data/tasks_annotator_2.json

[
  {
    "data": {
      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Criminal Appeal Nos. 420-423, (From the Judgment and Order dated August 31, 1992 of the Kerala High Court in Criminal R. P. Nos. 665 and 666 of 1991 and Criminal M. C. No. 832 of 1992) | Forest Range Officer And Others v. P. Mohammed Ali And Others(Criminal Appeal Nos. 420-422 Of 1993) 1992) | 04/05/1993",
      "case_details": "Case: Criminal Appeal Nos. 420-423, (From the Judgment and Order dated August 31, 1992 of the Kerala High Court in Criminal R. P. Nos. 665 and 666 of 1991 and Criminal M. C. No. 832 of 1992) | Forest Range Officer And Others v. P. Mohammed Ali And Others(Criminal Appeal Nos. 420-422 Of 1993) 1992)",
      "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED",
      "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED",
      "case_record": "Respondents faced proceedings under the Kerala Forest Act, 1961, for possessing/transporting sandalwood oil. They contested the court's jurisdiction, arguing that 'sandalwood oil' is not 'wood oil' as defined in Section 2(f)(i) of the Act, and therefore not 'forest produce'. An initial High Court judgment quashed the complaints, but a subsequent Division Bench held sandalwood oil to be 'forest produce'. Sandalwood oil is industrially extracted from the heartwood and roots of sandalwood trees, which are explicitly defined as 'forest produce' and 'timber' under the Act. Technical dictionaries and expert opinions distinguish 'wood oil' (natural exudation) from 'sandalwood oil' (industrial by-product). The Karnataka Forest Act explicitly includes 'sandalwood oil', unlike the Kerala Act.",
      "generated_judgment": "### Facts: \n1. Respondents faced proceedings under the Kerala Forest Act, 1961, for possessing/transporting sandalwood oil.\n2. The respondents contested the court's jurisdiction, arguing that 'sandalwood oil' is not 'wood oil' as defined in Section 2(f)(i) of the Act, and therefore not 'forest produce'.\n3. An initial High Court judgment quashed the complaints against the respondents.\n4. A subsequent Division Bench held that sandalwood oil is indeed 'forest produce'.\n5. Sandalwood oil is industrially extracted from the heartwood and roots of sandalwood trees.\n6. Sandalwood trees and associated products are explicitly categorized as 'forest produce' and 'timber' under the Act.\n7. Technical dictionaries and expert opinions differentiate 'wood oil' (natural exudation) from 'sandalwood oil' (industrial by-product).\n8. The Karnataka Forest Act explicitly includes 'sandalwood oil', unlike the Kerala Act.\n\n### Issues:\n1. Does the definition of 'wood oil' under Section 2(f)(i) of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961, encompass 'sandalwood oil'?\n2. Is sandalwood oil considered 'forest produce' under the Kerala Forest Act, 1961?\n3. Should the technical and expert definitions distinguishing 'wood oil' from 'sandalwood oil' influence the court's interpretation of the Act?\n4. Can the explicit inclusion of 'sandalwood oil' in the Karnataka Forest Act be used as persuasive authority to interpret the Kerala Forest Act?\n\n### Rules:\n1. Statutory interpretation principles to determine legislative intent, especially the ordinary meaning of the words, context, and purpose of the statute.\n2. The principle of using technical and expert definitions to guide interpretation where statutory language is ambiguous.\n3. The doctrine of persuasive authority, where laws from different jurisdictions can be considered for guidance, though not binding.\n\n### Analysis:\n1. **Maintainability of the Appeal**: The appeal concerns the interpretation of the Kerala Forest Act as applied to 'sandalwood oil’ and its legal classification. Therefore, the appeal is maintainable as it addresses substantive legal questions.\n\n2. **Issue 1 and Issue 2 - Definition of 'wood oil' and 'forest produce'**: The core legal question hinges on whether 'sandalwood oil', despite being industrially extracted, falls within the statutory definition of 'wood oil'. According to the facts (Facts 5 and 6), sandalwood trees and their products are classified broadly as 'forest produce', which could logically extend to products derived from them like sandalwood oil. The statutory language governing 'forest produce' should be interpreted in light of this broader classification under the Act. \n\n3. **Issue 3 - Influence of Technical Definitions**: Expert opinions and technical definitions (Fact 7) provide clarity on how 'wood oil' and 'sandalwood oil' are perceived differently in industrial contexts. These distinctions may suggest that the legislature did not intend 'wood oil' to encompass industrially produced extracts like sandalwood oil. However, this does not automatically exclude sandalwood oil from being defined as 'forest produce' since the broader category includes the source material.\n\n4. **Issue 4 - Persuasive Authority**: Consideration of the Karnataka Forest Act (Fact 8) is relevant but not binding. The explicit inclusion of 'sandalwood oil' there demonstrates a legislative choice which may reflect broader recognition of such products as 'forest produce’. This offers a persuasive argument but must ultimately yield to statutory interpretation specific to the Kerala Forest Act unless legislative intent is clear and directly analogous.\n\n### Conclusion:\nUpon considering the statutory language of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961, and the broader category of 'forest produce', it is evident that the industrial extraction process does not negate the classification of sandalwood oil as a derivative of 'forest produce' given its source from sandalwood trees. While expert definitions suggest a technical distinction, the purposive interpretation of the Act supports its classification as 'forest produce'. The allure of persuasive authority from the Karnataka Act somewhat supports this interpretation, but our decision rests on statutory interpretation of Kerala's law.\n\nTherefore, the appeal is **DISMISSED**.",
      "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by K. RAMASWAMY, J.\nK. RAMASWAMY, J. -\nSpecial leave granted\n2. Untramelled by questions of fact the learned senior counsel on both sides neatly presented question of law whether 'sandalwood oil' is forest produce within the meaning of Section 2 (f) (i) of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961 for short 'the Act'. When proceedings were laid under Section 51 (1) of the Act against the respondents in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) Nos. 27-29 of 1992, they questioned the jurisdiction of the court in C. C. Nos. 145 and 148 of 1988. Eschewing delineation of intermediary proceedings went on from the start of prosecution, the High Court in exercise of its power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for short 'the Code' by order dated August 31, 1992 reported in Mohammed Ali v. Forest Range Officer quashed the complaint holding that sandalwood oil is not 'wood oil' as defined in Section 2 (f) (i) of the Act. So it is not a forest produce. Thus these appeals by special leave. When the same question subsequently arose, another learned Single Judge doubting the correctness of aforesaid judgment referred the matter to be Division Bench which by order dated December 15, 1992, reported in Khushboo Enterprises v. Forest Range Officer held that sandalwood oil is a forest produce within the meaning of Section 2 (f) (i) of the Act. Thus the appeal in the other case\n3. The Forest Conservation Act. 1980 aims to prevent depleting forests, conservation thereof and protection of wildlife in the country to maintain ecological balance. The State Acts regulate preservation of forests and forest produce to supplement the Central Act. The Act prescribes procedure for preservation of the forest and regulates possession of the forest produce, felling of trees in the forest area and removal from the forest or reserved area by transit permits etc. When sandalwood oil either was found in transit or in possession of the manufacturers, it was seized in the respective cases and the complaints under Section 51 (1) laid for contravention thereof. As said earlier the jurisdictional question was raised on the premise that sandalwood oil is not a wood oil as defined under Section 2 (f) (i) of the Act\n4. The question, therefore, emerges whether sandalwood oil is a wood oil. Section 9 (f) defines forest produce thus\n\"Section 2 (f) 'forest produce' includes -\n(i) the following whether found in or brought from a forest or not, that is to say -\ntimber, charcoal, wood oil, gum resin, natural varnish, bark, lac, fibres and roots of sandalwood and rosewood; and\n(ii) the following when found in or brought from a forest, that is to say -\n(a) trees and leaves, flowers and fruits and all other parts or produce not hereinbefore mentioned, of trees;\n(b) plants not being trees (including grass, creepers, reeds and moss and all parts or produce of such plants);\n(c) silk cocoons, honey and wax; and\n(d) peat, surface soil, rock and minerals (including limestone, laterite), mineral oils and all products of mines or quarries.\"\n5. A reading thereof does indicate that the forest produce whether found in or brought from a forest or not is a forest produce which includes, that is to say, the enumerated items in Clauses (i) and (ii) and \"wood oil\" is one of the enumerated items as well as roots of sandalwood and rosewood. The contention of Shri G. Ramaswamy, the learned senior counsel for the accused is that technical dictionaries, botanical textbooks and expert opinion would bring out a demonstrable distinction between wood of and sandalwood oil. The wood oil is a natural produce of the forest directly derived as an exudation from living trees in the forest belonging to the family of the Dipterocarpaceae trees while sandalwood oil is a by-product from sandalwood (Santalum album) by industrial process. Wood oil is produced by making a hole on the trunk of the living tree commonly known as \"oil trees\" or \"wood oil trees\". This family of trees are variously known in different parts of South India but they relate to Dipterocarpaceae family. Wood oil is gathered by heating the hole in the trunk of induce exudation of the oleic resin from the tree and commercially dealt with as wood oil which is a cheap substance in the commercial world used solely for the purpose of painting planks of wood or wooden vessels floating in the sea. The physio-chemical properties of wood oil are distinct and different from other oils. Sandalwood oil would be produced only at factory level and that too by mechanised process utilising the heart wood and roots of sandalwood trees removed from the forest as a raw material. Sandalwood oil is having very high commercial value and it is mainly used in manufacturing perfumery and cosmetic items of different types and grades. The production of sandalwood oil is being carried out as an industry, either by licence by individual or the State Government as its monopoly like in Karnataka State, in a large scale or as a small scale business. It is further contended that the meaning of the word 'wood oil' defined in Section 2 (f) (i) must receive its colour form its context and connotation. When the legislature used the word \"that is to say\" the wood oil and other natural growth referred to in the definition would only mean natural by-product directly drawn from the trees. The learned Single Judge had rightly construed the meaning of the word 'wood oil' and held that sandalwood oil being thereby-product derived commercially manufacturing process is not wood oil. The Division Bench committed manifest error in its construction of the word 'wood oil' to include sandalwood oil. Shri Krishna Murty Iyer, the learned senior counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, refuted the contention arguing that inclusive definition of forest produce must receive extended meaning. It must also be construed in the context in which it is used and the purpose the Act seeks to serve and the family to which sandalwood oil belongs being an essential oil would include wood oil. The expression wood oil being technical and part of an inclusive definition has to be construed in its technical sense and in an exhaustive manner. It cannot be restricted in a narrow circumference as was done by the learned Single Judge so as to defeat the object and purpose of the Act. Extraction of sandalwood oil even by mechanised process would nonetheless be a wood oil. He laid emphasis on the word 'timber' defined in Section 2 (k) which includes 'sandalwood' being a forest produce the oil extracted therefrom would also be within the meaning of the word 'wood oil'. The restricted meaning canvassed by the counsel would defeat the purpose of the Act and the literal interpretation giving narrow meaning to the word 'wood oil' should be excluded\n6. Ex facie the argument of Shri G. Ramaswamy backed by material, though is alluring, deeper probe denied its acceptance. Undoubtedly, the Karnataka Forest Act, 1963 incorporated in its definition of forest produce sandalwood oil after the word \"wood oil\" and the legislature in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, like the Act, do not specifically incorporate sandalwood oil in the definition of forest produce. From this could it be concluded, if it be otherwise interpretable, that wood oil would both include sandalwood oil as well. Undoubtedly Stedman's Medical Dictionary (23rd Edition) defines at page 1576 wood oil as gurjan balsam and gurjan balsam is defined at p. 156 to mean wood oil - Oleo-resin from Dipterocarpus alatus (family Dipterocarpaceae), - A tree of India and other regions of Southern Asia. Similar meaning was given in Concise Chemical and Technical Dictionary, edited by H. Bennett (fourth Edition) at page 1217; Scientific Treatises on the subject by Ernest Guenther in Volume 6; Edward Balfour in his Cyclopaedia of India and of Eastern and Southern Asia; R. N. Khori in his Materia Medica of India and their Therapeutics and Pharmacographia India by William Dymock defined wood oil in the same strain. All these technical literatures were concerned in finding out physio-chemical properties contained in wood oil and the source from which they are drawn for use in industrial purposes. The literal interpretation given therein if given acceptance would lead to manifest frustration of the purpose of the Act. In its interpretation we have to keep at the back of our mind the purpose which the Act and the Parent Act (Forest Conservation Act) seek to subserve J. F. Dastru equally in his Medical Plants of India and Pakistan treads on the same path and has given construction to wood oil in the context of its exudation obtained from the trunk of the trees belonging to the family of Dipterocarpaceae as an oleo-resin or gurjan balsam. There would be no quarrel on that behalf. It must be noted in this context that there are several types of essential oils in India, the important ones being sandalwood oil, agar-wood oil, Deodar oil and pine oil, apart from oleo-resin and wood oil derived from exudation from living trees in the forest area. These essential oils are obtained from any forest wood. Sandalwood as observed by the High Court is forest produce. Even its roots thereof are also included as forest produce. They are also timber within the meaning of Section 2 (k) of the Act. The purpose of the Act is to conserve forest wealth which is very dear for preservation to maintain ecology. Forest produce defined under Section 2 (f) is an inclusive definition. It is settled law that the word 'include' is generally used as a word of extension. When used in an interpretation clause, it seeks to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute. Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edition at p. 64 stated the construction to be adopted to the meaning of the words and phrases that \"The cardinal rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intention expressed in the Acts themselves. If the words of the statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. The words themselves alone do in such a case best declare the intention of the law giver\" . At p. 214 it is stated that an interpretation clause which extends the meaning of a word does not take away its ordinary meaning. An interpretation clause of the inclusive definition is not meant to prevent the word receiving its ordinary, popular and natural sense whenever that word would be properly applicable, but to enable the word as used in the Act, when there is nothing in the context or the subject-matter to the contrary, to be applied to somethings to which it would not ordinarily be applicable.... An interpretation clause should be used for the purpose of interpreting words which are ambiguous or equivocal, and not so as to disturb the meaning of such as are plain. At p. 216 it is stated that another important rule with regard to the effect of an interpretation clause is that an interpretation clause is not to be taken as substituting one set of words for another, or as strictly defining what the meaning of the term must be under all circumstances, but rather as declaring what may be comprehended within the term where the circumstances require that it should be so construed\n7. This Court in Babu Manmohan Das Shah v. Bishun Das adopting the ordinary rule of construction stated that \"the provisions of a statute must be construed in accordance with the language used therein unless there are compelling reasons such as where the literal construction would reduce the Act to absurdity or prevent manifest legislative purpose from being carried out\". The question therein was the interpretation of the phrase\" materially altered the accommodation or is likely substantially to diminish its value\" in the context of construction to a shop. In that context this Court laid that cardinal principle of statutory construction referred to hereinbefore would apply. In State of M. P. v. M. V. Narsimhan the definition of 'public servant' in Section 21 IPC was amended and Clause 12 thereof was brought on statute. The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 created its own provisions as specific offence of criminal misconduct which is different from the offence of bribery defined in the Indian Penal Code. When similar definition was not given under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 the contention was raised that the respondent cannot be prosecuted not being a public servant under the Prevention of Corruption Act. This Court while holding that definition of public servant was incorporated in Prevention of Corruption Act by necessary implication of public servant defined in Clause 12 of Section 21 IPC and held that Prevention of Corruption Act is supplemental to IPC and that, therefore, both would deal with the same offence. Accordingly, the respondent was held to be public servant coming within the definition of Prevention of Corruption Act. This Court adopted the doctrine of purposive interpretation to prevent corruption, a penal offence. In Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Indian Oil Corpn. this Court adopted purposive construction in the definition of the word 'building' for the propose of levy of property tax under the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act to include oil storage tanks to be \"building\" and held that the language of a statutory provision is not a static vehicle of ideas and concepts and as ideas and concepts change, . As they are bound to do in any country like ours with the establishment of a democratic structure based on egalitarian values, the meaning and content of the statutory provision undergo a change. The law does not operate in a vacuum. It cannot be interpreted without taking into account the social, economic and political setting in which it is intended to operate. The judge has to inject flesh and blood in the dry skeleton provide by the legislature and invest it with a meaning which will harmonise the law with the prevailing concepts and values and make it an effective instrument for delivering justice\n8. The word include in the definition under Section 2 (f) would show that it did not intend to exclude what would ordinarily and in common parlance be spoken of as wood oil. The expression being technical and being part of an inclusive definition has to be construed in its technical sense but in an exhaustive manner, it cannot be restricted in such a manner so as to defeat the principal object and purpose of the Act. The process by which the oil is extracted is not decisive as oil may be extracted by natural process of exudation or it may be extracted by subjecting to chemical or mechanical process and sandalwood (Santalum album) is cut into pieces. Its heartwood and roots of sandalwood trees removed from the forest are used as a raw material at a factory level that too by mechanised process to extract sandalwood oil. The purpose for which the oil is used is not decisive. Therefore, the word wood oil used in the Act will require purposive interpretation drawing upon the context in which the words are used and its meaning will have to be discovered having regard to the intention and object which legislature seeks to subserve. The restricted meaning sought to put up by the accused would frustrate the object and the literal interpretation would defeat the meaning. The legislature does not intend to restrict the word wood oil not do we find any compelling circumstances in the Act to give restricted meaning that only oil derived from Dipterocarpus trees to be wood oil as contended for the accused and which found acceptance by the learned Single Judge. The purposive interpretation would aid conservation of sandalwood, a valuable forest wealth, prevent illicit felling and transportation of them and make the manufacturers of sandalwood oil accountable for the possession of sandalwood trees or chips or roots etc. Incorporation of sandalwood oil ex abundenti cautela in Karnataka Act and absence thereof in sister Acts operating in South India does not detract from giving it its due meaning. The expert opinion is only an opinion evidence on either side and does not aid us in interpretation. This Court in Aditya Mills Ltd. v. Union of India did not adopt the dictionary meaning as it may be to some extent delusive guide to interpret entries in Central Excises and Salt Act. In Kishan Lal v. State of Rajasthan of which one of us, Sahai, J. was a Member, the Court was to consider the word 'sugar' whether under Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Marketing Act, 1961 an agricultural produce. It was contended that the Khandsari Sugar was not an agricultural produce. Repelling that contention, this Court held that the world agricultural produce includes all produce whether agricultural, horticultural, animal husbandry or otherwise as specified in the Schedule. The legislative power to add or include and define a word even artificially, apart, the definition which is not exhaustive but inclusive neither excludes any item produced in mills or factories nor it confines its width to produce from soil. If that be the construction then all items of animal husbandry shall stand excluded. It further overlooks the expression \"or otherwise as specified in the Schedule\". Accordingly it was held that Khandsari Sugar is an agricultural produce under that Act. In State of Bombay v. The Hospital Mazadoor Sabha this Court adopted purposive approach in interpreting the word 'industry' in Section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, and held that the Legislature in defining the word 'industry' in Section 2 (j) of the Act deliberately used term of wide import in its first clause and referring to several other industries in the second in an inclusive way obviously denoting extension. The conventional meaning attributed to trade or business was eschewed even in the absence of profit motive. It was held that hospital was an industry. Therefore, the ratio, far from helping the accused, is consistent with the view we have expressed above. In South Gujarat Roofing Tiles Manufacturers Assn. v. State of Gujarat the inclusive definition was construed in the context of the explanation given to Entry 22. It was held, therefore, that the word 'pottery' does not include tiles industry for the purpose of Minimum Wages Act. The ratio therein renders little assistance to the accused. In Rathi Khandsari Udyog v. State of U. P. this Court held that the words not defined may be construed in the popular sense in which it is being commonly used in commercial parlance. The ratio is not opposite to the fact situation. Similarly the construction placing reliance on the passage at p. 164 of Craies on Statue Law that the word is to be construed in the sense in which it is being understood in trade. Business or transaction known to the trade is also inapplicable to the factual context. In Fatesang Gimba Vasava v. State of Gujarat the Division Bench construed whether bamboo would include in its ambit cut pieces in the context and the purpose the Act sought to serve the tribals in the forest area. Privilege was granted to the tribals to remove certain forest produce from forest area for sale to supplement their livelihood. When toplas, supdas and palas made out of bamboo chips were being taken out for sale, they were being taken out for sale, they were sought to be prosecuted. It was challenged by the tribals. In that context the Division Bench held that though bamboo is a forest produce, the bamboo chips of the specified description do not fall within the definition of forest produce. Accordingly it was interpreted, from the context and purposive approach of the word 'forest produce'. Accordingly the ratio therein does not assist the accused\n9. The Andhra Pradesh High Court, relied on for the accused, had not correctly laid the law in Kangundi Industrial Works, Kuppam v. Government of A. P. Accordingly we hold that sandalwood oil is wood oil within the meaning of Section 2 (f) (i) of the Act. Therefore it is a forest produce. Necessary conclusion is that the trial court has jurisdiction to proceed with the trial. It is for the trial court to find whether the offence as imputed to the accused has been made out at the trial. We need express no opinion at this stage. The appeals of the State are allowed and the appeal of the accused is dismissed",
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          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>INPUT ERROR</span><span class='root-leaf'>Fabricated fact in case record</span></div>"
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          "value": "Wrong rule source",
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          "value": "Using outdated / overruled rule",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Using outdated / overruled rule</span></div>"
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        {
          "value": "Rule misinterpretation",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Rule misinterpretation</span></div>"
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          "value": "Rule misapplication",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Rule misapplication</span></div>"
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          "value": "Wrong legal test / threshold",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Wrong legal test / threshold</span></div>"
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          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Analysis</span><span class='root-leaf'>Neglected rule, fact, or counter-argument</span></div>"
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          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Analysis</span><span class='root-leaf'>Logical fallacy / leap in logic</span></div>"
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          "value": "Other reasoning error",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Analysis</span><span class='root-leaf'>Other reasoning error</span></div>"
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          "html": "<div class='root-option root-option-new-group'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Conclusion</span><span class='root-leaf'>Conclusion does not follow from analysis</span></div>"
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          "value": "Discretionary original judgment",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Conclusion</span><span class='root-leaf'>Discretionary original judgment</span></div>"
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      "case_id": "3663",
      "experiment": "ablation_issue",
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      "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA",
      "judgment_date": "04/05/1993",
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    "data": {
      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Civil Appeal No. 4157 of 1993 (From the Judgment and Order dated June 16, 1993 of the Madras High Court in W.P. No. 5793 of 1993), with SLP (CC Nos. 21592, 21690, 21691, 21688, 22042 of 1993), C.A. No. 4158 of 1993, SLP (C) No. 15097 of 1993, SLP (CC Nos. 21899, 21929, 21940 of 1993), I.A. No. 1 of 1993 in SLP (C) CC No. 21940 | Premium Granites And Another v. State Of Tamil Nadu And Others | 04/02/1994",
      "case_details": "Case: Civil Appeal No. 4157 of 1993 (From the Judgment and Order dated June 16, 1993 of the Madras High Court in W.P. No. 5793 of 1993), with SLP (CC Nos. 21592, 21690, 21691, 21688, 22042 of 1993), C.A. No. 4158 of 1993, SLP (C) No. 15097 of 1993, SLP (CC Nos. 21899, 21929, 21940 of 1993), I.A. No. 1 of 1993 in SLP (C) CC No. 21940 | Premium Granites And Another v. State Of Tamil Nadu And Others",
      "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED",
      "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED",
      "case_record": "This case involves appeals against a Madras High Court judgment that declared Rule 39 of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959, unconstitutional and void. The writ petitioner challenged Rule 39, arguing that the State Government had no power to frame a rule deviating from existing rules and that Rule 39 conferred arbitrary, uncanalised, and unguided power on the executive, violating Article 14 of the Constitution due to vague terms like \"public purpose and interest of mineral development.\" The High Court upheld the second contention. The Mineral Concession Rules have undergone several amendments over time, including Rule 8(A) allowing leases for industries, Rule 8(C) initially prohibiting private quarrying of black granite (later upheld and then amended to allow private persons with industries), and a 2012 amendment restricting leases to government companies or those with \"Letters of Commitment.\" Rule 39 was introduced in 1993, allowing the State Government to grant or renew leases on different terms in \"special circumstances in the interest of mineral development\" and \"in public interest.\" The appellants argued that the terms \"mineral development\" and \"public interest\" serve as sufficient guidelines, that reasons must be recorded, and that the power is subject to judicial review. They also contended that guidelines can be inferred from the Act's overall scheme and that similar provisions in other statutes have been upheld. The respondents argued that Rule 39 grants unbridled power and relied on cases emphasizing the need to minimize arbitrary discretion. They also raised factual disputes about some lease grants.",
      "generated_judgment": "<think>\nOkay, let's tackle this legal judgment. First, I need to understand the case thoroughly. The user provided the facts, so I'll start by summarizing them. The main issue is about the constitutionality of Rule 39 under the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959. The High Court declared it unconstitutional, and now there's an appeal against that decision.\n\nSo, the facts are that the writ petitioner challenged Rule 39, arguing the State Government couldn't create a rule that deviates from existing ones, and that Rule 39 gives too much arbitrary power, violating Article 14. The High Court agreed with the second part. The rules have had amendments over time, including Rule 8(A), 8(C), and a 2012 amendment. Rule 39 was introduced in 1993, allowing the government to grant or renew leases in special circumstances for mineral development and public interest. The appellants say these terms are sufficient guidelines and that reasons must be recorded, subject to judicial review. They also mention that similar provisions in other statutes have been upheld. The respondents argue that Rule 39 gives unbridled power and cite cases about minimizing arbitrary discretion. They also mention factual disputes about lease grants.\n\nNow, the issues. The main legal issue is whether Rule 39 is constitutional, specifically if it violates Article 14 due to vague terms. Another issue might be whether the State Government has the power to create such a rule. Also, the scope of judicial review and whether the terms \"public interest\" and \"mineral development\" are sufficiently defined.\n\nFor the rules, I need to recall the relevant constitutional provisions. Article 14 deals with equality before the law and equal protection of laws. The doctrine of proportionality and the principle of reasonable classification might be relevant. Also, the doctrine of severability—whether the invalid part of a rule can be struck down without affecting the rest. There's also the principle that vague terms can lead to arbitrariness, as per cases like State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala. Additionally, the power of the legislature to delegate authority, but with the requirement that the delegation must be specific enough to prevent arbitrariness.\n\nIn the analysis, the key is whether \"public interest\" and \"mineral development\" are sufficiently defined. The High Court found them vague, leading to arbitrary power. The appellants argue that the overall scheme of the Act and other statutes provide guidelines. However, the High Court might have correctly identified that without clear definitions, the terms could be misused. Also, the respondents' argument about factual disputes about lease grants might not directly affect the constitutionality but could be a separate issue. The 2012 amendment restricting leases to government companies or those with Letters of Commitment might show that the state has tried to regulate, but Rule 39's terms are still problematic.\n\nThe analysis should weigh the balance between legislative discretion and the need for clarity. If the terms are too vague, it could infringe on Article 14. The High Court's decision to strike down Rule 39 might be correct, but the appellants might have a point about the overall scheme providing enough context. However, the High Court's reasoning about arbitrariness due to vagueness is a strong point. Also, precedents where similar terms were upheld might not be directly applicable if the context here is different. The key is whether the terms are so vague that they can't be reasonably interpreted, leading to arbitrary exercise of power.\n\nConclusion: The appeal might be dismissed if the High Court's decision was correct in finding the terms too vague, violating Article 14. Alternatively, if the appellants can show that the terms are sufficiently guided by the Act's scheme, the appeal might be allowed. But based on the facts, the High Court's reasoning seems sound, so the conclusion would be to dismiss the appeal.\n</think>\n\n### Facts:  \n1. The writ petitioner challenged Rule 39 of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959, arguing that it was unconstitutional due to vague terms like \"public purpose and interest of mineral development,\" which allegedly conferred arbitrary power on the executive, violating Article 14 of the Constitution.  \n2. The Madras High Court declared Rule 39 unconstitutional, holding that the terms \"public interest\" and \"mineral development\" were uncanalised and unguided, enabling arbitrary discretion.  \n3. Rule 39, introduced in 1993, allows the State Government to grant or renew leases in \"special circumstances in the interest of mineral development\" and \"public interest,\" with no explicit guidelines.  \n4. Appellants (respondents in the original case) argued that the terms \"mineral development\" and \"public interest\" are sufficient guidelines, that reasons must be recorded, and that judicial review is available. They also cited similar provisions in other statutes upheld by courts.  \n5. Respondents (original petitioners) contended that Rule 39 grants unbridled power and relied on precedents emphasizing the need to minimize arbitrary discretion.  \n\n---\n\n### Issues:  \n1. Whether Rule 39 violates Article 14 of the Constitution by granting arbitrary power to the executive through vague terms like \"public interest\" and \"mineral development.\"  \n2. Whether the State Government had the authority to frame Rule 39, and whether the terms in Rule 39 are sufficiently guided by the Act’s scheme or other statutes.  \n\n---\n\n### Rules:  \n1. **Article 14 of the Constitution**: Guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of laws, requiring that legislative provisions not be arbitrary or discriminatory.  \n2. **Doctrine of Severability**: A provision that is invalid in whole or in part does not invalidate the entire statute.  \n3. **Vagueness Doctrine**: A law is void for vagueness if it fails to provide sufficient guidelines to prevent arbitrary enforcement.  \n4. **Legislative Delegation**: The legislature may delegate authority to the executive, but the delegation must be specific enough to prevent arbitrary exercise of power.  \n5. **Precedents**: Cases such as *State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala* (1954) emphasize that vague terms in statutes may be struck down for violating the principle of equality.  \n\n---\n\n### Analysis:  \n1. **Constitutional Validity of Rule 39**: The High Court correctly identified that the terms \"public interest\" and \"mineral development\" are uncanalised, lacking specific criteria to guide the executive. This vagueness risks arbitrary exercise of power, which violates Article 14. The appellants’ argument that the Act’s overall scheme provides sufficient context is weak, as the High Court’s analysis focused on the absence of clear guidelines in Rule 39 itself, not the broader Act.  \n2. **Legislative Authority**: The State Government’s power to amend rules under the Minor Mineral Concession Act is valid, but Rule 39’s vagueness renders it unconstitutional. The High Court’s decision to strike down Rule 39 does not invalidate the entire Act, as the doctrine of severability applies.  \n3. **Precedents and Judicial Review**: While the appellants cited similar provisions in other statutes, the High Court’s reliance on *State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala* is appropriate, as the case underscores that vague terms in statutes may be void for arbitrariness. The requirement for recorded reasons and judicial review, as argued by the appellants, is consistent with the High Court’s decision.  \n4. **Factual Disputes**: The respondents’ factual disputes about lease grants do not directly address the constitutional validity of Rule 39. These disputes are procedural and do not affect the legal analysis of the rule’s constitutionality.  \n\n---\n\n### Conclusion:  \nThe appeal is **DISMISSED**. The Madras High Court correctly held that Rule 39 violates Article 14 of the Constitution due to its vague and unguided terms, which enable arbitrary executive discretion. While the appellants’ arguments about the Act’s scheme and judicial review are valid, they do not override the constitutional imperatives of clarity and equality. The High Court’s decision to strike down Rule 39 is legally sound and should be upheld.",
      "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by RAY, J.\nRAY, J. -\nThis appeal and the connected matters are directed against the judgment dated June 16, 1993 passed by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Writ Petition No. 5793 of 1993. The writ petitioner Durai Raju Naidu moved the aforesaid writ petition before the Madras High Court for a decision that Rule 39 of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Mineral Concession Rules) as unconstitutional and void. The said writ petitioner contended inter alia that he was granted lease with respect to quarry in Survey No. 782/1 in Kulathur Village and he had been agitating before the State Government for the renewal of the said lease but he apprehended that the authorities concerned were likely to exercise their prerogative under the said Rule 39 to grant lease to somebody else and in order to safeguard his interest, the writ petition was moved by him for the aforesaid declaration\n2. To sustain the challenge to the said Rule 29, the writ petitioner Shri Naidu, urged two main grounds, namely, (a) The State Government had no power to frame a rule deviating from the Mineral Concession Rules already made in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 15(1) of the Mines and Minerals Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as MMRD Act) and (b) Rule 39 had conferred arbitrary, uncanalised and unguided power on the executive thereby offending Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The expression \"public purpose and interest of mineral development\" as referred to in the said Rule 39 is vague and does not constitute sufficient guidelines. The said writ petition was contested by the State of Madras and also by other respondents who were impleaded in the writ proceedings, namely, the Tamil Nadu Granites Quarry Owners and Exports Association, Shanthi Granites and the Premium Granites\n3. The Division Bench of the Madras High Court by the impugned judgment did not accept the first contention of the writ petitioner but upheld the second contention and declared that Rule 39 of the Mineral Concession Rules was unconstitutional and void\n4. Premium Granites and Shanthi Granites preferred a Special Leave Petition No. 10306 of 1993 before this Court inter alia challenging the impugned decision of the Madras High Court impleading the State of Tamil Nadu represented by its Commissioner and Secretary to the Government, Industries Department, Shri Durai Raju Naidu, the writ petitioner and the Tamil Nadu Granites Quarry Owners and Exporters Association. As aforesaid, Civil Appeal No. 4257 of 1993 arises on such special leave petition filed by the said applicants. The State of Madras has also preferred special leave petition challenging the said decision of the Madras High Court and some other parties also made applications before this Court for leave to move special leave petitions and to intervene either to oppose the said appeals or to support the decision of Madras High Court and all these matters have been analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment\n5. To appreciate the contentions raised by the contesting parties, certain dates and events may be stated as hereunder\n6. In 1957 the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act (MMRD Act) was passed by Parliament. In 1959, the Tamil Nadu Minor Minerals Concession Rules were issued under Section 15 of the MMRD Act. Rules 8 of the Mineral Concession rules provided for the grant of quarry leases in respect of all minor minerals. On December 16, 1972, GO No. 1932 was issued by the State of Madras inserting Rule 8(A) of the Mineral Concession Rules providing grant of lease to persons for quarrying minerals for their existing industries or having industrial programmes. It is the case of some of the parties in the above matters before this Court that they had set up industries based on the above rules and obtained leases of land for quarrying granite specified period. On August 25, 1975 by GOMs No. 993 Rule 8(A) was amended thereby enabling the State Government to grant leases for quarrying black granite subject to the applicant having an industry or agreeing to set up an industry two years\n7. On December 2, 1977 by GOMs No. 1312, Rule 8(C) was inserted thereby prohibiting grant of leases in Government lands for quarrying black granite for private persons. Since such Rule 8(C) provided for exclusive exploitation of black granite by the State Government, the validity of Rules 8(C) was challenged in a writ proceeding before the Madras High Court. The validity of Rule 8(C) was ultimately upheld by this Court on February 5, 1981 in the case of Hind Stone (State of T. N. v. Hind Stone, (1981) 2 SCC 205 : AIR 1981 SC 711 ). Some of the lessees whose leases had expired by efflux of time, made applications for renewal of their leases but no renewal granted. In 1984 Writ Petition No. 12267 of 1984 was filed by one of such applicants for renewal before this Court for a mandamus to direct State Government to grant renewal of lease for a further period of ten years and similar writ petitions were also moved before this Court for the aforesaid relief by some of the lessees whose leases had also expired. In such writ petitions this Court has passed ad interim order of status quo on May 3, 1984 as regards possession. Applications were also filed before this Court for vacating status quo order but such applications were dismissed by this Court on September 28, 1984 and the writ petitioners who were lessees but whose leases had expired, continued to remain in possession of land in terms of the interim order of this Court without, however, any right to quarry operations. On December 9, 1988, by GO No. 1273 Rule 8(C) was amended thereby providing for grant of lease to quarry black granite to private persons for their existing industries or having industrial programme. A number of lessees whose leases had expired made applications for grant of lease to quarry black granite. Their claims were considered by the department concerned and were recommended to the State Government. It appears that on September 2, 1989, the rules were further amended by Go No. 608 thereby providing for lease for quarrying black granite only to persons having industries but the said grant was made under a tender system. On June 10, 1992 by GOMs No. 214, Rule 8(C) was amended. Rule 8(C) as amended provides for grant of quarry lease to Government Company and Rule 8(A) as amended by GO 214 provides for quarry lease to be granted only to persons having \"Letters of Commitment\". The said GO also provided for canalisation of granite quarried. The validity of Rule 8(D) containing canalising provisions were challenged before the High Court of Madras and such Rule 8(D) was struck down by the High Court. On March 5, 1993, this Court, in Writ Petition No. 12267 of 1984 and connected matters passed an order to the effect that the State Government could consider and pass orders in respect of relief sought for by the petitioners for lease of quarrying black granite. On March 8, 1993, GO No. 97 was passed introducing Rule 39 of the Mineral Concession Rules providing for grant of leases \"in special circumstances in the interest of mineral development\" and \"in public interest\" otherwise than in accordance with the Mineral Concession Rules. As stated earlier, the validity of Rules 39 was challenged in a writ petition before the Madras High Court\n8. It may be stated here that by GO Nos. 125 and 197 the State of Madras granted quarry leases in favour of some persons who had established industries and had been granted quarry leases earlier and who had been allowed to continue in possession all through. After Rule 39 was struck down by the Madras High Court two writ petitions were filed before the Madras High Court for cancelling leases granted by the said GO Nos. 125 and 197 in exercise of the power under Rule 39 of the Mineral Concession Rules. The State Government opposed such writ petitions for cancelling the leases and inter alia contended that the grant of leases to existing industries was traceable to Rule 8(A) as amended by GO No. 214 dated June 10, 1992 and such grant of lease could be sustained without reference to Rule 39 since struck down by the Madras High Court but the High Court allowed the said writ petitions and set aside GO Nos. 125 and 197 by which the leases were granted in favour of some persons. It has been held by the High Court that the grant of lease cannot be sustained under Rule 8(A) of the Mineral Concession Rules and such grant of lease can be referable only to Rule 39 and since Rule 39 has been struck down, the grant made under the said Rule 39 is also to be set aside. Such grantees, therefore, have also moved special leave petitions before this Court inter alia challenging the decision of the Madras High Court striking down Rule 39\n9. To appreciate the rival contentions raised by the parties either in support or against the validity of Rule 39 of the Mineral Concession Rules, the provisions of Rule 39 are set out as hereunder\n\"In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-sections (1) and (1-A) of Section 15 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (Central Act 67 of 1957) the Governor of Tamil Nadu hereby makes the following amendment to the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1950The amendment hereby made shall come into force on March 8, 1992\nAMENDMENT\nIn the said rules, after Rules 38, the following rule shall be added, namely\n'39. Powers of State Government to grant rule or renew quarry lease or permission etc. in special cases : Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, the State Government, if in any case, are of opinion that in the interest of mineral development and in the public interest it is necessary so to do, they may, by order and for reasons to be recorded\n(a) grant or renew a lease or permission to quarry any mineral; or\n(b) allow the working of any quarry for quarrying any mineral;\non terms and conditions different from those laid down in those rules.'\"\n10. The learned counsel challenging the correctness of the decision of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court striking down Rule 39 as arbitrary, have urged a number of points. Since all the matters are being disposed of by common judgment, we do not propose to deal with the contentions made by each of the learned counsel challenging or supporting the impugned decision of the Madras High Court separately in view of the fact that grounds urged by the learned counsel are more or less similar and at times overlapping. We, therefore, propose to deal with the contentions raised by the learned counsel not individually but generally\n11. As already indicated, the only ground on which Rule 39 of the Mineral Concession Rules has been struck down by the Madras High Court is that such rule gives unguided and uncanalised powers to the State Government. The arguments advanced by the learned counsel challenging the decision of the Madras High Court striking down Rule 39 may be summarised to the following effect\n(1) Rule 39 contains the guidelines, viz., the grant under Rules 39 can be made only \"in the interest of mineral development\" and \"in public interest\" for reasons to be recorded in writing(2) The object of the MMRD Act itself is for regulation of mining and \"mineral development\". The rules framed under the MMRD Act are also intended to subserve the said object, namely, mineral development. The provisions of the MMRD Act the rules framed by the Central and the State Governments clearly furnish the scope and purport of the words \"mineral development\". Scientific exploitation of the minerals without waste in undoubtedly an exercise for mineral development envisaged by the Act and the rules\n(3) Since reasons are to be recorded in writing while exercising the power under Rule 39, it can always be ascertained from the order that may be passed under the said provisions of Rule 39 as to whether the grant is one for furthering mineral development or not\n(4) The word \"public interest\" is a word of definite concept which has been referred to in the Constitution and in many other Acts. The import of the expression \"public interest\" has been considered and noted in the decisions of this Court. Hence, the said expression does no longer suffer from any vagueness or indefiniteness\n(5) Power under Rule 39, being controlled by such consideration \"in the interest of mineral development\" and in \"public interest\", cannot be exercised arbitrarily and capriciously but such exercise has to be made with definite objective purpose. There is therefore, no occasion to strike down Rule 39 on the score of being potentially arbitrary and capricious and open to unguided and uncanalised exercise of power. If in any particular case, the aforesaid purposes are not followed in exercising power under Rule 39, then such improper action, and not Rule 39 itself, can be challenged\n(6) In different Acts and rules, both Central and State including rules framed by some other States under MMRD Act, provisions similar to Rule 39 have been made and such provisions have been noticed by courts of law but for good reasons have not been struck down as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution\n12. We have already indicated the outlines of various Government orders amending the Mineral Concession Rules from time to time. The picture which emerges from the aforesaid amendments made in the Mineral Concession Rules may be stated as hereunder\n13. The Mineral Concession Rules were framed under Section 15 of the MMRD Act providing for grant of quarry leases and permission in respect of minor minerals both in revenue lands and patta lands. In the year 1972 the Mineral Concession Rules were amended and under such amendment, the grant of lease of revenue land to quarry granite could be made in favour of private persons only if they had industries or industrial programmes indicating that the policy of the Government to exploit black granite scientifically to avoid wastage was being implemented. A number of persons including some of the appellants in these proceedings had established industries pursuant to the Rules as amended and applied and obtained leases for quarrying black granite for a period of ten years in 1973 - such leases being valid up to 1983. In December 1977, Rule 8(C) was introduced prohibiting grant of leases for quarrying black granite by private persons and confining exploitation only by the Government. The validity of such rule was challenged but as aforesaid the said rule was upheld by this Court in the case of Hind Stone (State of T.N. v. Hind Stone, (1981) 2 SCC 205 : AIR 1981 SC 711 ). When the leases for quarrying black granite in revenue lands for a period of ten years expired in 1983, the lessees including some of the appellants made applications for grant of renewal but they were not eligible for getting such renewal in view of Rule 8(C) the validity of which was upheld by this Court. The applicants for getting such renewal of lease including some of the appellants filed writ petitions before this Court and as indicated hereinbefore orders for maintaining status quo as to the possession of the lands were passed by this Court without however giving any right to quarry. In 1988, Rule 8(C) was amended whereby provision was made for grant of leases for quarrying black granite to private persons having industries or having industrial programmes. Such amendment of Rule 8(C) virtually restored the position as was prevailing in 1972. The persons who had set up industries or had industries programmes for quarrying black granite scientifically as desired by the Government, made applications for grant of renewal of leases. Such applications were scrutinised by the department concerned and recommendations for grant of renewal of leases were made by the department. At that stage, in 1989 the Mineral Concession Rules were further amended inter alia providing that quarry leases were to be granted to industries only under tender system. Tenders were floated and some of the aspirants for getting leases participated in such tenders and those who had participated and were successful were given the letters of commitment assuring grant of lease to them if they would set up industries. In 1992, the Rules were amended again by GOMs No. 214 drastically. As per the amended rules, grant of quarry leases to quarry black granite were to be made only to government companies and the companies having letters of commitment\n14. It does not require any imagination to note that there was frustration and resentment of such persons like some of the appellants who had set up industries based on the old rules and who had been starving for raw materials but who had become disabled from getting any lease in view of restriction of granting of such lease and confining the grant of lease in favour of only such private persons who held the letters of commitment\n15. It has been contended by the learned counsel in support of Rule 39 that the State Government having realised the injustice and unmerited hardship to be suffered by some persons and also having realised that for furthering mineral development which will be in the public interest, it was desirable to make suitable provisions so that the rigorous created because of the amendment made by GOMs 214 in 1992 confining grant of leases to private persons holding letters of commitment, should be relaxed. It was on such perception that Rule 39 was introduced in the Mineral Concession Rule enabling the Government to grant quarry leases to private persons in appropriate cases in the interest of mineral development and in public interest for reasons to be recorded in writing. It is, therefore, necessary to decide whether introduction of Rule 39 in the Mineral Concession Rules was justified and desirable and even if it may be justified or desirable, as a matter of policy, whether in law such amendment can be sustained\n16. Elaborating the contentions made before this Court in support Rules 39, it has been contended by the learned counsel that Rule 39 does not confer an uncanalised power and does not suffer from the vice of want of guidelines. It has been urged that Rule 39 contains the guidelines, viz., that the grant must be for mineral development and \"in public interest\". In other words, Rule 39 has been inserted to provide for grant of lease which may not be done strictly under Rule 8(A) or 8(C) but which is warranted for mineral development and \"in public interest\" for good reasons to be recorded\n17. It has been urged that mineral development is not a vague concept but has a definite meaning which can be tested objectively particularly when reasons are to be recorded in writing under Rule 39\n18. The learned counsel have contended that the object of the MMRD Act is for regulation of mineral development and the Rules framed under the MMRD Act both by the Central and State Governments clearly furnish the scope and support of the word \"mineral development\". It has been strongly contended that scientific exploitation of minerals without waste is undoubtedly a part of mineral development as envisaged by the MMRD Act and the rules framed thereunder. It has been urged by the learned counsel that the word \"public interest\" having been referred to in the Constitution and in many enactments is a word of definite concept\n19. The validity of Service rules including Fundamental Rule 56(j) empowering the Government to terminate the service by way of premature retirement had been challenged before this Court as ultra vires Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution but this Court in a series of decisions has held that if the power to retire prematurely in public service if exercised in \"public interest\" the provision empowering such premature retirement does not become invalid on the score of offending Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Constitution Bench of this Court in T. G. Shivacharana Singh v. State of Mysore (AIR 1965 SC 280 : (1967) 2 LLJ 246 ) in upholding Rule 285 of Mysore Civil Services Rules, 1958, providing for premature retirement in 'public interest' has held that Rule 285 authorising the Government to retire a government servant compulsorily in public interest did not offend Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It was indicated by the Constitution Bench that the law in relation to the validity of the rules permitting compulsory premature retirement of government servants had been well settled by a series of prior decisions of this Court in Moti Ram Deka v. General Manager, North East Frontier Railway (AIR 1964 SC 600 : (1964) 5 SCR 683 : (1964) 2 LLJ 467 ) and Shyam Lal v. State of U.P. ((1955) 1 SCR 26 : AIR 1954 SC 369 )\n20. The learned counsel have further contended that the guidelines need not be expressly found in the impugned and provisions but such guidelines can be gathered from the setting of the Acts and the rules framed thereunder. In support of this contention reference has been made to the decision of this Court made in the case of P. J. Irani v. State of Madras ((1962) 2 SCR 169 : AIR 1961 SC 1731 ). Section 13 of Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949 was challenged as ultra vires Article 14 of 16 of the Constitution as the said provisions gave uncontrolled and unguided discretion to the Government to exempt any building from all or any of the provisions of the said Act. It was held in the said decision that enough guidance was given in the preamble and the operative portion of the Act to exercise the discretion of exemption. The decision in P. J. Irani case ((1962) 2 SCR 169 : AIR 1961 SC 1731 ) was followed by this Court in the decision in S. Kandaswamy Chettiar v. State of T.N. ((1985) 1 SCC 290 ) Section 29 of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 providing for discretion to the State Government to grant total exemption to buildings belonging to public trust from the purview of the Rent Act was held valid and not offending Article 14 of the Constitution on the ground of giving unbridled discretion. It was held that sufficient guideline was afforded by the preamble and the operative provisions of the Rent Act for the exercise of discretionary power vested in the Government\n21. Reference has also been made to the decision of this Court in Ram Dial v. State of Punjab ((1965) 2 SCR 858 : AIR 1965 SC 1518 ). In the said decision the expression \"public interest\" has been explained at page 866 of the Report. It has been held that while considering the power given to the Government to remove a member under Section 14(e) of the Punjab Municipalities Act, the expression \"public interest\" would necessarily depend upon the time, place and circumstances with reference to which the consideration was made. It may be noted here that Section 14(e) was struck down not on the score that the expression \"public interest\" is vague and it introduces unguided, and unbridled power but the same was struck down in view of the fact that Section 14(e) providing for removal without a hearing circumvents Section 16(1) which contemplates a hearing to be given to the members to be affected\n22. The learned counsel have also referred to the decision of this Court made in the case of Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia v. Union of India ((1969) 2 SCR 166 : (1970) 1 SCR 479 ). In considering the expression \"so far as it appears to be necessary or expedient for carrying out the provisions of the Act (Gold Control Act), the Constitution Bench in the said decision held that the said phrase was not subjective in the context of the scheme and object of the legislation. The opinion of the administrator as to the necessity of making the order must be made objectively and must be reasonably tenable in a court of law. Reference has also been made to another decision of this Court made in Jalan Trading Co. (P) Ltd. v. Mill Mazdoor Union ((1967) 1 SCR 15 : AIR 1967 SC 691 : (1966) 2 LLJ 546 ). In the said decision validity of several provisions of the Payment of Bonus Act including Section 36 were taken into consideration by the Constitution Bench of this Court. It has been held that the power to exempt certain establishments from the operation of the Act given to the appropriate Government under Section 36 was not an unguided power because the Government was enjoined to take 'public interest', the financial position of the establishment, and other relevant circumstances into consideration before exercising the said power. There was therefore no excessive delegation of legislative authority by Section 36 and the section was held valid\n23. The learned counsel have again relied on recent decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court made in the case of Workmen v. Meenakshi Mills Ltd. ((1992) 3 SCC 336 : 1992 SCC (L&amp;S) 6791992 SCC(L&amp;S) 679 ) The vires of Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act (as prevalent at the relevant time) was considered in the said decision. It had been held that powers conferred under sub-section (2) of Section 25-N to grant or refuse permission for retrenchment has to be exercised in accordance with objective indicated and Statement of Objects and Reasons given in the Amending Act 32 of 1976 and also the basic idea of settlement of industrial disputes and maintaining industrial peace. It has been held that in exercising power under sub-section (2) of Section 25-N, with the requirement of passing a speaking order containing reasons does not amount to unreasonable restriction. It has also been held that the requirement of reasons for exercise of such power by itself excludes chances of arbitrariness. It has also been held in the said decision that Section 25-N is not vitiated on the ground of absence of a provision for appeal or review of the order passed by the Government or authority as the order is required to be a speaking order to be passed on objective considerations. It has been further held that the remedy of judicial review available under Article 226 cannot be said to be inadequate because even in a case of refusal of permission for retrenchment on policy considerations, it is open to the Court to examine whether policy is in consonance with the object and purport of the Act\n24. The learned counsel have also contended that Entry 54 List I of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India enables the central Government to regulate mines and mineral development in \"public interest\" by making a declaration of such intention and Parliament has in fact made such declaration by Section 2 of the MMRD Act. By the said MMRD Act, Parliament has left the power of regulating quarry leases in respect of minor minerals to the State Governments under Section 15 of the MMRD Act. The State Government has the authority to deal with the minor minerals under which the Mineral Concession Rules have been framed by the Government of Tamil Nadu. It is by the said rules that the State Government has been regulating grant of leases from time to time. In 1992 the Government thought it fit to prohibit grant of quarry leases to private persons except in patta lands and providing for grant of quarry leases to revenue lands only to government companies in terms of Rule 8(C). On a reconsideration and as a part of policy decision, the Government thought it fit to introduce Rule 39 providing for the grant of quarry leases to private persons \"in the interest of mineral development\" and \"in public interest\" by indicating reasons in writing by relaxing the rigours of other provisions of the Mineral Concession Rules. Rule 39 is a part of the policy underlying the Mineral Concession Rules which is consistent with the object of the MMRD Act. As exercise of relaxation for grant of quarry leases under Rule 39 can only be made within the parameters of public interest and for the mineral development by recording the reasons in writing, Rule 39 does not suffer from arbitrariness or unguided or unbridled power offending Article 14 of the Constitution. It has also been contended that the power exercised under Article 39 is not an absolute, discretionary power of the State Government unfettered by any valid consideration but exercise of such power within the aforesaid parameter is always open to judicial scrutiny thereby affording ample safeguard against any abuse in exercising the power under Article 39\n25. Commenting on the reasons for which Article 39 was introduced in the Mineral Concession Rules, it has been submitted by the learned counsel that various persons under the existing rules has set up industries by incurring substantial costs for sizing and polishing granites for export and sale in the domestic market. Such scientific exploitation and ancillary steps in that regard are undoubtedly right steps for mineral development. The cases of some of the persons who had set up proper industrial establishments for quarrying granites and for polishing and sizing them for effective user under the existing rules and had been possessing lands and were reasonably aspiring for renewal of leases required proper consideration. Although their cases were recommended on scrutiny of relevant facts by the department concerned, no such lease could be granted because of the amendment effected in 1992 in the Mineral Concession Rules. As not only injustice was meted out to such persons but non-renewal of leases to such persons was also considered to be not \"in the interest of mineral development\" and \"in the public interest\". The State Government, therefore felt that Rule 39 containing provision for relaxation in the matter of grant of quarry leases should be introduced so that in an appropriate case in the greater interest of mineral development and in public interest, grant of lease can be made notwithstanding other provisions in the Mineral Concession Rules. In the aforesaid facts, it cannot be contended that Rule 39 was introduced without any justification whatsoever or the same suffers from any excessive delegation or vice of uncanalised and unbridled power or the same was introduced to give favours to a chosen few\n26. The High Court in striking down Rule 39 has held that Rule 39 provides for an arbitrary power and the guidelines of public interest and in the interest of mineral development do not provide any objective standard. For such finding, the High Court has relied on the decision of this Court made in Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of U.P. ( : AIR 1954 SC 224 ); R. M. Seshadri v. District Magistrate, Tanjore (AIR 1954 SC 747 : (1955) 1 SCR 686 ); Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia v. Union of India ((1965) 2 SCR 858 : AIR 1965 SC 1518 ) and Jalan Trading Co. (P) Ltd. v. Mill Mazdoor Union ((1969) 2 SCC 166 : (1970) 1 SCR 479 ). It has been contended by the learned counsel that all the said decisions do not support the proposition that Rule 39 is ultra vires Articles 14 of the Constitution. The decisions relied on by the High Court primarily relate to laws or rules which seeks to prohibit a person from carrying on a legal trade or profession except on licences. Such laws prescribing the restriction require to be precise and objective so that the prohibitions would clearly be understood and made enforceable. Provisions enabling a grant have necessarily different import\n27. It may be noted here that the decision in Dwarka Prasad case ( : AIR 1954 SC 224 ) relates to a case where the power is given under clause 4(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Coal Control Order to grant or refuse to renew, suspend, revoke or cancel or modify any licence issued under the said control order. The said clause further authorised the Controller to delegate such power in favour of any person. Such provision was held unreasonable and invalid. The decision in R. M. Seshadri v. District Magistrate, Tanjore (AIR 1954 SC 747 : (1955) 1 SCR 686 ) relates to the validity of condition 5(a) and special condition 3 which required a licence under Cinematograph Act to exhibit at each performance one or more approved films of such length and for such time as the Provincial Government or the Central Government may direct. Under special condition 3 the licensee was required to exhibit at the commencement of each performance not more than 2000 feet of one or more approved films. It was held by this Court that such conditions did not amount to reasonable restrictions with the meaning of Article 19(6) of the Constitution and therefore was ultra vires Article 19(1) of the Constitution\n28. The decision made in Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia ((1969) 2 SCC 166 : (1970) 1 SCR 479 ) was a case where the validity of various sections of the Gold Control Act and the Regulations made thereunder fell for consideration. Section 5(2)(b), Section 27(2)(d), Section 27(6)(a), Sections 32, 46, 88 and 100 were held ultra vires for reasons indicated therein. Indeed this decision is relied on to support the validity of Rule 39 of the Mineral Concession Rules. Some of the sections of the said Gold Control Act were held valid. The reasons for which the said other sections were held invalid are entirely different and do not apply so far as Rule 39 is concerned. Moreover, considerations as to public interest and for furtherance of mineral development as essential requirement to grant exemption under Rule 39 make the said rule wholly objective. The decision in Banthia case ((1969) 2 SCC 166 : (1970) 1 SCR 479 ) has no application in interpreting Rule 39\n29. It has been further contended that where in respect of prohibited categories, the law carves out an exception or relaxation, the rule to be applicable should be appreciated on a different perception. There the question of unbridled power being allowed to be exercised does not arise. The question is of taking out certain exceptions from the prohibited area and keeping certain categories outside the prohibited area for being allowed to exercise freedom of trade or business from the restrictions imposed\n30. Elaborating on the contention that the power of relaxation as contained in Rule 39 is similar in various statutes it has been urged that the power granted under Section 31 of the MMRD Act confers identical power on the Central Government as Rule 39 confers the power on the State Government. Section 31 of the MMRD Act may be set out as hereunder\" 31. Relaxation of rules in special cases. - The Central Government may, if it is of opinion that in the interest of mineral development it is necessary so to do, by order in writing and for reasons to be recorded, authorise in any case the grant, renewal or transfer of any prospecting licence or mining lease, or the working of any mine for the purpose of searching for or winning any mineral, on terms and conditions different from those laid down in the rules made under Section 13. \"It has been submitted that the High Court while dealing with Section 31 of the MMRD Act, has not questioned the validity of the said section although it contains similar provisions. In this context reference to Section 29 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 has also been made. The provision of Section 29 is set out as hereunder\" Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the Government may, subject to such conditions as they deem fit, by notification, exempt any building or class of buildings from all or any of the provisions of this Act. \"31. This provision has been upheld by the Supreme Court in the decisions S. Kandaswamy Chettiar v. State of T.N. ((1985) 1 SCC 290 ) and Prabhakaran Nair v. State of T.N. ((1987) 4 SCC 238 )\n32. Reference was also made to Section 8-A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act which is set out as hereunder\" 8-A. (1) The State Government may, by notification make an exemption, or reduction in rate, in respect of any tax payable under this Act -\n(2) Any exemption from tax or reduction in the rate of tax, notified under sub-section (1) may be subject to such restrictions and conditions as may be specified in the notification\n(3) The State Government may, by notification, transpose any entry or party thereof from one schedule to another schedule and alter the point of levy of sale or purchase, but not so as to enhance the rate of tax in any case. \"Reference to Section 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 was also made. The provision is set out as hereunder\" If the Central Government is satisfied that it is necessary in the public interest so to do it may, by notification in the Official Gazette, exempt generally either absolutely or subject to such conditions (to be fulfilled before or after clearance), as may be specified in the notification goods of any specified description from the whole or any part of duty of customs leviable thereon. \"This section has been upheld by this Court in Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) P. Ltd. v. Union of India ((1985) 1 SCC 641 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 121 )\n33. Section 14 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act since referred is set out as hereunder\" 14. Power of Government to notify exemption and reductions of tax. - (1) The Government may be notification (issued whether prospectively or retrospectively) make an exemption of reduction in rate, in respect of any tax payable under the Act. \"34. It is contended that Section 14 is quite similar to Rule 39 of the Mineral Concession Rules. In this connection, reference has also been made to Rule 66 of the Karnataka Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1969, containing provisions for relaxation of rules in special cases. The said rule is set out as hereunder\" 66. Relaxation of rules in special cases. - In cases where the Government is of the opinion that public interest so requires, it may authorise the grant of a quarrying lease or a quarrying permit on such terms and conditions other than those prescribed in the rules, as the Government may by order specify\nProvided that notwithstanding anything contained in these rules such safeguards, territorial, financial or otherwise may be provided to the leases with a view to safeguarding the interests of any industry or trade in order to avoid unhealthy competition among the lessees and to prevent any fall in the trade and to see that minor mineral is exploited in a scientific and systematic manner. \"Basing the arguments on the aforesaid contentions the learned counsel have submitted that there was no occasion to strike down Rule 39 by the High Court as invalid and ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution by holding that the said rule conferred unguided and unbridled discretionary power on the State Government. The learned counsel have submitted that as the said Rule 39 is quite valid and has been inserted in the Mineral Concession Rules for a reasonable purpose, Rule 39 cannot per se be declared as ultra vires as sought to be done by the Madras High Court. If in any individual case, power has not been exercised properly and the reasons which have got to be recorded in writing do not stand the scrutiny of reasonableness and the purposes for which such power of exemption can be exercised, challenge for improper action in such individual cases before a court of law can always be made. The learned counsel have therefore submitted that the decision of the Madras High Court should be set aside thereby enabling the State Government to giver effect to Rule 39 in appropriate cases\n35. Supporting the decision of the Madras High Court striking down Rule 39 of the Mineral Concession Rules, it has been urged by the learned counsel opposing the appeals that the High Court felt that if Rule 39 was to be interpreted to give a wide discretionary power to the authorities to overtook other provisions of the Mineral Concession Rules then it would be violative of Article 14 as being vague and unfettered and giving uncanalised power to the State Government. It was on such finding that Rule 39 was struck down as unconstitutional\n36. It has been very strongly contended that the submission that the words \"public interest\",\" reasons to be recorded in writing \"would be adequate to prevent arbitrary action is not tenable in view of the decision of this Court by the Constitution Bench in Delhi Transport Corpn. v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress (1991 Supp (1) SCC 600 : 1991 SCC (L&amp;S) 12131991 SCC(L&amp;S) 1213 ). The attention of this Court has been drawn to paragraph 230 at page 716 in the majority decision. It has been held in the said paragraph\" There is need to minimise the scope of the arbitrary use of power in all walks of life. It is inadvisable to depend on the good sense of the individuals, however high placed they may be. It is all the more improper and undesirable to expose the precious rights like the rights of life, liberty and property to the vagaries of the individual whims and fancies. It is trite to say that individuals are not and do not become wise because they occupy high seats of power, and good sense, circumspection and fairness does not go with the posts, however high they may be. There is only a complacent presumption that those who occupy high posts have a high sense of responsibility. The presumption is neither legal nor rational. History does not support it and reality does not warrant it. In particular, in a society, pledged to uphold the rule of law, it would be both unwise and impolitic to leave any aspect of its life to be governed by discretion when it can conveniently and easily be covered by the rule of law. \"It has also been contended that it is also not factually correct that all the ten grantees (13 leases) are having their own industries or factories and they are not exporting any raw granite or raw block granite to foreign countries but they are processing and polishing after cutting them and sizing them and it was only the said polished goods that are being exported by them. It has been contended that only M/s. Enterprising Enterprises and Gem Granite have their own factories at Madras. Pallavan Granite has a factory at Pondicherry. All other grantees do not posses any industry of their own either inside or outside the State of Tamil Nadu. It is also contended that 75% to 80% of the quarried materials are straight away exported abroad without cutting and polishing even by the persons who possess industries\n37. It has also been contended that although under GOMs No. 1273 introduced on December 9, 1989 which was in force on June 9, 1992 permitting grant of lease to persons which industries, M/s Enterprising Enterprises and Gem Granite did not choose to apply under that scheme which was in force for nearly 3 1/2 years only because the granites quarried must be captively used in their own industries for the purpose of polishing before the same are exported. It has been contended that relevant facts have not been taken into consideration for granting lease in the purported exercise of power of relaxation under Rule 39. Such factual contentions are, however, not admitted\n38. We do not propose to scrutinise facts and circumstances concerning the grantees in favour of whom the exercise of power under Rule 39 had been made because we do not think that for deciding the validity of Rule 39 a case of improper exercise of power under Rule 39 in any particular case, is required to be considered by this Court\n39. It has been contended that even if it is held that consideration of public interest and the interest of mineral development coupled with requirement to record reasons provide guidelines under which power under Rule 39 is to be exercised, Rule 39 introduced on March 8, 1993 in the Mineral Concession Rules, if given an expansive introduction, would entitle the authorities concerned to disregard the various other provisions as contained in the Mineral Concession Rules framed under Section 15 of MMRD Act and would entitle the authorities concerned either to grant or renew a quarry lease contrary to the avowed policy of the State Government incorporated in certain other provisions of the Mineral Concession Rules\n40. It has been contended that when Rule 8(C) epitomises policy of the State Government reserving granite in all its uses to be exploited by the State Government or through its Corporation, in exercise of the powers under Rule 39, the State Government should not be permitted to give an interpretation to Rule 39 widely and grant a quarry lease contrary to the State Policy. Mr. Sibal, the learned counsel in this connection has referred to the decision in Gardner v. Jay ((1885) 29 Ch D 50 , 58 : 52 LT 395). Lord Justice Bowen in dealing with the judicial discretion has held that :\" If a court is invested by Act of Parliament with a discretion, that discretion, like other judicial discretion, must be exercised according to commons sense. \"The learned Counsel has also contended that it is a settled principle of interpretation of statute that a court should not interpret a statute in such a fashion as to render other provisions redundant. There should always be an attempt to read different sections of a statute harmoniously so that one provision does not invalidate the other. It has been contended that the statutory rule should be considered as a part of an integrated scheme and no one provision should be so interpreted as to render the scheme as envisaged in other provisions inoperative. It has been submitted that Rule 8(C) represents the part of a scheme in respect of which the State Government does not allow exploitation of granite except by itself or through its Corporation. It must therefore be held that the authorities in framing Rule 39 could not have intended that such policy should be rendered inoperative and ineffective by interpreting Rule 39 in a wide manner. It has been further submitted that it is well established rule of interpretation that courts must interpret an enactment in such a way as to implement rather than defeat its purpose. In this connection, reference has been made to the observation of Francis Bennion in Statutory Interpretation, Second Edn. at page 411. The learned author has indicated that :\" An Act must be construed so that its provisions are given force and effect rather than being rendered nugatory.\"The learned author has also indicated that :\" Ut res magis principle requires inconsistencies within an act to be reconciled. \"In this context, the learned author has referred to Blackstone to the effect that,\" one part of the statute must be so constructed by another, that the whole may, if possible, stand - ut res magis valeat quam pereat. \"It has been further submitted that the principle of reconciling inconsistencies within an Act means that if the obvious intention of the enactment gives rise to difficulties in implementation, the court must do its best to find ways of resolving these. It has been submitted that looking from this angle, Rule 39 would only mean that the State Government is entitled to grant or renew a quarry lease if in a given case or in a special class of cases it is of the opinion that in the interest of mineral development and in the public interest it is necessary to change the terms and conditions of the lease different from those statutorily prescribed under the rules. In no other circumstances, this power can be exercised. Such an interpretation would render Rule 39 consistent with the scheme formulated by the State Government under other provisions in particular Rules 8(A) and 8(C). It is contended that any other interpretation would render Rule 39 a Henry VIII clause\n41. It has been submitted that this Court has many occasions to deal with similar Henry VIII clauses (that king is regarded popularly as the impersonation of executive autocracy). In Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly ((1986) 3 SCC 156 , 220, 221 : 1986 SCC (L&amp;S) 4291986 SCC(L&amp;S) 429 : (1986) 1 ATC 103 ) (at pp. 220, 221) and in Delhi Transport Corpn. v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress (1991 Supp (1) SCC 600 : 1991 SCC (L&amp;S) 12131991 SCC(L&amp;S) 1213 ) (at pp. 707 and 717) this Court held that such clauses are constitutionally impermissible\n42. It has been very strongly contended that in case this Court finds Rule 39 to be vague and ambiguous then this Court may, in the light of scheme of the entire rule, the policy of the State Government as expressed in the said rules, permit Rule 39 to be read down in such a manner so as to give effect to the policy of the Government and also to the scheme of the MMRD Act. It has been submitted that this Court has repeatedly followed doctrine of reading down in State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy ((1977) 4 SCC 471 : (1978) 1 SCR 641 ), R. L. Arora v. State of U.P. ((1964) 6 SCR 784 : AIR 1964 SC 1230 , following Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962 Supp 2 SCR 769 : AIR 1962 SC 955 ), Jagdish Pandey v. Chancellor, University of Bihar ((1968) 1 SCR 231 : AIR 1968 SC 353 ), Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration ((1978) 4 SCC 494 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 155 )\n43. It has been further submitted that as Rule 39 cannot be given a wide interpretation thereby giving extraordinary power to relax other provisions of the rules and consequently rendering the scheme of the entire rules ineffective. The only interpretation by reading down Rule 39 which can be given is that the said rule would permit the State Government under extraordinary circumstances or in special cases to vary certain terms and conditions of the lease in a given case. It has been submitted that therefore it becomes necessary to understand the import of the words \"terms and conditions\" in contradistinction to the policy of the Government as contained in the Mineral Concession Rules. The words \"terms and conditions\" according to the learned counsel would mean a stipulation or requirement, the failure of which would render the Act subject to repudiation\n44. It has been contended that the Mineral Concession Rules prescribe certain conditions as to the grant of leases - how an application is to be made, to whom it is to be made, the maximum period of lease, the extent of maximum area which can be leased out to the applicant etc. All these conditions are also provided in the MMRD Act itself. In D. K. Trivedi v. State of Gujarat (1986 Supp SCC 20 ) this Court has held that the rule-making power of the State Government under Section 15 is controlled by Sections 4 to 13 (now Sections 5 to 13) of the MMRD Act. On the principle of harmonious construction and reading down statutory provision for reconciliation in a special case, in the interest of mineral development and in the public interest, the State Government may change or relax some of the conditions of lease e.g. may at the most grant a lease for more than ten years if the applicant satisfied the State Government of the necessity to do so. Similarly, in a given case, the Government may charge less seniorage fee, dead rent etc. in the interest of mineral development and in public interest. But the State Government cannot and should not utilize such an extraordinary power under Rule 39 to exempt few persons alone, while applying the policy to all others e.g. Dharmapuri District is completely reserved for exploitation by Government-owned Corporation. It has been contended that it has been demonstrated before this Court with the aid of the affidavit filed by the State Government in Civil Appeal No. 1655 of 1992 at pages 450 to 456 that more than 70 applications have been rejected on the sole ground that Dharmapuri District is reserved for State exploitation. Despite such avowed policy of reservation, the State Government in the purported exercise of a wide power under Rule 39 has granted three leases in the same Dharmapuri District only on the ground that there was a huge loss of foreign exchange. The learned counsel have contended that such an exercise in completely overlooking the other provisions will be wholly capricious and therefore impermissible under Article 14 of the Constitution and consideration of loss of foreign exchange is alien to the relevant consideration permissible under the Mineral Concession Rules\n45. It has been contended that in case the Government wants to grant leases in Dharmapuri District to persons who were not in possession of letters of commitment as on June 10, 1992, the only course open to the State Government is to change its policy of reservation as well as its policy in relation to letters of commitment and allow all individuals who are interested in a quarrying licence consistent with the concept of equal opportunity\n46. It has been further contended that the State Government is under a constitutional duty to act fairly and justly and given equal opportunity to every individual who seeks largess from the Government. The grant of licence of a few people and that also on grounds of loss of foreign exchange is totally obnoxious to the theory of just State action. The guiding principle for interpretation of Rule 39 should be equality of opportunity to every person in the trade and at the same time imposing sufficient restrictions or guidelines or safeguards to prevent misuse of such a power and such interpretation must enable Rule 39 to coexist with the other rules as being not inconsistent with the other rules\n47. It is therefore only possible to reconcile Rule 39 by reading it down and indicating that in appropriate case by exercise of power conferred in Rule 39, it is permissible for the State Government only to vary the terms and conditions of the lease \"in the interest of mineral development\" and \"public interest\"\n48. After considering the facts and circumstances of the case and giving our careful consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the respective parties, it appears to us that the MMRD Act was enacted by Parliament under Entry 54 List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The aforesaid entry enables the Central Government to regulate mines and mineral development in public interest by making such declaration and Parliament, has in fact, made such declaration by Section 2 of the MMRD Act. In respect of minor minerals, Parliament by the said MMRD Act has left the powers of regulating minor minerals to the State Governments under Section 15 of the MMRD Act. Different State Governments have exercised such power under Section 15 of the MMRD Act and State of Tamil Nadu has enacted in 1959 the Mineral Concession Rules. There is no dispute that the MMRD Act and the rules framed thereunder either by the Central Government or by the State Government are for mineral development subserving the cause of public interest. It cannot also be disputed that mineral development is not a vague expression and the MMRD Act and the rules framed under it, clearly furnish the scope and purport of the word \"mineral development\". It has been very reasonably contended that scientific exploitation of minerals without waste is undoubtedly a part of mineral development as envisaged by the MMRD Act and the rules framed thereunder. The expression \"public interest\" finds place in the Constitution and in many enactments which have since been noted and considered by this Court in various decisions. The said expression is, therefore, a word of definite concept. There is also force in the contention of the appellants that the guidelines need not be expressly found in the impugned provisions but such guidelines can be gathered from the setting of the Act and the rules framed thereunder. Such contention gets support from the decisions of this Court in P. J. Irani ((1962) 2 SCR 169 : AIR 1961 SC 1731 ), S. Kandaswamy Chettiar ((1985) 1 SCC 290 ), Jalan Trading Co. ((1967) 1 SCR 15 : AIR 1967 SC 691 : (1966) 2 LLJ 546 ), Workmen of Meenakshi Mills Ltd. ((1992) 3 SCC 336 : 1992 SCC (L&amp;S) 6791992 SCC(L&amp;S) 679 )\n49. The power of relaxation under Rule 39 of Mineral Concession Rules is to be exercised for \"mineral development\" and \"in public interest\" after recording reasons for such exercise of power. In our view, it has been rightly contended by the learned counsel in support of the validity of Rule 39, that the exercise of power under the said Rule 39 cannot be made arbitrarily, capriciously and on subjective satisfaction of the authority concerned but the same is to be exercised within the parameters of \"mineral development\" and \"in public interest\" which as aforesaid, are not vague and indefinite concepts. Such exercise of power must satisfy the reasonableness of State action before a court of law if any challenge of improper action in exercise of the said power under Rule 39 in a given case is made. It has been held by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Meenakshi Mill case ((1992) 3 SCC 336 : 1992 SCC (L&amp;S) 6791992 SCC(L&amp;S) 679 ) that if a speaking order is required to be passed on objective consideration, such provision is not vitiated on the ground of absence of a provision for appeal or review because the remedy available by way of judicial review is by itself an adequate safeguard against improper and arbitrary exercise of power. It has also been held by this Court in the said decision that requirement of giving reasons for exercise of the power by itself excludes chances of arbitrariness\n50. The observation made in the majority decision in Delhi Transport Corpn. case (1991 Supp (1) SCC 600 : 1991 SCC (L&amp;S) 12131991 SCC(L&amp;S) 1213 ) as referred to hereinbefore should be appreciated with reference to the facts and circumstances of a case and the true import of a provision under which a discretionary power is to be exercised. While no exception can be made to the observation of this Court in the said decision that\" It would be both unwise and impolitic to leave any aspect of its life to be governed by discretion when it can conveniently and easily be covered by the rule of law\", it should also be borne in mind that it is not always feasible and practical to lay down such exhaustive written guidelines which can cover all contingencies. It has, therefore, become necessary to make provisions for exercise of discretion in appropriate cases by giving broad guidelines and indicating the parameters within which such power is to be exercised. In various decisions referred to hereinbefore, this Court has upheld such exercise of discretion if the same does not appear to be wholly uncontrolled uncanalised and without any objectives basis\n51. \"Public interest\" is a paramount consideration in the MMRD Act itself and the rules framed thereunder cannot but subserve \"public interest\" in furthering the cause of mineral development. We are, therefore, unable to hold that Rule 39 is per se obnoxious and having contained unbridled, unguided and uncanalised discretionary power offends Article 14 of the Constitution\n52. Although it does not appear that any argument of harmonious construction of the statute coupled with the principle of interpretation by reading down was advanced before the Madras High Court but since such contention has been raised before this Court and it appears to us that for considering the validity of Rule 39 and its true import, it may be necessary to consider the question of harmonious construction and the principle of reading down a statutory provision, we propose to examine the contentions made in that regard. It has been contended that all the provisions in the Mineral Concession Rules must be understood as an integrated scheme and no particular provision should be permitted to govern the field in isolation particularly when it runs counter to the scheme envisaged by the other provisions of the Mineral Concession Rules. It has been contended that since under the other provisions of the Mineral Concession Rules, exploitation of black granite in Dharmapuri District is restricted to a particular class of operators as a policy decision of the State Government, so long such policy decision remains in force no relaxation of the same is permissible in the purported exercise of power under Rule 39. Accordingly, Rule 39 may be held valid only if the same is interpreted as a provision having a limited application and being wholly confined in varying the terms and conditions of leases in appropriate cases\n53. Although, at the first glance, such argument appears to be reasonable but on closer scrutiny the same does not appear to be sustainable. T",
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          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Rule interaction error</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Burden misallocation",
          "html": "<div class='root-option root-option-new-group'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Analysis</span><span class='root-leaf'>Burden misallocation</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Neglected rule, fact, or counter-argument",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Analysis</span><span class='root-leaf'>Neglected rule, fact, or counter-argument</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Logical fallacy / leap in logic",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Analysis</span><span class='root-leaf'>Logical fallacy / leap in logic</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Other reasoning error",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Analysis</span><span class='root-leaf'>Other reasoning error</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Conclusion does not follow from analysis",
          "html": "<div class='root-option root-option-new-group'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Conclusion</span><span class='root-leaf'>Conclusion does not follow from analysis</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Discretionary original judgment",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Conclusion</span><span class='root-leaf'>Discretionary original judgment</span></div>"
        }
      ]
    },
    "meta": {
      "sample_id": "S012",
      "case_id": "3438",
      "experiment": "baseline_firac",
      "model": "qwen3-8b",
      "source_file": "S012__baseline_firac__qwen3-8b__3438.json",
      "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA",
      "judgment_date": "04/02/1994",
      "machine_error_stage": "rules",
      "machine_major_error_category": "model_error",
      "machine_minor_error_category": "Rule misinterpretation"
    }
  },
  {
    "data": {
      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CRIMINAL APPEAL - 868 of 2019 | Birendra Prasad Sah v. State Of Bihar And Anr. | 08/05/2019",
      "case_details": "Case: CRIMINAL APPEAL - 868 of 2019 | Birendra Prasad Sah v. State Of Bihar And Anr.",
      "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED",
      "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED",
      "case_record": "The dispute concerns two cheques, for Rs 36,00,000 and Rs 13,00,000, which were dishonoured and returned unpaid on 20 November 2015. The appellant received the memo of dishonour on 4 December 2015. A legal notice was issued on 31 December 2015. After failing to obtain proof of service from the postal department, a second legal notice was issued on 26 February 2016, which was replied to on 2 March 2016. A complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was filed on 11 May 2016. The Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) condoned the delay in filing the complaint and took cognizance. The Sessions Judge rejected the second respondent's revision petition. The High Court, however, quashed the cognizance order, holding that the complaint was not filed within the statutory period. The appellant argued that successive notices are permissible and that the delay was condoned under Section 142. The respondent argued that the second notice was issued beyond the thirty-day period from the dishonour memo, and the complaint was filed beyond the period from the first notice, and that the CJM had only condoned delay after a specific date.",
      "generated_judgment": "### Facts:\n1. The dispute involves two cheques that were dishonoured and returned unpaid on 20 November 2015.\n2. The appellant received the memo of dishonour on 4 December 2015.\n3. A legal notice was issued on 31 December 2015, but due to failure in obtaining proof of service, a second legal notice was issued on 26 February 2016.\n4. The second legal notice was replied to on 2 March 2016.\n5. A complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was filed on 11 May 2016.\n6. The Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) condoned the delay in filing the complaint and took cognizance.\n7. The Sessions Judge rejected the second respondent's revision petition.\n8. The High Court quashed the cognizance order, holding that the complaint was not filed within the statutory period.\n\n### Issues:\n1. Whether successive legal notices are permissible under the Negotiable Instruments Act.\n2. Whether the delay in filing the complaint was properly condoned under Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.\n3. Whether the complaint was filed within the statutory period from the date of receipt of the memo of dishonour or from the date of the last legal notice.\n\n### Rules:\n1. Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, prescribes the conditions under which a complaint can be filed for dishonour of cheques.\n2. Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act provides for the conditions and procedure for filing a complaint, including the timeframe within which it must be filed.\n3. The statutory period for filing a complaint under Section 138 is within one month from the date of receipt of the memo of dishonour or within one month from the date of the last legal notice, if such notice is sent.\n4. The principle that successive notices can be issued if the previous notice was not properly served, as long as the statutory period for filing the complaint is adhered to.\n\n### Analysis:\n1. Referring to **Fact 3** and **Rule 4**, the appellant's action of issuing a second legal notice after failing to obtain proof of service for the first notice seems justified, as the intention was to ensure proper service.\n2. Considering **Issue 2** and **Rule 2**, the CJM's decision to condone the delay under Section 142 is crucial. However, the High Court's decision to quash the cognizance order suggests that the delay was not properly condoned in accordance with the statutory requirements.\n3. Examining **Fact 5** and **Rule 3**, the complaint was filed on 11 May 2016, which is beyond the one-month period from the receipt of the memo of dishonour (**Fact 2**) and also beyond the one-month period from the second legal notice (**Fact 3**).\n4. Given **Issue 1** and **Rule 4**, the permissibility of successive notices does not directly address the issue of the complaint being filed beyond the statutory period.\n5. The appellant's argument that successive notices are permissible and the delay was condoned under Section 142 needs to be evaluated against the specific timelines and the High Court's reasoning for quashing the cognizance order.\n\n### Conclusion:\nBased on the analysis, the critical issue is whether the complaint was filed within the statutory period, considering the receipt of the memo of dishonour and the issuance of successive legal notices. The High Court's decision to quash the cognizance order due to the complaint not being filed within the statutory period is supported by the facts and the applicable rules. Therefore, the appeal should be **DISMISSED**.",
      "reference_judgment": "1. Delay condoned.\n2. Leave granted.\n3. This appeal arises from a judgment of a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Patna dated 10 May 2018 by which an order taking cognizance of an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 18881has been quashed. 1 \" Act\"\n4. The facts, briefly stated, are thus:\n5. The dispute arises over two cheques drawn on the State Bank of India in the amount of Rs 36,00,000 and Rs 13,00,000 which were returned unpaid under a memo issued by the UCO Bank, Begusarai on 20 November 2015. The appellant received the memo on 4 December 2015. Following this, a legal notice was issued on 31 December 2015 intimating the dishonour of the cheque. According to the appellant, between 14 February 2016 and 23 February 2016, he made queries with the postal department but no proof of service was provided. Accordingly, on 26 February 2016, a second legal notice was issued. This was replied to by the second respondent on 2 March 2016. Eventually, a complaint under Section 138 was instituted on 11 May 2016. 6 The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Begusarai by an order dated 14 July 2016, condoned the delay in filing the complaint. While taking cognizance, the CJM issued summons to the second respondent. The second respondent instituted revisional proceedings before the Sessions Judge which were rejected on 8 March 2017. In a further recourse to the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, the learned Single Judge held that the complaint under Section 138 was not filed within the statutory period of thirty days prescribed under Section 138 as a result of which the proceedings were quashed.\n7. Assailing the judgment of the High Court, Mr Nagendra Rai, learned Senior Counsel submitted that in MSR Leathers v. S Palaniappan2a three judge Bench of this Court has taken the view that the issuance of successive notices is permissible under the provisions of Section 138 having regard to the object of the legislation. Moreover, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that the delay in the institution of the complaint was condoned by the CJM under Section 142. Hence, there was an error on the part of the High Court in quashing the proceedings. 2 (2013) 1 SCC 177\n8. On the other hand, Mr Jay Savla, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the second respondent submitted that: (i) The second legal notice dated 26 February 2016 was sent beyond a period of thirty days of the receipt of the memo of dishonour on 4 December 2015 and hence cannot be the basis of a valid institution of a criminal complaint; (ii) If at all, the complaint could have only been instituted on the basis of the first legal notice dated 31 December 2015 which was within thirty days of the receipt of the memo of dishonour; (iii) The complaint which was lodged on 11 May 2016 was beyond the stipulated period from the date of issuance of the first notice; (iv) The CJM had condoned the delay which had occurred in the institution of the complaint only for the period after 6 April 2016 after the issuance of the second notice; and (v) In the decision of the three judge Bench in MSR Leathers (supra), there was a re-presentation of the cheque as a result of which, a fresh notice was held to be within the ambit of the law. 9 Section 138 provides thus:\n\"138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account. - Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for3[a term which may be extended to two years], or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:\n3. Sub. by Act 55 of 2002, sec. 7, for a \"term which may be extended to one year\" (w.e.f. 6-2-2003). Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless- (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months4from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;\n4. The period has been reduced from six months to three months vide R.B.I Notification No. RBI/2011-12/251, DBOD.AML BC. No. 47/14.01.001/2011-2012, dated 4th November, 2011 (w.e.f. 1-4-2012). (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque,5[within thirty days] of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.\"\n10. In the present case, the facts narrated above indicate that the appellant issued a legal notice on 31 December 2015. This was within a period of thirty days of the receipt of the memo of dishonour on 4 December 2015. Consequently, the requirement stipulated in proviso (b) to Section 138 was fulfilled. Proviso (c) spells out a requirement that the drawer of the cheque has failed to make payment to the holder in due course or payee within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice. The second respondent does not as a matter of fact, admit that the legal notice dated 31 December 2015 was served on him. The appellant has in the complaint specifically narrated the circumstance that despite repeated requests to the postal department, no acknowledgment of the notice was furnished. It was in these circumstances that the appellant issued a second notice dated 26 February 2016. Cognizant as we are of the requirement specified in proviso (b) to Section 138, that the notice must be issued within thirty days of the receipt of the memo of dishonour, we have proceeded on the basis that it is the first notice dated 31 December 2015 which constitutes the cause of action for the complaint under Section 138.\n11. The complaint was instituted on 11 May 2016. Under Section 142(1), a complaint has to be instituted within one month of the date on which the cause of action has arisen under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 1386. The proviso however stipulates that cognizance of the complaint may be taken by the court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period. Both in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the complaint, the appellant indicated adequate and sufficient reasons for not being able to institute the complaint within the stipulated period. These have been adverted to above. The CJM condoned the delay on the cause which was shown by the appellant for the period commencing from 6 April 2018. However, if paragraphs 7 and 8 of the complaint are read together, it is evident that the appellant had indicated sufficient cause for seeking condonation of the delay in the institution of the complaint. The High Court has merely adverted to the presumption that the first notice would be deemed to have been served if it was dispatched in the ordinary course. Even if that presumption applies, we are of the view that sufficient cause was shown by the appellant for condoning the delay in instituting the complaint taking the basis of the complaint as the issuance of the first legal notice dated 31 December 2015. 6 142 (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),-(a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque;(b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138:[Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period];(c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under section 138..\n12. In the view which we have taken, we have come to the conclusion that the impugned judgment of the High Court is unsustainable. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the order passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside. The complaint shall accordingly stand restored to the file of the trial court.\n13. We have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the rival contentions which will be adjudicated upon during the trial. O R D E R Delay condoned. Leave granted. The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed reportable judgment. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.",
      "root_cause_options": [
        {
          "value": "Missing fact",
          "html": "<div class='root-option root-option-new-group'><span class='root-group'>INPUT ERROR</span><span class='root-leaf'>Missing fact</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Incorrect fact",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>INPUT ERROR</span><span class='root-leaf'>Incorrect fact</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Fabricated fact in case record",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>INPUT ERROR</span><span class='root-leaf'>Fabricated fact in case record</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Fabricated fact in reasoning",
          "html": "<div class='root-option root-option-new-group'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Facts</span><span class='root-leaf'>Fabricated fact in reasoning</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Fact-weighing error",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Facts</span><span class='root-leaf'>Fact-weighing error</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Fact omission in reasoning",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Facts</span><span class='root-leaf'>Fact omission in reasoning</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Issue omission",
          "html": "<div class='root-option root-option-new-group'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Issues</span><span class='root-leaf'>Issue omission</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Spurious issue",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Issues</span><span class='root-leaf'>Spurious issue</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Issue misframing",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Issues</span><span class='root-leaf'>Issue misframing</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Issue misprioritisation",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Issues</span><span class='root-leaf'>Issue misprioritisation</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Wrong rule source",
          "html": "<div class='root-option root-option-new-group'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Wrong rule source</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Using outdated / overruled rule",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Using outdated / overruled rule</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Rule misinterpretation",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Rule misinterpretation</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Rule misapplication",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Rule misapplication</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Wrong legal test / threshold",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Wrong legal test / threshold</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Missed exception / qualification",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Missed exception / qualification</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Limitation / time-bar error",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Limitation / time-bar error</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Precedent context mismatch",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Precedent context mismatch</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Rule interaction error",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Rule interaction error</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Burden misallocation",
          "html": "<div class='root-option root-option-new-group'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Analysis</span><span class='root-leaf'>Burden misallocation</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Neglected rule, fact, or counter-argument",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Analysis</span><span class='root-leaf'>Neglected rule, fact, or counter-argument</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Logical fallacy / leap in logic",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Analysis</span><span class='root-leaf'>Logical fallacy / leap in logic</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Other reasoning error",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Analysis</span><span class='root-leaf'>Other reasoning error</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Conclusion does not follow from analysis",
          "html": "<div class='root-option root-option-new-group'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Conclusion</span><span class='root-leaf'>Conclusion does not follow from analysis</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Discretionary original judgment",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Conclusion</span><span class='root-leaf'>Discretionary original judgment</span></div>"
        }
      ]
    },
    "meta": {
      "sample_id": "S013",
      "case_id": "1779",
      "experiment": "baseline_firac",
      "model": "llama-3.3-70b-instruct",
      "source_file": "S013__baseline_firac__llama-3.3-70b-instruct__1779.json",
      "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA",
      "judgment_date": "08/05/2019",
      "machine_error_stage": "rules",
      "machine_major_error_category": "model_error",
      "machine_minor_error_category": "Missed exception / qualification"
    }
  },
  {
    "data": {
      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2024 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.18772 of 2014) | Rehan Ahmed (D) Thr. Lrs. v. Gulam Mohiuddin Khan | 22/04/2024",
      "case_details": "Case: CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2024 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.18772 of 2014) | Rehan Ahmed (D) Thr. Lrs. v. Gulam Mohiuddin Khan",
      "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED",
      "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED",
      "case_record": "The appeal challenges a Rajasthan High Court order that allowed a revision petition, setting aside an Executing Court's order. The dispute concerns a property originally owned by Ghulam Mohiuddin (Defendant No.1). His brother, Saeeduddin (Defendant No.2), who held a power of attorney, entered into an Agreement to Sell dated 04.10.1967 with the appellant (plaintiff). The plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance. A compromise was reached on 11.05.1978 between the plaintiff and Defendant No.1, acknowledging Defendant No.1's admission of the sale agreement and outlining terms for sale deed execution by 01.07.1978. Defendant No.1 was also to secure possession from Defendant No.2 and transfer rent notes. The Trial Court decreed the suit based on this compromise on 09.05.1979, dismissing it against Defendant No.2 and pro forma Defendant No.3. When Defendant No.1 failed to execute the sale deed, the plaintiff initiated execution. Defendant No.1's objections under Section 47 CPC were dismissed by the Executing Court on 09.12.1998, a decision upheld by the High Court and this Court in prior proceedings involving General Tariq, Defendant No.2's son and Defendant No.1's heir. Subsequently, Akhtar Un Nisa, wife of Defendant No.2, filed fresh objections under Section 47 CPC, arguing the decree was null and void. These objections were dismissed by the Executing Court on 03.05.2007. The High Court, however, allowed Akhtar Un Nisa's revision, declaring the decree inexecutable and a nullity.",
      "generated_judgment": "**Decision: DISMISSED**\n\n**Reasoning:**\nThe appeal is **dismissed** because the High Court’s order upholding the **legality** of a null and void decree (recognition of a non-existent or invalid obligation) displaces the Excuuting Court’s discretion, warranting intervention only on questions of law—not procedural failures from the plaintiff. The issue of pre-existing title or substantive validity encapsulates sympathy for tidbits—*reparenting Gerunds over Granting Trite Protocol Through Asymmetric Timeaignment*—not any ready vulnerability necessitating rehearing.\n\nCritical missteps in procrastination suggest timeless legal obstinacy (Ghulam Mohiuddin, Saeeduddin array of dawk-in) that the courts, in concurrence, corrected finally. The pathos of preexisting title remained excluded as null legal nephurial unkernaled hereto by invalid compromise, made non-credentialing enforceable as self-covering: **\"unsketch\" solvency undécédé** ** bila kial kanjapundi étype**—suffice to observe acquiesced timeline tension.\n\n**Conclusion:** DISMISSED.\n---\n*(Judicial idiosyncrasy trumps XFR forecaster: why cleave to this mastery…?)*",
      "reference_judgment": "Leave granted.\n2. This appeal, by the Decree Holder, assails the\ncorrectness of the judgment and order dated\n21.03.2014 passed by the Rajasthan High Court,\nJaipur Bench at Jaipur in S.B. Civil Revision Petition\nNo.95/2007, Smt. Akhtar Un Nisa vs. Rehan Ahmed,\nwhereby the revision filed under Section 115 of the\nCode of Civil Procedure, 19081 challenging the order of\nthe Executing Court dated 03.05.2007 rejecting the\nobjections under Section 47 CPC, has been allowed. The\norder impugned therein passed by the Executing Court\nwas set aside and it was held that the decree dated\n09.05.1979 passed by the Trial Court in Suit No.13/72\nwas inexecutable and a nullity and accordingly, the\nobjections under Section 47 CPC, were allowed.\n3. The factual matrix giving rise to the present appeal is\nas follows:\n3.1. The dispute relates to property being Municipal Nos.52-\n57, Maniharon Ka Rasta, Jaipur which was originally\nowned by Ghulam Mohiuddin (Defendant No.1). An\nagreement to Sell dated 04.10.1967 was executed for\nsale of the suit property by Saeeduddin – Defendant\nNo.2 (brother of Defendant No.1) and also the power of\n1 CPC\nattorney of Defendant No.1, for himself and for the\nprincipal Defendant No.1.\n3.2. Pursuant to the aforesaid agreement to sell, as the\nvendor was not executing the sale deed, the appellant\n(plaintiff) instituted a Civil Suit for specific performance\nregistered as Suit No.13/72 impleading Ghulam\nMohiuddin as Defendant no.1 and Saeeduddin as\nDefendant No.2. During the pendency of the Suit, the\nparties entered into a compromise dated 11.05.1978\nand presented the same before the Trial Court, a copy\nof which is filed as Annexure P-4. The terms of the\nCompromise Deed are briefly set out below:\n“ANNEXURE P-4\nIN THE COURT OF ADDL. DIST., CLASS-1,\nJAIPUR CITY, JAIPUR\nIN THE MATTER OF:\nRehan Ahmad S/o. Sh. Sultan Ahmad, aged about 22\nyears, Caste Muslim, R/o. Chaukadi Modikhana, Rasta,\nManiharan, H. No. 57, Jaipur-3\n... Plaintiff\n1. Gulam Mohiuddin Khan, aged about 58 years S/o.\nSh. Badiuddin Khan, Caste Muslimn, R/o. Mohalla\nKamnagran, Badayun (U.P)\n2. Saiduddin Khan aged about 52 years S/o. Sh.\nBadiuddin Khan, Caste Muslim, R/o. House of\nAbdulramham Khan, Gali Aatishbazi Rampur (U.P)\n...Defendants\n3. Ahsan Ahmad S/o. Sh. Sultan Ahmad aged about\n32 years, Caste Muslim, R/o. Chaukadi\nModikhana, Rasta Maniharan, H.No. 57, Jaipur-3\n...Pro forma Defendant\nSuit for specific performance of the contract regarding\nhouse and shop situated at Modikhana, Rasta\nManiharan, Jaipur\nMost respectfully showeth:\nIn the above civil suit, a compromise has been arrived at\nbetween the parties on under mentioned conditions,\ntherefore, the suit may be decreed as per the compromise.\n1. That, plaintiff and defendant No.3 executed an\nagreement for sale with the real brother and\ngeneral power of attorney of Def. No.2 named\nSaiduddin Khan on 4.10.1967 in writing in\nrespect to houses and shops No. 52 to 57,\nsituated at Circle No.1, Chaukadi Modikhana,\nJaipur, whose full description is given under, for\na sale consideration of Rs.40,000/-in his own\ncapacity and in the capacity of general power of\nattorney of Def. No.l, which was not accepted\nearlier by the defendant No.1 and 2, but now the\nDef. No.1 admits that agreement for sale was\nexecuted on 4.10.1967 on behalf of Def. No.2 in\nhis own capacity and on behalf and consent of\nDef. No.1.\n2. That, Def. No.l also admits that a sum of Rs.\n10,000/-out of entire agreed sale consideration\nwas received in respect to the disputed property\non 4.10.1967 and a sum of Rs.1,000/-was\nreceived on 1.1.69 and Rs.500/-on 22.1.69 i.e. a\ntotal of Rs.11,500/-was received by def. No. 2 on\nbehalf of Def No. 1 which is liable to be adjusted\nfrom the total consideration of the property, but\nthe plaintiff and defendant No.3 have alleged to\nspent Rs.6,500/-in the repairing of house etc,\nwhich amount shall not be adjusted from the sale\nconsideration because all these repairing and\nconstruction was done after the above agreement\nby the plaintiff and Def. No.3. besides this, the\nDef. No.1 has received Rs. 1500/-on 17.10.88,\nand Rs.1000/-on 24.10.77 and Rs.1000/-on\n11.11.77 from the plaintiff towards the cost of this\nproperty.\n3. That, the Def. No.1 shall get executed and\nregistered sale-deed of the above described\nhouses and shops in favor of plaintiff Rehan\nAhmad till 1.7.1978 and shall receive remaining\nsale consideration amount of Rs.25,000/-. If the\nDef. No. 1 fails to execute sale deed in this period\nthen the plaintiff Rehan Ahmad shall be entitled\nto get the sale-deed executed and registered in his\nfavor through the Court. Entire cost of registry\nwould be borne equally by the plaintiff Rehan\nAhmad and Def. No.1 Gulam Mohiuddin. In this\nrespect when the Def. No.1 will ask for half cost\nfor this from the plaintiff Rehan Ahmed then the\nplaintiff Rehan Ahmad shall pay the same taking\nreceipt from him and because of this the Def. No.1\nshall not be entitled to get the period agreed for\nregistry extended. The def. No.1 has received\ntoday the half cost of registry i.e. Rs.1,000/-from\nthe plaintiff Rehan Ahmad. Complete\nresponsibility to receive N.O.C. shall be of the Def.\nNo.l.\n4. That, Def. No.2 is residing in the third floor of\ndisputed property which would be got vacated by\ndefendant No.1 and the physical possession will\nbe given to the plaintiff Rehan Ahmed prior to\nregistration, and shall get the rent notes executed\nby the tenants who are presently occupying the\ndisputed property in favour of Rehan Ahmed.\n5. That, pro forma defendant No.3 has relinquished\nhis entire right in respect to the disputed property\nin favor of plaintiff Rehan Ahmad on 28.6.1977\nthrough a deed of Relinquishment, which was.\nordered by the court on 28.09.1977. Therefore,\npro forma defendant no.3 shall have no\nconnection now with this sale.\n6. That, the. def. No.2 Saiduddin Khan, himself has\nadmitted that he did not have right to sell or to\nexecute agreement for sale of the disputed\nproperty, but now, the defendant No.1, who is the\nreal owner of this disputed property, admits this\nagreement, therefore, now there is no hindrance\nin passing decree.\n7. That, cost of this suit shall be borne by the parties\nrespectively.\nDESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY\nPucca House comprising of three storeys and One chauk\nincluding entire internal houses of three storevs and five\nshops outside, out of which two shops are situated\ntowards south of Sadar Darwaja and three shops are\nsituated towards north of Sadar Darwaja along with\nstaircase adjoining the shops towards the north on which\nMunicipal No, written on the pole of House is 54/1 and\nMunicipal Number of shops situated towards south are\n52 and 53 and Municipal Number of shops situated\ntowards north are 55, 56 and 57, Circle 1 and no number\nis assigned to the staircase i.e. entire property including\nhouse and shops having municipal number 52 to 57,\nCircle No.1 and boundaries of these houses and shops\nare as under:\nIn East: Rasta Maniharan Government.\nIn west: House of Sindhi in between which littered\nGovernment street is situated.\nIn north: Temple of Digambar Jain\nIn south: House and shops of Tirthdas Shyamiani.\nTherefore, it is prayed that compromise be verified and\ndecree be passed in accordance with the compromise.\nApplicants\nRehan Ahmad, Plaintiff\nRehan (in English)\nGulam Mohiuddin Khan, Def. No.1\nsd.Ghulam mohiuddin khan (in\nEnglish)\nBoth Parties\nJaipur:\nDate: 11.5.78”\n4. In paragraph No.1 of the Compromise Deed, it is\nmentioned that Defendant No.1, although had earlier\nnot accepted the Agreement to Sell, now admits that the\nAgreement to Sell dated 04.10.1967 was executed by\nSaeeduddin–Defendant No.2, not only in his own\ncapacity but also on behalf of Defendant No.1 as Power\nof Attorney holder. Paragraph No.2 mentions the details\nof the amount received by the Defendant under the\nAgreement to Sell as advance until the time the\ncompromise was arrived at. It would be relevant to\nmention that the total sale consideration was\nRs.40,000/-out of which as per paragraph No.2 of the\nCompromise Deed, Rs.15,000/-had already been\nreceived by the Defendants. Paragraph No.3 mentions\nthat the Defendant No.1 will get the Sale Deed executed\nand registered in favour of the Plaintiff till 01.07.1978\nafter receiving Rs.25,000/-of the remaining sale\nconsideration. It, however, mentioned that if the\nDefendant No.1 does not execute the Sale Deed till\n01.07.1978, the Plaintiff would be entitled to get the\nSale Deed executed and registered in his favour through\nthe Court. The cost of registration would be borne\nequally by the Plaintiff and Defendant No.1. It was\nfurther mentioned that Defendant No.1 had also\nreceived half of the cost of registration from the Plaintiff\nand furthermore, the responsibility to receive the NOC\nwould be of Defendant No.1. Paragraph No.4 mentions\nthat Saeeduddin–Defendant No.2 was residing on the\nthird floor of the suit property which Defendant No.1-\nGhulam Mohiuddin would get vacated and ensure that\nphysical possession is delivered to the Plaintiff-Rehan\nAhmed prior to registration. Further, the rent notes\nexecuted by the tenants who are presently occupying\nthe suit property, would be executed by the tenants in\nfavour of Rehan Ahmed. One Ahsan Ahmed has been\nimpleaded as proforma defendant in respect of whom it\nwas stated in paragraph No.5 of the Compromise Deed\nthat he had relinquished his entire right to the property\nin favour of the Plaintiff–Rehan Ahmed through a Deed\nof Relinquishment dated 28.06.1977 which was\naccepted by the Court vide order dated 28.09.1977. In\nparagraph No.6 it was stated that Defendant No.2-\nSaeeduddin admitted that he did not have the right to\nsell or execute the Agreement to Sell but now Defendant\nNo.1, who was the real owner of the suit property,\nadmits this agreement. Therefore, there is no hindrance\nin passing the compromise decree. The property was\nalso described in the Compromise Deed to be a pacca\nhouse comprising of three stories and one chauk\nincluding the entire internal houses of the three storeys\nand five shops outside along with the staircase\nadjoining the shops. The house was numbered as 54/1\nin the municipal records, whereas the five shops were\nnumbered as 52, 53, 55, 56 and 57. Thus the entire\nproperty in question including the house of the five\nshops having municipal numbers 52 to 57 (except 54),\nCircle No.1.\n5. The Addl.District & Sessions Judge, Court No.1, Jaipur\nCity, Jaipur proceeded with the compromise and\nrequired the same to be duly verified for which due time\nwas granted to the parties. On 09.05.1979, initially the\nsuit was dismissed in the absence of the Plaintiff.\nHowever, on the same date, upon an application being\nfiled, the case was again taken up on board. The Trial\nCourt recorded that Rehan Ahmed and that Mohiuddin\n(Defendant No.1) had executed the compromise. The\nPlaintiff (Rehan Ahmed) further stated that he does not\nwant to pursue any proceedings against Saeeduddin\nand also Ahsan Ahmed-Defendant Nos.2 and 3, as such\nthe suit was dismissed against Saeeduddin and Ahsan\nAhmed. It was decreed against Ghulam Mohiuddin as\nper the compromise. Accordingly, a decree was drawn.\nAs per the decree, when the defendant did not execute\nthe Sale Deed, the Plaintiff-Decree holder initiated the\nproceedings for execution. In the execution proceedings\nDefendant No.1 Ghulam Mohiuddin filed objections\nstating that the Plaintiff had not paid the balance sale\nconsideration, and had allowed substantial time to pass\nfor about six to seven years, during which time the\nvalue of the property had doubled and as such the\ndecree could not be executed now on account of the\ndefault of the Plaintiff-Decree holder. These objections\nwere dismissed by the Executing Court by a detailed\norder dated 09.12.1998 on the findings that before the\nregistration of the Sale Deed, Defendant No.1 was\nrequired to fulfil his obligations which included getting\nthe third floor vacated, getting the NOC and also getting\nthe rent deeds transferred in the name of the Plaintiff.\nAs such there was no default on the part of the Plaintiff.\nIn the meantime, the Defendant No.1 Mohiuddin died.\nThe order dated 09.12.1998 was challenged by one\nGeneral Tariq, s/o. Defendant No.2-Saeeduddin and\nlegal heir of Defendant No.1 Gulam Mohiuddin,\nclaiming rights under a sale executed by Defendant\nNo.1 Mohiuddin by way of S.B.Civil Revision Petition\nNo.55 of 1999. The said revision came to be dismissed\nby the High Court vide order dated 02.06.2006. General\nTariq preferred a Special Leave Petition before this\nCourt registered as S.L.P.(C) No.12463 of 2006, which\ncame to be dismissed by this Court vide order dated\n11.08.2006. With the dismissal of the Special Leave\nPetition the innings of the objections under Section 47\nCPC filed by the Judgment-debtor – Defendant No.1\nMohiuddin came to an end. General Tariq, s/o.\nDefendant no.2-Saeeduddin did not carry the matter\nany further by way of review or otherwise before this\ncourt. However, a new round of objections under\nSection 47 CPC came to be initiated by respondent no.1\n– Akhtar Un Nisa, wife of Defendant No.2-Saeeduddin\nand the mother of General Tariq. The objections by\nrespondent No.1 Akhtar Un Nisa are to the following\neffect:\nI. The decree dated 09.05.1979 is without\njurisdiction and a nullity;\nII. The property in the suit was a joint property of\nGhulam Mohiuddin and Saeeduddin–\nDefendants No. 1 and 2 respectively;\nIII. The suit having been filed as against both the\nbrothers, the compromise deed could not have\nbeen arrived at between the Plaintiff and\nDefendant No.1 alone;\nIV. The Trial Court could not have accepted the\nsettlement/compromise between the Plaintiff\nand Defendant No.1 regarding Defendant No.2\nvacating the third story of the house in question\nand the rent notes being transferred in favour\nof the plaintiff.\nV. Since there was no decree against Saeeduddin,\nas such Decree holder could not have any right\nof getting possession of the portion of the\nproperty which was admittedly in possession of\nSaeeduddin and owner. Further, the tenants of\nSaeeduddin in the disputed property were\ntenants of the applicant-objector Akhtar Un\nNisa-respondent no.1.\n6. The Executing Court, vide judgment and order dated\n03.05.2007, dismissed the objections under Section 47\nCPC filed by Smt.Akhtar Un Nisa.\n7. Aggrieved by the same, Smt.Akhtar Un Nisa preferred a\nrevision before the High Court which has since been\nallowed by the impugned order giving rise to the present\nappeal.\n8. After careful consideration of the arguments presented\nby both sides, this Court believes that the High Court\nerred in setting aside the Executing Court's order dated\n09.12.1998 and in declaring the Trial Court's decree\ndated 09.05.1979 void. The High Court's decision\nappears to be based on several incorrect assumptions\nand observations.\n9. The core of the High Court's reasoning rests on the\nerroneous assumption that the property was jointly\nowned by Defendants No. 1 and No. 2, and that the\nabsence of Defendant No. 2's signature on the\ncompromise dated 11.05.1978 invalidated the decree.\nHowever, Defendant No. 2 has consistently\nacknowledged that he had no ownership rights over the\nproperty. In his written statement to the Trial Court in\nSuit No. 13/72, he explicitly stated that the property\nbelonged solely to Defendant No. 1. This was further\nsupported by a family arrangement dated 17.09.1976\nand reinforced in Paragraph 6 of the compromise deed.\nThe compromise, signed by Defendant No. 1 and the\nplaintiff and later verified by Defendant No. 2 through\nan application dated 14.05.1979, substantiates that\nDefendant No. 1 was the sole owner. These facts were\nupheld by the High Court and this Court in previous\nproceedings. During the challenge to the execution\nproceedings filed by General Tarik before the High\nCourt, the High Court vide order dated 11.8.2006 had\nalso recorded the finding that Defendant no.2 did not\nhave ownership rights over the suit property which fact\nwas also upheld by this Court. Defendant no. 2 had\nlimited rights of being in possession of the third floor of\nsuit property. Due to the aforesaid reasons, the Plaintiff\nand Defendant no. 1 were the only necessary parties\nneeded for the compromise dated 11.05.1978 as\nDefendant no.1 was the sole owner of the suit property.\n10. The High Court also incorrectly held that the provisions\nof Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the CPC were not adhered to,\nclaiming that the Trial Court failed to properly verify the\ncompromise. It is essential to clarify that the\ncompromise was indeed reached on 11.05.1978, with\nits verification delayed due to various adjournments\ncaused by the absence or illness of Defendant No.1 and\nother procedural delays. On 09.05.1979, a fresh\ncompromise application containing identical terms was\nsubmitted and duly signed by both parties due to the\noriginal being misplaced. The Trial Court then correctly\nrecorded and verified this compromise, fulfilling the\nrequirements of Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the CPC.\n11. It must be made clear that the compromise between the\nPlaintiff and Defendant no. 1 was arrived on 11.05.1978\nand it was only the procedural requirements of Order\nXXIII Rule 3 of verifying and the compromise before the\nCourt which were eventually completed on 09.05.1979.\nA perusal of the record of proceedings before the Trial\nCourt reveals that verification of the terms of the\ncompromise was attempted on 11.05.1978 but was not\npossible as Defendant No.1 was not present. Moreover,\non subsequent dates being 11.5.1978, 24.07.1978,\n31.01.1979 and 20.03.1979, either due to the illness of\nDefendant no.1 or due to the Presiding Officer not being\npresent, there were various adjournments before the\nTrial Court. Finally, on 09.05.1979, Gulam Mohiuddin\nappeared before the Court and the parties submitted a\nfresh compromise application was filed because the\nearlier compromise application submitted on 11-05-\n1978 was not traceable on the record of the Court\ncontaining the same terms and conditions as in the\ncompromise application earlier filed on 11.05.1978. The\nsaid application was also duly signed by both the\nparties. On the basis of the said compromise presented\non 09.05.1979, the Trial Court took the compromise\napplication on record, verified the fresh compromise\napplication fulfilling all the terms and conditions of\nOrder XXIII Rule 3 CPC. The terms and conditions of\nthe compromise were read over to the parties and were\naccepted by them and the signatures of the parities\nwere taken on the compromise application by the Court\nand thereafter the Court recorded its satisfaction on the\ncompromise application, which is on the record of the\nTrial Court. The decree dated 09.05.1979 was passed\nbased on this compromise.\n12. As far as the terms of the compromise are concerned,\nwhich have also been questioned by the High Court, the\nagreement stipulated that Defendant No. 1 was to\nexecute and register the sale deed in favor of the\nplaintiff by 01.07.1978, after receiving balance\npayment of Rs 25,000/-. The decree's execution was\ncontingent upon Defendant No. 1 fulfilling conditions\nsuch as obtaining the NOC and ensuring Defendant No.\n2 vacating the portion of the property in question in his\npossession. The recording of the compromise and the\nconsequent decree on 09.05.1979, although appearing\nprocedurally delayed, adhered to the process required\nunder CPC.\n13. Furthermore, the High Court overlooked the fact that\nGeneral Tarik, legal heir of Defendant No. 2, had\npreviously objected to the execution proceedings, which\nwas dismissed on 09.12.1988. Subsequent appeals\nbefore the High Court, including a Special Leave\nPetition to this Court, were also dismissed. Therefore,\nsimilar objections by Respondent No. 1, Smt. Akhtar Un\nNisa, in her capacity as one of the legal heirs of\nDefendant No. 2 would not be maintainable and would\namount to abuse of process of law.\n14. In light of the reasons recorded above, this Court finds\nmerit in the appellant-plaintiff’s argument and holds\nthat the Executing Court had rightly rejected the\nobjections under Section 47 CPC filed by Smt.Akhtar\nUn Nisa vide order 03.05.2007.\n15. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned\njudgement of the High Court is set aside, and the\nExecuting Court's order dated 03.05.2007 is restored\nand the objections of Respondent no.1 under Section 47\nof the CPC stand rejected.\n16. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.",
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          "value": "Incorrect fact",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>INPUT ERROR</span><span class='root-leaf'>Incorrect fact</span></div>"
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          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>INPUT ERROR</span><span class='root-leaf'>Fabricated fact in case record</span></div>"
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          "value": "Fact omission in reasoning",
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          "value": "Issue omission",
          "html": "<div class='root-option root-option-new-group'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Issues</span><span class='root-leaf'>Issue omission</span></div>"
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          "value": "Spurious issue",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Issues</span><span class='root-leaf'>Spurious issue</span></div>"
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          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Issues</span><span class='root-leaf'>Issue misframing</span></div>"
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          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Using outdated / overruled rule</span></div>"
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          "value": "Rule misinterpretation",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Rule misinterpretation</span></div>"
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          "value": "Rule misapplication",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Rule misapplication</span></div>"
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          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Wrong legal test / threshold</span></div>"
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      "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA",
      "judgment_date": "22/04/2024",
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    "data": {
      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CIVIL APPEAL NO. 12812 OF 2024 | Sincere Securities Private Limited & Ors. v. Chandrakant Khemka & Ors. | 05/08/2025",
      "case_details": "Case: CIVIL APPEAL NO. 12812 OF 2024 | Sincere Securities Private Limited & Ors. v. Chandrakant Khemka & Ors.",
      "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED",
      "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED",
      "case_record": "Nandini Impex Private Limited, the corporate debtor, secured ₹3 crores each from Sincere Securities Private Limited (appellant 1) and Noble Dealcom Private Limited along with Jodhpur Properties and Finance Private Limited (appellants 2 & 3) via MoUs in February 2019. These loans were secured by depositing title deeds for the front and rear portions of the ground floor of White House, New Delhi. Following loan defaults, conveyance deeds were executed on February 27, 2020, transferring title of these portions to the respective appellants. Simultaneously, Leave and License Agreements allowed Nandini Impex to retain possession on payment of ₹6 lakhs monthly rent for each portion. Appellants terminated these agreements on May 8, 2020, and initiated eviction suits due to rental payment defaults. UCO Bank, the sole Committee of Creditors member, initiated CIRP against Nandini Impex on September 20, 2022. The CoC decided the property was unnecessary due to high rentals and directed the Resolution Professional to return possession to the appellants. Chandrakant Khemka, a suspended director, objected to this decision. The NCLT, on August 7, 2023, directed the Resolution Professional to deliver possession to the appellants. Chandrakant Khemka appealed to the NCLAT, which, on November 12, 2024, set aside the NCLT order, citing Section 14(1)(d) of the IBC, and remanded the matter. The Supreme Court noted that UCO Bank and the current Resolution Professional supported the property's return, while Chandrakant Khemka refused to pay rent.",
      "generated_judgment": "### Facts  \n1. Nandini Impex Private Limited (the corporate debtor) obtained three separate loans of ₹3 crore each from Sincere Securities Pvt. Ltd. (appellant 1) and Noble Dealcom Pvt. Ltd. together with Jodhpur Properties and Finance Pvt. Ltd. (appellants 2 & 3) pursuant to MoUs executed in February 2019.  \n2. The loans were secured by the title deeds of the front‑ and rear‑portions of the ground‑floor of the White‑House premises, New Delhi, which were later handed over to the secured‑creditors by conveyance deeds dated 27 February 2020.  \n3. Simultaneously the parties executed Leave‑and‑License Agreements permitting Nandini Impex to retain possession of the conveyed portions on payment of ₹6 lakhs per month as rent to each secured‑creditor.  \n4. The secured‑creditors terminated the Leave‑and‑License Agreements on 8 May 2020 and instituted civil eviction suits on the ground of non‑payment of rent.  \n5. UCO Bank, the sole member of the Committee of Creditors (CoC), admitted a Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) against Nandini Impex on 20 September 2022.  \n6. The CoC, after evaluating the estate, concluded that the White‑House premises were “unnecessary” for the resolution‑plan because the rental receipts were high, and directed the Resolution Professional (RP) to return possession of the premises to the secured‑creditor appellants.  \n7. Chandrakant Khemka, a director who had been suspended from the board of Nandini Impex, objected to the CoC’s decision.  \n8. The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) on 7 August 2023 ordered the RP to deliver possession of the premises to the secured‑creditor appellants.  \n9. Khemka appealed to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), which on 12 November 2024 set aside the NCLT order, holding that the CoC’s reliance on Section 14(1)(d) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) was erroneous and remanded the matter.  \n10. The Supreme Court, noting that the RP and UCO Bank supported the return of possession while Khemka refused to pay rent, recorded observations but did not pronounce a substantive order on the merits.  \n\n### Issues  \n1. Whether the appeal filed by the suspended director, Chandrakant Khemka, is maintainable under Section 14(4) IBC, i.e., whether a suspended director has a statutory right to raise an “objection” that can stall or set aside the CoC’s decision.  \n2. (Assuming maintainability) Whether the CoC correctly applied the “unnecessary property” test under Section 14(1)(d) IBC in classifying the White‑House premises as unnecessary.  \n3. (Assuming maintainability) Whether the NCLAT was correct in setting aside the NCLT order on the basis of the alleged mis‑application of Section 14(1)(d).  \n\n### Rules  \n1. **Section 14(4), IBC** – Allows an “objection” to a resolution‑plan only from a “creditor” (including a financial or operational creditor) or a “debtor” as defined in the Code. The objection must be filed within the prescribed period and be in respect of the resolution‑plan as a whole.  \n2. **Section 14(1)(d), IBC** – Permits the CoC to deem a “property” “unnecessary” for the purpose of the resolution‑plan if the property is not required for the revival of the corporate debtor and its sale would maximise the value of the assets.  \n3. **Section 31, IBC** – Deals with the failure to comply with the terms of the approved resolution‑plan.  \n4. The Supreme Court of India, in *Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Hon’ble Supreme Court* (2022) 4 SCC 344, clarified that only persons recognised as “creditors” or “debtor” under the Code have locus standi to file an objection under Section 14(4).  \n5. The NCLAT is empowered to examine whether the CoC’s decision is in accordance with the provisions of the IBC and may set aside an NCLT order only on a finding of error of law or jurisdiction.  \n\n### Analysis  \n**1. Maintainability of the appeal (Issue 1)**  \n- The appellant, Chandrakant Khemka, is a *suspended* director of Nandini Impex. Under Section 14(4) the statutory “objection” is limited to a *creditor* or the *debtor* (the corporate debtor itself). A director, whether active or suspended, does not fall within either category unless he is also a creditor. No allegation is made that Khemka holds any claim as a financial or operational creditor.  \n- The Supreme Court’s pronouncement in *Swiss Ribbons* confirms that a director, absent creditor status, lacks locus standi to raise a Section 14(4) objection. Consequently, Khemka’s objection is a personal grievance and not a statutory objection.  \n- As the appeal is premised on the existence of a valid objection under Section 14(4), the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The appeal is therefore *not maintainable*.  \n\n**2. (Sub‑issues) – Not proceeded**  \nSince the appeal is not maintainable, the court does not need to address the substantive questions concerning the “unnecessary property” test or the correctness of the NCLAT’s order.  \n\n### Conclusion  \nThe appeal filed by the suspended director, Chandrakant Khemka, is not maintainable because he does not possess the statutory standing required under Section 14(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code to raise an objection to the CoC’s decision. Accordingly, the appeal must be **DISMISSED**.",
      "reference_judgment": "1. This appeal, under Section 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 20161, calls in question the order dated 12.11.2024 passed by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi2, allowing Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1064 of 2023 filed by Chandrakant Khemka, respondent No. 1, and setting aside the order dated 07.08.2023 of the National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata Bench3, in CP(IB) No. 1377/KB/2020. Thereby, the NCLT had directed delivery of possession of the property in question to the appellants herein.\n1 for short, “IBC”\n2 for short, “NCLAT”\n3 for short, “NCLT”\n\n12. Facts, relevant to this adjudication, need recounting at some length. On 13.02.2019, a Memorandum of Understanding was executed by and between Nandini Impex Private Limited, which became a corporate debtor under the IBC thereafter, represented by its Director, Chandrakant Khemka, on the one hand, and Noble Dealcom Private Limited along with Jodhpur Properties and Finance Private Limited, appellant Nos. 2 and 3 herein, on the other hand, whereby Nandini Impex Private Limited availed financial assistance to the tune of ₹3 crores from them and secured the same through deposit of the title deeds relating to the rear portion of the ground floor of White House, 1/18-20, Rani Jhansi Road, New Delhi. Another Memorandum of Understanding was executed by Nandini Impex Private Limited on 15.02.2019 with Sincere Securities Private Limited, appellant No.1 herein, for availing a loan of ₹3 crores from it and the same was secured through deposit of the title deeds of the front portion of the ground floor of White House. As Nandini Impex Private Limited failed to repay the loans, separate conveyance deeds were executed by it on 27.02.2020 transferring the title over the front and rear portions of the ground floor of White House to the appellants respectively. However, two separate Leave and License Agreements were executed simultaneously on the same day, whereby possession of the front and rear portions of the ground floor of White House was retained by Nandini Impex Private Limited on payment of rentals of ₹6 lakhs per month for each portion. Owing to the default in payment of the rentals, the appellants terminated the Leave and License Agreements on 08.05.2020. Eviction suits were also instituted by the appellants for regaining possession of the subject ground floor portions along with other reliefs.\n\n3. While so, UCO Bank, respondent No. 3 herein, filed a petition under Section 7 of the IBC against Nandini Impex Private Limited. The same was admitted on 20.09.2022 by the NCLT, initiating corporate insolvency resolution process4 against Nandini Impex Private Limited, the corporate debtor. Significantly, UCO Bank was the sole member of its Committee of Creditors5. The appellants, as operational creditors, filed their respective claims before the Interim Resolution Professional appointed for the corporate debtor and the said claims were accepted in toto. At that stage, UCO Bank, constituting the CoC, deputed the Resolution Professional to visit the subject property on the ground floor of White House and decide whether there was any need to retain the same by paying huge rentals. Thereafter, at its meeting held on 06.04.2023, the CoC decided that there was no requirement to hold on to the subject property and requested the Resolution Professional to hand over the possession thereof to the appellants. Chandrakant Khemka, being a suspended director of the corporate debtor, raised objections to this move. Interlocutory Applications came to be filed by the appellants in 2023 seeking a direction from the NCLT to return the subject property to them. By order dated 07.08.2023, the NCLT noted the decision of the CoC that the subject property was not required and directed the Resolution Professional to deliver possession of the same to the appellants. Aggrieved thereby, Chandrakant Khemka filed an appeal before the NCLAT. By way of the impugned order dated 12.11.2024, the NCLAT allowed his appeal and set aside the order dated 07.08.2023 passed by the NCLT, observing that Section 14(1)(d) of the IBC barred recovery by an owner of property during the CIRP, when such property was occupied by the corporate debtor. The NCLAT remanded the matter to the NCLT to consider the issue afresh.\n4 for short, “CIRP”\n5 for short, “CoC”\n\n4. By order dated 25.11.2024, this Court permitted the proceedings before the NCLT to continue, subject to the final outcome of this appeal. This Court also noted that UCO Bank, constituting the CoC, supported the appellants in so far as return of possession of the subject property was concerned. Further, this Court noted that the learned counsel appearing on advance notice for Chandrakant Khemka, respondent No. 1, conceded that he was not willing to pay the current rent or the arrears of rent, post initiation of the CIRP. This Court also recorded that the Resolution Professional did not wish to retain possession of the property in question.\n\n5. Thereafter, on 14.07.2025, upon being informed that a new Resolution Professional was appointed for the corporate debtor, this Court required him to make known his stand by way of a written affidavit. Pursuant thereto, Pratim Bayal, the new Resolution Professional, filed affidavit dated 17.07.2025. Therein, he categorically stated that, given the extremely limited operations of the corporate debtor at present and the extremely high rent of the White House property, it was not feasible and was totally unnecessary for the corporate debtor to continue to hold on to the said property. He, therefore, reiterated the statement made by his predecessor before the NCLT to the effect that the property could be returned to the appellants.\n\n6. Given the aforestated facts, it is clear that except for Chandrakant Khemka, respondent No. 1, who is a suspended director of the corporate debtor, all other parties are at consensus that the property in question need not be retained by the corporate debtor, as it is not required by it and imposes a huge financial burden on it, in terms of the lease/license rentals payable therefor. It is, however, the case of Chandrakant Khemka that the erstwhile Resolution Professional of the corporate debtor made a factually incorrect statement before the NCLT, leading to the passing of the unreasoned order dated 07.08.2023 and, therefore, the NCLAT was justified in remanding the matter for a comprehensive adjudication afresh. It is his further case that the property in question is essential for the functioning of the corporate debtor and Section 14(1)(d) of the IBC barred its return to the appellants.\n\n7. Despite all others involved in the CIRP being in favour of doing so, Chandrakant Khemka alone opposes the return of the subject property to the appellants. His lofty claim that the rent due to the appellants would stand secured by the provisions of the IBC does not stand to reason, Further, Chandrakant Khemka is himself not willing to bear the expenditure for retaining the possession of the subject property.\n\n8. UCO Bank, constituting the CoC, echoed the stand of the Resolution Professional, by filing separate written submissions. Reference was made therein to the decision of this Court in K. Sashidhar v. Indian Overseas Bank and others6. Paragraph 52 of the decision reads as follows:\n<QUOTE> 52. As aforesaid, upon receipt of a “rejected” resolution plan the adjudicating authority (NCLT) is not expected to do anything more; but is obligated to initiate liquidation process under Section 33(1) of the I&B Code. The legislature has not endowed the adjudicating authority (NCLT) with the jurisdiction or authority to analyse or evaluate the commercial decision of CoC much less to enquire into the justness of the rejection of the resolution plan by the dissenting financial creditors. From the legislative history and the background in which the I&B Code has been enacted, it is noticed that a completely new approach has been adopted for speeding up the recovery of the debt due from the defaulting companies. In the new approach, there is a calm period followed by a swift resolution process to be completed within 270 days (outer limit) failing which, initiation of liquidation process has been made inevitable and mandatory. In the earlier regime, the corporate debtor could indefinitely continue to enjoy the protection given under Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies Act, 1985 or under other such enactments which has now been forsaken. Besides, the commercial wisdom of CoC has been given paramount status without any judicial intervention, for ensuring completion of the stated processes within the timelines prescribed by the I&B Code. There is an intrinsic assumption that financial creditors are fully informed about the viability of the corporate debtor and feasibility of the proposed resolution plan. They act on the basis of thorough examination of the proposed resolution plan and assessment made by their team of experts. The opinion on the subject-matter expressed by them after due deliberations in CoC meetings through voting, as per voting shares, is a collective business decision. The legislature, consciously, has not provided any ground to challenge the “commercial wisdom” of the individual financial creditors or their collective decision before the adjudicating authority. That is made non-justiciable. </QUOTE>\n\nThe commercial wisdom of the CoC must, accordingly, be given primacy during the CIRP. When UCO Bank, constituting the CoC, decided that retention of the possession of the subject property was not in the interest of the CIRP, that decision must be given the respect that is lawfully due to it.\n6 (2019) 12 SCC 150\n\n9. Lastly, we may note that Section 14(1)(d) of the IBC states that once the adjudicating authority, by order, declares a moratorium, it would prohibit, amongst other acts, the recovery of any property by an owner or lessor where such property is occupied by or is in the possession of the corporate debtor. In the case on hand, the chronology of events manifests that, at its very first meeting held on 20.02.2023, the CoC discussed the issue of retention of the ground floor of White House. It asked the Resolution Professional to visit the said premises and decide as to whether holding on to the same was required, spending a huge amount towards rentals. Thereafter, at its third meeting held on 06.04.2023, the CoC took note of the Resolution Professional’s report that it was not feasible to hold on to the subject property, as only 8 to 9 staff members were there and the revenue generated would not be sufficient to pay the lease/license rentals. The CoC recorded that the matter was duly discussed and the Resolution Professional was asked to hand over possession as early as possible, as there was no requirement to hold on to the said premises spending such a huge amount towards rentals.\n\n10. It was only thereafter that the appellants filed Interlocutory Applications before the NCLT praying for a direction to deliver possession of the subject property to them along with other reliefs. It is, therefore, manifest that this was not a simple case of the owner of the property seeking recovery of possession thereof from the corporate debtor, which would be barred by the express language of Section 14(1)(d) of the IBC. On the other hand, as already noted hereinbefore, it was the CoC and the Resolution Professional who were and still are desirous of returning the possession of the property in question to the appellants, keeping in mind the adverse financial implications of retaining the same. It appears that Chandrakant Khemka, respondent No. 1, who is not willing to personally bear the expenditure for such retention, is bent upon stalling that process for some undisclosed and extraneous reasons.\n\n11. This was, therefore, not a situation which warranted an order of remand in the context of Section 14(1)(d) of the IBC. The order dated 12.11.2024 passed by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, in Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1064 of 2023, is accordingly set aside and the order dated 07.08.2023 passed by the National Company Law Tribunal, Kolkata Bench, in CP(IB) No. 1377/KB/2020, is restored. The Resolution Professional shall act upon and implement the said order expeditiously.\n\nThe appeal is allowed, in the aforesaid terms.\n\nPending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.",
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    "data": {
      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Appeal (Civil) 6782 of 2001 | Secretary, School Of Committee, Thiruvalluvar Higher Secondary School v. The Govt. Of Tamil Nadu And Others | 02/04/2003",
      "case_details": "Case: Appeal (Civil) 6782 of 2001 | Secretary, School Of Committee, Thiruvalluvar Higher Secondary School v. The Govt. Of Tamil Nadu And Others",
      "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED",
      "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED",
      "case_record": "The Managing Committee of Thiruvalluvar Higher Secondary School appeals against a High Court decision concerning the termination of an employee (P.G. Assistant for English, appointed in 1978). The management deemed the employee's performance and attendance unsatisfactory, citing irregular teaching, absence without prior permission from December 1, 1984, and failure to pass a mandatory Tamil language examination. Memos were issued regarding these deficiencies, and charges were framed. Despite show cause notices, the employee did not respond. The management terminated the employee's services effective December 1, 1984, and sought approval from the Chief Educational Officer (CEO) as per Rule 17 of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Rules, 1974. The CEO refused approval, deeming the allegations not grave enough for dismissal. An appeal to the Joint Director was rejected, and the CEO later directed reinstatement with back wages. The management challenged this in the High Court, arguing that student welfare necessitated disciplinary action and that the authorities overstepped their jurisdiction by examining punishment proportionality. The High Court dismissed the appeal. The employee, who has since been superannuated, appeared in person, claiming to be a victim of mala fides. The State Government has been paying the employee's salary based on interim court orders.",
      "generated_judgment": "**CONCLUSION: DISMISSED.**\n\n### **Rationale:**\nThe appeal fails on all material grounds due to a **lack of substantial errors of law or fact** in the process followed:\n\n1. **Sufficient Evidence for Dismissal** – The record confirms the grounds stated (irregular teaching, unauthorized absence, and failure to pass a qualifying examination) as demonstrably viable under administrative discipline. The Demonstrations in earnest followed, with the employee not responding—material that Mastersավորced their containment.\n\n2. **Procedural Strict Communications**: The management complied with legal wellreacied by this Rule 17, seeking CEO’s veil on time. The CEO’s stay call **not oppress/search but case-specific** (*Role 31(1)(c)* broadly covered ‘unsatisfactory services.’ Multiple charges and per collation was at lawful interpretation.\n\n3. **High Court Ruling Grounds Valid**: The school argued studentability motives (e.g., correcting intra-school misconduct habits), not exceeding jurisdiction. The High Court *fully assessed* the proportionality of dismissal admissible disciplinary action beyond 1st years lin-this teacher’s 36 years’ duration (e.g., not analogous to punitive salary dedctions).\n\n4. **No Mala fides Misconduct—Writ in *Recap***: Superannuation matter *is locked*, establishing arbitrary cruelty accusation a rejection of the facts.\n\nThus, failure recurrence— Wald independently, Pursuant to stopping order criteria as meeting procedural/statutory ‘constituted force rules’—isopposably dismissed for *no viable merits.*",
      "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by : Arijit Pasayat, J.\n1. Undaunted by reverses before the departmental authorities and the High Court, the Managing Committee of Thiruvalluvar Higher Secondary School (hereinafter referred to as the 'management') has filed this appeal. The controversy lies within u narrow compass and factual position being undisputed, a brief reference thereto would suffice.\n2. The 5th respondent (hereinafter referred to as the 'employee') was appointed as P.G. Assistant for teaching English in 1978. According to management, his behaviour and performance was not satisfactory and that he was highly irregular both in attendance as well as in teaching. A memorandum was sent to him and to another teacher on 14.1.1983 stating therein that they would be required to pass examination conducted by the State of Tamil Nadu in Tamil language before the end of the academic year in order to qualify for the posts they were holding, failing which appropriate action was to be taken. From 1.12.1984, the employee did not attend school.\n3. The management was of the view that since he had not taken prior permission from the school and had not chosen to intimate the school authorities; it resulted in dislocation of the teaching. Prior to his long absence, he had not been taking classes regularly. The students were put to grave and irreparable loss and hardship. Students as well as their parents complained about the deficiencies of the employee in not taking classes regularly and leaving the classes in the middle. He had also not completed portions of the lessons for the 11th standard. Several requests were made to the employee to attend classes, but he turned down their requests. On 29.8.1984, the management issued another memo to him seeking a clarification as to whether he had passed the Tamil examination. On 31.8.1984, the management issued another memo to the employee stating therein that since he had not attended the school for very long period without obtaining prior permission and as he had cancelled the classes and left for home early, same amounted to deficiency in service, misconduct and warranted action. Charges were framed and the employee was called upon to submit his reply to the charges. Another memo was issued on 30.10.1984 containing similar charges.\n4. Additionally, it was indicated that as he had not completed portions of the lessons for 11th standard and the students and parents had complained. He was required to show cause in respect of the allegations. On 24.1.1985 memo of charges was also issued to him, inter alia, indicating that since he had not passed the Tamil examination as required, and since he had failed to discharge his duties diligently having absented from school frequently without prior permission and having not taken classes regularly, there was serious dislocation of work and inconvenience to the students. On 13.3.1985, the show cause notice was issued indicating that in spite of opportunity given; he had failed to respond and was called upon to submit his explanation as to why his services should not be terminated for violation of code of conduct prescribed for teachers employed in private schools.\n5. Another copy of the show cause notice was served through another mode on 9.4.1985. The employee did not respond to the show cause notice. Therefore, a decision was taken by school committee unanimously to terminate his services w.e.f. 1.12.1984, the date from which he had stopped attending the school. On 9.5.1985, letter was written to the Chief Educational Officer, respondent No.3 (in short the 'CEO') seeking his approval for term (nation of employee's services in terms of Rule 17 of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Rules, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Rules'). On 29.8.1985 letter was written to the District Educational Officer, respondent No.4 (in short the 'DEO') requesting for early action in the matter.\n6. The DEO issued a notice to the employee but there was no response thereto. On 3.12.1985, DEO sent a report to the CEO. inter alia, indicating that the employee had not denied any of the charges and since the management had produced materials in support of the charges, sanction for dismissal should be granted. On 21.4.1987, an enquiry was conducted by the authorities and the employee was called to the school. But he did not make any effective participation. Again, an enquiry was conducted by the CEO on 23.4.1987. After seeing the employee, the CEO was prima facie of the view that he was psychic.\n7. Finally, on 24.4.1987 the CEO passed an order refusing permission for termination on the ground that the allegations which constituted foundation for the proposed order of termination, were not so grave as to warrant punishment like dismissal. Therefore, permission was refused. Aggrieved by the said order, the Management preferred an appeal under Section 41 of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973 (in short the 'Act') to the Joint Director of School Education (Secondary), Directorate of School Education (in short the 'Joint Director'). The appeal was rejected. inter alia, observing that though the employee did not give any reply to the charges as against him though he appeared before the CEO twice, yet the charges were not so grave as to warrant dismissal. The Joint Director wrote to the management that if it does not pay the wages directly to the employee, action should be taken for making direct payment to him.\n8. On 9.3.1988. CEO asked the management for re instatement of the employee with back wages. Aggrieved by such direction, management preferred a revision before the State Government. It was indicated that the very purpose for which a teacher is appointed is to impart teaching to the students. If the teacher was deficient in teaching and was irregular in taking classes, that is a very serious matter warranting termination of service. It also took a stand that since it had neither suspended the employee nor terminated his services and awaiting approval of the concerned authority, the question of reinstatement and paying back wages did not arise. In fact, the employee had not worked and abandoned work. But the DEO again directed the management to reinstate the employee and pay him back wages failing which the steps regarding direct payment were to be taken. Aggrieved by these orders, the Management filed a writ petition before the Madras High Court. Learned Single Judge was of the view that in terms of what is required under Section 22(1) of the Act, prior approval for effecting termination was necessary. This was intended to be a safeguard to protect the interest of the teacher so that there is no victimisation. An appeal was preferred before the Division Bench, inter alia, taking a stand that disciplinary action was taken was necessary in the interest of the Institution and the students whose interest was of paramount consideration.\n9. The authority and the learned Single Judge lost sight of this vital aspect. The Division Bench dismissed the appeal holding that the authorities had considered the materials on record and, therefore, no interference was called for.\n10. In support of the appeal, Mr. L. Nageshwara Rao, learned senior counsel submitted that the authorities and the High Court were not justified in their views and approach. It was submitted that Section 22 has not been interpreted in the proper perspective. Action of the authorities was beyond jurisdiction. They could not have gone into the question of the proportionality of punishment, as it was beyond the scope of their authority. Secondly, even if it is conceded for the sake of argument that there was jurisdiction to deal with the quantum of punishment, yet there was no application of mind in considering the relevant materials.\n11. Finally, it was submitted that if any amount has to be paid, the same has to be borne by the State Government as the post was a sanctioned and aided post. Another teacher has been appointed and the management is paying his salary. In elaborating the first ground of challenge, it was submitted that if the authorities can decide the quantum of punishment aspect, it would mean as if they are acting as an appellate authority. In case of approved action, appeal is provided under Section 23 of the Act and the effected employee is given an opportunity to prefer an appeal. There is also a scope for second appeal in terms of Section 24 of the Act. Proportionality is not within the domain of approved authority.\n12. The satisfaction of the approving authority is limited to consider whether adequate and reasonable grounds exist for taking action in the manner proposed by the management. The authorities and the High Court have lost sight of the fact that what was of paramount consideration is the welfare of the institution and the students in particular. A teacher, who is deficient in teaching as well as irregular, does not meet the requirements of a teacher, as one would expect him to be. This aspect which was of vital importance has been lost sight of, and not taken note of by the authorities and the High Court. The employee reflected very casual approach and even has absented from duty on several occasions for very long periods and after 1.12.1984 has not bothered to join duty. The employee who appeared in person supported the action and took the stand that he is victim of circumstances, and mala fides, and the management has been unfair to him. He claimed to be an ideal teacher for whom truth and honesty are the key-words.\n13. Learned counsel for the State Government submitted that pursuant to the interim directions given by this Court, the State has been paying the employee the amounts of salary directed to be paid. In fact, it has filed an interlocutory application No. 2 for modification of this Court's order. With reference to the counter affidavit filed in appeal, it is pointed out that the management has not drawn the amount sanctioned to it on the ground that it cannot make payment of said amount to a person (the teacher appointed in place of the employee) whose appointment has not been approved and, therefore, it was paying from its own funds. It was further submitted that the management has, in spite of the fact that no order of stay has been passed, not taken back the employee to service. Since no approval was given to the proposed order of termination, for all prActical purposes, there was no termination of the services of the employee and if any amount has to be paid, the same has to be borne by the management\n14. For considering the rival submissions, a few provisions need to be quoted. The pivotal provisions are Sections 22(1) and (2) and Rule 17(1) which so far as relevant read as follows:\n \"Section 22- Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or suspension of teachers or other persons employed in private school- (1) Subject to any rule that may be made in this behalf, no teacher or other person employed in any private school shall be dismissed, removed, or reduced in rank nor shall his appointment be otherwise terminated except with the prior approval of the competent authority.\n(2) Where the proposal to dismiss, remove or reduce in rank or otherwise terminate the appointment of any teacher or other person employed in any private school is communicated to the competent authority, that authority shall, if it is satisfied that there are adequate and reasonable grounds for such proposal, approve such dismissal, removal, reduction in rank or termination of appointment.\nRule 17, Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or suspension of teachers or other person employed in private schools:- \n(1) The competent authorities to accord prior approval for the dismissal. removal or reduction in rank of a teacher or other person employed in any private school, shall be the District Educational Officer in respect of teacher or other person employed in Pre-Primary, Primary and Middle Schools and the Chief Educational Officer in respect of teacher or other person employed in High Schools, Higher Secondary Schools and Teachers' Training Institutes.\" \n15. Though attempt was made to contend that at the stage of consideration under Section 22(1) and 22(2) and Rule 17(1), there is no scope for looking into the proportionality of punishment aspect, the same is clearly without any substance. What an authority is required to do at that stage is to see whether the proposed punishment is to be approved. Obviously, it has to consider whether the punishment as proposed is proper one; otherwise there is no need for seeking its approval. The crucial words used in sub-section (2) of Section 22 are \"adequate and reasonable ground\" for the proposal.\n16. The proposal relates to dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or otherwise termination of appointment of any teacher or any other person employed in a private school. While considering whether adequate and reasonable ground exist for giving approval, the authority is certainly required to look into the gravity of the proved charges and whether the punishment as proposed commensurates with it. Any other interpretation would make the question of approval an exercise in futility.\n17. Stand of the learned counsel for the Management is that if adequate and reasonable grounds exist for the action, then no other question needs to be looked into. This argument overlooks a vital aspect that the adequacy and reasonableness of grounds are relateable to the proposals for the enumerated actions. The proposed Actions being punishments, there is an inbuilt requirement to see whether the quantum of punishment commensurates with the gravity of the proved charges. Therefore, clearly the authority has jurisdiction to decide the question as to whether the punishment proposed commensurates with the proved charges. One of the related pleas was that if quantum of punishment is permitted to be considered, it would partake charActer of an appeal. This plea is equally untenable. Sections 22 and 23 operate in different fields. At the stage of consideration under Section 22, the teacher does not get any opportunity for presenting his side of the case. This opportunity is provided under Sections 23 or 24 as the case may be.\n18. The authority under Section 22 takes decision on the material placed before it by the management. So the question of action under Section 22 partaking appellate charActeristics does not arise. The second plea of learned counsel for the management was even if the authority had jurisdiction, there was no application of mind, as relevant factors have not been looked into. The basic duties of a teacher and what is expected from him were highlighted. It was strenuously contended that the welfare of the students' aspect was not even taken note of.\n19. The role a teacher plays in shaping the career and future of a student needs no great emphasis. In olden times, a teacher was considered equal to God. He is required to ensure good conduct of his pupils in addition to teaching lessons to them. The situation has not changed now so far as this basic concept is concerned. But nevertheless, the number of such teachers is sadly on the decline, and instead of tribe of such teachers increasing, it is alarming decreasing. A teacher is required to remove darkness and ignorance from the minds of students. But present day experiences show that the teachers are themselves ill-equipped and take their jobs very casually. No doubt, there are exceptions and those teachers who belong to the exception category are trying their best to make up the deficiency of their brothers in service.\n20. In the hands of these ill-equipped teachers, the destiny of the students does not get moulded in the way it ought to be. The centres of learning are becoming trade and money-making business centres. Learned counsel for the appellant is correct in his submission that welfare of the students has to receive utmost priority. But his submission that there was no application of mind by the authorities to the materials has not borne out from the records. The appellate authority has addressed itself to the relevant factors in greater details and has come to the conclusion that CEO was justified in not according approval for the proposed action of dismissal.\n21. Learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have put their seal of approval on the findings recorded. Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that once the disciplinary authority comes to a view that there was adequate material for imposing a particular punishment; the approving authority should not lightly interfere with the findings. This submission holds good only when the authority does not apply its mind to the materials forming the foundation of the proposed action. When after consideration of the material, it comes to a conclusion that the proposed punishment is harsh or disproportionate to the proved charges; the scope of interference with the finding is rather limited. This is because the approving authority has to consider whether the proved charges on the facts and the materials justify a particular action. Since reasons have been given on consideration of the materials, there is no scope for interference.\n22. The order of the authorities declining to accord approval does not suffer from any infirmity. The High Court was justified in declining to interfere.\n23. Another point urged by learned counsel for the appellant was that the direction for the back wages in its entirety is not justified because the employee absented from duty without sanctioned leave for long periods and even on some dates he went away during the school period and even abandoned the classes on several days. This certainly is a factor which needed consideration by the authorities. Except for the enumerated categories for other actions no approval is necessary. Authority acting under Section 22 could not have indicated any other aspect. Looking into the circumstances of the case, we feel that payment of 60% salary for the concerned period up to the date of superannuation (since we are told that the employee has been superannuated in the meantime) shall be proper. The undisputed position is that the charges have been proved. The question as to who will make the payment to the employee is a matter between the management and the Government. (The payment has, in any event, to be made, at the first instance, by the Management). So far as the question of re-imbursement is concerned, we do not think it necessary to give any direction in that regard, so far as the present dispute is concerned. No further orders are to be passed in the application for modification of earlier interim orders passed.\nThe appeal is disposed of accordingly.\nAppeal disposed of\n",
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      "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA",
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    "data": {
      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Criminal Appeal - 1627 of 2019 | Union Of India And Ors. v. Sepoy Pravat Kumar Behuria | 06/11/2019",
      "case_details": "Case: Criminal Appeal - 1627 of 2019 | Union Of India And Ors. v. Sepoy Pravat Kumar Behuria",
      "generated_outcome": "ALLOWED",
      "reference_outcome": "DISMISSED",
      "case_record": "The Respondent, enrolled in the Indian Army in 2002, was dismissed from service on 23.07.2012 following a Summary Court Martial. On 02.06.2011, he assaulted Subedar Satyendra Singh Yadav with a Talwar, causing a skull fracture and internal bleeding. A Court of Inquiry was convened, and summary of evidence was recorded. The Respondent declined to cross-examine witnesses during these proceedings and made no statement in his defence, though he voluntarily stated he attacked without provocation. The Summary Court Martial found him guilty under Section 326 of the IPC. The Respondent appealed to the Armed Forces Tribunal, alleging procedural irregularities, including being kept in close arrest without proper authorization, denial of participation in the Court of Inquiry and summary of evidence, hasty conduct of the Court Martial (45 minutes), and inconsistency between medical and oral evidence regarding the injury. The Tribunal accepted these contentions, finding inconsistencies between the medical report (compressed injury) and the weapon used (sharp-edged Talwar), noting the absence of blood and fingerprints on the weapon, and concluding that the proceedings were conducted hastily and without following prescribed rules, specifically Rules 179, 180, 115, and 116. The Tribunal also noted that the Respondent's signatures appeared to be taken in advance on blank papers.",
      "generated_judgment": "### **Facts:**\n1. The Respondent was enrolled in the Indian Army in 2002 and was dismissed from service on **23.07.2012** following a **Summary Court Martial**.\n2. On **02.06.2011**, the Respondent assaulted **Subedar Satyendra Singh Yadav** with a **Talwar**, causing a **skull fracture and internal bleeding**.\n3. A **Court of Inquiry** was convened, and a **summary of evidence** was recorded.\n4. The Respondent **declined to cross-examine witnesses** and made **no statement in his defence**, though he **voluntarily admitted** attacking without provocation.\n5. The **Summary Court Martial found him guilty under Section 326 of the IPC** (voluntarily causing grievous hurt).\n6. The Respondent appealed to the **Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT)**, alleging:\n   - **Procedural irregularities**, including:\n     - Being kept in **close arrest without proper authorization**.\n     - **Denial of participation** in the Court of Inquiry and summary of evidence.\n     - **Hasty conduct of the Court Martial** (completed in **45 minutes**).\n     - **Inconsistency between medical and oral evidence** regarding the injury.\n7. The **AFT accepted these contentions**, noting:\n   - **Inconsistencies** between the **medical report** (compressed injury) and the **weapon used** (sharp-edged Talwar).\n   - **Absence of blood and fingerprints** on the weapon.\n   - **Proceedings were conducted hastily** and **without following prescribed rules** (Rules **179, 180, 115, and 116**).\n   - The Respondent’s **signatures appeared to be taken in advance on blank papers**.\n\n### **Issues:**\n1. **Whether the Summary Court Martial proceedings were conducted in violation of procedural rules, rendering the conviction unlawful?**\n2. **Whether the inconsistencies in evidence and alleged coercion justify setting aside the dismissal?**\n\n### **Rules:**\n1. **Article 142 of the Constitution of India** – The Supreme Court and High Courts have the power to pass any order necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before them.\n2. **Army Act, 1950 (Sections 115, 116, 179, 180)** – These sections prescribe procedural safeguards in Court Martial proceedings, including:\n   - **Right to a fair hearing** (Rule 115).\n   - **Proper recording of evidence** (Rule 116).\n   - **Adequate time for defence** (Rule 179).\n   - **Proper authorization for arrest** (Rule 180).\n3. **Principles of Natural Justice** – Require fairness, impartiality, and an opportunity to defend oneself.\n4. **Precedents on Procedural Irregularities in Court Martial** – Courts have set aside convictions where fundamental procedural violations occurred (e.g., **Union of India v. Col. K.S. Kahlon**).\n\n### **Analysis:**\n1. **Procedural Violations (Facts 6, 7; Rules 2, 3, 4):**\n   - The **AFT found violations of Rules 179, 180, 115, and 116**, which are **mandatory procedural safeguards** in Court Martial proceedings.\n   - The **hasty conduct (45 minutes)** and **lack of proper authorization for arrest** (Rule 180) **deprived the Respondent of a fair trial**.\n   - The **pre-signed blank papers** suggest **coercion or lack of free consent**, violating **natural justice principles**.\n\n2. **Inconsistencies in Evidence (Facts 6, 7; Rule 3):**\n   - The **medical report (compressed injury) vs. weapon (Talwar)** discrepancy raises **reasonable doubt** about the prosecution’s case.\n   - The **absence of blood and fingerprints** further weakens the prosecution’s evidence.\n\n3. **Respondent’s Conduct (Facts 3, 4):**\n   - While the Respondent **admitted the attack**, his **refusal to cross-examine witnesses** does not negate the **procedural violations** or **evidentiary inconsistencies**.\n   - The **lack of proper defence opportunity** (Rule 115) makes the conviction **vulnerable to challenge**.\n\n### **Conclusion:**\nGiven the **gross procedural violations**, **inconsistent evidence**, and **lack of a fair trial**, the **appeal is ALLOWED**. The dismissal from service is set aside, and the Respondent is entitled to a **fresh inquiry** in accordance with the law.",
      "reference_judgment": "1. This Appeal is filed against the judgment of the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Lucknow (hereinafter, 'the Tribunal') by which the order of dismissal of the Respondent dated 23.07.2012 was set aside.\n2. The Respondent was enrolled in the Indian Army as Sepoy in the Unit 981 AD Regiment Workshop on 02.02.2002. He was posted at Jamnagar on 01.06.2011 and was scheduled to be on the third night duty from 04:00 hrs to 06:00 hrs. Thus, he was excused from physical training parade. On 02.06.2011, at about 07:45 1 hrs, he assaulted Subedar/Master Technical (Communication) Satyendra Singh Yadav, with a Talwar (grass cutting tool) without any provocation. Initially, the Respondent hit Subedar/Master Technical (Communication) Satyendra Singh Yadav on his head from behind and when Subedar/Master Technical (Communication) Satyendra Singh Yadav turned around, the Respondent hit on his forehead with the Talwar. When the Respondent attempted to give a third blow, Naib Subedar A. P. Singh intervened. Subedar/Master Technical (Communication) Satyendra Singh Yadav was immediately shifted to Gokul Hospital, Jamnagar and a surgery was conducted by a Neurosurgeon as his skull bone was fractured leading to internal bleeding and blood clotting in the brain.\n3. The Court of Inquiry was convened against the Respondent by Colonel Sanjay Khanna, Commanding Officer, 48 AD Regiment on 03.06.2011 to investigate into the circumstances which led the Respondent using criminal force against Subedar/Master Technical (Communication) Satyendra Singh Yadav. Nine witnesses were examined and the Respondent declined to cross- examine the witnesses though he was given an opportunity. The Respondent also did not make any statement in his defence. After appreciating the material on record, the Court of Inquiry recommended action to be initiated against the Respondent.\n4. The proceedings for recording the summary of evidence were initiated by Lt. Col. Amarvir Singh. Twelve witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution between 10.06.2011 and 15.06.2011. According to the Appellants, the Respondent declined to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses. The Respondent had voluntarily given a statement that he hit the victim with a grass cutting tool without any provocation. Thereafter, on 20.10.2011, additional summary of evidence was recorded. Two additional witnesses were examined and witness No. 2 and 12 were re-examined in the presence of the Respondent. The prosecution alleges that the Respondent refused to cross-examine the witnesses though he was given an opportunity to do so.\n5. By an order dated 23.07.2012, the Summary Court Martial found the respondent guilty and imposed the sentence of dismissal from service.\n6. The order dated 23.07.2012 was questioned by the Respondent before the Tribunal. The Respondent contended that he was kept in close arrest from 02.06.2011 to 05.10.2011 without the permission from the Chief of the Army Staff. It was further contended that he was not given an opportunity to participate in the Court of Inquiry and during the recording of summary of evidence. He complained that the Summary Court Martial was conducted in a hasty manner. The entire proceedings before the Court Martial was completed within a period of 45 minutes. It was further argued on his behalf that the oral evidence was inconsistent with the medical evidence. The Respondent's case was that there was no incised wound on the head of the victim though the Respondent is alleged to have used a Talwar which is a sharp-edged weapon. He submitted before the Tribunal that non- compliance of the provisions of the Army Act, 1950 and the Army Rules, 1954 (hereinafter, 'the Rules') vitiated the Summary Court Martial proceedings.\n7. The Tribunal accepted the submissions made on behalf of the Respondent and held that there was an irreconcilable inconsistency between the medical evidence and the oral testimonies of the witnesses. According to the medical certificate, the injury caused to Subedar/Master Technical Satyendra Singh Yadav was a compressed injury whereas the Respondent is alleged to have wielded a grass cutting tool which is sharp-edged. The Tribunal also found that there was no blood on the weapon and the prosecution was unable to prove that there were any finger prints of the Respondent on the weapon. The Tribunal agreed with the Respondent that the Summary Court Martial was conducted in a hasty manner. The entire enquiry was completed within a period of 45 minutes. After perusing the record of the summary of evidence, the Tribunal was of the opinion that the signatures of the Respondent appear to have been taken before the proceedings were held. The Tribunal found that the signatures of the Respondent were at the right-side corner at the bottom of every page. On some pages where the depositions of the witnesses concluded at the middle of the page, the signature of the Respondent was found at the right side at the bottom of the page. After examining the material on record, the Tribunal held that the Respondent was not afforded an opportunity as provided in Rules 179 and 180 of the Rules. The Tribunal was of the further opinion that the procedure prescribed in Rules 115 and 116 of the Rules which deals with recording the plea of guilt of a delinquent was not followed. After a detailed discussion, the Tribunal ruled in favour of the Respondent by holding that the imposition of the penalty of dismissal was with a pre-determined mind and was arrived at without following the procedure prescribed by law.\n8. We have heard Mr. R. Balasubramanian, learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants and Mr. Sudhanshu S. Pandey, learned counsel appearing for the Respondent. The Court of Inquiry was ordered against the Respondent to investigate the circumstances under which he used criminal force against Subedar/Master Technical, Satyendra Singh Yadav. The Court of Inquiry assembled on 03.06.2011. During the Court of Inquiry, the statement of the Respondent was recorded in which he stated that he was not provided liquor at 20:00 hrs on 01.06.2011 by Subedar/Master Technical Satyendra Singh Yadav. He was angry about the refusal of liquor due to which he attacked the victim by using Talwar on the morning of 02.06.2011. Other witnesses, including the victim Subedar/Master Technical Satyendra Singh Yadav were examined in the Court of Inquiry.\n9. We have perused the original record relating to the summary of evidence which was recorded between 10.06.2011 to 15.06.2011. The signatures of the Respondent are found on the right- hand side at the bottom of each page, at the same place on each page. The manner in which the signatures of the officer who recorded the summary of evidence and the other officers were put on certain pages would clearly show that the signature of the Respondent was taken in advance on blank papers. The statement of the Respondent was recorded under Rule 23 (2) of the Rules. Lt. Col. Amarvir Singh who recorded the summary of evidence certified that the summary of evidence containing 40 pages were recorded by him in the presence of the Respondent and that Clauses (1), (2), (3) and (4) of Rule 23 have been complied with while recording the summary of evidence. Even on this certificate, whereas the signature of Lt. Col. Amarvir Singh is at the center of the page, the signature of the Respondent is found at the right-hand side at the bottom of the page. The second half of the page is left blank. A bare perusal of the recording would indicate that the signatures of the Respondent were obtained and filled up with the depositions of the witnesses later. The contention of the Appellant that the summary of evidence was recorded in the presence of the Respondent is not acceptable. We have also perused the additional summary of evidence which was recorded on 20.10.2011. The original record discloses that the signatures of the Respondent were taken earlier as there is a huge gap on certain pages between the place where the depositions have ended and the place where the signature of the Respondent is found. The certificate given by the officer recording additional summary of evidence on 20.10.2011 actually ends with his signature at the center of the page and the signature of the Respondent was found at the bottom of the page without anything being written in between.\n10. After the judgment was reserved, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Union of India, handed over the original record pertaining to the Court of Inquiry. The proceedings of the Court of Inquiry were conducted between 04.06.2011 and 08.06.2011 during which the statements of the Respondent and the other witnesses were recorded. The signature of the Respondent is found on the left-hand side at the bottom of each page. The statement of witness No.3, Naib Subedar A. P. Singh ends at the middle of page No.9 of the original record. The signature of the Respondent is found at the left-hand side at the bottom of the said page. Major Hemant Juneja, who was the Presiding Officer of the Court of Inquiry appears to have signed at the bottom of each page on the right-hand side. On some pages where the deposition ended at the center of the page, signature of Major Hemant Juneja is found. Resultantly, on some pages, the signature of the Presiding Officer i.e. Major Hemant Juneja is found at the appropriate place i.e. immediately after the deposition has ended, as well as at the right-hand side of the bottom of the page.\n11. The Summary Court Martial was held on 23.07.2012. The Respondent was charged for committing an offence under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 by causing grievous hurt to Subedar/Master Technical Satyendra Singh Yadav. We agree with the Tribunal that the entire Summary Court Martial was held in a hasty manner. The enquiry commenced at 12.45 p.m. and concluded at 1.30 p.m. and the sentence was imposed at 2.30 p.m.\n12. It is clear from the record that Respondent was not given an opportunity to cross examine the witnesses whose statements were recorded in the summary of evidence. The proceedings of Court of Inquiry, recording of summary of evidence and the Summary Court Martial have been conducted without following the procedure prescribed by the Act and the Rules.\n13. The Tribunal examined the evidence on record to hold that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the Respondent. The irreconcilable inconsistency between the medical evidence and ocular testimony, lack of scientific evidence like finger prints on the weapon and the absence of blood on the weapon have been taken into account by the Tribunal to hold that the charge against the Respondent was not proved.\n14. It is trite law that judgments of acquittal should not be disturbed unless there are substantial or compelling reasons. The substantial or compelling reasons to discard judgment of acquittal were examined by this Court in Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh1which are as follows: 1 (2008) 10 SCC 450 \" 1....... i) The trial Court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; ii) The trial Court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; iii) The trial Court's judgment is likely to result in \"grave miscarriage of justice\"; iv) The entire approach of the trial Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; v) The trial Court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; vi) The trial Court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/ report of the Ballistic expert, etc. vii) This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive.\n2. The Appellate Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the trial Court.\n3. If two reasonable views can be reached - one that leads to acquittal, the other to conviction - the High Courts /appellate Courts must rule in favour of the accused.\"\n15. Applying the law laid down by this Court as stated above, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the Tribunal should not be interfered with.\n16. We have carefully examined the evidence. A view that the respondent is guilty is possible on a scrutiny of the oral evidence. However, the relevant factors taken into account by the Tribunal present another probable view. It is settled law that if two views can be reached, the one that leads to acquittal has to be preferred to the other, which would end in conviction. That apart, there is a clear violation of Rules 179 and 180 of the Rules and the respondent was deprived of an opportunity to defend himself.\n17. For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the Tribunal is upheld and the Appeal is dismissed.",
      "root_cause_options": [
        {
          "value": "Missing fact",
          "html": "<div class='root-option root-option-new-group'><span class='root-group'>INPUT ERROR</span><span class='root-leaf'>Missing fact</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Incorrect fact",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>INPUT ERROR</span><span class='root-leaf'>Incorrect fact</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Fabricated fact in case record",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>INPUT ERROR</span><span class='root-leaf'>Fabricated fact in case record</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Fabricated fact in reasoning",
          "html": "<div class='root-option root-option-new-group'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Facts</span><span class='root-leaf'>Fabricated fact in reasoning</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Fact-weighing error",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Facts</span><span class='root-leaf'>Fact-weighing error</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Fact omission in reasoning",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Facts</span><span class='root-leaf'>Fact omission in reasoning</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Issue omission",
          "html": "<div class='root-option root-option-new-group'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Issues</span><span class='root-leaf'>Issue omission</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Spurious issue",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Issues</span><span class='root-leaf'>Spurious issue</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Issue misframing",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Issues</span><span class='root-leaf'>Issue misframing</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Issue misprioritisation",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Issues</span><span class='root-leaf'>Issue misprioritisation</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Wrong rule source",
          "html": "<div class='root-option root-option-new-group'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Wrong rule source</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Using outdated / overruled rule",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Using outdated / overruled rule</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Rule misinterpretation",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Rule misinterpretation</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Rule misapplication",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Rule misapplication</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Wrong legal test / threshold",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Wrong legal test / threshold</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Missed exception / qualification",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Missed exception / qualification</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Limitation / time-bar error",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Limitation / time-bar error</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Precedent context mismatch",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Precedent context mismatch</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Rule interaction error",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Rule interaction error</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Burden misallocation",
          "html": "<div class='root-option root-option-new-group'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Analysis</span><span class='root-leaf'>Burden misallocation</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Neglected rule, fact, or counter-argument",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Analysis</span><span class='root-leaf'>Neglected rule, fact, or counter-argument</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Logical fallacy / leap in logic",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Analysis</span><span class='root-leaf'>Logical fallacy / leap in logic</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Other reasoning error",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Analysis</span><span class='root-leaf'>Other reasoning error</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Conclusion does not follow from analysis",
          "html": "<div class='root-option root-option-new-group'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Conclusion</span><span class='root-leaf'>Conclusion does not follow from analysis</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Discretionary original judgment",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Conclusion</span><span class='root-leaf'>Discretionary original judgment</span></div>"
        }
      ]
    },
    "meta": {
      "sample_id": "S017",
      "case_id": "4759",
      "experiment": "baseline_firac",
      "model": "mistral-small-3.2-24b-instruct",
      "source_file": "S017__baseline_firac__mistral-small-3.2-24b-instruct__4759.json",
      "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA",
      "judgment_date": "06/11/2019",
      "machine_error_stage": "rules",
      "machine_major_error_category": "model_error",
      "machine_minor_error_category": "Wrong legal test / threshold"
    }
  },
  {
    "data": {
      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Civil Appeal No. 12645 of 1996 | Madan Mohan Rajgarhia v. Messrs Mahendra R. Shah And Brothers And Another | 31/07/2003",
      "case_details": "Case: Civil Appeal No. 12645 of 1996 | Madan Mohan Rajgarhia v. Messrs Mahendra R. Shah And Brothers And Another",
      "generated_outcome": "ALLOWED",
      "reference_outcome": "DISMISSED",
      "case_record": "The appellant, engaged in the purchase and sale of shares, utilized the services of the respondent, a broker at the Bombay Stock Exchange. A dispute arose, leading the appellant to file a suit for recovery of Rs. 5,63,334/-. Upon receiving summons, the respondent filed an application under Section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, seeking to stay the proceedings on the ground that an arbitration provision covered the dispute. The learned Single Judge of the High Court accepted this contention and stayed the suit. The appellant's First Appeal against this order was dismissed. The appellant then filed the present appeal by way of special leave petition. The bills for transactions contained two arbitration clauses: one on the front, defining 'non-member' to 'include a remisier, authorized clerk or employee of any other person with whom the members shares (brokerage)', and another on the back, stating 'In the event of any claim... arising between you and us out of these transactions the matter shall be referred to arbitration'. The appellant contended that as he was not a remisier, authorized clerk, or employee, nor did he share brokerage, he was not covered by the definition of 'non-member', arguing that 'any other person' should be interpreted narrowly (ejusdem generis).",
      "generated_judgment": "To evaluate the appeal, we need to assess whether the arbitration clause should apply to the appellant under the principles of contractual interpretation, particularly considering the doctrine of ejusdem generis, which the appellant has invoked. Here are the critical steps:\n\n1. **Understanding the Dispute and Legal Framework**:\n   - The dispute involves the appellant and the respondent, a broker at the Bombay Stock Exchange, regarding the recovery of a certain sum.\n   - The respondent invoked Section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, to stay court proceedings, arguing that an arbitration clause covered the dispute.\n   - The arbitration clause defines 'non-member' and contains provisions that may apply to the appellant.\n\n2. **Interpretation of the Arbitration Clause**:\n   - The arbitration clause includes two parts:\n     - A definition on the front of the bills: \"non-member\" to \"include a remisier, authorized clerk or employee of any other person with whom members share (brokerage).\"\n     - An arbitration agreement on the back: \"In the event of any claim... arising between you and us out of these transactions the matter shall be referred to arbitration.\"\n   - The appellant argues that he does not fall within the definition of 'non-member' as he is not a remisier, authorized clerk, or employee, nor does he share brokerage. Here, he relies on the ejusdem generis principle, which suggests that where general words follow an enumeration of specific items, the general words are construed to apply only to items of the same kind.\n\n3. **Application of Ejusdem Generis**:\n   - The specific items listed are \"remisier, authorized clerk or employee of any other person with whom members share (brokerage).\"\n   - 'Any other person' is the general term following this list. Under ejusdem generis, 'any other person' should be interpreted as similar to the specific items preceding it, which are specifically related to brokerage or employment in broker-related roles.\n   - The appellant’s situation must be evaluated to see if he fits within this context. If his activities do not involve brokerage or employment in a related role, the ejusdem generis argument suggests he may not be covered by the arbitration clause.\n\n4. **Judicial Precedents and Interpretation**:\n   - Courts typically look to the intention of the parties when interpreting contract terms. If the language is ambiguous, they may lean towards a narrower interpretation unless clearly stated otherwise.\n   - The intention behind arbitration clauses is often to provide a streamlined dispute resolution process, but they must clearly specify the parties they cover.\n\n5. **Decision**:\n   - Given the appellant’s argument and the principle of ejusdem generis, there is a valid reason to believe that the arbitration provision might not encompass the appellant if he does not fit the specific categories or a similar context.\n   - Previous court decisions often favor the party not drafting ambiguous terms unless explicitly stated otherwise. Here, the ambiguity exists concerning whether the term 'any other person' extends to the appellant's role and activities.\n\nBased on the above analysis, the appeal hinges on how the term 'any other person' is interpreted within the arbitration clause. Given the appellant’s strong argument based on ejusdem generis and the ambiguity around 'any other person,' it seems fair that this matter should be considered, potentially in a non-arbitral forum, unless the clause is unequivocally applicable.\n\n**Conclusion**: The appeal is **ALLOWED** to provide a more thorough examination of whether the arbitration clause applicability, as contested by the appellant, should indeed exclude him based on the principles of contractual interpretation and ejusdem generis.",
      "reference_judgment": "The Order of the Court is as follows\n1. The appellant herein was engaged in the business of purchase and sale of shares and for that purpose he had been utilizing the services of the defendant, who is a broker at the Bombay Stock Exchange. The appellant herein filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 5,63, 334/- against M/s. Mahendra R. Shah &amp; Bros., who are the respondents herein. The respondents herein on receipt of the summons in the suit, filed an application under Section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 for staying the proceeding on the ground that there is a provision for arbitration as regards the dispute in the suit. The learned Single Judge of the High Court accepted the contention of the respondents herein and directed the stay of proceedings of the suit. Aggrieved, the appellant filed the First Appeal from the said order, which was dismissed. It is against the said order of the High Court, the appellant has filed this appeal by way of special leave petition.\n2. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant urged that the arbitration clause printed on the bills does not include the persons like plaintiff and, therefore, the appellant being a non-member is not required to seek arbitration. We do not find any merit in the contention. One clause of the Bill, which is printed on the front, reads as under:\n \"All the claims (whether admitted or not) difference and disputes between a member and a non-member or a non-member (the terms \"non-member\" shall include a remisier, authorized clerk or employee of any other person with whom the members shares (brokerage) arising out of or in relation to dealing transactions and contracts made subject to the rules and bye-laws and regulations of the Exchange or with reference to anything incidental thereto or in pursuance thereof or relating their construction, fulfillment or validity or relating to the rights, obligation and liabilities of remisier, authorised clerk, employees or any other persons with whom the member shares brokerage in relation to such dealings, transactions and contracts shall be referred to and decided by arbitration as provided in the rules, bye-laws and regulations of the Exchange.\" \n3. Another clause of the Bill, which is printed on the back side, reads as under:\n \"In the event of any claim (whether admitted or not) difference or dispute arising between you and us out of these transactions the matter shall be referred to arbitration in Bombay as provided in the Rules, Bye-laws and Regulations of the Stock Exchange, Bombay\". \n4. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant urged that a non-member will only be covered if he falls under the definition of a non-member. Since the appellant is neither a remisier or authorised clerk or employee or shares any brokerage with the member, he cannot be covered by the said definition and, therefore, the said rules, definition and bye-laws do not apply to him. In fact, the argument is that the words 'any other person\" should take colour from the preceding words, namely, 'remiser, authorised clerk or employee' and since the appellant is not one of those mentioned, he does not fall within the expression 'any other person'. T he reading of clause quoted above, as a whole, would clearly show that this clause is quite wide and comprehensive enough to cover the case of the plaintiff. In order to make it comprehensive, unauthorised clerk and employee and other persons like remisier, who are or have been receiving brokerage form the members of the Exchange have been included in the definition of non-member person. In fact by including these categories, the definition of a 'non-member' has been widened. The inclusion of such persons does not mean that no person like the appellant who is not a member of the Exchange has been excluded from the definition of the non-member. This aspect may be examined from another angle. The other Clause in the same bill puts the matter beyond doubt. The said clause shows that any claim (whether admitted or not) difference or dispute arising between you and us' out of these transactions the matter shall be referred to arbitration in Bombay as providing in the rules, bye-laws and regulations of the Stock Exchange. It does not show that what does it contemplate as regards arbitration clause printed on the front of the Bill, and that it provides for arbitration and the persons like appellant are included therein.\n5. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any merit in the appeal. It, accordingly, fails and is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.",
      "root_cause_options": [
        {
          "value": "Missing fact",
          "html": "<div class='root-option root-option-new-group'><span class='root-group'>INPUT ERROR</span><span class='root-leaf'>Missing fact</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Incorrect fact",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>INPUT ERROR</span><span class='root-leaf'>Incorrect fact</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Fabricated fact in case record",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>INPUT ERROR</span><span class='root-leaf'>Fabricated fact in case record</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Fabricated fact in reasoning",
          "html": "<div class='root-option root-option-new-group'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Facts</span><span class='root-leaf'>Fabricated fact in reasoning</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Fact-weighing error",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Facts</span><span class='root-leaf'>Fact-weighing error</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Fact omission in reasoning",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Facts</span><span class='root-leaf'>Fact omission in reasoning</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Issue omission",
          "html": "<div class='root-option root-option-new-group'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Issues</span><span class='root-leaf'>Issue omission</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Spurious issue",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Issues</span><span class='root-leaf'>Spurious issue</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Issue misframing",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Issues</span><span class='root-leaf'>Issue misframing</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Issue misprioritisation",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Issues</span><span class='root-leaf'>Issue misprioritisation</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Wrong rule source",
          "html": "<div class='root-option root-option-new-group'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Wrong rule source</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Using outdated / overruled rule",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Using outdated / overruled rule</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Rule misinterpretation",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Rule misinterpretation</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Rule misapplication",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Rule misapplication</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Wrong legal test / threshold",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Wrong legal test / threshold</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Missed exception / qualification",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Missed exception / qualification</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Limitation / time-bar error",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Limitation / time-bar error</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Precedent context mismatch",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Precedent context mismatch</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Rule interaction error",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Rule interaction error</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Burden misallocation",
          "html": "<div class='root-option root-option-new-group'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Analysis</span><span class='root-leaf'>Burden misallocation</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Neglected rule, fact, or counter-argument",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Analysis</span><span class='root-leaf'>Neglected rule, fact, or counter-argument</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Logical fallacy / leap in logic",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Analysis</span><span class='root-leaf'>Logical fallacy / leap in logic</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Other reasoning error",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Analysis</span><span class='root-leaf'>Other reasoning error</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Conclusion does not follow from analysis",
          "html": "<div class='root-option root-option-new-group'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Conclusion</span><span class='root-leaf'>Conclusion does not follow from analysis</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Discretionary original judgment",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Conclusion</span><span class='root-leaf'>Discretionary original judgment</span></div>"
        }
      ]
    },
    "meta": {
      "sample_id": "S018",
      "case_id": "172",
      "experiment": "baseline_cot",
      "model": "phi-4",
      "source_file": "S018__baseline_cot__phi-4__172.json",
      "court": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA",
      "judgment_date": "31/07/2003",
      "machine_error_stage": "rules",
      "machine_major_error_category": "model_error",
      "machine_minor_error_category": "Rule misapplication"
    }
  },
  {
    "data": {
      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | Criminal Appeal No. 317 of 2008 (Arising Out of Slp (Crl) No.4661 of 2007) | S.K. Alagh v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others | 15/02/2008",
      "case_details": "Case: Criminal Appeal No. 317 of 2008 (Arising Out of Slp (Crl) No.4661 of 2007) | S.K. Alagh v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others",
      "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED",
      "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED",
      "case_record": "M/s. Akash Traders was an Area Wholesale dealer for Britannia Industries Limited (the Company). The dealership was terminated. Despite this, the complainant sent two demand drafts totaling Rs. 1,68,000/- on 14.09.2000 for goods. The company reiterated the termination of the dealership. The proprietor of M/s. Akash Traders filed a complaint under Section 406 IPC against the appellant (Managing Director of the Company), but the company was not made an accused. The demand drafts were in the company's name. After the complainant's death and substitution, the Magistrate summoned the appellants. The Magistrate discharged the accused under Section 245(2) CrPC, finding no criminal intent due to the delay in returning the drafts being attributable to banking processes and the fact that the drafts were eventually received back by the complainant. The revisional court allowed the complainant's revision, stating the Magistrate erred by not allowing evidence under Section 244 CrPC. The High Court dismissed the appellant's application under Section 482 CrPC, finding a prima facie case.",
      "generated_judgment": "In evaluating the appeal, it's essential to consider the sequence of legal proceedings and the reasoning provided by the courts at different levels.\n\n1. **Initial Complaint and Discharge**: The complainant, M/s. Akash Traders, filed a complaint under Section 406 IPC. The Magistrate discharged the accused, finding no criminal intent. This was based on the conclusion that the delay in returning the drafts was due to banking processes and that the drafts were eventually returned to the complainant.\n\n2. **Revision by Complainant**: The complainant appealed, and the revisional court found that the Magistrate erred by not allowing evidence under Section 244 CrPC. As a result, the revision was allowed.\n\n3. **High Court's Decision**: The High Court dismissed the appellant's application under Section 482 CrPC, indicating that there was a prima facie case to be answered. This suggests that the High Court found merit in the revisional court's decision to allow the revision, implying that the Magistrate's decision to discharge might have been premature or without sufficient regard to evidence that could have been presented.\n\nConsidering these facts, the sequence of judicial decisions indicates that the higher courts found procedural and substantive grounds to question the Magistrate's discharge of the accused. The High Court's dismissal of the Section 482 CrPC application further supports the position that a prima facie case existed, warranting further examination.\n\nTherefore, based on the facts provided and the decisions of the revisional court and the High Court, the appeal should be **DISMISSED**.",
      "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by : HON'BLE JUSTICE S. B. SINHA\n1. Leave granted.\n2. M/s. Akash Traders was an Area Wholesale dealer of Britannia Industries Limited (the Company) for Azamgarh, U.P. Dealership of Respondent No.2 was terminated by the said company. It was earlier informed that goods will be delivered only upon receipt of demand drafts issued by it. Complainant sent two demand drafts for a sum of Rs.18, 000/- and Rs.1, 50, 000/- for supply of goods on 14.9.2000 despite the fact that the dealership had been terminated earlier.\n3. The said demand drafts were sent to the appellant through the local Sales In-charge of the Company. It is stated that the complainant refused to take the same back.\n4. A new Area Wholesaler for Azamgarh was appointed by the company.\n5. A demand was made by the complainant to deliver goods by a letter dated 24.9.2000 stating that the company owes him a sum of Rs.1, 00, 000/-. The stand of the company that his dealership had been terminated was reiterated by a letter dated 25.9.2000.\n6. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, purported to be the proprietor of the firm M/s. Akash Traders, filed a complaint petition in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Azamgarh against the appellant herein for commission of an offence under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Britania Industries Ltd. was not impleaded as an accused therein.\n7. On or about 17.2.2001, i.e., after filing of the complaint petition, the dealer accepted the said demand drafts being dated 8.1.2002 for a sum of Rs.1, 68, 000/-. On or about 25.2.2001, Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, the original complainant expired. A substitution application was filed by the second respondent-Alok Kumar Aggarwal on or about 19.4.2001.\n8. Inter alia, relying on or on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint petition that 'the company with mala fide intention neither sent the goods, nor returned the money'; an order for summoning the appellants was passed on 8.5.2001. A publication to that effect was also made in an article in a local newspaper.\n9. An application for recalling the order summoning before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate was filed by the appellant. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, by an order dated 13.12.2001 discharged the accused in terms of Section 245(2) of the Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973, holding :\n \"From the perusal of the record, this fact has come to light that in between the complainant M/s. Akash Traders, Azamgarh and Britannia Industries Ltd., Kolkata an agreement was made. M/s. Akash Traders were the authorized agent of Britannia Industries Ltd. and according to terms and conditions of the Agreement, Britannia Industries Ltd. used to supply biscuit to M/s. Akash Traders, Azamgarh. On 8.9.2000, Britannia Industries Ltd. terminated the agency regarding agreement as a result of which in between the parties dispute arose. It is the submission of the complainant that on 13.9.2001 bank draft of Rs.1, 68, 000/- was sent in favour of Britannia Industries Ltd. but on behalf of the accused the above amount did not return till 7.2.2001 to the complainant. The pleading on behalf of the accused is that the bank draft of Rs.1, 68, 000/- was returned to M/s. Akash Traders on 8.1.2001 and its payment was received by the complainant on 19.2.2001 under protest. Both the parties regarding the above reference after the case being decided this legal position has been made clear that if in any matter civil or criminal case is made out then on the basis of obtaining civil relief the proceedings of the suit could not be terminated. In the present matter, it has to be decided that whether in between both the parties during the business transactions prima facie criminal case was found? If in the present case any criminal case is not found then under Section 245(2) Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 the accused could be released at any stage. After the termination of agreement in between the accused and the complainant regarding agency on 13.9.2001 bank draft for an amount of Rs.1, 68, 000/- was sent to Britannia Industries Ltd. for the supply of biscuits. Prior to this also agreement dated 8.9.2000 has already been terminated regarding the agency in favour of M/s. Akash Traders Azamgarh. The complainant for receiving back an amount of Rs.1, 68, 000/- sent letters dated 11.10.2000 and 21.10.2000 but till 7.2.2001, the complainant did not receive back the above amount of Rs.1, 68, 000/-. But from the perusal of the photo copy of the letter enclosed with the file of bank draft of State Bank of India, Keshavpuram, Delhi it has become clear that bank draft No.597805 dated 8.1.2001 for an amount of Rs.1, 68, 000/ had already been prepared in favour of M/s. Akash Traders, Azamgarh and after the departmental proceedings of clearance on 19.2.2001 the complainant had received back the amount on 19.2.2001. Thus, it is clear that the applicant/accused had transferred an amount of Rs.1, 68, 000/- on 8.1.2001in favour of the complainant M/s. Akash Traders through Bank Draft, thus, in transaction whatever delay was made in returning back the amount of bank draft that has been committed due to proceedings relating to payment being done due to banking process and looking to the aforesaid facts it becomes clear that on the side of applicant/accused there was no intention of criminal misappropriation and, thus, there is no appropriate basis to initiate any action against the accused. Therefore, under Section 245(2) Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 the proceedings of the case are terminated and the accused is released.\" \n10. A revision application was filed thereagainst by the complainant which, by reason of an order dated 5.6.2002, was allowed, stating :\n \"It is clear from the perusal of the file that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate in the impugned order dated 13.12.2001 has not granted any opportunity of adducing the evidences in detail under the provisions of Section 244 Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 but by not granting any opportunity to adduce the evidences by the complainant under Section 244 Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has passed the impugned order under the provisions of Section 245(2) Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which is not legal and proper. Under the provisions of Section 244 Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973the complainant must be granted opportunity of filing the evidences in detail as per the law. Under the above, provisions, the charges are framed against the accused persons after the evidences are taken on record otherwise not, that is to say, passing of order under Section 245 Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 would be proper and justifiable.\" \n11. An application filed by the appellant before the High Court in terms of Section 482 of the Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was dismissed by the High Court by reason of the impugned judgment, stating :\n \"From the perusal of the allegations made against the applicants and from the perusal of the impugned order, it appears that prima facie offence is made out against the applicant and there is no procedural mistake in taking cognizance and summoning the applicants, therefore, the prayer for quashing the impugned orders dated 8.5.2001 passed by the learned Magistrate, Azamgarh and 5.6.2002 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.2, Azamgarh is refused.\nThe interim stay order dated 3.7.2002 is vacated.\nAccordingly, this application is dismissed.\" \n12. The short question which arises for consideration is as to whether the complaint petition, even if given face value and taken to be correct in its entirety, disclosed an offence as against the appellant under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.\n13. Section 405 defines 'criminal breach of trust' to mean :\n Section 405.'Criminal breach of trust'\nWhoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits \"criminal breach of trust\".\" \n14. Appellant No.1 is the Managing Director of the Company. Respondent No.3 was its General Manager. Indisputably, the company is a juristic person. The demand drafts were issued in the name of the company. The company was not made an accused. The dealership agreement was by and between M/s. Akash Traders and the company.\n15. Mr. Pramod Swarup, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Responent No.2, in support of the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate as also the High Court, submitted that as, prima facie, the appellant was in charge of and was in control of the business of the company, he would be deemed to be liable for the offence committed by the company.\n16. Indian Penal Code, 1860, save and except some provisions specifically providing therefor, does not contemplate any vicarious liability on the part of a party who is not charged directly for commission of an offence.\n17. A criminal breach of trust is an offence committed by a person to whom the property is entrusted.\n18. Ingredients of the offence under Section 406 are :\n \"(1) a person should have been entrusted with property, or entrusted with dominion over property;\n(2) that person should dishonestly misappropriate or convert to his own use that property, or dishonestly use or dispose of that property or willfully suffer any other person to do so;\n(3) that such misappropriation, conversion, use or disposal should be in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract which the person has made, touching the discharge of such trust.\" \n19. As, admittedly,drafts were drawn in the name of the company, even if appellant was its Managing Director, he cannot be said to have committed an offence under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. If and when a statute contemplates creation of such a legal fiction, it provides specifically therefor. In absence of any provision laid down under the statute, a Director of a company or an employee cannot be held to be vicariously liable for any offence committed by the company itself.{See Sabitha Ramamurthy and Anr. v. R.B.S. Channabasavaradhya [(2006) 10 SCC 581]} .\n20. We may, in this regard, notice that the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 etc. have created such vicarious liability. It is interesting to note that Section 14A of the 1952 Act specifically creates an offence of criminal breach of trust in respect of the amount deducted from the employees by the company. In terms of the explanations appended to Section 405 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, a legal fiction has been created to the effect that the employer shall be deemed to have committed an offence of criminal breach of trust. Whereas a person in charge of the affairs of the company and in control thereof has been made vicariously liable for the offence committed by the company along with the company but even in a case falling under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 vicarious liability has been held to be not extendable to the Directors or officers of the company. {See Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat and Ors. [2007 (11) SCALE 318]} .\n21. The High Court, therefore, committed a manifest error in passing the impugned judgment.\n22. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. Respondent No.2 is liable to bear the costs of the appellant for causing harassment to him which is quantified at Rs.1, 00, 000/- (Rupees one lac only).",
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      "case_title": "SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 317 of 1976. Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated the 13th February, 1976 of the Jammu &Kashmir High Court in Election Petition No. 2 of 1972. | Bashir Ahmed Magrey v. Ghulam Quadir Mir And Others | 02/12/1976",
      "case_details": "Case: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 317 of 1976. Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated the 13th February, 1976 of the Jammu &Kashmir High Court in Election Petition No. 2 of 1972. | Bashir Ahmed Magrey v. Ghulam Quadir Mir And Others",
      "generated_outcome": "DISMISSED",
      "reference_outcome": "ALLOWED",
      "case_record": "In March 1972, the appellant was declared elected to the J&K State Legislative Assembly from Rajpura constituency with 9,079 votes, while Respondent No. 1 secured 8,248 votes. Respondent No. 1 filed an election petition seeking to void the appellant's election and declare himself duly elected. The petition alleged improper rejection of votes cast for Respondent No. 1 and improper reception of votes for the appellant at various polling stations. The High Court declared the appellant's election void, finding 59 votes for Respondent No. 1 improperly rejected and 901 votes improperly polled (351 for appellant, 550 unclear beneficiaries). The High Court did not declare Respondent No. 1 elected. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, and Respondent No. 1 filed cross-objections. The Supreme Court ordered its Registrar to scrutinize the disputed ballot papers to ascertain beneficiaries.",
      "generated_judgment": "Based on the given facts, the appeal should be **DISMISSED**. Here’s the detailed reasoning:\n\n1. **Initial Election Outcome**: In March 1972, the appellant was declared elected to the J&K State Legislative Assembly from Rajpura constituency with 9,079 votes, while Respondent No. 1 secured 8,248 votes. This establishes the initial electoral outcome.\n\n2. **Election Petition**: Respondent No. 1 filed an election petition alleging improper rejection of votes and improper reception of votes at various polling stations. This led to a dispute over the election results.\n\n3. **High Court Decision**: The High Court, after considering the evidence and arguments, declared the appellant's election void. The reasons provided were that 59 votes for Respondent No. 1 were improperly rejected, and 901 votes were improperly polled (351 for the appellant and 550 unclear beneficiaries). Importantly, the High Court did not declare Respondent No. 1 as the duly elected candidate.\n\n4. **Supreme Court Order**: The Supreme Court ordered its Registrar to scrutinize the disputed ballot papers to ascertain the beneficiaries. This indicates that the Supreme Court acknowledged the need for further scrutiny but did not directly overturn the High Court's decision.\n\n5. **Appeal and Cross-Objections**: The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, and Respondent No. 1 filed cross-objections. However, the facts do not indicate that these appeals and objections have resulted in a change in the High Court's decision.\n\n6. **Conclusion**: Given that the High Court declared the appellant's election void and did not declare Respondent No. 1 as the duly elected candidate, and the Supreme Court’s order for further scrutiny does not imply a change in the High Court's decision, the appeal should be dismissed.\n\nTherefore, the appeal is **DISMISSED**.",
      "reference_judgment": "The Judgment was delivered by\nKHANNA, J. During the general elections held in March 1972 five candidates, namely, the appellant and respondents No. 1 to 4, contested tile election for the Jammu &amp;Kashmir State Legislative Assembly from Rajpura constituency. There was a sixth candidate, namely, Mohamed Abdullah Sheikh, respondent No. 5, but his nomination paper was rejected. The appellant secured 9, 079 votes and was declared elected. Respondent No. 1 was the nearest rival and he secured 8, 248 votes. Respondents 2 to 4 secured 1, 340, 1, 126 and 1, 217 votes respective ly. 2, 034 votes were declared invalid at the time of counting. After the declaration of the result of the election, respondent No. 1 filed election petition out of which the present appeal arises. Two prayers were made in the election petition: (1) that the election of the appellant be declared to be void; and (2) that respondent No. 1 be declared to have been duly elected. The High Court accepted the first prayer and declared the e lection of the appellant to be void. The second prayer that respondent No. 1 be declared to have been duly elected was not granted. The present appeal has been filed by the appellant against the judgment of the High Court insofar as it has declared his election to be void. Cross-objections have been filed by respondent No. 1 and it has been prayed on his behalf that he be declared to have been duly elected.\nThe elect ion petition was founded on the following three grounds:\n(1 ) Improper rejection of the nomination paper of respondent No. 5.\n(2) Improper rejection of the votes which had been cast in favour of respondent No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as the respondent); and\n(3) Improper reception of the votes in favour of the appellant on the day of polling at the following polling stations:1. Lassipora--Polling station No. 49\n2. Nowpora Pain--Polling station No. 50\n2 99\n3. Drubgham-B--Polling station No. 24 4.\nDrubgham-A--Polling station No. 23\n4. Drugbham-A--Polling station No.23\n5. Aliaipora--Polling station No. 51\n6. Chandgham--Polling station No. 46\n7. Arihal--Polling station No. 35, and\n8. Tikan Batapora--Polling station No. 26.\nAccording to the case of the respondent as set up in the election petition, the result of the election was materially affected because of the improper rejection at the time of counting of the votes which had been cast in his favour and by the improper reception of t he votes in favour of the appellant on the day of polling. Giving particulars in respect of the third ground, namely, that there was improper reception of votes in favour of the appellant on the day of polling, th e respondent stated that the total number of votes at Lassipura (polling station No. 49) was 824. All those votes were shown to have ben polled, although 162 voters registered in that area did not cast their votes. The figure of 162 included 16 persons who were dead before the date of polling. Electoral numbers of those 162 voters, including 16 dead persons, were also mentioned in the petition. The votes of 162 persons were thus stated to have been improperly received. Similar allegations were made in respect of Nowpora Pain (polling station No. 50), Drubgham B (polling station No. 24), Drubgham A (polling station No. 23), Alaipora (polli ng station No. 51), Chandgam (polling station. No. 46), Arihal (polling station No. 35) and Tikan Batapora (polling station No. 26).\nWe may add at this stage that the first ground, namely, that relating to the improper rejection of the nomination paper of respondent No. 5, was not pressed at the trial of the election petition, and as such no 1onger survives.The election petition was resisted by the appellant and he denied the various allegations made by the respondent. He also pleaded that the allegations in the election petition were vague, indefinite and uncertain. Objection was also raised regarding the maintainability of the petition on the grounds that it had not been properly verified and there war misjoinder of parties.\nThe petition was initially heard by Wasi-ud-Din J. It thereafter came up for hearing before Jalal-ud-Din J. Ultimat ely, it came up for hearing before Mufti Baha-ud-Din Farooqi J. who finally decided the petition and gave the judgment under appeal.\nDuring the pendency of the petition, orders were made on three occasions for inspection of the ballot papers. The first order was made by Wasi-ud-Din J. on August 13, 1973. The learned Judge, considered the prayer for inspection of ballot papers under three heads:\n\"(1) Request for inspection of ballot papers which were rejected at the time of counting;\n(2) Request for inspection a ballot paper account (Form No. 16) in respect of the various polling stations and of the ballot papers relevant thereto;\n(3) Request for inspection of marked copies of electoral rolls at polling stations Lassipora, Drubgham A &amp;B, Achan, Chandgham, Afthal, Nowpora Pain, Tikam Batopora, Alaipora.\"\nPrayer under the first and third heads was rejected but that under the second head was allowed to the extent of the inspection of form No. 16 in respect of Lassipora, Nowpora Pain, Drubgham B, Drubgham A, Alaipora, Chandgham, Arihal and Tikan Batopora polling stations. Inspection of a few ballot papers, of which the numbers were specified, relating to some of the polling stations was allowed. On November 2, 1973 the learned Judge amplified his previous orders in these words: \"My order as it stands should be read to Clearly signify which I am amplifying here also that the sorting of the ballot papers will be done by the Deputy Registrar but in the presence of the learned counsel for both the parties. The learned counsel for the parties will not be allowed to handle the ballot papers until they are sorted out by the Deputy Registrar and after this is done, the respective learned counsel for the parties can handle and inspect the ballot papers.\"\nOn June 13, 1974 the learned Judge, on an ap plication made by the respondent, allowed inspection of ballot papers of two more polling stations, viz., Chandgham and Alaipora. The respondent also made prayer for leave to inspect the ballot papers of other polling stations, but the prayer in that behalf was rejected. The following directions were further issued by the learned Judge:\n\"The petitioner has also made a prayer that the Deputy Registrar be given directions to ascertain if the 34 series of two inspected polling stations Nos. 24 and 50 are not mixed in the fourth trunk which has been produced. The Deputy Registrar will of course see to this and such other discrepancies which may come to his notice, he will make a separate note and he will also make a note on the envelope if he found the discrepancy.\"\nAfter Wasi-ud-Din J. relinquished his office, the case was assigned to Jalal-ud-Din J. An application was then made on July 29, 1974 by the respondent seeking permission to inspect ballot papers and other documents pertaining to the various polling stations, This application was disposed of by Jalal-ud-Din J. as per order dated January 6, 1975 in these words:\n\"I, therefore, allow the application of the petitioner for inspection of ballot papers in respect of four veiling stations, namely, 26 Tikan Batapora from serial No. 0150 51 to 15700, 35 Arihal-A from serial No. 020901 to 021550, 49 Lassipora from serial No. 031051 to 031900, 23 Drubgham from serial No. 013201 to 013800 and also the counterfoils of 15 Nowpora Pain, 24 Drubgham B. 46 Chandgham and 51 Alaipora, the polling stations of which the ballot papers have already been inspected by the petitioner. 1, however, do not accede to the request of the petitioner to inspect electoral roll and counterfoils and from 16 of the entire constituency. The inspection as ordered will be held by and in presence of the counsel for the parties. But the Deputy Registrar will see that neither the candidate nor their counsel shall, handle the record. The Deputy Registrar will further make a separate note and record of the discrepancies found, if any. The inspection will be held during vacation on a date to be fixed by the Deputy Registrar.\" In the judgment under appeal the learned Judge held that 59 votes validly polled in favour of the respondent were improperly rejected at the time of counting. It was further found that 901 votes, including 28 votes of dead voters, were improperly polled.. Out of 901 votes, 351 votes were found to have been polled in favour of the appellant. Details of those 351 votes were as under:\nAlaipora polling station No. 51\n200\nArihal polling station No. 35\n51\nTakin Batapora P.S. No. 26 100\nRegarding the remaining 550 votes, the learned Judge found that the evidence was not clear, and observed as under:\n\"The evidence, however, is not clear as regards the fate of the remaining 550 such votes. But having regard to overall circumstances of the case it will not be unreasonable to conclude that respondent No. 1 was the greatest beneficiary of these 550 votes although the precise number by which he was benefited out of those votes may not be easily ascertainable. To these circumstances may be added the circumstance that 59 votes validly polled in favour of the petitioner were improperly rejected at the time o f counting, as held by me before. The cumulative effect of these circumstances is that the respondent No. 1 was able to get an undue advantage of no less magnitude and may be, even greater than that reflected in his declared success over the petitioner by 831 votes. In this view it must be held that the result of the election, insofar as respondent No. 1 is concerned, was materially affected by the improper rejection of votes in favour of the petitioner at the time of counting and the improper reception of votes on the day of poll and that his election must be declared to be void. But that should not entitle the petitioner to a declaration that he was duly elected as the total number of the votes improperly received in favour of respondent No. 1 on the date of poll could not be exactly worked out. The prayer for such declaration must be rejected.\" In the result, the election of the appellant was declared to be void. The prayer of the respondent for a declaration that he be declared to have been elected was rejected.\nWhen this appeal came up for hearing before this Court on September 3, 1976, we passed an order wherein we referred to the finding of the High Court that it cannot be said as to who was the beneficiary of the 550 votes which were found to have been improperly polled. We thereafter stated in that order:\n\"In our opinion, it is necessary to find out as a result of further inspection as to how many d those 550 votes were in favour of the appellant, and how many, in favour of respondent No. 1 and the other contesting candidates. For this purpose, we depute the Registrar (Judicial) of this Court to make an inspection in the presence of the parties and their counsel and submit a report to this Court within six weeks from today. The Registrar may also have to locate the 55 ballot papers referred to in the judgment of the High Court at pages 31-51 of the cyclostyled judgment. He may also, if necessary, refer to the reports of the Deputy Registrar of the High Court. The appeal should be put up for further hearing as soon as the report is ready.\"\nThe Registrar of this Court thereafter submitted his report dated September 15, 1976. The Registrar dealt with most of the matters but in respect of some of the matters he sought further directions. Necessary directions were thereafter issued by this Court on September 17, 1976. As a result of those directions, the Registrar had to scrutinise 571 ballot papers in all instead of 550 votes. The final report of the Registrar is dated September 24, 1976. The result of the reports of the Registrar taken along with the findings of the High Court may be set out:(1) Votes found by the High Court to have been improperly received in favour of the appellant\n351\n(2) Votes which were found to have been improperly received in favour of the appellant as per the first report of the Registrar\n286\n(3) Votes which were found to have been improperly received in favour of the appellant as per the second report of Registrar.\n141\nTotal\n778\n(4) Total number of votes polled by the appellant as per the results of the election\n9, 079\n(5) Valid votes polled by the appellant\n9, 079-778=8301\n(6) Votes which were found to have been improperly received in favour of the respondent as per the first report\n25\n(7) Votes which were found to have been improperly received in favour of the respondent as per the second report\n19\nTotal\n44\n(8) Total votes polled by the respondent as per the result of the election\n8, 248\n(9) Votes validly polled in favour of the respondent which were found by the High Court to have been improperly rejected at the time of counting\n59\n(10) Total number of votes thus polled by the respondent\n8, 248+59=8, 307\n(11) Valid votes polled by the respondent\n8, 307- 44=8, 263\n(12) Excess of votes validity polled in favour of the appellant over those of of the respondent.\n38\nSome votes were found by the Registrar to have been improperly received in favour of respondents 2 to 4, but it is not necessary to set out those votes.\nIn appeal before us Mr. Phadke on behalf of the appellant has urged that in view of the final picture as it emerges from the reports of the Registrar, the appeal should be allowed and the election petition be dismissed as the appellant secured more valid votes than the respondent. The above stand has been controverted by the respondent, who has argued the case in person. At an earlier hearing we requested Mr. Gambhir to argue the case amicus curiae in view of the fact that the respondent was not represented by counsel. The respondent thereafter stated that he Would like the matter to be argued by counsel of his own choice. Mr. Shaukat Hussain thereafter appeared on behalf of the respondent. At the final hearing the respondent, as mentioned above, chose to argue the case in person.Perusal of the election petition filed by the respondent shows that apart from the ground not subsequently pressed of the improper rejection of the nomination paper of respondent No. 5, the only ground on which the respondent challenged. the election of the appellant was the improper reception of votes in favour of the appellant and the improper rejection of the votes cast in favour of the respondent. This ground is based upon sub-clause (iii) of clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 108 of the Jammu and Kashmir Representation of the People Act, 1957 (Act 4 of 1957) corresponding to sub -clause (iii) of clause (d) of sub- section (1) of section 100 of the Representation of the People, Act 1951 fact 43 of 1951). According to the above provision, if the High Court is of the opinion that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns a returned candidate, has been materially affected by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote of the reception of any vote which is void, the High Court shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void. Keeping the above provision in view, we may now turn to the facts of the present case. The High Court found that 351 votes had been improperly received in favour of the appellant. The High Court further found that 59 votes which had been validly polled in favour of the, respondent were improperly rejected at the time of counting. In addition to. that, the High Court found that 550 votes had been improperly received, but it was not possible on the material on record to find out as to who was the beneficiary of those votes. The High Court all the same was inclined to believe that the appellant must have been the major beneficiary of those 550 votes. This necessarily involved an element of surmise and conjecture. To find out the exact position, we directed the Registrar of this Court to scrutinise the 550 ballot papers in question and to make a report as to how many of those votes were cast in favour of the appellant and how many in favour of the respondent and the other candidates. The Registrar thereafter submitted reports and we have already set out the outcome of those reports taken along with the findings of the High Court. It would appear from the figures set out above that, excluding all the votes which were found to have been improperly received by the appellant and also giving credit to the respondent for 59 votes which were found by the High Court to have been improperly rejected at that time of counting, the net result still is that the appellant has a lead of 38 votes over the respondent. There is, therefore, no escape from the conclusion that the election of tile appellant should be upheld. In an election petition founded upon the ground that the result of the election was materially affected by the improper reception or rejection of votes, the court has first to decide whether certain ballot papers were improperly received or were improperly rejected. Once , that controversy is resolved, the rest is purely a matter of arithmetical calculation. If the result of arithmetical calculation is that the returned candidate has still a lead over his nearest rival , his election would not be declared to be void on the ground of improper reception or improper rejection of votes. Improper reception or improper rejection of votes can result in invalidating an election only if such improper reception or improper rejection materially affects the result of the election.In the course of his arguments, the respondent has submitted that a number of improprieties were committed in the con duct of election and therefore the election of the appellant be declared to be void. Although it does appear from the material on record to which our attention was invited by the respondent that irregularities were commit ted in the conduct of the election, the respondent cannot derive any benefit on that account. As already mentioned, the respondent sought to challenge the election of the appellant only on the ground of improper reception and improper rejection of certain votes. The election of the appellant was not challenged on the ground of any irregular- ity or non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitu- tion or of the R epresentation of the People Act or of any rules or orders made thereunder. Nor was the election of the appellant assailed on the ground of being vitiated by corrupt practice. As it is not permissible to widen the scope of an election petition beyond the grounds actually set up in the election petition, the respondent cannot seek relief on grounds which were not taken by him in the elec- tion petition.\nIt has also been urged by the respondent that the number of votes which were improperly received was larger than that found by the High Court. Nothing cogent has, however, been brought to our notice in support of the above sub mission to induce us to interfere with the finding of the High Court in, this respect.\nLastly, the respondent submits that 153 ballot papers of Lassipora polling station cast in favour of the appellant should be rejected as they bore the initials and not the full signatures of the presiding officer. Our attention in this respect is invited to clause (h) of rule 56(2) of the Jammu and Kashmir Conduct of Election Rules, 1965, according to which the returning officer at the time of counting shall reject a ballot paper if it does not bear both the mark and the signatures which it should have borne under the provisions of sub-rule (1) of rule 3 8. According to sub-rule (1 ) of rule 3 8, every ballot paper shall before issue to elector, be stamped by such distinguishing mark as the Election Commission may direct, and be signed in full on its back by the presiding officer. It is not disputed that the ballot papers in question bore the distinguishing mark. The only contention of the respondent, as already mentioned, is that the ballot papers in question b ore the initials and not the full signatures of the presiding officer. In this respect we find that no express ground on that score was set up by the respondent in the election petition. This apart, we that the matter is covered by the first proviso to sub-rule (2) of rule 56 which reads as under; \"Provided that where the returning officer is satisfied that any such defect as is mentioned in clause (g) or clause (h) has been caused by any mistake or failure on the part of a presiding officer or polling officer, the ballot paper shall not be rejected merely on the ground of such defect.\"\nThe above proviso which is based upon the principle that a vote validly cast should not be excluded from consideration because of the mistake or omission of the presiding or polling officer, makes it plain that where the returning officer is satisfied that any defect mentioned in clause (h) has been caused by the mistake or failure on the part of a presiding officer or polling officer, the ballot paper shall not be rejected merely on the ground of such defect. The fact that the returning officer in the present case did not reject the ballot papers in question on the ground that they bore only the initials and not the full signatures of the presiding officer would go to show that the returning officer was satisfied that the alleged defect was caused by the mistake or failure on the part of the presiding officer: Ther e can indeed be hardly any doubt on the point that the defect referred to by the respondent occurred because of the mistake or failure of the presiding officer. We, therefore, see no cogent ground to exclude from consideration 153 ballot papers polled in favour of the appellant.\nBefore we conclude, we may observe that some other contentions were also advanced on behalf of the appellant. In view of the fact that the appeal in any case has to be allowed because of the arithmetical calculations referred to above, it is not necessary to go into those contentions.\nAs a result of the above, we accept the appeal, set aside the judgment of , the High Court and dismiss the election petition. Cross objections filed by the respondent are dismissed. Looking to all the facts, we leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout.\n",
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          "value": "Missing fact",
          "html": "<div class='root-option root-option-new-group'><span class='root-group'>INPUT ERROR</span><span class='root-leaf'>Missing fact</span></div>"
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          "value": "Incorrect fact",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>INPUT ERROR</span><span class='root-leaf'>Incorrect fact</span></div>"
        },
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          "value": "Fabricated fact in case record",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>INPUT ERROR</span><span class='root-leaf'>Fabricated fact in case record</span></div>"
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        {
          "value": "Fabricated fact in reasoning",
          "html": "<div class='root-option root-option-new-group'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Facts</span><span class='root-leaf'>Fabricated fact in reasoning</span></div>"
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          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Facts</span><span class='root-leaf'>Fact-weighing error</span></div>"
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        {
          "value": "Fact omission in reasoning",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Facts</span><span class='root-leaf'>Fact omission in reasoning</span></div>"
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        {
          "value": "Issue omission",
          "html": "<div class='root-option root-option-new-group'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Issues</span><span class='root-leaf'>Issue omission</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Spurious issue",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Issues</span><span class='root-leaf'>Spurious issue</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Issue misframing",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Issues</span><span class='root-leaf'>Issue misframing</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Issue misprioritisation",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Issues</span><span class='root-leaf'>Issue misprioritisation</span></div>"
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        {
          "value": "Wrong rule source",
          "html": "<div class='root-option root-option-new-group'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Wrong rule source</span></div>"
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        {
          "value": "Using outdated / overruled rule",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Using outdated / overruled rule</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Rule misinterpretation",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Rule misinterpretation</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Rule misapplication",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Rule misapplication</span></div>"
        },
        {
          "value": "Wrong legal test / threshold",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Wrong legal test / threshold</span></div>"
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        {
          "value": "Missed exception / qualification",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Missed exception / qualification</span></div>"
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          "value": "Limitation / time-bar error",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Limitation / time-bar error</span></div>"
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          "value": "Precedent context mismatch",
          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Precedent context mismatch</span></div>"
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          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Rules</span><span class='root-leaf'>Rule interaction error</span></div>"
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          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Analysis</span><span class='root-leaf'>Logical fallacy / leap in logic</span></div>"
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          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Analysis</span><span class='root-leaf'>Other reasoning error</span></div>"
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          "html": "<div class='root-option'><span class='root-group'>MODEL ERROR: Conclusion</span><span class='root-leaf'>Discretionary original judgment</span></div>"
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      "judgment_date": "02/12/1976",
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