PLL Cyber-Guard
An OpenEnv environment for cyber-attack detection on grid-connected inverters · v{{VERSION}}
Grid-following inverters synchronise to the grid with a phase-locked loop. An attacker who can rewrite its voltage measurements (false-data injection) can desynchronise the inverter from the real grid. The agent watches PLL signals simulated at 5 kHz plus a trusted but delayed PMU stream. Every 50 ms it must decide whether an attack is under way, classify it, and engage a protective action in time. It must also avoid alarming on real grid events: phase jumps, sags, single-phase faults, harmonic steps and frequency events.
Tasks
Sinusoidal FDI detection. Spot an interharmonic injection on one phase quickly. Some episodes have no attack.
Classify under disturbances. Tell sinusoidal, ramp and pulse injections apart while natural grid events happen.
Stealthy phase spoofing. A balanced angle drift the PLL tracks perfectly. Cross-check against the PMU and hold over before 10° of desync.
Live demo · physics-heuristic baseline
Quick start
curl -X POST $URL/reset -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"task_id": 2, "seed": 7, "session_id": "me"}'
curl -X POST $URL/step -H 'content-type: application/json' \
-d '{"session_id": "me", "action": {"attack_detected": false, "attack_type": 0, "confidence": 0.9, "protective_action": 0}}'
Endpoints: POST /reset POST /step GET /state GET /tasks
GET /schema GET /metadata GET /health WS /ws ·
OpenAPI docs ·
source