Claude commited on
Commit
a037749
·
1 Parent(s): 2ebc042

Validate segment filenames in /jobs/{id}/zip to block path traversal

Browse files

The endpoint trusted state.segments[*].image_filename and audio_filename
when joining them to frames_dir, so a crafted name like ../../etc/hosts
would resolve outside the temp dir and bundle_zip would write that file
into the archive as static/<basename>. Filenames now must match the
same regex patterns the pipeline produces (primary, alt, or audio) or
they are dropped, keeping resolved paths under frames_dir.

Files changed (2) hide show
  1. app/main.py +16 -2
  2. tests/test_progress.py +73 -0
app/main.py CHANGED
@@ -584,9 +584,23 @@ async def fetch_job_zip(job_id: str, request: Request) -> Response:
584
  except Exception as exc:
585
  raise HTTPException(500, f"Render failed: {exc}")
586
 
587
- frame_paths = [frames_dir / s.image_filename for s in page.segments if s.image_filename]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
588
  audio_paths = [
589
- frames_dir / s.audio_filename for s in page.segments if s.audio_filename
 
 
590
  ]
591
  zip_bytes = bundle_zip(
592
  html,
 
584
  except Exception as exc:
585
  raise HTTPException(500, f"Render failed: {exc}")
586
 
587
+ # Filenames come from client-supplied state — only accept the
588
+ # exact patterns the pipeline produces so a crafted name with
589
+ # path separators or `..` can't escape `frames_dir` and pull
590
+ # arbitrary readable files into the bundle.
591
+ frame_paths = [
592
+ frames_dir / s.image_filename
593
+ for s in page.segments
594
+ if s.image_filename
595
+ and (
596
+ _PRIMARY_FILENAME_RE.match(s.image_filename)
597
+ or _ALT_FILENAME_RE.match(s.image_filename)
598
+ )
599
+ ]
600
  audio_paths = [
601
+ frames_dir / s.audio_filename
602
+ for s in page.segments
603
+ if s.audio_filename and _AUDIO_FILENAME_RE.match(s.audio_filename)
604
  ]
605
  zip_bytes = bundle_zip(
606
  html,
tests/test_progress.py CHANGED
@@ -225,3 +225,76 @@ def test_full_sse_job_lifecycle(tmp_path):
225
  assert resp.status_code == 200
226
  assert resp.headers["content-type"].startswith("text/html")
227
  assert b"<title>SSE Test</title>" in resp.content
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
225
  assert resp.status_code == 200
226
  assert resp.headers["content-type"].startswith("text/html")
227
  assert b"<title>SSE Test</title>" in resp.content
228
+
229
+
230
+ def test_zip_endpoint_rejects_path_traversal_filenames(tmp_path):
231
+ """A crafted state.segments[*].{image,audio}_filename must not pull
232
+ arbitrary readable files into the bundle. The endpoint should drop
233
+ any filename that doesn't match the pipeline's own naming patterns
234
+ so `frames_dir / filename` can never resolve outside the temp dir.
235
+ """
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+ import io
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+ import zipfile
238
+
239
+ from app.main import registry
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+
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+ # Plant a sentinel file outside the temp `static/` workdir that a
242
+ # traversal payload would otherwise read.
243
+ secret = tmp_path / "outside_secret.txt"
244
+ secret.write_text("sentinel-secret-bytes")
245
+
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+ job = registry.create()
247
+ try:
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+ client = TestClient(app)
249
+ # No `primary_image_data_uris` entries are written for these
250
+ # bogus filenames (they fail the upload-time regex), so the only
251
+ # way the bundler could include them is via the unvalidated
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+ # `frames_dir / s.image_filename` join.
253
+ # Two `..` segments to climb out of both `static/` and the
254
+ # `vgm_zip_*` workdir mkdtemp picks under TMPDIR.
255
+ traversal_image = f"../../{secret.name}"
256
+ traversal_audio = f"../../{secret.name}"
257
+ body = {
258
+ "state": {
259
+ "title": "Traversal Test",
260
+ "frames_dir": "static",
261
+ "segments": [
262
+ {
263
+ "index": 0,
264
+ "start_seconds": 0.0,
265
+ "end_seconds": 1.0,
266
+ "image_filename": traversal_image,
267
+ "section_title": "S",
268
+ "alt_text": "",
269
+ "audio_filename": traversal_audio,
270
+ }
271
+ ],
272
+ },
273
+ "primary_image_data_uris": {},
274
+ }
275
+
276
+ # We need `frames_dir` in the handler to live under `tmp_path`
277
+ # so the `..` payload would actually resolve to our sentinel.
278
+ # The handler uses `tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="vgm_zip_")`, which
279
+ # honors $TMPDIR — point it at tmp_path for this test.
280
+ import os
281
+ old_tmpdir = os.environ.get("TMPDIR")
282
+ os.environ["TMPDIR"] = str(tmp_path)
283
+ try:
284
+ import tempfile as _tempfile
285
+ _tempfile.tempdir = str(tmp_path)
286
+ resp = client.post(f"/jobs/{job.id}/zip", json=body)
287
+ finally:
288
+ _tempfile.tempdir = None
289
+ if old_tmpdir is None:
290
+ os.environ.pop("TMPDIR", None)
291
+ else:
292
+ os.environ["TMPDIR"] = old_tmpdir
293
+
294
+ assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
295
+ with zipfile.ZipFile(io.BytesIO(resp.content)) as zf:
296
+ names = zf.namelist()
297
+ # The sentinel file's basename must not appear anywhere in the bundle.
298
+ assert not any(secret.name in n for n in names), names
299
+ finally:
300
+ registry.pop(job.id)