", "first_time_payee", "high_value"],
velocity_1h=1, velocity_24h=1,
avg_transaction_amount=44_000.0,
account_age_days=1_200,
country_risk="medium", kyc_status="verified", kyc_expiry_days=130,
previous_violations=0, previous_sars=0, counterparty_risk="unknown",
correct_action="hold",
partial_credit_actions={"escalate": 0.6, "flag": 0.4},
requires_investigation={"request_docs", "contact_sender"},
docs_reveal="Email requesting bank change was sent from supplier-noreply@euro-cIearing.eu (capital I, not l). No signed bank-change authorisation on file. Possible BEC.",
contact_reveal="Called original supplier contact number on record. They confirmed they did NOT send a bank-change notice. BEC fraud confirmed — hold and alert client.",
key_flags=["bank_detail_change", "first_time_payee"],
),
PayOpsTask(
task_id="MED-008",
difficulty="medium",
description=(
"Buy Now Pay Later purchase: high-value electronics order, account opened "
"3 weeks ago, thin credit file, elevated risk signals."
),
transaction_id="TXN-M008",
amount=2_899.00,
currency="USD",
sender="bnpl-platform@payin4.io",
receiver="electronics@megastore.com",
transaction_type="payment",
risk_score=0.60,
ml_confidence=0.71,
flags=["thin_credit_file", "high_value_bnpl", "new_account"],
velocity_1h=1, velocity_24h=2,
avg_transaction_amount=None,
account_age_days=21,
country_risk="low", kyc_status="pending", kyc_expiry_days=None,
previous_violations=0, previous_sars=0, counterparty_risk="clean",
correct_action="flag",
partial_credit_actions={"hold": 0.6, "escalate": 0.4},
requires_investigation={"verify_kyc"},
kyc_reveal="KYC check: identity document submitted but address verification failed — billing address does not match ID. BNPL fraud profile. Flag for manual identity review before releasing funds.",
key_flags=["thin_credit_file", "new_account"],
),
]
# =============================================================================
# HARD (10 tasks — adversarial, conflicting, edge-cases)
# =============================================================================
HARD_TASKS: List[PayOpsTask] = [
PayOpsTask(
task_id="HARD-001",
difficulty="hard",
description="ML model poisoning: risk_score=0.18 but manual flags scream fraud. Agent must override the model.",
transaction_id="TXN-H001",
amount=47_000.00,
currency="GBP",
sender="grace@newaccount.co.uk",
receiver="payee@solicitor-uk.com",
transaction_type="transfer",
risk_score=0.18, # poisoned — deliberately underscored
ml_confidence=0.31, # low confidence signals model uncertainty
flags=["new_account_7d", "large_first_transfer", "solicitor_mule_pattern"],
velocity_1h=1, velocity_24h=1,
avg_transaction_amount=None,
account_age_days=7,
country_risk="low", kyc_status="pending", kyc_expiry_days=None,
previous_violations=0, previous_sars=0, counterparty_risk="watchlist",
correct_action="escalate",
partial_credit_actions={"flag": 0.6, "hold": 0.5, "reject": 0.3},
requires_investigation={"inspect"},
inspect_reveal=(
"Account 7 days old. First outbound transfer. Receiver matches solicitor-impersonation "
"mule pattern from last month's intelligence bulletin. ML underscored — new clean account."
),
key_flags=["solicitor_mule_pattern"],
),
PayOpsTask(
task_id="HARD-002",
difficulty="hard",
description="APP scam: victim willingly sending money but has been social-engineered. Receiver is a mule.",
transaction_id="TXN-H002",
amount=12_500.00,
currency="GBP",
sender="henry@victim-bank.co.uk",
receiver="mule_relay_2287@fastpay.io",
transaction_type="transfer",
risk_score=0.61,
ml_confidence=0.77,
flags=["app_scam_indicator", "mule_account_pattern", "first_time_payee"],
velocity_1h=1, velocity_24h=1,
avg_transaction_amount=300.0,
account_age_days=3_285,
country_risk="medium", kyc_status="verified", kyc_expiry_days=180,
previous_violations=0, previous_sars=0, counterparty_risk="blacklist",
correct_action="reject",
partial_credit_actions={"escalate": 0.6, "hold": 0.5, "flag": 0.3},
requires_investigation={"contact_sender"},
contact_reveal=(
"Sender says they were called by someone claiming to be their bank. "
"Instructed to move savings to a 'safe account'. Classic APP scam confirmed."
),
key_flags=["app_scam_indicator", "mule_account_pattern"],
network_graph={"victim": "henry@victim-bank.co.uk", "mule": "mule_relay_2287@fastpay.io"},
),
PayOpsTask(
task_id="HARD-003",
difficulty="hard",
description="Structuring/smurfing: just-below-CTR-threshold payments from same beneficial owner across accounts.",
transaction_id="TXN-H003",
amount=9_450.00, # just below $10k CTR threshold
currency="USD",
sender="irene_acct_A@shadow.net",
receiver="irene_acct_B@shadow.net",
transaction_type="transfer",
risk_score=0.71,
ml_confidence=0.83,
flags=["structuring_pattern", "same_ubo", "ctr_threshold_avoidance", "high_value"],
velocity_1h=3, velocity_24h=9,
avg_transaction_amount=9_200.0,
account_age_days=120,
country_risk="high", kyc_status="failed", kyc_expiry_days=None,
previous_violations=2, previous_sars=1, counterparty_risk="watchlist",
correct_action="reject",
partial_credit_actions={"escalate": 0.5, "flag": 0.2},
requires_investigation={"inspect"},
regulatory_action=True,
inspect_reveal=(
"3 transactions in 24h: $9,450 + $9,200 + $9,100 from related accounts. "
"Same UBO. KYC failed on inconsistent ID docs. Classic CTR structuring."
),
key_flags=["structuring_pattern", "ctr_threshold_avoidance"],
network_graph={"node_a": "irene_acct_A@shadow.net", "node_b": "irene_acct_B@shadow.net", "ubo": "irene_ubo"},
),
PayOpsTask(
task_id="HARD-004",
difficulty="hard",
description="Legitimate FX settlement: huge amount, looks alarming — is a standard correspondent banking transfer.",
transaction_id="TXN-H004",
amount=4_200_000.00,
currency="USD",
sender="nostro@bank-a-swift.com",
receiver="vostro@bank-b-swift.com",
transaction_type="internal",
risk_score=0.67,
ml_confidence=0.58, # model uncertain on legitimate large transfers
flags=["high_value", "cross_border", "fx_settlement"],
velocity_1h=8, velocity_24h=24,
avg_transaction_amount=3_900_000.0,
account_age_days=7_300,
country_risk="medium", kyc_status="verified", kyc_expiry_days=400,
previous_violations=0, previous_sars=0, counterparty_risk="clean",
correct_action="approve",
partial_credit_actions={"escalate": 0.5, "hold": 0.4, "flag": 0.3},
requires_investigation={"inspect"},
inspect_reveal=(
"Both SWIFT BIC-verified. Part of daily USD/EUR FX settlement cycle. "
"8 similar settlements this month, all cleared. Nostro/vostro agreement on file."
),
key_flags=["fx_settlement"],
network_graph={"correspondent": "nostro@bank-a-swift.com", "settlement": "vostro@bank-b-swift.com"},
),
PayOpsTask(
task_id="HARD-005",
difficulty="hard",
description=(
"Insider threat: employee of the bank initiating an unauthorised wire "
"to their personal account, disguised as a vendor payment."
),
transaction_id="TXN-H005",
amount=22_000.00,
currency="USD",
sender="staff_ops@bank-internal.com",
receiver="jake.smith.personal@gmail.com",
transaction_type="payment",
risk_score=0.54,
ml_confidence=0.61,
flags=["internal_to_personal", "unusual_beneficiary", "after_hours"],
velocity_1h=1, velocity_24h=1,
avg_transaction_amount=75_000.0,
account_age_days=2_000,
country_risk="low", kyc_status="verified", kyc_expiry_days=240,
previous_violations=0, previous_sars=0, counterparty_risk="unknown",
correct_action="escalate",
partial_credit_actions={"flag": 0.5, "hold": 0.4, "reject": 0.3},
requires_investigation={"inspect", "contact_sender"},
inspect_reveal=(
"Initiation time: 11:47 PM. No vendor contract matches this beneficiary. "
"Staff member placed on PIP last week. Receiver email matches staff home address."
),
contact_reveal=(
"Staff member claims it is a legitimate vendor. Unable to provide contract reference. "
"Story changes on follow-up. Escalate to HR and Fraud immediately."
),
key_flags=["internal_to_personal", "unusual_beneficiary"],
),
PayOpsTask(
task_id="HARD-006",
difficulty="hard",
description=(
"Ghost account: receiver account was dormant for 5 years and suddenly "
"received 20 inbound transfers this week. Possible account takeover."
),
transaction_id="TXN-H006",
amount=3_200.00,
currency="EUR",
sender="layla@verified-sender.eu",
receiver="old_dormant_acct_889@bank.eu",
transaction_type="transfer",
risk_score=0.63,
ml_confidence=0.69,
flags=["dormant_receiver", "sudden_activity", "high_inbound_velocity"],
velocity_1h=1, velocity_24h=3,
avg_transaction_amount=800.0,
account_age_days=890,
country_risk="medium", kyc_status="verified", kyc_expiry_days=60,
previous_violations=0, previous_sars=0, counterparty_risk="unknown",
correct_action="flag",
partial_credit_actions={"hold": 0.6, "escalate": 0.5},
requires_investigation={"inspect"},
inspect_reveal=(
"Receiver dormant 5 years. 20 inbound transfers this week totalling €64k. "
"All immediately forwarded offshore. Classic money-mule account reactivation."
),
key_flags=["dormant_receiver", "sudden_activity"],
),
PayOpsTask(
task_id="HARD-007",
difficulty="hard",
description=(
"SIM-swap attack: account holder's phone number was ported to a new SIM "
"6 hours ago; account now requesting a large crypto withdrawal to a new address."
),
transaction_id="TXN-H007",
amount=14_200.00,
currency="USD",
sender="crypto-user@exchange.io",
receiver="external-wallet-9f3a@coldwallet.net",
transaction_type="withdrawal",
risk_score=0.74,
ml_confidence=0.78,
flags=["sim_swap_detected", "new_withdrawal_address", "high_value"],
velocity_1h=1, velocity_24h=1,
avg_transaction_amount=500.0,
account_age_days=620,
country_risk="low", kyc_status="verified", kyc_expiry_days=195,
previous_violations=0, previous_sars=0, counterparty_risk="unknown",
correct_action="reject",
partial_credit_actions={"hold": 0.5, "escalate": 0.4, "flag": 0.3},
requires_investigation={"inspect", "contact_sender"},
inspect_reveal=(
"Telecom provider confirmed: SIM swap on this account's registered phone "
"completed 6 h 12 min ago. External wallet address first appeared in this "
"session only. IP geolocation mismatch vs prior 90-day baseline."
),
contact_reveal=(
"Attempted call to registered phone: intercepted by new SIM holder, "
"who provided all correct security answers (likely obtained via social "
"engineering). Account holder unreachable on backup email. SIM-swap "
"takeover confirmed — reject and lock account."
),
key_flags=["sim_swap_detected", "new_withdrawal_address"],
),
PayOpsTask(
task_id="HARD-008",
difficulty="hard",
description=(
"Romance scam / pig butchering: customer making 4th escalating transfer "
"to an overseas 'romantic partner' met on a dating app 7 weeks ago. "
"Amounts have doubled each time."
),
transaction_id="TXN-H008",
amount=8_000.00,
currency="USD",
sender="victim@personal-bank.com",
receiver="crypto-invest@hongkong-fund.net",
transaction_type="transfer",
risk_score=0.66,
ml_confidence=0.73,
flags=["romance_scam_indicator", "escalating_transfers", "offshore_receiver"],
velocity_1h=1, velocity_24h=1,
avg_transaction_amount=1_200.0,
account_age_days=4_015,
country_risk="high", kyc_status="verified", kyc_expiry_days=220,
previous_violations=0, previous_sars=0, counterparty_risk="blacklist",
correct_action="reject",
partial_credit_actions={"hold": 0.5, "escalate": 0.4, "flag": 0.3},
requires_investigation={"contact_sender", "inspect"},
contact_reveal=(
"Spoke with account holder. They believe they are investing with a "
"partner they met on a dating app. Prior transfers: $500, $1,000, $4,000. "
"Receiver domain registered 3 months ago. Pig-butchering romance scam confirmed."
),
inspect_reveal=(
"Transfer history: $500 → $1,000 → $4,000 → $8,000 over 7 weeks. "
"Receiver account linked to 23 other inbound romance-scam reports in the "
"financial intelligence database. All prior transfers drained offshore within hours."
),
key_flags=["romance_scam_indicator", "escalating_transfers"],
network_graph={"victim": "victim@personal-bank.com", "scammer_fund": "crypto-invest@hongkong-fund.net"},
),
PayOpsTask(
task_id="HARD-009",
difficulty="hard",
description=(
"Synthetic identity fraud: new business account with a flawless-looking "
"profile (perfect score, clean history) requests a large first outbound "
"wire within 10 days of opening."
),
transaction_id="TXN-H009",
amount=19_500.00,
currency="USD",
sender="newco-llc@startup-bank.com",
receiver="vendor@offshore-services.biz",
transaction_type="transfer",
risk_score=0.35,
ml_confidence=0.40, # low confidence: model flagging identity inconsistency
flags=["new_account_10d", "perfect_score_anomaly", "large_first_wire"],
velocity_1h=1, velocity_24h=1,
avg_transaction_amount=None,
account_age_days=10,
country_risk="medium", kyc_status="verified", kyc_expiry_days=360,
previous_violations=0, previous_sars=0, counterparty_risk="unknown",
correct_action="escalate",
partial_credit_actions={"hold": 0.5, "flag": 0.4, "reject": 0.3},
requires_investigation={"verify_kyc", "inspect"},
kyc_reveal=(
"KYC documents re-examined: EIN was issued 11 days ago but the 'years "
"in business' field on the application states 4 years. Registered address "
"is a UPS store mailbox. Director SSN belongs to a real person with no "
"knowledge of this LLC. Synthetic identity confirmed."
),
inspect_reveal=(
"Account ML confidence flagged as low: identity features are statistically "
"perfect (no noise in credit history, address, DOB fields) — consistent "
"with synthetically generated identity. Escalate for manual identity verification."
),
key_flags=["new_account_10d", "perfect_score_anomaly"],
),
PayOpsTask(
task_id="HARD-010",
difficulty="hard",
description=(
"Payroll diversion: HR system breach rerouted an employee's salary to "
"a newly added bank account 2 days ago. Employee has not been notified."
),
transaction_id="TXN-H010",
amount=5_640.00,
currency="USD",
sender="payroll@employer-corp.com",
receiver="new-acct-redirect@routing-bank.com",
transaction_type="payroll",
risk_score=0.58,
ml_confidence=0.63,
flags=["direct_deposit_changed", "recent_account_change", "payroll_diversion_indicator"],
velocity_1h=1, velocity_24h=1,
avg_transaction_amount=5_640.0,
account_age_days=2_920,
country_risk="low", kyc_status="verified", kyc_expiry_days=180,
previous_violations=0, previous_sars=0, counterparty_risk="unknown",
correct_action="reject",
partial_credit_actions={"hold": 0.5, "escalate": 0.4, "flag": 0.3},
requires_investigation={"inspect", "contact_sender"},
inspect_reveal=(
"HR system audit: direct deposit account changed 2 days ago via an "
"unrecognized IP at 2:14 AM. Employee's primary device was offline at the "
"time. No 2FA challenge was issued. Account change was unauthorized."
),
contact_reveal=(
"Reached employee by mobile: they confirm they did NOT change their "
"direct deposit account. Did not receive any email or SMS about the "
"change. HR system credentials were likely phished. Reject this payroll "
"disbursement and revert to prior account."
),
key_flags=["direct_deposit_changed", "payroll_diversion_indicator"],
),
]
# =============================================================================
# CRITICAL (6 tasks — multi-step chains, regulatory stakes)
# =============================================================================
CRITICAL_TASKS: List[PayOpsTask] = [
PayOpsTask(
task_id="CRIT-001",
difficulty="critical",
description=(
"Multi-step investigation: large wire to a new counterparty. "
"Agent must inspect logs, then request supporting documents, "
"then make a final decision. Chain of 3 steps."
),
transaction_id="TXN-C001",
amount=375_000.00,
currency="USD",
sender="deal-team@pe-firm.com",
receiver="newco@acquisition-target.io",
transaction_type="transfer",
risk_score=0.59,
ml_confidence=0.55,
flags=["high_value", "first_time_payee", "cross_border", "new_counterparty"],
velocity_1h=1, velocity_24h=2,
avg_transaction_amount=50_000.0,
account_age_days=3_000,
country_risk="medium", kyc_status="verified", kyc_expiry_days=120,
previous_violations=0, previous_sars=0, counterparty_risk="unknown",
correct_action="approve",
partial_credit_actions={"escalate": 0.5, "hold": 0.4, "flag": 0.3},
requires_investigation={"inspect", "request_docs"},
chain_total=3,
inspect_reveal="PE firm confirmed. Series B investment round. Deal announced in press last week.",
docs_reveal="Signed SPA (Share Purchase Agreement) on file. Notarised. Receiver is the acquisition target.",
key_flags=["first_time_payee", "new_counterparty"],
),
PayOpsTask(
task_id="CRIT-002",
difficulty="critical",
description=(
"Fraud ring: three related accounts sending coordinated small payments "
"that aggregate above the reporting threshold. Requires SAR filing."
),
transaction_id="TXN-C002",
amount=4_900.00,
currency="USD",
sender="ring_node_1@tempmail.com",
receiver="collector_hub@offshore.net",
transaction_type="transfer",
risk_score=0.76,
ml_confidence=0.80,
flags=["fraud_ring_indicator", "coordinated_transfers", "threshold_avoidance", "high_value"],
velocity_1h=5, velocity_24h=18,
avg_transaction_amount=4_800.0,
account_age_days=45,
country_risk="high", kyc_status="failed", kyc_expiry_days=None,
previous_violations=1, previous_sars=0, counterparty_risk="blacklist",
correct_action="reject",
partial_credit_actions={"escalate": 0.4, "flag": 0.2},
requires_investigation={"inspect"},
regulatory_action=True,
chain_total=2,
inspect_reveal=(
"3 accounts (ring_node_1/2/3) sending $4,900 / $4,850 / $4,750 simultaneously. "
"All created same day. Receiver account drained offshore within minutes. "
"SAR filing required under BSA §5318(g)."
), key_flags=["fraud_ring_indicator", "coordinated_transfers"],
network_graph={"ring_1": "ring_node_1@tempmail.com", "ring_2": "ring_node_2", "collector": "collector_hub@offshore.net"}, ),
PayOpsTask(
task_id="CRIT-003",
difficulty="critical",
description=(
"Trade-based money laundering: over- and under-invoiced international trade payments. "
"Documents don't match transfer amounts. Regulatory escalation required."
),
transaction_id="TXN-C003",
amount=680_000.00,
currency="USD",
sender="importer@trade-co.hk",
receiver="exporter@goods-supplier.cn",
transaction_type="payment",
risk_score=0.72,
ml_confidence=0.67,
flags=["trade_finance", "invoice_mismatch", "cross_border", "high_value"],
velocity_1h=1, velocity_24h=3,
avg_transaction_amount=120_000.0,
account_age_days=730,
country_risk="high", kyc_status="verified", kyc_expiry_days=30,
previous_violations=1, previous_sars=0, counterparty_risk="watchlist",
correct_action="escalate",
partial_credit_actions={"flag": 0.4, "hold": 0.35, "reject": 0.3},
requires_investigation={"request_docs", "inspect"},
regulatory_action=True,
chain_total=3,
docs_reveal="Invoice declares 500 units @ $1,360 each = $680k. Market price is $320/unit. 4× over-invoiced.",
inspect_reveal="Shipping records show only 200 units dispatched. Payment/goods ratio 3.4× above market norm.",
key_flags=["invoice_mismatch", "trade_finance"],
network_graph={"importer": "importer@trade-co.hk", "exporter": "exporter@goods-supplier.cn"},
),
PayOpsTask(
task_id="CRIT-004",
difficulty="critical",
description=(
"Compromised corporate account: valid credentials but geo-impossible login. "
"Someone in Nigeria logged into a US-only account 8 minutes after the CEO logged out in NY."
),
transaction_id="TXN-C004",
amount=198_000.00,
currency="USD",
sender="ceo@target-corp.com",
receiver="urgent-wire@third-party-finance.com",
transaction_type="transfer",
risk_score=0.81,
ml_confidence=0.85,
flags=["geo_impossible_login", "account_takeover_indicator", "high_value", "urgency_flag"],
velocity_1h=1, velocity_24h=1,
avg_transaction_amount=15_000.0,
account_age_days=4_380,
country_risk="high", kyc_status="verified", kyc_expiry_days=365,
previous_violations=0, previous_sars=0, counterparty_risk="unknown",
correct_action="reject",
partial_credit_actions={"escalate": 0.5, "hold": 0.4},
requires_investigation={"inspect", "contact_sender"},
chain_total=2,
inspect_reveal=(
"Last login: NY (US) at 14:23. This session: Lagos (NG) at 14:31. "
"Physical travel impossible in 8 minutes. Likely credential compromise."
),
contact_reveal="CEO confirms they did NOT initiate this transfer. Account takeover confirmed.",
key_flags=["geo_impossible_login", "account_takeover_indicator"],
),
PayOpsTask(
task_id="CRIT-005",
difficulty="critical",
description=(
"OFAC sanctions evasion: large USD payment routed through a UAE shell "
"company chain. Investigation reveals the ultimate beneficial owner is "
"on the OFAC Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list."
),
transaction_id="TXN-C005",
amount=490_000.00,
currency="USD",
sender="uae-trading@al-rashid-fze.ae",
receiver="intermediary@gulf-clearing-bv.nl",
transaction_type="transfer",
risk_score=0.69,
ml_confidence=0.60,
flags=["high_value", "cross_border", "shell_company_indicator", "sanctions_adjacent"],
velocity_1h=1, velocity_24h=2,
avg_transaction_amount=380_000.0,
account_age_days=180,
country_risk="high", kyc_status="verified", kyc_expiry_days=45,
previous_violations=0, previous_sars=0, counterparty_risk="watchlist",
correct_action="reject",
partial_credit_actions={"escalate": 0.5, "hold": 0.4},
requires_investigation={"inspect", "verify_kyc", "request_docs"},
regulatory_action=True,
chain_total=3,
inspect_reveal=(
"Corporate registry search: al-rashid-fze.ae incorporated 6 months ago. "
"Sole director: a nominee agent used by 47 other FZE shells. Beneficial "
"ownership records absent. Payment routed via 3 intermediate entities "
"before reaching the UAE sender — classic sanctions-evasion layering."
),
kyc_reveal=(
"UBO lookup via SWIFT KYC Registry and Refinitiv: ultimate beneficial "
"owner resolves to Tariq Al-Mansouri, listed on OFAC SDN list since 2021 "
"(Ref: SDN-2021-04-19-TM). Transacting with this UBO violates 31 C.F.R. "
"§ 594. Reject immediately and file SAR."
),
docs_reveal=(
"Provided trade invoice shows goods described as 'industrial equipment'. "
"HS code used (8479.89) does not match the attached packing list. "
"Likely misclassification to obscure dual-use goods export controls."
),
key_flags=["shell_company_indicator", "sanctions_adjacent"],
network_graph={
"sender_shell": "al-rashid-fze.ae",
"intermediary": "gulf-clearing-bv.nl",
"ubo_sdn": "Tariq Al-Mansouri",
},
),
PayOpsTask(
task_id="CRIT-006",
difficulty="critical",
description=(
"Correspondent banking alert: a downstream correspondent partner bank "
"was added to FinCEN's 311 Special Measures list yesterday. Payments "
"routed through them are now legally restricted."
),
transaction_id="TXN-C006",
amount=215_000.00,
currency="USD",
sender="trade-desk@our-bank.com",
receiver="correspondent@partner-bank-latam.bz",
transaction_type="transfer",
risk_score=0.71,
ml_confidence=0.65,
flags=["fincen_311_alert", "correspondent_risk", "high_value", "cross_border"],
velocity_1h=3, velocity_24h=12,
avg_transaction_amount=200_000.0,
account_age_days=2_100,
country_risk="high", kyc_status="verified", kyc_expiry_days=20,
previous_violations=0, previous_sars=0, counterparty_risk="watchlist",
correct_action="escalate",
partial_credit_actions={"hold": 0.5, "reject": 0.4},
requires_investigation={"inspect", "request_docs"},
regulatory_action=True,
chain_total=2,
inspect_reveal=(
"FinCEN Section 311 Special Measure imposed 2024-04-01 on partner-bank-latam.bz "
"for 'primary money laundering concern'. Special Measure 5 prohibits US "
"correspondent accounts and payable-through accounts. All in-flight wires "
"must be escalated to Compliance before release — unilateral rejection "
"also requires Compliance sign-off (may breach existing agreements)."
),
docs_reveal=(
"Correspondent agreement review: clause 12.3 requires 90-day wind-down "
"notice before terminating the relationship. Legal and Compliance must "
"jointly approve next steps. Escalate immediately — do not reject or "
"approve without written senior Compliance authorisation."
),
key_flags=["fincen_311_alert", "correspondent_risk"],
network_graph={
"our_bank": "trade-desk@our-bank.com",
"correspondent": "partner-bank-latam.bz",
},
),
]
# =============================================================================
# Combine all tasks
# =============================================================================
TASKS: List[PayOpsTask] = EASY_TASKS + MEDIUM_TASKS + HARD_TASKS + CRITICAL_TASKS
TASKS_BY_ID: Dict[str, PayOpsTask] = {t.task_id: t for t in TASKS}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Action cost table (investigation sub-actions consume budget)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ACTION_COSTS: Dict[str, float] = {
"approve": 0.0,
"reject": 0.0,
"flag": 0.0,
"escalate": 0.0,
"hold": 0.0,
"inspect": 0.10,
"request_docs": 0.20,
"verify_kyc": 0.20,
"contact_sender": 0.30,
"file_sar": 0.05, # intentionally cheap — incentivise regulatory compliance
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Task variant pools — anti-memorisation & investigation-gating
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Each entry is a list of override dicts for alternative scenarios of that task.
# Variant index 0 always means "use base task" (no overrides applied).
# Variants 1..N override the fields listed, so the correct_action is only
# determinable after performing the required investigation sub-actions.
# The variant is selected deterministically from the episode seed in environment.py.
#
# Key design constraint: the BASE observation (pre-investigation) must be
# genuinely ambiguous — investigation reveals ARE the decisive evidence.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TASK_VARIANTS: Dict[str, List[Dict]] = {
# ── EASY ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
"EASY-001": [
# v1: account accessed from unknown device just before transfer → hold
{
"correct_action": "hold",
"partial_credit_actions": {"flag": 0.6, "escalate": 0.3},
"flags": ["unusual_login_location", "device_change"],
"risk_score": 0.61,
"inspect_reveal": (
"Sender logged in from an unrecognized device in a different country "
"18 minutes ago. Possible account takeover. All signals otherwise "
"identical. Hold pending confirmation with account holder."
),
},
# v2: amount exceeds sender's daily limit for new payee → flag
{
"correct_action": "flag",
"partial_credit_actions": {"hold": 0.6, "approve": 0.2},
"flags": ["first_time_payee", "amount_spike"],
"risk_score": 0.44,
"inspect_reveal": (
"Bob is a new payee — first time ever on this account. System "
"limit for first-time payees is $25. Transfer amount $47.50 exceeds "
"new-payee daily cap. Flag for standard new-payee challenge-and-confirm."
),
},
],
"EASY-002": [
# v1: signals are real but entity is a licensed MSB with OFAC authorisation → escalate
{
"correct_action": "escalate",
"partial_credit_actions": {"reject": 0.4, "hold": 0.3},
"inspect_reveal": (
"Sender is a licensed Money Service Business (MSB) with a FinCEN "
"registration number and a current OFAC sanctions-compliance programme. "
"The 'sanctioned country' flag was triggered by destination country "
"of receiver's beneficial owner, but this MSB holds a specific OFAC "
"licence for this corridor. Escalate for senior review rather than "
"unilateral reject."
),
},
# v2: additional money mule node detected → reject + SAR
{
"correct_action": "reject",
"partial_credit_actions": {"escalate": 0.5},
"regulatory_action": True,
"inspect_reveal": (
"Receiver account linked to 6 prior confirmed fraud rejections this "
"quarter, totalling $58k. New network node in a known mule ring. "
"All prior transfers drained offshore within 30 minutes. Reject "
"immediately and file SAR."
),
},
],
"EASY-003": [
# v1: refund issued to a different card than the original purchase → flag
{
"correct_action": "flag",
"partial_credit_actions": {"hold": 0.5, "escalate": 0.3},
"flags": ["refund_mismatch", "different_card"],
"risk_score": 0.52,
"inspect_reveal": (
"Original purchase was made on Visa ending 4412. Refund is being "
"issued to Mastercard ending 7891 — a different card not on file for "
"this order. Possible refund fraud. Flag for merchant verification "
"before processing."
),
},
# v2: refund claimed on a fraudulent chargeback dispute → reject
{
"correct_action": "reject",
"partial_credit_actions": {"flag": 0.5, "escalate": 0.3},
"flags": ["chargeback_fraud", "dispute_open"],
"risk_score": 0.68,
"inspect_reveal": (
"Customer filed a chargeback claiming non-receipt. Courier tracking "
"shows package delivered and signed for 3 days ago. Customer's "
"claimed delivery address matches the signature. Friendly fraud — "
"reject refund and respond to chargeback with delivery evidence."
),
},
],
"EASY-004": [
# v1: card-cloning confirmed by bank intelligence → reject
{
"correct_action": "reject",
"partial_credit_actions": {"escalate": 0.5, "flag": 0.4},
"inspect_reveal": (
"Cross-check with card-fraud intelligence feed: the card number "
"involved in this ATM burst matches a batch of 340 card numbers "
"from a point-of-sale skimming incident reported yesterday. Confirmed "
"card-clone attack. Reject all withdrawals and block card immediately."
),
},
# v2: legitimate end-of-month cash distribution for a small cash-and-carry → approve
{
"correct_action": "approve",
"partial_credit_actions": {"flag": 0.3},
"inspect_reveal": (
"Account holder is a licensed cash-and-carry wholesaler. Same "
"end-of-month ATM burst pattern appears in 11 of the last 12 months — "
"consistent with weekly cash float replenishment for their 4 shop "
"locations. No fraud intelligence matches. Approve."
),
},
],
"EASY-005": [
# v1: loan account in arrears, payment covers only partial balance → flag
{
"correct_action": "flag",
"partial_credit_actions": {"hold": 0.5, "approve": 0.3},
"amount": 650.00,
"flags": ["partial_payment", "loan_arrears"],
"risk_score": 0.38,
"inspect_reveal": (
"Loan account 2 months in arrears. Required minimum payment is "
"$1,247 but sender submitted $650. Partial payment does not clear "
"the overdue balance. Flag for borrower contact and payment plan "
"communication before crediting."
),
},
# v2: overpayment submitted — process normally but note discrepancy → approve
{
"correct_action": "approve",
"partial_credit_actions": {"flag": 0.3},
"amount": 2_500.00,
"flags": ["overpayment"],
"risk_score": 0.08,
"inspect_reveal": (
"Borrower submitted $2,500 vs scheduled $1,247. Overpayments are "
"permitted under the loan agreement (clause 8.2) and reduce principal "
"balance. No fraud indicators. Approve and apply excess to principal."
),
},
],
"EASY-006": [
# v1: genuine re-submission after first instance failed → approve
{
"correct_action": "approve",
"partial_credit_actions": {"flag": 0.4},
"flags": ["resubmission"],
"risk_score": 0.18,
"inspect_reveal": (
"First submission (4 min ago) failed with a bank routing error "
"(error code: ROUTE-001 — invalid sort code format). This is a valid "
"resubmission with corrected routing. No double-charge risk. Approve."
),
},
# v2: vendor-side system error caused 8 duplicate submissions → hold
{
"correct_action": "hold",
"partial_credit_actions": {"flag": 0.6},
"velocity_1h": 8,
"flags": ["duplicate_transaction", "velocity_breach", "api_error_burst"],
"risk_score": 0.72,
"inspect_reveal": (
"Vendor payment API experienced a timeout loop at 14:02. 8 identical "
"payment submissions in 5 minutes from the same API key. Only 1 "
"should be processed. Hold all 8; contact vendor to identify the "
"canonical intended payment before releasing any."
),
},
],
# ── MEDIUM ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
"MED-001": [
# v1: CEO impersonation (BEC) — fraudulent wire instruction → reject
{
"correct_action": "reject",
"partial_credit_actions": {"escalate": 0.5, "hold": 0.4},
"flags": ["high_value", "cross_border", "bec_indicator"],
"risk_score": 0.74,
"inspect_reveal": (
"The CFO's email domain in the wire instructions is globalcorp.co "
"(note: .co not .com). CFO's actual domain is globalcorp.com. "
"Phone verification: real CFO is on holiday and did NOT authorise "
"this transfer. Business Email Compromise confirmed — reject."
),
},
# v2: contract and counterparty fully verified → approve
{
"correct_action": "approve",
"partial_credit_actions": {"escalate": 0.3, "flag": 0.2},
"inspect_reveal": (
"Vendor contract on file, signed 3 months ago (ref VC-EUR-0712). "
"Receiver is an EU-licensed entity (UID DE315441892). Payment matches "
"milestone 2 of 4. CFO confirmed by phone. Cross-border and amount "
"are within normal operating parameters. Approve."
),
},
],
"MED-002": [
# v1: KYC re-check reveals UBO mismatch → escalate
{
"correct_action": "escalate",
"partial_credit_actions": {"hold": 0.5, "flag": 0.3},
"kyc_reveal": (
"KYC renewal triggered a UBO re-check. Companies House filing shows "
"the ultimate beneficial owner changed 3 months ago to a holding "
"company domiciled in a secrecy jurisdiction, without bank "
"notification. Material KYC change — escalate for enhanced due "
"diligence before releasing any treasury transfers."
),
},
# v2: board resolution authorises emergency liquidity transfer → approve
{
"correct_action": "approve",
"partial_credit_actions": {"hold": 0.4},
"kyc_reveal": (
"KYC renewal: both entities share the same UBO (verified). Pending "
"status is purely administrative — renewal submitted 6 days ago, "
"no change of ownership. Board resolution ref BR-2024-Q1-08 "
"authorises this emergency liquidity transfer. Approve."
),
},
],
"MED-003": [
# v1: unauthorised recurring billing → hold
{
"correct_action": "hold",
"partial_credit_actions": {"flag": 0.5, "escalate": 0.3},
"inspect_reveal": (
"Merchant billing records show 3 prior declined charges this month "
"from different cards linked to the same subscriber IP. Pattern is "
"consistent with credential stuffing / unauthorised recurring charge. "
"Freeze payment and contact customer before releasing."
),
},
# v2: confirmed annual plan upgrade → approve
{
"correct_action": "approve",
"partial_credit_actions": {"flag": 0.3},
"inspect_reveal": (
"Customer service log: subscriber upgraded to annual plan via phone "
"this morning. $449.97 = 3 × monthly fee (annual discount applied). "
"Merchant has confirmed the charge. Safe to approve."
),
},
],
"MED-004": [
# v1: structuring pattern across exchanges → escalate
{
"correct_action": "escalate",
"partial_credit_actions": {"flag": 0.5, "hold": 0.3},
"inspect_reveal": (
"Sender has made 7 crypto exchange payments in 5 days totalling $28k "
"across 3 different platforms. Amounts stay just below exchange "
"reporting limits. Pattern matches structuring. Escalate for AML review."
),
},
# v2: clean recurring investment → approve
{
"correct_action": "approve",
"partial_credit_actions": {"flag": 0.3},
"inspect_reveal": (
"Sender's 3-year payment history shows consistent quarterly crypto "
"purchases of similar size. Exchange is fully regulated and KYC-verified. "
"Amount within personal investment limits. No structuring indicators. Approve."
),
},
],
"MED-005": [
# v1: KYC discrepancy found → escalate
{
"correct_action": "escalate",
"partial_credit_actions": {"flag": 0.5, "hold": 0.3},
"kyc_reveal": (
"KYC expired because the compliance team found discrepancies between "
"the business registration address and Companies House records. The "
"case has been flagged for investigation by the KYC team. Escalate — "
"do not approve or hold without senior sign-off."
),
},
# v2: KYC renewed, routine payroll → approve
{
"correct_action": "approve",
"partial_credit_actions": {"hold": 0.4},
"kyc_reveal": (
"KYC renewal was submitted 10 days ago and completed processing "
"yesterday. All checks passed. The lapse was an administrative "
"oversight only. Payroll has an 18-month history with no anomalies. "
"Approve and process."
),
},
],
"MED-006": [
# v1: forged purchase agreement → reject
{
"correct_action": "reject",
"partial_credit_actions": {"escalate": 0.4, "flag": 0.3},
"docs_reveal": (
"Purchase agreement is a forgery: the notary seal serial number "
"does not exist in the notary registry; the property title number "
"returns no match in Land Registry; the 'escrow agent' is not "
"registered with the Council for Licensed Conveyancers. "
"Classic conveyancing fraud — reject immediately."
),
},
# v2: title dispute — hold pending resolution
{
"correct_action": "hold",
"partial_credit_actions": {"escalate": 0.5, "flag": 0.3},
"docs_reveal": (
"SPA is authentic and escrow agent is licensed. However, a co-owner "
"has filed a title dispute on the property. The buyer's solicitor "
"advises funds should be held in escrow until the dispute is resolved "
"(expected 3–4 weeks). Hold pending legal clearance."
),
},
],
"MED-007": [
# v1: genuine bank account change, properly authorised → approve
{
"correct_action": "approve",
"partial_credit_actions": {"hold": 0.5, "flag": 0.3},
"docs_reveal": (
"Signed bank-change authorisation letter provided on supplier "
"letterhead, with notarised director signature matching KYC records. "
"Called supplier finance director on known contact number — confirmed "
"the account change. New account is registered to the same company. "
"Approve."
),
"contact_reveal": (
"Original supplier contact verified the bank change was genuine — "
"they switched banks last month due to a merger. Reference number "
"SBC-2024-0312 matches their internal change management log."
),
},
# v2: multiple lookalike invoice redirect emails sent to same client → escalate
{
"correct_action": "escalate",
"partial_credit_actions": {"hold": 0.5, "reject": 0.4},
"docs_reveal": (
"Client reports receiving 3 lookalike invoice redirect emails in 2 "
"weeks from slightly different supplier domains. Two payments to "
"prior redirect accounts were already processed (total €87k). This "
"is a systematic BEC campaign targeting this client relationship. "
"Escalate to fraud and financial crime team immediately."
),
"contact_reveal": (
"Genuine supplier finance director: they have sent zero bank-change "
"notices this year. The lookalike domain was registered 3 weeks ago. "
"Client's email system has been compromised. Escalate."
),
},
],
"MED-008": [
# v1: KYC passes, address verified — legitimate BNPL purchase → approve
{
"correct_action": "approve",
"partial_credit_actions": {"flag": 0.4},
"kyc_reveal": (
"KYC recheck: address verification passed on second attempt — "
"customer had entered a unit number incorrectly. Identity document "
"authentic. Credit bureau confirms thin file is consistent with "
"a first-time credit applicant (age 22). No fraud indicators. "
"Approve BNPL transaction."
),
},
# v2: device fingerprint linked to BNPL fraud network → reject
{
"correct_action": "reject",
"partial_credit_actions": {"escalate": 0.5, "hold": 0.4},
"kyc_reveal": (
"Device fingerprint matches 14 prior BNPL fraud applications across "
"3 platforms in the last 6 weeks. All 14 prior accounts defaulted on "
"first instalment. Identity documents were synthetically generated. "
"Reject and blacklist device fingerprint."
),
},
],
# ── HARD ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
"HARD-001": [
# v1: deeper forensics confirm active fraud ring → reject
{
"correct_action": "reject",
"partial_credit_actions": {"escalate": 0.5, "flag": 0.3},
"inspect_reveal": (
"Cross-database query: same receiver account (payee@solicitor-uk.com) "
"appeared in 4 prior rejected fraud wires this quarter, total £190k. "
"Funds clear to offshore within 45 min each time. ML score was "
"deliberately poisoned via clean-account seeding. Reject immediately."
),
},
# v2: flags are false positives, ML score correct → approve
{
"correct_action": "approve",
"partial_credit_actions": {"escalate": 0.4, "flag": 0.3},
"inspect_reveal": (
"Manual flag investigation: 'solicitor_mule_pattern' rule mis-fired "
"on a legitimate SRA-registered firm (reg. SRA-443210) that rebranded "
"last month, causing a new account. 'New_account_7d' flag triggered "
"by the rebrand. ALL flags are false positives. ML risk score 0.18 is "
"accurate. Safe to approve."
),
},
],
"HARD-002": [
# v1: new legitimate supplier, flags were incorrect → approve
{
"correct_action": "approve",
"partial_credit_actions": {"flag": 0.4, "hold": 0.3},
"contact_reveal": (
"Sender confirmed: mule_relay_2287@fastpay.io is their new supplier "
"in Singapore. The VPN flagged by geo-risk monitoring is the company's "
"standard corporate security policy. Purchase order #PO-44821 is on "
"file matching the amount. Safe to approve."
),
},
# v2: inconsistent story, AML review needed → escalate
{
"correct_action": "escalate",
"partial_credit_actions": {"reject": 0.4, "flag": 0.3},
"contact_reveal": (
"Contacted sender: story is vague and inconsistent across two "
"follow-up calls. Cannot confirm supplier identity. No purchase order "
"provided. The receiver's business registration cannot be located. "
"Cannot approve or reject — escalate to AML for investigation."
),
},
],
"HARD-003": [
# v1: confirmed structuring but scale needs MLRO → escalate
{
"correct_action": "escalate",
"partial_credit_actions": {"reject": 0.5, "flag": 0.3},
"inspect_reveal": (
"Pattern strongly resembles CTR structuring. However, the total "
"aggregate ($27,750) and the involvement of 3 related entities "
"means this crosses the threshold for mandatory MLRO referral under "
"internal policy. Escalate rather than unilaterally reject."
),
},
# v2: same UBO transfers are authorised corporate restructuring → hold
{
"correct_action": "hold",
"partial_credit_actions": {"reject": 0.4, "escalate": 0.5},
"inspect_reveal": (
"Same-UBO transfers are documented in a board resolution dated last "
"week authorising an internal corporate restructuring. KYC failure "
"was due to an ID document resubmission still in queue. Structuring "
"indicators are coincidental. Hold pending KYC re-verification."
),
},
],
"HARD-004": [
# v1: unrecognised SWIFT BIC, potential impersonation → reject
{
"correct_action": "reject",
"partial_credit_actions": {"escalate": 0.5, "flag": 0.3},
"inspect_reveal": (
"SWIFT BIC vostro@bank-b-swift.com resolved to a bank that does NOT "
"appear in the correspondent banking agreement registry. The BIC is "
"visually similar to a legitimate bank (one character substituted). "
"Likely impersonation of a correspondent partner — reject and alert."
),
},
# v2: ghost employees detected → flag for payroll audit
{
"correct_action": "flag",
"partial_credit_actions": {"approve": 0.5, "hold": 0.4},
"inspect_reveal": (
"FX settlement accounts are SWIFT-verified and legitimate. However, "
"the initiating staff workflow shows this $4.2M wire was split from "
"a larger batch that included 2 non-existent internal accounts. "
"Flag for payroll/treasury audit before releasing."
),
},
],
"HARD-005": [
# v1: confirmed insider fraud, no response from staff → reject
{
"correct_action": "reject",
"partial_credit_actions": {"escalate": 0.5, "flag": 0.3},
"contact_reveal": (
"Staff member's phone is disconnected; email bounced. HR confirms "
"the employee was placed on garden leave 2 days ago pending "
"investigation. Receiver account drained offshore within hours of "
"prior similar payments. Insider fraud confirmed — reject and freeze."
),
},
# v2: authorized vendor payment, staff working late → approve
{
"correct_action": "approve",
"partial_credit_actions": {"escalate": 0.4, "flag": 0.3},
"contact_reveal": (
"Staff member confirmed: personal Gmail was added as a forwarding "
"alias last month when the vendor switched to a personal invoicing "
"service. Contract reference VC-2024-189 verified by procurement. "
"After-hours initiation matches remote work schedule. Approve."
),
},
],
"HARD-006": [
# v1: confirmed active mule network → reject
{
"correct_action": "reject",
"partial_credit_actions": {"escalate": 0.5, "flag": 0.4},
"inspect_reveal": (
"Receiver account confirmed to be receiving from 12 other dormant "
"accounts this week (total €78k). All funds exit to the same offshore "
"cluster within 2 hours. Active money-mule aggregation network. "
"Reject and file SAR immediately."
),
},
# v2: estate probate settlement, legitimate reactivation → escalate
{
"correct_action": "escalate",
"partial_credit_actions": {"flag": 0.6, "hold": 0.4},
"inspect_reveal": (
"Account was frozen under a probate order that was lifted 3 days ago. "
"Estate settlement documentation is on file. Amount (€3,200) is "
"consistent with a partial distribution from the estate. Legitimate "
"reactivation — escalate for senior approval given the reactivation flag."
),
},
],
"HARD-007": [
# v1: SIM was ported by legitimate account holder (travelling) → hold
{
"correct_action": "hold",
"partial_credit_actions": {"escalate": 0.5, "reject": 0.4},
"inspect_reveal": (
"Telecom records: SIM swap was initiated via the carrier's verified "
"app using biometric authentication. Account holder is overseas and "
"replaced a broken SIM abroad. No third-party involvement detected. "
"New withdrawal address is a cold storage wallet previously linked "
"to the account. Hold briefly for confirmation call."
),
"contact_reveal": (
"Reached account holder on a backup email. They confirm the SIM swap "
"and the withdrawal are legitimate. They are in Japan and broke their "
"phone. Hold approved — confirm by secure callback before releasing."
),
},
# v2: no response from account holder, third-party SIM swap confirmed → reject
{
"correct_action": "reject",
"partial_credit_actions": {"hold": 0.4, "escalate": 0.5},
"contact_reveal": (
"Account holder unreachable on all registered contact methods. "
"Carrier fraud team confirmed: SIM swap was initiated via a social "
"engineering call to a customer service agent — not by the account "
"holder. No biometric authentication used. Third-party SIM swap "
"confirmed. Reject and lock account."
),
},
],
"HARD-008": [
# v1: customer is aware it's high-risk investment but not a scam → escalate
{
"correct_action": "escalate",
"partial_credit_actions": {"reject": 0.4, "hold": 0.4},
"contact_reveal": (
"Customer is fully aware of the risk and has a history of crypto "
"investing. The 'romantic partner' is actually a friend from a "
"verified online investment forum. Prior transfers were legitimate "
"investments that returned profit. However, the escalating pattern "
"and offshore destination warrant senior review. Escalate."
),
"inspect_reveal": (
"Transaction history: prior 3 payments were invested and partially "
"returned. Receiver fund has a verifiable online presence (2 years). "
"However, the most recent dormancy of returns and amount escalation "
"match late-stage pig-butchering conversion. Escalate for human review."
),
},
# v2: scam confirmed, customer is distressed victim → reject
{
"correct_action": "reject",
"partial_credit_actions": {"hold": 0.4, "escalate": 0.3},
"contact_reveal": (
"Customer broke down on the call. They have now been blocked by the "
"'romantic partner' and cannot reach them. They realise they have been "
"scammed. All prior funds ($5,500) are lost. Reject this transfer, "
"file SAR, and refer customer to scam recovery support."
),
},
],
"HARD-009": [
# v1: new tech entrepreneur, thin file is legitimate → approve
{
"correct_action": "approve",
"partial_credit_actions": {"hold": 0.5, "escalate": 0.4},
"kyc_reveal": (
"KYC deep-dive: EIN issued 11 days ago but LLC was pre-registered "
"90 days ago (formation date vs EIN issuance differ — normal for new "
"companies). Registered address is a co-working space (common for "
"startups). Director SSN cross-check passsed. Wire is to a verified "
"software vendor (AWS partner). Thin file is genuine, not synthetic. "
"Approve."
),
"inspect_reveal": (
"ML confidence flag was fired due to thin data, not anomalous data. "
"No features match synthetic identity profile (all values have "
"natural variance). The 'perfect score anomaly' flag was a false "
"positive from the rule engine. Safe to approve."
),
},
# v2: identity confirmed as synthetic via government database check → reject
{
"correct_action": "reject",
"partial_credit_actions": {"escalate": 0.4, "hold": 0.3},
"kyc_reveal": (
"IRS TIN matching service: EIN does not match the business name in "
"the IRS database. SSN belongs to a deceased individual. Address is "
"a virtual office with no physical occupancy. Synthetic identity "
"confirmed. Reject all transactions and report to FinCEN."
),
},
],
"HARD-010": [
# v1: employee did change their account (legitimate, notified HR verbally) → approve
{
"correct_action": "approve",
"partial_credit_actions": {"hold": 0.5, "flag": 0.4},
"inspect_reveal": (
"HR audit: account change was requested by the employee at HR's "
"'walk-in' desk 3 days ago. The change was logged manually by an "
"HR admin and entered into the system at 2:10 AM during the overnight "
"batch. Unusual timestamp is from the batch processor, not an "
"attacker. Legitimate change confirmed."
),
"contact_reveal": (
"Employee confirms: they switched to a new bank and submitted the "
"form in person. Was not aware any notification would be sent. "
"Batch processing time was confusing but legitimate. Approve."
),
},
# v2: HR credentials were phished, second employee already victimised → reject
{
"correct_action": "reject",
"partial_credit_actions": {"escalate": 0.5, "hold": 0.4},
"inspect_reveal": (
"HR system audit: same rogue IP (185.220.101.x — known Tor exit node) "
"changed direct deposit accounts for 3 employees overnight. Two "
"employees have already confirmed they did not make changes. Payroll "
"diversion campaign in progress. Reject all affected disbursements "
"and freeze HR system access."
),
},
],
# ── CRITICAL ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
"CRIT-001": [
# v1: deepfake deal, BEC fraud → reject
{
"correct_action": "reject",
"partial_credit_actions": {"escalate": 0.4, "hold": 0.35, "flag": 0.3},
"inspect_reveal": (
"PE firm name verified but domain is a typo-squatting lookalike "
"(pe-flrm.com vs pe-firm.com). No SEC filing exists for this deal. "
"The 'press announcement' URL leads to a page created 6 days ago. "
"Classic BEC / CEO impersonation fraud."
),
"docs_reveal": (
"'Signed SPA' is a doctored template — notarization certificate "
"serial number LN-2024-00512 does not exist in the notary registry. "
"Acquisition is fabricated. Reject and alert security team."
),
},
# v2: legitimate deal, wrong destination account → hold
{
"correct_action": "hold",
"partial_credit_actions": {"approve": 0.4, "escalate": 0.5},
"inspect_reveal": (
"PE firm and deal confirmed as genuine (SEC filing #0001234567). "
"Press announcement verified with three external sources. Acquisition "
"is legitimate. However, the destination account does not match the "
"independent escrow account specified in clause 7.3 of the SPA."
),
"docs_reveal": (
"SPA authenticated by legal team. Per clause 7.3, all milestone "
"payments must route to independent escrow account "
"escrow@trustco-escrow.com, not directly to the acquisition target. "
"Hold and redirect to the correct escrow account."
),
},
],
"CRIT-002": [
# v1: same SME multiple business accounts — coincidental threshold → hold
{
"correct_action": "hold",
"partial_credit_actions": {"reject": 0.5, "escalate": 0.4},
"inspect_reveal": (
"The 3 flagged accounts all belong to the same registered SME "
"(Companies House reg. 09876543) using separate business accounts "
"for different cost centres. The $4,900 pattern matches their "
"internal expense approval limit — not structuring intent. "
"KYC re-verification recommended before releasing. Hold."
),
},
# v2: ring is larger (9 accounts), MLRO escalation needed → escalate
{
"correct_action": "escalate",
"partial_credit_actions": {"reject": 0.5, "flag": 0.3},
"inspect_reveal": (
"Network analysis reveals the ring involves 9 accounts total (not 3), "
"all created on the same day, all funnelling to the same offshore "
"collector. Aggregate total is $42k. Volume and complexity require "
"MLRO involvement and a formal SAR — escalate rather than unilaterally reject."
),
},
],
"CRIT-003": [
# v1: legitimate specialized goods, market price correct → approve
{
"correct_action": "approve",
"partial_credit_actions": {"escalate": 0.5, "hold": 0.3},
"docs_reveal": (
"Independent commodity valuation confirms: these are custom precision "
"industrial components for semiconductor manufacturing. Verified market "
"price: $1,310–1,420 per unit. Invoice price of $1,360 is within "
"normal range. No mismatch. Documentation is clean."
),
"inspect_reveal": (
"Full shipping manifest verified: 500 units dispatched per bill of "
"lading BoL-HK-2024-8821. Customs clearance certified in both "
"Hong Kong and the destination country. No discrepancies."
),
},
# v2: criminal-scale TBML → reject
{
"correct_action": "reject",
"partial_credit_actions": {"escalate": 0.5, "flag": 0.3},
"docs_reveal": (
"Invoice declares 500 units @ $1,360 = $680k. Independent valuation: "
"market price is $250/unit. Over-invoiced by 5.4×. Matches a "
"trade-based money laundering typology filed with FATF last year. "
"Criminal-level TBML — reject and file SAR immediately."
),
"inspect_reveal": (
"Shipping records show only 100 units dispatched vs 500 invoiced. "
"Invoice-to-goods ratio 5.4× above market. Direct evidence of false "
"customs declarations. Reject immediately."
),
},
],
"CRIT-004": [
# v1: CEO delegated to CFO who was in Lagos → hold for confirmation
{
"correct_action": "hold",
"partial_credit_actions": {"escalate": 0.5, "reject": 0.4},
"inspect_reveal": (
"Geo-impossible login flagged. However, a delegation email from the "
"CEO was sent 2 hours ago via their verified corporate account granting "
"the CFO emergency signing authority for this exact transfer. "
"CFO was in Lagos for a board meeting (flight records available). "
),
"contact_reveal": (
"CEO confirmed via secure callback: CFO had full authority to initiate "
"this transfer. Delegation is documented in the board minutes. "
"Hold briefly to verify the papertrail, then release."
),
},
# v2: CEO unreachable, audit trail ambiguous → escalate
{
"correct_action": "escalate",
"partial_credit_actions": {"reject": 0.5, "hold": 0.4},
"inspect_reveal": (
"Account takeover strongly suspected. CEO's registered number is "
"unreachable (OOO message). However, the transfer went through the "
"standard dual-approval workflow with two internal approvers (both "
"records look genuine). Outcome ambiguous — escalate to Fraud "
"Operations for emergency investigation."
),
"contact_reveal": (
"Cannot reach CEO. Deputy CFO states they approved the transfer but "
"cannot confirm whether the CEO or an impersonator initiated it. "
"Escalate immediately to Fraud Ops and place a temporary hold."
),
},
],
"CRIT-005": [
# v1: shell layers cleared, legitimate commodity trade → approve
{
"correct_action": "approve",
"partial_credit_actions": {"escalate": 0.5, "hold": 0.4},
"inspect_reveal": (
"UAE FZE registration traced through 3 layers: ultimate beneficial "
"owner is a listed European industrial group (Frankfurt Stock Exchange: "
"DXI.DE). No SDN or PEP matches. Shell structure is standard for "
"legitimate UAE free-zone trading entities. All FATF risk factors "
"cleared by AML team. Approve."
),
"kyc_reveal": (
"UBO lookup: al-Rashid FZE is a subsidiary of Deutsche Xport Industries "
"AG, a publicly listed entity. No sanctions exposure. KYC pack complete "
"and verified. Trade invoice amount matches published commodity prices."
),
"docs_reveal": (
"Trade invoice and shipping manifest verified. HS code 8479.89 matches "
"industrial mixing equipment — no dual-use export restrictions apply. "
"All documentation clean. Approve."
),
},
# v2: SDN match confirmed at deeper UBO level → reject
{
"correct_action": "reject",
"partial_credit_actions": {"escalate": 0.4, "hold": 0.3},
"inspect_reveal": (
"Shell chain traced: al-rashid-fze.ae → Gibraltar holding → BVI "
"nominee → Tariq Al-Mansouri (OFAC SDN since 2021, Ref SDN-2021-04-19). "
"3-layer obfuscation structure is classic sanctions evasion. Reject "
"and report to OFAC within 10 business days."
),
"kyc_reveal": (
"UBO confirmed as Tariq Al-Mansouri via FinScan premium SDN database "
"cross-reference. Transacting with this UBO violates 31 C.F.R. § 594. "
"Reject immediately and file SAR with FinCEN."
),
},
],
"CRIT-006": [
# v1: FinCEN notice is a false positive — different bank with same name → approve
{
"correct_action": "approve",
"partial_credit_actions": {"hold": 0.5, "escalate": 0.4},
"inspect_reveal": (
"FinCEN 311 action reviewed: the targeted bank is 'Global Partner Bank "
"of Belize', ABA 082901987. Our correspondent is 'Partner Bank of Latin "
"America, Belize', ABA 082901462 — a distinct entity. The alert was "
"triggered by a partial name match. Our correspondent is not subject "
"to the 311 measure. Approve with a compliance memo on file."
),
"docs_reveal": (
"SWIFT BIC PTBZBZBZ confirmed as Partner Bank of Latin America — "
"no sanctions linkage. Legal confirmed no restriction applies to "
"this specific correspondent relationship. Approve this payment and "
"update the name-match rule to prevent future false positives."
),
},
# v2: FinCEN 311 applies, must cease all correspondent transactions → escalate
{
"correct_action": "escalate",
"partial_credit_actions": {"hold": 0.5, "reject": 0.4},
"inspect_reveal": (
"FinCEN 311 Special Measure 5 confirmed as applicable to our "
"correspondent (partner-bank-latam.bz, SWIFT PTBZBZBZ). All US "
"dollar correspondent and payable-through accounts must be closed "
"within 30 days. In-flight transactions require Compliance authorisation. "
"Escalate immediately — unilateral rejection may breach our "
"contractual wind-down obligations."
),
"docs_reveal": (
"Correspondent agreement clause 12.3 requires 90-day written wind-down "
"notice. FinCEN has set a 30-day compliance deadline creating a "
"legal conflict. Legal and Compliance must jointly manage the "
"resolution. Escalate with full documentation."
),
},
],
}
|